Order — ECLI:EU:T:2002:306
Date: 2002-12-06
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Application for interim measures: suspension of operation of the contested measure and other interim measures;Time-limits;Right to a judicial remedy;European Investment Bank
Procedure: Staff cases;Application for interim measures - unfounded;Action for damages

SUMMARY - CASE T-275/02 R 
Summary 
1. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure -
Interim measures - Conditions for granting - Urgency - Prima facie case -
Cumulative nature 
(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, 
Art. 104(2)) 
2. Applications for interim measures - Criteria for admissibility — Admissibility of 
the main action — Irrelevance - Limits 
(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, 
Art. 104(1)) 
3. Officials - Actions - Disputes between the European Investment Bank and 
members of its staff - Criteria for admissibility - Prior referral to the Conciliation 
Board — Excluded - Optional nature of the conciliation procedure 
(Art. 236 EC; Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, Art. 41) 
4. Officials - Actions — Disputes between the European Investment Bank and 
members of its staff — Time-limits for bringing actions - Requirement of a 
reasonable period - Point from which time starts to run 
(Art. 236 EC; Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) 
5. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of a measure -
Interim measures - Conditions for granting - Serious and irreparable damage — 
Burden of proof - Strictly pecuniary damage 
(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, 
Art. 104(2)) 
I-A - 260 
D v EIB 
1. Article 104(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance provides 
that an application for interim measures must state the circumstances giving rise to 
urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing aprima facie case for the interim 
measures applied for. Those conditions are cumulative, so that an application for 
suspension of the operation of a measure must be dismissed if any one of them is 
absent. 
(see para. 20) 
See: C-268/96 P(R) SCK and FNK v Commission [1996] ECR I-4971. para. 30; 
T-73/98R Prayon-Rupel v Commission [19981 ECR II-2769, para. 25; T-198/01 R 
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission [2002] ECR II-2153, para. 50 
2. In principle the issue of the admissibility of the main application should not be 
examined in proceedings relating to an application for interim measures so as not 
to prejudge the substance of that case. Where, however, it is contended that the 
main application from which the application for interim measures is derived is 
manifestly inadmissible, it may prove necessary to establish the existence of certain 
factors which would justify the prima facie conclusion that the main application is 
admissible. 
(see para. 21) 
See: 376/87 R Distrivet v Council [1988] ECR 209. para. 21; T-222/99 R Martinez and 
de Gaulle v Parliament [1999] ECR II-3397, para. 60 
3. The conciliation procedure provided for in Article 41 of the Staff Regulations of 
the European Investment Bank is purely optional and takes place independently of 
the action brought before the Court. Consequently, any failure to refer a matter first 
to the Conciliation Board is not such as to render the action for annulment of a 
decision inadmissible. 
(see para. 29) 
I-A - 261 
SUMMARY - CASE T-275/02 R 
See: T-7/98, T-208/98 and T-109/99 DE Nicola v EIB [2001] ECR-SC I-A-49 and II-185, 
paras 96, 101 and 102; T-192/99 Dunnett and Others v EIB [2001] ECR II-813, para. 54 
4. The need to weigh the entitlement to effective protection by the courts, which is 
one of the general principles of Community law and implies that those subject to the 
courts' jurisdiction must have a sufficient period of time available to them to assess 
the lawfulness of the act adversely affecting them and if necessary prepare their 
case, against the need for legal certainty which requires that, after a certain time, 
measures taken by Community bodies become definitive, requires that disputes 
between the European Investment Bank and members of its staff should be brought 
before the Community judicature within a reasonable period. 
In order to determine whether an action has been brought within a reasonable 
period, account must be taken of the conditions on time-limits for bringing actions 
laid down by Articles 90 and 91 of the EC Staff Regulations. Thus, a period of 
three months should, in principle, be considered reasonable. 
As regards the commencement of the limitation period for bringing actions, where 
a matter has been referred to the Conciliation Board, that period begins to run from 
the day on which the employee concerned is notified, where appropriate, of the 
failure of the conciliation procedure. Where the matter has not been referred to the 
Conciliation Board, the time-limit for bringing an action in disputes between the 
European Investment Bank and members of its staff begins to run from the date of 
notification of the Bank's decision to the person concerned or, in any event, from 
the day on which he becomes aware of it, at the latest. 
(see paras 31-35) 
I-A - 262 
D v EIB 
See: T-33199 Méndez Pinedo v ECB [20001 ECR-SC I-A-63 and II-273. paras 32. 33 and 
34; De Nicola v EIB. cited above, paras 101. 107 and 119; Dunnett and Others v EIB. 
cited above, paras 52 and 54; T-20/01 Cerafogli and Others v ECB [2001] ECR-SC 
I-A-235 and II-1075. para. 63 
5. The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation 
to the necessity for an interim order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to 
the party applying for them. It is for that party to prove that it cannot wait for the 
outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage of that nature. Although 
in order to establish the existence of such damage it is not necessary for the 
occurrence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, the applicant 
is none the less required to prove the facts forming the basis of his claim that 
serious and irreparable damage is likely. 
Purely pecuniary damage cannot, in principle, be regarded as irreparable or even 
as difficult to repair since it may be the subject of subsequent financial 
compensation. 
(see paras 59-60. 65) 
See: T-45/90 R Speybrouck v Parliament [19901 ECR II-705, para. 23; T-111/99 R 
Samper v Parliament [1999] ECR-SC I-A-111 and II-609. para. 38; T-373/00 R Tralli 
v ECB [2001] ECR-SC I-A-19 and II-83. para. 24; T-192/01 R Lior v Commission [20011 
ECR II-3657. para. 49; T-300/01 R De Nicola v EIB [2002]. not published in the ECR. 
para. 52 
I-A - 263