Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2022:314
Date: 2022-06-01
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Economic and monetary policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: United Kingdom

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. According to consistent case-law, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. Whilst the body of the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to extracts from documents annexed thereto, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot make up for the absence of the essential arguments in law which, in accordance with the abovementioned provisions, must appear in the application (see judgments of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v Commission, T‑201/04, EU:T:2007:289, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited, and of 5 October 2020, HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission, T‑380/17, EU:T:2020:471, paragraph 92 (not published) and the case-law cited). Furthermore, it is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see judgments of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v Commission, T‑201/04, EU:T:2007:289, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited, and of 24 September 2019, Netherlands and Others v Commission, T‑760/15 and T‑636/16, EU:T:2019:669, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, MasterCard and Others v Commission, C‑382/12 P, EU:C:2014:2201, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 300 In the absence of any argument in the reply, the applicants’ general references to the supplemental expert report annexed to the reply cannot be examined. 301 It should be noted that in valuation 2 Deloitte explained, for each of the categories of assets, the method used for their valuation and the uncertainties justifying the adjustments made. It follows from the foregoing that the applicants’ arguments do not call into question the adjustments made by Deloitte in valuation 2 concerning the different categories of assets of Banco Popular and do not support the conclusion that valuation 2 was not ‘fair, prudent and realistic’ in accordance with Article 20(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. 302 In the alternative, the applicants also claim that the assessment carried out by Deloitte in valuation 2 with regard to four key elements, which they claim are not impacted by the methodology applicable to the valuation, resulted in an undervaluation of Banco Popular’s value of EUR 4.8 to EUR 5 billion. The applicants refer to the adjustment of the deferred tax assets, the failure to take into account intangible assets, notably the core deposit intangibles, the overestimation of the legal contingencies and the underestimation of the value of joint ventures, subsidiaries and associates, appearing in valuation 2. 303 In that regard, suffice it to state, first, that the applicants merely make a comparison between the estimates in valuation 2 and those in their supplemental expert report. Second, they do not explain how, for the assessment of those four categories of assets, the valuation method is irrelevant. 304 Accordingly, the second complaint must be rejected. Third complaint, relating to the range used in valuation 2 305 The applicants submit that the breadth of the range in valuation 2 and the fact that it departed from the recent valuations of Banco Popular’s net assets should have alerted the SRB and the Commission to the fact that that valuation was not a ‘fair, prudent and realistic valuation’ and did not provide a reliable basis for adopting the resolution scheme. 306 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in valuation 2, Deloitte stated that the outcome of its assessment was in a range of between EUR 1.3 billion and minus EUR 8.2 billion, with the best estimate within that range being minus EUR 2 billion. 307 In the first place, the applicants claim that the breadth of the range indicated in valuation 2 shows that it was not reliable. 308 It should be noted that the breadth of the range is justified by the method used in valuation 2. 309 In that respect, with regard to the methodology used in valuation 2, Deloitte stated that it had adopted a category-by-category approach, adjusting the book values of each class of assets and liabilities in order to estimate profits and losses, and other adjustments that any purchaser would apply to the value. It produced a valuation range for each class of assets and liabilities. 310 That method complies with Article 2(3) of the regulatory technical standards, set out in Article 2(3) of Delegated Regulation 2018/345, according to which: ‘The valuer shall provide the best point estimate of the value of a given asset, liability, or combinations thereof. Where appropriate, the results of the valuation shall also be provided in the form of value ranges.’ 311 Thus, the addition of the lowest values for each class of assets and liabilities provided the low estimate of the range and the addition of the highest values provided the high estimate of the range. That method therefore explains the breadth of the range used in valuation 2. In addition, it must be borne in mind that it is apparent from the analysis of the first complaint that the determination of the disposal value is based on estimates which involve some uncertainties justifying the choice of the presentation of the results in the form of a range. 312 Moreover, as the Commission submits, given the size of Banco Popular’s total balance sheet, with a figure exceeding EUR 130 billion, the difference between the two values in the range represented only around 7% of the balance sheet. 313 In the reply, the applicants submit that that comparison is not relevant and that the breadth of the range, that is to say EUR 9.5 billion, should be compared with the value of Banco Popular’s net assets, that is to say EUR 10.78 billion. 314 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the Commission’s reference to the size of Banco Popular’s balance sheet is not intended to assess the accuracy of the range, but only to qualify its breadth. Second, the difference between the best- and the worst-case valuation scenario used by Deloitte is not comparable to the book value of Banco Popular’s net assets. 315 In the second place, the applicants submit that Banco Popular had taken the 2016 stress test and that, although Banco Popular faced liquidity problems, on 31 March 2017, its net assets amounted to EUR 10.78 billion, and its core small-medium enterprises (SMEs) franchise remained profitable. 316 In that regard, first, suffice it to state that Banco Popular’s stress test of 2016, published in July 2016, therefore concerns Banco Popular’s situation at a date several months before the date on which the resolution scheme was adopted and cannot be regarded as giving any indication of the financial development of Banco Popular. Second, the reference to net assets is not relevant, since they reflect only the book value of Banco Popular and not the disposal value on the date of the resolution. 317 Therefore, the third complaint must be dismissed. 318 It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicants have not shown that valuation 2 was not ‘fair, prudent and realistic’ within the meaning of Article 20(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. 319 It must be concluded that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in approving the resolution scheme in so far as it was based on valuation 2. 320 Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard 321 The applicants claim that the Commission infringed their right to be heard by adopting the contested decision without affording them the opportunity to make representations. They submit that they were not heard during the resolution procedure, even though their interests were individually and directly affected by the contested decision. The Commission is required to ensure that the applicants are heard in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, even though Regulation No 806/2014 does not so provide. 322 They submit that, if the SRB and the Commission had respected their right to be heard, they could have made representations effectively, even within a short period of time. The applicants could have addressed the issue of the correct valuation of Banco Popular and, in view of the evidence put forward under the fourth plea, it is likely that the SRB or the Commission would have had a different opinion on the valuation of Banco Popular, which would have led to the adoption of a resolution scheme different from the one endorsed by the contested decision. 323 The Commission contends that the procedure provided for in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 leads to the adoption of a measure of general application as regards the shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution and that Article 41 of the Charter is not applicable. It submits, in the alternative, that the applicants’ lack of opportunity to be heard is justified under Article 52(1) of the Charter. 324 It should be recalled that Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter provides that the right to good administration includes the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken. 325 The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. In addition, it should be stated that the right to be heard pursues a dual objective. First, it enables the case to be examined and the facts to be established in as precise and correct a manner as possible, and second, it ensures the effective protection of the person concerned. The right to be heard is intended, inter alia, to guarantee that any decision adversely affecting a person is adopted in full knowledge of the facts, and its purpose is to enable the competent authority to correct an error or to enable the person concerned to submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (see judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker, C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited). 326 It should be noted that the Court of Justice has affirmed the importance of the right to be heard and its very broad scope in the EU legal order, taking the view that that right must apply to any procedure which is liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting a person. In accordance with the case‑law of the Court of Justice, observance of the right to be heard is required even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see judgments of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 85 and 86 and the case-law cited; of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited; and of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). 327 Therefore, in the light of its character as a fundamental general principle of EU law, the application of the principle of the rights of the defence, which include the right to be heard, cannot be excluded or restricted by any legislative provision. Respect for that principle must therefore be ensured both where there is no specific legislation and also where legislation exists which does not itself take account of that principle (see judgment of 18 June 2014, Spain v Commission, T‑260/11, EU:T:2014:555, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 328 First of all, it should be noted that the resolution scheme adopted by the SRB has as its purpose the resolution of Banco Popular which must therefore be regarded as the person with regard to whom an individual measure is adopted and to whom the right to be heard is guaranteed by Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter. 329 Thus, it must be borne in mind that the applicants are not addressees of the resolution scheme, which is not an individual decision taken against them, or of the contested decision approving that resolution scheme. 330 However, it must be stated that, in accordance with Article 21(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the SRB exercised the power to write down or convert the capital instruments in Banco Popular. 331 Therefore, the procedure followed by the SRB to adopt the resolution scheme, even though it does not constitute an individual procedure initiated against the applicants, may lead to the adoption of a measure liable to have an adverse effect on their interests in their capacity as holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular. 332 The case-law of the Court of Justice, cited in paragraph 326 above, adopted a broad interpretation of the right to be heard as being guaranteed to every person in proceedings that are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person. 333 In addition, first, according to recital 121 of Regulation No 806/2014, that regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in particular by the Charter, including the right of defence, and should be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles. Second, no provision of Regulation No 806/2014 expressly excludes or restricts the right to be heard of shareholders or holders of capital instruments in the entity concerned in the course of the resolution procedure. 334 In that regard, it should be noted that the applicants do not raise a plea of illegality against Regulation No 806/2014 in that it does not provide for the holders of capital instruments to be given a prior hearing before a resolution scheme is adopted. They submit that they should be recognised as having the right to be heard in the resolution procedure for Banco Popular pursuant to Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter. 335 However, if the shareholders and creditors of the entity covered by the resolution action can rely on the right to be heard as part of the resolution procedure, the exercise of that right may be subject to limitations, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 336 Article 52(1) of the Charter states: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 337 However, the Court of Justice has held that fundamental rights, such as observance of the rights of the defence, do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not constitute, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed (see judgments of 10 September 2013, G. and R., C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 20 December 2017, Prequ’ Italia, C‑276/16, EU:C:2017:1010, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 338 It follows that the failure to hear the applicants, in their capacity as holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular, as part of the resolution procedure, whether by the SRB or by the Commission, could be justified. 339 It should be recalled that, in Article 4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB took the view that the resolution of Banco Popular was in the public interest in so far as it was necessary and proportionate to the achievement of two objectives referred to in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 806/2014, namely to avoid significant negative effects on financial stability and to ensure the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular. It stated that winding up Banco Popular under normal insolvency proceedings would not achieve those objectives to the same extent. In the contested decision, the Commission expressly approved the reasons put forward by the SRB to justify the need for resolution action in the public interest. 340 In the present case, the restriction of the applicants’ right to be heard may be justified, first, by the objective of stability of the financial markets and, second, by the need to ensure the effectiveness of the resolution of Banco Popular, which had to be carried out speedily. 341 In the first place, it should be noted that several recitals in Regulation No 806/2014, in particular recitals 12, 58 and 61, state that the stability of the financial markets is one of the objectives pursued by the resolution mechanisms established by that regulation. 342 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 18(5) of Regulation No 806/2014, a resolution action is to be treated as being in the public interest if it is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 of that regulation, and winding up of the entity under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent. The resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014 include, inter alia, ‘[avoiding] significant adverse effects on financial stability, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline’, and ‘[protecting] public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support’. 343 In that regard, the Court of Justice noted that financial services play a central role in the economy of the European Union. Banks and credit institutions are an essential source of funding for businesses that are active in the various markets. Furthermore, banks are often closely interconnected and many of them operate at an international level. For that reason, the failure of one or more banks risks spreading rapidly to other banks either in the Member State concerned or in other Member States. That is liable, in turn, to produce negative spill-over effects in other sectors of the economy (judgments of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 50; of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 72; and of 25 March 2021, Balgarska Narodna Banka, C‑501/18, EU:C:2021:249, paragraph 108). 344 The Court of Justice has held that the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending and minimising distortions of competition constitutes an overriding public interest (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 69). 345 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) held, in its decision of 1 April 2004, Camberrow MM5 AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2004:0401DEC005035799, § 6), that, in delicate economic areas such as the stability of the banking system, the States enjoyed a wider margin of appreciation and that, therefore, the impossibility for a shareholder to participate in the proceedings leading to the sale of the bank was not disproportionate to the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of creditors and safeguarding the proper administration of the bank’s bankruptcy estate. 346 Reference should also be made to the judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others (C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836), delivered in response to a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Articles 8, 25 and 29 of Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of [the second paragraph of Article 54 TFEU], in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (OJ 1977 L 26, p. 1). That case concerned an exceptional measure by the national authorities aimed at preventing, by means of an increase in capital, the failure of a company which, according to the referring court, threatened the financial stability of the European Union. The Court of Justice held that the protection conferred by Second Directive 77/91 on the shareholders and creditors of a public limited liability company, with respect to its share capital, did not extend to a national measure of that kind that is adopted in a situation where there is a serious disturbance of the economy and financial system of a Member State and that is designed to overcome a systemic threat to the financial stability of the European Union, due to a capital shortfall in the company concerned (judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others, C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836, paragraph 50). The Court of Justice added that the provisions of Second Directive 77/91 did not therefore preclude an exceptional measure affecting the share capital of a public limited liability company taken by the national authorities where there was a serious disturbance of the economy and financial system of a Member State, without the approval of the general meeting of that company, with the objective of preventing a systemic risk and ensuring the financial stability of the European Union (see judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others, C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). 347 Those considerations apply, by analogy, to the situation of former owners of capital instruments in a bank which has been placed under resolution pursuant to Regulation No 806/2014, such as the applicants. 348 It follows from the foregoing that the resolution procedure, established by Regulation No 806/2014 and described in Article 18, pursues an objective in the general interest within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial markets, capable of justifying a limitation on the right to be heard. 349 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicants do not dispute that the procedure for the resolution of Banco Popular complied with the objective of ensuring financial stability referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014. 350 In that regard, in Article 4.4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB explained that it had concluded that Banco Popular’s situation gave rise to an increased risk of significant adverse effects on financial stability in Spain on the basis of various elements. Those elements include, first, the size and relevance of Banco Popular which was the parent undertaking of the sixth largest banking group in Spain, with total assets of EUR 147 billion, and which was classified by the Bank of Spain in 2017 as a significant institution of a systemic nature. The SRB noted, inter alia, that Banco Popular was one of the main market participants in Spain, with a significant market share in the segment of small and medium-sized entreprises (SMEs) and that it had a relatively high market share of deposits (almost 6%) and a large number of retail clients (approximately 1.4 million) throughout Spain. Second, the SRB took into account the nature of Banco Popular’s business, which was structured around commercial banking activities and focused primarily on offering financing, savings management and financial services to individuals, families and companies (particularly SMEs). According to the SRB, the similarity between Banco Popular’s business model and that of other Spanish commercial banks contributes to the potential for indirect contagion to those banks which might have been perceived as facing the same difficulties. 351 Furthermore, it should be noted that the second objective pursued by the resolution scheme, namely to ensure the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular, also contributes to the general interest objective of protecting the stability of the financial markets. 352 Under Article 2(1)(35) of Directive 2014/59, the critical functions of an institution are defined as ‘activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations’. 353 In that regard, Article 6(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/778 of 2 February 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59 with regard to the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions may be partially or entirely deferred, and on the criteria for the determination of the activities, services and operations with regard to critical functions, and for the determination of the business lines and associated services with regard to core business lines (OJ 2016 L 131, p. 41), lays down the criteria for determining critical functions. It is a function provided by an institution to third parties who are not affiliated to the institution or group, the sudden disruption of which would likely have a material negative impact on those third parties, would give rise to contagion or would undermine the general confidence of market participants due to the systemic relevance of the function for third parties and the systemic relevance of the institution or group in providing that function. 354 Thus, the objective of ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of the entity concerned by a resolution action, provided for in Article 14(2)(a) of Regulation No 806/2014, is intended to prevent a break in those functions which could lead to disruption, not only on the market concerned, but also for the overall financial stability of the European Union. 355 Accordingly, since resolution action is intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of a credit institution, in particular in so far as it constitutes an alternative to its liquidation, it must be regarded as effectively meeting an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 March 2021, Balgarska Narodna Banka, C‑501/18, EU:C:2021:249, paragraph 108). 356 In that regard, in Article 4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB stated that the resolution of Banco Popular was necessary and proportionate to achieving, inter alia, the objective of ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular. In Article 4.4 of the resolution scheme, the SRB identified three critical functions of Banco Popular, within the meaning of Article 6 of Delegated Regulation 2016/778, namely deposit taking from households and non-financial corporations, lending to SMEs, and payment and cash services. 357 The applicants have not put forward any argument to dispute those findings. 358 It follows from the foregoing that the resolution procedure for Banco Popular pursued an objective of general interest, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial markets, capable of justifying a limitation on the right to be heard. 359 In the second place, the general interest of the European Union, in particular the pursuit of the objectives of maintaining the stability of the financial markets and ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular, requires that, once the conditions laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 have been fulfilled, resolution action must be adopted as soon as possible. 360 In that regard, a number of recitals in Regulation No 806/2014 imply that, when a resolution action becomes necessary, it must be adopted quickly. Those are, inter alia, recitals 26, 31 and 53, and especially recital 56 of that regulation which states that, in order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. 361 The Court of Justice has held that the objective of Regulation No 806/2014 is to establish, in accordance with recital 8, more efficient resolution mechanisms, which must be an essential instrument to avoid damage that has resulted from failures of banks in the past and that that objective presupposes a speedy decision-making process, as the short time limits laid down in Article 18 of that regulation illustrate, so that financial stability is not jeopardised (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 55). 362 Thus, Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 states, inter alia, that, where the ECB considers that an entity is failing or is likely to fail, it is to communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the SRB. According to paragraph 2 of that article, where the SRB itself carries out an assessment, it is to be communicated to the ECB without delay. If the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are met, the SRB must adopt a resolution scheme which, pursuant to Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, is to be transmitted to the Commission immediately after its adoption. The Commission then has 24 hours in which to endorse a resolution scheme or raise objections. 363 It follows that once the entity satisfies the conditions for the adoption of a resolution action, that is to say, first, that it is failing or is likely to fail, second, that there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable time frame and, third, that its resolution is necessary to achieve one or more of the objectives referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014, Article 18 of that regulation provides that a decision must be adopted within a very short time frame. 364 Thus, in the present case, since the ECB found that Banco Popular was failing or was likely to fail and the SRB considered that the conditions laid down in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 had been met, the resolution scheme had to be adopted as soon as possible. 365 That rapid decision was justified by the need to ensure the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular and to avoid the significant negative effects of Banco Popular’s situation on the financial markets, by preventing, inter alia, contagion risks. In the present case, since Banco Popular’s failure occurred on a weekday, it was necessary to complete the process and to adopt the decision before the opening of the markets on the morning of 7 June 2017. 366 As Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona made clear, in point 80 of his Opinion in Joined Cases ABLV Bank and Others v ECB (C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:16), the speed with which those institutions and agencies of the European Union must take their decisions is necessary in order to ensure that the resolution of the banking institution does not have an adverse impact on the financial markets and that need for speed also requires them to have the decision ‘prepared’ before they launch the procedure in order to take advantage of the financial markets being closed. 367 Speed in taking a decision was therefore a condition of its effectiveness. 368 Thus, the Court of Justice has already ruled that the urgency requiring immediate action by the competent authority justified a limitation of the right to be heard of the persons concerned by measures adopted in the field of environmental liability (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 67) and in the field of agriculture (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2006, Dokter and Others, C‑28/05, EU:C:2006:408, paragraph 76). 369 Moreover, in the field of fund-freezing measures, the Court of Justice has held that the communication of the grounds on which the initial inclusion of the name of a person or entity in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures is based, prior to that inclusion, would be liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of the freezing of funds and economic resources imposed by EU law. In order to attain the objective pursued by the applicable regulation, such measures must, by their very nature, take advantage of a surprise effect and apply with immediate effect (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 338 to 340; of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 51). 370 Nor are the EU authorities bound to hear the appellants before their names are included for the first time in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, for reasons also connected to the objective pursued by EU law and to the effectiveness of the measures provided by that law (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 341, and of 25 April 2013, Gbagbo v Council, T‑119/11, not published, EU:T:2013:216, paragraph 103). 371 That is all the more true in cases such as the present one where the restriction on the right to be heard concerns, not the entity covered by the resolution procedure, namely Banco Popular, but the applicants in their capacity as holders of capital instruments in that institution. 372 It should also be noted that, in its decision of 1 April 2004, Camberrow MM5 AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2004:0401DEC005035799), the ECtHR found that the sale of the bankrupt bank as a going concern had been effected in order to achieve the prompt and more certain satisfaction of its creditors, who had been waiting for years to receive their dues, and the quick completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the need for simplicity and speed in the procedure leading to the sale of the bank was of paramount importance. If the law provided that the bankruptcy court was under an obligation to consult with all shareholders and creditors of the bank, that would have led to a substantial slowing down of the proceedings and, consequently, to a further delay in the payment of the creditors’ dues and in the completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. 373 In the judgment of 24 November 2005, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2005:1124JUD004942999, § 136), the ECtHR held that, in such a sensitive economic area as the stability of the banking system and in certain situations, there may be a paramount need to act expeditiously and without advance notice in order to avoid irreparable harm to the bank, its depositors and other creditors, or the banking and financial system as a whole. 374 Furthermore, the fact that the resolution scheme may lead to an interference with the applicants’ right to property cannot justify an obligation to grant them a right to be heard before it is adopted. 375 In that regard, the General Court has already highlighted in paragraph 282 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486) that the applicable provisions must offer the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the competent authorities. In order to ensure compliance with that requirement, which constitutes a requirement inherent in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 368 and the case-law cited; of 25 April 2013, Gbagbo v Council, T‑119/11, not published, EU:T:2013:216, paragraph 119, and ECtHR, 20 July 2004, Bäckv. Finland, CE:ECHR:2004:0720JUD003759897, § 56). Therefore, that requirement cannot be interpreted as meaning that the interested person must, in all circumstances, be able to make his or her views known to the competent authorities prior to the adoption of measures infringing his or her right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 19 September 2006, Maupas and Others v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:0919JUD001384402, §§ 20 and 21). 376 The General Court considered that that was the case, in particular where, as in the present case, the measures at issue did not constitute a penalty and were implemented in a context of particular urgency. On that last point, the General Court noted that it concerned prevention of an imminent risk of collapse of the banks concerned in order to protect the stability of the financial system of a Member State and, therefore, to prevent contagion to other Member States of the euro area. The establishment of a prior consultation procedure, in the context of which the thousands of depositors and shareholders of the banks concerned could have usefully made their views known prior to the adoption of the harmful provisions, would inevitably have delayed the application of measures seeking to prevent such a collapse. The achievement of the objective consisting in protecting the stability of the financial system of that Member State and, therefore, preventing contagion to other Member States of the euro area would have been exposed to serious risks (see judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486 paragraph 282 and the case-law cited). 377 That assessment was confirmed by the Court of Justice which held that the General Court had correctly based its reasoning on the judgment of the ECtHR of 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece (CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614), from which it is clear that the requirement that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law cannot be interpreted as meaning that the persons concerned should have been consulted before the adoption of that law, in particular where such prior consultation would inevitably have delayed the application of the measures designed to prevent the collapse of the banks concerned (judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraph 159). 378 Furthermore, it must be concluded that the need to act swiftly without informing the shareholders and creditors of an entity that a resolution procedure concerning that entity is imminent is intended to avoid the worsening of that entity’s situation which would undermine the effectiveness of the resolution action. Informing the shareholders or bondholders of the bank that it might be under resolution, and therefore that it was considered to be failing or likely to fail, could encourage them to sell their securities on the markets and also lead to a massive withdrawal of deposits, which would have the effect of exacerbating the bank’s financial situation and making it more difficult, or even impossible, to adopt a solution likely to prevent its liquidation. 379 In that respect, as is apparent from recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, cited in paragraph 187 above, any information provided in respect of a decision before it is taken, be it on whether the conditions for resolution are satisfied, on the use of a specific tool or on any action during the proceedings, must be presumed to have effects on the public and private interests concerned by the action. 380 It should be noted that, in the application, the applicants accept that the mere suggestion that the SRB is in the process of considering whether to use its powers with respect to a particular entity would inevitably be a market significant event leading investors, creditors or depositors to take protective steps to avoid loss. 381 It must therefore be concluded that hearing the applicants before the resolution scheme was adopted or before the contested decision was adopted would have entailed a substantial slowdown in the procedure and, therefore, would have compromised both the attainment of the objectives of the action and its effectiveness. 382 In that regard, the applicants submit that the Commission and the SRB examined the potential need for resolution action for several weeks before the contested decision was adopted, which would have given the Commission sufficient time to hear the applicants. 383 Suffice it to note that, before 6 June 2017, the date on which the ECB found that Banco Popular was failing or was likely to fail, and before the SRB’s decision to implement the resolution procedure, Banco Popular’s resolution was merely a possibility. In addition, the applicants do not explain when the Commission ought to have consulted the holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular, and it is appropriate to bear in mind that their identity could change given that the capital instruments can be traded on the markets. 384 It follows, first, that a prior hearing of the applicants, informing them of the existence of a potential resolution action, would have led to a risk of them adopting conduct on the market that exacerbated the financial situation of Banco Popular. Such a hearing could thus have undermined the effectiveness of the resolution envisaged. 385 Second, in view of the urgent need to adopt the resolution scheme, it was not possible to consult the applicants beforehand in the same way as the other shareholders or holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular, not only because of the difficulties associated with identifying them, but also because it was impossible to analyse effectively their observations before the adoption of the resolution scheme or the contested decision. 386 It follows from all of the foregoing that hearing the applicants, before the adoption of the resolution scheme or the contested decision, would have undermined the objectives of protecting the stability of the financial markets and the continuity of the entity’s critical functions, and the requirements of speed and effectiveness of the resolution procedure. 387 Therefore, the failure to hear the applicants in the context of the resolution procedure for Banco Popular constitutes a limitation on the right to be heard which is justified and necessary in order to meet an objective of general interest and respects the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 388 Consequently, the sixth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to property 389 The applicants submit that the resolution scheme endorsed by the contested decision infringes their right to property, enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter. They argue that the resolution scheme endorsed by the contested decision expropriated them of their capital instruments. The write-down of capital instruments decided by the resolution scheme is an unlawful expropriation which does not meet the requirements of Article 17(1) of the Charter, in that it does not comply with the conditions ‘provided for by law’ and does not provide for fair compensation. 390 Article 17(1) of the Charter states the following: ‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions except in the public interest and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.’ 391 According to settled case-law, the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter is not absolute and its exercise may be subject to limitations justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. Consequently, as is apparent from Article 52(1) of the Charter, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of the right to property, provided that the restrictions genuinely meet objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right guaranteed (see judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 69 and 70 and the case-law cited; judgments of 16 July 2020, Adusbef and Others, C‑686/18, EU:C:2020:567, paragraph 85, and of 23 May 2019, Steinhoff and Others v ECB, T‑107/17, EU:T:2019:353, paragraph 100). 392 It follows that the right to property is not an absolute right, but that, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, cited in paragraph 336 above, it may be subject to limitations if they are provided for in the applicable texts, are necessary for the pursuit of a general objective and are proportionate to that objective. 393 It should be recalled that, in Article 6 of the resolution scheme, the SRB decided, pursuant to Article 21 of Regulation No 806/2014, to write down and convert the capital instruments in Banco Popular in accordance with the detailed rules set out in paragraph 73 above. 394 In addition, it is apparent, first, from recital 61 of Regulation No 806/2014 that restrictions on the rights of shareholders and creditors should comply with the principles set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter and, second, from recital 62 of that regulation that infringements of property rights should not be disproportionate. 395 According to Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 806/2014, concerning the general principles governing resolution, the shareholders of the institution under resolution are the first to bear the losses. 396 In that regard, the Court of Justice has held that, as regards the shareholders of banks, in accordance with the general rules applicable to the status of shareholders of public limited liability companies, they must fully bear the risk of their investments (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 73). 397 The Court of Justice has held in the field of State aid that, since the shareholders are liable for the debts of the bank up to the amount of its share capital, the fact that points 40 to 46 of the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) (OJ 2013 C 216, p. 1) require that, in order to remedy the capital shortfall of a bank, prior to the grant of State aid, those shareholders should contribute to the absorption of the losses suffered by that bank to the same extent as if there were no State aid, cannot be regarded as adversely affecting their right to property (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 74). 398 It must be held, by analogy, that the decision in the resolution scheme to write down and convert capital instruments in Banco Popular held by the applicants is the consequence of the fact that the shareholders of an entity must bear the risks inherent in their investments and of the fact that, since that entity is under resolution because of its failure, they must bear the economic consequences of that. 399 In that regard, the General Court has already held that a measure consisting in the reduction of the nominal value of the shares in a Cypriot bank was proportionate to the objective pursued by that measure. It noted, first of all, that that measure was intended to contribute to the recapitalisation of the bank and that that measure was appropriate for the objective of ensuring the stability of the Cypriot financial system and the euro area as a whole. Next, it found that that measure did not exceed the limits of what was appropriate and necessary in order to achieve that objective, since less restrictive alternatives were not feasible or would not have enabled the expected results to be achieved. Finally, it considered that, in the light of the importance of the objective pursued, the measure did not create disproportionate disadvantages. It recalled, in that regard, that the shareholders of banks bear the full risk of their investments (judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 330). 400 In those circumstances, the General Court concluded that it cannot be considered that the reduction of the nominal value of the shares of that bank constituted disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the shareholders’ right to property (judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 331). 401 In addition, it should be recalled that it is apparent from the case-law, cited in paragraph 343 above, that financial services play a central role in the EU economy and that the failure of one or more banks is likely to spread rapidly to other banks either in the Member State concerned or in other Member States. 402 The Court of Justice has already ruled that, in view of the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking system in the euro area, and having regard to the imminent risk of financial losses to which depositors with the banks concerned would have been exposed if those banks had failed, certain restrictions on the right to property may be justified (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 74). 403 The Court of Justice has also held that, although there is a clear public interest in ensuring throughout the European Union a strong and consistent protection of investors, that interest cannot be held to prevail in all circumstances over the public interest in ensuring the stability of the financial system (judgments of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 91, and of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others, C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836, paragraph 54). 404 It must be recalled that, in Article 4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB considered that resolution was necessary and proportionate to the objectives laid down in Article 14(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 806/2014, seeking to ensure the continuity of critical functions and to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline. It stated that the liquidation of Banco Popular under normal insolvency proceedings would not achieve those objectives to the same extent. In the contested decision, the Commission expressly endorsed the reasons put forward by the SRB to justify resolution action in the public interest. 405 Thus, the resolution scheme in so far as it was intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of Banco Popular and, in particular, in so far as it constituted an alternative to its liquidation, met an objective of general interest within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely to ensure the stability of the financial markets. 406 The applicants state that they do not call into question the compatibility of the Single Resolution Mechanism as provided for in Regulation No 806/2014 with the Charter and that they accept that the resolution of a failing bank in accordance with the provisions of that regulation, intended to protect the stability of the banking system, lawfully pursues a public interest. 407 In the first place, the applicants submit that the decision to write down and convert the capital instruments in Banco Popular which they held is contrary to the requirements of Article 17(1) of the Charter in so far as it did not comply with the conditions laid down by law. The resolution scheme and the contested decision do not comply with the general principles of EU law or the provisions of Regulation No 806/2014 on the grounds set out in their other pleas. 408 In that regard, suffice it to state that it is clear from the analysis of the other pleas that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in the application of the provisions of Regulation No 806/2014, nor did it breach general principles of law. 409 In addition, first, it must be noted that, in their other pleas, the applicants do not dispute that the conditions laid down in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 justifying the adoption of the resolution scheme were satisfied. Second, the applicants do not put forward any specific arguments seeking to establish that the write down and conversion of the capital instruments decided on by the SRB, which is the measure capable of infringing their right to property, is not consistent with the provisions of Article 21 of Regulation No 806/2014 and that the Commission therefore should not have endorsed it. 410 It follows that the applicants have not put forward any argument capable of calling into question, first, the fact that the SRB’s decision to write down and convert the capital instruments in Banco Popular complied with the conditions laid down in Regulation No 806/2014 and, second, the fact that that decision was necessary for the pursuit of a general objective capable of justifying a restriction on the right to property. 411 In the second place, the applicants submit that the resolution scheme and the contested decision infringe Article 17(1) of the Charter in that they do not provide for the grant of any compensation to them. 412 It should be noted that Article 15(1)(g) of Regulation No 806/2014 establishes that no creditor will incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the entity under resolution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. 413 In order to determine whether the shareholders and creditors would have benefited from better treatment if the entity concerned had been subject to normal insolvency proceedings, Article 20(16) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that a valuation is to be carried out after resolution. According to Article 20(17) of Regulation No 806/2014, that valuation establishes whether there is a difference between the treatment that shareholders and creditors would have received if the institution had entered normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision on resolution action was taken and the actual treatment which they received under the resolution. 414 If, following that valuation, it is established that the shareholders or creditors have incurred greater losses under the resolution than those they would have incurred in a winding-up under normal insolvency proceedings, Article 76(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that the SRB may use the SRF to pay them compensation. 415 It follows that Regulation No 806/2014 establishes a mechanism to ensure fair compensation for the shareholders or creditors of the entity under resolution, in accordance with the requirements of Article 17(1) of the Charter. 416 In addition, contrary to the applicants’ submission, the fact that they did not receive compensation on the date of the resolution scheme is not sufficient to establish an infringement of their right to property, since Article 17(1) of the Charter does not provide for the payment of compensation concomitant with the restriction of the right to property, but for payment in good time. 417 Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ arguments challenging valuation 3 raised in the reply, relating to Deloitte’s lack of independence and the infringement of their right of access to the file, suffice it to state that they are ineffective. Those arguments concern valuation 3 which was carried out after the adoption of the contested decision and a separate procedure, and they are therefore not capable of calling into question the lawfulness of the contested decision. 418 In the third place, in the reply, the applicants submit that compensation determined on the basis of the difference in treatment of creditors under resolution action and in normal insolvency proceedings does not constitute fair compensation within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Charter. They submit that, had the Commission complied with EU law, the contested decision would not have been adopted or the resolution scheme would have taken a different form, and therefore the payment of compensation under Article 76(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 does not constitute fair compensation. The true measure of compensation must be measured by reference to the proper counterfactual scenario, which is no resolution followed by a private solution or, alternatively, resolution action based on a proper valuation of Banco Popular. 419 It should be borne in mind that the purpose of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, referred to in Article 15(1)(g) of Regulation No 806/2014, is to ensure that, if the infringement of the applicants’ right to property resulting from the resolution scheme is greater than that which they would have suffered if Banco Popular had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, they would be entitled to compensation. 420 In the present case, the SRB stated in the resolution scheme that the conditions laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 were satisfied, namely that Banco Popular was failing or was likely to fail, that no alternative private sector or supervisory action could prevent its failure having regard to timing and that the resolution action was necessary in the public interest. It should be borne in mind that the applicants do not dispute that those conditions were satisfied in the present case. 421 It follows that, if the resolution scheme had not been adopted, the alternative was the liquidation of Banco Popular under normal insolvency proceedings, which the applicants acknowledged at the hearing. 422 In addition, it is apparent from the analysis of the third plea in law that the counterfactual scenario relied on by the applicants and included in their supplemental expert report, consisting in Banco Popular not being placed under resolution, followed by a private solution, is not relevant. 423 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicants submit, the value of their investment must not be calculated having regard to the situation before the adoption of the resolution scheme, but rather relates to a situation in which the resolution scheme was not adopted, which equates to a situation in which Banco Popular is liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. 424 In that regard, in the field of State aid, the Court of Justice has held that the scale of losses suffered by shareholders of distressed banks will, in any event, be the same, regardless of whether those losses are caused by a court insolvency order because no State aid is granted or by a procedure for the granting of State aid which is subject to the prerequisite of burden-sharing (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 75). 425 The Court of Justice noted that paragraph 46 of the Banking Communication provides that ‘the “no creditor worse off” principle should be adhered to’ and that ‘thus, subordinated creditors should not receive less in economic terms than what their instrument would have been worth if no State aid were to be granted’ (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 77). 426 According to the Court of Justice, it follows from that paragraph that the burden-sharing measures on which the grant of State aid in favour of a bank showing a shortfall is dependent cannot cause any detriment to the right to property of subordinated creditors which those creditors would not have suffered within insolvency proceedings that followed such aid not being granted. In those circumstances, it cannot reasonably be maintained that burden-sharing measures, such as those laid down by the Banking Communication, constitute interference in the right to property of the shareholders and the subordinated creditors (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraphs 78 and 79). 427 Furthermore, as regards securities, the amount of the compensation payable is calculated in relation to the true market value of those securities at the time of the adoption of the contested regulation, and not in relation to its nominal value or the amount the owner thereof hoped to receive at the time of its acquisition (see judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 314 and the case-law cited). 428 It must therefore be held, by analogy, that the application in the present case of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, as provided for in Article 15(1)(g) of Regulation No 806/2014, guarantees the applicants fair compensation in accordance with the requirements of Article 17(1) of the Charter. 429 It follows from all of the foregoing, first, that Banco Popular was failing or was likely to fail and that there were no alternative measures capable of preventing that situation, second, that without resolution, Banco Popular would have entered into normal insolvency proceedings and, third, that the shareholders of Banco Popular had to bear the risk of their investments and Regulation No 806/2014 provides for the possible payment of compensation in accordance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the decision to write down and convert Banco Popular’s capital instruments in the resolution scheme does not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the applicants’ right to property, but must be regarded as a justified and proportionate restriction on their right to property, in accordance with Article 17(1) and Article 52(1) of the Charter. 430 Moreover, it should be noted that the applicants submit that the treatment under normal insolvency proceedings is the correct yardstick for determining compensation where a bank has been legally resolved. In the present case, they claim that, since the resolution scheme did not comply with the provisions of Regulation No 806/2014, the compensation due to them should be based on the position they would have been in but for the unlawful acts. 431 It must be held that such an argument is not intended to establish an infringement of the right to property, but is in fact a claim for compensation for harm suffered as a result of an unlawful act committed by an EU institution, which may be awarded in the context of an action for damages. 432 Consequently, the fifth plea in law must be rejected. The applications for measures of organisation of procedure 433 In the application, the applicants submit requests for measures of organisation of procedure requesting the Court to order the Commission, the SRB and the ECB to produce certain documents. 434 It should be noted that, by its order for measures of inquiry of 21 May 2021, pursuant to Article 91(b), Article 92(3) and Article 103 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court ordered the Commission and the SRB to produce certain documents referred to in paragraph 93 above. By order of 16 June 2021, the Court held that the documents produced by the Commission and the SRB in their confidential version were not relevant to the outcome of the dispute. On the other hand, the letter from Banco Popular to the ECB of 6 June 2017, without its annex, was communicated to the other parties. 435 As regards applications made by a party for measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry, it must be recalled that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission, C‑619/13P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited; judgment of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS, C‑446/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 53). 436 In the present case, it must be noted that the elements in the case file and the explanations provided during the hearing are sufficient to allow the Court to give a ruling, since it has been able to give a proper ruling on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. 437 It follows that the applicants’ requests for measures of organisation of procedure must be rejected. 438 In the light of all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the applicants’ alternative head of claim seeking annulment of Article 1 of the contested decision. Costs 439 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and Banco Santander, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. 440 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, Member States and institutions which intervene in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Under Article 1(2)(f) of the Rules of Procedure, the term ‘institutions’ means the institutions of the European Union referred to in Article 13(1) TEU and the bodies, offices or agencies established by the Treaties, or by an act adopted in implementation thereof, which may be parties before the General Court. According to Article 42(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the SRB is an EU agency. The SRB shall therefore bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Algebris (UK) Ltd and Anchorage Capital Group LLC to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission and Banco Santander, SA.; 3. Orders the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to bear its own costs. Van der Woude Jaeger Kreuschitz De Baere Steinfatt Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 June 2022. E. Coulon G. De Baere Registrar President Table of contents Legal framework Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the action being brought The situation of Banco Popular before the resolution scheme was adopted Other facts prior to the adoption of the resolution scheme The resolution scheme for Banco Popular of 7 June 2017 Facts subsequent to the adoption of the resolution decision Procedure and forms of order sought Law First plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to examine the resolution scheme before endorsing it Second plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligations of professional secrecy and good administration Fourth plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment in the application of Articles 14, 18, 20 to 22 and 24 of Regulation No 806/2014 First complaint, relating to the reliability and provisional nature of valuation 2 Second complaint, relating to the adjustments made by Deloitte Third complaint, relating to the range used in valuation 2 Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to property The applications for measures of organisation of procedure Costs * Language of the case: English.