Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2020:155
Date: 2020-03-04
Language of the case: French
Subject matter: Asylum policy;Justice and home affairs;Area of freedom, security and justice
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary C-402/19 — 1 
Case C-402/19 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
  
Date lodged:  
24 May 2019 
Referring court:  
Cour du travail de Liège (Higher Labour Court of Liège, Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
17 May2019 
Appellant:  
LM 
Respondent: 
Centre public d’action sociale de Seraing 
  
I. Facts of the case and main proceedings 
1 LM, appellant in the main proceedings, born in 1956 and of Congolese 
nationality, is the father of a young girl, R, born in 1999 and who has now come 
of age. R suffers from severe sickle cell anaemia and has significant kyphosis 
requiring surgery in order to prevent paralysis. 
2 It is common ground between the parties that R’s medical condition is very 
serious and it is apparent from the documents before the Court in the main 
proceedings that the doctors consider it necessary for her father to be constantly 
present. 
EN 
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3 LM and R came to Belgium in 2012. On the basis of the health of R, a minor at 
the time, LM submitted, on 20 August 2012, an application for leave to reside on 
medical grounds, under Article 9b of the loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au 
territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers [Law of 
15 December 1980 on the entry in Belgian territory, residence, establishment and 
removal of foreign nationals] (Moniteur belge of 31 December 1980, p. 14584) 
(‘the Law of 15 December 1980’). That application was found to be admissible on 
6 March 2013 by the l’Office des étrangers [Belgian Immigration Office] (‘the 
Office). 
4 As a result of that first decision, the Centre public d’action sociale de Seraing 
(Public Centre for Social Welfare, Seraing) (‘the CPAS’), respondent in the main 
proceedings, granted LM financial social assistance at the rate assigned to heads 
of household.  
5 Three decisions rejecting the application under Article 9b were subsequently 
adopted by the Office against R and LM, but were systematically withdrawn 
following the action brought before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers 
(Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) (‘the CCE’). 
6 On 25 February 2016, the interested party was notified of a fourth decision 
rejecting the application, together with an order to leave Belgian territory within 
30 days. An action for the suspension and annulment of that decision was brought 
before the CCE and is still pending. 
7 In so far as that action does not have automatic suspensive effect, LM and R have 
been staying illegally on Belgian territory since 26 March 2016. 
8 The CPAS de Seraing withdrew financial assistance from that date. On 22 March 
2016, the CPAS granted emergency medical assistance to R, including hospital 
expenses. 
9 Following interlocutory proceedings before the tribunal du travail de Liège 
(Labour Court, Liège), financial assistance at the household rate was reinstated.  
10 That assistance was again withdrawn by two decisions notified to LM on 22 May 
2017, on the ground that R had come of age on 11 April 2017. By those decisions, 
the CPAS, on the one hand, withdrew the financial assistance at the household 
rate granted to LM with effect from 11 April 2017 — the date on which he no 
longer had a dependent minor child — and, on the other, refused his entitlement to 
any social assistance other than emergency medical assistance because he was 
considered to be staying illegally. 
11 With regard to R, given her medical condition, since coming of age she has 
received social assistance at the rate assigned to single persons, plus family 
benefits to which she is entitled on account of her disability. 
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12 By judgment of 16 April 2018, pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union of 18 December 2014, Abdida (C-562/13, EU:C:2014:2453) 
(‘the Abdida judgment’), the tribunal du travail de Liège acknowledged the 
suspensive effect of the action brought before the CCE against the decision 
rejecting the application made under Article 9b. As a result, the tribunal du travail 
de Liège ordered the CPAS to pay LM financial social assistance at the household 
rate between 26 March 2016, the date on which the application was submitted, 
and 10 April 2017, the day before his daughter came of age. 
13 With regard to the period beginning 11 April 2017, the tribunal de travail, finding 
that, from that date, LM was no longer the parent of a minor able to claim the 
impossibility of return on medical grounds, held that the decisions refusing to 
grant him social assistance were well founded as of that date. 
14 LM brought an appeal against that judgment, in so far as it confirmed the legality 
of the decisions of the CPAS relating to the withdrawal of and refusal to grant him 
social assistance from 11 April 2017. 
II. Legal context 
1. Belgian law 
15 Under Article 9b of the Law of 15 December 1980, a foreign national residing in 
Belgium who suffers from an illness occasioning a real risk to his life or physical 
integrity or a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment where there is no 
appropriate treatment in his country of origin or in the country in which he resides 
may apply to the Minister or his representative for leave to reside in the Kingdom 
of Belgium. This is a derogation from the general rule provided for in Article 9 
according to which the application for leave to reside for more than three months 
must be submitted to the Belgian diplomatic or consular post competent for the 
place of residence or place of stay of the person concerned. 
16 Pursuant to Article 57(2) of the loi du 8 juillet 1976 organique des centres publics 
d’action sociale [Basic Law of 8 July 1976 on public social welfare centres 
(CPAS)] (Moniteur belge of 5 August 1976, p. 9876) (‘the Law of 8 July 1976’), 
the consequence of an illegal stay is the refusal of all social assistance, except the 
provision of emergency medical assistance. 
17 The Cour constitutionnelle belge (Constitutional Court, Belgium) created a 
judicial exception to that rule, in favour of an illegally staying foreign national 
demonstrating that it is absolutely impossible on medical grounds for him or her 
to comply with an order to leave the national territory. 
18 By judgment 80/99 of 30 June 1999, the Cour d’arbitrage (Court of Arbitration) 
— now the Cour constitutionnelle — held that Article 57(2) cited above infringes 
Article 10 and 11 of the Constitution in cases where the restriction of social 
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assistance to emergency medical assistance only ‘applies to persons for whom, on 
medical grounds, it is absolutely impossible to comply with an order to leave 
Belgian territory’ because ‘it applies equal treatment, without reasonable 
justification, towards persons in fundamentally different situations: those who 
may be removed and those who may not be removed on medical grounds. 
Article 57(2) is, to that extent, discriminatory’. 
19 Judgment 194/2005 of 21 December 2005 of the Cour d’arbitrage extended the 
scope of that judicial exception to cover illegally staying parents of a seriously ill 
minor child. It held in that judgment that Article 57(2) of the Law of 8 July 1976 
infringed the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination in that it 
‘applies, without reasonable justification, towards persons in fundamentally 
different situations: those who may be removed and those who may not because 
they are parents — and can provide justification thereof — of a minor child for 
whom, on medical grounds, it is absolutely impossible to comply with an order to 
leave Belgian territory because of a serious disability in respect of which he or she 
cannot receive adequate care in the country of origin or in another State obliged to 
take him or her back and whose right to respect for family life must be preserved 
by guaranteeing the presence of his or her parents at his or her side’. The 
constitutional court reached that conclusion on the basis of, inter alia, Article 8 
ECHR. 
20 The courts having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter have subsequently 
established, in abundant case-law, the three criteria which must all be satisfied by 
the illegally staying foreign national — or his or her minor child — who claims it 
is absolutely impossible to return to his or her country of origin on medical 
grounds such as the severity of the disease, the lack of adequate treatment in the 
country of origin and the lack of effective access to care in the country of origin. 
2. International law and EU law 
21 Article 8 ECHR provides: 
‘Right to respect for private and family life 
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
22 The Court held in the Abdida judgment: 
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‘Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, taken in 
conjunction with Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive, are to be interpreted as 
precluding national legislation which:  
– does not endow with suspensive effect an appeal against a decision ordering a 
third country national suffering from a serious illness to leave the territory of a 
Member State, where the enforcement of that decision may expose that third 
country national to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his 
state of health, and 
– does not make provision, in so far as possible, for the basic needs of such a 
third country national to be met, in order to ensure that that person may in fact 
avail himself of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness during 
the period in which that Member State is required to postpone removal of the 
third country national following the lodging of the appeal’. 
23 The appellant also relies on Article 19(2), Article 47 and Articles 7 and [21] of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and 
Articles 5, 13 and 14(1)(b) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 
L 238, p. 98). 
III. The dispute in the main proceedings and the positions of the parties 
24 The appellant recognises that the tribunal de travail correctly applied the Abdida 
judgment in order to grant financial social assistance to his daughter, having 
regard to the suspensive effect of the action that he brought, whilst she was still a 
minor, before the CCE, on the basis of the arguable complaint set out therein 
relating to her state of health. 
25 He considers that, on account of the serious medical conditions suffered by his 
daughter, it is absolutely impossible on medical grounds for him or her to return, 
in so far as the medical profession confirms that, in view of the seriousness of R’s 
disability, the presence of her father at her side is imperative, thus preventing him 
from complying with the order to leave the national territory. 
26 He claims that the execution of that order to leave the national territory would 
adversely affect the right to respect for private and family life enshrined in 
Article 8 ECHR. 
27 In view of the force majeure circumstances preventing him materially and non-
materially from leaving the national territory, the appellant takes the view that it is 
necessary to preclude application of Article 57(2) of the Law of 8 July 1976. In 
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addition, he observes that the fact that the family unit that he forms with his 
daughter is in need is not contested by the CPAS which, for that reason, granted 
her application for financial assistance at the rate assigned to single persons. The 
expenses for which the father and daughter were liable remained the same (rent, 
energy, pharmaceutical and medical costs, etc.) whereas their resources fell by 
25% in relation to the time when LM received financial assistance at the 
household rate. 
28 Consequently, LM requests that the cour de travail de Liège orders the CPAS to 
grant him, with effect from 11 April 2017, financial assistance at the household 
rate or, in the alternative, at the rate assigned to cohabitees. 
29 The CPAS disputes, first of all, the suspensive effect of the action brought by LM 
before the CCE. 
30 Next, it considers that the refusal to grant social assistance to the interested party 
does not constitute a breach of his right to respect for private and family life since, 
on the one hand, the father and daughter are both staying illegally and, on the 
other, by granting the daughter the assistance she needs on medical grounds, the 
decision to withdraw social assistance from LM does not prevent him from living 
with his daughter who has now come of age. 
31 Moreover, LM cannot claim the impossibility of return on medical grounds, in so 
far as he does not personally have health problems, and his daughter’s illness — 
the seriousness of which is not disputed by the CPAS — does not constitute force 
majeure circumstances on which he relies in order to preclude application of 
Article 57(2) of the Law of 8 July 1976. 
32 Lastly, the CPAS disputes the fact that they are in need since LM has failed to 
demonstrate that the financial assistance granted to his daughter, plus family 
allowances for disability, are insufficient to cover the requirements of both 
interested parties. 
33 The CPAS therefore contends that the judgment should be upheld. 
IV. Findings of the cour du travail 
34 The cour de travail considers that the subject-matter of the dispute is not 
whether R, who has now come of age, meets the criteria of absolute impossibility 
to return, which has already been established. Despite staying illegally on Belgian 
territory, the CPAS grants her social financial assistance because of the 
seriousness of her illness which requires, according to the unanimous medical 
opinion of specialists over the years, adequate care which can only be received in 
Belgium, given the state of collapse of the healthcare system in the Congo. 
35 The subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings is therefore whether, 
due to the presence of LM at his daughter’s side, which the medical profession 
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considers to be imperative, it is permissible to preclude, for his benefit, 
application of Article 57(2) of the Law of 8 July 1976, with the result that, in so 
far as they have established that they are in need, he could be granted financial 
assistance in addition to that received by his daughter. 
1. Distinction between absolute impossibility of return on medical grounds and 
leave to reside on medical grounds 
36 The cour du travail notes the fundamental distinction to be made between absolute 
impossibility of return on medical grounds, on the one hand, and the criteria laid 
down in the Abdida judgment, on which the suspensive effect of an action for 
annulment and suspension directed against a decision refusing an application 
under Article 9b depends, on the other. 
37 That distinction has already been set out in a judgment of the cour de travail de 
Bruxelles (Labour Court, Brussels) of 13 May 2015, which held that the 
impossibility of return on medical grounds is an autonomous concept in relation to 
that which is relevant for an application under Article 9b. That conclusion is 
supported by the following considerations: 
– In finding, in judgment No 80/99, that there was a breach of Articles 10 and 11 
of the Constitution, the Cour consitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) failed to 
refer to either Article 3 ECHR, or to the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 2 May 1997, D. v. the United Kingdom 
(CE:ECHR:1997:0502JUD003024096). The same is true of judgment 
No 194/2005. 
– In the latter judgment, the Cour constitutionnelle considers that the lack of 
‘adequate care in the country of origin’ constitutes an obstacle to return, in 
respect of which the ECtHR states that ‘the fact that the applicant’s 
circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if 
he were to be removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to 
give rise to breach of Article 3 [ECHR]’ (judgment of 27 May 2008, N. v. the 
United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2008:0527JUD002656505, §42) (‘the N. v. the 
United Kingdom judgment’), case-law which the ECtHR has since altered (see 
below).  
– Social assistance granted in the case of impossibility of return on medical 
grounds has the same basis as that granted to a foreign national who, for 
circumstances beyond his control, but not of a medical nature, is prevented 
from returning to his country of origin (for example when that country refuses 
to issue the necessary documents). It is therefore the impossibility of return, as 
such, which is decisive for granting social assistance and not only the medical 
circumstances giving rise to that impossibility. 
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– The particularly strict formalities which characterise the assessment of 
conditions of residence is not therefore relevant when examining an application 
for social assistance. 
38 The cour de travail takes the view that it is necessary to analyse the appellant’s 
arguments by making a very clear distinction between, on the one hand, the 
criteria required for the recognition of force majeure circumstances making it 
impossible to comply with the order to leave the national territory and, on the 
other, much more restrictive criteria relating to the likelihood of serious or 
irreversible deterioration in the health of the illegally staying foreign national, 
necessary for recognising the suspensive effect of an action for the suspension and 
annulment of a decision rejecting an application under Article 9b. 
2. The opinion of the Public Prosecutor 
39 In its written opinion, the Public Prosecutor highlighted the seriousness of R’s 
illness and the degree of her dependence. It notes that R, who has lived with her 
father LM since arriving in Belgium, relies solely on him to provide emotional 
support in coping with repeated crises and hospital stays, closely monitoring 
medical treatment, making the right medical decisions, undergoing major surgery 
which will happen in the near future, and all in the context of a situation where the 
condition is life threatening. The question is therefore whether the need for LM to 
remain by his daughter’s side — which is undisputed — precludes him from 
complying with the order to leave the national territory. 
40 The Public Prosecutor thus focuses on Article 8 ECHR and the ECtHR’s 
application of Article 8 to private and family relationships between parents and 
their adult children or between adult siblings. It considers that ‘the particular 
circumstances of dependency of R — an a child who has come of age — on her 
father, to an extent exceeding normal ties, which is clear given the medical 
circumstances’ has been established in the present case. 
41 The Public Prosecutor makes the suggestion that the cour de travail makes a 
reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of provisions of Directive 2008/115, taken in conjunction 
with Articles 7 and [21] of the Charter guaranteeing respect for private and family 
life and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age respectively. 
42 The cour de travail follows the opinion of the Public Prosecutor and considers 
that, whatever the basis of the right invoked by the appellant — impossibility of 
return by reason of force majeure or suspensive effect pursuant to the Abdida 
judgment — it must be examined in the light of the right to respect for private and 
family life. 
3. Examination in the light of the right to respect for private and family life 
43 The ECtHR has enshrined the following principles in its case-law. 
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44 The bond between a child and his parents amounts, ipso jure, to ‘family life’ and 
is, on that basis, protected by Article 8 (see, inter alia, the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 21 December 2001, Sen v. the Netherlands, 
CE:ECHR:2001:1221JUD003146596; of 19 February 1996, Gül v. Switzerland, 
CE:ECHR:1996:0219JUD002321894; and of 28 November 1996, Ahmut v. the 
Netherlands, CE:ECHR:1996:1128JUD002170293). 
45 The purpose of that provision is, in essence, to protect the individual against 
arbitrary action by public authorities. In addition, it may create positive 
obligations on the part of States Parties to ensure effective respect for family life. 
Interference with the exercise of that right is subject to a review of 
proportionality, which balances compliance with national immigration policy 
against the seriousness of the infringement of the right of the persons concerned to 
respect for their private family life. The court must assess in the specific case 
whether, in exercising its discretion, the State has complied with Article 8 by 
taking into account a fair balance between the competing interests of the 
individual and society as a whole. 
46 The family relationship must be genuine. The ECtHR examines, in those 
circumstances, the quality and intensity of that relationship. The cour de travails 
observes, in the present case, that the close family relationship between LM and 
his daughter R is not disputed and therefore that the first criterion has prima facie 
been met. 
47 The question of maintaining protection of family life between a parent and their 
child who has come of age is more sensitive. The ECtHR has long recognised that 
the right to family life is not limited to relationships between parents and children 
and has extended that concept beyond the nuclear family to include the ties 
between near relatives, for instance those between grandparents and 
grandchildren, provided that the ties in question are real, effective and deep (see, 
in particular, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 13 June 1979, 
Marckx v. Belgium, CE:ECHR:1979:0613JUD000683374, and of 9 June 1998, 
Bronda v. Italy, CE:ECHR:1998:0609JUD002243093). 
48 The ECtHR has published a ‘Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf) 
(‘the Guide’). Pursuant to paragraph [329] of the Guide ‘[i]n immigration cases, 
there will be no “family life” between parents and adult children unless they can 
demonstrate additional elements of dependence other than normal emotional ties’; 
it is stated in paragraph [313] that ‘[i]n more recent jurisprudence, the [ECtHR] 
has stated that family ties between adults and their parents or siblings attract lesser 
protection unless there is evidence of further elements of dependency, involving 
more than the normal emotional ties’. * 
 
* These references concern the version of the Guide updated on 31 June 2018. In the version updated 
on 31 December 2018, they relate to paragraphs 311 and 297 respectively. 
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49 The ECtHR has also accepted in a number of cases concerning young adults who 
have not yet founded a family of their own that their relationship with their 
parents and other close family members also constitute family life. Most of those 
cases concern the expulsion of a foreign national who has committed a criminal 
offence, but the principles adopted by the ECtHR in that regard are all the more 
interesting in that they should be applied a fortiori to cases concerning sick 
foreign nationals who, like in the present case, have never committed a crime. 
Accordingly, in paragraph 62 of the judgment of 23 June 2008, Maslov v. Austria 
(CE:ECHR:2008:0623JUD000163803), the ECtHR noted that: ‘The applicant was 
a minor when the exclusion order was imposed. He had reached the age of 
majority, namely 18 years, when the exclusion order became final in November 
2002 following the Constitutional Court’s decision, but he was still living with his 
parents. In any case, the Court has accepted in a number of cases concerning 
young adults who had not yet founded a family of their own that their relationship 
with their parents and other close family members also constituted “family life”’. 
50 The ECtHR has even recognised the existence of a family tie justifying protection 
under Article 8 ECHR in situations where, either that tie exists only in embryo, or 
its exercise has been significantly disturbed by the specific living circumstances of 
the family unit in question, noting that ‘where the existence of a family tie has 
been established, the State must in principle act in a manner calculated to enable 
that tie to be developed and take measures that will enable parent and child to be 
reunited’ (judgment of 26 February 2002, Kutzner v. Germany, 
CE:ECHR:2002:0226JUD004654499). By contrast, that positive obligation 
should apply all the more so in the presence of long-established family ties. 
51 Paragraph [332]* of the Guide refers to the judgment of 13 December 2016, 
Paposhvili v. Belgium, CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD 004173810 (‘the Paposhvili 
judgment’), in which the ECtHR altered its decision in N. v. the United Kingdom. 
In paragraph 183 of the Paposhvili judgment, the ECtHR considers that the ‘other 
very exceptional cases’ within the meaning of the judgment in N. v. the United 
Kingdom which may raise an issue under Article 3 should be understood to refer 
to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent 
risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate 
treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being 
exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health 
resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The 
ECtHR points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the 
application of Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the removal of 
aliens suffering from serious illness. 
 
* In the version of the Guide updated on 31 December 2018, this relates to paragraph 314. 
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52 The cour du travail de Liège notes that the foreseeable consequences of 
withdrawing R’s treatment corresponds, in all respects, to the threshold of 
seriousness laid down in the Paposhvili judgment. 
53 Furthermore, the physical presence of LM alongside his daughter who has come 
of age is as imperative as when she was a minor, given that she is particularly 
vulnerable as a result of the seriousness of her illness. 
54 Although the CPAS rightly claims in that regard that the refusal to grant social 
assistance to LM is not in itself a breach of his right to private and family life, in 
so far as that breach does not result directly from the lack of social assistance, but 
rather the order to leave the national territory addressed to the interested party if 
the Office were to enforce it, on the contrary, the position of the CPAS cannot be 
followed where it writes that ‘the decision at issue does not de facto prevent the 
appellant in the main proceedings from continuing to live with his daughter and 
helping her on a daily basis’. 
55 The question of the financial means necessary to enable the interested party to 
maintain his support and physical presence alongside his daughter who has now 
come of age cannot be overlooked. LM, who is still of working age, is excluded 
from the labour market by reason of the irregularity of his stay and is, 
consequently, deprived of his own resources. 
V. Decisions of the cour du travail de Liège 
56 The complexity of the question from a legal standpoint, given the fact that the 
daughter of the party concerned has now come of age, supports the cour de travail 
de Liège making a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a 
preliminary ruling. Furthermore, the cour de travail de Liège makes a reference 
for a preliminary ruling to the Cour constitutionnelle concerning the alleged 
infringement of the provisions of the Constitution relating to equality before the 
law, non-discrimination, respect for private and family life and the right to lead a 
life in keeping with human dignity. Lastly, the cour de travail de Liège re-opens 
the oral proceedings so as to give the parties an opportunity to comment on 
whether the interested parties are in need. 
VI. Referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
57 The cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) asks the Court to give a preliminary ruling 
on the following question: 
‘Does the point 1 of the first subparagraph of Article 57(2) of the Organic Law of 
8 July 1976 on public social welfare centres infringe Articles 5 and 13 of 
Directive 2008/115/EC, read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive 
and Articles 7 and [21] of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
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Union as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Abdida 
judgment of 18 December 2014 (Case C-562/13):  
– first, in so far as it results in depriving a third-country national, staying illegally 
on the territory of a Member State, of provision, in so far as possible, for his 
basic needs pending resolution of the action for suspension and annulment that 
he has brought in his own name as the representative of his child, who was at 
that time a minor, against a decision ordering them to leave the territory of a 
Member State; 
– where, second, on the one hand, that child who has now come of age suffers 
from a serious illness and the enforcement of that decision may expose that 
child to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in her state of 
health and, on the other, the presence of that parent alongside his daughter who 
has now come of age is considered to be imperative by the medical 
professional given that she is particularly vulnerable as a result of her state of 
health (recurrent sickle cell crises and the need for surgery in order to prevent 
paralysis)?’