Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1111
Date: 2025-12-17
Language of the case: English

summary of reasons, the competent EU authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114). 46 Last, it should be borne in mind that, although for the rights of the defence and the right to be heard to be observed, the EU institutions must enable the person concerned by the act adversely affecting him or her to make his or her views known effectively, those institutions cannot be required to accept them (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 July 2017, Arbuzov v Council, T‑221/15, not published, EU:T:2017:478, paragraph 84, and of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 330). 47 As regards the September 2024 acts, it should be noted that, by letter of 27 June 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures taken against him and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 8090/2024. The applicant submitted his observations on 3 June and 12 July 2024. In the Council’s letter of 13 September 2024, the Council did indeed refer to the applicant’s letters of 3 June and 12 July 2024 and responded to his arguments. 48 As regards the March 2025 acts, it should be noted that, by letter of 10 February 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures taken against him. The applicant submitted his observations on 21 February 2025. 49 Accordingly, it follows from the circumstances of the present case that the applicant was informed of the Council’s intention to maintain his name on the lists at issue and that he had the opportunity on several occasions to make known his views before the Council, which took them into account before the adoption of the September 2024 and March 2025 acts. 50 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that, in essence, the Council did not take his observations into account. Although for the rights of the defence and the right to be heard to be observed, the EU institutions must enable the person concerned by the act adversely affecting him or her to make his or her views known effectively, those institutions cannot be required to accept them (see paragraph 46 above). 51 The mere fact that, in the present case, the Council did not conclude that the renewal of the restrictive measures at issue was not well founded, or even consider it necessary to provide a detailed response to all the points which the applicant set out in his letters, does not in itself mean that such observations were not taken into account (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). 52 As regards the alleged infringement of the obligation to carry out periodic reviews, it must be noted that the Council, after receiving the applicant’s requests for reconsideration of 3 June, 12 July and 1 November 2024 and 21 February 2025, sent him letters on 13 September 2024 and 17 March 2025, in which, first, it informed him that his arguments had already been raised and rejected in the context of ongoing proceedings, since they did not call into question the Council’s assessment that there were sufficient grounds for maintaining his name on the lists at issue and, second, it relied on the judgment in Melnichenko I, by which the Court found that the conditions for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were satisfied in respect of the initial acts, the September 2022 acts and the March 2023 acts. 53 Concerning the applicant’s argument that the Council is under an obligation to provide additional reasons, it should be noted that, according to the case-law referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same reasons as those which justified the adoption of the earlier acts. 54 Furthermore, the fact that certain persons were removed from the lists at issue in the context of political negotiations aimed at ensuring the required unanimity within the Council is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether the Council carried out an updated assessment with regard to the applicant. In any event, the Council has a broad discretion in order to decide whether, in the light of the objectives of the restrictive measures, it is appropriate to subject to those measures a person or entity which fulfils the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue laid down in the applicable acts (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 April 2015, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, T‑190/12, EU:T:2015:222, paragraph 243). 55 As for the argument relating to the assessment of the facts on which the Council relied in order to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it should be noted that that argument relates to the examination of an error of assessment and will therefore be examined in the context of the second plea. 56 The fourth plea in law must therefore be rejected. The first plea in law, raising a plea of illegality 57 The applicant raises a plea of illegality in respect of amended criterion (g) in so far as it concerns ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (‘the first part of amended criterion (g)’) and ‘businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ (‘the third part of amended criterion (g)’). 58 According to the applicant, first, amended criterion (g) has no legal basis. That criterion is incompatible with the requirements of Article 215 TFEU, given that, according to the case-law, there must be a link between the individual sanctions at issue and those imposed against the third State, and targeted sanctions can apply only to a limited category of persons. Furthermore, according to the applicant, if amended criterion (g) were interpreted more broadly, it would be at odds with the distinction between private and public ownership under international humanitarian law. 59 The applicant submits, second, that amended criterion (g) infringes the right to an effective remedy in so far as it has established irrefutable presumptions of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the persons exercising political power in Russia. Such presumptions contradict the precautionary nature of restrictive measures, since the persons listed cannot do anything to be removed from the lists. Furthermore, amended criterion (g), interpreted as meaning that it does not require proof of the exercise of the economic activity by the listed person, is unlawful. In support of that reasoning, the applicant refers to the fact that, by the May 2025 acts, the Council referred, in connection with amended criterion (g), to the ‘socio-economic situation’ of the person concerned and to his or her ‘influence’. 60 Third and last, the applicant submits that amended criterion (g) is very vague and does not contain any objective element allowing a category of persons that may fall within its scope to be defined, with the result that it is possible that any person engaged in a certain type of business activity in Russia may be included on the lists at issue without, however, that person being ‘leading’. Moreover, the threshold above which revenue must be regarded as substantial has not been specified, which renders modified criterion (g) too broad. Thus, that criterion conflicts with the principles of foreseeability and legal certainty. 61 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 62 As a preliminary point, even if, by his arguments in the third statement of modification, the applicant had intended to raise a plea of illegality concerning the May 2025 acts, it should be noted that, when questioned on that point at the hearing, he withdrew that plea. 63 Next, it should be borne in mind that, according to Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act. 64 Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of an act against which it can bring an action, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of such an act, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general act claimed to be unlawful must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested act and the general act the legality of which is contested (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 145 (not published) and the case-law cited). 65 According to settled case-law, the EU Courts must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). 66 The fact remains that the Council has a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the designation criteria and the procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the contested acts laying down the criterion against which the plea of illegality is directed – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 April 2015, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council, T‑10/13, EU:T:2015:235, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 149 (not published)). 67 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s complaint alleging the lack of a legal basis and the need to demonstrate a link between the persons subject to restrictive measures and the regime of the third State, it must be borne in mind that while Article 215(1) TFEU covers areas previously within the ambit of Articles 60 and 301 EC (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraphs 51 and 52), Article 215(2) TFEU empowers the Council to adopt restrictive measures against any ‘natural or legal person’, ‘non-State entity’ or any ‘group’ on the sole condition that a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty provides for such measures. In other words, if the latter condition is satisfied, Article 215(2) TFEU enables the Council to adopt in particular acts imposing restrictive measures against addressees in no way linked to the governing regime of a third country (judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 53). Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging a lack of a legal basis and the requirement of a sufficient link between the persons concerned and the third country in question cannot succeed. 68 As for the applicant’s argument that amended criterion (g) does not respect the protection of private property under international humanitarian law, it is sufficient to note, as the applicant acknowledged at the hearing, that that right is not applicable in the present case. 69 In the second place, by raising the complaint alleging infringement of his right to an effective remedy, the applicant submits that the criterion at issue is based on irrebuttable presumptions. In the third place, he claims infringement of the principle of legal certainty. It is appropriate to examine those two complaints together. 70 It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is a general principle of EU law – requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings. A penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis. The principle of legal certainty implies, inter alia, that any EU legislation, in particular when it imposes or permits the imposition of penalties, must be clear and precise so that the persons concerned may know without ambiguity what rights and obligations flow from it and may take steps accordingly. That requirement of a clear and precise legal basis has been enshrined in the field of restrictive measures (see judgment of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraphs 112 and 113 and the case-law cited). 71 In that regard, it has already been held that the first and third parts of amended criterion (g) were consistent with the principle of legal certainty (judgment of 18 September 2024, Kozitsyn v Council, T‑607/22 and T‑731/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:635, paragraphs 78 to 88). 72 In the present case, it must be observed that amended criterion (g) exists within a legal framework that is clearly circumscribed by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, namely the need, in view of the gravity of the situation, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue are consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco (United States) on 26 June 1945 (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 73 Concerning, more specifically, the first part of amended criterion (g), the term ‘leading’ was already used before it was amended, so that that concept must be interpreted in the same way, namely as referring to the importance of those businesspersons in the light, as the case may be, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143). 74 In other words, the change brought about by amended criterion (g) does not concern the definition of leading businesspersons, in so far as, by that new criterion, the Council sought to broaden the category of persons who may be subject to the restrictive measures at issue to all leading businesspersons operating in Russia, irrespective of the sector in which they are involved. Even though, by its broad formulation, the first part of amended criterion (g) confers a discretion on the Council, it is nevertheless sufficiently clear and foreseeable to meet the requirements of legal certainty. 75 In addition, it should be noted that, for the purposes of the application of the first part of amended criterion (g) to the individual situation of each person whose name appears on the lists at issue, it is for the Council to demonstrate, first, that a natural person can be classified as a leading businessperson within the meaning stated in paragraph 73 above and, second, that that natural person operates in Russia. The mere fact of belonging to the category of leading businesspersons operating in Russia is sufficient to justify the adoption of the necessary restrictive measures on the basis of the first part of amended criterion (g) without there being any need to provide evidence of a link between being a leading businessperson and the Russian regime, or between being a leading businessperson and providing support to that regime or benefiting from it (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 April 2025, Timchenko v Council, T‑297/23, under appeal, EU:T:2025:352, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited). 76 Therefore, since the sole purpose of the first part of amended criterion (g) was to establish an objective, autonomous and sufficient criterion justifying the inclusion of persons on the lists in question, which requires that the Council prove that two cumulative elements are satisfied, namely that the person concerned is a leading businessperson and that he or she operates in Russia, the applicant cannot maintain that that part of amended criterion (g) established a presumption (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 April 2025, Timchenko v Council, T‑297/23, under appeal, EU:T:2025:352, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). 77 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from recital 2 of Decision 2023/1094 that ‘the Union remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and, from recital 4 of that decision, that the Council considered that the designation criteria should cover ‘leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector of Russia’ and to extend those criteria by allowing for the listing of ‘businesspersons who are involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ in order to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine. By targeting those businesspersons, the Council seeks to exploit the influence which that category of persons is capable of exerting over the Russian regime by encouraging them to put pressure on that government to alter its policy of aggression towards Ukraine. 78 It is therefore as a result of the persistence, even worsening, of the situation in Ukraine that the Council took the view that it had to extend the circle of persons and entities covered by the first part of criterion (g) in order to achieve the objectives pursued. It follows from such an approach, which is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures, that the proportionality of those measures is established (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 104). 79 The targeting of ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ is such to exploit the influence of businesspersons on the Russian regime, by encouraging them to put pressure on that government to alter its policy towards Ukraine. 80 Therefore, the first part of amended criterion (g) responds to the Council’s intention to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to put an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 49). 81 Consequently, there is a rational connection between the targeting of Russian leading businesspersons, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 82 Last, the first part of amended criterion (g) and the restrictive measures deriving therefrom are, moreover, necessary in order to achieve and implement the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU. First, it is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 that, by extending the personal scope of the restrictive measures, resulting from the targeting of ‘leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector of Russia’, the Council could legitimately consider that those measures contributed to increasing pressure on that government, which was responsible for the invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Council is required to prove not that the restrictive measures had such an effect, but only that they are capable of having such an effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 66). Second, it should be noted that less restrictive alternative measures have not been mentioned by the applicant. 83 It follows that the first part of amended criterion (g) meets the degree of foreseeability required by EU law, with the result that it does not infringe the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, that criterion is not based on irrebuttable presumptions, with the result that the complaint alleging infringement of the right to an effective remedy cannot succeed either. 84 It is apparent from the foregoing that the first part of amended criterion (g) is not vitiated by illegality. 85 It should be recalled that, according to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the EU Courts consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). 86 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraph 119 below that the Council, in the contested acts, adduced a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to demonstrate that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia, within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g). 87 Since, as noted in paragraph 84 above, that part is not vitiated by the illegalities raised by the applicant in its respect, the plea of illegality directed against the provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, laying down the third part of amended criterion (g), must be rejected as ineffective. 88 Accordingly, the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety. The second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment 89 The applicant, supported by SUEK and EuroChem Group, disputes the merits of maintaining his name on the lists at issue. In essence, he complains that the Council failed to gather sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to justify maintaining his name on the lists on the basis of the first and third parts of amended criterion (g). 90 As regards the first part of amended criterion (g), the applicant claims that the Council is entitled to include a ‘leading businessperson’ on the lists solely when it establishes a relationship of interdependence between that person and the Government of the Russian Federation. According to the applicant, that is not the case here. The Council referred to the applicant’s presence at the annual RSPP meetings and his role within that organisation, but that information is not sufficient to establish close ties with the Russian Government. The other evidence put forward by the Council, such as the applicant’s wealth, are also not relevant for the purpose of determining whether he has links with the Russian Government. 91 The applicant submits that, having resigned from his non-executive functions on the board of SUEK and EuroChem Group and no longer being the beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, he is no longer operating in Russia or involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. The Council’s contentions that the applicant ‘continues to control’ SUEK and EuroChem Group or ‘continues to benefit from the wealth he transferred to his wife’ are incorrect and irrelevant for determining whether he operates within the Russian economy. 92 In his third statement of modification, the applicant submits, referring to the May 2025 acts, that the presumption relating to the ‘socio-economic’ situation of persons identified as leading businesspersons, as determined at the time of the initial inclusion of his name on the lists at issue, freezes his situation and ignores the legal reality. 93 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. Preliminary observations 94 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, whilst it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the EU Courts must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121). 95 The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the EU Courts are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 96 There is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU Courts the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act annulment of which is sought. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 67). 97 The assessment of whether the factual basis for the Council’s decision is sufficiently solid must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation, but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the persons or entities subject to a measure freezing their funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124). 98 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. For that purpose, there is no requirement that the Council produce before the EU Courts all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act whose annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see also judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 99 In accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In this respect, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited). 100 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 101 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information from being provided (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116). 102 As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the maintenance of the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it is important to bear in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list in question or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 103 It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). On that basis, changes in the context include taking into consideration, first, the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established and the particular situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101), and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited). 104 In the present case, it should be noted that, by the judgment in Melnichenko I, the Court dismissed the action brought by the applicant against the initial acts, the September 2022 acts and the March 2023 acts, pursuant to which his name was included and maintained on the lists at issue under criterion (g) in its version predating 7 June 2023. 105 It should be observed that the grounds of the contested acts are based, inter alia, on the fact that the applicant ‘is a Russian industrialist who continues to control major fertiliser producer [EuroChem Group] and the coal company [SUEK]’, that ‘since 9 March 2022, [he] transferred his interests in SUEK and EuroChem Group to his spouse, Aleksandra Melnichenko’, and that ‘he continues to benefit from the wealth he transferred to his wife’. Moreover, the Council found that the applicant ‘belong[ed] to the most influential circle of Russian businesspersons with close connections to the Russian Government’. Those grounds relate to the first and third parts of amended criterion (g). 106 Given that the grounds for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, contained in the September 2023 acts, the March 2024 acts and the September 2024 acts, remained, in essence, unchanged, there is no need to make a distinction between those acts, for the purposes of examining the present plea, since the verification of the information put forward in the statement of reasons and in the evidence relates, in essence, to the same factual circumstances. The first part of amended criterion (g) 107 As is clear from paragraph 75 above, the first part of amended criterion (g) requires that two conditions be met, namely, in the first place, that the person concerned may be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’, which means that he or she is of importance within the Russian economy in the light, in particular, of his or her professional status, the importance of his or her economic activities, the extent of his or her capital holdings or his or her functions within one or more undertakings in which he or she pursues his or her activities; and, in the second place, that he or she operates in Russia. 108 In that context, it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 102 above, the Council could, following its updated assessment of the situation carried out in the context of the review of the restrictive measures at issue, and on the basis of new evidence, maintain the restrictive measures against the applicant. 109 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the general context of the situation in Ukraine, so far as concerns threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, has remained unchanged since the March 2023 acts were adopted. Similarly, the restrictive measures at issue meet the objective pursued, namely to put pressure on the Russian Government to put an end to its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. 110 Second, as regards the applicant’s individual situation, it should be noted that the applicant disputes the fact that he controls SUEK and EuroChem Group, stating that he relinquished his status as a beneficiary of the trust FirstLine Trust on 8 March 2022. In addition, he states that the Council has not provided any evidence that could reasonably lead to the conclusion that he is still involved in economic sectors in Russia, despite standing down as a beneficiary of FirstLine Trust. 111 In that connection, it must be borne in mind, first, that the fact that the applicant used an intermediate legal structure, such as FirstLine Trust, is not such as to prevent him from being regarded as the holder of the shareholdings in SUEK and EuroChem managed by that trust for the purposes of the application of amended criterion (g) (see, to that effect, the judgment in Melnichenko I, paragraph 97). Second, it is common ground that, at the same time as the applicant relinquished his status as a beneficiary, that status was conferred on Ms Melnichenko, who was his wife at the time the contested acts were adopted. Since Ms Melnichenko is not an independent third party with no link to the applicant, the fact that the applicant relinquished his status as a beneficiary in favour of her cannot constitute a relevant change in his individual situation (see, to that effect, the judgment in Melnichenko I, paragraph 98). Consequently, the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding that the applicant continued, on the date the contested acts were adopted, to hold, from an economic point of view, capital holdings in SUEK and EuroChem Group and, as a result, was a ‘leading businessperson operating in Russia’, within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g). Furthermore, the economic control over the applicant’s assets after standing down as beneficiary of FirstLine Trust is confirmed by the other evidence in the file. It is apparent from a press article in Novaya Gazeta of 11 April 2023 (Exhibit No 7 in the file bearing the reference WK 7919/23), the reliability and credibility of which are not disputed by the applicant, that in December 2022, that is to say, after resigning from his non-executive functions on the board of SUEK and EuroChem Group and after relinquishing his status as beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, he still represented his interests in the field of fertiliser production and distribution in South Africa. According to that article, the applicant set up a system for managing his assets which operated autonomously, without requiring his personal involvement in the processes, thus enabling the business to grow and develop. Last, it is apparent from that article in Novaya Gazeta, which is based on the Kommersant article of 10 April 2023, and from the Forbes articles of 20 April 2023 (Exhibit No 8 of the file bearing the reference WK 7919/23) and of 4 April 2023 (Exhibit No 1 in the file bearing the reference WK 16827/2023 INIT), that the applicant continues to benefit from the interests in SUEK and EuroChem Group transferred to his wife, Ms Melnichenko, his wealth having increased further. 112 That finding cannot be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicant. 113 As regards the opinion of 11 November 2022 concerning FirstLine Trust produced by the applicant in order to support his assertion that the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust do not own, nor do they control, assets held in trust, it should be noted that that opinion, produced at the applicant’s request for the purposes of his defence in the present action, has only limited probative value and that, moreover, it discusses the concept of ownership in a formal sense, without considering whether the fact that the applicant was designated as the first beneficiary of the trust may indicate that his economic interests in the companies concerned remain (see, to that effect, the judgment in Melnichenko I, paragraphs 106 and 107). The same is true of the opinion of 14 February 2023 produced by the applicant, which sets out an analysis of FirstLine Trust by reference to Bermuda law. In addition, the argument that the applicant had no control over FirstLine Trust is contradicted, first, by the applicant’s own assertion that he did not take any steps to dissolve that trust or move it to Russia under the ‘de-offshorisation’ campaign launched in 2014 by President Putin and, second, by his interview published on the RSPP website on 26 April 2023 (Exhibit No 2 of the file bearing the reference WK 16827/2023), in which he states that he asked the trustees of the trust to do what was necessary to return to the situation prior to the transfer of his status as beneficiary. That information supports the view that, in practice, the applicant has always retained economic control over FirstLine Trust. 114 So far as concerns the applicant’s argument that his situation does not meet the criteria of ‘control’ set out in paragraph 63 of the note from the General Secretariat of the Council on EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures updated on 27 June 2022 (Document No 10572/22), it should be noted that that document is not legally binding and should not be read as recommending any action which would be incompatible with EU law. Moreover, the ‘control’ criteria, which are intended to identify the circumstances in which a company is subject to restrictive measures, are not aimed at interpreting amended criteria (g) or restricting its scope (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 May 2024, Vinokurov v Council, T‑302/22, not published, EU:T:2024:325, paragraph 122). 115 As regards the argument that the Council has not demonstrated that he ‘operat[ed] in Russia’ within the meaning of the first part of amended criterion (g), following the relinquishment of his status as beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, it should be noted, first, that the relinquishment at issue cannot constitute a relevant change in the applicant’s individual situation, given that his wife, Ms Melnichenko, was granted the status of beneficiary of the FirstLine Trust at the same time (see paragraph 111 above). 116 Second, the applicant does not dispute that EuroChem Group is active in the fertiliser sector and that SUEK is active in the energy sector. As regards SUEK, it is common ground between the parties that that company is established in Russia and is, moreover, one of the largest integrated energy companies in the world (see, to that effect, the judgment in Melnichenko I, paragraph 77). Furthermore, it is apparent from the Financial Assessment Report produced by Secretariat Advisors LLC of 13 October 2023, annexed to EuroChem Group’s application for leave to intervene, that, in 2022, SUEK produced 26% of Russian coal. As regards EuroChem Group, it is apparent from that report that that company represented, in 2022, 22% of Russia’s fertiliser production. Accordingly, the second condition of the first part of amended criterion (g), relating to the pursuit of activities in Russia, is also satisfied. 117 Concerning the applicant’s argument that the Council failed to establish a sufficient link between him and the Government of the Russian Federation, it must be stated that amended criterion (g) does not, contrary to what the applicant claims, require the existence of links or a relationship of interdependence between the person listed under that criterion and the Russian Government (see paragraph 75 above). Therefore, that argument is ineffective. 118 Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments based on the wording of the May 2025 acts, in support of his interpretation of amended criterion (g), are ineffective, in so far as those acts postdate the contested acts and are not applicable ratione temporis in the present case. 119 It follows that the Council was fully entitled to consider that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia, on account of the fact that he continued to control shareholdings in SUEK and EuroChem Group and of the importance of those companies for the Russian economy. Thus, the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering that the applicant satisfied the conditions required by the first part of amended criterion (g). 120 According to the case-law cited in paragraph 85 above, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures and having regard to their preventive nature, if the EU Courts consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision. 121 Therefore, without it being necessary to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the merits of maintaining his name on the lists at issue under the third part of amended criterion (g), the second plea in law must be rejected. The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights 122 The applicant, supported by EuroChem Group and SUEK, claims that the restrictive measures taken against him undermine the essence of his fundamental rights, which include, in particular, the right to respect for private and family life, the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property. Thus, a travel ban and a freeze of his funds prevent him from using his assets in the European Union and in Switzerland, where he has his main residence, from actively intervening in his capacity as a representative of the RSPP or as a member of the Gorbachev Foundation. The applicant submits that none of the interferences mentioned are lawful for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter. He adds that, since there is no link with the regime, the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue in no way contributes to attaining the objectives of Regulation No 269/2014, which consist in applying pressure on the Russian authorities, and is harmful to SUEK and EuroChem Group. In addition, the restrictive measures run counter to the European Union’s policy of guaranteeing global food security. Accordingly, maintaining the restrictive measures adopted against him is unnecessary and disproportionate. 123 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 124 It must be borne in mind that, as regards the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter, according to settled case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). 125 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 126 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, it must respect the essence of those rights. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 145 and 222 and the case-law cited). 127 In the present case, it is clear that those four conditions are satisfied. 128 As regards the first condition referred to in paragraph 126 above, it should be noted that the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of his rights enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts of, inter alia, general application, namely Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 129 As regards the second condition referred to in paragraph 126 above, it should be noted that, given that the contested acts apply for a period of six months and are kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of his rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 15 to 17 of the Charter are temporary and reversible. Therefore, it must be held that they do not infringe the essence of his right to respect for private and family life, his freedom to choose an occupation, his right to engage in work, his freedom to conduct a business and his right to property. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting exemptions to the restrictive measures applied. In particular, so far as concerns the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of frozen funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 130 As regards the third condition referred to in paragraph 126 above, it should be noted that the limitations of the rights enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter imposed on the applicant satisfy an objective of general interest which is as fundamental for the international community as that of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 198). 131 Concerning the fourth condition referred to in paragraph 126 above, it should be noted, as regards the appropriateness of the restrictive measures at issue, that it has been held that the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and in Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, imposed on natural and legal persons, entities and bodies included on the lists annexed to those acts, first, were, as such, appropriate and necessary in the light of the overriding importance of the objectives which they pursued, and, second, did not cause manifestly disproportionate negative consequences for those persons, entities and bodies, with the result that they complied with the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraphs 198 to 200 and 202). Moreover, the applicant has not been able to demonstrate that alternative and less restrictive measures would enable the objectives pursued in the present case to be achieved as effectively. 132 In the present case, a balancing of the interests at stake demonstrates that the disadvantages for the applicant of the temporary freezing of funds and the ban on entering the territory of the Member States for a limited period are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued. In that regard, the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, which form part of the broader objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any negative consequences, even considerable ones, for certain operators. It should be noted that specific derogations from the measures may be granted by the authorities of the Member States in accordance with Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, in particular to meet the basic or essential needs of the persons concerned or to meet certain necessary expenditure. 133 Accordingly, those restrictions are temporary and reversible restrictions which allow for possible exemptions. Therefore, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in view of the importance of the objective pursued by the contested acts. 134 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue has serious repercussions on his right to respect for family life and the home and on that of his wife and of his children, in particular because the travel ban imposed by the European Union has the indirect effect of cutting his family off from their main residence in Switzerland, it must be held that any measures taken against him by third States cannot be attributed to the contested acts. 135 In addition, as for the alleged infringement of the right to respect for private and family life resulting from the fact that the applicant can no longer visit certain members of his family in the territory of the European Union, it is sufficient to note that the applicant merely claimed that the prohibition on entering or transiting through the territory of the European Union prevented him from maintaining ties with his relatives who reside in the Member States without substantiating that claim with specific evidence. 136 In addition, as regards the argument that the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate on account of the dangers to which they give rise for global food security, it is sufficient to note that the subject matter of the contested acts is not trade in agricultural products and that no causal link between the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and risks for global food security has been demonstrated. 137 In addition, on 16 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2479 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 687) and Regulation (EU) 2022/2475 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 315), which provide for a derogation from the freezing of funds and economic resources where transactions are necessary for the sale, supply, transfer or export of agricultural and food products. 138 Last, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging harm suffered by EuroChem Group and SUEK, it is sufficient to note that the scope of the present action is limited to the review of the lawfulness of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and that neither EuroChem Group nor SUEK is covered by the restrictive measures at issue. 139 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third plea in law, alleging infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality, must be rejected. The pleas of SUEK and EuroChem Group 140 In their statements in intervention, SUEK and EuroChem Group, in addition to their arguments relied on in support of the pleas in law in the application, raise two separate pleas, alleging, first, misuse of powers by the Council and, second, infringement of their fundamental rights. 141 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, while the fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute and Article 142(3) of the Rules of Procedure, do not preclude an intervener from submitting arguments which are new or differ from those of the party which he or she supports, as otherwise his or her intervention would be limited to restating the arguments put forward in the application, it cannot be held that those provisions allow him or her to alter or distort the context of the dispute defined by the application by raising new pleas in law. In other words, those provisions give the intervener the right to set out, independently, arguments as well as pleas, in so far as they support the form of order sought by one of the main parties and are not entirely unconnected with the issues underlying the dispute, as established by the applicant and defendant, which would result in a change in the subject matter of the dispute (see judgment of 20 September 2019, Port autonome du Centre et de l’Ouest and Others v Commission, T‑673/17, not published, EU:T:2019:643, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited). 142 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the alleged misuse of powers, SUEK and EuroChem Group claim that the contested acts have a serious impact on their situation. According to SUEK and EuroChem Group, although the Council did not intend to affect their situation, it should be noted that the contested acts have no rational connection with the stated objective of Regulation No 269/2014, which is to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation. If, however, the Council’s true intention was to impose restrictive measures on them, then it circumvented the listing procedure provided for by Regulation No 269/2014 by adopting the contested acts. 143 In that regard, it should be noted that, under the guise of a plea alleging misuse of powers, the interveners raise, first, the alleged lack of a link between the measures at issue and the objective of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian Federation. Therefore, that argument must be rejected for the reasons set out in paragraphs 81 and 130 above. 144 Second, as regards the argument of SUEK and EuroChem Group that, by mentioning their names in the contested acts, the Council in fact intended to make them subject to the restrictive measures at issue, it should be noted that that argument, which in essence criticises the inclusion of SUEK and EuroChem Group in the grounds of the contested acts, does not support the form of order sought by the applicant seeking annulment of the contested acts in so far as they maintain his name on the lists at issue. Accordingly, that argument is entirely unconnected with the considerations underlying the dispute as established between the main parties, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 141 above. 145 In any event, it must be held that the argument based on the alleged intention of the Council to subject SUEK and EuroChem Group to the restrictive measures is unfounded, in so far as it is based on the premiss that the mere mention of the names of SUEK and EuroChem Group in the grounds of the contested acts affects their legal situation by requiring the authorities of the Member States to freeze their funds and economic resources and by prohibiting EU economic operators from making funds and economic resources available to them or for their benefit. That premiss is incorrect, given that the fact that a legal person or an entity is owned, held or controlled by a person whose name is included on the lists at issue must be established, in the case of the freezing of funds and economic resources, by the authorities of the Member States, and, where appropriate, in the case of the prohibition laid down in Article 2(2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 2(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, by the persons required to comply with those provisions (see, to that effect, orders of 21 October 2024, EuroChem Group v Council, T‑1111/23, not published, EU:T:2024:751, paragraphs 56 and 57, and of 21 October 2024, Suek v Council, T‑1112/23, not published, EU:T:2024:753, paragraphs 52 and 53). 146 Consequently, the plea alleging misuse of powers must be rejected. 147 In the second place, as regards the plea alleging infringement of the fundamental rights of SUEK and EuroChem Group, they claim, first, that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which led to a ‘de facto’ inclusion of their names, deprived them of access to any legal remedy, in infringement of Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter, and, second, that the mention of their names in the grounds of the contested acts infringes their right to property, as guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter, in so far as that mention incentivised operators to sever commercial ties with them, depriving them of their ability to operate. 148 It should be noted that, by relying on the alleged infringement of their right to a judicial remedy and their right to property, SUEK and EuroChem Group criticise, in essence, the mention of their names in the grounds of the contested acts. It follows that the present plea does not support the form of order sought by the applicant seeking annulment of the contested acts in so far as they entail the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue and, therefore, is entirely unconnected with the considerations underlying the dispute as established between the main parties, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 141 above. 149 Accordingly, the plea alleging infringement of the fundamental rights of SUEK and EuroChem Group must be rejected. 150 As a result, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 151 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those of the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. 152 According to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Commission must therefore bear its own costs. 153 Last, according to Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order an intervener other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof to bear his or her own costs. In the present case, SUEK and EuroChem Group must each bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Andrey Melnichenko to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders Siberian Coal Energy Company AO (SUEK), EuroChem Group AG and the European Commission each to bear their own costs. Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 December 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.