Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:348
Date: 2025-04-02
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - successful

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed to be sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 62). 30 That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing that person’s funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraphs 63 and 66). 31 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. There is no requirement, for that purpose, that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act of which annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see, also, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). 32 If that information or evidence does support those reasons, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light thereof and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 33 As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the acts which maintain the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it should be pointed out that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. Thus, when periodically reviewing those measures, it is for the Council to carry out an updated assessment of the situation and to take stock of the effects of those measures, with a view to determining whether they have made it possible to achieve the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether it is still possible to reach the same conclusion in relation to those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 34 Accordingly, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence as that which justified the initial inclusion, the re-inclusion or a previous maintenance of the applicant’s name on that list, provided that (i) the reasons for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). In that regard, assessment of the changes in the context involves taking into consideration, first, the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established and the particular situation of the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78), and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited). 35 In the present case, it is clearly apparent from the grounds for listing in the contested acts that the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue solely on the basis of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 36 It is therefore in the light of those preliminary observations that it is necessary to ascertain whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding, by means of the adoption of the contested acts, to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of that criterion. 37 The Court considers it appropriate to examine, first, the third and fourth sets of maintaining acts together, and then the fifth set of maintaining acts. – The application of the second part of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant in the third and fourth sets of maintaining acts 38 In the present case, it should be noted that, by the third and fourth sets of maintaining acts, the Council decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of a single ground, that is to say, that she is an immediate family member of and benefits from a ‘leading businessperson’, namely her spouse, Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy. 39 The applicant claims, in essence, (i) that she is no longer an ‘immediate family member’ of her spouse as a result of their separation and of the fact that she now lives in Dubai, (ii) that she does not in any way benefit from her spouse, (iii) that she is financially independent of him as a result of the sale of the shares that she held in Group Sinara, and (iv) that the Council made an error of assessment in finding that her spouse was a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purposes of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. She concludes that the Council therefore also made an error of assessment in finding her to be an ‘immediate family member’ of her spouse for the purposes of that criterion. 40 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. In essence, it submits that, even assuming that she is, as she claims, separated from her spouse, the fact remains that they are still married and that the conditions for applying the second part of the amended (g) criterion are satisfied. It further argues that, as a housewife, the applicant does not have her own resources, making it difficult to imagine how, without help from her spouse, she could maintain her standard of living in Dubai, which is commonly known to be a very expensive place to live. The Council also claims that Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy can be classified as a ‘leading businessperson operating in Russia’ for the purposes of criterion (g) and that it therefore correctly found that the applicant’s name should be maintained on the lists at issue. 41 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the name of her spouse, Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy, was included on the lists at issue by Decision 2022/397 and by Implementing Regulation 2022/396, and that that inclusion was maintained thereafter by Decisions 2022/1530, 2023/572, 2023/1767 and 2024/847 and by Implementing Regulations 2022/1529, 2023/571, 2023/1765 and 2024/849. Second, the re-listing of Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy by Decisions 2023/1767 and 2024/847 and by Implementing Regulations 2023/1765 and 2024/849 is justified in particular by the fact that, as is clear from paragraph 16 above, being a ‘leading businessperson operating in Russia’ is one of the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue. 42 However, it is clear from the judgment of 26 June 2024, Pumpyanskiy v Council (T‑740/22, not published, EU:T:2024:418), and from the judgment delivered today in Pumpyanskiy v Council (T‑727/24, not published) that the Council made an error of assessment in finding Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy to be still a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purposes of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and in finding him to be a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purposes of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 43 Accordingly, without it being necessary either to assess the evidence adduced by the Council or to analyse whether the applicant is in fact an immediate family member of her spouse, Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy, and benefits from him, it must be held that the Council made an error of assessment when it included the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by means of the third and fourth sets of maintaining acts, since the merits of that inclusion are founded on a purported benefit derived by her from a person wrongly classified as a ‘leading businessperson’ for the purposes of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 44 In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be upheld and the third and fourth sets of maintaining acts must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant, without it being necessary to examine either the other pleas for annulment raised in support of the action or the first head of claim. – The application of the second part of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant in the fifth set of maintaining acts 45 In her second statement of modification, the applicant repeats, in essence, the arguments she set out in the application and in her first statement of modification, as summarised in paragraph 39 above, seeking to establish that the Council erred in finding that she benefited from her spouse for the purposes of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 46 In its observations on the second statement of modification, the Council disputes the applicant’s arguments and, in essence, repeats the arguments it set out in the defence and in its observations on the first statement of modification, as summarised in paragraph 40 above. 47 In the present case, it should be noted that it is clear from the grounds of the fifth set of maintaining acts that the factual basis of the ground relied on in respect of the applicant, which relates to the second part of the amended (g) criterion and purportedly allows a finding that she benefits from her spouse, refers only, first, to his current or past positions within three bodies, namely the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (CCI) and the Sverdlovsk Regional Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (SOSPP), and, second, to her spouse’s former positions within the company TMK and Group Sinara (see paragraph 22 above). 48 Accordingly, given that the grounds for listing indicate a link between the applicant and her spouse’s positions referred to in paragraph 47 above, it is necessary to determine whether the factual basis relied on by the Council contains anything to demonstrate that those positions are capable of constituting a benefit from her spouse for the purposes of the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 49 Whether in relation to the positions of the applicant’s spouse within the three bodies referred to in paragraph 47 above or to his positions within the company TMK and Group Sinara, suffice it to note that the Council simply mentions those positions but adduces nothing capable of demonstrating in what respect the applicant benefited in any way from her spouse as a result. It follows that the Council cannot rely on those positions of the applicant’s spouse in order to justify maintaining her name on the lists at issue pursuant to the second part of the amended (g) criterion. 50 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant is therefore correct to claim that the factual basis on which the Council relied was insufficient to demonstrate that, at the time the fifth set of maintaining acts was adopted, she was benefiting, within the meaning of the second part of the amended (g) criterion, as a result of her spouse’s current or past positions. 51 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the Council’s arguments, first, that even though she claims to live in Dubai, she is still married to Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy and, second, that, as a housewife, the applicant does not have her own resources, making it impossible to imagine how, without help from her spouse, she could maintain her standard of living in Dubai, which is commonly known to be a very expensive place to live. 52 Irrespective of whether or not the applicant lives in Dubai and of whether or not she and Mr Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy are still married, it must be pointed out that the fact that she is allegedly a housewife and has no resources of her own with which she can support herself in Dubai is not mentioned in the grounds for listing in the fifth set of maintaining acts. Accordingly, unless a substitution of grounds is admitted, the Council cannot be permitted to rely on that fact to establish that those acts are well founded. 53 It should be added that, in any event, it cannot validly be argued that the applicant has no resources of her own enabling her to live in Dubai. Even if she is a housewife, the applicant has demonstrated, as supported by evidence annexed to her written pleadings, that she sold the shares that she held in Group Sinara for a sum enabling her to be financially independent of her spouse. 54 It follows from the foregoing that the Council has not discharged the burden of proof incumbent on it in order to establish that the applicant benefited from a leading businessperson operating in Russia, for the purposes of the amended criterion (g), as a result of the positions held by her spouse referred to in the grounds of the fifth set of maintaining acts. 55 The second plea in law must therefore be upheld and the fifth set of maintaining acts must be annulled in so far as those acts concern the applicant, without it being necessary to examine either the other pleas for annulment raised in support of the action or the first head of claim. The effects of annulment of the fourth and fifth sets of maintaining acts 56 In the context of its observations on the first and second statements of modification of the application, the Council has claimed that, in the event of the Court annulling the fourth and fifth sets of maintaining acts in so far as they concern the applicant, it should order that the effects of Decision 2024/847 and those of Decision 2024/2456 be maintained in respect of the applicant until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/849 and of Implementing Regulation 2024/2455 enters into force. 57 In that regard, it should be recalled that, by Decisions 2024/847 and 2024/2456, the Council updated the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures contained in Annex I to Decision 2014/145, as amended, respectively by adding the applicant’s name to it and by maintaining her name on it until 15 March 2025. 58 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2025/528), the Council updated the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures in Annex I to Decision 2014/145, as amended, respectively by adding the applicant’s name to it and by maintaining her name on it until 15 September 2025. 59 Therefore, although the annulment of Decisions 2022/337 and 2022/1530, in so far as they concern the applicant, entails the annulment of her listing in Annex I to Decision 2014/145, as amended, for the period from 12 March 2022 to 15 March 2025, that annulment does not, however, extend to Decision 2025/528, to which the present action does not relate. 60 Consequently, since the applicant is, currently, subject to new restrictive measures, the Council’s claim relating to the temporal effects of annulment of Decisions 2024/847 and 2024/2456 has become devoid of purpose. Costs 61 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 62 In the present case, since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as the name of Ms Galina Evgenyevna Pumpyanskaya was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies to which those restrictive measures apply; 2. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Ms Galina Evgenyevna Pumpyanskaya. Mastroianni Brkan Tóth Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 April 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.