Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2025:180
Date: 2025-02-26
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgment of 30 March 2022, Yanukovych v Council, T‑292/20, not published, EU:T:2022:188, paragraph 74). 73 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 74 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing his, her or its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 75 Last, it should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list in question or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 76 In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). That context includes not only the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established, but also the specific situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 60 (not published) and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78). Similarly, maintenance on the list in question is justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 83 and 84; of 27 April 2022, Boshab v Council, T‑103/21, not published, EU:T:2022:248, paragraph 121; and of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56). 77 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be ascertained whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding to include and then maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. The evidence produced by the Council 78 As is apparent from the contested acts, the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, maintained successively by the September 2022 acts, the March 2023 acts and the April 2023 acts, is based on her status as an associate of her husband, Mr Melnichenko, inter alia, on the ground that he transferred to her the ownership and benefit of EuroChem Group and SUEK, a ground which the General Court considers it appropriate to examine first. In order to substantiate that ground, which is disputed by the applicant, the Council refers to the first WK file, which contains 11 items of evidence. It should be noted that those constitute, with the exception of Exhibit 11, publicly available information, namely: – articles drawn from the websites of (i) Celeb Family, accessed in March 2022 (Exhibit 1), (ii) WIKI, accessed in February 2022 (Exhibit 2), (iii) Forbes, published on 5 March 2022 and 5 November 2019 (Exhibits 3 and 4), (iv) Rusbase, published on 5 November 2019 (Exhibit 5), (v) Kommersant, published on 24 February 2022 (Exhibit 9), and (vi) RBC, published on 12 January 2022 (Exhibit 10); – an extract dated February 2022 taken from the Twitter account of a journalist (Exhibit 6); – extracts from a website of SUEK (Exhibit 7) and from a website of EuroChem Group, both accessed in February 2022 (Exhibit 8); – a letter from a law firm of 27 April 2022 (unnumbered item, ‘Exhibit 11’). 79 Moreover, as regards specifically the March 2023 and April 2023 acts, the Council also relied on the additional evidence in the second WK file, namely: – articles published on the websites of Svoboda on 22 May 2022 (Exhibit 1) and of The Brussels Times on 14 June 2022 (Exhibit 2); – screenshots from the specialised websites of Cbonds (Exhibits 3 and 5), of GlobeNewswire (Exhibit 4), of Tadviser (Exhibits 6 and 7), of Rusprofile (Exhibits 8 and 11) and of ‘Audit-it.ru’ (Exhibits 9 and 10). The reliability of the evidence 80 The applicant calls into question the reliability of the evidence on which the Council based its decision. She claims, in essence, that that evidence is an ‘insubstantial compilation’ of very low quality publications drawn from social media and unreliable press articles, sometimes containing wrong information and which relate very little to her, if at all. In addition, press articles must be supported by other evidence. 81 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 82 It should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the General Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In that connection, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited). 83 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 84 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information from being provided (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T 193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116). 85 In the present case, first, it is apparent from paragraph 74 above that the assessment of whether the grounds for inclusion and maintenance on the lists at issue are well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. Therefore, the applicant’s challenge relating to the relevance of certain items of evidence, taken individually, in particular that of Exhibits 3 to 11 of the first WK file and Exhibits 9 to 11 of the second WK file must be rejected. Moreover, it must be noted that, with the exception of the information contained in Exhibit 3 of the first WK file according to which she owns, ‘together with [her husband]’, two penthouses in New York (United States), the applicant does not dispute the content of the documents in the first WK file, nor of those in the second WK file. 86 Second, as is apparent from paragraph 82 above, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence. Contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council did not rely on an ‘insubstantial compilation’ of press articles and websites of poor quality. It should be noted that the press articles come from sources of information of various origins, namely the websites of Svoboda, Kommersant, RBC, The Brussels Times, Rusbase, GlobeNewswire and Forbes. In addition, the Council produces screenshots from EuroChem Group’s website and SUEK’s website (Exhibits 7 and 8 of the first WK file, respectively) and from the website of Cbonds, a world-renowned data platform (Exhibits 3 and 5 of the second WK file), and of Tadviser (Exhibits 6 and 7 of the second WK file). The applicant’s argument must therefore be rejected. 87 Thus, in the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant has not demonstrated that the evidence at issue was unreliable. The application of the association criterion to the applicant 88 The applicant, supported by EuroChem Group and SUEK, disputes the merits of the inclusion and maintenance of her name on the lists at issue – which relate to the association criterion – on the ground that she cannot be regarded as ‘associated’ with her husband. 89 In essence, first, the applicant claims that, since she is not involved in her husband’s business activities, she is unable to take position on whether he is a leading businessperson within the meaning of the criterion referred to in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. However, as she is convinced that the Council made an error of assessment by including her husband’s name on the lists at issue, she annexes to her application initiating proceedings the application submitted by her husband in Case T‑271/22 and states that she contests all the claims made against her husband and echoes the arguments contained in his application. Second, she submits that she cannot be regarded as being ‘associated’ with him, on the ground that there is no evidence of a commonality of interests between her and her husband and that a family tie alone is not sufficient. Third, she observes that neither her husband nor herself are owners or beneficial owners of the assets held by Firstline Trust. In addition, she states that she did not take any active steps to become a beneficiary thereof. Furthermore, she underlines that the fact that she became the beneficiary of Firstline Trust does not constitute a risk of circumvention of a restrictive measure imposed on her husband. In any event, the beneficiary of a trust does not enjoy any right to property. Fourth, the applicant states that she is not involved in any action or any policy relating to Ukraine and does not have ties to the Russian Government, which is required in order to apply the association criterion. 90 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 91 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, while the applicant disputes the measures to which her husband is subject, she does not, however, develop any argument in her application to substantiate her claims. She merely annexed to her application the application initiating proceedings lodged by her husband in Case T‑271/22, in which he seeks annulment of the measures concerning him. It must be borne in mind that the review carried out by the General Court in the present case can relate only to whether the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is well founded and cannot therefore call into question the legality of the decisions by which the Council included her husband’s name on those lists (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 May 2017, Barqawi v Council, T‑303/15, not published, EU:T:2017:328, paragraph 42, and of 18 May 2022, Foz v Council, T‑296/20, EU:T:2022:298, paragraph 115). 92 In the present case, as regards the links between the applicant and Mr Melnichenko, the grounds for listing refer, first, to the fact that the applicant is his wife and, second, to the fact that she takes advantage of the fortune of her husband and benefits from his wealth, having regard in particular to her status as a beneficiary of Firstline Trust, which indirectly manages the assets of EuroChem Group. 93 As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be stated that, between the date of adoption of the initial acts and that of the September 2022, March 2023 and April 2023 acts, the gravity of the situation in Ukraine persisted. Thus, in the present case, there is no need to make a distinction between those acts, since the verification of the information put forward in that part of the statement of reasons and in the evidence, which is contained in the first WK file and in the second WK file, relates, in essence, to the same factual circumstances. 94 As regards family ties, the applicant does not dispute that she is married to Mr Melnichenko. 95 So far as concerns an economic link, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the first WK file (Exhibit 11), that is to say, a letter sent by a law firm to a national authority of a Member State of the European Union, the applicant is the beneficiary of the trust set up in order to protect her husband’s fortune, namely Firstline Trust, which manages, through two companies established in Cyprus, the assets of EuroChem Group and SUEK, which were both set up by her husband. Following her husband’s relinquishment of his status as first beneficiary of that trust, the applicant became the beneficiary and the protector of Firstline Trust on 8 March 2022, that is to say, the day before her name was included on the lists at issue. In addition, as the applicant observes, on 7 May 2022, Firstline Trust’s trustee distributed to her a not insignificant shareholding in a company which holds a portfolio of majority shareholdings in EuroChem Group and SUEK. It follows that, as the Council maintains, in addition to being a beneficiary of the trust at issue, the applicant indirectly holds a significant shareholding in EuroChem Group and SUEK. 96 In the light of those circumstances, which are not called into question by the applicant, the Council was entitled to find, without making an error of assessment, first, that the applicant took advantage of Mr Melnichenko’s fortune and benefited from his wealth and, second, that the persons concerned, in addition to the family ties which bind them, were linked by common economic interests; those considerations justify the application of the association criterion in the present case. 97 It should be noted that, as beneficiary of the trust at issue, the applicant participated in a scheme designed to prevent the assets transferred by Mr Melnichenko to that trust from being frozen as a result of the application of the restrictive measures adopted against him (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2024, Ismailova v Council, T‑234/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:287, paragraph 146). Accordingly, the Council was entitled to find, without making an error of assessment, the existence of common interests between the applicant and her husband. 98 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicant. 99 In the first place, the applicant claims that the transfer of the status of beneficiary of Firstline Trust cannot be regarded as a commercial transaction, since neither she nor her husband were the owners of the assets held in Firstline Trust at the time their names were included on the lists at issue. In her view, the legal opinions produced support the conclusion that the beneficiary of a trust does not enjoy the right of ownership or control of the assets held by the trust. She infers therefrom that the present case must be distinguished from the situation at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 8 May 2024, Ismailova v Council (T‑234/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:287), in which the applicant and the person with whom she was associated could use the trust assets at the same time. 100 In that regard, it should be noted that the use of trusts and intermediate companies for the management of assets does not have the effect of distancing the common interest linking persons and covering those assets (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 May 2024, Ismailova v Council, T‑234/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:287, paragraph 151). In the present case, the fact that the shares in EuroChem Group and SUEK are indirectly managed by the trust which was set up in order to protect Mr Melnichenko’s fortune and in relation to which the applicant obtained the status of beneficiary, following Mr Melnichenko’s renunciation of that status, is sufficient to establish the existence of common interests for the purposes of the association criterion. 101 The applicant’s arguments based on the fact that the beneficiary of a trust does not have the right of ownership or control over the assets held by the trust, and on the fact that she and her husband could not use Firstline Trust assets at the same time, are not such as to call into question the existence of common interests for the purposes of the association criterion, which are demonstrated, to the requisite legal standard, by the applicant’s status as a beneficiary of the trust set up in order to protect her husband’s fortune, and also borne out by the fact that the trustee of Firstline Trust transferred to the applicant a not insignificant shareholding in a company managed by that trust. The evidence produced by the applicant shows at most that the fiduciary ownership of the assets is formally transferred to the trust administrator, which does not alter the fact that the applicant is a beneficiary of the trust set up in order to protect her husband’s fortune, which shows that, economically, she is linked to the latter by common interests. That link is borne out by the fact that on 7 May 2022 a transfer of the assets managed by the trust was made in favour of the applicant and thus she indirectly holds a significant shareholding in EuroChem Group and SUEK. 102 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the association criterion fails to have regard to the requirement that a sufficient link must be established between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 63 above, that criterion does not require the person covered by that criterion to have a link with the reasons justifying the inclusion on the lists in question of the person’s name with which it is considered to be associated or, more generally, with the situation in Ukraine. Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraph 69 above, the applicant cannot claim that the Council is required to establish specifically a risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures in order to justify reliance on that criterion. 103 Having regard to the foregoing, the first plea in law must be rejected. The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights 104 The applicant claims that the inclusion of her name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified, arbitrary and disproportionate limitation of her fundamental rights, which include, inter alia, the right to respect for private and family life, home and communications, and the right to property. In addition, the applicant questions the proportionality of the restrictions on her freedom of movement and that of her minor children, all of whom are citizens of the European Union, and of her husband, a national of Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Last, she takes the view that none of the interferences referred to are legitimate under Article 52(1) of the Charter. 105 Furthermore, the applicant, supported by EuroChem Group and SUEK, adds that, since she has never had any link with Russian decision-makers, imposing restrictive measures on her in no way contributes to attaining the objectives of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, which consist in exerting pressure on the Russian authorities, and runs counter to the European Union’s policy of guaranteeing global food security. Maintaining those restrictive measures in relation to her is therefore neither necessary nor appropriate. 106 The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 107 It should be recalled that the right to respect for private and family life, home and communications, the right to property and the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States are enshrined in Articles 7, 17 and 45 of the Charter, respectively. 108 As regards, in the first place, the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter, in the present case, the restrictive measures at issue constitute protective measures, which are not intended to deprive the persons concerned of their right to property and their right to respect for private and family life, home and communications. However, with the exception of the right to respect for communications for which a limitation has not been demonstrated, the measures in question undeniably entail a limitation of those fundamental rights in the present case (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited). 109 However, according to settled case-law, the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). 110 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 111 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, it must respect the essence of those rights. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 145 and 222 and the case-law cited). 112 It is clear that those four conditions are satisfied in the present case. 113 First, it must be noted that the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of her right to respect for her private and family life, and home, and her right to property are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts which are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 114 Second, given that the contested acts apply for six months and are kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the limitations referred to in paragraph 113 above are temporary and reversible. Therefore, it must be held that they do not infringe the essence of her right to respect for private and family life, and home, and her right to property. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting exemptions to the restrictive measures applied. In particular, with regard to the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisations to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 115 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 113 above are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 116 Fourth, with regard to the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that, as a general principle of EU law, this requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 117 So far as concerns the appropriateness of the limitations referred to in paragraph 113 above, it must be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest which are as fundamental to the international community as those covered by the contested acts, those limitations cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate. Furthermore, as regards their necessity, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued. Moreover, the restrictions are temporary and reversible and provide for possible exemptions. Therefore, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in view of the importance of the objective pursued by those acts. 118 Moreover, as regards the applicant’s argument that the limitations referred to in paragraph 113 above are not proportionate because of the risks they pose to global food security, that argument must be rejected as ineffective because it has no connection with the applicant’s right to property or with her right to respect for private and family life, and home. 119 It follows that the limitations referred to in paragraph 113 above are not disproportionate in relation to the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures. 120 As regards, in the second place, the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of her right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, it must be noted that in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof, the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. As is apparent from the Explanations relating to the [Charter] (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed by Article 45(1) of the Charter is the same right as that guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The scope of that right is described further in Article 21 TFEU. 121 It should be noted that, according to Article 21(1) TFEU, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. That reservation, formulated in the second part of Article 21(1) TFEU, referring to the Treaties, in the plural, also includes the EU Treaty and the measures adopted to give it effect. It follows that limitations on the exercise of the right to freedom of movement and of residence of Union citizens enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter may, in the field of the CFSP, be imposed by acts which are adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, such as the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 195 and 196, and of 4 December 2015, Sarafraz v Council, T‑273/13, not published, EU:T:2015:939, paragraphs 194 and 195). 122 However, as recalled in paragraph 111 above, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 52(1) thereof, namely: be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. That also applies to the rights recognised by the Charter which are the subject of provisions in the Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, C‑452/20, EU:C:2021:855, point 60). Therefore, the limitations on the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, imposed in the context of the implementation of the CFSP, must satisfy those conditions. 123 In the present case, first, the limitations on the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States resulting from the contested acts are ‘provided for by law’ since they are set out in acts which are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 124 Second, as regards the question whether the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, regard must be had to the nature and scope of the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 153). 125 In that connection, it must be held that the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. First of all, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, those limitations comply with the principle of international law according to which a State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there. Next, under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that the names of persons who no longer meet the listing criteria are removed from the lists. Last, those limitations do not call into question that right as such, since they have the effect of temporarily suspending, under specific conditions and on account of their individual situation, the right of certain persons to move freely within the territory of the Member States, provided that those conditions continue to be satisfied (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 48). 126 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above relate to the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 115 above. 127 Fourth, as regards the appropriateness of the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above, it should be noted that they are suitable for the purpose of meeting the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 115 above, in that they contribute to its attainment. 128 As regards the necessity of the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Council was entitled to consider adopting measures which were less restrictive but just as appropriate as those provided for. Furthermore, the application of the restrictive measures at issue is subject to the exemption mechanism referred to in Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, which authorises the Member States to grant exemptions from the measures imposed, inter alia, where a person’s travel is justified on grounds of urgent humanitarian need. 129 Moreover, while recognising the negative consequences for the applicant, as described by her, which result from the application of the restrictive measures at issue, it must be held that, in the light of the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures, the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above are not manifestly disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 130 Furthermore, the applicant has not put forward any specific evidence to substantiate the alleged seriousness of the negative consequences flowing from the application of the restrictive measures at issue. In so far as she refers to the impossibility of going to the family residence in Switzerland, that factor is not relevant in the context of the analysis of her argument alleging infringement of her right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. 131 It follows that the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above comply with the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 132 As regards the applicant’s argument that the application by analogy of the judgment of 19 October 2004, Zhu and Chen (C‑200/02, EU:C:2004:639, paragraph 46), confers on her, under Article 21 TFEU, the derived right to reside in a Member State, where that is necessary in order to ensure enjoyment of the right of residence of her young children, who are Union citizens, it should be noted that the considerations drawn from that judgment cannot be transposed to the present case, given that the applicant, as a Union citizen, has the autonomous right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Such a right is not absolute and it is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the limitation of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States is considered to be justified. 133 Furthermore, in so far as the applicant refers to the derived right of her husband, a third-country national, to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, that argument must also be rejected as ineffective since it is not capable to demonstrate infringement of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. 134 As regards the applicant’s reference to the right of her minor children to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, it must be borne in mind that Article 24(2) of the Charter provides that, in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 135 In the present case, it should be noted, first, that the applicant stated, in her written pleadings and at the hearing, that she was not claiming infringement of her children’s autonomous right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Second, in so far as the applicant refers to the situation of her children in order to demonstrate the allegedly disproportionate nature of the limitation on her own right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, it should be noted that that argument is not substantiated. The applicant merely claims that the restrictive measures imposed on her would oblige her children to leave the territory of the Member States. Furthermore, when questioned on that point at the hearing, she merely stated in general terms that the members of her family are prevented from living together at their homes in the European Union and in Switzerland, and referred to the disruption to her children’s relationship with their grandparents living in Europe and to their education being put on hold. It should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue, first, do not cover the applicant’s children and, second, do not restrict the applicant’s right to enter and reside freely in the territory of the Member State of the European Union of which she is a national. Therefore, the applicant is wrong to claim that, as a result of those measures, her children are forced into leaving that territory. Moreover, it should be recalled that Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures at issue, inter alia, where a person’s travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, and that provision is to be interpreted and applied, in the light of Article 24(2) of the Charter, taking into account the best interests of the child. 136 In the light of all of the foregoing, the third plea in law must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 137 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 138 Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, Member States which intervene in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Kingdom of Belgium must therefore bear its own costs. 139 Last, according to Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order an intervener other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof to bear his or her own costs. In the present case, EuroChem Group and SUEK must each bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Ms Aleksandra Melnichenko to pay the costs; 3. Orders EuroChem Group AG, Siberian Coal Energy Company AO (SUEK) and the Kingdom of Belgium to bear their own costs. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 February 2025. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.