Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2001:233
Date: 2001-05-03
Language of the case: Portuguese
Court formation: Full Court
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Concepts: Commission decision following a preliminary review or proceeding to the formal investigation procedure
Procedure: Action for annulment - successful
Origin: Portugal

summary assessment of the consequences of the measures it had approved for the relevant market. 60. In connection with the plea of infringement of the Treaty, the applicant finally complains that the decision gives no indication of the criteria for or forms of practical application of the aid. It was unclear in what legal form and by which national authorities the aid was implemented and how compliance with the requirements of Community law was monitored. In particular it was not known how aid for advertising was allocated and which research projects were supported using which criteria. The scope of the technical support and the conditions for granting investment aid could not be identified. 61. The Commission stresses that only the complete text, as communicated to the French Government, counts for the sufficiency of the statement of reasons within the meaning of Article 190 of the EC Treaty. The publication of an abstract in the Official Journal was voluntary and served merely to inform interested third parties. Those concerned could use this information to obtain the full text of the decision from the Commission. 62. The Commission also points out, however, that the abstract published in the Official Journal contained all the essential elements of the decision. As far as market analyses were concerned, these had preceded the guidelines and parameters on the granting of aid applied by the Commission in this case. Therefore, comments on market analyses were not essential during examination of an individual aid scheme. 63. In connection with the plea of infringement of the Treaty, the Commission submits that more detailed information could not be demanded from a Member State when registering an aid scheme as it was up to that State alone to determine domestic responsibility and procedures for implementing aid in accordance with Community law. 64. In this connection, France recalls that the Commission had sent a letter to the Member States on 11 October 1990, giving details of the procedure for publishing a description in the Official Journal for information purposes. It followed from this that the version printed in the Official Journal did not reproduce the full text of the contested decision. Analysis 65. In the judgment on the Sytraval case the Court summarised the Commission's obligation to state reasons according to Article 190 of the EC Treaty in aid proceedings as follows: 'As regards the Commission's obligation to state reasons, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed withregard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. ... . (32) 66. The Court stated in even more concrete terms in the Matra case (33) that 'a decision not to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of the Treaty, which is taken in a short space of time, need contain only the reasons why the Commission considers that it is not faced with serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the aid at issue with the common market. Furthermore, the statement of reasons for the contested decision must be assessed in the context of the SIBR (34) and of the criteria laid down by the Community framework on State aid to the motor vehicle industry. 67. Admittedly the Court also found in the Sytraval case (35) that although, in the context of a criticism of the statement of grounds, deficiencies in investigations carried out by the Commission could not be criticised, the complete lack of any such investigations definitely could be, in so far as these were necessary in order to answer a complaint forming the basis of the Commission's investigation. 68. Whether the Commission has fulfilled the requirements thus made of the statement of reasons has to be examined using the original version of the decision issued to the addressees thereof, namely France. As the Court found in the Sytraval case, only this letter is attributed the character of a decision. (36) The abstract of the decision published in the Official Journal on the other hand is only of an informative nature. It is - irrespective of any legal consequences attached to its publication - of no relevance to the obligation to state reasons. 69. When examining the statement of reasons, however, irrespective of how this fits into the plea of infringement of the Treaty, consideration must also be given to Portugal's criticism regarding the lack of clarity of the decision on the granting of aid. (37) 70. If the requirements stated in the Matra case were taken literally, then the statement of grounds would in principle satisfy the minimum requirements expressed there. The present Commission decision makes it sufficiently clear that compliance with the general rules, practices and Community parameters for themonitoring of aid is enough to eliminate any reservations on the part of the Commission. 71. When analysing the Commission's decision, however, it is noticeable that although it contains fragmentary information on the arrangements for applying the aid, it does not even once name the recipients or indicate the extent of the aid in concrete terms. Only for that part of the aid affecting advertising for Cognac, Armagnac and Calvados does the Commission name the products concerned. Somewhat more detailed information emerges only from the Commission's correspondence with the French authorities, which, however, the Commission treats as confidential. It therefore cannot be regarded as an element of the statement of reasons. The significance of this deficiency in the statement of reasons is exemplified by the fact that in the present proceedings Portugal assumed, until France and Spain intervened, that the disputed aid was granted also to natural sweet wines. (38) This shows that the requirements of the Matra case can refer only to the decision not to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty, and do not also contain all the necessary elements of a statement of reasons for the simultaneous authorisation of aid. For this reason alone, there must in principle be held to be a deficiency in the statement of reasons, since neither the Court nor the parties concerned can assess, on the basis of the decision alone, to which aid the Commission raised no objections. 72. However, again with regard to the decision not to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty, account must be taken not only of the requirements in the Matra case but also the requirements stated in the Sytraval case in respect of the complainants' criticisms. The AEVP points repeatedly to its reservations, which arise from the combination of the aid with the existing taxation system for liqueur wines and natural sweet wines. The Commission does not say a single word about this central point of the complaint. There is therefore in this respect also a deficiency in the statement of reasons. 73. Consequently, the Commission's decision must also be set aside on the grounds of insufficient statement of reasons. (b) The alleged infringement of the Treaty or one of the rules of law relating to its application 74. As a second ground for annulment, the applicant invokes infringement of the Treaty or one of the rules of law relating to its application. Within this plea it mentions two different aspects. Firstly, it complains, on the basis of a substantive examination of the aid, of the infringement of the combined provisions of Article 92and Article 95 of the EC Treaty. Secondly, it submits that the aid scheme is not transparent and that the Commission has not imposed the necessary conditions. (aa) On the alleged infringement of Article 92 in conjunction with Article 95 of the EC Treaty Arguments of the parties 75. From the substantive point of view the applicant considers that the Commission's decision infringes Article 92 in conjunction with Article 95 of the EC Treaty. In this respect, the applicant stresses that examination of the aid in question should not be confined to considering its lawfulness on the basis of the Community parameters and the guidelines set in place by the Commission. On the contrary, what was needed was to measure it against Article 92 of the EC Treaty itself. 76. The breach of Article 92 in conjunction with Article 95 of the EC Treaty arose from the interaction of the French taxation system for liqueur wines with the authorised aid. In view of the discriminatory effect of the taxation system for liqueur wines, the authorised aid intensified the already distorted conditions of competition and adversely affected trade within the Community. 77. The French taxation system for liqueur wines was indeed discriminatory. As emerged from the statistics for 1993, 92% of the natural sweet wines sold in France were from French production and were taxed at the rate of FRF 350 per hectolitre. On the other hand, 81% of the liqueur wines sold in France were imported from other Member States (in particular from Portugal) and taxed at FRF 1 400 per hectolitre. A similar picture emerges for the following years. 78. By introducing the present system of aid the French authorities were at least partially compensating French liqueur wines for the tax disadvantage suffered by liqueur wines compared with natural sweet wines. 79. The applicant puts forward four arguments to prove that the aid regime authorised by the Commission goes beyond the limits laid down in Article 92: - Even if Directive 92/83/EEC (39) permitted different rates of taxation, this should not lead to the distortion of competition in the internal market. If the reduced tax rate amounted to only one quarter of the normal tax rate, however, such distortion did exist. - Although in its judgment of 7 April 1987, (40) the Court had dismissed the Commission's action against the French taxation system for liqueur wines and natural sweet wines, this judgment referred only to facts, in particular with regard to the market analyses, which related to a period before 1986, i.e. before the accession of Portugal and Spain. - Thirdly, the contested decision had not taken into account the significance of port and sherry in the relevant market since 1986. The production of port was subject to extremely stringent quality standards, and the regions of origin were in a comparable economic situation to the regions producing natural sweet wines in France. - Finally, after the sales increases in 1994 and 1995, exports of port and sherry to France had collapsed. Exports of port to France had fallen by 12.4% in 1996. 80. At the same time, the applicant emphasised that its concern was not, by some roundabout way, to obtain a judgment from the Court of Justice on the compatibility of national provisions with Article 95 of the EC Treaty. The applicant did not intend circumventing the various procedural provisions of either the law relating to the granting of aid on the one hand or taxation law on the other. On the contrary, its concern was whether the Commission, when examining aid in accordance with Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty, was allowed completely to disregard the existence of tax discrimination and its effects on imported products. 81. Spain considers, without reference to Article 95 of the EC Treaty, that the aid was unjustifiable on the basis of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. The French taxation system altered the conditions in the markets concerned in a way that adversely affected the common interest, which the Commission, when exercising its discretion, had failed to recognise. The aid strengthened the position of French producers of liqueur wines by compensating them for the disadvantage resulting from the taxation system, whereas foreign competitors did not enjoy such compensation. 82. The Commission points out that tax questions were generally only relevant in connection with examination of the granting of aid if the aid itself consisted of preferential tax treatment or if certain tax revenue specifically served to finance aid. In the case of the tax measures mentioned by the applicant, there was, however, no legal or financial connection with the aid in question. The fact that the recipients of the aid were not identical to the subjects of the tax on alcohol confirmed that the tax system and the aid were not linked with each other. Elements of an aid scheme which were not essential for the attainment of its objector for its proper functioning were in fact, according to Court of Justice case-law, (41) not subject to examination during proceedings on the granting of aid but to general provisions, such as Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 28 EC). 83. Besides, the applicant's approach altered the consequences of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. Established Court of Justice case-law (42) assumed, however, that Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty on the one hand and Article 95 of the EC Treaty on the other each had independent significance. There was overlap only where certain tax revenue was inseparably linked with a system of aid. At any rate, discrimination within the meaning of Article 95 of the EC Treaty did not constitute aid. In this connection the Commission refers to the judgment in Joined Cases 142/80 and 143/80. (43) 84. The Commission points out, moreover, with reference to Court of Justice case-law, (44) that, on the basis of the existing facts, the French system of taxation for liqueur wines and natural sweet wines did not infringe Article 95 of the EC Treaty. 85. The French Republic also largely supports the views presented by the Commission. It further submits in the alternative that the preferential tax treatment of natural sweet wines was covered by the relevant provisions of Community law, in particular Article 18 of Directive 92/83, (45) and had been confirmed by Court of Justice case-law. (46) 86. The aid for producers of liqueur wine and brandy was in no way connected with the taxation system. On the contrary, it was a reaction to the crisis in white wine production. Besides, the French tax system did not restrict competition, as could be seen from the increase in sales of port on the French market. Analysis 87. First of all it must be stated that neither in connection with a direct action against a decision by the Commission to raise no objection to aid nor in connection with the Commission procedure leading to such a decision do observations have tobe made on the compatibility of a national taxation system with Article 95 of the EC Treaty. In this respect the Commission and Member States are to be referred to the Treaty infringement procedure under Article 169 of the EC Treaty or Article 170 of the EC Treaty (now Article 227 EC), and the individual to the protection provided against such taxation by national laws. National courts may if necessary bring the matter before the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234 EC), even where a certain form of taxation is inseparably linked with aid. (47) For this reason it is of no significance for the compatibility of aid with Article 92 of the EC Treaty whether there exists simultaneously a discriminatory system of taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the EC Treaty. 88. On the other hand, it is not possible to judge whether aid runs contrary to the common interest within the meaning of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty without simultaneously taking into account the conditions of competition and trade on that market. These conditions are of course influenced by a discriminatory system of taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the EC Treaty - whether this is justified or not. A system of tax discrimination may be justified for objective reasons, and even a certain aid scheme may, viewed in isolation, be basically compatible with Community law. But there is much to be said in support of the fact that the cumulative influence of both measures on a certain market is no longer compatible with the common interest within the meaning of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. In such a situation a Member State should at least not implement the aid scheme until it eliminates or reduces the differences in taxation to such an extent that the additional effect of the aid on the market concerned no longer runs counter to the common interest. (48) 89. It cannot be judged how things stand in the present case as the Commission has not yet carried out the necessary investigations. 90. It is, however, noticeable that the aid for advertising for the brandies Cognac, Armagnac and Calvados - the only aid which does not relate to products coming under the system of taxation mentioned - is, in structural terms, out of place in the authorised scheme. This aid almost exclusively promotes advertising in states outside the European Union, with only Calvados also being advertised in Germany. The liqueur wines are advertised in France. In addition, the financing in the case of these three brandies is based on so-called compulsory voluntary contributions ('cotisations volontaires obligatoires), which otherwise applies only to Floc de Gascogne - one of the French liqueur wines. The aid for advertising for liqueur wines on the other hand is financed by non-compulsory voluntary contributions. If the aid for brandies is separated from the other aid on this basis,the remaining, substantial, part of the aid seems to favour a group which largely coincides with the group of French producers suffering a tax disadvantage. Should the necessary investigations confirm this impression, it could indeed be inferred from this that the purpose was compensation as alleged by the Portuguese Government. There is much to be said in support of regarding such compensation as incompatible with the common interest within the meaning of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. 91. Ultimately, however, weighing up these points of view in the case of a particular aid scheme is the responsibility of the Commission, which, after taking the necessary steps in terms of procedural law, is granted broad powers of discretion in making its decision. (49) (bb) Infringement of Article 92(3) of the EC Treaty 92. Finally, the applicant submits two further pleas under the heading of 'infringement of Article 92(3) of the EC Treaty. Firstly, it criticises the lack of clarity of the aid scheme and, secondly, the absence of conditions which the Commission should have imposed. - The lack of clarity of the scheme Arguments of the parties 93. As already explained in connection with the infringement of essential procedural requirements as the cause of the present action, under the plea of insufficient statement of grounds, the applicant criticises the lack of clarity of the present aid scheme as an infringement of the Treaty. (50) At the hearing it also pointed out that the Commission had dispensed with obtaining relevant information although relevant requests had been contained in a form with advice on registering aid which the Commission had sent to the French authorities along with the invitation to give notification of the scheme. 94. The Commission objects that the aim of the correspondence preceding the decision had been to clarify the circumstances under which aid was granted. The fact that the French authorities had in this context specifically guaranteed compliance with the relevant guidelines ensured compatibility of the aid with Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. 95. More detailed information could not be demanded from a Member State when registering aid as it was up to that State alone to determine domesticresponsibility and procedures for implementing aid in accordance with Community law. Besides, it followed from the case-law that it was up to Member States to monitor compliance with the conditions for the authorisation of aid whilst the Commission could if necessary order repayment of the aid where those conditions were infringed. Analysis 96. The accusation of lack of clarity of the present aid scheme is of importance in connection with the plea of infringement of the Treaty only in so far as it is directed at the fact that the Commission had never even determined the relevant facts. 97. In so far as the applicant complains of the risk of infringement of the conditions for the authorisation of aid, attention should first of all be drawn to the findings of the Court of First Instance in the AIUFFASS case, to which the Commission refers. According to this, 'a mere statement that one of the conditions on which a decision authorising the grant of aid was based will not be complied with cannot cast doubt on the legality of the decision. If the recipient undertaking were to fail to observe the conditions of authorisation, it would be for the Member State to make sure that the decision was properly carried out and for the Commission to assess whether it was appropriate to demand that the aid be repaid. (51) 98. This finding refers to the risk of aid being used contrary to the purposes authorised by the Commission. This risk can never be completely ruled out in advance. (52) The applicant's complaint, however, is levelled at the fact that the Commission did not obtain sufficient information about the aid to rule out the possibility of even its authorised form's being incompatible with Article 92(2)(c) of the EC Treaty. This complaint is to be endorsed in so far as establishing that aid basically gives no cause for concern requires a minimum amount of information on such aid and, in particular, the measures taken to prevent it being used inappropriately. 99. Commission practice, as it emerges from the form on the information which the notification of aid under Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty has to contain, (53) basically provides the model for the information required. According to the present documents and the Commission's oral submissions, the latter did not have all the details mentioned there when making its decision. In particular, there is no information about the French authorities responsible for distributing the aid or the criteria for distributing it to individual recipients. Only the limits on the granting of aid which can be derived from the texts mentioned in the decision offer some guidance in that respect. It therefore seems difficult, at the least, to monitor, on a case-by-case basis, whether the French have kept their promises, since the Commission does not know where to carry out monitoring. Besides, it is not possible to judge to what extent national regulations and criteria prevent aid from being misused. 100. Whether this lack of information is enough for the decision to be set aside does not, however, need to be decided here since the Commission can take it into account when carrying out the procedure under Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty. - The accusation of lack of conditions Arguments of the parties 101. In this respect the applicant complains that the Commission had authorised measures which were to be applicable for an unspecified period and which altered the conditions on the market concerned. However, if the aid were for restructuring, as the Commission asserted, it was permissible only if digressive and only for a limited period of time. 102. The Commission objects that, in so far as the applicant referred to the regulations on aid for restructuring, it ignored the fact that the 'Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (54) were not to be applied to the disputed aid, which related inter alia to the restructuring of a sector of French agriculture. The texts applicable in this case did not require a time-limit or digressive arrangement. 103. France also points out that the Commission was granted broad powers of discretion when judging whether aid was justified under Article 92(3). The applicant had not shown that the Commission in this respect had made a mistake when ascertaining the facts, or made a grave error of judgment, which alone could have helped this plea to succeed. 104. In view of the period of validity of the aid, France assumes that authorisation applied only to the funds identified in the 1995 budget. Analysis 105. The Commission's objection is to be endorsed in so far as none of the texts mentioned by it in the decision for putting Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty in concrete terms provides for a time-limit or digressive form. Such an arrangement does admittedly emerge from the guidelines mentioned by the Commission but - as the Commission submits - the purpose of the present aid is not to restructure or rescue individual businesses. Nor can the Commission be accused of having exceeded its powers of discretion by not applying business-related requirements to regional and sectoral aid also. Even if such aid is directed at restructuring, it differs so greatly from business-related aid that automatic equal treatment cannot be demanded. Besides, as France submits, the Commission also only authorised the aid planned for 1995. (55) This plea must therefore be rejected. V - Costs 106. Under Article 69(2), subparagraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party is to pay the costs if they have been applied for. Paragraph 4, subparagraph 1, states that the parties which intervene in the proceedings shall bear their own costs. VI - Conclusion 107. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should decide as follows: (1) The decision addressed to the French Government of 21 November 1996, SG(96) D/9957, 'to raise no objections to aid No N 703/95, is annulled. (2) The Commission bears the costs of the proceedings. (3) The Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic must bear their own costs. 1: - Original language: German. 2: - OJ 1997 C 70, p. 14. 3: - Plans for wine production ('conditionnement) and marketing. 4: - OJ 1986 C 272 of 28 October 1986, p. 3. 5: - OJ 1987 C 302 of 12 November 1987, p. 6. 6: - OJ 1996 C 45 of 17 February 1996, p. 5. 7: - Point 5.1. 8: - OJ 1996 C 213 of 23 July 1996, p. 4. 9: - OJ 1996 C 29 of 2 February 1996, p. 4. 10: - OJ 1994 L 79, p. 29. 11: - OJ 1990 L 91, p. 1. 12: - Judgment of the Court of 11 December 1973 in Case 120/73 [1973] ECR 1471. 13: - Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1990 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraph 27 et seq. 14: - Judgment in Case 120/73 (quoted in footnote 12). 15: - Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3233/92 of 5 November 1992 (OJ 1992 L 321, p. 11). 16: - Judgment in Case 120/73 (quoted in footnote 12). 17: - Judgment in Case 120/73 (quoted in footnote 12, at paragraph 4). 18: - Judgment of 20 March 1984 Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 1451, at paragraphs 13 et seq.; similarly in the judgment of 15 June 1993 in Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203 and implicitly also in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 28 September 1995 in Case T-95/94 Sytraval v Commission [1995] ECR II-2651 and in the judgment of 2 April 1998 on the related appeal, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval [1998] ECR I-1719, in which a processing period of 51 months was involved. 19: - Judgment in Case 84/82 (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 14 et seq.). 20: - Commission's request in letter of 3 June 1996, point 6; agreement in letter from the French authorities of 10 July 1996, point 6. 21: - Judgment in Case C-225/91 (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 38). 22: - Judgment of 19 May 1993 in Case C-198/91 Cook v Commission [1993] ECR I-2487, at paragraph 31. 23: - See above, paragraph 12 et seq. 24: - Judgment of 24 February 1987 in Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, at paragraph 22; cf. also the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 5 November 1997 in Case T-149/95 Ducros v Commission [1997] ECR II-2031, at paragraph 61 with further references. 25: - Judgment of 7 April 1987 Commission v France [1987] ECR 1597. 26: - For consideration of this burden see paragraph 87 et seq. below. 27: - Quoted in footnote 9, at paragraph 2. 28: - Quoted in footnote 10. 29: - Council Regulation of 15 June 1992 concerning specific measures for the Azores and Madeira relating to certain agricultural products (OJ 1992 L 173 of 27 June 1992, p. 1). 30: - Judgment of 21 March 1990 Belgium v Commission ('Tubemeuse) [1990] ECR I-959, at paragraph 48. 31: - Judgments in Case 301/87 (quoted in footnote 13, at paragraph 31) and Case 142/87 (quoted in footnote 30, at paragraph 48). 32: - Judgment of 2 April 1998 in Case C-367/95 P (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 63). 33: - Judgment in Case C-225/91 (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 48). 34: - This was a regional aid programme previously authorised, covering part of the aid disputed in this case. 35: - Judgment in Case C-367/95 P (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 68 et seq.). 36: - Judgment in Case C-367/95 P (quoted in footnote 18, at paragraph 45). 37: - For interpretation of the applicant's submission see judgment of 17 May 1984 in Case 338/82 Albertini v Commission [1984] ECR 2123, at paragraph 5 et seq. 38: - Part of the reason for this must also be the notice regarding authorisation of this aid (quoted in footnote 2), according to which 'natural sweet wines were also being promoted. 39: - Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (OJ 1992 L 316, p. 21). 40: - Judgment in Case 196/85 (quoted in footnote 25). 41: - Judgment of 22 March 1977 in Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi v Ditta Paolo Meroni [1977] ECR 557. 42: - Judgment of 3 July 1985 in Case 277/83 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 2049. 43: - Judgment of 27 May 1981 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, at paragraph 28. 44: - Judgment in Case 196/85 (quoted in footnote 25). 45: - Quoted in footnote 39. 46: - Judgment in Case 196/85 (quoted in footnote 25). 47: - Judgment in Joined Cases 142/80 and 143/80 (quoted in footnote 43, at paragraph 28). 48: - See mutatis mutandis the judgment of 15 May 1997 in Case C-355/95 P Textilwerke Deggendorf (TWD) v Commission [1997] ECR I-2549, at paragraph 26. 49: - Judgment of the Court in Case T-149/95 (quoted in footnote 24, at paragraph 63 with further references). 50: - See above, paragraph 58 et seq. 51: - Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 December 1996 in Case T-380/94 Association internationale des utilisateurs de fils de filaments artificiels et synthétiques et de soie naturelle (AIUFFASS) and Apparel, Knitting & Textiles Alliance (AKT) v Commission [1996] ECR II-2169, at paragraph 128; the reference to be found there, quoted by the Commission, to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 February 1992 in Case C-294/90 British Aerospace and Rover v Commission [1992] ECR I-493, at paragraph 11, refers merely to the possibility of demanding repayment as a sanction for infringement of conditions for authorisation, not to responsibility for monitoring the implementation of aid. 52: - See Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1). 53: - Annex to the Commission's invitation to the French Government of 12 April 1995 to notify the aid. 54: - OJ 1994 C 368 of 23 December 1994, p. 12. 55: - This shows again that the Commission in its statement of reasons for the decision did not present the authorised aid scheme in sufficient detail. According to the notice in the Official Journal, quoted in footnote 2, the aid is authorised for an unspecified duration.