Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:307
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Translation C-752/24 – 1 
Case C-752/24 [Jangielak] i 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
30 October 2024 
Referring court: 
Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
30 October 2024 
Party initiating the proceedings before the referring court: 
mBank S.A. 
Other party to the proceedings: 
KŁ 
JŁ 
      
ORDER 
The Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) […]: 
[…] 
having heard […] in closed session 
the action brought by mBank, a joint-stock company with its seat in Warsaw 
against KŁ and JŁ 
for payment 
makes the following order: 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 30. 10. 2024 – CASE C-752/24 
 
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I. The following question is referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union: 
Must Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts, and the principles of effectiveness, 
proportionality, legal certainty and of the right of access to a court or 
tribunal, be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national 
legislation according to which the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s 
claim against a consumer for the return of undue payments under the 
contract, which has become null and void because it contains unfair terms, is 
interrupted by an action for payment brought by the bank before the 
definitive conclusion of proceedings brought earlier by the consumer for a 
declaration that the loan contract is null and void? 
II. […] 
[…] 
GROUNDS […] 
1 The referring court. 
2 [Details of the court] […] 
3 Parties to the main proceedings and their representatives. 
4 […] 
5 […] 
6 Subject matter of the dispute and the essential facts. 
7 On 11 September 2008, the applicant concluded a mortgage loan contract with the 
defendants, pursuant to which the applicant granted them a loan in the amount of 
PLN 226 000 (Paragraph 1(2)) for the purchase of immovable property in the 
form of a plot of land […] (Paragraph 1(1)). The contract was concluded for a 
period of 360 months (Paragraph 1(4)). The interest rate on the loan was variable 
(Paragraph 8(1)) and was the sum of the 3-month LIBOR (CHF) benchmark and 
the bank’s fixed margin of 1% (Paragraph 10(2)). The loan was indexed (adjusted) 
to the CHF (Paragraph 1(3)). The amount of the loan expressed in CHF was 
determined on the basis of the CHF buying rate specified in the bank’s exchange 
rate table at the date and time of the loan’s advance (Paragraph 7(1)). The capital 
and interest instalments were repaid in zlotys after being converted according to 
the CHF buying rate specified in the bank’s exchange rate table as at 14.50 on the 
repayment date (Paragraph 11(4)). Pursuant to above contract, the bank made 
available to the borrowers the amount of PLN 226 000 on 23 September 2008. 
JANGIELAK 
 
3 
8 The borrowers are seeking a declaration that the loan contract is null and void in a 
group action against mBank S.A. pending before the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi 
(Regional Court, Łódź) under case number I C 711/24. KŁ and JŁ joined those 
proceedings by a document served on the bank on 28 September 2017, while the 
composition of the group (in which KŁ and JŁ were included) in those 
proceedings was determined by the decision of the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi 
(Regional Court, Łódź) of 13 March 2018. 
9 The present proceedings were instituted by the bank, which brought an action 
against the borrowers on 13 December 2021, seeking an order that it be awarded 
the amount of PLN 226 000 jointly and severally from the borrowers, plus 
statutory default interest from 30 November 2021, as reimbursement of the 
equivalent of the principal of the loan made available to the defendants. In the 
view of the applicant, the legal basis for the claim for payment is Article 405 of 
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 410(1) thereof. 
10 In their defence, the defendants contended that the action should be dismissed. 
The defendants raised a plea alleging that the bank’s claim was time-barred. 
11 By order of 28 July 2023, the referring court referred a question to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling. The Court of Justice answered that question by 
order of 12 January 2024, C-488/23, Naniowski. In view of the substance of the 
judgment of the Court of Justice, the applicant withdrew the claims for payment, 
as originally worded, as remuneration for the use of the capital and judicial 
adjustment, and the referring court stayed the proceedings in that respect by order 
of 19 June 2024. Consequently, the applicant is now only claiming from the 
defendants the amount of PLN 226 000, plus statutory default interest, as 
reimbursement of the equivalent of the capital of the loan made available to the 
defendants. 
12 At the hearing held on 20 June 2024, the borrowers’ representative lodged a 
procedural document in which he upheld the previous arguments and further 
stated that the bank’s action is conditional in nature as it shows that the applicant 
is requesting that it be awarded from the defendants the amount of PLN 226 000, 
plus statutory default interest, if the loan contract concluded by the parties is 
declared null and void in the case pending before the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi 
under case number I C 711/24. Therefore, according to the applicant’s 
representative, that action does not directly seek to assert the applicant’s claim 
before the court, and thus the bringing of that action did not interrupt the 
limitation period for the bank’s claim. 
13 In response to the abovementioned procedural document, the applicant’s 
representative noted that to declare the bank’s claim time-barred would be 
contrary to the objectives of Directive 93/13 and would lead to the unjust 
enrichment of the defendants since they would not have to reimburse the bank the 
equivalent of the principal of the loan, whilst they themselves could claim 
reimbursement from the bank of the equivalent of all loan instalments. In addition, 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 30. 10. 2024 – CASE C-752/24 
 
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the bank’s representative pointed out that if it were assumed that the action 
brought in the present case was conditional in nature and therefore the bringing 
thereof did not interrupt the limitation period for the bank’s claim, that would 
mean that the bank had no possibility of asserting a claim for reimbursement of 
the principal of the loan since the action would be either premature and 
conditional or time-barred. Such a result, in the view of the applicant’s 
representative, would infringe the principles of equality, legal certainty and 
proportionality. 
14 Relevant provisions of law. 
15 Provisions of Polish law. 
16 Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks cywilny (Law of 23 April 1964 
establishing the Civil Code) (consolidated version, Dz. U. of 2024, item 1061, 
as amended); ‘the Civil Code’. 
17 A legal transaction which is contrary to the law or intended to circumvent the law 
shall be null and void, unless a relevant provision provides otherwise, in particular 
that the invalid terms of the legal transaction are to be substituted by relevant 
provisions of the law (Article 58(1). 
18 Unless a specific provision provides otherwise, the limitation period shall be six 
years, and for claims concerning periodic payments as well as for claims 
connected with the pursuit of a business activity, it shall be three years. However, 
the limitation period shall expire on the last day of the calendar year, unless it is 
shorter than two years (Article 118). 
19 The limitation period shall be interrupted by any act before a court of law or other 
authority appointed to try cases or to enforce claims of a given kind or before an 
arbitration court, which act is undertaken directly to pursue or to establish or to 
satisfy or to secure a claim (Article 123(1)(1). 
20 Each interruption of the limitation period shall start time running afresh 
(Article 124(1)). 
21 If the limitation period is interrupted by an act in the course of proceedings before 
a court of law or another authority appointed to try cases or to enforce claims of a 
given kind or before an arbitration court, the limitation shall not start running 
afresh until the proceedings have been completed (Article 124(2)). 
22 The terms of a contract concluded with a consumer which have not been 
individually negotiated shall not be binding on the consumer if his or her rights 
and obligations are set forth in a way that is contrary to the accepted principles of 
morality and grossly infringes his or her interests (unlawful terms). This provision 
shall not apply to terms setting out the parties’ main obligations, including price or 
remuneration, so long as they are worded clearly (Article 3851(1)). 
JANGIELAK 
 
5 
23 If a contractual term is not binding on the consumer pursuant to paragraph 1, the 
contract shall otherwise continue to be binding on the parties (Article 3851(2)). 
24 Any person who, without legal basis, has obtained a pecuniary benefit at the 
expense of another person shall be required to return that benefit in kind and, 
where that is not possible, to make good the value thereof (Article 405). 
25 The provisions of the preceding articles shall apply in particular to undue 
performance (Article 410(1)). 
26 A performance shall be undue if the person who rendered it was not under any 
obligation to do so or was not under an obligation to render it to the person to 
whom it was rendered, or if the basis for the performance has ceased to exist or if 
the objective of the performance has not been achieved or if the legal act requiring 
that performance was invalid and has not become valid since the performance was 
rendered (Article 410(2)). 
27 Provisions of European Union law. 
28 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
29 Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection (Article 38). 
30 Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who 
lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
access to justice (Article 47). 
31 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29); ‘Directive 93/13’. 
32 Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with 
a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, 
not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the 
parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the 
unfair terms (Article 6(1)). 
33 Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, 
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in 
contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers (Article 7(1)). 
34 Reasoning in the request – relevance of the question to resolution of the case 
in the main proceedings. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 30. 10. 2024 – CASE C-752/24 
 
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35 The loan contract concluded by the parties in Paragraphs 7(1) and 11(4) contains 
unfair provisions (Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13) without which it is not capable 
of continuing in existence (Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13). That means that the 
loan contract is null and void (Article 58(1) of the Civil Code) and therefore the 
parties must reimburse each other all payments made pursuant to it (Article 405 of 
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 410(1) thereof). The present case 
concerns the bank’s claims against consumers arising from the nullity of the loan 
contract. The bank claims from the consumers reimbursement of the equivalent of 
the capital made available in the amount of PLN 226 000. The merits of that claim 
as such do not give rise to any doubts on the part of the referring court as it 
follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that a declaration that a loan 
contract is null and void gives rise to an obligation on the part of the consumer to 
reimburse the principal of the loan, 1 and in the event of nullity of a loan contract 
on account of the inclusion of unfair terms therein, the bank may claim from the 
consumer reimbursement of the equivalent of the principal of the loan, plus 
statutory default interest from the date of the demand for payment. 2 Therefore, 
the claim as such remains compatible with EU law. Nevertheless, an analysis is 
required of the rules under which the bank’s claim is time-barred. 
36 In resolving the present case, it is relevant to determine whether the limitation 
period for the bank’s claim was effectively interrupted by the bringing of the 
action for payment which initiated the present proceedings. Under Article 118 of 
the Civil Code, the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s claim is three years 
and expires at the end of a calendar year. The date of commencement of the 
limitation period for the bank’s claim is the date on which the consumer for the 
first time contested the binding effect of the provisions of the contract vis-à-vis 
the bank. 3 In the view of the referring court, in the present case it is reasonable to 
assume that the borrowers contested the binding effect of the provisions of the 
contract vis-à-vis the bank on the date on which the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi 
adopted the order determining the composition of the group in the group 
proceedings against mBank S.A., that is to say on 13 March 2018. It was only on 
the date of that order that the bank became aware that the borrowers were 
contesting the binding effect of the terms vis-à-vis it. Accordingly, the three-year 
limitation period for the applicant’s claim would have expired on 31 December 
2021. However, the action in the present case was brought by the bank earlier, that 
 
1 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 April 2014, C-26/13, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, 
paragraph 84, 
2 See: 
- judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 June 2023, C-520/21, Bank M., paragraph 84, 
- order of the Court of Justice of 11 December 2023, C-756/22, Bank Millennium, paragraph 29, 
- order of the Court of Justice of 12 January 2024, C-488/23, mBank, paragraph 25, 
3 See resolution of the Civil Chamber (full composition) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) 
of 25 April 2024, III CZP 25/22. 
JANGIELAK 
 
7 
is to say on 13 December 2021. Therefore, if it is held that, under 
Article 123(1)(1) of the Civil Code, the bringing of the above action interrupted 
the limitation period (in accordance with the applicant’s position), the applicant’s 
claim is not time-barred and the referring court should grant the action. On the 
other hand, if it is held that the bringing of the action by the bank did not interrupt 
the limitation period for the bank’s claim (in accordance with the defendants’ 
position), the applicant’s claim is time-barred and the referring court should 
dismiss the action. 
37 Reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling – substance. 
38 In the light of the case-law of the Polish courts, there is no doubt that the effective 
bringing of an action is an act made directly to assert a claim and therefore – 
pursuant to Article 123(1)(1) of the Civil Code – interrupts the limitation period. 4 
Thus, an analysis of the provisions of the Civil Code and national case-law should 
lead to the conclusion that, in the present case, the bringing of an action for 
payment by the bank on 12 December 2021 interrupted the limitation period for 
the applicant’s claim and, therefore, the action should be granted by the court. 
However, the adoption of that position may give rise to doubt in the light of EU 
law and, in particular, Directive 93/13. 
39 First of all, doubts may be raised as to whether or not allowing the limitation 
period for the bank’s claim to be interrupted by the bringing of an action in the 
present case is contrary to the objective of Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13. That 
provision requires Member States to provide ‘appropriate and effective means to 
prevent the continued use of such terms’. However, to accept the bringing of an 
action, such as that in the present case by the bank, may run counter to that 
objective. It should be noted in that respect that the bank and the borrowers have, 
for approximately eight years, been parties to a group action, in which the bank 
claims that the contract concluded by the parties is valid and does not contain 
unfair terms, and therefore seeks dismissal of the action seeking a declaration that 
the loan contract concluded by the parties is null and void (and similarly all the 
other contracts covered by the group action). On the other hand, in the present 
case the bank relies on the ‘possible’ nullity of that loan contract and therefore 
seeks an order that defendants must pay the amount of PLN 226 000, plus 
statutory default interest. At the same time, however, the bank claims that it 
cannot show definitively in the present case that the contract concluded by the 
parties contains unfair terms and is therefore null and void because that 
assessment will only be made by the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi in the group 
 
4 See: 
- judgment of the Sąd Najwyższy of 24 September 2009, IV CSK 43/09, 
- judgment of the Sąd Apelacyjny w Szczecinie (Court of Appeal, Szczecin) of 27 March 2019, I AGa 
230/18, 
- judgment of the Sąd Najwyższy of 15 January 2021, I CSKP 19/21. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 30. 10. 2024 – CASE C-752/24 
 
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proceedings pending under case number I C 711/24. At the same time, the bank 
acknowledges that it could not delay bringing the action until the conclusion of 
those group proceedings because its claim is time-barred after three years 
(Article 118 of the Civil Code), and the bringing of an action is necessary to 
interrupt the limitation period for that claim (Article 123(1)(1) of the Civil Code). 
40 It therefore follows from the foregoing that the bringing of an action in the present 
case was the result of some kind of calculation of legal risks. Although the bank 
does not agree with the borrowers’ assertions that the contract contains unfair 
terms and is therefore null and void, it nevertheless brought an action for payment 
in order to protect itself against the limitation period for the claim which it may 
have if the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi found that the loan contract is null and void on 
account of the unfair terms contained therein. From an objective point of view, 
such action on the part of the bank is rational, but there are serious doubts as to 
whether or not it makes it more difficult for consumers to assert claims pursuant to 
Directive 93/13. It must be borne in mind that a consumer who has been served 
with a copy of the bank’s application is placed in a problematic situation. The 
consumer is obliged to lodge a defence in which he or she must formulate the 
relevant assertions, pleas and requests for evidence. However, the selection of an 
appropriate procedural strategy is made difficult in a situation where the bank, on 
the one hand, claims that the contract concluded by the parties is valid and does 
not contain unfair terms, while on the other hand, in the event that the contract is 
declared null and void, demands the reimbursement of the payment made pursuant 
the contract. Moreover, if the consumer wants to protect him or herself against 
losing the action and being charged default interest and legal costs, that means that 
he or she must, in principle, recognise the bank’s claim for payment and 
immediately pay the bank the equivalent of the principal of the loan (in this case – 
the amount of PLN 226 000). However, that type of procedural strategy entails a 
significant risk, namely that it cannot be ruled out that the court in the proceedings 
previously initiated by the consumer will find that the contract concluded by the 
parties does not contain unfair terms and is not null and void. That, in turn, would 
mean that the bank’s claim for payment in the present case was unfounded and the 
consumer – in order to recover the amount paid to the bank (in this case – 
PLN 226 000) would be forced to bring another action against the bank. It is true 
that the consumer has the possibility of pleading set-off, but the effectiveness of 
that plea is conditional on the satisfaction of a number of conditions laid down in 
the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore raising such a plea 
is not always possible. 
41 The above circumstances may support a finding that adopting an interpretation 
that the bringing of an action by the bank in the present case interrupted the 
limitation period may infringe Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 and the principle of 
effectiveness. On the other hand, however, the arguments of the bank, which relies 
on the principles of proportionality, of the right of access to a court or tribunal and 
of legal certainty, must be borne in mind. The principle of legal certainty may 
support the finding that a provision such as Article 123(1)(1) of the Civil Code 
should be interpreted in the same way in every situation, that is to say that the 
JANGIELAK 
 
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bringing of an action for payment in any event interrupts the limitation period. On 
the other hand, adopting a contrary interpretation could infringe the bank’s right 
of access to a court or tribunal as it would thus be deprived of the possibility of 
effectively asserting its claim. While it is true that the bank could be required to 
state definitively in the application initiating the present proceedings that the loan 
contract is null and void and simultaneously acknowledge the consumers’ claim in 
the group action, such a possibility could also infringe the bank’s right of access 
to a court or tribunal and the right of defence in the proceedings as it would force 
the bank to admit facts with which it disagrees and would make it impossible to 
argue with the consumers’ claims as to whether the contract contains unfair terms 
and the possible consequences thereof. A further doubt concerns whether or not 
such a far-reaching restriction of the banks’ procedural rights is a measure which 
goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective, which is consumer 
protection (principle of proportionality). The situation presented illustrates, 
therefore, that in the present case it is necessary to determine whether or not the 
pursuit of the objectives of Directive 93/13 infringes the principle of 
proportionality and, furthermore, whether the objectives of that directive may in 
some way limit the bank’s right of access to a court or tribunal, which is 
underpinned by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Accordingly, an 
interpretation of European Union law in the terms set out above is necessary to 
resolve the present case and, accordingly, the referring court asks the Court of 
Justice to provide appropriate guidance. 
42 Question referred for a preliminary ruling. 
43 [repetition of the question] […] 
44 […] 
45 Staying of proceedings before the referring court. 
46 […] 
[…]