Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2024:466
Date: 2024-06-06
Language of the case: Polish
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded
Origin: Poland

summary of Case AT.39816 and the main content of the initial commitments. 16. On 15 March 2018, after receiving non-confidential versions of the interested parties’ observations on the initial commitments, Gazprom submitted revised proposed commitments (‘the final commitments’). 17. On 24 May 2018, the Commission adopted the decision at issue, to which the final commitments were annexed. By that decision, the Commission approved and made binding those commitments and closed the administrative procedure, concluding that there were no longer grounds for action by the Commission in relation to the potentially abusive practices initially identified in the statement of objections. B. The decision at issue 18. In the decision at issue, the Commission first presented a preliminary assessment of Gazprom’s practices, before presenting the initial commitments, the results of the market test and the final commitments. Next, the Commission set out its assessment of the final commitments and its reasons for considering them satisfactory in view of its competition concerns. 1. The preliminary assessment of the practices in question 19. In the first place, with regard to the preliminary assessment of the practices in question, the Commission defined, in Section 4 of the decision at issue, the national markets for the upstream wholesale supply of gas as relevant markets. In that regard, it also found that Gazprom held a dominant position on the relevant markets in the CEE countries concerned. 20. The Commission considered that Gazprom may have abused its dominant position, in breach of Article 102 TFEU, by engaging in an anticompetitive strategy aimed at preventing the free flow of gas in the CEE countries concerned and thereby isolating the relevant markets in those countries. In particular, the Commission considered that that strategy involved three sets of anticompetitive practices corresponding, in essence, to the competition concerns identified in the statement of objections. (6) 21. As regards the Yamal objections, although, in the context of the market test, some of the interested parties had observed the absence of commitments addressing those objections, the Commission explained, in recital 138 of the decision at issue, that, following further investigation, its preliminary competition concerns had not been confirmed. On the one hand, the Commission conveyed that the Polish Energy Regulatory Office had concluded that the independent system operator of the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline exercised decisive control over investment decisions relating to that section of the pipeline and over their implementation, and that Gazprom was not in a position to block decisions concerning that pipeline. On the other hand, the Commission noted the intergovernmental character of relations between the parties active in the gas sector in Poland, in particular as regards the construction and operation of the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline, and concluded that the fact may have, to a large extent, determined the behaviour of the parties concerned. 2. The content of the final commitments 22. In the second place, so far as concerns the content of the final commitments, which are annexed to the decision at issue and are intended to address the Commission’s competition concerns, they can be summarised as follows. 23. First, as regards the commitments to address the concerns relating to territorial restrictions, Gazprom first of all committed itself, in essence, to removing, from gas supply contracts concluded with its customers established in the CEE countries concerned, all provisions that directly or indirectly prohibited or impeded the free flow of gas between the CEE countries concerned. Furthermore, in order to allow gas flows between, on the one hand, Bulgaria and the Baltic States and, on the other hand, the other CEE countries concerned, in spite of the infrastructural isolation of the former, Gazprom undertook to take measures in order to offer the relevant customers the possibility to request that all or parts of their contractual gas volumes delivered at certain delivery points in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia be delivered instead at another delivery point in Bulgaria or the Baltic States. Following the market test, Gazprom has, in the final commitments, inter alia strengthened its proposal concerning the change in delivery points. 24. Second, as regards the commitments to address the pricing concerns, Gazprom undertook to introduce new clauses or, where appropriate, to modify existing clauses in the contracts with its relevant customers in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 25. Third, as regards the commitments associated with the competition concerns relating to the supply of gas at a given price being made conditional on the Bulgarian wholesaler obtaining an assurance concerning investments in the South Stream pipeline project, Gazprom undertook to allow the Bulgarian partners involved in that project to withdraw from it without seeking to hold them civilly liable and without recovering the gas price rebates it had granted in return for their participation in that project. 3. The assessment and implementation of the final commitments 26. In the third and last place, with regard to the assessment and implementation of the final commitments indicated in the decision at issue, the Commission concluded, in essence, that the final commitments were effective and necessary, without being disproportionate, to address its competition concerns, and stated that it had taken into account, in that regard, developments in the gas markets since notification of the statement of objections. Accordingly, the Commission decided to make the final commitments binding pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. C. The complaint relating to the Yamal objections 27. In parallel with the administrative procedure initiated by the Commission and which gave rise to the decision at issue, the appellant, on 9 March 2017 and pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation No 773/2004, lodged a complaint alleging abusive practices by Gazprom. (7) Those practices, which overlapped to a great extent with the competition concerns already set out in the statement of objections, included, inter alia, claims relating to abuse committed by Gazprom in connection with the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline. 28. On the basis that the decision at issue responded to the appellant’s concerns and that it took into account the observations submitted by the appellant in the context of the market test in Case AT.40497, the Commission adopted, on 17 April 2019, Decision C(2019) 3003 final rejecting the complaint (Case AT.40497 – Polish gas prices). 29. On 25 June 2019, the appellant brought an action before the General Court against that decision rejecting its complaint, registered as Case T‑399/19. IV. Proceedings before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 30. By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 15 October 2018, the appellant brought an action for the annulment of the decision at issue. In support of its action, the appellant relied on six pleas in law, alleging, in essence, in the first three, infringement of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, read in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU, and breach of the principle of proportionality, in that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by accepting insufficient and inadequate final commitments and, in the fourth, infringement of Article 194(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 7 TFEU, in that the decision at issue is contrary to the energy-policy objectives of the European Union and in that the Commission failed to take account of the negative impact of that decision on the European gas supply market. The fifth plea related to the discrimination by the Commission between Gazprom’s customers operating in the Western European Member States and those operating in the CEE countries concerned. The sixth plea related to the Commission’s disregard for the objective referred to in Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the limits of its powers in the management of the administrative procedure. 31. On 2 February 2022, the General Court delivered the judgment under appeal dismissing all of those pleas and, therefore, the action for annulment in its entirety. V. Proceedings before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought 32. On 8 April 2022, the appellant brought an appeal against the judgment under appeal. It claims that the Court should set aside the judgment under appeal and annul the decision at issue; in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and order the Commission to pay the costs incurred in the appeal and in the proceedings before the General Court. 33. In support of its appeal, the appellant raises four grounds of appeal, alleging, in essence: (i) infringement of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003; (ii) infringement of the principle of energy solidarity as set out in Article 194 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003; (iii) infringement of Article 9(1) of that regulation, in that the General Court erroneously interpreted the concept of ‘manifest error of assessment’ during its examination of the Commission’s assessment of complex economic and technical questions in respect of the adequacy of the commitments; and (iv) infringement of Article 9(2) of that regulation which led the court to consider, wrongly, that the Commission had not committed a manifest error of assessment in relation to the adequacy of the commitments. 34. The Commission, supported by Gazprom, contends that appeal should be dismissed and the appellant be ordered to pay the costs. As for Overgas and the Republic of Poland, they contend that the Court should allow the appeal. 35. On 3 August 2022, Overgas brought a cross-appeal requesting that the judgment under appeal be set aside and that the Commission be ordered to pay the costs. The Commission, supported by Gazprom, contends that the Court should dismiss the cross-appeal and order Overgas to pay the costs incurred in the cross-appeal. As for the appellant, it contends that the Court should allow the cross-appeal on the first ground and set aside the judgment under appeal. VI. Analysis 36. The present case above all raises the issue of the judicial review of competition decisions adopted by the Commission and, in particular, decisions taken pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. More specifically, the examination of the grounds of appeal and the grounds of the cross-appeal will require the Court to rule on three main issues: – the first concerning the relationship between the principle of energy solidarity set out in Article 194 TFEU and a decision adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, in order to address the concerns relating to the infringement of Article 102 TFEU (B); – the second relating to the procedural treatment of a statement of objections in the context of the proceedings provided for in Article 9 of that regulation which, in principle, do not require a statement of objections (C); – the third relating to the intensity of review by the EU Courts of decisions adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 9 of that regulation (8) and, accordingly, how to interpret the concept of ‘manifest error of assessment’ (D). 37. Before proceeding to the analysis of the first two issues which will be considered in this targeted Opinion, (9) I consider it useful to point out, in brief, the legal provisions relating to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and to set out the following preliminary observations (A). A. Preliminary observations 38. It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that the mechanism introduced by Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 is based on considerations of procedural economy and is intended to ensure that the competition rules are applied effectively, by providing a more rapid solution to the competition concerns identified by the Commission, instead of proceeding by making a formal finding of an infringement. (10) Accordingly, contrary to decisions taken under Article 7 of that regulation (aiming to put an end to the infringement that has been found to exist), in proceedings under Article 9 of that regulation, the Commission is not required to make a finding of an infringement, its task being confined to examining, and possibly accepting, the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned in the light of the competition concerns identified by it in its preliminary assessment and having regard to the aims pursued. (11) 39. It must be noted, in the second place, that the Commission has a wide margin of discretion to accept commitments under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, in so far as it is called upon to carry out a forward-looking analysis that requires numerous economic factors to be taken into account in order to assess the adequacy of the commitments offered by the undertaking concerned. (12) Consequently, the appropriate test to be applied in relation to the Commission’s concerns, as expressed in its preliminary assessment, is to determine whether the commitments are sufficient to address adequately those concerns, without the Commission being required itself to seek out less onerous or more moderate solutions than the commitments offered to it. (13) 40. It should be stated, in the third place, that, with regard to the nature and scope of judicial review in the field in question, it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that the fact that the Commission shall have discretion with regard to economic matters for the purposes of applying competition rules, and in particular Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, justifies the review by the EU courts of a Commission decision with regard to commitments being limited in the absence of a manifest error of assessment. (14) It follows that, in the exercise of their review of such complex economic situations, the EU Courts cannot substitute their own economic assessment for that of the Commission by putting forward their own assessment of complex economic circumstances. (15) 41. However, as the Court has repeatedly held in the context of areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, such as competition law, the discretion enjoyed by the Commission does not mean that the EU Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. (16) According to the principles established by the case-law of the Court, the EU Courts must, in particular, not only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, but also review whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. (17) 42. It follows that judicial review of decisions taken by the Commission under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 is therefore based on the EU Courts verifying that the commitments are sufficient to address adequately the competition concerns identified by the Commission, by taking account of the circumstances of the case, that is to say, the seriousness of the competition concerns, their extent and the interests of third parties. (18) 43. It should be noted, in the fourth and last place, that the Court’s case-law in that field is relatively limited (19) and principally concerns analysis of whether the commitments in question are adequate and sufficient, in particular in the light of the principle of proportionality, (20) and the consideration and protection of third party interests in the Commission’s acceptance of those commitments. (21) B. The relationship between the principle of energy solidarity set out in Article 194 TFEU and a decision adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 (third part of the first ground of appeal and second ground of appeal) 44. Both by the third part of the first ground of appeal and by the second ground of appeal, which should be examined together, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law in the review of the Commission’s assessment of the adequacy of the commitments by failing to take into account the objectives pursued by Article 194 TFEU, including, in particular, the principle of energy solidarity. 45. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the General Court, like the Commission, misinterpreted Article 194 TFEU in a way that is contrary to the interpretation of the Court of Justice in the judgment of 15 July 2021, Germany v Poland (C‑848/19 P, EU:C:2021:598) (‘the judgment in Germany v Poland’), and which renders that provision ineffective with regard to the Commission’s actions aimed at enforcing both the objectives of competition law in general terms and those relating to the proper functioning of the Union’s energy market. 46. In that context, it is necessary to examine whether, by proceeding in the manner in which it did, the General Court erred in law as alleged by the appellant. Before expressing a view on the General Court’s analysis, I consider it useful to make some preliminary observations relating to Article 194 TFEU and with regard to the relationship between that provision and the competition analysis that the Commission is required to carry out pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. 1. The principle of energy solidarity and its interaction with competition law 47. It should be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, in accordance with Article 7 TFEU, the European Union is to ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers. 48. It must be noted, first, with regard to Article 194 TFEU, that that provision sets out, in paragraph 1 thereof, the main EU energy policy objectives, including energy solidarity. (22) In that regard, it is apparent from the judgment in Germany v Poland that the principle of solidarity underpins and covers all the objectives set out in Article 194(1)(a) to (d) TFEU that the EU energy policy aims to achieve by serving as the thread that binds them together and gives them coherence (23) and that acts adopted by the EU institutions, including by the Commission under that policy, must be interpreted, and their legality assessed, in the light of the principle of energy solidarity. (24) 49. In that judgment, the Court also stated, in paragraph 69, that ‘the EU institutions and the Member States must take into account the principle of energy solidarity … in the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and, in particular, the internal market in natural gas, by ensuring security of energy supply in the European Union, which means not only dealing with emergencies when they arise, but also adopting measures to prevent crisis situations. To that end, it is necessary to assess whether there are risks for the energy interests of the Member States and the European Union, and in particular to security of energy supply’. 50. It is apparent, second, from the Court’s settled case-law that objectives pursued by other TFEU provisions must, when circumstances require it, be taken into account in the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The competitive assessment thus requires taking into account the context and examining the effects when assessing a restriction of competition in the light of the actual conditions in which the market functions, having regard to all relevant factors in that connection. (25) 51. As regards, third, the procedure to follow under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, it cannot be ruled out that the Commission is required, in its preliminary assessment and when the circumstances of the case so require, to take account of objectives pursued by other TFEU provisions, in particular in order to find, on a preliminary basis, that there has been no infringement of the competition rules. (26) 52. In the present case, the Court is asked to confirm whether this is also the case with regard not to a finding of problematic conduct from a competition law point of view but in relation to the Commission’s examination of commitments and the way in which considerations unrelated to competition law, such as in the present case, the principles and objectives pursued by Article 194 TFEU must be taken into account in the context of the Commission’s analysis leading to the acceptance of commitments under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. 2. Consideration of Article 194 TFEU in the context of a decision adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 53. It should be noted, in the first place, that, so far as concerns the judicial review of commitments, the General Court employed a classic scheme of analysis in accordance with the Court’s case-law, as described in points 40 to 42 of this Opinion, by recalling in paragraph 420 of the judgment under appeal that the role of the Commission (and, a fortiori, that of the EU Courts in examining a manifest error of assessment) is to ensure that the commitments are sufficient and can respond adequately to the stated competition concerns, by taking account of the circumstances of the case, that is to say the seriousness of the concerns, their extent and the interests of third parties. (27) 54. In the second place, although, in paragraph 420 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court does not expressly refer to the principle of energy security when analysing commitments made by Gazprom, it expressly noted that commitments made following a procedure based on Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 ‘may not lead to a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaties’. (28) It follows that the General Court therefore found, first, that the Commission’s discretion was limited by the obligation to act in compliance with TFEU provisions and the general principles of EU law, and recognised, second, the competence of the Commission to verify whether the commitments themselves infringed other provisions of the Treaty, including Article 194(1) TFEU. 55. In the third place, it must be stated that, in paragraph 422 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court considered that, in this case, in so far as the Commission had considered that the commitments made by Gazprom were sufficient and adequate in the light of competition concerns, it ‘was not obliged, in order to take account of the energy-policy objectives of the European Union, to investigate more of Gazprom’s practices or to require from Gazprom more binding commitments’. The General Court thus concluded that, in the context of the present case, ‘possible consideration of those objectives in the application of the EU competition rules cannot justify imposing such positive obligations on the Commission’. 56. I share that view. 57. The fact that the Commission’s discretion is limited by its obligation to act in compliance with the provisions of the Treaties results, in essence, in an obligation on the Commission when it acts in the context of a procedure under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 to verify that the commitments it intends to accept and that it considers to be capable of responding adequately to the competition concerns raised by the Commission are not liable to infringe other TFEU provisions including, in the present case, Article 194 TFEU. 58. It follows that the Commission cannot accept commitments that could result in an infringement of Article 194 TFEU and thus undermine the objectives pursued by the principle of energy solidarity or the security of energy supply in the European Union, notwithstanding the fact that that commitment may respond to the competition concerns raised by the Commission on the market concerned. (29) However, that does not mean that the Commission, acting as competition regulator in the context of the procedure provided for in Regulation No 1/2003, has the power to impose independent obligations going beyond those intended to remedy the competition issues identified in its investigation (and which are motivated by policies other than competition law policies) by requiring more binding commitments in that regard. 59. It is therefore without erring in law that, in paragraph 422 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court refused to treat the application of the principle of energy solidarity by the Commission as analogous to the imposition of positive obligations on the latter going beyond the scope of the complaints directed against Gazprom, or to the imposition of more binding obligations. 60. It should be noted, in that regard, that, by acknowledging in its appeal and at the hearing, that the principle of energy solidarity should not be treated as analogous to the imposition of positive obligations going beyond the powers of the Commission in the field of competition policy, the appellant does not seem to contest the position adopted by the General Court in paragraph 422 of the judgment under appeal. Although the appellant draws attention to the fact that both the Commission and the General Court failed to take into account the principle of energy security set out in Article 194(1) TFEU, it does not indicate clearly how the decision at issue or the judgment under appeal would disregard the specific objectives of the EU’s energy policy, or how the commitments infringe that provision or are, as such, contrary to the principle of energy security. The appellant merely notes the importance of that principle and observes that the Commission and the General Court were required to take it into account in their assessment of the commitments made by Gazprom without being able to determine the analytical framework and the exact interpretation that the Commission should have adopted and how it could have reached a different conclusion to that drawn by the Commission or the General Court. 61. It is also without erring in law that the General Court found, in paragraphs 423 and 424 of the judgment under appeal that the decision at issue and those commitments in no way prevent the EU institutions or the Member States from acting in other ways to address the problems identified by the appellant. (30) Moreover, there is nothing to prevent EU institutions or the national regulatory authorities, which have concurrent energy policy competences with those of the Commission, and which are therefore, by definition, best placed to take action in order to amend the rules in that sector or, where appropriate, to ensure compliance with specific energy rules in the energy sector. (31) 62. In the fourth and last place, in so far as the appellant maintains that the General Court had not penalised the Commission for having failed to give sufficient reasons for the decision at issue on the issue of its compliance with Article 194(1) TFEU, that complaint must also be dismissed. Thus, contrary to what the appellant submits, the fact that the Commission did not expressly refer to Article 194 TFEU and to the objectives pursued by that provision cannot be interpreted as a refusal or a failure to take the energy sector into consideration. As was rightly noted by the General Court in paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal, the Commission cannot be expected systematically to set out the reasons why the decision at issue complies with all the specific provisions of the Treaties which, although they do not constitute the legal basis for the measure at issue, could possibly have a link to the factual and legal context of that measure. 63. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the third part of the first ground of appeal and the second ground of appeal should be dismissed as unfounded. C. The procedural treatment of a statement of objections in the context of the proceedings provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 64. The second issue, which, at the request of the Court, must be considered in this targeted Opinion, concerns the procedural treatment of a statement of objections in the context of the proceedings provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 in the light of the General Court’s findings in that regard which it is appropriate to consider briefly. 1. The approach adopted by the General Court 65. It should be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, in the present case, the Commission had initially initiated proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, on account of the alleged infringement of Article 102 TFEU by Gazprom on the gas markets of Central and Eastern Europe, which required the issue of a statement of objections. (32) In the present case, the notification of that statement of objections resulted in Gazprom proposing commitments to the Commission pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. It should also be noted that the final commitments approved by the decision at issue made no reference to the Yamal objections which, although initially appearing in the statement of objections, were abandoned in the course of the proceedings by the Commission on the ground that its competition concerns had not been confirmed. (33) 66. In the action before the General Court, the appellant, supported by the Republic of Poland, criticised the Commission for abandoning the Yamal objections and, as a corollary, the absence of a commitment addressing those objections. (34) Moreover, those parties take the view that, contrary to the approach adopted by the Commission, it was required to justify the absence of a commitment relating to the Yamal objections. 67. Although the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action concerning the validity of the abandonment of initial objections relating to the Yamal pipeline and the absence of a commitment to address those objections by taking the view that the Commission had not committed a manifest error of assessment in that regard, it stated, in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘in the circumstances of the present case and, in particular, in the absence of a revised preliminary assessment, Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 required the Commission, contrary to what it maintains, to have reasons for the absence of a commitment to address the Yamal objections’. (35) However, it found, in paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had fulfilled its obligation to state reasons by setting out, in paragraph 138 of the decision at issue, its reasons for not imposing a commitment to address the Yamal objections. 68. For its part, the Commission, whilst disputing the General Court’s interpretation in that regard, nevertheless maintains that the error committed by the General Court should not result in the setting aside, even on a partial basis, of the judgment under appeal, in so far as that would affect only the grounds of the judgment, the operative part of which is based on other legal considerations. Accordingly, if applicable, it would only be necessary to substitute the grounds to an extent appropriate. 2. General rules on the procedural treatment of a statement of objections in the context of Regulation No 1/2003 69. It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that the statement of objections constitutes a formal step in the Commission’s investigations of alleged infringements of EU antitrust rules which precede the adoption of a decision finding an infringement of such rules. In the context of the administrative procedure as laid down by Regulation No 1/2003, the statement of objections is a procedural and preparatory document which delimits the scope of the administrative procedure initiated by the Commission by which it informs in writing the undertaking in question of the objections raised against it. (36) 70. As a preliminary step in the procedure, the issue of a statement of objections does not in any way prejudge the outcome of an investigation by the Commission. It is therefore inherent in the nature of the statement of objections that it is provisional and liable to be changed during the assessment subsequently undertaken by the Commission on the basis of the observations submitted to it by the parties and other findings of fact. It follows that the Commission is not bound by the assessments of facts or of law set out in the statement of objections and that it is therefore entirely open to the Commission to abandon certain objections which, therefore, can no longer, by definition, be subject to challenge before the courts. (37) 71. Moreover, it must be pointed out that it is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law, since the judgment in IBM v Commission, (38) that a statement of objections cannot be considered, on the basis of its nature and the legal effects it produces, as being a decision within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU which may be challenged in an application for a declaration that it is void. (39) It is clear from that case-law that an act or a decision may be the subject of an action for a declaration that it is void only if it is a measure definitively laying down the position of the institution on the conclusion of the procedure in question, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the final decision, final measures being the only ones capable of producing mandatory legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the undertakings concerned by that investigation. (40) 72. As regards, in the second place, the rights of the parties involved in the administrative procedure conducted by the Commission in application of Article 102 TFEU, it must be noted that, while the Commission is required to respect the rights of third parties, that procedure mainly concerns the undertaking under investigation, with the latter being the sole recipient of the statement of objections (and, subsequently, the final decision). The statement of objections thus constitutes a fundamental procedural guarantee intended to inform that party of the complaints directed against it so that it may exercise its right of defence. (41) 73. Accordingly, if the issue of a supplementary statement of objections were necessary when the Commission intends to rely on new objections, which were not included in the initial statement of objections, in order to ensure that the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned may be exercised effectively by giving it the opportunity to respond formally to the additional evidence, (42) no such obligation exists in the reverse situation when the Commission intends to abandon one or several objections. (43) In any event, it is not necessary for the Commission to give reasons in its final decision for the abandonment of objections included in the initial statement of objections. (44) 3. The procedural treatment of a statement of objections in the context of the proceedings provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 74. With regard to the commitments procedure, Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 provides that the commitments offered by the parties must meet the concerns set out in the preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission. 75. In this instance, the General Court noted, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the present case, the statement of objections fulfils the requirements of a preliminary assessment (45) and considered, in paragraph 83 of that judgment, that, in the absence of a revised preliminary assessment confirming the abandonment of the Yamal objections, Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 required the Commission to have reasons for the absence of a commitment addressing those objections. (46) 76. Although Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 establishes a link between the commitments and the preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission, in so far as they are supposed to respond to the concerns raised in that assessment, the fact remains that the approach adopted by the General Court is difficult to reconcile with the text of Regulation No 1/2003 (47) and with the Court’s case-law on the right to be heard set out in point 73 above. 77. To impose on the Commission an obligation to address to the recipient of the commitment decision, between the notification of the statement of objections and the adoption of the final decision, an additional document demonstrates, as the Commission maintains, excessive formalism, if that document confined itself to stating that the Commission had abandoned an objection. Apart from the fact that such an initiative is not necessary to guarantee the procedural rights of the undertaking concerned, it is of no interest for that undertaking. (48) A different interpretation of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 would also call into question the classification of the statement of objections as a preparatory document which is provisional in nature and would be likely to render the commitments procedure null and void in certain circumstances as the General Court itself recognises in paragraphs 81 and 82 of the judgment under appeal. (49) 78. Furthermore, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law on the right to be heard, recalled in points 72 and 73 of this Opinion, that additional reasoning why the Commission ultimately abandoned, in the final decision, some of the earlier objections previously set out in the statement of objections is not necessary. The Commission’s obligation to state reasons, with regard to decisions adopted under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, requires only that the Commission set out, clearly and unequivocally, the factual elements and legal considerations which led it to conclude that the commitments were sufficient to address the competition concerns raised at the end of the administrative procedure concluded by means of the adoption of its final decision, without the Commission being required to explain any possible differences in relation to the provisional assessments contained in the statement of objections. (50) 79. It should also be noted that the absence both of a revised preliminary assessment and the Commission’s reasons for abandoning the Yamal objections, and the absence of any commitments relating thereto are not, moreover, such as to affect the procedural rights of third parties. (51) 80. It must be emphasised, in that regard, that, in the context of the administrative procedure that resulted in the decision at issue, only Gazprom can be classified as an ‘undertaking concerned’ within the meaning of Regulation No 1/2003, the others – including the appellant – enjoying only the less extensive procedural rights of an ‘interested third party’. (52) As recalled by the General Court, in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, in so far as the sole recipient of the preliminary assessment referred to in Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 (whether it takes the form of a statement of objections or another document) is the undertaking which is the subject of the Commission’s investigation, that assessment serves as a basis for the undertaking to formulate appropriate commitments addressing the competition concerns expressed by the Commission, or to better define preciously discussed commitments. (53) Furthermore, as the General Court rightly noted in paragraph 137 of the judgment under appeal, there are no provisions of Regulation No 1/2003 or Regulation No 773/2004 requiring the Commission formally to inform interested third parties when, in the course of proceedings, it abandons certain objections against the undertaking concerned. 81. It must also be noted that, with regard to the administrative procedure which led to the adoption of the decision at issue, the Commission sent a non-confidential version of the statement of objections to the appellant which, moreover, presented oral argument as an interested party in the course of the market test procedure provided for in Article 27(4) of Regulation No 1/2003. The market test being a pre-condition for the Commission to adopt a decision making the commitments binding. (54) The appellant also challenged the decision at issue on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, including with regard to the abandonment of the Yamal objections and the absence of a commitment to address those objections. (55) 82. The fact that the statement of objections fulfilled the requirements of a preliminary assessment within the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 cannot call the foregoing findings into question. No provision of that regulation or, moreover, the Court’s interpretation thereof justifies treating a statement of objections differently depending on whether it forms the basis of a decision adopted under Article 7 or 9 of that regulation. (56) 83. Notwithstanding those considerations, nothing precludes the Commission, if it considers it necessary in view of the particular circumstances of a case, from setting out the reasons why it decided to abandon an objection and to justify the absence of a commitment addressing that objection as the Commission did in paragraphs 184 and 185 of the decision at issue. Although there is no such obligation under either Regulation No 1/2003 or Regulation No 773/2004, or the Court’s case-law in this area, the fact remains that the principle of sound administration, as noted by the Commission at the hearing, could justify such an approach in view of the specific circumstances of each case. (57) 84. In view of the above considerations, it should be noted that the approach advocated by the General Court, in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the Commission is required to amend the scope of the statement of objections which fulfils the requirements of a preliminary assessment before the adoption of a final decision (including in the event of the abandonment of an objection) or, where appropriate, to state reasons for the abandonment of objections not included in that decision, is misconceived. 85. It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that, if the grounds of a decision of the General Court contain an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement is not one that should cause that decision to be set aside, and, where certain conditions are fulfilled, a substitution of grounds should be made. (58) It should be noted, in this regard, that according to the Court’s settled case-law, a request for the substitution of grounds is admissible when it constitutes a defence to one of the appellant’s grounds of appeal. (59) However, in this case, in the context of the third ground of the appeal, the appellant argues that the abandonment of the Yamal objections contributed to the existence of a manifest error of assessment by the Commission which has not been sanctioned by the General Court, so that there is a sufficient link between that ground of appeal and the request for the substitution of grounds by the Commission which must be accepted in the present case. 86. It should be noted, lastly, that the judicial review to determine whether the Commission was right to recognise the commitments corresponding to the concerns it had raised must take into account the concerns that the Commission still had at the time of the adoption of the decision terminating the procedure and not the concerns which it abandoned after hearing the undertaking concerned and taking note of its position in that regard. (60) It follows that, contrary to what the appellant maintains, the competition concerns as identified in the statement of objections cannot be considered as a benchmark for assessing the lawfulness of a Commission decision (including a decision adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003). As explained in points 69 to 73 of this Opinion, another interpretation – namely considering the Commission to be bound by its preliminary concerns, as identified in the statement of objections – would be contrary to the right of the addressee to be heard, and in particular the very purpose of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. 87. It is therefore necessary to reject a significant part of the argument developed by the appellant in support of the first and second parts of the first ground of appeal and the third ground of appeal based on the incorrect premiss that the adequacy of the commitments proposed by Gazprom should be assessed in the light of the competition concerns identified by the Commission in the statement of objections. D. The review by the General Court of the existence of a manifest error of assessment (first part of the third ground of appeal) 88. By the first part of the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the absence of an overall analysis by the General Court of the adequacy of the commitments leads to a misinterpretation of the concept of ‘manifest error of assessment’. It takes the view that the General Court failed to carry out an overall assessment, first, of all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the various commitments and objections raised, independently of the individual analysis of each of them and, second, of the cumulative effect of all the irregularities (non-manifest errors) identified by the General Court in its review of the adequacy of the commitments. 89. It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that it is for the appellant seeking the annulment of a decision adopted by the Commission under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 to establish that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment. (61) However, while the appellant merely states in the abstract that an overall analysis would lead to a different result from that reached by the General Court, the fact remains that it provides no such evidence and, above all, does not establish the existence of a manifest error of assessment committed by the General Court. (62) 90. It should be noted, in the second place, that, contrary to what the appellant maintains, it is not apparent from either the decision at issue or the judgment under appeal that the Commission or the General Court dispensed with an overall analysis of the commitments proposed by Gazprom. 91. It must be observed, first of all, with regard to the Commission, that the overall approach that it adopted in the assessment of the commitments is set out, in paragraphs 160 to 164 of the decision at issue. It should next be clarified, in that regard, that the Commission’s decision to detail the proportionality of each commitment in relation to the concerns that it had identified, cannot call into question its overall approach. Having regard to the various anticompetitive practices identified by the Commission and the complex and technical nature of the markets concerned, the Commission cannot be criticised for having sought to address Gazprom’s anticompetitive strategy in a gradual manner, through measures specifically addressing each of those practices, thereby countering that strategy. (63) That does not mean that, by acting in that way, the Commission has dispensed with an overall analysis. 92. The same applies with regard to the General Court, in so far as it is apparent from paragraphs 195 to 202 and 310 to 319 of the judgment under appeal respectively that the General Court carried out an overall assessment of both the pricing commitments and of those concerning territorial restrictions. As for, more specifically, the commitments relating to delivery points (which are part of the commitments concerning territorial restrictions), it must be stated that, having rejected, in paragraphs 322 to 397 of the judgment under appeal, the complaints put forward by the appellant, Overgas, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland with regard to their effectiveness and proportionality, the General Court held, in paragraph 398 of the judgment under appeal, that, even taken together, they cannot lead to a finding of a manifest error. 93. Contrary to the criticisms made by the appellant that the General Court erred in finding that the outcome of an overall assessment cannot be different from that of the analysis of each of the objections taken individually, the approach adopted by the General Court is untainted by any error of law. 94. To the extent that, following an individual and detailed assessment of each of the complaints put forward by the parties, the General Court found no error of law in the Commission’s assessment and upheld the adequacy of the commitments in relation to the competition concerns identified by it, an overall assessment of those commitments cannot lead to an outcome different from that of the individual analysis or, still less, a finding of a manifest error. It follows that a manifest error of assessment could exist, from a conceptual point of view, only if the General Court had found at least one of the commitments accepted by the Commission to be inadequate so as to call into question, moreover, other commitments if they had been found to be linked. However, that is not so in the present case. 95. It is necessary, in the third place, to reject the appellant’s argument that, in disregarding the cumulative effect of all the errors identified by the General Court in its assessment of the commitments, it erred in law when interpreting the concept of ‘manifest error of assessment’. 96. It should be noted, in that regard, that, in the context of its assessment of the adequacy of the commitments relating to delivery points, the General Court identified certain irregularities vitiating the examination of those commitments by the Commission, without however considering that such circumstances could have an impact on the effectiveness of those commitments. It must be stated that the criticisms concerning the Commission’s assessment set out, in particular, in paragraphs 295, 358 and 362 of the decision at issue, relate more to the methodological approach adopted by the Commission in the context of its analysis than to the insufficiency of commitments. 97. It should also be borne in mind that a manifest error of assessment implies, as the name indicates, the existence, not of some irregularity or omission on the part of the Commission, but of an error capable of reaching a certain degree of seriousness such as to call into question the validity of the Commission’s analysis and, therefore, the lawfulness of the decision adopted. It follows that the review to determine whether there has been a manifest error of assessment does not therefore seek to ensure that the Commission’s analysis is untainted by any irregularity; the Commission has a certain margin for error, provided that the error in question is not manifest. (64) 98. In any event, in so far as the General Court found that those irregularities did not call into question the adequacy of the commitments or the lawfulness of the decision at issue, it cannot be criticised for not having found the existence of a manifest error of assessment. Therefore, contrary to what Orlen and Overgas maintain, there is no evidence to establish that cumulative minor errors, taken together, resulted in a manifest error of assessment. 99. In the light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the General Court was right to find that there was no manifest error in that regard. VII. Conclusion 100. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should reject the third part of the first ground of appeal, the second ground of appeal and the first part of the third ground of appeal as unfounded. 1 Original language: French. 2 OJ 2018 C 258, p. 6. The consolidated version of the Commission Decision (available only in English) is available at the following address: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39816/39816_10148_3.pdf. 3 Council Regulation of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in [Articles 101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1). 4 The administrative procedure relating to that investigation was registered as ‘Case AT.39816 – Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe’ (‘Case AT.39816’). 5 Commission Regulation of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2004 L 123, p. 18). 6 See points 10 to 12 of the present Opinion. 7 The administrative procedure relating to that investigation was registered as ‘Case AT.40497 – Polish gas prices’. 8 The issue relating to the intensity of review of decisions adopted on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, in the light of the principle of proportionality, is not considered in this Opinion. 9 This Opinion will also provide, in points 88 to 97, several observations on the interpretation of the concept of ‘manifest error of assessment’ which was debated at the hearing, and which lies at the heart of the first part of the third ground of the appeal. 10 See judgment of 29 June 2010, Commission v Alrosa (C‑441/07 P, EU:C:2010:377, paragraph 35) (‘the judgment in Alrosa’). 11 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraph 40 and 41. 12 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraph 94. 13 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraph 61. 14 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraph 42, and, by analogy, judgment of 13 July 2023, Commission v CK Telecoms UK Investments (C‑376/20 P, EU:C:2023:561, paragraph 124). 15 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraphs 60 and 67; judgment of 11 September 2014, CB v Commission (C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph 46); and, by analogy, in the field of mergers, judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala (C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 145). 16 See, to that effect, judgments of 13 July 2023, Commission v CK Telecoms UK Investments (C‑376/20 P, EU:C:2023:561, paragraph 126), and of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 17 See, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 54), of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others (C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 59), and of 8 December 2011, Chalkor v Commission (C‑386/10 P, EU:C:2011:815, paragraph 54). 18 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraphs 60 to 67, and of 9 December 2020, Groupe Canal + v Commission (C‑132/19 P, EU:C:2020:1007, paragraphs 121 and 122) (‘the judgment in Canal +). 19 To date, only five cases have been brought before the EU Courts, all in actions brought by third parties against decisions taken by the Commission. See, to that effect, judgments in Alrosa, in Canal +, and the judgments of 6 February 2014, CEEES and Asociación de Gestores de Estaciones de Servicio v Commission (T‑342/11, EU:T:2014:60); of 15 September 2016, Morningstar v Commission (T‑76/14, EU:T:2016:481) (‘the judgment in Morningstar’), and of 2 February 2022, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission (Rejection of complaint) (T‑399/19, EU:T:2022:44). 20 See, to that effect, the judgment in Alrosa, paragraphs 60 to 67. 21 See the judgment in Canal +, paragraphs 121 and 122. 22 Those objectives include, inter alia, ensuring security of energy supply in the EU and promoting the interconnection of energy networks. 23 The judgment in Germany v Poland, paragraphs 43 and 47. 24 The judgment in Germany v Poland, paragraph 44. 25 See, to that effect, judgments of 4 July 2023, Meta Platforms and Others (General terms of use of a social network) (C‑252/21, EU:C:2023:537, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited), of 21 February 1973, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission (6/72, EU:C:1973:22, paragraph 24) and the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Albany (C‑67/96, C‑115/97 and C‑219/97, EU:C:1999:28, point 179). 26 See, to that effect, the judgment in Canal +, paragraphs 46 to 54. 27 In that regard, the General Court refers, in particular, to paragraphs 40 and 41 of the judgment in Alrosa and to paragraph 45 of the judgment in Morningstar. 28 The General Court held, in paragraph 418 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘according to Article 7 TFEU, the European Union is to ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account … [including] the ones set out in Article 194(1) TFEU, in particular the objectives of ensuring security of energy supply in the European Union and promoting the interconnection of energy networks’. 29 The same is also true in a situation that is the reverse, in so far as a commitment which is in keeping with the principle of the energy security but does not respond sufficiently or adequately to the competition concerns clearly cannot be accepted by the Commission in the context of a procedure under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. 30 See, to that effect, also, recital 13 of Regulation No 1/2003. 31 It should be noted, in that regard, that on the basis of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 94), the national authorities have been given specific powers to promote and ensure the proper functioning of the internal market in natural gas. Furthermore, as noted by the General Court, in paragraph 424 of the judgment under appeal, Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Directive 2009/73 (OJ 2019 L 117, p. 1) seeks, inter alia, according to recital 3 of that directive, to address obstacles to the completion of the internal market in natural gas which result from the non-application, before its adoption, of European Union market rules to gas transmission lines to and from third countries. 32 See paragraphs 6 to 13 of the judgment under appeal. 33 See paragraph 138 of the decision at issue. 34 That complaint is reiterated in the third ground of appeal in which the appellant, supported by the Republic of Poland, submits that the abandonment of those objections contributed to the existence of a manifest error of assessment by the Commission which was not penalised by the General Court. 35 Moreover, the General Court held that that error ‘actually concerns the operative part of that decision, since, even though those objections are not covered by Article 1, which makes the final commitments binding, they are covered by Article 2, which concludes that there are no longer grounds for action in Case AT.39816’. 36 See Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (OJ 2011 C 308, p. 6; ‘the best practices’), in particular, paragraph 81. 37 See judgments of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala (C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 63) and of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission (C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 66). 38 Judgment of 11 November 1981 (60/81, EU:C:1981:264). 39 See judgment of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission (60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraphs 10 to 12). 40 See, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission (60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 10). 41 It should be noted, in that regard, that, where it has defined the right to be heard, the EU legislature has deliberately made graduations in Article 27 of Regulation No 1/2003 and in Articles 10 and 15 of Regulation No 773/2004 between the various persons who may be involved one way or another in antitrust proceedings. The rights of the parties to the administrative proceedings (also known as ‘undertakings concerned’) extend further than the rights of third parties who have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings but will not themselves be the addressees of the decision to be adopted by the Commission. See, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Commission v Alrosa (C‑441/07 P, EU:C:2009:555, paragraph 173). 42 The same applies, in principle, where the Commission intends to alter materially the evidence for the contested infringements. See, to that effect, the best practices, paragraphs 109 and 110. 43 No such obligation arises under Regulation No 1/2003, the best practices or even the Court’s case-law in this area. 44 See judgments of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission (C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraphs 192 and 193, and of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission (C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 66). 45 It should be noted, in that regard, that, although Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 does not specify the procedural and substantive requirements that must be satisfied by the preliminary assessment, it is apparent from paragraph 121 of the best practices that it must summarise the main facts of the case and identify the competition concerns that would warrant a decision requiring that the infringement is brought to an end. Furthermore, paragraph 123 of the best practices states that, in some cases, the statement of objections may fulfil the requirements of a preliminary assessment, as it contains a summary of the main facts as well as an assessment of the competition concerns identified. 46 This is notwithstanding the fact that the General Court had recalled, in paragraphs 81 and 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the statement of objections is a procedural and preparatory document, and the consequences which result from that document in light of the case-law on the right to be heard or the obligation to state reasons. 47 No provision of Regulation No 1/2003 provides for the revision of the preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission where it decides to abandon an objection. Moreover, the very expression of ‘revised preliminary assessment’ does not appear in either that regulation or Regulation No 773/2004. 48 That undertaking would have no interest in challenging such a step. 49 The General Court rightly notes, in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, that the requirements relating to observance of the principle of proportionality cannot mean that all the competition concerns set out in a preliminary assessment, including where such an assessment takes the form of a statement of objections, must necessarily be addressed in the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned. 50 See, to that effect, the judgment in Morningstar, paragraphs 100 and 101, and judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission (C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 66) so far as concerns, more specifically, the obligation to state reasons in the context of the proceedings under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003. 51 It must be pointed out in that regard that the approach advocated, in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, does not appear to be motivated by considerations relating to the protection of the rights of third parties. 52 See the judgment in Alrosa, paragraph 91 and the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Commission v Alrosa (C‑441/07 P, EU:C:2009:555, points 172 to 175). 53 See paragraph 122 of the best practices. 54 It should be noted, in that regard, that in the press release accompanying the market test notice which was published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the European Union in accordance with Article 27(4) of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission had announced its intention not to uphold the Yamal objections on the basis of the findings during the investigation which were arrived at after the issue of the statement of objections. 55 As stated in point 27 of this Opinion, in parallel with the administrative proceedings initiated by the Commission and giving rise to the decision at issue, the appellant, pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation No 773/2004, lodged a complaint alleging, inter alia, abusive practices by Gazprom in relation to the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline. 56 As is apparent from points 69 to 73 of this Opinion, the Commission is not required, in the context of a procedure under Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003, to justify the discrepancies between the statement of objections and the infringement decision concluding the administrative proceedings and, in particular, to justify the abandonment of objections initially identified in the statement of objections but which are not included in that decision. 57 The Commission submitted at the hearing that, since interested parties had questioned it on the absence of a commitment relating to the Yamal pipeline, it included, in accordance with the principles of sound administration and transparency, the reasons why its preliminary concerns had not been confirmed. 58 See judgment of 18 January 2024, Jenkinson v Council and Others (C‑46/22 P, EU:C:2024:50, paragraph 264 and the case-law cited). 59 See, to that effect, judgments of 27 March 2019, Canadian Solar Emea and Others v Council (C‑236/17 P, EU:C:2019:258, paragraph 159) and of 9 November 2017, TV2/Danmark v Commission (C‑649/15 P, EU:C:2017:835, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 60 In brief, the contested act is the decision adopted pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 and not the statement of objections. 61 See judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission (C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 107). 62 Indeed, it appears that, under the guise of a manifest error of assessment, some arguments put forward by the appellant in actual fact pursue a re-examination of factual considerations. 63 See, to that effect, paragraph 309 of the judgment under appeal. 64 See to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others (C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:292, point 37).