Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2023:830
Date: 2023-12-20
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

summary of reasons, the competent EU authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114). 62 In the present case, as regards the maintaining acts of September 2022, the Council published a notice on 16 March 2022 (see paragraph 16 above) for the attention of the persons and entities concerned, by way of which they were informed of the possibility of submitting a request for review by 1 June 2022. Thus the applicant was able to submit his first request for review on 25 May 2022, with the result that he had the opportunity to make his views known before those maintaining acts were adopted. 63 As regards the assessment of the need to maintain measures against the applicant, in its letter of 15 September 2022, the Council not only recalled the arguments put forward in its defence, given that the observations contained in the applicant’s request for review were similar to the pleas relied upon in the application, but also provided additional clarifications concerning the ties between the applicant and President Putin, as well as his capacity as a major shareholder in Evraz, all of which justified maintaining the restrictive measures at issue against the applicant. Furthermore, the Council was able to note the absence of any change in circumstances, which is demonstrated, in particular, by the adoption of the maintaining acts of September 2022 on the basis of the same items of evidence as the initial acts. On that basis, the applicant’s involvement in charitable works, humanitarian efforts and mediation cannot, in the light of the foregoing, be regarded as a change in circumstances. 64 Thus, the Council did not breach its obligation to review the applicant’s situation before adopting the maintaining acts of September 2022. 65 As to the maintaining acts of March 2023, it should be noted that the Council informed the applicant, by letter of 22 December 2022, that it was considering maintaining his name on the lists at issue, on the basis of the same statement of reasons, and invited the applicant to submit observations, which he did by letter of 19 January 2023. 66 The applicant was thus able to submit his observations on the fresh items of evidence that the Council had sent to him by letter of 22 December 2022, together with the second WK pack. 67 It follows that the Council sent the fresh items of evidence to the applicant before adopting the maintaining acts of March 2023, and that he was able to have his view on that evidence heard before the restrictive measures were maintained against him. 68 Furthermore, it should be observed that, while the Council rejected the second request for review and decided to maintain the measures at issue against the applicant, this cannot demonstrate that the Council disregarded its obligation to review. In fact, first, no change in circumstances arose in the light of the adoption of the initial acts and, second, there was nothing to prevent the applicant from adducing fresh items of evidence, when making the second request for review, in support of the argument relating to changes in circumstances which had allegedly arisen since the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue. Furthermore, in its letter of 14 March 2023, the Council stated the reasons justifying the maintenance of the applicant’s name on those lists, namely (i) his activity as a leading businessperson and (ii) his ties to President Putin. 69 As regards the alleged failure to give a substantive answer to certain of the applicant’s arguments, it should be noted that, although for the rights of the defence and the right to be heard to be observed the EU institutions must enable the person concerned to make his or her views known effectively, those institutions cannot be required to accept them (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 July 2017, Arbuzov v Council, T‑221/15, not published, EU:T:2017:478, paragraph 84, and of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraph 330). 70 The mere fact that the Council did not conclude that the extension of restrictive measures was not well founded, or even consider it useful to carry out verification in the light of the applicant’s observations, does not mean that the Council did not take cognisance of those observations (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2018, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑288/15, EU:T:2018:619, paragraphs 330 and 331). 71 Finally, as to the applicant’s argument regarding the non-contemporaneous nature of the fresh items of evidence, it must be held that, in so far as that argument is aimed at an error of assessment, it cannot be meaningfully put forward in support of the present part of the first plea. 72 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that the Council discharged its obligations concerning observance of the applicant’s right to be heard during the procedure culminating in the adoption of the maintaining acts of September 2022 and of March 2023. Accordingly, the present part and, consequently, the first plea in its entirety must be rejected. The second plea in law: ‘manifest error of assessment’ 73 The applicant argues, in essence, that the Council has failed to adduce specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of constituting a sufficiently solid factual basis to support the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists at issue pursuant to criteria (d) and (g). 74 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. – Preliminary observations 75 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the second plea in law must be regarded as alleging error of assessment, and not manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are satisfied, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 76 The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by way of which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That involves assessing the facts alleged in the statement of reasons on which that decision is based, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128). 77 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council in fact discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, EU:T:2022:674, paragraphs 63 and 66). 78 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. For that purpose, there is no requirement that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act in respect of which annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 67; see, also, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). 79 In such a scenario, it is for the Courts of the European Union to verify the material accuracy of the facts alleged in the light of the information or evidence and assess the probative value of the latter in the light of the circumstances of the case and taking into account any observations submitted on them by the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 80 As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the maintenance of the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it should be recalled that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. Thus, when periodically reviewing those measures, it is for the Council to carry out an updated assessment of the situation and to take stock of the effects of those measures, with a view to determining whether they have made it possible to achieve the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether it is still possible to reach the same conclusion in relation to those persons and entities (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 81 It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the applicant’s name on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for listing remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). On that basis, changes in the context include the taking into consideration of, first, the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established as well as the specific situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101) and, second, all of the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the achievement of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited). 82 It is in the light of those principles that it must be ascertained whether the Council erred in its assessment by deciding to include, then maintain, the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, beginning with the examination of the application of criterion (g) to the applicant. – The application of criterion (g) to the applicant 83 The applicant disputes, in general, the claim that the fact he is a major shareholder in Evraz implies either a significant contribution to the tax revenue of the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, or close ties to the Russian Government. 84 In the first place, the applicant states that Evraz does not constitute a major source of revenue for the Russian Federation on account of the fact that the taxes paid by that company are allocated to the regional budget, which is unrelated to the federal budget. 85 In the second place, the applicant points to the negative effects on Evraz to which the Russian Government’s actions in Ukraine have given rise. 86 In the third place, the applicant observes that he holds only 28.64% of the capital in Evraz’s parent company, which does not make him a major shareholder or afford him the possibility of deciding that company’s operations. 87 In the fourth place, the applicant claims that Evraz’s activities are not confined to Russia, but are also carried on in the United States and Canada, as well as in the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. 88 In the fifth place, the applicant points out that his personal tax contributions in Russia are not significant and that, consequently, he cannot be regarded as one of the Russian Federation’s largest taxpayers. In that connection, he challenges the application of the ‘sector of activity’ criterion – which, he argues, is discriminatory – in order to determine the substantial source of revenue. He adds that the fact that Evraz supplies steel to the Russian national rail company cannot be decisive in demonstrating the provision of a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 89 In the sixth and last place, the applicant disputes his being categorised as ‘a leading businessperson’ in Russia and states that his wealth has mostly been invested outside that country namely, in particular, in Israel, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada and that, moreover, he has distinguished himself as a renowned philanthropist whose charity work extends throughout all of the countries in which he is active. 90 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 91 In the present case, the reason relied on with regard to the applicant which is linked to criterion (g) relates to the fact that, since he is a major shareholder or one of the main shareholders in Evraz, which is one of Russia’s largest taxpayers, he is a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors which provide or constitute a substantial source for revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. 92 Criterion (g) employs the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ in correlation with the exercise of an activity ‘in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the [Russian] Government’, with no other condition regarding ties, be they direct or indirect, with that government. The purpose of that criterion is in fact to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and the military aggression against that country. 93 There is a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, on the one hand, and the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, which is, in particular, to increase the pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of the latter’s actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, on the other hand (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited). 94 However, there is nothing in the recitals or the provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended, or of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, for it to be found that it is for the Council to demonstrate the existence of close ties or interdependence between the person whose name is on the lists at issue and the Russian Government or its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 95 Such an interpretation would run counter not only to the wording of criterion (g) but also to the objective pursued. 96 First, having regard to the wording of criterion (g), it must be held that the persons targeted must be regarded as leading businesspersons on account of their importance in the economic sector in which they pursue their activity and the importance of that sector for the Russian economy (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited). Thus the concept of ‘leading businessperson’ must be understood as referring to the importance of those persons in the light, as the case may be, of their occupational status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more of the companies in which they pursue those activities. 97 Second, the objective of the restrictive measures at issue is not to sanction certain persons or entities on account of their links to the situation in Ukraine or their ties with the Russian Government, but rather, as has been recalled in paragraph 93 above, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to promote the end to the crisis (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited). 98 Accordingly, criterion (g) must be interpreted as meaning that it is intended to apply, on the one hand, to ‘leading businesspersons’ in the sense described in paragraph 96 above and, on the other hand, that it is the economic sectors in which those persons are involved which must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 99 It is therefore in the light of that interpretation of criterion (g) that an assessment must be made as to whether the reasons relied on in the contested acts are well founded. 100 In the present case, since those reasons for including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue have remained unchanged, it is not necessary to make a distinction between the initial acts, on the one hand, and the maintaining acts, on the other, given that the verification of the information alleged in the statement of reasons as well as in the items of evidence, which are set out in the first and second WK packs, relates, in essence, to the same factual circumstances. 101 The reasons relied on in connection with the applicant, as regards criterion (g), relate to the fact that, at the time when the initial acts and the maintaining acts were adopted, he was a major or leading shareholder in Evraz, which is one of Russia’s largest taxpayers and operates, in particular, in an economic sector which provides or constitutes a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 102 It is apparent from the case file that the applicant directly holds 28.64% of the share capital in Evraz’s parent company and only three other shareholders therein hold a share greater than 5%. 103 Although the applicant disputes being a major shareholder in Evraz as well as his power to decide the group’s operations or control over it, it is common ground not only that he is one of the major shareholders in Evraz’s parent company, but that he is also the principal shareholder therein, according to that company’s prospectus, which was added to the case file by the applicant. 104 In fact, in Evraz’s parent company, the applicant holds the highest percentage of voting rights of all four main shareholders – including himself – who, together, hold 63.35% of those rights, the remainder being free-float share capital, and have the capacity to exercise control over the election of directors, the declaration of dividends, the appointment of the board of directors and other policy decisions of that parent company. In that connection, as the Council points out, it should be noted that the board of directors of that parent company comprises 11 members, 6 of whom are independent non-executive directors, and that the applicant himself is entitled to appoint up to 3 directors. In any event, it should be noted that, even if the applicant’s shareholding in the parent company in question, as a mere investor, constitutes a minority shareholding which does not allow him to exercise any form of control over that company, that shareholding is nevertheless significant having regard, in particular, to the fact that Evraz is one of the leading Russian groups in the steel and mining sector. It follows that, as a major shareholder in the parent company in question over a number of years, the applicant can be categorised as a leading businessperson on the basis of criterion (g). 105 As regards, more specifically, the ‘leading’ aspect with regard to the applicant, it should be stated that, in order to come under the category of ‘leading businesspersons’, as has been stated in paragraphs 96 and 97 above, criterion (g) does not require the existence of close ties or interdependence with the Russian Government or the President of the Russian Federation. Nor is it dependent on the imputability to the applicant of the decisions to continue the invasion of Ukraine or a direct or indirect link with the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, with the result that the applicant’s argument relating to the absence of benefit from the Russian Government’s activities in Ukraine must be rejected as unfounded. 106 It follows that the Council rightly considered that the applicant was a leading businessperson an account, in particular, of his professional status, the importance of his economic activities, the scale of his capital holdings in Evraz and, more particularly, his status as principal shareholder in the parent company of that group of companies (see paragraph 96 above). 107 Furthermore, the applicant essentially disputes that he is involved in activities in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government within the meaning of criterion (g). 108 In that connection, it should be observed, as the Council does, that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the phrase ‘providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ set out in criterion (g) refers, in the light of the wording thereof, to the revenue from important economic sectors in the Russian Federation and not solely to the taxes paid by leading businesspersons. Although the wording of recital 11 of Decision 2022/329 states that the criteria of designation should be amended to include ‘persons and entities … providing a substantial source of revenue to [the Government of the Russian Federation]’, the fact remains that it cannot justify an interpretation of that criterion which runs counter to its wording, which is quite clear. Moreover, it must be stated that the interpretation put forward by the applicant would be contrary to the objective pursued by the restrictive measures at issue, which is to weaken the Russian Federation’s ability to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine. 109 Furthermore, while it is true that neither Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, defines the concept of ‘substantial source of revenue’, the fact remains that the use of the qualifying adjective ‘substantial’, which relates to the word ‘source’, means that that source must be significant and therefore not negligible. 110 What is more, although Evraz’s own contribution to the budget of the Russian Federation may be useful in determining the economic importance of that company, in particular, in order to establish the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson who is the main shareholder in its parent company, it is not decisive for the purposes of answering the question whether the economic sector in which the applicant is active provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 111 In the present case, as regards the question whether the economic sector in which the applicant is involved through Evraz provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, it cannot validly be argued that that is not the case for the steel and mining sector. 112 Such a substantial source of revenue provided by the steel and mining sector to the Russian Government can in fact be inferred from the context and from item No 2 in the first WK pack indicating that, in 2016, that sector was the third most important sector in terms of tax revenue in Russia and that, amongst the 50 leading Russian taxpayers, 10 of these – including Evraz – belonged to that sector. It is also apparent from that item of evidence that, whereas the overall tax burden on the Russian economy declined in 2016, it increased from 12.4% to 12.9% for those taxpayers. 113 Furthermore, it is apparent from item No 10 in the first WK pack and the history of Evraz, added to the case file by the applicant, that the parent company of that group of companies is one of the largest vertically integrated steel and mining undertakings in the world, comprising numerous subsidiaries. 114 That is supported by the 2021 annual report of Evraz’s parent company, added to the case file by the applicant, which sets out its revenue by sector of activity. It is apparent, in particular, from that report that steel activities brought in 12.5 billion United States dollars (USD), by also taking into account the revenue from that sector in North America (corresponding to USD 2.3 billion). More specifically, although that parent company pursues its activities in multiple sectors of the Russian economy, the revenue, from steel alone, which increased in Russia by 48.3% between 2020 and 2021, represents 66.3% of that company’s total revenue. According to that report, that parent company is a ‘leader in construction and railway product markets in Russia’. In fact it holds a 28% share of the Russian market for railway wheels and a 97% share of the market for trains. 115 Furthermore, it is apparent from the Evraz prospectus that, in 2018, that company was the fourth-largest crude steel producer in Russia and the largest manufacturer by volume of long products for the construction and railway industries in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The 2021 annual report of Evraz’s parent company also states that 94.8% of the 71 210 employees of Evraz are employed in Russia and the CIS. 116 All of these factors thus allow it to be established that the economic sector in question – that is, the steel and mining sector – in which Evraz, in particular, operates, provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 117 The circumstance, even if it were established, that the tax revenue from the steel and mining sector is primarily allocated to the budgets of local federal entities is irrelevant. Having regard to the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, as recalled in paragraph 93 above, the concept of ‘revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ cannot be given a restrictive interpretation, which would be confined to referring to the tax revenue allocated to that State’s federal budget. Furthermore and in any event, even though that source of revenue is not intended for the federal budget or used directly by that government in order to support its military expenditure, the fact remains that that source allows that government, as a whole, without distinction as to whether that revenue comes from the federal budget or the regional budgets, to mobilise even more resources for its actions to compromise the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 118 Moreover, the applicant’s arguments based on more personal contextual factors, namely his humanitarian efforts and his role in peace negotiations, must be rejected as ineffective. Such factors are, in fact, not relevant in assessing whether the conditions under criterion (g), as set out in paragraphs 92 to 97 above, are satisfied in the present case, 119 Lastly, the complaint raised by the applicant in the second statement of modification that, by relying on the items of evidence contained in the second WK pack, the Council erred, when adopting the maintaining acts, with regard to the assessment of the contracts between Evraz subsidiaries and the National Guard of the Russian Federation and the bill on the war economy which compels undertakings such as Evraz to supply materials and services to the army cannot succeed. It is clear that it is only for the sake of completeness that the Council made reference to that material and that, inasmuch as it did not use that material in order to substantiate the maintaining acts, in so far as it is not directly linked to criterion (g), that complaint must be rejected as ineffective. 120 It must therefore be found that the Council has adduced a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of demonstrating that the economic sector in which the applicant is involved provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. 121 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the ground for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, based on the status as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, corresponding to criterion (g), is sufficiently substantiated, with the result that, in the light thereof, the Council did not make an error of assessment in deciding to include then maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. 122 According to settled case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). 123 Consequently, without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the Council’s assessment in the light of criterion (d), the second plea must be rejected as unfounded. The third plea: infringement of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality 124 The third plea in law is divided into two parts, alleging (i) infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment and (ii) infringement of the principle of proportionality. – The first part of the third plea: infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment 125 The applicant claims, in essence, that the restrictive measures at issue are discriminatory. In his view, first, the Council’s interpretation of criterion (g) is too broad, since it allows any and all businesspersons, whatever their nationality, who are or have been involved in significant economic activities in Russia and who fulfil their tax obligations, to be sanctioned solely on that basis. Second, the Council’s application of criterion (g) is discriminatory, in that it targets Russian businesspersons and companies while ignoring foreign companies, even though the latter also operate on Russian territory and contribute sums in the form of taxes and fees to the Russian Federation’s budget. Third, the applicant takes the view that he has been sanctioned on account of factors over which he has no control, be it the amounts of tax to be paid, the allocation of tax revenue between the various regions and the federal government, or the use of the budget allocated to the latter. Having no tools at his disposal with which to influence Russian fiscal policy or the allocation of the proceeds of Evraz’s activities, no restrictive measure concerning the applicant would alter that company’s obligations as a Russian taxpayer. 126 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 127 It should be recalled that, according to the case-law, the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes a fundamental legal principle, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited, and of 13 September 2018, Vnesheconombank v Council, T‑737/14, not published, EU:T:2018:543, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited). 128 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council’s interpretation of criterion (g) is too broad, since it essentially allows any and all businesspersons, whatever their nationality, who are or have been involved in significant economic activities in Russia and who fulfil their tax obligations, to be sanctioned solely on that basis, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to state in what way or against whom that allegedly overly broad interpretation of that criterion is discriminatory. Contrary to the applicant’s arguments, not all businesspersons involved in a significant economic activity in Russia and paying or having paid taxes in that country on that basis are targeted, since only those who are involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government can be covered by that criterion. In any event, the grounds on which the Council relied when adopting the contested acts are based on the finding that the applicant is a major shareholder in Evraz, one of the Russian Federation’s biggest taxpayers. Thus, contrary to his claims, the applicant was made subject to the restrictive measures at issue further to an individual assessment, based on the actual evidence concerning him. 129 Furthermore, in the context of criterion (g), it is the economic sector – and not the businesspersons as such or the companies in which they are shareholders – which is identified as providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government (see paragraph 98 above). Thus, the payment of taxes by the applicant or by Evraz’s parent company is not in itself covered. That criterion refers to all of the revenue generated by the economic sector in which the businessperson targeted is involved, and therefore includes, in particular but not only, the tax revenue generated by that sector. 130 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council’s application of criterion (g) is discriminatory, in that that criterion targets Russian businesspersons and undertakings whilst ignoring foreign undertakings, it is sufficient to note, as the Council does, that that criterion does not refer to the nationality of the persons designated, but to any natural person with the status of a leading businessperson within the meaning of that criterion. Consequently, the persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue may be of any nationality if they meet the criterion in question. 131 In those circumstances, even if the Council had not adopted measures for the freezing of funds against certain persons meeting criterion (g), or examined, carefully and impartially, all the relevant evidence relating to those persons, the applicant cannot successfully rely on that fact, because the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination must be reconciled with the principle of legality (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 May 2016, Post Bank Iran v Council, T‑68/14, not published, EU:T:2016:263, paragraph 135 and the case-law cited). In any event, it must be noted that it is apparent from the examination of the second plea that, in the context of the discretion that it has in order to establish whether the designation criteria have been met, the Council did not make an error of assessment in deciding to include and maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. 132 In the third place, it should be observed that the applicant has failed to explain why his alleged lack of influence on the allocation of Russian tax revenue or on the allocation of the proceeds of Evraz’s activities might constitute an infringement of the principle of equal treatment, with the result that that argument must be rejected as unsubstantiated. 133 Accordingly, the present part of the plea in law must be rejected. – The second part of the third plea: infringement of the principle of proportionality 134 The applicant claims that the restrictive measures at issue taken against him are inappropriate and disproportionate, in that they exert no pressure on the Russian authorities and also cannot be effective, given that the applicant has taken no part in any action in connection with the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. 135 In that regard, the applicant takes the view, first, that the restrictive measures at issue taken against him are not necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued, given that he was neither involved in nor consulted on any decision relating to the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. Moreover, he maintains that those measures are far removed from their alleged objective of influencing the Russian Federation’s policy in Ukraine, having regard to the insubstantial contribution to the federal budget, and run the risk of having negative consequences for the applicant’s activities outside Russia. Furthermore, he argues that those measures were adopted on account of his status as a shareholder in Evraz’s parent company, which is not subject to any similar measures. Lastly, the applicant claims that the measures in question are disproportionate, since they prevent him from acting effectively as a channel of communication in the context of peace negotiations. 136 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 137 The principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, and is reproduced in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133). 138 Thus, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 139 With regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. It follows that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in those areas may be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 179 and the case-law cited). 140 In the present case, it should be observed that, in the light of the fundamental importance of the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures at issue, namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in that country, which are part of the wider objective of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, the negative consequences resulting from the application thereof to the applicant are not manifestly disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). 141 It should also be noted that, in recitals 2 to 10 of Decision 2022/329, the Council refers to the continuing deterioration of the situation in Ukraine which culminated, on 24 February 2022, in the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine in blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the latter State. Thus, it is on account of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, characterised by the outbreak of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation, that the Council deemed it necessary to widen the circle of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue, in order to achieve the objectives pursued. It follows from such an approach, which is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures, that the proportionality of those measures is also established (see, by analogy, judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 126, and of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 104). 142 Having regard to developments in the situation in Ukraine, by also targeting businesspersons who are involved in activities in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, the Council could legitimately expect that such actions would cease or become too costly for those engaging therein, in order to promote an end to the blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 157). 143 In the present case, in the context of the second plea, it has been established that the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were justified, on the ground that his situation supported the conclusion that he satisfied the conditions for the application of criterion (g). The designation of the applicant, as the principal shareholder in Evraz’s parent company, in fact takes into account the sector of activity in which that company operates, irrespective of the question whether it too is targeted by individual sanctions as a legal person, or of what tax contribution the Russian Government might benefit from. 144 Moreover, the fact that the applicant was not involved in any decision relating to the annexation of Crimea or to the destabilisation of Ukraine is irrelevant, since he was not subject to restrictive measures for that reason, but because, in particular, he is a leading businessperson active in economic sectors which provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. In that connection, it should be recalled that the importance of the objectives pursued by an EU act establishing a system of restrictive measures is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators, including those who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the measures in question (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 361, and of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). 145 As to the appropriateness of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant, it should be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest as fundamental for the international community as those referred to in paragraph 140 above, those measures cannot, in themselves, be regarded as inappropriate (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2020, Kalai v Council, T‑178/19, not published, EU:T:2020:580, paragraph 171 and the case-law cited). 146 In so far as concerns the necessity of the restrictive measures at issue, it should be held that other, less restrictive measures are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, namely bringing pressure to bear on Russian decision-makers responsible for the situation in Ukraine, particularly given the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Council could have envisaged the adoption of less restrictive measures that were just as appropriate as those provided for. 147 As to the applicant’s argument relating to the repercussions for his involvement in peace negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. In accordance with Article 1(6) of that decision, the competent authority of a Member State may authorise listed persons to enter its territory, inter alia on urgent humanitarian grounds, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, and those promoted or hosted by the European Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of the restrictive measures, including support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 148 In the present case, as the Council rightly points out, involvement in peace negotiations and, more generally, the provision of humanitarian aid cannot influence the Council’s assessment as to the need to take restrictive measures against the applicant or other leading Russian businesspersons in order to increase pressure on President Putin and his government. 149 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the restrictive measures at issue are neither discriminatory nor disproportionate. 150 The present part must therefore be rejected, as must the third plea in its entirety. The fourth plea: infringement of fundamental rights 151 The applicant claims that the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitute an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of his fundamental rights, which include, in particular, the right to property, the right to respect for private life and the freedom to conduct a business, as well as the right to free movement on the territory of the Member States. He takes the view that the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue also gave rise to an infringement of his right to the presumption of innocence and caused him non-material harm on account of the damage to his reputation. 152 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 153 First of all, it should be noted that the right to respect for private life, the right to freedom to conduct a business, the right to property and the right to freedom of movement and of residence form part of the general principle of EU law and are enshrined in Articles 7, 16, 17 and 45 of the Charter, respectively. 154 Admittedly, the restrictive measures contained in the contested acts, in spite of the precautionary nature thereof, give rise to limitations on the exercise, by the applicant, of the fundamental rights referred to in paragraph 153 above. 155 However, the fundamental rights on which the applicant relies are not absolute rights, and the exercise thereof may be subject to limitations, under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter, according to which, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 156 Consequently, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict the fundamental rights of a natural or legal person must have a legal basis for that purpose. Second, it must respect the essential content of those rights. Third, it must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 145 and 222 and the case-law cited). 157 It is clear that those four conditions are met in the present case. 158 In the first place, the limitations at issue are ‘provided for by law’, since they are laid down in acts which, in particular, are of general application and have a clear legal basis in EU law and sufficient foreseeability which, moreover, the applicant does not dispute. 159 In the second place, in so far as concerns the question whether the limitations at issue respect the ‘essential content’ of the fundamental rights on which the applicant relies, it is clear that the restrictive measures at issue are limited in time and are reversible. First, they apply for six months and are kept under constant review, as provided in the third paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and second, it is possible to grant exemptions to the restrictive measures applied, in so far as concerns both the freezing of funds and restrictions on admission to the territories of the Member States (see paragraph 147 above). 160 In the third place, the limitations at issue satisfy an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. They seek, in particular, to put pressure, directly and indirectly, on the Russian Government and decision-makers responsible for the invasion of Ukraine, in order to diminish their capacity to pursue their actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to put an end to those actions in order to safeguard global and European stability. That is an objective which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as, in particular, the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 226). 161 In the fourth place, as to the proportionate nature of the limitations at issue, it should be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest as fundamental for the international community as those referred to in paragraph 140 above, the measures for the freezing of funds cannot, in themselves, be regarded as inappropriate. In so far as concerns the necessity of the restrictive measures at issue, it should be held that other, less restrictive measures are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, namely bringing pressure to bear on Russian decision-makers responsible for the situation in Ukraine, particularly given the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). 162 Next, it must be borne in mind that Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 163 In so far as concerns, more specifically, the alleged infringement, by Article 1 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, of the applicant’s right, as a Portuguese national – and therefore a Union citizen – to move freely on the latter’s territory, as enshrined in Article 21 TFEU and in Article 45(1) of the Charter, it should be observed that the applicant does not dispute the fact that the adoption of acts under the CFSP, provided for by the Treaties, can limit the right to freedom of movement of Union citizens. The applicant in fact confines himself to claiming that the restriction of his freedom of movement is disproportionate. 164 It is, however, clear that the applicant has failed to explain in what way such a restriction is disproportionate in the light of the objective pursued. In his written pleadings, he merely makes a general reference to his line of argument under the plea alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, without setting out the reasons for which the arguments presented in the context of that plea are relevant in order to substantiate a disproportionate infringement of his freedom of movement within the European Union. Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging a disproportionate infringement of the free movement of Union citizens must be rejected as unsubstantiated. 165 As to the claim by way of which the applicant questions the possibility for the Council to adopt a restriction on free movement on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, even if such a claim were to constitute a separate argument, it is clear that that is also not substantiated and must be rejected. In any event, it should be noted that restrictions on freedom of movement are laid down solely in Article 1 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and do not feature in Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. As is apparent from the citations of that decision, the latter was not adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU but on that of Article 29 TEU. 166 Furthermore, it should also be noted that the applicant has failed to substantiate at all the way in which the restrictive measures taken against him might infringe his right to respect for private life. 167 Lastly, as regards the alleged infringement of the applicant’s right to the presumption of innocence – to which he refers in his written pleadings without, however, substantiating that claim with any specific arguments – it should be observed that, in so far as the effect of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant is not to confiscate his assets but, more simply, to freeze those assets as a precaution, it must be held that such measures are not, by their nature, criminal in any way and the effect thereof is therefore not to infringe the right to the presumption of innocence, recognised in Article 48(1) of the Charter, which requires that everyone who has been charged be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. As to the alleged non-material harm suffered on account of the damage to his reputation, also mentioned in the context of that complaint, it cannot be meaningfully relied upon in order to establish an infringement of the applicant’s right to the presumption of innocence. 168 It must be found that the limitations at issue, which follow from the restrictive measures taken against the applicant in the contested acts, are not disproportionate and do not vitiate those acts due to any unlawfulness. 169 In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected and, accordingly, the application for annulment dismissed in its entirety. The claim for compensation 170 The applicant seeks compensation in respect of the damage to his reputation, provisionally estimated at EUR 1 million. 171 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 172 It is clear from the case-law that the non-contractual liability of the European Union for unlawful conduct on the part of its institutions or bodies, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, depends on fulfilment of several conditions, namely the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the fact of damage, the existence of a causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured party (see judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). 173 The conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, which the EU judicature is not required to examine in any particular order, are cumulative, with the result that it is sufficient that one of these not be met in order for the action to be dismissed in its entirety (judgment of 1 February 2023, Klymenko v Council, T‑470/21, not published, EU:T:2023:26, paragraph 62; see also, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, European Union v Kendrion, C‑150/17 P, EU:C:2018:1014, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited). 174 It is clear from all of the foregoing that the arguments that the applicant has put forward in order to establish the unlawfulness of the contested acts by way of which his name was included on the lists at issue must be rejected, with the result that the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the Council has not been met in the present case. Thus, since one of the conditions referred to in paragraph 172 above has not been met, the European Union cannot incur liability. 175 Consequently, the claim for compensation must be rejected as unfounded, without it being necessary to examine the fact of the damage or the existence of a causal link between that damage and the infringement of the obligation at issue. Accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 176 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 177 According to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Commission must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. Spielmann Mastroianni Brkan Delivered in public in Luxembourg on 20 December 2023. [Signatures] Table of contents Background to the dispute Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action Forms of order sought Law The claim for annulment The first plea in law – The first part of the first plea: ‘infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons’ – The second part of the first plea: ‘infringement of the rights of the defence’ and ‘disregard by the Council of its obligation to review in the context of the adoption of the maintaining acts of September 2022 and of March 2023’ The second plea in law: ‘manifest error of assessment’ – Preliminary observations – The application of criterion (g) to the applicant The third plea: infringement of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality – The first part of the third plea: infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment – The second part of the third plea: infringement of the principle of proportionality The fourth plea: infringement of fundamental rights The claim for compensation Costs * Language of the case: French.