Order — ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021
Date: 2018-12-17
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Grand Chamber
Procedure: Application for interim measures - successful;Action for failure to fulfil obligations
Origin: Poland

summary form, the legal and factual particulars on which those complaints are based. As regards those legal particulars, it is not sufficient for the Commission, in order to claim that the defendant Member State has not complied with a provision of EU law, merely to cite that provision in the section of the reasoned opinion or application which covers the legal context and which is purely descriptive and lacking of any explanatory character. (46) 67. The Commission has failed to put forward legal particulars concerning the application of Article 47 of the Charter to the contested measures independently of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and how they implement EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Its complaints should therefore be rejected as inadmissible as far as they are based on Article 47 of the Charter. D. Merits of the action 1. The first complaint 68. By its first complaint, the Commission alleges that by lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court judges appointed to that court before 3 April 2018 when the Law on the Supreme Court entered into force, Articles 37(1) and 111(1) and (1a) of that law violate the principle of irremovability of judges. The Commission bases this claim on the pre-term removal of over one third of the Supreme Court judges in office and on the lack of transitory measures. 69. Poland argues that the Commission has not demonstrated that the contested measures violate that principle, taking account of the limited number of judges affected and their objective of aligning the retirement age of the Supreme Court judges with the general retirement age. It also refers to guarantees of independence inherent in its constitution. 70. The Court has held, with regard to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that protection against removal from office of the members of the body concerned is one of the guarantees essential to judicial independence. (47) Indeed, protection against removal from office (irremovability) ‘is the basis and the reflection of judicial independence and means that judges cannot be dismissed, suspended, moved or retired except on grounds, and subject to the safeguards, provided by law’. (48) 71. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated the circumstances in which removal of a judge from office violates the independence and impartiality of a judge under Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The objective element of impartiality protected by that article requires objective assessment of whether the tribunal itself, and among other aspects its composition, offers sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality. Appearances are of a certain importance, so that ‘justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done’. What is at stake is the confidence which courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public. (49) Those principles form a source of inspiration for principles of EU law which are applicable, at minimum, when the Commission, in Article 258 TFEU proceedings, alleges a breach of the rule of law as protected by Article 2 TEU and which is specifically expressed in Article 19 TEU. (50) 72. The irremovability of judges, along with security of tenure, are also recognised as fundamental guarantees of judicial independence in guidelines (51) issued by European and international bodies relating to judicial independence. (52) In particular, judges should have a guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, and can be subject to suspension or removal from office in individual cases only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour rendering them unfit for office. Early retirement should be possible only at the request of the judge concerned or on medical grounds, and any changes to the obligatory retirement age must not have retroactive effect. 73. In the present case, the Commission has sufficiently demonstrated that the contested measures violate the principle of irremovability of judges, whose observance is necessary to meet the requirements of effective judicial protection under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. (53) 74. The circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those which gave rise to the Court’s judgment in ASJP. (54) In that judgment, the Court ruled that the salary-reduction measures in question did not impair the judicial independence of the national court concerned based on the following circumstances: first, those measures were adopted because of the overriding need to remove the excessive budget deficit of the Member State in the context of an EU programme of financial assistance, and provided for a limited reduction of the amount of remuneration; second, they applied widely to various employees in the public sector, including representatives of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and thus could not be perceived as being specifically adopted in respect of the members of that court; and third, they were temporary in nature, as they were abolished over a period of 2 years. 75. A close reading of that judgment indicates that the Court took account of several relevant circumstances in its assessment and, in particular, the limited impact and general scope of the measures as not specifically targeted at the judiciary. It does not follow from ASJP that provisions applicable to judges related to general policies at the national level are not contrary to the principle of judicial independence, but rather that the Court’s assessment depends on the circumstances of the case. 76. In this case, the Commission has shown that the contested measures, first, have a considerable impact on the composition of the Supreme Court because they affect 27 out of 72 judges; second, constitute specific legislation adopted in respect of members of the Supreme Court; and third, are not envisaged to be temporary. In addition to this, a sudden and unforeseen removal of a large number of judges inevitably creates difficulties in terms of public confidence. It is principally for this reason that a transitional arrangement, securing continuity of the court, is needed. 77. I am not persuaded by Poland’s argument that, as regards judges appointed under a previous regime providing for the lower retirement age of 65, the principle of irremovability of judges is not impaired. As the Commission indicates, this disregards the fact that their term was extended to the retirement age of 70 by the 2002 Law on the Supreme Court and then terminated prematurely by the contested measures. 78. Moreover, although the contested measures were applicable for a period of about nine months, from 3 April 2018 to 1 January 2019 at which point the Law of 21 November 2018 entered into force, there is no indication at the time that they were passed that those measures were intended to be temporary. The adoption of the Law of 21 November 2018 apparently stemmed from the Court’s order for interim measures (see points 16 to 21 of this Opinion). (55) 79. Even if, as argued by Poland, it is considered that the objective of the contested measures is to align the retirement age of Supreme Court judges with the general retirement age, it is not disputed that those measures were applied retroactively to all judges in office without any safeguards in place by way of appropriate measures to guarantee the irremovability of judges. As illustrated by the Court’s case-law, while the Member States have competence to adjust the retirement ages of judges in view of societal and economic changes, they must do so without compromising the independence and irremovability of judges in violation of their obligations under EU law. 80. In particular, Commission v Hungary (56) concerned infringement proceedings for Hungary’s failure to fulfil obligations under Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 by adopting measures which lowered the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries from 70 to 62 years of age. The Court held that the measures concerned gave rise to a difference in treatment based directly on age, and then assessed whether they could be justified by a legitimate aim and were proportionate pursuant to Article 6(1) of that directive. On that basis, the Court, drawing from its previous case-law including Fuchs and Köhler, (57) held that the objectives put forward by Hungary which included standardising the age limit for compulsory retirement in the public sector were legitimate, but found the measures disproportionate. 81. By comparison, Commission v Hungary (58) involved a failure to fulfil obligations under Directive 95/46/EC (59) on the grounds that Hungary prematurely terminated the term served by the data protection supervisor and thereby compromised his independence in breach of Article 28(1) of that directive. In its judgment, the Court reiterated that if it were permissible for a Member State to compel a supervisory authority to vacate office before serving the full term, the threat of such premature termination could lead it to enter into a form of ‘prior compliance’ with the political authority incompatible with the requirement of independence. The Court rejected Hungary’s argument that institutional changes to the system of data protection were an objective reason justifying the premature termination, underlining that such changes must be organised to meet the requirement of independence laid down in EU law, and although Member States are free to adopt or amend the institutional model, they must ensure that the independence of the authority is not compromised. 82. As illustrated by the foregoing case of Commission v Hungary, (60) involving the retirement age of judges, along with Fuchs and Köhler, the Court has deemed legitimate certain objectives relating to the alignment of retirement age within the specific framework set out in Directive 2000/78 in respect of the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of age. However, in Commission v Hungary, (61) involving the pre-term removal of the data protection supervisor, the Court did not allow such objectives to diminish the independence of national supervisory authorities under EU law. That reasoning is just as compelling in the case of the independence of judges. It may also be inferred from the Court’s consideration of judicial independence as ‘essential’ to effective judicial protection under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. (62) 83. In light of the foregoing reasons, the first complaint raised by the Commission should be considered to be well founded. 2. The second complaint 84. By its second complaint, the Commission alleges that Articles 37(1) to (4) and 111(1) and (1a) of the Law on the Supreme Court and the Amending Law of 10 May 2018 violate the principle of judicial independence because the President of the Republic’s discretion to extend the active mandate of Supreme Court judges upon reaching the lowered retirement age allows him to exert influence on the Supreme Court and its judges. The Commission bases its claim primarily on the grounds that the President of the Republic’s decision is not subject to binding criteria or judicial review, and his duty to request an opinion of the NCJ does not eliminate his excessive discretion since that opinion is linked to general criteria and is not binding on him. 85. Poland contends that no violation of judicial independence is made out, taking into account, in particular, the role of the President of the Republic as guardian of the Polish constitution and the system of guarantees of judicial independence in Polish law. 86. According to the requirements of judicial independence which the Member States must meet under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body concerned exercises its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions. (63) 87. Those requirements represent the external aspect of the principle of judicial independence, which the Court has underlined, require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order ‘to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it’. (64) 88. I also refer to the principles elaborated above by the European Court of Human Rights that the objective element of the principle of judicial independence requires sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the body’s independence and impartiality and ensure the appearance of independence (see point 71 of this Opinion). 89. In the present case, the Commission has sufficiently demonstrated that the contested measures violate the requirements of judicial independence, since they are liable to expose the Supreme Court and its judges to external intervention and pressure from the President of the Republic in the initial extension and renewal of their mandate which impairs the objective independence of that court and influences the judges’ independent judgment and decisions. This is so, especially given that the requirement to apply to the President of the Republic for the extension of retirement age is accompanied by a reduction in the retirement age. (65) 90. Poland has acknowledged that the absence of authorisation by the President of the Republic to extend the term of office of a Supreme Court judge beyond the retirement age is not subject to judicial review. 91. Irrespective of Poland’s arguments as to the prerogatives of the President under the Polish constitution, the system of guarantees of judicial independence enshrined in Polish law and the criteria taken into account by the NCJ in formulating its opinion as laid down in Article 37(1b) of the Law on the Supreme Court, those arguments are not sufficient to dispel the impression of the lack of objective independence of the Supreme Court resulting from the contested measures and, in particular, from the lack of binding criteria provided in those measures as indicated by the Commission. 92. With regard to the role of the NCJ, it is undisputed that its opinion is not binding. Irrespective of the composition of the NCJ, its role in no way dispels the impression of the inordinate breadth of power of the President of the Republic. 93. Moreover, Poland’s arguments based on the laws of the other Member States and the Court of Justice of the EU fail to convince. As indicated by the Commission, the regimes of other Member States are not comparable to the situation in Poland, as they operate in a different legal, political and social context, and in any event, this has no bearing on Poland’s failure to fulfil obligations. The reference to the Court of Justice of the EU is also irrelevant, there being no question of alteration to rules on the retirement age of judges of this Court and, moreover, is inapposite, as it is situated at the supranational level entailing a different regime than the classic tripartite separation of powers in the Member States. (66) 94. In light of the foregoing reasons, the second complaint raised by the Commission should be considered well founded. 95. It follows from all of the foregoing that the Court should declare that, by lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court judges appointed to that court before 3 April 2018 and granting the President of the Republic discretion to extend the active mandate of Supreme Court judges, the Republic of Poland has violated the principles of irremovability and independence of judges and thereby failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. VII. Costs 96. Pursuant to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 97. According to my proposed solution, although the Commission’s complaints should be rejected as inadmissible as far as they are based on Article 47 of the Charter, the Commission is successful on both complaints as far as they are based on the second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Since the Commission has applied for costs and the Republic of Poland has been unsuccessful, the Republic of Poland should be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the Commission. 98. In accordance with Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, under which Member States which intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs, Hungary should be ordered to bear its own costs. VIII. Conclusion 99. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should: (1) declare that by lowering the retirement age of the judges of the Supreme Court and applying it to judges appointed to that court before 3 April 2018, and by granting the President of the Republic the discretion to extend the period of judicial activity of Supreme Court judges, the Republic of Poland failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU; (2) dismiss the action as to the remainder; (3) order the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of the Commission; (4) order Hungary to bear its own costs. 1 Original language: English. 2 In addition to the present case, there are several other cases pending before the Court relating to the reform of the Polish judiciary, including an infringement action (C‑192/18) and requests for preliminary rulings submitted by the Polish Supreme Court (C‑522/18, C‑537/18, C‑585/18, C‑624/18, C‑625/18 and C‑668/18), the Polish Supreme Administrative Court (C‑824/18) and Polish lower courts (C‑558/18, C‑563/18 and C‑623/18). It should be noted that, if, in its judgment of 6 November 2012, Commission v Hungary, C‑286/12, EU:C:2012:687, the Court ruled on the compatibility with EU law of measures lowering the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries, it did so on the basis of a breach of the prohibition on age discrimination in Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16). See point 80 of this Opinion. 3 Commission, Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, COM(2017) 835 final, 20 December 2017. 4 Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 19 October 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, not published, EU:C:2018:852. 5 Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021. 6 Order of the President of the Court of 15 November 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18, EU:C:2018:910. 7 Judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (‘ASJP’), C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, and of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality, C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586. 8 The Commission refers, in particular, to Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, 17 November 2010 (‘2010 Recommendation’), point 27. 9 Judgment of 27 February 2018, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117. 10 OJ 2016 C 202, p. 312 (‘Protocol No 30’). 11 Poland refers in particular to Article 180(1) and (4) of the Polish constitution. 12 Judgments of 21 July 2011, Fuchs and Köhler, C-159/10 and C-160/10, EU:C:2011:508, and of 6 November 2012, Commission v Hungary, C-286/12, EU:C:2012:687. 13 Poland refers, in particular, to Articles 126, 144(3), point 17, and 179 of the Polish constitution. 14 See judgment of 22 February 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑336/16, EU:C:2018:94, paragraph 47. 15 See judgment of 4 May 2006, Commission v United Kingdom, C-508/03, EU:C:2006:287, paragraph 73. 16 See judgment of 14 April 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-519/03, EU:C:2005:234, paragraph 19. 17 See judgment of 10 April 2008, Commission v Italy, C‑442/06, EU:C:2008:216, paragraph 42. 18 See judgment of 18 July 2007, Commission v Germany, C-503/04, EU:C:2017:432, paragraphs 15 and 16. 19 See the third paragraph of Article 1 TEU; Article 1(2) TFEU. 20 See Craig, P., and De Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 6th ed., OUP, 2015, p. 431. 21 See, in particular, the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU. 22 See Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Commission v Hungary, C‑235/17, EU:C:2018:971, points 64 to 127 and in particular points 66 and 67; Łazowski, A., ‘Decoding a Legal Enigma: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and infringement proceedings’, ERA Forum, Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 573 and 577. See further points 52 to 60 and 65 to 67 of this Opinion. 23 Editorial Comments, ‘Safeguarding EU values in the Member States – Is something finally happening?’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 52, 2015, pp. 619 and 626-627. 24 Reasoned Proposal, note 3, in particular points 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 and recitals 172 and 175. 25 See Closa, C. and Kochenov, D. (Eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, CUP, 2016; Jakab, A. and Kochenov, D. (Eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance, OUP, 2017; ‘Liability of Member States for the Violation of Fundamental Values of the European Union,’ Europarecht Beiheft 1, 2018. 26 See Lenaerts, K., Maselis, I. and Gutman, K., EU Procedural Law, Nowak, J.T., (Ed.), OUP, 2015, pp. 159-161; Prete, L., Infringement Proceedings in EU Law, Kluwer, 2017, pp. 29-34. 27 See Hillion, C., ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’, in Closa and Kochenov, note 25, pp. 59 and 71-74; Hoffmeister, F., ‘Enforcing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Member States: How Far are Rome, Budapest and Bucharest from Brussels?’, in Armin von Bogdandy and Pál Sonnevend (Eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, Hart, 2016, pp. 195 and 205-206. 28 See Schmidt, M. and Bogdanowicz, P., ‘The Infringement Procedure in the Rule of Law Crisis: How to Make Effective Use of Article 258 TFEU’, Common Market Law Review 1061, Vol. 55, 2018, pp. 1069-1073, in particular 1071. 29 See judgments of 14 June 2017, Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, paragraphs 54 and 55, and of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraphs 116 and 117, and Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission, C‑244/16 P, EU:C:2018:177, paragraphs 106 and 107. 30 Judgment of 27 February 2018, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 1, 18, 27 and operative part. 31 Judgment of 27 February 2018, ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 29. 32 See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), Explanation on Article 47, pp. 29 and 30. 33 Judgment of 27 February 2018, ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 35, 41 and 42. 34 Indeed, it is argued in the literature that a Member State’s breach of the values set out in Article 2 TEU can be prosecuted by the Commission under Article 258 TFEU. See Scheppele, K.L., ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions’, in Closa and Kochenov, note 25, p. 105; Waelbroeck, M. and Oliver, P., ‘La crise de l’état de droit dans l’Union europeéenne : que faire ?’, Cahiers de droit européen, 2017, p. 299. 35 See Bonelli, M. and Claes, M., ‘Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary’, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 14, 2018, p. 622; Krajewski, M., Associação Sindical Dos Juízes Portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma,’ European Papers, Vol. 3, 2018, p. 395; Pech, L. and Platon, S., ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue in the ASJP case’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, 2018, p. 1827. 36 Judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, in particular paragraphs 36, 55 and 56. 37 Judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality, C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, in particular paragraphs 48 to 55. 38 See Barents, R., Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts, Breese, H.E. (Ed.), Kluwer, 2016, pp. 112-113. See also Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2017:395, point 41. 39 Judgment of 27 February 2018, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 32, 37 to 41. 40 See, for example, judgment of 20 December 2017, Polkomtel, C‑277/16, EU:C:2017:989. 41 It may be considered that the material scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU does not cover the review of every national measure, however marginal, which relates to the organisation of the judiciary, but rather, is concerned predominantly with objective independence and national measures having a generalised impact on the overall system established by the Member States for ensuring effective judicial protection and the essential requirements thereof. 42 Judgment of 21 December 2011, N.S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 119 and 120. See also Opinions of Advocate General Trstenjak in N.S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:611, points 167 to 171, and of Advocate General Kokott in Bonda, C‑489/10, EU:C:2011:845 points 21 to 23. 43 See Łazowski, note 22, pp. 580-581; Prete, note 26, pp. 74-75. 44 See judgments of 16 May 2017, Berlioz Investment Fund, C-682/15, EU:C:2017:373, paragraph 49, and of 14 June 2017, Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, paragraph 55. 45 See judgment of 13 November 2008, Commission v Poland, C‑227/07, EU:C:2008:620, paragraph 67. 46 See judgment of 29 November 2001, Commission v Italy, C‑202/99, EU:C:2001:646, paragraph 21. 47 Judgments of 27 February 2018, ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 45, and of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 66. 48 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in De Coster, C‑17/00, EU:C:2001:366, point 93. 49 ECtHR, 25 September 2018, Denisov v. Ukraine, ECHR:2018:0925JUD007663911, paragraphs 61 and 63. 50 Similarly, the case-law of the Court on the meaning of ‘independence’ is relevant to the interpretation of Article 19(1) TEU. See, for example, judgment of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraphs 49 to 53. 51 I note that such guidelines are so-called ‘soft law’ or non-binding norms, yet they embody a ‘normative consensus’ of rules and principles shared by the Member States (and other jurisdictions) which provide a useful reference for the Court. See Hoffmann-Riem, W., ‘The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe – Standards and Impact’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, 2014, pp. 579-597. 52 See, for example, Council of Europe, European Charter on the statute of judges, 8-10 July 1998, DAJ/DOC (98) 23, point 3.4; 2010 Recommendation, note 8, points 49 to 52; Council of Europe Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles), 17 November 2010, CCJE (2010)3 Final, point 4; International Bar Association, Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, 1982, point 20; United Nations, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985, points 12 and 18; International Association of Judges, Universal Charter of the Judge, revised 2017, Article 2-2. 53 As indicated by the Commission, the Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) considered that early retirement of the currently sitting judges undermines both their security of tenure and the independence of the Polish Supreme Court in general in its Opinion No 904/2017 of 11 December 2017 on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, CDL-AD(2017)031, point 48. See also, for example, United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on his mission to Poland, 5 April 2018, A/HRC/38/38/Add.1, point 55; Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Opinion on Certain Provisions of the Draft Act on the Supreme Court of Poland (as of 26 September 2017), 13 November 2017, JUD-POL/315/2017, point 112. 54 Judgments of 27 February 2018, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 46 to 51, and of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 67. 55 See European Parliament Study, The EU framework for enforcing the respect of the rule of law and the Union’s fundamental principles and values, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2019, PE 608.856, p. 25. 56 Judgment of 6 November 2012, C‑286/12, EU:C:2012:687, paragraphs 54-81. 57 Judgment of 21 July 2011, C‑159/10 and C‑160/10, EU:C:2011:508, in particular paragraph 50. 58 Judgment of 8 April 2014, C‑288/12, EU:C:2014:237, paragraphs 54, 59 and 60. My emphasis. 59 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31), now repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1). 60 Judgment of 6 November 2012, C‑286/12, EU:C:2012:687. 61 Judgment of 8 April 2014, C‑288/12, EU:C:2014:237. 62 Judgment of 27 February 2018, ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 40 and 41. 63 Judgments of 27 February 2018, ASJP, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 44, and of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 66. 64 See judgment of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 53. 65 The contested measures have also been considered contrary to European and international standards of judicial independence. See, for example, Council of Europe Bureau of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Report on judicial independence and impartiality in the Council of Europe Member States in 2017, 7 February 2018, CCJE-BU(2017)11, point 158; United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, note 54, point 56. 66 See Kosař, D., ‘Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance in Europe’, German Law Journal, Vol. 19, 2018, pp. 1567 and 1596.