Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:369
Date: 2026-04-30
Language of the case: German

Anonymised version 
Translation C-190/25 – 1 
Case C-190/25 [Zelabrich] i 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
10 March 2025 
Referring court: 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
4 March 2025 
Applicant and respondent: 
GT 
Defendant and appellant: 
LS 
  
[…] 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart 
17th CIVIL SENATE – FAMILY SENATE 
Order 
In the family matter of 
GT, […] Stuttgart 
– Applicant and respondent – 
[…] 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 4. 3. 2025 – CASE C-190/25 
 
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v 
LS, […] Stuttgart 
– Defendant and appellant – 
[…] 
concerning divorce 
the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Stuttgart Higher Regional Court) – 17th Civil 
Senate – Family Senate – […] 
on 4 March 2025 
made the following order: 
I. The proceedings are stayed. 
II. The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article 267(2) TFEU, with 
regard to the interpretation of Article 19(1) and Article 63(3)(a) and (2) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (‘Brussels IIa Regulation’): 
1. Do Italian proceedings on the recognition of civil effects before the 
competent Corte d’Appello in Naples under Article 8(2) of the Agreement of 
18 February 1984 between the Holy See and the Italian Republic, amending 
the ‘Concordato lateranense’ of 11 February 1929, constitute proceedings 
relating to marriage annulment within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation? 
2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative: 
Is a court first seised in Germany concerning a divorce to be decreed 
permitted, contrary to Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, to stay its 
proceedings under national rules in favour of the court second seised which 
has to rule on recognition of civil effects proceedings? 
Reasons: 
The present divorce proceedings conducted before a German court concern 
questions relating to the scope of application of Article 63(2) and Article 19(1) of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation. The main proceedings were instituted before 1 August 
2022, which is why, pursuant to Article 100(2) of Council Regulation (EU) 
2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on 
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international child abduction (‘Brussels IIb Regulation’), the Brussels IIa 
Regulation shall continue to apply. 
1. 
The parties to the main proceedings, who are habitually resident in Germany, 
entered into a ‘concordat marriage’ in the Chiesa di Santa Maria Apparente in 
Naples on 16 June 2017, the marriage being duly registered with the civil registry 
office in Naples on the same day. The applicant husband has dual German and 
Italian nationality and the defendant wife is a Russian national. The marriage 
produced two children, who are minors, born in 2018 and in 2019. 
The applicant applied to the Amtsgericht Stuttgart (Stuttgart Local Court) for 
divorce on 25 January 2022. In addition to the matter of decreeing the divorce, 
that court is also called upon to settle the assignment of a retirement pension of its 
own motion and, on application by the defendant, to settle post-marital 
maintenance. 
On 22 July 2022, the applicant applied to the Tribunale Ecclesiastico 
Interdiocesano Partenopeo to have the marriage annulled. The annulment of the 
marriage was decreed so as to be final by decision of 28 February 2024 and 
declared enforceable by the Supreme Tribunal of Apostolic Signatura on 27 May 
2024. The Corte d’Appello in Naples, which has been handling the recognition of 
civil effects proceedings since 31 July 2024, has not yet ruled as to whether the 
decision of the Tribunale Ecclesiastico was effective under civil law. 
By order of 20 November 2024, the Stuttgart Local Court stayed the divorce 
proceedings together with related matters pursuant to the second sentence of 
Paragraph 113(1) of the Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den 
Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (Law on Proceedings in Family 
Matters and in Matters of Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, FamFG) in conjunction 
with Paragraph 148 of the Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure, ZPO). 
In its reasoning, it stated that the divorce proceedings together with related matters 
would become devoid of purpose in Germany if the marriage was annulled due to 
a positive recognition of civil effects decision by the court in Naples. 
The permitted immediate appeal by the defendant, filed on 4 December 2024, is 
directed against the order to stay proceedings which was served on 26 November 
2024. The defendant takes the view that it is not the Stuttgart Local Court, but the 
court in Naples that has to stay its proceedings. The Local Court cannot disregard 
the binding provisions of the Brussels Regulation which are applicable in this 
case. Furthermore, Italian law does not recognise the effect of an ecclesiastical 
annulment judgment on the related financial consequences of marriage. 
The applicant has opposed the appeal. 
2. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 4. 3. 2025 – CASE C-190/25 
 
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Regarding Question 1: 
Based on the wording of Article 63(3)[(a)] and (2) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, 
the Senate assumes that the Italian recognition of civil effects proceedings are part 
of proceedings relating to marriage annulment within the meaning of Article 19(1) 
of the Brussels IIa Regulation. If the annulment of the marriage is established by a 
civil court, the annulment must be automatically recognised in all Member States 
in accordance with Article 21(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, provided there is 
no obstacle to recognition. 
Regarding Question 2: 
(a) In accordance with Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, the court 
second seised is required to stay its proceedings if proceedings relating to divorce, 
legal separation or marriage annulment between the same parties have been 
brought. Where that jurisdiction is deemed to be established in accordance with 
the rules of Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation, any court other than the court 
first seised declines jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised, in accordance 
with Article 19(3) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
(aa) As regards the purpose of the rules on lis pendens set out in Article 19 of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation, the Court of Justice of the European Union has stated that 
these are intended to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different 
Member States and to avoid conflicts between decisions that might result 
therefrom. For that purpose, the EU legislature intended to put in place a 
mechanism which is clear and effective in order to resolve situations of lis 
pendens (CJEU, judgment of 6 October 2015 – C-489/14 –, paragraph 29). While 
the proceedings must involve the same parties, they may have a different cause of 
action, provided that they concern judicial separation, divorce or marriage 
annulment (CJEU, judgment of 6 October 2015 – C-489/14 –, paragraph 33). 
(bb) Given the identity of the parties and the various applications, an Italian court, 
at least the civil court, should, in accordance with the wording of Article 19(1) of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation, stay its proceedings if the first question is answered in 
the affirmative. This is because, in the light of the clear wording, there is also an 
obligation to stay proceedings where proceedings relating to marriage annulment 
are brought in the Member State whose courts were second seised. 
(1) In the view of this Senate, however, this appears questionable if the 
proceedings relating to marriage annulment mean that no further divorce-related 
matters may be settled precisely because of the annulment. Consequently, if the 
German court first seised were to decree the divorce and settle the related matters 
and the court second seised in Italy established the annulment of the marriage, this 
would lead to an unacceptable contradiction, including as regards the financial 
consequences. If, on the other hand, the Italian court were required, under 
Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, to stay the recognition of civil effects 
proceedings relating to the divorce proceedings pending before the Stuttgart Local 
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Court, the Stuttgart Local Court might be required to examine incidentally the 
recognition by the State of the marriage annulment established under ecclesiastical 
rules, even though there is no direct agreement in that regard between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Holy See. 
(2) It is true that the joint sections of the Italian Court of Cassation on 31 March 
2021 (n. 9004), ruled that proceedings relating to the payment of maintenance 
may be conducted independently of a marriage annulment, since the payment of 
maintenance does not derive from a marriage being legally valid, but from the 
dissolution of the marital union (a kind of de facto marriage) and the financial 
solidarity of the spouses, including after the marriage has been annulled. German 
law does not, however, provide for such a legal consequence. If the marriage must 
be regarded as not having been effectively constituted in Germany, no financial 
consequences can be inferred from an invalid marriage in Germany, in accordance 
with the previous case-law of the highest German courts (BGH (Federal Court of 
Justice), judgment of 13 March 2003, – IX ZR 181/99 paragraph 27). At most, 
financial consequences could be conferred on the marriage through the legal 
institution of adjustment. 
(b) If the marriage was not effective from the outset, it is not possible to 
subsequently settle any related matters. In this case, the possibility to stay 
proceedings in Germany should exist, contrary to Article 19(1) of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation, despite the existence of overriding international jurisdiction in favour 
of the court in the second State, until the final decision of that State, in order not 
to have to rectify subsequently, by means of possibly reopening proceedings, the 
legal consequences arising therefrom, including the assignment of a retirement 
pension that has been established. 
(c) If the German court has to continue its proceedings independently of the 
proceedings conducted in Italy, the further problem arises going forward as to 
whether a subsequent decision by the Italian court also declaring the marriage as 
having been annulled under civil law, can be recognised in Germany. 
Incompatibility with a judgment made in the State of recognition pursuant to 
Article 22(c) of the Brussels IIa Regulation could arise. 
(aa) Some German legal literature assumes that, in the event of a divorce decreed 
to be final, subsequent annulment by a court of another Member State constitutes 
grounds for refusal of recognition within the meaning of Article 22(c) of the 
Brussels IIa Regulation (Rauscher/Rauscher, Europäisches Zivilprozess- und 
Kollisionsrecht, 4th edition, Article 22 Brussels IIa Regulation, paragraph 24; 
Gottwald in Münchner Kommentar zum FamFG, 3rd edition, Article 22 Brussels 
IIa Regulation, paragraph 14). 
(bb) Because of the effect of the annulment ex tunc, it is true that this Senate 
cannot necessarily endorse that view (see also Helms FamRZ 2001, 257, 265). 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 4. 3. 2025 – CASE C-190/25 
 
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(cc) Nevertheless, this question has not yet been clarified by the highest court 
and, in order to avoid the possible reversal of financial divorce-related matters that 
have already been decided, recognition appears to be questionable. 
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