Order;Information — ECLI:EU:T:2022:770
Date: 2022-11-30
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Economic and monetary policy;Euro
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded
Origin: Cyprus;Greece

summary of those pleas in law and the form of order sought by the applicant. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without further information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the essential matters of fact and law on which it is based be apparent, at least in summary form, but in a coherent and comprehensible manner, from the text of the application itself (see order of 27 March 2017, Frank v Commission, T‑603/15, not published, EU:T:2017:228, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 184 In order to satisfy those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union or by one of its servants acting in the exercise of his or her functions must contain the elements which make it possible to identify the conduct of the defendant of which the applicant complains, the reasons why the applicant considers that there is a causal link between the conduct and the damage it claims to have suffered and the nature and extent of that damage (judgment of 18 September 2014, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, T‑317/12, EU:T:2014:782, paragraph 55). 185 It is necessary to ascertain whether the present action complies with those formal requirements in so far as it relates to the acts and conduct in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction and which are set out in paragraph 180 above. 186 First, as regards the defendants’ alleged approval of the harmful decrees, it should be noted that, for the purposes of establishing the existence of a causal link between, on the one hand, the monitoring of the macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 1(2) of Decision 2013/236 and Article 1(2) of Implementing Decision 2013/463 and, on the other hand, the alleged damage, the applicants merely rely on the judgment of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission (5/66, 7/66, 13/66 to 16/66 and 18/66 to 24/66, EU:C:1967:31, p. 245), from which it follows that the European Union’s liability may be incurred on the ground that the EU institutions have approved acts which have caused damage to an applicant. 187 It should be pointed out that Article 1(2) of Decision 2013/236 provides, inter alia, that the Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, is to monitor the progress of the Republic of Cyprus in the implementation of its programme. Article 1(3) of Decision 2013/236 provides that the Commission, first, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, is to examine with the Cypriot authorities any necessary modifications or updates to the programme and, secondly, to provide, on an ongoing basis, advice and guidance on fiscal, financial market and structural reforms and, finally, to assess at regular intervals the economic impact of the programme and recommend the necessary adjustments with a view to enhancing growth and employment creation, ensuring the required fiscal consolidation and minimising negative social impacts. 188 As for the provisions of Article 1(2) and (3) of Implementing Decision 2013/463, they are drafted in the same terms, except that paragraph 2 provides that the Cypriot authorities are to consult in advance with the Commission, the ECB and the IMF on the adoption of policies which are not covered by that implementing decision but which could have a material impact on the achievement of the programme’s objectives, and paragraph 3 provides that the macroeconomic adjustment programme is to be made public. 189 None of those obligations on the Commission entail, as such, any decision-making or enforcement powers. Any approval which the Commission might have issued in the context of the implementation of its responsibilities under Article 1(2) of Decision 2013/236 would therefore have been non-binding and consequently not binding on the Cypriot authorities. It is clear that the same conclusions must be drawn with regard to Article 1(2) and (3) of Implementing Decision 2013/463. 190 It follows that the Republic of Cyprus, which was not obliged to adopt the harmful measures (see paragraphs 100 to 122 above), was also not obliged to seek authorisation from the Commission or the ECB to adopt them. As can be seen from paragraphs 186 to 189 above, the Commission and the ECB did not, in any event, give the Cypriot authorities any such authorisation by the acts or conduct referred to in those paragraphs. 191 Conversely, in the judgment of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission (5/66, 7/66, 13/66 to 16/66 and 18/66 to 24/66, EU:C:1967:31, p. 245), the Court of Justice held that the European Community was liable because the Commission had wrongly authorised the adoption by the Federal Republic of Germany of certain agricultural safeguard measures. In that case, the Commission’s authorisation was a necessary condition for the adoption of those measures. The event giving rise to the Community’s liability was therefore not the mere approval by one of its institutions of the measures taken by a Member State, but the authorisation of those measures, without which they could not have been implemented. 192 Therefore, mere reference to the judgment of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission (5/66, 7/66, 13/66 to 16/66 and 18/66 to 24/66, EU:C:1967:31, p. 245) does not make it possible to understand in what way approving the adoption of the harmful measures was likely to give rise to the financial loss relied upon by the applicants. 193 It follows that the present action is manifestly inadmissible in so far as it relates to the alleged approval of the adoption of the harmful decrees by the defendants. 194 Secondly, as regards the applicants’ allegations concerning the negotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, they are not the subject of any specific and detailed development in the parts of their pleadings devoted to legal argument. In particular, there is nothing in those pleadings which makes it possible to identify the grounds on which the applicants consider that the conduct of the Commission or the ECB in the context of the negotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 contributed to causing the alleged damage. 195 It follows that the present action is manifestly inadmissible in so far as it relates to the negotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 by the defendants. 196 Thirdly, as regards ‘the acts by which the defendants required the Republic of Cyprus to adopt the Law of 22 March 2013 and the harmful decrees’, which form part of the contested acts, it should be noted that the applicants do not, in their written submissions, provide any details which would make it possible to identify those measures with certainty, assuming that they are distinct from the other contested acts prior to 22 March 2013. 197 The present action is therefore manifestly inadmissible in so far as it relates to ‘the acts by which the defendants required the Republic of Cyprus to adopt the Law of 22 March 2013 and the harmful decrees’. 198 It follows that the present action complies with the applicable formal requirements in so far as it relates to, first, the signing by the Commission of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, secondly, the monitoring by the Commission and the ECB of the implementation of the harmful measures under Article 13(7) of the ESM Treaty, thirdly, the alleged communication of specific assurances by the defendants, with the exception of the Eurogroup, that the harmful measures would not be adopted and, fourthly, the decisions adopted by the ECB in relation to ELA. 2. The alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies 199 In the context of its arguments concerning the alleged damage, the Commission submits, in essence, that, to the extent that the immediate cause of that damage lies in national measures, that no ancillary damage can be attributed to the Union alone and that the unlawfulness relied on is only indirectly linked to alleged Union action, the applicants must exhaust national remedies before the EU judicature can rule on their claim for compensation. 200 The applicants respond that, under the case-law, they were not obliged to bring actions before the national courts before bringing their case before the Court, since, first, the harmful measures are attributable to the European Union and, secondly, those courts could not guarantee them effective judicial protection. 201 In so far as they can be interpreted as relating to the admissibility of the present action and not to the alleged damage alone, the Commission’s arguments must be rejected. 202 According to the case-law, an action for damages under Article 268 TFEU and the second and third paragraphs of Article 340 TFEU must be assessed in the light of the entire system of judicial protection of individuals and its admissibility may therefore be made subject, in certain cases, to the prior exhaustion of national remedies that are available for obtaining annulment of a decision of a national authority, provided that those remedies under domestic law effectively ensure protection for the individuals concerned in that they are capable of resulting in compensation for the damage alleged (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 1989, Roquette frères v Commission, 20/88, EU:C:1989:221, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited, and of 13 December 2006, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, T‑138/03, EU:T:2006:390, paragraph 40). 203 In a judgment of 18 September 2014, Holcim (Romania) v Commission (T‑317/12, EU:T:2014:782, paragraphs 73 to 77), the Court clarified that cases of inadmissibility due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies were limited to the situation where the non-exhaustion of those remedies prevented the Courts of the European Union from identifying the nature and quantum of the damage relied on before it, so much so that the requirements of Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, reproduced in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure, as interpreted by the case-law cited in paragraphs 183 and 184 above, were not satisfied. 204 In the present case, the Court is in a position to identify the nature and quantum of the alleged damage, which the applicants have described with a sufficient degree of precision in their written submissions and the annexes thereto. Consequently, and without even needing to determine whether the acts and conduct referred to in paragraph 198 above could be the subject of an action before the national courts, it cannot be held that the present action is inadmissible solely on the ground that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies. 205 In those circumstances, it could at most be considered that the bringing of an action by one or more applicants before a national court seeking compensation for the same loss as the present action is likely to have a bearing on the examination of the merits of that action. According to the case-law, where, first, a person has brought two actions seeking compensation for one and the same loss, one directed against a national authority before a national court and the other directed against an EU institution before the EU judicature, and, secondly, there is a risk that because of different assessments of that damage by the two courts seised, that person may be inadequately or wrongfully compensated, the EU judicature must, before ruling on the damage, wait until the national court has ruled on the action brought before it by a final decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 July 1967, Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission, 5/66, 7/66, 13/66 to 16/66 and 18/66 to 24/66, EU:C:1967:31, p. 266, and of 13 December 2006, É.R. and Others v Council and Commission, T‑138/03, EU:T:2006:390, paragraph 42). In such a case, the EU judicature is obliged to wait until the national court has ruled before deciding on the existence and quantum of the damage. By contrast, it is possible for the EU judicature, even before the national court has given judgment, to determine whether the conduct complained of by the defendant institution is such as to give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2014, Holcim (Romania) v Commission, T‑317/12, EU:T:2014:782, paragraph 80). 206 Therefore, even if one or more of the applicants in the present case had brought an action before the Cypriot courts seeking compensation for the same damage as the present action, there is nothing to prevent the Court from ruling on the alleged illegalities even before those courts have given judgment. C. Conclusion on the jurisdiction of the Court and on the admissibility of the application 207 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the present action and that it is admissible in so far as it relates to, first, the signing by the Commission of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, secondly, the supervision by the Commission and the ECB of the implementation of the harmful measures under Article 13(7) of the ESM Treaty, thirdly, the alleged communication of specific assurances by the defendants, with the exception of the Eurogroup, that the harmful measures would not be adopted and, fourthly, the decisions adopted by the ECB in relation to ELA. 208 By contrast, as regards the other acts and conduct of which the applicants accuse the defendants, it is necessary to conclude, in part, that the action is inadmissible and, in part, that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with them. Only the pleas and arguments of the parties relating to the acts and conduct referred to in paragraph 207 above will therefore be examined on the merits. D. Substance 209 It is settled case-law, applicable mutatis mutandis to the non-contractual liability of the ECB under the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, that the non-contractual liability of the European Union, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, is subject to the fulfilment of a number of conditions, namely the illegality of the conduct of which the EU institution is accused, the reality of the damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage relied on (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited, and of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 65). In so far as those three conditions must be cumulatively satisfied, the fact that one of them is lacking is sufficient to dismiss an action for damages (judgment of 9 September 1999, Lucaccioni v Commission, C‑257/98 P, EU:C:1999:402, paragraph 14). 210 In the present case, it is appropriate to begin by examining whether the first of those conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the defendants, is satisfied. 211 In that regard, the Court of Justice has already made it clear on numerous occasions that the incurrence of non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union requires the establishment of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law the purpose of which is to confer rights on individuals (see judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). 212 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in their observations as to the consequences which they drew, for the present dispute, from the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), and, to the extent necessary and to the extent that they had not been set aside by the Court of Justice, the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), the applicants submit that Advocate General Pitruzzella, in his Opinion in Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:390), did not respond to all of their arguments in the appeal, which is contrary to the principle of equality of arms. 213 In that regard, it should be noted that the present action concerns the European Union’s liability for the contested acts referred to in paragraph 56 above. It follows that the applicants’ argument alleging breach of the principle of equality of arms, in so far as it relates to an alleged illegality vitiating not those contested acts but the procedure which gave rise to the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), must be rejected as manifestly ineffective. 214 In their application, the applicants claim that the defendants acted without taking into account the interests of the closed group of depositors of the banks concerned, in serious and flagrant breach of three rules of EU law for the protection of individuals, namely the right to property, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of equal treatment. 215 The Council and the ECB reply, in essence, that neither the acts and conduct referred to in paragraph 207 above nor the harmful measures are in breach of EU law. 216 The Commission, considering that the harm alleged is attributable solely to the Republic of Cyprus, refrains from systematically defending the legality of measures which the latter has unilaterally adopted and confines itself, in essence, to making targeted observations on the illegalities alleged by the applicants. 217 The Court will examine in turn the alleged infringements, first, of the right to property (see paragraphs 218 to 375 below), secondly, of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (see paragraphs 376 to 418 below) and, thirdly, of the principle of equal treatment (see paragraphs 419 to 479 below). 1. The existence of a possible infringement of the right to property 218 The applicants considered that they had been deprived of their right to property over the deposits they had made in the banks concerned, in breach of Article 17(1) of the Charter and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’). 219 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 220 It is settled case-law that the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter is not an absolute prerogative. As is apparent from Article 52(1) of the Charter, restrictions may be placed on the use of that right, provided that they meet objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in the light of the aim pursued, disproportionate and intolerable interference which would undermine the very substance of that right (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 69 and 70 and the case-law cited). 221 In that regard, it follows from Article 12 of the ESM Treaty that the adoption of a memorandum of understanding such as that of 26 April 2013 meets an objective of general interest pursued by the European Union, namely to ensure the stability of the banking system of the euro area as a whole. Financial services play a central role in the EU economy. Since banks, which are an essential source of financing for businesses, are often interconnected, the failure of one or more banks is likely to spread rapidly to other banks, either in the Member State concerned or in other Member States, and, consequently, to produce negative knock-on effects in other sectors of the economy (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 71 and 72 and the case-law cited; ECtHR, 10 July 2012, Grainger and Others v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2012:0710DEC003494010, §§ 39 and 42, and 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, § 103). 222 In the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 73 to 75), the Court of Justice held that, having regard to the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 221 above and having regard to the imminent risk of economic loss to which depositors in the banks concerned would have been exposed in the event of the latter’s bankruptcy, three of the harmful measures described in paragraphs 32 to 36 above did not constitute, as they appeared from paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the very substance of those depositors’ right to property and could not therefore be regarded as unjustified restrictions of the latter. Those measures include, first, the takeover by the BoC of the insured deposits of Laïki and the maintenance of the uninsured deposits in Laïki, pending its liquidation, secondly, the conversion of 37.5% of the uninsured deposits in the BoC into shares with full voting and dividend rights, and thirdly, the temporary freezing of another part of those uninsured deposits, it being specified that, if the BoC were to be overcapitalised in relation to the objective of a core tier one capital target of 9% under stress, a share buyback would be carried out in order to reimburse the holders of uninsured deposits by the amount of the overcapitalisation (together, ‘the first three harmful measures’). 223 By contrast, in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 73 to 75), the Court of Justice did not examine the conformity with the right to property of the harmful measure relating, in essence, to the sale of the Greek branches, as set out in paragraph 1.24 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 and provided for in Decrees No 96 and No 97 (see paragraph 32 above). 224 In a first step, the Court will assess whether the first three harmful measures (see paragraphs 225 to 300 below) and the sale of the Greek branches (see paragraphs 301 to 333 below) are compatible with the applicants’ right to property. In a second step, the Court will examine the arguments, alleging infringement of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, the right to sound administration and the requirements of fairness and consistency, which the applicants raise in support of their claim of breach of property rights (see paragraphs 334 to 375 below). (a) The first three harmful measures 225 In the present case, the applicants do not dispute that, as held by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701) (see paragraphs 221 and 222 above), the objective pursued by the first three harmful measures is in the public interest. The applicants nevertheless dispute the applicability to the present case of the conclusion reached by the Court of Justice in that judgment that the first three harmful measures did not constitute an excessive and intolerable intervention affecting the very substance of the right to property of the depositors in the banks concerned and could not therefore be regarded as unjustifiably restricting it. They put forward three arguments in that regard, relating, first, to the nature of the examination carried out by the Court of Justice in that judgment (see paragraphs 226 to 228 below), secondly, to the evidence relied on by the applicants in the case which gave rise to that judgment (see paragraphs 229 to 232 below) and, thirdly, to compliance with the requirements that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law and proportionate to the aim pursued (see paragraphs 233 to 299 below). (1) The nature of the review carried out by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P) 226 The applicants point out that, in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701), the Court of Justice confined itself to examining the existence of a possible infringement of the depositors’ right to property from the point of view of the inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 of paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27, which related, inter alia, to the first three harmful measures. The Court of Justice therefore did not examine the conduct of the defendants whose illegality is invoked in the present case. That conduct formed part of a continuum which began with the defendants’ interventions before the signing of the memorandum of understanding and continued with their interventions after the signing thereof. 227 That argument stems from a misreading of the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701). Admittedly, the Court of Justice concluded, in paragraph 75 of that judgment, that it could not be held that, by having allowed the adoption of paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, the Commission had contributed to an infringement of the applicants’ right to property. In order to do so, however, the Court of Justice examined, in paragraphs 73 and 74 of the same judgment, whether the first three harmful measures, as set out in paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27 of that memorandum, in themselves infringed the applicants’ right to property. The reasoning set out in those paragraphs therefore concerned the intrinsic legality of those measures. As to the applicants’ allegation that the conduct complained of formed part of a continuum, that has already been rejected in paragraph 125 above. 228 The applicants’ first argument must therefore be rejected. (2) The evidence submitted by the applicants in the case leading to the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P) 229 The applicants submit that the conclusion reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701) as to the existence of an infringement of the right to property must be read in the light of the applicants’ narrow claims in that case. It is clear that, in the case which gave rise to that judgment, neither the General Court nor the Court of Justice examined any evidence of a breach of the right to property. In the present case, however, the applicants have provided extensive evidence relating to the circumstances leading up to the adoption of the ‘Eurogroup statement’ and explaining the defendants’ conduct before and after that statement. That evidence, which the Court of Justice did not examine in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701), should be examined carefully in the present case in order to determine whether the harmful measures constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to property and to guarantee their right to effective judicial protection. Moreover, the grounds of illegality relied on in the present case are more extensive. 230 In that regard, it should be noted that the evidence to which the applicants refer concerns, in the first place, the imputability of the harmful measures to the defendants and the reality of the harm claimed. That evidence is not, in itself, such as to show that the conclusions reached by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701) as to the existence of such an infringement are inapplicable to the present case. 231 Consequently, the applicants’ second argument must be rejected in so far as it concerns evidence relating to the imputability of the harmful measures to the defendants and the reality of the harm invoked. 232 In so far, however, as some of the evidence to which the applicants refer could be regarded as tending to establish that the first three harmful measures are vitiated by an infringement of the right to property, it will, in so far as is necessary, be considered in the context of the assessment of the applicants’ arguments, which are based, in their view, on broader grounds of illegality than those relied on in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701), relating to the requirements that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law and proportionate to the aim pursued. (3) Compliance with the requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be provided for by law and proportionate to the aim pursued 233 The applicants claim, in essence, that the first three harmful measures are vitiated by a manifest breach of their right to property, in that those measures were not provided for by law and were adopted without giving them the opportunity to exercise their rights of defence and despite the existence of less restrictive measures, such as a gradual reduction in the amount of deposits. In that regard, the applicants had already indicated in their application that it follows from Article 17(1) of the Charter that any restriction on the right to property must be both prescribed by law and proportionate to the aim pursued. 234 The Court will examine in turn the conformity of the first three harmful measures with the requirements that any restriction of the right to property must, first, be provided for by law and, secondly, be proportionate to the aim pursued. In doing so, the Court will take into account that, in accordance with paragraph 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, the uninsured deposits in the BoC that had been frozen could be converted into shares, which was the case here (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). (i) The requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be provided for by law 235 In support of their claim that the harmful measures were not provided for by law, the applicants invoke the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), which requires that any restriction on the right to property be based on a clear, foreseeable and accessible legal framework. 236 According to the applicants, no rule of EU law allowed the defendants, at the material time, to adopt the harmful measures, nor did Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014, establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190), or Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1), which was not in force at the time. Moreover, the harmful measures do not satisfy ‘the requirements of legal certainty, due process, and foreseeability by any legal standard’. Thus, the harmful measures were adopted by the Governor of the CBC on the basis of the discretion conferred on him by an imprecise law which did not provide either for a clear compensation procedure or for a right to judicial protection, while no provision was made at Cypriot or EU level for consulting interested parties or for giving depositors in the banks concerned the opportunity to express their views. 237 The Council and the ECB contest the applicants’ arguments. 238 It should be noted that, under Article 17(1) and Article 52(1) of the Charter, no one may be deprived of his or her property except in the public interest, in cases and under conditions prescribed by law, and subject to fair compensation being paid in due course for its loss. For the purposes of determining the scope of that right, account must be taken, in the light of Article 52(3) of the Charter, of Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 356). According to the case-law of the ECtHR, the words ‘in accordance with the law’ not only require that the harming measure has a basis in domestic law, but also refer to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 13 July 2010, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, CE:ECHR:2010:0713JUD002682806, § 363). 239 It is therefore necessary to examine whether the first three harmful measures were adopted in the absence of a clear, foreseeable and accessible legislative framework and which provides for a system of compensation and appropriate legal protection. 240 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that the harmful measures were taken by the Governor of the CBC, pursuant to the Law of 22 March 2013, which was approved by the Cypriot Parliament. 241 It is true that, as the applicants claim, in essence, the Law of 22 March 2013 confers broad powers on the CBC. In particular, the latter may restructure the debts and obligations of an institution subject to a resolution procedure (Section 12(1) of the Law of 22 March 2013, see paragraph 25 above), require, irrespective of the existence of other legislative and statutory provisions, the increase of the capital of such an institution (Section 8(1) of the Law of 22 March 2013) and order the sale of certain of its activities without the need to obtain the consent of its board of directors or shareholders (Section 9(1) of the Law of 22 March 2013). However, the mere fact that the measures which may be adopted under the Law of 22 March 2013 are numerous or extensive in scope does not mean that that law lacks clarity, precision or predictability. 242 In the second place, it should be noted that the Law of 22 March 2013 provides for a series of guarantees for the benefit of the creditors of the banks concerned. First, Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of that law provides that the shareholders of an institution subject to a resolution procedure are the first to bear any loss resulting from the implementation of resolution measures, whereas the creditors of such an institution bear such losses only after the shareholders. Section 3(2)(d) of that law provides that measures adopted on the basis of the latter may not place such creditors in a less favourable financial situation than that in which they would find themselves in the event of the liquidation of the institution in question. Section 12(14) of that law specifies that, in the event of a restructuring, pursuant to Section 12(1) of that law, of the debts and obligations of an institution subject to a resolution procedure, the parties affected are to receive, in payment of their claims, at least the amount which they would have received, under Cypriot law, in the event of the liquidation of that institution (see paragraph 25 above). 243 Secondly, even assuming that the requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be provided for by law requires that the procedure for compensating the loss resulting from such a restriction must, where appropriate, also be provided for by law, it follows from Section 26(1) of the Law of 22 March 2013 that any party who considers that its right to property has been unduly prejudiced by resolution measures retains the right to bring an action before the competent national court to claim compensation. Section 26(2) and (3) of that law specifies that, if the affected party considers that its financial position has deteriorated significantly in relation to that in which it would have been if no resolution measure had been taken and if the bank concerned had been put directly into liquidation, it may claim compensation only for the losses suffered without prejudice to the transaction concluded or any act or measure adopted on the basis of that law. 244 In that sense, first, the applicants submit that, in accordance with Section 26(3) of the Law of 22 March 2013, claims made may not be directed either against the resolution authority, subject to the cases provided for in Section 29 of that law, or against the person who benefits from a transfer of activities, property or assets resulting from the adoption of a resolution measure. The applicants consider that it is therefore impossible to understand against whom an action could be brought. 245 In that regard, it is important to note that the question concerning against whom an action may be brought for compensation for damage unlawfully caused by a resolution measure adopted under the Law of 22 March 2013 is a matter of Cypriot law. The material in the case file does not make it possible to answer that question, which it is not, in any event, for the Court to decide in the context of the present case. It must, however, be noted that neither the wording of Section 26(3) of the Law of 22 March 2013 nor the documents in the case file suggest that it is impossible in practice to bring a claim for compensation for damage unlawfully caused by a resolution measure adopted under that law. Moreover, as the applicants themselves acknowledge, Section 29 of the Law of 22 March 2013 provides that the resolution authority may be held liable in the event of fraud, bad faith or gross negligence. 246 Secondly, the applicants submit that Section 22 of the Law of 22 March 2013, first of all, provides that an assessment must be carried out, for the purposes of implementing resolution measures, by the resolution authority and, then grants the latter a very wide margin of discretion. The applicants point out that, according to Section 22(7) of that law, that assessment cannot be subject to a separate judicial review, but must be considered in conjunction with the decision taken under ‘this section’. According to the applicants, that means that parties who consider that their financial position has deteriorated as a result of a resolution measure must challenge an assessment which is made at the sole discretion of the resolution authority. It would be difficult to understand how that assessment could be effectively challenged unless it itself reveals an underestimation. 247 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that there is nothing in Section 22 of the Law of 22 March 2013 to suggest that such an assessment is likely to be binding on the national court hearing a claim for compensation. It must therefore be held that the applicants have failed to show that that provision would, in practice, make the bringing of such a claim impossible or ineffective. 248 In the third place, it cannot be considered that the harmful measures did not contain any guarantees enabling the applicants to put forward their point of view. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicable procedures must provide the person concerned with an adequate opportunity to put his or her case to the competent authorities. In order to ensure compliance with that requirement, which is an inherent requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, it is necessary to consider the applicable procedures from a general point of view (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 368 and the case-law cited, and ECtHR, 20 July 2004, Bäckv. Finland, CE:ECHR:2004:0720JUD003759897, § 56). Thus, that requirement cannot be interpreted as meaning that the person concerned must, in all circumstances, be able to express his or her point of view to the competent authorities prior to the adoption of measures affecting his or her right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 19 September 2006, Maupas and Others v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:0919JUD001384402, §§ 20 and 21). That is particularly the case where, as in the present case, the measures in question do not constitute a penalty and are taken in a context of particular urgency. In that regard, it should be noted that, as the ECB pointed out in its defence, the aim was to prevent an imminent risk of collapse of the banks concerned in order to preserve the stability of the Cypriot financial system and thus to avoid contagion to other Member States of the Euro area. The implementation of a prior consultation procedure, in which the thousands of depositors in the banks concerned could have usefully made their views known to the CBC before the adoption of the harmful decrees, would have inevitably delayed the implementation of measures to prevent such a collapse. The achievement of the objective of preserving the stability of the Cypriot financial system and thus avoiding contagion to other Member States of the euro area would have been exposed to significant risks (see, to that effect and by analogy, ECtHR, 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, § 139). 249 In those circumstances, however, the person concerned must be able to benefit from a judicial procedure affording the requisite procedural guarantees, so as to enable the national courts to rule effectively and fairly on disputes relating to the alleged infringement of property rights. As can be seen from paragraphs 243 and 245 to 247 above, that is the case here. 250 In the fourth place, as the Commission rightly points out, the fact that there were no EU harmonisation measures on a bail-in for banks at the material time does not in any way mean that the Member States were prohibited from adopting bail-in measures. Nor does it follow from that non-existence that the EU institutions were prohibited from lending their support to the implementation of such measures by the Cypriot authorities. 251 Furthermore, it is in vain that the applicants argue, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in the judgments of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), in that the Court of Justice and the General Court failed to examine the argument that the defendants had placed the Republic of Cyprus under extreme pressure in order to force it to adopt the harmful measures. Such alleged extreme pressure is irrelevant to the question whether the first three harmful measures were or were not provided for by law. 252 It follows from the above that the applicants have failed to establish that the first three harmful measures were not provided for by law. (ii) The requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be proportionate to the objective pursued 253 The applicants claim that the first three harmful measures are not proportionate to the aim pursued, in that an excessive burden was imposed on them. First, they had to pay for errors which were attributable to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, to the lack of prior intervention by the EU institutions and to the imprudence of the ECB, whose ‘liberal policy’ in relation to ELA contributed substantially to the accumulation of debt by Laïki. Secondly, the defendants failed to take into account alternative measures that were less restrictive of the applicants’ right to property. 254 The Council and the ECB contest the applicants’ arguments. 255 In the first place, it should be noted that, in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 73 to 75), the Court of Justice has already expressly ruled on the proportionality of the first three harmful measures to the aim pursued, concluding that they do not constitute an excessive and intolerable intervention affecting the very substance of the property rights of the depositors in the banks concerned. The applicants failed to explain why that conclusion could not be transposed to the present case. It must therefore be held to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the present complaint. 256 In the second place, and in any event, the arguments relied on by the applicants in support of their complaint concerning the lack of proportionality of the first three harmful measures do not, in the present case, allow a different conclusion to be reached from that reached by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 73 to 75). 257 In that regard, it should be noted that a restriction on the right to property must not be excessive. First, the restriction in question must meet the general interest objective pursued and be necessary and proportionate to that end. Secondly, the ‘essential content’, that is to say, the substance, of the right to property must not be affected (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 355 and 360; of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraphs 53 and 54; and of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 200). 258 Where, as in the present case, the EU institutions are called upon, in a complex and evolving context, to make decisions of a technical nature and to make complex forecasts and assessments, they must nonetheless enjoy a broad discretion as to the nature and scope of the measures which they support. In such a context, the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct complained of requires proof of a manifest and serious disregard by the institution concerned of the limits on its discretion (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Nikolaou v Court of Auditors, C‑220/13 P, EU:C:2014:2057, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited, and of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 68). 259 It is in the light of those principles that the applicants’ arguments must be examined. More specifically, the Court will examine, first of all, whether the first three harmful measures contribute to the attainment of the objective pursued (see paragraphs 260 to 266 below), next, whether they are proportionate and necessary to the attainment of that objective (see paragraphs 267 to 291 below) and, finally, whether the disadvantages they cause are not disproportionate to that objective (see paragraphs 292 to 299 below). – The suitability of the first three harmful measures to contribute to the achievement of the objective pursued 260 According to the case-law, it is necessary to verify the suitability of the restriction on the right to property under consideration to contribute to the attainment of the objective of general interest pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 203). 261 In the present case, first, it should be noted that the adoption of the harmful measures responded to a situation in which, if they had not been recapitalised, the banks concerned would have been exposed to a risk of a run as soon as the period of closure of the banks ordered on 18 March 2013 had expired, with the result that they would have been at risk of having to cease their operations and would have been threatened by a disorderly default. As the ECB pointed out in its response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the effects of such default were likely to be of a systemic nature, threatening the Republic of Cyprus with a sovereign default and risking a rapid spread to other banks, in particular Cypriot banks. The confidence of the depositors of those banks and the solvency of the Republic of Cyprus, guarantor of some of the debts of Laïki, would have been affected and the stability of the entire Cypriot financial system threatened. As noted by the Commission and the ECB, a risk of contagion to other Member States, or even to the entire banking system of the euro area, could not have been excluded. 262 In the light of the material in the file, it cannot be concluded that that analysis of the economic and financial situation of Cyprus and of the European Union at the date of adoption of the harmful measures was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. In that regard, the vague allegations made by the applicants that, because of the small size of the Cypriot economy, its default had only a limited impact on the euro area are in no way supported. Those allegations ignore the size of the Cypriot financial sector, which was eight times the size of Cypriot GDP at the material time, and the risk of contagion to other Member States. 263 According to paragraph 1.26 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, the conversion of 37.5% of the BoC’s uninsured deposits was intended to enable the BoC to reach ‘a core tier one ratio of 9% under the adverse scenario of the stress test by the end of the programme’. In accordance with paragraph 1.27 of that memorandum of understanding, additional deposit conversions, such as those referred to in paragraph 34 above, were intended to ensure that that objective could be achieved at the end of the programme. Therefore, in the circumstances described in paragraph 261 above, it was not manifestly unreasonable to consider that those measures were likely to stabilise the financial system, in particular by making it possible, as is still apparent from paragraph 1.26 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, to ‘restore confidence and normalise funding conditions’. 264 As for the harmful measure whereby the BoC was to take over Laïki’s insured deposits, while its uninsured deposits would be maintained with the former entity, pending its liquidation, it was intended, as is apparent from the CBC’s press release of 26 March 2013, to enable Laïki to be split into a bad bank and a good bank. Therefore, in the circumstances described in paragraph 261 above, it was not manifestly unreasonable to consider that that measure was likely to stabilise the financial system by avoiding the disorderly default of Laïki. 265 Secondly, it is important to stress that the excessive size of the Cypriot financial sector was among the main causes of the banking crisis. As noted in the introduction to a May 2013 IMF report, the significant internal and external imbalances in the Cypriot economy prior to the financial crisis were exacerbated by a disproportionately large and weak financial sector. Highly exposed to Greece, it represented, as already noted (see paragraph 262 above), more than 800% of Cyprus’ GDP. 266 The first three harmful measures include, inter alia, the application of a haircut to the BoC’s uninsured deposits and were thus intended to reduce the size of the Cypriot financial sector. Therefore, in the circumstances described in paragraph 265 above, it was not manifestly unreasonable to consider that that haircut would contribute to ensuring the stability of the euro area banking system. – The proportionality and necessity of the first three harmful measures 267 According to the case-law, it must be ascertained whether the restriction on the right to property under consideration exceeds the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. In particular, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least restrictive should be adopted (see judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 205 and the case-law cited). 268 In the present case, first, the applicants argue, in essence, that alternatives which are less restrictive of their right to property than the first three harmful measures have not been taken into account. According to the applicants, it would have been possible to save the economy of the Republic of Cyprus by imposing on them lesser burdens than those which they have borne. Secondly, the applicants submit that they have been expropriated and have not, as such, obtained compensation which can be regarded as fair within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Charter. Thirdly, the applicants argue that, on the one hand, the excessive nature of those measures is apparent from the fact that the Republic of Cyprus ultimately used only 70% of the EUR 9 billion of the FAF and, on the other hand, an ulterior motive for the restructuring of the BoC and Laïki was that the Troika considered that the Cypriot banking system was not sufficiently compliant with the rules on combating money laundering. 269 First, as regards the consideration of less restrictive alternatives, it appears from the documents in the file that, as the Council rightly points out, any approach other than the one finally chosen was either not feasible or would not have achieved the desired results. First of all, it should be noted that the Cypriot authorities adopted the harmful measures only after the Cypriot Parliament had rejected a measure which was less restrictive to the applicants’ interests than the first three harmful measures, namely, the creation of a tax on all bank deposits in Cyprus (see paragraph 23 above). 270 Next, according to an IMF report of May 2013, the assumption by the budget of the Republic of Cyprus of the cost of recapitalising the banks concerned would have led to an increase in the Cypriot public debt to an unsustainable level. It follows from paragraph 11 of that report that, in the event of an injection of public capital for the benefit of the banks concerned, that debt would have reached a level of around 150% of Cypriot GDP and would have risked increasing even further. According to the IMF, that would have burdened Cypriot taxpayers, while the size of the banking sector, which was one of the main causes of the crisis (see paragraph 265 above), would have remained excessive and continued to threaten the Republic of Cyprus. 271 Finally, paragraph 11 of the report referred to in paragraph 270 above shows that approaches which did not generate debt, such as direct recapitalisation of the banks concerned by the ESM or their outright sale, were not available. As for an exit from the euro area, that would have only partially remedied Cyprus’ difficulties and would have inflicted considerable losses on both taxpayers and insured depositors. 272 The applicants nevertheless consider, first, that other measures should have been considered and, secondly, that the defendants failed to take account of situations comparable to that of the Republic of Cyprus, namely, that of the four other MSCE which had previously received financial assistance, that is to say, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic. 273 First, as regards the existence of less restrictive alternative measures, the applicants allege that it would have been perfectly feasible, even within the time limits within which the rescue measures had to be agreed, to provide for an alternative system of haircuts which would have taken account of the size of the deposits made in the banks concerned. According to the applicants, it would, in particular, have been possible to provide either for a haircut calculated as a percentage of the amount of a deposit in excess of EUR 100 000 or for a progressive system whereby the percentage of the haircut would increase above certain thresholds. 274 However, it must be noted that the applicants do not provide the slightest concrete evidence in support of their allegations, which are not, moreover, quantified in any way. At no point do the applicants specify what percentage or above what threshold the haircut would apply, nor do they establish that the approach which they advocate would have enabled the BoC to achieve the core tier one ratio provided for in paragraph 1.26 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013. 275 It is, however, possible to deduce from the applicants’ claims that that approach would have made it possible to allocate to the recapitalisation of the BoC only capital lower than that released by the first three harmful measures. In view of the imperative of protecting insured deposits, the haircut envisaged by the applicants could, like the first three harmful measures, have been applied only to deposits in excess of EUR 100 000. But, unlike those measures, that haircut would have applied only to a percentage of the deposits in question. 276 Either that percentage was insufficiently high to enable the BoC to achieve the level of equity referred to in paragraphs 1.26 and 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, in which case the approach advocated by the applicants would not have achieved the aim pursued, or that percentage was sufficiently high to do so, in which case the applicants would have suffered losses which it has not been established would have been substantially lower than those which they suffered as a result of the first three harmful measures. That would have been the case even if the haircut actually applied had been higher than was strictly necessary for the BoC to achieve a level of equity higher than that referred to in paragraphs 1.26 and 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013. According to paragraph 1.27 of that memorandum, which incorporates the substance of paragraph 6(5) of Decree No 103, if the BoC were to be overcapitalised in relation to the objective of a core tier one capital target of 9% under stress, a share buy-back would be carried out in order to reimburse the uninsured deposit holders by the amount corresponding to the overcapitalisation. 277 In any event, it is important to take account of the need for the Cypriot authorities to act quickly when adopting the harmful measures. Far from constituting, as the applicants essentially suggest, an indication of disregard for their right to sound administration, the speed with which the harmful measures were adopted bears witness to the urgency of the situation in which the Republic of Cyprus found itself at the material time. As indicated in paragraph 248 above, the aim was to prevent an imminent risk of collapse of the banks concerned in order to preserve the stability of the Cypriot financial system and thus to avoid contagion to other Member States of the euro area. Designing a differentiated haircut system such as that advocated by the applicants in such a context would have required the Cypriot authorities to undertake a particularly delicate and uncertain process to ensure that the percentages and thresholds chosen would allow the BoC to achieve the core tier one capital target referred to in paragraphs 1.26 and 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, thereby exposing the recapitalisation of the BoC to significant risks (see, to that effect and by analogy, ECtHR, 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, § 139). 278 As regards the argument, raised in the context of the measures of organisation of procedure, that urgency could not have justified the adoption of the harmful measures, the applicants do not provide any evidence to support the fact that, despite that urgency, the defendants could have provided temporary assistance to the banks concerned by giving them the opportunity to recapitalise themselves on terms which were less onerous for depositors. 279 Secondly, with regard to the existence of comparable situations, it should be noted that the measures to which the granting of financial assistance by the ESM (or by other international organisations, Union bodies and institutions or States) may be subject to in order to resolve the financial difficulties encountered by a State facing the need to recapitalise its banking system may vary fundamentally from one case to another depending on the experience gained and a set of specific circumstances. Those may include in particular, the economic situation of the beneficiary State, the size of the aid in relation to its economy as a whole, the prospects for the return of the banks concerned to economic viability and the reasons that led to the difficulties encountered by them, including, where appropriate, the excessive size of the banking sector of the beneficiary State in relation to its national economy, the evolution of the international economic situation or a high probability of future interventions by the ESM (or other international organisations, Union bodies and institutions or States) in support of other States in difficulty which may require a preventive limitation of the amounts devoted to each intervention. 280 In the present case, the applicants merely compare the size (absolute and relative) of the financial assistance received by the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, on the other hand. Thus, the applicants do not demonstrate or even allege that the respective financial sectors of the other MSCE which received financial assistance, including that of the Hellenic Republic, were, like that of the Republic of Cyprus (see paragraph 265 above), characterised by excessive size in relation to the size of the respective national economies of those MSCE. On the contrary, it is apparent from the documents in the file that the respective financial sectors of those Member States were less imbalanced than that of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, a press article dated 20 March 2013 quoted a member of the ECB’s Executive Board as saying that the Cypriot banking sector presented ‘unique circumstances’, since no other country in Europe had such a grossly unbalanced banking sector. 281 Nor have the applicants shown that the experience acquired and differences relating to the economic situation of the MSCE concerned or to the prospects of a return to viability of the banks concerned, the evolution of the international economic situation or a high probability of future interventions by the ESM in support of other States in difficulty, which may require a preventive limitation of the amounts allocated to each intervention, could not justify a difference in treatment between the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, on the other hand. 282 Secondly, as regards the award of fair compensation to the applicants, and assuming that the first three harmful measures can be regarded as involving an deprivation of the applicants’ right to property, it should be recalled that, without the payment of a sum reasonably commensurate with the value of the property in question, a deprivation of property would ordinarily constitute an excessive interference with the right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 21 February 1986, James and Others v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1986:0221JUD000879379, § 54). In the case of a security, the amount of compensation due is assessed by reference to the true market value of that security at the time of the adoption of the disputed regulation, and not by reference to its nominal value or the amount which its holder expected to receive at the time of its acquisition (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, § 112). In the present case, it is not for the Court to estimate in the abstract the amount of hypothetical compensation which the applicants should have received in the circumstances of the case. It should, however, be noted that, if they were not recapitalised, the banks concerned risked having to cease their operations and would have been threatened with disorderly default (see paragraph 261 above). The applicants have failed to establish that, in those circumstances, the true market value of their assets was such as to warrant compensation. 283 Secondly, and in any event, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 243, 245 and 247 above, Section 26 of the Law of 22 March 2013 provides that any party who considers that his or her right to property has been unduly infringed by resolution measures retains the right to bring an action before the competent national court to claim compensation. It must therefore be concluded that the applicants have not established that they have been unlawfully deprived of fair compensation. 284 Thirdly, as regards, first of all, the amount of the FAF actually used by the Republic of Cyprus, it should be noted that the Eurogroup statement of 7 March 2016, which the applicants rely on, states that it ‘welcomes the fact that economic activity has continued on a positive trend and that the [Cypriot] banking system continued to recover; the commitment of the Cypriot authorities and population to the [macroeconomic adjustment] programmes was also key to a fiscal performance that exceeded expectations’. 285 It follows that the fact that the Republic of Cyprus used only 70% of the amount allocated to the FAF, as set out in the IMF report of June 2017 produced by the applicants, can be explained, as the ECB argues, by the occurrence of more favourable circumstances than those initially envisaged at the time when the total amount of this assistance was defined by complex technical forecasts made in a complex and changing context, allowing for an unexpected fiscal performance. The applicants do not allege that those forecasts were vitiated by a manifest error. 286 Furthermore, the sums paid under the FAF could not, in any event, be used for the recapitalisation of the banks concerned, as the applicants themselves point out, so that the size of the sums actually received by the Cypriot authorities in that connection could not have had any impact on the conditions for the restructuring and resolution of the banks laid down by the harmful measures, which, moreover, were determined prior to the payment of the various instalments of the financial assistance. 287 Consequently, the fact that the Republic of Cyprus has used only 70% of the EUR 9 billion of the FAF does not manifestly demonstrate the disproportionate nature of the harmful measures. 288 Next, the allegation that one of the reasons for the harmful measures was that the Cypriot banking system was, in the eyes of the ‘Troika’ (the Commission, the ECB and the IMF), not sufficiently compliant with the anti-money laundering rules is not supported in any way. The only document produced by the applicants in that context consists of a press release of the CBC of 23 May 2013 which comments on the results of an audit of anti-money laundering measures in Cyprus without making any reference to the harmful measures, their reasons or the circumstances in which they were taken. That allegation is therefore manifestly unfounded. 289 Furthermore, the applicants submit, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in the judgments of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), because neither the Court of Justice nor the General Court in those judgments sufficiently explained how the bail-in of Laïki and the BoC was the least restrictive of the possible appropriate measures, or how the interests of the applicants had been taken into account. 290 In that regard, it should be noted that that argument consists either of a reiteration of the objections corresponding, in essence, to those examined and rejected in paragraphs 300 to 315 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and in paragraphs 299 to 314 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), or of allegations which are in no way substantiated. 291 It cannot therefore be considered that the first three harmful measures exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary to achieve the objectives pursued. – The disadvantages caused by the first three harmful measures 292 According to the case-law, it must be ascertained whether the disadvantages caused by the restriction on the right to property under consideration are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 205 and 209). 293 In that regard, first, it should be noted that the establishment of deposits with a bank is not free of risk. At the material time, Article 7(1a) of Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes (OJ 1994 L 135, p. 5), as amended by Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directives 98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organisational structure for financial services committees (OJ 2005 L 79, p. 9), and by Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 (OJ 2009 L 68, p. 3), obliged the Member States to ensure that the coverage for the aggregate deposits of each depositor be set at EUR 100 000 in the event of deposits being unavailable. In those circumstances, depositors must have been aware of the risk of losing all or part of the amounts above EUR 100 000 that they had deposited in the banks concerned in the event of deposits becoming unavailable. 294 Secondly, it should be noted that Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Law of 22 March 2013 provides that the shareholders of an institution subject to a resolution procedure are the first to bear any losses resulting from the implementation of resolution measures, whereas the creditors of such an institution bear such losses only after the shareholders. It follows that it is only after the shareholders of the banks concerned that their depositors had to bear the losses resulting from the implementation of the harmful measures. 295 Thirdly, it should be noted that the Law of 22 March 2013 guarantees the depositors in the banks concerned a level of protection at least equal to that which they would have enjoyed in the event of their liquidation. It follows from Section 3(2)(d) of that law that the measures adopted on the basis of that law may not place the creditors of the institutions concerned in a less favourable financial situation than that in which they would have found themselves in the event of their liquidation. Section 12(14) of that law specifies that, in the event of a restructuring, pursuant to Section 12(1) of that law, of the debts and obligations of an institution subject to a resolution procedure, the parties affected are to receive, in payment of their claims, at least the amount which they would have received, under Cypriot law, in the event of the liquidation of those banks (see paragraph 25 above). 296 In the present case, it is common ground between the parties that, in the absence of public intervention, the banks concerned would probably have had to be wound up. In those circumstances, Section 3(2)(d) and Section 12(14) of the Law of 22 March 2013 therefore ensured that the affected parties were not, as a result of the application of the first set of harmful measures, in a more unfavourable position than they would have been had the Cypriot authorities not intervened (see, to that effect and by analogy, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:102, point 90). 297 Fourthly, it should be noted that, in accordance with paragraph 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, paragraph 6(5) of Decree No 103 provides that if the contributions of uninsured depositors in the BoC exceed what is necessary for the purpose of restoring its capital, the resolution authority is to determine the amount corresponding to the overcapitalisation and treat it as if the conversion had never taken place. 298 It must therefore be concluded that, having regard also to the importance of the objectives pursued (see paragraphs 220 and 221 above), the disadvantages resulting from the application to the applicants of the first three harmful measures are not manifestly disproportionate. 299 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the first three harmful measures cannot be regarded as a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the very substance of the applicants’ right to property. It cannot therefore be considered that the Commission and the ECB, by supporting the first three harmful measures, have contributed to an infringement of the applicants’ right to property. 300 It must then be examined whether, by supporting the sale of the Greek branches, the Commission and the ECB contributed to an infringement of the applicants’ right to property. (b) The sale of the Greek branches 301 The applicants argue that the sale of the Greek branches cannot be considered objectively justified, nor can it be considered to be provided for by law or to comply with the principle of proportionality. 302 Even assuming that the sale of the Greek branches could have had an impact on the existence or extent of the damage claimed, allegedly originating in the conversion of deposits made in the Cypriot branches of the banks concerned, it must be found that that sale referred to in paragraph 1.24 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 and provided for in Decrees No 96 and No 97 was, like the harmful measures previously examined, justified by the public interest objective of ensuring the stability of the Cypriot financial system and of the euro area as a whole, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 221 above. 303 It is clear from the documents in the file that the purpose of that sale was, in view of the mutual exposure of Greece and Cyprus, to prevent a general destabilisation of the financial systems of those two Member States. 304 In that regard, first, it follows from recital 302 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/455 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.34826 (2012/C) and SA.36005 (2013/NN) implemented by Greece for Piraeus Bank Group relating to the recapitalisation and restructuring of Piraeus Bank SA (OJ 2015 L 80, p. 49) that the purpose of the sale of the Greek activities of three Cypriot banks and, in particular, of the Greek branches of the banks concerned was to safeguard the stability of the Greek banking system and to ensure that the Cypriot banks could sell businesses before those businesses were in danger of losing value. 305 Admittedly, the reasons why the Commission considered that the sale of those branches was necessary to ensure the stability of the Greek banking system are not clear from Decision 2015/455. However, as the applicants essentially agreed in their reply to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, those reasons are set out in an internal ECB report of 27 January 2013 produced at the reply stage. 306 It should be noted that, contrary to what the ECB and the Commission maintain, the production of the ECB’s internal report of 27 January 2013 cannot be regarded as inadmissible under Article 85(1) of the Rules of Procedure since it was produced, at the reply stage, in order to contest statements in the Commission’s defence relating to the conditions of sale of the Greek branches of the banks concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, Post Bank Iran v Council, T‑559/15, EU:T:2018:948, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 307 It follows, in essence, from the ECB’s internal report of 27 January 2013 that the objective of a possible sale of the Greek branches was to avoid any contagion effect from the Cypriot banking system to the Greek financial system and thus to maintain the stability of the latter. The aim was to prevent a widespread withdrawal in Greece in the event of either the default of Laïki or the haircut of deposits made in the BoC. As the ECB stated in its response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, there was a risk that, in view of the general situation in the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that their deposits were subject to the Cypriot deposit-guarantee scheme (see paragraph 440 below), the holders of deposits with Greek branches might withdraw their deposits. 308 The viability of the Greek branches, and indeed the viability of the banks concerned to which they belonged, would have been negatively affected, while the value of their assets would have declined as a result. Such developments would have risked jeopardising the renewed public confidence in the Greek banking sector, whose deposits were beginning to increase again after two years of sharp decline. There was a high risk that a run on the banks would ensue in Greece, which in turn could have aggravated the low funding capacity of Greek banks and would have required an increase in the ELA granted to them to a level potentially exceeding the actual capacity of Eurosystem central banks. 309 Secondly, it is apparent from the replies of the applicants, the Commission and the ECB to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure that the sale of the Greek branches was also intended to protect the Cypriot banking system from a contagion effect resulting, inter alia, from a possible deterioration of the economic situation in Greece. As stated in a Commission report of May 2013, to which the Commission refers in its reply to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the Cypriot banking system and, in particular, Laïki were particularly exposed to the difficulties of the Greek economy. 310 In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to consider, first, whether the sale of the Greek branches was provided for by law and, secondly, whether, in the light of the objective of general interest referred to in paragraphs 302 and 303 above, it constitutes a disproportionate and intolerable intervention which would undermine the very substance of the applicants’ right to property. 311 In that regard, first, it should be noted that, for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 238 to 250 above, the sale of the Greek branches was provided for by law. 312 Secondly, as regards the proportionality of the sale of the Greek branches, first, it must be considered that it was appropriate to achieve the objective pursued by reducing the mutual exposure of the Greek and Cypriot banking systems. 313 Next, it is not apparent from the documents in the file that the objectives pursued could have been achieved by means of less restrictive measures than the sale of the Greek branches. As part of their complaint alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination, the applicants admittedly submit that ‘distributing the cost of the bail-in among the Cypriot taxpayers’ would have made it possible to achieve those objectives. 314 However, it should be noted that, as the applicants confirmed, in essence, in their response to the measures of organisation of procedure, such a measure would have been tantamount to the Republic of Cyprus simply assuming the cost of recapitalisation and restructuring of the banks concerned. First, such an approach would not have been feasible. As the Commission rightly pointed out in its response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the Republic of Cyprus did not have the necessary funds for that purpose at the time of the events. It was also deprived of access to international capital markets. In those circumstances, it is, as the applicants agree in their reply to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, difficult to see how the Republic of Cyprus could have recapitalised the banks concerned without external financial assistance. 315 It should be noted that the amount of the FAF, limited to EUR 10 billion, was calculated on the basis of the financial needs of the Republic of Cyprus in the absence of any public capital injection in favour of the banks. Since, according to a March 2013 report by Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) (‘the PIMCO report’), the recapitalisation of the banks concerned would, at the end of 2012, have required a total amount of almost EUR 7.8 billion, the solution advocated by the applicants would have necessitated either an increase in the amount of the FAF or the use of a substantial part of the amount of the FAF for the purpose of recapitalising the banks concerned. 316 The first of those two options would have presented two major difficulties, which the applicants do not explain at any point how the Republic of Cyprus could have overcome. First, the ESM was under no obligation to grant the Republic of Cyprus an FAF in excess of EUR 10 billion. On the contrary, the ESM could legitimately consider that the size of that envelope should be limited, in particular to safeguard its ability to make future interventions. Secondly, an increase in the size of the FAF for the purpose of recapitalising the banks concerned would have contributed to increasing the Cypriot public debt to an unsustainable level (see paragraph 270 above). 317 The second of those two options would not, on the basis of the documents in the file, have been more viable. First, devoting a substantial part of the EUR 10 billion of the FAF to the recapitalisation of the banks concerned would have been incompatible with the conditions for the granting of the FAF, which provided that it would not be used for that purpose. Secondly, irrespective of those conditions, it should be noted that such an approach would necessarily have required a significant reallocation of the amounts granted to the Republic of Cyprus under the FAF. Therefore, all or part of the EUR 7.8 billion which would then have been used for the recapitalisation of the banks concerned could no longer have been used for the budgetary needs of the Republic of Cyprus, for the repurchase by the Republic of Cyprus of debt instruments or for the recapitalisation of Cypriot banks other than the banks concerned. As stated by the ECB and the Commission in response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, without financial assistance, the Republic of Cyprus would probably have been unable to meet its financial obligations, thereby jeopardising its solvency. In view of the resulting risks to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, it would then have become likely that the FAF would not achieve the objective of general interest pursued. 318 Moreover, unlike the sale of the Greek branches, the mere assumption by the budget of the Republic of Cyprus of the costs of recapitalisation and restructuring of the banks concerned would not have been capable of reducing the mutual exposure of the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus. Such a measure would have left the links between the banks concerned and the Greek banking system intact. 319 Finally, as regards the disadvantages generated by the sale of the Greek branches, it is true that recital 294 of Decision 2015/455 shows that Piraeus Bank had acquired the loan portfolios of the Greek activities of three Cypriot banks, including the banks concerned, at a price below their nominal value. It also appears from that recital that the sale price of those branches had been reduced to take into account the future losses estimated by PIMCO in the context of a stress test. According to the ECB’s reply to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the purpose of that test was to determine the capital requirements of the participating banks and was part of an audit of the Cypriot banking system which PIMCO had been commissioned to carry out by the CBC and which it conducted under the guidance of a committee composed of representatives of the CBC, the Commission, the ECB, the ESM, the European Banking Authority and the IMF as an observer. The result of that test was that the risk that loan losses would be higher than those already anticipated through the lower sales price was limited. 320 The Commission also stated, in recital 298 of Decision 2015/455, that the consideration finally paid by Piraeus Bank to acquire the Greek operations of the three Cypriot banks concerned, including the Greek branches, was much lower than the book value of the acquired portfolio, and even lower than the value of the loans after it was adjusted downward for anticipated future loan losses under the stress test. The Commission concluded that the acquisition price could be considered negative, which is confirmed by the fact that Piraeus Bank had booked significant negative goodwill after the acquisition and had seen its capital increase. 321 It cannot therefore be ruled out that the banks concerned suffered a significant loss of assets as a result of the sale of the Greek branches. As stated in recital 74 of Decision 2015/455: ‘The assets transferred to [Piraeus Bank] amounted to approximately EUR 18.9 billion and the liabilities amounted to approximately EUR 15 billion. However, the parties to the transaction agreed to take into account the amount of losses that was forecast in the PIMCO report for the banks in Cyprus, under an adverse scenario. According to the PIMCO report, the value of the assets that would be transferred to [Piraeus Bank] amounted to approximately EUR 16.5 billion. The liabilities transferred amounted to approximately EUR 14.5 billion.’ 322 However, it is clear from recitals 75 and 303 of Decision 2015/455 that the sale took place in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure, in which three bidders submitted offers, of which only Piraeus Bank’s offer proved to be valid. 323 The applicants do not put forward any argument to show that that sale procedure was flawed. They merely state that the price of the Greek branches was calculated on the basis of the valuation carried out by PIMCO in the context of its report, the role of which was essentially to magnify the capital requirements of the banks concerned, without the participation of their management or shareholders and depositors, despite the disagreement of their respective boards of directors, in complete opacity and in breach of international financial reporting standards (IFRS). 324 In that regard, first, it must be observed that the applicants’ reasoning is based on the premiss that the sale price of the Greek branches was ‘calculated’. That premiss is incorrect, since the price was the result of the best offer made in an open tender procedure (see paragraph 322 above). 325 Secondly, even assuming that the outcome of the PIMCO report, the purpose of which was not specifically to value the Greek branches for sale, but to assess, more generally, the value of the Cypriot banks under a baseline and an adverse scenario, was flawed, or based on biased assumptions, as the applicants contend by relying on an excerpt from a book published in 2016 entitled ‘The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis’, the sale of those branches is not, in itself, flawed. There is no evidence that the tenderers participating in the sale of the Greek branches were prohibited from offering a price different from the one resulting from the PIMCO report. 326 Thirdly, the applicants rely, in the context of their response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, on an announcement by the CBC of 7 June 2013, from which it appears that the price and conditions of sale of the Greek branches were determined ‘at a political level’ by the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus at two meetings of the Eurogroup in March 2013. 327 The conclusions which the applicants draw from the CBC’s announcement of 7 June 2013 cannot, however, be accepted. Without needing to rule on the evidential value of the announcement in question, it is sufficient to note that there is nothing in the file to indicate that the price and conditions on which the Greek and Cypriot authorities agreed ‘at a political level’ were binding on the tenderers who participated in the procedure for the sale of the Greek branches. 328 The applicants also rely, in the reply, on a press article of 19 February 2015 entitled ‘Unter Wert’ (Below value). 329 It should be noted that, contrary to what the ECB and the Commission maintain, the production of the press article of 19 February 2015 cannot be regarded as inadmissible under Article 85(1) of the Rules of Procedure since it was produced, at the stage of the reply, in order to contest statements in the Commission’s defence relating to the conditions of sale of the Greek branches of the banks concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, Post Bank Iran v Council, T‑559/15, EU:T:2018:948, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 330 The press article of 19 February 2015 does not, however, support the applicants’ claim. Contrary to their allegations, the article does not show that the ECB ‘conceived and articulated’ the sale of the Greek branches, still less that it determined the price. It is true that the article states that ‘the ECB and the European Commission devised an ambitious plan’, according to which the Cypriot banks would be forced to sell ‘their branches in Greece in order to guard the Greeks from the Cypriot shock’. In doing so, however, the article relies on the ECB’s internal report of 27 January 2013 referred to in paragraph 305 above, which examines different scenarios for the separation of the Greek branches and the banks concerned in view of the risk of contagion to the Greek financial system. As the ECB correctly points out, the fact that its services discussed such scenarios in an internal document does not mean that it ‘conceived and articulated’ the sale of Greek branches or that it played a role in determining the sale price. On the contrary, as can be seen from paragraphs 322 to 327 above, that price was the result of an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. 331 Consequently, also in view of the importance of the objectives pursued, the disadvantages generated by the sale of the Greek branches cannot be considered to be disproportionate. 332 The applicants therefore failed to establish that the sale of the Greek branches, provided for in Decrees No 96 and No 97 and referred to in paragraph 1.24 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, constituted a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the very substance of their right to property. 333 In the light of the foregoing, the sale of the Greek branches cannot be regarded as vitiated by an infringement of the right to property. It follows that the Commission and the ECB did not, by supporting the sale of the Greek branches, contribute to an infringement of the applicants’ right to property. (c) The alleged infringement of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, the right to sound administration and the requirements of consistency and fairness 334 In order to demonstrate the existence of an infringement of their right to property, the applicants allege a breach of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, of the requirements of fairness and consistency and of the principle of sound administration, which are inherent in the principle of proportionality, which is itself one of the conditions that must be met by any restriction on the right to property. In support of that view, the applicants put forward, in essence, three sets of arguments. 335 In the first place, as regards the applicants’ argument that the Eurogroup infringed the principle of sound administration by deciding on harmful measures in breach of ‘fundamental principles of democracy’, it is sufficient to point out that the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on that matter, since the Eurogroup does not constitute an entity established by the Treaties whose acts or conduct could be the subject of an action for non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU (see paragraph 95 above). 336 In the second place, the applicants submit that the ECB failed to observe the requirements of fairness and consistency in that it decided to support the bail-in of the banks concerned, even though, in a letter of 11 February 2013 addressed to the respective executive directors of those banks, the Director of the Office of the Governor of the CBC assured them, on behalf of the Eurosystem, that their depositors’ rights would not be restricted. 337 The defendants have not taken a position on that argument. 338 In that regard, without prejudice to the question whether the alleged lack of fairness and consistency is of any relevance for the purposes of assessing whether there has been a breach of the applicants’ right to property, it is sufficient to note that that argument merges with one of those relied on by the applicants in support of their claim that there has been a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, with which it will therefore be examined (see paragraphs 381 to 399 below). 339 In the third place, the applicants criticise the ECB’s conduct in relation to ELA. According to the applicants, that conduct is unfair, inconsistent and in breach of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute and the principle of sound administration, which the ECB disputes. 340 In support of their argument, the applicants submit, first, that the legal framework governing the ECB’s intervention in the field of ELA infringes the principle of sound administration and the requirement of consistency, which are an integral part of the principle of proportionality, and infringes the requirement that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law. In that regard, the applicants point out that ELA is subject to the condition that the beneficiary be solvent. According to the applicants, the concept of solvency for the purposes of ELA is not legally defined. The ECB is therefore not obliged to determine whether the potential beneficiary fulfils a strict solvency requirement laid down by law, but may, on the contrary, consider a bank to be solvent and therefore continue to authorise ELA on the basis of the prospect of financial assistance. 341 At the same time, the ECB could, by virtue of its membership of the Eurogroup and as it did in the present case, have a decisive influence on the decision to grant aid and the conditions attached to it. It would also participate, by virtue of its membership of the Troika, in the monitoring of the Republic of Cyprus’ compliance with conditionality. That would create a clear ‘moral hazard’, as the ECB could freely agree to ELA in the belief that it could demand repayment as a condition of any financial assistance. 342 Secondly, the applicants submit that the ECB was inconsistent and unfair in not objecting to the grant of ELA to the banks concerned until 21 March 2013, while stating that it was reserved for solvent banks. According to the applicants, the ECB had already become aware of Laïki’s insolvency at a date prior to 21 March 2013. In support of their argument, the applicants rely, on the one hand, on the PIMCO report, from which it transpires that the banks concerned were ‘economically insolvent’ and, on the other hand, on a press article dated 17 October 2014 and referred to in paragraph 115 above, from which it transpires, inter alia, that the Governor of the Bundesbank (Central Bank, Germany) had already referred to the insolvency of Laïki at a meeting of the Governing Council in December 2012. 343 Thirdly, the applicants complain, in essence, of the inconsistent, disproportionate and unfair nature of the ECB’s conduct, in that the latter, in a first step, between October 2011 and March 2013, displayed a liberal attitude by hastily granting Laïki virtually unlimited access to ELA, only, in a second step, to suddenly terminate ELA on 21 March 2013. 344 Fourthly, the applicants add, at the reply stage, that they are not in a position to challenge the analysis which led the Governing Council of the ECB to adopt its decision of 21 March 2013. According to the applicants, that decision lacks any statement of reasons and may not be the result of a genuine analysis. 345 Fifthly, the applicants submit that the ECB’s conduct in relation to ELA constitutes a clear and serious breach of the ECB’s discretionary powers under Article 14.4 of its Statute. 346 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 347 In that regard, it should be recalled that it is in the application of the harmful measures that the economic loss which the applicants claim to have suffered is likely to have had its immediate origin (see paragraph 65 above). As is apparent from paragraphs 100 to 122 above, the ECB did not require the adoption of the harmful measures either by its press release of 21 March 2013, or by the decision referred to therein, or by prior decisions to ‘continue the granting of ELA’. In those circumstances, it cannot be considered that any illegalities in those acts are capable of establishing a lack of proportionality of the harmful measures or their failure to comply with the requirement that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law. That conclusion is particularly relevant to the applicants’ arguments concerning the alleged inadequacy of the legal framework for ELA (see paragraphs 340 and 341 above). Since that legal framework is not the one in which the harmful measures were adopted (see, in that regard, paragraphs 238 to 250 and 311 above), its alleged inadequacy can in no way indicate that those measures were not adopted under conditions laid down by law. 348 In any event, the applicants’ arguments do not show that the ECB’s conduct in relation to ELA is vitiated by illegality. 349 First, the applicants’ criticisms alleging a lack of precision in the concept of solvency cannot succeed. The fact that the ECB, in exercising its powers under Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute and its wide margin of discretion, may have to interpret or apply a financial concept in the context of a complex economic assessment cannot, as such, constitute an illegality. 350 The applicants’ arguments, according to which the multiplicity of functions exercised by the ECB is contrary to the principle of proportionality due to a lack of consistency or an infringement of the principle of sound administration, can also not be accepted. In that regard, it is worth noting the scope of the consistency requirement in the context of the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of a measure. According to the case-law, a measure is suitable for ensuring the attainment of the aim pursued only if it genuinely responds to the concern to attain that aim in a coherent and systematic manner (judgment of 12 January 2010, Petersen, C‑341/08, EU:C:2010:4, paragraph 53). The applicants do not explain in any way how the alleged multiplicity of functions exercised by the ECB and the ‘moral hazard’ which would result from it are liable to impede the coherent and systematic achievement of the aim of ensuring the stability of the financial system of the euro area which the harmful measures pursue. Nor do they establish how that circumstance is such as to prejudice their right to sound administration. 351 Furthermore, it should be noted that the documents in the file do not support the applicants’ argument concerning the multiplicity of the ECB’s functions. 352 As regards the ECB’s participation in the activities of the Eurogroup, the applicants merely submit that the ECB had, in the present case, ‘defining influence in the determination of the terms of the [Eurogroup] Agreement of 25 March [2013]’, without providing the slightest evidence capable of substantiating that allegation, so that their argument is in any event manifestly unfounded. 353 As regards the ECB’s membership of the Troika, it is sufficient to note that the monitoring of compliance with conditionality presupposes that it has been determined in advance. Contrary to what the applicants essentially maintain, the ECB cannot therefore derive from the supervisory role conferred on it by Article 13(7) of the ESM Treaty the power to demand repayment as a condition of any financial assistance. 354 Secondly, it cannot be considered that the ECB behaved inconsistently, arbitrarily or unfairly by not objecting to ELA until 21 March 2013, although it had allegedly already become aware of Laïki’s insolvency at an earlier date. 355 In that regard, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, the role of the Governing Council of the ECB in the present case was limited to checking whether ELA interfered with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. In particular, in order to ensure compliance with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123 TFEU and Article 21.1 of the ECB Statute, it was for the Governing Council to verify that ELA was not granted to an insolvent bank (see paragraph 108 above). As noted in paragraph 109 above, at the time of the events, the ECB had no competence for the prudential supervision of EU credit institutions, which was the exclusive responsibility of national prudential supervisory authorities. In those circumstances, the ECB was dependent on the information provided to it by those authorities on the solvency of the banks benefiting from ELA. According to the ECB’s written submissions, which the applicants have not contested in that regard, the CBC provided the ECB’s Governing Council with its assessment from September 2011 that the banks concerned remained solvent. As the financial soundness of those banks gradually deteriorated, as the ECB again argues without being contradicted by the applicants, the CBC’s assessment of Laïki’s solvency was increasingly based on the prospect of the imminent provision of financial assistance to the Republic of Cyprus. When that prospect receded due to the rejection by the Cypriot Parliament on 19 March 2013 of the creation of a tax on all bank deposits, the Governing Council of the ECB objected to the continuation of the existing level of ELA to the banks concerned. As stated in the comments of the President of the ECB at the press conference of 4 April 2013, the Governing Council considered, at the time of taking the decision of 21 March 2013, that ‘in the absence of a programme, these banks would not have been solvent and viable’ and that at ‘that moment in time, there was no programme in place’. 356 The mere fact that a private company such as PIMCO or a member of the ECB’s Governing Council had previously expressed an opinion differing from that of the CBC as to the solvency of Laïki cannot suffice to establish that that council should already have departed from that opinion – and thus have objected to the maintenance of the existing level of ELA at an earlier date. Furthermore, even if, as the applicants claim in the context of the measures of organisation of procedure, the ECB is subject to a duty of care when verifying that ELA is not granted to an insolvent bank, the applicants do not establish that that duty was breached in the present case. They merely submit that the ECB is dependent on the information provided by the national central banks and that the decision of 21 March 2013 corresponds to an abrupt change in that institution’s position. In view of the factors set out in paragraph 355 above, that argument, which is not otherwise supported, is manifestly unfounded. 357 Thirdly, it cannot be considered either that the ECB behaved inconsistently, disproportionately and unfairly in opposing on 21 March 2013 the maintenance of the existing level of ELA, even though it had authorised ELA since October 2011. Far from being a sudden reversal without justification, the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013 simply responds to a change in circumstances, which was described in paragraph 355 above. 358 Fourthly, the fact that the applicants were not given access to the minutes or decisions of the ECB relating to ELA and that their requests to that effect were rejected by that institution, as is apparent from the documents in the file, does not in itself demonstrate the inconsistent, disproportionate and unfair nature of the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013. The applicants’ argument in that regard is therefore manifestly unfounded. 359 Fifthly, it is necessary to examine the applicants’ argument that the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013 is vitiated by a lack of or insufficient reasoning. 360 The ECB rejects that argument. First, it argues that, as it was only raised at the reply stage, that argument is new and therefore inadmissible. 361 Secondly, the ECB recalls that the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013 is not public. In the ECB’s view, the fact that no reasons were given for the decision could not be inferred from the fact that it was not made public. Since the decision was addressed to the CBC, it would be sufficient for the latter’s representative to be informed of the reasons for the decision at the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. 362 From the outset, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the ECB must be dismissed, as the failure to state reasons or the inadequacy of the statement of reasons is an infringement of essential procedural requirements within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU and, as such, constitutes a plea of public policy which the Court may, at any time, raise of its own motion (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 February 1997, Commission v Daffix, C‑166/95 P, EU:C:1997:73, paragraph 24; of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 67; and of 2 December 2009, Commission v Ireland and Others, C‑89/08 P, EU:C:2009:742, paragraph 34). 363 It is therefore necessary to examine the merits of the present argument. 364 It should be noted that, in cases where an EU institution, such as the ECB in the present case, has a wide discretion, the monitoring of compliance with certain procedural safeguards is of fundamental importance. Those safeguards include the obligation on the ECB to give adequate reasons for its decisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 69). 365 According to the case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the nature of the act and must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of its author, so as to enable the persons concerned to know the reasons for the measure taken and the Court of the Union to exercise its review. In that regard, first of all, the obligation to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure and the nature of the grounds relied on (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 July 2008, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, C‑341/06 P and C‑342/06 P, EU:C:2008:375, paragraph 88). It is not required that the statement of reasons specify all the relevant points of fact and law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for an act satisfies the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed in the light not only of its wording, but also of its context and of all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C‑88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited). 366 Next, a statement of reasons may be implicit, provided that it enables the persons concerned to know the reasons for which the measures in question were taken and the competent court to have sufficient information to exercise its review (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 372, and of 8 February 2007, Groupe Danone v Commission, C‑3/06 P, EU:C:2007:88, paragraph 46). 367 Finally, an examination of compliance with the obligation to state reasons can only be made on the basis of a formally adopted decision. However, other documents, such as a press release, may make it possible to ascertain the essential elements of the decision at issue and enable the persons concerned to know the reasons for which it was taken and the court to exercise its review (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 71). 368 In the present case, it should be noted that it is solely on the basis of the press release of 21 March 2013 that the applicants criticise the ECB for failing to provide any reasons in support of its decision of the same day to oppose the maintenance of the existing level of ELA as from 26 March 2013. However, that press release and that decision are not identical. As can be seen from paragraphs 111 and 112 above, that press release merely refers to the existence of that decision. It is clear from the ECB’s submissions that that decision was not published and that the reasons for it were communicated to the representative of the CBC, who was the sole addressee thereof. In those circumstances, it is necessary to determine whether the press release of 21 March 2013 enables those concerned to know the reasons for the decision referred to therein and enables the Court to exercise its review. 369 In that regard, first of all, it is apparent from the press release of 21 March 2013 that ‘the Governing Council of the [ECB] decided to maintain the current level of [ELA] until … 25 March 2013’ and that ‘thereafter, [ELA] could only be considered if an [EU or IMF] programme [was] in place that would ensure the solvency of the concerned banks [namely, the BoC and Laïki]’. It follows, implicitly but necessarily, that the solvency of the banks concerned would not have been guaranteed in the absence of such a programme. The comments of the President of the ECB at the press conference of 4 April 2013 (see paragraph 355 above) on the decision of 21 March 2013 of the Governing Council of the ECB support that interpretation: ‘[ELA] can be extended only to solvent and viable banks. Now, it so happened that in the absence of a programme, these banks would not have been solvent and viable. At that point in time the Governing Council assessed there was no programme in place, and that’s why it had to do what it did.’ 370 Next, it should be noted that, at the time of the publication of the press release of 21 March 2013, the existence and nature of the difficulties faced by the Republic of Cyprus and the banks concerned were known. It was also known that the Republic of Cyprus had submitted a request for financial assistance to the President of the Eurogroup, that such assistance would be provided in the context of a macroeconomic adjustment programme to be embodied in a memorandum of understanding and that the Cypriot Parliament had rejected the institution of a measure which the Cypriot authorities had undertaken to take for the purpose of mobilising domestic resources to limit the volume of financial assistance linked to that programme (see, inter alia, paragraphs 14 to 16, 19 and 21 to 23 above). 371 Finally, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraph 108 above, the rules governing ELA prohibit its grant to insolvent credit institutions. 372 Consequently, in any event, in the circumstances of the present case, the wording of the press release of 21 March 2013, however laconic it may have been, enabled the applicants to understand, having regard in particular to the context, the applicable legal rules and the comments of the President of the ECB made at the press conference of 4 April 2013, that the insolvency of the banks concerned in the absence of an adequate adjustment programme was an obstacle to the maintenance of the existing level of ELA. That same press release allows the EU judicature to exercise its review. Consequently, the applicants’ argument concerning the statement of reasons for the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013 must be rejected. 373 Sixthly, as regards the alleged infringement of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, it is sufficient to note that the applicants make assertions, not in any way explaining how the ECB’s conduct in relation to ELA is vitiated by a breach of that provision. 374 Consequently, the applicants have failed to establish that the ECB’s conduct in relation to ELA was in breach of the principle of sound administration, Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute and the requirements of fairness and consistency. The applicants’ third set of arguments must therefore be rejected. 375 As the applicants’ three sets of arguments have thus been rejected, the complaint alleging infringement of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, the requirements of fairness and consistency and the principle of sound administration must be rejected. 2. The existence of a possible infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations 376 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union (judgment of 24 March 2011, ISD Polska and Others v Commission, C‑369/09 P, EU:C:2011:175, paragraph 122). The right to rely on that principle presupposes that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances from authorised and reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union. That right belongs to any person in respect of whom an institution, body, office or agency of the Union, by providing him or her with precise assurances, has given rise to well-founded expectations (see judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 377 In the present case, the applicants consider that the defendants committed a serious breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. They submit that the defendants provided them with consistent and precise assurances that the harmful measures would not be imposed on the Republic of Cyprus. Those assurances are based, first, on a letter of 11 February 2013 from the Director of the Office of the Governor of the CBC on behalf of the Eurosystem to the respective executive directors of the banks concerned, secondly, on the Eurogroup’s commitment of 21 January 2013 as to the possibility of offering the FAF on the basis of a political agreement, agreed in November 2012, thirdly, the treatment of MSCE that received financial assistance before the Republic of Cyprus, fourthly, the ECB’s decision to allow ELA for a considerable period of time, and fifthly, the Commission’s decision of 13 September 2012 on State aid SA.34827 (2012/C) granted by Cyprus to [Laïki] in the context of its rescue recapitalisation (OJ 2012 C 341, p. 2) (‘the decision of 13 September 2012’). 378 The applicants add that those acts and conduct are capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on their part, not only taken individually but also taken together. According to the applicants, those acts and conduct have a cumulative effect which reinforced the assurance that no bail-in measures would be adopted. 379 It should be noted at the outset that the Eurogroup is not an entity established by the Treaties whose acts or conduct could be the subject of an action for non-contractual liability of the European Union under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU (see paragraph 95 above). Therefore, the Eurogroup’s alleged commitment of 21 January 2013 as to the possibility of offering the FAF on the basis of a political agreement, agreed in November 2012, cannot, in any event, give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the applicants capable of justifying non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. 380 It is therefore only with regard to the other acts and conduct complained of by the applicants that the Court is entitled to examine the existence of legitimate expectations. (a) The existence of a legitimate expectation derived from the letter of 11 February 2013 381 The applicants claim that, in a letter of 11 February 2013, addressed to the respective executive directors of the banks concerned, the Director of the Office of the Governor of the CBC, on behalf of the Eurosystem, provided them with clear, precise, unconditional and legally compliant assurances that the rights of their depositors would not be restricted (see also paragraphs 336 to 338 above). In that regard, the applicants note, first, that, under Article 282(1) TFEU, the Eurosystem is composed of the ECB and the central banks of the MSCE and conducts the European Union’s monetary policy and, secondly, that the Eurosystem’s mission statement indicates that the Eurosystem speaks with one voice. Any reasonable observer would therefore have assumed that the letter in question was binding on the Eurosystem, including the ECB, which breached the applicants’ legitimate expectations by subsequently requiring the Republic of Cyprus to comply with the conditionality agreement. If, however, the ECB considered that that letter did not correctly present its position, it should have made a public statement to correct the errors in it. The ECB did not make any such statement, thereby incurring liability. 382 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 383 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that there is nothing in the letter of 11 February 2013 which would allow a prudent and discerning reader to conclude that its content is attributable to the Eurosystem or the ECB. 384 First of all, that letter is addressed to the respective executive directors of the banks concerned by a person signing as Director of Communications and the Cabinet of the Governor of the CBC. At no point does that person claim to speak on behalf of the Eurosystem. On the contrary, as can be seen from the text of the letter itself, that person merely expresses the opinion of the CBC and makes no reference either to the bodies or to the operating rules of the Eurosystem: ‘Following the publication of an article in the Financial Times dated 10 February 2013 and titled “Radical rescue proposed for Cyprus”, the [CBC] wishes to stress that any action aimed at reducing, depriving or restricting the property rights of depositors, contradicts the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and of Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the [ECHR], provisions which protect the right to own property and which are crucial to the functioning of a free market economy. Hence, any suggestion to the contrary is not only legally unfounded but it cannot merit serious consideration.’ 385 It is true that, as the applicants point out, the CBC logo appears in the header of that letter, followed by the words ‘Central Bank of Cyprus’ and ‘Eurosystem’ in capital letters. 386 However, the mere presence of that heading would not allow a prudent and circumspect reader to assume that that letter is attributable to the Eurosystem. On the contrary, the impression that emerges from that heading is, on the one hand, that the letter is written on behalf of the CBC and not the Eurosystem and, on the other hand, that the term ‘Eurosystem’ is of a purely informative nature, merely indicating the CBC’s membership of the Eurosystem in its capacity as the central bank of a MSCE. First, the characters making up the term ‘Eurosystem’ in the heading of the letter of 11 February 2013 are located below those making up the words ‘Central Bank of Cyprus’ and are significantly smaller than the latter. 387 Secondly, as the applicants themselves acknowledged in their response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the word ‘Eurosystem’ is presumably an integral part of the CBC’s logo. No conclusion can therefore be drawn from the mere presence of that wording on the letter of 11 February 2013, unless it is considered that all, or at least the majority, of the letters from the CBC are attributable to the Eurosystem solely on the basis that they mention the former’s membership of the latter. 388 Thirdly, the footer of the letter of 11 February 2013, which identifies the address and website of the CBC, does not refer to the Eurosystem. 389 In the second place, it is important to point out that national central banks perform two types of functions, namely, first, those provided for in the ECB Statute and, secondly, those which are not. The latter cannot be imputed to the ESCB or the Eurosystem. Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute provides that national central banks may perform functions other than those specified in the ECB Statute, unless the Governing Council of the ECB decides, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, that they interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Conversely, functions which national central banks perform on their own responsibility and at their own risk are not considered to be ESCB functions (see paragraphs 104 to 106 above). 390 At the time of the events, the ECB Statute did not mention, among the tasks of the ECB or the ESCB, the determination of the conditions for recapitalisation or resolution of financial institutions. Those are therefore functions that national central banks perform on their own responsibility and at their own risk. In those circumstances, a prudent and circumspect reader could not reasonably consider that a statement made by the CBC in relation to the determination of the conditions for the recapitalisation or resolution of financial institutions was attributable to and binding on the Eurosystem. On the contrary, such a reader would necessarily have to consider that the CBC had expressed itself in the letter of 11 February 2013 in its own name and as a national central bank. 391 Contrary to what the applicants, in essence, claim, neither Article 282(1) TFEU nor the Eurosystem’s mission statement call that conclusion into question. 392 As regards, in the first place, Article 282(1) TFEU, it should be noted that it relates exclusively to the Eurosystem’s role in monetary policy. That provision reads as follows: ‘The [ECB], together with the national central banks, shall constitute the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The [ECB], together with the national central banks of the [MSCE], which constitute the Eurosystem, shall conduct the monetary policy of the Union.’ 393 The applicants could not therefore reasonably infer from Article 282(1) TFEU that the Eurosystem would guarantee the preservation of the value of deposits in the banks concerned in the event of their recapitalisation or resolution. 394 With regard, in the second place, to the ECB’s and the Eurosystem’s mission statement, it should be noted, first, that that statement is a mere statement of intent without any legal force (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 September 2015, ClientEarth and International Chemical Secretariat v ECHA, T‑245/11, EU:T:2015:675, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited) and which was, in that regard, not published either in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union, the purpose of which is to publish legally binding acts, or in the C series thereof, which publishes information, recommendations and opinions concerning the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 December 2012, Expedia, C‑226/11, EU:C:2012:795, paragraph 30). That statement is, by its very nature, purely aspirational and is not intended to impose obligations on its authors or to list exhaustively all the tasks and competences of the members of the Eurosystem. 395 Secondly, the content of that statement does not suggest that the Eurosystem has any competence to protect bank deposits in the event of a bank’s recapitalisation or resolution. On the contrary, that statement indicates that the Eurosystem’s primary objective is to maintain price stability. It is true that that statement also indicates that the Eurosystem, acting as the main financial authority, aims to safeguard financial stability and promote financial integration in the European Union. However, a prudent and informed reader could not reasonably draw the conclusion from such a vague statement that the Eurosystem was competent to determine the conditions for the possible recapitalisation or resolution of the banks concerned. 396 Likewise, the indications that, ‘while respecting the legal status of its members, the Eurosystem and its staff shall act and appear as a cohesive and unified entity’ and, ‘in that spirit and working as a team, the Eurosystem shall speak with a single voice and be close to the citizens of Europe’ cannot reasonably be interpreted as meaning that any communication from a national central bank which is a member of the Eurosystem is made on behalf of the latter. At issue is, rather, a general and imprecise declaration of intent, which at the most is applicable to the areas in which the Eurosystem is competent. 397 Finally, it is in vain that the applicants argue, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486). 398 The fact that the letter of 11 February 2013 may have been disseminated to a wide audience, or the fact that its purpose may have been to reassure depositors and the markets, which would have been relevant to the protection of financial stability in the euro area, which the applicants rely on, cannot suffice to call into question the findings in paragraphs 409 to 422 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), from which it was inferred that no legitimate expectations could be derived by the applicants in the case giving rise to that judgment from the letter of 11 February 2013, as well as the findings in paragraphs 383 to 397 above. 399 It must therefore be concluded that the applicants have failed to establish that they could derive from the letter of 11 February 2013 a legitimate expectation that the harmful measures would not be adopted. It cannot therefore, a fortiori, be held that the ECB, by acts and conduct subsequent to that letter, breached that expectation. (b) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the treatment of MSCE that received financial assistance before the Republic of Cyprus 400 The applicants claim that they had a legitimate expectation that the harmful measures would not be adopted because the granting of financial assistance to other MSCE, namely Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, had not been made conditional on the adoption of bail-in measures. 401 The defendants have not explicitly taken a position on that argument. 402 In that regard, in the first place, it should be emphasised that the mere fact that, in earlier phases of the international financial crisis, the granting of financial assistance was not conditional on the adoption of measures comparable to the harmful measures cannot, as such, be regarded as a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance capable of giving rise to legitimate expectations on the part of the depositors of the banks concerned that the granting of financial assistance to the Republic of Cyprus would not be so conditional (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraphs 65 and 66). 403 In the second place, it should be noted that the measures to which the granting of financial assistance by the ESM (or by other international organisations, Union bodies and institutions or States) may be made conditional in order to resolve the financial difficulties encountered by a State in need of recapitalising its banking system are likely to vary fundamentally from case to case depending on the experience acquired and a set of particular circumstances (see paragraph 279 above). In those circumstances, in the absence of a clear and explicit undertaking by the competent authorities, it cannot be considered that the applicants could legitimately expect the grant of the FAF to be subject to conditions identical or even similar to those to which the grant of financial assistance to Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic was subject. 404 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicants have failed to establish that they could derive a legitimate expectation from the fact that the granting of an FAF to other MSCE was not conditional on the adoption of measures comparable to the harmful measures. (c) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the fact that the ECB decided to authorise ELA for a prolonged period 405 The applicants consider that they can derive a legitimate expectation from the fact that the ECB authorised the CBC to grant ELA to Laïki for a prolonged period. 406 The ECB contests the applicants’ arguments. 407 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicants do not explain in any way how the fact that the ECB authorised the CBC to grant ELA to Laïki for a prolonged period could have given rise to a legitimate expectation on their part that the harmful measures would not be adopted. The applicants therefore failed to establish that they could derive a legitimate expectation from that fact. (d) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the decision of 13 September 2012 408 The applicants claim that specific assurances that Laïki would not become insolvent and that the rights of depositors would not be restricted are apparent from the decision of 13 September 2012. In that decision, the Commission approved the grant of State aid to Laïki in the form of a recapitalisation of EUR 1.8 billion on the ground that it was a systemically important bank whose failure could create a serious disturbance in the Cypriot economy, that the capital injection was then considered to be an appropriate, necessary and proportionate measure and that the aid measure was conditional, inter alia, on the commitment of the Cypriot Government to submit a restructuring plan. That plan was prepared and approved in the course of March 2013, but the Commission finally did not examine it in view of the Eurogroup decisions of 16 and 25 March 2013. 409 The Commission and the ECB contest the applicants’ arguments. 410 First of all, it should be pointed out that the decision of 13 September 2012 merely authorises temporary rescue aid for Laïki, conditional on the submission of a restructuring plan for the bank by the Cypriot authorities. Thus, it does not indicate that the financial difficulties of the beneficiary bank were definitively solved by the temporary support provided to it. 411 Next, it is true that recitals 43 and 48 of the decision of 13 September 2012 refer to the systemic importance of Laïki for the economy of Cyprus. 412 However, those grounds were retained by the Commission in the context of an examination of whether, on the basis of the evidence available in September 2012, the temporary rescue aid measure for Laïki in the form of a recapitalisation envisaged by the Cypriot authorities at that time could be authorised as a necessary and appropriate measure to safeguard financial stability within the meaning of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. It does not follow from the decision of 13 September 2012 that a further rescue measure financed by public resources would necessarily be taken if the financial difficulties faced by the bank were to persist or that restructuring measures of another nature would be excluded as a matter of principle. 413 It follows that the decision of 13 September 2012 did not contain any specific and unconditional assurance that Laïki could not, in the future, become insolvent or be subject to measures such as those resulting from the harmful measures. It is irrelevant in that respect whether or not a restructuring plan for the bank was subsequently actually examined by the Commission. 414 It follows from those considerations that the applicants clearly could not derive any legitimate expectation from the decision of 13 September 2012 that Laïki would not become insolvent and that the rights of depositors would not be restricted. 415 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the applicants could not derive legitimate expectations from any of the acts and conduct referred to in paragraph 377 above, taken individually. Nor, therefore, could those acts and conduct, taken together, by cumulative effect, give rise to legitimate expectations on their part. 416 Furthermore, the applicants submit, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in paragraph 181 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), because the Court of Justice referred to case-law relating to the legitimate expectations of economic operators which is not relevant to the assessment of their own situation as depositors in the banks concerned. That would also call into question the examination of legitimate expectations in relation to the letter of 11 February 2013. 417 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, contrary to what the applicants maintain, in paragraphs 181 and 182 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), the Court of Justice held that it was by analogy that the finding in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others (C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570), was relevant to the cases before it and, secondly, paragraph 181 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), does not relate to the consideration, in the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486) and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), of the legitimate expectation that might be derived from the letter of 11 February 2013. 418 It follows that the applicants’ complaint alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations can only be rejected. 3. The existence of a possible infringement of the principle of equal treatment 419 The principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EUn law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter (judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others, C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 54). The EU institutions are bound to respect that principle as a superior rule of EU law protecting individuals (judgments of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 87, and of 24 January 2017, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d’escompte v ECB, T‑749/15, not published, EU:T:2017:21, paragraph 110). 420 It is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others, C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). The factors which characterise different situations and thus their comparable nature must, in particular, be determined and assessed in the light of the object and purpose of the measures at issue, it being understood that account must be taken, for that purpose, of the principles and objectives of the field to which those measures relate (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 421 Since the applicants have pleaded infringement of the principle of equal treatment, it is for them to identify precisely the comparable situations which they consider to have been treated differently or the different situations which they consider to have been treated identically (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 April 2013, Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission, T‑31/07, not published, EU:T:2013:167, paragraph 311). 422 In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that, in the application, the applicants complain that they were discriminated against ‘vis-à-vis depositors of the Co-Op Savings Bank’, without in any way developing that complaint. In the reply filed on 25 September 2017, the applicants merely argued, with regard to the existence of discrimination between the depositors of the banks concerned and the depositors in the ‘Co-Op Savings Bank’, that the Council was wrong to maintain in the defence that the latter was not in a situation comparable to that of the banks concerned. 423 Such a complaint, which is not otherwise substantiated, does not enable the Court to identify the ‘Co-Op Savings Bank’ or to understand the situation of its depositors. Consequently, that complaint clearly cannot constitute an admissible plea within the meaning of Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure and the case-law cited in paragraph 181 above. 424 Furthermore, the applicants claim that the defendants infringed the principle of equal treatment in four respects, which the defendants contest. (a) The existence of discrimination against Laïki’s creditors whose claims originate in the ELA 425 The applicants claim that the uninsured deposit holders of Laïki were discriminated against in relation to Laïki’s creditors whose claims originated in the ELA. To the extent that Laïki’s debt arising from ELA was transferred to the BoC, those creditors could, in effect, apply to the BoC, while Laïki’s debt to the uninsured deposit holders would be cancelled. 426 The applicants add that the transfer of the Laïki debt arising from ELA to the BoC placed a considerable burden on the latter. Other categories of applicants were also discriminated against as a result. The transfer in question led, first, to the imposition of drastic limits on the claims of the BoC’s depositors and, secondly, to a decrease in the value of the shares of the banks concerned. The ECB, which is behind ELA, and the other defendants thus favoured their own interests to the detriment of those of the applicants. 427 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 428 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the applicants were, on the date on which the harmful measures were adopted, holders of deposits of the banks concerned, so that they are clearly not entitled to complain about the treatment of the persons who were then shareholders in the BoC. 429 In the first place, it is important to note that the transfer of the debt arising from ELA to the BoC is included in the conditions for the granting of the FAF. Paragraph 1.26 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 provides: ‘[The BoC] is taking over – via a purchase and assumption procedure – almost the entire Cypriot assets of [Laïki] at fair value, as well as the latter’s insured deposits and [ELA] exposure at nominal value. The uninsured deposits of [Laïki] will remain in the legacy entity ...’ 430 In the second place, it should be noted that, as the applicants acknowledged in their response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, the granting of ELA falls within the competence of the national central banks, with the ECB only having the competence to prohibit the national central banks from granting ELA where it interferes with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB (see paragraphs 103 to 109 above). In accordance with that division of powers, only the CBC granted ELA to Laïki and thus had a claim on Laïki. In those circumstances, as the ECB rightly argues, only the CBC had a right under the loan agreement with Laïki to repay the debt arising from the granting of ELA to Laïki. Consequently, the categories of persons who could, in the light of the applicants’ arguments (see paragraphs 425 and 426 above), have been treated differently as a result of the transfer to the BoC of Laïki’s debt arising from ELA are the CBC, first, and the holders of uninsured deposits in the banks concerned, secondly. 431 In the third place, it should be noted that a private operator, who, like the holders of uninsured deposits in the banks concerned, acted solely in his or her own private financial interest, is in a different situation within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 420 above from a Eurosystem central bank, whose decisions were guided exclusively by public interest objectives. The mere fact that depositors and a Eurosystem central bank whose decisions are guided by such objectives hold the same debt instrument against the same bank does not invalidate that conclusion, so that the principle of equal treatment cannot require that those two categories of persons be treated in an identical manner (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 92, and of 24 January 2017, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d’escompte v ECB, T‑749/15, not published, EU:T:2017:21 paragraphs 108 and 109). 432 In the present case, however, the CBC acquired the claim arising from ELA in order to contribute to the achievement of an objective of general interest, consisting in stabilising one of the two largest Cypriot banks and, by extension, the country’s financial system. It follows from paragraphs 104 and 105 above that the CBC granted ELA to Laïki in the exercise of the powers of public authority vested in it under Cypriot law. In particular, it follows from the ECB’s reply to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure and from the CBC’s letter annexed thereto that ELA is an instrument to enable the CBC to carry out the task of ensuring the stability of the financial system entrusted to it by Section 6(2)(e) in conjunction with Section 46(3) of the Law of 19 July 2002. 433 Furthermore, it should be noted that, as the Commission and the ECB rightly point out, the claim arising from ELA was secured by the assets of Laïki. As the holder of that claim, the CBC was therefore, unlike the uninsured depositors in the banks concerned, a preferred creditor. 434 In the fourth place, the applicants claim, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in paragraphs 193 to 196 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), on the ground that the Court of Justice merely repeated the reasons given in the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), and accepted that they were well founded without itself providing any reasons. 435 However, that argument is clearly unfounded, since it is apparent from paragraphs 193 to 196 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), that the Court of Justice, after examining the grounds of the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), held that those judgments were not vitiated by any error of law and accordingly rejected the arguments in the appeals. 436 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the respective situations of the CBC, on the one hand, and the uninsured deposit holders in the banks concerned, on the other hand, were not comparable. The applicants have therefore failed to establish that the defendants discriminated against those categories of persons in relation to the CBC. (b) The existence of possible discrimination with regard to the holders of deposits in the Greek branches 437 The applicants consider that they have been discriminated against on the basis of nationality in relation to the holders of deposits in the Greek branches. In that regard, the applicants point out that, while the grant of the FAF was made conditional on the adoption by the Cypriot authorities of a bail-in measure affecting deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus, it was not made subject to a similar condition in respect of deposits which had been made in those banks in Greece. Those were to be transferred to a Greek bank as a result of the latter’s acquisition of the Greek branches and could therefore, in principle, remain unaltered. In the absence of any objective justification, such a difference in treatment contravenes the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty or is prohibited by Article 18 TFEU. 438 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 439 In the first place, it is, first, common ground between the parties that the Greek branches were branches within the meaning of Article 4(3) of Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ 2006 L 177, p. 1). As such, those branches constituted parts without legal personality of the banks concerned and directly carried out all or some of the operations inherent in the activity of a credit institution. 440 Secondly, under Article 4(1) of Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, the depositors of those branches were covered by the Cypriot deposit-guarantee scheme. 441 Thirdly, it follows from recital 21 and Articles 40 to 43 of Directive 2006/48 that the responsibility for the supervision of the financial soundness of Greek branches, and in particular their solvency, rested with the Cypriot authorities, the Greek authorities being responsible only for the supervision of the liquidity of those branches and for monetary policies. 442 It follows that the applicants holding deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus and the holders of deposits with the Greek branches had deposits with the same banks, covered by the same deposit-guarantee-scheme and subject to the same rules. Therefore, the situation of the applicants with deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus and the situation of the holders of deposits with the Greek branches were comparable. 443 Unlike the deposits with Greek branches, the deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus were subject to bail-in measures. It must therefore be considered that the applicants holding deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus were treated unfavourably in relation to the holders of deposits with the Greek branches. 444 The ECB’s arguments cannot undermine that conclusion. First, the ECB submits that any discrimination suffered by the applicants should be considered as ‘reverse discrimination’, which is not prohibited by EU law. 445 It is true that, according to settled case-law, EU law does not preclude, in situations which do not present any factor connecting them to one of the situations envisaged by that law and all the relevant elements of which are confined within a single Member State, nationals of that Member State from receiving, from that State, less favourable treatment than that accorded to nationals of another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 June 1994, Steen, C‑132/93, EU:C:1994:254, paragraph 11, and of 1 April 2008, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, C‑212/06, EU:C:2008:178, paragraph 33). 446 However, that case-law does not apply to acts or omissions by which one or more EU institutions contribute to such treatment or require its maintenance or continued implementation. In the present case, the question is precisely whether the defendant institutions could support the adoption and implementation of a memorandum of understanding which made the granting of the FAF conditional on unequal treatment or required its maintenance or continued implementation. 447 Therefore, even supposing that allegations of discrimination between depositors of Cypriot banks and holders of deposits with Greek branches of those same banks can be regarded as referring to a situation in which all the relevant elements are confined to the territory of a single Member State, the ECB’s argument that any discrimination suffered by the applicants should be regarded as ‘reverse discrimination’, which is not prohibited by EU law, must be rejected. 448 Secondly, the ECB notes that the sale of the Greek branches took place at market prices and therefore maintained the capital base of the banks concerned. Therefore, the sale did not cause any additional disadvantage to the applicants. 449 In that regard, it should be noted that, in order for an EU institution to be held to have infringed the principle of equal treatment, the treatment in question must have resulted in a disadvantage for some persons compared with others. However, the existence of such a disadvantage cannot be denied solely on the ground that the difference in treatment at issue has not led to adverse economic consequences, since the disadvantage to be taken into account with regard to the principle of equal treatment may also be such as to affect the legal position of the person concerned by that difference in treatment (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07 EU:C:2008:728, paragraphs 39 and 44). The ECB’s argument relates exclusively to the absence of any additional economic loss suffered by the applicants as a result of the sale of the Greek branches. Therefore, even if it were true, that circumstance alone is not sufficient to demonstrate the absence of discrimination prohibited by EU law. At most, as the ECB seems to consider, that circumstance could be relevant for the purpose of assessing the proportionality of any difference in treatment to the objective pursued. Initially, however, the relevant question remains whether the applicants holding deposits in the banks concerned in Cyprus were in a similar situation to those holding deposits in the Greek branches, which is the case here (see paragraph 442 above). 450 In accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 420 above, it is therefore necessary to examine whether there is, in the present case, an objective justification for the difference in treatment to which the applicants holding deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus were subjected in relation to the holders of deposits with the Greek branches. 451 As indicated in paragraphs 304 to 306 above, that difference in treatment was due, inter alia, to the need to prevent any contagion effect from the Cypriot banking system to the Greek financial system. As the applicants agreed in response to the Court’s measures of organisation of procedure, it appears from an internal ECB report annexed to the reply that a haircut on deposits made with Greek branches would have risked triggering a widespread withdrawal of deposits in Greece, That, in turn, could have exacerbated the low funding capacity of Greek banks, thus potentially calling for an increase in ELA granted to them to a level potentially exceeding the actual capacity of the Eurosystem central banks. 452 Furthermore, it should be noted that a difference in treatment is justified where it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is to say, where it is related to a legally permissible aim pursued by the legislation in question, and where it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment concerned (judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 47). 453 With regard, first, to the question whether the difference in treatment between the applicants holding deposits in the banks concerned in Cyprus and the holders of deposits in the Greek branches was based on an objective and reasonable criterion, it should be noted that, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 220 and 221 above and in the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, §§ 103 and 138), the aim of preventing a general destabilisation of the Greek financial system via contagion through the Cypriot banking system must be regarded as objective and reasonable. 454 With regard, secondly, to the proportionality of the difference in treatment between the applicants holding deposits with the banks concerned in Cyprus and the holders of deposits with the Greek branches, it is important to recall that a difference in treatment is proportionate where it is suitable for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain them (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). 455 For reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 312 to 331 above, it must be held that that difference in treatment is appropriate to achieve the objectives pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 456 Consequently, the fact that the FAF, on the one hand, was made conditional on the adoption by the Cypriot authorities of a measure ordering a haircut on deposits in the banks concerned made in Cyprus and, on the other hand, was not made conditional on a similar condition in respect of deposits made in Greece was objectively justified and therefore does not constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment. 457 In the second place, the applicants submit that the harmful measures are contrary, first, to the free movement of capital in that they treated depositors differently on account of the Member State in which the deposits were made and, secondly, to the freedom of establishment in that they inflicted losses on persons exercising that freedom in Cyprus, as a result of which they entered the market under less favourable conditions. 458 Even assuming that those arguments, which are not otherwise substantiated, sufficiently establish that the harmful measures have impeded the exercise of the freedoms provided for in Articles 49 and 63 TFEU, it follows from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that a restriction on one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU may be permitted if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with that Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, provided that the application of such a measure is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective in question and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2021, Prefettura di Massa Carrara, C‑274/20, EU:C:2021:1022, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 459 For the reasons already set out in paragraphs 451 to 456 above, the fact that the FAF, first, was made conditional on the adoption by the Cypriot authorities of a measure ordering a haircut on deposits in the banks concerned in Cyprus and, secondly, has not been made subject to a similar condition as regards deposits in Greece is justified by the overriding reason of public interest to prevent a general destabilisation of the Greek financial system via contagion through the Cypriot banking system and does not go beyond what is necessary to do so. 460 The complaints alleging infringement of Articles 49 and 63 TFEU are therefore manifestly unfounded. 461 It must be held that the applicants have failed to demonstrate the existence of a breach of the principle of equal treatment or of the freedoms laid down in Articles 49 and 63 TFEU as a result of the different treatment of their deposits and those lodged with Greek branches. (c) The existence of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment based on discrimination against depositors in the banks concerned whose deposits did not exceed EUR 100 000 462 The applicants claim that those of them whose deposits in the banks concerned exceeded EUR 100 000 were discriminated against in relation to the depositors of those banks whose deposits did not exceed that amount. Deposits up to EUR 100 000 were fully covered by the Cypriot deposit-guarantee scheme, while deposits of a higher amount were covered only up to the amount of EUR 100 000. The fact that Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, required Member States to set up a scheme to cover all the deposits of a single depositor up to EUR 100 000 does not justify preventing the holders of uninsured deposits from obtaining compensation in the event of liquidation, nor does it explain why a depositor holding deposits of EUR 100 000 would not suffer any haircut, while a depositor who holds deposits of EUR 1 000 000 would be subject to a 90% haircut. 463 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 464 In that regard, it should be noted that the discrimination complained of by the applicants in fact concerns two separate aspects of the harmful measures. 465 First, at issue is the measure referred to in paragraph 5 of Decree No 104, which provides, in accordance with paragraph 1.26 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013, that the debts of Laïki to each of its depositors up to a limit of EUR 100 000 are to be transferred to the BoC, with amounts in excess of EUR 100 000 remaining with Laïki, pending its liquidation (see paragraph 36 above). It must be noted that that measure applies indiscriminately to all of Laïki’s depositors. Contrary to what the applicants essentially maintain, it does not therefore establish any difference in treatment between those depositors on the basis of the amount of the deposits they have made in that bank. 466 The mere fact that the transfer to the BoC of the deposits made in Laïki is subject to a uniform ceiling of EUR 100 000 per depositor, and is therefore liable to have different repercussions on those depositors depending on the size of their deposits, cannot call that conclusion into question. Any such difference results from the application of the guarantee ceiling of EUR 100 000 laid down by Article 7(1a) of Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, the illegality of which the applicants have not pleaded. That is a criterion which is both objective and appropriate to the needs of the functioning of the Union’s banking system (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 19 September 2013, Panellinios Syndesmos Viomichanion Metapoiisis Kapnou, C‑373/11, EU:C:2013:567, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 30 September 2009, Arkema v Commission, T‑168/05, not published, EU:T:2009:367, paragraph 115). Recital 16 of Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, states that the purpose of the abovementioned guarantee threshold is, first, not to leave too large a proportion of deposits unprotected, in the interests of both consumer protection and the stability of the financial system and, second, to take account of the cost of financing guarantee schemes and not to impose throughout the European Union a level of protection which, in certain cases, could have the effect of encouraging poor management by credit institutions. 467 Secondly, at issue are the BoC share conversion measures, provided for in Decree No 103, as amended, the substance of which is set out in paragraphs 1.26 and 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013. That measure provides that the haircut on uninsured BoC deposits applies only to the BoC depositors whose deposits exceed EUR 100 000. The result, as the applicants rightly point out, is therefore a difference in treatment between the BoC depositors depending on whether or not the amount of the deposits they have made in the BoC exceeds EUR 100 000. 468 However, contrary to what the applicants maintain, that difference in treatment in no way constitutes unequal treatment prohibited by EUn law. As the Council and the ECB correctly point out, depositors whose deposits in the banks concerned exceed EUR 100 000 are in a legally distinct situation from depositors whose deposits in the banks concerned do not exceed that amount. Under Article 7(1a) of Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, the deposits of the latter were, in the event of unavailability of deposits, fully covered by the Cypriot deposit-guarantee scheme, while those of the former were only covered up to an amount of EUR 100 000. 469 Furthermore, the applicants submit, in essence, that in the present case it is necessary to depart from the conclusions reached in the judgments of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), and of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), as regards, first, the inapplicability of the judgment of the ECtHR of 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece (CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614, § 137), to the present case, on the ground that it concerns the situation of bondholders, secondly, the circumstance that, in paragraph 482 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), the Court erred in finding that the difference in treatment resulted from the harmful measures and, thirdly, the absence of any indication as to why Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, would be such as to justify such a difference in treatment and why the fact that the Commission and the ECB supported the imposition of a 6.75% tax on deposits of EUR 100 000 or less demonstrates the arbitrary nature of that threshold. 470 Those arguments are clearly unfounded. First, in paragraph 200 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), the Court of Justice did not rely on the risk incurred by depositors in relation to bondholders but on the fact that the status of bank depositor falls within the scope of Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14. Secondly, it is apparent from paragraphs 482 and 483 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486) that, in examining a difference in treatment, the General Court took into account both the harmful measure at issue and the guarantee ceiling of EUR 100 000. Thirdly, paragraph 483 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), sets out how the threshold of EUR 100 000 provided for in Directive 94/19, as amended by Directives 2005/1 and 2009/14, is justified. 471 In view of the foregoing, no unlawful discrimination against the applicants whose deposits with the banks concerned exceeded EUR 100 000 can be found in the present case. (d) The existence of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment based on discrimination in relation to depositors of banks in other MSCE which received financial assistance before the Republic of Cyprus 472 The applicants consider that they have been discriminated against in relation to depositors of banks established in MSCE which received financial assistance similar to the FAF before the Republic of Cyprus. First, the applicants point out that the amount of that assistance was in each case greater than that of the FAF granted to the Republic of Cyprus, but that the deposits of banks in those Member States were not affected. Secondly, the applicants claim that the Greek banks benefited from aid amounting to EUR 50 billion to compensate for the effect of the PSI, whereas the latter affected the banks concerned more seriously than the Greek banks. 473 The applicants conclude that they were indirectly discriminated against on the basis of their nationality, in breach of Article 18 TFEU and Article 21 of the Charter. As for the Republic of Cyprus, it was discriminated against in relation to the other MSCE which received aid similar to the FAF. 474 The defendants contest the applicants’ arguments. 475 In that regard, it should be noted that the measures that may be attached to financial assistance provided by the ESM to resolve the financial difficulties faced by a State facing recapitalisation needs of its banking system may vary fundamentally from case to case depending on a range of factors other than the size of the assistance in relation to the size of the economy of that State. Those factors may include, in particular, as indicated in paragraph 279 above, the economic situation of the beneficiary State, the prospects of the banks concerned returning to economic viability, the reasons for the difficulties encountered by the banks concerned, including, where appropriate, the excessive size of the beneficiary State’s banking sector in relation to its national economy, the evolution of the international economic situation or a high probability of future interventions by the ESM (or other international organisations, Union bodies and institutions or States) in support of other States in difficulty which may require a preventive limitation of the amounts dedicated to each intervention. 476 In the present case, the applicants, who, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 421 above, had a duty to identify precisely the comparable situations which had been the subject of differential treatment, did not, apart from several references to the size (absolute and relative) of the financial assistance granted to the four MSCE concerned, explain in any way how the situation of those MSCE was, at the material time, comparable to that of the Republic of Cyprus (see paragraphs 279 and 280 above). 477 In the light of the foregoing, the applicants have failed to establish that they were in a situation comparable to that of the depositors of banks established in MSCE which benefited from aid similar to the FAF before the Republic of Cyprus. 478 It cannot therefore be held that the fact that the grant of the FAF was conditional on the adoption of measures aimed at reducing the size of the Cypriot financial sector, whereas the grant of financial assistance to the other MSCE was not conditional on the adoption of similar measures, constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment in relation to the applicants or, assuming that they can claim a breach of that principle in relation to a third party, the Republic of Cyprus. 479 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicants have failed to demonstrate the existence of a breach of the principle of equal treatment in their regard. It cannot therefore be held that the Commission and the ECB, by supporting the harmful measures, have contributed to a breach of that principle. 480 It follows that the first condition for the European Union’s non-contractual liability to be called into question is not satisfied in the present case, so that the claims for compensation made by the applicants must be rejected. E. Conclusions on the dismissal of the action 481 In view of all the foregoing considerations, it should be noted that, first, the present case falls within the same legal and factual framework as the two cases giving rise to the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), and that the essence of the pleas in law and arguments raised by the applicants in the present case is identical to the arguments raised by the applicants in the actions which gave rise to those judgments. 482 In the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), the actions were dismissed, in part, on the ground that the General Court did not have jurisdiction, in part, as inadmissible, and in part, as unfounded. In the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), the Court of Justice set aside those judgments only in so far as they dismissed the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Council to the extent that they related to the actions brought in those cases against the Eurogroup and Article 2(6)(b) of Decision 2013/236 and upheld those pleas of inadmissibility. 483 Furthermore, it follows from paragraphs 87 to 95, 251, 289 and 290, 397 and 398, 416 and 417, 434 and 435 and 469 to 471 above that it is necessary to reject the applicants’ arguments that the Court should depart, in the context of the present action, from the conclusions reached in the judgments of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028); of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486); and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487). 484 It follows that it is clear that the present action, in so far as it is based on pleas and arguments which are rejected, in the present order, on grounds identical to those of the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), or on grounds which are evident from the conclusions reached in the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), must be dismissed partly on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction, partly as inadmissible and partly as unfounded. 485 Secondly, as regards the pleas and arguments raised in the present action which are not rejected, in the present order, on grounds identical to those in the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486) and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), it follows from paragraphs 136, 152 to 162, 171, 176, 188 and 189, 196 and 197, 213, 284 to 288, 352, 356, 358, 408 to 414, 423, 428 and 457 to 460 above that the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear them, that they are manifestly inadmissible or that they are manifestly unfounded. 486 Therefore, the present action, as a whole, must be dismissed, in part, on the ground that the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction, in part, as being manifestly inadmissible and, in part, as being manifestly unfounded. IV. Costs 487 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 488 Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council, the Commission and the ECB. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Basicmed Enterprises Ltd and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex shall pay, in addition to their own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB). Luxembourg, 30 November 2022. E. Coulon H. Kanninen Registrar President Table of contents I. Background to the dispute A. ESM Treaty B. Financial difficulties of the Republic of Cyprus and request for financial assistance C. Bank restructuring measures adopted by the Republic of Cyprus D. Provision of financial assistance to the Republic of Cyprus II. Forms of order sought III. Law A. The Court’s jurisdiction 1. The action in so far as it concerns acts of the Eurogroup 2. The imputability of the harmful measures to the defendants (a) ‘Decision of the Governing Council of the ECB of 21 March 2013 to demand repayment of ELA on 26 March 2013 unless a rescue package is agreed’ (b) ‘[Decisions] to continue the granting of ELA’ allegedly adopted by the ECB (c) Subsequent acts (d) Conclusion as to whether the defendants are responsible for the adoption, maintenance or continued implementation of the harmful measures 3. The liability of the European Union for certain acts and conduct of the defendants 4. Conclusion on the Court’s jurisdiction B. Admissibility 1. Compliance with formal requirements 2. The alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies C. Conclusion on the jurisdiction of the Court and on the admissibility of the application D. Substance 1. The existence of a possible infringement of the right to property (a) The first three harmful measures (1) The nature of the review carried out by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C8/15 P to C10/15 P) (2) The evidence submitted by the applicants in the case leading to the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C8/15 P to C10/15 P) (3) Compliance with the requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be provided for by law and proportionate to the aim pursued (i) The requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be provided for by law (ii) The requirement that any restriction of the right to property must be proportionate to the objective pursued – The suitability of the first three harmful measures to contribute to the achievement of the objective pursued – The proportionality and necessity of the first three harmful measures – The disadvantages caused by the first three harmful measures (b) The sale of the Greek branches (c) The alleged infringement of Article 14.4 of the ECB Statute, the right to sound administration and the requirements of consistency and fairness 2. The existence of a possible infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (a) The existence of a legitimate expectation derived from the letter of 11 February 2013 (b) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the treatment of MSCE that received financial assistance before the Republic of Cyprus (c) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the fact that the ECB decided to authorise ELA for a prolonged period (d) The existence of legitimate expectations based on the decision of 13 September 2012 3. The existence of a possible infringement of the principle of equal treatment (a) The existence of discrimination against Laïki’s creditors whose claims originate in the ELA (b) The existence of possible discrimination with regard to the holders of deposits in the Greek branches (c) The existence of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment based on discrimination against depositors in the banks concerned whose deposits did not exceed EUR 100 000 (d) The existence of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment based on discrimination in relation to depositors of banks in other MSCE which received financial assistance before the Republic of Cyprus E. Conclusions on the dismissal of the action IV. Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 The list of other applicants is attached only to the version notified to the parties.