Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2018:591
Date: 2018-07-25
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Second Chamber
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - successful

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 25 July 2018 1. Appeal — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Review by the Court of the findings of fact — Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted — Legal classification of the facts — Admissibility (Art. 256 EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58(1) 2. State aid — Meaning — Criteria for assessment — Cumulative conditions (Art. 107(1) TFEU) 3. State aid — Meaning — Selective nature of the measure — Assessment based on taking account of the legislative technique used — Assessment based on the legal status of the beneficiaries — Not included (Art. 107(1) TFEU) 4. State aid — Meaning — Grant by the public authorities of favourable tax treatment to certain undertakings — Included — Advantages resulting from a general measure applicable without distinction to all economic operators — Not included (Art. 107(1) TFEU) 5. State aid — Meaning — Selective nature of the measure — Derogation from the general tax system — Measure of a general nature applicable without discrimination to all economic operators — Alleged discretionary power in granting the tax advantage — Discretion of the public authorities limited by objective criteria — Not selective in character (Art. 107(1) TFEU) 6. State aid — Commission decision finding aid to be incompatible with the common market — Duty to state reasons — Scope — Characterisation of the adverse effect on competition and the effects on trade between Member States (Art. 296 TFEU) 1. See the text of the decision. (see paras 31, 32) 2. See the text of the decision. (see para. 35) 3. As regards the condition relating to the existence of a selective advantage, interventions which, in any form whatsoever, are liable to favour undertakings directly or indirectly, or which must be regarded as economic advantages which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, are considered to be State aid. In particular, measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges included in the budget of the undertaking and which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect are considered to constitute aid. Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes and their aims, but defines them in relation to their effects, and thus independently of the techniques used. If the tax measures at issue are such as to constitute State aid in favour of economic interest groupings (EIGs), where the General Court does not acknowledge that those EIGs are the beneficiaries of those measures on the ground that those entities are fiscally transparent, it will hold that they cannot be the beneficiaries of State aid solely because of their legal form and the relevant rules on the taxation of profits. The classification of a measure as ‘State aid’ cannot depend on the legal status of the undertakings concerned or the techniques used. (see paras 36, 46) 4. See the text of the decision. (see para. 37) 5. In order to establish the selective nature of a tax advantage, it is not necessary for the competent national authorities to have the discretionary power to grant the benefit of that measure. However, the existence of such a discretion may be such as to enable those authorities to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods to the detriment of others and therefore establish the existence of aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. That is so, in particular, where the competent authorities have a discretionary power to determine the beneficiaries and the conditions of the measure granted on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system. On the other hand, the application of an authorisation system in which the competent authorities only have a latitude limited by objective criteria which are not unrelated to the tax system established by the legislation in question could not, in principle, be regarded as selective. (see para. 55) 6. See the text of the decision. (see paras 82-86, 101)