Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:309
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Summary C-901/24 – 1 
Case C-901/24 [Falucka] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date received: 
22 December 2024 
Referring court: 
Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
16 December 2024 
Party initiating the proceedings before the referring court: 
mBank S.A. 
Defendants: 
TK, DJ and JJ 
  
Subject matter of the case in the main proceedings 
Action for payment seeking to recover an amount equivalent to the principal of a 
loan as a result of the invalidation of a loan agreement containing unfair contract 
terms – Time-barring of a claim brought by a seller or supplier against a consumer 
for the recovery of sums unduly paid 
Subject matter and legal basis of the reference 
Interpretation of EU law, in particular Article 7(1) of Council Directive 
93/13/EEC, Article 267 TFEU, and the principles of effectiveness, 
proportionality, legal certainty and the right to a legal remedy 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-901/24 
 
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Question referred 
Must Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms 
in consumer contracts and the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, legal 
certainty and the right to a legal remedy be interpreted as precluding a judicial 
interpretation of national legislation according to which: 
1. the limitation period for a claim brought by a seller or supplier against a 
consumer for the recovery of sums unduly paid under a contract which has 
become invalid as a result of the fact that it contains unfair contract terms is 
interrupted by the submission, by the consumer, of a declaration stating that he or 
she is aware that the invalidation of the contract will impose on him or her an 
obligation to return the sums received from the seller or supplier under the invalid 
contract, 
2. the submission of such a declaration by a consumer may justify a decision to 
disregard the expiry of a limitation period for a claim which the seller or supplier 
is entitled to bring against the consumer? 
Provisions of Community law referred to 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Article 38 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29), ‘Directive 93/13/EEC’: Article 6(1) and 
Article 7(1). 
Provisions of national law referred to 
Law of 23 April 1964 on the Civil Code (Dz.U. 2024, Item 1061, as amended), 
‘the Civil Code’: Article 5, Article 58(1), Article 60, Article 61(1), Article 65(1), 
Article 65 1, Article 117(1) and (2), Article 117(2) 1, Article 117 1(2), Article 118, 
Article 120(1), Article 123(1)(1) and (2), Article 124(2), Article 385 1(1) and (2), 
Article 405, Article 410(1) and (2). 
Succinct presentation of the facts of the case 
1 In 2007, the bank concluded with the consumers a mortgage loan agreement for a 
sum of PLN 1 958 800; this sum was disbursed to TK alone (DJ and JJ became 
borrowers for the sole purpose of providing the level of creditworthiness 
necessary for the loan to be granted). The loan was indexed (adjusted) to the 
Swiss franc (CHF) (paragraph 1(3)). The amount of the loan expressed in CHF 
was determined on the basis of the CHF buying rate specified in the bank’s 
exchange rate table at the date and time when the loan was advanced 
(paragraph 7(1)). The capital and interest instalments were repaid in zlotys after 
FALUCKA 
 
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being converted according to the CHF selling rate specified in the bank’s 
exchange rate table on the repayment date (paragraph 11(4)). 
2 On 21 December 2017, the borrowers brought an action against the bank before 
the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland). In this 
action, they sought a finding that the abovementioned loan agreement was invalid, 
and asserted that paragraph 7(1) and paragraph 11(4) of the loan agreement were 
unfair contract terms without which the agreement could not be performed, and 
that this justified the application for a finding of its invalidity (I C 1381/17). 
During those proceedings, TK was examined twice by the court at the hearings 
held on 9 January 2019 and 3 October 2019, and stated at each of these hearings 
that she was aware of the consequences of a finding that the agreement was 
invalid, that she understood that if the loan agreement were to be found invalid 
she would be obliged to return to the bank an amount equivalent to the entire sum 
of the loan she had received, that she accepted these consequences, and that she 
consented to a finding being made that the loan agreement was invalid. In a 
judgment handed down on 5 November 2019, the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie 
(Regional Court, Warsaw) found that the 2007 loan agreement was invalid 
because paragraph 7(1) and paragraph 11(4) thereof contained unfair contract 
terms without which the agreement was not capable of continuing in existence. 
3 The main proceedings were instituted by the bank, which brought an action 
against the borrowers on 2 December 2022, seeking an order that it be awarded 
the amount of PLN 1 958 800 plus default interest at the statutory rate jointly and 
severally from the borrowers, as repayment of an amount equivalent to the 
principal of the loan made available to the defendants. In their defence, the 
defendants contended that the action should be dismissed. On 16 December 2024, 
the court handed down a partial judgment dismissing the action in relation to DJ 
and JJ, since the bank had not paid out any funds to DJ and JJ, and the entirety of 
the claim for payment should therefore be addressed solely to TK. 
Essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
4 In its statement of reasons, the bank cited Article 405 of the Civil Code in 
conjunction with Article 410(1) of the Civil Code as the legal basis for the claim 
for payment. In turn, the defendants contended that the bank had no claim against 
DJ and JJ, since it had never paid out any sums whatsoever to them. The 
defendants admitted that the entire loan amount had been paid out to TK, but 
complained that the claim against the defendant for repayment of this amount was 
time-barred. They highlighted the fact that they had sought a finding that the loan 
agreement was invalid in a previous action (file ref. I C 13817/17), and since a 
copy of this action had been served to the defendant on 15 January 2018, the 
limitation period for the claim started to run on this date and expired on 
31 December 2021. As a result, the action filed on 2 December 2022 by the bank 
in the case at hand was based on a time-barred claim. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-901/24 
 
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Brief statement of and reasons for the reference 
5 As regards the link between the question referred to the outcome of the case, it 
should be noted that a finding in a judgment which has the force of res judicata to 
the effect that a contract is invalid imposes an obligation on the parties to return to 
each other all payments made on the basis of this contract (Article 405 of the Civil 
Code in conjunction with Article 410(1) of the Civil Code). The merits of the 
bank’s claim against the consumer resulting from the invalidation of the loan 
agreement do not as such raise any doubts on the part of the referring court, since 
it follows from the Court’s case-law that a finding that a loan agreement is invalid 
imposes an obligation on the consumer to return the principal of the loan. 1 In a 
number of judgments, the Court has also stated that if a loan agreement is found to 
be invalid as a result of the fact that it contains unfair contract terms, the bank 
may ask the consumer to return an amount equivalent to the principal of the loan 
together with default interest at the statutory rate from the date on which the 
payment was requested. 2 It is however necessary to analyse the principles 
governing the time-barring of the bank’s claim. If the bank’s claim was time-
barred, its action can be dismissed by the court. A crucially important question is 
whether the limitation period for the bank’s claim was effectively interrupted by 
the submission of declarations in which TK indicated that she was aware of the 
effects of the invalidity of the contract. 
6 The date on which the limitation period for the bank’s claim (which lasts three 
years and expires at the end of a calendar year) starts to run is the date on which 
the consumer first submitted a query to the bank regarding the binding nature of 
the terms of the contract. 3 In the case at hand, the borrowers first queried the 
binding nature of the terms of the contract in the action by which they sought a 
finding that the contract was invalid (I C 1381/17). A copy of this action was 
served on the bank on 15 January 2018. In the present case, the limitation period 
for the bank’s claim expired on 31 December 2021, and therefore the filing of the 
action on 2 December 2022 could not interrupt the limitation period. The court 
should therefore dismiss the action against TK as time-barred on the basis of 
Article 117(2) 1 of the Civil Code. 
7 However, if it is assumed that the abovementioned declarations submitted by TK 
on 9 January 2019 and 3 October 2019 (in case I C 1381/17) constituted an 
acknowledgement of debt and therefore interrupted the limitation period for the 
bank’s claim (Article 123(1)(2) of the Civil Code), this limitation period would 
have started to run again from 3 October 2019 (Article 124(1) of the Civil Code). 
 
1 See the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2014, C-26/13, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, paragraph 84. 
2 See the Court’s judgments of 15 June 2023, C-520/21, Bank M., paragraph 84, and of 
11 December 2023, C-756/22, Bank Millennium, paragraph 29, and the Court’s order of 
12 January 2024, C-488/23, Naniowski, paragraph 25. 
3 See ruling by the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, sitting in full court, of 25 April 2024, III 
CZP 25/22. 
FALUCKA 
 
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The three-year limitation period for the bank’s claim would thus have expired one 
year later, or in other words on 31 December 2022, and therefore on 2 December 
2022 the bank’s claim would not yet have been time-barred. As a result, the 
bringing of an action by the bank on that date would have resulted in an 
interruption of the limitation period (Article 123(1)(1) of the Civil Code), which 
would have started to run again after the end of the main proceedings 
(Article 124(2) of the Civil Code). In that case, the referring court should uphold 
the action. 
8 As regards the first part of the question referred, pursuant to Article 123(1)(2) 
of the Civil Code a limitation period is to be interrupted by the acknowledgement 
of a claim by the person against whom the claim is made. The national case-law 
and literature make a distinction between express and implied acknowledgement 
of a claim; in the case at hand, there was implied acknowledgement of the claim in 
the form of a declaration of knowledge by the debtor. 4 Such a declaration can be 
any conduct whatsoever by a debtor that on the one hand indicates his or her 
awareness that a claim exists, and on the other hand justifies a belief on the part of 
the creditor that the debtor will settle the latter’s claim. The implied 
acknowledgement of a debt may take any form, 5 including implicit (tacit) actions. 
A declaration by a debtor should make reference to the specific claim in question, 
although it does not need to specify the amount of this claim or its legal basis. The 
acknowledgement of a debt therefore also results in an interruption of the 
limitation period if the debtor acknowledges the existence of the debt in principle, 
but queries its amount. Examples of conduct by debtors that can be regarded as 
the implied acknowledgement of a debt include a declaration by the debtor that he 
or she will (or at least ‘will try to’) make a payment, a request for the debt to be 
written off in part or in whole and the submission of a declaration concerning the 
setting off of the debt. The debtor must however submit any such declaration 
voluntarily and after having been sufficiently informed, which excludes the 
possibility that a declaration submitted by a debtor under threat or duress might be 
regarded as an acknowledgement of debt. The debtor’s declaration must 
furthermore be addressed to the creditor 6 and be received by the creditor. 7 If the 
acknowledgement of the claim satisfies the abovementioned conditions, it cannot 
be withdrawn or revoked. Nor do the consequences of the acknowledgement of a 
claim invalidate any steps taken by the debtor in the further course of proceedings 
to contest the creditor’s claim. 8 The objective pursued by means of the provisions 
 
4 For example, see the rulings by the Supreme Court of 30 December 1964, III PO 35/64 and 
26 April 1995, III CZP 39/95, and the judgment by the Supreme Court of 19 March 1997, II 
CKN 46/97, the judgment by the Supreme Court of 26 November 2021, III CSKP 88/21 and the 
judgment by the Supreme Court of 10 March 2022, II CSKP 170/22. 
5 For example, see the judgments by the Supreme Court of 19 September 2002, II CKN 1312/00, 
25 March 2010, I CSK 457/09 and 10 March 2022, II CSKP 170/22. 
6 See the judgment by the Supreme Court of 22 June 2004, IV CK 444/03. 
7 See the judgment by the Supreme Court of 17 November 2021, V CSKP 102/21. 
8 See the judgment by the Supreme Court of 27 April 2021, IV CSKP 41/21. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-901/24 
 
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of Article 123(1)(2) of the Civil Code is to protect the good faith of a creditor who 
refrains from pursuing a claim before the courts in the belief that the debtor will 
satisfy the claim voluntarily. The creditor’s failure to take action is justified in this 
case; on the other hand, if the limitation period were not interrupted in such a 
situation, the debtor might even be encouraged to ‘deceive’ the counterparty with 
a promise of payment. 
9 In the opinion of the referring court, the declarations made by TK at the hearings 
held on 9 January 2019 and 3 October 2019 meet all the requirements set out 
above, and can thus be regarded as acknowledgement of her debt to the bank for 
repayment of an amount equivalent to the principal of the loan (Article 123(1)(2) 
of the Civil Code). TK indicated that the invalidation of the loan agreement would 
mean that she was obliged to return to the bank an amount equivalent to the 
entirety of the loan which she had received, and that she accepted this as a 
consequence. In so doing, TK made a declaration of knowledge confirming that 
she knew of the existence of the specific debt to the bank; this declaration was 
furthermore brought to the attention of the bank (which was represented by a 
professional counsel at both hearings). There can be no doubt about the fact that 
TK submitted the above declaration of knowledge after having been sufficiently 
informed, since she had previously been provided with the relevant information by 
the court, and her professional counsel was present at the hearing. 
10 The referring court queries whether the adoption of such an interpretation might 
be contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and the principle of 
effectiveness. Against this backdrop, reference should be made to the context in 
which TK submitted the abovementioned declaration. The Polish courts had 
favoured an approach of informing borrowers about the consequences of 
removing unfair terms from a contract and the resulting consequences of 
invalidating the loan agreement, including in particular the claims against the 
consumer to which the bank would become entitled, and also of taking 
declarations from consumers confirming that those consumers understand those 
consequences and consented to them. This approach derived from a specific 
interpretation of the Court’s case-law, based on statements to the effect that it was 
for the national court to inform the parties to the proceedings that the contract 
contained an unfair term 9 and to indicate to the parties objectively and 
exhaustively the legal consequences which the removal of the unfair term may 
entail, including in particular the invalidation of the contract in its entirety and any 
resulting claims for restitution. 10 This approach was only altered in late 
 
9 See the Court’s judgments of 21 February 2013, C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank, paragraphs 29-36, 
of 30 May 2013, C-488/11, Asbeek Brusse and de Man Garabito, paragraphs 52-53, of 
7 November 2019, C-419/18 and C-483/18, Profi Credit Polska, paragraph 70, of 11 March 
2020, C-511/17 Lintner, paragraph 42, and of 29 April 2021, C--19/20, Bank BPH, 
paragraph 93. 
10 See the Court’s judgment of 29 April 2021, C-19/20, Bank BPH, paragraphs 96-99. 
FALUCKA 
 
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2023/early 2024, after the Court handed down judgments indicating the absence of 
any requirement for consumers to lodge ‘formal declarations’. 11 
11 Taking the above considerations into account, it can be considered that although 
the defendant voluntarily submitted a declaration acknowledging her debt to the 
bank, she did so in the belief that a declaration of this kind was necessary in order 
for the court to grant her action seeking a finding that the loan agreement was 
invalid as a result of the fact that it contained unfair contract terms. This may 
therefore mean that the borrower inadvertently acted to her own detriment, since 
with a probability verging on certainty her aim in making this declaration was not 
to interrupt the limitation period for the bank’s claim, but instead to bring about 
the handing down of a judgment confirming that the loan agreement was invalid. 
With these circumstances in mind, the assumption that the borrower’s submission 
of the abovementioned declarations interrupted the limitation period for the bank’s 
claim may infringe Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and the principle of 
effectiveness, since – given that the limitation period for these claims would be 
lengthened in practice as a result – this would hinder the consumer from asserting 
claims on the one hand and render it easier for the seller or supplier to do so on the 
other. 
12 Nevertheless, the referring court queries whether the principles of legal certainty, 
the right to a legal remedy and proportionality justify the conclusion that the 
limitation period for the bank’s claim for recovery of an amount equivalent to the 
principal of the loan was interrupted on the dates when TK submitted the 
abovementioned declarations. As noted above, the ratio legis for Article 123(1)(2) 
of the Civil Code is to protect the good faith of the creditor, who chooses to trust 
in the substance of the debtor’s declaration and thus delay the bringing of an 
action. The bank might have believed in 2019 that since the borrower had declared 
that she was aware of the obligation to return the principal of the loan, she would 
voluntarily meet this obligation, and this might have been the determining factor 
which meant that the bank did not bring an action for payment until 2022. 
Dismissing the bank’s action in a situation of this kind on the grounds that it is 
time-barred may infringe the bank’s right to a legal remedy and be 
disproportionate to attainment of the objective pursued, which is protecting 
consumers’ rights. 
13 The second part of the question referred is based on the hypothesis that the 
declaration that was made by the defendant and that is currently under analysis did 
not interrupt the limitation period, which would require a finding that the 
limitation period for the bank’s claim expired before it brought the action in the 
case at hand, so that the bank cannot therefore effectively assert the claim that is 
the subject of the action filed against the defendant (Article 117(21) of the Civil 
Code). In this situation, it is necessary to reflect on whether the referring court is 
able to uphold a time-barred claim pursuant to Article 117 1(1) of the Civil Code; 
 
11 See the Court’s judgment of 7 December 2023, C-140/22, mBank, paragraphs 59, 65, and the 
Court’s order of 3 May 2024, C-348/23, BNP Paribas Bank Polska, paragraph 35. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-901/24 
 
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that court states that in exceptional circumstances, and after weighing up the 
interests of the parties, it may disregard the time-barring of a claim which a seller 
or supplier is entitled to bring against a consumer if equity so requires. The court 
should then consider in particular ‘the nature of the circumstances that prevented 
the claimant from pursuing the claim, including the effect of the obliged party’s 
conduct on the claimant’s delay in pursuing the claim’ (Article 117 1(2)(3) of the 
Civil Code). It is noted in the civil law literature that, ‘the effect of the obliged 
party’s conduct on the claimant’s delay in pursuing the claim’ applies ‘if the 
debtor behaves reprehensibly from the perspective of the principles of fairness’. 12 
An example of this would be a situation in which a debtor expresses his or her 
intention to make a payment voluntarily in order to bring about the time-barring of 
the claim, or in which the debtor engages in negotiations with the creditor 
immediately prior to expiry of the limitation period, which may lead the claimant 
to have false hope that the debt will be paid and to refrain from taking legal 
action. 
14 In exceptional circumstances, the court may recognise the raising of a time-
barring defence as an abuse of process and disregard it (Article 5 of the Civil 
Code). One of the conditions capable of justifying the classification of a time-
barring defence as an abuse of process is prior conduct on the part of the debtor 
which led the creditor to a justified belief that the debtor would voluntarily fulfil 
the relevant commitments. 
15 Having regard to the above, in the case at hand there may be grounds for granting 
the bank’s time-barred claim on the basis of Article 117 1(1) of the Civil Code in 
conjunction with Article 117 1(2)(3) of the Civil Code, and potentially for making 
a finding that the time-barring defence was an abuse of process and should be 
disregarded pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code. When she was examined at 
each of the hearings held on 9 January 2019 and 3 October 2019, TK indicated 
that she was aware of the consequences of a finding that the loan agreement was 
invalid, and that she understood the consequences of its invalidation and accepted 
these consequences. The submission of declarations to this effect may have misled 
the bank, which might explain why it did not bring an action in 2021, and only 
decided to do so in 2022. Under these circumstances, dismissing the bank’s action 
on the grounds of time-barring might be contrary to the principles of fairness, 
since the borrower originally made known her intention to settle her debt to the 
bank, and later changed her mind, referring to the fact that the bank’s claim was 
time-barred. 
16 The court however queries whether this approach is contrary to the objectives of 
Directive 93/13/EEC, and in particular whether it infringes Article 7(1) of this 
Directive and the principle of effectiveness. The borrower would never have 
engaged in such conduct if the bank had not previously acted in breach of the 
 
12 See Mariusz Fras (ed.), Magdalena Habdas (ed.), Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz do art. 117-125 
[Civil Code. Commentary on Articles 117-125], LEX/el., 2019, commentary on Article 1171 of 
the Civil Code, paragraph 1. 
FALUCKA 
 
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principles of fairness by including unfair contract terms in the contract. The 
borrower’s unfair behaviour may therefore be justified by the bank’s unfair 
behaviour towards her. The principle of effectiveness may thus require the bank to 
tolerate even the furthest-reaching consequences, including the dismissal of its 
action for recovery of an amount equivalent to the principal of the loan. On the 
other hand, the referring court queries whether a dismissal of the bank’s action 
under the present circumstances might infringe the bank’s right to a legal remedy, 
which is a universal right to which even sellers or suppliers using unfair terms in 
their contracts are entitled. Dismissing the bank’s action on the grounds that the 
claim is time-barred, even though the bank might have justifiably believed that the 
borrower would satisfy the claim voluntarily, may restrict the bank’s right to a 
legal remedy (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), and potentially 
also infringe the principle of legal certainty. Ultimately, therefore, the referring 
court queries whether a decision as far-reaching as dismissing the bank’s action on 
the grounds that it is time-barred might violate the principle of proportionality, 
which is a general principle of EU law, requiring that the national legislation 
implementing that law does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives pursued. 13 
 
13  See the Court’s judgment of 15 June 2023, Bank M., C-520/21, paragraph 73.