Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:895
Date: 2025-11-13
Language of the case: Estonian

Summary C-438/24 – 1 
Case C-438/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
19 June 2024 
Referring court: 
Riigikohus (Estonia) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
31 May 2024 
Applicant: 
Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised 
Other parties to the proceedings: 
Riigikogu 
Õiguskantsler 
Justiitsminister 
Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon 
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action brought by Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Estonian Green Party) against 
Decision No 102 of the Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (National Electoral 
Committee) of 29 April 2024 refusing to register as candidates for the European 
Parliament elections seven persons for whom the deposit required for registration 
as candidates for those elections had not been paid.  
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
This request for a preliminary ruling, submitted on the basis of the third paragraph 
of Article 267 TFEU, seeks an interpretation of Article 17(1), first sentence, and 
Article 39(2), read in conjunction with Article 52(1), of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
EN 
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Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
Must Article 17(1), first sentence, and Article 39(2), read in conjunction with 
Article 52(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be 
interpreted as precluding an obligation, in order to stand in elections to the 
European Parliament, to pay a deposit amounting to five times the fixed monthly 
minimum wage for each person nominated for registration and forty-five times the 
fixed monthly minimum wage for a party’s full list? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on  
Article 17(1), Article 39(2) and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) 
Article 10(1) and Article 14(3) TEU 
Article 223(1) TFEU 
Article 1(3) and Article 8(1) of the Act concerning the election of the 
representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed 
to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (OJ 1976 L 278, 
p. 1) (‘the 1976 Election Act’) 
Article 3 of European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 establishing the 
composition of the European Parliament (OJ 2023 L 238, p. 114) 
Provisions of international law relied on 
Article 1, first paragraph, and Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the 
ECHR’). 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Paragraph 28(1), Paragraph 29(3) and (5) and Paragraph 77 of the Law on 
elections to the European Parliament (Euroopa Parlamendi valimise seadus, ‘the 
EPVS’) 
Paragraph 28(1) of the EPVS provides that the number of candidates on a list may 
exceed the number of Members of the European Parliament to be elected in 
Estonia by two. 
Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph 29 of the EPVS (‘Nomination of candidates for 
registration’) provides that, in order to register candidates, a political party must 
submit to the State Electoral Authority a copy of the payment order certifying 
payment of the deposit. Subparagraph (5) provides that, before candidates are 
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nominated for registration, a political party or an independent candidate must pay 
into the current account of the Ministry of Finance by way of a deposit an amount 
equal to five times the monthly minimum wage fixed by the Government of the 
Republic for each person nominated for registration. 
Paragraph 77 of the EPVS (‘Refund of deposit’) provides: ‘The deposit shall be 
refunded to an independent candidate or a political party where the independent 
candidate or the political party has received at least 5% in total of the votes cast 
nationally. The National Electoral Committee shall transfer an unrefunded deposit 
to the public purse’. 
Paragraph 121(2) and Paragraph 127 of the Law on Political Parties 
(Erakonnaseadus, ‘the EKS’) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 20 April 2024, the Estonian Green Party (Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised, 
hereinafter also referred to as ‘the applicant’) submitted to the State Electoral 
Authority the documents declaring its candidature in the elections to the European 
Parliament on 9 June 2024, including the nominations for nine candidates and a 
list of nine candidates. 
2 The National Electoral Committee (Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon), by Decision 
No 103 of 29 April 2024, registered two candidates from the Estonian Green Party 
and, by Decision No 102 of 29 April 2024 (‘Decision No 102’), refused to register 
the other seven candidates from that party as candidates. 
3 The reason given in the latter decision for not registering the candidates in 
question was that Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS provides that, before candidates 
are nominated for registration, a party must pay a deposit into the current account 
of the Ministry of Finance. However, the applicant had failed to submit to the 
State Electoral Committee a copy of a payment order certifying payment of a 
deposit for the candidates referred to in Decision No 102. In accordance with 
Paragraph 31(3), point 2, of the EPVS, the failure to provide such a copy is a 
ground for not registering a candidate and the law does not provide for the 
possibility of exempting a candidate from payment of the deposit. 
4 On 2 May 2024, the applicant brought an action against Decision No 102 before 
the Riigikohus (Supreme Court). It did not dispute that the deposit had not been 
paid, but claimed that Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS should be declared 
unconstitutional, that Decision No 102 should be annulled, and that the National 
Electoral Committee should be ordered to include all of the candidates nominated 
by the applicant in the list of candidates for the European Parliament elections. 
5 The National Electoral Committee maintained the positions it had held in 
Decision No 102, opposed the action and contended that it should be dismissed.  
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6 By order of 6 May 2024, the Supreme Court expressed the view that the 
constitutionality of Paragraph 29(5) of the EVS must be examined, and stated that 
the case might call for an examination of the compatibility of that provision with 
EU law too. That court joined the Riigikogu (Parliament), the Õiguskantsler 
(Chancellor of Justice), the Justiitsminister (Minister for Justice), the minister 
representing the government and – to enable it to submit observations – the 
National Electoral Committee as interested parties in the proceedings. 
7 By order of 14 May 2024, the Supreme Court suspended the validity of Decision 
No 102 until such time as the judgment concluding the proceedings in the present 
case becomes final, and instructed the National Electoral Committee to decide 
again whether the persons whose registration had been turned down by Decision 
No 102 can be registered as candidates. The Supreme Court stated that it had 
doubts as to the compatibility of Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS with EU law and 
considered it necessary to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of 
Justice and to stay the constitutionality review proceedings until such time as the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice becomes final. Since, in the event of a 
request for a preliminary ruling being submitted to the European Court of Justice, 
a final judgment would not become final before the 2024 elections to the 
European Parliament, it would be necessary in the interests of temporarily 
protecting the applicant’s rights to register the candidates whose registration had 
been turned down by Decision No 102, even though the deposit required for their 
registration had not been paid. 
8 By decision No 105 of 14 May 2024, the National Electoral Committee registered 
for the elections to the European Parliament on 9 June 2024 the seven candidates 
whose registration had been turned down by Decision No 102.  
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
9 The applicant is of the view that the requirement to pay a deposit laid down in 
Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS, in the amount determined by law, interferes with 
the right of candidates to stand for election. The deposit of EUR 4 100 per 
candidate is so high as to exclude the candidatures of social groups whose 
members strive not towards financial gain but rather, for example, towards 
enhancing the appreciation of the environment and sustainable solutions. This is 
true of the applicant too. The applicant is an active party that stands for serious 
political ideas, but a deposit of this amount prevents it from standing as a 
candidate and is not a suitable means of ensuring the representativeness of 
elections. 
10 In the applicant’s submission, that restriction is not necessary, since other 
effective solutions less restrictive of the right to stand as a candidate could be 
found to avoid frivolous nominations, such as providing for an exemption from 
the deposit under certain conditions or replacing the deposit with requirements to 
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furnish information, a clear programme for the candidature or the obligation to 
provide supporting signatures. 
11 At the time when the action was brought, the deposit at issue amounted to 215% 
of the average Estonian gross monthly wage and was 3.17 times the monthly 
median wage. A deposit of this amount is not moderate but clearly excessive. At 
the same time, the restriction of the right to stand for election that arises from the 
requirement to pay a deposit to stand in elections to the European Parliament is 
significantly greater than that which arises from the requirement to pay a deposit 
to stand in elections to the Riigikogu, since the deposit for elections to the 
European Parliament is significantly higher. In the case of elections to the 
Riigikogu, every person nominated for registration must pay a deposit in the 
amount of the minimum wage fixed by the government in the year in which the 
elections are scheduled. 
12 The applicant considers that the deposit puts the known parties at an advantage, 
since there is no doubt that they will exceed the polling threshold and have their 
deposit returned to them in accordance with Paragraph 77 of the EPVS. The 
amount of the deposit is thus determined by parties that do not in fact have to pay 
it because the deposit they have paid is refunded to them. Those parties have an 
interest in setting the deposit at the highest possible level in order to keep potential 
competitors out of the elections. 
13 The applicant submits that the disproportionality of the deposit at issue is 
demonstrated by a comparison with other States of the European Union in which 
deposits are much lower than those applied in Estonia. In elections to the 
European Parliament, this leads to a difference in the treatment of Estonian parties 
and candidates as compared with parties from other Member States. Since the 
restriction in question is so drastic, it also infringes the right which Estonian 
citizens and other Union citizens enjoy under Article 39 of the Charter to stand as 
candidates in elections to the European Parliament.  
14 In summary, the applicant takes the view that Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS and 
the procedure for registering candidates that is laid down in the EPVS are 
unconstitutional, as they do not allow candidates to be exempted from payment of 
the deposit and do not provide for any alternative ways for candidates to be 
registered other than by payment of a deposit. 
15 The Riigikogu is of the view that the amount of the deposit is moderate. The 
obligation to pay the deposit must be assessed as part of a comprehensive system 
that allows account to be taken of the successful performance of parties and helps 
parties which have not met the polling threshold but have received enough votes 
in elections to the Riigikogu to cover election-related costs using money received 
from the State budget. The fact that the deposit does not constitute an excessive 
restriction on standing for election is also ensured by Paragraph 77 of the EPVS, 
according to which the deposit must be refunded to parties having received at least 
5% of the national vote. 
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16 The Riigikogu takes the view that a party must make its own assessment of the 
risks associated with paying the deposit, and refrain from fielding a full list of 
candidates in an election if it considers that the individuals on its list of candidates 
standing in the election concerned are highly likely not to poll at least 5% of the 
national vote. The fact that the EPVS does not allow candidates to be exempted 
from payment of the deposit does not mean that that law is unconstitutional. It 
would not be appropriate for the National Electoral Committee to have to assess 
what deposit is appropriate in the light of the characteristics of each party. 
17 The Riigikogu is also of the view that the establishment of the deposit and the 
amount thereof falls within the competence of the Member States and is not 
covered by EU law. The establishment of the deposit must, however, take into 
account the principles applicable to elections to the European Parliament which 
are laid down in Article 14(3) TEU. The requirement to pay the deposit laid down 
in Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS is by its nature a restriction of the right to stand 
for election, but this does not mean that that restriction is incompatible with the 
principles of EU electoral law. 
18 The Chancellor of Justice submits that, in EU law, the first paragraph of Article 8 
of the 1976 Electoral Act, which contains the essential rules on elections to the 
European Parliament, lays down the principle as to the absence of harmonisation 
in this field. It therefore falls to be examined whether the provisions of EU law 
extend to a requirement to pay a deposit that restricts the right to stand for 
election. Article 39(1) of the Charter provides for a special fundamental right to 
equality with which the requirement to pay a deposit is consistent – it applies to 
Estonian and Union citizens alike. Article 39(2) of the Charter provides that 
Members of the European Parliament are to be elected by direct universal suffrage 
in a free and secret ballot. The Court of Justice has allowed that provision to be 
relied on even in a ‘purely domestic situation’, that is to say where a person 
wishes to stand as a candidate in the Member State of which he or she is a national 
(see judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:648, ‘the 
judgment in Delvigne, paragraph 44 et seq.). The different language versions of 
the provisions on elections to the European Parliament allow the meaning of those 
provisions to be understood in different ways. While, in the Estonian and German 
texts, the requirement of universality is defined by general reference to the terms 
‘valimised’ and ‘Wahl’, which do not distinguish between the right to vote and the 
right to stand as a candidate, in the English and French versions, the requirement 
of universality is defined by reference to the term ‘suffrage’, which is understood 
first and foremost as the right to vote (see, however, the ‘Electoral Law’ document 
published in 2013 by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe). This 
raises the question as to whether EU law protects the principle of universality in 
relation to the right to stand for election too. 
19 The Chancellor of Justice is of the view that the contested requirement to pay a 
deposit complies with the principle of proportionality and is constitutional. The 
restriction at issue pursues the legitimate aim of reducing the number of lost votes 
and is capable of achieving that aim. As regards whether it is necessary, an 
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alternative solution would be to require the collection of supporting signatures. 
The solution that would best protect the right to stand for election would be to 
give candidates a number of alternative ways of proving their seriousness, given 
that, for some, it may be easier to collect supporting signatures, while, for others, 
it may be easier to pay a deposit. However, the fact that something is desirable 
does not inevitably mean that it is necessary. Account must be taken of the special 
nature of elections to the European Parliament. For example, [in Estonia,] there 
are only seven seats to be allocated and the list submitted must not include more 
than nine candidates. Given the minimum number of members which a party must 
comprise (500), a full list would mean that each member of the party would have 
to pay EUR 73.80. A party is not obliged to submit a full list. The restriction is 
mitigated by the fact that the deposit is refunded if at least 5% of the votes are 
polled. 
20 The Minister for Justice takes the view that the contested provision is compatible 
with the [Estonian] constitution and with EU law. The deposit amount laid down 
in the EPVS – five times the minimum wage – has remained unchanged since that 
law was passed in 2002. In its case-law, the Supreme Court has previously 
considered the deposit for elections to the European Parliament as a constitutional 
restriction of the right to stand for election. 
21 The Minister for Justice notes that, although the right to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament is governed by EU law too, this leaves the 
Member States a broad margin of discretion when it comes to laying down the 
conditions governing the participation of their citizens in elections to that body. 
So it is that not all representatives of the Member States are elected on the basis of 
uniform conditions for standing as a candidate for election to the European 
Parliament, since those conditions are determined by the Member States 
themselves, not least on the basis of their own electoral traditions. The 
establishment of a deposit is compatible with EU law, since the obligation to pay 
that deposit applies to all candidates and draws no distinction between candidates 
who are Estonian nationals and candidates who are nationals of other Member 
States of the European Union. 
22 The National Electoral Committee is of the view that the objective of the deposit 
is in keeping with the principle of electoral universality enshrined in the 
[Estonian] constitution, that the amount of the deposit is moderate and that it has 
not prevented a broad spectrum of parties from submitting their lists for elections 
to the European Parliament. The deposit contributes towards a greater 
representativity of the elected representative body, since it prevents candidates 
from being nominated and standing for election frivolously. In practice, however, 
that objective has not been fully achieved. In elections to the European 
Parliament, there have been independent candidates who, despite having paid the 
deposit, have received only 48 or 55 votes. 
23 In the opinion of the National Electoral Committee, the assessment of whether the 
deposit is moderate cannot be based solely on the amount of the deposit per 
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candidate. A party has various sources of funding for the payment of a deposit, 
including membership fees and donations. The fact that the deposit at issue is 
higher by comparison with that for elections to the Riigikogu is explained by the 
shorter list of candidates and the smaller number of seats to be allocated. The 
amount of the deposit per full list of candidates is 2.7 times lower in elections to 
the European Parliament than in elections to the Riigikogu (compare 9 candidates 
x [5 x EUR 820] with 125 candidates x EUR 820) and cannot therefore be 
regarded as an unreasonable burden for a party. 
24 The National Electoral Committee submits that, since the worldview represented 
by the applicant is ensured by the nomination of two candidates in the elections in 
question, the applicant is not deprived of the right to stand for election. It is 
unlikely that a party with broad support in society will not be able to raise the 
required amount from membership fees and donations. The deposit takes into 
account the average income of members of the public, since its amount is linked 
by law to the monthly minimum wage fixed by the government. According to the 
commercial register, the applicant has 791 members, and, if the deposit of 
EUR 36 900 payable for a full list is divided by the number of members, this gives 
an amount per member of EUR 46.65. 
25 The National Electoral Committee notes that, under EU law, acts in connection 
with the election of Members of the European Parliament, including those relating 
to the nomination of candidates, are governed by the law of the Member States. 
Should the Supreme Court find that the contested provision is unconstitutional, it 
would also be contrary to EU law, since the requirement as to the proportionality 
of a restriction of the right to stand for election arises from the [Estonian] 
constitution, EU law and the ECHR alike. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
26 The case giving rise to the present request for a preliminary ruling concerns the 
amount of the deposit which a party must pay in elections to the European 
Parliament. The Supreme Court will first examine whether the question at issue 
falls within the scope of EU law and then set out the reasons why it considers a 
request for a preliminary ruling to be necessary in this case. 
27 With regard, first, to the scope of EU law, Article 10(1) TEU provides that the 
functioning of the Union is to be founded on the principle of representative 
democracy, which gives effect to the value of democracy referred to in Article 2 
TEU. Informed by the principle of representative democracy, Article 14(3) TEU 
states that the Members of the European Parliament – as an institution of the 
European Union – are to be elected for a term of five years by direct universal 
suffrage in a free and secret ballot (see judgment of the European Court of Justice 
of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C-502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, ‘the judgment 
in Vies’, paragraphs 63 and 64). The principle of representative democracy means, 
inter alia, that the composition of the European Parliament must reflect faithfully 
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and fully the free expression of choices made by the citizens of the European 
Union, by direct universal suffrage (in Estonian: üldistel ja otsestel valimistel; in 
French: au moyen du suffrage universel direct), as regards the persons by whom 
they wish to be represented in a legislative body (judgment in Vies, paragraph 83). 
28 Following the adoption of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
no separate legal act was introduced on the basis of Article 223(1) (see also, 
however, Council Decision [EU, Euratom] 2018/994 of 1[3] July 2018; on the 
plan to reform EU electoral law, including the plan to introduce EU-wide lists of 
candidates, see also European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on 
the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision 
[76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom] and the Act concerning the election of the 
members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that 
Decision [2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP)]). 
29 The principles of electoral law that follow from Article 10(1) and Article 14(3) 
TEU are given specific expression by the 1976 Electoral Act, the first paragraph 
of Article 8 of which provides that, subject to the other provisions of that Act, the 
electoral procedure is to be governed in each Member State by its national 
provisions. The European Court of Justice has held that it follows from the 
combined provisions of Article 223(1) TFEU and Article 8 of the 1976 Electoral 
Act that, as EU law currently stands, the Member States remain competent, in 
principle, to regulate the electoral procedure (judgment in Vies, paragraph 69). 
30 In the view of an Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, however, 
Article 223(1) gives expression to ‘the wish of the primary legislature to make the 
election of the members of the European Parliament a “situation governed by EU 
law” within the meaning of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, albeit not 
exclusively but rather with the participation of the laws of the Member States in 
the context of the uniform procedure established by the Union, or, as the case may 
be, the common principles laid down by it’ (see Opinion of Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón in Delvigne, C-650/13, EU:C:2015:363, point 96; see also point 101 
of that Opinion). 
31 With regard to Article 39(2) of the Charter, the European Court of Justice has held 
that that provision guarantees the right to stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament and the principle of direct universal suffrage in a free and 
secret ballot enshrined in Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral 
Act (judgment in Vies, paragraph 86). At the same time, the European Court of 
Justice emphasised the need to ensure that the right to stand for election is 
effectively guaranteed in accordance with the Charter. 
32 In the judgment in Delvigne, the European Court of Justice, adjudicating in 
response to a request for a preliminary ruling, adopted an interpretation of 
Article 39(2) of the Charter in a situation concerning the compatibility of a 
restriction of the right of a national of a Member State to vote in elections to the 
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European Parliament held in the same Member State, that is to say a situation 
essentially confined to one Member State. In paragraph 32 of that judgment, the 
European Court of Justice held that the Member States are bound by the 
obligation set out in Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act, read in conjunction 
with Article 14(3) TEU, to ensure that the election of Members of the European 
Parliament is by direct universal suffrage and free and secret. In paragraph 33 of 
the same judgment, the European Court of Justice stated that EU law is 
implemented within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter where a Member 
State, in fulfilling its obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the 
1976 Electoral Act, makes provision in national law to the effect that Union 
citizens who were convicted of a criminal offence and whose conviction became 
final before 1 March 1994 are excluded from those entitled to vote in elections to 
the European Parliament. 
33 The Supreme Court understands the aforementioned acts of EU law and the case-
law of the European Court of Justice concerning their application to mean that a 
Member State must be regarded as implementing EU law even where, in 
fulfilment of its obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and the 1976 Electoral Act, it 
lays down in its legislation the requirement to pay a deposit in order to participate 
in elections to the European Parliament. 
34 As regards, secondly, the need for a preliminary ruling, the Supreme Court states 
that – in much the same way as in the circumstances addressed in the judgment in 
Delvigne – the imposition of a requirement to pay a deposit on a candidate 
participating in elections restricts the right to stand for election which that 
candidate enjoys under Article 39(2) of the Charter, in particular from the point of 
view of the guarantee of universal suffrage. Whether or not the deposit is 
refunded, that obligation to pay also restricts, at least for a certain period, the right 
which the person obliged to pay the deposit enjoys under the first sentence of 
Article 17(1) of the Charter to own, use and dispose of his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. 
35 Article 52(1) of the Charter permits limitations on the exercise of rights such as 
those enshrined in Article 39(2) thereof in so far as they are provided for by law, 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of 
proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
A limitation must not call into question the right as such (judgment in Delvigne, 
paragraphs 46 and 48). In the present case, the permissibility of an interference 
with the right to property must be assessed by reference to the same principles as 
also apply to the permissibility of an interference with the right to stand for 
election. 
36 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that the right to free 
elections under Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR also includes elections to 
the European Parliament, since the activities of the European Parliament consist in 
the exercise of legislative power within the meaning of that provision (see 
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[ECtHR], judgments of 18 February 1999, Matthews v. United Kingdom, 
CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002483394, §§ 45 to 54, and of 12 November 2013, 
Occhetto v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2013:1112DEC001450707, § 42). Both the 
subjective right to vote and the right to stand for election arise from Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (see ECtHR, judgment of 11 January 2007, Russian 
Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD005506600, ‘ECtHR, judgment in Russian 
Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs, § 48). Consequently, in order to assess the 
compatibility of the requirement to pay a deposit in elections to the European 
Parliament with EU law, it is also necessary to take into account Article 52(3) of 
the Charter, which provides that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those 
rights are to be the same as those laid down by that Convention. 
37 The ECtHR has taken the view that the failure to refund a paid deposit to a party 
interferes not only with the right under Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR 
but also with the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR 
(ECtHR, judgment in Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs, §§ 91 to 97). 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, that conclusion applies not only to the failure 
to refund the deposit, but also to the requirement to pay the deposit itself. 
38 The requirement to pay a deposit that is laid down in Estonian national law and 
the amount of the deposit payable in elections to the European Parliament follow 
from the aforementioned statute. It also follows from that statute that a candidate 
who fails to pay the deposit and fails to submit proof of payment of the deposit to 
the National Electoral Committee may not be registered for elections to the 
European Parliament. 
39 In the view of the Supreme Court, the obligation to pay a deposit in elections to 
the European Parliament is in itself compatible with EU law. The requirement to 
pay a deposit is intended to discourage frivolous candidatures and to give 
candidates a greater sense of responsibility. Discouraging frivolous candidacies 
reduces the number of lost votes in elections and increases the correlation between 
election results and the actual will of the voters. It thus guarantees the right of 
voters to effective representation and the representativeness of the representative 
body. It also serves, as a secondary objective, to ensure that public resources, such 
as, for example, those needed to cover the costs to the State of holding of 
elections, the costs of reporting on debates in the public media, and so on, are not 
used inappropriately (see also ECtHR, judgment of 28 March 2006, Sukhovetskyy 
v. Ukraine, CE:ECHR:2006:0328JUD001371602, ‘ECtHR, judgment in 
Sukhovetskyy’, §§ 61 and 62). The same legitimate objectives are pursued by the 
restriction to the effect that a deposit is to be refunded to an unsuccessful 
candidate only if that candidate has received a certain percentage of the votes 
(ECtHR, judgment in Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs, § 94). 
40 At the same time, the amount of the deposit must not lead to a disproportionate 
restriction of the right to stand for election. The ECtHR has held that Member 
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States have broad latitude to establish rules on the right to stand for election (see 
ECtHR, judgment in Sukhovetskyy, § 51). However, a deposit in an amount such 
as to constitute an insurmountable barrier for candidates wishing to participate in 
elections is disproportionate. The deposit must certainly not constitute an obstacle 
to the emergence of a sufficiently representative political force or an interference 
with the principle of pluralism (ECtHR, judgment in Sukhovetskyy, §§ 72 and 73). 
41 According to point 1.3(vi) of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters, a deposit required for a candidature in an election must be 
refunded to the candidate once the candidate has received a certain number of 
votes, and neither the amount of the deposit nor the number of votes required for a 
refund must be excessive. 
42 In Estonia, the monthly minimum wage for full-time employment has been 
EUR 820 since 1 January 2024. In elections to the European Parliament in 2024, 
the deposit payable by a candidate is therefore EUR 4 100, and, for a party 
submitting a list with the maximum number of candidates, EUR 36 900. 
According to information from the [Estonian] Statistical Office, the average gross 
monthly wage in Estonia in the fourth quarter of 2023 was EUR 1 904 and the 
median gross wage in the same period was EUR 1 578. The deposit is therefore 
about 2.2 times the [average] gross monthly wage and about 2.6 times the … 
median gross wage. 
43 The deposit is not the only expense which candidates have to bear in elections to 
the European Parliament. Thus, for example, the election campaign costs also 
have to be borne. At the same time, in accordance with the principle of political 
balance, public service broadcasters are obliged to ensure that all parties and 
independent candidates standing in the elections to the European Parliament have 
the same opportunities to explain their positions appropriately and free of charge. 
44 The ability of a party to generate revenue to finance its activities, including 
payment of the deposit, is limited by law. In accordance with Paragraph 121(2) of 
the EKS, a party may receive income only from membership fees paid on the 
basis of the [party’s] articles of association, allocations from the State budget paid 
on the basis of that law, donations by natural persons that meet the conditions laid 
down by law and transactions involving the political party’s assets. So it is that, in 
Estonia, anonymous donations and donations from legal persons, for example, are 
prohibited, and there are also restrictions on borrowing. In accordance with 
Paragraph 12[7] of the EKS, a party which is represented in the Riigikogu or 
which has stood in elections to the Riigikogu and received at least 2% of the votes 
is entitled to receive an allocation from the State budget. Although the applicant 
stood in the elections to the Riigikogu in 2023, it did not poll the minimum 
number of votes required for an allocation from the State budget. 
45 Many other Member States of the European Union do not impose an obligation to 
pay a deposit similar to that in place in Estonia, but employ other measures 
instead (for example, the obligation when submitting a candidature to present a 
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certain number of supporting signatures from eligible voters) (see the European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies: The European elections: EU 
legislation, national provisions and civic participation, Study, p. 17; see also the 
Explanatory Report to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters, point 1.3). By way of comparison with countries which require 
a deposit in elections to the European Parliament, Estonia demands one of the 
highest (for example, in Latvia, the deposit is EUR 8 000 per party list, in Ireland 
EUR 1 800 per party list and in the Netherlands EUR 11 250 per party list). 
46 The EPVS does not provide for any alternative means by which a person wishing 
to stand as a candidate or a political party wishing to submit a list of candidates 
can prove the seriousness of his, her or its intention to stand other than by paying 
a deposit (such as, for example, being able to submit supporting signatures). The 
number of votes which the applicant received in previous elections to the 
European Parliament did not guarantee the election of its candidates. The Estonian 
Green Party received 986 votes in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament 
and 5 824 votes in the 2019 elections. However, this does not support the 
conclusion that the party lacks support in society or that its desire to stand is 
frivolous. That said, in the observations which it submitted to the Supreme Court, 
the National Electoral Commission conceded that the objective served by the 
deposit, of preventing frivolous candidatures, had not been fully achieved. 
47 The Supreme Court also notes that the EKS attaches strict requirements to 
membership of a party and to a party’s activities so as to ensure that it is not a 
frivolously formed association of persons. In order to be registered, a party must 
have a significant actual supporter base in society. 
48 The Supreme Court considers that, in order to give judgment in the present case, it 
requires a ruling from the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of the 
Charter. Neither the wording of the relevant legal acts of the European Union nor 
the previous case-law of the European Court of Justice supports the inference of 
clear conclusions in relation to the present case. Neither does the Court of Justice 
of the European Union have pending before it a reference for a preliminary ruling 
on the question raised here. There is therefore no acte clair or acte éclairé.