Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:443
Date: 2025-05-07
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Trade marks;Intellectual, industrial and commercial property
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment
Origin: Germany

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) 7 May 2025 (*) ( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark SOUNDLESS – Earlier EU word mark SOUNDTEX – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 ) In Case T‑398/24, Carl Freudenberg KG, established in Weinheim (Germany), represented by M. Knitter, lawyer, applicant, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent, defendant, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being Cadeinor – Mobiliário de escritório integrado Lda., established in Quinchães (Portugal), THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm (Rapporteur) and D. Kukovec, Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, gives the following Judgment 1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Carl Freudenberg KG, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 30 May 2024 (Case R 1510/2023‑4) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 On 22 February 2022, Cadeinor – Mobiliário de escritório integrado Lda. filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign: 3 The mark applied for covered goods in Class 17 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to ‘Acoustical insulation barrier panels; acoustic insulating panels; acoustical panels for buildings’. 4 On 2 June 2022, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above. 5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark SOUNDTEX, covering inter alia goods in Class 17 and corresponding to the following description: ‘Absorption and insulation material against sound, heat and electricity, in particular in the form of roll material, sheets, punched blanks and blanks being semi-finished materials, in particular of non-wovens, absorption and insulation material against sound, heat and electricity for apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water, in particular for motor vehicles, utility vehicles and railway vehicles, ships and aircraft, all of the aforesaid goods being in particular in the form of roll material, sheets, punched blanks and blanks being semi-finished materials, in particular of textiles, in particular of non-wovens’. 6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). 7 On 23 May 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition. 8 On 18 July 2023, Cadeinor – Mobiliário de escritório integrado Lda. filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division. 9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public in view of the high level of attention of that public, the weak distinctive character of the common word element ‘sound’ and the below-average or low distinctiveness of the earlier mark, despite the identity of the goods concerned. Forms of order sought 10 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested decision; – order EUIPO to pay the costs. 11 EUIPO contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened. Law 12 The applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 13 The applicant claims that the marks at issue are highly similar as the word element ‘sound’ is the beginning of those marks as well as their distinctive dominant element. In its view, in the case of the earlier mark, that word element is of inherent distinctiveness, at least for the non-English-speaking public, such as the Spanish public. It also submits that the word element is non-descriptive because the ‘absorption and insulation material against sound, heat and electricity’ in Class 17 is unconnected with audio equipment. As for the word element ‘tex’ contained in the earlier mark, it will not be perceived as referring to ‘textiles’ and is thus of normal distinctiveness. With regard to the mark applied for, the applicant submits that the word element ‘soundless’ is that mark’s dominant element, that the sign is characterised more by its word element on account of the allusive nature of the figurative device and that, for the same reasons as those relating to the earlier mark, the word element ‘sound’ is not merely descriptive of the goods in question. The applicant argues that the signs at issue are conceptually and visually highly similar and phonetically similar to a high degree. Lastly, it considers that the allegedly weak distinctive character of the word element ‘sound’ does not offset the identity of the goods and the fact that the marks at issue are highly similar phonetically, visually and conceptually. 14 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 15 Under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for is not to be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods and services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier mark. 16 The risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited). 17 It is in the light of those considerations that this plea in law must be examined. The relevant public 18 As the Board of Appeal observes, the goods concerned are mainly directed at professional customers and some members of the broader public, namely do-it-yourself enthusiasts, whose level of attention is high, a fact which is not, moreover, disputed by the applicant. 19 The Board of Appeal also correctly took the view that the relevant public was that of the European Union as a whole, a fact which, once more, the applicant did not call into question. The comparison of the goods 20 As the Board of Appeal observed, the goods covered by the mark applied for are identical to those covered by the earlier mark, a fact which the applicant itself confirms. The comparison of the signs 21 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression made by the signs, their distinctive and dominant elements, in particular, being borne in mind. The perception of marks in the mind of the average consumer of the goods or services at issue plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 22 According to the case-law, two marks are similar when, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects (see judgment of 15 November 2023, Portal Golf Gestión v EUIPO – Augusta National (imaster.golf), T‑677/22, not published, EU:T:2023:720, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). The distinctive and dominant elements 23 In the present case, before considering the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of those marks. 24 As recalled in paragraph 21 above, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression made by the signs, their distinctive and dominant elements, in particular, being borne in mind. 25 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. However, it is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgments of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraphs 41 and 42, and of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraphs 42 and 43). 26 In the present case, as regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal considered that both the English-speaking and the non-English-speaking relevant public will understand the word ‘sound’, and that that word element has weak distinctive character in connection with the goods concerned. As for the word element ‘tex’, it took the view, first, that it is weakly distinctive for the English-speaking, Spanish-speaking and French-speaking parts of the relevant public, who will perceive it as an abbreviation of the word ‘textile’ and see in it a reference to a material with sound-absorbing properties, and, second, it is distinctive for the remaining part of that public, who will not grasp its meaning or will understand it as a reference to a unit of weight used to measure the density of yarns, without being able to link that reference immediately to the goods in question. With regard to the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal confirmed the weak distinctive character of the word ‘sound’, the separation of which from the word element ‘less’ was strengthened by their different shades of grey. It also considered, as to the figurative element, that three curved lines in a light grey colour constituted a commonplace representation of sound and that that element as a whole was at the very least allusive in respect of the goods concerned, but that, given its size and position, it will certainly not be overlooked. Lastly, it concluded that neither of the signs at issue had a dominant element. 27 In the first place, as regards the word element ‘sound’ of the earlier mark, the applicant submits that, for the non-English-speaking part of the relevant public and at the very least for the Spanish-speaking and Italian-speaking parts of that public, which the Board of Appeal excluded from its assessment, that word element has no meaning and therefore has inherent distinctiveness. 28 Firstly, it is clear from paragraphs 21, 22 and 35 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal took into consideration the public of the European Union as a whole and did not therefore simply take account of the English-speaking public. Thus, the applicant is wrong to claim that the non-English-speaking public, in particular the Spanish-speaking and Italian-speaking public, was disregarded in the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue. 29 Secondly, the Board of Appeal correctly considered that the relevant public of the European Union as a whole would understand the word element ‘sound’ contained in the earlier mark. 30 According to settled case-law, knowledge of a foreign language cannot in general be assumed (judgment of 13 September 2010, Inditex v OHIM – Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN), T‑292/08, EU:T:2010:399, paragraph 83; see also, to that effect, judgment of 24 June 2014, Hut.com v OHIM – Intersport France (THE HUT), T‑330/12, not published, EU:T:2014:569, paragraph 40). However, it is also apparent from case-law that many consumers in the European Union know basic English vocabulary (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2009, Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll v OHIM – Redrock Construction (REDROCK), T‑146/08, not published, EU:T:2009:398, paragraph 53; of 15 October 2018, Apple and Pear Australia and Star Fruits Diffusion v EUIPO – Pink Lady America (WILD PINK), T‑164/17, not published, EU:T:2018:678, paragraph 58; and of 8 July 2020, Pablosky v EUIPO – docPrice (mediFLEX easySTEP), T‑21/19, EU:T:2020:310, paragraph 71 (not published)). 31 In that regard, it must be acknowledged that the word element ‘sound’ is a common word in the English vocabulary and that the relevant public will understand its meaning when that term is associated with the goods in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, TrekStor v OHIM – Scanlab (iDrive), T‑105/14, not published, EU:T:2015:924, paragraph 74). 32 In that context, EUIPO correctly observes that the Spanish-speaking and Italian-speaking parts of the relevant public will more readily understand the term ‘sound’ since the Spanish-language term ‘sonido’ and the Italian-language term ‘suono’ bear strong resemblances to that term ‘sound’. 33 Thirdly, as the Board of Appeal notes, the word element ‘sound’ contained in the earlier mark is weakly distinctive in respect of the goods in question, because it is closely and directly linked to those goods, which relate to acoustic insulation. Relying on case-law, the applicant attempts unsuccessfully to claim that, even though the word element ‘sound’ had to be regarded as descriptive, that did not alter its ability to attract the attention of the relevant public and, therefore, to entail a likelihood of confusion with the mark applied for. 34 It is well-established case-law that the greater or lesser degree of distinctiveness of the elements common to the mark applied for and an earlier mark is one of the relevant factors in assessing the similarity of those signs (see judgment of 26 March 2015, Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club v OHIM – Lifestyle Equities (Royal County of Berkshire POLO CLUB), T‑581/13, not published, EU:T:2015:192, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). The descriptive, non-distinctive or weakly distinctive elements of a composite trade mark generally have less weight in the analysis of the similarity between the signs than the elements of greater distinctiveness, which are also more able to dominate the overall impression created by the mark (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The weakly distinctive character of an element which is common to two signs, just like the descriptive nature of such an element, significantly reduces the relative weight of that element in the comparison of those signs, including the visual and phonetic comparisons, even though its presence must be taken into account (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 October 2020, Rothenberger v EUIPO – Paper Point (ROBOX), T‑49/20, not published, EU:T:2020:492, paragraph 67; of 13 September 2023, Korres v EUIPO – Naos (EST. KORRES 1996 HYDRA-BIOME), T‑328/22, not published, EU:T:2023:533, paragraph 75; and of 6 November 2024, W. L. Gore & Associates v EUIPO – Angiokard med. Spritzguß (Cardioflow), T‑1146/23, not published, EU:T:2024:789, paragraph 57). 35 In the second place, with regard to the word element ‘tex’, the applicant submits that that element is of normal distinctiveness in respect of the relevant goods of the earlier mark as it has no link with any unit of measurement for the density of yarns and nor is it a common abbreviation for ‘textiles’, thus refuting that it is weakly distinctive for part of the relevant public. 36 However, in so far as it refers specifically to the word element ‘tex’, the applicant’s argument is ineffective since, like the applicant, the Board of Appeal correctly found that that element was meaningless for part of the relevant public and that it had relatively more weight than the word element ‘sound’. The mere fact that the Board of Appeal could consider the word element ‘tex’ being weakly distinctive for another part of the public therefore in no way changes the fact that the Board of Appeal did indeed take into account, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the situation in which the word element ‘tex’ has, essentially, average distinctiveness. 37 In the third place, as regards the figurative element of the contested sign, the Board of Appeal rightly found, in essence, that it would not be overlooked or dominated by the word element of that sign. While it is settled case-law that, where a mark consists of both word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more easily refer to the goods in question by citing the name of the trade mark than by describing the figurative element of that mark, it does not follow, however, that the word elements of a mark must always be considered to be more distinctive than the figurative elements. In the case of a composite mark, the figurative element may, in particular on account of its shape, size, colour or position in the sign, rank equally with the word element (judgment of 23 September 2020, Veronese Design Company v EUIPO – Veronese (VERONESE), T‑608/19, not published, EU:T:2020:423, paragraph 68; see also, to that effect, judgments of 23 November 2010, Codorniu Napa v OHIM – Bodegas Ontañon (ARTESA NAPA VALLEY), T‑35/08, EU:T:2010:476, paragraphs 37 and 39, and of 12 November 2015, CEDC International v OHIM – Fabryka Wódek Polmos Łańcut (WISENT VODKA), T‑450/13, not published, EU:T:2015:841, paragraph 74). 38 In addition, the Board of Appeal correctly relied on the size and the position of the figurative element of the mark applied for to find, in essence, that that element ranked equally with the word element. 39 In that context, the applicant argues to no avail that, given the allusive nature of the figurative element in respect of the goods in question, the sign applied for is characterised more by its word element. As EUIPO has observed, there is no basis on which to argue in the present case that that figurative element will be less distinctive than the word element ‘sound’, which conveys the same weakly distinctive message. 40 Finally, in the fourth place, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 29 to 34 above, the word element ‘sound’ of the mark applied for is also weakly distinctive in connection with the goods concerned. In that regard, as the Board of Appeal observed, it will be easier for the relevant public to recognise that word element on account of the two shades of grey used for the word elements ‘sound’, on the one hand, and ‘less’, on the other. 41 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue must be rejected. The similarity of the signs 42 Firstly, as regards the visual comparison, the Board of Appeal rightly considered that the marks at issue are visually similar at most to a below-average degree. 43 The word element ‘sound’, although present at the beginning of the signs at issue, is weakly distinctive and not dominant. As recalled in paragraph 34 above, the weakly distinctive character or the descriptive nature of an element which is common to two signs significantly reduces the relative weight of such an element in the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of those signs, even though its presence must be taken into account. In particular, where an element which is common to the signs at issue is weakly distinctive or is descriptive, whereas the other elements in those marks have some distinctive character, such an element may be of less importance notwithstanding its length and its position within those marks (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2020, Eugène Perma France v EUIPO – SPI Investments Group (NATURANOVE), T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraphs 43 and 44, and of 6 November 2024, Cardioflow, T‑1146/23, not published, EU:T:2024:789, paragraph 47). 44 In that regard, the suffix ‘less’ contained in the mark applied for, on the one hand, and the suffix ‘tex’ and the figurative element in the earlier mark, on the other hand, are not visually similar to any degree. 45 Secondly, the Board of Appeal’s assessment that, phonetically, the marks at issue are similar to an average degree given the weakly distinctive character of the word element ‘sound’ and the difference between the suffixes ‘less’ and ‘tex’, despite their common vowel ‘e’, must be upheld. 46 In that regard, the applicant unsuccessfully claims that the ends of the word elements in the marks at issue, which will be pronounced as ‘less’ and ‘teks’ respectively, are highly similar. The similarity between the signs at issue must be assessed on the basis of the overall impression produced by their full pronunciation (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 June 2012, XXXLutz Marken v OHIM – Meyer Manufacturing (CIRCON), T‑542/10, not published, EU:T:2012:294, paragraph 50, and of 15 July 2020, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO – Save the Duck (FAKE DUCK), T‑371/19, not published, EU:T:2020:339, paragraph 49). In addition, not only will the stress fall on the first part of the syllables ‘tex’ and ‘less’, that is, on the letters ‘t’ and ‘l’, which are pronounced very differently, but also the end of those syllables will be clearly differentiated by the letter ‘x’ in the earlier mark, which has a predominant ‘k’ sound. 47 Thirdly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that, conceptually, both signs refer to the idea of sound, but that that conceptual similarity was based on a weakly distinctive element, that it thus played a limited role and that it therefore had less impact on the assessment of the likelihood of confusion. As recalled in paragraphs 34 and 43 above, the descriptive nature or weakly distinctive character of an element that is common to two signs significantly reduced the relative weight of such an element in the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of those signs, even though its presence had to be taken into account. The distinctiveness of the earlier mark 48 In paragraphs 50 and 51 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the distinctiveness of the earlier mark as a whole was, at most, somewhat below average and that, for the part of the relevant public who understand the term ‘tex’ as an abbreviation of ‘textile’, the earlier mark’s distinctiveness had to be regarded as low. 49 The applicant attempts unsuccessfully to call that assessment into question by arguing that the word element ‘tex’ is, essentially, of average distinctiveness and that therefore, taken as a whole, the earlier mark’s distinctiveness reaches an average level. 50 The Board of Appeal was right to consider that, on account of its shortness in particular, the word element ‘tex’ was incapable of strengthening the distinctiveness of the earlier mark. Neither the length of that word element, which is shorter than the word element ‘sound’, nor its visual, phonetic and conceptual characteristics are capable of strengthening the weak distinctiveness of that mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, NATURANOVE, T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraph 68). 51 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal’s conclusion vis-à-vis the weak distinctiveness of the earlier mark for the part of the relevant public who understand the term ‘tex’ and the ‘somewhat below-average’ distinctiveness for the part of that public who do not understand the meaning of that term must be upheld. The likelihood of confusion 52 The applicant submits that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. It disagrees with the Board of Appeal’s global assessment of the similarity of the signs, repeating, in essence, that the Board of Appeal significantly diminished the impact of the phonetic, visual and conceptual similarities due to the alleged descriptiveness of the term ‘sound’, that it did not sufficiently consider the identity of the goods concerned, and that it attributed too much significance to the weak or below-average distinctiveness of the earlier mark. 53 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods and services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74). 54 As is set out in recital 11 of Regulation 2017/1001, the appreciation of the likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the public’s recognition of the trade mark on the market at issue. The more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and therefore marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the public’s recognition of them, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24; of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; and of 22 June 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, C‑342/97, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 20). 55 Moreover, it follows from the unitary character of the EU trade mark laid down in Article 1(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 that an earlier EU trade mark is protected in the same way in all Member States. Earlier EU trade marks may therefore be relied on in opposition to any subsequent application to register a trade mark which infringes their protection, even if it does so only in the perception of the consumers of part of the European Union. It follows that the principle laid down in Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, according to which it suffices, in order for registration of a trade mark to be refused, that an absolute ground for refusal exists only in part of the European Union, also applies by analogy to a relative ground for refusal under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2018, Link Entertainment v EUIPO – García-Sanjuan Machado (SAVORY DELICIOUS ARTISTS & EVENTS), T‑694/17, not published, EU:T:2018:432, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 56 The Board of Appeal concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion relying, in essence, on the high level of attention of the relevant public, the weak distinctive character of the common word element ‘sound’, the differentiating elements, namely the endings ‘less’ and ‘tex’, in the word elements of the signs at issue and the figurative element of the contested sign, the existence of, at most, below-average visual similarity and average phonetic similarity, the lack of any significant impact of the existence of a conceptual similarity on the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, and the below average or low distinctiveness of the earlier mark. It considered that, in the light of those factors, the identity of the goods covered by the marks at issue did not call into question the conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion. 57 As noted in paragraphs 42 to 47 above, the conclusions reached by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision concerning the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue are correct. The Board of Appeal was justified in considering that criteria such as the high degree of attention of the relevant public, the below-average visual similarity and the average phonetic similarity, and the below-average distinctiveness of the earlier mark for part of the relevant public or weak distinctiveness for another part of that public, which argued in favour of there being no likelihood of confusion, could not be offset by the identity of the goods and the conceptual similarity of the signs. The Board of Appeal therefore correctly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above. 58 Therefore, the single plea alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, relied on by the applicant in support of the form of order sought by it, must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 59 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 60 Since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, each party is to bear its own costs, given that no hearing was organised. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders each party to bear its own costs. Škvařilová-Pelzl Nõmm Kukovec Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 May 2025. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.