Information;Order — ECLI:EU:C:2024:425
Date: 2024-05-27
Language of the case: Bulgarian
Court formation: Tenth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - inadmissible
Origin: Bulgaria

Summary C-797/21 – 1 
Case C-797/21 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice  
Date lodged:  
15 December 2021 
Referring court:  
Sofiyski rayonen sad (Bulgaria)  
Date of the decision to refer:  
15 December 2021 
Applicant:  
Y. YA.  
Defendant:  
K. P.  
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
The proceedings were instituted on the application of Y. YA. seeking an order for 
protection from violence. At present, only the dispute as to costs is still pending in 
the case, in connection with which the request for a preliminary ruling is also 
made. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
On the basis of Article 267 TFEU, the referring court refers two groups of 
questions of interpretation to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The first 
group concerns the independence of judicial authorities and, in particular, the 
compatibility of the rules on the long-term secondment of judges under Bulgarian 
law with the requirement under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to 
guarantee the independence of the courts of the Member States of the European 
Union. The second group of questions concerns the effects of legal acts issued by 
an adjudicating panel that may not meet the standards for an independent court or 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-797/21  
 
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tribunal in the case where those acts contain directions given to a lower national 
court. 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU be interpreted as 
meaning that, due to the fact that the independence of the courts has been 
undermined, citizens are not guaranteed the legal remedies necessary for effective 
judicial protection where, in a Member State of the European Union, it is 
permissible for judges to be seconded to a higher court for an indefinite period, 
with their consent, by decision of a governing body of the judiciary which is 
independent of the other public authorities, if conditions are laid down for a 
decision to terminate the secondment and provision is made for a legal remedy 
against that decision, but that remedy does not have suspensive effect while the 
proceedings are pending, and on the basis of what criteria should it be specifically 
assessed whether secondment for an indefinite period is permissible? 
2. Would the answer to the first question be different if the objective conditions 
for the decision to order the termination of a secondment are laid down by law and 
are subject to judicial review, but no such conditions subject to judicial review are 
laid down in respect of the selection of judges to be seconded? 
3. If the answer to the first question is that the secondment of judges is 
permissible under such conditions if objective rules are complied with, must 
account be taken, when assessing the extent to which the national provisions run 
counter to the requirement to provide sufficient remedies under the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, of not only the criteria laid down by law but 
also the manner in which they are applied by the competent administrative and 
judicial authorities? 
4. Must Commission Decision 2006/929/EC be interpreted as meaning that the 
answers to the previous three questions would be different if a national practice of 
secondment which is based on rules similar to those currently in force has been 
established, and this has given rise to objections under the mechanism for 
cooperation and verification established by that decision? 
5. If it has been established that the national provisions on the secondment of 
judges may run counter to the obligation to provide remedies that are necessary to 
guarantee effective judicial protection under the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU, must that article be interpreted as precluding a higher court, 
the adjudicating panel of which was also composed of a seconded judge, from 
giving binding directions to a national court, and under what conditions is that the 
case? In particular, are directions which do not concern the merits of the dispute 
but prescribe that certain procedural acts are to be performed vitiated by a 
procedural defect? 
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Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 
C-64/16 (EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 32 to 37) 
Judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, [Joined 
Cases] C-558/18 and C-563/18 (EU:C:2020:234, paragraphs 34, 35 and 46 to 48) 
Judgment of 6 October 2021, W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and 
Public Affairs of the Supreme Court – Appointment), C-487/19 (EU:C:2021:798, 
paragraph 94) 
Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and FrontEx 
International, [Joined Cases] C-427/16 and C-428/16 (EU:C:2017:890) 
Judgment of 16 November 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim, 
[Joined Cases] C-748/19 to C-754/19 (EU:C:2021:931, paragraphs 78 to 86) 
Judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociaţia “Forumul Judecătorilor din România”, 
[Joined Cases] C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19 
(EU:C:2021:393) 
Judgment of 5 October 2010, Elchinov, C-173/09 (EU:C:2010:581) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Konstitutsia na Republika Balgaria (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria) – 
preamble, Articles 8, 117, 129, 130, 130a, 133 
Zakon za sadebnata vlast (Law on the judiciary; ‘the ZSV’) – Articles 2, 5, 16, 30, 
36, 87, 107, 160, 165, 176, 178, 188, 189, 191a, 192 and 193, Article 227(1) and 
(2) 
Zakon za zashtita ot domashnoto nasilie (Law on protection against domestic 
violence) 
Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (Code of Civil Procedure; ‘the GPK’) – 
Articles 20, 21, 22, 78, 81, 248, 252, 258, 274, 278 
Pravilnik za administratsiata v sadilishtata (Regulations on the administration of 
the courts) – Article 80 
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Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
Facts 
1 The proceedings were instituted on 28 February 2020, on the application of 
Y. YA. seeking an order for protection from violence, in which he claims that he 
and his minor daughter had been victims of violence at the hands of the defendant, 
K. P. The hearing in the proceedings was scheduled for 3 July 2020. 
2 On 15 May 2020, the applicant applied to the court of second instance (Sofiyski 
gradski sad, Sofia City Court) and requested that it expedite the proceedings by 
setting a time limit for the referring court to perform procedural acts (referred to 
as an ‘application to have a time limit set in the event of delay’). That application 
was refused by order of the Sofia City Court (‘the SGS’) of 2 July 2020. 
3 By application of the same date, lodged not with the SGS, where the case file was 
located at that time, but with the Sofiyski rayonen sad (District Court, Sofia; ‘the 
SRS’), a court of first instance, the applicant withdrew his application for 
protection, stating that his fundamental rights had been violated. 
4 The following day (3 July 2020), the case file was still not physically in the 
building of the SRS, as a result of which the scheduled hearing was not held. On 
the same day, the defendant lodged an application with the court, by which, in 
addition to numerous objections to the applicant’s conduct, she also requested that 
she be reimbursed the costs. 
5 By decision of the SRS of 14 July 2020, the proceedings were discontinued (due 
to the withdrawal of the application for protection on 2 July 2020). The referring 
court proceeded on the assumption that no costs were to be reimbursed, as it had 
no information concerning any action taken by the defendant. The failure to take 
the defendant’s application of 3 July 2020 into account was attributable to an 
omission on the part of either the judge or the court administration. 
6 On 7 August 2020, the defendant lodged an appeal by which she requested that 
she be reimbursed the costs following the discontinuation of the proceedings. The 
decision to discontinue the proceedings was not challenged and became final on 
7 August 2020. 
7 The defendant’s appeal was forwarded to the appellate court (the SGS). The 
adjudicating panel seised of that appeal was composed of two judges appointed to 
the SGS and one judge who had been seconded from the SRS to the SGS on 
6 February 2017 (by order of the President of the Apelativen sad Sofia, [Court of 
Appeal, Sofia]; ‘the SAS’) for a period of 12 months (but whose secondment had 
not yet been terminated), whereby the reason cited for the secondment was ‘the 
existence of vacant judge positions, the secondment of judges from the SGS to the 
SAS and the Varhoven kasatsionen sad, [Supreme Court of Cassation] – “the 
VKS” – and the extended parental leave of judges’. By order of the SGS of 
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28 January 2021, the proceedings relating to the defendant’s appeal of 7 August 
2020 were discontinued, whereby the SGS found that the referring court had 
jurisdiction and directed it to rule itself on the question of costs in accordance with 
Article 248 of the GPK. 
8 The applicant brought an appeal against the order of 28 January 2021, which was 
dismissed by the SAS (via the adjudicating panel composed of the three judges 
who had already ruled in the proceedings, one of whom had been seconded). The 
directions of the SGS instructing the referring court to rule on the defendant’s 
claim for costs also became final with that dismissal. 
9 It should be noted that there is no evidence in the proceedings showing that the 
judges included in the adjudicating panels with powers of review were 
compromised by a conflict of interest, and no concerns have been raised in that 
regard. The only cause for concern is the objective existence of rules of the 
secondment system that are liable to give rise to doubts as to the impartiality of a 
seconded judge. 
Facts about the secondment system in Bulgaria 
10 Bulgarian law has always allowed a judge appointed to a particular judicial 
authority to be seconded, during his or her judicial service, to another court of the 
same or a higher judicial level under certain conditions. For years, that power was 
regarded as being extraordinary in nature and was subject to certain conditions. 
Over time, and due to the inability (and perhaps unwillingness) of the judiciary’s 
body responsible for the organisation of personnel (Vissh sadeben savet, Supreme 
Judicial Council; ‘the VSS’) to organise regular competitions for the promotion of 
judges, there has been an ever increasing number of vacant posts for judges in the 
higher courts. The workload of those courts is increasing and this has brought 
about a need to seek alternative career paths. 
11 One such alternative path is the secondment of judges, which has become a 
widespread practice, as it is carried out not according to a centralised competition 
procedure, but only by decision of the presidents of the courts, which is not 
subject to consultation with other judicial authorities. For example, the 
secondment of a judge from the SRS to the SGS is ordered solely by the President 
of the SAS (Article 87 of the ZSV), while the secondment of a judge from the 
SGS to the SAS is likewise ordered by decision of the President of the SAS 
(Article 107 of the ZSV). 
12 The provisions on the secondment of judges have been amended several times in 
the last six years. In response to the objections raised by the European 
Commission under the mechanism for cooperation and verification established by 
its Decision 2006/929, an attempt was made in 2016 to limit that practice by 
amending the ZSV so as to set a maximum period of secondment of one year and 
to prohibit repeated secondments to the same judicial authority (see Article 227(1) 
of the ZSV). However, that amendment has to a certain extent been rendered 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-797/21  
 
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meaningless by the creation of a new Article 227(2) of the ZSV (in force since 
14 November 2017), which allows a judge to be seconded with his or her consent, 
without a time limit, where the authority to which he or she has been seconded has 
a vacant post for a judge. Thus, in practice, the decision on secondment, which is 
valid for an indefinite period, is taken solely by the presidents of the courts, who 
authorise such secondment, provided that the seconded judge gives his or her 
consent. Experience shows that the duration of secondments reaches nine years in 
some cases. 
13 Moreover, by order of 14 August 2020 in Administrative Case No 2374/2020, the 
Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court; ‘the VAS’) refused 
to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union the question as to whether 
the secondment of judges solely by decision of presidents of courts constitutes a 
breach of the guarantee of judicial independence. 
14 Until 2018, the termination of secondments took place solely by decision of the 
president of a court who had authorised the secondment. An amendment made to 
Article 30(5) of the ZSV that same year created a new point 18, which empowered 
the Sadiyska kolegia na VSS (Judicial College of the VSS) to terminate the 
secondment of a judge where there are ‘breaches of the procedure provided for in 
this Law or where the work of the judicial authority from which the judge was 
seconded has brought about staffing needs’. 
15 The law does not define what ‘staffing needs’ means. However, point 18 of 
Article 30(5) of the ZSV has been interpreted by the VAS. In judgment No 8223 
of 25 June 2020 in Administrative Case No 13214/2018, it held that, when 
assessing ‘staffing needs’, only the workload of the court from which the judge 
was seconded is to be taken into account, whereby that court must have 
experienced a change in the number of cases received. Furthermore, the VAS held 
that a termination of secondment does not require, as a mandatory condition, that 
the seconded judge be heard before the Judicial College of the VSS, since the 
termination of the secondment is requested by the president of the court from 
which the judge had been seconded. 
16 In relation to the practice of the Judicial College of the VSS in the exercise of the 
powers to terminate secondment, the referring court examined, in detail, the 
minutes of the hearing of the Judicial College of the VSS held on 23 June 2020, 
which show that, in a particular case, the usual procedure for appointing certain 
judges was changed in order to terminate the secondment of another judge. The 
referring court takes the view that the contradictory reasoning set out in the 
minutes raises concerns that the judiciary’s body responsible for the organisation 
of personnel does not take its decisions in a transparent manner and, in that 
respect, is guided by motives to satisfy certain judges at the expense of others. In 
support of that conclusion, the referring court also points to the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 19 October 2021 in Miroslava Todorova v 
Bulgaria, from which the reluctance of the Judicial College of the VSS to state 
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reasons for the unequal treatment of persons is apparent (albeit in relation to 
different issues). 
17 In summary, with regard to the situation of a seconded judge under the Bulgarian 
law currently in force, it can be said that, in the general case of secondment under 
Article 227(1) of the ZSV, the change of job is a one-off event and for a 
maximum period of one year. The period is quite short and the judge is aware that 
he or she will return to his or her former post, with the result that the secondment 
appears to be in accordance with the conditions established in the case-law of the 
Court (see paragraph 31 below). 
18 The situation is different in the case of secondment under the provision of 
Article 227(2) of the ZSV, which was introduced in 2017. In accordance with that 
provision, secondment for an indefinite period of time is conditional only on the 
existence of a vacant post in the court to which the judge is seconded (after all, 
such a judge agrees to be seconded for an indefinite period of time). Those 
secondments often last several years, even up to 10 years in some cases. During 
that time, the judge develops social and domestic ties with his or her new place of 
work and changes his or her functions according to his or her new duties. Despite 
that change, there is no guarantee that the secondment cannot be terminated at any 
time, including by the president of the court who authorised it. The decision on 
such termination is subject to judicial review, but is enforced while the court 
proceedings are pending, and the judge must await the outcome of the proceedings 
in the post and with the authority from which he or she was seconded (see 
Article 36 of the ZSV). This makes the judge’s work dependent on the decisions 
of the Judicial College of the VSS and the president of the court who seconded 
him or her, and this could constitute a reason for exerting pressure in the case of 
specific decisions. Thus, the referring court takes the view that the secondment 
system can be used to exert pressure on certain judges, thereby giving rise to the 
possibility of arbitrariness within the judiciary. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
19 The applicant submits that he is not required to reimburse costs to the defendant, 
as he had cause to institute the proceedings, but opted not to pursue them only 
because the courts had infringed his procedural rights. According to the applicant, 
the defendant is entitled to hire expensive lawyers, but such costs should not be 
borne by the applicant. In addition, the applicant has submitted, before the courts 
at the various instances, that his right to a fair trial has been infringed and that the 
SRS’s view that there is no basis for reimbursing the defendant’s costs should not 
be reviewed. 
20 The defendant contends that she filed an application for reimbursement of costs 
within the prescribed time limit and seeks reimbursement of the lawyers’ fees that 
she has paid (in the amount of 425 leva [BGN]). 
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Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
Subject matter of the dispute and link between that subject matter and EU law 
21 As stated above, only the dispute as to costs is still pending in the proceedings at 
the time of the reference for a preliminary ruling. 
22 First, the referring court points out that, due to the doubts expressed by the 
applicant as to the possibility that he is a victim of biased judges, failure to 
respond to that objection could constitute an infringement of Article 6 of the 
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and such an infringement may also have financial consequences for the 
State. The referring court takes the view that this requires exhaustion of all 
permissible remedies, including those under EU law, to remove any doubt as to 
the impartiality of the judges who heard the case. 
23 Furthermore, with a view to establishing the link between the subject matter of the 
dispute and EU law, the referring court interprets the case-law of the Court of 
Justice on the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU as follows: 
24 According to the Court of Justice, any court or tribunal that might potentially 
apply EU law may defend its independence against external factors that may 
impair its independence, even if the subject matter of the main proceedings does 
not fall directly within an area of competence of the European Union (judgment of 
27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, 
EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 32 to 37). In other words, the very provision of the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU makes the independence of any 
national court or tribunal entrusted in the abstract with the task of adjudicating on 
cases in which it is possible to make a request for a preliminary ruling on the 
substance under Article 267 TFEU a matter of EU law and not merely of national 
constitutional law (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator 
Generalny, Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraphs 34 
and 35). 
25 It is self-evident that national courts or tribunals cannot make requests for 
preliminary rulings in order to defend their independence where they consider 
only in the abstract that it might be compromised, but, rather, they can make such 
requests only where there is a factual circumstance which places the adjudicating 
court or tribunal in a situation in which its independence would be called into 
question (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, 
Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraphs 46 to 48). 
26 In the present case, the higher courts gave directions to the referring court, in 
accordance with Article 278(3) of the GPK, instructing it to rule on the question 
of costs in proceedings that had been discontinued. Even though those 
proceedings have been discontinued and the order concerning that question has 
become final, one of the parties claims that it is aggrieved by the fact that the 
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independence of the national court which refused to order it to pay costs is 
undermined. The applicant in the proceedings submits that the referring court has 
already ruled on the claim against him and found that it was unfounded, thereby 
bringing an end to the dispute. 
27 At the same time, the question of costs was challenged by the defendant in the 
proceedings before two ordinary courts of the Bulgarian legal system, [the 
adjudicating panels of which] were also composed of seconded judges. Those 
courts held that the proceedings concerning costs had not yet been concluded, as a 
result of which they referred the case back to the referring court, and their view 
that the proceedings were still pending is binding on that court. This is a matter of 
national procedural law, but it relates to judicial independence and the possibility 
to give directions to a national judge, with the result that there is a case concerning 
the application of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (judgment of 
6 October 2021, W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of 
the Supreme Court – Appointment), C-487/19, EU:C:2021:798, paragraph 94). 
28 In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to assess to what extent the referring 
court is to be regarded as being bound by the directions of the higher courts (as 
provided for in national law, namely in Article 278(3) of the GPK) in the case 
where the adjudicating panels were composed of seconded judges. This is a 
question concerning the independence of the court (on which the further 
progression of the present proceedings directly depends) and, consequently, there 
is reason to take the view that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
applies. 
29 Lastly, for the sake of completeness, the referring court states that, in examining 
the question of the amount of the claim for costs, it will also have to assess – in 
the light of the applicant’s view that the defendant had used expensive legal 
services – whether and to what extent the defendant’s claim should be granted in 
terms of amount. In that regard, it is recognised in national law that the Vissh 
advokatski savet (Supreme Council of the Legal Profession) has set a mandatory 
tariff, on which the Court of Justice has ruled (judgment of 23 November 2017, 
CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and FrontEx International, [Joined Cases] C-427/16 and 
C-428/16, EU:C:2017:890). 
The question referred for a preliminary ruling 
30 The Court of Justice recently had occasion to rule on the question as to whether 
the possibility to second judges, as provided for in a national legal system, is 
incompatible with the standards for guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary (see judgment of 16 November 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku 
Mazowieckim, [Joined Cases] C-748/19 to C-754/19, EU:C:2021:931). The case 
concerned a Polish law under which a body of the executive (the Minister of 
Justice), who also performs the functions of the Public Prosecutor General, may 
second appointed judges from one court to another. 
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31 In accordance with paragraphs 78 to 86 of the judgment of 16 November 2021, 
Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim (C-748/19 to C-754/19, 
EU:C:2021:931), in assessing the permissibility of the secondment of judges with 
a view to guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, the national court must 
proceed on the basis of whether the secondment is carried out by a public 
authority without exercising any influence on the judicial proceedings, whether it 
is carried out with or without the consent of the judge, whether the selection of the 
seconded judges and the termination of the secondment are carried out on the 
basis of criteria known in advance and whether they are accompanied by a 
statement of reasons, and whether the decisions seconding a judge and terminating 
that secondment may be challenged before an independent and impartial court or 
tribunal. 
32 At this point, it is necessary to address some differences between the situation in 
Bulgaria and the secondment of judges in Poland by the Minister of Justice. First, 
secondment in Bulgaria takes place by decision of the judicial authorities. Second, 
a secondment for a period of more than three months can take place only with the 
consent of the judge. Third, although there are no criteria for the start of the 
secondment, there are criteria for the termination of secondments by the Judicial 
College of the VSS and they appear to be objective (see paragraph 14 above). 
33 Therefore, in the first place, it is necessary to answer the question as to whether 
the criteria set out in the judgment of 16 November 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa 
w Mińsku Mazowieckim (Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, EU:C:2021:931) 
apply not only where the secondment is ordered by a body of the executive, but 
also where it is carried out by a governing body of the judiciary which enjoys a 
status of independence from the legislature and the government (first question 
referred). 
34 Second, it must be clarified whether the absence of judicially reviewable 
requirements for the selection of judges at the beginning of a secondment is 
sufficient to impair judicial independence, in breach of the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU. It must be taken into account that Article 227(7) of the ZSV 
provides for abstract conditions for selection for a secondment, but they are not 
subject to judicial review (second question referred). 
35 Third, it is necessary to answer the question as to whether the establishment of 
statutory conditions for the termination of the secondment, which appear to be 
objective (see paragraph 32 above), is not rendered meaningless by the manner in 
which the VSS applies the law, which, even in the view taken by some of its 
members, is not consistent (see paragraph 16 above). More generally, the question 
arises as to whether, despite the existence of objective conditions for secondment 
that are laid down by law, the arbitrary application of the law by the competent 
national administrative and judicial authorities can lead to a breach of the standard 
of independence under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (third 
question referred). 
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36 Fourth, it must be noted that the reports under the mechanism for cooperation and 
verification identified a systemic problem with the control of the secondment of 
judges, whereby the report of 13 November 2018 (COM(2018) 850 final) 
expressed concerns that secondment not subject to scrutiny could become an 
alternative career path not provided for by law, leading to ‘risks to independence’ 
(see, regarding the binding nature of the decision establishing the mechanism for 
cooperation and verification, operative part 2 of the judgment of 18 May 2021, 
Asociaţia “Forumul Judecătorilor din România”, C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, 
C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, EU:C:2021:393). It is therefore necessary to 
take into account the specific context of Bulgaria and Romania as countries to 
which the mechanism for cooperation and verification applies and to answer the 
question as to whether, where weaknesses in the secondment system have been 
identified under the mechanism for cooperation and verification but have not been 
remedied (or have been remedied but subsequently reintroduced by law), the 
removal of the guarantees relating to secondment can be regarded as a breach of 
the requirement of independence under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU (fourth question referred). 
37 If the above questions are answered to the effect that there has been a breach of 
the requirement of independence of seconded judges, the fifth question that must 
be answered is what the consequences of the established lack of independence are 
(fifth question referred). 
38 It must also be taken into account that, in accordance with the judgment of 
5 October 2010, Elchinov, (C-173/09, EU:C:2010:581), directions from a higher 
court which are binding under national law lose their binding force if they do not 
comply with EU law. In the present case, guidance is sought as to [the 
circumstances in which] that binding force would cease to exist in the case where 
the directions, although not directly contrary to EU law, were given by an 
authority which might not meet the standards of that law. It should also be borne 
in mind in the present case that the directions [of the higher national court] do not 
concern a decision on the substance of the dispute but are procedural in nature 
(see paragraph 27 above).