Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2015:255
Date: 2015-05-05
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - successful

summary of the pleas in law relied on, and that new pleas in law may not be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a plea which constitutes an amplification of a plea previously made, either expressly or by implication, in the original application and is closely linked to it must be declared admissible (judgement of 20 September 1990 in Hanning v Parliament, ECR, T‑37/89, EU:T:1990:49, paragraph 38). Similar requirements must be met where a submission is made in support of a plea in law (see, for example, judgment of 14 May 1998 in Mo och Domsjö v Commission, T‑352/94, ECR, EU:T:1998:103, paragraph 333). 55 In the present case, it is clear that the argument expounded by the applicants in the reply, challenging the claim that PPL was owned by NICO, is not based on any new factor which came to light in the course of the procedure. Moreover, that argument cannot be regarded as an amplification of a submission previously made in the application as it does not in any way correspond to the facts as presented by the applicants when they lodged their application. 56 First, in the application, the applicants reproduced a diagram of the hierarchical structure of the group controlled by NIOC showing that NIOC held all the share capital in NICO, which, in turn, held all the share capital in PPL, which held the entire share capital in PPI, which held shares in the other applicants, namely 97% of the shares in POSCO, 48% of the shares in POMC and 49% of the shares in PRE. It is clear that the holding chain thus described shows no break in the chain of ownership linking the applicants to NIOC. 57 Second, at no point in the application did the applicants mention that the links that existed between them and NIOC were severed in March 2012; they simply stated that those links were too remote to meet the criterion for inclusion established in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012. 58 Third, in the application, when the applicants state that PPL was included on the lists on the ground that it was a subsidiary of NICO, no submission is made to challenge that ground. On the contrary, the applicants rely on that fact in support of their argument that they could not be regarded as entities connected with an entity providing support to the Iranian Government as their parent company had not been included on the lists on account of the provision of such support but on the basis of its status as an entity owned or controlled by an entity which provided such support. 59 Accordingly, the claim that PPL no longer belonged to the group controlled by NIOC after March 2012 must be rejected as inadmissible and it is necessary to examine whether the contested acts are justified solely in the light of the holding chain as described in paragraph 56 above. 60 First, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, inter alia, that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision has been taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013 in Commission and Others v Kadi, ‘Kadi II’, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 61 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative — that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union are to disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing (judgment in Kadi II, paragraph 60 above, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 to 123). 62 Next, according to case-law, when the funds of an entity identified as providing support to the Iranian Government are frozen, there is a not insignificant danger that that entity may exert pressure on the entities it owns or controls or which belong to it, in order to circumvent the effect of the measures applying to it. Consequently, the freezing of the funds of such entities, as imposed by the Council by Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012, is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures adopted and to ensure that those measures are not circumvented (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:137, paragraphs 39 and 58). 63 Accordingly, when adopting a decision under the provisions referred to above, the Council must carry out an assessment of the circumstances of the individual case in order to determine which entities may be classified as entities ‘owned or controlled’. On the other hand, the nature of the activity of the entity concerned and the fact that there may be no connection between that activity and the provision of support to the Iranian Government are not relevant criteria in that context, as the grounds for the adoption of a measure freezing the funds of an entity that is owned or controlled do not have to include the fact that the entity itself directly provides support to that government (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in Melli Bank v Council, paragraph 62 above, EU:C:2012:137, paragraphs 40 to 42). 64 Lastly, it is also settled case-law that, where the capital of an entity is entirely owned by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government, the criterion for inclusion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 is satisfied (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in Melli Bank v Council, paragraph 62 above, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 79). 65 In the present case, the Council considered that, as NIOC held all the shares in NICO, which itself held all the shares in PPL, which in turn held all the shares in PPI, which held shares in the other applicants, namely 97% of the shares in POSCO, 48% of the shares in POMC and 49% of the shares in PRE, each of the applicants must be regarded as being owned or controlled NIOC within the meaning of Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012. 66 It is therefore necessary to examine whether, in the light of that holding chain and in respect of each applicant, the Council made an error of assessment in taking the view that the criterion for inclusion applicable to entities owned by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government was satisfied. 67 In the first place, with regard to PPI, which is a subsidiary of NIOC, the Court considers that the Council did not make an error of assessment in including that entity on the lists. 68 Bearing in mind the case-law cited at paragraph 64 above, the fact that an entity providing support to the Iranian Government owns the entire capital of an entity implies of itself that the criterion for inclusion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 is satisfied. Moreover, it should be noted that, in the field of competition law, in which the issue of the relationship between a subsidiary and its parent company also has to be addressed, the existence of intermediary companies between those two companies does not affect the application of the rebuttable presumption that the parent company in question exercises decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary. It is indeed considered that it is possible for such influence to be exercised indirectly via intermediary companies (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 January 2011 in General Química and Others v Commission, C‑90/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:21, paragraph 88, and 27 September 2012 in Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, T‑343/06, ECR, EU:T:2012:478, paragraph 52). 69 Accordingly, where the capital of an entity is indirectly held by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government, the criterion for inclusion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 is satisfied, irrespective of the presence and number of intermediary companies between that parent entity and the entity that is owned by it, provided that each of the entities present in the holding chain is entirely owned by its respective direct parent company. In such circumstances, the parent entity retains sole and exclusive control over all its subsidiaries and is therefore in a position, via intermediary companies, to exert pressure on the entity which it owns indirectly in order to circumvent the effect of the measures applying to it, therefore justifying the adoption of restrictive measures in respect of the entity that is thus indirectly owned. 70 In the present case, it must therefore be concluded that the inclusion on the lists of PPI, the capital of which was entirely owned by PPL, which is wholly owned by NICO, which was, in turn, wholly owned by NIOC, is justified in the light of the criterion applicable to entities owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government. 71 In the second place, with regard to POSCO, it should be recalled that virtually all the capital of that entity — that is, 97% — was owned by PPI. 72 In that regard, it is apparent from competition law-related case-law that a parent company is able to exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary not only if it owns all the capital but also if it owns virtually all the capital of that subsidiary (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 September 2009 in Arkema v Commission, T‑168/05, EU:T:2009:367, paragraph 71). 73 Accordingly, it must be concluded that, where all the capital or virtually all the capital of an entity is owned by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government, the criterion for inclusion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 is satisfied. 74 In the present case, in spite of the fact that there are three intermediary companies between NICO and POSCO and the fact that PPI is not the sole owner of POSCO, the Council did not make an error of assessment in adopting restrictive measures directed at POSCO. 75 As indicated at paragraphs 68 and 69 above, the number of intermediary companies has no effect on the ability of a parent company to have significant influence on the conduct of its subsidiary where the capital of the subsidiary and that of each of the intermediary companies is entirely owned by that parent company. The same conclusion applies where the parent company holds virtually all the capital of the subsidiary and the intermediary companies, as in the case under examination, in which, through PPI, NIOC owns 97% of the capital of POSCO. It may reasonably be concluded that, as PPI is exclusively or almost exclusively owned by NIOC, POSCO remains subject to the exclusive sole control of that parent company. 76 It must therefore be concluded that the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering that POSCO was owned by NIOC and, accordingly, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded in so far as it concerns that applicant. 77 In the third place, with regard to POMC and PRE, the Council submits that, according to competition law-related case-law, the presumption that a parent company actually exerts decisive influence over its subsidiary is also applicable where two companies are placed in a position analogous to that in which a single company owns the entire capital of its subsidiary. In the situation under consideration, given that the capital in POMC is owned jointly by PPI and Global O & M Company (with shares of 48% and 47%, respectively) and that PRE is a joint venture in which the capital was held by PPI and Telford International (with shares of 49% and 47%, respectively), the Council considers that the case-law cited at paragraph 64 above is relevant and that POMC and PRE must therefore be regarded as indirectly controlled by NIOC via, inter alia, PPI. 78 Moreover, at the hearing, the Council argued that, given that PPI had a greater share in the capital of POMC than that held by Global O & M Company and a greater share in the capital of PRE than that held by Telford International, it could be assumed that that entity had the last word and could impose its decisions on POMC and PRE. 79 However, the Court considers that, in the present case, as regards POMC and PRE, the presumption that their parent company actually exerts decisive influence on them is not applicable. 80 First, in so far as concerns the argument relating to the joint ownership of capital in POMC and PRE, it should be noted that, unlike PPI, Global O & M Company and Telford International were not the subject of restrictive measures. In those circumstances, it is not in the interest of either of the latter two companies to assist PPI in exerting pressure on their common subsidiary in order to circumvent the effect of the restrictive measures directed solely at that subsidiary. Therefore, the situation cannot be regarded as analogous to that in which a single entity owns all the capital of its subsidiary as, in such circumstances, the fact that there exists joint control is liable to prevent PPI and, as a consequence, NIOC from exerting pressure on POMC and PRE for the purpose of circumventing the effect of the restrictive measures applied to it. 81 Next, it should be recalled that, according to case-law, a 60% holding in an entity’s share capital does not mean, by itself, that the criterion for inclusion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 is satisfied (judgment of 6 September 2013 in Persia International Bank v Council, T‑493/10, ECR (Extracts), EU:T:2013:398, paragraph 106). A fortiori, in the present case, a holding of 48% and of 49% in the share capital of POMC and PRE, respectively, is not sufficient by itself, in the light of the case-law cited at paragraph 64 above, to justify the adoption of restrictive measures in respect of those entities. 82 As PPI does not own all or virtually all the share capital of POMC or PRE, it is necessary to examine whether, given the circumstances of the present case, there was a not insignificant risk that the latter two companies might be led to circumvent the effect of the restrictive measures applied to NIOC. 83 The Council has failed to adduce any evidence that would enable the Court to reach the conclusion that PPI was in a position to exercise control over POMC or PRE. Although the share held by PPI in the capital of the latter two companies was slightly greater than that held by those entities’ other main shareholders, it is none the less a minority holding. It cannot therefore be assumed that PPI had the power to appoint more than half the board members of POMC or half the board members of PRE or otherwise had the last word within the board of directors of those entities. 84 It must therefore be concluded that the Council made an error of assessment in considering that POMC and PRE were held or controlled by NIOC. 85 In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded, in so far as concerns PPI and POSCO, and upheld, in so far as concerns POMC and PRE. As a consequence, the contested acts must be annulled in so far as concerns the latter two applicants. The fourth plea, alleging violation of the right to property, the right to conduct business, the principle of environmental protection and the Union’s humanitarian values and, in any event, the principle of proportionality and the precautionary principle 86 The applicants contend that the contested acts constitute a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. 87 First, the applicants submit, in essence, that the contested acts violate their right to property and their right to conduct a business and are disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued. 88 Next, the applicants maintain that the contested acts are liable to cause significant harm to the environment, to the health and safety of workers and to ordinary Iranians, including children. The applicants claim that, as a result of the sanctions, they will be unable to complete Phase 19 of the South Pars Development Project, the completion of which is critical to preventing a gas shortage during the winter in Iran. Moreover, in the reply, the applicants specify that most of the equipment and technical services used was sourced from EU countries. The inability to obtain that equipment will therefore force the Islamic Republic of Iran to rely on alternative heating fuels which are more harmful to the environment and will increase the risk to the health and safety of humans living and working in the vicinity of the development projects. 89 In the light of those risks, the applicants submit that the Council infringed the precautionary principle. The Council ought to have taken into account the effects of freezing their assets before adopting the contested acts. 90 Lastly, the applicants maintain that the measures adopted by the Council are disproportionate to their stated aim. 91 The Court is of the view that all of the applicants’ arguments must be rejected. 92 In the first place, with regard to the applicants’ right to property and the right to conduct a business, it should be observed, first, that those rights form part of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 17 and Article 16, respectively, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose observance is ensured by the Courts of the European Union. However, it should be recalled that fundamental rights are not absolute and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union (judgment of 16 November 2011 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 113). 93 Next, according to case-law, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by EU institutions should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question, and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgment of 18 November 1987 in Maizena and Others, 137/85, ECR, EU:C:1987:493, paragraph 15). 94 In the present case, the applicants’ right to conduct a business and their right to property are restricted to a considerable extent as a result of the adoption of the contested acts, as they are prevented from having access to funds held by them in the EU, other than by means of special authorisation, and, under Article 23(3) of Regulation No 267/2012, no fund or economic resource may be made available to them, either directly or indirectly. However, given the prime importance of the preservation of international peace and security, the Council was entitled to take the view that the infringements of the rights referred to above that would result from the inclusion on the lists of the entities owned by an entity providing support to the Iranian Government were appropriate and necessary for the purpose of exerting pressure on that government in order to oblige it to cease its nuclear proliferation activities (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 62 above, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 61). 95 Accordingly, in the light of the objectives pursued, such restrictions cannot be regarded as a disproportionate and intolerable interference undermining the very substance of the right to property and the right to conduct a business (see, to that effect, judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 92 above, EU:C:2011:735, paragraphs 114 and 115). 96 Moreover, contrary to the applicants’ contentions, the freezing of their funds cannot be regarded as disproportionate on account of a violation, as alleged, of their right to submit their arguments to the Council. As will be concluded in connection with the examination of the fifth plea (see paragraph 123 et seq. below), the applicants were given the opportunity to express their point of view. 97 Accordingly, the arguments alleging violation of the right to property and the right to conduct a business and that the measures in question were disproportionate must be rejected as unfounded. 98 In the second place, with regard to the risk of harm to the environment and to the health and safety of workers and ordinary Iranians, it should be noted, first, that the fact that it is impossible to obtain key equipment and technical services from undertakings established in the EU — presented as the cause of that risk — is not the result of the restrictive measures directed at the applicants. 99 It is apparent from the applicants’ arguments, and from the documents annexed to the reply which were produced in support of those arguments, that the risk of a gas shortage or the risk of reliance on alternative heating fuels are not the consequence of any financial difficulties that may affect the applicants as a result of the freezing of their funds and would prevent them from acquiring the equipment necessary to conduct their businesses, but are the result of the restrictions imposed by the EU in relation to the supply to Iranian entities of goods or key technologies or of technical services associated with those goods intended for the gas industry in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 100 As observed by the Council, those restrictions, provided for, inter alia, in Article 4 of Decision 2010/413 and Articles 8 and 9 of Regulation No 267/2012, apply to any Iranian entity and may therefore affect the applicants, irrespective of whether they are included on the lists. Moreover, a claim that those provisions are unlawful cannot be made in the present proceedings as they do not constitute the legal basis of the contested acts. 101 It must therefore be concluded that the claim that the contested acts pose a risk to the environment and to the health and safety of workers and ordinary Iranians is unfounded. 102 In the third place, with regard to the precautionary principle, it should be noted that that principle is a general principle of EU law, requiring the authorities in question, in the particular context of the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the relevant rules, to take appropriate measures to prevent specific potential risks to public health, safety and the environment, by giving precedence to the requirements related to the protection of those interests over economic interests (see judgments of 26 November 2002 in Artegodan and Others v Commission, T‑74/00, T‑76/00, T‑83/00 to T‑85/00, T‑132/00, T‑137/00 and T‑141/00, ECR, EU:T:2002:283, paragraphs 183 and 184, and 21 October 2003 in Solvay Pharmaceuticals v Council, T‑392/02, EU:T:2003:277, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited). 103 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 98 to 101 above, the applicants have failed to establish that there may be a risk to health, safety or the environment that may have arisen as a result of the freezing of their funds. Therefore, the Council cannot be criticised for not having considered the possible application of the precautionary principle when adopting the contested acts. 104 In the light of all of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected as unfounded. The fifth plea, alleging failure to give notification in so far as concerns two of the applicants and violation of the obligation to state reasons, of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection 105 The applicants submit that the Council committed numerous violations of procedural rights, the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection in respect of them. 106 First, the applicants contend that the Council failed to notify the contested acts to POMC and PRE individually. 107 Second, the applicants submit that the Council failed to give adequate reasons for its decision to impose restrictive measures on them and did not therefore inform them of the basis for their inclusion on the lists. In the reply, the applicants state that the reason for the claim that they are owned or controlled by NIOC does not correspond to the statement of reasons given in the contested acts. 108 Third, the applicants maintain that the Council failed to provide them, despite their request, with the information and evidence on which it relied when adopting the contested acts. They submit, therefore, that they have not been able to make representations and properly challenge their inclusion on the lists. 109 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicants have requested the Court to examine the procedural arguments raised in the fifth plea only in the event that the Court rejects the first four pleas. Given that the second plea was upheld in so far as concerns POMC and PRE, it will be necessary to examine the fifth plea only with regard to PPI and POSCO (‘the first two applicants’). Therefore, the argument that the contested acts were not notified to POMC or PRE will not be examined in connection with the fifth plea. 110 First, as regards the obligation to state adequate reasons, it is apparent from the examination of the first plea (see paragraphs 27 to 48 above) that the statement of reasons for the contested acts is sufficient as it enabled the first two applicants not only to identify the legal basis of those acts but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered that restrictive measures had to be adopted in respect of them, in accordance with the case-law cited at paragraph 35 above. 111 Next, with regard to the rights of the defence, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, observance of those rights, especially the right to be heard, in all proceedings initiated against an entity which may lead to a measure adversely affecting that entity, is a fundamental principle of EU law which must be guaranteed, even when there are no rules governing the procedure in question (judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 35 above, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 91). 112 The principle of respect for the rights of the defence requires, first, that the entity concerned must be informed of the evidence adduced against it to justify the measure adversely affecting it. Second, it must be afforded the opportunity properly to make known its views on that evidence (see, by analogy, judgment in OMPI I, paragraph 33 above, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 93). 113 Consequently, as regards an initial measure whereby the funds of an entity are frozen, unless there are compelling reasons touching on the security of the EU or of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations which preclude it, the evidence adduced against that entity should be disclosed to it either concomitantly with or as soon as possible after the adoption of the measure concerned. Where the entity concerned so requests, it must also have the right to make submissions concerning that evidence once the act has been adopted (see, by analogy, judgment in OMPI I, paragraph 33 above, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 137). 114 It should also be observed that, when sufficiently precise information has been disclosed, enabling the entity concerned properly to state its point of view on the evidence adduced against it by the Council, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence does not mean that that institution is obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in its file. It is only at the request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue (see judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 35 above, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 97 and case-law cited). 115 Lastly, the principle of effective judicial protection means that the EU authority in question is bound to disclose the grounds for a restrictive measure to the entity concerned, so far as possible, either when that measure is adopted or, at the very least, as swiftly as possible thereafter, in order to enable the entity concerned to exercise, within the periods prescribed, its right to bring an action. Observance of that obligation to disclose the grounds is necessary both to enable the persons to whom restrictive measures are addressed to defend their rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the Courts of the European Union, and also to put the latter fully in a position to carry out the review of the lawfulness of the measure in question, which is the duty of those courts (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2008 in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 335 to 337 and case-law cited). 116 In the present case, first, as regards the initial disclosure of inculpatory evidence, it should be recalled (i) that the contested acts were communicated to the first two applicants by letters of 10 June 2013 and (ii) that it is apparent from the examination of the first plea and paragraph 110 above, concerning the obligation to state reasons, that the contested acts gave sufficient reasons in so far as they enabled the first two applicants to understand the reasons why they were included on the lists. 117 Therefore, it must be found that the Council did not violate the first two applicants’ rights of defence in so far as concerns the original disclosure of the evidence against them. 118 In the second place, with regard to access to documents, without there being any need to rule on the claim that the Council failed to disclose to the first two applicants the documents in their file in good time, the Court finds that the Council did not violate those applicants’ rights of defence. 119 It must be noted that the belated disclosure of a document on which the Council relied in order to adopt or maintain the restrictive measures concerning an entity does not constitute a breach of the rights of the defence that would justify the annulment of the acts concerned unless it is established that the restrictive measures in question could not have been lawfully adopted or maintained if the document belatedly disclosed had to be excluded as inculpatory evidence (judgment in Persia International Bank v Council, paragraph 81 above, EU:T:2013:398, paragraph 85). 120 As a consequence, in the present case, even if the Council had disclosed the documents in the applicants’ files belatedly, that could justify the annulment of the contested acts only if it was also established that the adoption of the restrictive measures in respect of the first two applicants could not be justified on the basis of the evidence disclosed to them in good time, namely the grounds set out in the contested acts. 121 First, it must be noted that the documents disclosed when the defence was lodged do not contain any new information that could be relevant to the defence of the first two applicants, as their content does not disclose any new information concerning them. Second, it is apparent from the examination of the second plea that the reasons given in the contested acts, as disclosed to the first two applicants, were sufficient for the purpose of justifying the adoption of the restrictive measures concerning them. 122 In those circumstances, the Court finds that the Council did not violate the first two applicants’ rights of defence in so far as concerns access to documents. 123 In the third place, with regard to whether it was possible for the first two applicants properly to make known their views, it should be noted that, following the adoption of the contested acts, the applicants sent a letter to the Council on 9 August 2013 in which they set out their views and requested disclosure of the reasons for their inclusion on the lists and of the evidence on their file. 124 Accordingly, the first two applicants were given the opportunity properly to make known their views, with the result that it cannot be claimed that the Council violated their rights of defence in that regard. 125 In those circumstances, the Court considers that the first two applicants were able to defend their rights and that it has, to all intents, been placed in a position enabling it to review the lawfulness of the contested acts. The first two applicants are therefore incorrect in claiming that the Council violated their right to effective judicial protection. 126 As a consequence, the fifth plea must be rejected as unfounded in so far as concerns the first two applicants. 127 In the light of all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed, in so far as concerns PPI and POSCO, and upheld, in so far as concerns POMC and PRE. The temporal effects of the annulment of the contested acts in so far as they concern POMC and PRE 128 Under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU the Court may, if it considers this necessary, state which of the effects of an act which it has declared void are to be considered as definitive. It follows from the case-law that the Courts of the European Union may decide, on the basis of that provision, the date when their annulling judgments are to take effect (judgment of 12 December 2013 in Nabipour and Others v Council, T‑58/12, EU:T:2013:640, paragraphs 250 and 251). 129 In this case, the Court considers, for the reasons set out below, that it is necessary to maintain the temporal effects of the contested acts until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal stated in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, until the dismissal of the appeal. 130 It must be borne in mind that the nuclear programme pursued by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a source of serious concerns at both the international and European levels. That is the background to the Council’s gradual extension of the number of restrictive measures adopted against that State, in order to hinder the development of activities which jeopardise peace and international security, in the context of implementation of Security Council resolutions. 131 Consequently, the interest of POMC and PRE in ensuring that the annulment of the contested acts should take effect immediately in so far as they are concerned must be weighed against the objective of general interest pursued by the EU’s policy in relation to restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The adjustment of the temporal effects of the annulment of a restrictive measure may thus be justified by the need to ensure that restrictive measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations to do with security or the conduct of the international relations of the EU and of its Member States (see, by analogy with there being no obligation to inform the person or entity concerned beforehand of the grounds for an initial listing, judgment of 21 December 2011 in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 67). 132 The annulment with immediate effect of the contested acts in so far as they concern POMC and PRE would enable them to transfer all or part of their assets outside the EU, without the Council being able, if appropriate, to apply in good time Article 266 TFEU with a view to correcting the irregularities identified in this judgment, and consequently the effectiveness of any freezing of assets in relation to those entities which might, in the future, be decided on by the Council might be seriously and irreversibly prejudiced. 133 As regards the application of Article 266 TFEU in this case, it must be observed that the annulment by this judgment of POMC’s and PRE’s listing stems from the fact that the reasons stated for that listing are not supported by sufficient evidence (see paragraphs 77 to 84 above). Although it is for the Council to decide on what measures to adopt to comply with this judgment, a further listing of POMC and PRE cannot automatically be ruled out. In the course of further review, the Council has the possibility of again listing those entities on the basis of reasons which are supported to the requisite legal standard. 134 It follows that the effects of the contested acts must be maintained as regards POMC and PRE, until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal or, if an appeal is brought within that period, until the dismissal of the appeal. Costs 135 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Under Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order that the costs be shared or order the parties to bear their own costs if each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, or where the circumstances are exceptional. 136 In the circumstances of the present case, the Court decides that each party must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls the following, in so far as they concern Petropars Aria Kish Operation and Management Co. and Petropars Resources Engineering Kish Co.: – Council Decision 2013/270/CFSP of 6 June 2013 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran; – Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 522/2013 of 6 June 2013 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran; 2. Orders that the effects of Decision 2013/270 and Regulation No 522/2013 be maintained as regards Petropars Aria Kish Operation and Management Co. and Petropars Resources Engineering Kish Co. until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal, as provided for in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or, if an appeal is brought within that period, until the date of any dismissal of that appeal; 3. Dismisses the action as to the remainder; 4. Orders each party to bear its own costs. Jaeger Van der Woude Buttigieg Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 5 May 2015. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.