Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:710
Date: 2025-09-18
Language of the case: French

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL EMILIOU delivered on 18 September 2025 (1) Case C‑728/23 P Kingdom of Spain v Robert Stockdale, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina ( Appeal – national of the United Kingdom working for the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Consecutive fixed-term employment contracts – Termination of the contract following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union – Appeal lodged by a Member State which did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court – third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Admissibility of the appeal – Concept of ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ ) I. Introduction 1. The third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute’) allows Member States to appeal against final decisions of the General Court before the Court of Justice, even if they did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court. However, that right is subject to one caveat: it does not apply to cases involving disputes ‘between the Union and its servants’. Accordingly, in such cases, a Member State may only appeal against a final decision if it intervened in the proceedings before the General Court. 2. By its appeal, the Kingdom of Spain requests that the Court of Justice set aside, in part, the judgment of the General Court in Stockdale v Council and Others (‘the judgment under appeal’), concerning a dispute between the Council of the European Union and an individual (Mr Robert Stockdale), who was employed on successive fixed-term contracts by the European Union Special Representative (‘the EUSR’) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2) 3. The Kingdom of Spain asked to intervene in the proceedings before the General Court that led to the adoption of that judgment. However, the judgment under appeal was delivered before a decision to grant or refuse that Member State leave to intervene was reached by that court. 4. At the request of the Court, the present Opinion will focus on the procedural issue of whether the appeal brought by that Member State must be regarded as having been made in a case relating to a ‘dispute between the Union and its servants’ and, thus, as being inadmissible under the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute. II. Legal framework A. The Statute 5. Under Article 56 of the Statute: ‘An appeal may be brought before the Court of Justice, within two months of the decision appealed against, against final decisions of the General Court and decisions of the Court disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility. Such an appeal may be brought by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions. … With the exception of cases relating to disputes between the Union and its servants, an appeal may also be brought by Member States and institutions of the Union which did not intervene in the proceedings before the General Court. Such Member States and institutions shall be in the same position as Member States or institutions which intervened at first instance.’ B. Decision (CFSP) 2019/1340 6. Pursuant to Article 1 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1340 of 8 August 2019 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Mr Johann SATTLER is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1 September 2019 until 31 August 2021. The Council may decide that the EUSR’s mandate be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the [European] Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).’ 7. Article 4 of that decision provides: ‘1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR. 2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR. 3. The EUSR shall work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the relevant departments thereof.’ 8. Article 6 of that decision, which is entitled ‘Constitution and composition of the team’, provides that: ‘1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the [European] Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team. 2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State. 3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, the sending institution of the Union or the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the EUSR’s mandate.’ III. Background to the dispute 9. The background to the dispute is set out in detail in the judgment under appeal. (3) The factual circumstances that are relevant to the present Opinion may be summarised as follows. 10. Mr Stockdale is a national of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland who held the position of Head of Finance and Administration with the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 11. Pursuant to Article 33 TEU, on 11 March 2002, the Council adopted a decision concerning the appointment of an EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (4) Subsequently, the Council adopted various successive acts by which it appointed an EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a fixed-term mandate, without interruption. 12. On the date the action at issue was brought (that is to say, 29 December 2020), the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been appointed for the period from 1 September 2019 to 31 August 2021. (5) 13. From 15 February 2006 to 1 March 2007, Mr Stockdale was employed under a fixed-term employment contract (FTEC) concluded with the EUSR for a period not exceeding the duration of the EUSR’s mandate. 14. From 1 March 2007 onwards, he concluded 16 successive FTECs with the EUSR. The last FTEC concluded by Mr Stockdale (‘the contract in question’) provided, in Article 5 thereof, for a term running from 1 September 2019 to 31 August 2021. 15. Mr Stockdale also signed 13 tripartite contracts with the Commission and the EUSR, designating him as acting Head of Office. Those contracts stipulated that in the event of the EUSR’s death or resignation, accident or illness preventing him or her from performing his or her duties, or the termination of the financing agreement between the Commission and the EUSR, Mr Stockdale would become responsible for managing the funds allocated to the EUSR. The last such contract was signed by Mr Stockdale on 7 October 2019. 16. On 24 January 2020, representatives of the European Union and the United Kingdom signed the agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (6) (‘the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement’). 17. On 1 February 2020, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement entered into force pursuant to Article 185 thereof. That agreement established, in Article 126, a transition period beginning on the date the agreement entered into force and ending on 31 December 2020 (‘the transition period’), during which, under Article 127(6) thereof, references to ‘Member States’ in EU law were to be understood as including the United Kingdom. 18. On 24 June 2020, Mr Stockdale sent a letter to the EUSR to enquire about his rights and to complain of discrimination in the event that his post would ultimately be deemed redundant due to the transfer of the EUSR’s office in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU delegation in that country, and therefore to the EEAS. 19. On 7 July 2020, the EUSR forwarded Mr Stockdale’s request to the Director of the Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, stating that Mr Stockdale had raised questions regarding his employment conditions, particularly in view of a probable termination of the contract in question as a result of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. A Head of Unit from that service replied on 13 July 2020 that the service was not responsible for human resources in relation to the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) staff and advised the EUSR to consult the EEAS in that regard. She also pointed out that, in so far as Mr Stockdale’s request involved financial aspects, no severance pay or pension contributions could be granted under the terms of the contract in question. 20. On 15 September 2020, the EUSR contacted the EEAS by forwarding the applicant’s letter dated 24 June 2020. 21. On 28 September 2020, Mr Stockdale wrote to the EUSR requesting that they obtain more information on the possibilities for him to remain in his current post beyond the end of the transition period. After the EUSR contacted the Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, the director of that service replied on 2 October 2020 that no exceptions were provided for nationals of the United Kingdom and that their contracts would be terminated on 31 December 2020. 22. On 17 November 2020, the EUSR adopted a termination decision, by which it ended the contract in question with notice, the decision taking effect on 31 December 2020 (‘the termination decision’). As the General Court indicates in paragraph 34 of the judgment under appeal, the ground for the termination decision was the fact that, due to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the applicant no longer had the nationality of a Member State. This meant – according to the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina – that he could no longer remain on his staff. IV. Procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal A. Procedure before the General Court 23. By an application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 29 December 2020, Mr Stockdale brought an action against the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which he requested, first, that the termination decision be declared unlawful; second, that the defendant parties be ordered to pay him the sum of EUR 10 000 in compensation for the non-material damage resulting from that decision; and, third, that he be reinstated in his previous post or, alternatively, that the defendant parties be ordered to pay him the sum of EUR 393 850.08 in compensation for the material damage resulting from the termination decision (‘the first head of claim’). 24. Mr Stockdale also put forward three other heads of claim, the last one of which was formulated ‘in the alternative’. However, for the purposes of the present appeal, only the first head of claim is relevant. 25. By separate submissions lodged with the Registry of the General Court – on 11 May 2021 by the Commission and the Council, 12 May 2021 by the EEAS and 30 June 2021 by the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively – those parties raised pleas of inadmissibility and lack of jurisdiction, arguing, in particular, that the termination decision and any alleged irregularities invoked by Mr Stockdale were not attributable to them. 26. On 30 August 2021, Mr Stockdale submitted his observations on the pleas of inadmissibility and lack of jurisdiction, requesting that those pleas be dismissed. 27. The General Court decided, under Article 130(1) of its Rules of Procedure, to rule on the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as to all heads of claim before examining the substance of the case. B. The judgment under appeal 28. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court partially upheld the pleas of inadmissibility and lack of jurisdiction raised by the defendant parties. 29. In particular, as regards the first head of claim, the General Court declared that it had jurisdiction, both under Article 263 TFEU, regarding the request for judicial review of the legality of the termination decision, which was adopted by an entity of the European Union established under the Treaties, namely the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and under Article 268 TFEU, concerning the claim for pecuniary compensation for the alleged non-material and material damage resulting from that decision. After identifying the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the EU body that adopted the termination decision, the General Court concluded that those claims were admissible with respect to the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and inadmissible with respect to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS. 30. However, the General Court declined jurisdiction regarding Mr Stockdale’s request that it order his reinstatement as a member of staff of the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It explained that EU judges cannot, in principle, including in the context of a damages action, issue orders to an EU institution, body or agency without interfering with the prerogatives of the administrative authority. V. Procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought 31. By document lodged with the registry of the Court of Justice on 27 November 2023, the Kingdom of Spain brought the present appeal. 32. By its appeal, the Kingdom of Spain claims that the Court should: – set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it rules on the standing to be a defendant with regard to the first head of claim; and – declare that the first head of claim is admissible with regard to the Council and inadmissible with regard to the EUSR. 33. In his response to that appeal, Mr Stockdale contends that the Court should: – uphold the appeal brought by the Kingdom of Spain; and – order the defendant parties to pay the costs of the appeal. 34. In its response, the Council claims that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; and – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs incurred by the Council in the present proceedings. 35. In its response, the Commission contends that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; and – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 36. In its response, the EEAS claims that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal as unfounded or, failing that, dismiss it as inadmissible; and – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 37. In its response, the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina claims that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal as inadmissible or, in any event, as unfounded; and – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 38. Mr Stockdale lodged a cross-appeal on 28 October 2024. However, for the purposes of the present Opinion, I shall only consider the appeal brought by the Kingdom of Spain (‘the main appeal’), since the focus of my analysis will be on the admissibility of that appeal. VI. Assessment 39. The Kingdom of Spain argues that the General Court made an error of law in concluding, in paragraphs 125 to 142 of the judgment under appeal, that the first head of claim was admissible with regard to the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and inadmissible with regard to, inter alia, the Council. In its view, the Council should have been regarded as the only defendant. 40. That Member State brought the main appeal under the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, given that, on the date when the judgment under appeal was delivered, it had applied for leave to intervene in the proceedings before the General Court, but had not yet been admitted as an ‘intervener’. 41. As I have explained in the introduction, that provision grants Member States a special (or extended) right of appeal, (7) which derogates from the general rule, contained in the second paragraph of that article, that only the parties that intervened before the General Court are entitled to lodge an appeal against the decisions of that court that bring an end to the proceedings or to an incidental procedure relating to an objection of lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility. 42. By virtue of that special right of appeal, Member States may appeal against final decisions of the General Court, even where they have not intervened in the proceedings before that court. The purpose is to allow such privileged applicants, in their capacity as ‘guardians of the law’, to bring cases before the Court in order to preserve the coherence of case-law, even when the parties to the proceedings before the General Court accept the judgment delivered by the latter. (8) 43. However, it is clear from the wording of the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute that that right does not extend to ‘cases relating to disputes between the Union and its servants’. Accordingly, just as much as that provision introduces a special or extended right of appeal for Member States, it also provides for an exception to that right. For such staff-related disputes, the right of appeal of Member States is limited to that recognised under the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute (in other words, the general rule applies). (9) 44. In the following section, I will expand upon the reasons why I consider that the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute does not cover disputes between the European Union and internationally contracted CFSP personnel such as Mr Stockdale, with the consequence that the main appeal is admissible (A). I will then comment on the fact that, in the present case, the Kingdom of Spain sought to intervene in the proceedings before the General Court. However, the judgment under appeal was delivered before a decision to grant or refuse that Member State leave to intervene was reached. I will explain why, in my view, that particularity provides an additional reason for considering the main appeal to be admissible (B). A. Why the exception relating to ‘d isputes between the Union and its servants’ does not apply to internationally contracted CFSP personnel 45. In their answers to a question put by the Court for written response regarding the admissibility of the main appeal, the Kingdom of Spain, the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina all explained that the exception to the special right of Member States to appeal against a final decision of the General Court, even if they have not intervened in the proceedings before that court, covers all decisions delivered on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, and no others. 46. Article 270 TFEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisdiction in ‘any dispute between the Union and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union’ (‘the Staff Regulations’ (10)). As such, that provision guarantees EU civil servants and other persons to which the Staff Regulations apply a right to judicial redress. It has been interpreted extensively, since the Court has found that it covers disputes concerning not only persons who are covered by the Staff Regulations as officials or ‘other servants of the Union’, but also those who have the status neither of official nor of ‘other servant of the Union’ and merely claim that status. (11) 47. However, not all disputes that have their origin in an employment relationship between a natural person and the European Union come within the scope of Article 270 TFEU. Indeed, the Staff Regulations do not constitute an exhaustive body of rules prohibiting the employment of persons otherwise than within the framework of those rules. (12) 48. In particular, members of the CFSP contract staff are not covered by the Staff Regulations and are, thus, excluded from the scope of that provision. (13) A clear example within that category is provided by members of the contract staff working in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (14) missions in non-member countries. Those agents, who (like other members of the CFSP contract staff, more generally) may be recruited either locally or internationally, (15) are not covered by the Staff Regulations – even though their mission is treated as coming within the scope of the concept of ‘bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ for the purposes of the application of Article 263 TFEU. (16) Therefore, actions initiated by those persons before the EU Courts, in application of Article 270 TFEU, would be considered inadmissible. (17) 49. The only way in which the EU Courts may have jurisdiction over such employment disputes is when they are brought on the basis of Article 272 TFEU or Article 263 TFEU. However, the first of those provisions enables judicial review by those courts only if there is an arbitration clause in the employment contract in question designating EU Courts as the ones before which disputes regarding that contract are to be brought. The second of those provisions entitles the EU Courts to review ‘the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’ (this presupposes that the contested act can be regarded as having been adopted by the European Union). 50. The same legal avenues are available to an individual such as Mr Stockdale, who is an internationally contracted member of staff working for the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (within the context of the CFSP). In the judgment under appeal, the General Court declared that it had jurisdiction under Article 263 TFEU as regards the first head of claim, to the extent that it included a request for judicial review of the legality of the termination decision, which had been adopted by an entity of the European Union established under the Treaties, namely the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 270 TFEU was never envisaged, not even by Mr Stockdale himself, as a possible ‘avenue’ for bringing the dispute before the General Court. 51. To my knowledge, only two other employment disputes concerning persons hired as internationally contracted members of staff within the context of the CFSP (in casu, by the European Union Capacity Building mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia)) have been brought before the EU Courts in the last five years. (18) In those cases, again, the applicants based their action on Article 263 TFEU and (in the alternative) on Article 272 TFEU, not Article 270 TFEU. 52. In those circumstances, it is clear to me that Mr Stockdale, in his capacity as an internationally contracted member of staff working for the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (within the context of the CFSP) does not come within the scope of Article 270 TFEU. 53. Having made that clarification, I shall explain why I agree with the Kingdom of Spain, the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute has the same scope as Article 270 TFEU, with the result that the main appeal does not come within the ambit of that exception and is, thus, admissible. I will rely in that regard on a textual and contextual analysis of those provisions (1), as well as teleological considerations (2). 1. Textual and contextual analysis 54. To begin with, I note that the wording of Article 270 TFEU and the exception in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute is strictly identical, not merely in the English-language versions, but also in, for example, the French- (19) and Spanish-language (20) versions. Their wording is also practically identical in other language versions. (21) 55. In my view, that identical wording constitutes the first element in support of the conclusion that the scope of Article 270 TFEU and that of the exception in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute coincide. 56. That conclusion is then reinforced by the fact that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union has been inserted as Protocol No 3 of the FEU Treaty. Thus, when identical phrases are used in the provisions of the Treaty and that statute, I consider that they must, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, be understood in the same way. 57. In that regard, I would add that there is a natural logic in considering that the way in which a specific category of cases is defined under the FEU Treaty (here, the category referred to in Article 270 TFEU as ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’) determines how the same category is to be understood under the Statute. 58. In my Opinion in Parliament v Axa Assurances Luxembourg and Others, (22) I explained that ‘the texts governing procedure before the Courts of the European Union are akin to a railway system. Each track represents a procedural route, while the trains operating on those tracks symbolise the cases that are brought before this judicial institution. As the progression of a case unfolds, the rules of procedure serve as the railway signalling, ensuring that the case stays on the appropriate track towards its final destination.’ 59. In my view, it is clear that the railway tracks before the EU Courts are laid by the FEU Treaty. The starting point of the railway track for ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ is Article 270 TFEU, which, as I have explained, grants the EU Courts jurisdiction to rule on such disputes. The exception in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute is ‘railway signalling’, as it indicates that decisions of the General Court regarding ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ cannot be appealed against by Member States that have not participated in the proceedings before that court. 60. In the light of those elements, I consider, based on a literal and contextual analysis, that that exception and Article 270 TFEU cover the same category of case. As the present case does not come within the scope of that provision, it is not caught by the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute and is, therefore, admissible. 61. I wish to make one more point. 62. As I have explained in point 46 above, Article 270 TFEU has been interpreted by the Court as covering not only persons defined by the Staff Regulations as officials or ‘other servants of the Union’, but also those who have the status neither of official nor of ‘other servant of the Union’ and merely claim that status. 63. However, that does not mean, in my view, that the present case must be regarded as if it could have been brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU. Indeed, Mr Stockdale did not claim, before the General Court, that he should be regarded as a person coming within the scope of the Staff Regulations (that is to say, that the Staff Regulations must apply to him). Rather, he argued that he must be entitled to a particular benefit, namely to remain in his post beyond the end of the transition period, regardless of whether a similar benefit was even available for nationals of the United Kingdom who were covered by the Staff Regulations. 64. I shall now turn to the teleological considerations which reinforce the conclusion that the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute and Article 270 TFEU cover the same category of case. 2. Teleological analysis 65. In Council v Busacca and Others, (23) the Council, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, argued that the phrase ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’, in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, (24) does not concern disputes which put in issue the legality of a measure of general application (such as a regulation), but only those relating to questions of an individual nature, for which it does not appear justified to confer a ‘special right of appeal’ to the Court on institutions or Member States which had not intervened before the General Court. (25) Accordingly, to determine whether an employment dispute is covered by that exception, one would have to assess the substance of the claims or arguments made (that is to say, whether they raise questions as to the legality of a measure of general application or only one of an individual nature). 66. However, the Court rejected that argument. It stated that the procedural rules applicable to staff cases cannot depend on whether or not the parties raise the interpretation or validity of legislative or general provisions capable of applying to the case. (26) Instead, one must focus on the subject matter of the application. In that regard, the Court noted that the application could lead (if granted) only to the annulment of the individual decisions concerning the applicants. Consequently, the appeal brought by the Council, which had not intervened in the proceedings before the General Court, concerned a case relating to a ‘dispute between the Union and its servants’, within the meaning of the exception in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, and was, therefore, inadmissible. 67. I understand from those findings, first, that the substance of the questions of EU law raised by the parties before the General Court is irrelevant to the question of whether a Member State (or an EU institution) that has not intervened in the context of the proceedings before that court can rely on the ‘special right of appeal’ provided in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute. (27) Whether that right is available does not depend on whether the case raises important or transversal questions of EU law. Conversely, not all cases for which the special right of appeal is available to Member States may raise such questions. 68. In casu, that means that the fact that, in support of the main appeal, the Kingdom of Spain invokes broader considerations (28) linked to whether a distinction should be made between ‘management’ decisions regarding staff employed within the context of the CFSP and decisions of a strategic or political nature adopted within that context is irrelevant to the admissibility of that appeal. 69. Second, I understand from the judgment in Council v Busacca and Others (29) that the reason why Member States or the EU institutions do not have, under the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, a ‘special right of appeal’ as regards ‘cases relating to disputes between the Union and its servants’ is connected to the fact that, in such cases, the subject matter of the action is, typically, the annulment of an individual decision. (30) 70. Since the dispute in the present case also concerns a natural person (Mr Stockdale) who seeks the annulment of an individual decision concerning his terms of employment (in casu, the termination decision), one could argue that, in the same way that the Kingdom of Spain would have had no ‘special right of appeal’ if the case had come within the scope of Article 270 TFEU, it must have no such right where the same case falls outside the scope of that provision (in casu, because Mr Stockdale is employed by the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 71. In support of that view, one could also argue that the mere fact that the phrase ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute corresponds to an exception does not mean that it must be interpreted strictly. As Advocate General Alber explained in his Opinion in Council v Busacca and Others, (31) the special right of appeal laid down in that provision is itself already an exception, since, under the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute, only parties and interveners directly affected by a judgment can, in principle, bring an appeal. In those circumstances, what I have thus far called an ‘exception’ constitutes, in fact, an exception to the exception, or a counter-exception. It is unclear whether the general principle that exceptions must be interpreted strictly can be applied to such a situation. 72. Having said that, I am of the view that employment disputes brought under Article 263 TFEU and Article 270 TFEU should not be treated as forming a single category of case relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ and, thus, as both falling within the scope of the exception contained in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute. 73. In that regard, I wish to say a few words about the Court’s judgment in H v Council and Others. (32) That case did not concern a member of the CFSP contract staff like Mr Stockdale, but an Italian magistrate who was seconded to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) by the Italian Minister for Justice and who had been informed by the Chief of Personnel of the EUPM that she would be redeployed for operational reasons in the Banja Luka regional office. The Court found that seconded EU staff and national staff were, in some respects, subject to the same rules within CSDP missions. It further stated that the decisions at issue ‘constitute[d], by their very essence, acts of staff management, just like all similar decisions adopted by the EU institutions in the exercise of their competences’. (33) In the light of those elements, it held that, given that the EU Courts have jurisdiction under Article 270 TFEU to review acts of staff management where they concern staff members seconded by the EU institutions, they must also have jurisdiction, under Article 263 TFEU, to review such acts when they relate to staff members seconded by the Member States to meet the needs of that mission. 74. I can see how one may consider that that judgment indicates that employment disputes must be placed on an equal footing, regardless of whether they fall within the scope of Article 270 TFEU or can only be brought before the EU Courts under Article 263 TFEU, in the sense that the scope of the legal review must be the same under both headings. However, it seems to me that the judgment in H v Council and Others also illustrates that the Court did not treat those two categories of cases as one and the same, but still regarded those two headings (Article 270 TFEU and Article 263 TFEU) as different procedural avenues. 75. In that regard, I also recall that, pursuant to Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not have general jurisdiction ‘with respect to the provisions relating to the [CFSP] nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions’. Only two exceptions exist, concerning respectively compliance with the non-encroachment clause provided for in Article 40 TEU and the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty. The extent to which the EU Courts should have jurisdiction over employment disputes in the context of the CFSP is a delicate issue and one which is, at any rate, not entirely settled, even after the judgment in H v Council and Others, (34)since, as it follows from the description I have set out above, that judgment did not concern members of internationally or locally contracted CFSP staff. 76. In those circumstances , I find it difficult to defend the view that the EU legislature intended the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute to cover disputes involving those agents – all the more so given that those terms are identical or almost identical to those employed in Article 270 TFEU and that members of internationally or locally contracted CFSP staff do not come within the scope of that provision. 77. In conclusion, I consider that the main appeal does not come within the scope of the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute and is, therefore, admissible. B. Postscript 78. As I have explained in point 44 above, in the present case, the Kingdom of Spain has sought to intervene in the proceedings before the General Court. In fact, the application of that Member State for leave to intervene was dated 6 May 2021, more than two years before the judgment under appeal was delivered. However, the General Court decided to adopt that judgment before granting or refusing the Kingdom of Spain leave to intervene (and, thus, before that Member State submitted its written observations). (35) 79. The reason why the General Court delivered the judgment under appeal without first deciding on that issue is, as I have explained in point 27 above, because that court may, under Article 130(1) of its Rules of Procedure, if the defendant so requests, give a ruling on lack of competence or admissibility without going to the substance of the case. 80. In my view, that particularity provides an additional reason for considering the main appeal to be admissible – even if one were to regard the case as coming within the exception relating to ‘disputes between the Union and its servants’ in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute. 81. Indeed, I consider that, in such circumstances, the Member State in question is in a different position from a Member State that has not sought at all to intervene in the proceedings before the General Court. It has sought to secure its right of appeal by intervening in the proceedings at first instance and demonstrated its awareness that the case was pending before the General Court and its willingness to take a position on legal issues raised by it. (36) Furthermore, I do not think that Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court can be used to ‘circumvent’ the special right of appeal which Member States and the EU institutions would otherwise enjoy (that is to say, if the General Court did not decide to give a ruling on lack of competence or admissibility without going to the substance of the case). VII. Conclusion 82. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court find that the appeal of the Kingdom of Spain is admissible. 1 Original language: English. 2 Judgment of 26 July 2023 (T‑776/20, EU:T:2023:422). 3 See, in particular, paragraphs 2 to 18 of that judgment. 4 Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP on the appointment of the [EUSR] in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OJ 2002 L 70, p. 7). 5 By Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1340 of 8 August 2019 appointing the [EUSR] in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OJ 2019 L 209, p. 10). 6 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 7), which was adopted on 17 October 2019 and entered into force on 1 February 2020, and which was approved on behalf of the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) by Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 1). 7 The same special right of appeal also exists for the EU institutions. 8 See Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Council v Busacca and Others (C‑434/98 P, EU:C:2000:298, points 24 and 25). 9 That is also the case for appeals made by the EU institutions. 10 Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 1962 P 045, p. 1385). 11 See judgment of 5 October 2004, Sanders and Others v Commission (T‑45/01, EU:T:2004:289, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). I also note that Article 270 TFEU has been extended to cover persons working for institutions or bodies which do not apply the Staff Regulations, notably the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), since that provision has been aligned with Article 50a of the Statute. 12 See judgment of 6 December 1989, Mulfinger and Others v Commission (C‑249/87, EU:C:1989:614, paragraph 10). 13 To be clear, by using the term ‘members of the CFSP contract staff for which no staff regulations have been adopted’, I am not referring to seconded EU civil servants or other staff that come within the scope of the Staff Regulations. Indeed, such persons can, even when they are employed within the context of the CFSP, rely on Article 270 TFEU, since the terms and conditions of their employment remain tied to the rules of their place of ordinary employment. 14 The CDSP is an integral part of the CFSP and is the main policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises, protect the European Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security (see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy). 15 For an overview of the different categories of personnel employed in CSDP missions, see Moser, C., ‘Administrative accountability: Separate but complementary fora’ (Chapter 7), in Accountability in EU Security and Defence – The Law and Practice of Peacebuilding, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 240 to 245. 16 See, for example, judgment of 24 February 2022, Eulex Kosovo (C‑283/20, EU:C:2022:126), where the Court found that ‘Eulex Kosovo’ would be the defendant in any action brought before the EU Courts relating to the consequences of the implementation of the mission entrusted to it. 17 For a more detailed explanation, see Butler, G., ‘Contracted EU civil servants in EU common security and defence policy missions: Procedural routes to judicial remedies’, European Labour Law Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2023, p. 355. 18 See judgments of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia (T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454), and JC v EUCAP Somalia (T‑165/20, EU:T:2022:453). 19 For example, in the French-language version of the Statute, the phrase ‘litiges opposant l’Union à ses agents’ is used in the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute. Article 270 TFEU uses the same phrase (‘litige entre l’Union et ses agents’). 20 The phrase ‘litigios entre la Unión y sus agentes’ is used in both the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute and Article 270 TFEU. 21 For example, the phrase ‘qualsiasi controversia tra l’Unione e gli agenti di questa’ is used in the Italian-language version of Article 270 TFEU, whilst the third paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute refers, in its Italian-language version, to ‘controversie tra l’Unione e i loro agenti’. In the German-language versions of those provisions, a small nuance also exists (‘Streitsachen zwischen der Union und ihren Bediensteten’ and ‘Streitsachen zwischen der Union und deren Bediensteten’). The wording is also practically the same in the Greek-language versions of both Article 270 TFEU and Article 56 of the Statute. 22 (C‑766/21 P, EU:C:2024:63, point 1). 23 See judgment of 5 October 2000 (C‑434/98 P, EU:C:2000:546). 24 On the date on which that judgment was delivered, the corresponding provision was Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice. 25 See judgment of 5 October 2000, Council v Busacca and Others(C‑434/98 P, EU:C:2000:546, paragraph 19). 26 Ibid., paragraphs 22 to 25. 27 See also Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Council v Busacca and Others (C‑434/98 P, EU:C:2000:298). 28 According to that Member State, the judgment under appeal makes a distinction between acts of the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are performed under the authority of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (when carrying out the mandate conferred on him) and those which he or she accomplishes in his or her own name and under his or her sole responsibility, when engaging in administrative management related to the mandate (such as personnel matters). The Kingdom of Spain considers that distinction erroneous. It claims that the FEU Treaty does not draw any distinction based on the nature of the acts that the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be called upon to perform, whether they are strategic or political in nature or whether they relate to staff management. 29 See footnote 23 above. 30 I note that disputes that concern measures of general application can be brought before the EU Courts on the basis of Article 270 TFEU. However, the case-law indicates that, in such a situation, the measure of general application must come from the competent appointing authority and must, at the very least, contain a definitive position taken by the administration regarding the individual situation of the applicant (see judgment of 12 September 2018, De Geoffroy and Others v Parliament, T‑788/16, EU:T:2018:534, paragraphs 24 and 25). 31 See footnote 27 above (point 23 of that Opinion). 32 Judgment of 19 July 2016 (C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569). For a commentary on that case, see Prete, L., ‘The scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP: H v Council and Others’ in Butler, G. and Wessel, R.A. (eds), ‘EU External Relations Law’, Hart Publishing, 2022, pp. 831 to 840. 33 See paragraph 54 of that judgment. 34 For a critical analysis of that judgment, see Prete, L., ‘The scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP: H v Council and Others’ in Butler, G. and Wessel, R.A., ‘EU External Relations Law’, Hart Publishing, 2022, pp. 831 to 840. 35 In its application for leave to intervene before the General Court, the Kingdom of Spain merely stated that it wished to intervene in support of Mr Stockdale’s application. 36 See, by contrast, Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Council v Busacca and Others, point 27 (footnote 27 above), where he explains that, in that case, the Council had not sought to intervene at all in the proceedings before the General Court.