Nejvyšší soud České republiky; 2025-05-21; 20 Cdo 220/2025
Decision by national courts in the field of European Union law — ECLI:CZ:NS:2025:20.CDO.220.2025.1
Date: 2025-05-21
Subject matter: Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Origin: Czechia

82025CZ0521(51)_ENG_SUMJURE
JURE summary
JURE summary
This case, decided by the Nejvyšší soud (hereinafter ‘the Supreme Court’), concerned recognition in the Czech Republic of a United States of America (US) default judgment and, in particular, whether the South Carolina court had international jurisdiction under the Czech ‘mirror test’ in Section 15(1)(a) of the ZMPS (1).
The plaintiff sought recognition of a judgment of a federal court in South Carolina ordering the defendant, domiciled in the Czech Republic, to pay several sums awarded as damages (including treble damages under the RICO Act (2) and damages for reputational harm and emotional distress arising from defamation).
The Okresní soud Praha-východ (hereinafter ‘the Court of First Instance’) refused recognition. It held that, applying Czech jurisdictional criteria, the US court would not have been competent in a tort matter against a defendant not domiciled in the US, and that reliance on the Czech head of optional local jurisdiction under Section 87(b) of the o.s.ř. (3) presupposed the existence of the defendant’s general forum.
On appeal, the Krajský soud v Praze (hereinafter ‘the Court of Appeal’) recognised the US judgment in part. It relied on the defendant’s awareness of and initial participation in the US proceedings and on the involvement of US co-defendants and conduct occurring in the United States. It considered that the US court had a sufficiently close connection to the dispute and that recognition was therefore not barred by Section 15(1)(a) of the ZMPS.
On an appeal on a point of law, the Supreme Court held, first, that special recognition proceedings were not excluded, since Section 16(3) of the ZMPS allows recognition on application even where recognition would otherwise occur without further proceedings, and enforcement by judicial executor requires a prior recognition decision under Section 16(2) of the ZMPS.
As to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was defective. It held that jurisdiction could not be based on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) (4), since that provision (as part of the Czech ‘mirror’ criteria) presupposes that the claim is brought against a defendant domiciled in a Member State, which was not the case. For the same reason, jurisdiction could not be founded on Article 8(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) (multiple defendants), which likewise operates only where the defendants are domiciled in Member States and does not extend to third-country defendants.
The Supreme Court further held that jurisdiction could not, at that stage, be inferred from Section 87(b) of the o.s.ř., since at least some of the relevant harmful events occurred outside the United States. It therefore directed the Court of Appeal, on remittal, to examine whether the US judgment permits identification of the part of the awarded sums attributable exclusively to conduct occurring within the US court’s jurisdiction; only such a separable part could potentially satisfy Section 15(1)(a) of the ZMPS, whereas otherwise recognition (even partial) would not be possible.
The Supreme Court therefore set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remitted the case for further proceedings.
(1) Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb., o mezinárodním právu soukromém (Act No. 91/2012 Coll., on Private International Law).
(2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
(3) Zákon č. 99/1963 Sb., občanský soudní řád (Code of Civil Procedure).
(4) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast).