Judgment (extracts);Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2020:436
Date: 2020-09-23
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 61 It is for the Courts of the European Union in order to carry out that examination to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013 Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited). 62 That is because it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121). 63 For that purpose, there is no requirement that that authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act sought to be annulled. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122). 64 If the competent European Union authority provides relevant information or evidence, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 65 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, an appraisal of the substance of the reasons for a listing must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation but in the context in which it fits (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 51, and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 50). 2. The grounds for inclusion and the determination of listing criteria 66 Bearing in mind that, at the hearing, the applicant and the Council had an exchange of arguments on whether the applicant’s name had been retained on the lists in question on two or three grounds for inclusion, the Court deems it appropriate to provide the following clarifications. 67 In the present case, as is clear from paragraph 27 above, the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question were not amended as compared with Decision 2016/850 and Implementing Regulation 2016/840, and are as follows: ‘Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and/or activities in the telecommunications, oil and plastic industry sectors and close business relations with Maher Al-Assad. He benefits from and provides support to the Syrian regime, through his business activities. Associate of Maher Al-Assad, including through his business activities.’ 68 Under Article 28(1), (2)(a) and (3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836: ‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the regime, and persons and entities associated with them, as listed in Annexes I and II, shall be frozen. 2. In accordance with the assessments and determinations made by the Council in the context of the situation in Syria as set out in recitals 5 to 11, all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by: (a) leading businesspersons operating in Syria; … 3. Persons, entities or bodies within one of the categories referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be included or retained on the list of persons and entities in Annex I if there is sufficient information that they are not, or are no longer, associated with the regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention.’ 69 Article 15(1)(a), (1a)(a) and (1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, is worded in almost identical terms. 70 In the light of the wording of the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists, together with the wording of the listing criteria, it is appropriate to find that, in the present case, three grounds for inclusion were relied on with regard to the applicant. The first subparagraph, which corresponds to the first ground, relates to the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria; the second subparagraph, which corresponds to the second ground, concerns benefit received from and support provided to the Syrian regime; and the third subparagraph, which corresponds to the third ground, relates to association with the Syrian regime. 71 It follows that the first ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question is based on the legal criterion laid down in Article 28(2)(a) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1a)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of leading businessperson operating in Syria), and the second and third grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists are based on the legal criterion laid down in Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of association with the regime), on account of either the benefit received from and support provided to the Syrian regime, or his association with Mr Maher Al-Assad, a key figure of the Syrian regime. 72 In so far as, at the hearing, the Council put forward the argument that the reference to the benefit received from and support provided to the Syrian regime was not to be interpreted as a third ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question – an argument which the applicant did not challenge – the Court considers it useful to provide the following clarifications. 73 The benefit received from or support provided to the Syrian regime is an autonomous legal criterion, laid down in Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, which, as such, is to be distinguished from that of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’ provided for in Article 28(2)(a) of that decision, or even that of association with figures belonging to that regime, in Article 28(1) of the decision. 74 That is apparent from the very wording of Article 28 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836. That article provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, for the freezing of funds and economic resources of three categories of person, namely (i) those responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, (ii) those benefiting from or supporting the regime, and (iii) those associated with them. Article 28(2) envisages the freezing of funds and economic resources of a number of categories of person, including leading businesspersons operating in Syria. Article 28(1) and (2) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, therefore refers, in principle, to different categories of person, which is confirmed by the possibility, afforded solely to persons who fall within the scope of Article 28(2) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, of relying on Article 28(3), which allows them, under certain circumstances, not to have their names included or retained on the lists in question. 75 The literal interpretation of that provision is consistent with the context of its adoption and the objective referred to therein (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 10 March 2005, easyCar, C‑336/03, EU:C:2005:150, paragraph 21). It should be recalled, first, that it is clear from recital 5 of Decision 2015/1836 that the Council established a number of categories of person, inserted into Article 28(2) of Decision 2013/255, in order to expand the existing restrictive measures that it intended to maintain whilst retaining a targeted, differentiated approach. It therefore clearly expressed its intention to add listing criteria to the existing ones laid down in Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255. Secondly, Decision 2015/1836, which inserted Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, was intended to apply solely to those new categories of person, as is clear from recital 14 of that decision, Lastly, it should be noted that the possibility afforded by Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255 had no equivalent within Article 28 of that decision prior to its amendment by Decision 2015/1836. 76 The fact that Article 28 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, makes provision for different categories of person does not mean that a given person cannot fall into several categories. It does, however, mean that where the Council decides to include or retain a person’s name on the lists in question, it must determine, in the light of the evidence at its disposal, the category or categories into which that person may fall. In that connection, it must consider, first, which criterion or criteria it intends to use in order to include or retain a person’s name on the lists in question, and, secondly, whether it has a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that each of the grounds for inclusion, which are based on the criterion or criteria that the Council has chosen, is well founded. 77 In that regard, it cannot be excluded that, for a specific person, the grounds for inclusion might overlap to a certain extent, in that a person may be considered to be a leading businessperson operating in Syria and also regarded as benefiting, in the course of his or her activities, from the Syrian regime or supporting it through those same activities. That is apparent, specifically, from the fact that, as is established in recital 6 of Decision 2015/1836, close association with the Syrian regime and support to it by that category of persons are one of the reasons for which the Council decided to establish that category. The fact remains that, even in such a situation, these are separate criteria. 78 It has in fact been acknowledged by the case-law that Decision 2015/1836 introduced as an objective, autonomous and sufficient listing criterion, that of ‘leading businessperson operating in Syria’, with the result that the Council is no longer required to demonstrate that there is a link between that category of persons and the Syrian regime, or between that category of persons and the support provided to, or the benefit derived from, the regime, since being a leading businessperson operating in Syria is sufficient for the restrictive measures in question to be applied to a person (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 38, and of 4 April 2019, Sharif v Council, T‑5/17, EU:T:2019:216, paragraphs 55 and 56, and order of 11 September 2019, Haswani v Council, T‑231/15 RENV, not published, EU:T:2019:589, paragraph 56). 79 It follows that, where the Council decides to include a person’s name on the lists in question on account of his or her status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria, it is not required to specify, in the grounds for including that person on the lists in question, that that person benefits from or provides support to the Syrian regime. If the Council does so, it is because it also intends to apply the criterion laid down in Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255 to that person. That interpretation is the most appropriate for guaranteeing the effectiveness of each of the paragraphs of Article 28 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and allowing listed persons to determine precisely the criteria on the basis of which their name has been included or retained on the lists in question. 80 Consequently, if the Council refers, explicitly, in the grounds for including a person’s name on the lists in question, to the benefit derived from or the support provided to the Syrian regime by that person, this means that the Council must establish, by means of a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence, the way in which that person provides support to or derives benefit from the Syrian regime, In that sense, although the Council takes the view that benefit received from or support provided to the Syrian regime is the result of activities pursued, moreover, by a leading businessperson operating in Syria, the evidence that the Council should have in its possession and may be called upon to produce in order to demonstrate that benefit or support is not necessarily the same as that serving to demonstrate the status of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’. 81 It follows that, in the present case, contrary to the Council’s argument, the reference to the benefit derived from and support provided to the Syrian regime by the applicant must be interpreted as a ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question that is distinct from that relating to the status of leading businessperson operating in Syria and that relating to his association with a key figure of the Syrian regime. Consequently, the Council must be able to demonstrate, by means of a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence, that that ground is well founded. 82 Those details and clarifications having been set out, it is necessary to ascertain whether, in the present case, the Council, as the applicant claims, committed an error of assessment by deciding to retain his name on the lists in question. 3. The error of assessment 83 In support of the grounds for retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question, the Council submitted to the Court, in annexes to the defence, a COREU document of 20 May 2016 bearing the reference PESC/0049/16 – ST 9478/16 and documents from the meeting of the RELEX working group of 17 December 2014 bearing the reference 340/14, and of 31 March 2016 bearing the references 430/16 to 435/16. 84 The COREU document bearing the reference PESC/0049/16 – ST 9478/16 contains links and references to evidence and summarises the relevant points of the evidence contained therein. 85 The document from the meeting of the RELEX working group, bearing the reference 340/14, contains seven of the items of evidence referred to in the COREU document, namely links to websites and press articles published on: – the ‘Lebanon Wire’ website (article of 31 March 2005), which states that the applicant is the brother-in-law of Mr M. Al-Assad, founded Al-Shahba Telecommunications Ltd with Mr Mohammed Hamsho and Mr Souleiman Marouf, and that an apartment in Beirut (Lebanon) was transferred to a close friend of the applicant, the office manager for Mr M. Al-Assad; – the ‘Middle East Transparent’ website (article of 24 April 2011), which states that the applicant founded Al-Shahba Telecommunications with Mr Hamsho and Mr Marouf, a shell company controlled by Mr M. Al-Assad; – ‘The Jamestown Foundation’ website (source: The New York Times, article of 7 June 2011), which also states that, along with Mr Hamsho and Mr Marouf, the applicant founded Al-Shahba Telecommunications with the involvement of Mr M. Al-Assad, with whom the applicant maintains close relations; – the ‘Washington Institute’ website (organisational chart of the Syrian regime, dated 2013), which shows that there are links between the applicant and Mr M. Al-Assad; – the ‘Recherches sur le terrorisme’ (Research on Terrorism) website (dated October 2011), which describes the applicant as being the brother-in-law of Mr M. Al-Assad, his business manager, even as one of his straw men, who transfers large amounts of money, obtained through the illegal sale of Iraqi oil, to accounts held at the Lebanese Al-Madina Bank; – the ‘WorldCrunch’ website (source: Le Monde, article of 30 June 2014), which refers to the applicant as being one of the ‘servants’ to Mr M. Al-Assad; – the ‘New York Sun’ website (article of 23 March 2006), which also states that an apartment in Beirut was transferred to a close friend of the applicant who is described, moreover, as the office manager for Mr M. Al-Assad. 86 As to the RELEX working group meeting documents bearing the references 430/16 to 435/16, these consist in: – the document bearing the reference 430/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 27 March 2012 on the ‘Shabab Kurd’ website, which refers to a list of members of ‘Maher Al-Assad’s private commercial group’ describing the applicant as ‘the right-hand man of Maher Al-Assad’. It is also stated in that article that the applicant ‘has a plastics factory and a company specialising in munitions procurement abroad’; – the document bearing the reference 431/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 9 February 2013 on the website of the newspaper Ya Libnan, which contains the statement that ‘Maher’s office manager, Khaled Kaddour, was transferred at no cost a Beirut apartment valued at 2.5 million dollars … to put it under Maher’s control’; – the document bearing the reference 432/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 26 November 2015 on the ‘WorldCrunch’ website, which claims that ‘the gang of Syrian oligarchs also includes Maher Al-Assad, the president’s brother, and his servants Mohammed Hamsho, Samer Debs and Khaled Kaddour’ and that ‘in exchange for the State’s contribution, these industrialists transfer back part of their [profits]’; – the document bearing the reference 433/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 27 March 2005 on the ‘Writingcompany’ blog concerning the insolvency of a Lebanese bank which refers to the applicant as ‘the office manager for Lt. Col. Maher [Al-]Assad’; – the document bearing the reference 434/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 3 June 2015 on the website of the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation, headed ‘The new Syrian mafia of Maher Al-Assad’, which claims that ‘Maher Al-Assad’s corruption outside Syria operates through Mirza Nitham Eddin and her son-in-law, Khaled Nasser Kaddour, who are “the management board” for his business abroad’; – the document bearing the reference 435/16 RELEX which contains a solvency report produced in December 2015 by Orbis concerning the Lebanese company, belonging to Mr Ayman Jaber and formed in 2010, in which the applicant has a significant holding, namely 40% of the shares in that company. 87 The applicant takes the view, in essence, that the evidence adduced by the Council is out of date and insufficient to justify his name being retained on the lists in question in 2018. Furthermore, he disputes the reliability and content of that evidence. Lastly, he is of the opinion, particularly in the light of the evidence that he has produced, that the Council wrongly inferred from all of the documents referred to in paragraphs 84 to 86 above that he is a leading businessperson operating in Syria and that he is associated with the Syrian regime. 88 The Council observes, in essence, that the applicant’s name was retained on the lists in question by the contested measures based on the same grounds as those set out in Decision 2016/850 and Implementing Regulation 2016/840. As regards the 2016 measures, it should be noted not only that the General Court found, in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 102), that the evidence relied on by the Council in support of the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question constituted a body of evidence capable of justifying the re-inclusion of his name on those lists. It is argued furthermore that the applicant has not presented any evidence which is capable of calling into question the Court’s assessment in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316). 89 Consideration must therefore be given to whether the judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), and of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), have any effect on the examination of the present ground, in so far as those judgments both analysed the evidence submitted in the present proceedings. 90 In that connection, it should be observed that Article 30(3) of Decision 2013/255 and Article 32(3) of Regulation No 36/2012 provide that where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council is to review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly. Moreover, in accordance with Article 32(4) of that regulation, that list is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. 91 It follows from the combination of those provisions that the Council may, in any review prior to the adoption of measures retaining a person’s name on the lists in question, or at any time, determine, on the basis of substantial evidence or observations submitted to it, whether the factual situation has changed since the initial inclusion, the re-inclusion of the applicant’s name, or since a previous review, so that their designation is no longer justified (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 26 July 2017, Council v LTTE, C‑599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583, paragraph 46, and of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 50). 92 Furthermore, without being bound in the strict sense from the perspective of res judicata, as the subject matter of the actions dismissed by the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), is not identical to that of the present proceedings, the Court cannot completely disregard the reasoning that he put forward in those two cases, which involved the same parties and essentially raised the same legal issues. 93 However, there is no reason to presume, without an examination of the elements of fact and law submitted in support of the present plea, that the Court will make the same findings as those reached in the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316) (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 53). 94 In the present case, it cannot be excluded, without examining them, that the elements submitted by the applicant in the context of his plea are capable of establishing that the Council wrongly decided, in 2018, to retain his name on the lists in question. 95 The applicant’s arguments must be assessed in the light of those considerations. (a) The relevance of the evidence submitted by the Council 96 The applicant disputes the relevance of the evidence submitted by the Council to demonstrate that retaining his name on the lists in question, in 2018, was still well founded. 97 It should be noted that, as regards restrictive measures taken in the context of the fight against terrorism, the essential question when reviewing whether to continue to include a person on the list at issue is whether, since the inclusion of that person on that list or since the last review, the factual situation has changed in such a way that it is no longer possible to draw the same conclusion in relation to the involvement of that person in terrorist activities (judgment of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 82). Furthermore, it has been stated, in the context of restrictive measures adopted against Iran, that the Council is not required to adduce new facts for as long as the facts underpinning the initial inclusion are relevant and sufficient for keeping the party concerned on the list (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2018:720, paragraph 182). 98 Lastly, the Court has ruled that the Council is required to submit new evidence in order to establish that the inclusion of a person’s name is well founded where the criterion and grounds for that inclusion have changed (see, to that effect, order of 11 September 2019, Haswani v Council, T‑231/15 RENV, not published, EU:T:2019:589, paragraph 56). 99 It follows that, in order to justify retaining a person’s name on the lists in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. 100 In that connection, it should again be observed that it is inherent in the nature of the measures adopted in the context of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that they are subject to periodical review and may be applied repeatedly in subsequent periods. That is notably the case where, despite the restrictive measures previously applied, the geopolitical situation does not evolve. In that situation, the Council must be allowed to continue to apply the necessary measures, even if the situation has not changed, provided that the facts which form the basis for maintaining the restrictive measures continue to justify their application at the time of their adoption, in particular that the facts are still sufficiently recent (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2018:720, paragraphs 201 and 202). 101 Thus, in the present case, since, as has been stated in paragraph 67 above, the grounds for including the applicant’s name have not been amended, it is necessary only to ascertain whether there are elements amongst the information before the Court suggesting that the applicant’s factual situation or that in Syria have evolved in such a way that the evidence submitted by the Council to argue that retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question was well founded in 2016 is no longer relevant in justifying the retention of his name on those lists in 2018. 102 In that regard, first, it is clear that the situation in Syria saw no improvement between 2016 and 2018. The evidence adduced by the applicant in his application, which seeks to establish that the economic situation in Syria is such that it would be fanciful to believe that he is able to support the regime with what little remains of his wealth, does not permit the inference that the Syrian context has changed in such a way that retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question is no longer justified. On the contrary, the 2017 World Bank Group Report on the economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria, the article from the newspaper International Business Times of 14 March 2016 about the costs of the war in Syria for Russia and the United States and, lastly, the article from Time magazine of 9 April 2018, which attempts to provide an answer to the question whether the Syrian civil war is becoming even more complex, all attest to the fact that the war in Syria is still ongoing. In that context, the Council and the European Union are entitled to maintain the restrictive measures that they consider necessary to put pressure on the Syrian regime. 103 Secondly, while the applicant argues that his business operations have ceased and that he has never had any association or ties with Mr Maher Al-Assad, it should be observed that he previously relied on those arguments in the case giving rise to the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 115), and that he has failed, in his written submissions, to put forward any indication that his personal situation changed between 2016 and 2018. As to the documents submitted by the applicant in order to demonstrate that General Bilal was Mr Maher Al-Assad’s office manager, it should be noted that, without prejudice to the examination of their probative value and capacity to call the evidence submitted by the Council into question – which examination is carried out in paragraph 120 below – that evidence makes reference, however, solely to General Bilal and does not serve in itself to point out a material change in the applicant’s situation of which the Council could and should have been aware at the time when the decision to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question was adopted. In addition, those documents seek to challenge that aspect of the relations between the applicant and Mr Maher Al-Assad, but they do not relate to the business relations between the two. 104 Consequently, without prejudice, at this stage in the Court’s reasoning, to the question of whether the evidence produced by the Council does indeed demonstrate that the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question was well founded in 2018, the Council was not required to adduce supplementary evidence in relation to that produced in 2016 on account of changes in the applicant’s situation or that in Syria of such a nature as to justify removing the applicant’s name from the lists in question. 105 The applicant’s arguments seeking to dispute the relevance of the evidence produced in the light of its age or the lack of new evidence corroborating it must therefore be rejected. Moreover, and in any event, the Court must reject the applicant’s argument that the Council could not base its decision on articles that the Court had regarded, in its judgment of 13 November 2014, Kaddour I (T‑654/11, not published, EU:T:2014:947), as not demonstrating that the grounds for including him on the lists in question were well founded. The judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628, paragraph 78), previously rejected that argument in relation to the same evidence, recalling that each case brought before the Court has its own file and that each of those case files is entirely separate. Thus the fact that the Council has, in the present proceedings, adduced some of the documents that the Court had, in a different case, regarded as not satisfying the burden of proof, does not deprive the Council of the possibility of relying on those documents, amongst other items of evidence, for the purposes of constituting a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that the decision to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question was well founded. 106 Furthermore, during the hearing, the applicant claimed, for the purposes of demonstrating that the evidence submitted by the Council was no longer sufficient, that there was no trace of the review conducted by the Council. In so far as it may be necessary to interpret the applicant’s line of argument as seeking to claim that the Council failed duly to fulfil its obligation to conduct a review, as provided for in Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012, it is clear that the applicant has failed, either in the application or in the reply, to raise a plea alleging infringement of Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012 by claiming that the Council failed to conduct any review. 107 It should be noted that under Article 76(d) in conjunction with Article 84(1), of the Rules of Procedure, the original application must set out the subject matter of the proceedings and contain a summary of the pleas relied on and no new plea may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a plea which constitutes an amplification of a plea previously made, either expressly or by implication, in the original application and is closely linked to it must be declared admissible (see judgment of 5 May 2015, Petropars Iran and Others v Council, T‑433/13, EU:T:2015:255, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 108 Moreover, to be regarded as an amplification of a plea previously made, a new line of argumentation must, in relation to the pleas or heads of claim initially set out in the application, present a sufficiently close connection in order to be considered as forming part of the normal evolution of debate in proceedings before the Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, paragraph 31). 109 In the present case, first, the applicant has not relied on any new elements of fact or of law that came to light in the course of the procedure which could have justified the submission of a new plea alleging infringement of Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012. Secondly, it should be observed that, in the head of claim which seeks to dispute the relevance of the evidence produced by the Council, the applicant has argued that the Council failed to review his situation correctly, which led to it basing its decision on evidence which is out of date. There is a significant difference between, on the one hand, arguing that the Council failed to review the applicant’s situation correctly – which means, therefore, that a review nevertheless took place – and, on the other hand, claiming that the Council failed to conduct any review whatsoever of the applicant’s situation. Consequently, the argument put forward by the applicant at the hearing cannot be understood as an amplification of the head of claim seeking to dispute the relevance of the evidence produced by the Council and must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. 110 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that all of the evidence produced by the Council to justify retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question in 2018 is relevant. (b) The reliability of the evidence 111 The applicant disputes the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council to substantiate the grounds for inclusion. 112 It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2012, Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, T‑343/06, EU:T:2012:478, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited). 113 In that connection, it must be said that the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), found that all of the evidence submitted by the Council, which has been produced once again in the present case, was reliable. In particular, the Court considered, in paragraphs 86 and 87 of the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), that (i) the evidence collated in the document from the meeting of the RELEX working group bearing the reference 340/14 came from various digital sources of information of different geographical origin, (ii) some items of that evidence came from newspapers with a worldwide reputation, while others came from international entities known for the independence of their research, and (iii) the various items had been published at different times. The Court added that, although the various pieces of information in question did not expressly state the primary source of their information, the state of war in Syria made it difficult, and indeed impossible, in practice, to gather testimonies from persons who would agree to be identified. As to the evidence collated in the COREU document bearing the reference PESC/0049/16 – ST 9478/16 and the documents from the meeting of the RELEX working group bearing the references 430/16 to 435/16, the Court found, in paragraph 108 of the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), that it came from digital sources of information which were publicly accessible, had been published at different times and provided different but consistent pieces of information, with the result that, in paragraph 111 of that judgment, the Court upheld both the veracity and the reliability of that evidence. 114 First, it must be observed that the applicant’s arguments seeking to challenge the soundness and reliability of the evidence on account of the source and content thereof are based on the same facts as those examined by the Court in the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316). Secondly, as the Council maintained during the hearing, without being contradicted by the applicant on that point, the latter failed to lodge a request with the Council for a review prior to the adoption of the contested measures, which request might have contained observations casting doubt on the reliability of the evidence as determined by the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), with the result that, in so doing, the Council could, during the review procedure leading to the adoption of the contested measures, reasonably find that that evidence was sound and reliable. The applicant’s arguments must, therefore, be regarded as being unfounded. (c) The existence of a body of specific, precise and consistent evidence 115 The applicant takes the view, in essence, that the evidence submitted by the Council does not constitute a body of specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the grounds for inclusion were well founded. 116 It should be noted that the evidence produced by the Council in both the case giving rise to the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and that giving rise to the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), was found to contain information corroborating the fact that the applicant was at the heart of the leading economic class in Syria on account of his management of the affairs of Mr Maher Al-Assad and his undeniable links with the Syrian regime, since he exercised a decisive influence, through his commercial and professional activities, on the inner circle of the leaders of that regime (judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 102). 117 Consequently, in accordance with the principles referred to in paragraphs 92 and 93 above, it is necessary to examine the observations submitted by the applicant seeking to contradict, in the light of the documents that he has produced in the present case, the information contained in the documents produced by the Council seeking to demonstrate, in the first place, his association with a key figure of the Syrian regime, namely Mr Maher Al-Assad, the brother of President Bashar Al-Assad. 118 In that connection, it is clear from the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628, paragraph 100), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraphs 102, 103 and 110), that the applicant’s association with Mr Maher Al-Assad was established on account of (i) their joint involvement in the transfer of considerable sums of money from the illegal sale of Iraqi oil, as is apparent from the article published in October 2011 on the ‘Research on Terrorism’ website; (ii) the creation, by the applicant, of the company Al-Shahba Telecommunications, a company controlled and used by Mr Maher Al-Assad, which information is conveyed by articles published in April 2011 and April 2012, respectively, on the ‘Middle East Transparent’ and ‘The Jamestown Foundation’ websites; (iii) the fact that the applicant is described as the ‘office manager’ for Mr Maher Al-Assad in all of the documents adduced by the Council; (iv) the fact that he was Mr Maher Al-Assad’s right hand according to the article published on 27 March 2012 on the ‘Shabab Kurd’ website; and (v) the fact that he was Mr Maher Al-Assad’s overseas business manager, as is apparent from the article published on 3 June 2015 on the website of the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation. 119 To that effect, first, the applicant disputes the allegation that he is in fact the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad. According to the applicant, General Bilal occupied that post. In support of his argument, the applicant submits the following articles: – an article from the Syria News Wire blog of 21 December 2007, which mentions General Bilal as the ‘director of Maher Al[-]A[s]sad’s (brother of Bashar Al[-]Assad) office’; – an article from the NOW News blog of 11 December 2007, which describes General Bilal as the ‘director of the office of Maher Al-Assad, brother of the Syrian president, who was involved in the Bank Al-Madina scandal in Lebanon’; – an article from the Stratfor Worldview information platform of 21 December 2007, which refers to General Bilal as the ‘director of Maher Al[-]As[s]ad’s (brother of Bashar Al[-]Assad) office’; – an article published by the association Middle East Policy Council in its newsletter of Spring 2008, which describes General Bilal as the ‘director of the office of Maher Al-A[s]sad, brother of Syrian President Bashar Al[-] A[s]sad’; – an article published by the newspaper RFS Media of 29 August 2016, which describes General Bilal as ‘the head of Maher Al[-]Assad’s office’; – a copy of a tweet from a journalist’s Twitter account of 4 September 2017, which refers to General Bilal as ‘Maher Al[‑]Assad Office Manager’; – an article from the online newspaper Huffington Post Greece of 20 September 2017, which refers to General Bilal as ‘head of the office of General Maher [A]l-Assad, brother of Bashar [A]l-Assad’; – an article from the Syrian website ‘Zaman Alwasl’ of 15 November 2017, which refers to General Bilal as ‘the office manager for Major General M. Al-Assad’. 120 First of all, in so far as concerns the reliability of that evidence, it should be observed that the Council has not put forward any arguments seeking to dispute the soundness and reliability of the articles produced by the applicant, which come from various journalistic sources. Secondly, it should be noted that both in the defence and at the hearing, the Council did not reject the possibility that General Bilal could also have been the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad. However, it argues that Mr Maher Al-Assad may have had different office managers for his different activities or during different periods. Admittedly, none of the evidence submitted by the Council or the applicant would appear to preclude that possibility, but the latter also cannot be confirmed, owing to a lack of sufficient evidence. Moreover, raising the possibility that there may have been several office managers in succession at different times raises the question of whether the applicant is still the office manager and, on that basis, continues to have a particularly close relationship with Mr Maher Al-Assad. It should be recalled that the fact that the Court is unable to determine whether the applicant’s arguments, by which he disputes the claim that his conduct justifies the restrictive measures concerning him, are well founded is attributable to the failure to discharge the burden of proof resting on the Council and operates, therefore, to the detriment of the latter (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2016, Council v Bank Saderat Iran, C‑200/13 P, EU:C:2016:284, paragraph 105). Consequently, while it cannot be excluded that the applicant was the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad, the Court is, however, unable to confirm that the applicant was still the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad on the date of adoption of the contested measures. 121 Secondly, the applicant has produced an article from the publication Fortune Magazine of 11 May 2006, which refers to the transfer of the Beirut apartment and in which (i) the applicant’s name is not mentioned and (ii) it is stated that the person who benefited from the transfer was ‘a friend of Maher Al-Assad’s office manager’. According to the applicant, the article published on 9 February 2013 on the website of the newspaper Ya Libnan, included in the Council’s file, refers to that article in Fortune Magazine but names the applicant as the direct beneficiary of that transfer and as the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad, with the result that the article produced by the Council contains, it is argued, incorrect, even contradictory information. In that regard, it should be noted that the article on the ‘Writingcompany’ blog of 27 March 2005, the article on the ‘New York Sun’ website of 23 March 2006, and the article on the ‘Lebanon Wire’ website of 31 March 2005, reproduce the information disclosed in the article in the publication Fortune Magazine – namely that the transfer was made to a friend of the applicant – and not that from the newspaper Ya Libnan. The fact remains that those various articles confirm that a friend of the applicant benefited from that transfer and that there were reasons to believe that the objective was that Mr Maher Al-Assad would ultimately profit from that transfer, for whom the applicant was, at the material time, the office manager, as is apparent from those various articles. 122 Thirdly, the applicant relies on a copy of an online search made in order to demonstrate that the company Al-Shahba Telecommunications does not exist. It is appropriate to find that such a document is not sufficient to challenge the information contained in three articles from different journalistic sources, namely an article from the ‘Lebanon Wire’ website of 31 March 2005, an article from ‘The Jamestown Foundation’ website (source: The New York Times) of 7 June 2011, and an article from the ‘Middle East Transparent’ website of 24 April 2011, stating that the applicant had founded that company. In that connection, it is true, as the applicant maintains in the reply, that the article from ‘The Jamestown Foundation’ website refers to that from the ‘Middle East Transparent’ website. However, the source is cited and the article from ‘The Jamestown Foundation’ website comes from a reputable and reliable source, with the result that the fact that the latter article reproduces that of the ‘Middle East Transparent’ website is not such as to deprive the information that the applicant founded the company Al-Shahba Telecommunications of all veracity. The applicant’s contention therefore cannot succeed. 123 Fourthly, the applicant’s argument which seeks to maintain that, by means of the various actions that he has brought before the Court, he has demonstrated that he was not an associate of Mr Maher Al-Assad, must be rejected as, in any event, those actions were dismissed by the judgments of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316). 124 It follows from all of those considerations that, while there is doubt as to whether the applicant is the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad, he has failed, however, to adduce evidence challenging – even in part – the business links that bind him to that key figure of the Syrian regime. The applicant has failed to challenge effectively the fact that he founded the company Al-Shahba Telecommunications controlled by Mr Maher Al-Assad or, for that matter, the other elements referred to in paragraph 118 above. 125 Consequently, the body of evidence adduced by the Council is capable of substantiating specifically, precisely and consistently the third ground for including the applicant on the lists in question, namely that he is part of Mr Maher Al-Assad’s entourage on account, in particular, of his business activities. 126 According to the case-law, having regard to the preventive nature of decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). However, the Court finds that, in the specific facts of the present case, it is necessary to examine, in the second place, the applicant’s arguments seeking to contest the first ground for inclusion, namely that he is a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 127 In that connection, it is clear from the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 125), that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Syria on account, in particular, of his holding in a plastics factory and a company specialising in munitions procurement abroad for the army – as is apparent from the article published on 27 March 2012 on the ‘Shabab Kurd’ website – and of his 40% shareholding in the capital of the Lebanese company with Mr A. Jaber, as is apparent from the 2015 financial statement. The Court went on to add, in the same judgment, that the applicant had himself acknowledged having been a leading businessperson in Syria before the outbreak of the war, but had adduced no evidence to suggest that this was no longer the case. 128 First, the applicant claims that he cannot be a leading businessperson operating in Syria as the Lebanese company is not trading on Syrian territory. In support of his argument, the applicant has produced the following evidence: – the audit reports relating to that company for the years 2011 to 2015. These audit reports were prepared by the same Lebanese chartered accountant and all bear the same date, namely 19 August 2016. It is apparent from those audit reports that the company does not trade on Lebanese territory and that the applicant holds 40% of the shares in that company; – a letter from the Syrian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and a letter from the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, both dated 17 August 2016, certifying that (i) the Lebanese company is not registered with any Syrian chamber of commerce and (ii) it does not own any establishments in Syria. 129 By way of measures of organisation of procedure, the Court invited the parties, at the end of the hearing, to answer two questions concerning the activities of the Lebanese company. 130 In response to the first question, the applicant stated that the reference, in the application, to a company operating in Lebanon, was not intended to refer to carrying out commercial activities in Lebanon but that the company was incorporated in Lebanon and operated from Lebanon. According to the applicant, the key point evidenced by the audit reports is that the Lebanese company has been a dormant company since its incorporation and has never traded anywhere in the world, neither in Lebanon nor, a fortiori, in Syria. It is argued that, as the audit reports show, no commercial activity was carried out and the company’s only asset is its incorporation share capital. 131 In response to the second question, the applicant stated that, in order to carry out business in Syria, foreign companies must register with the Foreign Trade Directorate of the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade and comply with the registration requirements set out in Law No 34 of 2008 on foreign companies’ branches, in particular by registering with a Syrian chamber of commerce. Article 3 of Law No 34 of 2008 provides, it is argued, that it is not permissible for any foreign legal person to perform its main activity or to do any commercial business in Syria or to establish a branch or office in Syria, unless it is registered in accordance with the provisions of that law, after obtaining a permit to operate in accordance with the laws and regulations in force. Consequently, the letters from the Syrian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and the Syrian Ministry of the Economy and Foreign Trade produced in the present case demonstrate, it is claimed, that the Lebanese company does not conduct business in Syria. 132 The Council contends, in essence, that, as regards the first question, the applicant had failed to establish that the Lebanese company had not engaged in business activities after 2016, whereas he states that, according to Lebanese law on tax procedures, even a dormant company is under the obligation to submit a financial statement to the competent tax authorities every year. Consequently, the Council takes the view that the applicant should have been able to prove that the Lebanese company did not carry out activities after 2016. It infers therefrom that the 2015 financial statement remains valid. 133 In so far as concerns the second question, the Council states that it can neither confirm nor deny the applicant’s claims concerning Syrian law. By contrast, it recalls that the evidence relating to the Lebanese company is not the only evidence on which it based its finding that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 134 It can reasonably be inferred, from both the evidence produced by the applicant and the answers given to the measures of organisation of procedure, that the Lebanese company did not carry out any business activity on either Lebanese or Syrian territory between 2011 and late 2015. In that regard, while the financial statement produced by the Council was indeed prepared in 2015, it should nevertheless be pointed out that it contains no information permitting the inference that the Lebanese company had in fact carried out an activity at that time. On the contrary, the statement appears to suggest that no information concerning that company was recorded after February 2012. The fact remains that that company continues to exist and the applicant holds 40% of its share capital, while Mr A. Jaber also holds 40% and Mr M. Jaber holds 20% thereof, which fact is apparent from both the financial statement for that company, produced by the Council, and the evidence submitted by the applicant. It should be noted that Mr A. Jaber is a leading Syrian businessperson included on the lists in question, and Mr M. Jaber is also included on those lists, inter alia on account of the fact that he is an associate of Mr Maher Al-Assad for the Shabiha militia. 135 That evidence establishes the existence of the applicant’s business relations with persons subject to restrictive measures on account of their status as leading businesspersons operating in Syria. Consequently, while it is true that this evidence is not sufficient in itself to establish the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria, on account, specifically, of the fact that the Court is unable to ascertain the existence of the Lebanese company’s activities in Syria, it does however constitute an indication that the applicant may belong to the small circle of leading businesspersons operating in Syria and close to the Syrian regime, the latter factor being strengthened by the links between Mr M. Jaber and Mr Maher Al-Assad. Lastly, it should be observed that the translation of the name of that company was provided by the Council at the hearing. The name can be translated as ‘United Island company for public transport, trade in oil derivatives and oil services’, which demonstrates that the applicant does indeed have interests in the transport and oil sector. 136 Secondly, in so far as concerns the table containing the applicant’s business activities, intended to demonstrate that they no longer exist, it is clear that these are mere assertions made by the applicant, which none of the evidence can support. In that regard, the photographs produced by the applicant, seeking to demonstrate that the tobacco factory that he owned was destroyed, have already been examined by the Court in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 116), and were held to be insufficient to establish that the applicant’s business activities had ceased. The applicant has made no effort to produce supplementary evidence that could have given those photographs greater credibility. On that basis, as the Court has already suggested in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 116), he could have supplemented his evidence by adducing, for example, evidence of the end to all operations. Consequently, this argument is unfounded. 137 Thirdly, in so far as concerns the arguments and evidence put forward by the applicant, seeking to demonstrate that there are international companies in Syria exercising or likely to exercise greater influence than the applicant, suffice it to find that, in any case, those arguments and evidence are ineffective in establishing that the applicant is not a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 138 Fourthly, as regards the plastics factory and the company specialising in munitions procurement abroad for the army, the applicant disputes the reliability of the article published on 27 March 2012 on the ‘Shabab Kurd’ website but has failed to adduce evidence intended to constitute a detailed rebuttal of that evidence, the soundness and reliability of which has previously been recognised by the Court in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316), as recalled in paragraph 113 above. That argument must therefore be rejected. 139 Consequently, although there are serious doubts as to the active character of the Lebanese company on Syrian territory, the fact remains that the applicant maintains business relations with persons included on the lists in question on account of their status as leading businesspersons operating in Syria, and that he has not meaningfully disputed the pursuit of his other business activities. 140 Accordingly, the body of evidence adduced by the Council is capable of substantiating specifically, precisely and consistently the first ground for inclusion on the lists in question, namely that the applicant is a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 141 In the light of the foregoing, it should be found that the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists in question on account of his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria and his association with a key figure of the Syrian regime are sufficiently substantiated, with the result that, in the light of those criteria, the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists in question is well founded. 142 As has been recalled in paragraph 126 above, according to the case-law, with regard to a decision adopting restrictive measures, having regard to the preventive nature of such measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the first plea must be rejected, without there being any need to examine the applicant’s other arguments relating to the second ground for inclusion. B. The second plea: infringement of Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and of Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 143 The applicant takes the view that he is entitled to the benefit of Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828. 144 In that regard, he claims that the criteria laid down in those provisions are not cumulative, so that, contrary to the Council’s contention in the defence, it is possible for him to rely on those provisions if he satisfies any one of the criteria laid down therein. 145 In any event, the applicant considers that he satisfies all the criteria. He argues, first, that he is not associated with the Syrian regime and, in any event, he has publicly disassociated himself from that regime. Furthermore, if he had once been the office manager for Mr Maher Al-Assad, it has been established that he no longer is. Secondly, the applicant argues that it is implausible to suggest that he exercises any influence on the Syrian regime. Thirdly, the applicant does not pose the slightest risk of circumvention of measures taken with regard to other listed persons or entities. 146 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 147 In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, persons, entities or bodies in one of the categories referred to in paragraphs 2 of those articles are not to be included or retained on the lists of persons and entities appearing in Annex I to Decision 2013/255 if there is sufficient information that they are not, or are no longer, associated with the regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention. The same criteria are reproduced, with regard to the freezing of funds, in Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828. 148 As regards, first, the applicant’s argument that those criteria are alternative and not cumulative, this requires an interpretation of those provisions. According to the case-law, it is necessary to interpret provisions by taking into account not only their wording, but also their context and objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 10 March 2005, easyCar, C‑336/03, EU:C:2005:150, paragraph 21). 149 In that connection, it should be noted that the criteria set out in Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, as well as in Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, are separated by the conjunction ‘or’. That conjunction may, linguistically, have an alternative or a cumulative sense and must consequently be read in the context in which it is used and in light of the objectives of the act in question (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 May 2019, M and Others (Revocation of refugee status), C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403, paragraph 102). 150 The objective pursued by the restrictive measures regime introduced by Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012 is to prohibit any form of support to the Syrian regime in order to put pressure on the latter to change its policies of repression against the civilian population. In order to attain that objective, the Council adopted Decision 2015/1836 amending Decision 2013/255 as, specifically, it had noted the attempts that were made by the Syrian regime to circumvent EU restrictive measures in order to continue to finance and support the regime’s policy of violent repression against the civilian population (recital 4 of Decision 2015/1836). Therefore, in order to ensure the effectiveness of those measures, the Council defined certain categories of persons and entities of particular relevance to attaining such an objective (recital 5 of Decision 2015/1836), persons and entities in respect of which fund-freezing measures were, in particular, to be adopted. Those categories of persons and entities were defined in the light of the association that they have with the regime, the influence they can exercise on the latter or the support, in whatever form, that they are likely to provide to the regime (recitals 6 to 12 of Decision 2015/1836). 151 Consequently, the wording adopted in Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, as well as in Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, must be understood as reflecting the different ways in which a person might favour the Syrian regime currently in place without those ways being regarded as mutually exclusive. Having regard to that context and the objective pursued by Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012, the conditions set out in those various articles are necessarily cumulative. 152 It cannot be otherwise, since that would risk stripping the restrictive measures regime at issue of all meaning. That would in fact be tantamount to allowing persons or entities to be removed from the lists in question because they are no longer associated with the regime when, for example, they exercise an influence on it or are associated with a real risk of circumvention. 153 Secondly, as regards the application of those provisions in the present case, it should be borne in mind that it is established, in paragraph 71 above, that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists in question is based on Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, on the one hand, and on Article 28(2)(a) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1a)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, on the other. 154 As the conditions laid down by Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, along with Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 do not apply to persons included on the lists in question on account of the criterion of association with the Syrian regime, as provided by Article 27(1) and Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, along with Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, the second plea must be rejected as being ineffective to that extent. 155 In any event, in so far as it has been found, in paragraph 124 above, that the arguments and evidence submitted by the applicant are not capable of calling into question the Council’s findings as to the existence of an association between the applicant and a key figure of the Syrian regime, they cannot, a fortiori, demonstrate that the applicant satisfies the condition relating to the absence or end of an association with the Syrian regime thus laid down by Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828. 156 In that connection, the applicant’s argument that he has publicly disassociated himself from the Syrian regime by bringing his actions before the Court cannot succeed, in so far as (i) his actions have been dismissed and (ii) bringing those actions is not, in itself, such as to establish that the applicant has clearly disassociated himself from the Syrian regime and to justify his name being removed from the lists in question. 157 Consequently, since one of the cumulative criteria laid down by Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, has not been satisfied, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded to that extent. 158 It follows that the second plea must be rejected as, in part, ineffective and, in part, unfounded. C. The third plea: infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights and infringement of the principle of proportionality 159 The applicant submits that the contested measures infringe his fundamental rights, namely (i) the right to respect for his reputation and (ii) the right to property, as guaranteed by Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter and Articles 8 and 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. He argues that the retention of his name on the lists in question constitutes a very substantial interference with such rights and is manifestly disproportionate. 160 The applicant notes, in the first place, that the Court must assess the proportionality of the restrictive measures as against the reasons actually established by the Council. First, the Council is not able to substantiate the reasons it gave and, secondly, the applicant satisfies the criteria laid down in Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1b) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828. In any event, whatever association he has, whatever influence he exercises, and whatever risk of circumvention he poses, these are minimal. Consequently, the serious deleterious consequences of the retention of his name on the lists in question are wholly disproportionate by comparison. In that connection, the applicant criticises the Council for taking a general approach to the proportionality of the restrictive measures, whereas the applicant – who does not dispute, in itself, the lawfulness of the regime of restrictive measures against Syria – expected the Council to submit arguments relating to his specific case. 161 In the second place, re-imposing restrictive measures on the applicant cannot have an impact on the aims of the sanctions regime and would not put any pressure on the Syrian regime, since the applicant is not part of that regime and occupies no position of influence. 162 In the third place, the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question by the contested measures causes considerable harm to his reputation both within and outside the European Union. In particular, he is presented as part of the Syrian regime and as a loyal regime supporter, whereas he has publicly disavowed any association with it and has disassociated himself from it. 163 In the fourth place, it is claimed that the restrictive measures are draconian and prevent the applicant from having peaceful enjoyment of his property and exercising all the usual rights which flow from ownership in relation to his property. 164 In the fifth place, and lastly, it is argued that the applicant and his family have been caused real prejudice by the imposition of the restrictive measures. In that regard, the applicant claims that his businesses have been destroyed, due to his being targeted as a result of the retention of his name on the lists in question, that he and his family are being threatened and their movements monitored, and that his ability to provide his family with the necessary material support is compromised. 165 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 166 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of the right to property, it must be noted that the right to property is one of the general principles of EU law and is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited). 167 However, according to settled case-law, the right to property under EU law does not enjoy absolute protection. Consequently, the exercise of that fundamental right may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 121, and of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 59 (not published)). 168 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the protection of the civilian population in Syria, the restrictions on the applicant’s right to property are not disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 106), a fortiori because Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012 provide for certain exceptions that allow the persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures to meet essential expenditure. 169 Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012 provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources and of revising periodically the entries in those lists in order to ensure that, where persons or entities no longer meet the necessary criteria for inclusion, those persons or entities are removed from the list in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraphs 102 and 105). 170 It should be observed that the applicant has failed to put forward, in support of his claim relating to the infringement of his right to property, arguments based on elements of fact and law that are different to those rejected by the Court in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraphs 135 and 136), with the result that that claim must be rejected for the same reasons, namely that the applicant has never raised the need for access to all or part of the frozen funds. Furthermore, the applicant has never claimed to have made a request to be able to use his assets and funds with the aim, in particular, of helping his family, which request would have been refused. 171 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging breach of the right to reputation, it should be noted that that right is not an absolute right and that its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to reputation of the person or entity subject to that measure, so causing harm to that person or entity. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is, however, such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the persons or entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 115). 172 It is clear that the applicant has failed to adduce any elements of fact or law that differ to those rejected in the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 138), with the result that his claims must be rejected for the same reasons, namely that, in any event, the applicant has adduced no evidence capable of showing that the measures taken against him have harmed his reputation. 173 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging a breach of the principle of proportionality, it is settled case-law that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122; of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 60 (not published); and of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 149). 174 It is certainly the case that the applicant’s rights are to a certain extent curtailed by the restrictive measures adopted against him due to the fact that he cannot, in particular, dispose of any funds that may be situated within the territory of the European Union or transfer his funds to the European Union, except with special authorisation. Likewise, the measures imposed on the applicant may cause his associates and customers to regard him with a certain suspicion or mistrust. 175 However, as the first and second pleas have been rejected as unfounded, it is apparent that the Council rightly retained the applicant’s name on the lists in question, basing its decision on the relations maintained with key figures of the regime, particularly Mr Maher Al-Assad, and his status as a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 176 The decision to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question is therefore appropriate for attaining the objective of general interest pursued by the policy of restrictive measures adopted by the Council, namely putting an end to the repression against the civilian population in Syria that has cost the lives of thousands of civilians. That objective forms part of a more general framework of endeavours linked to the maintenance of international peace and security, laid down in Article 21 TEU, which refers to provisions of EU external action, and is, therefore, legitimate. 177 As regards the alleged disproportionality in retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question, it must be held, as is clear from paragraphs 168 and 169 above, that Article 28(6) of Decision 2013/255, as amended, provides for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, secondly, of granting specific authorisation to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 364, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 127). 178 Furthermore, account should be taken of the fact that retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question cannot be regarded as disproportionate because it is allegedly potentially unlimited in time. The retention of an entry on a list is revised periodically (at least yearly) in order to ensure that, where persons or entities no longer meet the necessary criteria for inclusion, those persons or entities are removed from those lists (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 365, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 129). 179 As regards the applicant’s claims relating to the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the retention of his name on the lists in question, and according to which his businesses have been destroyed and his life and that of his family are in danger, it should be noted, first of all, in order to demonstrate the existence of the losses claimed, that the applicant has confined himself to submitting the same elements of fact and law as those submitted to and rejected by the Court in the case giving rise to the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour III (T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 146), with the result that those arguments must be rejected for the same reasons, namely that black-and-white photocopies of photographs of a destroyed building are not sufficient to show that such loss has been sustained. 180 Lastly, the importance of the aims pursued by the contested measures is such as to justify their possible – even substantial – negative consequences for the applicant without that affecting their legality (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 191). 181 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the preservation of international peace and security, any restrictions on the applicant’s right to property and reputation caused by the contested measures are justified by an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate to the aims pursued. 182 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court dismisses the third plea alleging infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality and, consequently, the action in its entirety. Costs 183 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has applied for costs and the applicant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Khaled Kaddour to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union. Gervasoni Madise Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2020. E. Coulon S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.