Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2018:9
Date: 2018-01-16
Language of the case: Hungarian
Subject matter: Consumer protection;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Hungary

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 31 May 2018 1. Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Means to prevent the use of unfair terms — National legislation providing for specific procedural requirements when the fairness of a term in a loan agreement denominated in foreign currency is challenged — Lawfulness — Conditions — Compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Council Directive 93/13, Arts 6(1) and 7(1)) 2. Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13 — Scope — Situations without a cross-border element — Included (Council Directive 93/13) 1. Article 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude, in principle, national legislation which lays down specific procedural requirements, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in respect of actions brought by consumers who concluded loan contracts denominated in foreign currency, containing a term stipulating a differential between the exchange rate applicable to the advance of the loan and that applicable to its repayment and/or a clause stipulating an option of unilateral amendment, enabling the lender to increase interest, fees and costs, provided that a finding that terms in such an agreement were unfair would restore the legal and factual situation that the consumer would have been in had those unfair terms not existed. While the Court has thus previously circumscribed, in a number of respects and taking account of the requirements set out in Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, the manner in which national courts must guarantee the protection of rights which consumers derive from that directive, the fact remains that, in principle, EU law does not harmonise the procedures which apply for the assessment of an allegedly unfair contractual term, and that those procedures are therefore a matter for the national legal order, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar situations subject to domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they afford effective judicial protection, as provided for in Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 April 2016, Sales Sinués and Drame Ba, C‑381/14 and C‑385/14, EU:C:2016:252, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). (see paras 35, 55, operative part 1) 2. Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that it also applies to situations without a cross-border element. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the freedoms of movement do not apply to situations which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). However, as the Advocate General noted in paragraph 70 of his Opinion, the main proceedings are concerned not with the provisions of the Treaty on the freedoms of movement, but with the EU legislation that harmonises across the Member States a specific field of law. Consequently, the rules contained in the EU legislation concerned apply irrespective of the purely internal nature of the situation at issue in the main proceedings. (see paras 57-59, operative part 2)