Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2023:647
Date: 2023-09-07
Language of the case: Swedish
Subject matter: Approximation of laws
Procedure: Action for failure to fulfil obligations - successful;Action for failure to fulfil obligations - unfounded;Action for failure to fulfil obligations - inadmissible
Origin: Sweden

Summary of the arguments of the parties A. Admissibility 21. As a preliminary point, the Kingdom of Sweden questions whether its interpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 may be called into question in an action for failure to fulfil obligations, since, first, the Republic of Latvia had the possibility of challenging the decision taken by the Swedish deposit guarantee authority before the Swedish national courts and, secondly, an action for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible if it is limited to seeking an interpretation of EU law. The Republic of Sweden adds, moreover, that what is at issue is a minimum harmonisation provision. 22. As regards the first complaint, relating to infringement of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, the Kingdom of Sweden takes the view that the Republic of Latvia altered the scope of the dispute in the judicial stage of the action by not referring to Article 10 of that directive, which had been referred to at the hearing organised between those two Member States by the Commission on 1 July 2021. 23. The Kingdom of Sweden submits that the second complaint, alleging infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation based on Article 4(3) TEU, must be rejected since, during the administrative procedure, the Republic of Latvia relied on an infringement of the principle of equal treatment with regard to the treatment of the Republic of Finland, whose DGS was in the same situation as the Latvian DGS. 24. With regard to the Republic of Latvia’s request concerning the payment of contributions by the Swedish DGS to the Latvian DGS, the Kingdom of Sweden states that the purpose of an action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot be the payment of compensation. 25. The Republic of Latvia replies, first, that, even in the case of a minimum harmonisation provision, it is necessary to interpret Directive 2014/49 so as to ensure that its objective of improving and ensuring the stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors is achieved and, secondly, that an action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 259 TFEU is not conditional on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 26. As regards its first claim for a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations, the Republic of Latvia denies having changed the subject matter of the dispute, which has been neither extended nor altered as compared with its initial complaint based on Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49; it takes the view that it is necessary to apply, by analogy, the case-law concerning actions for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the Commission, which does not require the statement of complaints set out in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and the form of order sought by the action to be exactly the same, provided that the subject matter of the proceedings, as defined in the reasoned opinion, has not been extended or altered. 27. As regards its third claim, the Republic of Latvia submits that the failure to fulfil obligations alleged against the Kingdom of Sweden must not only be established but must also cease and that that cessation can only take the form of the payment to the Latvian DGS of the contributions that were refused, which does not amount to compensation. B. Infringement of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 28. The Republic of Latvia does not dispute the fact that the Kingdom of Sweden has transposed the directive. It argues that Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 must not be interpreted formally and literally, as the Kingdom of Sweden has done, but in conjunction with Article 10(1) of that directive. It submits that the infringement is characterised by the failure to transfer the contributions collected in respect of the activities of the Latvian branch. 29. In its view, Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, which states that ‘if a credit institution ceases to be member of a DGS and joins another DGS, the contributions paid during the 12 months preceding the end of the membership … shall be transferred to the other DGS’, must be interpreted in the light of its context and the objectives pursued. It adds that recital 3 of that directive is clear in that regard since it states that that ‘directive constitutes an essential instrument for the achievement of the internal market from the point of view of both the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide financial services in the field of credit institutions, while increasing the stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors’. It infers from this that, in the event of a change of DGS, the DGS of the host Member State must receive the contributions which have been calculated and claimed, in respect of the activities transferred, for a period of 12 months, irrespective of when they were actually paid. It states that the formalistic interpretation of that article by the Kingdom of Sweden renders Directive 2014/49 ineffective, particularly since that Member State allows a period of time to pay the contribution which exceeds the period of one year. 30. The Republic of Latvia adds that the logic of the mechanism put in place by Directive 2014/49 is that the contributions relating to the 12 months preceding the transfer of activity are to be transferred to the DGS of the host Member State since that Member State, on the date of the transfer, becomes responsible for paying the guarantee due to the depositors concerned by that activity. It states that a similar mechanism is implemented when the depositors of a branch must be reimbursed: this is done by the DGS of the host Member State, on the instructions of the DGS of the home Member State, which must provide the necessary financing, before the payment is made to depositors, and reimburse the costs incurred by the DGS of the host Member State. 31. The Commission supports the Republic of Latvia’s reasoning, stating that Article 10(1), which provides for a contribution to be made at least annually, must be read in conjunction with Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, since those two provisions are fundamentally linked in order to guarantee the objectives of that directive, in particular solidarity between credit institutions in the event of failure, referred to in recital 37 of that directive. (12) In its view, the contributions were regarded as consideration for the deposit guarantee for a certain period and must therefore be transferred when the burden of the guarantee is transferred to another DGS. 32. The Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania make the same claims as the Republic of Latvia since the Swedish DGS, for the same reasons, refused to transfer to their national DGSs, following the transfer of the branches located on their territories, the contributions collected in respect of the activities of those branches. 33. On the contrary, the Kingdom of Sweden submits that a teleological interpretation cannot be used to remedy a shortcoming in Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, which does not provide for an exhaustive solution in respect of the transfer of funds from one scheme to another. That article should be redrafted to take account of unforeseen situations, as suggested by the EBA and the European Forum of Deposit Insurers. (13) The Kingdom of Sweden also disputes, in particular because of the lack of proportion between the amount of deposits guaranteed by a credit institution and the minimum level of contributions, the scope given by the Commission to the consequences of a literal interpretation of that article in terms of serious effects for the completion of the internal market and the undermining of confidence in the DGS and cooperation between the Member States. Moreover, it considers that the issue of the link between the transfer of activities, and therefore of the risk to another Member State, and the transfer of contributions is not clearly regulated. 34. The Kingdom of Sweden considers that the wording of Article 10 of Directive 2014/49 is customary in EU law and does not require either a specific payment date or that the contribution collected at least annually relates to a specific contribution period (in particular in the case of disputes concerning the amount of the contribution). 35. The Kingdom of Sweden points to an inconsistency in the reasoning put forward, since, if the payment must be made while taking into account the contribution period (non-literal interpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49), the date of the payment that is to be made at least annually is no longer of importance. C. Infringement of Article 4(3) TEU 36. The Republic of Latvia states that the Court’s case-law derives from the principle of sincere cooperation, which is protected by Article 4(3) TEU, an obligation on the Member States, first, to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of EU law and to eliminate the unlawful consequences of a breach of that law and, secondly, to assist each other, in full mutual respect, in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. It infers from this that the refusal of the Swedish DGS to transfer to the Latvian DGS the contributions which it received in respect of the Latvian branch is contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation and to the principle of equality since, in a comparable legal situation, the Swedish DGS agreed to transfer contributions to the Finnish DGS. 37. Conversely, the Kingdom of Sweden disputes the fact that a literal application of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 may constitute infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation. It adds that, in the majority of cases of transfers of contributions, it is the date of actual payment that has been taken into account by the DGS of the home Member State. Furthermore, it states that it treated the Finnish DGS’s request differently because contributions had been paid during the 12 months preceding the transfer of the head office. VI. Analysis A. Admissibility 38. In the first place, as regards the subject matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the Court’s settled case-law is clear on two points. 39. First, the Court recalls that the objective pursued by the procedure provided for in Article 259 TFEU is designed to obtain a declaration that the conduct of a Member State is in breach of EU law and to terminate that conduct. (14) It infers thereby that an action under that article concerning future possible infringements or which is limited to seeking an interpretation of EU law is inadmissible. (15) 40. Thus, contrary to what is stated by the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Latvia’s action for failure to fulfil obligations concerning the conduct of that aforementioned Member State in relation to the payment of contributions from the Swedish DGS to the Latvian DGS is admissible since its purpose is to obtain a declaration concerning a past failure to fulfil obligations, and it is only for that reason that the latter Member State supports before the Court an interpretation of Directive 2014/49 as regards the manner in which the transfer of contributions must take place when deposit-related activities are transferred between two Member States. Moreover, that interpretation of the directive in question was adopted, at least in part, by the Commission in the reasoned opinion of 30 July 2021. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the Kingdom of Sweden has transposed Article 14(3) of that directive. Therefore, the first complaint in the Republic of Latvia’s application, in so far as it does not seek the Court’s interpretation of a directive but a declaration that there has been an infringement of a provision of a directive as interpreted by that Member State and by the Commission, appears to me to be admissible. 41. Secondly, the Court recalls that, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations, it cannot be asked to do anything other than to find that the failure to fulfil obligations alleged exists with a view to bringing that situation to an end; in particular, it cannot be asked to require a Member State to adopt a particular conduct in order to comply with EU law. (16) 42. However, the Republic of Latvia not only seeks a declaration that the alleged infringement has occurred, but also requests that the Court order the Kingdom of Sweden to transfer to the Latvian DGS the contributions paid in respect of the activities of the Latvian branch of Nordea Bank to the Swedish DGS, including, in the alternative, if the Court were to interpret Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 strictly. Consequently, the Republic of Latvia’s requests relating to the transfer of contributions between the Swedish DGS and the Latvian DGS must be declared inadmissible. 43. In the second place, as regards the question of the alteration of the scope of the dispute between the pre-litigation stage and the litigation stage of the action, it should be noted that, in a context characterised by the small number of actions for failure to fulfil obligations between States, (17) the question of the application by analogy of the Court’s case-law on actions for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the Commission on the basis of Article 258 TFEU has never arisen. The present case will enable the Court to clarify the situation. 44. The Court has held that, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under EU law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission. It follows that the subject matter of an action brought under Article 258 TFEU is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision and cannot, consequently, be extended in the course of the litigation. (18) 45. The Court has inferred that the Commission’s reasoned opinion and the action must be based on the same grounds and pleas, with the result that the Court cannot examine a ground of complaint which was not formulated in the reasoned opinion, which for its part must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty. (19) However, that requirement cannot be stretched so far as to mean that in every case the statement of complaints set out in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and the form of order sought by the action must be exactly the same, provided that the subject matter of the proceedings, as defined in the reasoned opinion, has not been extended or altered. (20) 46. However, the fourth paragraph of Article 259 TFEU provides that the absence of a reasoned opinion from the Commission within three months of the Member State’s request does not deprive the latter State of the possibility of bringing the matter before the Court. In such a case, the reasoned opinion cannot serve to circumscribe the debate. 47. It seems to me that, since it follows from the second paragraph of Article 259 TFEU that the pre-litigation stage of an action for failure to fulfil obligations between States is mandatory, the first part of the aforementioned reasoning (21) could perfectly well be applied to this procedure. However, in order to define the scope of the dispute, account should be taken primarily of the Member State’s request and, if it has been given, of the reasoned opinion. 48. Thus, as regards the first alleged failure to fulfil obligations, contrary to what the Kingdom of Sweden claims, it was only by means of a reading in support of a teleological interpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 that Article 10(1) of that directive was discussed during the pre-litigation stage, on the initiative of the Republic of Latvia, as is clear from the Commission’s reasoned opinion. Moreover, it was not cited in the conclusion of the initial complaint or in the form of order sought in the Republic of Latvia’s application. Furthermore, the reference to Article 10 was made using similar wording in the application and in the initial complaint, without any allegation of an infringement of that article. Consequently, the first ground of inadmissibility must be rejected. 49. As regards the second failure to fulfil obligations relating to the infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation, contrary to the summary given of the Republic of Latvia’s requests made in the reasoned opinion, it is clear from the Republic of Latvia’s initial complaint that, to substantiate that objection, both the Kingdom of Sweden’s alleged misinterpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, disregarding the objectives of that directive, and the unequal treatment as between the Latvian DGS and the Finnish DGS were alleged. Thus, the Kingdom of Sweden was given the opportunity to put forward its arguments on those two points and the scope of the dispute was neither altered nor extended during the litigation stage. The second ground of inadmissibility must also be rejected. 50. As regards the failure to exhaust national remedies, the parties, including the Kingdom of Sweden in its rejoinder, agree that Article 259 TFEU does not impose such a condition. The third ground of inadmissibility must be rejected. B. The complaint based on Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 51. It cannot be denied that the Kingdom of Sweden has transposed Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 into its national legislation in a literal manner by providing, in Paragraph 14 of the Law on deposit guarantees, that, in the event of the transfer of a credit institution with the result that that institution is subject to another DGS, the contributions paid during the 12 months preceding that transfer are to be transferred to that other DGS. The Kingdom of Sweden has applied that rule by taking into account the date on which the contributions were paid, as provided for in Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, which meant that there was no transfer of contributions to the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian DGSs because the contributions were paid on a date before or after the 12-month period preceding the transfer of the institution and that there was a double transfer to the Finnish DGS. 52. The Republic of Latvia, supported by the Commission and by the Republics of Estonia and Lithuania, submits principally that Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 should be read not literally but purely teleologically, relying, first, on a combined reading of that provision with Article 10 of that directive and, secondly, on the objectives of that directive set out in recitals 3 and 37, namely to achieve the completion of the internal market by increasing the stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors and by creating solidarity among all the credit institutions in a given financial market. The Republic of Latvia, the Republics of Estonia and Lithuania, and the Commission infer from this that the transfer of contributions must correspond to the transfer of liability between DGSs following the transfer of a credit institution. 53. First, a combined reading of Article 14(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49 appears, prima facie, to permit the inference either that the payment of the contribution to the DGS must take place every year on a fixed date, or that that payment must relate to the contribution due in respect of the previous 12 months. 54. The payment of contributions on a fixed date requires the possibility of making transfers every day of the year, which is not necessarily possible. 55. As for considering, on the basis of that combined reading of Article 14(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49, that the contribution to be transferred is that due in respect of the 12 months preceding the transfer of the credit institution, this amounts to applying illogical reasoning since, as the Kingdom of Sweden notes, if the amount due corresponds to a period (the previous 12 months), it is no longer necessary to indicate, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of that directive, that the levy is to take place on an annual basis. 56. Moreover, the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) is similar, in essence, to that used for contributions to financing arrangements in the area of banking resolution (22) or to the Single Resolution Fund, (23) which provides for contributions to be raised ‘at least annually’, which leaves the Member States a margin of discretion to organise that collection. However, there is no provision in the field of banking resolution for the transfer of contributions in the event of a change in the financing arrangement. 57. Nevertheless, the one-month period allowed by Paragraph 13 of the Law on deposit guarantees to pay the required contribution does not appear to be contrary to the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49, which does not lay down any obligation other than that of paying the contribution to the DGS at least annually. Moreover, Article 14(3) of that directive refers only to payments made ‘during the 12 months preceding the end of the membership’. 58. Indeed, faced with what appears to be a defect in the drafting of the original text of Directive 2014/49, the Commission has had the opportunity to clarify the wording of Article 14(3) thereof in its proposal for amending that directive, dated 18 April 2023, by stating that, in the event of a transfer between two DGSs of different Member States of a credit institution or part of its activities, the DGS of the home Member State is to transfer to the DGS of the host Member State the contributions due for the last 12 months preceding the change of DGS membership. (24) 59. Secondly, Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49 states that the available financial means of a DGS must at least reach a target level of 0.8% of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. While, contrary to the Kingdom of Sweden’s argument, there is indeed a link between the amount of the contribution to the DGS and the amount of the covered deposits at the time when the contribution is set, (25) it must be held that that correlation ceases to apply as soon as (and for as long as) that target level is reached. 60. The second subparagraph of Article 10(2) of that directive provides that ‘where the financing capacity [of the DGS] falls short of [that] target level, the payment of contributions shall resume at least until the target level is reached again’. 61. Therefore, the arrival of a new credit institution within a DGS will automatically increase the total amount of guaranteed deposits and will be liable to result in a call for contributions within that DGS. If that credit institution comes from a DGS of another Member State, that arrival should be accompanied, where appropriate, by the transfer of the contribution it has paid to the DGS of the home Member State in the 12 months preceding its arrival and will not give rise to a new call for contributions, provided that the contribution transferred covers the proportion of new guaranteed deposits. 62. However, the arrival within a DGS of a Member State of a credit institution from a third country will not be accompanied by a transfer of contributions and the increase in the amount of the target level and the possible taking back or increase in contributions will be borne by all the credit institutions subject to that DGS. 63. Similarly, the transfer of a credit institution from a DGS of a Member State for which the target level has been reached and to which no contribution has been paid, by that institution, during the previous 12 months will not only not result in any transfer of contributions to the DGS of the host Member State, but may even, as mentioned in the previous point of this Opinion, lead to an increase in contributions to the DGS of the host Member State on account of the increase in the amount of guaranteed deposits and, therefore, the target level. 64. Thus, there are many situations in which the arrival of a credit institution within a DGS will not lead to a transfer of contributions to that DGS. It is therefore difficult to draw an argument from the consequences of the transfer of the credit institution in terms of liability for the transfer of contributions. 65. Thirdly, as regards the objectives of Directive 2014/49 recalled in recitals 3 and 37, they do not appear to me to justify a purely teleological reading of Article 14(3) of that directive. 66. Since, as mentioned above, there is no strict correlation between the transfer of liability and the transfer of contributions, it must also be inferred that the EU legislature accepted that discrepancy while seeking the stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors and establishing solidarity between credit institutions. 67. In any event, the stability of the banking system is sought, above all, by means of the deposit guarantee, which is intended to prevent massive withdrawals of sums deposited in banking institutions. Similarly, depositors are protected by the introduction of a coverage level of EUR 100 000 per depositor and per credit institution in the event of deposits being unavailable. (26) Moreover, the solidarity between all credit institutions referred to in recital 37 of Directive 2014/49 concerns credit institutions in a given financial market and not all EU credit institutions; in this respect, there is no inconsistency in making the other credit institutions belonging to a DGS bear the burden of any liability that may arise from a new credit institution joining the DGS without transferring contributions. 68. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that, by providing that only contributions to the DGS paid in the 12 months preceding the transfer of the credit institution are to be transferred to the DGS of the host Member State, the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49, even if that provision is read in conjunction with the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of that directive. 69. As regards the one-month period following the deposit guarantee authority’s decision for paying the contribution, case-law exists which accepts that a practice which is, to some degree, of a consistent and general nature and which does not comply with the correct transposition of a directive can be made the object of an action for failure to fulfil obligations. (27) 70. In the present case, while the introduction of such a time limit does not appear to be contrary to Directive 2014/49, it is necessary to carry out an examination of whether there is a general and consistent practice on the part of the Swedish DGS which does not comply with that directive or its transposing law and which undermines the principle of transferring contributions provided for in Article 14(3) of that directive. 71. The contribution for 2016 was decided on 2 September 2016 and was paid on 30 September 2016, thus within the one-month period. As for the contribution for 2017, decided on 14 September 2017, it was paid on 13 October 2017. Lastly, the contribution for 2018 was decided on 27 September 2018 and paid the following day. 72. The second subparagraph of Article 14(4) of Directive 2014/49 states that ‘if a credit institution intends to transfer from one DGS to another in accordance with [that] Directive, it shall give at least six months’ notice of its intention to do so’. 73. Thus, by 1 April 2017 at the latest, Nordea Bank should have informed the Swedish DGS of its intention to divest its branches on 1 October 2017. Similarly, by 1 April 2018 at the latest, Nordea Bank should have informed the DGS of its intention to transfer its head office to Finland. 74. While it may seem surprising that the Swedish deposit guarantee authority changes the date of its decision setting the amount of contributions to the DGS each year over the three years examined, that is not sufficient to prove a general, consistent and deliberate practice aimed at preventing the transfer of contributions to another DGS. 75. If Nordea Bank knew, when setting the transfer of the branches for 1 October 2017, that the contribution for 2016 would not be transferred since it had been paid on 30 September 2016, that institution could not have been unaware, by paying its contribution for 2017 on 13 October 2017, thus after 30 September 2017, that that contribution would not be transferred to the DGSs of the host Member States of the transferred branches. Similarly, by setting the transfer of its head office for 1 October 2018 and paying its contribution for 2018 on the day after the decision setting the amount of the contribution, namely on 28 September 2018, Nordea Bank knew that its contributions for 2017 and 2018 would be paid to the Finnish DGS. 76. Consequently, not only has the general and consistent practice of the Swedish DGS not been proven, since a period of three years is not sufficient to establish such a practice and this did not automatically lead to a refusal to transfer contributions, but it is also the case that the absence of a transfer of contributions is the result of a choice made by Nordea Bank as to the date of payment of those contributions to the Swedish DGS. 77. In conclusion, it does not appear to me that the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations arising from a combined reading of Article 14(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49 and, consequently, the first complaint must be rejected. C. The complaint based on Article 4(3) TEU 78. By way of a reminder, according to the Court’s settled case-law, while it ‘follows from the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU that the Member States are obliged to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of EU law’, (28) ‘a failure to fulfil the general obligation of sincere cooperation following from Article 4(3) TEU may be found only in so far as it covers conduct distinct from that which constitutes the infringement of the specific obligations alleged against the Member State’. (29) 79. It is therefore necessary to examine the two grounds which form the basis of the Republic of Latvia’s request. 80. First, as regards the misinterpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49 which disregards the objectives of that directive, that alleged failure to fulfil obligations relates in reality to the same conduct which forms the basis of the first complaint, since that refusal is directly linked to the interpretation of Article 14(3). As Advocate General Ćapeta has stated, the fact that a Member State has a different understanding of EU law than the Commission does not amount in itself to infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation on the part of that Member State. (30) The same applies where a Member State has a different understanding of EU law to another Member State. The complaint based on that ground is therefore unfounded. 81. Secondly, as regards inequality in the treatment accorded to the requests from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian DGSs compared to the request from the Finnish DGS, it should be noted that that allegation is also based on the contested interpretation of Article 14(3) of Directive 2014/49. 82. In any event, inequality can be found only where identical situations are treated differently or different situations are treated identically. 83. In the present case, the situations of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian DGSs, on the one hand, and the Finnish DGS, on the other, are different. During the 12 months preceding the change of DGS membership, thus between 1 October 2016 and 30 September 2017, no contributions were paid to the Swedish DGS in respect of the activities of the transferred branches, whereas contributions were paid to that DGS in the 12 months preceding the transfer of the head office to Finland and those contributions were transferred to the Finnish DGS. Therefore, failure to comply with the duty of sincere cooperation cannot be based on that ground. 84. The complaint based on failure to comply with the principle of sincere cooperation must be rejected. VII. Conclusion 85. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should: (1) Dismiss the action; (2) Order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs; (3) Order the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Lithuania and the European Commission to bear their own costs. 1 Original language: French. 2 OJ 2014 L 173, p. 149. 3 Whereas, in the form of order sought in its application, the Republic of Latvia relies on an infringement of the principle of mutual trust, it refers, in the grounds of that application, to the principle of sincere cooperation (paragraphs 39 to 41). I therefore consider that, in alleging an infringement of Article 4(3) TEU, the Republic of Latvia is alleging an infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation. 4 See, inter alia, judgments of 4 October 1979, France v United Kingdom (141/78, EU:C:1979:225); of 16 May 2000, Belgium v Spain (C‑388/95, EU:C:2000:244); of 12 September 2006, Spain v United Kingdom (C‑145/04, EU:C:2006:543); of 16 October 2012, Hungary v Slovakia (C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630); of 18 June 2019, Austria v Germany (C‑591/17, EU:C:2019:504); and of 31 January 2020, Slovenia v Croatia (C‑457/18, EU:C:2020:65). 5 SFS 1995, No 1571. 6 The ‘transferred branches’. 7 See point 6 of this Opinion. 8 Thus 12 months and 1 day before the branches were transferred. 9 Thus after the branches were transferred and less than 12 months before the head office was transferred to Finland. 10 Thus less than 12 months before the head office was transferred. 11 See footnote 3 to this Opinion. 12 That recital states: ‘Deposit protection is an essential element in the completion of the internal market and an indispensable complement to the system of supervision of credit institutions on account of the solidarity it creates among all the institutions in a given financial market in the event of the failure of any of them. Therefore, Member States should be able to allow DGSs to lend money to each other on a voluntary basis.’ 13 A non-profit-making association which comprises, inter alia, DGSs. 14 See judgment of 16 October 2012, Hungary v Slovakia (C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630 paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 15 See judgment of 16 October 2012, Hungary v Slovakia (C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630 paragraph 68). 16 See judgment of 2 April 2020, Commission v Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic (Temporary mechanism for the relocation of applicants for international protection) (C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, EU:C:2020:257, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). 17 See judgments cited in footnote 4 to this Opinion. 18 See judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v France (C‑237/12, EU:C:2014:2152, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). 19 See judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v France (C‑237/12, EU:C:2014:2152, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). 20 See judgment of 27 January 2021, Commission v Austria (VAT – Travel agencies) (C‑787/19, not published, EU:C:2021:72, paragraph 21). 21 See point 44 of this Opinion. 22 See Article 103(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190). 23 See Article 70(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1). 24 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency (COM(2023) 228 final). 25 See Article 10(2), first subparagraph, Article 10(6), second subparagraph, Article 10(8) and Article 13(1) of Directive 2014/49. 26 See Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 2014/49. 27 See judgment of 22 September 2016, Commission v Czech Republic (C‑525/14, EU:C:2016:714, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited). 28 See judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Slovenia (ECB archives) (C‑316/19, EU:C:2020:1030, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited). 29 See judgment of 14 July 2022, Commission v Denmark (PDO Feta) (C‑159/20, EU:C:2022:561, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 30 See Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta in Commission v Denmark (PDO Feta) (C‑159/20, EU:C:2022:198, point 84).