Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:1997:564
Date: 1997-11-27
Language of the case: Dutch
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Social security for migrant workers;Free movement of workers
Concepts: Equal treatment;Matters covered by the regulations
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Netherlands

summary of 
the observations submitted, it is clear from 
the Court's case-law that there are a number 
of constituent elements 'which enable a ben­
efit to be classified as unemployment benefit. 
The Court has consistently held21 that the 
distinction between benefits excluded from 
the scope of Regulation N o 1408/71 and 
those which fall within its scope is based 
essentially on the constituent elements of the 
particular benefit, in particular its purposes 
and the conditions on which it is granted. In 
the final analysis, whether a benefit is classi­
fied as a social security benefit by national 
legislation is not the decisive factor. 22 
19. As the Court has held in numerous 
cases, 'a benefit may be regarded as a social 
security benefit in so far as it is granted, 
without any individual and discretionary 
assessment of personal needs, to recipients 
on the basis of a legally defined position and 
provided that it concerns one of the risks 
expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation 
N o 1408/71'. » 
20. Consequently the first question here is 
whether the benefit in the present case is 'a 
legally defined right',24 and the second is 
whether it relates to the risk of unemploy­
ment. 
21. Whether it is a legally defined right may 
appear questionable in view of the fact that 
the Foundation derives its legal personality 
from civil law. However, any such doubt can 
be disposed of. The Foundation fulfils public 
tasks, its budget funds are provided by the 
State, most of the decision-makers in the 
21 — See Case C-l 11/91, cited in footnote 13, paragraph 28, and 
Case C-78/91, cited in footnote 18, paragraph 14. 
22 — See, for example, the judgments referred to in the previous 
footnote. 
23 — See Case C- l l l / 91 , cited in footnote 13, paragraph 29, with 
further references. 
24 — See Case C- l l l / 91 , cited in footnote 13, paragraph 30, and 
Case C-78/91, cited in footnote 18, paragraph 15 et seq. 
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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-57/96 
Foundation are civil servants of the ministry 
responsible, and the Foundation is under the 
supervision of the Minister for Agriculture. 
Therefore the Foundation serves public, not 
private, purposes. Its power to adopt the 
Compensation Rules in question is based on 
public law. 
22. It is also doubtful whether the nature of 
the legal measure regulating compensation 
meets the requirements of a 'legally denned 
right'. In essence this question is to a large 
extent the same as the definition of 'legisla­
tion' 25 within the meaning of Article 4(1) of 
Regulation N o 1408/71. 
The national court has described the legal 
basis of the compensation payments as a 'set 
of guiding principles'.26 It is common 
ground that the Compensation Rules do not 
constitute a formal statute. In reply to the 
Court 's question concerning the legal nature 
of the Compensation Rules, the Netherlands 
Government explained that they constitute 
delegated legislation. Legal rules of this type 
are usually measures for implementing stat­
utes. With regard to their binding effect, it 
must be observed that a right to compensa­
tion exists (subject to the funds being avail­
able) if the applicant fulfils the conditions 
laid down by the Compensation Rules. The 
Netherlands Government confirmed this 
when questioned at the hearing. According 
to the information supplied by the national 
court and the Netherlands Government, spe­
cial circumstances may permit a decision 
such as that in the present case to be set aside 
in favour of the applicant if unreasonable 
hardship may be caused if the Compensation 
Rules are strictly applied. 
23. In so far as implementing measures are 
adopted on a statutory basis and confer 
rights on those concerned, they meet the 
requirements of a 'legally defined right'. 27 
According to the Netherlands Government, 
the Compensation Rules in the present case 
were adopted to implement Community 
regulations in the agricultural sector, namely 
Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1094/88 of 25 
April 1988 amending Regulations (EEC) N o 
797/85 and (EEC) N o 1760/87 as regards the 
set-aside of arable land and the extensifica-
tion and conversion of production, 28 and the 
related Commission Regulation (EEC) N o 
1272/88 of 29 April 1988 laying down 
detailed rules for applying the set-aside 
incentive scheme for arable land.29 In my 
opinion, a legal basis of Community law, in 
the form of regulations, corresponds for this 
purpose to a legal basis in national law. 
25 — See Article l(j) of Regulation N o 1408/71. In principle, this 
term must be construed widely (see Joined Cases 82/86 and 
103/86 Laborero and Sabato v OSSOM [1987] ECR 3401, 
paragraph 23 et seq.). 
26 — Beleidsregeling. 
27 — This conforms with the definition of 'legislation' in Article 
l(i) of Regulation N o 1408/71: 'legislation' means in respect 
of each Member Sute statutes, regulations and other provi­
sions and aü other implementine measures, present or 
future, relating to the branches and schemes of social secu­
rity covered by Article 4(1) and (2) (emphasis added). 
28 — OJ 1988 L 106, p. 28. 
29 — OJ 1988 L 121, p. 36. 
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MEINTS v MINISTER VAN LANDBOUW, NATUURBEHEER EN VISSERIJ 
24. Doubt as to the existence of a 'legally 
defined right' may none the less arise from 
the fact that, 'when the funds are exhausted, 
the president of the Foundation may take a 
decision, which is published in the Staatscou­
rant, that no further applications for the cur­
rent budget year will be accepted. This is a 
hypothetical possibility because, as the 
Netherlands Government stated in answer to 
a question during the hearing, it has never 
yet occurred in practice. 
25. In my view, therefore, a right with a 
legal basis may be presumed to exist. 
26. However, it is not typical for the funds 
available for a social security benefit to be 
limited to a particular amount, so that it 
appears doubtful whether the legislation as 
such concerns 'branches of social security' 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Regu­
lation No 1408/71. This criterion could pre­
clude classification of the Compensation 
Rules as 'legislation concerning branches of 
social security'. 
27. Pursuant to Article 4(2)(a), however, the 
Regulation also applies to special non-
contributory benefits which are provided for 
under schemes other than those referred to 
in paragraph 1, where such benefits are 
intended to provide supplementary, substi­
tute or ancillary cover against the risks cov­
ered by the branches of social security 
referred to in paragraph 1. 30 
28. Therefore the question remains whether 
the compensation relates expressly to one of 
the risks Usted in Article 4(1) of Regulation 
N o 1408/71. At first sight, it seems to be an 
unemployment benefit because one of the 
conditions for entitlement to compensation 
is a right to benefit under the Werkloos­
heidswet. 
29. According to the Court's case-law, one 
of the characteristics of unemployment ben­
efit is that it provides substitute income. This 
is not so with regard to the compensation in 
question as it takes the form of a single pay­
ment which is not related to previous remu­
neration or to the duration of the employ­
ment relationship or of unemployment. It is 
this last factor which most strongly suggests 
that the compensation is not an unemploy­
ment benefit, in so far as the Court has 
stated that the continuance of unemploy­
ment M is the basis of benefit and is therefore 
a constituent element of an unemployment 
benefit. 
30. If the applicant is subsequently 
employed by another employer, he is abso-
30 — However, Article 10a of the Regulation indicates that the 
Member State of residence is responsible for granting spe­
cial non-contributory cash benefits in accordance with its 
legislation. 
31 — See Case C-66/92, cited in footnote 19. 
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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-57/96 
lutely entitled to retain the compensation 
but, on the other hand, he must repay it if he 
is re-employed by his previous employer 
within one year. This shows that the basis of 
the ' benefit is the previous contract of 
employment, or rather, the termination 
thereof. The payment is made in respect of 
the termination of the specific contract of 
employment with the particular agricultural 
employer. 
31. The benefit in question undoubtedly 
serves the purpose of making it easier for the 
farmer employer to limit or give up produc­
tion entirely, in that he is partially relieved of 
the social responsibility to employees whom 
he has to lay off on economic grounds. 
32. In the Mouthaan case32 there was a 
similar close connection between the discon­
tinued contract of employment and the ben­
efits available in the event of unemployment. 
The Court found that the benefits claimed 
could not be regarded as unemployment 
benefits within the meaning of Regulation 
N o 1408/71. In that case, the benefits were 
partly paid by a trade association as compen­
sation for the loss of rights which had arisen 
during the period of employment as against 
the employer, who had subsequently become 
insolvent. Nevertheless, the Mouthaan case 
and the present case are similar in so far as 
the particular contract of employment, not 
the condition of unemployment in general, 
formed the basis of the benefit. 
33. In my opinion, this conclusion is con­
firmed by the fact that compensation of the 
type in question here may be granted to an 
employee a second time. 33 Therefore sup­
port is provided for being made redundant 
on economic grounds by a second employer, 
and not for continued unemployment. 
34. From this angle, the financing of rede­
ployment measures, which may also take 
place on the basis of the Compensation 
Rules, 34 has the same aim in endeavouring to 
assist the agricultural sector. From the point 
of view of the objective of agricultural 
policy, the compensation in question is an 
incentive to set land aside. The unemploy­
ment of agricultural workers is to that extent 
only a consequence which must be mitigated 
by financial means. 
35. In this context, the existence of a right to 
unemployment benefit has only a limited 
function. According to the Netherlands 
Government, in this way it is possible to 
ensure that it is the employer who takes the 
initiative in terminating the contract of 
employment. If the employee does so, he 
will not be entitled to unemployment benefit 
under the Werkloosheidswet. As this con­
dition is only intended to ensure that the 
contract of employment is terminated in a 
certain way, it would be wrong to conclude 
32 — Sec Case 39/76 Metaalnijverheid v Mouthaan [1976] ECR 
1901. 
33 — Article 5(a) of the Compensation Rules. 
34 — Article 7(2) of the Compensation Rules. 
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MEINTS v MINISTER VAN LANDBOUW, NATUURBEHEER EN VISSERIJ 
from this link that the compensation claimed 
is an unemployment benefit 'within the 
meaning of Regulation No 1408/71. 
36. If, therefore, it is not to be presumed 
that this is an unemployment benefit, it is 
unnecessary to consider the other conditions 
for applying Article 71 of Regulation N o 
1408/71. In any case, its provisions are clear 
in so far as a wholly unemployed frontier 
worker for the purpose of Article 71(l)(a)(ii) 
of Regulation N o 1408/71 has to rely on the 
legislation of the State where he resides, in 
this case Germany, with regard to unem­
ployment benefits. On factual grounds there 
is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff in the 
main proceedings is an 'atypical frontier 
worker' of the kind referred to in Article 
71(l)(b)(ii), who would then have the 
Option' 35 of making himself available either 
to the employment services of the State in 
•which he was last employed or those of the 
State where he resides. It is for the national 
court alone to assess the situation,36 
although in the present case it has ruled out 
this possibility. 
37. Therefore the reply to the first question 
must be that Regulation N o 1408/71 does 
not apply to a benefit such as that provided 
for in the Compensation Rules for Workers 
Leaving Farming, which does not depend on 
the duration of unemployment and which 
forms part of a scheme of measures for the 
structural improvement of the agricultural 
sector emphasizing the promotion of the 
complete or partial cessation of farming or 
the abandonment of farming by farmers. 
HI. The second question 
38. The national court asks whether a ben­
efit granted under the Compensation Rules 
is to be regarded as a social advantage within 
the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation N o 
1612/68 and, if so, whether the indirect 
requirement of residence constitutes dis­
crimination prohibited by Article 7(1) of the 
Regulation. 
39. As it has been concluded above that such 
a benefit does not fall within the scope 
ratione materiae of Regulation No 1408/71, 
it is now necessary to examine that of Regu­
lation N o 1612/68. 37 However, even if it had 
been concluded that the benefit is a social 
security benefit, that would not have been a 
reason for excluding the application of Regu­
lation N o 1612/68, as the judgment in Com­
mission v Luxembourg shows. 38 
35 — Case 1/85 Miabe v Bundeumsult für Arbeit [1986] 1837, 
paragraph 9. 
36 — Ibid., paragraph 19. 
37 — See Case 122/84, cited in footnote 7. 
38 — Case C-lll/91, cited in footnote 13, paragraph 21. 
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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-57/96 
40. Article 7(1) and (2) of Regulation N o 
1612/68 provides as follows: 
' 1 . A worker who is a national of a Member 
State may not, in the territory of another 
Member State, be treated differently from 
national workers, by reason of his national­
ity in respect of any conditions of employ­
ment and work, in particular as regards 
remuneration, dismissal, and should he 
become unemployed, reinstatement or 
re-employment. 
2. He shall enjoy the same social and tax 
advantages as national workers.' 
41. The parties who submitted observations 
differ as to the reply to the second question. 
Whereas the national court considers that it 
is 'not unreasonable' for the expression 
'social advantage' to be construed so as to 
cover a benefit under the Compensation 
Rules, although the indirect requirement of 
residence may constitute indirect discrimi­
nation by reason of nationality, which is pro­
hibited, the Netherlands and French Gov­
ernments take the view that the residence 
requirement is justified. The Commission, 
on the other hand, considers that the appli­
cant in the main proceedings may success­
fully rely on Article 7(2) of Regulation N o 
1612/68. 
42. The NetherUnds Government considers 
that the compensation is a social advantage 
within the meaning of the Regulation as it 
fulfils the requirements laid down by case-
law for such a benefit. However, it is clear 
from the Court's case-law that a worker can 
claim a social advantage within the meaning 
of the provision only if he also resides in the 
Member State where he claims the benefit, 
although a certain minimum period of resi­
dence cannot be required of a frontier 
worker. Entitlement to social advantages is 
only intended to make the worker's integra­
tion in the Member State where he is 
employed easier. A frontier worker who 
consciously chooses to reside in another 
Member State does not need special assis­
tance of that kind. 
43. If, furthermore, the residence require­
ment could not be invoked against a wholly 
unemployed frontier worker, the conse­
quences could be very serious. The Nether­
lands Government illustrates this with the 
example of social assistance, which is 
excluded by Article 4(4) from the ambit of 
Regulation N o 1408/71. It points out that 
this cannot be paid under Article 10 of the 
regulation to a worker residing in another 
Member State. Social assistance payments 
are, however, unquestionably social advan­
tages within the meaning of Article 7(2) of 
Regulation N o 1612/68. The Netherlands 
Government adds that there is a risk of blur­
ring the differences between the two regula­
tions. 
44. Finally, the Netherlands Government 
observes that the reference to benefit under 
the Werkloosheidswet should not, strictly 
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MEINTS v MINISTER VAN LANDBOUW, NATUURBEHEER EN VISSERIJ 
speaking, be construed as setting up a resi­
dence requirement for compensation. The 
purpose of the reference is to obtain proof 
that the termination of the contract of 
employment was not attributable to the 
worker. The Werkloosheidswet provides for 
machinery whereby an employee can resist 
dismissal. The reference to a right to benefit 
under that law aims to ensure that all those 
possibilities are exhausted. Consequently the 
receipt of unemployment benefit in another 
Member State cannot take the place of an 
entitlement to benefit under the Werkloos­
heidswet, because unemployment benefits 
paid in other Member States are subject to 
other conditions. 
45. The French Government sees in the 
present case a fundamental problem concern­
ing the exportability of social advantages 
within the meaning of Regulation N o 
1612/68. It contends that, firstly, there is no 
residence condition in the conventional sense 
and therefore the case-law on residence 
requirements 39 is not applicable to this case. 
More important, however, is the question of 
the extent to which a frontier worker can 
rely on Regulation N o 1612/68, which 
makes no provision for the export of social 
advantages. There are good reasons for the 
view that frontier workers are covered by 
the State of residence in relation to unem­
ployment benefits. 
46. As the Netherlands scheme in question 
is based on an objective distinction, it does 
not result in direct discrimination. The situ­
ation of an unemployed frontier worker dif­
fers objectively from that of an unemployed 
migrant worker who has settled in the State 
of employment. 
47. According to the French Government, 
the fact that frontier workers are mentioned 
in the preamble to Regulation N o 1612/68 
although there are no provisions concerning 
them in the operative part justifies the con­
clusion that the regulation does not lay 
down specific rules relating to them. In addi­
tion, the special rules of Regulation N o 
1408/71 cannot be called into question by 
Regulation N o 1612/68. 
48. The French Government adds that the 
export of social advantages within the mean­
ing of the latter regulation may take place 
only in very rare exceptional cases, if at all. 
Any grant of benefit must be limited to cases 
where there is a direct connection with a 
contract of employment or a previous con­
tract of employment in another Member 
State. In the present case, the connection 
could consist in the comparable nature of a 
situation existing under the legal systems of 
the Member States concerned. As we know, 
the plaintiff in the main proceedings is not 
subject to the Netherlands legislation on 
unemployment, but to that of Germany. This 
circumstance may, if necessary, be regarded 
as equivalent. 
39 — See Case 152/73 Sorgi« v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 
153; Case C-279/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] 
ECR 1-5785, and Case C-lll/91, cited in footnote 13. 
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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-57/96 
49. The Commission contends that, by refer­
ence to the Court's relevant case-law,40 the 
compensation is a social advantage within 
the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 
1612/68. The Commission also considers 
that the Netherlands Rules in question give 
rise to covert indirect discrimination, con­
trary to Article 7 of the said regulation. In 
the Commission's view, there appear to be 
no circumstances which would justify this 
unequal treatment. 
50. The Court has consistendy held that 
social advantages are 'all those which, 
whether or not linked to a contract of 
employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because of their 
objective status as workers ... and whose 
extension to workers who are nationals of 
other Member States therefore seems likely 
to facilitate the mobility of such workers 
within the Community'. 41 
51. As we have already seen when consider­
ing whether the compensation is of the 
nature of unemployment benefit, this is a 
direct consequence of the previous contract 
of employment which has been terminated. 
In my view, therefore, it can readily be 
accepted that it is an advantage which is 
granted to the worker because of his objec­
tive status as a worker. If the applicant had 
not been a worker fulfilling certain condi­
tions, there would have been absolutely no 
reason for granting the benefit. A worker 
residing in the State of employment and a 
frontier worker are objectively in the same 
situation in that respect. 42 In so far as the 
compensation may mitigate, at least partly, 
the economic consequences for a worker 
who has been made redundant involuntarily, 
it is also likely to facilitate mobility within 
the Community. The economic risk of 
impending unemployment may very well 
stand in the way of taking up employment in 
another Member State. Any measure which 
is capable of mitigating the consequences of 
unemployment therefore promotes mobility, 
in my view. The knowledge that one will not 
be faced with economic ruin even in the 
event of unemployment may certainly 
encourage a person to take up employment 
in another Member State. 
52. As I see it, this reasoning is not affected 
by the fact that funds may be limited and 
compensation may therefore not be paid. 
Firstly, in practice the budget has never been 
fully used up in the past. Secondly, the Court 
has found that an advantage granted on the 
basis of a discretionary decision may be a 
social advantage within the meaning of the 
provision. 43 The justified hope of receiving 
the benefit if the insured event occurs 
appears to be a sufficient incentive for facili­
tating mobility. In the present case there is 
40 — Case 39/86 Lair v Universität Hannover [1988] ECR 3161; 
Case 44/72 Marsman v Rosskame [1972] ECR 1243; and 
Case 65/81 Reina v Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg 
[1982] ECR 33. 
41 — Casc 65/81, cited in footnote 40, paragraph 12; Case 249/83 
Hoeckx v Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn 
KalmtboM [1985] ECR 973, paragraph 20; Case 157/84 
frascogna v Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations [1985] ECR 
1739, paragraph 20; Case 39/86, cited m footnote 40, para­
graph 21; and Case C-310/91 Schmid v Belgian State [1993] 
ECR 1-3011, paragraph 18. 
42 — See Case C-80/94 Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe 
Belastingen [1995] ECR 1-2493, paragraph 20. 
43 — See Casc 65/81, cited in footnote 40. 
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MEINTS v MINISTER VAN LANDBOUW, NATUURBEHEER EN VISSERIJ 
even a right, as I have shown above. There­
fore it follows that the advantage linked to 
objective status as a worker is likely to facili­
tate the mobility of workers. 
53. When the Netherlands Government 
claims that participation in social advantages 
only has the purpose of promoting integra­
tion in the Member State of employment ** 
and cannot therefore be granted to a frontier 
worker who necessarily resides in another 
Member State, I consider this to be a one­
sided and simplistic approach. 
54. It may be presumed that the 'average 
migrant worker', who could also be called 
the prototype migrant worker, will take up 
residence in the State of his employment. 
Consequently, facilitating his integration in 
his new place of residence also contributes to 
promoting his mobility. 
55. The structure of Regulations Nos 
1408/71 and 1612/68 shows that the Com­
munity legislature took as its starting point 
this 'average type' of migrant worker. In this 
respect the frontier worker is an exception 
expressly taken into account by Regulation 
N o 1408/71.« Regulation N o 1612/68 does 
not make special exceptions of that kind for 
frontier workers. Nevertheless it must be 
presumed that the Community legislature 
had frontier workers in mind when Regu­
lation N o 1612/68 was adopted. The pre­
amble to the Regulation expressly mentions 
frontier workers4 é as being entitled under 
the Regulation. 
56. In my view, this can only lead to the 
conclusion that frontier workers are also to 
have all the rights conferred upon migrant 
workers by Regulation No 1612/68. This 
seems proper because a frontier worker is 
also unquestionably a migrant worker who 
travels to work in another Member State. In 
so far as there is no objective ground for giv­
ing him special treatment, such as provided 
for by Regulation N o 1408/71, the rights 
conferred by Community law must be avail­
able to him in their entirety. 
57. It seems to me that there is no justifica­
tion for the fears of the Netherlands and the 
French Governments that, given this assess­
ment of the position of frontier workers, 
social assistance benefits would become 
exportable, a result which Regulation N o 
1408/71 seeks to prevent expressly47 and 
Regulation N o 1612/68 implicitly. 
44 — Case C-3/90 Bernini v Minister voor Onderwijs en Weten­
schappen [1992] ECR 1-1071. 
45 — Sec, for example, Article 71 of Regulation No 1408/71. 
46 — This footnote relates only to the German text of the legisla­
tion. 
47 — See Artides 4(4) and 10a of Regulation No 1408/71. 
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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-57/96 
58. The specific contract of employment 
must be the point of connection for the grant 
of a social advantage. In substance, at least, 
this requirement has already been taken into 
account by the Court in referring to objec­
tive status as a worker and to the contract of 
employment when defining social advan­
tages. There is no question of having to pay 
in future all social assistance benefits across 
borders as a result of Article 7(2) of Regu­
lation N o 1612/68. It is precisely the link 
with status as a worker and the contract of 
employment which excludes conventional 
social assistance benefits. 
59. Against this background it is necessary 
to ascertain whether the conditions pre­
scribed for compensation are formulated in 
such a way as to result in covert discrimi­
nation on grounds of nationality. 
60. The Compensation Rules do not contain 
an express residence condition, but it arises 
from the combination of the Rules with the 
Werkloosheidswet.. Nevertheless, the resi­
dence requirement is mandatory. It is an 
indispensable condition for a subjective right 
under the Werkloosheidswet and without it a 
right to compensation under the Rules can­
not be acquired. Because of this mandatory 
connection it is correct to regard the resi­
dence requirement as a condition of entitle­
ment to compensation under the Rules. 
61. The residence requirement, for its part, 
expressly makes no distinction according to 
the applicant's nationality. However, as the 
Court has consistently held, covert discrimi­
nation which leads to the same result is also 
prohibited. 48 The condition of residence in 
the Member State concerned may have pre­
cisely that effect because such a requirement 
is in practice more easily met by Netherlands 
nationals,49 whereas migrant workers are 
obliged first to move their residence50 or 
must retain their residence in another coun­
try, as in the case of frontier workers. 
62. However, to make a distinction accord­
ing to whether the potential recipient of the 
benefit resides in the country concerned or 
another country must not be deemed pro­
hibited discrimination if it is necessary on 
objective grounds. The condition may very 
well be justified in the context of the Werk­
loosheidswet and only lead to results incom­
patible with Community law because of the 
reference in the Compensation Rules. 
63. When the Netherlands Government 
states that the reference to the Werkloos­
heidswet does not, in the final analysis, 
allude to the place where the worker resides, 
but that it is explained by the need to ensure 
that certain substantive conditions relating to 
the method of termination of the contract of 
employment are fulfilled, reasons of that 
48 — Sec Case 152/73, cited in footnote 39, paragraph 11; also, to 
the same effect, Case C-175/88 Biehl v Administration des 
Contributions [1990] ECR 1-1779, paragraph 13. 
49 — See Case C-lll/91, cited in'footnotc 13, paragraph 10. 
50 — See in that regard Case C-279/89, cited in footnote 39, 
paragraph 42. 
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MEINTS v MINISTER VAN LANDBOUW, NATUURBEHEER EN VISSERIJ 
kind may very well be regarded as a justified 
concern. 
64. However, if the requirements are formu­
lated in such a way that the applicant is dis­
qualified from compensation even before the 
relevant circumstances are examined, the 
distinction is in any event disproportionate. 
In the case of a frontier worker, it is suffi­
cient to require him to prove that the con­
tract of employment was terminated by the 
employer and not the worker himself. 
65. The requirement of entitlement under 
the Werkloosheidswet, which results in 
excluding compensation if the worker does 
not reside in the Netherlands, must therefore 
be disregarded in the case of a frontier 
worker. 
66. The answer to be given to the second 
question is, therefore, that a benefit based on 
the Compensation Rules must be classified 
as a social advantage within the meaning of 
Article 7(2) of Regulation N o 1612/68. In 
this connection, the condition that the 
worker concerned must reside in the Nether­
lands is to be regarded as a distinction by 
reason of nationality, which is prohibited 
under Article 7 of that Regulation. 
C — Conclusion 
67. On those grounds, I propose that Court reply as follows to the questions from 
the national court: 
(1) Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community does not apply to a 
benefit, such as that provided for ih the Compensation Rules for Workers 
Leaving Farming, which does not depend on the duration of unemployment 
and which forms part of a scheme of measures for the structural improvement 
of the agricultural sector emphasizing the promotion of the complete or partial 
cessation of farming or the abandonment of farming by farmers. 
(2) A benefit based on the Compensation Rules must be classified as a social 
advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) N o 1612/68 
of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community. In this connection, the condition that the worker con­
cerned must reside in the Netherlands is to be regarded as a distinction by 
reason of nationality, which is prohibited under Article 7 of that Regulation. 
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