Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:320
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: Polish

Summary C-254/25 – 1 
Case C-254/25 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
4 April 2025 
Referring court: 
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gliwicach (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
2 April 2025 
Applicant: 
A.A. 
Defendant: 
Wojewoda Śląski 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
The subject matter of the main proceedings is an action brought by A.A. against 
the inaction of the Wojewoda Śląski (Provincial Governor of Silesia, Poland) in 
connection with a temporary residence permit. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) essentially concern 
the interpretation of Articles 2, 4 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), 
Articles 10, 18 and 67 TFEU and Articles 20, 21, 41, 47, 51 and 52 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in conjunction with 
Article 34(1) and (3) of Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, 
pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast) (OJ 2016 
L 132, p. 21) (‘Directive 2016/801’). 
EN 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Do the Treaty principles of: 
(a) the rule of law and respect for human rights (Articles 2 and 6(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union; consolidated version, OJ 2016 C 202, p. 13 et seq.; 
‘TEU’); 
(b) proportionality (Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union; OJ 2007 C 303, p. 1 et seq., as amended (‘the Charter’), in 
conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, and in conjunction with Article 6(1) TEU); 
(c) the primacy of EU law and its effectiveness (Article 4(3) TEU); and 
(d) the ‘right to good administration’ (regarded as a principle of the European 
Union – Article 41(1) to (4) of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) 
thereof, Article 6(1) TEU and stemming from case-law of the Court of Justice) 
preclude 
– the prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion under national law, on 
organisational or economic grounds, of the right of foreign nationals (third-
country nationals) to seek an effective remedy against the failure of public 
authorities to act (reminders, actions for a declaration of failure to act or undue 
delay), inter alia in the context of the requirements laid down in Article 34(1) and 
(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast) (OJ 2016 L 132, p. 21 et 
seq., as amended)?; 
2. Must the prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion under national law of 
the possibility for foreign nationals – third-country nationals – to seek an effective 
remedy against the failure of public authorities to act, as outlined in paragraph 1, 
and the exclusion of the possibility for a national administrative court to award an 
adequate sum of money as compensation for the infringement of the right to 
action by the authorities without undue delay and the exclusion of the possibility 
of ordering the adoption of an administrative act within a time limit set by the 
court, where Polish nationals are not deprived of those rights in the context of 
their administrative procedures, be interpreted as: 
(a) not meeting the requirements of the general interest and unduly restricting 
the sphere of fundamental rights of the European Union (Article 2 TEU; 
Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, in conjunction with Article 52(1) to (3) of the Charter); 
(b) discriminating against foreign nationals – third-country nationals (Article 2 
TEU, Articles 10 and 18 TFEU and Articles 20 and 21(1) and (2) of the Charter); 
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(c) contrary to the principle of justice (Article 2 TEU); 
(d) hindering genuine, effective access to justice (Article 2 TEU, Article 67(4) 
TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof)? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Treaty on European Union: Articles 2, 4(3) and 6(1) and (3); 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Articles 10, 18, 67(4), 197 and 
267; 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Articles 20, 21(1) and (2), 
41(1) to (4), 47, 51(1) and 52(1) to (3); 
Directive 2016/801: recitals 3, 14, 21 and 30 and Article 34; 
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98); 
Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2009 L 168, p. 24) 
(‘Directive 2009/52’): recitals 9 and 12; 
Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-
country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a 
common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State 
(OJ 2011 L 343, p. 1) (‘Directive 2011/98’): Article 5(2). 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Dz.U. No 78, item 483, as 
subsequently amended): Articles 9 and 91(3); 
Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z 
konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa (Law of 12 March 2022 on 
assistance to nationals of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict in the 
territory of that State) (consolidated version, Dz.U. of 2025, item 337; ‘the Law 
on assistance to Ukrainian nationals’): Articles 100c and 100d; 
Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach (Law of 12 December 2013 on 
foreign nationals) (consolidated version, Dz.U. of 2024, item 769, as subsequently 
amended; ‘the Law on foreign nationals’): Articles 3 and 112a; 
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Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. – Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego 
(Law of 14 June 1960 establishing the Code of Administrative Procedure 
(consolidated version, Dz.U. of 2024, item 572, as subsequently amended; ‘the 
Code of Administrative Procedure’): Articles 35(1) and 37; 
Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 2002 r. – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami 
administracyjnymi (Law of 30 August 2002 on the code of procedure before the 
administrative courts) (consolidated version, Dz.U. of 2024, item 935, as 
subsequently amended; ‘the Code of Procedure’): Articles 53(2b), 149(1), (1a), 
(1b) (2) and 153. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 17 April 2024, A.A., a […] national (‘the applicant’), submitted to the 
Wojewoda Śląski (Provincial Governor of Silesia) an application for a temporary 
residence permit. It is apparent from that application that the main purpose of the 
applicant’s residence in the territory of the Republic of Poland is to study. He 
attached to the application documents from the University of K., including 
confirmation of payment of the requisite tuition fee. 
2 On account of the failure to handle the matter in time and the inaction of the 
Provincial Governor of Silesia, the applicant filed a reminder on 25 October 2024. 
3 On 22 November 2024, the applicant, acting through an agent, brought before the 
referring court an action for a declaration of failure to act against the Provincial 
Governor of Silesia on the ground that the time limit for handling the matter in the 
administrative procedure for granting a temporary residence permit had been 
grossly exceeded. 
4 The application requested that the administrative authority be ordered to adopt the 
relevant administrative act within fourteen days of the file being delivered to the 
authority, and that the applicant be awarded a sum of money by the authority, or 
alternatively that the authority be fined the maximum amount laid down in the 
Code of Procedure. 
5 In response to the action, the Provincial Governor of Silesia requested that it be 
dismissed. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
6 The applicant alleges that the time limit for dealing with the matter in the 
administrative procedure for granting a temporary residence permit has been 
grossly exceeded. 
7 The Provincial Governor of Silesia argues that the allegation of inaction made by 
the applicant is unfounded. He argues that in the Law on assistance to Ukrainian 
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nationals, the legislature has laid down, in Article 100d, exceptions to the time 
limits for handling matters, stipulating, inter alia, that in the period until 
30 September 2025, the time periods for handling matters in administrative 
procedures concerning foreign nationals conducted by the Governor are not to 
start running, and those that have started to run are to be suspended for that 
period. He states that the suspension of those time limits is justified by the 
successive increases in the number of applications for residence permits in 
connection with the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine on 
24 February 2022. For several years, the Governor has been receiving a huge, 
steadily increasing number of residence applications, resulting in a significant 
increase in the workload of individual staff members. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
8 The referring court emphasises at the outset that it is a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU and that the questions 
which it refers are admissible. 
9 It points out that the Law on foreign nationals applicable to the dispute is a legal 
act which implements a number of European Union directives, including Directive 
2016/801. In that regard, it refers to recitals 3, 14, 21 and 30 of that directive and 
in particular Article 34(1) and (3) thereof. It also cites recitals 9 and 12 of 
Directive 2009/52 and Article 5(2) of Directive 2011/98. 
10 On the basis of those provisions, it concludes that the administrative procedure for 
granting a temporary residence permit to a third-country national is an EU matter 
and not merely a national one. That means that national authorities and courts 
must also comply with the provisions of the Charter and with EU principles. 
11 At the same time, it notes that, as is clear from the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, situations cannot exist which are covered by EU law without fundamental 
rights being applicable (judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 February 2013, 
C-617/10, Fransson, paragraph 21). Measures which are irreconcilable with 
fundamental rights are inadmissible under EU law by virtue of respect for the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law with regard to the level of protection 
of fundamental rights, which cannot vary according to the national law involved 
(judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 March 2014, C-206/13, Cruciano Siragusa 
v Regione Siciliana, paragraphs 31 and 32, and of 26 February 2013, C-399/11, 
Melloni, paragraph 60). 
12 The referring court then analyses the provisions of Polish law applicable to the 
case. It notes that, under the provisions analysed, administrative courts administer 
justice by monitoring the activities of the public administration. That monitoring 
is carried out with regard to legality, unless otherwise provided by law. It 
includes, inter alia, adjudication in actions for a declaration of failure to act or 
undue delay in procedures conducted by authorities in the cases set out in the 
relevant provisions of the Code of Procedure. 
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13 For an action to be admissible, all remedies must have been exhausted. In the case 
of an action for a declaration of failure to act or undue delay in procedures, it is 
necessary to file a reminder pursuant to Article 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Under Article 37(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party has the right to file a 
reminder if: (1) the matter has not been dealt with within the time limit laid down 
in Article 35 or in special provisions, or within the time limit stated pursuant to 
Article 36(1) (failure to act); (2) the procedures are conducted for longer than it is 
necessary to deal with the matter (undue delay). 
14 In the view of the referring court, the requirement for filing a reminder was met in 
the present case, so that it is able to examine the case on its merits, taking into 
account not only provisions of national law but also those of international law, 
including EU law. It must have regard to the content of Article 149(1) of the Code 
of Procedure, in the light of which the court, in granting an action for a declaration 
of failure to act or undue delay in procedures by the authorities in the matters 
referred to in the Code of Procedure is to: (1) require the authority concerned to 
adopt an act or an interpretation or to perform an act within a specified time limit; 
(2) require the authority concerned to ascertain or recognise an entitlement or 
obligation arising from the provisions of law; (3) find that the authority has failed 
to act or has unduly delayed procedures. 
15 However, Article 100c(1) of the Law on assistance to Ukrainian nationals 
provides that in the period until 31 December 2022, the time periods for dealing 
with the matters stated therein (concerning, inter alia, the granting of a temporary 
residence permit to a foreign national) in procedures conducted by a governor are 
not to start running, and those that have started to run are to be suspended for that 
period. During that period, the provisions on the inaction of an authority, and the 
obligation of the authority conducting the procedures in the cases referred to in 
paragraph 1 to notify a party or a participant in the procedures that the matter has 
not been dealt with within the time limit, are to be disapplied (Article 100c(3)(1)). 
The authority conducting the procedure in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 is 
not to be fined or ordered to pay sums of money to the applicants for failing to 
adopt decisions within the time limits prescribed by law (Article 100c(3)(2)). In 
addition, the cessation of action by the authority conducting the procedure in the 
cases referred to in paragraph 1, or their delayed performance, within the period 
referred to in paragraph 1, may not form the basis for remedies concerning failure 
to act, undue delay or infringement of a party’s right to have their case heard 
without undue delay (Article 100c(4)). 
16 As of 1 January 2023, the legislature added Article 100d to the Law on assistance 
to Ukrainian nationals, which, repeating the content of Article 100c, extended its 
validity until 24 August 2023. Following the amendment of Article 100d(1) of the 
law in question, that period was extended again to 4 March 2024, then to 30 June 
2024, and most recently to 30 September 2025. The draft legislative amendments 
do not state any detailed grounds for the need to extend those periods and do not 
address the question of the admissibility of such a legislative procedure in the 
context of the requirements of EU law. 
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17 The referring court points out that the Law on assistance to Ukrainian nationals, 
by laying down the rules for legalising the residence of Ukrainian nationals who 
came to the territory of the Republic of Poland from the territory of Ukraine in 
connection with the hostilities conducted on the territory of that country and of 
Ukrainian nationals holding a Karta Polaka (Polish card) who, together with their 
immediate family, came to the territory of the Republic of Poland because of those 
hostilities (Article 1(1)), gives rise to discrepancies in case-law as the legislature 
uses the separate concepts of ‘Ukrainian national’ and ‘foreign national’ in the 
text of that law. The former is defined in Article 1(2) of that law, whilst under 
Article 3(2) of the Law on foreign nationals, a foreign national is anyone who 
does not hold Polish nationality. 
18 For that reason, the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative 
Court) has, in a number of judgments, taken the position that the inclusion of 
‘foreign nationals’ within the scope of Article 100c(1) of the Law on assistance to 
Ukrainian nationals is evidence of the legislature’s intention for all foreign 
nationals to be covered by that provision, regardless of their nationality and the 
date of their arrival in the territory of the Republic of Poland. The rules in 
question apply to any foreign national within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 
Law on foreign nationals who initiates one of the procedures (granting, amending, 
revoking of a permit) listed in Articles 100c(1) and 100d(1) of that law. In other 
words, in the view of the Supreme Administrative Court, Articles 100c and 100d 
of that law constitute general solutions concerning all foreign nationals – 
irrespective of their nationality, and not only those whose residence in Poland 
results from the war in Ukraine. 
19 As regards the right to good administration, the referring court notes that an 
element of that right, which is a principle of EU law in the light of the case-law of 
the Court of Justice, is the obligation to act efficiently. It is also laid down in 
Article 41 of the Charter. 
20 Article 41(1) to (4) of the Charter contains a list of rights which together 
constitute the right to good administration. Although that list does not mention the 
possibility of seeking an effective remedy against the failure of the public 
authorities to act, it is difficult to imagine the right to good administration being 
exercised without such a right of a participant in an administrative procedure. 
Although Article 47 of the Charter only mentions the right to an effective remedy 
before a tribunal, it would appear that the possibility of seeking an effective 
remedy from a higher-level public authority should be regarded as one of the 
elements of the right to good administration. 
21 Although the Court of Justice accepts in its case-law that it is clear from the 
wording of Article 41 of the Charter that it is addressed not to the Member States 
but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union 
(see judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2011, Cicala, C-482/10, 
paragraph 28), the right to good administration reflects a general principle of EU 
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law (judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2014, H.N., C-604/12, 
paragraph 49). 
22 In the judgment of 8 May 2014, H.N., C-604/12 (paragraph 50), it was pointed 
out, inter alia, that when a Member State implements Union law, the requirements 
pertaining to the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the 
Charter and constituting a general principle of EU law, are applicable, including 
the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a 
reasonable period of time. Consequently, a ‘Member State must comply with the 
general principle of EU law relating to good administration’ (judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 5 December 2023, C-128/22, Nordic Info BV v Belgische Staat, 
paragraph 69). 
23 The referring court therefore requests an interpretation of that general principle. 
24 The referring court goes on to refer to Article 13 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 
4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), under which everyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated must have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
25 According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the remedy 
required by Article 13 ECHR must be ‘effective’ both in practice and in law. That 
does not necessarily have to be violations committed by a judicial authority, but 
also by other State authorities (ECtHR judgment of 26 October 2000, Case 
No 30210/96 Kudła v. Poland, paragraph 157). 
26 The referring court notes that, on the one hand, the Polish legislature introduced 
remedies to counteract the failure of the authorities to act (a reminder, actions for 
a declaration of failure to act or undue delay), while, on the other hand, there has 
been a systemic, statutory suspension of the possibility for foreign nationals to 
avail themselves of those remedies, which has made that right illusory and 
ineffective. Whilst in the emergency situation that arose immediately after the 
outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, such a situation was temporarily tolerated by 
some adjudicating panels in the administrative courts, on account of the number of 
cases that suddenly had to be considered by the authorities, that state of affairs 
should not be accepted in the long term, especially by the legislature. 
27 The referring court therefore took the view in its judgments that, in view of the 
binding provisions of international law, including those contained in the ECHR 
and EU law, the interpretation of exceptions, such as the provisions of the Law on 
assistance to Ukrainian nationals, suspending the time limits for handling cases, 
should not be extended to persons other than those directly affected by that law. It 
also pointed out in those judgments that the interpretation of the provisions should 
lean towards ensuring human rights and freedoms and not restricting them on the 
basis of Article 100d(1), (3) and (4) of the Law on assistance to Ukrainian 
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nationals. Those provisions – in the view of the referring court – are contrary to 
the requirements of the ECHR and the EU principle of the right to good 
administration. 
28 The referring court noted in its judgment that even if the view were to be taken 
that ‘foreign national’ within the meaning of the Law on assistance to Ukrainian 
nationals includes all foreign nationals (and not only Ukrainian nationals), the 
obligation to give precedence to international law over national law would still 
have to be fulfilled. It also took the view expressed in case-law that the staffing 
difficulties of a public authority or a significant influx of cases do not justify 
conducting procedures in an inefficient manner. 
29 However, the Supreme Administrative Court did not share the view that the Law 
on assistance to Ukrainian nationals was contrary to Article 13 of the ECHR and 
the principles of EU law. The Supreme Administrative Court noted that the 
extension of the validity of Article 100d of the Law on assistance to Ukrainian 
nationals is correlated with the extension by the Council of the European Union of 
the temporary protection granted to displaced persons from Ukraine referred to in 
Article 2 of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 
establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine and 
having the effect of introducing temporary protection. That court also referred to 
Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2409 of 19 October 2023, which 
extended temporary protection until 4 March 2025. 
30 The referring court notes, however, that, according to recital 9 of Council 
Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2409, that decision respects the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter. Consequently, the 
reference by the Supreme Administrative Court to that decision in support of 
limiting fundamental rights (rather than guaranteeing them) appears to contradict 
the purpose of the decision itself and demonstrates a profound discrepancy in the 
interpretation of the provisions of national and international law, including the 
ECHR and EU rules, to the detriment of foreign nationals – third-country 
nationals under the protection of the European Union. 
31 In its further considerations, the referring court examines the ineffectiveness of the 
remedies under national law, the existence of discrimination, and the failure to 
observe the principles of proportionality, effectiveness and the primacy of EU 
law. 
32 Under Article 67(4) TFEU, the Union is to facilitate access to justice, whereas the 
legal norms derived from Article 100c (3) and (4) and Article 100d (3) and (4) of 
the Law on assistance to Ukrainian nationals render that access merely formal and 
illusory (ineffective). Having regard to the wording of those provisions and the 
case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, the referring court cannot grant a 
sum of money to a foreign national under Article 149(1) and (2) of the Law on 
assistance to Ukrainian nationals on account of an authority’s inaction and order 
the authority to adopt an administrative act, resolving the issue as to the substance, 
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within a specified time limit. That means that the Polish legislature has excluded 
in national law the responsibility of the Republic of Poland for failure to comply 
with the requirements of EU law and the ECHR. 
33 Polish nationals, meanwhile, are not, in their administrative cases (including those 
conducted by governors), deprived of the above rights and may file both 
reminders and actions for a declaration of failure to act or undue delay in 
procedures. The administrative court, in turn, may, in their cases, award them an 
adequate sum of money under Article 149(1) and (2) of the Code of Procedure for 
the failure of the authority to act, and may also order it to adopt an administrative 
act within a certain time limit. 
34 The referring court notes that the relevant provisions, including provisions of EU 
law (and principles of EU law), are therefore not interpreted uniformly by national 
courts, which negatively affects the Treaty principle of sincere cooperation, 
primacy of EU law and effectiveness (Article 4(3) TEU), which require identical 
interpretation and application of EU rules in all Member States of the EU (all the 
more so as fundamental rights are at issue). 
35 That kind of divergent interpretation leads, in fact, to a situation where, in various 
cases of the same type, the governor only uses general statements about the case 
load, without demonstrating in detail the situation, the number of applications, the 
possibility of handling cases, for example on a monthly/yearly basis per 
employee, etc., and the foreign national – third-country national – cannot 
effectively react to the failure of the authority to act. Adopting the governor’s 
position, any failure to act (also caused by human factors) would be justified only 
because the authority relies on the Law on assistance to Ukrainian nationals. 
However, no failure to act should be justified by the situation related to Ukrainian 
nationals and the number of cases. 
36 Furthermore, referring to the wording of Article 197(1) and (2) TFEU, which 
mentions, inter alia, that the Union is to support the efforts of Member States to 
improve their administrative capacity to implement Union law, the referring court 
adds that each Member State has the possibility of receiving adequate EU 
assistance before it decides to restrict or withdraw fundamental rights from certain 
persons. 
37 As regards the principle of proportionality, the referring court considers that, in 
the situation under consideration, less restrictive remedies existed to resolve the 
problems arising from the sudden influx of a large number of Ukrainian nationals 
into Poland due to the outbreak of war. The prolonged and discriminatory 
exclusion under national law of the possibility for foreign nationals – third-
country nationals – to exercise their fundamental rights appears to be 
disproportionate in this case. 
38 In addition, the objectives (results) of EU directives concerning third-country 
nationals, treaty provisions and Union principles are not attained, contrary inter 
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alia to the requirements laid down in the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, 
thus breaching the principle of the effectiveness of EU law (Article 4(3) TEU). 
39 In the light of the principle of primacy formulated by the Court of Justice in its 
judgment of 15 July 1964, C-6/64, F. Costa v E.N.E.L., the executive force of EU 
law cannot vary from one Member State to another in deference to subsequent 
domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty 
or giving rise to prohibited discrimination. 
40 The referring court then notes that, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the 
provisions of EU law and the requirements of the ECHR are not applied 
uniformly, and that the judicial authorities in Poland, in the absence of a clear 
interpretation of the applicable provisions of EU law by the Court of Justice, will 
not be able to ensure the requisite level of compliance with fundamental rights. An 
answer by the Court of Justice to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling is 
therefore necessary for the referring court to give a correct judgment on the action 
for a declaration of failure to act against the Provincial Governor of Silesia which 
was lodged by a foreign national. 
41 In the event that the national court finds that Articles 100c and 100d of the Law on 
assistance to Ukrainian nationals do not infringe EU law, including the right to 
good administration, the action would be dismissed. On the other hand, in the 
event of an interpretation leading to the conclusion that those provisions are 
contrary to the Treaties and the principles developed by the Court of Justice, it 
would become necessary to apply the principle of the primacy of EU law, 
accepted in national law in Articles 91(3) and 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland, aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of EU law (Article 4(3) 
TEU). 
42 In addition, a ruling by the Court of Justice is necessary because the divergence in 
interpretation has also been recognised by the Supreme Administrative Court, 
which stated in a recent judgment of 18 December 2024 that ‘the decision not to 
award the costs of the appeal proceedings on a point of law was made pursuant to 
Article 207(2) of the Code of Procedure, having regard to the serious divergences 
in the interpretation of the scope ratione personae of Articles 100c and 100d [of 
the Law on assistance to Ukrainian nationals] which have emerged in the case-law 
of the regional administrative courts’. 
43 In conclusion, the referring court proposes that the questions referred be answered 
as follows: 
1. The Treaty principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights 
(Articles 2 and 6(3) TEU), proportionality (Article 52(1) of the Charter, in 
conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, and in conjunction with Article 6(1) TEU), 
the primacy of EU law and its effectiveness (Article 4(3) TEU) and the ‘right to 
good administration’ (regarded as a principle of the European Union, as expressed 
in Article 41(1) to (4) of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof and 
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in conjunction with Article 6(1) of the TEU and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice) preclude the prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion by the national 
legislature, solely on organisational or economic grounds, of the right of foreign 
nationals (third-country nationals) to seek an effective remedy against the failure 
of public authorities to act (reminders, actions for a declaration of failure to act or 
undue delay). 
2. The prolonged and repeatedly extended exclusion under national law of the 
possibility for foreign nationals (third-country nationals) to seek an effective 
remedy against the failure of public authorities to act and the exclusion of the 
possibility for a national administrative court to award an adequate sum of money 
as compensation for the infringement of the right to action by the authorities 
without undue delay and the exclusion of the possibility of ordering the adoption 
of an administrative act within a time limit set by the court, must be interpreted as: 
(a) not meeting the requirements of the general interest and unduly restricting 
the sphere of fundamental rights of the European Union (Article 2 TEU; 
Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, in conjunction with Article 52(1) to (3) of the Charter); 
(b) discriminating against foreign nationals – third-country nationals (Article 2 
TEU, Articles 10 and 18 TFEU, Articles 20 and 21(1) and (2) Charter); 
(c) contrary to the principle of justice (Article 2 TEU), and 
(d) hindering genuine, effective access to justice (Article 2 TEU, Article 67(4) 
TFEU, Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof). 
44 The referring court further requests that the Court of Justice reformulate, if 
necessary, the questions referred to it.