Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:350
Date: 2026-04-23
Language of the case: Bulgarian

Summary C-321/25 – 1 
Case C-321/25 [Gidzhinov] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice  
Date lodged: 
8 May 2025 
Referring court: 
Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
2 May 2025 
Defendants: 
A 
B 
V 
G 
D 
Other party: 
Sofiyska gradska prokuratura 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
The referring court is examining charges of running and participating in a criminal 
organisation formed to commit tax offences which concern specific tax offences 
committed by the parties in line with the abovementioned criminal objective. 
National law provides for a higher penalty for running and participating in a 
criminal organisation than for the offences which it was formed to commit. It also 
provides for limitation rules which (for most of the charges) will lead to the 
criminal proceedings being discontinued in future without a decision on the 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-321/25 
 
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merits. There are serious doubts as to the compatibility of national law with EU 
law, for which reason it is necessary to request a preliminary ruling. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The request is made on the basis of point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 
TFEU. 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
Do Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
Article 2(1) of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests preclude a national law which provides for criminal prosecution 
to become time-barred in respect of acts directed against the EU’s financial 
interests and for which the limitation period is  determined solely by reference to 
the maximum potential penalty applicable to an offence and not by reference to 
the factual and legal complexity of the case, and which takes no account of the 
possibility of a coincidental occurrence making it necessary to restart the criminal 
proceedings anew, such that the application of national law may lead to impunity? 
Does Article 3(1)(b) of Council Framework Decision 2008/841 preclude a 
national law under which the offence referred to in Article 2(b) is punishable by a 
higher maximum term of imprisonment than the offence which the agreement 
referred to in Article 2(b) concerns? 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, to which the 
EU acceded by Council Decision of 29 April 2004 (2004/574/EC) (OJ 2004 
L 261, p. 69) 
Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, signed 
in Brussels on 26 July 1995 and annexed to the Council Act of 26 July 1995 (OJ 
1995 C 316, p. 48) 
Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means 
of criminal law (OJ 2017 L 198, p. 29; ‘the PIF Directive’) 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) 
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime (OJ 2008 L 300, p. 42) 
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Provisions of national law relied on 
Nakazatelen kodeks (Criminal Code), promulgated in DV No 26/68, as amended 
in DV No 42/24 (‘the NK’) 
Article 80. (1) Prosecution shall be time-barred where it is not initiated within the 
following limitation periods: 
… 
2. fifteen years in the case of acts punishable by a term of imprisonment of more 
than ten years; 
3. ten years in the case of acts punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 
three years; 
… 
Article 81. (1) The limitation period shall be suspended where the commencement 
or continuation of criminal prosecution depends on the resolution by final judicial 
decision of a preliminary question. 
… 
(3) Notwithstanding the suspension or interruption of the limitation period, 
criminal prosecution shall be precluded where a period has elapsed which exceeds 
by half that provided for in the preceding article. 
Nakazatelno-protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure), promulgated in 
DV No 86/05, as amended in DV No 39/24 (‘the NPK’) 
Reasons precluding the initiation of proceedings and reasons for proceedings to be 
discontinued 
Article 24. (1) Proceedings shall not be initiated, and those initiated shall be 
discontinued, if: 
… 
3. criminal liability is extinguished as a result of expiry of the limitation period for 
which the law provides; 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 25 March 2025, a bill of indictment against five people was filed with the 
referring court, charging two of those people with running a criminal organisation 
and the three others with participating in that organisation. It alleges that the 
objective pursued by that organisation for the purpose of enrichment was to 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-321/25 
 
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commit tax offences. Specifically, it claims that, as a result of unlawful deduction 
of input tax without justification, VAT due was neither declared nor paid. It 
moreover alleges a number of secondary offences in the form of non-declaration 
and non-payment of VAT due by means of just such an unlawful deduction of 
input tax. 
2 In detail, the Public Prosecutor’s Office states that the defendant A was engaged 
in a commercial activity (construction) through two companies which he owned 
and was involved in major infrastructure projects, in the course of which he 
decided not to pay the VAT due. Allegedly, he therefore contacted the defendant 
B, an influential figure in the underworld, and asked him to find someone who 
would issue invoices addressed to A for fictitious deliveries, which A could use to 
deduct the VAT due. It is alleged that B agreed to that and instructed V, who had 
experience of fraud, to organise the issuing of those invoices; B introduced A and 
V to one another, and V undertook, at A’s request, to see to the issuing of the false 
invoices. Accordingly, it is alleged, V contacted G and D and instructed them to 
register companies in the names of low-income natural persons which would issue 
the false invoices for deliveries which had not taken place. G and D allegedly 
agreed to do so. 
3 The Public Prosecutor’s Office claims that the criminal organisation was active 
from March 2011 until 14 November 2012 – when B and V allegedly fell out and 
the criminal organisation was disbanded. 
4 With regard to A and B, the conditions for commission of the offence of running a 
criminal organisation for the purpose of enrichment within the meaning of 
Article 321(3)(2)(1) of the NK, read in conjunction with paragraph 1(2) thereof, 
were considered to be met; that offence is punishable by a term of imprisonment 
of five to 15 years. 
5 With regard to V, G and D, the conditions for commission of the offence of 
participating in a criminal organisation for the purpose of enrichment within the 
meaning of Article 321(3)(2)(2) of the NK, read in conjunction with paragraph 2 
thereof, were considered to be met. That offence is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of three to ten years. 
6 The Public Prosecutor’s Office alleges several separate offences in connection 
with the activities of that criminal organisation. 
7 First, the Public Prosecutor’s Office accuses A and B of committing three acts by 
falsely declaring VAT due using invoices from two companies which referred to 
deliveries and payments which had not taken place. It submits that those acts 
relate to false declarations in the June, July and August 2011 tax periods and that 
the total sum which was unlawfully deducted as input tax and therefore not 
declared as due and not paid comes to 1 239 070 leva (BGN) (EUR 633 525), 
which is particularly high. 
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8 Second, the Public Prosecutor’s Office accuses B of instructing V, after B had 
gained effective control of one company which had traded in fuels, to supply him 
with invoices for deliveries and payments which had not taken place, with a view 
to using them to deduct input tax. The charges encompass 14 acts committed 
between August 2011 and October 2012, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
alleges that the total sum which was unlawfully deducted as input tax and 
therefore not declared as due and not paid comes to BGN 2 211 200 
(EUR 1 130 568), which is particularly high. 
9 Third, the Public Prosecutor’s Office submits that A, B, V and D are guilty of tax 
fraud in that they pretended to have sold a plot of land, which led to the use of two 
false invoices for fictitious deliveries, which led in turn to the unlawful deduction 
of input tax amounting to BGN 2 000 000 (EUR 1 022 583) in the November 
2011 tax period. Nevertheless, only A was charged. 
10 Fourth, the Public Prosecutor’s Office accuses A of individual actions in the form 
of instructions to the accountants to enter various invoices into the accounts 
payable ledger and into the declarations made under the Zakon za danak varhu 
dobavenata stoynost (Law on value added tax; ‘the ZDDS’). It alleges that some 
of those invoices did exist but referred to fictitious deliveries and to deliveries and 
payments which had not taken place; other invoices were never issued and also 
related to deliveries and payments which had not taken place. All of those 
invoices for April, September, October and December 2012 are alleged to have 
been used for the unlawful deduction of input tax totalling BGN 2 433 590 
(EUR 1 244 274). 
11 Those secondary offences were characterised as evading the setting of the VAT 
actually due and evading the payment of tax by means of unlawful deduction of 
input tax without entitlement, with the tax amount being particularly high and the 
offence continuous in nature. It is argued that the conditions for commission of the 
offence under Article 255(3) of the NK, read in conjunction with 
Articles 255(1)(7), 26(1) and 20(4), (2) and (1) thereof, are met. Each of those acts 
is punishable by a term of imprisonment of three to eight years and the 
confiscation of assets in whole or in part. 
12 Under the national provisions governing the fixing of penalties, the court first 
determines the penalty corresponding to each offence and subsequently combines 
these into a cumulative penalty. The cumulative penalty must not exceed the 
maximum penalty provided for by law for that offence. Consequently, the 
maximum penalty which could be imposed for all offences committed for the 
purpose of evading the setting and payment of tax obligations under the ZDDS 
must not exceed a term of imprisonment of eight years. 
13 The referring court notes that, according to the rules governing the time-barring of 
criminal prosecution, the expiry of the absolute limitation period for most of the 
charges is certainly imminent. 
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14 The absolute limitation period for the prosecution of all offences under 
Article 255(3) of the NK (that is to say, evading the setting of tax and evading the 
payment of VAT on a particularly large scale by means of unlawful deduction of 
input tax without entitlement) is 15 years. The same limitation period applies to 
participating in a criminal organisation. 
15 It follows that the offences will become time-barred in 2026 and 2027 on the dates 
on which – 15 years earlier – the allegedly false declaration of VAT due was 
made. Criminal prosecution for participating in a criminal organisation would be 
precluded on the grounds of time-barring as of 14 November 2027, that is to say, 
15 years after the alleged disbanding of the criminal organisation. 
16 In that context, the referring court notes that it is objectively impossible to 
complete criminal proceedings at three levels of jurisdiction before the dates when 
the absolute limitation period for prosecuting most of the offences expires (not 
those connected to the running of a criminal organisation). Even if the referring 
court were to decide on the merits of the case before then, the absolute limitation 
period would certainly expire before any appeals lodged were decided at second 
and/or third instance. 
17 At the same time, the expiry of the absolute limitation period would result in the 
criminal proceedings on those charges being terminated without the court being 
entitled to rule on the merits. 
18 Only if the defence applied for the proceedings to be continued despite the expiry 
of the limitation period could the court reach a decision on the merits. Moreover, 
that decision would have only declaratory value. The possible finding that an 
offence had been wrongfully committed would be the only consequence of the 
judicial decision, while the court would not have jurisdiction to impose a sentence. 
19 In contrast, criminal prosecution in connection with the running of a criminal 
organisation on the part of A and B concerns a maximum term of imprisonment of 
15 years. The absolute limitation period is therefore 22.5 years and expires on 
14 May 2035. The ten-year period which remains for prosecuting the individuals 
named as leaders of the criminal organisation would suffice for the conduct of 
criminal proceedings, even at three levels of jurisdiction. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
20 In the first place, the referring court has certain doubts as to the compatibility of 
the national limitation rules with EU law. In particular, it wishes to know to what 
extent it is appropriate to determine the limitation period solely on the basis of the 
maximum penalty provided for, given that the need for a certain amount of time to 
conduct the criminal prosecution and reach a final decision on the merits depends 
primarily on the legal and factual complexity of the case and potentially on the 
occurrence of unforeseeable circumstances. 
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21 In the second place, the referring court notes that the national legislature has 
provided for a less severe penalty for tax evasion (up to eight years), a more 
severe penalty for participating in a criminal organisation (up to 10 years) and an 
even more severe penalty for running one (up to 15 years), regardless of whether 
tax evasion is the sole criminal purpose of that organisation. The question arises 
whether such a significant difference between penalties is compatible with EU 
law. In fact, that question concerns only the running of a criminal organisation, 
since the limitation period for participating in one is the same as for tax evasion. 
Grounds for the first question 
22 The first question arises from the judgment of 24 July 2023, Lin (C-107/23 PPU, 
EU:C:2023:606), which concerns a similar situation. In that judgment, the Court 
of Justice states that the Member States must ensure that the limitation rules laid 
down by national law allow effective punishment of infringements linked to VAT 
fraud (paragraph 86). No systemic risk may arise, for reasons inherent in those 
rules, that acts that may be categorised as such offences may go unpunished 
(paragraph 93), in particular in cases whose complexity calls for a longer 
investigation (paragraph 91). 
23 It follows that the limitation rules should be underpinned by objective criteria 
relating to the time objectively needed for the conduct of the investigations, for 
the bringing of charges and for the examination of those charges by the courts at, 
depending on the nature of the charges, two or three levels of jurisdiction. Those 
limitation rules should also take into consideration the possible occurrence of 
certain coincidental factors which, given the need for the composition of the court 
to remain constant, result in the proceedings having to be restarted anew. 
24 Instead, national law determines limitation periods only according to the severity 
of the maximum penalty provided for. There is no option to determine a longer 
limitation period for a more complex case or in the event of a coincidental 
occurrence resulting in the proceedings having to be restarted anew. That 
constitutes a systemic problem, as the more complex the offence and the more 
defendants and acts it encompasses, the greater the difficulty of examining the 
case within the limitation period. 
25 Reference should also be made to the legal solution set out in recital 22 and 
Article 12(1) of the PIF Directive. Although it is ratione temporis not applicable 
to the facts of the case in the main proceedings, it nevertheless offers a specific 
legal solution. 
26 The limitation period must allow for effective investigations and judicial 
proceedings in criminal cases, including judicial decisions on the merits. That 
depends on the way in which the Member State organises its criminal 
proceedings, while account must also be taken of the risk of coincidental 
occurrences arising which result in the proceedings having to be restarted anew 
and the procedural efforts of many years being lost. 
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27 Under Article 12(2), the maximum penalty provided for serves as a guideline for 
the minimum length of the limitation period but does not constitute a criterion for 
setting it. Those criteria are set out in paragraph 1. As EU law does not preclude 
national legislation providing for no limitation periods which would hinder 
prosecution (third sentence of recital 22) it seems likely that it also does not 
preclude a longer limitation period where more time is objectively necessary for 
more complex cases and in the event of coincidental occurrences arising which 
result in the proceedings having to be restarted anew. 
Grounds for the second question 
28 Under Article 3(1)(b) of Framework Decision 2008/841, the first alternative for 
the penalty by which the offence referred to in Article 2(b) is punishable is that it 
have the same maximum term as the offence at which the agreement is aimed. In 
concrete terms, where a person agrees with another person or other persons to 
commit the offences referred to in Article 1(1) (namely offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty of a maximum of at least four years and 
committed to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit), 
that agreement is punishable by deprivation of liberty of the same maximum term 
as that laid down for those offences. 
29 The requirement of the first alternative set out in Article 3(1)(b) of the framework 
decision consists of ‘the same maximum term’, which means that it is not 
permissible to set a shorter or longer maximum term. Consequently, the first 
alternative for the penalty under Article 3(1)(b) of Framework Decision 2008/841 
requires that the penalty laid down for the criminal agreement have the same 
maximum term as the penalty for the offence at which the agreement is aimed. 
30 The agreement in the case in the main proceedings was established with a view to 
committing tax offences for which national law lays down a term of imprisonment 
of eight years as a maximum penalty; that means it is permissible to provide in 
national law for a penalty with the same maximum term for the agreement, 
namely a term of imprisonment of eight years. 
31 By contrast, the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of the framework decision 
provides a second option for determining the penalty which does not relate to the 
maximum term for the offences which are the aim of the organisation defined in 
Article 1(1). The question arising here is whether that second alternative permits 
the setting of a longer maximum term for the penalty. 
32 When interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its 
wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the 
rules of which it is part (judgment of 12 October 2023, KBC Verzekeringen, 
C-286/22, EU:C:2023:767, paragraph 32). 
33 Considering first the objectives of the rules, it should be stated that the agreement 
as referred to in Article 2(b) which has given rise to the formation of a criminal 
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organisation within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the framework decision is 
punishable only because it is aimed at the future commission of certain offences. 
Consequently, those are the very offences which determine the degree to which 
the agreement is punishable and the degree to which the organisation formed on 
the basis of it is punishable. 
34 It follows that the criminal nature of the agreement and of the organisation formed 
on the basis of it is directly connected to the criminal nature of the acts which will 
be committed under that agreement and within the organisation formed on the 
basis of it. The punishability of the agreement is determined by the punishability 
of the acts which are the subject matter of the agreement. Consequently, the 
degree to which the agreement is punishable cannot be greater than that of the 
offences which are the subject matter of that agreement. 
35 However, it is possible to penalise the agreement less severely than the offences 
the commission of which is the subject matter of the agreement. That follows from 
the fact that planning, preparing and organising the commission of a particular 
offence prior to committing it exhibit a lesser degree of unlawfulness than actually 
committing the offence. 
36 It is therefore the view of the referring court that the second alternative for the 
penalty set out in Article 3(1)(b) of the framework decision relates only to the 
scenario where the penalty provided for by the national legislature has a maximum 
term which is lower than the maximum term of the penalty laid down for the 
offence which is the subject matter of the agreement. This second alternative 
contains a restriction: the maximum term must not be less than a certain term of 
imprisonment (between two and five years). 
37 That being said, it seems unlikely to be permissible for the maximum term of the 
penalty for the agreement referred to in Article 2(b) of the framework decision to 
exceed the maximum term of the penalty for the offence at which the agreement is 
aimed. 
38 If it were otherwise, agreeing to commit an offence would be penalised more 
severely than actually committing the offence. That would be contrary to the 
principle of proportionality, since the criminal nature of the agreement, as already 
stated, stems solely from the criminal nature of the offences which the agreement 
was formed to commit and which may be committed in future. 
39 Consequently, interpretation of the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of the 
framework decision, having regard to the objective of the provision and to the 
principle of proportionality of penalties, leads to the conclusion that the second 
alternative for the penalty relates only to cases where the maximum term is lower 
than the maximum term for the offences which the criminal organisation was 
formed to commit. The restriction stipulating ‘a maximum term … of at least 
between two and five years’ cannot be understood to mean that the maximum 
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term exceeds the maximum term of the penalty for the offences which the 
criminal organisation intends to commit. 
40 Second, however, interpretation of the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of the 
framework decision leads to the conclusion that it is in fact possible to provide for 
a penalty for criminal agreement which is more severe than the penalty for the 
offences at which that agreement is aimed. 
41 The expression ‘punishable … by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 
between two and five years’ setting out the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of 
the framework decision is not easy to understand. On the one hand, ‘maximum 
term’ means the most severe penalty provided for by law (for example, where the 
national law provides for a penalty of three to eight years, then eight years is the 
maximum term). The expression ‘at least’ must mean the minimum length of the 
maximum penalty provided for by law. 
42 The explanatory memorandum to the proposal for that framework decision goes in 
the same direction: ‘minimum thresholds for prison sentences’, sets the minimum 
penalty’ and ‘in accordance with the “minimum maximum” method’. 
43 Consequently, the expression ‘by a maximum term … of at least’ refers to the 
minimum level of the upper limit for the penalty provided for in national law. It 
therefore seems logical to give a specific number as the shortest possible 
maximum term for the penalty. Every penalty provided for by national law with 
an upper limit equal to or higher than that number would be compatible with the 
framework decision. 
44 In fact, the provision reads ‘between two and five years’. That, however, it not a 
specific number. That gives rise to uncertainty. In the view of the referring court, 
various interpretations are possible. 
45 The referring court sees four possible interpretations, as follows: 
46 First, it may be interpreted as meaning that the minimum length of the upper limit 
provided for may be any number between two and five. The maximum length of 
that upper limit is subject to no restrictions. 
47 The second possible interpretation of the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of 
the framework decision is that ‘maximum term’ refers to the maximum length of 
time which a convicted person can spend in detention regardless of any reduction 
in their sentence for good behaviour or early release. By that logic, the expression 
‘maximum term’ does not preclude a shorter length of time where that is due to 
circumstances arising after conviction and during execution of the penalty. 
48 The third possible interpretation of the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of the 
framework decision is that ‘maximum term’ refers only to the upper limit of the 
penalty provided for by national law. That upper limit must be between two and 
five years. That means the national legislature is free to set a term of 
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imprisonment of between two and five years’ duration as the maximum penalty, at 
its discretion. 
49 The fourth possible interpretation of the second alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of 
the framework decision is that the legislative process is incomplete. The objective 
of the European legislature was to formulate a minimum maximum penalty, as the 
proposal for the framework decision explicitly specifies. That is the direction 
indicated by all of EU criminal policy when it comes to determining the specific 
length of a penalty, such as in Article 7(3) of the PIF Directive. In the course of 
deliberations, provisional agreement was reached on a minimum maximum 
penalty of between two and five years; a precise length of time should have been 
determined at a later point. Meanwhile, it was the provisional agreement which 
was reproduced in the two paragraphs of Article 3 of the framework decision. 
50 Conclusion: In view of all the possible interpretations of the second alternative in 
Article (3)(1)(b) of the framework decision which the referring court has been 
able to extrapolate, it is entirely acceptable for a Member State to provide for a 
term of imprisonment of five years – or even a longer penalty, under some 
interpretations – for a criminal organisation. However, a criminal organisation 
exists if its objective is to commit offences punishable by a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least four years. That means that, even where an organisation 
was formed to commit offences punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment 
of four years, there is nothing to prevent the participants in that organisation being 
handed a custodial sentence with a maximum term of five years or even more. 
51 The above considerations feed uncertainty as to the interpretation of the second 
alternative in Article 3(1)(b) of the framework decision, that is to say, whether it 
does or does not preclude a national law which for the running of a criminal 
organisation provides for a maximum penalty which is almost twice as long as 
that laid down for the offences which the criminal organisation was formed to 
commit. 
52 The Court’s reply will help the referring court to assess how the limitation period 
for prosecuting the leaders of the criminal organisation is to be determined: 
whether it is to be determined according to the maximum penalty provided for by 
national law or the maximum penalty permissible under EU law. In addition, the 
reply will help the referring court to set the specific penalty in the event of a 
conviction, since there would be certainty as to the upper limit of the penalty 
provided for by law.