Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2018:316
Date: 2018-05-31
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons for the relisting decision is based on the criterion of being associated with the Syrian regime and benefiting from and supporting it in virtue of Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255 and Article 15(1) of Regulation No 36/2012 and on the criterion of being a leading businessperson operating in Syria, as referred to in Article 27(2) to Article 28(2)(a) of Decision 2013/255 and in Article 15(1a)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012. Second, since the reasons for which the decision to maintain the measures, namely being a ‘leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and/or activities in the telecommunications, oil and plastic industry sectors and close business relations with Maher Al-Assad’ do not appear in the Regulation No 36/2012, Implementing Regulation No 363/2013 and Decision 2013/255, despite the fact that they concerned the applicant, with effect from 23 January 2015, those reasons were not reviewed by the Court in the judgment of 13 November 2014, Kaddour I (T‑654/11, not published, EU:T:2014:947). 83 In any event, it should be recalled, as is apparent from paragraph 93 of the judgment of 13 November 2014, Kaddour I (T‑654/11, not published, EU:T:2014:947), that the Council, in the context of a fresh examination, may include the applicant’s name on the lists in question on the basis of reasons substantiated to the requisite legal standard. Accordingly, a decision to retain the applicant’s name on those lists adopted for the same reasons as those stated when the applicant was first listed may suffice to justify his relisting provided that the evidence adduced by the Council supports those reasons to the requisite legal standard. 84 The Court finds that the applicant’s argument, according to which the Council’s new allegations are based on facts, evidence or circumstances which the Court had regarded as insufficient in the judgment of 13 November 2014, Kaddour I (T‑654/11, not published, EU:T:2014:947), relates more to the substance of the statement of reasons drawn up against the applicant and therefore to the substantive legality of the contested measure. In so far as it is raised in support of the second plea, that argument must therefore be rejected as ineffective. 85 The second plea in law must therefore be rejected. The third plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment. 86 The applicant submits, first of all, that the Council has retained his name on the lists in question on the basis of the same allegations as those justifying the initial entry of his name on those lists, namely, the financial support he allegedly provides to the Syrian regime (see paragraph 5 above). Next, he claims that the Council has not adduced evidence capable of substantiating the reasons for retaining his name on the lists. Lastly, he denies that he is a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 87 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 88 According to settled case-law, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires, in particular, that as part of the review of the legality of the reasons which are the basis of the decision to enter or to maintain the entry of a given person on the lists of persons subject to sanctions, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 89 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, namely that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced by the authority in question should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union are to disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 to 123). 90 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, an appraisal of the substance of the reasons for a listing must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation but in the context in which it fits (judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 51, and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 50). 91 Furthermore, in view of the situation in Syria, the Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a measure freezing his funds and the regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 53). 92 In the present case, it should be noted that the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question is based on two distinct reasons, namely, on the one hand, on his status as a leading businessman (criterion of being a leading businessperson operating in Syria) and, on the other, on his close business relations with Mr Maher Al-Assad (criterion of association with the regime). It follows that, according to the view adopted in the contested measures, the applicant benefits from and provides support to the Syrian regime through his business activities (criterion of association with and benefit from the regime). 93 Furthermore, the fact remains that, as has been noted in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, being a leading businessperson operating in Syria constitutes, in accordance with Article 27(2) and Article 28(2) of Decision 2013/255, as amended most recently by Decision 2015/1836, one of the legal criteria for the application of the restrictive measures, and hence for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists in question. 94 It is true that under Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, as applicable in the present case, the names of leading business men and women operating in Syria are not to be included or retained on the list in question if there is sufficient information that those persons are not, or are no longer, associated with the Syrian regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention. 95 The applicant submits, in the first place, that the Council wrongly retained his name on the lists in question on the basis of the same reasons as those justifying the initial inclusion of his name on those lists, namely, his association with Mr Maher Al-Assad and the financial support he provides to the Syrian regime. 96 In the present case, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 82 and 83 above, the reasons for retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question do not correspond to the reasons for the initial inclusion of that name on those lists. Reasons consisting of being a ‘leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and/or activities in the telecommunications, oil and plastic industry sectors and close business relations with Maher Al-Assad’ differ from those underlying that initial listing. Thus, not only the criteria for inclusion on those lists, but also the reasons relied on by the Council against him have been amended between, on the one hand, the initial listing and, on the other, the relisting and the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question. 97 In any event, it should be noted that a decision to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question adopted for the same reasons as those stated when the applicant was first listed may suffice to justify his relisting provided that the evidence adduced by the Council supports those reasons to the requisite legal standard (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 November 2014, Kaddour I, T‑654/11, not published, EU:T:2014:947, paragraph 93). 98 It is therefore necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the Council wrongly retained the entry of the applicant’s name on the lists in question for the same reasons as those justifying the initial entry of that name on those lists. 99 In the second place, the applicant maintains that the Council did not provide any new evidence capable of proving the substance of the reasons for the inclusion of his name on those lists, in particular, his association with Mr Maher Al-Assad and the support he provides to the Syrian regime. 100 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628), the Court found that the re-entering of the applicant’s name on the lists in question was justified since the Council had adduced a body of precise and consistent evidence capable of showing that the applicant still had links with certain key figures of the Syrian regime, such as Mr Maher Al-Assad. 101 Moreover, it should be noted in the present case that in order to justify retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question the Council provided the applicant’s legal counsel with COREU document PESC/0049/16 — ST 9478/16 of 20 May 2016 bearing the reference 430/16 to 435/16 RELEX, which consists of several documents, containing publicly accessible information, which were, according to the Council, intended to clarify the general and person context in relation to the applicant. In particular, the COREU document of 20 May 2016 contains an explanation of the new reasons taken into account in respect of the applicant and the information provided in support of that reasoning. That information is comprised, in particular, of links to the websites of the Washington Institute, the Jamestown Foundation, WorldCrunch, The New York Sun, Lebanon Wire, Middle East Transparent, Research on terrorism, by Shabab Kurd, Ya Libnan and the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation which publish articles concerning the applicant. The documents bearing the reference 430/16 to 435/16 RELEX contain new press articles cited in the COREU document of 20 May 2016 and published on the websites of Shabab Kurd, Ya Libnan, Writingcompany, WorldCrunch and the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation and a credit report of a car and van haulage company, produced in December 2015 by Orbis. 102 The Court finds that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the documents in question contain information from distinct, open, public and varied sources different to those that the Court had identified in the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628) as constituting a body of evidence capable of justifying the re-entry of the applicant’s name on the lists in question. The only similarity between those documents and the material provided by the Council in support of that relisting is that that information corroborates the fact that the applicant was at the heart of the leading economic class in Syria due to management of the affairs of Mr Maher Al-Assad and his undeniable links with the Syrian regime, since he exercises a decisive influence, through his commercial and professional activities, on the inner circle of the leaders of that regime. 103 In particular, the following points should be noted: – first, the document bearing the reference 433/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 27 March 2005 on the blog Writingcompany concerning the insolvency of a Lebanese bank refers to the applicant as ‘the office manager for Lt. Col. Maher Al-Assad’. Similarly, the document bearing the reference 431/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 9 February 2013 on the website of Ya Libnan, contains the statement that ‘Maher’s office manager, Khaled Kaddour, was transferred at no cost a Beirut apartment valued at 2.5 million dollars … to put it under Maher’s control’; – next, the document bearing the reference 432/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 26 November 2015 on the website of WorldCrunch, claims that ‘the gang of Syrian oligarchs also includes Maher Al-Assad, the president’s brother, and his servants Mohammed Hamsho, Samer Debs and Khaled Kaddour’ and that ‘in exchange for the State’s contribution, these industrialists transfer back part of their [profits]’; – furthermore, the document bearing the reference 430/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 27 March 2012 on Shabab Kurd’s website, refers to a list of members of ‘Maher Al-Assad’s private commercial group’ describing the applicant as ‘the right-hand man of Maher Al-Assad’. In that article, it is also stated that the applicant ‘has a plastics factory and a company specialising in munitions procurement abroad’; – in addition, the document bearing the reference 434/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 3 June 2015 on the website of the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation, which is entitled ‘“The new Syrian mafia” Maher Al-Assad’, claims that, ‘Maher Al-Assad’s corruption outside Syria operates through Mirza Nitham Eddin and her son-in-law, Khaled Nasser Kaddour, who are “the management board” for his business abroad’; – lastly, the document bearing the reference 435/16 RELEX contains a solvency report produced in December 2015 by Orbis concerning a car and van haulage company, belonging to Mr Ayman Jaber and formed in 2010, in which the applicant has a significant holding, namely 40% of the shares in that company. 104 Consequently, the Court finds that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council introduced, in the context of the present proceedings, new documents which are relevant for the purpose of substantiating the reasons for retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question. 105 In the third place, the applicant disputes the accuracy of the information contained in the documents at issue and submits that they are devoid of probative value. 106 In that regard, the Court notes, first of all, that the applicant disputes the accuracy of the information contained in the documents in question, but has not adduced any evidence to support that assertion beyond his own testimony annexed to the application. 107 Next, as regards the reliability of the information provided by the Council, the Court notes that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2012, Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, T‑343/06, EU:T:2012:478, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited). 108 It should be observed, as is apparent from paragraph 101 above, that each source of digital information, which is publicly available, provides different information and all of those sources agree, in essence, as to the description of the applicant as a person at the heart of the leading economic class in Syria, having regard to his commercial activities and management of the affairs of Mr Maher Al-Assad, thereby benefiting from the Syrian regime, in particular in the present context of a civil war. Furthermore, it should be noted that that material was published on different dates, even before the onset of the Syrian crisis in the case of certain articles, and that already at that time the applicant was regarded as being associated with Mr Maher Al-Assad. 109 Lastly, that material has not only corroborated the information considered by the Court in the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628) as a body of specific, precise and consistent evidence capable of proving that the applicant still had links with certain key figures in the Syrian regime, such as Mr Maher Al-Assad, but also provided new, more up-to-date information capable of justifying retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question. 110 In particular, the document bearing the reference 430/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 27 March 2012 on Shabab Kurd’s website, describes some of the applicant’s commercial activities, inter alia, the fact that he owns ‘a plastics factory and a company specialising in munitions procurement abroad’. Furthermore, the document bearing the reference 434/16 RELEX, namely an article published on 3 June 2015 on the website of the Syrian Democratic Union Organisation highlights the applicant’s business and family relationship with Mirza Nitham Eddin, namely that the applicant is the brother-in-law of the latter, a relationship which the applicant himself has also recognised in the application. In addition, that article states that the applicant manages Mr Maher Al-Assad’s business abroad. Furthermore, the document bearing the reference 435/16 RELEX, namely the solvency report produced in December 2015 by Orbis, highlights that the applicant has a substantial holding in a car and van haulage company belonging to Mr Jaber, a Syrian businessman whose name is also included on the lists in question, which was not called into question by the judgment of 26 October 2016, Jaber v Council (T‑154/15, not published, EU:T:2016:629). In that regard, the applicant merely states, without denying his holding in that company or adducing any evidence to the contrary, that the company has never been active or entered into any commercial transactions. There is therefore no reason to call into question the reliability of that information. 111 It follows that the applicant’s arguments calling into question the accuracy of the information contained in those documents and their reliability must be rejected as unfounded. 112 In the fourth place, on the basis of extracts from his own testimony annexed to the application, the applicant disputes the Council’s claims relating to the reasons for retaining his name on the lists in question. The applicant also requests the Court ‘to consider [his] evidence in full.’ 113 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, although specific points in the text of the application can be supported and completed by references to specific passages in the documents attached, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot compensate for the lack of essential information in the application. It is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which the applicant may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see order of 19 May 2008, TF1 v Commission, T‑144/04, EU:T:2008:155, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 25 October 2012, Arbos v Commission, T‑161/06, not published, EU:T:2012:573, paragraph 23). 114 Consequently, the Court will examine only those extracts from the applicant’s testimony which are explicitly mentioned and analysed in the application, since references to his testimony as a whole must be regarded as inadmissible. 115 As regards the extracts from his testimony which are mentioned and analysed in the application, the applicant claims, first of all, that he has no professional or commercial relationship with Mr Maher Al-Assad and that he has never supported or occupied any political post in the government. Next, he maintains that his ‘former’ wealth and commercial interests were not the result of any advantages or favours received from the Syrian regime but from his own entrepreneurial initiatives (in particular in the tobacco sector). Furthermore, he disputes the existence of any alleged activities in the telecommunications, oil and plastic industry sectors. Moreover, he maintains that he has never held a contract with a government body or received commission in regard to any type of business transaction. Lastly, he contends that he is currently an uninfluential businessman, since his commercial interests were destroyed at the beginning of the war. In support of his testimony, he has produced photocopies of photographs which are intended to show the destruction of his tobacco factory. 116 In that regard, the applicant provides only his testimony and poor quality black-and-white photocopies of photographs of what appears to be a destroyed building without adducing the slightest evidence capable of calling into question the Council’s allegations and the material on which it relied in the present case. The applicant could have adduced articles of association, contracts or other documents evidencing his commercial or business activities or even an end to all operations. Moreover, it should be pointed out that this testimony from the applicant himself is only of little probative value. 117 Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of calling into question the substance of the reasons for the continued inclusion of his name on the lists in question. On the contrary, he has acknowledged, in his pleadings, that he had been a leading businessman in Syria before the outbreak of the war. 118 Furthermore, as has been stated in paragraphs 101, 103, 109 and 110 above, the Council has adduced a series of documents from various sources capable of showing that the applicant was associated with the Syrian regime in place which justified retaining his name on the lists in question. 119 Indeed, it should be recalled that the Council provided to the applicant’s legal counsel, in its letters of 30 May and 26 July 2016, a copy of the new documents and particulars (documents COREU of 20 May 2016 bearing the reference PESC/0049/16 — ST‑9478/16 and the documents bearing the references 430/16 to 435/16 RELEX) for the continued inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists in question and amendment of the summary of reasons for that listing (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above). This new material contains, first, new evidence and new information concerning the applicant in respect of the evidence already regarded in the judgment of 26 October 2016, Kaddour II (T‑155/15, not published, EU:T:2016:628) as sufficient to support the reasons relied on by the Council to justify the re-entering of that name on those lists (see paragraphs 101, 103 and 110 above), and, second, information which corroborates the evidence already presented by the Council at the time of that relisting. 120 The Council has also annexed to the defence further press articles from various sources. Those articles assert that the Syrian economic elite was largely composed of entrepreneurs chosen by Mr Bashar Al-Assad and his extended family circle and that this elite prospered by being awarded favours granted by the regime. It should therefore be observed that the Council was entitled to take that evidence into account, not to provide ex post reasons for the measures at issue, but as evidence capable of showing, in the light of the context in which those measures were adopted, that the statement of reasons for those measures was sufficient (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 62). 121 The Court therefore finds that these documents taken as a whole thus form a body of evidence within the meaning of the judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 52), also capable of justifying retention of the applicant’s name on the lists in question. 122 It follows from the foregoing that the Council has adduced a body of precise and consistent evidence, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 91 above, capable of showing that the applicant still had links with certain key figures of the Syrian regime, such as Mr Maher Al-Assad. It must therefore be concluded that the second reason for retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question was sufficiently substantiated. 123 Furthermore, according to the case-law, with regard to a decision adopting restrictive measures, having regard to the preventive nature of such measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). 124 In the present case, since the second reason for retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question, namely his close business relationship with Mr Maher Al-Assad, has been legitimately substantiated by the Council and is a sufficient basis for inclusion according to the legal criterion laid down by Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255 and Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, it is not necessary to examine the substance of the first reason. 125 However, it may be pointed out for the sake of completeness that the Council has provided new evidence intended to show that the applicant was a leading businessman, in particular, evidence of his holding in a plastics factory and a company specialising in munitions procurement abroad and of his 40% shareholding in the capital of a motor vehicle haulage company with Mr Jaber, a leading businessman also included on the lists in question. In addition, in his testimony provided in an annex to the application, the applicant himself acknowledged having been a leading businessman in Syria before the outbreak of the war, but adduced no evidence to suggest that this was no longer the case. 126 As is clear from Article 27(3) and Article 28(3) of Decision 2013/255, the names of leading businesspersons will not be included or retained on the lists of persons appearing in Annex I to that decision if there is sufficient information that they are not, or are no longer, associated with the regime or do not exercise influence over it or do not pose a real risk of circumvention. In that regard, the Court finds that, apart from the applicant’s testimony which, as has been stated in paragraph 116 above, cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence, it is not apparent from the case file that the applicant is no longer associated with the regime and therefore the Council did not make an error in including him on the lists in question in accordance with the criterion of being a ‘leading businessman’ laid down in those provisions. 127 Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the measures provided for in Article 27(2) and Article 28(2) of Decision 2013/255, as last amended by Decision 2015/1836 refer to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Syria’ and to ‘persons associated with them, as listed in Annex I’. However, given that, on the one hand, as is apparent from the judgment of 26 October 2016, Jaber v Council (T‑154/15, not published, EU:T:2016:629, paragraph 109), the Council had adduced sufficient evidence in order to establish that Mr Jaber had been rightly included on the lists in question and, on the other hand, as is apparent from the information provided by the Council, the applicant is associated with Mr Jaber, Mr Kaddour is likely to be associated with the regime within the meaning of Article 27(2) and Article 28(2) of Decision 2013/255. In addition, nothing in the case file is capable of calling that finding into question. On the contrary, as has already been stated, the applicant is associated with Mr Jaber in so far as they are both controlling shareholders each with 40% of the shares in a haulage company. 128 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court dismisses the third plea in law, alleging an error of assessment. The fourth plea, alleging breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality 129 The applicant claims, in the first place, that the retaining of his name on the lists in question, following the annulment of the initial inclusion of that name on those lists, amounts to a breach of his rights to respect for reputation and to property, which are guaranteed, respectively, by Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 1 and 8 of the ECHR. He maintains, in the second place, that the measures taken against him are disproportionate, since, first, the Council has not been able to demonstrate the substance of the reasons laid against him, second, those measures will not affect the Syrian regime because he is not a member of the regime and is not in a position of influence and, third, he and his family have sustained real loss due to those measures. 130 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 131 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of the right to property, it must be noted that the right to property is one of the general principles of EU law and is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited). 132 However, according to settled case-law, the right to property under EU law does not enjoy absolute protection. Consequently, the exercise of that fundamental right may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 121, and of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 59 (not published)). 133 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the protection of the civilian population in Syria, the restrictions on the applicant’s right to property are not disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 106), a fortiori because Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012 provide for certain exceptions that allow the persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures to meet essential expenditure. 134 Decision 2013/255 and Regulation No 36/2012 provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources and of revising periodically the entries in those lists in order to ensure that, where persons or entities no longer meet the necessary criteria for inclusion, those persons or entities are removed from the list in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraphs 102 and 105). 135 In that regard, it must be pointed out that the applicant has never raised the need for access to all or part of the frozen funds. 136 That argument must therefore be rejected. 137 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging breach of the right to reputation, it should be noted that that right is not an absolute right and that its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to reputation of the person or entity subject to that measure, so causing harm to that person or entity. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is, however, such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the persons or entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 115). 138 Furthermore and in any event, it must be held, as indeed the Council has submitted, that the applicant has adduced no evidence capable of showing that the measures taken against him have harmed his reputation, as a result of which such claims must be rejected. 139 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging a breach of the principle of proportionality, it is settled case-law that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122; of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 60 (not published); and of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 149). 140 It is certainly the case that the applicant’s rights are to a certain extent curtailed by the restrictive measures adopted against him due to the fact that he cannot, in particular, dispose of any funds that may be situated within the territory of the European Union or transfer his funds to the European Union, except with special authorisation. Likewise, the measures imposed on the applicant may cause his associates and customers to regard him with a certain suspicion or mistrust. 141 However, it is apparent from the examination of the third plea that the Council was entitled to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question on the basis of his working relationship with prominent regime figures, including with Mr Maher Al-Assad. As a result, the applicant must be regarded as a leading businessperson operating in Syria. 142 The decision to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question, in so far as it is based on the criterion relating to the applicant’s association with the Syrian regime through his close business relationship with Mr Maher Al-Assad and, therefore, through his support to that regime, is capable of attaining the objective of general interest pursued by the policy of the restrictive measures adopted by the Council, namely, putting an end to the repression of the civilian population in Syria, which has cost the lives of thousands of civilians. That objective forms part of a more general framework of endeavours linked to the maintenance of international peace and security, laid down in Article 21 TEU which refers to provisions of EU external action, and is, therefore, legitimate. 143 As regards the alleged disproportionality in retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question, it must be held, as is clear from paragraphs 133 and 134 above, that Article 28(6) of Decision 2013/255, as amended, provides for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisation to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v CouncilandCommission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 364, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 127). 144 Furthermore, account should be taken of the fact that retaining the applicant’s name on the lists in question cannot be regarded as disproportionate because it is allegedly potentially unlimited in time. The retention of an entry on a list is revised periodically (at least yearly) in order to ensure that, where persons or entities no longer meet the necessary criteria for inclusion, those persons or entities are removed from those lists (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 365, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 129). 145 As regards the loss which the applicant claims to have sustained as a result of the continued inclusion of his name on the lists in question and, according to which, his businesses have been destroyed and his life and that of his family are in danger, it should be noted, first of all, that the applicant has not made a claim for damages in his statement of claim. 146 Next, in that regard and in any event, the Court finds that, in order to show that loss has been sustained, the applicant merely advanced his own testimony and poor quality black-and-white photocopies of photographs of what appears to be a destroyed building.The evidence provided by the applicant does not therefore suffice to show that such loss has been sustained. 147 Lastly, the importance of the aims pursued by the contested measures is such as to justify their possible — even substantial — negative consequences for the applicant without that affecting their legality (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 191). 148 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the preservation of international peace and security, any restrictions on the applicant’s right to property and reputation caused by the contested measures are justified by an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate to the aims pursued. 149 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court dismisses the fourth plea, alleging breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality. The fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination 150 The applicant claims that the Council has breached the principle of non-discrimination by treating his continued listing in the same way as those of Mr M. Hamcho and Mr Jaber. He maintains, in this regard, that that principle means that not only must like cases be treated alike but also that unlike cases must be treated differently. According to the applicant, although it is true that he instructed the same legal counsel as Mr M. Hamcho and Mr Jaber, the facts alleged against him and his professional situation are nevertheless completely different to those alleged against Mr M. Hamcho and Mr Jaber. 151 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 152 According to the case-law, the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes a fundamental principle of law, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 56). 153 In the present case, it should be noted, as was submitted by the Council in its defence, that the contested measures were imposed on the applicant following an individual assessment, based on solid evidence. The reasons and evidence on which the Council relied in order to retain the applicant’s name on the lists in question differ, as the Council acknowledged, from the reasons and evidence on which that institution relied in retaining the inclusion of Mr Hamcho and Jaber’s names on those lists. It is true that the names of these three persons were included on the lists because of their commercial activities since, although their activities are different, they are benefiting from the Syrian regime and support it (criterion of leading businesspersons operating in Syria). However, nothing suggests that the Council treated the applicant’s situation in the same way as that of Mr Hamcho and Mr Jaber. 154 Accordingly, the present plea must be rejected as unfounded. 155 The Court therefore dismisses the fifth plea and, consequently, the action in its entirety. Costs 156 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has applied for costs and the applicant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber), hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Khaled Kaddour to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union. Gratsias Labucka Ulloa Rubio Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 31 May 2018. E. Coulon S. Gratsias Registrar President Table of contents Background to the dispute On the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons subject to the restrictive measures On the re-inclusion and retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons subject to the restrictive measures Procedure and forms of order sought Law The first plea, alleging misuse of powers and breach of the principles of sound administration, res judicata, legal security and the right to an effective remedy The first part, alleging a misuse of powers The second part, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration The third part, alleging infringement of the right to an effective remedy and breach of the principles of res judicata and of legal certainty The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU The third plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment. The fourth plea, alleging breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality The fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination Costs * Language of the case: English.