Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:217
Date: 2026-03-25
Language of the case: Dutch
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
17 March 2025 
Referring court:  
Hof van Cassatie (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
28 February 2025 
Applicants:  
TUI Belgium NV 
TUI Belgium Retail NV 
TUI Airlines Belgium NV 
TUILFLY Academy Brussels NV 
Tec4Jets NV 
Pats NV 
TUI Travel Belgium NV 
TUI Technology NV 
TUI Belgium Real Estate NV 
Defendant:  
Belgische Staat 
      
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
This request has been submitted in the context of a dispute over the levying of 
valued added tax (‘VAT’) on travel services outside the European Union by travel 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE T-221/25 
 
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agencies. The applicants are of the opinion that those services are exempt from 
VAT and therefore claim a refund of VAT paid previously. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The referring court is referring for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article 267 
TFEU, questions on the ‘standstill’ clause of Article 28(3)(a) of the Sixth Council 
Directive (77/388/EEC) of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: 
uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1; ‘the Sixth Directive’), now 
Article 370 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, p. 1; ‘the VAT Directive’). This 
‘standstill’ clause allows services which were already taxable in a Member State 
on 1 January 1978 to continue to be taxed after the entry into force of the Sixth 
Directive. More specifically, the referring court is asking questions on the effects 
of amendments to national legislation which previously allowed, pursuant to that 
clause, for VAT to be maintained on services of travel agencies for trips outside 
the European Union. The referring court questions whether this requires an 
express legal provision and whether the new legislation, from which it follows 
only implicitly that those services remain taxable, is identical in its main points to 
the previous legislation and is based on the same main idea. 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Does the application of the standstill clause of Article 28(3)(a) and (4) of 
and Annex E, point 15 to Directive 77/388/EEC, now Article 370 of and 
Annex X, Part A, point 4 to Directive 2006/112/EC, require an express legal 
provision derogating from the VAT exemption for travel agencies for travel 
services outside the European Union laid down in Article 26(3) of Directive 
77/388/EEC, now Article 309 of Directive 2006/112/EC? 
2. Should Article 28(3)(a) and (4) of and Annex E, point 15 to Directive 
77/388/EEC, now Article 370 of and Annex X, Part A, point 4 to Directive 
2006/112/EC, be interpreted as meaning that an amendment made to existing 
legislation after the entry into force of Directive 77/388/EEC, whereby the express 
statutory provision which resulted in the taxability of travel services provided by 
travel agencies outside the EU is deleted and replaced by provisions from which it 
follows only implicitly that travel services outside the EU remain taxable, must be 
regarded as legislation which is not identical in its main points to the previous 
legislation and is based on a different main idea? 
Provisions of EU law relied on 
Sixth Council Directive (77/388/EEC) of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of 
TUI BELGIUM 
 
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value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, Article 15, point 14, Article 26(1) 
and (3), Article 28(3)(a) and (4) and Annex E, point 15 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax, Articles 153, 306, 309 and 370, and Annex X, Part A, point 4) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Wetboek van de belasting over de toegevoegde waarde (Belgian Value Added Tax 
Code), as amended by the Royal Decree of 28 December 1999 (‘Belgian VAT 
Code’), Article 1, § 7, 2°, Article 21, § 1 and § 2, and Article 41, § 2 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main dispute 
1 The first applicant, TUI Belgium, is a travel agency subject to VAT which sells 
holiday trips under its own name and uses the services of third parties to that end. 
Together with the other applicants, it has formed the VAT entity Travel4you since 
1 February 2009. 
2 In the main dispute, they seek a refund of VAT on the trips outside the European 
Union that they organised between 1 January 2000 and 30 April 2014, as they 
consider that those travel services are exempt from VAT. 
3 The tax authorities have repeatedly refused that refund, as they consider that, even 
after a change in national law on 1 January 2000, travel services outside the 
European Union remain subject to VAT. 
4 The applicants lodged an appeal against that refusal but, on 22 March 2022, the 
hof van beroep te Gent (Court of Appeal, Ghent, Belgium) ruled that those travel 
services outside the European Union remained legally subject to VAT after 
1 January 2000 and dismissed the claim for reimbursement of VAT for those 
services. 
5 The Wet houdende wijziging van het btw-wetboek (Law amending the Belgian 
VAT Code) of 29 November 1977, which entered into force on 1 December 1977, 
made travel agency services for the organisation of trips outside the European 
Union subject to VAT. Under those rules, travel agencies were required to act as 
agent of the traveller. However, they were explicitly excluded from the tax 
exemption which applied to brokers and agents with regard to supplies and 
services provided abroad.  
6 That amendment to the Belgian VAT Code was made shortly prior to the entry 
into force of the Sixth Directive on 1 January 1978. That amendment resulted in 
the Belgian rules derogating from Article 26(3) of the Sixth Directive, according 
to which those services were exempt from VAT. By the standstill clause of 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE T-221/25 
 
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Article 28(3)(a) of the Sixth Directive, the Belgian legislature maintained the 
levying of VAT on travel services outside the European Union. 
7 The court of first instance in this case had already referred to the Court of Justice 
questions for a preliminary ruling on that amendment of the Belgian legislation 
which took place during the transposition period of the Sixth Directive. The Court 
ruled, in the judgment of 13 March 2014, Jetair and BTWE Travel4you 
(C-599/12, EU:C:2014:144), that that timing did not preclude the application of 
the standstill clause, whereby Belgium could continue to tax those services even 
after 31 December 1977. 
8 Following a letter of formal notice sent by the European Commission in relation 
to the status of intermediaries in the travel sector applied by Belgium, the Belgian 
legislature introduced various amendments to the VAT legislation by Royal 
Decree of 28 December 1999. Under those new rules, travel agencies were 
deemed to be acting in their own name, and no longer as agent of the traveller. 
The provision explicitly excluding travel agencies from the scope of the tax 
exemption for agents was thereby deleted. Since they were no longer responsible 
for the traveller under the new rules, that exclusion became redundant. 
9 In view of those legislative changes, the applicants are appealing against the 
judgment of the hof van beroep te Gent (Court of Appeal, Ghent) of 22 March 
2022 before the Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation, Belgium), the referring 
court in this case. 
Essential arguments of the parties in the main dispute 
10 The applicants essentially submit that travel services outside the European Union 
have been exempt from VAT since 1 January 2000, and allege infringement of 
Article 15(14), Article 26(1) and (3), Article 28(3)(a) and (4) of and Annex E, 
point 15 to the Sixth Directive, now Articles 153, 306, 309 and 370 of and 
Annex X, Part A, point 4 to the VAT Directive, as well as infringement of the 
general principle of the primacy of EU law. 
11 They argue that, since 1 January 2000, Belgian law has no longer contained any 
express provision which derogates from the VAT exemption for travel services 
outside the EU and that, therefore, the standstill clause of Article 28(3)(a) of the 
Sixth Directive can no longer be relied upon to continue taxing those services. 
Once the ‘frozen’ national provision was deleted, the VAT exemption provided 
for in the Sixth Directive and the VAT Directive for those services became 
directly applicable under Belgian law. 
12 They further argue that, even if it were assumed that an express legal provision 
was not necessary to continue taxing those services, it would have to be 
established that the provisions that were introduced by the Royal Decree of 
28 December 1999 are no longer identical in their main points to the previous 
rules. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, including the judgment of 
TUI BELGIUM 
 
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23 April 2009, Puffer (C-460/07, EU:C:2009:254, paragraph 87), the derogation 
which allows the ‘standstill’ clauses applies only to new provisions which are 
identical in their main points to the previous legislation and not to a legal 
provision based on a different main idea.  
13 In this case, travel agencies under the old rules acted as agent of the traveller, but 
the VAT exemption for agents was denied to them by an express provision. 
Following the changes which came into effect on 1 January 2000, travel agencies 
were required to act in their own name. This only implicitly ensures that travel 
services outside the European Union are excluded from a VAT exemption under 
Article 15(14) of the Sixth Directive, now Article 153 of the VAT Directive. 
Those provisions essentially stipulate that a VAT exemption applies only to 
certain transactions carried out by intermediaries who are acting in the name and 
on behalf of third parties. The applicants therefore argue that the new legislation is 
based on a main idea different from the previous legislation and that the earlier 
derogation no longer applies as a result.  
14 The defendant contends that the amendments introduced on 1 January 2000 were 
merely a response to the European Commission’s letter of formal notice. The 
provision by which those services were excluded from VAT exemption was 
deleted only because it had become redundant. Travel agencies still remain subject 
to VAT for travel services which are provided outside the EU. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
15 The referring court cites several judgments of the Court of Justice concerning 
standstill clauses, from which it concludes that: 
– a national measure which is adopted after the date of entry into force of 
directives is not automatically excluded from the derogation laid down 
in standstill clauses by that fact alone (judgment of 24 May 2007, 
Winfried L. Holböck, C-157/05, EU:C:2007:297), 
– those clauses merely prevented the introduction after 1 January 1978 
of a new national derogation or extension of an existing derogation, in 
so far as a Member State thus moved further away from the objective 
of the VAT Directives (judgment of 11 September 2003, Cookies 
World, C-155/01, EU:C:2003:449, paragraphs 63 and 66; judgment of 
11 December 2008, Danfoss and AstraZeneca, C-371/07, 
EU:C:2008:711, paragraphs 32, 33 and 43; judgment of 22 December 
2008, Magoora, C-414/07, EU:C:2008:766, paragraphs 36, 37 and 43; 
judgment of 23 April 2009, Puffer, C-460/07, EU:C:2009:254, 
paragraphs 85, 86 and 93; judgment of 18 July 2013, AES-3CMaritza 
East 1, C-124/12, EU:C:2013:488; judgment of 2 May 2019, Grupa 
Lotos, C-225/18, EU:C:2019:349), 
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– Member States may restrict an existing derogation in order to come 
closer to the objectives of the directives (judgment of 29 April 1999, 
Norbury Developments, C-136/97, EU:C:1999:211, paragraphs 19 and 
20; judgment of 14 June 2001, Commission v France, C-345/99, 
EU:C:2001:334, paragraph 2), 
– the derogation permitted in those clauses also applies to legislation 
which is identical in its main points to the previous legislation, but that 
legislation based on a main idea which differs from that of the previous 
law is not permitted (judgment of 23 April 2009, Puffer, C-460/07, 
EU:C:2009:254, paragraph 87; judgment of 11 September 2003, 
Cookies World, C-155/01, EU:C:2003:449, paragraph 63); 
– the referring court has, in principle, jurisdiction to interpret national 
legislation in order to determine its content on the date of entry into 
force of directives and in order to establish whether subsequent 
amendments to that legislation have extended or restricted the scope of 
that national legislation (judgment of 8 January 2002, Metropol and 
Stadler, C-409/99, EU:C:2002:2, paragraph 47; judgment of 
22 December 2008, Magoora, C-414/07, EU:C:2008:766, 
paragraphs 32, 33 and 42; judgment of 23 April 2009, Puffer, 
C-460/07, EU:C:2009:254, paragraph 84; judgment of 18 July 2013,  
AES-3CMaritza East 1, C-124/12, EU:C:2013:488; judgment of 2 May 
2019, Grupa Lotos, C-225/18, EU:C:2019:349); 
– for the assessment of whether a national measure which was adopted 
after the date of entry into force of the directives in the Member State 
concerned falls within the standstill provisions of those directives, 
account must be taken of the actual application of the national 
provisions and of their effects on taxable persons (judgment of 
11 December 2008, Danfoss and AstraZeneca, C-371/07, 
EU:C:2008:711, paragraphs 31 and 42). 
16 According to the referring court, that case-law does not provide in this case a clear 
answer to the question of whether an express legal provision is required in order 
for travel services outside the European Union to remain taxable under 
Article 28(3)(a) and (4) of the Sixth Directive, now Article 370 of the VAT 
Directive.  
17 The court further questions whether the new rules introduced by the Royal Decree 
of 28 December 1999 are ‘identical in their main points’ to the previous 
legislation to which the standstill clause applied, given that the new rules no 
longer contain an explicit exemption.