Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:919
Date: 2025-11-27
Language of the case: Czech
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Czechia

Summary C-539/24 – 1 
Case C-539/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
7 August 2024 
Referring court: 
Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) 
Date of decision to refer: 
31 July 2024 
Applicant: 
Mikroregion Porta Bohemica 
Defendant: 
Odvolací finanční ředitelství 
 
Subject matter of the main proceedings  
The referring court is adjudicating an appeal by the defendant against the 
judgment of the Krajský soud v Ústí nad Labem (Ústí nad Labem Regional Court, 
Czech Republic), which granted the action of Mikroregion Porta Bohemica which 
contested the defendant’s decision concerning two payment orders on the ground 
of failure to meet the time limit for initiating proceedings concerning the repaying 
of a subsidy or the time limit for the rendering of a final decision. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The referring court has doubts as to whether the national regulation that lays 
down, inter alia, a 10-year time limit for decisions in cases is compatible with the 
limitation period set out in Regulation No 2988/95 and, in that context, as to the 
application of that latter regulation to subsidies granted partly from EU resources 
and partly from the resources of the national budget of a Member State. In that 
regard, it refers three questions for a preliminary ruling. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-539/24 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
(1) Does Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 
on the protection of the European Communities financial interests permit: 
(a) National legislation which, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the 
Regulation, sets a longer time limit for a decision about a case (here of 10 years) 
than that based on the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the regulation, 
without, at the same time, expressly laying down a separate time limit for the 
initiation of proceedings, as provided for by the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) 
of Regulation No 2988/95? 
(b) A Member State to establish, as the start of the time limit for the adoption 
of a decision, the first day of the next calendar year, instead of the time when the 
irregularity occurred? 
(2) If the answer to part (a) of the first question is affirmative, does Regulation 
2988/95 permit a Member State that has exercised its right under Article 3(3) of 
the regulation to commence proceedings within a time limit that is longer than that 
based on the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95? Or is it 
necessary – in the event that national legislation does not provide for a special 
time limit for the commencement of proceedings – to proceed in line with the first 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95 and commence the 
proceedings within the time limit laid down therein? 
(3) Where irregularities, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation 
2988/95, have arisen in the financing of projects related to an EU policy and in 
relation to subsidies provided in part from EU resources and in part from 
resources of the Member State’s budget, is it necessary to proceed solely in line 
with Regulation 2988/95 (including the time limits and definitions), and hence, to 
apply the regulation to the irregularity in full? Or is it necessary to proceed in that 
way only in relation to a severable portion of the subsidy that is provided from EU 
resources and, by contrast, to proceed in line with national legislation in relation 
to the severable portion provided from a Member State’s budget? 
Applicable European Union legislation  
The referring court cites the following provisions of Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities financial interests: recital 4, Article 1(1) and (2), Article 2(1), (3), 
and (4), and Article 3(1) to (3). 
MIKROREGION PORTA BOHEMICA 
 
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Applicable national legislation  
Zákon č. 218/2000 Sb., o rozpočtových pravidlech a o změně některých 
souvisejících zákonů (Law 218/2000 on budgetary rules and on the amendment of 
certain related acts (‘the Budgetary Rules’). 
Pursuant to Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules, 1 levies imposed for a 
breach of budgetary discipline as well as penalties are administered by the revenue 
authorities in line with the Tax Code. An entity that has breached budgetary 
discipline has the position of a tax subject in the administration of levies imposed 
for a breach of budgetary discipline. Upon request, the revenue authority provides 
information obtained in the administration of levies to the administrative authority 
that has decided to grant funds from a national budget, state financial assets, a 
state fund, or a National Fund, and to an authority entitled to oversee the granting 
of such funds and also to oversee the utilisation of funds from a national budget or 
other state funds, provided that the information pertains to the administration of a 
levy imposed for a breach of budgetary discipline; that applies even to competent 
European Union authorities and to administrative authorities taking part in the 
administration of such funds granted from abroad. A penalty incurred as a result 
of a breach of budgetary discipline prior to an assessment is due within 30 days of 
the delivery of a payment order. A levy and penalty can be assessed within 10 
years from 1 January of the year following the year in which the breach of 
budgetary discipline occurred . 2 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 As part of the Operational Programme Environment, the Ministerstvo životního 
prostředí (Ministry of the Environment) provided the applicant, by decision of 
4 April 2014, with funds from the Cohesion Fund for the project ‘Flood-control 
Measures for the Porta Bohemica Micro-region’. Further funds for the project 
were obtained by the applicant from the same programme, on the basis of an 
agreement on the provision of support of 15 April 2014, from the Státní fond 
životního prostředí České republiky (State Environmental Fund of the Czech 
Republic, (‘the SEF’)). In total, the subsidy amounted to 5 655 899.70 Czech 
 
1 The case was adjuciated according to the version of the Budgetary Rules applicable until 
19 February 2015. The same rule may now be found in Paragraph 44a(11) of the Budgetary 
Rules. 
2 In the view of the referring court, practically the same problem arises in cases that are similar in 
legal terms where administrative authorities proceed on the basis of Paragraph 22(13) of zákon 
č. 250/2000 Sb., o rozpočtových pravidlech územních rozpočtů (Law 250/2000 on budgetary 
rules for territorial budgets) or Paragraph 11a(6) of zákon č. 256/2000 Sb., o Státním 
zemědělském intervenčním fondu a o změně některých dalších zákonů (Law 256/2000, on the 
State Agricultural Intervention Fund and amending certain other acts), version in effect until 
11 February 2008. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-539/24 
 
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koruny (CZK). The applicant’s own resources amounted to CZK 628 433.30. 
Subsidy funds from the SEF, amounting to CZK 312 795.38, and from the 
Cohesion Fund, amounting to CZK 5 317 521.58, were credited to the applicant’s 
account on 8 December 2014. 
2 On 26 February 2020, the tax administration initiated a tax inspection of the 
applicant, as a result of which it issued, on 10 September 2021, two payment 
orders for a levy imposed for a breach of budgetary discipline in respect of funds 
provided on the basis of the abovementioned decision and agreement. The 
applicant appealed against those orders. The defendant dismissed the appeal, 
confirming payment order 1 and amending payment order 2 by correcting its 
wording. The defendant’s decision was served on the applicant on 19 December 
2022. Subsequently, the applicant challenged that decision by an action brought 
before the Ústí nad Labem Regional Court. 
3 The Regional Court granted that action by judgment of 25 March 2024, ref. no. 
141 Af 3/2023-53. It annulled the defendant’s decision as it considered that the 
limitation period for the imposition of the assessed levies had expired without 
action having been taken. The Regional Court found that the subsidy concerned 
had been provided primarily from the European Union budget. If an economic 
operator has not complied with the conditions of a subsidy provided (albeit in 
part) from EU resources, that constitutes an unjustified item of expenditure, 
namely an irregularity within the meaning of Regulation 2988/95. According to 
the Regional Court, the limitation period for proceedings concerning the 
repayment of the subsidy (in this case four years on the basis of the first 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95) and for the rendering of a 
final decision (in this case eight years pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of 
Article 3(1); see also Article 3(2) of Regulation 2988/95 as concerns the time limit 
for implementing a decision concerning the obligation to repay a subsidy), had 
begun to run no later than at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, namely 
15 April 2014 (or 3 June 2014 as regards the publication of Amendment 1 and 
18 November 2014 as regards the publication of Amendment 2). The Regional 
Court found that neither the four-year time limit for the commencement of 
proceedings, since the tax inspection had been initiated on 26 February 2020, nor 
the eight-year time limit for the final decision, which was rendered and took legal 
effect only in 2022, had been met. Accordingly, the court considered that the 
limitation period began at the time of the occurrence of the ‘irregularity’, within 
the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation 2988/95. 
4 The defendant has challenged the Regional Court’s judgment by an appeal (as 
appellant in the proceedings before the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme 
Administrative Court)). 
MIKROREGION PORTA BOHEMICA 
 
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Basic arguments of the parties to the original proceedings 
5 The defendant disagrees with the Regional Court’s conclusion concerning the 
limitation period. 
6 It maintains that Regulation 2988/95 should not have been applied to the 
irregularity found as a whole since it was possible to sever the part of the funds 
that came from the Member State, meaning that, in relation to the funds provided 
from the budget of the Czech Republic, there is nothing to prevent the limitation 
period from being calculated pursuant to national legislation (Paragraph 44a(9) of 
the Budgetary Rules). The defendant argues that the Regional Court, when 
assessing the limitation period for rendering a decision to commence proceedings 
(‘prosecution’) concerning the repayment of a subsidy or the limitation period for 
rendering a decision on the repayment of a subsidy that has been provided, also 
failed to have regard to Article 3(3) of Regulation 2988/95, which allows Member 
States to apply a longer period than that provided for in Article 3(1) and (2) of the 
regulation. In the present case, that longer period is set out in Paragraph 44a(9) of 
the Budgetary Rules. 
7 The applicant maintains that the Regional Court assessed the matter correctly and 
that it was necessary to assess the case, on the basis of the regulation, as a whole, 
that is to say in relation to the entire levy, whether it pertained to funds from EU 
resources or from the state budget. According to the applicant, the Regional Court 
also proceeded correctly when it applied the time limits set out in Article 3(1) of 
Regulation 2988/95 and disregarded the time limit in Paragraph 44a(9) of the 
Budgetary Rules. 
Succinct presentation of the grounds of the request for a preliminary ruling 
8 In its first and second questions, the referring court focuses primarily on the 
relationship of the limitation periods set out in Article 3 of Regulation 2988/95 to 
the limitation period regulated by the last sentence of Paragraph 44a(9) of the 
Budgetary Rules. The court asks whether that national legislation is compliant 
with Regulation 2988/95, in particular as concerns the room given by the 
regulation to Member States to adopt their own rules, in accordance with 
Article 3(3) of Regulation 2988/95. 
9 According to the referring court, Member States may, in line with Article 3(3) of 
Regulation 2988/95, apply longer time limits at the national level than those set 
out in the general rules of the regulation and – as follows from the case-law of the 
Court of Justice – their powers in that regard are wide, 3 as long as the principles 
 
3 Judgments of 2 March 2017, Glencore Céréales France, C-584/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:160, 
paragraphs 64 and 65; of 22 December 2010, Corman SA, C-131/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:825, 
paragraphs 49 and 54; of 17 September 2014, Cruz & Companhia Lda, C-341/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2230, paragraphs 55 and 56. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-539/24 
 
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of legal certainty and proportionality are adhered to. 4 A five-year period for the 
commencement of proceedings, and respectively a 10-year period for rendering a 
decision on the matter, has been accepted as reasonable; 5 on the other hand, 
periods of 20 and 30 years for the commencement of proceedings are not 
reasonable. 6 According to the referring court, it may be inferred from this that the 
rules for the length of the limitation periods in Regulation 2988/95 constitute 
supplementary rules, in the event that the length of the periods, or some of them, 
have not been (proportionately) set at the national level. 7 
10 If limitation periods have not been set at all at the national level, the referring 
court maintains that, in principle, the limitation period of four years is to be 
applied to the commencement of proceedings and a limitation period of eight 
years is to be applied to a decision in the case (calculated as twice the length of 
the period for the commencement of proceedings under the fourth subparagraph of 
Article 3[(1)] of Regulation 2988/95). However, where the national legislature has 
taken advantage of the right provided by Regulation 2988/95 to establish a longer 
time limit for one or more of the limitation periods concerned, the longer time 
limits based on the national rules may be primarily applied. In that case, according 
to the referring court, EU law does not prevent the time limit for rendering a 
decision at national level from being set differently to that of twice the length of 
the time limit set at national level for the commencement of proceedings. If, on 
the other hand, that were not made possible by EU law, the referring court points 
to the argument of the appellant, which deems such an interpretation in the present 
case to be formalistic, hard to justify, and also in breach of the broad right of 
Member States to set the time limits concerned in its national legislation at its 
discretion (with the limits set out above), as previously referred to by the Court of 
Justice. 
11 The referring court considers that in the cases where the Court of Justice referred 
to ‘twice’ the period for rendering a decision on the matter, as compared to the 
period for the commencement of proceedings, it did so in a different context and 
without any clear conclusion . 8 Accordingly, it is questionable, according to the 
 
4 Judgment in Glencore Céréales France, paragraphs 72 and 74. 
5 Ibid., paragraph 74. 
6 Judgment in Cruz & Companhia Lda, paragraphs 61 and 63; judgment of 5 May 2011, Ze Fu 
Fleischhandel GmbH a Vion Trading GmbH, C-201/10 a C-202/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:282, 
paragraphs 43, 45, and 47. In this regard, the referring court also points to the judgment of 
8 May 2024, Republik Österreich v GM, C-734/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:395, paragraphs 30 and 
33, which, however, concerned general civil-law limitation periods and the issue of whether it is 
possible to consider the establishment of a limitation period shorter than four years, namely, the 
period for ’proceedings’, as constituting a ‘sectoral time limit’ for the purposes of Article 3(1), 
first subparagraph, of Regulation 2988/95. 
7 Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordony delivered on 8 September 2016, 
Glencore Céréales France, C-584/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:655, point  84. 
8 In this regard, the referring court points, for example, to the judgment in Glencore Céréales 
France. 
MIKROREGION PORTA BOHEMICA 
 
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court, whether it is justifiable – and in line with the text and purpose of the EU 
regulation – to disregard a longer time limit for rendering a decision on the matter 
that has been explicitly set at national level in a situation where a Member State 
decides, at the same time, not to extend or regulate the period for the 
commencement of proceedings (as governed by Regulation 2988/95). 
12 The national regulation at issue concerning limitation periods in this area does not 
set a specific time limit for the commencement of proceedings or a specific time 
limit for rendering a decision, but establishes a single absolute time limit for 
rendering a decision on the repayment of funds that have been granted or a portion 
thereof. According to the referring court, that should be considered as a statutory 
national objective limitation period, that is to say, in accordance with the fourth 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, an absolute time limit for 
the entire proceedings, from their commencement to the rendering of a decision. 
13 In the present case, the Regional Court refused to apply the 10-year limitation 
period for the rendering of a decision laid down in the Budgetary Rules, pointing 
to gaps in that national regulation. The court observed that the Budgetary Rules do 
not contain explicit provisions with respect to limitation periods for the 
commencement of proceedings or for the implementation of a decision on the 
repayment of a subsidy, and thus, given the absence of a limitation period for the 
commencement of proceedings, it is not possible to assess, in line with the case-
law of the Court of Justice, whether the rule of a maximum of twice that period 
for the rendering of a decision on repayment of a subsidy has been complied 
with. 9 
14 In its judgment of 18 March 2022, ref. no. 5 Afs 4/2021 – 66, No. 4333/2022 Sb. 
NSS, the referring court emphasised the point that the time limit set out in the 
fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95 constitutes an ‘absolute 
limit for the limitation of the prosecution of an irregularity’. 10 In that judgment, 
however, the referring court did not address the question of whether it is possible 
for a Member State to take advantage of the possibility given to it under 
Article 3(3) of Regulation 2988/95 in such a manner that it regulates only the time 
limit for rendering a decision (pursuant to the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) 
of Regulation 2988/95), without regulating the time limit for the commencement 
of proceedings (‘prosecution’) (within the meaning of the first subparagraph of 
Article 3(1) of that regulation) as the time limit for rendering a decision 
 
9 In this regard, the Regional Court follows the judgment of the referring court of 15 February 
2024, ref. no. 4 Afs 52/2023 – 85, paragraphs 37 and 38, according to which the Court of Justice 
‘with regard to the principle of legal certainty, insists on a maximum and non-violable limit 
from which the economic operator can no longer be prosecuted for an irregularity that it has 
committed. At the same time, it refers in this regard to a time limit that is twice as long for 
initiating proceedings concerning the repayment of a subsidy’. 
10 Paragraphs 36 and 38 of judgment 4 Afs 52/2023 – 85, in which the referring court took up the 
wording of paragraph 63 of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 June 2015, Pfeifer & 
Langen, C-52/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:381. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-539/24 
 
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concerning the obligation to repay the subsidy that had been provided was also 
time barred under national law. However, it is evident that it was already 
uncertain at that time as to the interpretation of EU law. 
15 As the referring court has already indicated, several considerations arise in this 
context. The first is whether the regulation of the time limit under 
Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules is sufficiently comprehensive so that it 
may be applied instead of the time limits set out in subparagraphs one and four of 
Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95, or, more precisely, whether it is possible for a 
Member State to regulate only the ‘longer’ time limit for rendering a decision, 
without also regulating the ‘shorter’ time limit for the commencement of 
proceedings. The second is whether – in the event of a Member State regulating 
only the ‘longer’ time limit in national law for the rendering of a decision – the 
EU time limit for the commencement of proceedings (‘prosecution’) under the 
first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95 should also be applied, 
on a subsidiary or ‘complimentary’ basis (such that a Member State’s authorities 
could decide within the 10-year limitation period but would also be obliged to 
commence proceedings or ‘a prosecution’, within the four-year period). Does EU 
law therefore require national legislation to comprehensively regulate all types of 
time limits, as set out in Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation 2988/95 – or is it 
permissible for it to regulate only some of them, which would be supplemented by 
the time limits set out in Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation 2988/95 precisely to 
the extent to which they have not been ‘covered’ by the national legislature? A 
related question is thus whether it is permissible, in the event of a combination of 
the EU time limit for the commencement of proceedings and a 10-year period for 
a decision, for the period for rendering the decision to be more than twice the time 
limit for the commencement of proceedings (see the fourth subparagraph of 
Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95), but is still of a length that the Court of Justice 
considers in principle to be acceptable (10 years). A related issue is also the 
question of whether Member States may change the start of the time limit for 
rendering a decision from the time when the irregularity occurred to the first day 
of the subsequent calendar year, as laid down by the Czech legislature in 
Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules. 
16 Several circumstances seem to indicate that the Czech national legislation may 
comply with the requirements of EU law. In view of the judgments of the Court of 
Justice referred to in paragraph 9 above, the ‘limitation’ period in 
Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules is evidently set more precisely than the 
periods established in the general provisions of other Member States, which the 
Court of Justice did not question as being inconsistent with Article 3(3) or the first 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2988/95. In that regard, general civil 
law limitation periods are less precise than the limitation period set out in 
Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules, according to which proceedings must 
not only be commenced, but also finally concluded. Furthermore, that constitutes 
a special rule for regulating the period for the exercise of an administrative 
authority’s right to the repayment of that which a subsidy provider has wrongfully 
paid to a recipient of resources from EU funds. 
MIKROREGION PORTA BOHEMICA 
 
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17 As concerns the third question, the referring court asks whether the ‘effectiveness 
of the combating of fraud against the Communities’ financial interests [that] calls 
for a common set of legal rules to be enacted for all areas covered by Community 
policies’ (recital 4 of Regulation 2988/95), or the ‘general rules … relating to 
homogenous checks and to administrative measures and penalties concerning 
irregularities with regard to Community law’, that being ‘for the purposes of 
protecting the European Communities’ financial interests’ (Article 1(1) of 
Regulation 2988/95), require that, where proceedings concern the repayment of 
subsidies (as in the present case), financed from both EU and national sources and 
which pursue an EU policy objective, it is possible to act only in accordance with 
a directly applicable EU regulation, including the applicable time limits, 
definitions and terms (in particular, the term ‘irregularity’), or whether it is 
possible, in the case of severable funds provided from EU sources, to act on the 
basis of a directly applicable EU regulation (in this case, Regulation 2988/95), and 
in the case of severable funds provided from a Member State budget, on the basis 
of national legislation (here, Paragraph 44a(9) of the Budgetary Rules). 
18 The appellant acknowledges that the subsidy was mostly provided from EU funds, 
although not the entire amount. In total, the eligible expenses provided from the 
EU budget accounted for 85%; the remaining 15% included 5% from SEF funds 
and 10% from the applicant’s own resources. Of the total levy of CZK 1 333 735 
imposed for a breach of budgetary discipline, the amount of CZK 74 089, which 
represents 5% of the levies and the financial resources of the Member State, is 
relatively marginal. Accordingly, in relation to the levy to be paid to the SEF, no 
EU funds are concerned and, in the opinion of the referring court, it is at the very 
least questionable whether it is appropriate to apply Regulation 2988/95 as regards 
the time period for the imposition of a levy to be paid to the SEF. 
19 In that context, the referring court refers to the appellant’s argument referring to 
paragraph 31 of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 July 2023 in Case 
C-615/21, Napfény-Toll Kft. (ECLI:EU:C:2023:573), in which it examined 
whether the time limits set in Regulation 2988/95 should apply to proceedings 
conducted by individual Member States when collecting value-added tax. 
According to the appellant, prejudice caused to the general budget of the 
European Union, as described in Regulation 2988/95, cannot be interchanged with 
prejudice caused to the budgets of individual Member States. Hence, the appellant 
argues that the time limits set out in Regulation 2988/95 cannot be applied to 
subsidies provided from the state budget of the Czech Republic or, respectively, to 
levies to the state budget. It is thus of the view that, in relation to the funds 
provided from the budget of the Czech Republic, there is nothing to prevent the 
limitation period from being calculated in accordance with Paragraph 44a(9) of 
the Budgetary Rules, in the applicable version. 
20 On the other hand, it is necessary to take account of recital 4 and Article 1(1) of 
Regulation 2988/95, as well as the related provisions (Article 1(2) and Article 2(1) 
and (3) of the regulation), which aim to harmonise to a certain extent the 
procedures applied in the European Union in order to protect its resources in the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-539/24 
 
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respective areas of its competence. In the present case, where EU funds were 
provided from the Cohesion Fund, it is necessary to consider the similar links to 
shared competences in the sphere of economic, social, and territorial cohesion 
(Article 4(2)(c) TFEU) in conjunction with Article 174 TFEU and Article 175, 
first sentence, TFEU, or the shared competence in the area of the environment 
(Article 4(2)(e) TFEU) in conjunction with EU environmental policy (in 
particular, Article 191 TFEU, with Article 192(4) TFEU stating, ‘without 
prejudice to certain measures adopted by the Union, the Member States shall 
finance and implement the environment policy’). 
21 Accordingly, the third question referred seeks to clarify whether, in the case of 
projects co-financed from EU resources and from Member State resources, the 
regime established by Regulation 2988/95 (including the time limits and the term 
‘irregularity’) should apply to the entirety of the amount provided, or whether 
Regulation 2988/95 should be applied in respect of the part provided from EU 
resources and the applicable national legislation should be applied in respect of 
the part provided from national resources, and to what extent the EU policy 
pursued by the subsidy plays a role. This question is also related to whether it 
makes any difference in such a case whether the subsidy amount was provided by 
means of a single or several acts, and whether it can be determined which of the 
sources the act applies to.