Order — ECLI:EU:T:2011:399
Date: 2011-07-18
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Appeals Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Staff cases

Summary 1. Officials – Actions – Request under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations – Time-limit for submission – Reasonable time (Art. 270 TFEU; Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) 2. Officials – Actions – Time-limits – Claim for compensation addressed to an institution – Duty to act within a reasonable time – Criteria for assessment – Discretion of the Civil Service Tribunal – Legal characterisation (Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46; Staff Regulations, Art. 90) 1. A dispute between an official and an institution to which he belongs or belonged concerning compensation for damage falls, where it originates in the employment relationship between the person concerned and the institution, within the scope of Article 270 TFEU and Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations and therefore falls outside the scope of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. The fact that Article 270 TFEU and Article 90 of the Staff Regulations do not fix any time-limit for bringing a claim for compensation for damage does not make it unlawful to require that such a claim be brought within a reasonable time. Those provisions must be applied, particularly in respect of a claim for compensation for damage, in accordance with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, which are general principles of European Union law. In the absence of any statutory rule, those general principles prevent the institutions and natural or legal persons from being able to act without any time-limits, thereby threatening, inter alia, to undermine the stability of legal positions already acquired, and they require that any such action be taken within a reasonable time. Thus, a challenge, brought after a reasonable time has elapsed, to a harmful event occasioned by a European institution in its relations with its staff affects the certainty of legal relations between that institution and its staff and exposes the European Union budget to costs arising from a harmful event which occurred too far in the past. The principle of legal certainty therefore requires that staff should submit claims for compensation within a reasonable time following damage allegedly caused to them by a European institution in the context of their relations with that institution. In that regard, the reference to the period prescribed in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice may be regarded as a maximum period. However, the fact that a claim was brought within five years of the time when the person concerned became aware of the situation of which he complains does not suffice to establish that that claim was brought within a reasonable time. (see paras 24-27, 29) See: T‑45/01 Sanders and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3315, para. 59; T‑144/02 Eagle and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3381, para. 62; T‑114/08 P Marcuccio v Commission [2009] ECR-SC I‑B‑1‑53 and II‑B‑1‑313, paras 12 and 25 and the case‑law cited 2. The determination of the time-limit for bringing an action is a point of law and, where the applicable rules do not prescribe a time-limit for bringing an action for damages resulting from the employment relationship between an official and his institution, that claim must be submitted within a reasonable time from the time when the official became aware of the situation of which he complains, which is determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. In that regard, while the Civil Service Tribunal has absolute discretion to find and assess the relevant facts, provided that there is no clear distortion of their sense, its subsequent legal characterisation of those facts in the light of the ‘reasonable time’ principle is subject to review by the General Court. In any event, as an indication, the reference to the period prescribed in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice may be regarded as a maximum period. (see paras 28, 29, 31) See: T-114/08 P Marcuccio v Commission [2009] I‑B‑1‑53 and II‑B‑1‑313, paras 25 and 27 and the case-law cited