Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:1999:145
Date: 1999-03-16
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968;Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 - Jurisdiction
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

summary of the substance of the problem, 
at least as it appears in the context of the 
Tessili judgment, cited above. 
50. The first possibility is that the plain­
tiff's choice of jurisdiction remains open 
and application of Article 5(1) of the 
Convention, under that case-law, results 
in the obligations at issue being performed 
in more than one place, which means that 
there can be more than one court having 
jurisdiction. This is the view held by the 
Italian Government and Leathertex. 
51. A second is that, as the United King­
dom Government proposes in the alterna­
tive, the choice of jurisdiction should be 
abandoned in favour of the criterion of the 
domicile of the person being sued, in 
accordance with Article 2 of the Conven­
tion, which would avoid creating a situa­
tion in which a number of courts have 
jurisdiction in respect of one and the same 
case. 
16 — In this regard, the order for reference is not totally clear in 
the description it gives of the reasoning employed by the 
Hof van Beroep, Ghent in entertaining jurisdiction and one 
might doubt the fact that performance of the obligations at 
issue under the relevant jurisdictional rules should be 
located in different contracting States. The Hof van 
Cassatie states that the Hof van Beroep, Ghent, ruled 
that, under the Belgian conflicts rule, the obligation to give 
notice of termination must be performed in Belgium but 
that the judgment of the Hof van Beroep, Ghent, did not 
apply that rule as regards the obligation to pay outstanding 
commission (p. 6 of the French translation of the abridged 
order for reference). The reference for a preliminary ruling 
is based on the hypothesis of there being more than one 
court having jurisdiction upon application of the relevant 
conflict rules, although the appeal court only applied those 
rules in part, which detracts from the value of the question 
referred. In reality, this ambiguity is illusory. There is no 
doubt that the Hof van Beroep, Ghent, only referred to its 
conflicts rule in the case of one of the two obligations at 
issue. However, the fact that it upholds a judgment based 
not on the fact that the obligations must be performed in 
the same place according to the relevant conflict rules but 
that they are related, in order to justify combining the 
claims before the same court, shows that determining the 
place of performance of the second obligation in the light 
of the conflict rules would have resulted in identification of 
another place of performance. If this was not the case, it 
would have been necessary to combine the claims under 
the relevant rules of private international law alone. The 
question referred by the Hof van Cassatie thus confirms 
the existence of the two separate places of performance 
resulting from the lex causae, and is definitely situated in 
the context defined by the Court's judgment in Tessili, 
cited above. 17 — Paragraph 13. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
52. The final possibility is that, the court 
having jurisdiction to hear and determine 
one of the claims based on obligations 
which are of equal rank, under Article 5(1) 
of the Convention, also has jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the other claim if there 
is a relationship between those two claims 
which is so close that it is in the interest of 
good justice to examine and rule on them 
together in order to avoid irreconcilable 
outcomes. This is the solution advocated by 
the Commission. 
53. As regards the Commission's argument 
that jurisdictions should be combined since 
the claims are related, I consider this goes 
further than the wording of the Convention 
allows. 18 
54. It should be stated that, although 
relatedness is taken into account in the 
Convention, it is not considered to confer 
jurisdiction. In other words, Article 22 of 
the Convention does not allow a court to 
decline jurisdiction in favour of another 
court on the ground that actions are related 
unless a related case has already been 
brought before that other court. The provi­
sion contained in Article 22 therefore 
applies only in such circumstances. It is 
only in that case that, as a result of a plea 
that the actions are related, the cases may 
both be brought before one court. 
55. The Court of Justice clearly stated this 
in its judgment in Elefanten Schuh: 'Arti­
cle 22 of the Convention is intended to 
establish how related actions which have 
been brought before courts of different 
Member States are to be dealt with. It does 
not confer jurisdiction'. 19 
56. The Commission, however, accepts this 
view since it states that 'so long as only one 
court is seised there is no question of 
applying Article 22'. 20 
57. It even adds that it is merely a matter of 
interpreting Article 5(1) in a way which 
will preclude situations likely to come 
within the scope of Article 22. 21 
58. Although the objective sought by the 
Commission is clear and undoubtedly legit­
imate, I have difficulty understanding the 
reasoning which led it to propose an 
18 — It should be pointed out that this line of argument, which is 
held exclusively by the Commission in its written observa­
tions, was only put forward at the hearing in order to 
supplement its main contention that the court having 
jurisdiction should be that for the place where the 
obligation is actually performed, thus demonstrating a 
shift in its original position. 
19 —Case 150/80 [1981] ECR 1671, paragraphs 18 to 20, 
emphasis added. 
20 — Paragraph 17 of its written observations. It should be 
added that Article 6 of the Convention provides the 
opportunity of combining related cases before a single 
court which has jurisdiction, thus avoiding the risk of 
breaking up the proceedings on any ground apart from an 
objection of connection, but this provision contains an 
exhaustive list of the cases concerned: where there are a 
number of defendants, actions on a warranty or guarantee 
or in any other third party proceedings, counterclaims, 
both contractual proceedings and proceedings in matters 
of immovable property rights against the same defendant, 
so that it does not apply in all related cases. Likewise the 
jurisdictional rules in matters of insurance and in matters 
of contracts entered into by consumers, and exclusive 
jurisdictions ensure from the start of proceedings that 
related claims are combined by appointing the court of a 
single Contracting State. 
21 — Ibid. 
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LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
interpretation of Article 5(1) which is so far 
removed from the text. 
59. Direct combination of related actions 
before the same court, where the places of 
performance of the obligations on which 
they are based are situated in different 
Contracting States amounts to disregarding 
the criterion of the place of performance of 
one of those obligations, which is contrary 
to the provisions of Article 5(1). 
60. In fact, the Commission's proposal 
amounts to altering the way the Conven­
tion deals with the question of related 
claims, going against the letter of its 
provisions and failing to take into account 
the intentions of the Contracting States, an 
outcome which was never actually envi­
saged, and this cannot be permitted. 
61. The two other sets of arguments con­
cern the choice to be made in the present 
case between Article 2 and Article 5(1), as 
interpreted in the light of the rule in Tessili, 
cited above. This choice is dictated by the 
objectives of the Convention themselves. 
62. We should remember that the Conven­
tion seeks to strengthen in the Community 
the legal protection of persons therein 
established.22 
63. As can be seen from the case-law of the 
Court, as I have already mentioned, this 
requirement for legal protection is reflected 
in the need to avoid wherever possible a 
situation in which a number of courts have 
jurisdiction in respect of one and the same 
contract.23 
64. In order to ensure that the Convention 
is fully effective, it is essential to unify the 
jurisdiction rules of the courts of the 
Contracting States, so as to avoid as far 
as possible multiplication of the bases of 
jurisdiction, and allow the plaintiff to 
identify easily the court before which he 
may bring an action and the defendant 
reasonably to foresee the court before 
which he may be sued.24 It is thus a case 
of protecting legal certainty for persons 
within the territory of the Community by 
ensuring the predictability of the rules on 
jurisdiction that will apply. 
65. Combining jurisdiction also precludes 
the risk of irreconcilable decisions and 
facilitates the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in States other than those in 
which they were delivered.25 
22 — Preamble to the Convention. 
23 — See points 19 and 20 of this Opinion. 
24 — See, in particular, Case C-383/95 Rutten [1997] ECR I-57, 
paragraph 13, and C-295/95 Farrell, cited above, para­
graph 13. 
25 — See, for example, the judgment in Mulox IBC, cited above, 
paragraph 21. In addition to the clear disadvantages for 
individuals caused by irreconcilable decisions delivered in 
related cases, from the point of view of the exact content of 
the relevant legal rule it should be pointed out, as the 
Court of Justice has done, that 'the risk of irreconcilable 
decisions [constitutes a] reason for which recognition or an 
order for enforcement is withheld by virtue of Arti­
cle 27(3) of the Convention' (Case C-220/88 Dumez 
France and Tracoba [1990] ECR I-49, paragraph 18). 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
66. This means that it is essential, if one 
wishes to comply with the spirit of the 
Convention, to promote solutions which 
favour the centralisation of proceedings 
and thus interpret the provision in this way. 
67. The judgments delivered by the Court 
in cases involving multiple obligations 
confirm this course. 
68. When it comes to identifying, among 
several obligations, the contractual obliga­
tion forming the basis of the legal proceed­
ings, 26 the principal obligation,27 or the 
obligation which characterises the con­
tract, 28 the Court has advocated establish­
ing, wherever possible, a hierarchy within 
the obligations at issue in order to avoid 
related proceedings being split between 
different courts. 
69. In this particular case we are presented 
with a situation which does not allow a 
hierarchy to be established within the 
obligations, since they are described as 
being of equal rank. 
70. The question is therefore whether, in 
view of this fact, the text of the Convention 
allows jurisdiction to be combined on other 
grounds. 
71. The Court has held on several occa­
sions that the categories of 'special jurisdic­
tion' enumerated in Article 5 of the Con­
vention constitute derogations from the 
principle that jurisdiction is vested in the 
courts of the State where the defendant is 
domiciled, as laid down in the 'General 
provisions' of Articles 2 and 3, and as such 
must be interpreted restrictively.29 
72. One might gain from that case-law the 
idea that where recourse to a special 
jurisdiction produces results which clearly 
conflict with the objectives of the Conven­
tion it is necessary to reject the choice of 
jurisdiction and say, as in the Humbert 
judgment, cited above, that Article 5(1) of 
the Convention does not apply.30 
73. This solution seems to me to be of 
doubtful legal validity. 
74. The Convention does not make the 
choice of jurisdiction subject to compliance 
with any prior condition. A plaintiff is 
always at liberty to choose any of its terms 
where a case comes within the scope of the 
26 — De Boos judgment, cited above. 
27 — Shenavai judgment, cited above. 
28 — Ivenel judgment, cited above. 
29 — Case 189/87 Kalfelis [1988] ECR 5565, paragraph 19 and 
Case 32/88 Humbert, cited above, paragraph 18. 
30 — Paragraph 19. 
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LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
Convention and provided, naturally, the 
legal nature of that case allows the plaintiff 
to have recourse to one of the categories of 
special jurisdiction, if he so chooses.31 
75. Moreover, the fact that in the Humbert 
judgment cited above the choice of juris­
diction was rejected in favour of the rule of 
jurisdiction contained in Article 2 of the 
Convention was due to the specific nature 
of the main proceedings in that case, which 
related to obligations performed outside 
the territorial scope of the Convention. 
Application of Article 5(1) would have 
resulted in jurisdiction being located out­
side the territory of the Contracting States, 
a situation which is contrary to both the 
letter and the spirit of Article 5, which 
provides that a person domiciled in a 
Contracting State may be sued elsewhere 
than in that State only in another Con­
tracting State, and excludes third States. 
76. The Court of Justice has, moreover, 
observed that, whilst it is true that dis­
advantages arise from different aspects of 
the same dispute being adjudicated upon by 
different courts, the plaintiff is always 
entitled to bring his action in its entirety 
before the courts for the domicile of the 
defendant, which thus provides a sure and 
reliable criterion.32 
77. In other words, the choice of jurisdic­
tion provided in the interest of the parties, 
in particular of the plaintiff, still gives them 
the security of a predictable rule of juris­
diction, which the plaintiff may choose if, 
for his own particular reasons, the other 
rule of jurisdiction does not suit him. 
78. The choice which is made may conflict 
with the objectives of the Convention: it is 
up to the plaintiff to assess to what extent 
the increased number of courts having 
jurisdiction as a result of applying Arti­
cle 5(1) is the source of more inconvenience 
than would result from combining the 
heads of claim comprising his action before 
a single court situated in the place where 
the defendant is domiciled, if, under Arti­
cle 5(1), one of the courts is situated in the 
Contracting State of his domicile. 
79. I share the idea that Article 5(1) of the 
Convention cannot be prevented from 
applying on grounds other than those 
dictated by its own scope of application, 
even where the use which the plaintiff seeks 
to make of it leads to determining jurisdic­
tion in a way which is not in accordance 
with the principles of the Convention, if 
that is the choice of the plaintiff. 
80. Using the rule for determining jurisdic­
tion contained in Article 2 of the Conven­
tion only where application of Article 5(1) 
is likely to have undesirable effects would 
31 — Thus, in the Kalfelis judgment, cited above, the impossi­
bility for the court seised of a claim based on a 
combination of tortious liability, breach of a contractual 
obligation and unlawful enrichment to hear and deter­
mine, on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Convention 
(jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-
delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred), parts of that claim which are not tortious is 
justified on grounds relating to the scope of the provision 
in question. 
32 — Kalfelis judgment, paragraph 20, and Humbert judgment, 
paragraph 20. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
be adding to the text of the Convention a 
condition which is not there. 
81. It follows, therefore, that claims relat­
ing to two obligations of equal rank arising 
from one and the same contract, whose 
respective places of performance according 
to the jurisdiction rules of the State of the 
court seised of the matter are in two 
different Contracting States, may, under 
Article 2 of the Convention, be submitted 
to the same court, namely that of the 
Contracting State of the person being sued. 
82. However, in that same situation, Arti­
cle 5(1) of the Convention precludes one 
and the same court having jurisdiction to 
entertain both those claims where their 
places of performance are located in the 
territory of two different Contracting 
States. 
83. The Court may consider that it is for 
the plaintiff to choose the provision which 
he thinks provides greater protection of his 
interests, even if he sacrifices thereby the 
advantages stemming from the existence of 
a single forum. The proposed interpretation 
therefore constitutes one possible answer to 
the question referred by the national court. 
84. However, the Court may also consider 
that observance of the principles of the 
Convention does not permit, in a case such 
as that now before it, that one of the terms 
of the choice of jurisdiction which is open 
to a party should result in a solution which 
is so far removed from those principles. 
This is the opinion which I support, which 
leads me to propose to the Court an 
alternative interpretation of the provisions. 
C — The effects of the content of the 
concept of 'places of performance' 
85. In referring to the conflict rules of the 
forum in order to determine the place of 
performance of the obligations at issue, the 
national court was naturally complying 
with the relevant Community case-law. 
(1) The Tessili judgment 
86. The method of determining the place of 
performance used by the Belgian courts is, 
as we have seen, in part the reason why 
there is more than one place of perfor­
mance of the obligations at issue.33 
87. Since the Convention entered into force 
the question has constantly been raised as 
to whether the expressions and concepts it 
contains should be regarded as autono­
mous, and hence common to all the Con­
tracting States, or as referring to the 
I - 6762 
33 — Point 47 et seq. of this Opinion. 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
substantive rules of the law applying in 
each case according to the conflict rules of 
the court first seised of the matter.34 
88. In the Tessili judgment, cited above, the 
Court answered: 'Neither of these two 
options rules out the other since the 
appropriate choice can only be made in 
respect of each of the provisions of the 
Convention to ensure that it is fully effec­
tive having regard to the objectives of 
Article 220 of the Treaty'. 35 
89. The Court has on several occasions 
ruled in favour of an autonomous inter­
pretation of some of the concepts of the 
Convention, stating that, 'according to 
settled case-law... the Court will, in prin­
ciple, interpret the terms of the Convention 
autonomously so as to ensure that it is fully 
effective having regard to the objectives of 
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, for the 
implementa t ion of which it was 
adopted'.36 
90. However, as regards the term 'place of 
performance' of contractual obligations 
within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 
Convention, the Court's initial choice of 
reference to the conflict rules of the forum 
was recently confirmed very clearly, 
thereby dismissing indirectly any autono­
mous definition.37 
91. The reference by the Court to the 
substantive law applicable was based on 
the differences obtaining between national 
laws of contract and in view of the absence, 
at the stage of legal development in 1976, 
of any unification of the substantive law 
applicable.38 It was stated that that posi­
tion was justified also by the fact that 
determination of the place of performance 
of the obligations depends on the contrac­
tual context to which those obligations 
belong.39 
92. The position set out in the Tessili 
judgment cited above reflects a legitimate 
concern not to impose on all the Contract­
ing States a definition which conflicted 
with their national laws and whose appro­
priateness as regard the objectives of the 
Convention was not clearly apparent. 34 — The Tessili and De Bloos judgments, both delivered on 
6 October 1976, are the first of the Court's judgments 
interpreting the Convention. 
35 — Paragraph 11. 
36 — Farrell judgment, cited above, paragraph 12. A definition 
of the term 'civil and commercial matters' had been given 
by the Court back in 1976 in the judgment in Case 29/76 
LTU [1976] ECR 1541. Other definitions followed: the 
term 'matters relating to a contract' in the Peters judgment, 
'matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict', in the 
Kalfelis judgment, or the term 'maintenance creditor' in 
the Farrell judgment, to cite but a few. 
37 — The solution given in the Tessili judgment, paragraph 13, 
referred to in the Sbenavai judgment, paragraph 7, was 
referred to again in the judgment in Case C-288/92 
Custom Made Commercial [1994] ECR I-2613, paragraph 
26 et seq. 
38 — Tessili judgment, paragraph 14. 
39 — Ibid. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
93. Thus, the obligation to make payment, 
which obviously relates to a very large 
number of contracts and is directly at issue 
in the case in the main proceedings,40 
clearly shows the unsatisfactory nature of 
an autonomous definition in this area, 
which derives its content from the way in 
which some of the Contracting States 
determine the place of performance of this 
type of obligation. 
94. Depending on whether payment is to be 
collected at the place of the debtor's 
domicile or the creditor's domicile, the 
place of performance of the obligation to 
make payment will be the place where 
either the defendant or the plaintiff is 
domiciled. In addition to the difficulties 
relating to the choice between the national 
laws of the Contracting States, which are 
divided equally between the legal sys­
tems,4 1 there is no rational criterion 
enabling arbitration in accordance with 
the principles of the Convention. 
95. Adopting an autonomous definition 
based on the payment being payable at 
the place where the creditor is domiciled 42 
amounts in fact to adopting a forum actoris 
which was clearly not that intended by the 
Convention. This can be seen from the fact 
that Article 2 provides that the jurisdiction 
of the courts of the defendant's domicile is 
the fundamental jurisdiction. Moreover, as 
the Court itself pointed out: 'the hostility of 
the Convention towards the attribution of 
jurisdiction to the courts of the plaintiff's 
domicile was demonstrated by the fact that 
the second paragraph of Article 3 preclu­
ded the application of national provisions 
attributing jurisdiction to such courts for 
proceedings against defendants domiciled 
in the territory of a Contracting State'.43 
The Court added that: 'apart from the 
cases expressly provided for, the Conven­
tion appears clearly hostile towards the 
attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of 
the plaintiff's domicile'.44 
96. On the other hand, to identify the place 
of performance of an obligation to make 
payment as the place where the defendant 
is domiciled — which is the solution 
adopted by those Contracting States for 
whom a debt is payable at the debtor's 
place of domicile — would remove the 
choice of jurisdiction provided for in the 
Convention, since this interpretation of 
40 — See point 7 of this Opinion. 
41 — The following Contracting States consider that obligations 
to make payment are, in principle, to be performed at the 
place where the debtor is domiciled: the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom 
of Spain, the French Republic and the Grand-Duchy of 
Luxembourg; those which consider that they are, in 
principle, to be performed at the place where the creditor 
is domiciled are: the Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic 
Republic, Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the 
Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
42 — In matters relating to the international sale of goods, for 
example, the Hague Convention of 1 July 1964 relating to 
a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods ( United 
Nations— Treaties Series, 1972, vol. 834, N o 11929, 
p. 107) and the Vienna Convention of 11 April 1980 
publishing the United Nations Convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods (Decree No 87-1034 of 
22 December 1987, Journal officiel de la République 
française of 27 December 1987, p. 15241) state that 
payment must be made at the seller's place of business or, if 
he does not have a place of business, at his habitual 
residence. 
43 — Dumez France and Tracoba judgment, cited above, 
paragraph 16. 
44 — Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton [1993] ECR 
I-139, paragraph 17. 
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LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
Article 5(1), by adopting the place where 
the defendant is domiciled, means that 
Article 5(1) has the same tenor as Article 2. 
97. In the Custom Made Commercial, cited 
above, the question submitted by the 
national court concerned application of 
the above-mentioned Tessili case-law to a 
claim for payment brought by a supplier 
against his customer under a contract for 
manufacture and supply, where the lex 
causae is constituted by a provision such 
as Article 59(1) of the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods annexed to the 
Hague Convention. 
98. Application to the contractual relation­
ship of a uniform law dispels the disadvan­
tages attaching to the multiplicity of laws 
applicable. However, the meaning of the 
relevant provision of that law, under which 
the place of performance of the obligation 
on the buyer to pay the price to the seller is 
the seller's place of business or, if he does 
not have a place of business, his habitual 
residence, subject only to the proviso that 
the parties to the contract have not stipu­
lated a different place for the performance 
of that obligation, determined that the 
court of the applicant was the court having 
jurisdiction. 
99. The Court of Justice upheld its case-
law, transposing it to the circumstances 
where a renvoi is made under conflict rules 
to a uniform law.45 It therefore declined to 
adopt an autonomous definition, establish­
ing the place of business of the seller, and 
hence in this particular case, that of the 
applicant, as the place of performance of 
the obligation to make payment. 
(2) Application to the present dispute 
100. In the case in the main proceedings, 
the multiplicity of fora is the result of the 
differences between the national rules con­
cerning the place of performance of obliga­
tions to make payment, as such differences 
appear following application of the conflict 
rules. 
101. Although clearly contrary to the 
requirement to simplify the rules of juris­
diction, a multiplicity of courts having 
jurisdiction could be accepted if it was 
justified by other essential considerations 
resulting from the scheme of the Conven­
tion. 
102. Besides the interest in having certainty 
regarding the rules of jurisdiction, it is also 
necessary to point out the importance of 
the connecting factor which must exist, so 
far as possible, between the dispute and the 
court having jurisdiction to resolve it. The 
special rules of jurisdiction, which apply to 
the forum contractus provided for in Arti­
cle 5(1) of the Convention, are justified by 
the consideration that there is a close 45 — Paragraph 28. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
connecting factor between the dispute and 
the court having jurisdiction to resolve it, in 
order to ensure the proper organisation of 
the case.46 
103. This principle stems from the idea that 
it will be easier for a court which is 
geographically proximate to the contrac­
tual relationship at issue, through the 
knowledge it has of the facts of the case, 
to rule on the matter before it. 
104. Although the criterion of predictabil­
ity certainly constitutes one criterion for 
interpreting Article 5(1), it should be 
remembered that it is the criterion of the 
connecting factor which lies at the origin of 
that provision. An acceptable interpreta­
tion of Article 5(1) must therefore ensure 
that the meaning ascribed to the concept of 
'place of performance' reflects as far as 
possible a genuine connecting factor. 
105. The Court's case-law moreover con­
sistently refers to the fundamental nature of 
this principle, which justifies Article 5, and 
the freedom of choice which its existence 
gives alongside Article 2. 47 
106. It is difficult in this particular case to 
find such a connection between the claim 
for payment of commission sought and the 
corresponding forum according to the sub­
stantive law applicable, which is that of 
Italy, when one realises that the commis­
sion is the consideration for the perfor­
mance of the agreement by Bodetex, which 
is established in Belgium and responsible, 
under the terms of the agreement, for the 
Belgian and Netherlands markets. 
107. May I add that, with regard this time 
to the criterion of certainty or predictability 
of the rules of jurisdiction, identification of 
the competent forum by an indirect method 
is no more likely to promote comprehen­
sion of the rules of jurisdiction, since it 
means resorting to the private international 
law of the forum in order to determine the 
substantive law applicable, which localises 
the place of performance of the contested 
obligation. 
46 — Report on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. 
47 — Judgments in Tessili, paragraph 13; Ivenel, paragraph 11; 
Shenavai, paragraph 6, and Custom Made Commercial, 
paragraph 13. 
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LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
108. It is clear therefore that, in the case in 
the main proceedings, application of Arti­
cle 5(1) when interpreted for the purposes 
of the Tessili case-law cited above, comes 
up against several guiding principles of the 
Convention, to the extent that the situation 
clearly stimulated the Hof van Beroep, 
Ghent into seeking to bring the claims 
together by other means. 
109. It seems to me that a solution which is 
closer to the requirements of the Conven­
tion could be applied in this case. 
(3) To achieve a solution which is closer to 
the objectives of the Convention 
(a) Place of performance: a term with a 
variety of meanings 
110. It is necessary to start from the idea 
put forward by Advocate General Lenz 48 
that the place of performance of an obliga­
tion is not defined, for the purposes of 
substantive law, on the basis of require­
ments such as those laid down in the 
Convention. 
111. The substantive provisions relating to 
the place of performance 'not only ... have, 
in the absence of agreement, to crystallise 
the parties' obligations, they must also 
demarcate the areas for which each of the 
parties are responsible, in case irregularities 
should arise in carrying out the con­
tract ... ' .49 
112. Advocate General Lenz adds that 'the 
place of performance under substantive law 
generally determines merely the allocation 
of the risks and burdens connected with the 
transfer of money, the availability of which 
does not depend on the place of perfor­
mance of the obligation in question'.50 He 
considers that it is necessary to 'diverg[e] 
from the substantive law of the contract 
[if]... those rules [cannot] serve to deter­
mine a court which [is] physically prox­
imate to the relationship ...'.51 
113. There is often therefore a discrepancy 
between the reasons which explain the 
definition of the place of performance of 
an obligation under substantive law, on the 
one hand, and the objectives sought by the 
Convention, on the other. 
48 — Opinion in Custom Made Commercial, cited above. 
49 — Ibid., point 26. 
50 — Ibid., point 21. In point 26. Mr Lenz quotes the example 
of Article 59(1) of the Uniform Law on the International 
Sale of Goods, which provides that the purchaser's 
obligation to make payment is to be performed at the 
creditor's place of business. That rule, he says, is based on 
the view that the person from whom a sum of money is due 
has to bear the risks attaching to the payment operation. 
51 — Ibid., point 80. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
114. So, in addition to the drawback of the 
differences between the national laws, 
which conflict with the objective of harmo­
nising rules of jurisdiction as sought by the 
Convention, it is also regrettable that 
application of the lex causae results in 
designating the forum on the basis of a 
place of performance which is legally 
determined for reasons other than those 
concerned with proper organisation of the 
proceedings. 
115. May I say, lastly, that Mr Lenz's 
statement that 'in neither of [the] judg­
ments [in De Bloos ν Bouyer and Tessili ν 
Dunlop] did the Court take physical proxi­
mity as a reason for examining whether it 
was necessary to deviate from the substan­
tive law (of the contract) in interpreting 
Article 5(1)...' 52 could also be made with 
regard to the judgment in Custom Made 
Commercial, cited above. 
116. This continuing tolerance of a version 
of a provision which is so far removed from 
what constitutes its main justification can­
not be explained solely by the existence of a 
choice of jurisdiction, which enables a 
plaintiff facing procedural complications 
due, for example, to the multiplicity of fora 
or the existence of a negative conflict of 
jurisdiction, to base his claims on Article 2 
of the Convention. 
117. It reveals the proper quandary facing 
the Court when it has to provide an 
autonomous definition of the concept of 
the place of performance. 
(b) The choice of an autonomous interpre­
tation 
118. There is no doubt that such an 
interpretation is difficult for a number of 
reasons. 
119. Firstly, one wonders whether the very 
principle of an autonomous definition in 
the matter of contracts is not questionable 
from the point of view of legal certainty, 
since the Court has to define as many 
concepts of 'place of performance' as there 
are contracts, which includes contracts sui 
generis and this means that it is faced with 
a never-ending task. 
120. Secondly, assuming this tricky under­
taking is embarked upon, the Court is 
required to give substance to the concept of 
'place of performance'. The existence of 
uniform laws, which are thought to remove 
the obstacle, referred to in the Tessili 
judgment cited above, of the absence of 
unification of the substantive law applic-52 — Point 49. 
I - 6768 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
able, was not sufficient, as we have seen, to 
alter the direction of the Court's case-law in 
Custom Made Commercial, cited above. 53 
121. The choice of consistency of case-law 
is the direct consequence of the fact that a 
uniform law, for reasons already stated, 54 
is not always able to provide the Court 
with the information enabling it to devise 
an autonomous definition which complies 
with the objectives of the Convention. 
122. I think, however, that, however tricky 
it may be, an autonomous definition of the 
place of performance is desirable. 
123. The drawback to this process is that it 
depends on a case-by-case approach to each 
contract, which would lead to constant 
lack of legal certainty. 
124. This factor, which is not entirely 
unfounded, does not, however, constitute 
a decisive criterion for dismissing the idea 
of an autonomous definition. 
125. A case-by-case approach is in fact the 
way favoured by a renvoi to the rules of 
private international law. A definition of 
the place of performance of each contract 
forming the subject of a dispute which the 
Court would be called upon to give, 
according to the scheme of autonomous 
interpretation, has already been given by 
the national court according to a similar 
process. 
126. In addition, it is quite justified to 
think that the drawbacks of this approach, 
in the circumstances of the Tessili judgment 
cited above, were exacerbated by the fact 
that in the absence of a uniform law the 
solutions thus devised still differ from one 
State to another. Even where the applicable 
conflict of laws rules are derived from 
international rules, the definition of the 
place of performance of an obligation stems 
from a national law. Lastly, where the rule 
is itself defined at international level, its 
content is determined on the basis of 
considerations other than those of proce­
dure. 
127. Thus, the concept of place of perfor­
mance, applying to an indeterminate num­
ber of obligations, is all the more elusive 
because the way in which it is determined 
in each case only applies in respect of the 
court which defines it. 
128. In those circumstances, an autono­
mous interpretation has some legitimacy, 
53 — Point 97 et seq. of this Opinion. 
54 — Point 98 of this Opinion. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
that conferred on it by the objective of 
harmonisation and simplification of the 
Convention. 
129. However, the risk that this analytical 
process will affect legal certainty for liti­
gants should not be exaggerated. 
130. An autonomous definition of the 
place of performance of an obligation will 
often be transposable to other obligations, 
of which there may be many.55 
131. In its search for a solution which 
complies more closely with the objectives 
of the Convention, and more particularly 
Article 5(1) thereof, the Court will, so far 
as is possible, take care not to adopt an 
analytical approach which would lead to as 
many definitions as there are obligations. 
132. Rather, I think that it would be more 
appropriate to determine a general criter­
ion, whose application would serve to 
provide definitions applying, if not to every 
contractual obligation, at least to certain 
categories of contractual obligation. 
133. I would add that the lack of legal 
certainty generated by the uncertainty 
affecting determination of the place of 
performance of the obligations seems to 
me to be greater in the case of application 
of the lex causae than of devising autono­
mous Community law. 
134. The choice of an autonomous criter­
ion is, in fact, likely to make it easier to 
devise pragmatic definitions applicable in a 
uniform and lasting manner to an increas­
ing number of categories of obligation, 
according to one scheme, which meets the 
requirements of the Convention. 
135. Recourse to rules derived from uni­
form laws is, however, desirable only to the 
extent that the concept of the place of 
performance which results from so doing 
complies with the requirements of the 
Convention. 
136. I therefore conclude that it is neces­
sary to follow the general direction of the 
Court's case-law on the Brussels Conven­
tion and provide an autonomous interpre­
tation of the terms it uses. 
(4) The place of performance of the con­
tested obligations 
137. In the case in the main proceedings, 
compliance with the criterion of the con-
55 — One might imagine that the place of performance of a 
service of the type provided by an individual engaged in 
commercial distribution, where that activity is geographi­
cally defined by the terms of the agreement, could give rise 
to a transposable definition, whatever the nature of the 
distribution agreement concerned. 
I - 6770 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
necting factor between the dispute and the 
court having jurisdiction leads us to 
approach the process of determining the 
place of performance of the contested 
obligations in two stages: 
(a) Obligations to make payment 
138. It is appropriate to apply the Court's 
case-law in De Bloos, cited above. 
139. The general principle in De Bloos 
would lead one to take into account the 
obligation corresponding to the contractual 
right on which the plaintiff's action is 
based. 56 This therefore involves both the 
obligation to pay the commission sought in 
return for operating as an agent, as pro­
vided in the agreement, and the obligation 
to pay compensation for termination of the 
agreement in return for the obligation to 
comply with a term of notice at the end of 
the commercial agency agreement. 
140. It should be remembered, however, 
that according to that judgment 'in a case 
where the plaintiff asserts the right to be 
paid damages or seeks a dissolution of the 
contract on the ground of the wrongful 
conduct of the other party, the obligation 
referred to in Article 5(1) is still that which 
arises under the contract and the non­
performance of which is relied upon to 
support such claims'. 57 
141. The De Bloos judgment cited above 
takes account of the fact that the claim is 
not seeking direct performance of a default­
ing contractual obligation, but rather com­
pensation for non-performance or draws 
the legal consequences therefrom, in order 
not to dissociate artificially the place of 
performance of the original contractual 
obligation from that of the 'obligation 
replacing the unperformed contractual 
obligation', 58 which might also be termed 
a counter obligation. 
142. Thus, in such a circumstance, the 
place of performance serving to determine 
jurisdiction is not, as the first principle set 
out in the abovementioned judgment would 
have it, that of the obligation under the 
contractual law on which the plaintiff's 
action is based, but that of the unperformed 
obligation on which the claim for payment 
is based. 
143. In this way, the multiplicity of heads 
of claim, which is sometimes the conse­
quence of one and the same failure to 
perform a contractual obligation, does not 
result in a proliferation of jurisdictions. 
56 — Paragraph 13. 
57 — Paragraph 14. 
58 — Paragraph 17. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
144. The result is that, as regards the 
obligation to pay compensation for termi­
nation of the agreement, the obligation to 
which reference should be made for the 
purposes of Article 5(1) is the obligation to 
comply with a period of notice. 59 
145. On the other hand, if one follows the 
sense of the De Bloos judgment, cited 
above, that reasoning cannot be transposed 
to a claim for payment of commission. The 
payment of commission does not in fact 
constitute an obligation replacing an unper­
formed contractual obligation, within the 
meaning of the judgment cited above, but, 
as the file shows, one of the main contrac­
tual obligations incumbent on the princi­
pal. 
146. In these circumstances, the place of 
performance to be taken into account 
should be that of the actual obligation to 
make the payment. 
147. I have already mentioned the difficul­
ties involved in determining the place of 
performance of obligations to pay sums of 
money. 60 
148. If one follows the De Bloos ruling, the 
place of performance of the original con­
tractual obligations is still determined by 
the substantive law applicable, which inevi­
tably means that the competent forum is 
chosen according to whether the payment is 
to be collected at the place where the 
debtor is domiciled or at the place where 
the creditor is domiciled, and involves a 
risk that no account will be taken of any 
connecting factor between the dispute and 
the court having jurisdiction. 
149. There is no reason to draw a distinc­
tion between these obligations since they 
come under the same category of obliga­
tions to make payment. 
150. As Mr Lenz pointed out in his Opi­
nion in the Custom Made Commercial 
case, cited above, regarding the payment 
of the purchase price — 'in the case of 
disputes about the payment of the price 
arising on account of the alleged defective 
performance of the counter-obligation ... 
the court for the place at which the goods 
were intended to be supplied is, as a general 
rule, nearer to the facts than the courts for 
the place from which they were sent ...'. 61 
151. He therefore proposed that the Court 
should rule: 'Where a supplier makes a 
claim against a customer for the payment 
of the price due under a contract for 
manufacture and supply to which the Uni­
form Law is applicable and the first part of 
Article 59(1) of the Uniform Law is appli­
cable to that payment under the substantive 
law, the place of performance within the 
meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels 
Convention is the place agreed in the 59 — The period of notice is laid down in Article 15 of Council 
Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the 
coordination of the laws of the Member States relating 
to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, 
p. 17). 
60 — Point 94 of this Opinion. 61 — Point 80. 
I - 6772 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
contract at which the goods are intended to 
be supplied ...'. 62 
152. The objective legal basis of a dispute, 
whether it be a claim for payment of a price 
or a claim for compensation, is often to be 
found at the place of performance of the 
obligation in kind, so that the correspond­
ing forum is likely to be chosen according 
to the criterion of the close connecting 
factor between the dispute and the court 
having jurisdiction. 
153. This is why I approve that view and I 
consider that it should be transposed to a 
case where a claim is for payment of 
commission allegedly due in respect of the 
proper performance of the service provided 
as part of a commercial agency. 
154. The search for a close connecting 
factor between the court and the dispute, 
which provides the logical basis for this 
reasoning, should not be regarded as a 
desire to establish this connecting factor as 
a direct criterion of jurisdiction. 
155. I agree with the Court that 'Article 5 
does not establish that connecting factor 
itself as the criterion for the choice of the 
competent forum' and 'It is not possible for 
an applicant to sue a defendant before any 
court having a connection with the dispute 
since Article 5 lists exhaustively the criteria 
for linking a dispute to a specific court'. 63 
156. It seems to me, as it did to the Court, 
to be essential not to allow the use of 
criteria other than the place of performance 
where that place assigns jurisdiction to a 
forum which has no direct connection with 
the case. 
157. Conferring jurisdiction on the court of 
the place of performance of the obligation 
forming the basis of the claim or, in the case 
of a claim for payment, of the place of 
performance of the relevant obligation in 
kind provides a way of improving the 
chances of ensuring there is a connecting 
factor. However, the rule is by no means 
automatic, since the subject-matter or legal 
basis of the dispute before the court may be 
located elsewhere than at the place of 
performance of the obligation at the time 
when proceedings are instituted. 
158. To the extent that it was not possible 
to contemplate establishing a direct criter­
ion of jurisdiction based on the connecting 
factor, which would have affected the 
predictability of the competent forum by 
forcing the parties to discuss in every 
instance the question of which forum was 
62 — Ibid., point 82. Emphasis added. With regard to the place 
of performance of the obligation to make a payment for 
the purposes of Article 59(1) of the Uniform Law on the 
Sale of Goods, see points 97 and 98 of this Opinion. 
63 — Custom Made Commercial judgment, cited above, para­
graphs 12 and 13. 
I - 6773 
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
best placed to hear and determine the 
dispute in order to agree on jurisdiction, it 
was decided to select the place of perfor­
mance as the criterion which was best 
suited to achieve this purpose. Its fixed 
nature, irrespective of whether a connect­
ing factor with the dispute of the court it 
designates can be proved, guarantees a 
clear and precise determination of the rules 
of jurisdiction applicable. 
159. This is the interpretation which the 
Court has given in this connection, ruling 
that 'under Article 5(1), in matters relating 
to a contract, a defendant may be sued in 
the courts for the place of performance of 
the obligation in question, even where the 
court thus designated is not that which has 
the closest connection with the dispute'.64 
160. Selection of the place of performance 
of the obligations to which payment of 
commission and compensation for termi­
nation of the agreement are the counter 
obligation must therefore take precedence, 
even where no close connection can be 
established between the dispute and the 
court. 
161. To summarise, reference to the place 
of performance of contractual obligations 
in order to establish jurisdiction, where the 
claim is for payment of a price, seems to me 
to be likely to avoid, if not as a general rule 
at least to a significant extent, proliferation 
of jurisdictions. It also seems to me to 
promote the search for a forum close to the 
dispute, without thereby threatening liti­
gants' legal certainty by resorting directly 
to that criterion. 
(b) Obligations in kind 
162. It is appropriate to examine the fac­
tors which make it possible to establish the 
place of performance, for the purposes of 
Article 5(1) of the Convention, of the 
obligations in respect of which commercial 
agency commission and compensation for 
termination of the agreement are the coun­
ter obligations. 
163. I think that, in order to remove from 
the definition of the concept of 'place of 
performance' considerations not related to 
the geographical location stricto sensu of 
the obligation at issue, which is only valid 
with regard to the requirement laid down 
in the Convention that there must be a 
close connecting factor between the dispute 
and the court having jurisdiction, it is 
appropriate to refer to the place where the 
contested obligation was or must be actu­
ally performed. 
164. Situated on the spot, near to one of 
the strategic points in the contractual 
process, the court has the facilities which 
that proximity should normally afford it in 
order to rule more quickly, and in full 64 — Ibid., paragraph 21. 
I - 6774 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
knowledge of the facts, on the dispute 
before it. 
165. It should be pointed out that this 
approach is not totally new since, in view 
of their specific nature, contracts of 
employment do not come within the scope 
of the Court's Tessili judgment cited above, 
since their place of performance is defined 
autonomously. 
166. After observing that 'the obligation to 
be taken into consideration for the pur­
poses of the application of Article 5(1) of 
the Convention to contracts of employment 
is always the obligation which characterises 
such contracts, namely the employee's 
obligation to carry out the work stipu­
lated',65 the Court held that, in this area 
'the place of performance of the relevant 
obligation must be interpreted as meaning, 
for the purposes of Article 5(1) of the 
Convention, the place where the employee 
actually performs the work covered by the 
contract with his employer'. 66 
167. The interpretation is justified by two 
different considerations. 
168. On the one hand, contracts of 
employment display certain particular fea­
tures compared with other contracts in that 
they create a lasting bond which brings the 
worker to some extent within the organisa­
tional framework of the employer's busi­
ness and they are linked to the place where 
the activities are pursued, which determines 
the application of mandatory rules and 
collective agreements protecting the 
employee. 67 
The Court deduces from this that it is 
appropriate to determine the place of 
performance of the relevant obligation, 
for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) 
of the Convention, by reference not to the 
applicable national law in accordance with 
the conflict rules of the court seised but, 
rather, to uniform criteria which it is for the 
Court to lay down on the basis of the 
scheme and objectives of the Convention.68 
169. On the other hand, the interpretation 
is based on the concern to afford proper 
protection to the party to the contract who 
is the weaker from the social point of view, 
in this case the employee.69 The Court 
considers that protection of that kind is 
best assured if disputes relating to a con­
tract of employment fall within the juris­
diction of the courts of the place where the 
employee discharges his obligation towards 
his employer. That is the place where it is 
least expensive for the employee to com­
mence, or defend himself against, court 
proceedings. 70 
65 — Mulox IBC judgment, cited above, paragraph 14. 
66 — Ibid., paragraph 20, emphasis added. 
67 — Ibid., paragraph 15. 
68 — Ibid., paragraph 16. 
69 — Ibid., paragraph 18. 
70 — Ibid., paragraph 19. 
I - 6775 
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
170. I do not think that, as regards the 
balance of relations between contracting 
parties, an agreement such as a commercial 
agency agreement is comparable to a 
contract of employment. The relationship 
of economic dependency in which an agent 
finds himself with regard to his principal is 
not such that the agent must necessarily, as 
a result of his position, be regarded as the 
weaker party. Being, as a matter of law, 
self-employed,71 a commercial agent has 
significant room for manœuvre in the 
organisation of his activity. Save where he 
is prevented by an exclusive dealing con­
tract, he may also be connected to more 
than one principal, which is likely to 
provide him with a minimum turnover 
sufficient to reduce any potential subjec­
tion. 
171. Moreover, there are no regulations 
comparable to the law applying to con­
tracts of employment, the mandatory pro­
visions of which would apply at the place 
of performance of the contract. The law 
applicable can be that chosen by the 
parties. 
172. The reasons why I am proposing an 
autonomous definition of the place of 
performance are not therefore the same as 
those on which the Court decided to do so 
in respect of contracts of employment and 
do not have the same specific nature. 
173. On the contrary, this choice is dictated 
by the particular ability of the actual place 
of performance, in an agency agreement, to 
reconcile the two criteria of the connecting 
factor and the predictability of the rules of 
jurisdiction. 
174. As Article 7(2) of Directive 86/653 
provides, a commercial agency agreement 
produces its effects mainly within a terri­
torial context determined by the agree­
ment. At all events, whether or not the 
context is determined, examination of the 
agreement should make it possible to 
localise the actual place of performance of 
the obligations it contains, which is all the 
more justified because, in an agency agree­
ment such as the one in the case in the main 
proceedings, the law applicable 72 leaves it 
to the parties themselves to determine the 
place of performance of their obligations. 
175. In the present case, it is apparent from 
the order for reference that Bodetex was 
acting as a commercial agent for Leather-
tex, without an exclusive dealing agree­
ment, on the Belgian and Netherlands 
markets. 
176. Agreements provide details of the 
geographical location where they are to 
71 — Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653. 
72 — Which, according to Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague 
Convention of 14 March 1978 publishing the Convention 
on the law applicable to agency (Decree No 92-423 of 
4 May 1992, Journal officiel de la République française of 
8 May 1992, p. 6307) is either the internal law chosen by 
the parties or that of the State where, at the time of 
formation of the agency relationship, the agent has his 
business establishment or, if he has none, nis habitual 
residence, or lastly that of the State where the agent is 
primarily to act if the principal has his business establish­
ment, or if he has none, his habitual residence in that State. 
I - 6776 
LEATHERTEX V BODETEX 
be performed. However, reference to the 
obligation at issue means it is possible to 
avoid uncertainty in connection with agree­
ments that can be performed simulta­
neously in the territories of more than one 
Contracting State, and at the same time 
designates the courts which are nearest to 
the case. It is thus the place of performance 
of the obligation itself which must take 
precedence, as Article 5(1) of the Conven­
tion provides. It will be for the national 
court, on the basis of the information at its 
disposal, to determine the place where, 
according to the agreement, the obligation 
at issue has been or should be performed. 
177. This solution does not of course 
provide an automatic answer in cases 
where the proceedings are fragmented, 
since several obligations which arise from 
the same contract but are, or could be, 
performed in the territory of more than one 
Contracting State may, as in the present 
case, constitute the basis for the same 
proceedings. 
178. However, the principle of determining 
the place of performance solely of the 
obligations in kind, where the obligation 
at issue relates to the payment of a sum of 
money, reduces that risk. 
179. In the case which concerns us, where 
the obligations at issue in the proceedings 
are of equal rank, the existence of a single 
forum having jurisdiction depends on the 
existence of a single place of performance 
of the obligations in kind, to which the 
claims for payment correspond. 
180. With regard to the claim for payment 
of compensation for termination of the 
agreement, it is necessary to refer to the 
place of performance of the original claim, 
failure to perform which is being conten­
ded, that is to say, the period of notice. 
Since this period is constituted by the 
extension of the effects of the agreement 
as a whole, for a legally appointed time, 73 
its place of performance is the same as that 
of the agreement itself and not of any 
specific obligation. 
181. As regards the claim for payment of 
commission, the place of performance to be 
taken into consideration is that of the 
agency mandate granted to the commercial 
agent, whose commission constitutes the 
consideration therefor, which again covers 
the localisation of the agreement itself. 
182. Where, as in the present case, the 
place of performance of the obligations at 
issue is the same as that of the agreement 
73 — Article 15 of Directive 86/653. 
I - 6777 
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-420/97 
itself, and the scope of the agreement 
covers the territories of several Contracting 
States, it is for the court making the 
reference to determine that place of perfor­
mance on the basis of the factors which 
enable it to designate one of the States as 
the State in whose territory the commercial 
agent will engage in most of his activity. 
183. From a more general viewpoint, this 
policy does not exempt the referring court 
from first checking whether a hierarchy can 
be established between the contested obli­
gations arising from an agreement, in order, 
as the Court has consistently held, to 
determine the principal obligation so as to 
designate the court which has jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
184. I therefore propose that the Court give the following answer to the question 
submitted by the Hof van Cassatie: 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by 
the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is to be 
interpreted as meaning that a composite claim for payment of commercial agency 
commission and a claim for payment of compensation for termination of an 
agreement, based on obligations presented as being of equal rank and arising 
from the same commercial agency agreement, may be brought before the same 
court if the place where the agency mandate to which the commission relates has 
been or is due to be actually performed, and the place where the obligation to 
comply with the period of notice of termination has been or is due to be actually 
performed, to which the compensation for termination relates, are situated in the 
territory of the same Contracting State. 
I - 6778