Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:255
Date: 2026-04-15
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Second Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Ireland

summary of those pleas in law, from which it is readily apparent that the applicant disputes the lawfulness of both the contested implementing regulation and Regulation No 1151/2012, which that implementing regulation applies. In that regard, the applicant maintains, in essence, that it ought to have been heard regarding the amendments made to the initial application for registration following the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom. 30 In addition, the essential elements of fact and of law on which the pleas put forward in the action, as set out in paragraphs 21 to 24 above, are based are indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and are sufficiently clear and precise to permit the Commission to prepare its defence, as indeed it has been able to do, and the Court to adjudicate on the action. B. The merits of the action 1. The first plea in law, alleging breach of the right to be heard 31 The applicant claims that there has been an infringement of the right to be heard within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, also protected by Article 6 ECHR. The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. That right must be observed even where the applicable legislation does not provide for such a formality. 32 The applicant maintains that, in the present case, it was deprived of any opportunity to be heard and to make known its views on the amended application for registration. 33 The Commission and Ireland dispute the applicant’s arguments. 34 As a preliminary point, the complaint alleging infringement of Article 6 ECHR must be rejected at the outset as ineffective, as the Commission is not a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of that provision (see judgments of 27 June 2012, Coats Holdings v Commission, T‑439/07, EU:T:2012:320, paragraph 171 and the case-law cited, and of 27 March 2014, Saint-Gobain Glass France and Others v Commission, T‑56/09 and T‑73/09, EU:T:2014:160, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). 35 It should, in the first place, be borne in mind that Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that the right to good administration includes ‘the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken’. 36 The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption by an institution or body of the European Union of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, observance of the right to be heard is required, as the applicant observes, even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 85 and 86 and the case-law cited, and of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 37 The right of every person to be heard is not intended to apply, however, where a person considers himself or herself to be affected by an act of general application (judgment of 22 June 2023, Arysta LifeScience Great Britain v Commission, C‑259/22 P, not published, EU:C:2023:513, paragraph 50). 38 Similarly, the Court of Justice has made clear that the right to good administration, as provided for in Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not cover the process of enacting measures of general application (judgment of 17 March 2011, AJD Tuna, C‑221/09, EU:C:2011:153, paragraph 49). 39 As regards measures of general application, neither the process of the preparation of such acts nor those acts themselves require, under the general principles of EU law, such as the right to be heard, consulted or informed, the participation of those affected. The position is different if an express provision of the legal framework governing the adoption of that act confers such a procedural right on an affected person. Even though Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not require it to do so, it remains open to the EU legislature to provide for a right, for persons deemed to be affected by an act of general application, to be heard, consulted or informed and to regulate the exercise of that right (judgment of 22 June 2023, Arysta LifeScience Great Britain v Commission, C‑259/22 P, not published, EU:C:2023:513, paragraph 51). 40 In the present case, the contested implementing regulation is an act of general application, in that it recognises that all operators whose products meet the requirements of the amended product specification may market their products under the protected name. 41 Therefore, in the context of the adoption of the contested implementing regulation, the only procedural rights that the applicant has are those expressly provided for in Regulation No 1151/2012. On that basis, the exercise of the right to be heard on an application for registration of a protected name is governed by Articles 49 and 51 of that regulation. 42 Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, entitled ‘Application for registration of names’, provides, in that context, in paragraph 3 thereof, that ‘the Member State shall initiate a national opposition procedure that ensures adequate publication of the application and that provides for a reasonable period within which any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident on its territory may lodge an opposition to the application’. 43 Article 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, entitled ‘Opposition procedure’, provides, in that regard, in paragraph 1 thereof, as follows: ‘Within three months from the date of publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, the authorities of a Member State or of a third country, or a natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established in a third country may lodge a notice of opposition with the Commission. Any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest, established or resident in a Member State other than that from which the application was submitted, may lodge a notice of opposition with the Member State in which it is established within a time limit permitting an opposition to be lodged pursuant to the first subparagraph. … The Commission shall forward the notice of opposition to the authority or body that lodged the application without delay.’ 44 It is apparent from a combined reading of Articles 49 and 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012 that a natural or legal person, established or resident in the Member State from which the application to register a protected name was submitted, may lodge an opposition to such an application only at the level of that Member State and is therefore unable to lodge a notice of opposition with the Commission. 45 As the applicant is established in the Member State from which the application for registration of the PGI at issue was submitted, it cannot validly claim that the Commission acted in breach of its right to be heard in respect of the amended application for registration when it adopted the contested implementing regulation. 46 In view of all of the foregoing, the first plea in law must be rejected. 2. The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 47 The applicant maintains that, as it was deprived of any opportunity to be heard concerning the amended application for registration, the Commission adopted the contested implementing regulation in breach of Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014. In its submission, Article 4 provides that, in case of joint applications, the national opposition procedures must be implemented in all the Member States concerned. 48 The Commission and Ireland dispute the applicant’s arguments. 49 It should be noted that Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014, entitled ‘National opposition procedures for joint applications’, provides as follows: ‘In case of joint applications as referred to in Article 49(1) of Regulation … No 1151/2012, the related national opposition procedures shall be carried out in all the Member States concerned.’ 50 Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 thus concerns only the Member States and not the Commission, and the organisation of national opposition procedures within the meaning of that provision is solely within the competence of the Member States concerned. 51 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, ‘in the case of a “protected designations of origin” or “protected geographical indications” name that designates a trans-border geographical area …, several groups from different Member States or third countries may lodge a joint application for registration’. 52 In that regard, it is sufficient to state that no joint application for registration, within the meaning of Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, was lodged. The only application received by the Commission, in the context of the procedure that led to the adoption of the contested implementing regulation, was the initial application for registration lodged by Ireland. That implementing regulation was thus adopted outside the scope of that provision. 53 Although, as the Commission states in recital 5 of the contested implementing regulation, the initial application for registration, following the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom, became a multi-country application in that it then covered the territory of Northern Ireland, such a circumstance cannot however, where no formal application was lodged, have transformed the initial application for registration into a ‘joint application for registration’ within the meaning of Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012. 54 Consequently, since Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 imposes obligations only on the Member States concerned, the Commission cannot have adopted the contested implementing regulation in infringement of such a provision, which, moreover, was not applied in the present case. 55 In view of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected. 3. The third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration 56 The applicant maintains, in essence, that the Commission infringed the principle of good administration by not ensuring, in breach of the division of powers between the Commission and the Member State concerned provided for by Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, that Ireland in fact organised a new opposition procedure in relation to the amended application for registration. 57 In the applicant’s submission, because the geographical area designated by the PGI at issue, following the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom, became a cross-border area and because the amended application for registration included a new group, the Commission ought to have regarded that application as a new application, jointly submitted by Ireland and the United Kingdom, within the meaning of Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, in order fully to ensure the protection of the right to be heard. 58 The applicant maintains that the documents annexed to the defence do not support the Commission’s contention that Ireland repeated its scrutiny of the amended application for registration. Nor was any national opposition procedure implemented with respect to the amended application for registration. 59 According to the applicant, by not ensuring that a new opposition procedure was in fact organised at national level, the Commission failed to have regard to the scope of Article 51(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, which, in the applicant’s words, does not permit the Commission to ‘accept an entirely new application where to do so would result[, as in the present case,] in a denial of the right to be heard’. 60 The Commission also, according to the applicant, infringed Article 17 TEU, which provides that the Commission is to ‘ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them’, since it did not ensure that the Member States complied with Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014, which the applicant claims lays down the ‘obligation to carry out national opposition procedures in all Member States concerned by the joint applications’. 61 The applicant maintains that, in the present case, it was even more necessary to allow it to exercise effectively its right to be heard at national level and to formulate objections to the amended application for registration because that application had been submitted by two groups neither of which fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 or constituted a group as defined in Article 3 of that regulation. 62 The applicant infers that, in registering the name at issue without the applicant having had the opportunity to submit observations in the context of an opposition at national level to the amended application for registration, the Commission infringed the principle of good administration. 63 The Commission and Ireland dispute the applicant’s arguments. 64 In that regard, Ireland observes that it was not required, in any event, to organise a new opposition procedure on the amended application for registration on the basis of Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012. The amendments made to the initial application for registration constitute substantial amendments and as a result the national procedure ended and the amended application for registration was then solely a matter for the Commission and was covered by Article 51(4) of that regulation. 65 In the present case, as it clarified at the hearing, the applicant takes issue with the Commission for having deprived it, in essence, of its right to be heard by Ireland because it did not consider that the amended application for registration constituted a new application, jointly submitted by Ireland and the United Kingdom, and failed to ensure, before repeating the scrutiny referred to in Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012, that a new national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration had in fact been implemented in Ireland. 66 Accordingly, it is appropriate to answer, in the first place, the question whether, in the present case, Ireland was required, in the context of Regulation No 1151/2012, to implement a national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration and, in the second place, the question whether, if the answer to the first question is in the positive, the Commission was required, in application of the principle of good administration, to ensure the effective implementation of such a procedure by Ireland, before determining whether the Commission fulfilled its obligations arising from that principle in the present case. (a) Whether there is an obligation on Ireland to implement a national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration 67 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the guarantees conferred by EU law in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, part of which is the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (judgments of 21 November 1991, Technische Universität München, C‑269/90, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14, and of 23 September 2009, Estonia v Commission, T‑263/07, EU:T:2009:351, paragraph 99). 68 It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, when a provision of EU law is interpreted, account must be taken not only of its wording but also of its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part. The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see judgment of 9 June 2022, IMPERIAL TOBACCO BULGARIA, C‑55/21, EU:C:2022:459, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). 69 It is therefore appropriate to carry out a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, in particular Article 51(4) of that regulation, on which the applicant relies. 70 In the first place, as regards the literal interpretation, it should be noted that Articles 49 to 51 do not expressly lay down an obligation on the applicant Member State to implement a national opposition procedure after the initial application for registration has been the subject of a reasoned and admissible statement of opposition received at EU level. In particular, those articles do not lay down such an obligation where that application has been substantially amended following the appropriate consultations between the authority or person that lodged the opposition and the authority or body that lodged the application, within the meaning of Article 51(3) of that regulation. Article 51(4) of that regulation merely states that, in such a case, the Commission is to repeat the scrutiny provided for in Article 50 of that regulation. 71 It should be noted, however, first, that Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012 refers to Article 49 of that regulation, providing that the Commission is to scrutinise any application that it receives pursuant to that article in order to check that the application is justified. 72 Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 provides that every applicant Member State is under an obligation to allow any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident on its territory to lodge an opposition to any application for registration of a name. 73 Second, when the details published in accordance with Article 50(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, namely, in essence, the details of the product specification covered by the application for registration of the name at issue, have been substantially amended following the appropriate consultations, Article 51(4) of that regulation provides, as is apparent from paragraph 70 above, that the Commission is to repeat the scrutiny, referred to in Article 50 of that regulation, of the application for registration. 74 Such scrutiny means that the application as thus amended must be published again, in accordance with Article 50(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, which allows any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest, established or resident in a Member State other than that from which the application was submitted, to lodge an opposition to that amended application, in accordance with Article 51(1) of that regulation. 75 It thus follows from the wording of Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, which provides for the procedure for the registration of a name, that the EU legislature provided for a right, for persons liable to be affected by such a procedure, to lodge an opposition, either at national level or at EU level. However, the wording of those articles does not expressly provide that a natural or legal person established or resident in the applicant Member State has a right to lodge an opposition, at national level, to an application for registration which has been substantially amended. 76 In the second place, as regards the contextual and teleological interpretation, it should be stated that Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012 come under Title V, Chapter IV, entitled ‘Application and registration processes for … geographical indications …’, which also concerns procedures for the amendment of a product specification and the cancellation of a registration. 77 In that regard, it may be observed, first of all, that, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, where an application to amend a product specification, namely an application lodged after the name in question has been registered, involves one or more amendments that are not minor, which include amendment of the protected geographical area, as follows from point (d) of the third subparagraph of Article 53(2) of that regulation, ‘the amendment application shall follow the procedure laid down in Articles 49 to 52’ of that regulation. 78 Likewise, it must be emphasised that, alongside Article 54 of Regulation No 1151/2012, relating to the procedure for the cancellation of a protected name, Article 7 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 provides that the procedure laid down in Articles 49 to 52 of Regulation No 1151/2012 is to apply mutatis mutandis to the cancellation of a registration as referred to in the first and second subparagraphs of Article 54(1) of that regulation. 79 Such provisions therefore imply that amendments to a product specification which are not minor, or the cancellation of a registration, may be the subject of an opposition both in the Member State from which the application for amendment or cancellation is submitted, for natural or legal persons having a legitimate interest and established or resident in that State, and at EU level, for natural or legal persons having a legitimate interest and established or resident in one of the other Member States, through that Member State. 80 In those circumstances, having regard to both the general scheme of Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012 and the legal context of which they form part, Article 51(4) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 50 of that regulation, implicitly but necessarily means that, where the details of the product specification of the product at issue covered by the initial application for registration have been substantially amended, the Member State to which the authority or body that lodged that application belongs is to initiate a new national opposition procedure. That new procedure must guarantee adequate publication of the application for registration as thus amended and provide for a reasonable period within which any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident on the territory of that Member State may lodge an opposition to the application. 81 Questioned on that point at the hearing, the Parliament, a co-legislator of Regulation No 1151/2012, confirmed, in that respect, the Commission’s interpretation, as is apparent from the explanations which it provided at the hearing, that where the details of the product specification have been substantially amended, the Member State concerned is to initiate a national opposition procedure for the application for registration as thus amended. 82 In the third place, such an interpretation is confirmed by the rules that existed prior to those contained in Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, which should be taken into account in the context of the teleological and contextual interpretations of those provisions, under which the applicant Member State was required to implement a new national opposition procedure when the details of the initial application were substantially amended following an opposition lodged before the Commission. 83 Regulation No 1151/2012 was adopted following the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 1992 L 208, p. 1). 84 The procedure governing an application for registration of a protected name was the subject of Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 2081/92 and provided, in particular, that any legitimately concerned natural or legal person might object, at national level, to the proposed registration and that any Member State might object to the registration following its publication in the Official Journal. If the objection was held to be admissible, the Commission then asked the Member States concerned to seek agreement among themselves in accordance with their internal procedures. 85 However, if such an agreement was reached and that agreement resulted, in essence, in the amendment of the product specification of the product protection of which was sought, the Commission, on the basis of Article 7(5) of Regulation No 2081/92, was to ‘again initiate the procedure laid down in Article 7’ of that regulation. Article 7 of that regulation expressly provided, in paragraph 2 thereof, that the competent authorities of the Member States were to ensure that all persons who could demonstrate a legitimate economic interest were authorised to consult the application and, in paragraph 3 thereof, that any legitimately concerned natural or legal person might object to the proposed registration at the level of the Member State in which that person was resident or established, as noted in paragraph 84 above. 86 It is thus apparent from the registration procedure laid down by Regulation No 2081/92, which preceded Regulation No 1151/2012, that any person concerned by the application for registration and residing or established in the Member State from which the application was submitted benefited from a new national opposition procedure in that Member State after an opposition had resulted in the amendment of the initial application. 87 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be concluded, regard being had to the literal, contextual and teleological analysis of Articles 49 to 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, interpreted in the light of the principle of good administration, that legitimately interested natural or legal persons established or resident in the applicant Member State should be able to object, to that Member State, to an application to register a protected name after that application has been substantially amended. 88 It must therefore be concluded that, in the present case, Ireland was required to organise a national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration. (b) The obligations on the Commission to ensure the effective implementation by Ireland of a new national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration 89 It must be noted that, in accordance with Article 51(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, the obligation on the Commission to repeat the scrutiny referred to in Article 50 of that regulation applies where the details published in accordance with paragraph 2 of that article have, following the appropriate consultations referred to in Article 51(3) of that regulation, been substantially amended. 90 The Commission must therefore necessarily take account of the results of the appropriate consultations, following which the scrutiny which it must carry out takes place. 91 Such an interpretation is supported by Article 52(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012, which expressly provides that, where the Commission receives an admissible statement of opposition, it is to take account of the ‘results’ of the appropriate consultations referred to in Article 51(3) of that regulation, before proceeding, if an agreement has been reached, to register the name in question. 92 As is apparent from paragraph 80 above, where, following an opposition, the details of the product specification of the product at issue covered by the initial application for registration have been substantially amended, within the meaning of Article 51(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, the applicant Member State is to initiate a new national opposition procedure in respect of the application for registration as thus amended. 93 That interpretation is confirmed, moreover, by the evolution of the legal framework of which Regulation No 1151/2012 forms part. 94 In that regard, as explained in paragraph 85 above, Regulation No 2081/92, which preceded Regulation No 1151/2012, provided, in Article 7 thereof, that where the details of the initial application had been amended following an objection that was deemed admissible, the Commission was to initiate the opposition procedure again both for the benefit of the Member States and for that of any legitimately concerned natural or legal person, who could then object by sending a statement to the Member State on whose territory the person in question was resident or established. In the absence of any objection, or where the details of the initial application were not amended, the Commission was to register the name. Such a procedure therefore necessarily meant that the Commission would verify whether there was any opposition, since that determined whether it was possible to proceed directly to the registration concerned. 95 In addition, it may be observed that, in accordance with Article 50(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/2117 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 (OJ 2021 L 435, p. 262), on which the applicant relies, when the Commission examines applications for registration, it is to check that such applications contain the required information, ‘taking into account the outcome of the scrutiny and opposition procedure carried out by the Member State concerned’. 96 In those circumstances, the Commission must take into account and examine carefully and impartially, in compliance with the principle of good administration, all the relevant details of the particular case, including the fact that a national opposition procedure was conducted, which constitutes a precondition of the scrutiny provided for in Article 50(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 where the details of the initial application are substantially amended. 97 It must be concluded from all of the foregoing that, in the present case, the Commission was required, in application of the principle of good administration, to ensure, before carrying out again, on the basis of Article 51(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, the scrutiny provided for in Article 50(1) of that regulation in respect of the amended application for registration, that Ireland had in fact initiated a national opposition procedure for that application. (c) Compliance by the Commission with its obligations arising under the principle of good administration in the present case 98 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind, in addition, that the duty of sincere cooperation with the Commission, as laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, means that every Member State is under a duty to facilitate the Commission’s accomplishment of its task consisting, in accordance with Article 17 TEU, as the applicant observes, in ensuring, as guardian of the Treaties, the application of EU law under the control of the Court of Justice (judgment of 6 March 2025, Commission v Luxembourg (Whistleblowers directives), C‑150/23, EU:C:2025:146, paragraph 63). The duty of sincere cooperation implies, in particular, that the Member State concerned must in good faith provide the Commission with all relevant information requested by it (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 19 September 2024, United Kingdom and Others v Commission (Taxation of profits of CFCs), C‑555/22 P, C‑556/22 P and C‑564/22 P, EU:C:2024:763, paragraph 99). 99 In the present case, it is apparent from the case file that, in an email of 7 July 2022 to the Irish Department of Agriculture, the Commission, in answer to Ireland’s inquiry about procedural steps to be taken in the case Ireland reached an agreement with the United Kingdom, ‘strongly’ recommended that Ireland ‘republish the [amended] product specification’ as this ‘would allow … sufficient time for potential oppositions in Ireland, considering the substantial changes to the product specification that seem[ed] to be envisaged as a result of the ongoing consultations (extending the demarcated area to cover the territory in Northern Ireland (NI), among others).’ The Commission stated in that email that that Department ‘might consider it useful to request an extension of the consultations by three months to allow more time for implementation of the necessary steps at national level’. 100 In answer to the Commission’s email of 7 July 2022, the Irish Department of Agriculture replied, by email of 8 July 2022, that it ‘intend[ed] to publish the revised documents again once agreement [between Ireland and the United Kingdom was] reached and, as ha[d] always been the case, it [was] open to any stakeholder to submit views’. 101 By email of 12 December 2022, that is to say, after the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom was forwarded to it, the Commission, after informing the Irish Department of Agriculture that it was aware that that Department had published the product specification relating to the amended application for registration, requested it to ‘confirm if any oppositions [had] followed’ that publication. The Department confirmed by email of 14 December 2022 that it had ‘not received any oppositions regarding the PGI application’. 102 It is apparent from those email exchanges that the amended product specification had been made available on the Irish Department of Agriculture’s website and that that Department, which was responsible for examining the application for registration, had expressly confirmed to the Commission that it had not received any oppositions. 103 In those circumstances, there was nothing in the file that was liable to cause the Commission to have serious doubts as to Ireland’s initiation of a new national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration. The Commission, therefore, on the basis of the information available to it and without infringing the principle of good administration was, contrary to the applicant’s submission at the hearing, under no obligation to ask the competent Irish authorities to provide additional proof that that procedure had actually been implemented. 104 In that regard, the fact, invoked by Ireland before the Court, that ‘the Irish authorities were always completely satisfied that it was not necessary to [organise a] consultation procedure at national level [on the amended application for registration]’ and that, in fact, such a procedure was not actually implemented, thus has no effect on the legality of the action taken by the Commission and the Court’s review of the Commission’s obligations under the principle of good administration. 105 It must therefore be concluded from all of the foregoing that the Commission, in the present case, ensured that Ireland in fact initiated a national opposition procedure for the amended application for registration. 106 Consequently, and irrespective of the answer to the question whether the amended application for registration might be classified as a ‘joint application’ within the meaning of Article 49(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, the applicant cannot in any event take issue with the Commission for not having ensured, in application of Article 17 TEU, that Ireland complied with Article 4 of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 which provides, as was noted in paragraph 49 above, that ‘in case of joint applications … the related national opposition procedures shall be carried out in all the Member States concerned’. 107 It should be made clear, in that regard, that it follows from Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 that the national opposition procedure is to be conducted at the initiative of and under the control of the Member State concerned, which must also ensure that persons having a legitimate interest have an opportunity to appeal. It does not follow either from Articles 49 to 51 of that regulation, or from any other provision of that regulation, that the Commission, which intervenes only at a later stage of the procedure once the application for registration has been forwarded to it, is responsible for reviewing the lawfulness of the national opposition procedure. It would, moreover, be contrary to the system of division of powers established by that regulation, under which the authorities of the Member State concerned have autonomous decision-making power during the national phase of the registration procedure, for the Commission to exercise such a power of review (judgment of 21 February 2024, Papouis Dairies and Others v Commission, T‑361/21, not published, EU:T:2024:99, paragraph 66). 108 In the present case, while it is apparent from the case file that on 3 August 2022 the Irish Department of Agriculture published a notice on its website advising that the amended application for registration had been sent to the Commission, the Commission was under no obligation to check, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 107 above, that the procedure implemented at national level had been implemented lawfully. 109 In those circumstances, the applicant cannot successfully rely on the irregularity of the national opposition procedure, on the ground, as is apparent from its line of argument set out in paragraph 61 above, that the application was not submitted by the competent authorities, to call into question the legality of the contested implementing regulation. 110 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Commission did not infringe the principle of good administration when it repeated the scrutiny provided for in Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012 in respect of the amended application for registration. 111 The third plea in law must be rejected. 4. The fourth plea in law, alleging the illegality of Regulation No 1151/2012 112 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that in the application the applicant formally requested the Court to ‘order that … Regulation No 1151/2012 [is] invalid in so far as [it] failed to allow effective participation by the applicant in the registration of the PGI’. 113 Questioned about the meaning and the scope of that request, the applicant stated at the hearing that that head of claim should be interpreted as forming part of the fourth plea, in that Regulation No 1151/2012 does not permit the applicant to be heard. 114 The applicant maintains, in that regard, in essence, that Regulation No 1151/2012 does not permit, as in the circumstances of the present case, an interested person to be heard and to participate effectively in the procedure for the registration of a PGI, with the result that that regulation should be declared unlawful. 115 In the reply, the applicant submits that such a breach of its right to be heard constitutes a beach of the principle of legality, enshrined in Article 2 TEU. 116 The Commission, Ireland, the Parliament and the Council dispute the applicant’s arguments. 117 As the Court concluded in the analysis of the third plea in law put forward in the present action, Regulation No 1151/2012 must be interpreted as permitting any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident, as the applicant is, in the applicant Member State, to lodge an opposition to any application for registration of a name, either when the application for registration is lodged, or during the procedure, following an opposition submitted by another Member State, where the details of the product specification of the product covered by that application have been substantially amended. 118 In those circumstances, the premiss on which the applicant relies in support of the present plea is incorrect. The fourth plea must therefore be rejected. 119 In the light of all of the foregoing, since all the pleas have been rejected, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need to rule on its admissibility. Costs 120 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. 121 Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. It follows that Ireland, the Parliament and the Council must bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Independent Farmers Organisation of Ireland Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 3. Orders Ireland, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs. Marcoulli Schwarcz Spangsberg Grønfeldt Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 April 2026. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.