Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2025:999
Date: 2025-12-18
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Luxembourg

Summary C-296/24 – 1 
Case C-296/24 [Jouxy] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice  
Date lodged: 
26 April 2024 
Referring court: 
Cour de cassation (Luxembourg) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
25 April 2024 
Appellants: 
SM 
PX 
Respondent: 
Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants 
  
1. FACTS 
1 SM is a frontier worker who works in Luxembourg. He has his home in France, 
which he shares with PX, his spouse and her child. His spouse also pursues a paid 
activity and receives monthly maintenance for the child of EUR 250, paid by the 
child’s biological father. The child receives a higher education grant. 
2 SM received for a time, for his wife’s child, the family allowance paid by the 
Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants (Children’s Future Fund, Luxembourg), the 
respondent. 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
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3 The entitlement to that allowance was subsequently withdrawn from him with 
retroactive effect from 1 August 2016, on the ground that the child was no longer 
to be regarded as a member of his family pursuant to Articles 269 and 270 of the 
code de la sécurité sociale luxembourgeois (Luxembourg Social Security Code) 
(as amended). 
Background to the proceedings 
4 The Conseil arbitral de la sécurité sociale (Social Security Arbitration Board, 
Luxembourg) upheld the action and ruled that the payment of the family 
allowance to SM had to be restored. 
5 On appeal, the Social Security Arbitration Board reversed the judgment at first 
instance and confirmed that the entitlement to the family allowance was to be 
withdrawn. 
6 An appeal on a point of law has now been brought before the Court of Cassation 
against the decision on appeal. 
The contested appeal judgment 
7 The Law of 23 July 2016, which entered into force on 1 August 2016, amended 
the Social Security Code by excluding, inter alia, the spouse’s or partner’s 
children from the concept of ‘family member’ defined in Article 270 of that code. 
In its judgment of 2 April 2020 (Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants, C-802/18, 
EU:C:2020:269) the Court of Justice held ‘that a family allowance based on the 
fact that a frontier worker pursues an activity as an employed person in a Member 
State is a social advantage within the meaning of EU law’ (paragraph 23) and that 
‘EU law precludes provisions of a Member State according to which frontier 
workers are entitled to receive a family allowance, on the basis of the fact that 
they pursue an activity as employed persons in that Member State, solely for their 
own children, and not for a spouse’s children with whom those workers have no 
child-parent relationship, but whom those workers support, whereas any child 
residing in that Member State is entitled to receive that allowance’ (paragraph 71). 
8 The judgment under appeal holds that there is no discrimination, since 
discrimination would be conceivable only in so far as the frontier worker may 
claim, on the basis of EU law, a social advantage, such as the family allowance, 
for his spouse’s child with whom he has no child-parent relationship.  
9 However, that right presupposes that the frontier worker can establish that he 
supports his spouse’s child. Requiring such proof is not a source of indirect 
discrimination in relation to workers living in Luxembourg. The Court of Justice 
has stated that the status of dependent member of a family is the result of a factual 
situation, ‘which it is for the Member State and, if appropriate, the national courts 
to assess, and it is not necessary to determine the reasons for that contribution or 
make a precise estimation of its amount’ (judgments of 15 December 2016, 
Depesme and Others, C-401/15 to C-403/15 EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 60; and of 
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2 April 2020, Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants, C-802/18 EU:C:2020:269, 
paragraph 50). 
10 The court must therefore determine whether the appellant supports his spouse’s 
child. It follows from the case-law that evidence thereof does not automatically 
emerge from the existence of a joint household, or even from the absence of 
maintenance payment by the father. The courts adjudicating on the substance must 
carry out a specific verification of the evidence provided by the appellant. 
11 In principle, each of the biological parents contributes to the maintenance and 
education of their common children, in proportion to their means, to those of the 
other parent and to the needs of the children and, in the event of the parents’ 
separation, the contribution to their maintenance and education takes the form of 
maintenance paid, depending on the case, by one of the parents to the other. In the 
present case, the biological mother PX pursues a professional activity from which 
she derives an income. The biological father also devotes himself to a professional 
activity and the mother receives from him indexed maintenance for the child in 
the amount of EUR 250 per month. 
12 The items paid by the stepfather, SM, including the purchase of a family 
television set, the amortisation table of a mortgage loan, the study grant paid by 
the CEDIES for the child and the income tax notice, although they are evidence of 
household expenditure, are not such as to prove that SM supports the child, 
particularly in the light of the objective evidence according to which the biological 
parents assume the maintenance of their child. 
2. GROUNDS IN THE APPEAL ON A POINT OF LAW 
FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL 
First part: broad interpretation 
13 According to confirmed case-law, the status of family member of a worker is a 
concept subject to the ‘principle that the provisions establishing the free 
movement of workers, which constitutes one of the foundations of the [European] 
Union, must be construed broadly’ (judgments of 15 December 2016, Depesme 
and Others, C-401/15 to C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 58; and of 18 June 
1987, Lebon, 316/85, EU:C:1987:302, paragraphs 21 to 23). Applying that 
principle, the Court of Justice held that the ‘status of a family member of a frontier 
worker who is dependent on that worker’ does not presuppose a ‘right to 
maintenance’, but is a ‘factual situation’ in which that status ‘may, when it relates 
to the case of a child of a spouse or recognised partner of that worker, be 
evidenced by objective factors, such as a joint household shared by that worker 
and the student, and it is not necessary to determine the reasons for the frontier 
worker’s contribution to the maintenance of the student or make a precise 
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estimation of its amount’ (judgment of 15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, 
C-401/15 to C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraphs 58 and 60). 
14 However, the judgment under appeal adopted a restrictive interpretation of the 
status of ‘family member’, ruling that the child lived with SM and that although 
SM contributed to the ‘household costs’, that did not prove that he contributed to 
the maintenance of the child living in the household, because the biological 
parents also contributed (or were able to contribute) to the child’s maintenance. 
15 In so ruling, the appeal judges made the existence of SM’s contribution subject to 
the ‘reasons for that contribution’ (whether or not connected to a failure to pay on 
the part of the biological parents) and to an assessment of its ‘amount’, in breach 
of the case-law of the Court of Justice.  
16 In order to avoid legal uncertainty, the following question must be referred to the 
Court of Justice: ‘Does the ‘principle that the provisions establishing the free 
movement of workers, which constitutes one of the foundations of the [European] 
Union, must be construed broadly’ (judgment in Depesme and Others …, 
paragraph 58) preclude provisions of a Member State from being interpreted as 
meaning that frontier workers cannot receive a family allowance on the basis of 
the fact that they pursue an activity as an employed person in that Member State 
for their spouse’s children, when those children live in the same household as that 
of the frontier worker and when that worker contributes to the payment of the 
costs of the household to which the child belongs, on the ground that the 
biological parents of the child also contribute to the child’s maintenance?’ 
Second part: discrimination 
17 By giving such a restrictive interpretation of the status of family member of a 
frontier worker, whereas all children living in the Member State in question are 
entitled to receive that allowance, the appeal judges also infringed the principle of 
no direct or indirect discrimination.  
18 In order to avoid legal uncertainty, the following question must be referred to the 
Court: ‘2. Does the principle of the free movement of workers and the prohibition 
of the discriminations resulting from paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 45 TFEU and 
Article 1(i) and Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, read in conjunction 
with Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 and with Article 2(2) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, preclude provisions of a Member State from being 
interpreted as meaning that frontier workers cannot receive a family allowance on 
the basis of the fact that they pursue an activity as an employed person in that 
Member State for their spouse’s children, when those children live in the same 
household as that of the frontier worker and when that worker contributes to the 
payment of the costs of the household to which the child belongs, on the ground 
that the biological parents of the child also contribute to the child’s maintenance, 
whereas all children in the same situation residing in that Member State are 
entitled to receive that allowance?’ 
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Third part: need for a uniform interpretation 
19 The Court states that a worker’s contribution to the child’s maintenance is a 
‘factual situation’ in order to make it clear that that contribution, which is subject 
to the principle that it be construed broadly, does not presuppose a ‘right’ to 
maintenance and in order to insist on the need to refer to ‘objective factors’ in 
assessing that contribution, for the purposes of a ‘uniform’ application ‘of EU law’ 
in that regard (judgments of 15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, (C-401/15 
to C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 58; and of 2 April 2020, Caisse pour 
l’avenir des enfants, C-802/18 EU:C:2020:269, paragraph 50. 
20 However, by inferring from that case-law that a worker’s contribution to the 
child’s maintenance is a matter for definitive assessment of a factual situation 
which both the Court of Justice and the Court of Cassation (have) reserved to the 
courts adjudicating on the substance, the judgment under appeal was manifestly 
wrong. The definitive assessment of the courts adjudicating on the substance 
means the absence of a uniform interpretation and is incompatible with the 
uniform interpretation of EU law sought by the Court of Justice. In so ruling, the 
appeal courts infringed the rule that EU law must be interpreted uniformly 
21 In order to avoid legal uncertainty, the following question must be referred to the 
Court: ‘Does the rule that EU law must be interpreted uniformly (judgment of 
1 February 1972, 49-71 …, judgment of 1 February 1972, 50/71) preclude the 
status of family member of a cross-border worker and, more particularly, the 
worker’s contribution to the maintenance of his or her spouse’s child, which is 
subject to that uniform interpretation rule (judgment … Caisse pour l’avenir des 
enfants, C-802-18, paragraph 50) from being left to the definitive assessment of 
the courts adjudicating on the substance, and therefore preclude the Court of 
Cassation from not ensuring the uniform application of the concept?’ 
Fourth (alternative) part: appropriateness of the reference 
22 It is necessary to refer the questions for a preliminary ruling set out above, in the 
event that the Court of Cassation intends to reject the first three parts of the first 
ground of appeal. The improper refusal to refer a question for a preliminary ruling 
is a basis for an action for failure to fulfil obligations and constitutes a breach of 
Article 6 of the ECHR.  
SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL: INFRINGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
23 Article 1 of Protocol No 12 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ECHR apply to 
entitlement to social benefits. In order to assess whether there has been 
discrimination within the meaning of those provisions, the ECtHR attaches a 
‘highly persuasive value’ to the conclusions of the Court of Justice. It has already 
found that many Luxembourg provisions discriminate against frontier workers 
(see, for example, judgments of 20 June 2013, Giersch and Others (C-20/12, 
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EU:C:2013:411) or of 14 December 2016, Bragança Linares Verruga and Others 
(C-238/15, EU:C:2016:949) or of 10 July 2019, Aubriet (C-410/18, 
EU:C:2019:582). By adopting here a restrictive interpretation of the status of 
‘family member’ of a frontier worker, the judgment under appeal unlawfully 
discriminated again by drawing a distinction between cross-border workers and 
resident workers, which constitutes indirect discrimination based on nationality 
and is not justified by any legitimate objective. In so ruling, the appeal courts 
infringed the abovementioned provisions. 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF CASSATION 
Interpretation of European Union law 
24 In its judgment of 2 April 2020, Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants (C-802/18, 
EU:C:2020:269), the Court of Justice made a frontier worker’s entitlement to 
payment of the family allowance for the child of his or her spouse – or registered 
partner – with whom the worker has no child-parent relationship subject to the 
submission of evidence that he or she fulfils the condition of supporting that child. 
25 The concept of ‘support’ was used at the outset by the Court of Justice in order to 
state that a frontier worker is entitled to payment of a State benefit as a social 
advantage, in the case in question, financial aid for higher education studies, for 
his or her own child, where he or she continues to support that child (judgments of 
26 February 1992, Bemini, C-3/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:89, paragraphs 25 and 29; of 
8 June 1999, Meeusen, C-337/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:284, paragraph 19; of 14 June 
2012, Commission v Netherlands, C-342, ECLI:EU:C:2012:346, paragraph 35, 
and of 20 June 2013, Guirsch, C-20/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 39), 
without the concept being defined in the course of those judgments. 
26 Subsequently, still in the context of a social advantage constituted by financial aid 
for higher education studies, but concerning a child who has no child-parent 
relationship with the frontier worker, the Court of Justice clarified the concept of 
‘support’ by stating, first of all, that it ‘d[oes] not presuppose a right to 
maintenance’ (judgment of 15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, C-401/15 to 
C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 58), adding that ‘the status of dependent 
member of a family is the result of a factual situation. The person having that 
status is a member of the family who is supported by the worker and there is no 
need to determine the reasons for recourse to the worker’s support or to raise the 
question whether the person concerned is able to support himself [or herself] by 
taking up paid employment’(paragraphs 58 and 59). It concluded ‘that the status 
of dependent member of a family is the result of a factual situation, which it is for 
the Member State and, if appropriate, the national courts to assess. The status of a 
family member of a frontier worker who is dependent on that worker may, when it 
relates to the case of a child of a spouse or recognised partner of that worker, be 
evidenced by objective factors, such as a joint household shared by that worker 
and the student, and it is not necessary to determine the reasons for the frontier 
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worker’s contribution to the maintenance of the student or make a precise 
estimation of its amount’ (paragraph 60) 
27 The Court of Justice then applied the criterion of ‘support’ to the question whether 
a frontier worker is entitled to the social advantage constituted by the payment of 
a family allowance, for a child with whom he or she does not have a child-parent 
relationship, stating in the grounds of its decision that ‘a child of a frontier 
worker, who is able to benefit indirectly from the social advantages referred to in 
the latter provision, means not only a child who has a child-parent relationship 
with that worker, but also a child of the spouse or registered partner of that 
worker, in the case where that worker provides for the upkeep of that child. 
According to the Court, that latter requirement is the result of a factual situation, 
which it is for the national authorities and, if appropriate, the national courts, to 
assess, on the basis of evidence provided by the applicant, and it is not necessary 
for them to determine the reasons for that contribution or to make a precise 
estimation of its amount’ (judgment of 2 April 2020, Caisse pour l’avenir des 
enfants, C-802/18 EU:C:2020:269, paragraph 50). The Court of Justice took care 
to state, in fact, ‘that the biological father of the child does not pay any 
maintenance to the child’s mother. It appears therefore that FV, the spouse of 
HY’s mother, supports that child, a matter which it is nevertheless for the 
referring court to verify’ (paragraph 52). 
28 The Court of Justice has also found that ‘the concept of a “member of the family” 
of a frontier worker able to benefit indirectly from equal treatment under 
Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 is the same as that of a “family member” 
for the purposes of Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38, which includes the spouse or 
partner with whom the EU citizen has contracted a registered partnership, the 
direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants, and the direct 
descendants of the spouse or partner. The Court has had particular regard, in this 
respect, to recital 1, Article 1 and Article 2(2) of Directive 2014/54’ 
(paragraph 51) 
29 The Court of Cassation infers from the statement that the term ‘support’ is the 
result of a factual situation that it is not a purely factual concept excluded from 
review by the Court of Justice and the Court of Cassation, but that that wording is 
intended to emphasise that that concept is assessed independently of any right of 
the child to maintenance (see judgment of 15 December 2016, Depesme and 
Others, C-401/15 to C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 58). 
30 The Court of Cassation then infers from the above that the concept of ‘support’, in 
the context of legislation relating to entitlement to social advantages, constitutes 
an autonomous concept of EU law which requires a uniform interpretation and 
application.  
31 However, such a uniform interpretation is not currently ensured in the light of the 
questions raised by the points of law under discussion. 
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32 In that regard, the Court of Cassation is prompted to inquire about the scope of the 
example used in the judgment of 15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, 
(C-401/15 to C-403/15, EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 60) to illustrate ‘objective 
factors, such as a joint household shared by that worker and the student’, first, as 
to whether that point is mentioned merely as an example or, on the contrary, as a 
condition, in which case the question arises whether it is a sufficient condition or a 
necessary condition, and, second, as to whether the mode of financing of the joint 
household matters, since it is necessary to investigate whether the frontier worker 
contributes in part or in full to that financing. 
33 As to the needs of the child to be taken into consideration which the frontier 
worker meets, the Court is called upon to consider whether only the maintenance 
needs essential to the child’s subsistence should be taken into account (food, 
clothing, accommodation, education …), or whether, in general, all expenditure of 
whatever kind, including on pleasurable activities or mere convenience (mobile 
telephone, restaurants, driving licence …) or even on sumptuous, lavish or luxury 
items (regular purchases of electronic equipment, holidays in remote countries …) 
intended to ensure a certain standard of living should be considered. 
34 As to the manner in which the frontier worker supports the child, the Court of 
Cassation wonders whether the frontier worker’s contribution to the child’s 
maintenance must take the form of cash payments made directly to the child, or 
whether it can take the form of expenditure made in the interest of the child. In the 
same context, the question arises whether the expenditure must be made, as the 
findings of the Parquet general (Principal Public Prosecutor’s Office) seem to 
suggest, in the specific, or even exclusive, interest of the child, or whether 
expenditure incurred in the common interest of the family unit (monthly mortgage 
payments, rent, purchase of equipment used in common …) may be taken into 
account. Again, on the subject of specific support arrangements, the question 
arises whether the expenditure made by the frontier worker in order to support the 
child must have a certain degree of regularity or frequency (mortgage loan, rent, 
electricity and heating costs, telephone bills …) or whether the assumption of non-
recurring costs (occasional purchases of clothing …) is also to be considered. 
Finally, whilst noting that the Court of Justice states that, in assessing the factual 
situation, it is not necessary to determine the reasons for the frontier worker’s 
contribution or make a precise estimation of its amount (judgments of 
15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, C-401/15 to C-403/15 EU:C:2016:955, 
paragraph 64, and of 2 April 2020, Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants, 
C-802/18 EU:C:2020:269, paragraph 50), the Court of Cassation wonders whether 
any contribution, however small, is to be taken into account, or whether it must be 
of a fairly significant level, and in the latter case whether that criterion must be 
assessed in relation to the child’s needs or in relation to the frontier worker’s 
financial situation. 
35 The origin of the funds may also come into question, in that, in certain cases, the 
frontier worker maintains with his or her spouse or registered partner, who is a 
parent of the child, a joint bank account used to pay expenditure advanced in court 
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proceedings in order to demonstrate that the condition of ‘supporting’ the child 
has been fulfilled, without maintaining that account exclusively and without 
establishing to what extent her or she maintains that account, in which case the 
question arises whether the contribution to the child’s needs comes from the 
frontier worker. 
36 The Court of Cassation also wonders about the scope of the statement made by the 
Court of Justice in the judgment of 15 December 2016, Depesme and Others, 
C-401/15 to C-403/15 EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 62) that ‘the EU legislature 
takes the view that the children are, in any case, presumed to be dependent until 
the age of 21 years’, since it needs to ascertain whether any child under the age of 
21, on account of that age condition taken alone or combined with other factors, 
must be regarded as having his or her needs supported by the frontier worker.  
37 The parents’ contribution to the child’s needs must then be addressed. They are 
bound by law by a maintenance obligation, unlike the frontier worker who is not 
bound by such an obligation. The criterion of ‘supporting’ the child, however, 
subjects the frontier worker to a factual assessment. Therefore, the question arises 
whether it is sufficient to establish the existence or extent of the parents’ 
maintenance obligation in order to exclude the existence of the frontier worker’s 
contribution, or whether it is also necessary to ensure that the parents’ 
maintenance obligation was fixed at an appropriate amount, and whether they 
actually fulfil their maintenance obligation, so as to make a supplementary or 
additional contribution by the frontier worker unnecessary. In the absence of 
effective payment of such support, the question arises whether it is necessary to 
verify whether the spouse or registered partner of the frontier worker has at least 
tried to take enforcement measures and whether, ultimately the frontier worker’s 
contribution remedies the failure to pay of one of the parents. In relation to that 
maintenance support and to the question whether it is fixed at an appropriate 
amount, the method of fixing the amount by judicial or conventional means may 
have an effect. Those aspects may be linked to the question, raised above, of what 
expenditure on the child is to be considered. If only maintenance expenditure 
essential to the child’s subsistence is taken into account, the parents’ maintenance 
obligation will, in principle, cover those needs, rendering nugatory a 
supplementary or additional contribution by the frontier worker to cover such 
needs.  
38 As regards relations with the child’s other parent, the question also arises whether 
it is relevant to examine the arrangements whereby the child lives alternately with 
his two parents, since visiting and extended accommodation rights or a shared 
residence may cause the other parent, in principle, to assume more substantially in 
kind his or her maintenance obligations, leaving less room for any necessity for 
the frontier worker to cover the child’s needs. 
39 All those questions must be seen against the background of the principle that the 
provisions establishing the free movement of workers must be construed broadly 
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(judgment of 15 September 2016, Depesme and Others, C-401/15 to C-403/15, 
EU:C:2016:955, paragraph 58), and therefore of any limits on that principle.  
40 Those considerations lead the Court of Cassation to request a ruling from the 
Court of Justice on the matter. 
4. THE QUESTIONS REFERRED FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 
41 The Court of Cassation asks the following questions: 
1(a) Is the condition of ‘supporting’ a child, from which is derived the status of 
family member within the meaning of the provisions of EU law, as applied by the 
case-law of the Court of Justice in the context of the free movement of workers 
and of the receipt by a frontier worker of a social advantage linked to the pursuit, 
by that worker, of an activity as an employed person in a Member State, for the 
child of his or her spouse or registered partner, with whom the worker has no 
child-parent relationship, read alone or in conjunction with the principle that the 
provisions intended to ensure the free movement of workers must be construed 
broadly, to be interpreted as being fulfilled, and therefore as conferring 
entitlement to the receipt of the social advantage, 
– merely by reason of the marriage or registered partnership between the 
frontier and one of the child’s parents 
– merely by reason of a joint home or household shared by the frontier 
worker and the child 
– merely by reason of the frontier worker’s assumption, in general, of 
expenditure of whatever kind for the benefit of the child, even when 
o it covers needs other than essential or maintenance needs 
o it is made to a third party and benefits the child only indirectly 
o it is not made in the exclusive or specific interest of the child, but 
benefits the whole household 
o it is only occasional 
o it is less than that of the parents 
o it is merely insignificant in the light of the child’s needs 
– merely by reason of the fact that the expenditure is made from a joint 
account held by the frontier worker and his or her spouse or registered 
partner, who is a parent of the child, without regard to the origin of the 
funds present in the account 
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– merely by reason of the fact that the child is under 21 years of age? 
1(b) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, is the condition of ‘support’ to 
be interpreted as being fulfilled, and therefore as conferring entitlement to the 
receipt of the social advantage, where two or more of those circumstances are 
present? 
2 Is the condition of ‘supporting’ a child, from which is derived the status of 
family member within the meaning of the provisions of EU law, as applied by the 
case-law of the Court of Justice in the context of the free movement of workers 
and of the receipt by a frontier worker of a social advantage linked to the pursuit, 
by that worker, of an activity as an employed person in a Member State, for the 
child of his or her spouse or registered partner, with whom the worker has no 
child-parent relationship, read alone or in conjunction with the principle that the 
provisions intended to ensure the free movement of workers must be construed 
broadly, to be interpreted as not being fulfilled, and therefore as excluding the 
right to receive the social advantage, 
– merely by reason of the existence of à maintenance obligation imposed 
on the child’s parents, irrespective 
o of whether the amount of the maintenance claim is fixed by 
judicial or conventional means 
o of the amount at which that maintenance claim was fixed 
o of whether the debtor actually pays that maintenance debt 
o of whether the frontier worker’s contribution remedies the failure 
to pay of one of the child’s parents 
– merely by reason of the fact that the child lives periodically, in the 
context of exercising visiting and accommodation rights or alternate 
residence or another arrangement, with the other parent?