Order;Information — ECLI:EU:C:2023:1033
Date: 2023-12-19
Language of the case: Romanian
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Subject matter: Accession;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Transport;Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;Area of freedom, security and justice;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - inadmissible
Origin: Romania

Summary C-223/23 – 1 
Case C-223/23 [Redu] 1 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
11 April 2023 
Referring court:  
Curtea de Apel Brașov (Romania) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
11 April 2023 
Appellant:  
L.D. 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings  
Extraordinary appeal (exceptional review procedure) seeking to set aside the final 
judgment of the referring court sentencing the appellant to a custodial sentence. 
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling relate to case-law of the Curtea 
Constituțională (Constitutional Court, Romania; ‘the Constitutional Court’) 
concerning the interruption of the limitation period for criminal liability, the 
application of which would result in the conviction being quashed and would 
make it impossible to convict the appellant. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, interpretation is sought of Article 2, Article 4(3) 
and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with recitals 2, 
15 and 22 and Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126, Decision 2006/928, the last 
sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, and the principle of the primacy of EU law. 
 
1 The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-223/23 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Must Article 2 TEU, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and 
Article 4[(3)] TEU, read in conjunction with recitals 2, 15 and 22 and 
Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences, from the point of view of the 
Member State’s obligation to take all appropriate and necessary measures to 
achieve the objective of improving road safety, in the context of the free 
movement of persons within the European Union, and in application of 
Commission Decision 2006/928/EC, with reference to the last sentence of 
Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be 
interpreted as precluding a legal situation, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, in which the appellant seeks, by means of an extraordinary appeal, to 
have set aside a final judgment in criminal proceedings for the offence of driving a 
motor vehicle with a suspended driving licence, which would enable him to 
exercise his right to drive again, implying freedom of movement throughout the 
European Union, invoking the application of the principle of the more lenient 
criminal law, which he alleges was applicable in the course of the substantive 
proceedings and would have entailed a shorter limitation period which would have 
expired before the case was finally concluded, but which was only subsequently 
revealed by a decision of the national Constitutional Court which declared 
legislation on interrupting the limitation period for criminal liability to be 
unconstitutional (decision of 2022), on the ground that the legislature had failed to 
act to bring the legislation in question into line with another decision of the same 
Constitutional Court delivered four years earlier (decision of 2018) – and in the 
interim the case-law of the ordinary courts applying the first decision had become 
settled in the sense that the legislation in question continued to exist, in the form 
understood following the first decision of the Constitutional Court – with the 
practical consequence that the limitation period for all the offences in relation to 
which no final conviction had been handed down prior to the first decision of the 
Constitutional Court was reduced by half and the criminal proceedings against the 
[defendant] in question were consequently discontinued? 
2. Must Article 2 TEU, on the values of the rule of law and respect for human 
rights in a society in which justice prevails, and Article 4[(3)] TEU, on the 
principle of sincere cooperation between the European Union and the Member 
States, in application of Commission Decision 2006/928/EC in so far as it 
concerns the commitment to ensuring the efficiency of the Romanian judicial 
system, with reference to the last sentence of Article 49[(1)] of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the principle of the 
more lenient criminal law, be interpreted, in relation to the national judicial 
system as a whole, as precluding a legal situation, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, in which the appellant seeks, by means of an extraordinary appeal, to 
have set aside a final judgment in criminal proceedings for the offence of driving a 
motor vehicle with a suspended driving licence, which would enable him to 
exercise his right to drive again, implying freedom of movement throughout the 
European Union, invoking the application of the principle of the more lenient 
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criminal law, which he alleges was applicable in the course of the substantive 
proceedings and would have entailed a shorter limitation period which would have 
expired before the case was finally concluded, but which was only subsequently 
revealed by a decision of the national Constitutional Court which declared 
legislation on interrupting the limitation period for criminal liability to be 
unconstitutional (decision of 2022), on the ground that the legislature had failed to 
act to bring the legislation in question into line with another decision of the same 
Constitutional Court delivered four years earlier (decision of 2018) – and in the 
interim the case-law of the ordinary courts applying the first decision had become 
settled in the sense that the legislation in question continued to exist, in the form 
understood following the first decision of the Constitutional Court – with the 
practical consequence that the limitation period for all the offences in relation to 
which no final conviction had been handed down prior to the first decision of the 
Constitutional Court was reduced by half and the criminal proceedings against the 
[defendant] in question were consequently discontinued? 
3. If so, and only if it is impossible to provide an interpretation in conformity with 
EU law, is the principle of the primacy of EU law to be interpreted as precluding 
national legislation or a national practice pursuant to which the ordinary national 
courts are bound by decisions of the national Constitutional Court and binding 
decisions of the national supreme court and may not, for that reason and at the risk 
of committing a disciplinary offence, of their own motion disapply the case-law 
resulting from those decisions, even if, in the light of a judgment of the Court of 
Justice, they take the view that that case-law is contrary to Article 2 TEU, the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 4[(3)] TEU, in conjunction 
with recitals 2, 15 and 22 and Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving 
licences, from the point of view of the Member State’s obligation to take all 
appropriate and necessary measures to achieve the objective of improving road 
safety, and in application of Commission Decision 2006/928/EC, with reference to 
the last sentence of Article 49[(1)] of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, as in the situation in the main proceedings? 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Article 2, Article 4(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU; 
Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 December 2006 on driving licences, recitals 2, 15 and 22 and Article 11(4); 
Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address 
specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against 
corruption; 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), 
Article 49(1), last sentence; 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-223/23 
 
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The principle of the primacy of EU law; 
Judgments of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others (C-357/19, 
C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19 and C-840/19), EU:C:2021:1034; of 8 September 
2015, Taricco and Others (C-105/14), EU:C:2015:555; of 5 December 2017, 
M.A.S. and M.B. (C-42/17), EU:C:2017:936; of 18 May 2021, Asociația ‘Forumul 
Judecătorilor din România’ (C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 
and C-397/19), EU:C:2021:393; of; and of 22 February 2022, RS (C-430/21), 
EU:C:2022:99. 
Provisions of international law and case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights referred to in the proceedings  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘ECHR’), Article 7; 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) of 18 October 
2000, Coëme and Others v. Belgium; of 12 February 2013, Previti v. Italy; of 
17 September 2014, Mocanu and Others v. Romania; and of 22 September 2015, 
Borcea v. Romania. 
Provisions of national law and case-law relied on 
The referring court relies on the same legislative acts and case-law as set out in 
the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-107/23 PPU, with the exception of 
Law No 241/2005. It also relies on Article 335(2) of the Criminal Code, which 
regulates the offence of driving a vehicle without a driving licence. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 By criminal judgment delivered on 30 May 2019 by the Curtea de Apel Brașov 
(Court of Appeal, Brașov, Romania) (‘the judgment of 30 May 2019’), the 
appellant was finally sentenced, inter alia, to one year’s imprisonment for the 
offence of driving a motor vehicle with a suspended driving licence, which he 
committed on 14 June 2013. 
2 By extraordinary appeal lodged with the referring court, the appellant seeks to set 
aside that judgment, claiming that he was convicted despite there being evidence 
of grounds for termination of the criminal proceedings – that is, the limitation 
period for criminal liability – citing to that effect Decisions 297/2018 and 
358/2022 of the Constitutional Court. 
3 The referring court observes that the appellant is currently serving several 
custodial sentences for offences similar to the one for which he was convicted by 
the judgment of 30 May 2019. 
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The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
4 The appellant takes the view that, given the legal nature of the offence for which 
he was convicted, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to rule on the questions 
referred. 
5 The public prosecution service takes the view that Directive 2006/126 is 
applicable in the present case and that the Court of Justice does have jurisdiction 
to rule on the questions referred by the referring court. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
6 The referring court puts forward, in essence, the same grounds as those set out in 
the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-107/23 PPU. It also makes the 
following specific points with regard to the present case. 
7 As regards the first question, the referring court states that the limitation period 
for criminal liability for the offence of driving a motor vehicle with a suspended 
driving licence is five years. If the argument put forward by the appellant on the 
basis of judgments 297/2018 and 358/2022 of the Constitutional Court were 
upheld, that limitation period would have expired before the judgment of 30 May 
2019 had acquired the force of res judicata. As a result, the criminal proceedings 
would have been terminated and the appellant could not have been convicted. His 
right to drive motor vehicles would also have been reinstated. The appellant 
would be free to move anywhere in the European Union, where he could exercise 
his right to drive motor vehicles, despite the fact that quashing his conviction 
would be contrary to the principles of effective and dissuasive penalties related to 
driving on public roads. 
8 Recitals 2, 15 and 22 and Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 require Member 
States to take all appropriate and necessary measures to achieve the objective of 
improving road safety. According to the referring court, the mere possibility of an 
EU citizen regaining the right to drive a motor vehicle in breach of those 
principles undermines that objective. That observation is even more apposite in 
the case of Romania, which, according to Decision 2006/928, is required to 
establish an effective judicial and administrative system, properly equipped, inter 
alia, to fight corruption. 
9 As regards the second question, the referring court notes the exemplary nature of 
the main proceedings in the light of its subject matter, which, although it concerns 
a relatively minor offence in national law, highlights the general nature of the 
situation created by the application of Decisions 297/2018 and 358/2022 of the 
Constitutional Court. Those decisions cover nearly all the offences provided for 
by national law, which at any given time may concern social relations or whole 
areas of Union competence. Moreover, they have implications for the entire 
Romanian legal system, the effectiveness and credibility of which are called into 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-223/23 
 
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question. This has the effect of undermining the principles of sincere cooperation 
and mutual trust among Member States. 
10 The entire European legal system is also affected by the absence of effective and 
dissuasive criminal penalties in the national legal system. At the same time, the 
values of the rule of law are undermined in a society in which justice prevails 
within the common area of freedom, security and justice. This entails respect for 
social relations protected under criminal law through State coercion by imposing 
effective and dissuasive penalties.