Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2018:393
Date: 2018-06-29
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

summary of the hearings as it appears in the records of the hearings, the Court considers that, as regards her own testimony, the applicant has failed to show which of her answers to the questions put to her by the Advisory Committee were not set out or were not adequately set out in the record of her own testimony. The same applies with regard to the hearings of the other witnesses, in respect of which the Court considers that the records provided by the Parliament were sufficient as regards their purpose of providing information, in this instance for the Advisory Committee to draft its opinion. 108 It is clear from all the above considerations that the second plea must be rejected as unfounded. Third plea: ‘manifest errors of assessment’, infringement of the obligation to provide assistance and the duty of care, and infringement of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations 109 In support of her third plea, the applicant claims that, in the contested decision as upheld by the decision rejecting the complaint, the AECE committed a ‘manifest error of assessment’ by refusing to classify the events which she described in the request for assistance as constituting psychological harassment. That constitutes an infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, and thus was in breach of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, which imposes a duty on the AECE to provide assistance, that that request was rejected. In doing so, the AECE also failed in its duty of care. 110 Referring to the list, drawn up by the AECE in an internal communication dated 11 May 2016, of types of conduct that might be classified as psychological harassment, the applicant considers that, contrary to what the AECE stated in the contested decision, citing the context of the unit’s organisational difficulties, she was subjected by her head of unit to constant criticism, lack of consideration, failure to take into account opinions she expressed, excessive supervision of her work, insults or hurtful comments, an attitude of ignoring her, permanent hostility and behaviour designed to humiliate or ridicule her because of her work. In that regard, she considers that, contrary to what the Parliament implies in its defence, the classification of acts as psychological harassment, within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, does not require them to have been deliberately intended to impair the victim’s working conditions. 111 The conduct which the applicant complains about is apparent from the description of the facts at issue which she gave in the request for assistance. In that regard, she considers that, contrary to what the AECE and subsequently the Parliament contend, the aggressive, mocking and sarcastic behaviour of the Head of the Audiovisual Unit towards her could not possibly be justified by the unit’s operating difficulties which the head of unit was supposed to deal with, and in any event the latter could not be allowed, in his capacity as head of unit, to behave in such a manner, in breach of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, in order to deal with them. 112 The Parliament contends that the third plea should be rejected as unfounded. It states that the criticisms addressed to the applicant by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit were directly linked to the need to improve the operation of the unit and that the applicant herself acknowledged that those criticisms had been made at meetings about problems within the service, following the increase in the burden of work and the restructuring of the operational services. Although it recognises that some of the head of unit’s comments were on occasions exaggerated or regrettable, such as those quoted by the applicant in her application, the Parliament maintains that they were not based on unfair accusations with no bearing on objective facts attributable to the applicant and that they must be seen in the context of the tension, existing at that time, due to the problems within the unit and the increase in the burden of work. 113 The Parliament considers, with regard to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit’s mentioning of the end of the applicant’s contract, that the applicant did not provide any evidence to prove that such comments had been made from any other perspective than one connected with assessment of the interests of the service, bearing in mind the fact that it was part of the applicant’s head of unit’s job to assess her performance. 114 According to the Parliament, although it was regrettable that the Head of the Audiovisual Unit disclosed the fact that the applicant had made the request for assistance, that did not in itself constitute psychological harassment. 115 Lastly, the Parliament states, with regard to its duty of care, that it took the state of the applicant’s health into account by reassigning her to another service. – The concept of ‘psychological harassment’ as used in the Staff Regulations 116 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, before the entry into force of the Staff Regulations resulting from Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Communities (OJ 2004 L 124, p. 1), the General Court, ex proprio motu, defined the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ as corresponding, regardless of the subjective perception which the alleged victim may have had of it, to a body of evidence proving that that person was subjected to conduct aimed, objectively, at discrediting him or at deliberately impairing his working conditions (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 February 2001, De Nicola v EIB, T‑7/98, T‑208/98 and T‑109/99, EU:T:2001:69, paragraph 286, and of 8 July 2004, Schochaert v Council, T‑136/03, EU:T:2004:229, paragraph 41). Thus, in order to establish the existence of psychological harassment, the conduct at issue should be objectively intentional in character (judgments of 4 May 2005, Schmit v Commission, T‑144/03, EU:T:2005:158, paragraph 65, and of 25 October 2007, Lo Giudice v Commission, T‑154/05, EU:T:2007:322, paragraph 83). 117 Since the entry into force on 1 May 2004 of Article 12a(1) and (3) of the Staff Regulations, according to which ‘officials shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment’, psychological harassment is now interpreted to mean ‘any improper conduct that takes place over a period, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts that are intentional and that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person’. 118 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the wording of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations the Union legislature did not reiterate the earlier case-law requirement, recalled in paragraph 116 above, that, in order to fall within the concept of psychological harassment, conduct must have been aimed, objectively, ‘at discrediting or at deliberately impairing [the] working conditions’ of the person towards whom such conduct had been shown. 119 In those circumstances, it must be acknowledged that the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ is defined, in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, as ‘improper conduct’, first, in the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts, which takes place ‘over a period’ and is ‘repetitive or systematic’, suggesting that psychological harassment must be understood as a process that occurs over time and presupposes the existence of repetitive or continual behaviour which is ‘intentional’, as opposed to ‘accidental’. Secondly, in order to fall under that definition, such physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts must have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person (judgment of 13 December 2017, HQ v CPVO, T‑592/16, not published, EU:T:2017:897, paragraph 101; see, also, judgment of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited). 120 Accordingly, it is not necessary to establish that the physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts in question were committed with the intention of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person. In other words, there can be psychological harassment without it being established that there has been any intention on the part of the harasser, by his conduct, to discredit the victim or deliberately impair the latter’s working conditions. It is sufficient that such conduct, provided that it was intentional, led objectively to such consequences (see judgments of 5 June 2012, Cantisani v Commission, F‑71/10, EU:F:2012:71, paragraph 89, and of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). 121 Finally, as the conduct in question must, under Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, be improper, it follows that the classification of such conduct as ‘harassment’ is subject to the condition of its being sufficient, when viewed objectively, to be considered real, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same situation, would consider the behaviour or act in question to be excessive and open to criticism (judgments of 16 May 2012, Skareby v Commission, F‑42/10, EU:F:2012:64, paragraph 65, and of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 78). 122 It is in the light of those considerations from case-law that the third plea must be examined, and in order to do so it is necessary to address in chronological order each of the events mentioned by the applicant in the light of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations before assessing them overall in order to determine whether, as the applicant contends, the AECE erred in its assessment of the facts and, hence, infringed both Article 12a and Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. 123 In that regard, it should further be pointed out that the definition laid down in Article 12a of the Staff Regulations is an objective concept which, although based on a contextual classification of the actions and behaviour of third parties — in the present case officials and other members of staff — which is not always straightforward, does not, in any event, call for complex assessments to be carried out, such as those that may have to be conducted in respect of economic concepts (see, concerning trade protection measures, judgments of 7 May 1991, Nakajima v Council, C‑69/89, EU:C:1991:186, paragraph 86, and of 27 September 2007, Ikea Wholesale, C‑351/04, EU:C:2007:547, paragraph 40), scientific concepts (see, in respect of decisions of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), judgment of 7 March 2013, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, T‑94/10, EU:T:2013:107, paragraphs 98 and 99), or technical concepts (see, in respect of decisions of the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), judgment of 15 April 2010, Schräder v CPVO, C‑38/09 P, EU:C:2010:196, paragraph 77), which warrant a margin of discretion being afforded to the administrative body in applying the concept in question. Therefore, where it is alleged that Article 12a of the Staff Regulations was misapplied, it is necessary to examine whether the AECE erred in its assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of psychological harassment laid down in that provision and not whether that error is manifest. – The alleged conduct at issue 124 The applicant explains that, although her service records had always been good and had satisfied three successive heads of unit, the last being the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, the latter’s conduct towards her had changed from the end of 2011 and, even more, during 2012. The conduct also extended beyond that period, in this instance, from December 2012 to September 2014. In fact, that head of unit engaged in improper conduct intended to belittle her systematically and consisting in criticism of her mainly in front of third parties, whether she was present or not, but also sometimes in writing. The main criticisms thus made of her directly related to her as a person, inter alia, her alleged personality problems and alleged arrogance. Her head of unit thus regularly reminded her that he was her hierarchical superior and that she should obey him, and he also repeatedly asked her to justify her actions, without drawing any conclusions from the justifications she provided in response. He also put her under pressure by threatening to end her employment relationship or, at least, by warning her not to ask for the renewal of her contract as a member of the contract staff for auxiliary tasks. In addressing her he used such terms as ‘Who do you think you are, Your Ladyship?’ and criticised her ‘personality problems’. In return, the applicant criticises her head of unit for his unjustified reactions. 125 For example, as regards the Head of the Audiovisual Unit’s lack of coordination in implementing a specific procedure for handling requests from the media, which had first to pass through the Audiovisual Section coordinated by the applicant, the latter considers that it was legitimate that she should complain about it in an email of 25 October 2011. 126 Similarly, as regards the email that the Head of the Audiovisual Unit sent her on 26 September 2011, putting two other staff members in the Newsdesk Hotline sector in copy, an email in which he stated that he had requested in vain on several occasions that that unit should assist a person in another sector with regard to a visit by a delegation from the Tunisian Republic, in her view her email of 26 September 2011 in reply constituted an appropriate and exhaustive response, showing the unfounded nature of that criticism, which was ultimately aimed at her personally. 127 Furthermore, with regard to the email of 19 January 2012, by which the applicant had provided information to the Director for Media on the way in which transmission of a programme by a French television broadcaster would be organised, the applicant considers that the email in reply from the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, of 19 January 2012, in which he criticised her for giving the Director of the Directorate for Media information about the event ahead of time, when he himself was preparing a global reply detailing the contributions of all the players involved; the applicant considers that criticism unjustified and likewise the criticism that she had chosen ‘to go it alone’ ‘bombard[ing]’ the other services with information which he was meant to send and coordinate in his capacity as head of unit, and the criticism that she projected an unprofessional image which allegedly did not demonstrate teamwork and even detracted from promoting teamwork in the service. 128 Following an email which she sent on 28 February 2012 to another sector asking to be alerted to any changes, additions or deletions of subjects on the channel EuropeBySatellite (‘EbS’), the applicant complains of the tone and content of the email sent to her in reply by her head of unit the same day, and also the second exchange of emails that followed, in which he pointed out to her that there were four people on the Newsdesk Hotline and that therefore one of those four people could have had the job of monitoring and detecting changes on EbS, and he concluded that she could not ‘always pass responsibility/‘the buck’ to others ([“]we are not being kept informed!![”])’, and asked the four people on the Newsdesk Hotline to be ‘interactive, both internally and externally, in seeking information’. 129 The applicant also mentions an exchange of emails of 19 March 2012 concerning a meeting regarding coverage of the event ‘Rabat [(Morocco)] — Euromed’, convened by a person from another sector, which finally only one of the four people working on the Newsdesk Hotline attended. She complains, in that regard, about the criticism expressed by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit of the three people who missed it, including the applicant, in an email in which he stated that it was pointless to call coordination meetings that were attended by only three people, namely himself, the person who had called the meeting and the only person from the Newsdesk Hotline who had come to the meeting. According to the applicant, it was normal, at that type of meeting, for that service to be represented by only one person, so, contrary to what the head of unit had suggested in his critical email, the presence of the three other people, including herself, was not necessary. 130 The applicant also complains about the tone and content of an exchange of emails of 8 May 2012. In that regard, in an initial email addressed to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit with eight people and a service in copy, the applicant had made the following request to one of those recipients in a post script: ‘X, could you in future wait until we have finalised our research and consultations with the parties concerned before forwarding an email with missing or incomplete information with regard to my sector.’ 131 In an email in reply, addressed to the applicant, with the person she had referred to and another person in copy, the head of unit wrote as follows: ‘You should stop trying to put everyone in their place … This matter …, has been managed, correctly and with professionalism, by [X] … I have not had time to respond to this earlier, but I intend to arrange a meeting with you on this subject as soon as possible. I did not approve of the emails exchanged on this matter. It is one thing to draw up a schedule and adopt a way of working, but quite another thing to be impolite to colleagues. The telephone avoids a lot of misunderstandings too. The time when one can act in this way is in my view long passed and I will react very strongly to such behaviour, which goes completely beyond the bounds of the basic rules for us to work together and calls for direct responsibility on the part of those of you who have not understood the messages which I have addressed to you all many times. The message is clear. We remain a team who must and will work together, come what may. I do not have to go along with a ‘sector’ which wants to act alone or to have the last word. That is and remains my exclusive domain.’ 132 The applicant then replied to the last email that she did not agree with the head of unit and she did consider, yet again, that it was the Newsdesk Hotline sector which ‘got on with the job’ whilst other sectors ‘malfunctioned, withheld information or spread confusion’. Also in that email, she stated that, in a number of cases, the members of the Newsdesk Hotline were faced with faits accomplis on the part of other sectors and they did not try to have the last word. She further stated that the other members of the Newsdesk Hotline were exhausted by all this. 133 At a meeting of the unit held on 10 May 2012 to discuss problems that existed in the unit and provide solutions, the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, according to the applicant, verbally attacked her directly, criticising her openly and exclusively, accusing her of withholding information and failing to show team spirit and so ultimately, accusing her of being responsible for the problems. He also attacked her personally, questioning her about other subjects that had nothing to do with coordinating the three areas of the unit and without allowing her to reply. In an email headed ‘Confidential’, sent to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit on 12 May 2012, Y moreover stated that he had ‘gone home with his stomach in a knot and had a sleepless night’. That person reports that ‘that meeting was very difficult and strayed out of context, with comments that were out of place’ and he wondered ‘how [the applicant had] managed to hold back her emotions and keep calm’. The day after that meeting the applicant went on sick leave. 134 The applicant also recalls an incident that arose during November 2012 concerning replacement, during the lunch break, of a colleague from the Audiovisual Unit accreditation service who, on her own, had to welcome journalists to the Parliament during a visit by 16 Heads of State or Government for an event entitled ‘Friends of Cohesion’. During the course of the day, the head of unit berated the applicant because members of the Newsdesk Hotline had not provided the backup he had asked for so that their colleague, Z, could take her lunch break. In that regard, the applicant states that she had had an exchange of emails with Z on 4 October 2012 in order to put backup in place so she could take a lunch break. 135 However, in an email of 13 November 2012 addressed to the members of the unit, the head of unit stated that, even though Z had not complained, he and other colleagues had noticed that a schedule of replacements for the person concerned, which he had been asking for since September, had not been arranged, with the result that she was not able to take a break. He went on as follows: ‘Lastly, I have just spoken to the person who has been coordinating the team up until now; she answered me in a challenging and very unpleasant tone when I reminded her that today, with the arrival of a large number of teams for [‘Friends of Cohesion’] and for the Commissioners’ hearings, it was necessary to give [Z] some help. The message does not seem to have been taken into account in your ‘priorities’ for the day … As we discussed yesterday [at the] planning meeting, I consider that welcoming the journalists on [their] arrival is top priority today, and clearly I wish to have a binding schedule from now on with a name for every day to provide a replacement for our colleague at least during the lunch break and at any other time when she, like you would, wishes to take a break. I hope this message is sufficiently clear to everyone … You are part of a team and if any of you do not fit in here you are at liberty to look for a job somewhere else that is better suited to what you want.’ 136 Subsequently, the Head of the Audiovisual Unit informed the applicant, at a meeting held on 4 December 2012 in the presence of an assistant, that he was the person in charge, whether the applicant liked it or not. In that context, as reported by the applicant, he made the following threatening comment: ‘The team functions with or without you; every day I receive hundreds of [CVs] from people who are very capable of doing what you do. If you do not alter your approach I shall have to take a decision.’ 137 The applicant also maintains that, when she was not present, the head of unit criticised the work of the team which she coordinated, at two meetings in particular, a matter which the applicant raised with him in an email of 12 November 2013 in which she expressed her disappointment at such behaviour on the part of the head of unit. She further produced in that regard, inter alia, an exchange of emails, of 18 March 2014, between Y and the Head of the Audiovisual Unit in which Y told the latter that he considered that ‘the purpose of the meeting [held on 17 March 2014 was] to verbally assassinate and belittle certain persons, and a service that was not present’. Furthermore, first, she produced an email from a former secretary to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit who, in the context of her reassignment to another service, wrote as follows: ‘My experience at Audiovisual?! It is like being addicted to heroin: you take the drug thinking … you will find paradise, but in fact you are going down deeper and deeper into hell. I have never been happier than when I left.’ 138 Secondly, the applicant mentions the resignation of an assistant to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, tendered in a brief email of 27 January 2015, as being a sign of the discontent created by that head of unit’s behaviour. 139 On 25 September 2014, at a meeting convened by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, a difference of opinion arose between him and the applicant. In that context, when she asked him to open the history function on a computer in order to establish that, contrary to what he argued, the contributions of the members of the Newsdesk Hotline were positive, he rudely interrupted her and reminded her that he was the head and he was the one who decided whether a person should represent a sector at unit meetings. He also stated that the Newsdesk Hotline was useless. 140 Following that incident, the applicant went to see the Parliament’s medical service and, with effect from 26 September 2014, she was placed on sick leave; since then, she has not returned to work. In that connection, she considers that, in breach of the duty of care, the medical certificates she provided were not properly taken into account by the AECE in its handling of her request for assistance. – Individual assessment of the various types of conduct at issue 141 As a preliminary point, the Court notes that, although it cannot be ruled out that the Head of the Audiovisual Unit may have adopted an inappropriate tone at unit meetings or in discussions with the applicant, accidental words or gestures, even if they appear to be inappropriate, are excluded from the scope of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations (judgment of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 95). 142 Furthermore, in view of the broad discretion enjoyed by the institutions in the organisation of their services, neither administrative decisions, even if they are difficult to accept, nor disagreements with the administration over questions relating to the organisation of services, can by themselves prove the existence of psychological harassment (see judgment of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited). 143 In the present case, although the facts indicate a conflictual relationship within a difficult administrative context, they do not show any evidence of acts of an unfair or excessive nature, and the words and behaviour that were documented show, at most, poor, indeed on occasions inept, handling of a conflict situation by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit. 144 Although the tone adopted by the head of unit in some of those emails may sometimes appear a little familiar or unstructured from the point of view of language or style, but not excessively so, this must be viewed in the context of the service’s operating difficulties following on from its restructuring. 145 In that regard, the Court notes that the majority of the emails produced by the applicant that had been sent to her by her head of unit concerned reprimands made by that head of unit, which, in principle, fell within his field of competence as a hierarchical superior. 146 Thus, regarding the emails in which he reprimanded the applicant for conduct, an action or an omission which in his view did not meet the requirements of the service, such as the emails of 26 September 2011 and of 19 January, 28 February and 19 March 2012, it must be said that they do not necessarily appear to be excessive or open to criticism to an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same situation. Hence, such reprimands, made in measured terms, could be objectively justified in the light of the applicant’s conduct criticised by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit. 147 It should be noted that criticism by a hierarchical superior of work or a task carried out by a subordinate is not in itself inappropriate behaviour since, were that the case, the management of a service would be almost impossible (judgments of 11 July 2013, Tzirani v Commission, F‑46/11, EU:F:2013:115, paragraph 97, and of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 87). Likewise, negative comments addressed to a member of staff do not necessarily undermine his personality, dignity or integrity where they are formulated in measured terms and are not based on allegations that are unfair and lacking any connection with objective facts (judgment of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 87; see also, to that effect, judgment of 24 February 2010, Menghi v ENISA, F‑2/09, EU:F:2010:12, paragraph 110). 148 As regards the email of 26 September 2011, irrespective of the explanations provided subsequently by the applicant, on which the Head of the Audiovisual Unit was not, contrary to what the applicant contends, necessarily obliged to adopt a position in writing or within a specified period, that head of unit is merely echoing a complaint by a colleague from another service concerning the lack of support from the applicant and other members of the Newsdesk Hotline. Such a reprimand, issued in measured terms, would not appear to an impartial and reasonable observer to be excessive or open to criticism. 149 As regards the email of 19 January 2012, it appears that, since the applicant had taken the initiative to send information to the Director of the Media Directorate, the hierarchical superior of the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, without referring to the latter, it was not inappropriate for that head of unit to complain about this to the applicant and to remind her, in measured terms, of his demands that the members of the unit should act collectively and under his hierarchical authority, even though, it is true, at a formal level the email could have been more carefully worded. In that regard, the fact that in the past and subsequently the applicant had occasion, or was accustomed, to communicate directly with the Director in question is irrelevant, since it is undisputed that the head of unit was her direct hierarchical superior and, as such, could require her to act within a collective framework. 150 As regards the exchange of emails of 28 February 2012, it should be noted that, in her email sent at 11.04, the applicant informed the Head of the Audiovisual Unit that it ‘[was] necessary for someone from EbS … to inform [the Newsdesk Hotline] of changes or queries in order to have credible information for [their] “clients”’. Thus, given that she asked for a person from the office in charge of EbS to inform the Newsdesk Hotline of those changes in real time, it was not inappropriate for the head of unit to tell her in reply that, from his point of view, as the hierarchical superior with responsibility for both the Newsdesk Hotline and EbS, one of the four persons working on the Newsdesk Hotline should undertake that task, which the applicant considered needed to be done and wanted someone else to take over. 151 Furthermore, that email was not addressed solely to the applicant and, again, even though the tone of the email could have been less familiar, the criticisms thus made not only of the applicant but also of one of her colleagues from the Newsdesk Hotline, do not appear to be either unreasonable or excessive. Lastly, the Court notes that, in reply to the applicant’s email and to the one from the head of unit, someone from EbS, in an email written in Spanish, clearly questioned the truth of the applicant’s assertion that she had attempted to contact that service by telephone, and even accused the applicant of lying and casting the blame on the others. 152 As regards the reprimand issued by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, in an email of 19 March 2012, concerning the absence of the applicant and two of her colleagues from a meeting, it should be noted that an official or other staff member is obliged to make himself available to meet with his superior when that person summons him to a meeting (judgment of 10 July 2014, CW v Parliament, F‑48/13, EU:F:2014:186, paragraph 123). Accordingly, irrespective of the justifications for that absence subsequently provided by the applicant, the head of unit’s email of 19 March 2012 by no means appears inappropriate to an impartial and reasonable observer. 153 As regards the exchange of emails of 8 May 2012, it should be noted that, in the email initially sent by the applicant to the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, to eight other persons and to a service, she directly challenged a colleague from another service, implying that he was putting out incomplete information concerning the Newsdesk Hotline. Such an allegation, made in the context of an email sent to multiple recipients, could be perceived by the person concerned as belittling the quality of his work, although, given her functions and her grade, the applicant was by no means in a position of hierarchical superiority entitling her to assess and give an opinion in this way on the quality of that person’s professional performance. Moreover, every official or other staff member must not only refrain from challenging without grounds the authority of his hierarchical superiors, but must also show measure and caution, in particular in selecting multiple recipients, when sending emails connection with such an approach or designed to question the quality of the work of one of their colleagues. 154 In those circumstances, although a less familiar expression than ‘you should stop trying to put everyone in their place’ could have been used by the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, it was still appropriate and legitimate for him to explain to the applicant that she had gone beyond the limits of her area of competence, whilst reassuring the person in question as to the quality of his or her professional performance, the assessment of which was primarily a matter for that head of unit. Furthermore, whereas the applicant had made the criticism of X in the form of an instruction contained in an email sent to multiple recipients, the head of unit took care to send his reply only to the applicant, to X and to the person responsible for planning production resources. 155 As regards the question of the replacement for Z during the reception of journalists at the Parliament, the firmness of the tone used in the email of 13 November 2012 reveals the existence of a conflict with the applicant on that question and, clearly, difficulties in communicating. However, that emailed reprimand, which was moreover sent to the whole team concerned, does not, as such, constitute a written comment undermining the personality, the dignity or the physical or mental integrity of the applicant or the other members of that team. 156 As regards, lastly, the alleged repeated threats from the Head of the Audiovisual Unit regarding his intention not to renew the applicant’s contract unless she altered her behaviour, it is clear from the documents in the case that, although it is established that the head of unit expressed a similar view with regard to all the members of the Newsdesk Hotline, in this instance in the email of 13 November 2012 (see paragraph 135 above), the applicant has nonetheless failed to prove that the head of unit issued a threat specifically against her regarding the renewal of her contract of employment. In particular, although one witness did state that, in his case, the Head of the Audiovisual Unit had reminded him ‘that he was only a temporary staff’ and although another ‘thought that his [own] contract [was] continuing because he had not complained’, that does not concern the question of the applicant’s own contract. 157 Further and in any event, first, so long as the applicant was in active employment, her contract was renewed and, in particular, it is clear from paragraph 94 of the judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament (T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282), that the head of unit took the necessary steps to ensure that the contracts of persons such as the applicant would be renewed for an entire year and that he was trying, within his sphere of responsibility, to obtain so far as possible renewal of their employment contracts within his unit for longer than previously. Secondly, even though the tone of the email of 13 November 2012 addressed to all those working on the Newsdesk Hotline may be perceived as being familiar and it cannot be ruled out that, at the meeting referred to in that email, the head of unit implied that he would assess the appropriateness of renewing contracts of temporary staff in the light of their compliance with his instructions, it is not necessarily unreasonable for a hierarchical superior to express his dissatisfaction with the conduct and the quality of the professional performance of his subordinates. – Overall assessment of the conduct at issue 158 Taking into account the various facts at issue examined individually above and, even though they could not necessarily all be documented, all the other evidence or events described by the applicant in her pleadings, in particular the lively exchanges that took place at the meetings on 4 December 2012 and 25 September 2014, the Court considers that, even though the style and tone of some of the written comments of the Head of the Audiovisual Unit and his behaviour, at those meetings and also during direct bilateral discussions with the applicant, might be perceived, including from the viewpoint of the type of language used, as being particularly direct and forthright — and even with regard to some casual comments, as being sarcastic — the fact remains that, in the light of the context in which they were made, inter alia the existence of organisational difficulties, but also of the tone used by the applicant herself, in particular in some of her emails sent to her superiors or others of her colleagues, and as reported by some of the witnesses, an impartial and reasonable observer would not necessarily have perceived the conduct of the head of unit in question as being improper within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. 159 In that regard, so far as the possibility for the AECE to assess the alleged facts in the light of the service’s operational difficulties is concerned, it should be pointed out, as was held in the case-law referred to in paragraph 121 above, that assessment of the existence of psychological harassment involves examining whether the alleged facts are objectively sufficiently real, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the same situation, would consider them to be excessive and open to criticism. In the present case, the service’s operating difficulties form part of the context in which the alleged facts occurred, so they could be taken into account in order to recreate the conditions in which that observer should be placed in order to determine how he would have assessed the alleged facts if he had been a spectator of them. 160 Furthermore, the Court notes in that regard that the reprimands from the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, issued in emails or at meetings, were not exclusively addressed to the applicant and that, in his capacity as her hierarchical superior, he was entitled to convey instructions, to reiterate them and to express, where appropriate, his dissatisfaction at the level and quality of the professional performance of members of the unit, including that of the applicant. Moreover, although the working atmosphere within the Audiovisual Unit was not necessarily of the best, as might be indicated by the departure of two of the people working with the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, that does not mean that the applicant was subjected to psychological harassment. Lastly, the documents provided by the applicant and the records of the witness hearings might indicate that she herself might have contributed to the tension referred to by the AECE in the contested decision, read in the light of the letter of 8 December 2015, for example through her emails of 25 September 2011 and of 28 February and 8 May 2012. 161 As regards the records of the witness hearings, contrary to what the applicant contends, the way in which the witness statements were written up to serve the purposes of such a document, that is to say the drafting of the opinion of the Advisory Committee, does not establish that they were incomplete, or that they could not be used as adequate substantive evidence in the context of dealing with the present plea. In particular, she cannot accuse the Advisory Committee of raising vague or irrelevant questions when it had broad discretion with regard to the conduct of the inquiry entrusted to it by the AECE. 162 As regards the content of the testimonies, clearly it confirms the existence of ‘clans’ of officials or other staff members within the Audiovisual Unit, one of which was visibly structured around the Newsdesk Hotline coordinated by the applicant, and of organisational difficulties between the various sectors of that unit, having implications for the comprehensibility of the roles of those sectors for the unit’s discussion partners, both inside and outside the Parliament, but also for interactions between those sectors, as illustrated by the references, in this case, to the difficulties in replacing someone during lunch breaks, the difficulties relating to the way in which certain information is transmitted or those concerning the appropriate decision-making process for the organisation of events. 163 Some testimonies tend to substantiate the validity of some of the applicant’s assertions regarding the strong personality of the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, a certain amount of aggressiveness towards her on the part of the latter and the existence of relationship difficulties between the head of unit and others working in his unit, none of whom had, however, submitted a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. On the other hand, a similar, even higher, number of testimonies refer to inappropriate behaviour on the part of the applicant, substantiating the validity of the head of unit’s criticisms of her, and also the existence of professional differences between the applicant and others working in the Audiovisual Unit, of her tendency to withhold information in order to make herself indispensable for the operation of the Newsdesk Hotline and the Audiovisual Unit, of the applicant’s lack of willingness to give help to other sectors of the Audiovisual Unit, even her aggressiveness and lying about some aspects of her professional performance. Some testimonies show, moreover, that the head of unit’s criticisms were not specifically directed against the applicant, but against the operation and performance of the Newsdesk Hotline sector, which she was, de facto, responsible for coordinating. 164 In conclusion, the Court considers that, although the various documents in the present case, including the opinion of the Advisory Committee and the records of the witness hearings, shed light on some undeniable weaknesses in the management style of the Head of the Audiovisual Unit, inter alia inappropriate comments addressed to members of staff of that unit, including the applicant, regarding the fact that they were ‘at liberty to look for work elsewhere’, the AECE did not infringe Article 12a of the Staff Regulations or err in its assessment of the facts when it took the view in the contested decision, referring to the considerations set out in the letter of 8 December 2015, that the alleged facts, assessed overall, did not demonstrate the existence of improper conduct by the head of unit towards the applicant, in the sense that an objective observer, of normal sensitivity, would not have considered that the factual situation described was such that it would undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the applicant. 165 That conclusion is not altered by the fact that the Head of the Audiovisual Unit was informed that the applicant had submitted the request for assistance and he in turn had informed the members of his unit, at a unit meeting held on 13 January 2015. It is preferable in principle, in order to protect both the alleged victim and the professional integrity of the alleged harasser, that, initially, the AECE does not inform the latter, or other third parties, of the submission of a request for assistance and of the identity of the person making the request. However, since the Staff Regulations do not make any special provisions in that respect, the AECE may, in any event, where, as in the present case, the alleged victim has been the subject of a distancing measure, decide, in the context of handling a request for assistance, to inform the person implicated in that request of the existence of the request, as long as disclosure of that information does not undermine the effectiveness of the inquiry, which was not so in the present case. In addition, again in the present case, the members of the Audiovisual Unit needed to be informed, eventually, of the existence of the inquiry, since they were being asked to testify before the Advisory Committee. 166 It follows that the applicant’s complaint, in which she claims, in the context of the present plea, that there was a ‘manifest error of assessment’ on the part of the AECE and infringement of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, must be rejected. – Further complaints 167 As regards the complaint concerning infringement by the AECE of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the Court holds that, since that authority had, without erring in law in the application of the definition of ‘psychological harassment’ referred to in Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, established that the facts described in the request for assistance, which had been the subject of the administrative inquiry, should not ultimately be considered to constitute psychological harassment, that authority was not required to adopt additional measures of assistance. In the present case, the measures initially taken by the AECE, namely the distancing of the applicant and the opening of an administrative inquiry, were based on the finding that in the request for assistance the applicant had provided adequate prima facie evidence of the facts she alleged. However, since at the end of the administrative inquiry the AECE considered that the case before it was not one of psychological harassment within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, it was not required, inter alia in view of its broad discretion, to adopt other measures of assistance and could therefore refuse the request for assistance in the light of Article 24 the Staff Regulations. 168 As regards the complaint concerning the AECE’s duty of care, contrary to what the applicant contends, although that authority was obliged to examine the request for assistance in a spirit of openness, the duty of care which it must observe did not require it to be more open-minded because the applicant had provided medical certificates establishing that she was unable to work due to ‘burn out’, or even that she had experienced psychological harassment. The AECE was still required to examine that request for assistance in the light of the definition contained in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. In that regard, it is settled case-law that the medical certificates submitted by the applicant, if they reveal that the applicant has psychological problems, do not establish, however, that those problems result from psychological harassment within the meaning of the Staff Regulations, since, to make such a finding of harassment, the doctors thus consulted necessarily rely exclusively on the description that the applicant made of her working conditions in the Parliament (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 December 2008, K v Parliament, F‑15/07, EU:F:2008:158, paragraph 41, and of 17 September 2014, CQ v Parliament, F‑12/13, EU:F:2014:214, paragraph 127) and that, in any event, they were not required to apply the definition contained in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. 169 Lastly, since in the present plea the applicant is seeking to question the lawfulness of the decision not to renew her contract, and not, as she states, of the dismissal decision, it must be held that that line of argument is manifestly inadmissible in the light of the force of res judicata pertaining to the judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament (T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282). 170 In the light of all the above considerations, the third plea must be rejected and, hence, the claim for annulment must be rejected in its entirety. Claim for damages 171 In support of her claim for damages, the applicant maintains that she suffered non‑material damage as a result of the unlawful conduct of the AECE in its handling of the request for assistance. She alleges she experienced uncertainty and anxiety and her health had declined particularly since September 2014. On those grounds she claims the award of EUR 70 000 in compensation. 172 Moreover, the applicant claims a further amount of EUR 20 000 in compensation for non-material damage resulting from the irregularities that affected the inquiry procedure, in this instance regarding the proceedings of the Advisory Committee. 173 The applicant considers that the AECE infringed the ‘reasonable time’ principle in its handling of the request for assistance and moreover that the Advisory Committee, although she had referred the matter to it in accordance with the flexible requirements laid down in the Internal Rules on Harassment, did not comply with those rules and, in particular, did not hear her within the 10‑day period laid down in those rules and did not make any serious attempt to contact her until 3 March 2015. She also complains about the timeframe of the witness hearings conducted by the Advisory Committee, noting inter alia that over 6 months passed between her hearing on 25 March 2015 and the hearings of the last witnesses, which took place on 6 October that year. To this is added the fact that originally the AECE wrongly considered, in the decision of 4 February 2015, that the file was closed. Lastly, according to the applicant, she also suffered non‑material damage due to the presence, at the hearings by the Advisory Committee, of persons who were not on that committee and to whom as a result confidential information about her was disclosed. 174 The Parliament contends that the claim for damages should be rejected, pointing out that in the present case the AECE had promptly adopted assistance measures in this instance by deciding to reassign the applicant, who was on sick leave at the time, and to open the administrative inquiry. It considers moreover that the applicant did not submit to the Advisory Committee a complaint within the meaning of the Internal Rules on Harassment, since the Chairman of the Advisory Committee had been copied in on the request for assistance addressed to the AECE only in his capacity as Head of the Human Resources Unit of the Directorate for Resources of DG Personnel and not in his capacity as Chairman of the Advisory Committee. Lastly, the Parliament considers that the applicant has failed to state what confidential information was disclosed to third parties. 175 In that regard, suffice it to note that claims for compensation for material or non‑material damage must be rejected where they are closely associated with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as unfounded (judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 69; see also, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 129, and of 14 September 2006, Commission v Fernández Gómez, C‑417/05 P, EU:C:2006:582, paragraph 51). 176 Consequently, in respect of that part of it which is closely associated with the claim for annulment, the claim for damages must be rejected as unfounded. 177 As regards that part of the claim for damages concerning non-material damage allegedly linked to unlawful conduct not associated with that which affected the contested decision, in this case problems within the Advisory Committee, the Court notes that the applicant was, in any event, entitled to submit a request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations to the AECE, without being under an obligation to make a prior referral to the Advisory Committee (judgment of 16 May 2017, CW v Parliament, T‑742/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2017:338, paragraph 54). 178 Next, the fact remains that the applicant addressed the request for assistance to the Secretary-General and only in copy to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, the President of the Parliament and the Director-General for Personnel. It follows that the applicant sent a copy of the request for assistance to the latter three only for information. Accordingly, the applicant cannot argue that she properly referred her case to the Advisory Committee. She cannot therefore complain that the Parliament did not ensure compliance — by that internal body which is separate from the AECE — of the Internal Rules on Harassment, in particular the obligation for the Advisory Committee, as laid down in Article 11 of those rules, to interview the alleged victim within 10 working days of his or her request. 179 As for the length of time taken in handling the request for assistance, which was submitted on 11 December 2014, it was nearly 18 months, which is somewhat long. However, it must be stated that, initially, incorrect, even inconsistent, replies were given by the Director-General for Personnel in his letters of 4 February and 4 March 2015 as regards whether there had been an implied rejection of the request for assistance. That being said, according to the principle of good administration, the incorrect nature of the information supplied by the AECE was subsequently noted by the Secretary-General in the decision of 20 August 2015 in reply to the applicant’s complaint about that point. Furthermore, that aspect of the dispute has already justified the Parliament being ordered to pay half the costs incurred by the applicant in the case giving rise to the judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament (T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283). 180 As regards the inquiry carried out by the Advisory Committee, in reality it only took place between the date of the referral to the Advisory Committee by the Director-General for Personnel, which was 2 February 2015, and the date on which that committee delivered its advisory opinion, which was in this instance 12 October 2015, a period of more than 8 months. That period of more than 8 months, whilst demonstrating that the proceedings of the Advisory Committee took place relatively slowly, is not unreasonable however in the light of the number of witnesses that had to be heard, the type and number of the applicant’s allegations, the fact that, since the persons comprising that advisory body came from various services, the sessions of the Advisory Committee could not take place regularly and the fact that at those sessions the committee had to interview other witnesses called by the committee to testify in cases other than the applicant’s case. 181 As regards the length of time that passed between the date on which the advisory opinion was sent to the Secretary-General and the date of the contested decision was taken, which was more than 7 months, that was due to the applicant exercising her right to be heard in respect of the grounds on which the AECE proposed to reject her complaint. 182 The Court considers therefore that, taken overall, the length of time the AECE took in handling the request for assistance was not unreasonable in the present case. 183 As regards the applicant’s allegation that confidential information about her was disclosed to persons who were not members of the Advisory Committee, regardless of the fact that it is not substantiated in any way, the Court would like to point out that it appears from the records of the hearings that all the persons present were full or alternate members of the Advisory Committee, which comprised a total of nine members and two secretaries. Consequently, the arguments in that regard must be rejected as unfounded. 184 It is clear from the above that the claim for damages must be rejected. 185 The action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety as being unfounded. Costs 186 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, according to Article 135 of the Rules of Procedure, if equity so requires, the Court may decide that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his own costs, or even that he is not to be ordered to pay any costs. On the other hand, the Court may order a party, even if successful, to pay some or all of the costs, if this appears justified by the conduct of that party, including before the proceedings were brought, especially if he has made the opposite party incur costs which the Court holds to be unreasonable or vexatious. 187 In the present case, the Court notes that the AECE did not provide the applicant with the opinion of the Advisory Committee so that she could submit her observations on the reasons given in the letter of 8 December 2015 to support rejection of the request for assistance. Moreover, as regards the question whether the Director-General for Personnel and the Secretary-General were in possession of that opinion and the records of the witness hearings conducted by the Advisory Committee for the purposes of adopting the contested decision and the decision rejecting the complaint, respectively, the Parliament provided replies that were manifestly inconsistent, as the applicant rightly stated in her observations of 26 March 2018. Whilst, in its replies to a similar question from the Court in that regard, namely in its reply of 15 December 2017 and at the hearing, the Parliament stated that those two persons were only in possession of an oral report given by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, the Secretary-General finally testified on 7 March 2018, in reply to an express request from the Court made at the end of the hearing and notwithstanding an incorrect date mentioned by the applicant, that he and the Director-General for Personnel had been in possession of the opinion of the Advisory Committee and of the records of the witness hearings. 188 In those circumstances, the Court considers that the conduct of the Parliament justifies it bearing its own costs and, in addition, paying a quarter of the costs incurred by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders the European Parliament to bear its own costs and to pay a quarter of the costs incurred by HF; 3. Orders HF to bear three quarters of her own costs. Pelikánová Valančius Nihoul Svenningsen Öberg Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 29 June 2018. [Signatures] Table of contents * Language of the case: French.