Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:367
Date: 2026-04-30
Language of the case: English

summary to be drafted in Language 1 of a text in Language 3 will assess your field-related Language 3 skills. …’ 9 Annex II to the notice of competition at issue, entitled ‘General rules governing open competitions’, provides information on open competitions. The 2015 General Rules 10 The General rules governing Open Competitions, published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 27 February 2015 (OJ 2015 C 70A, p. 1; ‘the 2015 General Rules’), state in their introductory section: ‘These general rules are an integral part of the competition notice, and together with the notice they constitute the binding framework of the competition procedure.’ 11 Point 2.5 of those General Rules, entitled ‘Assessment Centre’, is worded as follows: ‘… The content of the assessment centre tests is validated by the selection board of the competition. Depending on the competition these tests may include the following: – case study: a written test based on a relevant scenario, in which you are faced with various problems that you are asked to solve or to which you must react, relying solely on the material provided, – oral presentation: an individual test of analysis and presentation, in which you are asked to come up with a proposal concerning a fictitious work-related problem. After analysing the documentation provided, you have to present your ideas to a small group of people, – competency-based interview(s): an individual exercise designed to obtain, in a structured way, relevant information about your general skills (and/or specific skills, in the case of specialist competitions), based on past experience, … The tests used in each individual competition are indicated in the competition notice. A detailed explanation of these tests will also be given in the “Assessment Centre Manual” that candidates receive when invited to take part in this stage of the competition.’ The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 12 The Code of good administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their relations with the public, annexed to Commission Decision 2000/633/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules of Procedure (OJ 2000 L 267, p. 63) (‘the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’), contains an introduction, of which the section entitled ‘Scope’ is worded as follows: ‘The Code is binding on all staff covered by the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities … and the other provisions on relations between the Commission and its staff that are applicable to officials and other servants of the European Communities. … …’ 13 In Chapter 1 of that code, entitled ‘General Principles of Good Administration’, there is a section headed ‘Lawfulness’ which provides: ‘The Commission acts in accordance with the law and applies the Rules and Procedures laid down in Community legislation.’ 14 In the same chapter there is a section headed ‘Consistency’, which contains the following statement: ‘The Commission shall be consistent in its administrative behaviour and shall follow its normal practice. Any exceptions to this principle must be duly justified.’ The European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016 15 The European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016 for an open, efficient and independent European Union administration (2016/2610(RSP)) (OJ 2018 C 86, p. 126; ‘the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016’) contains a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council for an open, efficient and independent European Union administration, recital 11 of which states: ‘An efficient Union administration is essential for the public interest. An excess as well as a lack of rules and procedures can lead to maladministration, which may also result from the existence of contradictory, inconsistent or unclear rules and procedures.’ Background to the dispute 16 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 11 of the judgment under appeal in the following terms: ‘2 On 21 January 2021, [EPSO] published in the Official Journal of the European Union [the notice of competition at issue] organised with a view to drawing up, inter alia, a reserve list of Bulgarian-language lawyer-linguists in Grade AD 7, intended to fill vacant posts mainly within the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission. 3 In point 5 of the section of the notice entitled “How will I be selected?”, as amended by the notice of 8 March 2022 amending the [notice of competition at issue], it was stated that the assessment centre tests would consist of three tests, namely a general competency-based interview (in English), an oral presentation followed by a question and answer session, and the drafting of a summary, in the language of the competition, of a text written in the chosen “Language 3”, a language other than English and the language of the competition. The eight general competencies would each be assessed out of 10 points and the field-related competencies out of 100 points. The pass mark would be 40/80 in total for the general competencies and, in the case of the field-related competencies, 20/40 for the oral presentation and 30/60 for the summary. 4 On 30 January 2021 the [appellant] applied to be a candidate in that competition. 5 After successfully sitting the “multiple-choice” question test and the translation test provided for in the [notice of competition at issue], the [appellant] was invited, by email of 31 May 2022, to participate remotely in two oral assessment centre tests. According to the letter of invitation, each test was to last between 40 and 50 minutes. 6 After sitting the written assessment centre test, which involved drafting a summary of a text, the [appellant] participated, on 13 and 22 June 2022 respectively, in the competency-based interview and the oral presentation test. 7 By letter of 29 November 2022, the selection board informed the [appellant] of its decision not to include him on the reserve list because he had obtained a score below the pass mark (“the original decision”). That letter was accompanied by a competency passport, which indicated that the [appellant] had obtained an overall score of 189/260 and a score of 19/40 for the oral presentation, whereas the pass mark was 20/40. The letter further explained that the candidates included on the reserve list had all received at the least an overall score of 198/260. 8 On 2 December 2022, the [appellant] requested that the selection board review the original decision because the oral presentation test was vitiated by a material irregularity. By [the decision at issue], the selection board confirmed the original decision. 9 On 19 March 2023, the [appellant] lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations …, by which he sought the annulment of the original decision and the [decision at issue]. 10 On 30 May 2023, EPSO acknowledged receipt of the [appellant’s] complaint and informed him that the absence of a reply within four months of that complaint being lodged should be deemed to constitute a decision implicitly rejecting the complaint. 11 On 20 July 2023, EPSO’s failure to respond to the [appellant’s] complaint within the period of four months provided for in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations gave rise to a decision implicitly rejecting that complaint …’ The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 17 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 19 October 2023, the appellant brought an action under Article 270 TFEU, seeking annulment of the decision at issue and the payment of damages of EUR 7 000 in respect of the harm which he had allegedly suffered on account of the non-inclusion of his name on reserve list for the competition at issue. 18 In support of his claim for annulment of the decision at issue, the appellant essentially raised three pleas in law, alleging, first, the unlawful changing of the structure and the scope of the oral presentation test; secondly, the unlawful provision of inaccurate, unclear, ambiguous, inconsistent and contradictory information; and, thirdly, breach of the right to be heard and of the obligation to state reasons. 19 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety. Forms of order sought by the parties 20 By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should: – set aside the judgment under appeal; – annul the decision at issue; – order the Commission to pay damages as compensation for the harm suffered; and – order the Commission to pay the costs. 21 The Commission contends that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal, and – order the appellant to pay the costs. The appeal 22 In support of his appeal, the appellant puts forward, in essence, two grounds of appeal, which concern the conclusions adopted by the General Court in its examination of the first and second pleas at first instance. The first ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 23 There are six parts to the first ground of appeal. 24 By the first part, the appellant claims that the General Court incorrectly found that his legitimate expectations in relation to the structure and scope of the oral presentation test had not been breached. 25 In the first place, the General Court is to have erred in holding, in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, that the description of the oral presentation test contained in the notice of competition at issue was inconsistent with that in the 2015 General Rules. Furthermore, the General Court is to have subsequently contradicted itself, in paragraph 127 of the judgment under appeal, by stating that the information communicated to the appellant in that regard was precise, unconditional and consistent. 26 In the second place, the General Court is to have incorrectly concluded, in paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had not produced any sound evidence to support the conclusion that he could in fact expect the total duration of the oral presentation test to be 20 minutes. The appellant submits that such information resulted directly from EPSO’s website and that he had produced, to that end, evidence that the General Court failed to take into consideration. In that regard, the appellant claims that the letter of invitation of 31 May 2022, which expressly stated that the test would last approximately 40 to 50 minutes, runs counter to EPSO’s usual practice, which is to state a precise duration for that type of test. He submits that such wording permitted him to take the view that the duration referred to included not only the duration of the oral presentation, but also the time necessary for technical set-up and contingencies for delays, since the test took place during the COVID-19 pandemic and encountered various technical problems. 27 The second part of the first ground of appeal alleges infringement of the 2015 General Rules. In that connection, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 78 and 79 of the judgment under appeal, which refer to paragraphs 63 to 67 of that judgment, that the 2015 General Rules were not applicable to the competition at issue. He submits, first, that the notice of competition at issue, together with its annexes, contained only incomplete or broad information on the contents and duration of the written tests. In those circumstances, he takes the view, contrary to the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that it was legitimate to refer to the more detailed information on EPSO’s website and in the 2015 General Rules. The appellant submits that the notice of competition at issue, on account of the absence of detailed information on the tests, was only authoritative as to how many and what kinds of test would take place. 28 In that regard, he observes that the 2015 General Rules, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, constituted, taking account of their title and wording and in particular the statement that they are an integral part of the competition notice, ‘rules of general application’ within the meaning of the case-law and, therefore, were intended to have legal effects and were to be applicable in the present case without it being necessary for them to be expressly referred to by the notice of competition at issue. 29 Lastly, the appellant takes the view that it cannot be accepted that the notice of competition at issue, and in particular Annex II thereto, entitled ‘General rules governing open competitions’, derogated from the 2015 General Rules, since the scope of those texts is different. Thus, whereas the general rules contained in Annex II relate solely to procedural and technical matters, such as what diplomas the candidates must have and how to communicate with EPSO, the 2015 General Rules concern substantive matters, in particular a detailed description of the content and duration of the tests. The General Court thus incorrectly assessed the nature of the latter provisions and how they interacted with the notice of competition at issue and, on that basis, erroneously refused to take them into account in the present case. 30 In the third part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant argues that, inasmuch as the 2015 General Rules applied and as, according to the findings of the General Court in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, the description of the oral presentation test in the notice of competition at issue was inconsistent with that in those general rules, the General Court infringed Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations when it concluded, in paragraphs 81 to 88 of the judgment under appeal, that the notice of competition at issue complied with that provision in so far as that notice gave information to the requisite standard as to the kind of test that would be held. 31 In that regard, the appellant states, first, that the respective descriptions of the oral presentation test in the competition notice at issue and in the 2015 General Rules, to which it was necessary to refer given the imprecise nature of that notice, were inconsistent, which the General Court is to have confirmed in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal. 32 Secondly, since the 2015 General Rules and the information available on EPSO’s website stated that that test was to consist of an oral presentation of 5 minutes followed by a 15-minute question and answer session on that presentation, and was therefore to have a total duration of 20 minutes, the appellant could not have legitimately expected the oral presentation test to include, following an oral presentation of 20 minutes, a 30-minute session of general questions on his knowledge of EU law. 33 By the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, alleging breach of the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, the appellant takes issue with the General Court for basing, in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, the rejection of the fourth part of the first plea at first instance only on the alleged inapplicability of the 2015 General Rules, without however adopting a position on his arguments on the breach of the principles of consistency and legality, referred to in paragraphs 91 and 92 of that judgment. 34 By the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, alleging breach of the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, the appellant claims that the General Court committed an error in paragraph 37 of the judgment under appeal by not finding a breach of that code and by taking the view that that code was not intended to apply in the case under consideration. He submits that, as a member of the public, he was legitimately entitled to require that EPSO comply with the obligations resulting from that code. Since that code produces legal effects, the appellant had a right to form legitimate expectations as to the fact that EPSO would remain consistent in its practices, that it would observe the law and that it would apply due care in its dealings with the candidates. 35 By the sixth part of the first ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principles of legal certainty, of protection of legitimate expectations and of good faith, the appellant criticises the General Court, first, for concluding, in paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal, that he had produced no evidence establishing the breach of those principles. In his view, on the basis of the evidence in the file, that breach should be held to be established in the light of the applicability of the 2015 General Rules and the inconsistency between the arrangements for the oral presentation test provided for in the notice of competition at issue and in those rules. 36 Next, the appellant submits that the General Court should have asked the Commission to produce information on the prior competitions organised by EPSO in order to confirm if, in the competition at issue, EPSO had departed from its previous practice. 37 Lastly, the appellant alleges the General Court ignored the arguments concerning the reasons for which the private messages from the selection board, the information on EPSO’s official website and his experience of participating in a number of EPSO competitions had given rise to legitimate expectations on his part as to the arrangements for the oral presentation test, as provided for in those sources. 38 The Commission contends that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible and, in any event, manifestly unfounded. Findings of the Court 39 It is appropriate to start by examining the second part of the first ground of appeal. The second part of the first ground of appeal 40 By that part, the appellant alleges, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 63 to 67, 78 and 79 of the judgment under appeal, that the 2015 General Rules were not applicable to the competition at issue. 41 It must be observed that in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal the General Court correctly recalled the case-law according to which a notice of competition lays down the ‘regulatory framework’ of a specific competition in accordance with the objective set by the appointing authority, that framework governing the competition procedure concerned from publication of the notice in question until publication of the reserve list containing the names of the successful candidates in the competition concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2019, Commission v Italy, C‑621/16 P, EU:C:2019:251, paragraph 50). 42 Since every notice of competition lays down the regulatory framework of the competition to which it relates, the selection board is bound by the text of that notice as published. The basic function of the notice of competition is precisely to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the post to enable them to judge whether they should apply for it (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 February 1982, Ruske v Commission, 67/81, EU:C:1982:69, paragraph 9). 43 In the present case, in paragraphs 65 and 67 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the notice of competition at issue expressly directed the candidates’ attention, so far as concerns general rules governing open competitions, to Annex II thereto, without referring to the 2015 General Rules. 44 In those circumstances, the General Court did not err when it held, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, which refers to paragraphs 63 to 67 thereof, that the 2015 General Rules did not apply to the competition at issue. 45 As regard the statement on the first page of the 2015 General Rules, according to which they ‘are an integral part of the competition notice, and together with the notice they constitute the binding framework of the competition procedure’, given the absence of any reference to those general rules in the notice of competition at issue, that statement does not suffice to render those rules applicable to the competition at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2019, Commission v Italy, C‑621/16 P, EU:C:2019:251, paragraph 53). 46 The fact, relied on by the appellant, that the 2015 General Rules contain information which is, in some respects, different or more developed than the general rules in Annex II to the notice of competition at issue is therefore not such as to call into question the lawfulness of the General Court’s finding referred to in paragraph 43 of the present judgment. 47 The second part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected. The first part of the first ground of appeal 48 In support of the first part of the first ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principle of legitimate expectations, the appellant claims, in the first place, that the General Court committed an error and contradicted itself in the grounds of the judgment under appeal. 49 It must, at the outset, be observed that the second part of the first ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law in finding that the 2015 General Rules were not applicable to the competition at issue, was rejected. 50 It follows that, in so far as, in the present part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant relies on the 2015 General Rules to claim that the General Court erred in law by failing to hold that, in the light of those rules and their consistency with the notice of competition at issue, he had a legitimate expectation in the oral presentation taking place in a certain way, which had not been met, that part must to that extent be dismissed as based on an incorrect premiss. 51 As regards the claim of a contradiction between the grounds in paragraphs 62 and 127 of the judgment under appeal, it must be held that that claim is unfounded, since the finding of an inconsistency in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal and the finding of consistency in paragraph 127 of that judgment relate to different sets of texts, the first comparing the notice of competition at issue and the 2015 General Rules, the second comparing, on one hand, that notice of competition and, on the other hand, the letter of invitation and the assignment page for the oral presentation test. 52 In the second place, the appellant argues that the General Court wrongly concluded, in paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had not produced any sound evidence to support the conclusion that he could in fact expect the total duration of the oral presentation test to be 20 minutes. 53 It must be recalled that it is apparent from Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal is limited to points of law and that the General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The assessment of the facts and evidence does not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law, which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal. Such a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence. Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he or she must, under those provisions and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his or her view, led to such distortion (judgment of 2 October 2025, WV v EEAS, C‑243/24 P, EU:C:2025:742, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited). 54 In paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court relied, inter alia, on the fact that the letter of invitation of 31 May 2022 expressly referred to a duration of 40 to 50 minutes to conclude, in essence, that the appellant had not established by any sound evidence that he had a legitimate expectation in the fact that the oral presentation test would last only 20 minutes. 55 By his complaint as to paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant is in essence seeking to obtain from the Court of Justice a fresh examination of the facts, without claiming a distortion of those facts by the General Court. Accordingly, that complaint is inadmissible. 56 In those circumstances, the first part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected. The third part of the first ground of appeal 57 As regards the third part of the first ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, it must, in the first place, be observed that that part is largely based on the premiss that the 2015 General Rules were applicable to the competition at issue. It was found in the examination of the second part of the present ground of appeal that the General Court did not err in law in concluding that the 2015 General Rules were not applicable to that competition. The third part of the first ground of appeal is thus, to that extent, based on an erroneous premiss and is therefore unfounded. 58 In the second place, inasmuch as the appellant alleges that the General Court infringed Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations by incorrectly holding, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that the notice of competition at issue was consistent with that provision, it should be recalled that under that provision, it is for the appointing authority to determine, by the adoption of a notice of competition, where the competition is on the basis of tests, what kind of tests they will be and how they will be marked. 59 However, that provision does not require detailed information on each test to be provided in the notice of competition. 60 In the present case, the section of the notice of competition at issue on the assessment centre stated that ‘the oral presentation (in your Language 1) will be followed by a question and answer session (also in your Language 1) and will assess your general competencies, your field-related competencies as well as your knowledge of European Union law’. 61 It must be stated that the General Court did not err in law when it held, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that the wording of the notice of competition at issue stated the kind of test, since it was clear from that notice that the test would consist of an oral presentation followed by a question and answer session. 62 Furthermore, Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations does not rule out the specific arrangements for the oral presentation test being made clear by means of documents supplementing the notice of competition, as occurred in the present case. As described by the General Court, inter alia in paragraphs 5 and 73 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant was informed, by letter of invitation of 31 May 2022, that the test at issue would last ‘ approximately 40 – 50 minutes’. Therefore, the appellant knew in due time of the temporal arrangements for that test and had all the necessary information enabling him to prepare for it. 63 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the General Court did not infringe Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations in holding that the notice of competition at issue was consistent with that provision. 64 Therefore, the third part of the first ground of appeal is unfounded. The fourth part of the first ground of appeal 65 By the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant challenges the rejection of the fourth part of the first plea in law at first instance, alleging breach of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, not because the General Court is to have erred in law in the interpretation of that provision but because, in essence, it failed to respond to certain arguments. 66 It must be recalled in that connection that, in the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, inter alia, to ascertain whether the General Court addressed, to the requisite legal standard, all the arguments put forward by the appellant, it being noted that the plea alleging that the General Court failed to address arguments relied on at first instance amounts essentially to alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons which derives from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and of Article 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (judgment of 27 February 2025, OA v Parliament, C‑32/24 P, EU:C:2025:118, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 67 That duty to state the reasons on which judgments are based does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the reasoning articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition, however, that it enables the persons concerned to know the grounds on which the judgment under appeal is based and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 27 February 2025, OA v Parliament, C‑32/24 P, EU:C:2025:118, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 68 In the present case, the alleged breach of Article 41 of the Charter on account of the arbitrary change in the structure of the oral presentation test, as invoked by the appellant before the General Court, was based on the premiss that the arrangements for the test at issue might be governed by a different legal framework than that provided for by the notice of competition at issue, a premiss which was reiterated in the appellant’s arguments on the applicability to the test at issue of the 2015 General Rules and of the information published on EPSO’s website. 69 It must be stated that the fourth part of the first plea in law at first instance was directly contingent on the first and second parts of that plea, which were rejected by the General Court. In those circumstances, the General Court was entitled to restrict itself, in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, to referring to paragraphs 69 to 74 and 63 to 67 of that judgment in which it had found that the oral presentation test was consistent with the notice of competition at issue and that the binding legal framework applicable to the competition at issue was constituted by that notice of competition. 70 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the reasoning in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal makes it possible to ascertain, to the requisite legal standard, why the General Court rejected the fourth part of the first plea in law at first instance. 71 Accordingly, the fourth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. The fifth part of the first ground of appeal 72 By the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in not finding that there had been a breach of the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. He submits that, in paragraph 37 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court failed to state reasons for its unfounded conclusion that, leaving aside the question of its binding force, that code was not intended to govern the situation at issue in the case under consideration. 73 In paragraph 37 of that judgment, the General Court stated that it is apparent from the very wording of the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour that it is a guide to good administrative behaviour which the institutions and their staff should observe in their relations with the public, and that, therefore, leaving aside the question of its binding force, it was not intended to govern the situation at issue in the case under consideration. It follows from that assessment that the General Court, by necessary implication, held that the appellant, in his relations with EPSO, was not a member of the public but a candidate in a competition organised by that agency, and that his relationship with EPSO was governed by the provisions of the notice of competition at issue. Accordingly, the reasoning in paragraph 37 was sufficient in the light of the requirements of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 53 thereof, and the General Court’s assessment in paragraph 37 does not contain any error of law. 74 Therefore, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the fifth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. The sixth part of the first ground of appeal 75 By the first complaint in the sixth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court should have held that a breach of the principles of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations and good faith had been established on account of the applicability of the 2015 General Rules and the inconsistency of the oral presentation test with those rules. 76 Since that line of argument is based on the premiss that the 2015 General Rules are applicable to the competition at issue, which the Court of Justice has rejected in the examination of the second part of the first ground of appeal, that complaint must likewise be rejected as unfounded. 77 By the second complaint in the sixth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for not, of its own motion, investigating the arrangements of the previous competitions organised by EPSO in order to confirm that the competition at issue had departed from EPSO’s previous practice. 78 It follows from established case-law that the General Court is the sole judge of whether the information available to it concerning the cases before it needs to be supplemented. Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by the General Court alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the substantive inaccuracy of the findings of the General Court is apparent from the documents in the case (judgment of 2 October 2025, WV v EEAS, C‑243/24 P, EU:C:2025:742, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). 79 Similarly, it should be borne in mind that, in the light of Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that court is, in principle, the sole judge of whether it is necessary to order measures of inquiry for the purposes of the resolution of the dispute. It is, however, for the Court of Justice to examine the question of whether the General Court committed an error of law in in refusing to order the measures sought (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2013, Viega v Commission, C‑276/11 P, EU:C:2013:163, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited). 80 That is not the case and the appellant does not put forward any evidence to suggest that the General Court, by failing to investigate of its own motion EPSO’s usual practice in that regard, infringed any of the appellant’s rights or that, without that investigation, the file was not examined to the requisite standard. 81 In those circumstances, the General Court cannot be criticised for not investigating of its own motion EPSO’s usual practices as regards the oral presentation test. Accordingly, the second complaint must be rejected as unfounded. 82 By the third complaint in the sixth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court disregarded, in its examination of the sixth part of the first plea at first instance, the arguments which he had put forward concerning the reasons why private messages from the selection board, the information on EPSO’s official website and the appellant’s experience of participation in several competitions organised by EPSO had caused the appellant to entertain a legitimate expectation as to the arrangements for the oral presentation test which did not correspond to those on the basis of which the test was conducted. 83 As recalled in paragraph 67 of the present judgment, the duty to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the reasoning articulated by the parties to the case, and the reasoning followed by the General Court may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review. 84 In the present case, it should be noted that, in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court referred to the evidence submitted by the appellant which he claimed justified a legitimate expectation, such as private messages from the selection board, the information on EPSO’s official website and the appellant’s experience of participation in several EPSO competitions. However, it held, in paragraph 108 of that judgment, that, in the light of the arguments already examined in the first to fifth parts of the first plea at first instance, the appellant had not adduced any additional specific evidence from which it could be concluded that the principles of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations and good faith had been breached. 85 It follows that the General Court did not disregard the appellant’s arguments. 86 Moreover, in so far as the General Court had clearly held, in the examination of the first five parts of the first plea at first instance and, specifically, in the examination of the first of those parts, alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, first, that certain sources on which the appellant relied were not consistent with the notice of competition at issue and, secondly, that the legal framework applicable to the competition at issue was constituted by that notice of competition, the General Court was entitled, without erring in law, to reject – as it did – the appellant’s arguments. The third complaint is therefore unfounded. 87 Since all the parts relied on in support of the first ground of appeal have been rejected, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. The second ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 88 There are four parts to the second ground of appeal. 89 In the first part of the second ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the appellant alleges, by his first complaint, that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 126 of the judgment under appeal in holding that the notice of competition at issue and its annexes constituted the sole legal framework applicable to the competition at issue and that that had been confirmed by the letter of invitation of 31 May 2022. The appellant reiterates his position as to the applicability of the 2015 General Rules and also submits that their application could not be derogated from by virtue of that letter. 90 By his second complaint, the appellant argues that the General Court contradicted itself in holding, in paragraph 127 of the judgment under appeal, that the information which had been communicated to the appellant was precise, unconditional and consistent, while stating the opposite in paragraph 62 of that judgment. He takes the view that the General Court’s finding as to the precision of the information on the oral presentation test is incorrect, both on account of the fact that the structure of that test was described differently in the 2015 General Rules, on EPSO’s website, and in the various versions of the assignment page, and of the fact that that test was described on that website and in some versions of that assignment page as being of a 20-minute duration. 91 In his third complaint, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law by refusing, in paragraph 128 of the judgment under appeal, to concede that EPSO’s website, in particular the ‘Sample tests’ page of that website, had legal force. He argues that the information published on that website, relating to the description and duration of the oral presentation test, was consistent with the 2015 General Rules and the information on the assignment page. 92 By the second part of the present ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principle of good administration, after reiterating his position that EPSO breached that principle, the appellant criticises the General Court, first, for committing an error in paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal by refusing to concede interpretative value to the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016, whereas such interpretative value does not need to be proven. 93 Secondly, the General Court is to have erred in law, in paragraph 134 of that judgment, by stating that the appellant had not provided any evidence capable of establishing a breach of his right to good administration in the light of the discrepancies in the description of the oral presentation test. He submits that, having regard to the contradictions pointed out concerning the description and the duration of that test, the breach of that principle has been established to the requisite standard. 94 The third part of the second ground of appeal alleges breach of the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. The appellant, referring to the arguments put forward in the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, set out in paragraph 34 of the present judgment, submits that the General Court committed an error of law in holding, in paragraph 138 of the judgment under appeal, that that code did not apply in the present case and that the appellant had not produced sufficient evidence to conclude that the principle of consistency had been breached. The appellant is of the opinion that the mere fact that there were discrepancies in the description of and the information on the duration of the test proves that that principle was breached. He adds that the General Court could have asked the Commission of its own motion to produce information on the prior competitions organised by EPSO in order to confirm if the organisation of the competition at issue had departed from that agency’s previous practice. 95 By the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principles of legal certainty, of protection of legitimate expectations and of good faith, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had not produced any evidence from which it could be concluded that those principles had been breached. In that regard, he submits that the mere fact that there are contradictions between the various items of information made available to him concerning the description and duration of the test shows that those principles were breached. 96 The Commission contends that the second ground of appeal is inadmissible and, in any event, ineffective. Findings of the Court The first part of the second ground of appeal 97 In his first complaint, the appellant reiterates, in essence, his arguments on the applicability of the 2015 General Rules to the competition at issue. 98 It was found in the examination of the second part of the first ground of appeal, in that regard, that the General Court had not erred in law in concluding that the 2015 General Rules were not applicable to the competition at issue. The complaint is thus based on an erroneous premiss and must therefore be rejected as unfounded. 99 In his second complaint, the appellant alleges that the General Court adopted a contradictory position in paragraphs 62 and 127 of the judgment under appeal. In his view, whereas, in paragraph 127, the General Court held that the information communicated to the appellant was precise, unconditional and consistent, it stated the opposite in paragraph 62. 100 It must be stated that the appellant in essence reiterates the arguments he submitted in support of the first part of the first ground of appeal, which have already been rejected by the Court of Justice in paragraph 51 of the present judgment. 101 In his third complaint, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 128 of the judgment under appeal in finding that the ‘Sample tests’ page of EPSO’s website had no legal force, and in not taking it into account, in paragraph 127 of the judgment under appeal, in respect of the information available to the appellant. 102 It must be held in the present case that, having regard to the General Court’s correct conclusion that the binding legal framework of the competition consisted of the notice of competition at issue and its annexes, that court was not required to assess the appellant’s arguments in the light of the web page entitled ‘Sample tests’. The General Court did not therefore err in law in finding that that web page referred to by the appellant had no legal force but, at most, indicative force. 103 Thus, that complaint must be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the first part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety. The second part of the second ground of appeal 104 The second part of the second ground of appeal concerns breach of the principle of good administration. 105 As regards the breach of that principle, the appellant confines himself, at the outset, to repeating his criticisms of EPSO, without however referring to any paragraph of the judgment under appeal. Those considerations are therefore inadmissible. 106 Moreover, it is necessary to recall the finding made in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the present judgment that the appellant’s claim of breach of the principle of good administration is based on the erroneous premiss that the binding legal framework of the competition was not limited to the notice of competition at issue. 107 So far as concerns the appellant’s criticism of the General Court’s refusal to concede, in paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal, interpretative value to the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2016, it is sufficient to note that the appellant does not explain how that criticism, even if it were well founded, could entail the setting aside of the judgment under appeal. 108 In respect of the appellant’s criticism of the General Court’s assertion in paragraph 134 of the judgment under appeal that he did not provide any evidence capable of establishing a breach of the principle of good administration, that criticism is based, again, on the premiss that the description of the oral test was inconsistent. 109 As the General Court correctly stated in paragraph 134 of the judgment under appeal and as is apparent, in essence, from paragraphs 61 and 62 of the present judgment, the appellant was duly informed, by the notice of competition at issue and the letter of invitation of 31 May 2022, of the binding legal framework applicable to the competition and of the conditions under which the oral test was to be conducted. 110 The second part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected. The third part of the second ground of appeal 111 By the third part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in paragraph 138 of the judgment under appeal in concluding that the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour did not apply to his situation. He is of the opinion that the breach of the principle of consistency enshrined in that code follows directly from contradictions between several sources of information made available to him as regards the description and duration of the oral presentation test. Similarly, he again criticises the General Court for not, of its own motion, instructing the Commission to provide information on its practices concerning the oral presentation tests in prior competitions. 112 It must be stated that that part of the second ground of appeal is based on the twofold premiss that, first, the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour applies to the appellant’s situation and, secondly, the description of the oral test was inconsistent. 113 As regards the first premiss, and as has already been pointed out in paragraph 73 of the present judgment, the assessment made by the General Court in paragraph 37 of the judgment under appeal and recalled in paragraph 136 of that judgment does not contain any error of law. As regards the second premiss, the appellant merely repeats his arguments relating to the allegedly inconsistent description of the oral presentation test. Those arguments were rejected for the reasons referred to, inter alia, in paragraphs 61 and 62 of the present judgment. 114 Moreover, as regards the General Court’s alleged obligation to obtain information of its own motion on EPSO’s practices in the organisation of prior competitions, it is apparent from paragraphs 77 to 81 of the present judgment that the General Court was not, in the present case, under any such obligation and that it was in a position to consider that the state of the proceedings was such as to permit final judgment to be given without such information. 115 The third part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded. The fourth part of the second ground of appeal 116 By the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the mere fact that there are contradictions between several items of information made available to him concerning the description and duration of the oral presentation test shows that the principles of legal certainty, of the protection of legitimate expectations and of good faith were breached and that the General Court erred, in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, by failing to find a breach of those principles. 117 It must be stated that, by that part, the appellant in essence merely repeats the arguments set out in his appeal concerning the allegedly inconsistent description of the oral test, arguments which have already been rejected. 118 Accordingly, the fourth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected and, consequently, the second ground of appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. 119 Since none of the grounds put forward by the appellant in support of his appeal has been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 120 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 121 Since the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against the appellant and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must, in addition to bearing his own costs, be ordered to pay those incurred by the Commission. On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders Mr Yavor Markov, in addition to bearing his own costs, to pay those incurred by the European Commission. Passer Gratsias Smulders Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 April 2026. A. Calot Escobar J. Passer Registrar President of the Chamber * Language of the case: English.