Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2012:303
Date: 2012-05-23
Language of the case: Italian
Subject matter: Right of establishment;Approximation of laws;Freedom to provide services
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Italy

Summary of conclusions 94. In summary, it must be stated that the contract at issue concerning the study and evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of certain hospitals requires a tendering procedure and Directive 2004/18 is applicable. Since no call for tenders was made in the main proceedings, there is an infringement of the directive. In view of the fact that national law permits agreements such as that between Lecce ASL and the University, national law is also not consistent with the directive. 95. Consequently, Directive 2004/18, and, in particular, Article 1(2)(a) and (d), Article 2 and Article 28 of that directive and Categories 8 and 12 in Annex II thereto, are to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits written agreements to be entered into between a contracting authority and a university constituted under public law for the study of the seismic vulnerability of hospital structures and its evaluation in the light of national regulations on the safety of structures and of strategic buildings in particular, for a consideration not exceeding the costs incurred in the performance of the service, where the university responsible for performance may act as an economic operator. VII – Conclusion 96. In the light of the above considerations, I suggest that the Court answer the question asked by the Consiglio di Stato as follows: Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, and, in particular, Article 1(2)(a) and (d), Article 2 and Article 28 of that directive and Categories 8 and 12 in Annex II thereto, are to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits written agreements to be entered into between a contracting authority and a university constituted under public law for the study of the seismic vulnerability of hospital structures and its evaluation in the light of national regulations on the safety of structures and of strategic buildings in particular, for a consideration not exceeding the costs incurred in the performance of the service, where the university responsible for performance may act as an economic operator. 1 – Original language of the Opinion: German Language of the case: Italian 2 – OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114. 3 – Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-4747. 4 – GURI No 192 of 18 August 1990. 5 – P. 2 of the written observations submitted by the University. 6 – Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa [2009] ECR I-12129. 7 – Ibid., paragraph 35. 8 – Ibid., paragraph 42. 9 – See p. 22, paragraph 34 of the order for reference. 10 – See Hailbronner, K., Das Recht der Europäischen Union (Eberhard Grabitz/Meinhard Hilf (eds.), part B5, paragraph 24, p. 4, in whose view the criterion of pecuniary interest is considered to be satisfied in principle in the case of any non-cash benefit. See also Eisner, C., ‘Interkommunale Kooperationen und Dienstleistungskonzessionen (Teil 1)’, Zeitschrift für Vergaberecht und Beschaffungspraxis, 2011, p. 190, according to whom, as soon as remuneration for the provision of a service is actually agreed, the operation in question must be assessed on the basis of the procurement rules. 11 – See Frenz, W., Handbuch Europarecht, Vol. 3 (Beihilfe- und Vergaberecht), Heidelberg 2007, p. 617, paragraph 2012. 12 – Ibid. 13 – See Case 263/86 Humbel & Edel [1988] ECR 5365, paragraph 18. Budischowsky, J., Kommentar zu EU- und EG-Vertrag (Heinz Mayer (ed.)), Vienna 2003, Article 49 EC, paragraph 8, p. 5, considers the criterion of pecuniary interest to be satisfied on account of the cost-covering character of a consideration. 14 – See Frenz, W., loc. cit. (footnote 11), p. 618, paragraph 2013. 15 – See footnote 22 of the written observations submitted by the Commission. 16 – Commission Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts (OJ 2009 L 314, p. 64). 17 – Opinion in Case C‑271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-6817, point 143. 18 – Ibid. 19 – See Frenz, W., loc. cit. (footnote 11), p. 533, paragraph 1721. 20 – Case C‑458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-8585, paragraph 48. 21 – Case C‑196/08 Acoset [2009] ECR I-9913, paragraph 49, and Case C‑410/04 ANAV [2006] ECR I-3303, paragraph 21. With regard to the relationship between the prohibition on discrimination and the transparency requirement, see Case C‑507/03 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I‑9777, paragraph 30 et seq.; Case C‑412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-619, paragraph 66; Case C‑231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287, paragraph 17 et seq.; and Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60 et seq. 22 – See Joined Cases C‑320/90 to C‑322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 6. 23 – See Joined Cases C‑480/00 to C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00, C‑497/00 to C‑499/00 Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others [2004] ECR I-2943, paragraph 73, and Case C‑67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraph 40. 24 – Connected with the calculation method are the prohibitions on circumvention expressly laid down in all the procurement directives. First, it is prohibited to split up contracts with the intention of circumventing the application of the relevant directive. Second, the directives prohibit circumvention through the choice of calculation method. Furthermore, it is possible to infer from the prohibitions of circumvention a general prohibition of deliberate or negligent under-calculation (see Frenz, W., loc. cit. (footnote 11), p. 209, paragraph 822; Trepte, P., Public Procurement in the EU, 2nd edition, Oxford 2007, p. 262 et seq.). 25 – Under that case-law, it is assumed that the national court alone has direct knowledge of the facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by the parties and is therefore in the best position to determine, with full knowledge of the matter before it, the relevance of the questions of law raised by the dispute before it and the necessity for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to give judgment (see Case C‑425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I-4861, paragraph 21). 26 – See, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑18/01 Korhonen and Others [2003] ECR I-5321, paragraph 19; Case C‑295/05 Asemfo [2007] ECR I‑2999, paragraph 30; and Case C‑103/08 Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117, paragraph 16. 27 – See, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 61; Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon [2008] ECR I-1683, paragraph 29; and Case C‑103/08 Gottwald, cited above in footnote 26, paragraph 17. 28 – See point 44 of the present Opinion. 29 – See Frenz, W., loc. cit. (footnote 11), p. 670, paragraph 2197. 30 – See Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, paragraph 14; Case C‑107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 43; Case C‑71/92 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-5923, paragraph 10; and Case C‑84/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-139, paragraphs 48 and 58. 31 – See paragraphs 17 and 18 of the written observations submitted by the Czech Government. 32 – See Case 13/61 Bosch [1962] ECR 45 and Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 33 – See the Commission Green Paper of 27 January 2011 on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy, Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15 final, p. 24, which mentions both situations developed in the Court’s case-law. The Commission advocates, in connection with formulating legislative proposals, defining those forms of cooperation that are outside of the scope of application of the EU public procurement directives. Consideration should also be given in this regard to the findings made in the Court’s case-law. 34 – Case C‑26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I-1. 35 – Ibid., paragraph 48. 36 – See Holoubek, M., EU-Kommentar (Jürgen Schwarze (ed.)), 2nd edition., Article 49/50 EC, paragraph 151, p. 753, who points out that the Court’s case‑law has excluded from the scope of the procurement directives, and also from the scope of the fundamental freedoms, not only quasi-contractual internal relations within a legal person, but also contractual relationships between the public sector and spun-off bodies. 37 – Case C‑107/98 Teckal, cited above in footnote 30. 38 – See Case C‑107/98 Teckal, cited above in footnote 30, paragraph 50; Case C‑26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, cited above in footnote 34, paragraph 49; and Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraph 34. 39 – See paragraph 35 of the order for reference. 40 – Cited above in footnote 3. 41 – See Chaminade, A., ‘Des possibilités de coopération accrues pour les collectivités territoriales’, La Semaine Juridique – édition générale, 2010, No 363, p. 662, who discusses a further development in the Court’s case‑law since the judgments in relation to in-house operations. See Ferk, P./Ferk, B., ‘Osebe javnega prava kot ponudniki’, Podjetje in delo, 2011, No 4, p. 481 et seq., who state, in connection with Commission v Germany, that the previous legal theory on in-house operations was supplemented in so far as the judgment referred to a contractual and not an institutional relationship between the participants. 42 – See Pirker, B., ‘La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du Tribunal de première instance. Chronique des arrêts. Arrêt Commission c/Allemagne’, Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, 2009 No 3, p. 574; Broussy, E./Donnat, F./Lambert, C., Chronique de jurisprudence communautaire, Droit administratif, 2009, p. 1542, who take the view that Commission v Germany establishes a new exception in respect of procurement law. 43 – See Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraph 37. 44 – See Case C‑324/07 Coditel Brabant [2008] ECR I-8457, paragraph 48. 45 – See Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraph 45. 46 – See Steiner, M., ‘Ausschreibungsfreier Abfallentsorgungsvertrag: Ist das der Anfang vom Ende der sogenannten Teckal-Kriterien?’, European Law Reporter, 2009, p. 283, who, with regard to the situation in Commission v Germany, talks about de facto ‘institutionalised cooperation’. 47 – See Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraph 47. 48 – Ibid. 49 – See Wagner, S., ‘Öffentliche Aufträge: Eine förmliche europaweite Ausschreibung ist nicht erforderlich, wenn öffentliche Stellen i.R. interkommunaler Zusammenarbeit einen Vertrag zur Erfüllung einer ihnen allen obliegenden öffentlichen Aufgabe (Abfallentsorgung) schließen’, Europäisches Wirtschafts- & Steuerrecht, 2009, p. 328. 50 – See Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraphs 34, 44, 45 and 47. 51 – See Öhler, M./Gruber, C., ‘“Zusammenarbeit” iSd EuGH-Urteils Rs Stadtreinigung Hamburg nicht auf Kooperationen zwischen Gebietskörperschaften beschränkt’, Zeitschrift für Vergaberecht und Beschaffungspraxis, 2011, p. 288. 52 – See p. 3 of the written observations submitted by ASL Lecce. 53 – See Struve, T., ‘Durchbruch für interkommunale Zusammenarbeit’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009, p. 807; Veldboer, W., ‘Zur Entscheidung für interkommunale Zusammenarbeit durch das EuGH-Urteil “Hamburger Stadtreinigung”’, Die öffentliche Verwaltung, 2009, p. 360. 54 – See Öhler, M./Gruber, C., loc. cit. (footnote 51), p. 289, who require the agreement between the public authorities to have ‘cooperative character’. 55 – See Case C‑480/06 Commission v Germany, cited above in footnote 3, paragraph 37. 56 – See Struve, T., loc. cit. (footnote 53). 57 – See paragraph 22 of the written observations submitted by the Polish Government. 58 – See p. 6 of the written observations submitted by the CNI, in which it even denies that the study and evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of hospital buildings is actually a statutory task of ASL Lecce. 59 – See paragraph 86 of the written observations submitted by the Commission. 60 – See point 53 of this Opinion. 61 – See point 53 of this Opinion. 62 – See Dreyfus, J.-D., Rodrigues, S., ‘La coopération intercommunale confortée par la CJCE?’, L’actualité juridique; droit administratif, 2009, p. 1720. 63 – See point 34 of this Opinion. 64 – See p. 3 of the written observations submitted by ASL Lecce. 65 – See points 27 and 28 of this Opinion. 66 – See p. 23 et seq. of the written observations submitted by ASL Lecce. 67 – See p. 2 of the written observations submitted by the CNI. 68 – See paragraph 23 of the written observations submitted by the Polish Government. 69 – Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa, cited above in footnote 6, paragraph 37. 70 – Procurement law places limits on private autonomous action by public authorities, specifically as regards the choice of contractual partners, in the interest of competition. See, with regard to the influence of internal-market objectives on private law, Wendehorst, C., ‘Methodenlehre und Privatrecht in Europa’, Vom praktischen Wert der Methode – Festschrift für Heinz Mayer zum 65. Geburtstag, Vienna 2011, p. 829. 71 – See p. 15 of the written observations submitted by ASL Lecce. 72 – See point 81 of this Opinion. 73 – See point 86 of this Opinion. 74 – See point 91 of this Opinion.