Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:77
Date: 2026-02-05
Language of the case: Romanian

Summary C-606/24 - 1 
Case C-606/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
17 September 2024 
Referring court: 
Tribunalul București (Romania) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
12 September 2024 
Applicants: 
XY 
ZT 
and Others 
Defendant: 
Ministerul Finanțelor 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action in administrative and tax proceedings concerning the salary entitlements of 
civil servants 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation is sought, on the basis of Article 267 TFEU, of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
EN 
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Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
Is the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (read in conjunction with 
Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) to be 
interpreted as meaning that the principle of the independence of judges precludes 
national legislation introducing an obligation for adjudicating panels, which hear 
and determine cases concerning the establishment and/or payment of the salary 
entitlements or salary-related entitlements of staff paid from public funds, to 
request that the Înalta Curte de Casație şi Justiție (High Court of Cassation and 
Justice), in all cases which they are called to decide, give a preliminary ruling on 
points of law not previously dealt with by that court, thereby diminishing the 
ability of the judges hearing the cases in question to decide those cases 
independently, solely on the ground that inconsistent judicial practice may have a 
negative impact on the consolidated general budget and the socio-economic 
stability of the country? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 2 TEU 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the 
Charter’) 
The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’), namely 
the judgments of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C-554/21, C-622/21 and 
C-727/21, EU:C:2024:594, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales 
International and Others, C-110/15, EU:C:2016:717 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Article 519 of the Codul de procedură civilă (Code of Civil Procedure), according 
to which an adjudicating panel hearing a case at last instance which finds that a 
point of law, the clarification of which is necessary in order to give a ruling on the 
merits of the case, is new and that the Înalta Curte de Casație şi Justiție (High 
Court of Cassation and Justice; ‘the ÎCCJ’) has not given a ruling on that point of 
law may request that the ÎCCJ give a ruling resolving the point of law in principle. 
Article 2 of Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 62/2024 privind unele măsuri 
pentru soluționarea proceselor privind salarizarea personalului plătit din fonduri 
publice, precum și a proceselor privind prestații de asigurări sociale (Government 
Emergency Order No 62/2024 laying down measures for resolving proceedings 
concerning the remuneration of staff paid from public funds, as well as 
proceedings concerning social security benefits) (‘OUG nr. 62/2004’), which 
provides, in essence, that if, in the course of proceedings concerning the salary 
entitlements of staff paid from public funds, the adjudicating panel hearing the 
case at first instance or on appeal finds that the ÎCCJ has not given a ruling on a 
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point of law the clarification of which is necessary in order to give a ruling on the 
merits of the case it is to request that the ÎCCJ give a ruling resolving the point of 
law in principle. The decision to refer the case to the ÎCCJ is also to be transmitted 
to the other courts having jurisdiction to hear similar cases, at first instance or on 
appeal, which will be suspended until the ÎCCJ has given its ruling. The ÎCCJ is to 
give its ruling within 60 days of the date of referral. The reasons for its ruling 
must be provided no later than 15 days after the ruling has been given and the 
ruling is to be published no later than 5 days after those reasons are given. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicants brought an action before the referring court on 20 November 2023, 
whereby they sought, in essence, an order requiring the defendant to recalculate 
and pay the difference between the salary entitlements actually received and the 
salary entitlements due at the maximum remuneration level for similar positions in 
payment, for the same function and grade, in several public authorities and 
institutions. 
2 Following the entry into force of OUG nr. 62/2024 on 14 June 2024, the referring 
court questioned whether it was appropriate to make a reference to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling regarding the compatibility with EU law of that national 
legislation, which introduces an obligation for courts hearing cases concerning the 
salary entitlements of staff paid from public funds to request that the ÎCCJ, in all 
cases which they are called to decide, give a preliminary ruling on points of law 
not previously dealt with by that court, thereby diminishing the ability of the 
judges hearing the cases in question to decide the cases independently on the 
ground that inconsistent judicial practice in that area may have a negative impact 
on the general budget and the socio-economic stability of the country. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
3 The applicants have argued, in essence, that the courts cannot be deprived of the 
right independently to decide cases which are subject to OUG nr. 62/2024, which 
granted the ÎCCJ exclusive jurisdiction to decide a point of law that concerns 
many different cases. 
4 The defendant has argued that no issue of interpretation of a rule of EU law arises 
in the present case and has stated that there is a need to unify judicial practice in 
the area of establishing the salary entitlements of staff paid from public funds. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
5 The referring court groups its reasoning under five categories. 
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6 In the first place, it points out that, according to the case-law of the ÎCCJ 
regarding the application of Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the role of 
the ÎCCJ in the process of interpreting the legal rules the clarification of which is 
necessary in order to give a ruling on the merits of a case remains exceptional and 
consequential, and can be permitted only where a point of law which is decisive 
for deciding the case on the merits is not sufficiently clear and, for that reason, is 
liable to lead to inconsistent case-law. 
7 Thus, the ÎCCJ does not have the prerogative to substitute itself for the judges in 
the case in resolving all the issues of law with which they are confronted, so long 
as those issues of law are not characterised by any real difficulty. Furthermore, 
Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an optional procedure, 
which gives a judge hearing a case the freedom to assess the difficulty of the issue 
of law and to manage the case on the basis of the specific facts of each case. That 
article also provides that only the last court to hear a case may refer a matter to the 
ÎCCJ, and its provisions are applicable to all persons. 
8 According to the referring court, first, OUG nr. 62/2024 transforms an optional 
procedure into a mandatory procedure in cases falling within its scope; second, 
that order is not applicable to all persons who bring proceedings before the courts; 
and, third, it obliges those courts to refer the matter to the ÎCCJ even if they have 
no doubts as to the merits of the case. 
9 In addition, through the adoption of OUG nr. 62/2024, the legal concept of ‘point 
of law’ referred to in Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure is touched upon. 
That concept, not being defined by law, needed to be clarified by case-law in 
order to ensure a strict delimitation between, on the one hand, the analysis and 
interpretation in principle which may be given to legal rules under the mechanism 
for the unification of judicial practice and, on the other, the precise and specific 
rulings to be made by the courts, which must also rule inherently on points of law 
relating to the disputes brought before them. The usefulness and necessity of such 
a delimitation arises from the very purpose of the procedure governed by that 
article, namely that it is a judicial mechanism to be used as a legal instrument for 
the unification of case-law, and not as an instrument enabling the courts to 
delegate powers concerning the interpretation and application of the law to the 
ÎCCJ. 
10 Moreover, according to the referring court, by making it mandatory to refer the 
matter to the ÎCCJ and suspending all cases pending before the courts of the 
country, a judge is not given the opportunity to pass through the filter of his or her 
own reasoning the manner in which the issue of law is to be resolved and adapted 
to the case before him or her. However, in the judgment of the Court of 11 July 
2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C-554/21, C-622/21 and C-727/21, 
EU:C:2024:594, it was held that a ‘tribunal established by law’ is characterised by 
its judicial function, that is to say determining matters within its competence on 
the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. 
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11 The referring court also points out that, in [Decizia nr. 59/2018 (Decision 
No 59/2018) of 24 September 2018], the ÎCCJ held that, in order to avoid turning 
the procedural mechanism governed by Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
into an unjustified cause of prolongation of judicial proceedings and in order not 
to divert that procedure from its natural purpose, which is to unify judicial practice 
through the resolution by the ÎCCJ of a point of law which is necessary in order to 
give a ruling on the merits of the case, the court referring the matter to the ÎCCJ 
must indicate, in the order for reference, (i) the specific issue of law which is in 
serious need of clarification and (ii) the difficulty of interpretation, so as to require 
the intervention of the ÎCCJ in order to resolve the point of law in principle. 
Therefore, the mere dilemma as to the meaning of a rule of law cannot constitute a 
basis for triggering that mechanism for the unification of case-law, since it is 
considered imperative that the view of the court making a reference to the ÎCCJ 
must contain a well-founded argument regarding the admissibility of the 
reference, not only in terms of the procedural conditions, but in particular in terms 
of the circumstances of the condition concerning the existence of a point of law, 
the clarification of which is necessary in order to give a ruling on the merits of the 
case. 
12 Furthermore, in [Decizia nr. 71/2018 (Decision No 71/2018) of 15 October 2018], 
the ÎCCJ held that the purpose of the procedure provided for in Article 519 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure is the interpretation of doubtful, incomplete or unclear 
rules of law that are decisive for the purpose of giving a ruling on the merits of the 
case. The purpose of that procedure is to prevent the emergence of inconsistent 
case-law, and not to interpret and apply the law itself in order to give a ruling on 
the case in question, which is and must remain within the jurisdiction of the court 
seised of the case. For there to be a genuine issue of law, the disputed rule must be 
doubtful, imperfect, incomplete or unclear. Consequently, the point of law under 
discussion must be serious, linked to the possibility of interpreting a law 
differently, because that law is incomplete, is not linked to other legal provisions, 
or is no longer in force. 
13 In those circumstances, the referring court considers that the aforementioned case-
law of the ÎCCJ regarding the admissibility of such a reference becomes devoid of 
purpose if judges are obliged to refer to the ÎCCJ all situations falling within the 
scope of OUG nr. 62/2024. 
14 In the second place, the referring court states that OUG nr. 62/2024 is in breach of 
the principles of the rule of law, the separation of powers and the independence of 
judges, as it represents an inadmissible form of interference by the 
executive/legislature in the administration of justice. 
15 Thus, by not indicating an objective and sufficient reason why OUG nr. 62/2024 
applies only in certain judicial proceedings, and by not imposing clear and precise 
conditions or deadlines, the legislature is in fact establishing a special court at the 
level of the ÎCCJ only in the case of certain judicial proceedings concerning salary 
entitlements claimed in court by a broad category of public servants, including 
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magistrates. Under a strengthened rule of law, such an exceptional rule, applicable 
only to certain disputes, should not exist, as it is contrary to the principles of the 
rule of law and the separation of powers. 
16 The referring court points out that, in order to ensure a balance between the 
judiciary and the executive/legislature, the laws enacted must not prevent or delay 
the administration of justice but, on the contrary, must ensure that a judge is 
independent in the application of the law in each case before him or her. 
17 However, it would appear from the preamble to OUG nr. 62/2024 that the 
executive/legislature is impinging on the independence of the judiciary by 
involving itself in the administration and even the resolution of cases. To justify 
the adoption of a normative act on the ground that inconsistent judicial practice 
may have a negative impact on the consolidated general budget and on socio-
economic stability suggests a desire on the part of the author of that order that the 
envisaged procedure of unification of judicial practice should have favourable 
results for the State budget. Thus, the assumption that the solutions of unification 
of practice will be favourable to the State budget demonstrates that the legislature 
has a certain expectation as to the results of the unification procedure. 
18 Accordingly, the referring court considers that OUG nr. 62/2024 is liable to 
infringe the independence of the judiciary because it contains in the very 
reasoning for its adoption the requirement that judicial decisions unifying judicial 
practice must be aligned with the financial interests of the State. In itself, this 
implies censorship of the judicial solution from the perspective of a party to the 
proceedings, namely an institution or an authority administering public funds. 
19 Furthermore, according to the referring court, the fact that OUG nr. 62/2024 
applies only to certain categories of disputes opens the way to political influence 
on the judicial system, since it is only in the case of disputes in which the courts 
having jurisdiction have found serious legislative inconsistencies that an 
exceptional solution is regulated. In this way, the courts will be perceived as being 
under the influence of the executive/legislature or as being subject to political 
directives, and public confidence in justice will be seriously affected, which will 
have negative consequences for the rule of law and democracy as a whole. 
20 Moreover, in the referring court’s view, the obligation to refer the case to the ÎCCJ 
is also in breach of the principle of the independence of judges because it limits 
the ability of the competent courts to decide cases independently. Thus, as judges 
must be free to interpret and apply the law without outside interference, the 
imposition of a mandatory procedure of making references to the ÎCCJ 
undermines that independence. 
21 In addition, according to the referring court, the fact that OUG nr. 62/2024 
requires the automatic suspension of all similar cases directly affects the 
independence of judges to manage their own cases. Thus, their obligation to 
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suspend the aforementioned cases irrespective of the specific features of each of 
those cases is contrary to the principle of independence. 
22 In the third place, the referring court considers that OUG nr. 62/2024 also has 
adverse effects on the fairness of the trial, in the light of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) and Article 47 of the Charter. Thus, 
litigants might perceive the measures adopted by OUG nr. 62/2024 as an attempt 
to favour the administration in cases concerning salary entitlements and as an 
indication that judges of the lower courts may not enjoy the public trust necessary 
to make decisions on their own, which undermines public confidence in the 
judicial system. Moreover, it creates a dangerous precedent of excessive 
centralisation of case-law and forced standardisation of the interpretation of the 
law in certain categories of disputes. Any attempt to forcibly standardise legal 
interpretation only in the case of certain types of dispute, by exceptional 
legislative means, constitutes impermissible interference in judicial activity. 
23 Moreover, the referring court points out that the automatic suspension of a large 
number of similar cases would lead to a considerable backlog of cases in the 
courts, further complicating the efficient management of cases and prolonging the 
duration of judicial proceedings. This would run counter to the very stated 
purpose of OUG nr. 62/2024 with regard to making the administration of justice 
more efficient. 
24 In the fourth place, according to the referring court, the existence of divergences 
in case-law is not a reasonable ground for the adoption of OUG nr. 62/2024 and 
the large number of cases pending before the courts cannot be confused with the 
existence of divergences in case-law. Divergences in case-law are inherent in any 
judicial system which is based on a group of courts of first instance having 
territorial jurisdiction. This was also noted by the European Court of Human 
Rights in its judgment of 4 June 2013, Teodor v. Romania, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0604JUD004687806, in which it was emphasised that such 
divergences can also occur within the same court and that this is not in itself 
contrary to the ECHR. 
25 The referring court points out, in that regard, that Romanian legislation contains 
sufficient mechanisms for the unification of judicial practice, provided for by the 
Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, which lay down general provisions 
concerning making references to the ÎCCJ in order to resolve issues of law, but 
only after it has been found that the issue in question is new or difficult and that 
certain conditions of admissibility are satisfied. 
26 In the fifth place, the referring court points out that OUG nr. 62/2024 was adopted 
in the field of judicial organisation, although the results of the national referendum 
of 26 May 2019, in which the Romanian people expressed, inter alia, their 
agreement with the prohibition of the adoption, by the Government, of emergency 
orders in the field of judicial organisation, were confirmed by Decision No 2/2019 
of the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania). Even 
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if the effects of a consultative referendum are of a political rather than a legal 
nature, the government had to respect the obligation of constitutional loyalty and 
propose to the Parliament the adoption of a law on the matter. 
27 On those grounds and in view of the fact that the correct application of EU law 
cannot be so self-evident as to leave no reasonable doubt as to how the issue 
which is the subject of the question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be 
resolved, the referring court considers that it is necessary that the Court interpret 
the rules and principles of EU law applicable in the present case.