Order;Information — ECLI:EU:C:2022:592
Date: 2022-07-12
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Subject matter: Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;Police cooperation;Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Ireland

C-480/21 - 1
SUPREME COURT
S:AP:IE:2021:000018 and S:AP:IE:2021:000020
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 267 OF THE TREATY ON THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE 
TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
MS JUSTICE DUNNE 
MR JUSTICE CHARLETON 
MS JUSTICE O’MALLEY 
MS JUSTICE BAKER
High Court 2015 No. 145 EXT, 2015 No. 159 EXT, 2015 No. 160 EXT, 2017 No. 
50 EXT
IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 (AS 
AMENDED)
AND IN THE MATTER OF W O (DOB: 23rd day of September 1983) 
BETWEEN
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
APPLICANT
AND
WO
RESPONDENT
AND
High Court 2019 No. 349 EXT
IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
ACT 2003 (AS AMENDED)
AND IN THE MATTER OF J L (DOB: 27th October 1993)
BETWEEN
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
APPLICANT
AND
JL
RESPONDENT
ORDER DATED THE 30th DAY OF JULY 2021 
FOR REFERENCE TO THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION PURSUANT TO 
ARTICLE 267 OF THE TREATY
The Notice of Appeal by the Respondent WO filed on the 5th day of March 
2021 by way of appeal from the Judgment of the High Court (Mr Justice Binchy) 
given on the 4lh day of February 2021 and the Order made on the 17th day of February' 
2021 that the Respondent WO be surrendered to the Republic of Poland and for an 
Order setting aside the said Judgment and Order on the grounds and as set forth in the 
said Notice of Appeal having come on for hearing before this Court on the 30lh day of 
June 2021 together with the Notice of Appeal by the Respondent JL filed on the 19lli 
day of April 2021 by way of appeal from the Judgment of the High Court (Mr Justice 
Binchy) given on the 4th day of February' 2021 and the Order made on the 17lh day of
February 2021 that the Respondent JL be surrendered to tire Republic of Poland and 
for an Order setting aside the said Judgment and Order on the grounds and as set forth 
in the said Notice of Appeal
Whereupon and having read the Determinations of this Court the 9th day of 
March 2021 and the 6th day of May 2021 granting leave to appeal herein the said 
Notices of Appeal the said Orders the documents therein referred to the judgments of 
the High Court and the written submissions filed on behalf of the respective parties 
and having heard Counsel for the Respondent WO and Counsel for the Respondent JL 
and Counsel for the Applicant
IT WAS ORDERED that the case should stand for judgment 
And the matter having been listed for judgment on the on the 23rd day of July 
2021 and judgment having been delivered on that date in the presence of Counsel for 
the respective parties and the parties having been given an opportunity to make 
observations on a draft Order of Reference
And It Appearing that the facts and proceedings are as set forth and included 
in the Order for Reference annexed hereto
And it further appearing to this Court that the determination of the issues 
between the parties on this application raise questions concerning the correct 
interpretation of certain provisions of European Union Law namely questions arising 
in respect of the Council Framework Decision 2002/5 84/JHA as amended by Council 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA and the appropriate test to be applied when an 
objection is raised pursuant to s. 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 that 
ordering the surrender of a respondent who is the subject of an EAW would 
potentially lead to a violation of their rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
THE COURT HAS DECIDED TO REFER to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union pursuant to Article 267 of tire Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union as set out in the said Order for Reference the questions:
(1) Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P 
where there is a real risk that the appellants will stand trial before courts which are not
established by law?
(2) Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P 
where a person seeking to challenge a request under an EAW cannot meet that test by 
reason of the fact that it is not possible at that point in time to establish the 
composition of the courts before which they will be tried by reason of the manner in 
which cases are randomly allocated?
(3) Does the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the validity of the 
appointment of judges in Poland, in circumstances where it is apparent that the 
appellants cannot at this point in time establish that the courts before which they will 
be tried will be composed of judges not validly appointed, amount to a breach of the 
essence of the right to a fair trial requiring the executing state to refuse the surrender 
of the appellants?
AND IT IS ORDERED that the Respondents remain on continuing bail there 
being liberty to apply in the High Court in this regard and that the further hearing of 
these Appeals do stand adjourned until after the said Court of Justice shall have given 
its preliminary ruling on the said questions or until further Order in the meantime
And the Court noting that application having been made at the outset the Court doth 
in the circumstances of this case recommend the payment by the State of the costs of the 
Respondents including Solicitor and Senior and Junior Counsel in accordance with the Legal 
Aid - Custody Issues Scheme.
JOHN MAHON
/ o’Ax't i'l i
BIRMINGHAMGEORt
REGISTRAR
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
Perfected this 30n’ day of July, 2021
AN CHUIRT UACHTARACH
THE SUPREME COURT
S :AP:IE:2021:000018
Birmingham P. 
Dunne J. 
Charleton J. 
O’Malley J. 
Baker J. 
Between/
WO
AND
Appellant
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
Respondent
S :AP:IE:2021:000020
Between/
JL
Appellant
AND
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
Respondent
Order of Reference of the Court of the 30th July 2021
Introduction
1. The Supreme Court has decided to refer to the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 267 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, questions arising in respect of the 
Council Framework Decision 2002/5 84/JHA as amended by Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA and tire appropriate test to be applied when an objection is raised pursuant to s. 
37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 that ordering the surrender of a respondent who 
is the subject of an EAW would potentially lead to a violation of their rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (“the Charter”). In Celmer, following a reference to the Court of Justice, it was decided 
that Member State courts were required to undertake a two-step analysis when a respondent 
seeks to resist surrender on the suggestion that there is a risk of violation of their rights pursuant 
to EU law: firstly, the court should identify whether generalised and systemic deficiencies exist 
in the requesting Member State that give rise to a breach of rights under the ECHR or the 
Charter, and secondly, the Court must identify a real risk on substantial grounds that the essence 
of the fundamental right will be breached, (see Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies 
in the system of justice) Case C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, “LM” herein, as Celmer 
was identified in the CJEU). This test was more recently affirmed by the CJEU in Joined Cases 
C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, L&P, £CLI:EU:C:2020:1033, “L and P” hereinj.The 
Facts
2. Mr. O and Mr. L are the subject of a number of EAWs which seek their extradition to 
the Republic of Poland (“Poland”). The first-named appellant is the subject of four EAWs, two 
of which were issued by the regional court of Lublin, and the remaining two issued by the 
District Court in Zdzislaw Lukasiewicz and Zamosc respectively. Three of these EAWs seek 
his surrender to face trial for a number of specific offences and one seeks his surrender so that 
he can be imprisoned for convictions already handed down by the Polish courts. The second- 
named appellant is the subject of an EAW issued by the regional court of Rzcszow, and it 
relates to five offences.
The Proceedings in Ireland
3. The ordinary procedures for the execution of the warrants against Mr. O and Mr. L were 
followed with the applicant/respondent (the Minister) applying for enforcement of the 
warrants. The cases were considered together in the High Court. The EAWs were challenged 
on a number of grounds in both cases, and while separate judgments were given for each of 
them, the judgments concern the same core issue, and were decided in the same way. The 
judgments of the High Court in each case found in favour of the Minister and ordered the 
surrender of Mr. O and Mr. L (See Minister for Justice & Equality v. O, [2021] IEHC 109, and 
Minister for Justice & Equality v. L [2021] IEHC 108). The appellants applied for and were 
granted leave to appeal to this Court by determinations dated the 9th of March 2021 (O v. 
Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IESCDET 28) and the 6th of May 2021 (L v. Minister 
for Justice and Equality [2021] IESCDET 48) respectively.
4. The core contention of the appellants is that, since the decision of Celmer, the situation 
in Poland has changed. The Act on the System of Common Courts (“the New Laws”) was 
passed on the 20th December 2019 and adopted by the Polish legislature on the 23rd January 
2020, and came into force in Poland on the 24th February 2020, which the appellants say raises 
the possibility that tire courts in Poland which would consider their cases may not be constituted 
in accordance with law in the manner recently referred to by the Court of Justice in A.B. and 
Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court - Actions) Case C-824/18 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:153. Moreover, the appellants say that no mechanism exists in Poland to 
challenge this illegality. The respondent argues that the appellants are effectively asking the 
Court to dispense of the second stage of the LM test. The respondent says that there is no 
authority, domestic or international, to suggest that a party can complain only of a theoretical 
breach of their rights. A party must demonstrate some nexus between the breach complained 
of and their individual case, and without such evidence, the appellants must fail.
The Position of the parties
5. In the course of arguments before the Supreme Court, the appellants’ central argument 
was that the decision in LM, which set out a two-step approach as to whether a rule of law- 
objection to surrender should succeed, does not apply to the facts of this case, on the basis that 
it was concerned only with questions of the independence of the judiciary, which they said is 
a distinct consideration from whether a court is one that is established by law. They made the 
point that if the court in Poland is not established in accordance with law, then, the requested 
person will have no effective remedy. In this case, the concern relates not to independence but
the legality of the court. Therefore, they said that it is only if the court is established in 
accordance with law that the question of independence of the court arises. The appellants said 
that there is a real risk that any court before which they will appear will not be established by 
law by virtue of the New Laws and other changes brought in since 2015, contrary to the 
requirements under Article 47 of the Charter and Arts. 6 and 13 of the ECHR. In those 
circumstances, they will have no effective remedy as required by the ECHR and the Charter. 
The appellants said that the decision in LM concerned questions pertaining to independence, 
whereas in this case, there is an identifiable, fundamental right i.e. the right to an effective 
remedy, which has been removed from the appellants as a result of recent legislative changes 
in Poland. The appellants argue that this distinction is significant, as the right to an effective 
remedy is less subjective than the question of independence and therefore less referable to 
factors personal to the requested person.
6. The respondent argued that the appellants seek a radical departure from the settled 
principle that a party must show that their specific and precise circumstances create a real risk 
of a breach of a Convention and/or Charter right. She said that the appellants proffer no reason 
as to why the right to an effective remedy should be treated any differently than any other 
Convention right, and that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR has 
consistently adopted the approach that there must be a real risk of a breach of a right to the 
requested person in relation to the right not to be subject to degrading and/or inhuman treatment 
(Aranyosi and Caldararu Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, 
Saadi v. Italy Application No. 37201/06 [2009] 49 E.H.R.R. 30), or there must be a real risk of 
a breach of the essence of a right to a fair trial {LM; L and P). The respondent submitted that 
there is no basis for the suggestion that the same test should not apply in respect of the right to 
an effective remedy. She relied on Minister for Justice v. Brennan [2007] 3 I.R. 732 in stating 
that the principle that a party must show a nexus between the breach of the right and their own 
specific circumstances is also a principle of domestic law. The matter complained of must 
impact on the person whose surrender is sought. It was further noted that to require a party to 
show individualised risk where they claim a potential breach to their right to be free from 
degrading and inhuman treatment but not require the same individualised risk where there is a 
potential breach of the right to an effective remedy would be anomalous.
7. The respondent said there are other reasons for maintaining the LM approach: firstly, 
the Framework Decision 2002/584 states that a warrant shall be executed unless one of the 
stated reasons for refusing surrender is proven to arise. The respondent further argued that, if
it were sufficient for a requested party to alone show that generalised and systemic deficiencies 
exist in the requesting Member State, then all EAWs issued by that Member State could be 
subject to objection and it would render the Framework Decision in respect of that Member 
State meaningless. The respondent submits that such a conclusion would be problematic. 
Firstly, it was pointed out that under Article 7 of the TEU, where the European Council believe 
there has been a serious and persistent breach in the issuing Member State of Article 2 
principles, Framework Decision 2002/584 can be suspended in respect of that Member State, 
and refusal to execute any warrants pursuant to the Framework Decision can be made without 
specific assessment (See LM at paras. 72 and 73). Secondly, the respondent argued that to allow 
refusal on general deficiencies would grant effectual impunity to persons attempting to flee 
conviction or sentence from the requesting Member State, as they could successfully challenge 
an EAW without any evidence relating to their specific circumstances. The respondent said 
that this is a position which would contradict the purpose underlying the Framework Decision, 
which is to combat impunity of a requested person who is present in a territory other than that 
in which they have committed the offence (See L and P at paras. 59 and 60). The respondent 
has emphasised that the CJEU has made it clear that the test to be applied when a ground for 
refusal to surrender is raised to the effect that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental 
right concerned, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing Member 
State, the executing judicial authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the requested person themselves will run such a risk 
if surrendered to that State. (See Aranyosi and LM). Accordingly, it is contended that 
dispensing with the second stage of the test would undermine the very objective of the EAW 
system.
8. The appellants said that the principle of “effective judicial protection” at issue in Article 
19(1) TEU has a relationship with Ai ts. 6 and 13 ECHR and Art. 47 of the Charter so that while 
the organisation of justice is a matter in which Member States have competence, Member States 
must comply with EU law, including Article 19(1) TEU. The appellants cited European 
Commission v. Poland (Independence of the ordinary courts) Case C-192/18 F.CLT.EU: 
C:2019:924 as authority for this proposition. The appellants also argued that the CJEU have 
recognised that Art. 47 includes the right to invoke a breach of the right to a fair trial and that 
courts must be able to scrutinise irregularities in the appointment of judges, and to this end they 
rely on HG & Simpson Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-1I and C-543/18 RX-II 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:232. The appellants said that the decision in Simpson provides a mandate for
domestic Member State courts to review any irregularity in relation to the appointment of 
judges in order to satisfy compliance with Ait. 47. The appellants further relied on Astradsson 
v. Iceland in maintaining that, even when a review mechanism is provided, the quality of the 
review is of importance. In that case, the ECtHR found that the review of the irregularities in 
appointment was deficient in that it failed to consider die question of whether the court was 
established by law. The respondent argued that the right to an effective remedy can arise only 
where there is first established some other right or entitlement which the claimant alleges has 
been breached or is likely to be breached having regard to the specifics of this case and which 
therefore requires a remedy. The ECtHR has confirmed on a number of occasions that the right 
to an effective remedy has no independent existence. It merely complements the other effective 
clauses of the Convention and its protocols. Similarly, the CJEU has held in relation to the right 
to an effective remedy set out in the first paragraph of Article 47 that "... the recognition of 
that right, in a given case, presupposes, as is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 47 
of the Charter, that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed 
by EU law. " (A.B. and Others Case C-824/18 at para. 88). The respondent argued that there is 
no basis in principle, and none in domestic case law or that of the CJEU the ECtHR, to suggest 
that die right to an effective remedy has some elevated status such that generalised deficiencies 
in the remedies available in a requesting State would result automatically in a refusal to 
surrender.
9. The appellants said that the establishment of a court or tribunal in accordance with law 
is an uncontroversial component of the rule of law and has been recognised as such by the 
Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice. They submitted that the case law demonstrates that 
the rule of law entails, inter alia, the process of appointing judges in a proper manner. They 
relied on Astradsson v. Iceland and L and P in arguing that a consideration of whether a court 
is one “established by law” is a distinct question from whether the court is impartial or 
independent in its exercise following that establishment, and therefore, different considerations 
apply to it.
10. Fundamentally, the appellants submitted that a consideration of whether a court is 
established in accordance with law precedes any consideration of independence; in other 
words, the first step is the question of whether the court concerned is one established by law. 
Essentially it is contended that the question of whether the court before which the appellants 
will stand trial is established by law is a separate complaint to that determined by the CJEU in 
LM and confirmed recently in L and P. If it does not meet the criteria of Article 6 ECHR and
Article 47 of the Charter, the examination of the Court comes to an end as there is nothing 
further to examine. In other words, if tire court is not established by law then the question of 
independence or impartiality does not arise. In those circumstances it is contended that the 
High Court does not have to consider the personal situation, the nature of the offence in 
question and the factual context in which the relevant warrant was issued as such matters are 
external to the primary question of establishment.
11. The respondent said that the distinction between independence and establishment is 
artificial where both the right to be heard in front of a tribunal established by law, and the right 
to be heard by an independent and impartial court, are different aspects of the same right 
pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter, and that to apply two different tests to two parts of the 
same right would be contrived. It is said that this distinction has never been noticed by any 
court in the past. The right to an independent tribunal and one established by law are part of 
the same fundamental right. That this is so has been recognised in the past. (HG & Simpson). 
Further, it was observed that the CJEU has explained that the objective of the requirement that 
tribunals be established by law "is to guarantee the independence of judicial power with 
respect of the executive “ (FV v. Council of the European Union, Case T-639/16P). The 
respondent argued that the discussion of the distinction between independence and 
establishment in Astradsson needs to be contextualised. While the Court made a distinction 
between impartiality and independence in that case, bearing in mind that it was common case 
that the appointment of a judge to the Icelandic court of appeal was irregular under domestic 
law, the ECtHR went on to examine whether the irregularity had any impact on the applicant. 
The respondent said that the applicant in that case could only complain about a breach of his 
rights under Article 6 because he could show that there was an irregularity in the appointment 
of one of the judges who dealt with his case. In other words, he could show that the irregularity 
affected his individual case. The respondent reiterated the point that the appellants have led no 
cogent evidence to suggest that any of the judges before whom they are likely to appear have 
been appointed other than in accordance with domestic Polish law. Accordingly, the respondent 
says that in order to succeed, the appellants must show that the establishment right is radically 
different to the right to be heard before an independent tribunal, or indeed any other right. There 
is nothing in the case law to ground such a proposition.
12. This Court, in the course of its consideration, has had regard to the evidence before the 
High Court from Ms. Dqbrowska, a Polish lawyer, who provided a number of reports on behalf
of the appellants. It is relevant to note that it is not possible at this stage to identify the 
composition of the courts before which the appellants will be tried by reason of a random case 
allocation system. Reliance was also placed on a number of documents put before the High 
Court, including an opinion on the New Laws delivered by the Polish Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Dr. Bodnar, reports from the Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe (tire 
OSCE), and a report of the Venice Commission of the 30th December, 2019 together with the 
Resolution of the Supreme Court of Poland of the 23rd January 2020. This Court also had regard 
to the conflict highlighted by Ms. D^browska between the Supreme Court of Poland and the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland on the new laws.
13. Further information was sought by the High Court j udge from the issuing authority in 
respect of Mr. O which confirmed that pursuant to Article 26(3) of the new laws, a motion 
challenging the composition of a court will not be heard if it relates to establishing or 
assessment of the legality of the appointment of the judge or his legitimacy to perform tasks 
concerning the justice system.
Observations
14. This Court is acutely aware of the systemic deficiencies apparent in the rule of law 
previously identified in this jurisdiction in the Celmer case in its various iterations and in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in cases such as LM and more recently in L and P, which are now 
even more troubling and of deeper concern following the introduction of the New Laws. The 
Supreme Court of Poland in its Resolution of the 23rd January 2020 has said that a Court 
formation “is unduly appointed” where the court formation includes a person appointed to the 
office of a judge of a common court (and other courts) on application of the National Council 
for the Judiciary formed in accordance with the Act of 8th December 2017 and certain other 
Acts, if the defective appointment causes, under specific circumstances, a breach of the 
standards of independence within the meaning of the Constitution of Poland, Article 47 of the 
Charter and Article 6(1) of the ECHR (See Resolution No. 2). It is hard to imagine a more 
severe condemnation of the system of appointment of judges from a country’s Supreme Court. 
It is the view of this Court that the position in Poland in respect of the rule of law is even more 
troubling and grave than it was when LM was decided by the Court of Justice. This Court 
previously observed (O’Donnell J.) in Celmer v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 
80 at para. 85:
"1 would tend to agree with the trial judge that the possibility that systemic deficiencies 
in a particular system could, by themselves, amount to a sufficient breach of the essence 
of the right to a fair trial, requiring an executing authority to refuse surrender, cannot 
and should not be ruled out in the abstract. That could occur, for example, where the 
deficiency identified at a systemic level is so far-reaching and pervasive as it would 
plainly and unavoidably take effect in the requesting court, and on any individual trial 
on a particular charge. However, I also agree with the trial judge that it is clear from 
the judgement of the C.J.E. U., that the systemic changes in Poland, while undoubtedly 
both serious and grave, cannot themselves be seen as sufficient to reach that point in 
this case. ”
15. It now appears that there are significant issues with regard to the validity of the 
appointment process for judges in Poland. It is impossible for the appellants in this case to 
identify the judges before whom they are to be tried because of the manner in which cases are 
randomly allocated. Even if they could identify the judges and establish that the judges were 
not validly appointed and thus not part of a court established by law, it is clear that there is no 
possibility of challenging the validity of the composition of the court allocated to try them by 
reason of the provisions of the New Laws and, in particular, Article 26(3) thereof. That being 
so, the question must arise as to whether the systemic deficiencies in the Polish system are such 
that they, by themselves, amount to a sufficient breach of the essence of the right to a fair trial, 
requiring the executing authority, in this case, Ireland, to refuse surrender. The answer to that 
question is not acte clair.
16. This Court is aware of a further decision of the Court of Justice in European 
Commission v Republic of Poland, Case C-2021:596 concerning the rule of law, the 
independence of the judiciary and the effect of disciplinary proceedings against judges. This 
decision was delivered after the hearing in this Court and whilst it was not part of the 
consideration of this Court, it has to be said that it adds to our concerns as to the rule of law in 
Poland and the consequences for individuals before those courts.
The Questions
17. In the circumstances, this Court proposes to request a ruling from the CJEU as follows:
(1) Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P where there is a real 
risk that the appellants will stand trial before courts which are not established by law?
(2) Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P where a person 
seeking to challenge a request under an EAW cannot meet that test by reason of the fact that it 
is not possible at that point in time to establish the composition of the courts before which they 
will be tried by reason of the manner in which cases are randomly allocated?
(3) Does the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the validity of the appointment of 
judges in Poland, in circumstances where it is apparent that the appellants cannot at this point 
in time establish that the courts before which they will be tried will be composed of judges not 
validly appointed, amount to a breach of the essence of the right to a fair trial requiring the 
executing state to refuse the surrender of the appellants?
Request for the Reference to be dealt with by way of Expedited Procedure
18. The Supreme Court requests the CJEU to deal with the reference under Article 105 of 
its Rules of Procedure dealing with its expedited procedure. The Supreme Court considers that 
the appeals raise fundamental issues of national and EU law having regard to the matters set 
out above and thus comes within the expedited procedure and requires to be dealt with as a 
matter of urgency. In particular, the following matters are relied on:
a. The Appellants, although not in custody, are the subject of bail orders which 
amounts to a restriction of their liberty;
b. The answers to the questions posed will be decisive to the determination of 
whether or not the Appellants will be surrendered - in that regard it might be 
pointed out that the Irish Courts cannot make a final decision in relation to 
surrender until the reference is determined;
c. The answers to the questions posed may be decisive to the determination of 
whether or not others sought pursuant to EAWs by Poland will be surrendered;
d. In the event that other persons who are sought pursuant to EAWs by Poland are 
not surrendered to Poland pending the determination of the reference this may
amount to a de facto suspension of the operation of the Framework Decision as 
between Ireland and Poland during such period;
e. Given that EAWs from Poland represent slightly less that half of the number of 
EAWs executed annually by the State this would have significant implications 
for Ireland’s operation of tire Framework Decision;
In the circumstances, the Supreme Court considers that the criteria for an expedited procedure 
have been met.