Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:154
Date: 2026-02-25
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Romania

summary of those pleas in law’. 15 In that regard, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that same statute, and under Article 177(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application made in the context of an action brought against EUIPO must contain, inter alia, a summary of the pleas in law relied on. It must, accordingly, specify the grounds on which the action is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure. Moreover, that summary – albeit concise – must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without any further information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary – if an action or, more specifically, a plea in law, is to be admissible – that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see judgment of 7 July 2021, Frommer v EUIPO – Minerva (I-cosmetics), T‑205/20, not published, EU:T:2021:414, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 16 In the present case, it is clear from the application that the first plea in law relied on by the applicant alleges infringement of Article 58(1)(a) and Article 58(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18 of that regulation and Article 19(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001 and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1). In that regard, in paragraphs 15 to 55 of the application, the applicant alleges a number of errors in the assessment of the place, extent and nature of use of the contested mark, as well as of the genuine use of the contested mark in relation to the services covered by that mark. 17 As regards the second plea, alleging a failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal did not explain, first, how the services in Class 36 examined simultaneously are closely linked and, second, why the assessments relating to the services in Classes 38, 41 and 42 are not as detailed as those made in relation to Classes 36 and 39. 18 Despite being somewhat concise in places, the arguments and pleas in law put forward by the applicant are sufficiently intelligible from the actual text of the application. The observations made by EUIPO and the intervener in their responses confirm that they were able to understand the essence of the applicant’s arguments and thus prepare their defence. 19 It follows that the application meets the requirements of Article 177(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure and that the plea of inadmissibility raised by EUIPO and the intervener alleging infringement of that provision must therefore be rejected. B. Substance 20 When questioned at the hearing on the scope of its claims, the applicant stated that it was asking the Court, first, to alter the contested decision by adopting the decision which, in its view, the Board of Appeal should have taken, that is to say, to dismiss the action brought before it, and, second, to annul the contested decision in part. 21 The applicant relies on two pleas in law, the first plea alleging infringement of Article 58(1)(a) and Article 58(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18 of that regulation and Article 19(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, and the second plea, which it is appropriate to examine first, alleging infringement of Articles 263 and 296 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. 1. The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 263 and 296 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 22 The applicant argues that the Board of Appeal failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons by providing inconsistent and incoherent reasons in support of its findings. 23 First, the applicant argues, by way of example, that the Board of Appeal chose to conduct a specific or individual analysis in relation to some of the services in Class 36, including ‘brokerage for provision of tickets for transportation, entertainment events and activities and accommodation’, while simultaneously analysing certain other services in the same class as a group, such as ‘brokerage for the collection of payments’ and ‘bill payment services provided also by electronic means and networks’. It claims that the Board of Appeal did not explain how the services in Class 36 examined simultaneously were closely linked. 24 Secondly, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal did not explain why the assessments concerning the services in Classes 38, 41 and 42 are not as detailed as those made in respect of the services in Classes 36 and 39. 25 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 26 It should be borne in mind that, under Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO are to state the reasons on which they are based. In accordance with case-law, that obligation has the same scope as that enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and has the dual purpose of enabling interested parties to know the justification for the measure taken so as to be able to protect their rights and of enabling the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power to review the legality of the contested decision (see judgment of 28 April 2004, Sunrider v OHIM – Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann and Friesland Brands (VITATASTE and METABALANCE 44), T‑124/02 and T‑156/02, EU:T:2004:116, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 6 September 2012, Storck v OHIM, C‑96/11 P, not published, EU:C:2012:537, paragraph 86). 27 However, the duty to state reasons does not require the Boards of Appeal to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the lines of reasoning articulated by the parties before them. It is therefore sufficient if the institution concerned sets out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 27 February 2018, Hansen Medical v EUIPO – Covidien (MAGELLAN), T‑222/16, not published, EU:T:2018:99, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 28 In addition, it should be pointed out that the duty to state reasons in decisions is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 23 October 2024, ePlus v EUIPO – Telefónica Germany (E-Plus), T‑462/23, not published, EU:T:2024:715, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). 29 In the present case, the applicant challenges, inter alia, the Board of Appeal’s approach in analysing certain services individually and other services collectively. However, in so far as those arguments actually concern the merits of the statement of reasons for the contested decision, they must, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above, be rejected as ineffective. 30 Furthermore, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal set out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of that decision. It should be noted that, in paragraphs 79 to 102 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal analysed to the requisite legal standard genuine use of the contested mark in relation to the services at issue, making explicit references in particular to the evidence provided by the intervener. It thus concluded that the intervener had submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine use of the contested mark in connection with the services at issue in Classes 35, 36, 38, 39, 41 and 42, with the exception of certain services in Classes 36, 39 and 42, referred to in paragraph 107 of the contested decision, in respect of which the Board of Appeal upheld the application for revocation. Accordingly, it must be held that the contested decision is not vitiated either by contradictory reasoning or by an inadequate statement of reasons. 31 In that regard, it should be noted, as EUIPO states, that although some services in Class 36 were examined simultaneously and the assessment concerning the services in Classes 38, 41 and 42 is more concise, the Board of Appeal stated, to the requisite legal standard, the reasons for the contested decision as regards the question whether the intervener had provided proof of genuine use of the contested mark in connection with the services at issue. 32 Consequently, the statement of reasons for the contested decision enabled both the applicant and the Court to understand the Board of Appeal’s reasoning. Accordingly, the second plea must be rejected. 2. The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 58(1)(a) and Article 58(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 18 of that regulation and Article 19(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625 33 In support of the first plea, the applicant submits that the proof of use provided by the intervener was insufficient to demonstrate genuine use of the contested mark within the meaning of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, with the result that its rights should have been revoked. That plea is divided, in essence, into four parts. First, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the evidence submitted by the intervener was sufficient to conclude that the contested mark had been used in Romania and Cyprus. Secondly, it argues that the Board of Appeal also erred in its assessment of the extent of use. Thirdly, as regards the nature of use, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having concluded that the use of the intervener’s company name, Viva Wallet, also constituted use of the contested mark. Fourthly, the applicant takes the view that the evidence is not capable of demonstrating genuine use of the contested mark for the services referred to in paragraph 7 above. 34 As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that, pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 58(1)(a) of that regulation, the rights of the proprietor of an EU trade mark are to be declared to be revoked on application to EUIPO if, within a continuous period of five years, the trade mark has not been put to genuine use in the European Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, and there are no proper reasons for non-use. 35 Pursuant to Article 58(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, where the grounds for revocation of rights exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the EU trade mark is registered, the rights of the proprietor are to be declared to be revoked in respect of those goods or services only. 36 According to settled case-law, there is genuine use of a trade mark, within the meaning of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark (judgment of 3 July 2019, Viridis Pharmaceutical v EUIPO, C‑668/17 P, EU:C:2019:557, paragraph 38; see also, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul, C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43). Moreover, the condition relating to genuine use of the trade mark requires that the mark, as protected in the relevant territory, be used publicly and outwardly (see judgment of 4 April 2019, Hesse and Wedl & Hofmann v EUIPO (TESTA ROSSA), T‑910/16 and T‑911/16, EU:T:2019:221, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 37 When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial use of the mark is real in the course of trade, particularly the practices regarded as warranted in the relevant economic sector as a means of maintaining or creating market shares for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark (judgment of 8 July 2004, Sunrider v OHIM – Espadafor Caba (VITAFRUIT), T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 40; see also, by analogy, judgment of 11 March 2003, Ansul, C‑40/01, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43). 38 Furthermore, in interpreting the concept of ‘genuine use’, account should be taken of the fact that the ratio legis of the requirement that the earlier mark must have been put to genuine use is not to assess the commercial success of an undertaking or to review its economic strategy, nor is it to restrict trade mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks (see judgment of 11 April 2019, Fomanu v EUIPO – Fujifilm Imaging Germany (Representation of a butterfly), T‑323/18, not published, EU:T:2019:243, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 39 Moreover, genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or presumptions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of actual and sufficient use of the trade mark on the market concerned. It is therefore necessary to carry out a global assessment which takes into account all the relevant factors of the particular case and entails a degree of interdependence between the factors taken into account (judgment of 8 July 2020, Euroapotheca v EUIPO – General Nutrition Investment (GNC LIVE WELL), T‑686/19, not published, EU:T:2020:320, paragraph 35). 40 In that regard, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 10 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, applicable to revocation proceedings pursuant to Article 19(1) of that regulation, proof of use of a trade mark must relate to the place, time, extent and nature of use of the trade mark and is, in principle, to be limited to the submission of supporting documents and items such as packages, labels, price lists, catalogues, invoices, photographs, newspaper advertisements, and statements in writing as referred to in Article 97(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001. 41 Moreover, it is settled case-law that it cannot be ruled out that an accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, would be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts (judgment of 13 February 2015, Husky CZ v OHIM – Husky of Tostock (HUSKY), T‑287/13, EU:T:2015:99, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). 42 Accordingly, the question whether a trade mark has been put to genuine use requires that an overall assessment be carried out, taking into account all the relevant factors. Thus each piece of evidence is not to be analysed separately, but rather together, in order to determine the most likely and coherent meaning (see judgment of 21 November 2013, Recaro v OHIM – Certino Mode (RECARO), T‑524/12, not published, EU:T:2013:604, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 43 It is in the light of those considerations that the first plea must be examined. 44 In the present case, as recalled in paragraph 8 above, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant period was between 6 April 2017 and 5 April 2022, which the parties do not dispute. 45 The applicant likewise does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s admission of the evidence relating to the use of the contested mark submitted by the intervener for the first time before the Board of Appeal, or the Board of Appeal’s findings that the evidence submitted by the EUTM proprietor contains sufficient indications concerning the time of use of the contested mark. (a) Place of use 46 The Board of Appeal found that the place of use was principally Greece, but also other Member States, such as Cyprus and Romania, which could be inferred from the emails, dated printouts from websites and newsletters produced by the intervener. 47 The applicant criticises the Board of Appeal, in essence, for having accepted that the contested mark was used in Romania and Cyprus. In addition, the applicant submits that use solely in the territory of Greece is insufficient to prove genuine use of the contested mark in the European Union. 48 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 49 First of all, it should be noted that, at the hearing, the applicant stated that it was challenging the use of the mark in Greece. However, it must be observed that the applicant did not put forward in its application any specific evidence in support of that challenge. Indeed, the applicant’s arguments are directed against the Board of Appeal’s findings relating to use of the mark in Romania and Cyprus. 50 Next, as regards the applicant’s arguments that no connection can be established between Item XXV and the territories of Romania or Cyprus, it should be pointed out that the Board of Appeal cites that item only by way of example and cannot be criticised for having made an error of assessment on that basis alone. Furthermore, even if the invoice produced by the applicant does not indicate a Romanian or Cypriot address, but rather a Greek address, there is nothing to preclude it from being taken into consideration as part of the overall assessment of the evidence. 51 The same is true of the applicant’s arguments relating to Item VI. Indeed, it is clear from paragraph 51 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal carried out an overall assessment of the evidence in the file. It thus found that, in view of the language (Greek), the currency mentioned and the addresses in Greece, Romania and Cyprus, the evidence made it possible to infer that the relevant services were aimed principally at the Greek market, as well as the markets in other countries, such as Romania and Cyprus. 52 Furthermore, as EUIPO states, the Board of Appeal’s assessments concerning the connection between the contested mark and the territories of Romania and Cyprus are corroborated by other evidence produced by the intervener during the proceedings before EUIPO, specifically emails sent by the intervener to a Romanian customer and a Cypriot customer and other evidence indicating that the intervener provided services covered by the contested mark in a number of countries, including Greece, Romania and Cyprus. 53 Lastly, the applicant’s argument that it is apparent from Item XX that the number of users in Romania is lower than the number of users in other Member States must be rejected as ineffective as regards the challenge to the place of use. It is clear that that argument relates to the extent of use. 54 It follows from all of the above considerations that the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that, assessed as a whole, the evidence provided by the intervener was sufficient to establish that the contested mark had been used in the territory of the European Union during the relevant period. (b) Extent of use 55 The Board of Appeal found that the evidence, such as emails sent to clients based in Greece, Cyprus and Romania mentioning the different services offered, the websites through which the applicant provides various financial and related services, and references in the press, considered as a whole, indicated sufficient extent of use of the contested mark. 56 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal relied on probabilities instead of solid and objective evidence. In addition, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal attached excessive weight to communications to clients. 57 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 58 As to the extent of the use to which the contested mark has been put, account must be taken, in particular, of the commercial volume of the overall use, as well as of the length of the period during which the mark was used and the frequency of use (judgments of 8 July 2004, MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON), T‑334/01, EU:T:2004:223, paragraph 35, and of 8 July 2004, VITAFRUIT, T‑203/02, EU:T:2004:225, paragraph 41). 59 Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 41 above, an accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, would be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts. 60 In the present case, first of all, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that the evidence provided by the intervener, in particular the emails to clients based in Greece, Cyprus and Romania, refers to the various services offered by the intervener, specifically the issuance of prepaid cards and debit cards, bill payment via a website, online payment solutions, issuance of tickets and the sale of goods and services on behalf of third parties. Next, it is apparent from the file that the intervener provided its services via two websites, www.vivawallet.com and www.viva.gr, and via mobile phone applications called ‘Viva’. 61 In addition, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, and as is borne out by the file relating to the proceedings before EUIPO, that the Viva group is recognised as the top e-money institution in Greece. Furthermore, a number of items of evidence indicate a large number of customers and merchants, the volume and value of transactions carried out using cards (prepaid and debit) issued by the intervener during the period 2015-2020, traffic data from the website www.vivawallet.com coming within the relevant period, the number of points of sale across Greece and several invoices and samples of the volume of tickets issued by the intervener. 62 Consequently, it must be held, contrary to the applicant’s contention, that, in order to assess the extent of use of the contested mark, the Board of Appeal relied on a very large amount of evidence which it analysed together in order to conclude that there had been sufficient extent of use. As regards the duration and frequency of use of the contested mark, it should be pointed out that the evidence shows that the contested mark was used regularly during the relevant period. As regards the commercial volume, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that the evidence shows a substantial volume of sales and transactions effected by the intervener. 63 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the contested mark had been put to commercial use that was real and intended to create and maintain a market share for at least some of the services covered, with the result that the extent of use of that mark could be regarded as sufficient. (c) Nature of use 64 The Board of Appeal found that the contested mark operated as a link between the services at issue and the undertaking responsible for their provision, so that the relevant public may recognise the origin of those services and distinguish it from that of other services originating from other undertakings. In addition, the Board of Appeal found that the use of the term ‘viva’, alone or with the addition of non-distinctive terms, constituted use of the contested mark as registered. 65 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the use of the combination of the elements ‘viva’ and ‘wallet’, where that combination denotes the intervener’s company name, also constituted use of the contested mark in connection with the services covered by that mark. 66 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 67 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicant does not call into question the Board of Appeal’s findings that the use of the Viva sign must be regarded as use of the contested mark as registered. However, it criticises the Board of Appeal for having concluded that the use of the sign constituting the intervener’s company name could constitute use of the contested mark in the course of trade. 68 In that regard, in accordance with case-law, there is use in relation to goods or services where a sign constituting a company name is used in such a way that a link is established between that sign and the goods marketed or the services provided (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2007, Céline, C‑17/06, EU:C:2007:497, paragraph 23). In so far as that condition is satisfied, the fact that a word element is used as the company’s trade name does not therefore preclude its use as a mark to designate goods or services (see judgment of 15 March 2023, Zelmotor v EUIPO – B&B Trends (zelmotor), T‑194/22, not published, EU:T:2023:130, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 69 In the present case, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that, as is apparent from numerous items of evidence, the element ‘viva’ was not used solely as a company name, but was also used in the form in which it was registered or with additional elements such as an exclamation mark or ‘gr’, ‘wallet’ or ‘payments.com’. Since the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that those additional elements were not distinctive, it was correct in finding that the use of the element ‘viva’, alone or with the addition of those elements, had to be considered use of the contested mark as registered. 70 Consequently, it must be held that the evidence shows that the contested mark was used in such a way as to establish a link between that mark and the services provided by the intervener, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 68 above. (d) Use of the contested mark in connection with the services at issue 71 It should be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 58(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, where the grounds for revocation of rights exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the EU trade mark is registered, the rights of the proprietor are to be declared to be revoked in respect of those goods or services only. 72 The breadth of the categories of goods or services for which the contested mark was registered is a key element of the balance between, on the one hand, the maintenance and preservation of the exclusive rights conferred on the proprietor of the contested mark and, on the other hand, the limitation of those rights in order to prevent a trade mark which has been used in relation to part of the goods or services being afforded extensive protection merely because it has been registered for a wide range of goods or services (judgments of 16 July 2020, ACTC v EUIPO, C‑714/18 P, EU:C:2020:573, paragraph 39, and of 2 March 2022, Apologistics v EUIPO – Kerckhoff (apo-discounter.de), T‑140/21, not published, EU:T:2022:110, paragraph 22). 73 Although the principle of partial use operates to ensure that trade marks which have not been used for a given category of goods or services are not rendered unavailable, it must not result in the proprietor of the mark concerned being stripped of all protection for goods or services which, although not strictly identical to those in respect of which he or she has succeeded in proving genuine use, are not in essence different from them and belong to a single group which cannot be divided other than in an arbitrary manner. In that regard, it is in practice impossible for the proprietor of a trade mark to prove that the mark has been used for all conceivable variations of the goods and services concerned by the registration. Consequently, the concept of ‘part of the goods or services’ cannot be taken to mean all the commercial variations of similar goods or services but merely goods or services which are sufficiently distinct to constitute coherent categories or sub-categories (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 74 In that regard, it is important to assess in a concrete manner – principally in relation to the goods or services for which the proprietor of a mark has furnished proof of use of the mark – whether those goods or services constitute an independent subcategory in relation to the goods and services falling within the class of goods or services concerned, so as to link the goods or services for which genuine use of the mark has been proved to the category of goods or services covered by the application for registration of that trade mark (judgment of 16 July 2020, ACTC v EUIPO, C‑714/18 P, EU:C:2020:573, paragraph 46). 75 In the present case, the Board of Appeal identified a number of subcategories of services, based in particular on the classes to which they belong. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the Board of Appeal’s assessment in the light of the use of the contested mark in respect of each class of services at issue. (1) Class 35 76 First, the Board of Appeal found that the evidence submitted by the intervener was sufficient to demonstrate that it had continuously operated a digital platform through which it had compiled offers enabling end users to carry out searches or purchase goods and services provided by third parties, and had also provided marketing activities. Second, it found that it could be established from the evidence with certainty that the intervener had provided brokerage and intermediation services for electronic payments. Third, it concluded that the mark had also been used in connection with a wide range of commercial services. Furthermore, it found that the partial use thus demonstrated also applied to services that were not in essence different from those for which use had been proved and that belonged to a single group, which could not be divided other than in an arbitrary manner. 77 The applicant argues that the Board of Appeal’s findings are incorrect and that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the intervener had produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate use of the contested mark in connection with the services in Class 35. 78 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 79 First of all, it must be stated, as the Board of Appeal did, that it is apparent from several items of evidence, such as screenshots of the intervener’s website www.viva.gr and from a sample service agreement, corroborated by newsletters and press articles, that the contested mark was used by the intervener in order to market a digital platform enabling third parties to offer and sell tickets and various services and to enable end customers to carry out searches and purchase those goods and services. The same evidence shows that the intervener also used the contested mark to provide marketing activities in the form of advertisements for offers provided by third parties on its digital platform. 80 Next, it is apparent from, inter alia, screenshots of the website www.viva.gr that the contested mark was also used to provide brokerage and intermediation services for electronic payments between end customers and the recipients of the payments. 81 Lastly, as the Board of Appeal pointed out, several screenshots of the intervener’s website and the sample service agreement show that the intervener also offered multiple types of commercial services, namely marketing and advertising services, business promotion, advisory services regarding sales and pricing policy, brokerage and intermediation services, or customer service. 82 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the intervener had established genuine use of the contested mark in connection with the services in Class 35. The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call that finding into question. 83 In the first place, the applicant submits that, by holding that the evidence submitted is sufficient to demonstrate actual use of the contested mark for the services in Class 35, the Board of Appeal failed to apply the principle laid down in paragraph 35 of the judgment of 8 July 2004, HIPOVITON (T‑334/01, EU:T:2004:223), since that evidence does not make it possible to establish the volume of services marketed, while the frequency of those acts of use is, moreover, limited. 84 However, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraph 61 above, it is apparent from the evidence taken into account by the Board of Appeal that the contested mark had been put to actual use and that the volumes marketed were taken into account in order to determine genuine use. Accordingly, the applicant cannot claim that the volumes marketed were not taken into account. 85 In the second place, the applicant merely states that the information contained in the evidence relating to the services in Class 35 could prove genuine use of the contested mark for the services in Class 36. However, it has failed to substantiate the reasons why that evidence is capable of establishing genuine use of the contested mark in relation to the services in Class 36 rather than those in Class 35. In any event, it is apparent from paragraphs 79 to 82 above that the Board of Appeal correctly assessed the evidence in order to establish that the contested mark had been used for the services in Class 35. 86 In the third place, the fact, relied on by the applicant, that the Cancellation Division revoked the contested mark in respect of all the services in Class 35 is not such as to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment. 87 In accordance with settled case-law, there is functional continuity between the various departments of EUIPO, on the one hand, and the Boards of Appeal, on the other. It follows from that functional continuity that, in the review of decisions taken by the departments of EUIPO hearing the application at first instance that the Boards of Appeal must undertake, the Boards of Appeal are required to base their decision on all the matters of fact and of law which the parties concerned introduced either in the proceedings before the department which heard the application at first instance or in the appeal. The review undertaken by the Boards of Appeal is not limited to the lawfulness of the contested decision, but, by virtue of the devolutive effect of the appeal proceedings, it requires a reappraisal of the dispute as a whole, since the Boards of Appeal must re-examine in full the initial application and take into account evidence produced in due time. Thus, it follows from Article 71(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that, through the effect of the appeal before it, the Board of Appeal is called upon to carry out a full re-examination of the merits of the case before it, in both law and fact (see judgment of 7 December 2017, Coca-Cola v EUIPO – Mitico (Master), T‑61/16, EU:T:2017:877, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited). 88 Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the contested decision is inconsistent with the decision of the Cancellation Division must be rejected as ineffective. (2) Class 36 89 The Board of Appeal found that the evidence proved genuine use of the contested mark for all the services in Class 36 referred to in paragraph 7 above. 90 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal relied on probabilities and suppositions in order to conclude that the evidence was capable of demonstrating genuine use of the contested mark for non-electronic financial payment services. According to the applicant, the evidence provides no indication of the specific services offered or their actual provision. 91 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 92 In the present case, in the first place, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that it is apparent from numerous items of evidence, such as screenshots of the intervener’s website, emails to customers, newsletters, the general terms and conditions of Viva Wallet Services, the cooperation agreements concluded by the intervener and press articles that the Viva services could also be purchased by cash payments, in physical points of sale or even via a courier dispatched to the customer’s home. 93 In the second place, it should be noted that the evidence, including presentations on the profile of the intervener, emails to customers, screenshots of the intervener’s website and cooperation agreements, shows that the contested mark was used for a wide range of financial services in relation to payments, in particular in connection with a digital platform through which the intervener provided various financial services allowing the collection, clearing, reconciling of payments from end customers (payment of invoices) and electronic money transactions, payment administration services, maintenance of user accounts, user verification services, credit services and technical support in relation to payment services. Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 92 above, the intervener also operated non-electronic payment systems. 94 In the third place, as the Board of Appeal observed, it is apparent from the general terms and conditions of Viva Wallet Services and from the cooperation agreements that users of Viva Wallet accounts could deposit and withdraw sums of electronic money from their accounts, up to the monetary equivalent paid to Viva Payments for that purpose, whether by electronic means or in cash. 95 In the fourth place, it should be noted that it is apparent from, inter alia, the general terms and conditions of Viva Wallet Services, corroborated by screenshots of the intervener’s website and emails to customers, that the contested mark was used to offer services enabling the transfer of money between several users of the intervener’s financial services. 96 In the fifth place, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that numerous items of evidence, including photographs of debit cards, samples of ticketing agreements and internal records indicating the number of cards issued by the intervener and the transaction value realised by use of those cards, demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the contested mark had been put to genuine use in connection with the services of issuing and acquiring of payment instruments. 97 In the sixth place, screenshots of the intervener’s website, multiple tickets issued by the intervener through its website and samples of ticketing agreements make it possible to establish that the digital platform managed by the intervener gave third parties the opportunity to offer, sell and advertise their goods and services and gave end users the opportunity to carry out searches and purchase goods and services, such as transport tickets or accommodation bookings. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the intervener had established genuine use of the contested mark in connection with the brokerage for provision of tickets for transportation, entertainment events and activities and accommodation. 98 Accordingly, in the light of those considerations and the case-law cited in paragraphs 72 to 74 above, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the intervener had adduced proof of use of the contested mark for all of the services in Class 36. 99 The applicant’s arguments do not succeed in calling those findings into question. 100 The applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having relied on communications sent to clients and on Google analytics reports, documents which, in its view, do not make it possible to determine the services provided by the intervener. 101 First, it is clear that the Board of Appeal took into account, inter alia, a brochure from the intervener, various screenshots of its website, emails to customers, newsletters, general terms and conditions of the services offered and samples of agency agreements, which are dated throughout the relevant period and systematically confirm the use of the contested mark also for non-electronic payments. In addition, that evidence is also corroborated by press articles from independent third parties. 102 Second, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 41 above, an accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, would be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts. Thus, even if the probative value of the Google analytics reports is limited, in so far as, taken in isolation, those reports do not show with certainty how the services concerned were placed on the market, that factor is not in itself decisive, but may nevertheless be taken into account in the overall assessment of whether the use is genuine. 103 As pointed out in paragraph 41 above, the question whether a mark has been put to genuine use is to be assessed globally, taking into account all the available evidence, without analysing each piece of evidence separately, but rather together, in order to determine the most likely and coherent meaning. 104 Accordingly, it cannot be claimed that the Board of Appeal based its assessment on probabilities and suppositions, since it is apparent from paragraphs 92 to 97 above that it carried out an overall assessment of the concrete and varied evidence which clearly indicates the services in respect of which the intervener used the contested mark. 105 Moreover, as regards paragraphs 39, 40 and 46 of the judgment of 5 June 2024, Supermac’s v EUIPO – McDonald’s International Property (BIG MAC) (T‑58/23, not published, EU:T:2024:360), cited by the applicant, it must be held that the goods and services at issue in that judgment concern goods and services that are clearly different and a set of different factual circumstances, with the result that the General Court’s assessments cannot be transposed to the present case. (3) Class 38 106 The Board of Appeal found that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate, first, that the intervener’s digital infrastructure provided access to communication networks and information transmission and, second, that users of the Viva services were able to make payments with credit cards via various electronic communication channels offered by the intervener, including via its website, on the telephone or via a mobile application by using QR codes. It observed that the provision of financial services in Class 36, particularly electronic financial services, in respect of which the Cancellation Division had rejected the application for revocation, was impossible without the electronic communication services covered by Class 38. According to the Board of Appeal, the intervener has an obligation to verify the identity of users. 107 The applicant argues that the Board of Appeal erred in concluding that the link between the services in Classes 36 and 38 made it possible to find genuine use in relation to the services in Class 38. According to the applicant, such an approach is not consistent with EUIPO’s decision-making practice and does not make it possible to distinguish the services in those two classes. 108 EUIPO, supported by the intervener, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 109 In the present case, it must be held that the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for such reasoning. The Board of Appeal did not rely solely on the link between the services in the two classes referred to above, but also examined numerous items of evidence in order to conclude that they established genuine use for each of the services in Class 38. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has not put forward any argument in order to challenge the evidence referred to in paragraphs 90 and 91 of the contested decision. Consequently, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the evidence assessed as a whole was sufficient to demonstrate genuine use of the contested mark in respect of all the services in Class 38. 110 Furthermore, as regards the EUIPO decisions relied on by the applicant, it should be borne in mind that the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001 and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65). (4) Classes 39, 41 and 42 111 The Board of Appeal found that the evidence provided by the intervener sufficiently demonstrated use of the contested mark for the services in Classes 39, 41 and 42, referred to in paragraph 7 above. 112 The applicant argues that the Board of Appeal erred in concluding that the intervener had submitted sufficient evidence of use of the contested mark for the services in Classes 39 and 42 and refers to the reasoning set out for the services in Classes 35, 36 and 38. As regards Classes 41 and 42, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for not having distinguished the services in those two classes from the services in Class 38 and Class 36, respectively. 113 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments relating to Classes 39 and 42, but does not, however, comment on those relating to Class 41. The intervener disputes the applicant’s arguments. 114 In the present case, in the first place, as regards the services in Class 39, it must be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that the intervener is a licensed travel agent and member of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). It is also apparent from screenshots of the intervener’s website, sales confirmation receipts, invoices and sample tickets that the intervener operates a digital platform via its website where third parties are able to sell transport tickets or tickets to events and end customers are able to carry out searches and purchase tickets. In addition, the examples of service agreements and newsletters demonstrate that the intervener issued tickets and provided information regarding travel. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that, as regards the general category of ‘travel office and agency services, travel organisation’, the intervener had provided proof of use for the subcategory consisting in ‘making, management and facilitation of reservations and bookings for transportation, accommodation and events’. 115 In accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 36 to 39 above, having regard to all of those factors and to their overall assessment, it must be held that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the intervener had provided solid and objective evidence establishing genuine use of the contested mark for part of the services in Class 39. 116 In the second place, as regards the services in Class 41, it is apparent from multiple items of evidence, such as samples of ticketing agreements, cooperation agreements concluded by the intervener, screenshots of its website and emails to customers, that the intervener used the contested mark to provide ticket reservation services also by non-electronic means, by enabling customers to reserve tickets from physical points of sale and to obtain actual tickets via physical delivery channels. 117 Therefore, in the light of the evidence produced by the intervener, it must be held that the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude from that evidence that the contested mark had been used for the services comprising the non-electronic issuance of tickets. 118 In the third place, as regards Class 42, it is apparent from several items of evidence, including the presentation of the profile of the intervener and screenshots of its website, that the intervener provided financial services via its online portal and mobile application, access to which depended on the provision of online authentication software. It follows, in particular, from the general terms and conditions relating to the Viva Wallet Services that the intervener had the obligation to verify the identity of users. In addition, the applications support smart payments through various means, including QR codes generated by the intervener’s software tool. 119 It must therefore be held that the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the Board of Appeal’s findings that the intervener demonstrated genuine use of the contested mark in connection with the services comprising ‘providing temporary use of authentication software’ in Class 42. 120 The applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not distinguish between the services in Classes 38 and 36, on the one hand, and those in Classes 41 and 42, on the other, does not call that finding into question, in so far as, in paragraphs 97 to 101 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal carried out an overall assessment of the evidence establishing use of the contested mark in relation to the services in Classes 41 and 42. 121 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the applicant’s first plea, relating to the Board of Appeal’s incorrect assessment of the proof of genuine use of the contested mark, must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 122 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 123 Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Viva Credit IFN SA to pay the costs. Gâlea Costeira Ricziová Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 February 2026. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.