Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2022:491
Date: 2022-06-21
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Grand Chamber
Subject matter: Asylum policy;Immigration and asylum policy;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Transport;Police cooperation;Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters;Fundamental rights;Data protection;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary C-817/19 - 1 
Case C-817/19 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
31 October 2019 
Referring court:  
Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
17 October 2019 
Applicant:  
ASBL ‘Ligue des droits humains’ 
  
I. The subject matter of the proceedings and the parties’ positions 
1 The Belgian legislature has enacted a Law of 25 December 2016 on processing of 
passenger data (Moniteur Belge of 25 January 2017; also referred to below as the 
‘PNR Law’), essentially to transpose: 
– Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime (also referred to below as ‘the PNR Directive’). 
– Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 ‘on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data’ (also referred to below as ‘the API Directive’). 
2 The PNR Law requires international passenger transport carriers in various sectors 
(air, rail, international road and sea), as well as tour operators, to transfer data on 
their passengers to a database managed by the SPF Intérieur (Ministry of the 
Interior, Belgium).  
3 To that end, the law creates a ‘passenger information unit’ within the SPF 
Intérieur (Articles 12 to 14), which is made up inter alia of seconded members of 
the police, State security, intelligence and security and customs services, and has 
EN 
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responsibility for collecting, retaining and processing the passenger data 
transmitted by the carriers and tour operators. 
4 The ‘passenger database’ includes reservation (‘API’) data and check-in and 
boarding (‘PNR’) data (Article 9).  
5 Those data are processed for purposes including detection, prosecution and 
execution of penalties in relation to criminal offences referred to in the law, as 
well as prevention of serious public security disturbances in the context of violent 
radicalisation and furthering the activities of the intelligence and security services, 
and are also processed with a view to improving border controls on individuals at 
external borders and combating illegal immigration (Article 8).  
6 The data may be processed in the course of advance assessment of passengers 
(before their departure or arrival) (Articles 24 to 26) or in the course of ad hoc 
searches (Article 27). 
7 The law provides for passenger data to be retained in the passenger database for a 
maximum period of five years from being entered (Articles 8 to 23).  
8 The ASBL (not-for-profit association) ‘Ligue des droits humains’ (Human Rights 
League) has raised objections to the following seven aspects of the law: 
– the provisions for implementation of the Law of 25 December 2016 
(Article 3(2) and Article 7(3)); 
– the concepts of ‘identity documents’ and ‘travel documents’ (Article 7(1) and 
(2)); 
– the data to which it relates (Articles 4 9° and 9); 
– the definition of ‘passenger’ (Article 4(10°)); 
– the purposes for which the PNR data are to be processed (Article 8); 
– the management of the passenger database and the processing of data in the 
context of advance assessment of passengers and ad hoc searches (Articles 12 
to 16, 24 to 27, and 50 and 51); 
– the period of time for which PNR data is retained (Article 18). 
9 It claims that there are irregularities in those aspects of the law and has brought an 
action for annulment before the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court, 
Belgium), in which it advances two pleas.  
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10 The first plea is essentially based on Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 1 
Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘the ECHR’).  
11 The Ligue des droits humains essentially maintains that the interference with the 
right to private life and the right to protection of personal data is unlawful in that it 
does not meet the tests of legality, necessity or proportionality. 
12 First, the PNR Law gives significant discretion to the executive, providing, 
contrary to the principle of legality, for it to define certain essential elements by 
way of Royal Decree. The principle of legality requires that such interference is 
provided for by law or, in the case of delegation to the King, that the essential 
elements are provided for by law in a sufficiently precise and detailed manner. 
Furthermore, the contested law does not pursue a legitimate objective. It provides 
for an advance assessment or pre-screening process which consists of an 
evaluation of the risk presented by the passengers before arrival in, transit through 
or departure from Belgium. 
13 The applicant goes on to dispute that the contested measures are necessary to 
achieve the objective of the law. 
It maintains that data matching, which would involve significantly less intrusion 
into private life than the creation of a database, would be equally capable of 
achieving the objective pursued. 
14 Finally, it argues that the contested law is disproportionate, in that the data is 
collected by the operators in an indiscriminate and generalised way, and 
transferred to the competent authorities to be stored for five years, without 
distinction, differentiation, limitation or exception by reference to the objective 
pursued. 
15 More specifically, the law does not conform to the principle of proportionality 
having regard (a) to its scope and the categories of data to which it relates, (b) to 
the data processing for which it provides, (c) to its purposes and (d) to the length 
of time for which the data is stored. 
16 First, the contested law defines the data to be collected in very broad terms, and 
those data clearly go beyond what is strictly necessary.  
 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1 (also referred to below as ‘the GDPR’). 
 
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17 The applicant observes that it seems — although the law is not clear — that the 
pre-screening is to be carried out within the central PIU database, using pre-
defined criteria as threat indicators. However, the PNR Law does not state either 
the precise nature of the databases to be used in the process of comparison, or how 
that process is to be carried out. Equally, it does not provide that the comparison is 
limited to databases operated for the purposes of combating terrorism and serious 
crime. 
18 The applicant also objects to the ad hoc searches for which the law provides 
without specifying what data is actually accessible.  
19 It also challenges the purposes for which the data is to be processed, which are 
significantly broader than those provided for by the PNR Directive and include 
combating illegal immigration, activities capable of amounting to a threat to the 
fundamental interests of the State, and ‘violent radicalisation’, which is only 
defined in a circular.  
20 Finally, the applicant objects to the period of five years for which the data is 
retained. The legislature has given no justification for opting for maximum period 
permitted by the PNR Directive, and the fact that it did so reveals the 
disproportionality of the measure. 
21 The Council of Ministers (which defends the law) submits principally that the first 
plea is inadmissible, in that it is based on a breach of Article 23 of the GDPR, 
when it is clear both from recital 19 of the GDPR and from Article 1 of the PNR 
Directive that processing of PNR data is not subject to the GDPR, but is a matter 
of judicial and police cooperation between Member States falling within Directive 
(EU) 2016/680. 2 
22 It also submits that there is no infringement of the principle of legality, as the law 
does lay down the essential elements of the measures for which it provides, and 
the terms in which it confers power on the King are sufficiently precise. 
Furthermore, the requirement of legality is to be understood in a practical sense, 
according to the European Court of Human Rights, such that regulatory acts are 
within the meaning of ‘law’ in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The PNR Law is intended to ensure public security, not only by enabling terrorist 
offences and certain serious crimes to be prosecuted, but also, through advance 
analysis of the data collected, by preventing the commission of such offences. The 
Court of Justice has recognised that those are legitimate objectives for the 
purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, both in its judgment of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland and 
 
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, p. 89) (‘Directive 2016/680’). 
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Others(C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238) and in Opinion 1/15 (EU-
Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592. 
23 The Council of Ministers submits that the contested measures are proportionate. 
24 As regards the creation of a ‘passenger’ database, the Council of Ministers 
observes that the applicant has merely asserted, and not demonstrated, that the 
objective pursued could have been achieved by data matching, and that this would 
have been less intrusive in terms of the right to respect for private life. It adds that 
data matching would not be sufficient for the advance assessments to be carried 
out in order to identify security risks. The creation of a database is also a way of 
addressing recital 25 of the PNR Directive, which states that the data should be 
retained for as long as is necessary having regard to the objectives pursued. 
25 As to the linking of the various databases, the Council of Ministers points out that 
Articles 24 and 25 of the PNR Law transpose Article 6 of the PNR Directive. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the preparatory work that the legislature did not 
intend the ‘passenger’ database to be linked to all the other databases to which the 
competent authorities have access, but only to those corresponding to the 
objectives pursued by the contested law. Those measures are in conformity with 
Opinion 1/15 of the Court of Justice, given that Article 6(3) of the PNR Directive 
similarly does not specify which databases are to be available for the purposes of 
comparison. Nor is the existence of a discretion incompatible with the principle of 
legality, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Moreover, the objective of the law could not be achieved if passengers knew, in 
advance, the criteria which would lead to a positive match, as they would then be 
able to adapt their behaviour accordingly. Article 16 of the contested law clearly 
states, furthermore, that the pre-screening is to be carried out within the 
‘passenger’ database, which is thus in conformity with the principle of legality. 
26 As regards the length of time for which the data is retained, the Council of 
Ministers considers that it is not unreasonable to provide for a retention period of 
five years, which, moreover, corresponds to the shortest limitation period 
applicable to public prosecutions for offences classified as being of intermediate 
seriousness, or treated as such despite a higher classification. 
Thus the retention period, which is in conformity with the period provided for by 
the PNR Directive, is in no way disproportionate. 
27 The second plea, which is advanced in the alternative, is based essentially on 
breach of Article 3(2) TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 45 of the Charter.  
28 The applicant submits that Article 3(1), Article 8(2) and Chapter 11 (containing 
Articles 28 to 31) of the PNR Law are contrary to the free movement of persons, 
in that they relate not only to extra-EU transport, but also to intra-EU transport 
(including scheduled stops). In other words, the applicant argues that by extending 
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the PNR system to intra-EU flights, the contested provisions indirectly re-
establish border controls which infringe the right of free movement of persons. 
29 The Council of Ministers submits that the contested law does not re-establish any 
border controls and is not contrary to the free movement of persons in any way. 
The PNR Directive does not apply to illegal immigration and it is not only that 
directive, but also the API Directive, which is transposed by the contested law. 
The plea, as formulated, relates only to Article 3 § 1, Article 8 § 2 and Chapter 11 
of the contested law. However, it follows from the definition of ‘external borders’ 
that the PNR Law is directed only to extra-EU controls. Furthermore, the PNR 
Law transposes Directive 2004/82/EC, and thus cannot be regarded as re-
establishing border controls within the Schengen area. 
Lastly and very much in the alternative, recital 10 of the PNR Directive expressly 
provides for the use of PNR data to be extended to intra-EU flights, which shows 
that the measure does not inherently contravene either freedom of movement or 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006. 
II. Legal background 
The European Convention on Human Rights  
30 Article 8 provides:  
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’  
European Union law 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
31 Article 7 of the Charter (‘Respect for private and family life’) provides: 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.’  
32 Article 8 of the Charter (‘Protection of personal data’) provides: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 
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2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning 
him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority’. 
33 Article 52(1) of the Charter provides: 
‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others.’  
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  
34 Article 2(2)(d) provides: 
‘2. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: 
… 
(d) by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
public security.’  
35 Article 23 provides: 
‘1. Union or Member State law to which the data controller or processor is subject 
may restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope of the obligations and rights 
provided for in Articles 12 to 22 and Article 34, as well as in Article 5 in so far as 
its provisions correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in Articles 12 
to 22, when such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to 
safeguard: 
(a) national security; 
(b) defence; 
(c) public security; 
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(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the 
prevention of threats to public security; 
(e) other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a 
Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the 
Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters, 
public health and social security; 
(f) the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings; 
(g) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of breaches of ethics 
for regulated professions; 
(h) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even 
occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the cases referred to in points 
(a) to (e) and (g); 
(i) the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others; 
(j) the enforcement of civil law claims. 
2. In particular, any legislative measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain 
specific provisions at least, where relevant, as to: 
(a) the purposes of the processing or categories of processing; 
(b) the categories of personal data; 
(c) the scope of the restrictions introduced; 
(d) the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer;  
(e) the specification of the controller or categories of controllers; 
(f) the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into account the 
nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing; 
(g) the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; and 
(h) the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless that 
may be prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction.’ 
The PNR Directive 
36 Article 3 reads as follows: 
‘For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions apply: 
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… 
(4) “passenger” means any person, including persons in transfer or transit and 
excluding members of the crew, carried or to be carried in an aircraft with the 
consent of the air carrier, such consent being manifested by that person’s 
registration in the passengers list’. 
37 Article 4 provides: 
‘Passenger Information Unit 
1. Each Member State shall establish or designate an authority competent for the 
prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences and of 
serious crime or a branch of such an authority, to act as its passenger information 
unit (‘PIU’). 
2. The PIU shall be responsible for: 
(a) collecting PNR data from air carriers, storing and processing those data and 
transferring those data or the result of processing them to the competent 
authorities referred to in Article 7; 
(b) exchanging both PNR data and the result of processing those data with the 
PIUs of other Member States and with Europol in accordance with Articles 9 and 
10’. 
…’. 
38 Article 6 provides:  
‘1. The PNR data transferred by the air carriers shall be collected by the PIU of 
the relevant Member State as provided for in Article 8. Where the PNR data 
transferred by air carriers include data other than those listed in Annex I, the PIU 
shall delete such data immediately and permanently upon receipt. 
2. The PIU shall process PNR data only for the following purposes: 
(a) carrying out an assessment of passengers prior to their scheduled arrival in 
or departure from the Member State to identify persons who require further 
examination by the competent authorities referred to in Article 7, and, where 
relevant, by Europol in accordance with Article 10, in view of the fact that such 
persons may be involved in a terrorist offence or serious crime; 
(b) responding, on a case-by-case basis, to a duly reasoned request based on 
sufficient grounds from the competent authorities to provide and process PNR 
data in specific cases for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating and 
prosecuting terrorist offences or serious crime, and to provide the competent 
authorities or, where appropriate, Europol with the results of such processing; and 
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(c) analysing PNR data for the purpose of updating or creating new criteria to 
be used in the assessments carried out under point (b) of paragraph 3 in order to 
identify any persons who may be involved in a terrorist offence or serious crime. 
… .’ 
39 Article 12 provides: 
‘1. Member States shall ensure that the PNR data provided by the air carriers to 
the PIU are retained in a database at the PIU for a period of five years after their 
transfer to the PIU of the Member State on whose territory the flight is landing or 
departing. 
2. Upon expiry of a period of six months after the transfer of the PNR data 
referred to in paragraph 1, all PNR data shall be depersonalised through masking 
out the following data elements which could serve to identify directly the 
passenger to whom the PNR data relate: 
(a) name(s), including the names of other passengers on the PNR and number of 
travellers on the PNR travelling together; 
(b) address and contact information; 
(c) all forms of payment information, including billing address, to the extent 
that it contains any information which could serve to identify directly the 
passenger to whom the PNR relate or any other persons; 
(d) frequent flyer information; 
(e) general remarks to the extent that they contain any information which could 
serve to identify directly the passenger to whom the PNR relate; and 
(f) any API data that have been collected. 
3. Upon expiry of the period of six months referred to in paragraph 2, 
disclosure of the full PNR data shall be permitted only where it is: 
(a) reasonably believed that it is necessary for the purposes referred to in point 
(b) of Article 6(2) and 
(b) approved by: 
(i) a judicial authority; or  
(ii) another national authority competent under national law to verify whether the 
conditions for disclosure are met, subject to informing the data protection officer 
of the PIU and to an ex-post review by that data protection officer.  
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4. Member States shall ensure that the PNR data are deleted permanently upon 
expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 1. This obligation shall be without 
prejudice to cases where specific PNR data have been transferred to a competent 
authority and are used in the context of specific cases for the purposes of 
preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting terrorist offences or serious 
crime, in which case the retention of such data by the competent authority shall be 
regulated by national law. 
5. The result of the processing referred to in point (a) of Article 6(2) shall be kept 
by the PIU only as long as necessary to inform the competent authorities and, in 
accordance with Article 9(1), to inform the PIUs of other Member States of a 
positive match. Where the result of automated processing has, further to 
individual review by non-automated means as referred to in Article 6(5), proven 
to be negative, it may, however, be stored so as to avoid future “false” positive 
matches for as long as the underlying data are not deleted under paragraph 4 of 
this Article.’  
40 Annex I to the PNR Directive, headed ‘Passenger name record data as far as 
collected by air carriers’, refers amongst other things to:  
‘… 
12. General remarks (including all available information on unaccompanied 
minors under 18 years, such as name and gender of the minor, age, language(s) 
spoken, name and contact details of guardian on departure and relationship to the 
minor, name and contact details of guardian on arrival and relationship to the 
minor, departure and arrival agent) 
… 
18. Any advance passenger information (API) data collected (including the type, 
number, country of issuance and expiry date of any identity document, nationality, 
family name, given name, gender, date of birth, airline, flight number, departure 
date, arrival date, departure port, arrival port, departure time and arrival time) 
…’. 
The API Directive 
41 Article 1 provides: 
‘This Directive aims at improving border controls and combating illegal 
immigration by the transmission of advance passenger data by carriers to the 
competent national authorities.’  
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Belgian law 
42 The relevant provisions of the PNR Law (as amended by the Laws of 15 and 
30 July 2018, and by the Law of 2 May 2019) are as follows: 
‘CHAPTER 2 Scope 
Art. 3 § 1 This law lays down the obligations of carriers and tour operators 
regarding the transfer of data relating to passengers travelling to or from Belgium, 
or transiting through Belgian territory.  
§ 2 The King shall prescribe, by decree deliberated in the Council of Ministers, in 
respect of each sector of the transport industry and in respect of tour operators, the 
passenger data to be transferred and how they are to be transferred, after an 
opinion has been given by the competent authority for the supervision of 
processing of personal data. … 
CHAPTER 3 Definitions 
Art. 4 ‘For the purposes of this law and its implementing decrees, the following 
definitions shall apply: 
…  
9° “PNR”: a record of each passenger’s travel requirements which contains the 
information referred to in Article 9, which is necessary to enable reservations to 
be processed and controlled by the booking and participating carriers and tour 
operators for each journey booked by or on behalf of any person, whether it is 
contained in reservation systems, departure control systems used to check 
passengers onto flights, or equivalent systems providing the same functionalities; 
10° “passenger”: any person, including persons in transfer or transit and excluding 
members of the crew, carried or to be carried by the carrier with its consent, such 
consent being manifested by that person’s registration in the passengers list; 
… 
CHAPTER 5 Purposes for which data may be processed 
Art. 8 § 1 Passenger data shall be processed for the purposes of: 
1° detection and prosecution (including the execution of penalties or measures 
depriving the person concerned of his liberty) of offences referred to [in the] 
Criminal Procedure Code;  
2° detection and prosecution (including the execution of penalties or measures 
depriving the person concerned of his liberty) of offences referred to [in the] 
Criminal Code; 
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3° prevention of serious disturbances to public security in the context of violent 
radicalisation, through monitoring of developments and groupings in accordance 
with Article 44/5 § 1 2° and 3° and Article 44/5 § 2 of the Law of 5 August 1992 
on the police service; 
4° furthering the activities referred to in Article 7 1° and 3°/l, and Article 11, § 1 
1° to 3° and 5°, of the Organic law of 30 November 1998 on the intelligence and 
security services; 
5° detection and prosecution of the offences referred to [in various laws]. 
§ 2 Subject to the conditions in Chapter 11, passenger data shall also be processed 
with a view to improving external border controls on individuals, and with a view 
to combating illegal immigration. 
CHAPTER 6 — Passenger data 
Art. 9 § 1 As regards booking information, passenger data may include but shall 
be limited to the following details: 
1° PNR record locator; 
2° date of reservation and issue of ticket; 
3° dates of intended travel; 
4° full name and date of birth; 
5° address and contact information (telephone number, email address); 
6° payment information, including billing address; 
7° complete travel itinerary for the relevant passenger; 
8° information on members of loyalty schemes (such as frequent flyer 
programmes); 
9° travel agency or agent; 
10° travel status of passenger, including confirmations, check-in status, no-show 
or go-show information; 
11° split or divided PNR information;  
12° general remarks (including all available information on unaccompanied 
minors under 18 years, such as name and gender of the minor, age, language(s) 
spoken, name and contact details of guardian on departure and relationship to the 
minor, name and contact details of guardian on arrival and relationship to the 
minor, departure and arrival agent); 
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13° ticketing field information, including ticket number, date of ticket issuance 
and one-way tickets, automated ticket fare quote fields; 
14° seat number and other seat information; 
15° code share information; 
16° all baggage information; 
17° number and other names of travellers on the PNR; 
18° any advance passenger information (API) data which has been collected, as 
itemised in § 2; 
19° all historical changes to the PNR listed in 1° to 18°. 
§ 2 As regards check-in and boarding information, the advance passenger 
information referred to in § 1, 18° comprises: 
1° type of travel document; 
2° document number; 
3° nationality; 
4° country of issue of document; 
5° expiry date of document; 
6° full name, gender and date of birth; 
7° carrier/tour operator; 
8° transport number; 
9° date of departure and of arrival; 
10° place of departure and of arrival; 
11° time of departure and of arrival;  
12° total number of passengers carried on that transport; 
13° seat number; 
14° PNR record locator; 
15° number of items of baggage, together with their weights and identification 
codes; 
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16° the border crossing point of entry into Belgian territory. 
… 
CHAPTER 7 The Passenger Information Unit 
Art. 12 A Passenger Information Unit is hereby created within the Service Public 
Fédéral Intérieur (Ministry of the Interior, Belgium). 
Art. 13 § 1 The PIU shall be responsible for: 
1° collecting passenger data from carrier and tour operators, retaining and 
processing those data, and managing the passenger database; 
2° exchanging both passenger data and the result of processing such data with the 
PIUs of other Member States of the European Union, with Europol, and with third 
States, in accordance with Chapter 12. 
§ 2 Without prejudice to other provisions of law, the PIU may not use the data 
retained pursuant to Chapter 9 for purposes other than those contemplated by 
Article 8. 
Art. 14 § 1 The PIU shall be made up of: 
1° an official … responsible for: 
(a) the organisation and functioning of the PIU; 
(b) monitoring compliance by carriers and tour operators with the obligations 
imposed on them by Chapter 4; 
(c) the management and operation of the passenger database; 
(d) processing of passenger data; 
(e) ensuring that the processing referred to in Chapter 10 is carried out in a 
lawful and regular manner; 
… .  
2° members seconded from the following … services: 
(a) the police services …; 
(b) the national security service …; 
(c) the general intelligence and security service …; 
(d) the customs and excise administration …; 
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… . 
CHAPTER 8 The passenger database 
Art. 15 § 1 A passenger database under the management of the Ministry of the 
Interior shall be established, in which passenger data shall be stored.  
… .  
§ 4 Processing of passenger data carried out pursuant to this law is subject to the 
data protection law. The competent authority for processing of personal data shall 
exercise the powers provided for in the law on protection of private life. …  
… 
CHAPTER 9 Retention period 
Art. 18 Passenger data shall be retained in the passenger database for a maximum 
period of five years from being entered. They shall be destroyed on expiry of that 
period. 
… 
CHAPTER 10 Processing of data 
Section I. Processing of passenger data in connection with the advance assessment 
of passengers 
Art. 24 § 1 Passenger data shall be processed with a view to carrying out an 
assessment of passengers prior to their scheduled arrival in, departure from, or 
transit through Belgian territory, in order to identify persons who require further 
examination. 
[methods of advance assessment]  
Art. 25 …  
§ 2 Assessment of passengers prior to arrival, transit or departure against pre-
determined criteria shall be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner. The pre-
determined criteria may not concern the identification of an individual and must 
be targeted, proportionate and specific. 
§ 3 They may not be based on data indicating a person’s race or ethnic origin, 
religion or philosophical beliefs, political opinions, trade union membership, 
health, sexual life or sexual orientation. 
… 
Section 2 — Processing of data in connection with ad hoc searches 
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Art. 27 Passenger data shall be used in carrying out ad hoc searches for the 
purposes contemplated by Article 8 § 1 1°, 2°, 4° and 5°, subject to the conditions 
laid down in Article 46 septies of the Criminal Procedure Code, Article 16/3 of 
the Organic law of 30 November 1998 on the intelligence and security services, 
and Article 281 § 4 of the General law on customs and excise duties, consolidated 
on 18 July 1977.  
CHAPTER 11 Processing of passenger data with a view to improving border 
controls and combating illegal immigration 
Art. 28 § 1 This Chapter applies to the processing of passenger data by the police 
services responsible for border control and by the foreign nationals bureau, carried 
out with a view to improving external border controls on individuals and 
combating illegal immigration. 
… 
Art. 29 § 1 …  
§ 2 Only [API] data relating to the following categories of passenger shall be 
transferred: 
1° passengers who intend to enter or have entered Belgian territory at an external 
border; 
2° passengers who intend to leave or have left Belgian territory at an external 
border; 
3° passengers who intend to pass through, are located in, or have passed through 
an international transit area situated in Belgium. 
§ 3 The passenger data referred to in § 2 shall be transferred to the police services 
referred to in Article 14, § 1 2° (a) immediately after they have been entered in the 
passenger database. The police services shall save those data in a temporary file 
and delete them within 24 hours of the transfer. 
§ 4 … the passenger data referred to in § 2 shall be transferred to the foreign 
nationals bureau immediately after they have been entered in the passenger 
database. The foreign nationals bureau shall save those data in a temporary file 
and delete them within 24 hours of the transfer. 
… . 
Art. 31 Within 24 hours of completion of the transport, as referred to in Article 4 
3° to 6°, the carriers and tour operators shall delete all the passenger data referred 
to in Article 9, § 1 18°, … . 
… 
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CHAPTER 15 Amending provisions 
Section I. Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code 
Art. 50 There shall be inserted, in the Criminal Procedure Code, an Article 46 
septies which shall read as follows: 
“Art 46 septies In detecting the offences referred to in Article 8 § 1 1°, 2° and 5° 
of the Law of 25 December 2016 on the processing of passenger data, the crown 
prosecutor may, by reasoned written decision, instruct the officer of judicial police 
to direct the PIU to transmit passenger data in accordance with Article 27 of the 
Law of 25 December 2016 on the processing of passenger data. 
… 
Section 2 Amendment of the Organic law of 30 November 1998 on the 
intelligence and security services 
Art. 51 There shall be inserted, in Chapter III, Section I, Sub-section 2 of the Law 
of 30 November 1998 on the intelligence and security services, an Article 16/3 
which shall read as follows: 
“Art. 16/3 § 1 The intelligence and security services may, for the better exercise of 
their functions, make a duly reasoned decision to access the passenger data 
referred to in Article 27 of the Law of 25 December 2016 on the processing of 
passenger data … ”. 
III. The assessment of the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) 
43 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) begins by stating that, in 
considering the action, it has taken account of the amendments to the Law of 
25 December 2016 which were made by the Laws of 15 and 30 July 2018 and the 
Law of 2 May 2019.  
44 It also narrows the scope of the action for annulment by determining that the first 
plea is directed only against Article 3 § 2, Article 4 9° and 10°, Articles 7 to 9, 
Articles 12 to 16, Article 18, Articles 24 to 27 and Articles 50 and 51 of the law, 
and that the second plea is directed against Article 3 § 1, Article 8 § 2, and 
Articles 28 to 31 of the law. 
1. Admissibility of the first plea: is Article 23 of the GDPR applicable to the 
PNR Law? 
45 The referring court observes that the protection conferred by the GDPR is based 
on Article 16(2) TFEU and that in principle, the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties is 
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governed not by the GDPR, but by Directive 2018/680. That directive lays down 
specific rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the 
prevention of threats to public security, respecting the specific nature of those 
activities. 
46 The PNR Law makes provision as to the collection and transfer of PNR data, the 
creation of a passenger database, managed by the PIU, the purposes for which that 
database may be used, and access to it. Essentially it transposes the PNR 
Directive, but its content goes beyond transposition of that directive. 
47 Making reference to Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017 
(EU:C:2017:592), the referring court observes that provisions governing the 
collection, transfer and processing of PNR data may fall within the ambit of both 
data protection (Article 16 TFEU), and police cooperation (Article 87 TFEU). 
It also points out that recital 5 of the PNR Directive states that the objectives of 
that directive are ‘inter alia, to ensure security, to protect the life and safety of 
persons, and to create a legal framework for the protection of PNR data with 
regard to their processing by competent authorities’. Recital 38 of the PNR 
Directive nevertheless indicates that the objectives of the directive are ‘the 
transfer of PNR data by air carriers and processing of those data for the purposes 
of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and 
serious crime’, which may give those objectives precedence over that of data 
protection. 
The referring court observes, furthermore, that national law does not exclude the 
PNR Law in its entirety from the scope of Article 23 of the GDPR. 
48 On that basis, the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) concludes that in 
order to determine whether the requirements of Article 23 of the GDPR apply to 
the PNR Law, which principally, though amongst other things, transposes the 
PNR Directive, it is necessary to refer a first question to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. 
2. Substance of the first plea 
The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) goes on to examine the plea on 
its merits, as regards the seven matters set out in paragraph 8 of this summary. It 
holds that the first two objections, relating to the ‘provisions for implementation’ 
of the law and the concepts of ‘identity documents’ and ‘travel documents’, are 
without foundation. It proceeds to examine the other five objections and expresses 
doubt as to the interpretation to be given to certain provisions of the PNR 
Directive, and, having regard to the Charter, as to their validity. 
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The data to which the PNR Law relates (Articles 4 9° and 9) 
49 The applicant submits that the very broad range of passenger data contemplated 
by Articles 4 9° and 9 of the PNR Law is manifestly disproportionate in the light 
of the objective pursued. It contends that the data in question may reveal sensitive 
information, such as membership of a trade union, personal affinities or personal 
or professional relationships. 
50 The referring court observes that interference by the public authorities with 
enjoyment of the right to respect for private life must not only be based on a 
legislative provision which is sufficiently precise, but must also be justified in a 
democratic society by a pressing social need, and proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. The legislature has a margin of appreciation in the matter but this 
has limits; in order for a legal standard to be compatible with the right to respect 
for private life, the legislature must have established a fair balance between all the 
relevant rights and interests.  
In its Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017 
(EU:C:2017:592), the Court observed that interference with the right to protection 
of personal data must be limited to what is ‘strictly necessary’ (see paragraphs 140 
and 141).  
51 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) observes that the objective of 
the PNR Law is to ensure public security by making provision for the transfer of 
passenger data, and the use of such data, in the context of efforts to combat 
terrorist offences and serious cross-border crime. Those are objectives of general 
interest capable of justifying interference with the right to respect to private life 
and the right to protection of personal data (judgment of 8 April 2014, Digital 
Rights Ireland and Others, C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238, 
paragraph 42). The Court of Justice has, moreover, confirmed that those 
objectives of general interest are capable of justifying the transfer and processing 
of passenger data (Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017, 
EU:C:2017:592, paragraphs 148 and 149). 
52 The referring court then considers whether the interference is sufficiently precise, 
proportionate, and limited to what is ‘strictly necessary’, having regard to the 
breadth of the data to which the PNR Law relates. 
The collection of passenger data envisaged by the PNR Law is subject to 
safeguards relating to the content of that data. The data are exhaustively defined in 
Article 9 of the PNR Law. They comprise information relating directly to the 
journey involving the transport which falls within the scope of the PNR Law — 
information which, in principle, is already available to the carriers and tour 
operators. Furthermore, the data reflect Annex I of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) guidelines. They are therefore relevant to the objectives 
pursued by the PNR Law. 
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Furthermore, Articles 10 and 11 of the PNR Law, which are not challenged, 
provide that passenger data may not relate to a person’s racial or ethnic origin, 
religious or philosophical convictions, political opinions, trade union membership, 
or data concerning his state of health, sexual life or sexual orientation. Where 
passenger data transferred by carriers and tour operators include data other than 
those enumerated in Article 9, or include data enumerated in Article 10, the PIU 
deletes those additional data permanently, upon receipt. These provisions ensure 
that sensitive data cannot, in principle, be collected or retained as ‘passenger 
data’. 
53 In Opinion 1/15 of the Court of Justice, of 26 July 2017, the Court also held, in 
relation to sensitive data, that ‘Articles 7, 8 and 21 and Article 52(1) of the 
Charter preclude both the transfer of sensitive data to Canada and the framework 
negotiated by the European Union with that non-member State of the conditions 
concerning the use and retention of such data by the authorities of that non-
member State’ (paragraph 167). 
That observation can be transposed to the present case. While there are safeguards 
attaching to the passenger data covered by the PNR Law, the question must 
nevertheless be asked as to whether those safeguards are sufficient, having regard 
to the breadth of the data in question. The data referred to in Article 9(1) of the 
PNR Law, which reproduces the list of data in Annex I of the PNR Directive, do 
cover a very broad range, over and above check-in and boarding data. In 
particular, they include the passenger’s complete itinerary, the travel agent, seat 
number, all baggage information, information relating to means of payment, 
including the billing address, and general remarks ‘including all available 
information on unaccompanied minors under 18 years’. 
In Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, the Court also observed that, ‘even if some of the 
PNR data, taken in isolation, does not appear to be liable to reveal important 
information about the private life of the persons concerned, the fact remains that, 
taken as a whole, the data may, inter alia, reveal a complete travel itinerary, 
travel habits, relationships existing between air passengers and the financial 
situation of air passengers, their dietary habits or state of health, and may even 
provide sensitive information about those passengers, as defined in Article 2(e) of 
the envisaged agreement’ (paragraph 128).  
In its Opinion of 19 August 2016 on the Data protection implications of the 
processing of Passenger Name Records (‘Opinion of 19 August 2016’), the 
Consultative Committee of Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (‘the 
Consultative Committee of Convention 108’) observed, equally, that ‘PNRs 
contain information that is needed to facilitate a passenger’s travel, and may 
include a number of sensitive data which could serve to indicate racial origin, 
political opinions or religious or other beliefs or data relating to a person’s 
health or sexual orientation, not only under certain ‘coded’ data but also under 
the open field containing general remarks (such as dietary or medical 
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requirements, or the fact that a political or religious association benefited from 
reduced fares for the travel of its members) which could lead to direct 
discrimination’ (Council of Europe, Opinion of 19 August 2016, T-
PD(2016)18rev, p. 7). 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has also remarked that PNR 
data ‘might include sensitive or special data under the heading “general 
remarks”’ (Opinion 1/2011 of the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights on the Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime (COM(2011) 32 final), 14 June 2011, p. 8; see also ibid., p. 13). 
54 In the light of their very wide scope, the data referred to in Article 9 of the PNR 
Law, while they may not literally contain sensitive data, may nevertheless 
indirectly reveal sensitive information which falls within the ambit of protection 
of personal data and respect for private life. Having regard to Opinion 1/15 of the 
Court of Justice, the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) wonders 
whether those data, which include the data listed in Annex I of the PNR Directive, 
go beyond what is ‘strictly necessary’ to achieve the objectives pursued by that 
directive. It accordingly decides to refer a second question to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. 
55 In Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, the Court also made the following observations, 
concerning the requirement for a clear and precise definition of the data 
contemplated by the draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on 
the transfer and processing of passenger data: 
‘156. In this connection, although the 19 PNR data headings set out in the Annex 
to the envisaged agreement correspond, according to the observations of the 
Commission, to Appendix 1 to the Guidelines of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) on PNR data, it should nonetheless be stated, as the 
Advocate General has observed in point 217 of his Opinion, that heading 5, which 
refers to “available frequent flyer and benefit information (free tickets, upgrades, 
etc.)”, and heading 7, which covers “all available contact information (including 
originator information)”, do not define in a sufficiently clear and precise manner 
the PNR data to be transferred. 
157. Thus, as regards heading 5, the use of the term “etc.” does not specify to the 
requisite standard the scope of the data to be transferred. Furthermore, it is not 
clear from the terms of that heading whether it covers information concerning 
merely the status of air passengers in customer loyalty programmes or whether, 
on the contrary, it covers all information relating to air travel and transactions 
carried out in the context of such programmes.  
158. Similarly, the use of the terms “all available contact information” in 
heading 7 does not specify sufficiently the scope of the data to be transferred. In 
particular, it does not specify what type of contact information is covered, nor 
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does it specify whether that contact information also covers, as may be inferred 
from the Commission’s written answer to the questions posed by the Court, the 
contact information of third parties who made the flight reservation for the air 
passenger, third parties through whom an air passenger may be contacted, or 
indeed third parties who are to be informed in the event of an emergency. 
159. As regards heading 8, that heading relates to “all available payment / 
billing information (not including other transaction details linked to a credit card 
or account and not connected to the travel transaction)”. It is true that that 
heading may appear to be particularly broad inasmuch as it employs the 
expression “all available information”. Nevertheless, as is clear from the 
Commission’s answer to the questions posed by the Court, that heading must be 
regarded as covering information relating solely to the payment methods for, and 
billing of, the air ticket, to the exclusion of any other information not directly 
relating to the flight. Construed in that way, heading 8 may therefore be regarded 
as meeting the requirements as to clarity and precision. 
160. As regards heading 17, that heading refers to “general remarks including 
Other Supplementary Information (OSI), Special Service Information (SSI) and 
Special Service Request (SSR) information”. According to the explanations 
provided, inter alia, by the Commission, that heading constitutes a “free text” 
heading, intended to include “all supplementary information”, in addition to that 
listed elsewhere in the Annex to the envisaged agreement. Consequently, such a 
heading provides no indication as to the nature and scope of the information to be 
communicated, and it may even encompass information entirely unrelated to the 
purpose of the transfer of PNR data. Furthermore, since the information referred 
to in that heading is listed only by way of example, as is shown by the use of the 
term “including”, heading 17 does not set any limitation on the nature and scope 
of the information that could be set out thereunder. In those circumstances, 
heading 17 cannot be regarded as being delimited with sufficient clarity and 
precision. 
161. Lastly, as regards heading 18, that heading relates to “any Advance 
Passenger Information (API) data collected for reservation purposes”. According 
to the clarifications provided by the Council and the Commission, that 
information corresponds to the information referred to in Article 3(2) of Directive 
2004/82, namely the number and type of travel document used, nationality, full 
names, the date of birth, the border crossing point of entry into the territory of the 
Member States, code of transport, departure and arrival time of the 
transportation, total number of passengers carried on that transport, and the 
initial point of embarkation. That heading, in so far as it is construed as covering 
only the information expressly referred to in that provision, may be regarded as 
meeting the requirements as to clarity and precision.  
162. The provisions of Article 4(3) of the envisaged agreement, which require 
Canada to delete any PNR data transferred to it if it is not listed in the Annex to 
that agreement, do not serve to offset the lack of precision of headings 5, 7 and 17 
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of that annex. Since that list does not itself delimit with sufficient clarity and 
precision the PNR data to be transferred, those provisions are incapable of 
resolving the uncertainties as to the PNR data to be transferred. 
163. In those circumstances, as regards the PNR data to be transferred to 
Canada, headings 5, 7 and 17 of the Annex to the envisaged agreement do not 
delimit in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the scope of the interference 
with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’. 
56 As some of those observations may be transposable to the present case, in relation 
to the fact that Annex I of the PNR Directive, which is transposed by Article 9 of 
the PNR Law, refers to some of the data it covers by way of example, and not 
exhaustively, the referring court decides to refer a third question to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. 
The definition of ‘passenger’ (Article 4 10° of the PNR Law) 
57 The applicant objects to the breadth of the definition of ‘passenger’, which leads 
to systematic, non-targeted automated processing of the data of all passengers. 
58 The effect of the definition of ‘passenger’ (Article 4 10° of the PNR Law) is that 
the obligations to collect, transfer and process PNR data relating to ‘passengers’ 
are general and undifferentiated in nature, applying to every person carried or to 
be carried who appears on the list of passengers. The obligations imposed by the 
PNR Law thus apply regardless of whether there are substantial grounds to believe 
that that the persons concerned have committed an offence, are on the point of 
committing an offence, or have been found guilty of an offence. 
59 In its Opinion of 19 August 2016, the Consultative Committee of Convention 108 
observed in this regard that ‘the processing of PNR data — providing the unique 
benefit of enabling the identification of individuals of interest — is the general 
and indiscriminate screening of all passengers, including individuals who are not 
suspected of any crime, by different competent authorities and concerns data 
initially collected for commercial purposes by private entities. In light of the 
degree of interference with the rights to private life and data protection that 
would arise from such processing, the fact that this processing is a necessary 
measure in a democratic society for a legitimate aim has to be clearly evidenced 
and the appropriate safeguards must be put in place. A specific demonstration of 
the necessity is needed for the collection and further use of PNR data’ (Opinion of 
19 August 2016, T-PD(2016)18rev, p. 5).  
60 In the field of electronic communications, the Court has ruled on national 
legislation which provided for the general and indiscriminate retention of all 
traffic and location data relating to all subscribers and registered users, and to all 
methods of electronic communication, and imposed an obligation on providers of 
electronic communications services to retain such data systematically and 
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continuously, with no exceptions (judgment of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige 
and Watson and Others, C-203/15 and C-698/15, EU:C:2016:970). 
It held that ‘while the effectiveness of the fight against serious crime, in particular 
organised crime and terrorism, may depend to a great extent on the use of modern 
investigation techniques, such an objective of general interest, however 
fundamental it may be, cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing 
for the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data should 
be considered to be necessary for the purposes of that fight’ (paragraph 103). 
The Court held, first, that the effect of such legislation was that the retention of 
traffic and location data was the rule, whereas the system put in place by Directive 
2002/58 required the retention of data to be the exception, and secondly, that 
‘national legislation … which covers, in a generalised manner, all subscribers 
and registered users and all means of electronic communication as well as all 
traffic data, provides for no differentiation, limitation or exception according to 
the objective pursued. It is comprehensive in that it affects all persons using 
electronic communication services, even though those persons are not, even 
indirectly, in a situation that is liable to give rise to criminal proceedings. It 
therefore applies even to persons for whom there is no evidence capable of 
suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, 
with serious criminal offences. Further, it does not provide for any exception, and 
consequently it applies even to persons whose communications are subject, 
according to rules of national law, to the obligation of professional secrecy (see, 
by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, 
paragraphs 57 and 58).  
106. Such legislation does not require there to be any relationship between the 
data which must be retained and a threat to public security. In particular, it is not 
restricted to retention in relation to (i) data pertaining to a particular time period 
and/or geographical area and/or a group of persons likely to be involved, in one 
way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) persons who could, for other reasons, 
contribute, through their data being retained, to fighting crime (see, by analogy, 
in relation to Directive 2006/24, the Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 59). 
107. National legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings therefore 
exceeds the limits of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be 
justified, within a democratic society, as required by Article 15(1) of Directive 
2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter. 
108. However, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 
and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, does not prevent a Member State from 
adopting legislation permitting, as a preventive measure, the targeted retention of 
traffic and location data, for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that 
the retention of data is limited, with respect to the categories of data to be 
retained, the means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the 
retention period adopted, to what is strictly necessary. 
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109. In order to satisfy the requirements set out in the preceding paragraph of the 
present judgment, that national legislation must, first, lay down clear and precise 
rules governing the scope and application of such a data retention measure and 
imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data has been retained 
have sufficient guarantees of the effective protection of their personal data against 
the risk of misuse. That legislation must, in particular, indicate in what 
circumstances and under which conditions a data retention measure may, as a 
preventive measure, be adopted, thereby ensuring that such a measure is limited 
to what is strictly necessary (see, by analogy, in relation to Directive 2006/24, the 
Digital Rights judgment, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 
110. Second, as regards the substantive conditions which must be satisfied by 
national legislation that authorises, in the context of fighting crime, the retention, 
as a preventive measure, of traffic and location data, if it is to be ensured that 
data retention is limited to what is strictly necessary, it must be observed that, 
while those conditions may vary according to the nature of the measures taken for 
the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crime, the retention of data must continue nonetheless to meet objective criteria, 
that establish a connection between the data to be retained and the objective 
pursued. In particular, such conditions must be shown to be such as actually to 
circumscribe, in practice, the extent of that measure and, thus, the public affected.  
111. As regards the setting of limits on such a measure with respect to the public 
and the situations that may potentially be affected, the national legislation must be 
based on objective evidence which makes it possible to identify a public whose 
data is likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal 
offences, and to contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to 
preventing a serious risk to public security. Such limits may be set by using a 
geographical criterion where the competent national authorities consider, on the 
basis of objective evidence, that there exists, in one or more geographical areas, a 
high risk of preparation for or commission of such offences. 
112. Having regard to all of the foregoing, the answer to the first question 
referred in Case C-203/15 is that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the 
light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted 
as precluding national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, 
provides for the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location 
data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic 
communication’. 
In answer to the second question in Case C-203/15 and the first question in Case 
C-698/15, the Court ruled that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light 
of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted ‘as 
precluding national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic 
and location data and, in particular, access of the competent national authorities 
to the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of 
fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where access is 
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not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, 
and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained 
within the European Union’ (paragraph 125). 
61 For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has since held Swedish 
legislation on bulk interception of electronic communications to be in conformity 
with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in its judgment in 
Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden, of 19 June 2018. It stated, in particular, as 
follows:  
‘The Court has expressly recognised that the national authorities enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in choosing how best to achieve the legitimate aim of 
protecting national security … .In Weber and Saravia and Liberty and Others the 
Court accepted that bulk interception regimes did not per se fall outside this 
margin. Given the reasoning of the Court in those judgments and in view of the 
current threats facing many Contracting States (including the scourge of global 
terrorism and other serious crime, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
sexual exploitation of children and cybercrime), advancements in technology 
which have made it easier for terrorists and criminals to evade detection on the 
internet, and the unpredictability of the routes via which electronic 
communications are transmitted, the Court considers that the decision to operate 
a bulk interception regime in order to identify hitherto unknown threats to 
national security is one which continues to fall within States’ margin of 
appreciation’ (ECtHR, 19 June 2018, Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden, § 112). 
The same court held, on the other hand, that United Kingdom law on the 
interception of communications infringed Article 8 ECHR, because it did not meet 
the criteria set out in its case-law. It also held that ‘the operation of a bulk 
interception regime in principle falls within a State’s margin of appreciation. Bulk 
interception is by definition untargeted, and to require “reasonable suspicion” 
would render the operation of such a scheme impossible’ (ECtHR, 13 September 
2018, Big Brother Watch v. the United Kingdom § 317). 
62 The question arises of how far the case-law referred to above, relating to 
generalised and indiscriminate retention of data in the area of electronic 
communications, can be transposed to generalised and indiscriminate collection, 
transfer and processing of passenger data, as provided for by the Law of 
25 December 2016. 
63 In Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2015, the Court of Justice was considering a PNR 
scheme which was analogous but more limited in scope, as the draft agreement 
between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of 
passenger data provided for ‘the systematic and continuous transfer of PNR data 
of all air passengers flying between the European Union and Canada’ 
(paragraph 127). It held that ‘the transfer of PNR data to Canada and subsequent 
processing of that data may be regarded as being appropriate for the purpose of 
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ensuring that the objective relating to the protection of public security and safety 
pursued by the envisaged agreement is achieved’ (paragraph 153). 
As regards the passengers concerned, the Court held: 
‘186.The envisaged agreement covers the PNR data of all air passengers flying 
between the European Union and Canada. The transfer of that data to Canada is 
to take place regardless of whether there is any objective evidence permitting the 
inference that the passengers are liable to present a risk to public security in 
Canada. 
187. In this connection, it should be pointed out that, as recalled in 
paragraphs 152 and 169 of this Opinion, the PNR data is intended, inter alia, to 
be subject to automated processing. As several of the interveners have stated, that 
processing is intended to identify the risk to public security that persons, who are 
not, at that stage, known to the competent services, may potentially present, and 
who may, on account of that risk, be subject to further examination. In that 
respect, the automated processing of that data, before the arrival of the 
passengers in Canada, facilitates and expedites security checks, in particular at 
borders. Furthermore, the exclusion of certain categories of persons, or of certain 
areas of origin, would be liable to prevent the achievement of the objective of 
automated processing of PNR data, namely identifying, through verification of 
that data, persons liable to present a risk to public security from amongst all air 
passengers, and make it possible for that verification to be circumvented. 
188. Moreover, in accordance with Article 13 of the Chicago Convention, to 
which, in particular, the Council and the Commission have referred in their 
answers to the questions posed by the Court, all air passengers must, upon 
entrance into, departure from, or while within the territory of a contracting State, 
comply with the laws and regulations of that State as to air passengers’ admission 
to or departure from its territory. All air passengers who wish to enter or depart 
from Canada are, therefore, on the basis of that article, subject to border control 
and are required to comply with the conditions on entry and departure laid down 
by the Canadian law in force. Furthermore, as is clear from paragraphs 152 and 
187 of this Opinion, the identification, by means of PNR data, of passengers liable 
to present a risk to public security forms part of border control. Consequently, 
since they are subject to that control, air passengers who wish to enter and spend 
time in Canada are, on account of the very nature of that measure, subject to 
verification of their PNR data. 
189. In those circumstances, the envisaged agreement does not exceed the limits 
of what is strictly necessary in so far as it permits the transfer of the PNR data of 
all air passengers to Canada’.  
64 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) raises the question of whether 
those considerations are applicable to the PNR Directive and to national 
legislation, such as the PNR Law, which transposes that directive and provides for 
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29 
generalised and indiscriminate collection, transfer and use of PNR data relating to 
all passengers travelling by air, rail or bus, regardless of whether they cross an 
external border of the European Union. This system applies to individuals in 
relation to whom there is nothing giving reason to believe that their conduct may 
be linked — even indirectly or remotely — with serious crime, and is broader in 
scope than the system envisaged by the EU-Canada PNR agreement. Given the 
breadth of the data to which it relates, the question arises of whether the measure 
is confined to what is ‘strictly necessary’. Before giving a substantive ruling, the 
Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) therefore decides to refer a fourth 
question to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
The purposes for which PNR data are processed (Article 8 of the PNR Law) 
65 The applicant objects to the terms in which the purposes for which PNR data are 
processed are set out in Article 8 of the PNR Law, submitting that these are much 
broader than the ‘specific purposes’, limited to terrorist offences and serious crime 
referred to in the PNR Directive. It contends that those purposes go beyond what 
is ‘strictly necessary’. 
The purposes for which PNR data is to be processed, as laid down in Articles 1(2) 
and 6(2) of the PNR Directive, are limited to preventing, detecting, investigating 
and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime (see also recital 7 of the PNR 
Directive). 
Some of the processing purposes contemplated by Article 8 of the PNR Law 
correspond to offences listed in Annex II of the PNR Directive, reflecting the 
objectives of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist 
offences and serious crime pursued by that directive. However, some of the 
purposes for which PNR data is processed are additional to those provided for by 
the directive. Among these is ‘furthering the activities referred to in Article 7 1° 
and 3°/l, and Article 11, § 1 1° to 3° and 5°, of the Organic law of 30 November 
1998 on the intelligence and security services’ (Article 8 § 1 4°). 
The referring court considers whether those additional purposes are expressed in 
clear, precise rules which go no further than is strictly necessary, and expresses 
doubt as to whether that is so in relation to the purpose set out in Article 8 § 1 4° 
of the PNR Law.  
The explanatory memorandum to the PNR Law states that this ‘purpose relates to 
the functions of the intelligence services, namely State Security and the General 
Intelligence and Security Service (SGRS). In order to perform their functions of 
investigation, analysis and processing of information concerning activities 
representing a potential threat to the fundamental interests of the State, those 
services must be in a position to analyse passenger data in order to detect concrete 
threats as soon as possible, to monitor the movements of specific individuals, and 
to carry out analyses of broader developments or trends. This purpose 
encompasses functions relating to the investigation, analysis and processing of 
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information relating to the activities of foreign intelligence services on Belgian 
soil’. (Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2018-2019, DOC 54-3652/001, p. 19-20). 
While, generally speaking, the functions of the intelligence and security services 
do contribute to national and international security, the processing of PNR data in 
connection with the purpose referred to in Article 8 § 1 4° of the PNR Law seems 
very vague and general. 
Furthermore, in relation to advance assessment of passengers, this purpose is 
treated in the same way as those referred to in Article 8 § 1 1°, 2° and 5° of the 
PNR Law (Articles 24 § 2 and 26 § 2). 
Against that background, the Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) decides 
to refer a fifth question to the Court, with a view to establishing whether this 
purpose is sufficiently clear and precise, and whether it is limited to what is 
strictly necessary.  
Management of the passenger database and processing of data in the context of 
advance assessment of passengers and ad hoc searches (Articles 16, 24 to 27, and 
50 and 51 of the PNR Law) 
66 The applicant contends that the various ways in which personal data is processed 
and transferred are manifestly disproportionate.  
67 Article 16 of the PNR Law provides that, as regards the purposes contemplated by 
Article 8 § 1, passenger data is to be subject to the processing contemplated by 
Articles 24 to 27.  
– Advance assessment of passengers (Articles 24 to 26) 
68 Passenger data is processed with a view to carrying out an assessment of 
passengers (pre-screening) prior to their scheduled arrival in, departure from, or 
transit through Belgian territory, in order to identify persons who require further 
examination. ‘This is a matter of assessing the potential threat and determining 
which passengers are of interest from the point of view of the performance of their 
functions or, for example, necessitate the taking of a particular step (such as the 
execution of an arrest warrant, or a search)’. (Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2018-2019, 
DOC 54-3652/001, p. 28). 
There are two aspects to advance assessment: comparison of the passenger data 
against databases, and comparison of the data against pre-determined criteria.  
69 As regards comparison against databases, the preparatory documents relating to 
the PNR Law state that ‘the first aspect is a search for positive matches which is 
made by comparing the passenger data against processed data held in the 
databases managed by the competent services. This enables, for example, an 
assessment to be made as to whether an individual is particularly dangerous, on 
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the basis that he appears in a police database in connection with a terrorist matter, 
and it is apparent on analysis of his passenger data that he regularly travels to 
countries that harbour terrorist training camps, or countries of transit to such 
places. Equally, information available from the intelligence services might 
indicate that the individual in question is planning a hostage operation, and the 
transport data may show that he is travelling to a country in which, as its 
intelligence services know from information received, he would be able to recruit 
with a view to executing his plan. Furthermore, the greater the number of positive 
matches identified in relation to one and the same individual, by multiple services, 
the greater the probability that the threat is real. 
The positive match may equally call for a step to be taken under a judicial order, 
such as the execution of an arrest warrant in respect of an individual preparing to 
leave Belgium. 
A positive match may also be identified on comparison of the passenger data 
against international databases such as SIS II or Interpol (SLTD). 
Naturally, the objective is not to link all the services’ databases to the passenger 
database, but to implement technical restrictions on database comparisons relating 
directly to the purposes laid down by the law. 
… 
The comparison can also be made using the lists of persons specifically produced 
for this purpose by the competent services. Under the Law on the protection of 
private life, and more specifically Article 4 § 1 4° of that law, those lists must be 
updated regularly’ (Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2015-2016, DOC 54-2069/001, p. 28-29). 
70 As regards comparison against pre-determined criteria, the preparatory documents 
relating to the PNR law state: 
‘The second aspect is a search for positive matches using one or more criteria 
which have been predetermined by the PIU and are applied to the passenger data. 
The criteria are made up of one or more objective indicators on the basis of which 
it can be inferred that the conduct of the corresponding persons carries a specific 
risk, capable of constituting a threat in relation to the purposes set out in Article 8 
§ 1 1°, 4° and 5° of the law. 
The criteria may, for example, relate to certain specific behaviours concerning 
reservations or travel. 
Their use is beneficial in that it may bring to light profiles of high-risk passengers 
who are not necessarily known to or mentioned in the services’ databases. 
The criteria may relate, for example, to a country of destination or departure, 
combined with certain information on the journey such as the means of payment 
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and reservation date’. (Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2018-2019, DOC 54-3652/001, p. 29-
30). 
‘The advance assessment carried out in relation to the purpose concerning 
phenomena of administrative policing and groupings linked with violent 
radicalisation is subject to conditions much more restrictive that those relating to 
the other purposes … 
As regards the advance assessment carried out in relation to the other purposes, 
access is permitted to all the passenger data set out in Article 9’ (ibid. p. 31). 
‘All positive matches must be validated by the PIU. In order to ensure that the 
right to protection of personal data … is fully respected, no decision which has 
legal consequences for an individual, or is capable of causing him serious 
prejudice, can be taken solely on the basis of automated processing of the data in 
the file containing information on his journey. For that reason, an assessment will 
always be made by a human being before a decision is taken which is binding on 
the person concerned. 
Such validation must take place within 24 hours in order for a right of access to 
the passenger database to arise. 
After validation of the positive match, the services which originally identified the 
match are responsible for pursuing the matter efficaciously and within an 
appropriate timescale. Pursuing the matter efficaciously may mean taking active 
steps (for example, carrying out a search or arrest), but equally, it may mean 
refraining from taking active steps for the time being. This operational assessment 
is entirely a matter for the competent services’ (ibid. p. 30-31). 
71 As to the assessment criteria which are predetermined by the PIU, these may not 
be based on data indicating a person’s race or ethnic origin, religion or 
philosophical beliefs, political opinions, trade union membership, health, sexual 
life or sexual orientation. The assessment of passengers prior to arrival, transit 
or departure against pre-determined criteria must be carried out in a non-
discriminatory manner. The pre-determined criteria may not relate to the 
identification of an individual and must be targeted, proportionate and specific.  
72 In its Opinion of 19 August 2016 the Consultative Committee of Convention 108 
stated as follows: 
‘The processing of personal data may concern all passengers and not only the 
targeted individuals suspected of involvement in a criminal offence or posing an 
immediate threat to national security or public order. 
… 
This assessment of passengers by data mining may raise the question of 
predictability, in particular when operated on the basis of predictive algorithms 
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33 
using dynamic criteria which may constantly evolve in light of self-learning 
capacities.  
The development of data mining algorithms should be based on the results of 
regular assessments of the likely impact of the data processing on the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of data subjects. 
The basic structure of the analyses should be based on predefined risk indicators 
which have been clearly identified in advance. 
The relevance of individual results of such automatic assessments should be 
carefully examined on a case-by-case basis, by a person in a non-automated 
manner’ (Opinion of 19 August 2016, T-PD(2016)18rev, p. 8). 
73 In the present case, the databases referred to in Article 24 are defined with 
precision and relate directly to the purposes contemplated by Article 8 of the PNR 
Law. They are the databases of the ‘competent services’, which means the police, 
State Security, General Intelligence and Security and Customs services. 
Furthermore, Article 24 § 4 and § 5 of the PNR Law ensures, as required by 
Article 6(5) of the PNR Directive, that any positive match resulting from 
automated systematic processing is individually reviewed by non-automated 
means, to verify whether the competent authority needs to take action under 
national law. 
74 In Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017 (EU:C:2017:592), 
the Court of Justice also insisted on the need for individual re-examination by 
non-automated means before an individual measure is adopted (paragraph 173). 
The requirement for human intervention, after a positive match has been 
identified, constitutes a safeguard serving to ensure that advance assessment is not 
solely based on automated methods, and thus contributes to the effectiveness of 
the system. 
Accordingly, a systematic advance assessment of passengers is, in principle, a 
relevant measure with respect to the objective of identifying and preventing 
threats to public security.  
As the Court of Justice nevertheless observed in Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, the 
processing carried out in the course of advance assessment ‘may provide 
additional information on the private lives of air passengers’ (paragraph 131); 
furthermore, ‘the analyses are carried out without there being reasons based on 
individual circumstances that would permit the inference that the persons 
concerned may present a risk to public security’ (ibid., paragraph 132). 
Noting that the automatic processing of PNR data, based on pre-established 
models and criteria, presented a significant margin of error (ibid., paragraphs 169-
170), the Court nevertheless held that ‘the pre-established models and criteria 
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should be specific and reliable, making it possible … to arrive at results targeting 
individuals who might be under a “reasonable suspicion” of participation in 
terrorist offences or serious transnational crime and should be non-
discriminatory’, and that ‘the databases with which the PNR data is cross-checked 
must be reliable, up to date and limited to databases used by Canada in relation 
to the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime’ (ibid., 
paragraph 172). Lastly, in order to ensure that the assessment is not discriminatory 
and is limited to that which is strictly necessary, the Court held that ‘the reliability 
and topicality of those pre-established models and criteria and databases used 
should, taking account of statistical data and results of international research, be 
covered by the joint review of the implementation of the envisaged agreement’, a 
year after its entry into force, and then at regular intervals (ibid., paragraph 174).  
75 In addition, it appears to be technically impossible to define the pre-determined 
criteria which are to be used to identify high-risk profiles any further. As has been 
stated above, such criteria must be specific, reliable and non-discriminatory.  
76 Although neither the PNR Directive nor the PNR Law indicates how the advance 
assessment criteria are to be pre-determined by the PIU, the safeguards 
surrounding the establishment of those criteria appear to be sufficient for the 
contested measure not to be regarded as disproportionate. It is nevertheless 
appropriate, in order to determine whether such advance systematic assessment is 
sufficiently clear, to refer a sixth question to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
– Ad hoc searches (Articles 27, 50 and 51) 
77 Article 27 of the PNR Law authorises the processing of passenger data with a 
view to carrying out ad hoc searches for the purposes contemplated by Article 8 
§ 1 1°, 2°, 4° and 5°, subject to the conditions set out in Article 46 septies of the 
Criminal Procedure Code or Article 16/3 of the Law of 30 November 1998, which 
were inserted, respectively, by Articles 50 and 51 of the PNR Law. Under 
Article 20 of the PNR Law, the applicability conditions of Article 27 also govern 
requests for access made after the six-month period referred to in Article 19 has 
expired. 
78 Article 46 septies of the Criminal Procedure Code concerns ad hoc searches 
relating to the purposes contemplated by Article 8 § 1 1°, 2° and 5° of the PNR 
Law. This measure is subject to a number of safeguards, including prior 
authorisation from the crown prosecutor. 
79 As to Article 16/3 of the Law of 30 November 1998, this concerns ad hoc searches 
relating to the purpose contemplated by Article 8 § 1 4° of the PNR Law. This 
measure is subject to a number of safeguards, including a requirement to inform 
Permanent Committee R, which then performs a monitoring function.  
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35 
80 The applicant submits that the personnel seconded from the police services to the 
PIU are not sufficiently independent to deal with requests for access in the context 
of such ad hoc searches. 
81 The composition of the PIU is laid down by Article 14 § 1 of the PNR Law. The 
preparatory work indicates, in this regard, that ‘the Belgian model is based on the 
concept of a multidisciplinary unit made up of a civil servant director responsible 
for its leadership, administrative staff, and personnel seconded from the 
competent services. 
The PIU will be made up of: 
– a civil servant director, assisted by a support department, who is responsible 
within the Ministry of the Interior for, amongst other things, management of the 
database, compliance by carriers and tour operators with their obligations, 
reporting, concluding protocols with the competent services, and compliance with 
the processing conditions. The support department will include analysts, lawyers, 
IT experts and the data protection officer, who will have the necessary security 
clearance. 
– of personnel seconded from the competent services referred to (exhaustively) 
in § 1 2°, namely the police services, the intelligence services and Customs. The 
precisely defined purposes are, in themselves, the first restriction. For example, at 
combined police service level, it is clear that a neighbourhood officer in a local 
force could never become aware of passenger data inasmuch as the purposes do 
not form part of his functions. 
The secondment of personnel from the competent services is intended to guarantee 
a certain level of expertise but in no way does it prevent those services from 
entering into secondment pooling agreements.’ (Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2015-2016, 
DOC 54-2069/001, p. 22).  
The Minister for Security and the Interior added that ‘a data protection officer will 
also be designated, with responsibility for reporting to the Commission for the 
Protection of Private Life’ (Doc. Parl, Chamber, 2015-2016, DOC 54-2069/003, 
p. 24). 
The Royal Decree of 21 December 2017 relating to the execution of the PNR Law 
makes detailed provision as regards the composition and organisation of the PIU. 
The report to the King which preceded that Royal Decree states that ‘the database 
can only … be consulted within the PIU, and only by members of the PIU, in the 
course of performing their functions, and the data protection officer’. 3 
Procedural arrangements for secondment are laid down in Articles 12 to 21 of that 
Royal Decree. The participation of personnel seconded from the competent 
 
3 Moniteur Belge, 29 December 2017, second edition, p. 116833. 
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services in the operation of the PIU is intended to guarantee that it is made up of 
personnel with a certain expertise, in order to strengthen its effectiveness. The 
possibility of secondment is, moreover, expressly provided for in Article 4(3) of 
the PNR Directive.  
There is nothing to justify the view that such persons do not act independently in 
performing their functions within the PIU, even if they retain their status in the 
service from which they have been seconded. Furthermore, members of the PIU 
may be subject to criminal law penalties if they do not respect professional 
secrecy, or if they consciously and deliberately retain information or data which 
obstructs the purposes contemplated by Article 8 (Articles 48 and 49). 
82 As regards access to PNR data in the context of ad hoc searches after a period of 
six months has passed, the Court held, in Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement) of 26 July 2017 (EU:C:2017:592), that the use of PNR data so stored 
should ‘be based on objective criteria in order to define the circumstances and 
conditions under which the Canadian authorities referred to in the envisaged 
agreement may have access to that data in order to use it’ and that ‘that use 
should, except in cases of validly established urgency, be subject to a prior review 
carried out either by a court, or by an independent administrative body; the 
decision of that court or body authorising the use being made following a 
reasoned request by those authorities submitted, inter alia, within the framework 
of procedures for the prevention, detection or prosecution of crime’ 
(paragraph 208). 
83 In order to establish whether the PIU should be regarded as ‘another national 
authority competent under national law’ within the meaning of Article 12(3) of the 
PNR Directive, it is appropriate, before ruling on the matter, to refer a seventh 
question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
The period during which PNR data are retained (Article 18 of the PNR Law) 
84 The applicant submits that the retention period of five years which applies to PNR 
data is disproportionate. 
85 Recital 25 of the PNR Directive states: 
‘The period during which PNR data are to be retained should be as long as is 
necessary for and proportionate to the purposes of preventing, detecting, 
investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime. Because of the 
nature of the data and their uses, it is necessary that the PNR data be retained for a 
sufficiently long period to carry out analysis and for use in investigations. To 
avoid disproportionate use, after the initial retention period the PNR data should 
be depersonalised through masking out of data elements. To ensure the highest 
level of data protection, access to the full PNR data, which enable direct 
identification of the data subject, should be granted only under very strict and 
limited conditions after that initial period.’  
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37 
86 Under the case-law of the Court of Justice, the period during which data are 
retained must ‘continue to satisfy objective criteria that establish a connection 
between the data to be retained and the objective pursued’ (judgment of 
6 October 2015, Schrems, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 93; Order of 
16 March 2017, Tele2 Sverige and Watson and Others, C-203/15 REC and 
C-698/15 REC, EU:C:2017:222, paragraph 110; Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592, paragraph 191). 
87 In relation more specifically to PNR data, the Court of Justice held, in Opinion 
1/15 of 26 July 2017, that the five-year retention period ‘does not exceed the limits 
of what is strictly necessary for the purposes of combating terrorism and serious 
transnational crime’ (paragraph 209) with the caveat that ‘as regards air 
passengers in respect of whom no such risk has been identified on their arrival in 
Canada and up to their departure from that non-member country, there would not 
appear to be, once they have left, a connection — even a merely indirect 
connection — between their PNR data and the objective pursued by the envisaged 
agreement which would justify … the continued storage of the PNR data of all air 
passengers after their departure from Canada for the purposes of possibly 
accessing that data, regardless of whether there is any link with combating 
terrorism and serious transnational crime (see, by analogy, judgment of 
21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige and Watson and Others, C-203/15 and 
C-698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 119)’ (paragraph 205). 
88 Article 18 of the PNR Law provides for passenger data to be retained in the 
passenger database for no more than five years from initial storage, and deleted on 
the expiry of that period. Under Article 21 § 1 of that law, the PIU is to ensure that 
passenger data are permanently erased from its database on expiry of the period 
mentioned in Article 18. 
The period of five years must nevertheless be read in combination with 
Articles 19 et seq. of the PNR Law, which also make provision as regards the 
retention of data. Article 19 of the law must itself be read in conjunction with 
Article 4 14°, which defines ‘depersonalisation through masking out of data 
elements’ as ‘making data elements capable of directly identifying the person 
concerned invisible to users, as provided for by Article 19’. 
Article 20 of the PNR Law provides that on expiry of the six-month period 
referred to in Article 19, the passenger data can be transferred in its entirety only 
for the purposes of the data processing provided for by Article 27, and only on the 
conditions referred to in that article. 
Furthermore, the result of the processing contemplated by Article 24 is only 
retained by the PIU for as long as is necessary to inform the competent authorities, 
and the PIUs of other Member States, that a positive match has been found 
(Article 21 § 3, first subparagraph). 
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Article 22 of the PNR Law ensures that it is only in the course of performing their 
functions that the official who heads the PIU and the data protection officer have 
access to all relevant data. 
Finally, the processing of data is required to be logged and to relate directly to the 
purposes contemplated by Article 8 (Article 23 § 1). The PIU is responsible 
logging and is required to retain, for a period of five years, a documented history 
of all the systems and processing procedures within its remit (Article 23 § 2, first 
subparagraph). 
89 The period of retention of passenger data must be determined in the light of the 
purposes for which such data is processed, relating directly to the objectives of 
prevention, detection and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.  
90 The Commission for the Protection of Private Life had nevertheless observed that, 
where data is retained for a long period and is stored en masse, ‘the risk of the 
persons concerned being profiled rises, as does the risk of function creep, or in 
other words the potential for illegitimate use of the data in relation to offences for 
which there was, initially, no (political) data transfer agreement’ (Commission 
for the Protection of Private Life, Opinion No 01/2010 of 13 January 2010, 
produced on the Commission’s own initiative, on the Draft law ratifying the 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to 
the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR 
Agreement), done at Brussels on 23 July 2007 and at Washington on 26 July 
2007, paragraph 3.3, p. 17-18). 
In Opinion No 55/2015 of 16 December 2015 on the draft bill which became the 
PNR Law, the Commission for the Protection of Private Life also stated, in 
relation to the need to retain the data for five years, that a more precise and better 
supported justification was required. 
In its Opinion of 19 August 2016, the Consultative Committee of Convention 108 
had also observed that ‘masked out data still enables individuals to be identified 
and continues as such to constitute personal data, and that its conservation should 
also be limited in time in order to avoid permanent and general surveillance’ 
(Opinion of 19 August 2016, T-PD(2016)18rev, p. 9). 
91 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) considers that in order to 
establish whether the retention period of five years, authorised by the PNR 
Directive, is, in the light of the foregoing and of the various safeguards referred to 
in paragraph 88 above, compatible with the observations of the Court of Justice 
referred to in paragraph 87 above, given that it makes no distinction on the basis 
of whether the passengers in question were identified, in the advance assessment, 
as presenting a public security risk, it is necessary to refer an eighth question to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling.  
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39 
3. The second plea in law 
92 The applicant argues that by extending the PNR system to intra-EU flights, the 
contested provisions indirectly re-establish border controls which are contrary to 
the free movement of persons. 
93 As regards the scope of the PNR Law, the preparatory work indicates that: 
‘The inclusion of intra-EU travel in the data collection will provide a fuller picture 
of passenger movements representing a potential threat to intra-Community and 
national security. Experience shows that certain ‘returnees’ (or ‘foreign fighters’ 
returning to Europe) board various different flights before taking travelling to 
their final destination. 
The EU PNR Directive expressly permits Member States to process EU passenger 
data in relation to international transport within the European Union. Furthermore, 
on 21 April 2016, at the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs, all the 
Member States approved a declaration to the effect that the transposition of the 
EU PNR Directive into their national law would extend to intra-EU transport’ 
(Doc. Parl, Chambre, 2015-2016, DOC 54-2069/001, p. 7).  
94 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) notes that the passengers 
referred to in Chapter 11 of the PNR Law are defined in limited terms, as are the 
data in question and the retention period. 
The preparatory work indicates that ‘… the only passengers affected are those 
wishing to enter or leave Belgium via an external border, or already having done 
so, regardless of the mode of transport (sea, rail, land or air). Hence it is only the 
data of those passengers which will be processed by the police services 
responsible for border control and the foreign nationals bureau. 
Passengers intending to transit through the international transit zone, for example, 
of an airport located in Belgium, are also affected inasmuch as the rules 
concerning access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign 
nationals also apply to them. Such persons must therefore hold the necessary 
travel documents. Certain persons are required to hold airport transit visas; 
controls are permitted in these zones and may, in certain circumstances, lead to 
refoulement. 
… only the so-called API passenger data will be transferred to the police services 
and the foreign nationals bureau under this chapter. Those data are enumerated in 
Article 9(2) of the draft bill. 
They essentially correspond to the data which air carriers are already required to 
transfer under the Royal Decree of 11 December 2006. 
… 
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The use of the data is also restricted to 24 hours. Once 24 hours have passed, if the 
foreign nationals bureau requires access to passenger data for the purposes of 
performing the functions assigned to it by law, it must send a reasoned request to 
the PIU’ (ibid. p. 34-35). 
95 As has been noted above, recital 10 of the PNR Directive permits the PNR system 
to be extended to intra-EU flights. Article 2 of the PNR Directive makes provision 
as to the procedure for extending the scope.  
The purpose of combating illegal immigration and improving border control 
relates only to the categories of passengers enumerated in Article 29 § 2 of the 
PNR Law, and is limited to the API data referred to in Article 9 § 1 18°, of that 
law. The processing carried out for that purpose is also limited. The contested 
provisions relate to the transposition of the API directive, which also pursues the 
objectives of combating illegal immigration and improving border control. 
96 In Opinion No 55/2015 of 16 December 2015 on the draft bill which became the 
Law of 25 December 2016, the Commission for the Protection of Private Life 
nevertheless raised the issue of whether the PNR system it establishes, which 
relates ‘both to journeys to and from the Schengen area (extra-Schengen), and to 
journeys entering and leaving the Schengen area (intra-Schengen)’, and might 
thus lead ‘indirectly to a re-establishment of internal border controls’, is 
compatible with the free movement of persons (paragraphs 21 to 25). 
97 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court), being uncertain as to the 
interpretation and validity of the API Directive (Directive 2005/82) in the light of 
the Charter and of the TEU, decides to refer a ninth question to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling.  
98 The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) also refers a final question in 
relation to the possibility of making specific provision as to the temporal effects of 
its judgment. 
IV. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
The Cour constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) accordingly refers the following 
questions for a preliminary ruling: 
1. Is Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 ‘on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC’ (the General Data Protection Regulation — 
GDPR), read in conjunction with Article 2(2)(d) of that regulation, to be 
interpreted as applying to national legislation such as the Law of 25 December 
2016 ‘on the processing of passenger data’, which transposes Directive (EU) 
2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 ‘on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, 
LIGUE DES DROITS HUMAINS 
 
41 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime’, as well as 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 ‘on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data’ and Directive 2010/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 ‘on reporting formalities for 
ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States and repealing 
Directive 2002/6/EC’? 
2. Is Annex I of Directive (EU) 2016/681 compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 
52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, given that the 
data it refers to are very wide in scope — particularly the data referred to in 
paragraph 18 of Annex I to Directive (EU) 2016/681, which go beyond the data 
referred to in Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/82/EC — and also given that, taken 
together, they may reveal sensitive information, and thus go beyond what is 
‘strictly necessary’?  
3. Are paragraphs 12 and 18 of Annex I to Directive (EU) 2016/681 
compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, given that, having regard to the word ‘including’, the data 
referred to in those paragraphs is given by way of example and not exhaustively, 
such that the requirement for precision and clarity in rules which interfere with the 
right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data is not 
satisfied? 
4. Are Article 3(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/681 and Annex I of the that 
directive compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, given that the system of generalised collection, 
transfer and processing of passenger data established by those provisions relates to 
any person using the mode of transport concerned, regardless of whether there is 
any objective ground for considering that that person may present a risk to public 
security? 
5. Is Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/681, read in conjunction with Articles 7, 
8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be 
interpreted as precluding national legislation such as the contested law, which 
includes, among the purposes for which PNR data is processed, furthering 
activities within the remit of the intelligence and security services, thus treating 
that purpose as an integral part of the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime? 
6. Is Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/681 compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 
52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, given that the 
advance assessment for which it provides, which is made by comparing passenger 
data against databases and predetermined criteria, applies to such data in a 
systematic and generalised manner, regardless of whether there is any objective 
ground for considering that the passengers concerned may present a risk to public 
security?  
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 17.10.2019 — CASE C-817/19 
 
42  
7. Can the expression ‘another national authority competent under national 
law’ in Article 12(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/681 be interpreted as including the 
PIU created by the Law of 25 December 2016, which would then have power to 
authorise access to PNR data after six months had passed, for the purposes of ad 
hoc searches? 
8. Is Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2016/681, read in conjunction with 
Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as the contested 
law which provides for a general data retention period of five years, without 
making any distinction in terms of whether the advance assessment indicated that 
the passengers might present a risk to public security? 
9. (a) Is Directive 2004/82/EC compatible with Article 3(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union and Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, given that the obligations for which it provides apply to flights 
within the European Union? 
(b) Is Directive 2004/82/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union and Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as the 
contested law which, for the purposes of combating illegal immigration and 
improving border controls, authorises a system of collection and processing of 
data relating to passengers ‘travelling to or from Belgium, or transiting through 
Belgian territory’, which may indirectly involve a re-establishment of internal 
border controls? 
10. If, on the basis of the answers to the preceding questions, the Cour 
constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court) concludes that the contested law, which 
transposes, inter alia, Directive (EU) 2016/681, fails to fulfil one or more of the 
obligations arising under the provisions referred to in those questions, would it be 
open to it to maintain the effects of the Law of 25 December 2016 ‘on the 
processing of passenger data’, on a temporary basis, in order to avoid legal 
uncertainty and enable the data hitherto collected and retained to continue to be 
used for the purposes envisaged by the law?