Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:466
Date: 2025-06-19
Language of the case: Latvian
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Latvia

Summary C-509/23 – 1 
Case C-509/23 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
8 August 2023 
Referring court: 
Administratīvā rajona tiesa (Latvia) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
7 August 2023 
Applicant: 
SIA Laimz 
Defendant: 
Izložu un azartspēļu uzraudzības inspekcija 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action for the annulment of the decision of the Izložu un azartspēļu uzraudzības 
inspekcija (Lotteries and Gambling Inspection and Supervision Service, ‘the 
Inspection Service’) imposing on the applicant a fine for failing to fulfil the 
requirements laid down in the Noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizācijas un 
terorisma un proliferācijas finansēšanas novēršanas likums (Law on the 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and nuclear proliferation) 
with respect to the screening of customers and the verification of their status. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
On the basis of Article 267 TFEU, the referring court seeks an interpretation of 
the provisions of Directive 2015/849 in order to identify the criteria in accordance 
with which a person may be regarded as being a close associate of a politically 
exposed person and whether obliged entities belonging to the same group may 
share customer screening information and use the information so obtained, and the 
situations requiring customer due diligence measures. 
EN 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Must point 11(a) of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 be interpreted as 
meaning that an individual may be regarded as being a close associate of a 
politically exposed person solely on the ground that those persons form part 
of the same public body, without regard to any other circumstances? 
2. Must [point 9 of Article 3] of Directive 2015/849 be interpreted as meaning 
that, in order to determine whether a person is a politically exposed person, 
it is necessary to determine whether that person holds one of the positions 
referred to in that article and, in addition, to carry out an investigation and 
verify that this is a high-ranking position rather than a middle-ranking or 
more junior position? 
3. Must Article 45(1) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with 
paragraph 8 of that same article, be interpreted as meaning that Member 
States must allow the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1) of Directive 
2015/849, which are regarded as companies in the same group, to share 
information with each other, including by concluding information sharing 
agreements and ensuring the reciprocal flow and mutual enforceability of 
information, in order to attain the objectives of Directive 2015/849? 
4. Does Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with 
points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of that directive, allow such information, or 
decisions, to be used and enforced in several undertakings belonging to the 
same group, those being decisions adopted, within that group, by the senior 
management of an undertaking belonging to that group? 
5. Must Article 14(5) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with 
Article 8(2) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that an obliged entity is not 
under an obligation to apply customer due diligence measures to existing 
customers if neither the time limit laid down in national law nor the time 
limit imposed by the internal control procedures for the application of new 
due diligence measures has expired, and the obliged entity is unaware of any 
new circumstances that might affect the risk assessment carried out in 
relation to the customer concerned? 
6. Must the obligation which Article 11(d) of Directive 2015/849 imposes on 
obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures where, upon the 
collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, the transaction 
amounts in total to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried 
out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked, 
be interpreted as meaning that such measures must be applied every time the 
total amount of the transaction reaches EUR 2 000, irrespective of how long 
it is before the sum of EUR 2 000 laid down in that provision is reached 
again? 
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Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Treaty on the European Union, first subparagraph of Article 5(4). 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes 
of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC: recitals 30, 31, 32 and 34 and Articles 3, 
points 9, 11(a), 12 and 15, 5, 8(1) and (2), 11(a), (d) and (f), 13(1)(a) to (d) and 
(2), 14(5), 26(2) and 45(1) and (8). 
Case-law  
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 17 November 2022, 
C-562/20, Rodl & Partner, EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 91. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizācijas un terorisma un proliferācijas 
finansēšanas novēršanas likums (Law on the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing and nuclear proliferation): 1 Articles 1, points 21(a), 81, 18 and 
182, 3(1), point 7, (2) and (21), 10(1), 11(1), points 1 and 4, 111(1), points 1 and 5, 
(2), (6) and (7), 25(2) and 29(1). 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicant is a commercial company, registered in the Commercial Register in 
the Republic of Latvia, whose business activity consists in the provision of 
services in the field of gambling and betting. The applicant’s share capital is 
wholly owned by SIA Optibet, whose business activity also consists in gambling 
and betting. Both companies form part of the Enlabs AB group, a company 
registered in Sweden. 
2 On 2 March 2020, the applicant and SIA Optibet concluded a contract to facilitate 
access to technical solutions under which SIA Optibet developed a technical 
solution for collecting and processing information in accordance with the 
requirements of the Law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing and nuclear proliferation (‘the Law on Prevention’). SIA Optibet obtains 
from third parties information, for the purposes of risk assessment and risk 
management in connection with the requirements of the Law on Prevention, 
 
1 All Latvian legislation of general application, in its current and historical versions, is available 
at: https://likumi.lv/. 
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relating to the status of individuals as politically exposed persons, their situation 
as regards penalties and their situation as regards negative information in the 
media. For its part, SIA Optibet, as the parent company of the applicant, provides 
the latter with access to the technical solutions and information services provided 
by third parties so as to make the most efficient use of resources and ensure 
uniform compliance with the requirements of the Law on Prevention within the 
group of undertakings. 
3 Between 10 February 2022 and 4 March 2022, the Inspection Service carried out 
an inspection on the applicant in connection with the prevention of money 
laundering and stated that a customer of the applicant to whom the latter had been 
providing interactive gambling services since 23 August 2021 (‘the customer’) 
was to be regarded as a politically exposed person. 
4 On 14 March 2022, the Inspection Service carried out a further inspection on the 
applicant in the course of which it looked at the deposits paid by the customer on 
27 and 28 January 2022, when the customer had been registered as a player, how 
the customer’s identity had been determined, how the internal control system had 
been applied to the customer and what customer screening procedures had been 
followed. On 14 March 2022, the Inspection Service drew up an inspection report 
in relation to the foregoing. That report states the following. 
5 If it is established that the customer is a politically exposed person, the business 
relationship with that customer must be terminated, but, if the customer is a 
relative or a close associate of the politically exposed person, the business 
relationship may continue with the consent of the applicant’s management. 
6 In 2020, 2021 and 2022, the applicant did not establish the existence of any 
business relationships with close associates of politically exposed persons. In 
addition, the applicant did not screen the customer after the screening threshold 
(EUR 2 000) had been reached on 26 August 2021, which would have required it 
to ask the customer for information on his sources of income, the size of his 
income, his gambling budget, and whether he is a politically exposed person, or a 
family member or close associate of such a person, and to check information 
contained in publicly available databases in order to identify additional risk 
factors. 
7 In the light of the customer’s gambling habits and the amount of the bets, the 
applicant, on 31 January 2022, began a detailed screening in relation to the 
customer, asking him for additional information. The applicant took into account 
the deposits made by the customer in the amount of EUR 15 000, as a result of 
which the customer had been rated a medium-high risk on 14 September 2021, 
and the customer’s historical data from his customer profile with SIA Optibet. In 
addition, on the basis of the data sharing agreement it had concluded with SIA 
Optibet, the applicant abided by the decision of SIA Optibet’s board of 
management of 27 March 2020 to maintain the relationship with the high-risk 
customer in question. It is not customary for the applicant to review or compare its 
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customers against information obtained by SIA Optibet in the course of customer 
screenings. 
8 Consequently, the Inspection Service concluded, on the basis of the results of the 
inspection it had carried out, that the applicant had not screened the customer, 
notwithstanding that the threshold for such a screening had been reached, had not 
determined the customer’s status as a close associate of a politically exposed 
person and had not subjected the customer to a detailed screening in this regard. 
9 In the light of the foregoing, the Inspection Service, by decision of 15 June 2022, 
imposed on the applicant a fine for failure to comply with the requirements laid 
down in the relevant legislation. 
10 In its decision, the Inspection Service considered that, when entering into, and 
subsequently developing, its business relationship with the customer, the applicant 
could not use and rely on the screening of that customer carried out by another 
undertaking (SIA Optibet), even if the latter was linked to the applicant; the 
applicant should have conducted that screening autonomously and independently. 
In its view, since the applicant used and relied on information obtained from 
another undertaking, without itself asking the customer for information, it must be 
concluded that the applicant failed over a long period of time to take steps to 
ascertain whether the customer was a close associate of a politically exposed 
person and, consequently, did not comply with the enhanced monitoring 
requirements. Accordingly, it formed the view that the applicant had not correctly 
applied the internal customer control system or carried out any customer 
screening. 
11 The Inspection Service considered the applicant’s customer to be a close associate 
of a politically exposed person, since, at the same time as having a role in politics, 
that customer performed tasks as an official within the executive body of an 
association. 
12 On 18 July 2022, the applicant brought before the Administratīvā rajona tiesa 
(District Administrative Court, Latvia) an action for the annulment of the 
Inspection Service’s decision. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
13 The applicant claims that it concluded with SIA Optibet an information sharing 
agreement under which the latter provided it with the information necessary to 
comply with the requirements of the Law on Prevention in respect of any player 
who is a customer of SIA Optibet and has subsequently become a customer of the 
applicant. It is therefore of the view that there was no need to request and re-
examine the information obtained by SIA Optibet in connection with a particular 
customer who had previously been one of SIA Optibet’s customers, and that that 
information could also be used in the context of the business relationship between 
the applicant and that customer. In the applicant’s opinion, the same can be said of 
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management decisions in respect of common customers, since SIA Optibet and 
the applicant are linked. 
14 The applicant submits that the Inspection Service misinterprets the concept of 
‘any other close relationship’ contained in Article 1, point 182, of the Law on 
Prevention, in taking the view that the fact that a customer belongs to a public 
body in which a politically exposed person also works is in itself a reason to 
regard the customer as being associated with a politically exposed person. It 
argues that establishing whether such a relationship exists calls for an individual 
and complex assessment in which that circumstance is not the only factor 
determining the status of the person in question. 
15 The Inspection Service notes that the Law on Prevention does not provide for the 
conclusion of a contract for information sharing between gambling and lottery 
operators. It states that, at the time when the customer entered into a business 
relationship with the applicant, the customer had terminated his business 
relationship with SIA Optibet, which is all the more reason why the applicant 
could not use the information obtained by Optibet. It therefore considers that the 
applicant and the customer entered into a new business relationship without due 
diligence. According to the Inspection Service, the applicant and SIA Optibet, as 
economic operators each holding a licence for the organisation of gambling in 
Latvia, are not linked by the legal status of a single group. It submits that SIA 
Optibet, a partner of the applicant, is itself a licensed gambling operator subject to 
the Law on Prevention, and to the same requirements as the applicant, and 
operating in accordance with its internal control system in order to ensure 
compliance with that Law. In its view, the relevant legal framework does not 
allow customer data to be shared with another undertaking, the effect of which 
would be to exempt the recipient of the information from the duty to comply with 
its legal obligations. Only credit and financial institutions may receive the results 
of a customer screening. In the opinion of the Inspection Service, the fact of 
having held a long-term position as an official within an executive body along 
with someone who has been classified as a politically exposed person may enable 
the politically exposed person, with the assistance of the other person, to conceal a 
misuse of power for private ends. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
16 [1.] The concept of ‘close associate of a politically exposed person’ was 
introduced into the Law on Prevention in accordance with point 11 of Article 3 of 
Directive 2015/849, which defines ‘persons known to be close associates’. 
Point 11 of Article 3 of Directive 2015/849 clarifies the meaning of ‘close 
associates’ in the context of that directive, namely natural persons who are known 
to have any other close business relations with a politically exposed person. Thus, 
close business relations alone are relevant to whether a person is to be regarded as 
a close associate in the context of that directive. Article 1, point 182, of the Law 
on Prevention, however, provides that a person generally maintaining business 
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relations or any other close relationship with a politically exposed person is to be 
regarded as a close associate of that person. 
17 According to the clarifications provided in the Politiski nozīmīgu personu, to 
ģimenes locekļu un ar tām cieši saistītu personu noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu 
legalizācijas, terorisma un proliferācijas finansēšanas risku vadības vadlīnijas 
(Guidelines for managing the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing and 
nuclear proliferation posed by politically exposed persons, their relatives and 
close associates), drawn up by the Latvijas Republikas Finanšu izlūkošanas 
dienests (Financial Information Service of the Republic of Latvia), the concept of 
‘any other close relationship’ means a relationship that enables the politically 
exposed person, with the assistance of the other person, to conceal a misuse of 
public power for private ends. In particular, persons regarded as close associates 
of a politically exposed person are persons outside the latter’s family circle 
(friends, for example) who are prominent members of the same political party, 
public body or trade union as the politically exposed person, for example, or well-
known figures in society. In that context, the most important criterion is the 
existence of a ‘close relationship’ that may enable the politically exposed person, 
with the assistance of that other person, to conceal a misuse of power for private 
ends. It follows from the Guidelines that the fact of belonging to the same public 
body may be regarded as constituting the existence of a close relationship. 
18 On the one hand, the very fact that persons are part of the same public body is a 
higher risk factor for money laundering or terrorist financing, especially if any of 
those persons holds or has held a politically significant position or is a widely 
known or prominent member of society, since, as is noted in recital 30 of 
Directive 2015/849, risk itself is variable in nature, and the variables, on their own 
or in combination, may increase or decrease the potential risk posed. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that such a circumstance is not always 
obvious, since public registers only list officials and, in organisations in which 
there are many members, such information is not usually available to the public. 
What is more, there is no public register in Latvia in which all public associations 
or bodies have to register and make public the identity of their members. 
19 On the other hand, the purpose, structure and size of public bodies are very 
different factors that may influence the likelihood of a risk occurring. It would be 
essential to determine the status of the persons in question and their mutual 
interaction within the body concerned (as official or member, and whether or not 
they are able to influence processes and so on, for example), the scope of the 
public body’s activities (whether or not, for example, that body is involved in 
matters affecting political or financial processes) and other circumstances. At the 
same time, however, it is important to bear in mind that such an assessment might 
require additional resources on the part of the obliged entity, since the only way to 
determine whether persons forming part of the same public body have a close 
relationship with each other would be to collect and analyse additional 
information. 
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20 Likewise, in the context of close associates, it is essential to determine whether 
one of them holds one of the positions referred to in point 9 of Article 3 of 
Directive 2015/849, which, as that article makes clear, does not include middle-
ranking or more junior positions. Furthermore, that article establishes that a 
politically exposed person is not any person known and prominent in the public 
sphere, but someone who meets the criteria laid down in that article and has the 
status of a high-ranking official. It follows from this that, in order to be able to say 
that someone is an associate of the politically exposed person, it is not sufficient 
to establish that one of those persons is publicly known or holds or has held a 
position that might be among those listed in point 9 of Article 3 of Directive 
2015/849. It must also be ascertained whether the position in question is high-
ranking. This calls for an individual assessment. 
21 It would therefore be necessary to clarify whether point 11(a) of Article 3 of 
Directive 2015/849 must be interpreted as meaning that an individual may be 
regarded as a close associate of a politically exposed person on the sole ground 
that those persons form part of the same public body, without regard to any other 
circumstance, in particular whether the person in question holds or has held a 
position that might be among those referred to in point 9 of Article 3 of Directive 
2015/849, and without determining whether that position is high-ranking. 
22 [2.] In accordance with recital 35 of Directive 2015/849, in order to avoid 
repeated customer identification procedures, it is appropriate to allow customers 
whose identification has been carried out elsewhere to be introduced to the 
obliged entities. 
23 Article 45(1) of the aforementioned directive provides that Member States are to 
require obliged entities that are part of a group to implement group-wide policies 
and procedures, including data protection policies and policies and procedures for 
sharing information within the group for AML/CFT purposes. Those policies and 
procedures are to be implemented effectively at the level of branches and 
majority-owned subsidiaries in Member States and third countries. For its part, 
Article 45(8) of Directive 2015/849 provides that Member States must ensure that 
the sharing of information within the group is allowed. 
24 It must therefore be concluded that undertakings in the same group, such as the 
applicant and SIA Optibet, are not entitled but obliged to share information, in 
particular by concluding information sharing agreements and ensuring the 
reciprocal flow and mutual enforceability of information. In addition, Member 
States have an obligation to ensure that such information sharing within the group 
is permitted and is sufficient to support the conclusion that the obliged entity in 
question has screened its customer. Conferring that right on any of the obliged 
entities referred to in point 1 of Article 2 of Directive 2015/849 (not only credit 
and financial institutions), first, enables the repetition (within a group of 
undertakings) of substantive customer identification procedures to be avoided, 
and, second, ensures an efficient use of funds for the undertakings in the group. 
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25 Article 13(1) of Directive 2015/849 lays down the customer due diligence 
measures which must be applied by obliged entities, in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of that article. At the same time, however, paragraph 2 of that article 
provides that obliged entities may determine the extent of such measures on a 
risk-sensitive basis. The referring court therefore takes the view that the foregoing 
allows information obtained as a result of information sharing within the group of 
undertakings to be enforced for the purposes of common customers. According to 
that court, this is confirmed by Article 26(2) of Directive 2015/849, which 
provides that Member States are to prohibit obliged entities from relying on third 
parties established in high-risk third countries. Member States may exempt 
branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of obliged entities established in the 
Union from that prohibition where those branches and majority-owned 
subsidiaries fully comply with the group-wide policies and procedures in 
accordance with Article 45. That directive thus permits the reciprocal flow and 
mutual enforceability of information where that information is obtained and used 
within a group of undertakings, in particular where it is obtained from an 
undertaking in the group that is not established in a high-risk third country. 
26 For its part, Article 5 of Directive 2015/849 provides that Member States may lay 
down stricter rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, which in 
turn means that a Member State may actually restrict the range of obliged entities 
on which it confers the rights provided for in Article 45(8) of Directive 2015/849. 
27 [3.] In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is also important to clarify 
whether Article 45(1) and (8) of Directive 2015/849, read in conjunction with 
points 12 and 15 of Article 3 of that directive, also allows such information, or 
decisions, to be used and enforced in several undertakings belonging to the same 
group, these being decisions adopted, within that group, by the management of an 
undertaking belonging to that group. 
28 [4.] In accordance with Article 8(1) and (2) of Directive 2015/849, Member 
States are to ensure that obliged entities take appropriate steps to identify and 
assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, taking into account 
risk factors. Those steps must be proportionate to the nature and size of the 
obliged entities. The risk assessment referred to in paragraph 1 must be 
documented, kept up-to-date and made available to the relevant competent 
authorities and self-regulatory bodies concerned. 
29 Article 11 of Directive 2015/849 provides that the obliged entity must apply 
customer due diligence measures, in particular, when establishing a business 
relationship, when there are doubts about the veracity or accuracy of previously 
obtained customer information, and, in the case of providers of gambling services, 
upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, when carrying 
out transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is 
carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be 
linked. Furthermore, Article 14(5) of the aforementioned directive provides that 
Member States must require that obliged entities apply the customer due diligence 
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measures not only to all new customers but also at appropriate times to existing 
customers on a risk-sensitive basis, including at times when the relevant 
circumstances of a customer change. 
30 It follows from Article 111(1), (2) and (7) of the Law on Prevention that, under 
that Law, the obliged entity has an obligation to update customer data in 
accordance with the customer risk assessment at least once every five years. 
31 Consequently, the aforementioned legislative framework provides that customer 
due diligence measures must be carried out if any risk is identified, but no less 
frequently than laid down in the national framework. 
32 The applicant submits that the application of due diligence to existing customers 
(including those on which information is available within the group of 
undertakings) prior to the deadline laid down in the aforementioned legislation is 
based on a risk assessment. It is of the view that, if, when assessing a customer, 
the obliged entity found no risks to be present, but such risks do arise later, before 
the deadline for updating customer data is reached, and the obliged entity cannot 
be informed about those risks, that entity is not obliged to apply customer due 
diligence measures to existing customers ahead of time. 
33 The Court of Justice has provided the clarification that Article 14(5) of Directive 
2015/849, read together with Article 8(2) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning 
that obliged entities are required, on the basis of an updated risk assessment, to 
apply due diligence measures or, where necessary, enhanced due diligence 
measures to an existing customer where appropriate, including where the relevant 
circumstances of the customer change, irrespective of the fact that the time limit 
laid down by national law for carrying out a new risk assessment on that customer 
has not yet expired (judgment of 17 November 2022, Rodl & Partner, C-562/20, 
EU:C:2022:883, paragraph 91). 
34 In that clarification, however, the Court of Justice does not answer the question of 
how to proceed if the obliged entity was unaware of other new circumstances 
concerning the customer in question that might affect the risk assessment of that 
customer. 
35 It is therefore appropriate to raise the fifth question referred for a preliminary 
ruling. 
36 [5.] Likewise, given that the obligations imposed on obliged entities must be 
proportionate, it is appropriate to raise the sixth question referred for a preliminary 
ruling.