Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2017:402
Date: 2017-05-30
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Grand Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Action for damages

summary of the reasoning followed by the General Court in the grounds of the judgment under appeal which are being challenged in the complaint under consideration. 52. In paragraphs 80 and 85 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court points out, first of all, that, when an entity is the subject of restrictive measures because of the support it has allegedly given to nuclear proliferation, it is publicly associated with conduct which is considered a serious threat to international peace and security, as a result of which it becomes an object of opprobrium and suspicion (which thus affects its reputation) and is therefore caused non-material damage — distinct from any material loss resulting from an impact on its commercial relations — for which it is entitled to be compensated. Next, after observing that annulment of the contested acts is capable of constituting a form of reparation for that damage, since it entails a finding that the appellant’s association with nuclear proliferation is unjustified and, consequently, unlawful, the General Court finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, that annulment can only limit the amount of compensation to be awarded but cannot represent full reparation for the damage suffered. (35) The General Court sets out four grounds in support of that finding. First, the effects which triggered the non-material damage suffered by the appellant, in particular the way in which third parties, located for the most part outside the European Union, behaved towards it, ‘cannot be wholly offset by a subsequent finding that the contested acts are unlawful, given that the adoption of restrictive measures against an entity tends to attract more attention and provoke a greater reaction, in particular outside the European Union, than does their subsequent annulment’ (paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal). Second, the allegation levelled by the Council at the appellant is particularly serious (paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal). Third, that allegation ‘has not been substantiated by any relevant information or evidence’ (paragraph 90 of the judgment under appeal). Fourth, although the listing of the appellant’s name could have been withdrawn by the Council at any time, it was maintained for almost three years despite the appellant’s objections (paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal). 53. The Council’s arguments are based on a series of what I consider to be erroneous premisses. 54. In the first place, contrary to what the Council suggests, the Court of Justice has not transposed to the sphere of restrictive measures the principle, which it established in the context of civil service litigation, that the annulment of an act of the administration, and therefore the recognition of its illegality, constitutes in itself adequate and, in principle, sufficient reparation for the non-material damage which that act caused to the official contesting it. (36) It is true, as the General Court recalls in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, that, in paragraph 72 of the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), the Court of Justice stated that recognition of the illegality of the contested act was capable of rehabilitating the applicant or constituting a form of reparation for the non-material harm which he had suffered by reason of that illegality. However, the Court of Justice made that statement when ruling on whether the applicant retained an interest in bringing proceedings after his name had been removed from the list at issue, and its finding must therefore be regarded as obiter dictum in the context of that judgment. Moreover, the Court confined itself to stating that the annulment of the act ‘[was] capable … of … constituting a form of reparation for the non-material harm’, (37) but did not reproduce the considerably more restrictive wording it had used in paragraph 26 of the judgment of 7 February 1990, Culin v Commission (C‑343/87, EU:C:1990:49) — to which it nonetheless referred — to the effect that the annulment of the contested act ‘constitutes appropriate reparation for any non-material harm which [the applicant] may have suffered’. (38) 55. In the second place, even if the Court of Justice had transposed the principle referred to in point 54 above, it is apparent from the case-law that the application of that principle is not automatic, contrary to what the Council appears to imply. Thus, on the one hand, in order to assess whether the annulment of an unlawful act may have the effect of retroactively eliminating the non-material damage suffered by the applicant, account must be taken of all the circumstances of the case, (39) including the seriousness and duration of the infringement, (40) as well as the aggravating circumstances which characterised the specific situation of the person concerned. (41) On the other hand, the applicant may be able to show that he has suffered non-material damage which is separable from the unlawfulness justifying the annulment of the act and incapable of being entirely remedied by that annulment. (42) In this regard, the case-law states that serious accusations made publicly against the person concerned in an act adversely affecting him or in the course of proceedings culminating in such an act are capable of causing that person non-material damage separate from that act where they are prejudicial to his honour, dignity, self-esteem or reputation. (43) As the Court of Justice pointed out in the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), persons covered by restrictive measures are publicly designated as being associated with conduct which raises opprobrium and suspicion. (44) As a result, they suffer non-material damage which is separable from that which is caused by the act itself and which, depending on the circumstances, may be incapable of being entirely remedied by the annulment of that act. (45) 56. In the third place, contrary to what the Council suggests, the claim for compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant in Sison v Council (judgment of 11 July 2007, Sison v Council, T‑47/03, not published, EU:T:2007:207) was dismissed on grounds other than a finding that annulment of the restrictive measures at issue was capable of entirely eliminating that damage. Paragraph 241 of that judgment, to which the Council refers, concerns only the damage caused by the failure to observe the applicant’s rights of defence, which the General Court found could be adequately compensated by annulment of the contested act, given that the rule infringed constituted a procedural guarantee. In paragraph 247 of that judgment, however, the General Court rules on the claim for compensation for the non-material damage caused, in particular, by the applicant’s being branded a ‘terrorist’ by dismissing that claim on the ground that there was no evidence of a direct causal link between that damage and the Community acts at issue. 57. It follows from the foregoing considerations that the General Court did not make the errors alleged by the Council when it carried out, in the judgment under appeal, an assessment of the circumstances of the case in order to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the non-material damage pleaded by the appellant could be considered to have been entirely eliminated by the annulment of the acts at issue. 3. Conclusion with respect to the cross-appeal 58. On the basis of all the foregoing, I take the view that the Council’s cross-appeal is unfounded and must therefore be dismissed. C – The principal appeal 59. The appellant raises two grounds in support of its appeal. By its first ground of appeal, directed against paragraphs 93 to 149 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court made various errors of law in dismissing its claim for compensation for the material damage it claims it suffered as a result of its inclusion on the lists at issue. The second ground of appeal, on the other hand, is directed against that part of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court ruled on the appellant’s claim for compensation for non-material damage. 1. The first ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of proportionality and equitable evaluation, denial of justice, distortion of the facts and defective and contradictory reasoning in relation to the claim for compensation for the material damage allegedly suffered by the appellant 60. This ground of appeal is divided into several limbs. (a) The first limb, alleging a breach of the principle of full compensation laid down in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and in Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 61. By the first limb of its first ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court infringed its right to full compensation for the damage caused by the Council’s unlawful conduct, in accordance with the principles laid down in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It claims that the general principles common to the laws of the Member States to which those provisions refer include the principles of ‘proportionality’ and ‘equitable evaluation’, whereby, where the existence of damage has been proved but establishing the precise extent or quantum of that damage is difficult or burdensome, the General Court has a duty to determine the quantum of damages ‘in a fair and equitable manner or, alternatively, ex aequo et bono’, rather than dismissing the ‘obvious’ in its entirety. The appellant also submits that the grounds on which the General Court dismissed all of its claims for compensation for material damage, after it had acknowledged at various points in the judgment under appeal (46) that the Council’s conduct had indeed and ‘by definition’ caused such damage to the appellant, were illogical and contradictory. 62. I would observe, as a preliminary point, that, since the above arguments are methodically and fully reproduced by the appellant in the other parts of its first ground of appeal, which concern those grounds of the judgment under appeal that address the various heads of damage alleged at first instance, it is legitimate to question the autonomy of the limb under consideration here within the context of that ground of appeal. 63. Nonetheless, I note that the European Union’s non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, for the unlawful conduct of its institutions is subject to the satisfaction of a number of cumulative conditions, including the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of which the institutions are accused and the damage complained of. (47) Moreover, according to settled case-law, it is for the applicant to adduce conclusive proof both as to the existence and the extent of the damage he alleges. (48) It is also settled case-law that it is first and foremost for the party seeking to establish the European Union’s liability to establish the causal link between that damage and the conduct complained of on the part of the institutions. (49) 64. Contrary to what the appellant seems to suggest, those principles also apply where the European Union’s non-contractual liability is put in issue in the context of the adoption of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, that is to say measures designed to have an adverse impact on the legal or financial situation of the entities and individuals targeted by them so as to bring about a change in their conduct. The General Court cannot therefore be criticised for having carried out, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the appellant, an assessment both of the fact of the various heads of damage complained of by the appellant and of the extent of that damage, or for having verified, in relation to each head of damage alleged, the existence of a direct causal link with the unlawful conduct attributed to the Council. Consequently, the fact that, following such an examination, the General Court dismissed all the claims put forward by the appellant does not, in itself, and regardless of any finding that that examination was vitiated by errors, support the conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and the principle laid down in Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights were infringed. 65. As regards the complaint alleging that the grounds relied on were illogical and contradictory, I note, in common with the Council, that this is based on a selective reading of the judgment under appeal. First, the assertion in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the allegation that the appellant was involved in nuclear proliferation affected the way in which third parties, located outside the European Union, behaved towards it, is contained in the grounds concerning the examination of the claim for compensation for non-material damage — in which the General Court states that those effects actually caused that damage — and cannot therefore be regarded as forming part of the assessment of the fact of the material damage alleged by the appellant. Second, it is true that, in paragraph 109 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, as the appellant notes, that ‘the termination of business relations by entities located in the European Union is an inevitable consequence of the adoption of restrictive measures’ and that, in the present case, the termination of the business relationship between Siemens AG and the appellant was the ‘direct result’ of the adoption of the measures at issue. At the end of the analysis that then follows, however, the General Court concluded that the appellant had not proved to the requisite legal standard that it had actually suffered the material damage alleged to have been consequent upon the termination of that relationship. Third, the assertion in paragraph 145 of the judgment under appeal that ‘the extracts from the applicant’s financial statements and the summary table in question in fact show a significant decrease in its turnover’ is accompanied by the finding that those documents ‘do not establish the reasons for that trend’, a fact which the appellant neglects to mention. The same is true of the assertion, in paragraph 147 of the judgment under appeal, that the restrictive measures concerned are ‘by definition … intended to limit the free exercise of the applicant’s business’, which is followed, later in that same paragraph, by the finding that the appellant did not produce evidence that enabled the extent of the damage sustained to be ascertained. 66. Finally, the complaint alleging that the General Court has an obligation to award compensation ex aequo et bono where the existence of damage has been proved but the evaluation of the extent of that damage is a complex process should be examined in the context of the specific assessment of the various heads of damage pleaded by the appellant, which is the subject of isolated points of criticism in the other limbs of the ground of appeal under consideration. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that such an obligation cannot in any event exempt the EU judicature from its duty to ascertain, on a case-by-case basis, whether the conditions governing the incurring of non-contractual liability by the European Union, in particular those relating to the fact of the damage complained of and the causal link, have been satisfied. 67. On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, I take the view that the first limb of the first ground of the principal appeal must be dismissed as unfounded so far as concerns those parts of it which do not overlap with the other limbs of the same ground of appeal. (b) The second limb, alleging various errors of law vitiating the dismissal of the claim for compensation for damage purportedly suffered by the appellant as a result of the termination of the contract for the refurbishment of the Derbendikhan (Iraq) electrical substation and the closure of its bank accounts i) The claim for compensation for the damage associated with the termination of the contract for the refurbishment of the Derbendikhan electrical substation 68. By the second limb of its first ground of appeal, the appellant claims, in the first place, that the General Court, acting arbitrarily and contrary to the principles of proportionality and ‘equitable evaluation’, refused to grant it any compensation for the damage it suffered as a result of the termination of the contract for the refurbishment of the Derbendikhan (Iraq) electrical substation. 69. It submits that the General Court recognised, in paragraph 102 of the judgment under appeal, that that contract, which was entered into between the appellant and the authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan, had been terminated by those authorities because the appellant had not been able to obtain a payment made by the World Bank, as it had been blocked by a European intermediate bank, and, moreover, in paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal, that that payment had been blocked shortly after the adoption of the restrictive measures against the appellant. However, the General Court did not draw from those findings the obvious conclusion that the only plausible explanation for the blocking of the payment was the appellant’s inclusion on the lists at issue. 70. As regards the assertion in paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal that the fact and extent of the damage pleaded had not been established, the appellant argues that it produced before the General Court the information needed to enable the value of the contract, the expenditure incurred in its preparation and the anticipated profit margin to be assessed, thus providing a detailed justification for the amount claimed as compensation for the damage suffered. The appellant submits that the General Court unlawfully dismissed or distorted that evidence. 71. It should be noted that, after finding, in paragraph 103 of the judgment under appeal, that the evidence available to it did not expressly show that the blockage of the payment by the European intermediate bank was the result of the adoption of the restrictive measures against the appellant, the General Court went on to state that, even if a causal link between that blockage and those measures had been established, the appellant had not in any event established the fact and extent of the damage pleaded. By its arguments, the appellant challenges that assertion by calling into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence produced before it. 72. I would point out in this regard that, in accordance with settled case-law, since the appeal is limited to points of law, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence adduced. The findings of fact and the assessment of that evidence do not therefore, save where they have been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice. (50) It also follows from the case-law that there is distortion of the clear sense of the evidence where, without recourse to new evidence, the General Court’s assessment of the existing evidence appears to be clearly incorrect. That is the case, in particular, where the inferences drawn by the General Court from certain documents are not consistent with the meaning and implications of those documents read as a whole. (51) 73. In the present case, although the appellant alleges that the clear sense of the evidence produced at first instance was distorted, it does not explain precisely how it was distorted, but confines itself to making general references to passages from its pleadings before the General Court and the annexes to them. So far as this point is relevant, I note that paragraphs 71 to 77 of the reply before the General Court, to which the appellant refers, contain only a summary of the circumstances in which the contract in question was terminated. It is only in paragraph 76 of that reply that the appellant gives an account of the damage sustained, claiming a loss of 10% of the contract price by way of expenditure incurred in the preparation of the contract and 20% of the contract price by way of anticipated profit margin. In that context, the appellant refers to Annex A-5 to the application at first instance and to Annexes A-25-a and A-25-b to the reply before the General Court. The first of those annexes consists of a table listing those of the appellant’s projects that were affected and the tenders lost as a result of the sanctions adopted against it, while the second and third consist of a copy of the contract in question and the special conditions annexed to it. Although they provide information on the value of the contract in question, those documents are not such as to prove that the expenditure which the appellant claims to have incurred in connection with that contract was actually incurred, or the extent of the profit margin which it could reasonably have expected to achieve from the performance of that contract. As regards the answers to questions 7 and 8 put by the General Court as part of the measures of organisation of procedure of 14 January 2014, to which the appellant responded by document lodged at the General Court Registry on 31 January 2014, I note that the first of those answers concerns only the purported causal link between the blockage of the payment in question and the restrictive measures against the appellant, while the second merely contains allegations concerning the costs which it incurred and the lost earnings resulting from the termination of the contract in question. As the General Court held in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, those claims are not supported by statements of the costs incurred or any precise information concerning the appellant’s own general profitability ratio or that of the industry in which it operates. (52) 74. In the absence of substantiation of the claim that the General Court distorted the evidence submitted to it, the complaints which the appellant has raised with regard to the conclusion that it did not prove the fact and extent of the damage allegedly caused by the termination of the contract for the refurbishment of the Derbendikhan electrical substation must be declared inadmissible. 75. Given that the conditions relating, in particular, to the fact of the damage complained of and the causal link between that damage and the conduct of which the institutions are accused are cumulative, and that, if any of those conditions is not satisfied, the European Union cannot have incurred non-contractual liability, there is no need to rule on the complaint that the General Court was wrong to conclude that there was no such link in respect of the head of damage concerned. 76. Moreover, in so far as, on the one hand, the General Court, without committing the faults alleged by the appellant, concluded that there was no evidence of the fact and amount of the damage pleaded, and, on the other hand, the appellant has not argued that it was impossible or even difficult for it to quantify the damage, the complaints alleging infringement of the principles of proportionality and ‘equitable evaluation’ cannot in any event be upheld. ii) The claim for compensation for damage associated with the closure of the appellant’s bank accounts 77. In the second place, the appellant claims that the General Court, acting arbitrarily, on the basis of illogical and contradictory grounds and in such a way as to distort the evidence, refused to award any compensation for the damage it suffered as a result of the closure of its bank accounts by the Emirate National Bank of Dubai. 78. It should be noted that, in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, on the basis of the letter from the Emirate National Bank of Dubai to the appellant informing it of the closure of its bank accounts, that that closure was a consequence of the adoption, a short time before, of the restrictive measures against the appellant. However, in the further grounds of that judgment, the General Court stated, with regard to the fact and extent of the damage pleaded, first, that theEmirate National Bank of Dubai had not frozen the funds in the appellant’s accounts but had returned them to the appellant (paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal); second, that the appellant had not put forward any material showing that it was not able to obtain the financial services previously provided by the Emirate National Bank of Dubai from another bank (paragraph 98 of that judgment); third, that it had not put forward any specific matters to show that the closure of its accounts or the suspension of its payments had affected its relations with its business partners or with other persons or entities (paragraph 99 of that judgment); and, fourth, that it had not produced any material substantiating the amount of the damage it had allegedly sustained (paragraph 100 of that judgment). 79. As regards, first of all, the finding in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal that the impact which the suspension of the financial services in question had had on the appellant’s business relations had not been demonstrated, the appellant simply states that that finding is not reasoned and alleges that the facts were distorted. However, apart from making general assertions to the effect that ‘[that suspension] led to the paralysis of [its] business and its [economic] activities’, the appellant does not adduce any specific evidence to substantiate such an impact which the General Court neglected to consider, distorted or dismissed without proper reasoning. 80. Next, contrary to what the appellant claims, the General Court’s assertion in paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, that the refusal of the Emirate National Bank of Dubai to continue to provide financial services to the appellant was probably due to the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue and to the bank’s fear that it would itself be the subject of such restrictive measures does not amount to an admission that the appellant would unquestionably have received the same refusal from any other bank to which it might have been able to redirect its payments. The General Court did not therefore contradict itself in finding, in paragraph 98 of that judgment, that the appellant had fallen short of proving that it was unable to obtain the same financial services from another bank. Moreover, it is not evident from the appellant’s written submissions before the General Court that it had taken steps to obtain from other banking institutions the financial services previously provided by the Emirate National Bank of Dubai and that it had been met with a refusal. In those circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that the General Court’s finding is based on a distortion of the facts or evidence. 81. Finally, as regards the finding in paragraph 100 of the judgment under appeal that the appellant did not substantiate the amount of the damage allegedly sustained, the appellant, once again, simply argues that the facts were distorted without substantiating that argument with anything more than general assertions to the effect that the closure of the accounts in question had the ‘inevitable and undeniable consequence’, ‘in accordance with the ordinary course of events’, of causing it ‘considerable financial [damage]’. (53) (c) The third and fourth limbs, alleging various errors of law vitiating the dismissal of the claim for compensation for damage allegedly sustained by the appellant as a result of the termination of contracts and relations with its business partners 82. By the third and fourth limbs of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principles of proportionality and equitable evaluation, by refusing to award it any compensation for the EUR 2 000 000 loss it sustained as a result of the termination of its contracts and business relations with its most important partners, namely Siemens and Mobarakeh Steel Co. (‘Mobarakeh’). The appellant submits that the General Court’s reasoning is also illogical and contradictory and based on a distortion of facts and a denial of the obvious. 83. It should be recalled that, in paragraph 109 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recognised the existence of a direct causal link between the termination of the business relationship between Siemens and the appellant and the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning the appellant. In paragraph 110 of that judgment, the General Court, ruling on the existence of damage, acknowledged that the termination of relations with major suppliers disrupts a company’s business, but stated that a refusal to supply products does not, in itself, constitute damage, since damage arises solely where the refusal has an impact on the financial results of that company. 84. It then considered the various items of evidence adduced by the appellant to show that it had suffered damage as a result of the termination by its European suppliers of all business relations with it. Those items relate to the termination of the contract with Mobarakeh (paragraphs 112 to 117 of the judgment under appeal), the repercussions of that termination on the performance of the contracts for the modernisation of the electrical equipment at the Euphrates Dam in Syria (paragraphs 118 to 125 of that judgment) and the construction of electrical sub-stations in Kunduz (Afghanistan) and Baghlan (Afghanistan) (paragraphs 126 to 132 of that judgment), and other foreign projects allegedly affected (paragraphs 133 to 148 of that judgment). i) The termination of the contract with Mobarakeh 85. The appellant submitted before the General Court that, because of Siemen’s refusal to ship certain equipment, it had been unable to fulfil its contractual obligations to Mobarakeh, which terminated the contract in question and excluded the appellant from its future projects. In paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court concluded that the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning the appellant had not been the determining and direct cause of the termination of the contract in question. 86. According to the appellant, that conclusion is based on a distortion of the meaning of the letter which Mobarakeh sent to it on 3 September 2011 to notify it of the termination of the contract. Contrary to what the appellant submits, it is not apparent from that letter that the adoption of the restrictive measures against it was the ‘crucial and decisive’ reason for the decision to terminate the contract, Mobarakeh having placed more emphasis on the appellant’s delay in performing its obligations in relation to the contractual delivery time of 15 months, which expired on 15 November 2010, that is to say, as the General Court pointed out in paragraph 114 of the judgment under appeal, more than six months before the appellant’s inclusion on the lists concerned. The General Court did not therefore distort the meaning of that letter. (54) ii) The losses allegedly suffered by the appellant in connection with the contracts for the modernisation of the electrical equipment at the Euphrates Dam in Syria 87. The appellant submitted before the General Court that, because its European suppliers had severed all business relations with it, it was not in a position to provide the bulk of the equipment, accessories and materials necessary for the modernisation of the electrical equipment at the Euphrates Dam in Syria, as a result of which it suffered a loss amounting to at least 30% of the value of the portion of the contract concerned which had to be subcontracted, that is, EUR 1 425 000 in respect of preparatory work undertaken and profit margin (see paragraph 118 of the judgment under appeal). The General Court dismissed the appellant’s claim for compensation on that ground after having found that there was no evidence of the existence of a causal link between the Council’s alleged conduct and the loss pleaded (paragraphs 119 to 121 of that judgment), on the one hand, or of the loss pleaded (paragraphs 122 to 124 of that judgment), on the other. 88. As regards, in the first place, the causal link, in paragraph 119 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recognised, on the basis of the documents produced by the appellant, that the start and the schedule of the works commissioned from the appellant had been deferred and that the appellant had been authorised to use ‘secondary contractors’. However, in paragraph 120 of that judgment, the General Court found that the material produced by the appellant did not prove that the reason for the delay in carrying out the project and for the use of ‘secondary contractors’ was the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning the appellant. 89. The appellant disputes that finding. 90. It should be recalled that, so far as the non-contractual liability of the European Union is concerned, the question as to whether there is a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage is a question of law which, as a consequence, is subject to review by the Court of Justice. (55) However, that review may not call into question the General Court’s findings and assessments of facts. (56) 91. In the present case, most of the appellant’s arguments have the effect of calling into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence but do not allege that that evidence was distorted. Those arguments must therefore be declared inadmissible. 92. A complaint which is admissible, however, inasmuch as it seeks to criticise the General Court for not having carried out a correct legal characterisation of the facts, is that alleging that the General Court erred in failing to recognise the existence of a causal link on the basis of the ‘plausibility’, in the light of the circumstances of the case, of the appellant’s allegations. In that regard, I note that, according to the case-law, there is a causal link for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU where there is a certain, direct causal link between the fault committed by the institution concerned and the damage pleaded, the burden of proof of which lies upon the applicant. (57) Consequently, the General Court cannot be criticised for having confined itself to finding that there was no evidence of such a causal link without determining whether the appellant’s allegations were ‘plausible’. Moreover, the appellant cannot rely on the plausibility of its interpretation of the relevant facts in order to mitigate its failure to produce evidence proving to the requisite legal standard that such a causal link exists. 93. As regards, in the second place, the General Court’s finding that the appellant did not adduce evidence proving the damage alleged, it should be noted that the appellant’s arguments simply call into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence, without claiming that that evidence was distorted, and must therefore be declared inadmissible. iii) The damage allegedly sustained by the appellant in connection with the contract for the construction of the electrical sub-stations in Kunduz and Baghlan 94. The appellant submitted before the General Court that, because its European suppliers had severed all business relations with it, it was not in a position to provide some of the machines and equipment necessary for the construction of electrical sub-stations in Kunduz and Baghlan, and that it had suffered a loss of at least 10% of the value of the portion of the project which had to be subcontracted, that is, EUR 729 210.80. 95. In paragraphs 129 to 132 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, first, that it did not have at its disposal any evidence showing that the terms of the contract for the construction of the electrical sub-stations in Kunduz and Baghlan had had to be amended following the adoption of the restrictive measures against the appellant, in particular as regards the use of subcontractors; second, that the appellant had not proved that, following Siemens’ cancellation of an order, it had become impossible for it to perform the contract concerned without having recourse to subcontractors; and, third, that the appellant had also not specified the type of damage suffered or put forward any evidence of the amount represented by the portion of the contract that was allegedly subcontracted. 96. Almost all the arguments raised by the appellant against the findings reproduced above seek to call into question the General Court’s appraisal of the facts and evidence or amount to mere assertions, often based on a selective reading of the judgment under appeal. 97. The only admissible complaint, in my view, is that alleging that the General Court distorted the facts and evidence by stating that the appellant had not proved that, following the cancellation of the Siemens order, it had become impossible for it to perform the contract in question without having recourse to subcontractors. The appellant submits, in that regard, that the General Court should have known that it is not a manufacturer and that it is therefore dependent on suppliers and subcontractors. That complaint seems to me, however, to be based on a misreading of paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal. I take the view that the General Court did not mean to say that the appellant could have manufactured the equipment and machines under the contract itself, but rather that it could, if necessary, have acquired those materials from suppliers other than Siemens, for example, from non-European suppliers, rather than subcontracting the procurement of those materials. The distortion alleged by the appellant, which is the only complaint raised by the appellant in respect of that paragraph of the judgment under appeal, has not therefore been established. iv) The other matters assessed by the General Court in the context of the claim for compensation for the damage purportedly suffered by the appellant as a result of the termination of contracts and relations with its business partners 98. The appellant submits, first, that in paragraph 133 et seq. of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that there was no evidence of facts which the General Court itself had regarded as established at other points in that judgment. 99. I note, in that regard, that, in the abovementioned paragraphs of the judgment under appeal the General Court examined a series of documents produced by the appellant and concluded, in relation to each of them, that they did not provide sufficient evidence of the existence of a causal link between the Council’s alleged conduct and the damage which the appellant claimed to have suffered as a result of the termination of business relations with its European suppliers or of the fact that that damage had been sustained. In paragraphs 88 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, to which the appellant refers, the General Court stated that ‘the applicant[’s involvement] in nuclear proliferation affected the way in which third parties, located for the most part outside the European Union, behaved towards it’ (paragraph 88 of that judgment) and that ‘the termination of business relations by entities located in the European Union is an inevitable consequence of the adoption of restrictive measures’ (paragraph 109 of that judgment). Contrary to what the appellant appears to claim, those passages do not constitute an acknowledgement of the fact of the damage which the appellant claimed to have suffered as a result of the termination of those relations, or of the existence of a causal link between that damage and the restrictive measures. On the contrary, in paragraph 110 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated very clearly that ‘a refusal to supply products does not, in itself, constitute damage’. 100. Next, the appellant submits that, in the ‘usual course of events’, it is ‘normal’ that damage would result from the termination of business relations by a company’s suppliers, and, more generally, that restrictive measures are adopted with the aim of inflicting maximum economic and financial harm on the targeted entity, a fact which, in the appellant’s contention, the General Court attempts to deny, not least by placing on it a burden of proof which is impossible to discharge. 101. In that regard, it is indeed true, as the General Court itself acknowledges in paragraph 147 of the judgment under appeal, that restrictive measures are intended to limit the free exercise of the business of the entities concerned with a view to bringing about a change in their conduct to reflect the objectives pursued. However, that self-evident fact does not support the presumption that those measures specifically caused the person concerned to suffer actual and certain damage and cannot therefore exempt that person from the obligation incumbent on him in an action to establish the non-contractual liability of the European Union to prove not only the unlawfulness of the conduct of which the Council is accused, but also the fact and extent of the damage complained of and the causal link between that damage and that conduct. After all, as the Court of Justice has already had occasion to point out, the existence of actual and certain damage cannot be considered in the abstract by the EU judicature but must be assessed in relation to the specific facts characterising each particular case in point. (58)Moreover, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, it is for the European Union to make good only such damage as is the consequence of the conduct of its institutions or servants, for which purposes there must be a sufficiently direct causal nexus between that conduct and the damage pleaded. (59) In the present case, moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the General Court placed on the appellant a burden of proof which was abnormal or impossible to discharge. 102. The remaining arguments put forward by the appellant call into question the General Court’s assessment of the evidence and must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible. v) The complaint alleging that the General Court failed to carry out an equitable evaluation of the damage sustained by the appellant 103. In the alternative, the appellant complains that the General Court did not carry out an ex aequo et bono evaluation of the damages to be awarded to it for the termination of relations with its business partners, relying in this regard, in particular, on the significant decrease in its turnover and its large-scale redundancy programme, but instead dismissed all of its claims for compensation. 104. In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, in order for an obligation on the part of the General Court to carry out such an evaluation to be capable, if appropriate, of being established, the appellant would at the very least have had to provide evidence of the fact of the damage pleaded and of the existence of a causal link, which the General Court, without being legitimately challenged in this regard, found that it had not done. 105. In so far as the appellant refers to the extracts from its financial statements, I would observe that, in paragraph 145 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to assess the evidence, that, although those extracts did show a significant decrease in its turnover, they did not establish the reasons for that trend, with the result that ‘it [was] impossible to determine whether — and if so, to what extent — that decrease [was] accounted for by the adoption and maintenance of the restrictive measures concerning the applicant rather than by other factors such as general developments in the economic climate’. (d) Conclusion with respect to the first ground of appeal 106. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the first ground of the principal appeal directed against the dismissal of the claim for compensation for the material damage allegedly sustained by the appellant must, in my view, be dismissed. 107. In so far as it is apparent from the foregoing that the conditions relating to the fact and extent of the damage and/or the causal link between that damage and the conduct of which the Council is accused are not satisfied in relation to all the heads of damage pleaded by the appellant in its claim for compensation for material damage, the appellant’s request that the Court, exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, make an equitable determination of the amount of those damages cannot in any event be granted. 2. The second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and of the principle of proportionality in relation to the claim for compensation for non-material damage sustained by the appellant 108. According to the appellant, the amount of EUR 50 000 awarded by the General Court for non-material damage, which it considers to be negligible, was determined in an arbitrary and unreasoned fashion and in breach of the principle of proportionality. 109. As regards the complaint alleging failure to state reasons, I note that, according to settled case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the reasoning of the General Court, so that the persons concerned can ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review. (60) In this case, the General Court was sufficiently clear, in paragraphs 86 to 91 of the judgment under appeal, the content of which is summarised in point 52 above, as to the considerations and material on the basis of which it determined the amount of compensation to be awarded to the appellant. 110. As regards the complaint alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the arguments put forward by the appellant do not, in my view, successfully demonstrate that the General Court’s assessment is vitiated by such an error. 111. First, in so far as the appellant states that the General Court did not take appropriate account either of the extent of the damage it suffered or of the seriousness of the Council’s infringements, it is in fact asking the Court of Justice to carry out a new assessment of the amount determined by General Court. According to the case-law, however, once the General Court has found that actual damage has been sustained, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the confines of the claim, the most appropriate compensation. (61) 112. Second, in so far as the appellant criticises the General Court for having considered that the damaging effects of its inclusion on the lists concerned lasted for almost three years, when it is in fact still suffering the negative consequences of its listing, it is sufficient to note, as the Council does, that the European Union can be held liable only for damage which is the direct consequence of infringements committed by its institutions and servants. Neither the fact, alleged by the appellant, that its name is still to this day associated with those sanctions on Internet sites, nor the damage purportedly caused by that fact, can be regarded as constituting such a direct consequence, since the appellant’s name was removed from the lists concerned on 16 April 2014 and the judgment annulling that listing was delivered on 25 November 2014. 113. For the foregoing reasons, the second ground of appeal must, in my view, be dismissed. 3. Conclusion with respect to the principal appeal 114. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I take the view that the principal appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. IV – Conclusion In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court: – dismiss in their entirety both the principal appeal lodged by Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. and the cross-appeal lodged by the Council of the European Union; and – order Safa Nicu Sepahan Co., the Council of the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own costs, in accordance with Article 138(2) and (3) and Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 1 Original language: French. 2 I note that the acts annulled by the General Court were adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU and, therefore, outside the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Consequently, those acts fall within the general jurisdiction of the EU judicature under Article 19 TEU (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2016:381, point 48)). The General Court therefore had jurisdiction to hear the action for damages brought by the appellant with a view to obtaining compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the adoption of those acts, a fact, moreover, which the Council has not at any time disputed either before the General Court or the Court of Justice. 3 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39). 4 Council Decision of 23 May 2011 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2011 L 136, p. 65). 5 Council Regulation of 25 October 2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (OJ 2010 L 281, p. 1). 6 Council Regulation of 23 May 2011 implementing Regulation No 961/2010 (OJ 2011 L 136, p. 26). 7 Council Decision of 1 December 2011 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2011 L 319, p. 71). 8 Council Regulation of 1 December 2011 implementing Regulation No 961/2010 (OJ 2011 L 319, p. 11). 9 Council Regulation of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1). 10 Council Decision of 16 April 2014 amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2014 L 119, p. 65). 11 Council Regulation of 16 April 2014 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2014 L 119, p. 1). 12 The General Court noted that the appellant no longer disputed that it was designated by the listing at issue and concluded that there was therefore no longer any need to consider the first plea (paragraphs 23 to 25 of the judgment under appeal). 13 The claim for annulment of the listing of the names of the appellant’s ‘affiliated companies’, on the other hand, was dismissed as inadmissible (paragraphs 41 to 44 of the judgment under appeal). 14 Under Article 174 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, ‘a response shall seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part’. 15 Under Article 179 of the Rules of Procedure, ‘where a cross-appeal is brought, the applicant at first instance … may submit a response, which must be limited to the pleas in law relied on in that cross-appeal’. 16 See point 29 of this Opinion. 17 See, inter alia, judgment of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission (C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited). 18 See, inter alia, judgments of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 51); of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraphs 41 and 42); of 10 December 2002, Commission v Camar and Tico (C‑312/00 P, EU:C:2002:736, paragraph 53); and of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine (C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399, paragraph 25). 19 See judgments of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 55); of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 43); of 10 December 2002, Commission v Camar and Tico (C‑312/00 P, EU:C:2002:736, paragraph 54); and of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine (C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399, paragraph 26). 20 See judgments of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 44); of 10 December 2002, Commission v Camar and Tico (C‑312/00 P, EU:C:2002:736, paragraph 54); and of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine (C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399, paragraph 26). 21 See judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 57). 22 See paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal. 23 Paragraphs 56 and 57 of the judgment under appeal. 24 See also paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal. 25 Paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal (emphasis added). 26 See, in particular, judgments of 18 January 2007, PKK and KNK v Council (C‑229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraphs 109 to 111); of 29 June 2010, E and F (C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraph 57); of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142, paragraphs 96 and 97); of 13 March 2012, MelliBank v Council (C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 46); of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 142); and of 12 December 2006, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council (T‑228/02, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 159). It is interesting to note that, in the judgment of 18 February 2016, Council v Bank Mellat (C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96), the Court confirmed the Council’s obligation to produce information and evidence to substantiate the validity of the restrictive measures adopted so as to enable the EU judicature to review their lawfulness (paragraphs 109 to 112), although it did state that, at least on the initial adoption of a listing decision, the Council is not required to assess the relevance and the validity of that information and evidence where that information and evidence is submitted to it by a Member State or by the High Representative of the Union (paragraphs 88 to 91). 27 Paragraph 38 of the judgment under appeal. 28 Point 171 of the Opinion in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:470); see also points 172 and 174 of that Opinion. 29 Paragraphs 109 and 110 of that judgment. 30 See paragraphs 109 to 111 of that judgment. 31 The question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is obviously, as the Court has pointed out on many occasions, separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned; see, inter alia, judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba (C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 60). 32 See paragraph 57 of that judgment (emphasis added). In the same paragraph, the Court added that the possibility of an adequate review by the courts was indispensable if a fair balance between the requirements of the fight against international terrorism, on the one hand, and the protection of fundamental liberties and rights, on the other, was to be ensured. To the same effect, in the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadiand Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), the Court had already stated, in particular, that restrictive measures such as those at issue in the case giving rise to that judgment did not escape all review by the EU judicature purely because the act laying them down concerns sensitive areas such as national security and the fight against terrorism (see, in particular, paragraph 343; see also paragraphs 281, 326, 350 to 351 of that judgment). 33 This was the position adopted by the Council notably in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (see Opinion of Advocate General Bot in that case, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:470, point 88). 34 See, inter alia, judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 40). 35 See paragraphs 86 and 87 of the judgment under appeal. 36 See, in particular, judgments of 9 July 1981, Krecké v Commission (59/80 and 129/80, not published, EU:C:1981:170, paragraphs 73 and 74); of 7 October 1985, van der Stijl v Commission (128/84, EU:C:1985:395, paragraph 26); of 9 July 1987, Hochbaum and Rawes v Commission (44/85, 77/85, 294/85 and 295/85, EU:C:1987:348, paragraph 22); of 6 July 1999, Séché v Commission (T 112/96 and T 115/96, EU:T:1999:134, paragraph 281); of 16 December 2004, De Nicola v EIB (T 120/01 and T 300/01, EU:T:2004:367, paragraph 73); and of 18 September 2015, Wahlström v Frontex (T 653/13 P, EU:T:2015:652, paragraphs 82 to 85). 37 Emphasis added. 38 Emphasis added. The same form of words is used, sometimes with slight variations, in all civil service cases in which the principle in question is applied. 39 See, for example, judgments of 26 October 1993, Caronna v Commission (T‑59/92, EU:T:1993:91, paragraph 107), and of 10 June 2004, François v Commission (T‑307/01, EU:T:2004:180, paragraph 110). 40 See judgments of 11 October 1995, Baltsavias v Commission (T‑39/93 and T‑553/93, EU:T:1995:177, paragraph 86), and of 16 June 2000, C v Council (T‑84/98, EU:T:2000:156, paragraph 101). 41 See judgment of 24 November 2005, Marcuccio v Commission (T‑236/02, EU:T:2005:417, paragraphs 234 and 237). 42 See, to that effect, judgments of 7 February 1990, Culin v Commission (C‑343/87, EU:C:1990:49, paragraphs 27 and 28), and of 6 June 2006, Girardot v Commission (T‑10/02, EU:T:2006:148, paragraph 131). 43 See judgments of 7 February 1990, Culin v Commission (C‑343/87, EU:C:1990:49, paragraphs 27 to 28); of 23 March 2000, Rudolph v Commission (T‑197/98, EU:T:2000:86, paragraph 98); of 10 June 2004, François v Commission (T‑307/01, EU:T:2004:180, paragraph 110); of 9 December 2010, Commission v Strack (T‑526/08 P, EU:T:2010:506, paragraph 108); and of 2 October 2012, Q v Commission (F‑52/05 RENV, EU:F:2012:139, paragraph 273). 44 See paragraph 70 of that judgment. 45 Contrary to what is held in the judgment under appeal, in the judgment of 18 February 2016, Jannatian v Council (T‑328/14, not published, EU:T:2016:86, paragraphs 62 to 66), the General Court, having assessed all the circumstances of the case, concluded, in the grounds included for the sake of completeness, that the annulment constituted adequate reparation for all the non-material harm suffered by the applicant. 46 The appellant refers to paragraphs 88, 109, 145 and 147 of the judgment under appeal. 47 See, inter alia, judgment of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission (C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited). 48 See judgments of 16 September 1997, Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission (C‑362/95 P, EU:C:1997:401, paragraph 31), and of 16 July 2009, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission (C‑481/07 P, not published, EU:C:2009:461, paragraph 36). 49 See judgments of 21 May 1976, Roquette Frères v Commission (26/74, EU:C:1976:69, paragraphs 22 and 23), and of 16 September 1997, Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission (C‑362/95 P, EU:C:1997:401, paragraph 31). 50 See, inter alia, judgment of 3 December 2015, PP Nature-Balance Lizenz v Commission (C‑82/15 P, not published, EU:C:2015:796, paragraphs 26 and 27). 51 See, inter alia, judgment of 18 July 2007, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission (C‑326/05 P, EU:C:2007:443, paragraphs 60 and 63). 52 With regard, in particular, to the burden of proof incumbent on the appellant in relation to the anticipated profit margin, I note that, where it is necessary to determine the value of a lost opportunity to make money, and therefore the value of hypothetical economic transactions, it can be difficult, even impossible, for the applicant to put an exact figure on the loss which it claims to have sustained, but that does not relieve the applicant entirely of the obligation to adduce evidence of the loss claimed. Although the value of a lost opportunity to make money is necessarily a hypothetical fact which must be estimated, since it cannot be calculated with certainty, the fact remains that the data on which that estimate is based can — and must, in so far as is possible — be proved by the party relying on it (see judgment of 28 April 2010, BST v Commission, T 452/05, EU:T:2010:167, paragraphs 167 and 168). 53 The appellant also refers to the significant decrease in its turnover and profitability, as well as to the large-scale redundancy programme and other unforeseen costs. 54 Although the appellant has not raised a complaint alleging an erroneous classification of the facts so far as concerns the General Court’s conclusion that the causal link between the Council’s alleged conduct and the termination of the contract with Mobarakeh had not been established, I would nonetheless point out that, according to the case-law, direct damages are those which derive from the unlawful act of the subject responsible and which do not depend on the intervention of other causes, whether positive or negative (see Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Compagnie Continentale France v Council (169/73, not published, EU:C:1974:32, point 4)), since the conduct complained of must be the determining cause of the damage (see order of 31 March 2011, Mauerhofer v Commission, C‑433/10 P, not published, EU:C:2011:204, paragraph 127). 55 Judgment of 16 July 2009, Commission v Schneider Electric (C‑440/07 P, EU:C:2009:459, paragraph 192). 56 Judgment of 16 July 2009, Commission v Schneider Electric (C‑440/07 P, EU:C:2009:459, paragraph 193). 57 Judgment of 30 January 1992, Finsider and Others v Commission (C‑363/88 and C‑364/88, EU:C:1992:44, paragraphs 24 and 25). 58 See judgment of 15 June 2000, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission (C‑237/98 P, EU:C:2000:321, paragraph 25). 59 See judgments of 19 May 1982, Dumortier and Others v Council (64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79, 28/79 and 45/79, not published, EU:C:1982:184, paragraph 21); of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission (C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 53); and of 10 May 2006, Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission (T‑279/03, EU:T:2006:121, paragraph 130 and the case-law cited). 60 See, inter alia, judgment of 8 May 2013, Eni v Commission (C‑508/11 P, EU:C:2013:289, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). 61 See judgment of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others (C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 66).