Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2025:763
Date: 2025-10-09
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Ireland

summary, they involve circumstances in which the requested person: (a) was 
informed of the date and place of the trial; (b) was defended at trial by a legal 
counsellor to whom he or she had given a mandate; (c) after being served with the 
decision, stated that he or she did not contest it, or did not request a retrial or appeal; 
or (d) may avail of a retrial or appeal procedure which allows the merits of the case to 
be re-examined and for the original decision to be reversed. 
15. Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA makes clear that Article 4a is an optional 
ground for non-recognition and that Member States have the discretion to transpose it 
into national law. Ireland transposed Article 4a into Irish law through section 45 of the 
European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 (“the 2003 Act”). This section states that: 
“A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if he or she did not appear in 
person at the proceedings resulting in the sentence or detention order in respect of 
which the European arrest warrant... was issued, unless... the warrant indicates the 
matters required by points 2, 3 and 4 of point (d) of the form of warrant in the Annex 
to the Framework Decision as amended by Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA... as set out in the table to this section.”3 
16. The table to section 45 of the 2003 Act then sets out in four numbered paragraphs the 
conditions in Article 4a referred to above, where a person tried in absentia can be 
surrendered. The Irish courts have made clear that section 45 of the 2003 Act is an 
implementing measure of EU law which must be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the Framework Decisions.4 For this reason, while section 45 of the 2003 Act 
refers to “the proceedings resulting in the sentence or detention order”, this term is 
equated in Irish law with the term “the trial resulting in the decision”, as used in the 
 
2  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures Between Member States, O.J. L/190. 18th July 2002, as amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA O.J. L/81, 27th March 2009. 
3 Section 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 as amended 
https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2003/act/45/section/45/revised/en/html 
4  See, for example, Minister for Justice v. Lipinski [2017] IESC 26, (Unreported, Supreme Court, 22nd May 
2017) at page 4, para. 3.2. 
 
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Framework Decision. 
17. Section 45 of the Latvian Criminal Law states as follows: 
“(1) Police supervision is an additional sentence, which a court may adjudge as a 
compulsory measure, in order to supervise the behaviour of the person released 
from a place of deprivation of liberty and so that this person may be subjected to 
the limitations prescribed by the police institution. If cases when a person is 
conditionally early released from the sentence serving, the enforcement of the 
additional punishment - police supervision - shall be started as of the moment 
when the supervision of a person after conditional early release has ended. 
(2)  Police supervision shall be imposed only when adjudging a sentence of 
deprivation of liberty in cases set out in the Special Part of this Law, for a term of 
not less than one year and not exceeding three years. 
(3) A court may reduce the term of police supervision, or revoke it, pursuant to 
a submission by the administrative commission of the imprisoning institution or by 
the police institution. 
(4) If a convicted person, while serving the term of an additional sentence, has 
committed a new crime, a court shall substitute deprivation of liberty for the 
unserved additional sentence term and shall determine the final sentence in 
accordance with the provisions provided for in Sections 51 and 52 of this Law. 
(5) If a person, for whom police supervision has been determined by a 
judgment of the court, violates its provisions in bad faith, a court, pursuant to a 
submission from the police institution, may replace the term of an additional 
sentence that has not been served, with the deprivation of liberty, counting two 
police supervision days as one liberty deprivation day.5 
(6) A violation of a police supervision provision is in bad faith if the person has 
been administratively sentenced twice within a one-year period for such 
violation.” 
IV. Consideration of the Questions Referred: 
General Principles Relating to Enforcement Hearings: 
18. The term “trial resulting in the decision” is an autonomous concept of EU law. It must 
be interpreted uniformly throughout the European Union, irrespective of 
 
5  Emphasis added. 
 
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classifications in the Member States.6 In R.Q., the CJEU held that the “trial resulting 
in the decision” must be understood as referring to the proceeding that led to the 
judicial decision which finally sentenced the requested person.7 The decisive factor for 
the purposes of classifying proceedings as falling within the concept of a ‘trial 
resulting in the decision’ is the fact that those proceedings resulted in a judgment 
constituting a final conviction and which, consequently, finally disposes of the case on 
the merits.8 
19. Over the course of several judgments, the CJEU has made clear that a hearing relating 
to the enforcement or execution of a previously-imposed sentence generally does not 
fall within the scope of the “trial resulting in the decision”, save in limited 
circumstances. The CJEU has made clear that a more expansive interpretation would 
“risk undermining the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant mechanism”.9 
20. In Openbaar Ministerie v. Zdziaszek, the CJEU considered whether proceedings 
involving the amendment of a sentence constitute a “trial resulting in the decision”. 10 
The CJEU distinguished between measures which modify the quantum of the penalty 
imposed and those relating to execution of the sentence. The court noted that Article 6 
of the Convention does not apply to questions concerning the methods for executing a 
sentence. Conversely, a person is entitled to be present at proceedings aimed at 
determining an overall sentence which are not a purely formal and arithmetic exercise 
but entail a margin of discretion in the determination of the level of the sentence. On 
that basis, the CJEU held that Article 4a applied to proceedings in which a court 
exercised a level of discretion in handing down a cumulative sentence which led to a 
new determination of the level of custodial sentences imposed previously. 
21. In Ardic, the CJEU considered whether a court hearing dealing with activation of a 
suspended sentence amounts to a “trial resulting in the decision”.11 The requested 
person in that case was sentenced to a custodial sentence. He served a portion of the 
sentence and remainder was suspended. This was in accordance with German law, 
which provided that after a certain portion of the custodial sentence is served and 
additional conditions are met, the remainder of the custodial sentence may be 
conditionally suspended and provisional release granted. The suspension of the 
sentence was later revoked following a court hearing, as the requested person failed to 
comply with certain conditions. The requested person did not appear at the revocation 
hearing. The revocation decision did not modify the quantum of the custodial 
 
6  OpenbaarMinisterie v. Tupikas (Case C-270/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:628) at para. 67; Ardic (Case C-
571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026) at para. 63. 
7  Case C-398/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1031 at para. 29. 
8  Ibid at para. 33. 
9  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026 at para. 87. 
10  Case C-271/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:629. 
11  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026. 
 
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sentence. However, the courts did have a discretion in deciding whether to revoke the 
suspension of the sentence or not, taking into account the personal situation of the 
person concerned. 
22. The CJEU held that Article 4a must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The court noted that the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights established that Article 6 does not apply to 
questions relating to the detailed rules for the execution or application of a custodial 
sentence. The position is different only where a new judicial decision modifies either 
the nature or the quantum of sentence previously imposed. Accordingly, the CJEU 
held that for the purposes of Article 4a, the “trial resulting in the decision” does not 
include a decision relating solely to the execution or application of a custodial 
sentence finally imposed at the conclusion of criminal proceedings, except where the 
purpose or effect of that decision is to affect the finding of guilt or to modify either the 
nature or quantum of that sentence and the authority which adopted it enjoyed some 
discretion in that regard.12  
23. Applying these principles to the facts, the CJEU stated that where a person receives a 
part-suspended sentence subject to certain conditions, the concept of the “trial 
resulting in the decision” must be interpreted as “not including subsequent 
proceedings in which that suspension is revoked on the grounds of infringement of 
those conditions during the probationary period, provided that the revocation decision 
adopted at the end of those proceedings does not change the nature or the level of the 
sentence initially imposed.”13 The CJEU noted that the only effect of a decision 
revoking the suspension of a sentence is that the person concerned must, at most, 
serve the remainder of the sentence initially imposed. The CJEU noted that where the 
suspension is revoked in its entirety, the sentence once again produces all of its effects 
and the determination of the quantum of the sentence still remaining to be served is 
derived from a purely arithmetic operation. 
24. The CJEU further noted that the matter was not affected by the fact that the competent 
court enjoyed a margin of discretion as to whether to require a person to serve, in part 
or in full, the custodial sentence which had been imposed, so long as the discretion did 
not concern the nature or quantum of the sentences imposed. 
25. In L.U. and P.H.14, the requested persons were subject to suspended sentences which 
had been activated following their convictions for further criminal offences. The trials 
leading to those further convictions and the proceedings to revoke the suspension of 
the sentences had taken place in the absence of the respondents. A question arose as to 
whether the proceedings leading to that subsequent conviction and / or the proceedings 
leading to the making of the enforcement order constitute a “trial resulting in the 
 
12  Ibid at paras. 77 and 88. 
13  Ibid at para. 92. 
14  Joined Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:235 
 
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decision”. 
26. The CJEU stated that the first issue for consideration was whether, where the 
suspension of a custodial sentence is revoked on account of a new criminal conviction, 
the decision revoking the suspension or the second criminal conviction constitutes a 
“trial resulting in the decision”. The CJEU stated as follows: 
“[53] ...[A] decision relating to the execution or application of a custodial 
sentence previously imposed does not constitute a ‘decision’, within the meaning of 
Article 4a(1), except where it affects the finding of guilt or where its purpose or 
effect is to modify either the nature or quantum of that sentence and the authority 
which adopted it enjoyed some discretion in that regard. It follows that a decision 
revoking the suspension of a custodial sentence on account of the breach by the 
person concerned of an objective condition attached to that suspension, such as 
the commission of a new offence during the probation period, does not fall within 
the scope of Article 4a(1), since it leaves that sentence unchanged with regard to 
both its nature and its quantum… 
[54] Furthermore, since the authority responsible for deciding on such a 
revocation is not called upon to re-examine the merits of the case that gave rise to 
the criminal conviction, the fact that that authority enjoys a margin of discretion is 
not relevant, as long as that margin of discretion does not allow it to modify either 
the quantum or the nature of the custodial sentence, as determined by the decision 
finally convicting the requested person.” 
27. As part of the references, the referring court queried whether it was relevant that the 
“court that made the enforcement order was obliged to make that order as a matter of 
law or whether it had a discretion to make such an order”.15 The CJEU’s answer to 
that question appears to have been provided at paragraph 54, quoted above. 
28. The CJEU indicated however that there was a difference between “questions relating 
to the detailed rules for execution or application of a sentence” and a “judicial 
decision convicting the person concerned.” 16 It held that if Article 4a(1) was not to be 
rendered largely ineffective, the executing judicial authority must, when assessing 
whether surrender should be refused under that provision, be able to take into account 
not only the possible in absentia proceedings leading to the final conviction for the 
execution of which the European arrest warrant was issued, but also any other in 
absentia proceedings leading to a criminal conviction without which such a warrant 
could not have been issued.17 
 
15  Ibid at para. 34. 
16  Ibid at para. 59. 
17  Ibid at para. 65. 
 
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29. Accordingly, the CJEU concluded as follows in respect of the first issue: 
“[67] It follows that a judicial decision which convicted, in absentia, the requested 
person must be regarded as being a ‘decision’ within the meaning of Article 4a(1) 
of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Articles 47 and 48 of the 
Charter, where its adoption was decisive for the issue of the European arrest 
warrant. 
[68] It follows from all of the foregoing that Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 
2002/584, read in the light of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, must be 
interpreted as meaning that, where the suspension of a custodial sentence is 
revoked, on account of a new criminal conviction, and a European arrest warrant, 
for the purpose of executing that sentence, is issued, that criminal conviction, 
handed down in absentia, constitutes a ‘decision’ within the meaning of that 
provision. That is not the case for the decision revoking the suspension of that 
sentence.” 
30. The CJEU held that it followed that “the criminal conviction handed down in absentia 
and without which the suspension of the custodial sentence for the execution of which 
the European arrest warrant was issued would not have been revoked is part of the 
‘trial resulting in the decision’”.18 
31. The CJEU went on to consider whether it was permissible for the executing judicial 
authority to refuse to surrender the requested person on the basis that the proceedings 
resulting in the revocation of the suspension of the sentence and / or the proceedings 
resulting in a second criminal conviction of that person which was decisive for the 
issue of that warrant were conducted in absentia and in a manner which affected the 
requested person’s fair trial rights under the Charter. 
32. The CJEU held that Article 4a(1) had to be interpreted as authorising the executing 
judicial authority to refuse to surrender the requested person to the issuing Member 
State where it is apparent that the proceedings resulting in a second criminal 
conviction of that person, which was decisive for the issue of the European arrest 
warrant, took place in absentia, unless the European arrest warrant contains, in respect 
of those proceedings, one of the statements referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of 
that provision.19 
33. However, the CJEU held that the Framework Decision must be interpreted as 
precluding the executing judicial authority from refusing to surrender the requested 
person to the issuing Member State on the ground that the proceedings resulting in the 
 
18  Ibid at para. 70. 
19  Ibid at para. 92. 
 
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revocation of the suspension of the custodial sentence for the execution of which the 
European arrest warrant was issued took place in absentia.20 On this point, the CJEU 
stated as follows: 
“[83] ,..[T]he decision revoking the suspension of the custodial sentence for the 
execution of which the European arrest warrant was issued does not fall within the 
scope of Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584, with the result that the fact 
that that decision was adopted in absentia cannot justify the refusal of an 
executing judicial authority to surrender the requested person. 
[84] Furthermore, since that fact does not constitute one of the mandatory or 
optional grounds for non-execution listed in Articles 3 and 4 of that framework 
decision, those provisions cannot form the basis for such a refusal either. 
[...] 
[89] Given that Framework Decision 2002/584 lists exhaustively the grounds for 
refusing to execute a European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 
January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C 158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 73), 
that framework decision therefore precludes an executing judicial authority from 
refusing to surrender a person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant for 
the purpose of executing a custodial sentence on the ground that the suspension of 
that sentence has been revoked by a decision rendered in absentia.” 
34. For completeness, it is noted that the CJEU recently applied these principles in 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin  21 , holding that a judgment imposing a cumulative 
sentence amounts to a trial resulting in the decision where the court had a margin of 
discretion in the determination of the level of that cumulative sentence. 
The Questions Asked: 
35. The questions asked by the referring court seek to determine whether the hearing 
before Zemgale District Court amounted to the “trial resulting in the decision”. It is 
clear that this hearing related to the enforcement or execution of the sentence of police 
supervision. Therefore, the principles set out in Ardic22 and L.U. and P.H.23 must be 
applied in answering the questions which have been referred. 
36. The judgments in those preliminary rulings make clear that for the purposes of Article 
4a, the “trial resulting in the decision” does not include a decision relating solely to 
the execution or application of a custodial sentence finally imposed at the conclusion 
of criminal proceedings. The only exception is where that decision “affects the finding 
 
20  Ibid at para. 92. 
21  Case C-396//22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1029 
22  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026. 
23  Joined Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:235. 
 
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of guilt or where its purpose or effect is to modify either the nature or quantum of that 
sentence and the authority which adopted it enjoyed some discretion in that regard1” 
[emphasis added].24 
37. Therefore, it is necessary to ask whether: (a) the purpose and effect of the decision of 
Zemgale District Court was to modify either the nature or quantum of the sentence of 
police supervision imposed on the respondent; and (b) if so, whether the court 
“enjoyed some discretion in that regard”. While these two issues are captured in the 
questions posed by the referring court, it is respectfully submitted that the logical 
starting point is consideration of question 2, which relates to the purpose and effect of 
the decision by Zemgale District Court. 
Observations on Question 2: 
38. In this question, the referring court asks whether the decision to convert police 
supervision into a custodial sentence had the purpose or effect of modifying the nature 
and / or quantum of the sentence of police supervision. 
39. When the original sentence of police supervision was imposed on the respondent in 
2015, its terms were clear. The relevant provisions of Latvian law provided that the 
sentence of police supervision could lead to the imprisonment of the respondent if he 
failed to comply with conditions or committed further offences. In this way, the 
possibility of imprisonment was pre-fixed or integrated into the sentence. Further, the 
maximum length of the imprisonment was fixed by the original decision of the 
sentencing court in 2015. While the actual prison sentence to be served would depend 
on how much of the period of police supervision had elapsed, it was tied through a 
fixed statutory mathematical calculation to the length of the police supervision 
sentence originally set by the sentencing court. 
40. The decision of Zemgale District Court in August 2020 activated or executed the 
custodial element which was already inherent in the police supervision sentence. The 
length of the sentence was determined through a mathematical calculation set down by 
law with reference to the original length of the sentence. For these reasons, the 
decision of Zemgale District Court cannot be seen as a new judicial decision which 
modified the nature or quantum of the sentence that had been originally imposed on 
the respondent in 2015. 
41. The referring court agreed with this analysis. It is submitted that the reasons it gave in 
this regard are persuasive. The Supreme Court held that the “terms and parameters of 
the deprivation of liberty that followed a breach were clear and ascertainable and did 
not involve a new decision or a variation in terms of the nature or quantum of the 
original sentence ”.25 The court further held that: 
 
24  Ibid at para. 53. See also Ardic (Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026) at paras. 77 and 88. 
25  Judgment of the Supreme Court, page 36, para. 72. S:AP:IE:2022:000116; [2023] IESC 37 
 
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“What is clear from the information provided by the Latvian authorities in this 
case is that the period of three years’ police supervision commenced from the 
moment the serving of the period of four years and nine months had been 
completed. Thereafter, in the event of a breach, an arithmetic calculation is used 
to determine the period of any deprivation of liberty that will follow from a breach 
of the police supervision. It appears, to use the language used by the CJEU, that 
no new judicial decision is made in relation to the quantum of sentence to be 
served, as the maximum period involved has already been decided by the District 
Court in Zemgale. Neither the nature nor the quantum of the sentence is varied, 
save and in accordance with the provisions of Latvian law, as previously 
described. No additional terms are imposed and no additional period of time is 
added to that which was already provided for in the original court decision of 
2015." 26 
42. The Latvian sentence of police supervision is not an immediate custodial sentence. 
However, it can be seen as the functional equivalent of a suspended sentence, as that 
concept exists in other jurisdictions. It is an “additional sentence” which requires the 
convicted person to comply with certain conditions. The Latvian law provides that 
police supervision can be breached where the convicted person commits a new crime 
during the period of supervision or violates the conditions of supervision in bad faith. 
The law provides in either case for the imposition of a custodial sentence in default. 
The length of this sentence is fixed under law and easily calculable. This is identical to 
how a suspended sentence - as exists in other jurisdictions - functions. In both cases, a 
person subject to a suspended sentence or a police supervision period retains their 
liberty upon certain conditions. Failure to comply with such conditions results in the 
potential execution of a custodial sentence. 
43. Seen from this perspective, the hearing in Zemgale District Court on 19th August 2020 
was the equivalent of an enforcement hearing involving revocation of suspension for 
breach of conditions. It is clear from L.U. and P.H. that “a decision revoking the 
suspension of a custodial sentence on account of the breach by the person concerned 
of an objective condition attached to that suspension, such as the commission of a new 
offence during the probation period, does not fall within the scope of Article 4a(1), 
since it leaves that sentence unchanged with regard to both its nature and its 
quantum." 27 Similar comments were made in Ardic. 28 The same conclusion should 
apply in the case of the sentence of police supervision under consideration in these 
proceedings. To hold otherwise would be a triumph of form over substance. The 
enforcement or execution hearing simply gives effect to the dormant custodial 
sentence which was attached to the sentence and could be activated under law for 
defaulting on conditions.  
 
26  Ibid at p. 33, para. 68. 
27  Joined Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:235 at para. 53. 
28  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026 at para. 83. 
 
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44. Again, the referring court appeared to agree with this analysis, holding that “this Court 
is inclined to the view that the procedure in Latvia is akin to the procedure elsewhere 
when a suspended sentence is reactivated.”29 It is submitted that this is determinative 
of the question as to whether the hearing at Zemgale District Court was a “trial 
resulting in the decision”. It was a hearing relating to the enforcement or execution of 
a sentence which was akin to a suspended sentence. It did not have the result of 
modifying the nature or quantum of the original sentence imposed in 2015. Therefore, 
in accordance with the principles in Ardic and L.U. and P.H., it was not a “trial 
resulting in the decision”. 
45. However, in the event that this Honourable Court is of the view that the decision did 
modify the nature or quantum of the sentence, it is necessary to go on to consider 
whether the court had a discretion in doing so. This is the subject matter of the first 
question by the referring court, which is considered below. 
Observations on Question 1: 
46. In relation to this question, the referring court focuses on the fact that Zemgale District 
Court had discretion as to whether to accede to the application to convert police 
supervision into a custodial sentence in light of the breaches that had taken place and 
asks whether this means that the decision of the court amounted to a “trial resulting in 
the decision”. 
47. As set out in Ardic and L. U., an execution or enforcement hearing only amounts to a 
“trial resulting in the decision” where the court decision modifies either the nature or 
quantum of the original sentence, and “the authority which adopted it enjoyed some 
discretion in that regard”. The discretion must relate to the ability to modify the 
nature or quantum of the original sentence. In other words, for the enforcement 
hearing to amount to a “trial resulting in the decision”, the court dealing with the 
execution or enforcement hearing must have had some level of volition over the type 
of penalty or duration of the penalty it would impose. 
48. The fact that a court simply has discretion as to whether to order the enforcement of 
the sentence or not is irrelevant to this analysis. In Ardic, the CJEU made clear that it 
is immaterial that the court enjoyed discretion in deciding whether the suspension of a 
sentence should be revoked and, if so, whether a person was required to fully or partly 
serve the custodial sentence. This does not amount to a discretion over the “nature or 
quantum of that sentence”. Considering the revocation decisions at issue in Ardic, the 
CJEU stated that: 
“...[U]nder the relevant national rules, the competent court only had to determine 
if such a circumstance justified requiring the convicted person to serve, in part or 
in full, the custodial sentences that had been initially imposed and the execution of 
which, subsequently, had been partially suspended. As the Advocate General 
pointed out in point 71 of his Opinion, while that court enjoyed a margin of 
 
29  Judgment of the Supreme Court, page 47, para. 88. S:AP:IE:2022:000116; [2023] IESC 37 
 
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discretion in that regard, that margin did not concern the level or the nature of the 
sentences imposed on the person concerned, but only whether the suspensions 
should be revoked or could be maintained, with additional conditions if 
necessary.”30 
49. Further, in L.U. and P.H., the CJEU stated that: 
“Furthermore, since the authority responsible for deciding on such a revocation is 
not called upon to re-examine the merits of the case that gave rise to the criminal 
conviction, the fact that that authority enjoys a margin of discretion is not relevant, 
as long as that margin of discretion does not allow it to modify either the quantum 
or the nature of the custodial sentence, as determined by the decision finally 
convicting the requested person.”31 
50. It is submitted that if the term “trial resulting in the decision” were interpreted as 
including any enforcement-type hearing where the court had discretion as to whether 
to order enforcement or not, this would risk undermining the efficacy of the European 
Arrest Warrant mechanism. As noted by the CJEU in Ardic, this is an important 
reason for interpreting that term in a limited fashion.32 
51. In the present case, Zemgale District Court had a discretion as to whether to accede to 
the application that was brought before it under s. 45(5), for police supervision to be 
replaced with a deprivation of liberty. However, the true and proper question is 
whether it had discretion regarding the nature or quantum of the sentence to be 
imposed if it acceded to the application. 
52. If the court chose to accede to the application, it had no discretion as to the type of 
penalty it would impose or the quantum of that penalty. Instead, it would be obliged to 
impose the penalty of a deprivation of liberty, based on the fixed statutory ratio of one 
liberty deprivation day to every two outstanding police supervision days. The court 
was not free to choose any other type of punishment or to freely decide the level of 
punishment (whether at a higher or lower level). To do so, would contravene the strict 
statutory arithmetic by which the unserved police supervision period was converted 
into a custodial sentence. Further, the court was not called on to re-examine the merits 
of the case that gave rise to the criminal conviction. It was simply deciding whether to 
enforce the custodial element inherent in the police supervision sentence or not, based 
on the breaches of conditions that had occurred. 
53. It is submitted that, in those circumstances, Zemgale District Court could not be 
considered to be exercising the sort of discretion to modify the nature or quantum of 
the original sentence that would bring the hearing within the scope of the “trial 
 
30  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026 at para. 80. 
31  Joined Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:235 at para. 54. 
32  Case C-571/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1026 at para. 87. 
 
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resulting in the decision”. As was the case with the German court Ardic, it is 
submitted that the discretion of Zemgale District Court as to whether to accede to an 
application to enforce the sentence or not ought not be equated with discretion as to 
the nature and level of the penalty to be imposed if it did so accede. 
V. Proposed Answers to the Questions Referred: 
54. The Minister for Justice and Ireland propose the following answers to the questions 
referred for preliminary ruling: 
In response to the First Question, the fact that a court has discretion to impose a 
custodial sentence or not on a person (in circumstances where that person violated the 
terms of a sentence of police supervision previously imposed on such person) does not 
mean that such decision constitutes a “trial resulting in the decision’” for the purpose 
of Article 4a(1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA given that such a 
court had no discretion to change the nature or the level of the sentence initially 
imposed. 
In response to the Second Question, the decision to convert the sentence of police 
supervision into a custodial sentence, in the circumstances set out in (1) above, did not 
have the purpose or effect of modifying the nature and/or quantum of the sentence of 
police supervision previously imposed on the requested person. 
Counsel for the Minister for Justice and Ireland: Glen Gibbons SC 
David Perry BL 
Signed: Ciara McMahon 
Agent for the Minister for Justice and Ireland 
On behalf of Maria Browne, Chief State Solicitor and Principal Agent 
Signed: Aoife Burke 
Agent for the Minister for Justice and Ireland 
On behalf of Maria Browne, Chief State Solicitor and Principal Agent 
Signed: Tony Joyce 
Agent for the Minister for Justice and Ireland 
On behalf of Maria Browne, Chief State Solicitor and Principal Agent 
Dated: 4th day of April 2024