Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:363
Date: 2025-05-15
Language of the case: German

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Translation C-428/23 – 1 
Case C-428/23 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
11 July 2023 
Referring court: 
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
13 June 2023 
Applicant, appellant on a point of law and respondent in the appeal on a 
point of law: 
ROGON GmbH & Co. KG 
MVI Management GmbH 
DC 
Defendant, respondent in the appeal on a point of law and appellant on a 
point of law: 
Deutscher Fußballbund e. V. (DFB) 
  
[…] 
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF (FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE, GERMANY) 
ORDER 
[…] 
In the case of 
1. ROGON GmbH & Co. KG, […] Frankenthal, 
EN 
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2. MVI Management GmbH, […] Mondsee (Austria), 
3. DC, […], 
Applicant, appellant on a point of law and respondent in the appeal on a point of 
law, 
[…] 
v 
Deutscher Fußballbund e. V. (DFB), […] Frankfurt am Main, 
Defendant, respondent in the appeal on a point of law and appellant on a point of 
law 
[…] 
Following the hearing held on 28 February 2023, the Cartel Panel of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) […] 
ordered: 
The proceedings are stayed. 
The following questions on the interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU are 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary 
ruling: 
1. Do the principles developed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in the judgments in ‘Wouters’ (of 19 February 2002 – 
C-309/99) and ‘Meca Medina’ (of 18 July 2006 – C-519/04 P), 
according to which, when applying the rule prohibiting cartels, 
– account must be taken of the overall context in which the decision in 
question was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its 
objectives, 
– and according to which it has then to be considered whether the 
decision’s consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent 
in the pursuit of those objectives, 
– and whether they are proportionate to those objectives (‘the Meca 
Medina test’), 
apply to the regulations of a sports association, which are addressed to 
members of the association and regulate the use of services of 
undertakings outside the association on a market upstream of the 
association’s activities? 
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2. If question 1 is answered in the affirmative: in that case, must the 
Meca Medina test be applied to all the provisions of those regulations, 
or does its application depend on substantive criteria, such as the 
proximity or remoteness of the individual rule to the sporting activity 
of the association? 
Grounds: 
1 I. The parties disagree over claims for injunctive relief under cartel law in 
connection with a set of regulations issued by the defendant governing the 
activities of players’ agents (Reglement für die Spielervermittlung; ‘the RfSV’). 
2 The first applicant is one of the leading consultancy firms for young talents and 
professional footballers in Germany. Its activities include, among other things, 
providing advice in connection with transfers and contract extensions of 
professional football players. Its founder and managing director is the third 
applicant. The second applicant is a legal person under Austrian law whose 
business activities are also aimed at the activities of players’ agents. Players’ 
agents can be engaged both by players who are looking for a club and by clubs 
wishing to let a player go (outward transfer) or to recruit a player (inward 
transfer). 
3 The defendant is the umbrella organisation of 27 German football associations 
with approximately 25 000 clubs and more than 7 million members. In 
organisational terms, it is integrated into a pyramid of associations under the 
umbrella of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA). 
4 Pursuant to Paragraph 16a of the defendant’s statutes, matches in the top two 
professional leagues (Bundesliga (Federal Football League) and 2. Bundesliga 
(2nd Federal Football League)) are operated by the Deutsche Fußball Liga 
(German Football League; ‘DFL e. V.’). DFL e. V. is an association of the clubs 
of the top two German professional leagues. Matches in the 3rd league, which is 
also a professional league, are operated by the defendant itself. Other leagues are 
organised by the regional football associations. As ordinary members of DFL e. 
V., clubs participating in Bundesliga or 2nd Bundesliga matches are bound by the 
defendant’s statutes and the binding regulations. In order to be eligible to play in 
the Bundesliga or 2nd Bundesliga, players must sign a licence agreement with 
DFL e. V., which also obliges them to comply with association rules. As a 
member of FIFA, the defendant is subject to its regulations and is under an 
obligation to implement FIFA’s decisions. 
5 In the wake of FIFA’s adoption of regulations on working with players’ agents, 
the defendant adopted the RfSV, which entered into force on 1 April 2015. It is 
addressed to clubs and players who are obliged to comply with the defendant’s 
regulations. It governs the use by players and clubs of the services of an agent for 
the conclusion of professional player contracts and transfer agreements. Among 
other things, it 
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– imposes a registration obligation on agents, Paragraphs 2(3) and 3(2) 
and (3) of the RfSV (‘registration obligation’); 
– requires the production of an agent’s declaration, which provides for 
the agent’s submission to various statutes, regulations and rules of 
FIFA, the defendant and DFL e. V., including submission to the 
association’s jurisdiction, Paragraph 2(2) and Paragraph 3(2) and (3) of 
the RfSV and Annexes 1 and 2 (‘submission obligation’); 
– imposes the additional obligation of a natural person when registering 
legal persons, Annex 2 of the RfSV (‘additional obligation for legal 
persons’); 
– prohibits the agent, in the case of an inward transfer, from sharing in 
future transfer proceeds of the club, Paragraph 7(3) of the RfSV 
(‘prohibition of commission for subsequent transfers’); 
– prohibits commission for agent services in respect of minors, 
Paragraph 7(7) of the RfSV; 
– imposes an obligation to disclose fees paid and payments made to 
agents, Paragraph 6(1) of the RfSV (‘disclosure obligation’). 
6 Breaches of the regulations can be sanctioned as unsportsmanlike conduct 
(Paragraph 9 of the RfSV). The annex to the regulations contains standard forms 
for the required agent’s declaration. 
7 DFL GmbH, a wholly owned subsidiary of DFL e. V., sent Circular No 62 to the 
managers of the clubs and companies of the Bundesliga and the 2nd Bundesliga 
on 12 January 2018 to inform them, inter alia, about outward transfer agreements. 
The Circular stated that a one-off lump-sum payment or a fee in instalments could 
be agreed in relation to the transfer fee achieved for the outward transfer service 
with the proviso, however, that it should not amount to a percentage share (‘fee 
calculation in accordance with Circular No 62’). 
8 By their requests for injunctive relief, the applicants object to the registration 
obligation (application 1), the submission obligation (application 2), the additional 
obligation for legal persons (application 3), the prohibition of commission for 
subsequent transfers (application 4), the fee calculation in accordance with 
Circular No 62 (applications 5 and 5a), the prohibition of commission for agent 
services in respect of minors (application 6) and the disclosure obligation 
(application 7). They primarily invoke the prohibition of cartels. 
9 The Landgericht (Regional Court, Germany) allowed the claims in part. It ordered 
the defendant to cease and desist in accordance with application 2, to the extent 
that the agents are required to submit to the association jurisdiction of FIFA and 
the DFB for the punishment of infringements, and in accordance with application 
3. It dismissed the other claims. 
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10 On appeal by the applicants, the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, 
Germany) allowed other claims on the merits. It ordered the defendant to refrain 
from registering agents only if they submit to the regulations of FIFA, the 
defendant and DFL e. V. relating to the exercise of the agent’s activity 
(application 2). It also ordered the defendant to refrain from instructing DFL e. V. 
or another contractor to operate matches in a football league and thereby to allow 
the contractor to restrict clubs in their ability to agree on formulae for the 
calculation of commission on the basis of a percentage of the proceeds of 
subsequent transfers (application 5a). It dismissed the defendant’s appeal in other 
respects and the defendant’s cross-appeal. 
11 By the appeals on points of law, for which leave was granted by the 
Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court), the applicants continue to pursue 
their further applications for injunctive relief and the defendant continues to 
pursue its application for dismissal of the action. 
12 II. The decision on the appeal on points of law is determined by provisions of the 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (German Law against restrictions of 
competition; ‘GWB’), which read as follows: 
Paragraph 33 Claim for injunctive relief and rectification 
(1) Whoever infringes a provision of this Part or Article 101 or Article 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (infringer) or 
whoever infringes a decision issued by the competition authority shall 
be obliged to the person affected to rectify the harm caused by the 
infringement and, where there is a risk of recurrence, to desist from 
further infringements. 
(2) (…) 
(3) Affected persons are competitors or other market participants impaired 
by the infringement. 
(4) (…) 
13 III. The success of the appeal on points of law depends on the questions referred. 
For that reason, prior to a decision, the proceedings must be stayed and a 
preliminary ruling obtained from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
pursuant to point (b) of the first paragraph, and the third paragraph, of Article 267 
TFEU (see, on the FIFA Football Agent Regulations: Landgericht Mainz 
(Regional Court Mainz, Germany), order for reference of 30 March 2023 – 9 O 
129/21). 
14 The court of appeal (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt a.M. [(Higher Regional Court, 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany)] WuW 2022, 99) stated that the regulations should 
be measured against Article 101(1) TFEU, citing the following reasons. They led 
to a restriction of competition on the market for players’ agent services that was 
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appreciable and relevant to the internal market. As a set of sporting rules, 
however, the regulations had to be examined for compatibility with the prohibition 
of cartels in accordance with the requirements of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (judgment of 18 July 2006 – C-519/04 P, […] Meca Medina). To 
determine the applicability of those principles restricting the prohibition of cartels, 
it was necessary to ascertain whether the restrictions of competition associated 
with the rules of the RfSV were connected with the sporting objective claimed by 
the defendant. That was the position in the present case. The RfSV was a set of 
sporting rules within the meaning of that case-law. According to its statutes, the 
defendant was tasked with ensuring sporting competition in football; the rules of 
the RfSV also served that purpose. In order to ensure fair sporting competition, 
the RfSV was intended to lay down the conditions for the recruitment and 
engagement of athletes. The activity of players’ agents significantly influenced the 
composition of the teams, their continuity and their sporting strength; it was thus 
directly linked to sporting competition. The activities of players’ agents had an 
influence on fair competitions and the performance and health of the athletes. The 
regulations were intended to avoid dependencies between players’ agents, players 
and clubs. Such dependencies could jeopardise the integrity and fairness of 
competitions and the sport. In the past, players and clubs had in some cases been 
harmed financially and professionally by practices of players’ agents that might 
have consequences under criminal law. 
15 The contested rules would therefore have to be examined in detail on the basis of 
the principles established in the ‘Meca Medina’ decision. Irrespective of the 
general objective, it was necessary to examine with regard to each of the 
regulations at issue whether it related to the legitimate objective, whether there 
was an inseparable link between the pursuit of the legitimate objective and the 
restriction of competition and whether the measure was proportionate. 
16 On that basis, the regulations which were challenged in applications 1, 4, 6 and 7 
for injunctive relief, concerning the registration obligation, the prohibition of a 
share in subsequent transfer proceeds, the prohibition of commission for agent 
services in respect of minors and the disclosure of all payments to the defendant 
did not infringe Article 101 TFEU. By contrast, the submission obligation 
challenged by application 2 for injunctive relief and the provision challenged by 
application 3 for injunctive relief, according to which legal persons must, when 
submitting the agent’s declaration, simultaneously submit a further agent’s 
declaration by a private person, did fall under the prohibition of Article 101 
TFEU. Application 5 for injunctive relief was unfounded. The contested circulars 
were not attributable to the defendant. Subsidiary application 5a, however, was 
well founded. The defendant had a monitoring obligation vis-à-vis DFL GmbH. 
17 2. The applicants’ appeal against that decision will be successful if the applicants 
are entitled to injunctive relief against the defendant under Paragraph 33(1) of the 
GWB) and Article 101(1) TFEU in respect of the provisions of the RfSV 
challenged by applications 1, 4, 6 and 7. The requirements of Article 101(1) 
TFEU are met (see (a) below). On the basis of the first-instance court’s findings of 
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fact, the conditions for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU are not satisfied 
(see (b) below). The question arises whether, taking into account the overall 
context in which the regulations produce their effects and their objective, a 
restriction of the requirements of Article 101(1) TFEU is possible. That cannot be 
answered conclusively on the basis of the previous case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (see (c) below). The decision therefore depends on 
the answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling (see (d) below). 
18 a) Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits as incompatible with the internal market inter 
alia decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the internal market. It is an unwritten 
requirement that both the restriction of competition and the effect on interstate 
trade must be appreciable. Whoever infringes the prohibition is obliged to cease 
and desist pursuant to Paragraph 33(1) of the GWB. 
19 aa) The defendant, as an association of undertakings, is an addressee of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Among other things, the defendant groups together the 
football clubs belonging to the German professional leagues. For them, football is 
first and foremost an economic activity. The fact that that economic activity is 
connected with sport does not change the status of the defendant as an undertaking 
(see CJEU, judgment of 1 July 2008, C-49/07, […] paragraph 22 – MOTOE). The 
fact that the defendant is a grouping of amateur clubs, alongside professional 
clubs, is not capable of calling that assessment into question (see, in relation to 
FIFA: General Court, judgment of 26 January 2005 – T-193/02, […], 
paragraphs 69 to 72 – Piau). The rules of the defendant at issue here, which 
concern the use of a regularly paid upstream service, that of arranging the transfer 
and placement of athletes, also constitute an economic activity. The RfSV must be 
regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings (see, in that regard, the 
fundamental principles in: CJEU, judgment of 27 January 1987 – 45/85, […] 
paragraphs 29 to 32 – Feuerversicherung; General Court, […] paragraph 75 – 
Piau). As is clear from Paragraph 1(1) of the RfSV, by laying down those 
regulations, the defendant wishes to coordinate the conduct of its members in a 
specific market, namely with regard to the activities of players’ agents in 
concluding professional players’ contracts and in transfer agreements. 
20 bb) The rules of the RfSV challenged here also lead to an appreciable restriction 
of competition on the market for players’ agent services. 
21 (1) While the rules are not directly aimed at players’ agents but at clubs and 
players who, as users of the agent’s services, belong to the opposite side of the 
market, they do, however, have the effect of restricting the freedom of choice of 
the players, clubs and undertakings involved, which at the same time affects the 
players’ agents’ economic freedom to act. 
The latter must align their conduct with the provisions laid down in the 
regulations in order to be able to operate on the market for agents’ services. 
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Otherwise, they run the risk that – under the pressure of being sanctioned by the 
defendant (Paragraph 9 of the RfSV) – players and clubs will stop using them as 
players’ agents. 
22 (2) The restriction of competition is also appreciable. As has been set out above, 
all clubs and players that operate in Germany and use players’ agent services are 
bound by the regulations. Realistic market opportunities in Germany therefore 
exist only for agents who comply with the contested regulations on the registration 
obligation (Paragraph 2(3), Paragraph 3(2) and (3)), on the fee structure 
(Paragraph 7(3) and (7)) and on the disclosure of payments (Paragraph 6(1)). That 
is not precluded by the clarification under Paragraph 1(4) of the RfSV, according 
to which professional player contracts and transfer agreements remain valid even 
in the event of non-compliance with the provisions of the regulations. 
23 (3) The rules of the RfSV are also capable of impairing trade between the Member 
States. As has been set out above, all clubs and players operating in Germany are 
bound by the regulations in their capacity as users of players’ agent services, 
which means that all players’ agents operating in Germany are also restricted by 
the regulations. Although they only apply to the entire German market, the rules 
constitute a barrier to market entry for foreign players’ agents who are not subject 
to the same restrictions in their home countries. In addition, a large number of 
brokered player transfers have a foreign connection in cases that concern a 
transfer to or from the Bundesliga. The relevance for the internal market is 
therefore beyond question. 
24 b) The court of appeal did not examine whether the contested rules fulfil the 
exemption requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. On the basis of the findings of 
the appeal judgment, that cannot be assumed. 
25 c) It is therefore crucial for the outcome of the case to determine whether the 
requirements of Article 101(1) TFEU are restricted in accordance with the 
principles of the ‘Meca Medina’ decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, as the court of appeal has assumed. 
26 aa) According to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
restrictions of the prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU have only been 
recognised for specific types of cases (see CJEU, judgments of 19 February 
2002 – C-309/99, […] paragraph 97 et seq. – Wouters; of 28 February 2013 – 
C-1/12, […] paragraph 93 – OTOC; of 18 July 2013 – C-136/12, […] 
paragraphs 53 and 54 – Consiglio nazionale dei geologi; of 23 November 2017 – 
C-427/16 and C-428/16, […] paragraph 54 – CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria). According 
to those cases, not every decision of an association of undertakings which limits 
the parties’ freedom of action necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in 
Article 101(1) TFEU. The compatibility of such a decision with the EU rules on 
competition cannot be assessed in the abstract. Rather, when applying the 
prohibition of cartels, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in 
which the decision in question was taken or produces its effects and, more 
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specifically, of its objectives. It then has to be considered whether the 
consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives and are proportionate to them. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union has also applied those principles – taking into account the specific nature of 
sporting competition – in the field of rule-making by sports associations. It has 
ruled that a legitimate objective in the aforementioned sense can also be pursued 
by a set of sporting rules in so far as – like doping control rules – they are inherent 
in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and their very purpose 
is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes (‘Meca Medina test’: CJEU, […] 
paragraphs 43, 45 – Meca Medina). 
27 bb) The facts of the present case differ from previous cases in which the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has considered a restriction of the prohibition in 
respect of decisions of associations of undertakings. The decisions in ‘Wouters’, 
‘OTOC’, ‘CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria’ and ‘Consiglio nazionale dei geologi’ each 
concerned professional regulations of professional representative bodies formed 
on a statutory basis, which had rule-making competence for their field (see CJEU, 
[…] paragraphs 44, 62 – Wouters; […] paragraphs 48 and 49 – OTOC; […] 
paragraphs 5, 43 and 44 – Consiglio nazionale dei geologi; […] paragraphs 21, 
48 – CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria). The decision in ‘Meca Medina’ was based on anti-
doping regulations of the International Olympic Committee and a swimming 
federation (see CJEU, […] paragraphs 27 and 28 – Meca Medina). Those 
regulations directly concerned the sporting activities of the athletes and the fair 
conduct of competitions, i.e. the market for the organisation of sporting 
competitions. They thus fell within the ambit of the autonomy of associations, 
which allows associations to self-regulate their internal affairs (Article 12(1) of 
the Charter, Article 11(1) of the ECHR, Article 9(1) of the Grundgesetz (German 
Basic Law)). Although the regulations at issue here are also addressed to clubs 
and players, namely to the defendant’s association members, they also concern 
players’ agents who are not members of the defendant. The regulations therefore 
have an effect on a third market upstream of the sporting activity, in which the 
clubs and players are only involved as users of the players’ agent service. 
Restrictions of third parties in competition cannot be justified solely on the basis 
of the association’s autonomy. The private-law relationships of an association or 
its members with other private-law entities must be assessed in the same way as 
corresponding relationships of non-associated persons (see, in that regard, 
BVerfG, decision of 12 October 1995 -1 BvR 1938/93, NJW 1996, 1203 
paragraph 9). 
28 cc) Whether, in cases such as those, a regulation that appreciably restricts the 
economic freedom of action of non-associated market participants can be 
exempted from the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU by applying the Meca 
Medina test cannot be clearly inferred from the case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. Different views are expressed in that regard. 
29 (1) According to one view, the principles developed by the Court of Justice inter 
alia in the ‘Wouters’ and ‘Meca Medina’ decisions are not applicable in cases 
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such as the present one. On that view, those principles should apply only if the 
regulations pursue purely sporting or at least ‘sport-specific’ objectives […] 
[references]. That is said to be supported by the fact that in ‘Meca Medina’ the 
Court of Justice pointed out that the limitation of possible actions through anti-
doping rules was ‘inherent’ in the proper conduct of competitive sport (CJEU, 
[…] paragraph 45 – Meca Medina). Furthermore, a power of sports associations to 
set rules with regard to commercial activity could indeed result from the specific 
characteristics of competitive sport (see in that regard: Opinion of the Advocate 
General of 15 December 2022 – C-333/21, […] point 91 – European Super 
League), the submission of the members to the associations’ statutes under private 
law and the legally recognised autonomy of the association. However, it is a 
different matter if conditions for markets are imposed that do not directly concern 
the competitive sport itself and if the regulated activity concerns undertakings that 
are not members of the sports association and are therefore unable to influence the 
content of those regulations. In that case, neither the specific characteristics of 
competitive sport nor the rule-making power conferred on associations by their 
members under private law justify refraining from applying Article 101(1) TFEU 
in accordance with the Meca Medina test of the Court of Justice […]. Otherwise, 
the prohibition of agreements restrictive of competition under Article 101(1) 
TFEU could cease to be enforceable. The second sentence of Article 165(2) TFEU 
does not change that conclusion. That provision would only allow the European 
Union to make recommendations and take legislative incentive measures in order 
to achieve its sport-related objective under Article 165(4) TFEU, but not to relax 
any cartel-related obligations […] [references]. Furthermore, it should be taken 
into account that only the democratically legitimised legislature is authorised to 
legitimately define overriding interests which are in conflict with Article 101(1) 
TFEU [references]. 
30 (2) According to another view, the applicability of the principles developed inter 
alia in ‘Wouters’ and ‘Meca Medina’ does not depend on whether the regulations 
of a sports association only concern the purely sports-related field of the 
association’s activities – in particular the markets for the organisation of sports 
competitions – or whether they have a direct impact on third markets. Rather, the 
principles apply if there is any factual connection at all between the association’s 
rules and the organisation and the proper conduct of a sporting competition. The 
only instance in which the Meca Medina principles do not apply is if the disputed 
rules pursue solely commercial goals (of the association) and no sport-related 
objectives whatsoever with regard to the specific sporting competition 
[references]. The autonomy of the association is not decisive in that context. 
Notwithstanding the above, a legitimate objective, which rules out the mandatory 
consequence of the prohibition under Article 101 TFEU, may be seen in the 
specific characteristics of sport, the ethical values of which are also among the 
declared objectives of the European Union under the second sentence of 
Article 165(2) TFEU [references]. That is also supported by the fact that in ‘Meca 
Medina’ the Court of Justice did not expressly refer to the autonomy of 
associations but made a general reference to the principles mentioned in 
‘Wouters’. It assumed that the compatibility of rules with the EU rules on 
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competition could not be assessed in the abstract, but that account had to be taken 
of the overall context in which the decision in question was taken or produced its 
effects (see CJEU, […] paragraph 42 – Meca Medina). The overall sporting 
context could also include regulations which are not of a purely sporting nature 
but concern the use of a service by members of the association which only 
indirectly affects the sporting activity. Moreover, the market for players’ agent 
services could not even exist without the organisation of professional football by 
the defendant, so that it is directly connected to the sporting activity, at least in 
that respect. 
31 dd) If the rules set by a sports association relating to a third market can be 
exempted from the application of Article 101(1) TFEU after an examination of 
their necessity and proportionality with regard to the regulatory objectives and if, 
therefore, question 1 should be answered in the affirmative, consideration would 
have to be given to not carrying out the assessment uniformly for the entire set of 
regulations issued by a sports association, but necessarily only for those 
regulations that are sufficiently closely related to the sporting activity of the 
association (question 2). An assessment as to whether there is a legitimate 
objective, whether the restrictive effects on competition are necessarily related to 
the pursuit of the stated objectives and whether they are proportionate with regard 
to those objectives would then only be possible and necessary with regard to those 
individual regulations. 
32 d) If it is assumed, in line with the court of appeal, that a legitimate objective 
within the meaning of ‘Meca Medina’ arises from the overall context of the 
regulations, the individual regulations challenged would have to be assessed as to 
whether they correspond to that general objective. As a second step of the 
assessment, it would be necessary to examine whether there is a necessary 
connection between the pursuit of the legitimate objective and the restriction of 
competition. In a third step, it would be necessary to examine whether the 
particular measure restrictive of competition is proportionate, i.e. capable of 
achieving the legitimate objective and necessary and appropriate for that purpose. 
When applying the Meca Medina test, at least part of the contested regulations 
could prove to be compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. 
33 If, on the other hand, the Meca Medina test is not applicable to sets of rules of the 
type at issue, which are connected only in a wider sense with the operation of 
matches organised by a sports association, a finding of infringement of 
Article 101(1) TFEU would have to be made in respect of all the contested 
regulations. 
[…]