Judgment;Judgment (extracts);Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2021:450
Date: 2021-07-14
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question of whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64). 65 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C 584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited; judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65). 66 That is because it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 66). 67 For that purpose, there is no requirement that that authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act sought to be annulled. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 67). 68 So far as concerns the types of evidence which may be relied on, the prevailing principle of EU law is the unfettered evaluation of the evidence available (judgment of 6 September 2013, Persia International Bank v Council, T‑493/10, EU:T:2013:398, paragraph 95 (not published)). 69 In that regard, it is important to recall that, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, or other similar sources of information (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107). It is clear from the case-law that, inter alia, in some situations, the Courts of the European Union may take into account reports from international organisations (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 48). 70 Furthermore, as indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, in accordance with Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Decision 2017/2074, the general criterion established for the purposes of inclusion in the lists at issue covers, inter alia, natural persons ‘whose actions, policies or activities otherwise undermine democracy or the rule of law in Venezuela’. That criterion is also set out in Article 8(3) of Regulation 2017/2063. 71 In that regard, in the first place, it should be borne in mind that, as regards the general context in Venezuela, it is clear from recitals 1 and 5 to 8 of Decision 2017/2074 and recitals 1 and 2 of Regulation 2017/2063 that the contested acts were adopted on account of the continuing deterioration of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Venezuela, as a result of, inter alia, the use of excessive force, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. Recital 6 of Decision 2017/2074 states that on 2 August 2017, the European Union expressed its deep regret at the decision of the Venezuelan authorities to continue with the election of a Constituent Assembly, a decision that durably worsened the crisis in Venezuela and risked undermining other legitimate institutions foreseen by the Venezuelan Constitution, such as the National Assembly. 72 That general context of the situation in Venezuela was also referred to by the Council before the Court, without it being disputed by the applicant. The Council thus recalled that, after December 2015, following elections to the National Assembly, a coalition of opposition parties had won a majority of the seats. In January 2016, the then President of Venezuela declared a state of emergency in Venezuela and ruled by decree. By April 2017, demonstrations had taken place almost daily for several months, which resulted in the death and injury of many civilians and thousands of arrests. In May 2017, the then President of Venezuela announced the creation of a Constituent Assembly, the members of which were elected on 30 July 2017 through an electoral process which was boycotted by the opposition 73 It is in the light of those considerations that it is appropriate to examine whether the reasons for the applicant’s inclusion in and retention on the lists at issue, which alleged that, taking into account his role as member then President of the Constituent Assembly, and as the First Vice-President of the PSUV, he was involved in undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, in particular by using the media to publicly attack and threaten political opposition, other media and civil society. The first part, directed against the contested acts, alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’ 74 The applicant submits that the fact that he has his own television programme does not prove that he has used the media to publicly attack and threaten the political opposition, other media and civil society, or that he has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. In particular, the applicant alleges that the Council has misconstrued the content of the articles on which it relied. Thus, the Council relied on the heading of an article published by the newspaper Impactocna stating that the applicant had issued threats against the Office of Prosecutor General of Venezuela, whereas that was not the meaning of the content of that article. That article referred to a press conference given by the applicant in the context of indications that the Prosecutor General had failed to fulfil her duties. In that context, the applicant submits that he merely asserted that it would be for the Constituent Assembly to determine whether the Public Prosecutor’s Office turned its back on the country or was one that fulfilled its interests, without there being any threat. 75 Next the Council alleges that the applicant threatened the media by accusing journalists in particular of complicity with a bomb attack that killed seven members of the Bolivarian National Guard. However, in an article in the newspaper El Nuevo Siglo, on which the Council relied, the applicant asserted that he merely echoed a statement made by the Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard that journalists knew that a bomb had been there and had not said anything, instead waiting for it to detonate. 76 The applicant therefore concludes that the Council failed to conduct a careful and impartial assessment of the evidence or, at the very least, that its assessment is manifestly erroneous. 77 The Council contests the applicant’s arguments. 78 In the present case, as regards in the first place the evidence put at issue by the applicant, it must be recalled, first, that, the article published on the website ‘impactocna.com’, on 31 May 2017, sets out a statement by the applicant made to journalists according to which, when installed, the Constituent Assembly should decide whether or not to allow the Prosecutor General’s Office or any constituent power to ‘turn its back on the country’. Also in that statement, the applicant asserted that the Prosecutor General’s Office supported the violence and made itself complicit in the murders, referring to the fact that it had criticised the conduct of the police forces during the demonstrations that shook the country. Moreover, in response to the positions inter alia of the Prosecutor General which opposed the government and the calling of the Constituent Assembly, the applicant added that there were enough traitors and that one was ‘either with the country or with the opposition who wanted to destroy it’. The applicant has not contested the content of that article but merely states that he had simply stated that it was for the Constituent Assembly to determine whether the Public Prosecutor wished to serve the interests of the country, without there being any threat. However, the Council cannot be criticised for having deducted from that article that the applicant had threatened the Public Prosecutor’s Office by stating, in essence, that the Constituent Assembly would decide whether or not to retain that service, that it would not accept the presence of traitors, and also that the Public Prosecutor’s Office supported violence and had become an accomplice to murders. 79 Second, according to the article in El Nuevo Siglo of 13 July 2017 the applicant repeated on his own account a statement of the General Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard that journalists knew that there was a bomb, which, on exploding, had in fact injured seven soldiers, but had not alerted them, instead waiting for it to detonate. According to the same article, the applicant added, first, that the journalists present were complicit in that explosion taking place and, second, that the journalists who were at the place of the explosion were there because they knew what was going to happen. Thus, contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Council was able to infer from that article that the applicant had accused those journalists of complicity in a bomb attack perpetrated against the Bolivarian National Guard, despite the fact that he had reacted to a statement made by the General Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard. 80 In the second place, it must be observed that the applicant has not raised any challenge regarding the other evidence upon which the Council relied contained within its file. 81 First, the applicant has not presented arguments regarding a 2017 report on Venezuela by the non-governmental organisation Freedom House, which criticised him for having used, in his television programme, information obtained from the illegal recording of private conversations, in order to attack his political opponents. 82 Secondly, the applicant has moreover not commented on the report of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) on Venezuela, of 19 July 2017, accusing the applicant of inciting brutal repression through incendiary rhetoric, of giving instructions to deploy combat corps against demonstrations by the opposition, of publicly threatening opposition leaders by stating ‘we know where you live’, of publicly exhibiting, in his weekly television programme Con el Mazo Dando, a ‘manual for revolutionary fighters’ which included personal information on opposition leaders including their place of residence, in order to intimidate the opposition and, potentially, endanger its members. That latter information was also given in articles in the newspaper Infobae which appeared on 18 and 20 April 2017. 83 Thirdly, the applicant has not criticised the press release by the organisation Transparency International which disclosed intimidatory manoeuvres by the applicant during his television programme and on its website, towards movements denouncing human rights violations in Venezuela. 84 Fourthly, the applicant has not disputed information that appeared in the OAS report of 14 March 2017 according to which he was responsible for acts of torture. 85 Fifthly, the applicant has not contested an article in the newspaper Efecto Cocuyo, of 19 July 2017, from which the Council concluded that the applicant had threatened judges who were to be nominated to the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Supreme Court, Venezuela) by the National Assembly. 86 In view of all the elements set out in paragraphs 78 to 85 above, it must be held that the Council did not commit an error of assessment in concluding that, taking into account his duties as a member of the Constituent Assembly and the First Vice-President of the PSUV, the applicant was involved in undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela, including by using the media to publicly attack and threaten the political opposition, other media and civil society. 87 It follows that the first part of the second plea in law is unfounded. The second part of the second plea in law, directed against Decision 2018/1656 and Implementing Regulation 2018/1653, alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’ 88 In his statement of modification of the application, the applicant disputes the retention by Decision 2018/1656 and by Implementing Regulation 2018/1653 of his name on the lists at issue. He submits that it is apparent from the wording of the reasons given in those acts that the Council attaches particular importance to the fact that he has become President of the Constituent Assembly. According to the applicant, the mere fact that he is the President of the Constituent Assembly is insufficient to justify the retention of his name on the lists at issue and to prove that his actions and policies, in the context of that role, undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. 89 In that connection, the applicant claims that the President of the Constituent Assembly is, as such, vested merely with organisational and administrative powers relating to the management and functioning of the Constituent Assembly and that he has neither a ‘qualified vote’ nor a right of veto. That role thus is insufficient to prove that his actions undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. According to the applicant, the inclusion on the lists at issue on account of links with a body suspected of having undermined democracy or violated human rights cannot be based on presumptions that are not substantiated by the conduct of the person concerned. 90 The Council contests the applicant’s arguments. 91 It should be observed that while, as the applicant submits, Decision 2018/1656 and Implementing Regulation 2018/1653 amended the reasons for his inclusion on the lists at issue by substituting for his role as member of the Constituent Assembly that of President of that assembly, the other reasons for inclusion remained identical such that it was merely an updating of the information in order to take into account the change of role of the applicant that occurred after his inclusion on those lists. 92 Hence, the complaint, that the applicant draws from the fact that Decision 2018/1656 and Implementing Regulation 2018/1653 refers to his new role as President of the Constituent Assembly, cannot lead to the annulment of those two acts to the extent that it is not clear from the file that that fact is the only reason for his name being retained on the lists at issue. The Council states in its observations on the statement of modification, without it being disputed by the applicant, that the retention of his name on the lists at issue continued to be justified on the basis of the file that had provided the initial basis for including his name on those lists. 93 Moreover, the fact that the applicant took on more important duties within the Constituent Assembly cannot call into question the retention of his name on the lists at issue. Restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 58 and 59). Therefore, the fact that the applicant was nominated President of that assembly cannot, in itself, preclude the retention of his name on the lists at issue. On the contrary, the exercise of the more important role within that assembly together with the acts undermining of the rule of law and democracy committed by the applicant while he carried out roles of lesser importance within that assembly (see paragraph 86 above) justifies the retention of the applicant on the lists at issue. 94 Consequently, as with the conclusions reached on the first part of this plea in law, the present part thereof must be rejected. 95 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second plea in law must be rejected. The third plea in law, alleging a breach of the freedom of expression 96 According to the applicant, the contested acts constitute an unlawful restriction on his freedom of expression, a freedom which he may rely on in his capacity as a commentator, journalist and entrepreneur in the entertainment industry. He submits that that right covers in particular his statements broadcast in the context of his weekly television programme entitled Con el Mazo Dando. 97 With a view to demonstrating that the contested acts are unlawful, the applicant claims that the Venezuelan Constitution guarantees extensive freedom of expression and the right to information. In addition, the Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisión y Medios Electrónicos (Law on Social Responsibility in radio, television and electronic media) organises the provision of telecommunication services on the basis of that freedom of expression. 98 The applicant also refers to Article 11 of the Charter and to Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’). 99 The Council contests the applicant’s arguments. 100 It should be recalled that respect for fundamental rights is required of all actions of the European Union, including those in the area of CFSP as is apparent from the combined provisions of Articles 21 and 23 TEU (see judgment of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:C:2018:619, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Given that the freedom of expression and to information is guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter and, under the following conditions, by Article 10 ECHR, it is necessary to verify whether the contested acts comply with that right. 101 As regards Article 10 ECHR, it must be observed that, admittedly, that convention is not, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law. Consequently, the examination of the validity of an act of EU secondary legislation must be carried out solely in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. However, it should be recalled, on the one hand, that, under Article 6(3) TEU, fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and, on the other hand, that it follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter that the rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR. According to the explanations relating to that provision, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting it, the meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of the ECHR but also, in particular, by the case-law of the ECtHR. It is also apparent from those explanations that Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Moreover, it must be pointed out that that equivalence between the freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and those guaranteed by the ECHR has been formally expressed in relation to freedom of expression (see judgment of 31 May 2018, Korwin-Mikke v Parliament, T‑770/16, EU:T:2018:320, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 102 The text itself of Article 11(1) of the Charter and of Article 10(1) ECHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression’. The ECtHR has already held that the freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and that no distinction is made in that convention according to the nature of the aim pursued or the role played by natural or legal persons in the exercise of that freedom (ECtHR, 28 September 1999, Öztürk v. Turkey, CE:ECHR:1999:0928JUD002247993, § 49). 103 It should be borne in mind that the ECtHR places particular weight on the role played by journalists as ‘watchdogs’ of society in general and democracy in particular. It recommends ‘the greatest care’ when it is necessary to assess the validity of restrictions on their freedom of expression (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 24 June 2014, Roșiianu v. Romania, CE:ECHR:2014:0624JUD002732906, § 61). It also stresses that audiovisual media, such as radio and television, have a particularly important role to play in that regard. Because of their power to convey messages through sound and images, such media have a more immediate and powerful effect than print. The function of television and radio as familiar sources of entertainment in the intimacy of the listener or viewer’s home further reinforces their impact (ECtHR, 17 September 2009, Manole and Others v. Moldova, CE:ECHR:2009:0917JUD001393602, § 97). 104 Nevertheless, the ECtHR considers that the right of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest requires that they should act in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide ‘reliable and precise’ information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. Article 10(2) ECHR, underlines that freedom of expression carries with it ‘duties and responsibilities’, which also apply to the media even with respect to matters of serious public concern (see, ECtHR, 17 December 2004, Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, CE:ECHR:2004:1217JUD004901799, § 78 and the case-law cited). It follows from the case-law of the ECtHR that the fact that audiovisual media have effects that are often more immediate and powerful than print media is a factor to be taken into consideration when assessing the ‘duties and responsibilities’ referred to above (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 16 June 2015, Delfi AS v. Estonia, CE:ECHR:2015:0616JUD006456909, § 134). 105 Furthermore, the ECtHR has held that there is little scope under Article 10(2) ECHR for restrictions on political expression or on debate on questions of public interest. Expression on matters of public interest is in principle entitled to strong protection, by contrast with that which promotes or justifies violence, hatred, xenophobia or other forms of intolerance, which is normally not protected. It is in the nature of political speech to be controversial and often virulent, but that does not diminish its public interest, provided that it does not cross the line and turn into a call for violence, hatred or intolerance (ECtHR, 15 October 2015, Perinçek v. Switzerland, CE:ECHR:2015:1015JUD002751008, §§ 197, 230 and 231; see also, to that effect, ECtHR, 8 July 1999, Sürek v. Turkey (N° 1), CE:ECHR:1999:0708JUD002668295, §§ 61 and 62). According to the ECtHR, in order to determine whether the statements as a whole could be regarded as incitement to violence, it was necessary to have regard to the words used and the context within which they were broadcast (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 6 July 2010, Gözel and Özer v. Turkey, CE:ECHR:2010:0706JUD004345304, § 52). In particular, if those statements were made against a tense political or social background, that court has generally accepted that some form of interference with such statements may be justified under Article 10(2) ECHR (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 15 October 2015, Perinçek v. Suisse, CE:ECHR:2015:1015JUD002751008, § 205). 106 For the application of those principles to this case, it is necessary to have regard to the context of the present case, which has specific characteristics distinguishing it from those that allowed the ECtHR to develop its case-law (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 93). 107 It must be emphasised that the principles set out in the case-law of the ECtHR were established in view of situations in which a state, which had acceded to the ECHR, imposed restrictive measures, often of a penal nature, on a person who had made statements or undertaken actions considered unacceptable to that state, and that person invoked the freedom of expression as a defence against that state (judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 94). 108 By contrast, in the present case, the applicant is a Venezuelan citizen, resident in Venezuela, who exercises political functions in his own country and has considerable access to the audiovisual media in that country. 109 That is the context in which the applicant invokes the right to freedom of expression. Thus, he does not rely on that right in order to defend himself against the Venezuelan State, but rather to protect himself against restrictive measures, of a precautionary, rather than penal, nature, which the Council adopted in reaction to the prevailing situation in Venezuela (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 97). 110 It is in the light of all of those principles and all of those considerations that the present plea must be examined. 111 It must be emphasised that the applicant was included and retained on the lists at issue in his capacity as a leading Venezuelan political figure, for having publicly attacked and threatened the political opposition, media and civil society. That ground allowed the Council to apply the criterion laid down in Article 6(1)(b) of Decision 2017/2074, for including the names of natural persons whose actions, policies or activities otherwise undermine democracy or the rule of law in Venezuela. 112 It must be observed that the media interventions made by the applicant on which the Council relied in order to justify the contested acts disclose, inter alia, his political acts and statements during demonstrations, before the press and at press conferences. 113 It follows that the applicant was made the subject of the restrictive measures at issue in his capacity as a political figure who undermined democracy and the rule of law by making public and targeted threats against the political opposition, media and civil society. 114 As regards the applicant’s argument that he may rely on his status of commentator, journalist and entrepreneur in the entertainment industry, it should be observed that his weekly television programme, the sole evidence moreover of the status of journalist upon which he relies for his benefit, appears to be an extension of his political activities. In fact, as is clear from paragraphs 81 to 83 above, the applicant has used his programme to attack his political opponents and to give instructions as to actions against the opposition. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph 112 above, the applicant’s actions considered by the Council do not concern his television programme alone. In any event, it follows from the case-law of the ECtHR that the principles relating to journalists’ good faith and ethical duties that they are required to respect in order to be able to rely on greater protection from interference in their freedom of expression (see paragraph 104 above) apply equally to other persons who engage in public debate (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 15 February 2005, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2005:0215JUD006841601, § 90, and 29 November 2005, Urbino Rodrigues v. Portugal, CE:ECHR:2005:1129JUD007508801, § 25). Thus, those principles are relevant as regards the applicant’s situation, who undoubtedly engaged in the public debate taking place in Venezuela. 115 It is clear from an examination of the case file that, without taking on the ‘duties and responsibilities’ referred to in the ECtHR case-law, the applicant freely made use of the media in order to publicly threaten and intimidate the political opposition, other media and civil society. 116 In particular, the applicant accused journalists of complicity in a bomb attack on the National Guard. In addition, he has not denied having engaged in intimidation on his website with regard to movements denouncing human rights violations in Venezuela, or having used, in his television programme, information derived from the unlawful recording of private conversations in order to attack political opponents. Nor did he dispute the information that he incited brutal repression through incendiary rhetoric, gave instructions to deploy combat corps against the demonstrations by the opposition, publicly threatened opposition leaders by declaring ‘we know where you live’, publicly exhibited a ‘manual for revolutionary fighters’ that contained personal information about opposition leaders, including in particular their place of residence, in order to intimidate the opposition. The applicant has furthermore not disputed information that appeared in the OAS report of 14 March 2017 according to which he was involved in acts of torture. 117 Therefore, it must be held that the acts of the applicant examined by the Council in its file constitute an incitement to violence, hatred and intolerance, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 105 above, such that those acts cannot benefit from the enhanced freedom of expression which protects, in principle, statements made in the political context. Those acts are, in fact, genuine attacks that undermine democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. 118 Consequently, the applicant’s arguments based on his role as journalist relating to the freedom of expression enjoyed by journalists must be rejected. 119 Moreover, it is true that, as noted in paragraph 102 above, ‘everyone’ enjoys freedom of expression. In addition, in the present case, the restrictive measures imposed on the applicant may lead to restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of expression since they were decided upon by the Council on account, inter alia, of some of his comments and may therefore deter him from expressing his views in similar terms. However, it must be observed that the freedom of expression does not constitute an unfettered prerogative and may be limited, under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 120 In order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the freedom of expression must satisfy three conditions. First, the limitation must be ‘provided for by law’. In other words, the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a person’s freedom of expression must have a legal basis for its actions. Secondly, the limitation in question must be intended to achieve an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Thirdly, the limitation in question must not be excessive (see judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). 121 As regards the first condition, it should be noted that, in the present case, the limitation is ‘provided for by law’, in view of the fact that it is set out in acts which are, inter alia, of general application and have clear legal bases in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 72). 122 As regards the second condition, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the examination of the second plea in law, the contested acts comply, as regards the applicant, with the objective referred to in Article 21(2)(b) TEU of consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law in so far as they form part of a policy designed to promote democracy in Venezuela. 123 As regards the third condition, it must be noted that it has two aspects: first, the limitations on freedom of expression liable to result from the restrictive measures at issue must be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued and, second, the essence of that freedom must not be impaired (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 84). As regards the first aspect, it must be recalled that the principle of proportionality, as one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 87). 124 In that respect, the case-law makes clear that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 88). 125 In the present case, as regards whether the restrictive measures, such as those imposed on the applicant, are appropriate in the light of an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as the protection of democracy and the rule of law, it appears that the freezing of funds, financial assets and other economic resources of persons identified as being involved in the undermining of democracy in Venezuela cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate. (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Boshab v Council, T‑171/18, not published, EU:T:2020:55, paragraph 134 and the case-law cited). As has been pointed out in paragraph 117 above, by his incitements to violence, hatred and intolerance, the applicant is the cause of such harm. 126 As regards the necessity of the limitations at issue, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, namely bringing pressure to bear on Venezuelan decision-makers responsible for the situation in Venezuela, particularly given the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 85). 127 Furthermore, it should be recalled that Article 7(4) of Decision 2017/2074 and Article 9(1) of Regulation 2017/2063 provide for the possibility of authorising the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources in order for the persons concerned to meet basic needs or commitments. 128 Since the limitations on the applicant’s freedom of expression that the restrictive measures at issue are liable to entail are necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued, it is appropriate next to examine whether they impair the essence of that freedom. 129 It must be borne in mind that the restrictive measures at issue provide that, first, Member States are to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories and, second, all of his funds and economic resources in the European Union are to be frozen. 130 The applicant is a national of a third country to the European Union, Venezuela, and resides in that state, where he pursues his professional activity as a politician also active in the media of that country. Accordingly, the restrictive measures at issue do not undermine the essence of the applicant’s right to exercise his freedom of expression, in particular in the context of his professional activity in the media sector, in the country in which he resides and works (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 123). 131 In addition, those measures are by nature temporary and reversible. It follows from Article 13 of Decision 2017/2074 that that decision is kept under constant review (see paragraph 7 above). 132 Therefore, the restrictive measures to which the applicant is subject do not infringe his freedom of expression. 133 Having regard to all of the foregoing, the third plea in law must be dismissed. 134 Since all the pleas in law relied on by the applicant have been rejected, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 135 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Diosdado Cabello Rondón to pay the costs. da Silva Passos Reine Truchot Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 July 2021. E. Coulon S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.