Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2023:429
Date: 2023-05-25
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: Asylum policy;Area of freedom, security and justice;Border checks
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Germany

Translation C-364/22 – 1 
Case C-364/22 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
7 June 2022 
Referring court: 
Verwaltungsgericht Minden (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
2 March 2022 
Applicants: 
J.B. 
S.B. 
F.B.  
Defendant: 
Federal Republic of Germany 
  
[…] 
VERWALTUNGSGERICHT MINDEN (Administrative Court, Minden) 
Order 
[…] 
In the administrative court proceedings of 
1. Mr J.B.,  
2. Mrs S.B., 
3. F.B., a minor, 
the third applicant being represented by her parents, the first and second 
applicants, 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 2. 3. 2022 – CASE C-364/22 
 
2  
Applicants, 
[…] 
v 
the Federal Republic of Germany […] 
Defendant, 
concerning  the right to asylum (Lebanon) 
in the present case: request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
the 1st Chamber of the Administrative Court, Minden, 
[…] on 2 March 2022, 
[…] 
[…] [composition of the chamber] 
ordered as follows: 
The proceedings are stayed. 
The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
for a preliminary ruling: 
1. Must Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EU be interpreted as precluding 
a national rule under which a further application for international protection must 
be refused as inadmissible irrespective of whether the applicant concerned 
returned to his or her country of origin after an application for international 
protection was rejected and before a further application for international 
protection was made? 
2. In the context of the answer to Question 1, does it make any difference 
whether the applicant concerned was removed to his or her country of origin or 
returned there voluntarily? 
3. Must Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EU be interpreted as precluding 
a Member State from refusing a further application for international protection as 
inadmissible where, although a decision on the granting of subsidiary protection 
status was not taken by way of the decision on the earlier application, grounds 
preventing removal were examined, and that examination is comparable in 
substance to the examination as to the granting of subsidiary protection status? 
4. Are the examination of grounds preventing removal and the examination as 
to the granting of subsidiary protection status comparable where, in the 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
 
3 
examination of grounds preventing removal, it was necessary cumulatively to 
examine whether, in the country to which the applicant concerned is to be 
removed, he or she faces 
(a) a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(b) a risk of being subjected to the death penalty or execution; 
(c) a risk of being the subject of an infringement of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights – ECHR); or 
(d) a real and significant threat to his or her life and limb or freedom; 
or whether he or she 
(e) is exposed, as a member of the civilian population, to a significant individual 
threat to life or limb in the context of an international or internal armed conflict? 
G r o u n d s: 
1 A. The applicants are Lebanese nationals. According to an extract from the 
Lebanese family register, the first applicant was born on 26 July 1980, the second 
applicant on 3 August 1987 and the third applicant on 23 January 2006. Copies of 
passports, which have now expired, have been presented for the first and second 
applicants. No such documents have been presented for the third applicant. 
2 The first applicant entered the Federal Republic of Germany for the first time in 
mid-November 2000 and made an application for asylum on 29 November 2000. 
By decision of 13 December 2000, the competent authority refused the first 
applicant’s application for recognition as a person entitled to asylum on the 
ground that it was manifestly unfounded (point 1) and found that the requirements 
of Paragraph 51(1) of the Ausländergesetz (Law on aliens; ‘the AuslG’) were 
manifestly not met (point 2). In addition, the competent authority found that there 
were no obstacles to removal under Paragraph 53 of the AuslG (point 3) and 
threatened the applicant with removal to Lebanon (point 4). On 13 August 2001, 
the first applicant was removed to Lebanon. 
3 In March 2010, the first applicant entered the Federal Republic of Germany again, 
and the second and third applicants entered the Federal Republic of Germany for 
the first time, and made applications for asylum on 29 March 2010. By decision of 
18 May 2010, the competent authority refused the second and third applicants’ 
applications for recognition as persons entitled to asylum (point 1) and found that 
the requirements for the granting of refugee status were not met (point 2). In 
addition, the competent authority found that there were no obstacles to removal 
under Paragraph 60(2) to (7) of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (Law on residence; ‘the 
AufenthG’) (point 3) and threatened the applicants with removal to Lebanon 
(point 4). By decision of 4 October 2010, the competent authority refused the first 
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applicant’s applications for a further asylum procedure (point 1) and for 
amendment of the decision of 14 December 2000 (note by the referring court: this 
should read ‘decision of 13 December 2000’) with regard to the finding 
concerning Paragraph 53(1) to (6) of the AuslG (point 2). On 17 March 2011, the 
applicants voluntarily departed the territory and travelled to Lebanon. 
4 At the beginning of January 2021, the applicants entered the Federal Republic of 
Germany again together with a son born of the first and second applicants on 
13 April 2011, and made applications for asylum on 11 February 2021. At their 
interview held by staff of the competent authority, the applicants substantiated 
their asylum applications, in essence, as follows: the situation in Lebanon is no 
longer safe. The currency depreciation had hit them hard. In addition, there are 
daily disputes between the groups in the area. Hezbollah has created a parallel 
State. They are therefore afraid that something bad would happen to them in 
Lebanon. In addition, her two older sons had been radicalised by Hezbollah, and, 
when one of them had been injured in the war, they had found out about this 
through a third person. 
5 By decision of 11 August 2021, the competent authority refused the asylum 
applications as inadmissible (point 1). In addition, it refused the applicants’ 
applications for amendment of the decisions of 18 May 2010 and 5 October 2010 
(note by the referring court: this should read ‘decision of 4 October 2010’) with 
regard to the finding concerning Paragraph 60(5) and (7) of the AufenthG 
(point 2), threatened the applicants with removal to Lebanon (point 3) and ordered 
a ban on their entry and residence of 30 months from the date of removal 
(point 4). 
6 The applicants brought an action against that decision on 18 August 2021. They 
submit that the contested decision was already unlawful because the competent 
authority should not have rejected their asylum application as inadmissible. This is 
already apparent from the fact that they had lived in Lebanon for more than ten 
years in the meantime. In addition, they have presented circumstances that had 
occurred after their return to Lebanon. 
7 By contrast, the defendant takes the view that the applicants’ asylum applications 
of 11 February 2021 are to be categorised as subsequent applications within the 
meaning of point 5 of Paragraph 29(1) and Paragraph 71(1) of the AsylG. It 
submits that a subsequent application exists irrespective of whether an applicant 
has returned to his or her country of origin in the meantime. Nothing to the 
contrary follows from either Article 2(q) or Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 
2013/32/EU. In accordance with Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a 
subsequent application can be rejected as inadmissible where no new elements or 
findings relating to the examination of whether the applicant qualifies as a 
beneficiary of international protection by virtue of Directive 2011/95/EU have 
arisen or have been presented by the applicant. It must therefore be examined in 
the individual case whether the new elements or findings contribute to such a 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
 
5 
probability. The mere fact of a return to the country of origin is not sufficient to 
establish that there is such a probability. 
8 By order of 1 September 2021 […] [file reference], the referring court ordered that 
the present action has suspensory effect in respect of the threat of removal 
contained in the contested decision. 
9 The competent authority also rejected the asylum application of the first and 
second applicants’ son, born on 13 April 2011. The action brought against that 
decision is pending under file reference […]. 
10 B. The case must be stayed and referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘the Court’) under Article 267 TFEU for a ruling on the questions 
concerning Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60, referred to as the 
Procedures Directive; ‘Directive 2013/32/EU’) which are set out in the operative 
part of the present order. The questions referred concerning the interpretation of 
Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EC are relevant to the decision to be given 
and require clarification by the Court. 
11 I. […] [Statements regarding procedural aspects of the stay of proceedings under 
national procedural law and regarding the composition of the Chamber] 
12 II. The national legal situation is as follows: 
13 1. If, after the withdrawal or unchallengeable rejection by the competent national 
authority of an asylum application, a foreign national makes a further asylum 
application, the latter is referred to as a subsequent application under national law 
(Paragraph 71(1) of the AsylG). The examination of a subsequent application 
takes place in two stages: the first stage concerns the question as to whether a 
further asylum procedure must be conducted (Paragraph 71(1) of the AsylG). The 
conditions under which a further asylum procedure must be conducted follow – in 
so far as relevant to the present case – from Paragraph 51(1) of the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (Law on administrative procedure; ‘the VwVfG’). If 
there are no grounds for conducting a further asylum procedure, the subsequent 
application must be rejected as inadmissible (point 5 of Paragraph 29(1) of the 
AsylG); in such a case, the reasons put forward by the applicant as to why he or 
she fears persecution or serious harm in his or her country of origin need not be 
further examined. The subsequent procedure is thus concluded – subject to 
judicial review. If, on the other hand, there are grounds for conducting a further 
asylum procedure, the subsequent application is admissible and the competent 
authority must examine, in the second stage, whether the applicant is to be granted 
refugee status or, in the alternative, subsidiary protection status. 
14 Under national law, an ‘asylum application’ seeks, in principle, recognition of 
entitlement to asylum and the granting of international protection (first sentence of 
Paragraph 13(2) of the AsylG). The asylum application can be limited to the 
granting of international protection (second sentence of Paragraph 13(2) of the 
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AsylG). Entitlement to asylum is a national protection status based on 
Article 16a(1) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law; ‘the GG’), and the requirements for 
that status correspond largely, but not completely, to the requirements for the 
granting of refugee status. 
 See also, regarding that protection status, CJEU, judgment of 
9 November 2010, Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 (B and D), 
EU:C:2010:661, paragraphs 65 and 113 et seq. 
 
15 Under national law, ‘international protection’ is understood to mean refugee 
protection and subsidiary protection (point 2 of Paragraph 1(1) of the AsylG). 
16 The relevant provisions read as follows: 
17 Paragraph 1 of the AsylG (Scope) 
18 (1) This Law shall apply to foreign nationals applying for: 
19 1. protection against political persecution under Article 16a(1) of the Basic Law, 
or 
20 2. international protection under Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 …; international protection 
within the meaning of Directive 2011/95/EU includes protection against 
persecution under the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of 
Refugees (BGBl. 1953 II p. 559, 560) and subsidiary protection within the 
meaning of the directive; … 
21 Paragraph 13 of the AsylG (Asylum application) 
22 … 
23 (2) Any asylum application shall constitute an application for recognition of 
entitlement to asylum and international protection within the meaning of point 2 
of Paragraph 1(1). The foreign national may limit the asylum application to the 
granting of international protection. … 
24 Paragraph 29 of the AsylG (Inadmissible applications) 
25 (1) An application for asylum shall be inadmissible if 
26 … 
27 5. in the case of a subsequent application under Paragraph 71, a further 
asylum procedure need not be conducted. 
28 Paragraph 71 of the AsylG (Subsequent application) 
29 (1) If, after the withdrawal or unchallengeable rejection of a previous asylum 
application, the foreign national files a new asylum application (subsequent 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
 
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application), a new asylum procedure shall be conducted only if the conditions of 
Paragraph 51(1) to (3) of the Law on administrative procedure are met; this shall 
be examined by the Federal Office. … 
30 Paragraph 51 of the VwVfG (Reopening of the procedure) 
31 (1) An administrative body shall consider an application from an individual 
concerned requesting that an administrative act which is no longer open to 
challenge be set aside or amended, if: 
32 1. the factual or legal circumstances on which the administrative act was based 
have changed in favour of the individual concerned; or 
33 2. new evidence has come to light which would have led to a more favourable 
decision for the individual concerned; or 
34 3. … 
35 2. If an application for international protection is rejected as inadmissible or 
unfounded, the competent authority must examine, in addition, whether a ground 
preventing removal exists in respect of the applicant (Paragraph 31(3) of the 
AsylG). The grounds preventing removal are regulated in Paragraph 60 of the 
AufenthG and are intended to prevent removal from being carried out in violation 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights – ECHR) or in violation of fundamental 
rights protected by the national constitution. If a ground preventing removal is 
established in respect of a specific State, that ground precludes the issuance of a 
threat of removal relating to that State. A threat of removal constitutes a return 
decision within the meaning of point 4 of Article 3 of Directive 2008/115/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 (OJ 2008 
L 348, p. 98, referred to as the Return Directive). 
36 Subsidiary protection status was introduced as an independent protection status in 
national law for the first time by the Law of 28 August 2013 (BGBl. I p. 3 474), 
which entered into force on 1 December 2013. Prior to that, subsidiary protection 
was guaranteed in national law by way of grounds preventing removal. Until the 
entry into force of the Law of 28 August 2013, the grounds preventing removal 
enshrined in national law were divided into two groups, each of which formed 
separate subject matter of a given dispute. The first group included the grounds 
preventing removal provided for in Paragraph 60(2), (3) and (7), second sentence, 
of the AufenthG. Until the introduction of an independent subsidiary protection 
status, those grounds preventing removal served to implement the requirements of 
EU law governing the granting of subsidiary protection. The second group 
included the grounds preventing removal provided for in Paragraph 60(5) and (7), 
first sentence, of the AufenthG. Those grounds preventing removal were (and 
continue to be) referred to as national grounds preventing removal. 
 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court; ‘the  
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BVerwG’), judgment of 24 June 2008 – 10 C 43.07 – 
ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2008:240608U10C43.07.0, paragraph 13 et 
seq.; […] [reference to national legal literature]. 
 
37 The relevant provisions in the version in force at the time when the decisions of 
18 May and 4 October 2010 were issued read as follows: 
38 Paragraph 31 of the Asylverfahrensgesetz (Law on asylum procedure; ‘the 
AsylVfG’ (Decision of the Federal Office on asylum applications) 
39 (3) In the circumstances … and in decisions …, it shall be established whether the 
conditions in Paragraph 60(2) to (5) or (7) of the Law on residence are satisfied. 
This may be dispensed with if the foreign national is recognised as a person 
entitled to asylum or if he or she is granted refugee status. 
40 Note: the Asylverfahrensgesetz (Law on asylum procedure; ‘the AsylVfG’) was 
subsequently renamed the Asylgesetz (Law on asylum; ‘the AsylG’).  
41 Paragraph 60 of the Law on residence (Grounds preventing removal) 
42 … 
43 (2) A foreign national may not be removed to a State in which that foreign 
national faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
44 (3) A foreign national may not be removed to a State if that State is seeking the 
foreign national on account of a criminal offence and there is a risk of the death 
penalty or execution. … 
45 … 
46 (5) A foreign national may not be removed if it follows from the application of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
4 November 1950 […] that such removal is impermissible. 
47 … 
48 (7) A foreign national shall not be removed to another State if that foreign national 
faces a significant, real threat to life and limb or his or her freedom in that State. A 
foreign national shall not be removed to another State if he or she is exposed, as a 
member of the civilian population, to a significant threat to life or limb in the 
context of an international or internal armed conflict. Threats pursuant to the first 
or second sentence to which the population or the population group to which the 
foreign national belongs is generally exposed shall be taken into account in orders 
under the first sentence of Paragraph 60a(1). 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
 
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49 The legislature transposed Article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 
29 April 2004 (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12, referred to as the Qualification Directive I; 
‘Directive 2004/83/EC’) into national law by means of the second sentence of 
Paragraph 60(7) of the AufenthG in the version cited above. Despite its slightly 
different wording, that provision was to be interpreted on the basis of Article 15(c) 
of Directive 2004/83/EC; in particular, the condition ‘by reason of indiscriminate 
violence’, which is not included in the wording of the second sentence of 
Paragraph 60(7) of the AufenthG, was to be read into that provision. 
 See BVerwG, judgment of 24 June 2008 – 10 C 43.07 – 
ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2008:240608U10C43.07.0, paragraphs 17 
and 36. 
 
 
50 With regard to the third sentence of Paragraph 60(7) of the AufenthG in the 
version cited above, it should be noted that that provision was to be interpreted in 
conformity with EU law to the effect that it did not cover cases in which the 
conditions for granting subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) of Directive 
2004/83/EC were met. 
 See BVerwG, judgment of 24 June 2008 – 10 C 43.07 – 
ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2008:240608U10C43.07.0, paragraphs 30 and 
31. 
 
 
51 III. The questions set out in the operative part of the present order require 
clarification and are relevant to the decision to be given. 
52 1. The need to clarify Questions 1 and 2 arises from the statements of Advocate 
General Saugmandsgaard Øe (‘Advocate General’) in Case C-8/20. Referring to 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31, 
referred to as the Dublin III Regulation; ‘Regulation 604/2013’), the Advocate 
General takes the view that Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32/EU does not 
apply if the applicant was removed to his or her country of origin between the first 
and subsequent applications. 
 See Opinion of 18 March 2021, EU:C:2021:221, points 30 and 
34 et seq. 
 
 
53 It is true that, unlike the applicants in Case C-8/20, the applicants in the present 
case were not removed to their country of origin but rather returned there 
voluntarily. However, the referring court takes the view that the question raised 
arises accordingly in the case of a voluntary return to the country of origin. The 
second subparagraph of Article 19(2) of Regulation 604/2013 provides for a legal 
consequence comparable to that in the second subparagraph of Article 19(3) of 
Regulation 604/2013 in the event that an applicant leaves the territory of the 
Member States for at least three months. This also includes voluntary return to the 
country of origin. 
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54 In the judgment that it delivered in Case C-8/20, the Court did not address the 
Advocate General’s statements set out above. 
 See judgment of 20 May 2021, C-8/20 (L.R.), EU:C:2021:404, 
paragraph 27 et seq. 
 
 
55 Questions 1 and 2 are relevant to the decision to be given, because the application 
for annulment of the decision of 11 August 2021 must be upheld only if the view 
taken by the Advocate General is to be followed. Otherwise, the action would 
have to be dismissed on the basis of national law: On the basis of the facts of the 
case and matters at issue as they stand, there are no grounds for conducting a 
further asylum procedure, namely no new elements or findings relating to the 
examination of whether the applicants should be granted international protection. 
Nor is it possible to infer from Paragraph 71(1) of the AsylG and Paragraph 51(1) 
of the VwVfG a restriction in the sense that the application of those provisions is 
precluded where the applicant has returned to his or her country of origin between 
the first and subsequent applications. 
56 There is considerable interest, both for the authorities responsible for conducting 
asylum procedures and for the courts before which asylum proceedings are 
brought, in obtaining clarification in respect of both types of situation (voluntary 
return and removal). In view of the fact that, in proceedings in which questions of 
law are raised which are the subject of preliminary ruling proceedings pending 
before the Court of Justice, many courts stay the proceedings until the Court has 
given a ruling, and in view also of the current duration of such preliminary ruling 
proceedings, the Court of Justice is requested to clarify, in the present case, both 
types of situation. 
57 2. Question 3 is asked only in the event that Question 1 is answered in the 
negative, and Question 4 only in the event that Question 3 is answered in the 
negative. The need for clarification of Questions 3 and 4 arises from the fact that 
the national legislature introduced an independent subsidiary protection status 
with effect only from 1 December 2013, but such an independent protection status 
was already provided for in Article 18 of Directive 2004/83/EC, which, in 
accordance with Article 38(1) thereof, had to be transposed before 10 October 
2006. The questions are also relevant to the decision to be given: if Question 3 is 
answered in the affirmative, the decision of 11 August 2021 must be annulled; if 
Question 3 is answered in the negative and Question 4 in the affirmative, the 
action must be dismissed. 
58 IV. The referring court takes the following position on the questions raised: 
59 1. The referring court considers that Question 1 should be answered in the 
negative. It takes the view that the decisive factor in that respect is that the 
wording of Article 33(2)(d) as well as Article 2(q) and Articles 40 to 42 of 
Directive 2013/32/EU does not contain a restriction of the nature referred to 
above. 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
 
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60 The scheme-related considerations on which the Advocate General bases his 
statements are – at the very least – not compelling. The referring court takes the 
view that the question as to whether an application is to be categorised as a new 
application within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 and the question as 
to whether a further asylum application is to be categorised as a subsequent 
application within the meaning of Article 2(q) and Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 
2013/32/EU must be strictly separated. It is true that, when an applicant re-enters 
the territory of the Member States, a Member State other than the one that was 
responsible for conducting the asylum procedure when he or she first entered may 
(initially) be responsible for conducting it. However, this does not preclude the 
application of the provisions on subsequent applications. The referring court 
agrees with the Advocate General in that those rules also apply where the first 
application for international protection was made in a Member State other than the 
one in which the further application for international protection is made. 
 See Opinion of 18 March 2021, EU:C:2021:221, point 49 et seq.; 
see, for an opposing view, European Commission, cited in CJEU, 
judgment of 20 May 2021, C-8/20 (L.R.), EU:C:2021:404, 
paragraph 29; the Court also left this question open in the 
judgment cited above. 
 
 
61 Moreover, as the Advocate General also points out in his Opinion of 18 March 
2021 (point 65), it must be taken into account that, in accordance with, in 
particular, the third subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 23(3) and the first 
sentence of Article 29(2) of Regulation 604/2013, the responsibility for 
conducting the asylum procedure can be (and in practice often is) transferred to 
another Member State. This may also be the Member State which was previously 
responsible for conducting the first asylum procedure. Lastly, it must also be taken 
into account in that connection that the second subparagraph of Article 19(2) and 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(3) of Regulation 604/2013 establish a 
merely fictitious new (first) application (‘shall be regarded’). 
62 The Advocate General’s statements regarding the purpose of Regulation (EU) 
604/2013 and Directive 2013/32/EU also fail to convince the referring court. 
Contrary to the impression given by the Advocate General, Article 33 of Directive 
2013/32/EU does not serve primarily to prevent secondary movements. Rather, as 
follows from recital 36 of Directive 2013/32/EU, that provision is intended to 
relieve the Member States of the burden of conducting a full asylum procedure 
(‘disproportionate’) where an applicant makes a subsequent application without 
presenting new evidence or arguments. That ratio legis also applies in the case 
where an applicant voluntarily returns to his or her country of origin or is removed 
there in the period between the first and subsequent applications. 
63 2. The referring court takes the view that Question 3 should also be answered in 
the negative. According to the referring court, the decisive factor in that respect is 
whether, in the first asylum procedure, the competent authority went through the 
entire examination programme prescribed by Article 15 of Directive 2004/83/EC. 
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If that is the case, the examination carried out and the examination provided for in 
Articles 15 and 18 of Directive 2004/83/EC, as to whether subsidiary protection 
status should be granted, are equivalent. The fact that the competent authority’s 
examination did not concern the granting of subsidiary protection but rather the 
establishment of a ground preventing removal is legally irrelevant, at least in cases 
in which the competent authority found that there was no serious harm – as in the 
present case. In such a case, the applicant concerned is not adversely affected by 
the lack of the possibility to grant him or her subsidiary protection status, as he or 
she does not fulfil the conditions for that. 
64 3. The referring court takes the view that Question 4 should be answered in the 
affirmative. Paragraph 60(2), (3) and (7), second sentence, of the AufenthG 
correspond to Article 15 of Directive 2004/83/EC. Therefore, the examination 
carried out by the competent authority on the basis of those provisions is 
equivalent to an examination concerning the granting of subsidiary protection. 
[…] [Signatures]