Order — ECLI:EU:T:2026:162
Date: 2026-02-23
Language of the case: German

Anonymised version 
Translation T-845/25 – 1 
Case T-845/25 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
17 November 2025 
Referring court: 
Landgericht Köln (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
13 November 2025 
Appellants: 
ZB 
JG 
YZ 
TA 
BX 
Respondent: 
Ryanair DAC 
      
Landgericht Köln (Regional Court, Cologne, Germany) 
Order 
In the case 
[…] 
the Eleventh Civil Chamber of the Regional Court, Cologne, 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 13. 11. 2025 – CASE T-845/25 
 
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on 13 November 2025, 
[…] 
has made the following order: 
1. The proceedings are stayed. 
2. The following question is referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union for an interpretation of EU law under Article 267 TFEU: 
Are Articles 4 and 2(j) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 to be interpreted as 
meaning that denied boarding triggering an obligation to pay compensation is also 
present in the case where passengers are denied permission to join a flight based 
on the ticket they have purchased for that flight, which gives them a confirmed 
reservation within the meaning of Article 3(2) of that regulation, but are carried on 
the flight on the basis of a new ticket purchased by them following the refusal to 
board them? 
I. 
1. The applicants at first instance and appellants (‘the appellants’) are suing the 
defendant at first instance and respondent in the appeal (‘the respondent’) inter 
alia for compensation in the amount of EUR 400 each under Regulation (EC) 
No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the 
event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (‘Regulation No 261/2004’ / ‘Air 
Passenger Rights Regulation’) plus interest. 
The facts of the case are as follows: 
The appellants had purchased tickets for flight FR1140 from Cologne/Bonn 
(Germany) to Seville (Spain) on 10 July 2022, to be operated by the respondent, at 
a fare of EUR 917.96. The respondent confirmed the reservation. The appellants 
arrived at the airport in good time prior to the departure of the booked flight 
FR1140. However, boarding using the tickets originally booked was denied. The 
appellants had to make a new reservation at a price of EUR 1 271.25 in order to be 
able to take flight FR1140 and were carried on the flight on the basis of the latter 
reservation. The distance between Cologne and Seville is over 1 500 km. 
The appellants sued the respondent for reimbursement of the ticket costs in the 
amount of EUR 1 271.25 and for compensation of EUR 400.00 each. In the appeal 
proceedings, only the payment of compensation is still in dispute. 
2. The Amtsgericht (Local Court, Germany) dismissed the action in relation to 
the compensation claims. As grounds, it stated in that regard that this was not a 
case of denied boarding within the meaning of Article 4 of the Air Passenger 
RYANAIR DAC 
 
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Rights Regulation, since the appellants were carried on the scheduled flight, albeit 
only after booking a new ticket. It held that an interpretation based on the spirit 
and purpose of that regulation did not require compensation to be granted in a 
manner going beyond its wording, since the appellants had reached their 
destination on time and were reimbursed for the cost of the tickets on account of a 
breach of obligation under the contract of carriage. 
3. By their appeal, the appellants are pursuing their claim for compensation in 
the amount of EUR 400.00 each. 
They argue that the defining element of denied boarding was fulfilled by the very 
refusal to carry them on the basis of the tickets that they had originally booked. 
The respondent contends that the appeal should be dismissed. 
II. 
The outcome of the appeal depends on a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (‘the CJEU’) on the question set out in the 
operative part of this order: 
1. The question is relevant to the resolution of the dispute. If the CJEU answers 
the question referred in the affirmative, the present appeal must be upheld and the 
respondent must be ordered to pay the appellants EUR 400.00 each. If the 
question referred is answered in the negative, the appeal against the judgment of 
the Local Court must be dismissed. 
(a) This Chamber has doubts as to whether a claim by the appellants for 
compensation, the only conceivable basis for which is denied boarding within the 
meaning of Article 4(3) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of the Air Passenger 
Rights Regulation, may be rejected on the ground that the respondent did not 
actually refuse to allow the appellants to board flight FR1140, but simply made 
boarding subject to the purchase of new tickets, the appellants having eventually 
been carried on the scheduled flight after purchasing new tickets. 
The understanding of the denied boarding rule which forms the basis of the Local 
Court’s judgment, to the effect that that rule applies only if the passengers are not 
actually carried on the scheduled flight, is questionable. It is true that, under the 
Air Passenger Rights Regulation, denied boarding is likely to presuppose that a 
passenger is actually and definitively denied boarding. It does not necessarily 
follow from this, however, that denied boarding can occur only if the passenger is 
denied permission to join the flight altogether. Rather, denied boarding might also 
occur if the passenger is definitively denied boarding on the basis of the ticket 
which he or she has purchased for the flight and which gives him or her a 
confirmed reservation within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the Air Passenger 
Rights Regulation. The definition contained in Article 2(j) of the Air Passenger 
Rights Regulation, according to which the term ‘denied boarding’ means a refusal 
to carry passengers on a flight, although they have presented themselves for 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 13. 11. 2025 – CASE T-845/25 
 
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boarding under the conditions laid down in Article 3(2), except where there are 
reasonable grounds to deny them boarding, such as reasons of health, safety or 
security, or inadequate travel documentation, leaves open that possibility. 
Article 4 of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation might also provide support for 
such an understanding when it states that the operating air carrier must first ‘call 
for volunteers to surrender their reservations’. 
(b) Neither, in the view of this Chamber, is the situation in the present case 
comparable to that underlying the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Court of Justice, Germany; ‘the BGH’) in its ruling of 25 February 2023 – X ZR 
25/22 (NJW-RR 2023, 827). That is because, in the situation addressed by the 
BGH, the passenger was actually carried on the flight on the basis of the ticket 
presented by him, albeit in return for payment of a surcharge; however, he did not 
have to rebook the flight in order to be carried on it. In the present case, on the 
other hand, the appellants had to make a new reservation in order to be able to 
reach their destination. It is likely to be the trouble and inconvenience associated 
with the denial of boarding as such and the reorganisation of carriage for which 
the legislature wishes to provide flat-rate compensation, irrespective of the 
specific circumstances of the individual case. It seems doubtful whether the 
legislature considers such trouble and inconvenience to be less worthy of 
compensation if passengers do not have to book another flight but have the option 
of rebooking the same fight. What might militate against that proposition is the 
fact that the right to compensation in the event of denied boarding is retained 
regardless of whether passengers reach their final destination late. A delay is not 
made a precondition of entitlement to compensation in the event of denied 
boarding. 
2. It follows that the success of the appeal is dependent on the interpretation of 
Articles 4(3) and 2(j) of Regulation No 261/2004. In that regard, the correct 
application of EU law is not so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable 
doubt (see CJEU, Case C-283/81 […] – Cilfit). 
[…]