Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2018:571
Date: 2018-07-12
Language of the case: Lithuanian
Subject matter: Energy;Approximation of laws;Freedom to provide services
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - inadmissible

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 14 November 2018 Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for an interpretation of provisions of EU law that are manifestly inapplicable in the dispute in the main proceedings — Inapplicability of Directive 2009/72 with regard to an electricity producer that is not subject to public service obligations — Inadmissibility (Art. 267 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72, Art. 3(2)) The request for a preliminary ruling from the Vilniaus miesto apylinkės teismas (District Court, City of Vilnius, Lithuania), made by decision of 11 April 2017, is inadmissible. In that regard, Article 3(2) of Directive 2009/72 provides that, having full regard to the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency, energy from renewable sources and climate protection. In its response, the referring court stated that Lithuanian legislation did not impose a mandatory obligation on Renerga to produce and supply electricity from renewable energy sources. According to that court, Renerga was not included on the list of public service providers that was adopted by the Lithuanian Government, but voluntarily undertook to generate electricity and to sell it to the defendants in the main proceedings. The referring court also stated that the legal relations between Renerga and the defendants in the main proceedings were defined by the contracts concluded by them on 7 January and 19 June 2013 and were governed by civil law, and that these contracts could be terminated, so that it would be incorrect to state that Renerga was obliged to provide public services. Thus, the response provided by the referring court must be understood as meaning that the Member State concerned did not impose any public service obligation within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 2009/72 on Renerga. It follows that the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought are not applicable, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings and that, consequently, all of the questions referred in the context of that case are hypothetical. (see paras 23, 26-28, operative part)