Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2018:697
Date: 2018-09-11
Language of the case: German
Subject matter: Social Policy
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Germany

Summary — Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 15 November 2018 1. EU law — Principles — Equal treatment — Equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin — Directive 2000/43 — Scope — Concept of ‘education’ — Award by a private foundation of scholarships aimed at promoting projects for research and studies abroad — Included — Condition — Sufficiently close link between the assigned financial payments and participation in those research projects or studies which, themselves, fall within the concept of ‘education’ (Council Directive 2000/43, Art. 3(1)(g)) 2. EU law — Principles — Equal treatment — Equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin — Directive 2000/43 — National measure giving rise to indirect discrimination — Concept of ‘particular disadvantage’ — Award by a private foundation of scholarships aimed at promoting projects for research and studies abroad only to candidates who have passed a law examination in that Member State — No such discrimination (Council Directive 2000/43, Art. 2(2)(b)) 1. Article 3(1)(g) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin must be interpreted as meaning that the award by a private foundation of scholarships to support research projects or studies abroad falls within the concept of ‘education’, within the meaning of that provision, where there is a sufficiently close link between the assigned financial payments and participation in those research projects or studies which, themselves, fall within that same concept of ‘education’. That is the case, in particular, where such financial payments are linked to the participation of potential candidates in such research projects or studies, and are designed to remove all or some of the potential financial barriers to participation, and where those payments are appropriate to achieve that aim. First of all, as observed by the Advocate General in points 22 and 23 of her Opinion, the term ‘education’ has the usual meaning it has in everyday language, so as to include acts or the process by which is transmitted or acquired, inter alia, information, knowledge, understanding, attitudes, values, skills, competences, or behaviours. As observed by the Advocate General in points 32 and 34 of her Opinion, a teleological interpretation of the concept of ‘education’, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2000/43, requires, first, that access to education be considered an essential aspect of this concept, since there can be no education without the possibility to access it and that, therefore, the directive’s objective, which is to combat discrimination in education, could not be achieved if discrimination were allowed at the access to education stage. Secondly, costs related to the participation in a research project or in an educational programme must be considered to be part of the components of access to education and thus included in the concept of ‘education’, in so far as the availability of the financial resources necessary to ensure such participation is likely to determine who is able to access that project or programme. (see paras 31, 37, 38, 44, operative part 1) 2. Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a private foundation established in a Member State restricts the award of scholarships to support research projects or legal studies abroad to candidates having successfully completed, in that Member State, a law examination, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute indirect discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin within the meaning of that provision. For the purposes of that article, indirect discrimination is to be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The concept of ‘particular disadvantage’, within the meaning of that provision, must be understood as meaning that it is particularly persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin, because of the provision, criterion or practice in question, who are disadvantaged (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 100, and of 6 April 2017, Jyske Finans, C‑668/15, EU:C:2017:278, paragraph 27). (see paras 46, 47, 52, operative part 2)