Abstract;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:352
Date: 2025-04-02
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

summary of reasons, the competent EU authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114). 61 In the present case, it should be noted that the requests for reconsideration, put by the applicant to the Council on 31 May 2023, concerning the March 2023 acts, and the letters of 27 June and 21 July 2023, which contested the Council’s stated intention to maintain those acts, were communicated to all of the delegations of that institution. 62 The Council also informed the applicant, on 22 December 2022 and 19 June 2023, that it intended to maintain the restrictive measures to which he was subject. In its letters of 14 March and 15 September 2023, the Council replied, in essence, to all of the objections raised by the applicant, referring in particular to the written pleadings which he had lodged in the proceedings that led to the delivery of the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:496), and replying in a more substantiated manner in so far as concerns his claims that the measures to which he was subject were not well founded, in particular as regards an alleged infringement of the right to be heard, and as regards the question whether the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue, on the basis of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was well founded. 63 As regards the time allowed to the applicant to peruse supplementary WK maintenance file 2, which was provided to him after the Council had informed him, on 19 June 2023, that it intended to include his name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, irrespective of the size of that 192-page file, the period of more than 10 days allowed to the applicant, that is, from 18 to 31 August 2023, was sufficient to allow him to peruse the file and to submit his comments which, moreover, he did. That also applies to WK maintenance file 2, since, in the letter of 10 July 2023, the Council had given the applicant the opportunity to submit his comments by 25 July 2023. It has already been held that, in the context of the procedure for the renewal of restrictive measures, a period of 12 days could be sufficient for persons or entities subject to such measures to submit their comments (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 8 July 2020, Ocean Capital Administration and Others v Council, T‑332/15, not published, EU:T:2020:308, paragraph 191). 64 In addition, it should be observed that, contrary to the applicant’s contention, and as is apparent from the letter of 15 September 2023, the Council replied to the objections raised by the applicant in its letter of 18 August 2023, pointing out, in particular, that the information contained in WK maintenance file 2 ‘[contained] specific references [to the applicant], which [confirmed] the comments and arguments which it had submitted in Cases T‑252/22 and T‑297/23’. 65 Thus, since none of the evidence put forward by the applicant shows the existence of a breach of the right to be heard, the third plea must be rejected. 3. The seventh plea, raising an objection of illegality against the first part of criterion (g), as amended 66 By his seventh plea, the applicant raises, by means of the objection, the illegality of the first part of criterion (g), as amended. This plea consists of three parts, alleging, in essence, (i) insufficiency of the evidence justifying the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, and manifest error of assessment in the context of the adoption of that criterion; (ii) breach of the principles of legal certainty and legality; and, (iii) breach of the principle of proportionality. 67 The Council disputes those arguments. 68 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act. 69 Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of a measure against which it can bring an action, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of such a measure, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that it be declared void. The general measure claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested individual decision and the general measure the legality of which is contested (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 145 (not published) and the case-law cited). 70 According to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). 71 The fact remains that the Council has a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the designation criteria and the procedures for adopting restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining these criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the contested acts establishing the criterion against which the objection of illegality is directed – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 April 2015, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council, T‑10/13, EU:T:2015:235, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 149 (not published)). 72 It is in the light of those considerations that the three parts of the seventh plea will be analysed. (a) The first part of the seventh plea, alleging lack of evidence justifying the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, and manifest error of assessment 73 By the first part of the seventh plea, the applicant claims that, by adopting the first part of criterion (g), as amended, the Council, as may be seen from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, establishes a presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons, on the one hand, and the Russian Government, on the other. 74 He submits that the evidence in the additional WK maintenance files 2 cannot justify the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, since, in particular, supplementary WK maintenance file 2 was compiled after that criterion had been adopted. 75 He adds that the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, reflects a manifest error of assessment on the Council’s part, on the ground that the evidence in supplementary WK maintenance file 2 shows that Russian businessmen close to the President of the Russian Federation have no influence on him any longer since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. 76 He concludes that the presumption created by the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is not substantiated and is unfounded and that, in adopting such a presumption, the Council thus made a manifest error of assessment. 77 It should be noted that, before criterion (g) was amended, it referred only to ‘leading businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. The amendment made to that criterion by Decision 2023/1094 had the effect of widening the scope of that criterion to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’, which is the criterion which the applicant disputes, and also to ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. 78 In the present case, the applicant proceeds on the assumption, relying on recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, establishes a presumption that a relationship of interdependence exists between the leading businesspersons and the women and men exercising political power in the Russian Federation. 79 In that regard, it should be observed that criterion (g), as amended, employs the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ which was used before the amendments, so that that concept must be interpreted in the same way, namely as referring to the importance of those businesspersons in the light, as the case may be, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143). 80 In other words, the amendment to criterion (g) does not affect the definition of the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ as such, but is intended solely to widen the scope of the restrictive measures so that they will apply to all leading businesspersons, including those not involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. 81 The reasons that justify the widening of the criterion set out in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 as amended by Decision 2022/329 are set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094. That recital describes the functioning of the Russian economy, characterised by a relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation. Thus, in referring to those businesspersons, the Council seeks to exploit the influence which that category of persons is capable of exerting on the Russian regime, by encouraging them to put pressure on that government to alter its policy towards Ukraine. 82 As regards the argument that the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is not justified by sufficient evidence, it should be borne in mind, first, that the adoption of a criterion for the inclusion of a person or an entity on the lists at issue is an act of general application intended to attain an objective pertaining to the CFSP, in this instance the end of the war of aggression conducted by Russia in Ukraine and, second, that the Council has a broad discretion when adopting such criteria. 83 It follows that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council is not required to produce evidence to establish the existence of a relationship of interdependence between the Government of the Russian Federation and the leading businesspersons for the purpose of adopting the first part of criterion (g), as amended. It is for the applicant to adduce, in support of his plea of illegality, any evidence capable of establishing that such a consideration on the existence of that relationship is manifestly incorrect and that it thus renders that part of the criterion unlawful. 84 In that regard, it should be observed that the evidence contained in the additional WK maintenance files 2, on which the applicant relies in order to call into question the validity of criterion (g), as amended, on the assumption that it is capable of proving the existence of a relative weakening of the power of leading businesspersons to influence the Government of the Russian Federation following the war in Ukraine, is not however capable of proving that the Council’s taking into account of the relationship of interdependence between the Russian Government and the leading businesspersons in order to adopt the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is manifestly incorrect. 85 Thus, the applicant’s line of argument alleging that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment must be rejected. The applicant’s argument that the evidence in supplementary WK maintenance file 2 does not justify the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, on the ground that that file was compiled after that criterion had been adopted, must also be rejected, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 83 above. 86 In addition, it should be noted that, for the purposes of the application of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, to the individual situation of each person whose name is entered on the lists at issue, it is for the Council to demonstrate, first, that a natural person can be classified as a leading businessperson within the meaning stated in paragraph 79 above and, second, that that natural person operates in Russia. In that regard, it should be emphasised that the mere fact of belonging to the category of leading businesspersons operating in Russia is sufficient to justify the adoption of the necessary restrictive measures on the basis of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, without there being any need to provide evidence of a link between being a leading businessperson and the Russian regime, or between being a leading businessperson and providing support to that regime or benefiting from it (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 66, and order of 6 September 2022, Haikal v Council, C‑113/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:640, paragraph 41). 87 Therefore, since the sole purpose of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was to establish an objective, autonomous and sufficient criterion justifying the inclusion of persons on the lists at issue, which requires that the Council prove that two cumulative elements are satisfied, namely that the person concerned is a leading businessperson and that he or she operates in the Russian Federation, the applicant cannot maintain that that part established a presumption (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). 88 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first part of the seventh plea must be rejected. (b) The second part of the seventh plea, alleging breach of the principles of legal certainty and legality 89 By the second part of the seventh plea, the applicant claims that, even assuming that criterion (g), as amended, might be regarded as constituting a rebuttable presumption, the fact remains that such a presumption is drafted in disproportionately broad terms and thus breaches both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of legality, as laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 90 As regards, in the first place, the first complaint, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty by the first part of criterion (g), as amended, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is one of the general principles of EU law – requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings. A sanction, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis. The principle of legal certainty means, in particular, that any EU legislation, in particular when it imposes or permits the imposition of sanctions, must be clear and precise so that the persons concerned may know without ambiguity what rights and obligations flow from it and may take steps accordingly. That requirement of a clear and precise legal basis has been enshrined in the field of restrictive measures (see judgment of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraphs 112 and 113 and the case-law cited). 91 Furthermore, it has been held that the discretion conferred on the Council by the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 as amended by Decision 2022/329 did not run counter to the requirement of foreseeability, since that criterion was sufficiently clear and foreseeable and existed within a legal framework that was clearly circumscribed by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue, namely, in essence, the need, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they might bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and the military aggression of which it was the victim. From that perspective, the restrictive measures at issue were held to be consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945. That criterion was therefore held to be consistent with the principle of legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraphs 45 to 48 and the case-law cited). 92 In the present case, as regards the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’, within the meaning of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, it should be recalled that that concept refers to the importance of those persons in the light, in particular, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue their activities (see paragraph 79 above). 93 As for the condition that those businesspersons must be operating in Russia, it must be stated that it is sufficiently circumscribed and defined as not to contravene the principle of security. 94 It thus follows from paragraphs 92 and 93 above that the provisions of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, are sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable to determine the persons to whom they are intended to apply and that they exist within a legal framework clearly defined by the objectives pursued by the legislation governing the restrictive measures at issue and set out in paragraph 91 above. Furthermore, the discretion conferred on the Council by the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is counterbalanced by an obligation to state reasons and by the strengthened procedural rights (see, by analogy, judgments of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 122, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 47). 95 As regards, in the second place, the second complaint, alleging breach of the principle of legality, it is clear that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was introduced by Decision 2023/1094, namely an act of general application adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU. The applicant cannot therefore maintain that that criterion does not comply with the principle of legality. 96 Thus, since it cannot be considered that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, constitutes a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the principle of legality, the second part of the seventh plea must be rejected. (c) The third part of the seventh plea, concerning the breach of the principle of proportionality by criterion (g), as amended 97 By the third part of the seventh plea, the applicant claims that criterion (g), as amended, breaches the principle of proportionality. 98 To that end, first, he claims that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, by the very broad formulation which it takes, makes it possible to designate arbitrarily a very large number of persons, so that the measures thus adopted cannot be considered to be targeted. Second, he submits that that part makes it possible to adopt restrictive measures without taking account of the personal conduct of the individuals concerned by reference to the policy pursued by the Russian Government in Ukraine, whereas the mere status of leading businessperson does not confer any relationship with that government, let alone the power to influence that government. Third, he states that, when the evidence adduced by the Council is capable of proving that businesspersons, even important businesspersons, have no influence over the Russian Government, the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is manifestly inappropriate for achieving the aim pursued the Council, a fortiori since, by failing to take into any account the provision by the targeted persons of a significant source of revenue, that new criterion appears to be wholly ineffective. 99 It should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not manifestly go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 52). 100 In addition, the Council is not required to prove that the restrictive measures which it introduces have the effects expected by the legislation concerned, but only that those measures are capable of attaining the objectives pursued by that legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 66). 101 In the present case, the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was adopted by the Council because, in the exercise of its broad discretion, and on account of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, it considered that it was appropriate, in order to put pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation, to be able to include on the lists at issue the leading businesspersons operating in that country. 102 First of all, it should be observed that the Council’s action in extending the circle of persons covered by the restrictive measures at issue, on account of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, in order to attain the objectives pursued, is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 January 2017, Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence v Council, T‑255/15, not published, EU:T:2017:25, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). 103 Next, by the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, as is clear from paragraph 81 above, the Council seeks to exploit the influence which that category of persons is capable of exerting over the Russian regime by encouraging them to put pressure on that government to alter its policy towards Ukraine. In that regard, it should be noted that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is not aimed indistinctly and generally at all businesspersons operating in the Russian Federation, but, in a targeted fashion, at leading businesspersons operating in that country. It must therefore be considered that the adoption of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was appropriate for attaining the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures. 104 Last, it should be pointed out that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is necessary in order to attain and implement the objectives set out in Article 21 TEU. It is in fact apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 that, by extending the personal scope of the restrictive measures, by targeting leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector of Russia, the Council did not make a manifest error of assessment in considering that those measures contributed to increasing pressure on that Government, which was responsible for the invasion of Ukraine. In that regard, it must be stated that the applicant has failed to show that an alternative criterion, more limited in scope, would have allowed the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures to be attained as effectively. 105 Furthermore, the objections raised by the applicant, which consist in challenging the first part of criterion (g), as amended, on the grounds that it does not take account of the personal conduct of the businesspersons covered by the restrictive measures at issue and that those businesspersons do not have any influence over the Government of the Russian Federation, cannot succeed. It should be noted that the applicant has failed to show that the Council’s considerations relating to the existence of a relationship of interdependence between the leading businesspersons and the Government of the Russian Federation were vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (see paragraph 84 above). Consequently, the applicant has also failed to demonstrate that that category of persons would not be in a position to put pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to modify its policy towards Ukraine. It follows that the fact that leading businesspersons operating in Russia are not responsible for the annexation and the invasion of Ukraine, and likewise that they do not provide support for or benefit from that conflict, is not capable of establishing that the first part of criterion (g), as amended, is manifestly disproportionate for attaining the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures. 106 Thus, since the applicant has failed to show that the introduction of the first part of criterion (g), as amended, was such as to breach the principle of proportionality, the third part of the seventh plea and, accordingly, the seventh plea in its entirety, must be rejected. 4. The first plea, alleging manifest error of assessment 107 By his first plea, the applicant claims that the Council made a manifest error of assessment in considering that, in the March 2023 acts, criteria (a) and (d) were satisfied with respect to him and that criteria (a), (d) and (g) were satisfied in the September 2023 acts. 108 The Council contends that this plea must be rejected. 109 In the present case, the Court considers it useful to analyse whether the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is well founded in the light of all the criteria relied upon against him in the contested acts, namely, first, criterion (a) and, second, criterion (d) in so far as concerns the contested acts and, lastly, criterion (g), in so far as concerns the September 2023 acts. 110 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the first plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment and not a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of all EU acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited). 111 It must also be recalled that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects individually the person or entity concerned, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 112 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123). 113 In addition, the assessment of whether those reasons are well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a fund-freezing measure and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 114 Furthermore, restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to maintain them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the lists at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 115 In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the lists in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence that justified the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person concerned on those lists, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned. Similarly, maintenance on the list at issue is justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been attained (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 169 and the case-law cited). 116 In such a context, the Council may decide to maintain names of the persons concerned on the lists at issue for the same reasons relating to past acts relied on in previous decisions concerning those persons, provided that the maintenance of their names is still justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been attained (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, Mutondo v Council, T‑94/22, not published, EU:T:2023:120, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 117 It is in the light those considerations that the arguments put forward by the applicant against the contested acts will be analysed. (a) The error of assessment alleged against the March 2023 acts 118 In the present case, the March 2023 acts were adopted on the basis of criteria (a) and (d). The applicant claims that those criteria are not satisfied in so far as he is concerned, in the absence of sufficient evidence adduced by the Council. It is therefore appropriate to analyse each of those criteria in turn. (1) The error of assessment concerning criterion (a) 119 In the present case, the applicant claims, in essence, that the evidence in the initial WK file and in the supplementary initial WK file, and also in WK maintenance file 1and the WK 17683/2022 INIT file (see paragraph 19 above), is insufficient to show that he personally and individually supported or implemented the actions or policies carried out by the Russian Federation that undermine or threaten the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 120 In that regard, the applicant maintains that, contrary to what the Court held in the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:496), he cannot be regarded as having personally provided support for actions or policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, in circumstances in which, as in the present case, such support is provided not by the applicant himself, but through Bank Rossiya, in which he has no administrative function and is an indirect minority shareholder. 121 In that regard, he submits that adopting such a line of reasoning is tantamount to denying any reality to the legal personality of companies and thus breaching ‘a fundamental and universal principle of company law’, when, as a minority shareholder, he is able to take part in only a limited number of decisions, while the strategic directions of the company are adopted by the board of directors. 122 He further submits that he cannot be held personally responsible for the establishment of branches in Crimea by Bank Rossiya, when such a decision comes within the exclusive competence of that company’s board of directors. As for the ownership links between Bank Rossiya and the National Media Group, the applicant claims that, since Bank Rossiya’s shareholding in that group is 17%, his effective shareholding in that group amounts only to 1.7% of its capital. 123 The Council disputes those arguments. 124 As regards criterion (a), it should be recalled that that criterion implies that a direct or indirect link is established between the activities or the actions of the person or entity targeted and the situation in Ukraine underpinning the adoption of the restrictive measures concerned. In other words, those persons or entities must, by their conduct, have been responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 74). 125 In the present case, and as stated in paragraph 45 above, it should be observed that, in the grounds of the contested acts, the factors that can be linked with criterion (a) relate to the fact that the applicant is a shareholder in Bank Rossiya and that that bank (i) has significant shareholdings in the National Media Group, which controls television channels that actively support the Russian Government’s policy, and (ii) conducts a policy of active investment in Crimea by establishing branches in that region. Furthermore, that statement of reasons refers to the Volga Group, which ‘contributes significantly to the development of the Russian economy’. In the light of those factors, the Council takes the view that, through that bank, the applicant supports the policy of the annexation of Ukraine carried out by the Russian Government. 126 In the present case, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue pursuant to criterion (a), the Council relies on the evidence in the initial WK and the supplementary initial WK files and also on the evidence in WK maintenance file 1, and in particular on the following items: – item 6 in the initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the Volga Group, undated, to which the Council had access in February 2022, which presents that group, in particular from the viewpoint of its shareholdings; – item 7 in the initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of an NGO, published in July 2017, to which the Council had access in February 2022, and which gives a breakdown of the shareholding in Bank Rossiya; – item 1 in the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the Russian media service ABR, published in January 2019 and accessed by the Council in October 2019; – item 2 in the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the Russian media service RBC, published in August 2016 and of which the Council became aware in October 2019; – item 4 from the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the TASS news agency, undated, but relating to events subsequent to 1 March 2014 and to which the Council had access on 23 February 2015; – item 5 from the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the Russian media service RIA of 10 September 2014 and which concerns an article entitled ‘Bank Rossiya begins its work in Crimea’, to which the Council had access on 23 February 2015; – item 6 from the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of Bank Rossiya, to which the Council had access on 23 February 2015; – item 7 from the supplementary initial WK file: a screenshot from the website of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta and which relates to an article entitled ‘15 years, the most turbid lakes in the world’, to which the Council had access in February 2015; – item 8 from WK maintenance file 1, taken from the website ‘eastwest.eu’ and presenting an article entitled ‘Bank Rossiya, Putin’s bank’, published in June 2016 and to which the Council had access in November 2022. 127 Lastly, it should be observed that, in order to characterise the existence of criterion (a) vis-à-vis the applicant, the Council also relied on two articles in the newspaper The Guardian annexed to the defence (Annexes B 19 A and B 19 B), the first, undated, entitled ‘Bank Rossiya, Kremlin’s favoured bank, to be “frozen out of the dollar”’ and the second, dated April 2016, entitled ‘Revealed: the $2bn dollar offshore trail that leads to Vladimir Putin’. It should be noted that the Council had access to those two articles before it adopted the March 2023 acts, since they are referred to in paragraphs 82 and 83 of the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:496). 128 In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that the applicant does not dispute the probative value of any of the documents referred to in paragraphs 126 and 127 above. 129 As to whether the Council erred in its assessment by considering that the applicant provided support for the policy of the annexation of Ukraine and that he therefore came within the scope of criterion (a), it should be stated that it follows from items 5 and 6 in the supplementary initial WK file that Bank Rossiya invested in Crimea in order to set up a network of 30 branches in that region of Ukraine. 130 Bank Rossiya’s policy of investing in the regions of Ukraine annexed by the Russian Federation is confirmed, first, by the information in item 1 of the supplementary initial WK file, which shows that in 2019 Bank Rossiya granted a loan to the Crimea railway company in the amount of 1 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (around EUR 14 million) and, second, by the information set out in item 2 of the supplementary initial WK file. That information shows that Bank Rossiya became a shareholder in Sebastopol airport. 131 Such events, which occurred after the invasion of Crimea by the Russian Federation, are such as to demonstrate that those investments contribute to the implementation of the policy of annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. 132 As regards, moreover, the question whether, as a result of the investment policy carried out by Bank Rossiya and which contributes to the economic annexation of Crimea, the applicant may be regarded as supporting actions or policies that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine within the meaning of criterion (a), it should be observed that the applicant acknowledges that he is the sole shareholder in the Volga Group, which holds 100% of Transoil, which, in turn, holds 10.323% of Bank Rossiya. 133 Such a shareholding pattern means that Transoil’s position between the applicant and Bank Rossiya has no effect on the fact that, in practice and in the light of his 100% shareholding in Transoil, the applicant may be regarded as holding 10.323% of Bank Rossiya’s shares, which makes him its second largest shareholder. 134 In that regard, it should be noted that, as may be seen upon reading item 7 of the initial WK file in conjunction with item 8 of WK maintenance file 1 and Annex B 19 B, Bank Rossiya is known to be a banking institution very close to Mr Putin’s entourage, which is confirmed by the breakdown of its shareholding (Mr Kovalchuk owns 37%, Mr Shamalov 9.64% and Mr Rolduguin 3.03%). As is shown by item 4 in the supplementary initial WK file, that circle of persons has for more than 10 years been a group of stable shareholders in Bank Rossiya, the capitalisation of which came to RUB 231 billion (around EUR 3 billion) in 2010. 135 Such evidence is sufficient to support the view that the applicant is one of the largest shareholders in Bank Rossiya and that he is also part of a long-standing group of shareholders in that bank. 136 Thus, since the applicant is a significant shareholder in Bank Rossiya and since that bank participates in supporting and implementing actions or policies carried out by the Government of the Russian Federation against the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, it must be considered that the Council has established to the requisite legal standard a direct or indirect connection between the applicant’s activities or actions and the situation in Ukraine, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 124 above. 137 In that regard, it must be emphasised that, contrary to the applicant’s statements at the hearing, the evidence referred to in paragraphs 132 to 136 above cannot be considered to be contrary to the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215). In both of those judgments, the Court considered, in essence, that in the absence of any factual evidence showing that a bank had committed acts coming under criteria (a) and (d), it was not possible to conclude that the shareholders in such a bank, even significant shareholders, could have their names included on the lists of restrictive measures. 138 It follows from the foregoing that the Council was able, without making an error of assessment, to consider that, on the date on which the March 2023 acts were adopted, the applicant met the requisite conditions under criterion (a). (2) The error of assessment in respect of criterion (d) 139 As regards criterion (d), the applicant claims, in essence, that the body of evidence on which the Council relies does not show that he provides material or financial support to, or that he benefits from, the President of the Russian Federation. 140 He submits that, contrary to what the Court held in the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:496), none of the documents on which the Council relies specifically identifies the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to the President of the Russian Federation, as such a factor cannot be inferred from the mere fact that Bank Rossiya is President Putin’s bank. 141 As regards the Council’s assertions that the applicant provides material or financial support to Russian decision-makers responsible for the invasion of Ukraine both by means of the action which he took at the time of the COVID-19 crisis and by his involvement in the Russian-Chinese Business Council, he states that he acts only in accordance with commercial interests which do not need to be orchestrated by the State and that, as he has always stated, he has never followed guidance given to him by the Russian governmental authorities. 142 The Council disputes those arguments. 143 In that regard, it should be observed that item 8 in WK maintenance file 1, which is an article taken from the website ‘eastwest.eu’, states, inter alia, that analysis of the Panama Papers revealed the financial techniques employed by Bank Rossiya to divert ‘rivers’ of dollars to close allies of Mr Putin’s entourage. 144 That information is confirmed by the article from the newspaper The Guardian attached to Annex B 19 B, entitled ‘the two billion dollar offshore trail leading to Vladimir Putin’ and which, from investigations carried out by a number of journalists on the basis of the Panama Papers, reveals the way in which funds, initially coming from loans and going through offshore companies, and with the intervention of Bank Rossiya, benefitted the President of the Russian Federation and his friends, namely Mr Kovalchuk and Mr Rolduguin. 145 In that regard, it should be observed that the connection between the stable group of shareholders in Bank Rossiya and, consequently, with that bank, the President of the Russian Federation, is confirmed by item 7 in the supplementary initial WK file, namely the article from Novaya Gazeta entitled ‘15 years of the most opaque lakes in the world’. Although that newspaper article was written before the invasion of Crimea by the Russian Federation, it nonetheless contains relevant information. It shows that the links connecting the inner circle of friends of the President of the Russian Federation, more commonly known as the ‘Ozero Dacha Circle’, of which the applicant and Mr Kovalchuk and Mr Shamalov are part or to which they are close, rely on a long-standing friendship which has structured all Russian capitalism for almost 30 years. As for Mr Rolduguin, he is described, in the Guardian article referred to in paragraph 139 above, as the best friend of the President of the Russian Federation. 146 It follows from the evidence referred to in paragraphs 143 to 145 above that Bank Rossiya provides financial support to the President of the Russian Federation. 147 It follows that the Council was able to consider, without erring in its assessment, that the applicant, in his capacity as an important shareholder in Bank Rossiya, provided financial support to the President of the Russian Federation, and to conclude that he satisfied the conditions laid down in criterion (d). 148 In the light of the foregoing, the claim for annulment of the March 2023 acts must be rejected. (b) The error of assessment alleged against the September 2023 acts 149 As regards the September 2023 acts, it should be observed that the claim for annulment of those acts relies on two parts, the first alleging that the items compiled in the additional WK maintenance files 2 lack probative value, and the second alleging an error of assessment by the Council in so far as concerns the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criteria (a) and (d) and criterion (g), as amended. (1) The probative value of the items in the additional WK maintenance files 2 150 In order to challenge the probative value of the items in the additional WK maintenance files 2, the applicant claims that, generally, the documents contained therein are not analyses or reports prepared by the Council, but mere compilations of documents, screenshots and excerpts listed one after another, and that he is not in a position to determine what the Council actually intends to demonstrate with the help of those documents, or to determine the conclusions which it draws from them. 151 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and that the sole criterion for assessing the value of the evidence adduced is its credibility. In that regard, in order to assess the probative value of a document, the Court must verify the reliability of the information which it contains, taking account, in particular, of the origin of the document, the circumstances in which it was created and the person to whom it was addressed and determine whether, on the basis of its content, the document seems to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published and the case-law cited)). 152 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment by the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 153 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). 154 In the present case, it should be observed that, in so far as concerns the September 2023 acts, the excerpts from the report by Ms Iwona Wisniewska, published in October 2018, entitled Priceless Friendship, to which the Council had access in April 2023, which appear on pages 227 to 232 of WK maintenance file 2, are helpful when analysing the validity of the restrictive measures to which the applicant is subject. 155 It should be noted that, in the present case, the applicant puts forward no objective evidence such as to call into question the probative value of that document, a reading of which shows that the analysis which it contains is based on objective and serious factors, which are not called into question by the applicant. 156 Furthermore, in the light of the considerations referred to in paragraphs 152 and 153 above, the Council cannot be criticised for resorting, as in the present case, to reports on the situation in the Russian Federation as proof of the validity of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. 157 In that regard, the applicant’s argument that the Council ought to have relied on its own analysis of the situation in the Russian Federation must be rejected, since such an analysis could not have been regarded as constituting proof, when it did not originate from a third party. 158 In the light of those factors, the applicant’s complaints concerning the probative value of the document referred to in paragraph 154 above must be rejected. (2) The error of assessment in respect of criterion (a) 159 As concerns criterion (a), it should be observed that the applicant has failed to show that his personal situation had changed, in that, in particular, he remains a significant indirect shareholder in Bank Rossiya, or that that bank had put an end to its policy of contributing to the economic annexation of Crimea. 160 Thus, it must be held that the applicant has failed to show that his designation on the basis of criterion (a) was vitiated by an error of assessment. (3) The error of assessment in respect of criterion (d) 161 As concerns criterion (d), it should be observed that the applicant has failed to show that his personal situation had changed, in that, in particular, he continues to be a significant indirect shareholder in Bank Rossiya, or that that bank had ceased to provide financial support to the President of the Russian Federation. 162 In addition, the extracts from the report entitled Priceless Friendship, referred to in paragraph 154 above, show that, following the sanctions imposed on him, the applicant benefitted, in April 2017, from legislation dubbed by some the ‘Timchenko law’, under which he enjoyed tax exemptions. Those extracts, moreover, state that the companies Novatek and Sakhatrans received aid from the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively, in 2015, amounting to RUB 150 billion (around EUR 2.2 billion at the time) and, in 2016, amounting to RUB 1.5 billion (around EUR 20 million at the time). It is apparent from item 6 in the initial WK file that the applicant is, through the Volga Group, in which he holds 100% of the share capital, a shareholder in each of those companies, in which he holds 23% and 89% of the share capital, respectively, which the applicant has not shown to be incorrect. 163 Those factors therefore show that the applicant benefits, within the meaning of criterion (d), from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. 164 Thus, since the matters already referred to in paragraphs 143 to 148 above continued to prevail on the date on which the September 2023 acts were adopted, and since the Council has also shown that the applicant benefitted from the Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine, the Council was able, without making an error, to consider, when adopting those acts, that the applicant satisfied the conditions of criterion (d). (4) The error of assessment with respect to criterion (g), as amended 165 As is clear from paragraphs 92 and 93 above, the first part of criterion (g), as amended, requires that two conditions be met, namely, in the first place, that the person concerned may be classified as an ‘influential businessperson’, which means that he or she is of importance in the Russian economy in the light, in particular, of his or her professional status, the importance of his or her economic activities, the scale of his or her capital holdings or his or her functions within one or more undertakings in which he or she operates; and, in the second place, that he or she operates in the Russian Federation. 166 As regards the first condition, it should be noted that, in the present case, the applicant is a businessperson who holds shares in a number of companies established in Russia through the holding company the Volga Group, in which he is the sole shareholder. 167 In that regard, it should be noted that both item 6 in the initial WK file and the application itself show, first, that the applicant mainly owns, through the Volga Group, 100% of Transoil, 10.323% of Bank Rossiya, 89% of Sakhatrans, 23% of Novatek and 12.5% of Sogaz and, second, that the companies in that group, which employ 90 000 persons, generate a consolidated annual revenue of 116 billion United States Dollars. 168 Since the applicant has failed to rely on elements that would call into question the veracity and the accuracy of the information referred to in paragraph 167 above, it must be held that the Council has adduced proof that he was a leading businessman on account of the scale of his capital holdings. 169 As to the second condition, which relates to operating in the Russian Federation, it must be observed that it has been met, since the undertakings referred to in paragraph 167 are all established and operate in the Russian Federation. 170 It follows that the Council did not err in its assessment when it considered, when adopting the September 2023 acts, that the applicant satisfied the conditions laid down by the first part of criterion (g), as amended. 171 It follows that the first plea must be rejected in its entirety. 5. The fifth plea, concerning infringement of the applicant’s fundamental right to freedom of movement as a Union citizen 172 By his fifth plea, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures to which he is subject infringe Article 21 TFEU and Article 45(1) and Article 52(1) of the Charter. 173 He submits that, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, it is not possible, in the absence of a special provision to that effect, to restrict the scope of Article 21 TFEU on the freedom of movement of Union citizens. 174 In that connection, the applicant claims, in essence, that, contrary to what has already been held in the judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council (T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926), restrictive measures adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU cannot be regarded as constituting a lex specialis or as capable of derogating from normative measures adopted on the basis of Article 21 TFEU, including Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77), Article 27 of which allows the freedom of movement to be restricted, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, solely on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 175 He further claims that an analysis of the legislation of various EU Member States shows that there is a constitutional tradition common to the Member States by virtue of which freedom of movement can be restricted only on grounds of public policy, public security and public health, and subject to strict judicial review. 176 The applicant infers that the contradiction that exists between the practice of the European Union and that shared constitutional tradition means that the contested acts infringe Article 21 TFEU and Articles 45 and 52 of the Charter. 177 The Council disputes those arguments. 178 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, when questioned at the hearing, the applicant stated and confirmed that he was not raising a plea of illegality against Article 1 of Decision 2014/145, in that that provision provides that the Member States are to prevent the transit through their territory of persons subject to restrictive measures. He added that he was, however, challenging the legality of the measures to which he was subject in that, in particular, they do not comply with the principle of proportionality. 179 It should be observed that the right to move and reside freely on the territories of the Member States, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, is to be exercised, in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, under the conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties. As is clear from the Explanations relating to the Charter (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed by Article 45(1) of the Charter is the right guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The scope of that right is explained in Article 21 TFEU. 180 Under Article 21(1) TFEU, freedom to move and reside in the territories of the Member States is to be exercised subject to the limitations and conditions provided for in the Treaties and by the provisions adopted for their application. As that reservation, formulated in the second part of Article 21(1) TFEU, refers to the Treaties in the plural, it also includes the EU Treaty and the provisions adopted in application of that treaty. It follows that restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of movement and of residence of Union citizens enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter may be imposed by decisions coming within the CFSP which are adopted on the basis of Article 29 TFEU, such as Decisions 2023/572 and 2023/1767 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 195 and 196, and of 4 December 2015, Sarafraz v Council, T‑273/13, not published, EU:T:2015:939, paragraphs 194 and 195). 181 In that regard, it should be observed that, in the field of the CFSP, Article 29 TEU, which is worded in broad terms, authorises the Council to adopt decisions that define the European Union’s position on a particular issue that is geographic or thematic in nature, pursuing the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, even if that results in a limitation of the freedom of movement of Union citizens within the territory of Member States of which they are not nationals. That means that that freedom may, in application of that article, be restricted on grounds other than those provided for in Directive 2004/38. 182 That is the position in the present case, since the restrictive measures at issue are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 183 However, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights set forth in Article 45(1) of the Charter must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, which means that they must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, pursue an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. That consideration also applies to the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, C‑452/20, EU:C:2021:855, point 60). Consequently, limitations on the exercise of the right set forth in Article 45(1) of the Charter, which are imposed in the context of the implementation of the CFSP, must satisfy those conditions. 184 In the present case, first, the limitations on the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, arising from Decisions 2023/572 and 2023/1767, are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in an act which is, in particular, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145 as amended by Decision 2022/329, and having a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU. 185 Second, in so far as concerns the question whether the limitations referred to in paragraph 184 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, regard must be had to the nature and the scope of the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 153). 186 In that connection, it must be held that the limitations referred to in paragraph 184 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. First of all, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision 2014/145 as amended by Decision 2022/329, those limitations comply with the principle of international law according to which a State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there. Next, under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 as amended by Decision 2022/329, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that the names of persons who no longer meet the listing criteria are removed. Last, those limitations do not call into question that right as such, since they have the effect of temporarily suspending, under specific conditions and on account of their individual situation, the right of certain persons to move freely within the territory of the Member States, provided that those conditions continue to be satisfied (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 48). 187 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 184 above are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 188 Fourth, with regard to the principle of proportionality, it should be recalled that, as a general principle of EU law, this requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 189 As regards the necessity of the limitations referred to in paragraph 184 above, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to show that the Council could envisage adopting measures which were less restrictive but just as appropriate as those provided for. Furthermore, the application of the restrictive measures at issue is subject to the exemption mechanism referred to in Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, which authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures imposed, in particular where travel is justified on the ground of urgent humanitarian need. 190 Moreover, while recognising the negative consequences for the applicant, as described by him, which result from the application of the restrictive measures at issue, it must be held that, in the light of the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures, the limitations referred to in paragraph 184 above are not disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 191 In that regard, it must be emphasised that the fact that the applicant cannot enjoy the real estate which he owns in the European Union on account of the restriction of his freedom of movement does not constitute a disproportionate restriction in the light of the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 192 Furthermore, it should be observed that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States do not establish a right for Union citizens to move within the territory of a State other than that of which they are a national. It follows that the applicant is not justified in maintaining that those traditions are such as to limit the Council’s competence to adopt, in the context of the CFSP, restrictions on the freedom of movement of citizens on grounds other than public policy, public security and public health. 193 It follows that the limitations on the applicant’s right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States satisfy the conditions laid down in the Treaties. 194 In the light of the foregoing, the fifth plea must be rejected. 6. The sixth plea, concerning infringement of Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter in the light of the right to property and the right to respect for private life and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 195 By his sixth plea, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures to which he is subject infringe Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter, which protect the right to property and the right to respect for private life. 196 He submits that the infringement of the right to property was aggravated by the fact that, by Regulation (EU) 2022/1273 of 21 July 2022 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 194, p. 1), the Council inserted in Regulation No 269/2014 a new Article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which require persons whose names are on the lists at issue to report funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State that belong to or are owned, held or controlled by them; any failure to report such funds or resources is to be regarded as a circumvention of the restrictive measures. 197 He states that the application of the provisions of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/1273, along with Article 15(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/880 of 3 June 2022 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 75), is liable to create a risk that his assets and possessions will be confiscated. 198 He claims that the infringement of the right to property by the restrictive measures constitutes an unlawful interference in the light of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 199 To that end, he states that national laws authorise the freezing of property and assets only on condition that there is a causal link between the personal conduct of the individual and the frozen property or asset, which may be the case, for example, where an asset has enabled an offence to be carried out or is the result of that offence. 200 He claims, furthermore, that the restrictive measures to which he is subject damage his reputation and consequently entail an infringement of the right to respect for his private life, on the ground that the fact of designating him as responsible for supporting actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine exposes him to opprobrium for acts for which he is not responsible. 201 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the applicant does not raise a plea of illegality against the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014 or those of Decision 2014/145, which provide for the freezing of the property and assets of the persons whose names are included on the lists at issue and for the exemptions from those fund-freezing measures; nor does he dispute, by means of a plea, the legality of the provisions of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/1273, with those of Article 15(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/880. 202 Thus, as the applicant has failed to raise, by means of a plea, the illegality of those provisions, the Court cannot invalidate the restrictive measures to which he is subject on the grounds that the provisions on which those measures are based are illegal. 203 As regards, moreover, the infringement of the right to private life and the right to property by the restrictive measures to which the applicant is subject, it should be observed that the restrictive measures at issue are precautionary measures which are not intended to deprive the persons concerned of those rights, which are enshrined in Article 7 and Article 17 of the Charter, respectively. However, those measures undeniably entail a restriction of those fundamental rights in the present case (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited). 204 Nonetheless, as has been stated in paragraph 183 above, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter must meet the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) thereof, namely that those measures must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, pursue an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. 205 In the present case, it is clear that those four conditions are satisfied. 206 First, it must be noted that the limitations on the applicant’s exercise of his right to property and the infringement of his right to respect for his private life are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts that are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 207 Second, since the contested acts apply for six months and are kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the limitations referred to in paragraph 206 above are temporary and reversible. It must therefore be held that they do not infringe the essence of the right to respect for private and family life or the right to property. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting exemptions from the restrictive measures applied. In particular, with regard to the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisations to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 208 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 206 above are intended to attain the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 187 above. 209 Fourth, as regards the appropriateness of those limitations, first of all, it should be observed that they are appropriate for attaining the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 187 above, in that they contribute to its attainment. Next, as regards their necessity, it should be noted that the applicant does not mention any alternative and less restrictive measures that would be as effective in achieving the objectives pursued. Lastly, the restrictions in question are temporary and reversible and provide for possible exemptions. Accordingly, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in view of the importance of the objective pursued by those acts. 210 Furthermore, the argument put forward by the applicant on the basis that there are constitutional traditions common to the Member States with respect to the right to property must be rejected. Aside from the fact that the applicant relies on a small number of analyses of the national laws of the Member States, it should be observed that he has failed to show that those national laws require compliance with conditions that are essentially different from those laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 211 Having regard to the foregoing, the sixth plea must be rejected in its entirety. 7. The fourth plea, concerning breach of the principle of proportionality 212 By his fourth plea, the applicant claims, in essence, that the measures at issue breach the principle of proportionality in that (i) they are neither appropriate nor necessary; (ii) the Council’s interpretation of criteria (a) and (d) would have the effect of penalising potentially every shareholder in a Russian company which, by its activity, contributes to the creation of wealth; and (iii) the applicant has no personal influence over the President of the Russian Federation. 213 In that regard, first of all, it should be observed that, for the reasons already set out in paragraphs 189, 190 and 209 above, the restrictive measures at issue are necessary and appropriate and thus do not constitute a breach of the principle of proportionality. 214 Next, in so far as concerns the complaint alleging that criteria (a) and (d) are interpreted too broadly, it should be observed that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the Council’s interpretation of those criteria has the effect of applying not to any shareholder in a company that contributes to the Russian economy, but, as is clear from paragraphs 135 and 136 above, to any important shareholder in a company that satisfies the conditions laid down by those two criteria. 215 Lastly, in so far as concerns the restrictive measures taken against him, irrespective of the fact that the applicant denies being at the root of the actions or policies pursued by the leaders of the Russian Federation or being able to exercise any influence whatsoever over them, it should be observed that the restrictions on freedom to move within the Member States of the European Union, like the freezing of funds or resources of persons whose names are included on the lists at issue, are such as to exert pressure not only on those persons, but also on the general functioning of the Russian economy and, ultimately, at least indirect pressure on the leaders of the Russian Federation, which is consistent with the objective pursued by the restrictive measures, as stated in paragraph 182 above. 216 It follows that the fourth plea, and the claim for annulment in its entirety, must be rejected. B. The claim for compensation 217 In support of this claim, the applicant submits that the contested acts caused him to suffer non-material damage in respect of which he seeks compensation. 218 The Council contends that that claim must be rejected. 219 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability for the unlawful conduct of its institutions, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, a number of conditions must be satisfied: the institutions’ conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage pleaded. Since those three conditions for the incurring of liability are cumulative, failure to meet one of them is sufficient for an action for damages to be dismissed, without it being necessary to examine the other conditions (see judgment of 22 June 2022, Haswani v Council, T‑479/21, not published, EU:T:2022:383, paragraph 155 and the case-law cited). 220 As regards the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of the contested acts, it follows from the findings set out above in relation to the claim for annulment that the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is not vitiated by illegality. Accordingly, since one of the conditions referred to in paragraph 219 above has not been met, the claim for compensation must be rejected. 221 Having regard to all of the foregoing, that claim must be rejected and the action dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 222 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 April 2025. [Signatures] * Language of the case: French.