Judgment;Information — ECLI:EU:C:2024:576
Date: 2024-07-04
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Tenth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded

summary of the first plea in law of the appellant’s action before the General Court, is based on a misreading or even a distortion of the judgment under appeal and in so far as the appellant does not state, in a sufficiently coherent and intelligible manner, what error of law she claims the General Court committed. 60 In any event, the Parliament contends that the first ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded. Findings of the Court 61 Contrary to the Parliament’s submissions, the first ground of appeal cannot be rejected as inadmissible. The error of law which the appellant claims the General Court committed is evident from a reading of the arguments. In addition, it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 44 of the present judgment that it is open to the appellant to repeat, at the appeal stage, arguments relied on at first instance. Lastly, as is apparent from paragraph 45 of the present judgment, assuming that the first ground of appeal is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal, such a circumstance would be capable of justifying the rejection of that ground of appeal as unfounded and would not affect its admissibility. 62 As regards the examination of the substance of the first ground of appeal, it must be held that the General Court did not err in law in finding, in paragraph 33 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 137 of the CEOS, which refers to Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, is intended to apply to recovery procedures initiated by the Parliament in respect of an accredited parliamentary assistant and does not apply to a Member, who is not covered by the CEOS. 63 Even if the appellant’s arguments summarised in paragraph 16 of the judgment under appeal and reiterated, for the most part, in the appeal may be understood as supporting the application by analogy of the criteria laid down in Article 85 of the Staff Regulations, where it is envisaged that a request for recovery under Article 68(2) of the Implementing Measures should be sent to a Member, such an this line of argument cannot succeed, since the General Court did not err in law in rejecting it. 64 First, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 47 of the present judgment, it is for the Member concerned to prove that the sums paid by the Parliament to his or her accredited parliamentary assistant correspond to assistance which was necessary and directly linked to the exercise of his or her mandate, failing which those sums must be regarded as having been ‘unduly paid’, within the meaning of Article 68(1) of the Implementing Measures, and be the subject of a recovery decision, in accordance with paragraph 2 of that article. 65 Secondly, as noted in paragraph 52 of the present judgment, the Member concerned is the only one in a position to know whether his or her accredited parliamentary assistant does not provide him or her with the necessary assistance which is directly linked to the exercise of his or her mandate, or whether that parliamentary assistant is absent, without permission, from his or her place of work, and to notify the Parliament accordingly so that the Parliament may adopt, with regard to that assistant, the appropriate measures provided for by the CEOS, including, if necessary, the suspension of payment of his or her salary or the termination of his or her contract. 66 Therefore, the case of a Member who is not aware of the undue payment of his or her parliamentary assistant’s salary may be excluded from the outset, as can a possible application, by analogy, of Article 137 of the CEOS to Members. 67 Furthermore, it is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 64 and 65 of the present judgment that, contrary to what the appellant submits, it cannot be claimed that the Implementing Measures establish a ‘system of strict liability’ of Members for the recovery of sums unduly paid to their assistants. 68 It follows from all the foregoing that the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. The third ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the principle of the freedom and independence of Members Arguments of the parties 69 The appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in rejecting, in paragraphs 45 to 60 of the judgment under appeal, her argument that the ‘system of strict liability’ of Members for any innocent errors in their working relationship with their parliamentary assistants is contrary to the Members’ right to freedom and independence in accordance with Article 2 and Article 21(2) of the Statute for Members. 70 According to the appellant, it is apparent from Article 21 of the Statute for Members that parliamentary assistants are to be employed by Members. That employment relationship secures the conditions for mutual trust in a long-term relationship, expected between the Member concerned and his or her assistant. A Member should not be forced to change service providers at frequent intervals. 71 The appellant refers to paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal, according to which ‘the Secretary-General of the Parliament has merely implemented the applicable legal framework, consisting in particular of the [I]mplementing [M]easures, the legality of which, moreover, has recently been confirmed by the [General] Court’. That sentence shows, in the appellant’s view, that the General Court failed to take into account the very substance of the Members’ right to freedom and independence as the relevant legal framework that supplements the Implementing Measures and guides their interpretation and application. In accordance with the principles of representative democracy, the provisions concerning the recovery of expenses incurred by Members should be interpreted in such a way as not to undermine the freedom and independence of Members, who must be protected against ordinary risks that may influence their judgment. 72 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court endorsed the ‘system of strict liability’ established by the Parliament, according to which, whenever a Member cannot produce evidence capable of demonstrating that his or her parliamentary assistant had performed adequately for a particular calendar month, the Parliament is entitled to assume that that assistant’s salary was ‘unduly paid’ for that calendar month and could be recovered from that Member. In that regard, the appellant submits that, in accordance with Article 92 of the Financial Regulation, EU officials may be held liable only in cases of intentional harm or gross negligence. The appellant submits that the General Court took the view that Members should be less protected than EU civil servants against innocent errors. 73 In addition, she claims that the ‘system of strict liability’ established by the Parliament is monitored not by an independent regulator but by other Members, most probably political opponents of the Member concerned. Members cannot be truly free and independent if they could be financially ruined by the effects of a decision taken by their political opponents because of an innocent error in their employment relationship with a parliamentary assistant. 74 The Parliament contends, primarily, that the third ground of appeal should be rejected as manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, as unfounded. Findings of the Court 75 Contrary to the Parliament’s submissions, the third ground of appeal cannot be rejected as inadmissible. First of all, as noted in paragraph 44 of the present judgment, it is open to the appellant to repeat, at the appeal stage, arguments relied on at first instance. Next, the arguments put forward by the appellant in the context of that third ground of appeal are not limited, as the Parliament maintains, to criticising paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal. Accordingly, it is not necessary to rule on whether those arguments must be regarded as being directed against a ground included in that judgment purely for the sake of completeness which cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and which is therefore ineffective. Lastly, as noted in paragraph 45 of the present judgment, assuming that that third ground of appeal is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal, that circumstance would be capable of justifying the rejection of that ground of appeal as unfounded and does not affect its admissibility. 76 As regards the examination of the merits of the third ground of appeal, it should be noted that the arguments relied on by the appellant in the context of that ground of appeal are based on a twofold erroneous premiss, in that the appellant claims, first, that the Parliament put in place a ‘system of strict liability’ of Members for the recovery of sums unduly paid to their accredited parliamentary assistants and, secondly, that the Parliament, by the decision at issue, and then the General Court, by the judgment under appeal, wrongly found that the remuneration paid to such an assistant was to be regarded as unduly paid if that assistant did not prove to have ‘performed adequately’. 77 First, it is apparent from paragraphs 64 and 67 of the present judgment that, contrary to what the appellant claims, the provisions relating to the recovery of sums unduly paid by way of parliamentary assistance allowance do not establish a ‘system of strict liability’. Secondly, it is apparent from paragraph 50 of the present judgment that, in order to demonstrate that the parliamentary assistance expenses borne by the Parliament were not unduly paid, a Member need only prove that those expenses correspond to work actually carried out by his or her assistant, intended to provide that Member with assistance which is necessary and directly linked to the exercise of his or her mandate, regardless of the quality of that work. As is also noted in that paragraph of the present judgment, there is nothing in the judgment under appeal to indicate that the General Court reached a different conclusion with regard to that issue. 78 Moreover, it should be noted, as the General Court did in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament’s defrayal of Members’ parliamentary assistance expenses is intended precisely to strengthen the Members’ freedom and independence, in so far as they will not need to use other sources of funding, possibly private sources, in order to cover those expenses. 79 However, in order to prevent abuse, Article 33(1) and (2) of the Implementing Measures requires Members to prove that the expenses borne by the Parliament correspond to actual assistance, which is necessary and directly linked to the exercise of their mandate. That provision therefore pursues a legitimate aim and the obligation it imposes on Members does not go beyond what is necessary and appropriate to achieve that aim. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that that obligation may be satisfied by the production of any relevant evidence in the possession of the Member (see, to that effect, order of 21 May 2019, Le Pen v Parliament, C‑525/18 P, EU:C:2019:435, paragraph 38). 80 As regards the appellant’s argument that the defrayal of parliamentary assistance expenses is monitored not by an independent regulator, but by other Members, who might be political opponents of the Member concerned, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 68(2) of the Implementing Measures, recovery decisions are to be taken by the Secretary-General of the Parliament, who is not a Member. 81 Furthermore, and in any event, Article 2 of the Statute for Members, which enshrines their freedom and independence, cannot be interpreted as precluding, as a matter of principle, any involvement of Members of Parliament in the adoption of the rules and, possibly, the measures relating to the defrayal of parliamentary assistance expenses, bearing in mind that any Member who is faced with a decision to recover such expenses incurred by the Parliament on his or her behalf may challenge that decision before the Courts of the European Union, by putting forward any appropriate pleas and arguments, including, as the case may be, the lack of impartiality of the persons who were involved in the adoption of that decision. 82 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision at issue, by ordering the recovery of sums unduly paid as parliamentary assistance allowance under the procedure laid down by the relevant provisions, did not infringe the appellant’s freedom and independence. 83 Consequently, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 84 In accordance with Article 184(2) of Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. 85 Under Article 138(1) of those rules of procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 86 Since the appellant has been unsuccessful and the Parliament has applied for costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament. On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Order SN to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament. Csehi Ilešič Gratsias Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 July 2024. A. Calot Escobar Z. Csehi Registrar President of the Chamber * Language of the case: English.