Order;Information — ECLI:EU:C:2026:141
Date: 2026-02-26
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Summary C -517/24–1 
Case C-517/24 [Broski] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
26 July 2024 
Referring court: 
Sąd Dyscyplinarny przy Sądzie Apelacyjnym w Gdańsku (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
28 June 2024 
Party initiating the proceedings before the referring court: 
VG 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Proceedings before a national court concerning a judge’s motion for a cumulative 
decision against him covering the disciplinary penalties imposed on him in 
individual judgments handed down in disciplinary cases 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The concept of a tribunal established by law in accordance with Article 2, 
Article 19(1) and Article 6(1)–(3) TEU read in conjunction with Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the interpretation of 
the principle of primacy and the principle of effectiveness in connection with 
Article 4(1) and (2) read in conjunction with Article 10(1) and the first sentence of 
recital 16 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal 
proceedings in the context of the decisions of the Izba Odpowiedzialności 
Zawodowej Sądu Najwyższego (Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the 
Supreme Court) 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-517/24 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Must Articles 2 and 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (‘the TEU’) and 
Article 6(1) to (3) TEU read in conjunction with the first and second 
sentences of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’) 
be interpreted as meaning that: 
a court that includes members of the Izba Odpowiedzialności Zawodowej 
Sądu Najwyższego (Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme 
Court), which was established in place of the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu 
Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) pursuant to the 
2017 amendment to the ustawa o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law on the Supreme 
Court) (ustawa z 9 czerwca 2022 r. o zmianie ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym 
oraz niektórych innych ustaw) (Law of 9 June 2022 Amending the Law on 
the Supreme Court and Certain Other Laws, Dz. U. of 2022, item 1259) and 
whose competences includes the competence to review decisions issued in 
disciplinary proceedings conducted against, among others, judges 
(Articles 3(4a), 27a and 73(1) of the Law of 8 December 2017 on the 
Supreme Court – consolidated text of 23 April 2024 (Dz. U. of 2024, item 
622)), is not a tribunal established by law within the meaning of EU law; 
2. Must the provisions indicated in the first question, as well as the principle of 
primacy and the principle of effectiveness, in connection with Article 4(1) 
and (2) read in conjunction with Article 10(1) and the first sentence of 
recital 16 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in 
criminal proceedings, be interpreted as meaning that – with respect to 
decisions given at first instance, appeals against which were heard by the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court – those 
provisions oblige (or authorise) the national court hearing a case on the 
handing down of a cumulative judgment (a cumulative decision) against a 
judge to find that guilt has not been finally and lawfully proven and 
determined in that regard, and thus the aforementioned provisions oblige (or 
authorise) the national court to disregard such decisions in the process of 
deciding on a cumulative penalty (handing down a cumulative decision), 
thus applying a remedy which has the effect of placing the judge who has 
filed a motion for such a decision in the same position that he or she would 
have been in had the violations in question not occurred[?] 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Articles 2, 4(3), 6(1) to (3) and 19(1) TEU 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the 
Charter’) 
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First sentence of recital 16, Article 4(1) and (2), and Article 10(1) of Directive 
(EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on 
the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the 
right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Constitution of the Republic of Poland) – 
Articles 175, 179, 186(1) and 187; 
Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. – Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 
27 July 2001 on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, consolidated text of 
8 March 2024, Dz. U. of 2024, item 334; ‘the LOOC’) – Articles 107, 109(1), 
110, 128 and 133a; 
Kodeks postępowania karnego (Code of Criminal Procedure) – Article 569(1); 
Ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law of 8 December 2017 
on the Supreme Court, consolidated text of 23 April 2024, Dz. U. of 2024, item 
622; ‘the LSC’) – Articles 3, 22a, 27a, 59 and 63; 
Ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa (Law of 12 May 
2011 on the National Council of the Judiciary, consolidated text of 11 February 
2021, Dz. U. of 2021, item 269; ‘the LNCJ’) – Articles 3, 9a, 11a. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 By judgment of the Sąd Dyscyplinarny przy Sądzie Apelacyjnym w Łodzi 
(Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź) of 1 April 2019 (Ref. 
ASD 4/18), VG, a judge of the Sąd Rejonowy w Śremie (District Court in Śrem), 
was convicted of two counts of professional misconduct. That judgment was 
amended by the judgment of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the 
Supreme Court of 15 November 2022 (Ref. II ZOW 1/22), which imposed a 
cumulative penalty under Article 133a(2) of the LOOC. 
2 By judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź of 
4 October 2019 (Ref. ASD 4/19), the judge was convicted of three counts of 
professional misconduct, with a cumulative penalty imposed in lieu of the 
penalties imposed for each offence. By judgment of the Disciplinary Chamber of 
the Supreme Court of 2 September 2021 (Ref. II DOW 13/21), the judgment at 
first instance was amended by increasing the disciplinary penalty imposed. 
3 By judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Gdańsk of 
27 September 2021 (Ref. ASD 2/21), the same judge was convicted of eight 
counts of professional misconduct with a cumulative penalty imposed in lieu of 
the penalties imposed for each offence. By judgment of the Chamber of 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-517/24 
 
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Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of 18 April 2023 (Ref. II 
ZOW 22/22), the judgment at first instance was upheld. 
4 On 12 November 2021, the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź 
received VG’s motion for a cumulative judgment in cases ASD 4/19 and 
DOW 13/21. In addition, VG submitted a statement in which he requested that 
both decisions of the Disciplinary Court in Łódź, including in case ASD 4/18, and 
the judgment of the Disciplinary Court in Gdańsk in case ASD 2/21, be included 
in the proceedings concerning the cumulative judgment. The Disciplinary Court at 
the Court of Appeal in Łódź found itself without jurisdiction and transferred the 
case to the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Gdańsk, which is the 
referring court in the present case. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
5 Pursuant to Article 133a(3) of the LOOC, in the event that the accused has 
committed two or more disciplinary offences before the first decision has been 
handed down with respect to any of them, even if that decision is not final, at the 
request of the sanctioned person a cumulative decision is given, provided that the 
penalties imposed are subject to cumulation according to the rules provided for in 
Article 133a(2) of the LOOC. Pursuant to Article 569(1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure read in conjunction with Article 128 of the LOOC, a cumulative 
decision is only given against a person who has been convicted by final judgment. 
6 In applying the rules indicated above, the referring court must decide on the 
possibility of combining disciplinary penalties for the concurrent disciplinary 
offences of which the sanctioned judge was convicted in the individual judgments. 
However, the referring court has doubts as to whether the aforementioned 
convictions for disciplinary offences should be treated as final given the nature of 
the adjudicating body that handed down the judgments at second instance. 
7 It should be noted that in case ASD 4/19 heard by the Disciplinary Court at the 
Court of Appeal in Łódź, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled as 
the court of second instance. On the other hand, in case ASD 4/18 heard by the 
Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź, and in case ASD 2/21 heard by 
the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Gdańsk, the Chamber of 
Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court, which was established by the 
Law of 9 June 2022 amending the Law on the Supreme Court, ruled as the court 
of second instance. 
8 As regards the first of the above cases, the referring court takes the position – 
supported by the extensive case-law of the Court of Justice, but also the case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the Polish courts – that the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court was neither a tribunal ‘established by 
law’ within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR 
nor a competent court within the meaning of Article 45(1) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland. This means that the disciplinary penalties imposed by the 
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judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź of 4 October 
2019 in case ASD 4/19 cannot be subject to cumulation, because in a situation 
where the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled on those penalties as 
the appellate court, the judgment cannot be considered final. 
9 However, a problem arises with regard to the other two cases and concerns 
whether the same criteria can be applied to the disciplinary penalties imposed by 
the judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź in case 
ASD 4/18 and by the judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in 
Gdańsk in case ASD 2/21, as it was the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of 
the Supreme Court which ruled on the two aforementioned cases as the appellate 
court. 
10 In the view of the referring court, a case concerning the disciplinary responsibility 
of a judge of an ordinary court falls within the scope governed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and at the same time is an EU case that is subject 
to Article 47 of the Charter and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. 
Indeed, the referring court belongs to the Polish system of legal remedies in the 
‘fields covered by Union law’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU [judgments of 24 June 2019, Commission/Poland 
(Independence of the Supreme Court), C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 56 
and the case-law cited therein, and of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and 
Prokurator Generalny, C-558/18 and C-563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 35 
and the case-law cited therein]. 
11 The issue presented by the referring court is relevant to the decision that is to be 
given by the national court. Without a resolution of whether, in cases where 
appeals are heard by the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme 
Court, the accused has been convicted by final judgment (his or her guilt has been 
proven) delivered by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established 
by law within the meaning of EU law, it will not be possible to determine whether 
and which disciplinary penalties are concurrent, and in connection with which a 
cumulative penalty may be imposed. 
12 In its judgment of 5 December 2019, and in its orders of 15 January 2020, the 
Supreme Court, ruling on the cases in connection with which the 19 November 
2019 judgment was given in A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, 
EU:C:2019:982), found that the National Council of the Judiciary, in its current 
composition, is not a body independent of the legislature and the executive. That 
position was confirmed by the resolution of 23 January 2020 of the joint chambers 
of the Supreme Court – the Civil Chamber, the Criminal Chamber, and the 
Chamber of Labour Law and Social Security. 
13 As regards the status of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the 
Supreme Court as an independent and impartial tribunal whose decision in a case 
would not provide absolute grounds for appeal, doubts have also been raised by 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-517/24 
 
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some judges of that Chamber. In the order given by a panel of that Chamber on 
7 February 2024 (Ref. II ZIZ 14/23), the following facts were cited as grounds for 
those doubts: First, the fact that judges are appointed to the Chamber by the 
Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (President of the Republic of Poland) with 
the approval of the Prezes Rady Ministrów (Prime Minister). Second, the absence 
of any criteria for such appointments. Third, the failure of the President of the 
Republic of Poland to provide any reasons for the appointment of Supreme Court 
judges. Fourth, the improper appointment to the Supreme Court of the majority of 
the judges sitting in that Chamber – they were appointed with the participation of 
the National Council of the Judiciary (‘the NCJ’), which was not properly 
constituted. Fifth, the inability of judges to resign from adjudicating in that 
Chamber. Sixth, the fact that a panel of judges cannot be selected from among 
Supreme Court judges who do not sit in the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility. Seventh, the narrow, sensitive, and generally repressive nature of 
the cases falling under the jurisdiction of that Chamber, that is to say, disciplinary 
cases and cases involving the waiver of immunity of judges and prosecutors. 
Eighth, the real risk that two-instance proceedings conducted before a court that 
does not include defectively appointed Supreme Court judges cannot be 
guaranteed to the parties. Ninth, the fact that since six of the eleven judges in the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility cannot – due to the defectiveness of their 
appointments as Supreme Court judges – form an independent and impartial 
tribunal, that Chamber is structurally and systemically flawed, and a decision 
given with the participation of an improperly appointed Supreme Court judge 
would result in absolute grounds for appeal. 
14 In a dissenting opinion to the resolution of the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility in its full composition of 2 September 2013 (Ref. II ZZP 2/22) 
Judge K. Staryk also pointed out that, first, the President of the Republic of 
Poland does not have the constitutional authority to ‘appoint’ judges for a specific 
period of time to adjudicate in a specific case or in a specific category of cases. 
Second, the composition of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility was not 
established by law, but rather by ministerial decision. Third, the principles of 
separation of powers and judicial independence have been infringed as a 
consequence of specific judges having been appointed to hear specific cases or a 
specific range of cases, which points to the overt influence of the executive on the 
composition of courts. Fourth, the judges appointed to that Chamber were not 
served acts of appointment, which is incompatible with national law and raises 
reasonable doubts as to their capacity to hear cases in that Chamber. Fifth, the 
principle of equal treatment was infringed, since the judges of that Chamber were 
treated less favourably than other judges, since they were appointed to the 
Chamber without their consent. Sixth, the same principle of equal treatment was 
also infringed by forcing judges in that Chamber to work double time for a single 
salary owing to their being assigned cases from two chambers of the Supreme 
Court, by assigning those judges to hear cases in a new area of law for which they 
had not been previously prepared, and by giving them additional duties that they 
had not previously performed (on-call duty in cases concerning judges to be 
remanded in custody). Seventh, court independence may be compromised by the 
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participation of lay judges in the hearing of cases by that Chamber due to their 
lack of legal training, which effectively prevents them from engaging in any legal 
argument, despite having been assigned to hear the most legally complex cases. 
15 The referring court cites the Court’s case-law regarding the Disciplinary Chamber 
of the Supreme Court [for instance, the judgment of 15 July 2021, Commission v 
Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C-791/19, EU:C:2021:596] and 
regarding the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the 
Supreme Court [for instance, the judgment of 21 December 2023, Krajowa Rada 
Sądownictwa (Continued holding of a judicial office), C-718/21, 
EU:C:2023:1015], which indicated that those bodies do not have the status of 
independent and impartial tribunals previously established by law within the 
meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU read in conjunction 
with the second subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter. In that regard, the 
referring court also cites the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 
23 November 2023 in Wałęsa v. Poland (Application No 50849/21), which called 
on Poland to restore the independence of the NCJ by introducing legislation that 
would guarantee the Polish judiciary the right to elect judges who are members of 
the NCJ, by regulating the status of all judges appointed under a flawed procedure 
involving the newly constituted NCJ and of the decisions made with their 
participation, and by ensuring effective judicial review of NCJ resolutions on the 
appointment of judges submitted to the President of the Republic of Poland, 
including by the Supreme Court. 
The first question 
16 By its first question, the referring court seeks to determine whether, in view of the 
irregularities pointed out in that question with respect to the creation of the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility – including, in particular, those relating to 
the manner in which judges are designated to hear cases in that Chamber, the 
manner in which some who hear cases in that Chamber were appointed to judicial 
posts, and the procedure related to the inclusion of a lay judge in the list of lay 
judges of the Supreme Court who may be designated to hear cases – a court whose 
composition includes members of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of 
the Supreme Court, the competences of which include the review of decisions 
issued in disciplinary proceedings conducted against, among others, judges, is a 
tribunal established by law that meets the necessary criteria to be considered a 
court under EU law. Consequently, the referring court seeks to determine whether, 
in those circumstances, a panel thus constituted may conduct proceedings in a 
case and deliver a decision without prejudice to the right to a fair trial as 
guaranteed under EU law, in particular Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the 
Charter. 
17 The national court is aware of the legal environment that has emerged in the 
national legal order over recent years. In particular, the national court realises 
that – in the absence of legislative changes – the current legal order shifts the 
burden of assessing the consequences of that state of affairs onto the courts as 
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bodies which apply the law, and at the same time fails to provide the courts with 
the necessary tools to ensure the effective application of the results of that 
assessment within the framework of the national judicial system. 
18 The answer to the question referred is fundamental to the ongoing national 
proceedings, since if it is established that, in the given circumstances, the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility is not a court within the meaning of EU 
law, it will be necessary to recognise that the decisions given by adjudicating 
panels of that Chamber in cases involving the application of EU law, such as the 
decisions analysed in the context of handing down a cumulative judgment with 
regard to the disciplinary penalties previously imposed on Judge VG, have 
deprived that judge of the right to a fair trial and the right to effective judicial 
protection as guaranteed by the treaties. In that case, both decisions will have to be 
considered non-existent from the point of view of EU law. As a result, the 
condition that a cumulative judgment may only be given against a person 
convicted by final judgment will not be met. 
19 The doubts as to whether a court whose composition includes members of the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court, which was 
established to replace the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, is a 
tribunal established by law within the meaning of EU law are based on three 
fundamental points that should be evaluated and considered together. The first is 
the perceived irregularities in the manner of appointing judges to sit in that 
Chamber. The second is the perceived irregularities with respect to the procedure 
for including a lay judge in the list of lay judges of the Supreme Court who can be 
designated to adjudicate in, among others, the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility. The third is the defective appointment to the position of Supreme 
Court judge of some of the judges designated to adjudicate in that Chamber; in 
particular, those defects consist in the fact that the candidates were recommended 
to the President of the Republic of Poland by the newly constituted NCJ – this 
relates to six persons sitting in the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the 
Supreme Court. 
20 The Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court was 
established by the Law of 9 June 2022 amending the Law on the Supreme Court 
and certain other laws in order to replace the Disciplinary Chamber. The process 
of appointing judges to the Chamber of Professional Responsibility was redefined 
and involved two stages. In the first stage, 33 judges were drawn by lot from 
among all judges of the Supreme Court, with certain exceptions laid down in the 
legislation (Article 22a(4) of the LOOC). Then, from among those judges, 11 
were appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland to sit in the new 
Chamber (Article 22a(1) of the LOOC). The order of the President of the Republic 
of Poland appointing those judges required the approval (countersignature) of the 
Prime Minister (Article 144(2) read in conjunction with Article 144(3) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland). No other body, including the NCJ and the 
Supreme Court itself, participated in that process in any manner. The law likewise 
did not stipulate any criteria to be taken into account by the President and by the 
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Prime Minister when making the relevant decision, and it explicitly stated that the 
consent of the judges concerned was not required (Article 22a(8) of the LOOC). 
As a result, and in practice, the composition of the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility was determined arbitrarily by two organs of the executive, that is to 
say, the President of the Republic of Poland and the Prime Minister. 
21 The choice made by the President of the Republic of Poland is very significant, as 
he almost exclusively selected for the Chamber of Professional Responsibility 
persons previously appointed to the Supreme Court in violation of the treaties and 
conventions, and also in violation of Supreme Court judgments, or those judges 
who rejected the resolution of the combined Chambers of the Supreme Court of 
23 January 2020. The latter judges have been willing to sit on adjudicating panels 
that include judges whose participation in hearing cases is contrary to the law. 
This is all the more important if one considers that the statutory competences of 
the Chamber of Professional Responsibility include ruling on disciplinary 
sanctions, including the removal of judges from office, particularly in cases in 
which judges refuse to adjudicate or question the appointment of other persons to 
judicial posts (Article 72(1)(1a) to (3) of the LOOC). 
22 The referring court points out that the appointment of judges by the executive in 
that manner was entirely arbitrary. When appointing judges to the Chamber of 
Professional Responsibility, the President of the Republic of Poland was not 
guided by any statutory considerations, nor did he justify his decisions in any way. 
Given the results of those appointments, it is reasonable to conclude that, in actual 
fact, the President’s real motivation when appointing the majority of members of 
the Chamber of Professional Responsibility was to ensure that his previous 
appointments to the Supreme Court, made in clear violation of the law, would not 
be challenged. In addition, there is no procedure for appealing against those 
decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland. Moreover, in the absence of 
any statutory criteria to be taken into account, and in the absence of any 
justification for the appointments, any legal remedy, even if permissible, would be 
rendered ineffective. 
23 Another issue concerning the composition of the adjudicating panels of the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility is that of lay judges. The participation of 
lay judges in cases heard by that Chamber also raises legitimate doubts as to the 
independence and impartiality of the panels thus composed. Lay judges are 
appointed by the Senat (Senate), that is, by a purely political body. As a member 
of an adjudicating panel, a lay judge has the same powers as a professional judge. 
In accordance with paragraph 85(1) of the Regulamin Sądu Najwyższego (Rules 
of the Supreme Court), lay judges should be notified 14 days in advance of a 
hearing or closed session in which they are to participate, but in exceptional cases 
a shorter period will suffice. Under paragraph 85(2) of those Rules, if a lay judge 
is absent, another lay judge – who is already participating in another hearing or 
session on the same day – may participate in their place. In addition, for the 
purposes of adjudication, an alphabetical list of lay judges has been established, 
and cases are assigned to them on that basis. If, within 24 hours, a lay judge does 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-517/24 
 
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not respond to an attempt to contact him or her by telephone and text message, the 
case is assigned to the next lay judge on the list, and the lay judge who has been 
omitted is subsequently considered for assignment to the next case. In practice, 
those provisions allow the presiding judge to arbitrarily change the lay judge who 
is to be included in the adjudicating panel. They also make it impossible for that 
person to properly prepare for the hearing, and lay judges are not required to have 
the expertise necessary to take decisions on the disciplinary responsibility of 
judges, prosecutors, lawyers, physicians and members of other professions. 
24 The third issue concerns the defective appointments of Supreme Court judges, 
which has already been dealt with in numerous proceedings before the Court of 
Justice. The referring court takes the position that in the case of six persons 
appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland to adjudicate in the Chamber 
of Professional Responsibility, no effective motion for their appointment was 
submitted, and therefore they were not effectively appointed as Supreme Court 
judges. In that regard, the referring court cites the Court’s findings on the proper 
conduct of the judicial appointment procedure contained, inter alia, in the 
following judgments: of 24 June 2019, Commission/Poland (Independence of the 
Supreme Court), C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531; of 19 November 2019, A.K. and 
Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), 
C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982; of 26 March 2020, Review 
Simpson and HG v Council and Commission, C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-
II, EU:C:2020:232; of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to 
the Supreme Court – Actions), C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153; and of 6 October 2021, 
W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme 
Court – Appointment), C-487/19, EU:C:2021:798.  
25 In that regard, the referring court also cites the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights contained in the following decisions: of 28 June 1984 in Campbell 
and Fell v. the United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, 
paragraph 79; of 2 June 2005 in Zolotas v. Greece, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0602JUD003824002, paragraphs 24 and 25; of 9 November 2006 
in Sacilor-Lormines v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:1109JUD006541101, 
paragraph 67; and of 18 October 2018 in Thiam v. France, 
CE:ECHR:2018:1018JUD008001812, paragraph 80. The referring court points 
out that in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the phrase ‘established by law’ refers not only to the legal basis for the very 
existence of the ‘tribunal’, but also to the composition of the adjudicating panel in 
individual cases (Buscarini v. San Marino, Application No 31657/96, 4 May 
2000, and Posokhov v. Russia, Application No 63486/00, paragraph 39, ECtHR 
2003-IV; Gorgiladze v. Georgia, paragraph 69; Volkov v. Ukraine, 150–151). On 
the other hand, ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR includes, in 
particular, provisions concerning the establishment and competence of judicial 
bodies (Lavents v. Latvia, paragraph 114; Richert v. Poland, paragraph 41; Jorgic 
v. Germany, paragraph 64), but also any other provisions of national law which, in 
the event of their infringement, make it unlawful for one or more judges to 
participate in the hearing of a case (Pandjikidze and Others v. Georgia, 
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paragraph 104; Gorgiladze v. Georgia, paragraph 68). The referring court is also 
mindful of the 1 December 2020 judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland (Application No 26374/18), 
which introduced a three-step test to determine whether irregularities in a judicial 
appointment procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to 
a tribunal established by law. The referring court also cites cases in which the 
applications concerned Poland [judgments of 7 May 2021 in Xero Flor v. Poland 
(Application No 4907/18); of 22 July 2021 in Reczkowicz v. Poland (Application 
No 43447/19); of 8 November 2021 in Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland 
(Applications Nos 49868/19 and 57511/19); and of 23 November 2023 in Wałęsa 
v. Poland (Application No 50849/21)]. At the same time, the referring court points 
out that a case is currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights 
(Grzegorczyk v. Poland, Application No 2203/23) that is entirely concerned with 
issues arising in connection with the establishment of the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility and the appointment to that Chamber of judges appointed before 
2018 as well as those appointed in a later procedure. 
26 In the opinion of the referring court, the analysis of the cited case-law of the Court 
of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights raises reasonable grounds 
for concluding that the irregularities identified in connection with the 
establishment and functioning of the now defunct Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court and in connection with the establishment and functioning of the 
Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court – 
including, in particular, the critically assessed legal framework and actual 
circumstances related to the appointment of judges who hear cases in those 
chambers – are applicable by analogy to the creation and functioning of the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court. Although the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility was established in order to eliminate the 
systemic flaws affecting the Supreme Court, that goal has not been achieved. 
The second question 
27 The answer to the first question, particularly if it leads to the finding that the 
judicial panels hearing cases in the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the 
Supreme Court do not meet the criteria stipulated in the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU, will automatically necessitate a decision on how to handle 
cases in which, as the result of an appeal, the decision at second instance was 
given by an adjudicating panel of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of 
the Supreme Court. Thus, the task of the referring court is to determine whether 
the judgments handed down in relation to the sanctioned person and potentially 
taken into account when determining the cumulative penalty are actually 
enforceable and concurrent with the other penalties. 
28 The referring court recognises that national law, in accordance with the principles 
enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, should guarantee a 
system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring individuals’ right to effective 
legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. Currently, however, the Polish 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-517/24 
 
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legal system lacks the remedies to guarantee that system, and consequently the 
decisions given by adjudicating panels of the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility of the Supreme Court are considered enforceable in that system. 
Therefore, should the Court of Justice find that a disciplinary court consisting of 
adjudicating panels of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme 
Court violates the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the problem of the 
formal enforceability of judgments handed down by such panels at second 
instance will have to be resolved. It remains to be decided, therefore, what remedy 
should be applied in order to ensure the compatibility of national law with EU law 
in a situation where decisions given by the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility of the Supreme Court are considered valid in the national legal 
system. 
29 The referring court notes that the Court of Justice has pointed out that the burden 
of ensuring respect for EU law is, in principle, borne by the courts of the Member 
States. In each case, national courts have the power, and in some circumstances 
also the legal obligation, to verify whether the requirements arising from the 
fundamental right to effective judicial protection within the meaning of the 
provisions of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter have been met, 
which, in the view of the referring court, imposes a clear, precise and 
unconditional obligation on those courts to achieve compliance with those 
provisions. That goal should be served by the remedies provided by the Member 
State in its national law. If, however, national law does not provide for such 
remedies, then, in the view of the referring court, the direct effect of the regulation 
in question obliges the national court to disapply any provisions of national law, 
case-law or practice contrary to those provisions of EU law, as interpreted by the 
Court of Justice. 
30 It also follows from the Court’s case-law, however, that the Court has a major role 
in guiding the application of the principle of effectiveness. In the case in the main 
proceedings, given the absence of legal arrangements in the national legal order 
that would constitute an effective remedy, it is necessary for the Court of Justice 
to rule on the remedies that should be adopted if the Chamber of Professional 
Responsibility of the Supreme Court is found not to meet the criteria of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Indeed, in the view of the referring court, 
those effective remedies are to be found in EU law and, more specifically, in 
Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings. 
31 The referring court notes that if the Chamber of Professional Responsibility is 
found not to meet the criteria of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, 
this would result in a situation in which the judgment issued by such a court 
would conclude the appeal proceedings, formally causing the penalties imposed 
by the courts at first instance to become enforceable. This formally places an 
obligation on the referring court to take into account the penalties imposed in such 
cases when determining the cumulative penalty. Meanwhile, Directive 2016/343, 
particularly the first sentence of recital 16 and Article 4(1) and (2), expressly 
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prohibits referring to a party to the proceedings as guilty in judicial decisions 
other than those on guilt until the accused person has been proven guilty 
according to law. Under Article 10(1) of the directive, Member States must ensure 
that suspects and accused persons have an effective remedy if their rights under 
the directive are breached. In the view of the referring court, the provisions of 
Directive 2016/343 preclude a decision on a cumulative penalty, which is 
essentially a judicial decision other than one on guilt, from referring to the 
judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in Łódź in case 
ASD 4/18 and the judgment of the Disciplinary Court at the Court of Appeal in 
Gdańsk in case ASD 2/21 as decisions proving VG guilty according to law, since 
in those cases the appeals were heard by adjudicating panels of the Chamber of 
Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court. In the opinion of the referring 
court, the judgments of the courts of appeal should be considered non-final in 
those cases, which appears to be the only remedy available in the light of 
Article 10(1) of Directive 2016/343, and as a result, those decisions should be 
disregarded in the process of determining the cumulative penalty. 
32 In view of the above, according to the referring court, in this particular case, the 
obligation to achieve compliance with the provisions of Article 19(1) TEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter can only be fulfilled by way of the referring court, which 
is obliged to disapply any provisions of national law that violate those provisions, 
disregarding the decisions of the courts in cases ASD 4/18 and ASD 2/21 as non-
final. 
33 The referring court asks the Court of Justice, which guides the application of the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law, for an opinion on whether such a remedy can 
ensure respect for the principle of effectiveness of EU law. 
Expedited procedure 
34 Pursuant to Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the 
referring court requests the application of the expedited preliminary ruling 
procedure. 
35 The significance of the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling 
goes beyond the circumstances of the case which the question directly concerns. 
Numerous disciplinary proceedings, including against judges, are currently 
pending before disciplinary courts at courts of appeal. In the vast majority of those 
cases, the parties are appealing to the court of second instance, which is the 
Chamber of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court. As a result of the 
judgments given by that Chamber, the legal chaos in Poland may be exacerbated. 
The immediate resolution of the doubts expressed in the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling would make it possible to avoid a systemic threat to civil 
liberties and rights in Poland or to determine that there is no such threat.