Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2009:313
Date: 2009-09-08
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Appeals Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Appeals;Specific cases;Duty to have regard for the interests of officials;Termination of contract
Procedure: Appeal;Staff cases;Action for damages

Summary 1. Appeals – Admissibility – Effect of compliance with a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal – None (Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 12) 2. Officials – Members of the temporary staff – Termination of a contract concluded for an indefinite period – Obligation to state reasons – Scope (Conditions of Employment of other Servants, Art. 47(c)(i)) 3. Officials – Members of the temporary staff – Termination of a contract concluded for an indefinite period – Obligation to state reasons – Administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of staff (Art. 253 EC; Staff Regulations, Art. 25; Conditions of Employment of other Servants, Arts 11, 47 and 49) 4. Officials – Members of the temporary staff – Termination of a contract concluded for an indefinite period – Obligation to state reasons – Scope – Administration’s discretion (Conditions of Employment of other Servants, Art. 47(1)(c)(i)) 5. Appeals – Pleas in law – Review by the Court of First Instance of the assessment of the evidence carried out by the Civil Service Tribunal – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 11) 1. Since, pursuant to Article 12 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal before the Court of First Instance does not have suspensory effect, the mere fact that the institution whose act has been declared void has taken the necessary measures to comply with a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal does not imply that it does not intend to appeal. In any event, waiver of a right of action, inasmuch as it leads to the loss of a right, can cause an action to be inadmissible only if the waiver is clear and unconditional. (see para. 80) 2. The requirement to state reasons is intended, on the one hand, to provide the person concerned with details sufficient to allow him to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by an error which will allow its legality to be contested and, on the other, to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision. The substantive legality of a decision which contains no statement of the reasons on which it is based, either in the wording of the document itself or in the context in which it was adopted cannot be reviewed by the court, regardless of the extent of that review. In the absence of an obligation on the part of the author of the decision to state the reasons which led to its adoption, both the court’s capacity to perform its duty, if such has been given to it, to review the substantive legality of measures brought before it and to ensure judicial protection of individuals would be compromised and would be made subject to the discretion of the author of the decision. The requirement that an institution should state the reasons for its decisions is thus inseparable from the court’s power to review the validity of such decisions and that power must be guaranteed, in a community based on the rule of law, under equivalent conditions, to all persons subject to the law who exercise their right to judicial protection. Consequently, the Court of First Instance cannot conclude that there is absolutely no obligation on the part of the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment to give reasons for its decisions terminating the contracts of members of the temporary staff concluded for an indefinite period on the ground that that authority is required to comply only with the conditions concerning notice laid down in Article 47(c)(i) of the Conditions of Employment. (see paras 108-110) See: 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, para. 22 and the case-law cited therein 3. The obligation to state the reasons for any decision with an adverse effect laid down in Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, which merely reiterates the general obligation laid down in Article 253 EC, constitutes an essential principle of Community law which may be derogated from only for compelling reasons. That requirement also helps to guarantee the right to effective judicial protection, a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. Such a broad exception to that general and essential principle that the administration must give reasons for its decisions, in particular, those which create adverse effects, could only be the result of the express and unequivocal will of the Community legislature which is not evident in the general provisions of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations and Article 11 of the Conditions of Employment. Thus, the mere fact that Article 47 of the Conditions of Employment, concerning the termination of employment of temporary staff, does not expressly provide that reasons must be given for decisions adopted under that provision cannot exclude the application of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations. If that obligation to state reasons did not exist, the Community Courts would be unable to exercise their powers of judicial review, however limited, properly, whereas the administration would in fact be able to decide the fate of a member of the temporary staff in an arbitrary fashion, notwithstanding the fact that when the competent authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official it is required, when assessing the interests of the service, to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and, in particular, the interests of the staff member concerned. That flows from the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff, which reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations, and by analogy, the Conditions of Employment, in the relationship between the official authority and its staff. If that obligation to state reasons did not exist, the Community Courts would be unable to exercise their powers of judicial review, however limited, properly, whereas the administration would in fact be able to decide the fate of a member of the temporary staff in an arbitrary fashion, notwithstanding the fact that, according to case-law, when the competent authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official it is required, when assessing the interests of the service, to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and in particular, the interests of the staff member concerned. That flows from the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff, which reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations, and by analogy, the Conditions of Employment, in the relationship between the official authority and its staff. (see paras 148-150, 153, 160) See: C‑432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I‑2271, para. 37 and the case-law cited therein; T‑223/99 Dejaiffe v OHIM [2000] ECR-SC I‑A‑277 and II‑1267, para. 53 and the case-law cited therein; T‑281/01 Huygens v Commission [2004] ECR-SC I‑A‑203 and II‑903, para. 105 and the case-law cited therein 4. Although the Staff Regulations give officials a greater security of tenure since the cases in which they may be definitively dismissed against their will are strictly limited, the less stable nature of the employment of a member of temporary staff is not altered by the obligation to state reasons imposed on the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment when terminating contracts for an indefinite period held by members of the temporary staff. That nature is the result, in particular, of the broad discretion enjoyed by that authority in regard to termination, under Article 47(c)(i) of the Conditions of Employment and subject to the period of notice provided for in the contract, of a contract for an indefinite period held by a member of the temporary staff, and the judicial review exercised by the Community Courts must therefore be limited to whether there has been a manifest error or a misuse of powers. Far from justifying an exemption in favour of the administration from the obligation to give reasons for its decisions, that broad discretion makes it all the more necessary to respect the essential procedural requirement of giving reasons. Where a Community institution has a wide discretion, the review of observance of guarantees conferred by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular for the competent institution, the obligations to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the individual case and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its decision. (see paras 161-163) See: 25/80 de Briey v Commission [1981] ECR 637, para. 7; C‑269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I‑5469, para. 14; C‑525/04 P Espagne v Lenzing [2007] ECR I‑9947, para. 58; C‑405/07 P Netherlands v Commission [2008] ECR I-8301, para. 56; T‑45/90 Speybrouck v Parliament [1992] ECR II‑33, paras 97 and 98; T‑51/91 Hoyer v Commission [1994] ECR-SC I‑A‑103 and II‑341, para. 27; T‑52/91 Smets v Commission [1994] ECR-SC I‑A‑107 and II‑353, para. 24 5. The assessment by the Civil Service Tribunal of the probative value of a document may not, generally, be subjected to review by the Court of First Instance in appeal proceedings, since it is clear from Article 11 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal lies on a point of law only. It is for the Civil Service Tribunal alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. Save where the evidence adduced before the Civil Service Tribunal has been distorted, that appraisal therefore does not constitute a point of law which is subject to appeal. (see para. 198) See: C‑182/99 P Salzgitter v Commission [2003] ECR I‑10761, para. 43; C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission [2007] ECR I‑729, paras 38 to 40