Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:32
Date: 2026-01-21
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Second Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Portugal

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) 21 January 2026 (*) ( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative trade mark EF – Earlier EU word mark EF – ERMELINDA FREITAS – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 ) In Case T‑71/25, Casa Ermelinda Freitas – Vinhos, S. A., established in Águas de Moura (Portugal), represented by M. Martinho do Rosário, lawyer, applicant, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent, defendant, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being Eggers & Franke Holding GmbH, established in Bremen (Germany), represented by A. Ebert-Weidenfeller, lawyer, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber), composed of N. Półtorak, President, D. Petrlík and I. Dimitrakopoulos (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, gives the following Judgment 1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Casa Ermelinda Freitas – Vinhos, S. A., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 November 2024 (Case R 466/2024-5) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 On 9 July 2018, the intervener, Eggers & Franke Holding GmbH, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign: 3 The mark applied for covered, inter alia, goods in Class 32 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Beers; mineral water [beverages]; aerated water; non-alcoholic beverages; fruit drinks; juices; syrups for making beverages; preparations for making beverages’. 4 On 28 September 2018, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above. 5 The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark EF – ERMELINDA FREITAS No 13 625 728, applied for on 8 January 2015, registered on 4 June 2015 and renewed on 18 December 2024, covering goods in Class 33 corresponding to the following description: ‘Alcoholic beverages (except beer)’. 6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). 7 On 4 January 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition. 8 On 28 February 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision. 9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. Forms of order sought 10 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should: – annul the contested decision; – order the intervener to pay all the costs. 11 EUIPO contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is held. 12 The intervener submits, in essence, that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs. Law 13 The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 14 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. 15 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the protected goods or services (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited). 16 For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 17 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the goods in question were aimed at the general public displaying an average degree of attentiveness and that the relevant territory was the European Union as a whole. It also considered that the goods covered by the trade mark applied for and the goods covered by the earlier trade mark were in part similar, at least to an average or low degree, and in part dissimilar. 18 Those findings of the Board of Appeal are not disputed by the applicant. 19 However, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal made errors in its assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue which affected its overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The comparison of the signs at issue 20 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 21 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole. The overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. However, it is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (see judgment of 8 May 2014, Bimbo v OHIM, C‑591/12 P, EU:C:2014:305, paragraphs 22 and 23 and the case-law cited). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression given by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43). The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue 22 For the purpose of assessing the dominant character of one or more given components of a composite trade mark, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of other components. In addition and accessorily, account may be taken of the relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the composite mark (judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN), T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 35). 23 As for the assessment of the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 13 June 2006, Inex v OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide), T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). – The earlier sign 24 In paragraph 41 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ in the earlier sign occupied, because of their size, a much more significant position than the group of letters ‘ef’ in that sign, and that that group of words formed a syntactical and conceptual unit which dominated the whole of that earlier mark. It further considered that that group of words had an average degree of intrinsic distinctiveness with respect to the goods covered by the earlier sign. 25 In paragraphs 42 and 43 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, relying on paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment of 7 May 2009, Klein Trademark Trust v OHIM – Zafra Marroquineros (CK CREACIONES KENNYA) (T‑185/07, EU:T:2009:147), observed that the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ of the first element of the earlier sign corresponded to the initial letters of the words ‘ermelinda’ and ‘freitas’, thus establishing the origin of that element and explaining its presence. Accordingly, it considered that, although those letters were intrinsically distinctive in relation to the relevant goods, they occupied an ancillary position in relation to the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’. It concluded that the relevant consumer would above all remember that group of words, on which he or she would to a very great extent focus his or her attention, and it added that the mere position of the group of letters ‘ef’ at the beginning of the earlier sign would not call that assessment into question. 26 In paragraph 44 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal observed that, in the earlier sign, the hyphen between the group of letters ‘ef’ and the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ was a common punctuation mark and was not distinctive. 27 The applicant maintains, first, that the Board of Appeal could not conclude that the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign had low distinctive character, still less that consumers would disregard that group of letters by comparison with the second part of the sign. Second, it claims that the Board of Appeal was wrong to rely on the judgment of 7 May 2009, CK CREACIONES KENNYA (T‑185/07, EU:T:2009:147). In the case that gave rise to that judgment the trade mark CK CREACIONES KENNYA included a second part of word elements clearly showing the names corresponding to the initials, which is not the case for the sign applied for. 28 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 29 In the present case, it should be noted that the earlier sign is a word sign composed of several word elements. The initial part of that sign consists of the group of letters ‘ef’, which is linked by a hyphen to the following part of the sign, which consists of the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’. 30 First, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal could not conclude that the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign had low distinctive character or that consumers would disregard that group of letters by comparison with the second part, ‘ermelinda freitas’, of that sign must be rejected, since it is based on a misreading of the contested decision. 31 Although it follows from paragraph 42 of the contested decision, which is summarised in paragraph 25 above, that the Board of Appeal considered that the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign was intrinsically distinctive in relation to the goods concerned, it did not consider that that distinctive character was low. 32 Furthermore, it follows from paragraph 42 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal considered that the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign occupied an ancillary position in relation to the word element ‘ermelinda freitas’ in the earlier sign, which had an average degree of intrinsic distinctiveness, as is apparent from paragraph 41 of that decision. In that regard, the Board of Appeal did not conclude that all consumers would disregard that group of letters. In fact, it follows from a reading of that decision that, in the context of its analysis of the similarity of the signs at issue at visual and phonetic levels, the Board of Appeal also took into account consumers who would perceive that group of letters in the earlier sign. 33 Second, the argument whereby the applicant seeks to call into question the relevance of the judgment of 7 May 2009, CK CREACIONES KENNYA (T‑185/07, EU:T:2009:147), to the present case cannot succeed. 34 The applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that, in essence, the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ in the earlier sign, because of its length, occupies a much more significant position than the group of letters ‘ef’ in that sign or the finding that that group of words forms a syntactical and conceptual unit. Nor does it dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that that group of letters corresponds to the first letters of the words ‘ermelinda’ and ‘freitas’, thus establishing the origin of that group of letters and explaining its presence. 35 It follows from paragraphs 42 and 44 of the judgment of 7 May 2009, CK CREACIONES KENNYA (T‑185/07, EU:T:2009:147), upheld by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 2 September 2010, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v OHIM (C‑254/09 P, EU:C:2010:488), that it was on the basis of similar findings that the General Court concluded, in paragraph 44 of the first of those judgments, that the element ‘ck’ of the word sign CK CREACIONES KENNYA occupied an ancillary position in relation to the element ‘creaciones kennya’ and that the relevant consumer would above all remember the latter element. However, contrary to the applicant’s suggestion, the fact that that sign was the sign applied for, and not the earlier sign, was of no importance in the General Court’s reasoning that led to the finding that the element ‘ck’ of the sign in question was ancillary in character. 36 It should be added, moreover, that in the present case, although the hyphen between the group of letters ‘ef’ and the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ is a common punctuation mark and is not distinctive, it reinforces the impression that that group of letters corresponds solely to the initials of the group of words that follows it (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita, C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147, paragraph 34) and therefore the conclusion that that group of letters has only an ancillary position in relation to that group of words (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2012, Strigl and Securvita, C‑90/11 and C‑91/11, EU:C:2012:147, paragraph 38). 37 Accordingly, although there is no general rule that a sequence of letters which reproduces the first letter of each of the words of the word combination to which it is attached is ancillary in character (see, by analogy, judgments of 22 October 2015, BGW, C‑20/14, EU:C:2015:714, paragraph 32, and of 24 September 2019, IAK – Forum International v EUIPO – Schwalb (IAK), T‑497/18, not published, EU:T:2019:689, paragraph 64), it follows from the circumstances of the present case referred to in paragraphs 34 and 36 above that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in considering that the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign occupied an ancillary position in relation to the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ in that sign, on which the relevant consumer would to a large degree focus his or her attention. – The sign applied for 38 In paragraphs 45 to 48 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal observed, first, that the sign applied for was a figurative mark composed of an ornate depiction of two letters, in grey and white. Second, it considered that at least part of the relevant public would perceive an ampersand between the two letters, that the first letter was clearly legible as the letter ‘e’ and that the second letter could be recognised as ‘f’ or ‘j’. The Board further observed that it would focus on the part of the relevant public that would recognise the second letter as ‘f’. Third, it stated that as the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ had no direct and clear meaning in relation to the relevant goods, they were inherently distinctive to an average degree. Fourth, it considered that the stylisation of the first and second letters was sufficiently pronounced to ensure that it would not go unnoticed by the relevant public and possessed, if only to a limited extent, a distinctive character. Last, it considered that the distinctive character of the ampersand, which would be perceived as the symbol for the word ‘and’, would be at best minimal. 39 The applicant maintains that the ampersand is not perceived in the sign applied for. In its view, that is confirmed by the fact that even the intervener filed the trade mark applied for as ‘EF’ with EUIPO. In addition, it claims that the stylisation of the mark applied for is trivial and without distinctive character. Such stylisation cannot therefore contribute to differentiating the signs at issue. 40 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 41 First, it should be observed that the Board of Appeal took into account not only the situation in which the sign applied for would be perceived as including the ampersand but also the situation in which the sign would be perceived as consisting solely of the group of letters ‘ef’. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the ampersand in the sign applied for will not be perceived is irrelevant. 42 Second, contrary to the applicant’s contention, the stylisation of the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ in the sign applied for is not trivial and without distinctive character. The two letters composing that sign are not represented in a typeface that is normally used. They are entwined and, because of that stylisation, the perception of the letter ‘e’ and, especially, that of the letter ‘f’ requires a certain effort. That stylisation will therefore not go unnoticed. The Board of Appeal therefore correctly considered that the stylisation in question was distinctive, if only to a limited extent. 43 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal made errors of assessment in its analysis of the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue. The visual and phonetic comparisons of the signs at issue 44 As regards the visual comparison, the Board of Appeal observed, in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the contested decision, that although the signs at issue coincided in the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’, the impression given by the earlier sign was dominated by the element ‘ermelinda freitas’ and that the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ of the sign applied for were represented by a specific stylisation, which did not go unnoticed. The Board of Appeal therefore considered that there was only a low degree of visual similarity overall. 45 As regards the phonetic comparison, the Board of Appeal considered, in paragraph 52 of the contested decision, that the sign applied for was likely to be pronounced as ‘ef’ or, in the alternative, ‘e and f’. In contrast, according to the Board of Appeal, the earlier sign will likely be referred to by the part consisting of the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’, since the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ in the group of letters ‘ef’ will be perceived merely as the initials of those words, or by the full expression ‘ef – ermelinda freitas’. It concluded that the signs at issue had at most a low degree of phonetic similarity. 46 The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal should have concluded that there was at least an average degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. 47 In that regard, the applicant claims, first, that it follows, in particular, from the judgment of 24 September 2019, IAK (T‑497/18, not published, EU:T:2019:689, paragraph 70), that, since the group of letters ‘ef’ in the earlier sign did not have low distinctive character, the Board of Appeal should not have played down the fact that the sign applied for reproduced that group of letters in its entirety. Second, it maintains that, according to the case-law, the stylisation of the letters is not relevant for the visual comparison and, consequently, for the assessment of the likelihood of confusion. Third, it refers to the case-law according to which consumers have a natural tendency to abbreviate long trade marks, precisely by using their initials, as is the case of the marks CK for CALVIN KLEIN, YSL for YVES SAINT LAURENT, IBM for International Business Machines, BMW for Bayerische Motoren Werke, KFC for Kentucky Fried Chicken, HP for Hewlett Packard. It submits that, according to the case-law, consumers tend to omit certain word elements of a mark when pronouncing it, in order simply to economise on words. 48 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 49 First, as regards trade marks with a common element, the Court of Justice has held that, when that element is identical to one of the trade marks at issue, even if that element cannot be regarded as dominating the overall impression, it ought to be taken into consideration in the assessment of the similarity of the marks at issue, to the extent that it constitutes in itself the earlier mark and retains an independent distinctive role in the mark consisting, inter alia, of that element, for which registration is sought. Where a common element retains an independent distinctive role in the composite sign, the overall impression produced by that sign may lead the public to believe that the goods or services in question come, at the very least, from companies which are linked economically, in which case the likelihood of confusion must be held to be established (judgment of 24 September 2019, IAK, T‑497/18, not published, EU:T:2019:689, paragraph 70; see also, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2005, Medion, C‑120/04, EU:C:2005:594, paragraphs 30 and 36, and order of 22 January 2010, ecoblue v OHIM and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑23/09 P, not published, EU:C:2010:35, paragraph 45). 50 However, the application of the principle arising from the case-law cited in paragraph 49 above to a particular case presupposes, in particular, that the earlier mark is fully contained, that is to say, reproduced identically, in the mark applied for (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 November 2016, CG v EUIPO – Perry Ellis International Group (P PRO PLAYER), T‑349/15, not published, EU:T:2016:677, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited; of 24 October 2018, Bayer v EUIPO – Uni-Pharma (SALOSPIR), T‑261/17, not published, EU:T:2018:710, paragraph 45; and of 30 March 2022, Kalita and Haas v EUIPO – Kitzbühel Tourismus (Representation of two animals), T‑206/21, not published, EU:T:2022:191, paragraph 97). That is not the case here. 51 Only the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ in the earlier sign are reproduced in the sign applied for and, moreover, those letters are not reproduced in an identical matter in the sign applied for. The letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ in the sign applied for are stylised and that stylisation, which, contrary to the applicant’s contention, is not trivial, will be perceived by the relevant public and will complicate the reading of those letters (see paragraph 42 above). 52 Second, it follows from the case-law on which the applicant relies, concerning the assessment of the visual similarity between a word sign and a figurative sign including a word element, that where the word element of the figurative sign in question is only lightly stylised, the style in which that element is presented is irrelevant for the purposes of the visual comparison of the signs at issue, since the word sign in question may be represented in any font, including in a version corresponding to that of the earlier sign (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2023, Liquid Advertising v EUIPO – Liqui.do (Liquid+Arcade), T‑592/22, not published, EU:T:2023:708, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 53 Therefore, where the stylisation of the word element of the figurative sign is not trivial, that stylisation is taken into account in the visual comparison of that word element with the word sign in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 October 2013, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Sohawon (fRee YOUR STYLe.), T‑282/12, not published, EU:T:2013:533, paragraph 42; of 28 April 2021, Klaus Berthold v EUIPO – Thomann (HB Harley Benton), T‑284/20, not published, EU:T:2021:218, paragraphs 107 and 108; and of 11 October 2023, Dr. Rudolf Liebe Nachfolger v EUIPO – Bit Beauty (ayuna LESS IS BEAUTY), T‑490/22, not published, EU:T:2023:616, paragraph 51). 54 Consequently, although the signs at issue coincide in visual terms owing to the presence of the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’, in view of the particular stylisation of those letters in the sign applied for and the presence in the earlier sign of 16 additional letters, which form the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in paragraph 51 of the contested decision, that there was only a low degree of visual similarity overall between the signs at issue. 55 Third, although it does indeed follow from the case-law on which the applicant relies that consumers have a natural tendency to abbreviate long signs and not to pronounce all the word elements of which they consist (see judgment of 2 February 2022, Canisius v EUIPO – Beiersdorf (CCLABELLE VIENNA), T‑694/20, not published, EU:T:2022:45, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited), that tendency cannot, in principle, justify in itself the conclusion that the final word elements of a sign will probably not be pronounced (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2018, Şölen Çikolata Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO – Zaharieva (Packaging for ice-cream cornets), T‑794/16, not published, EU:T:2018:70, paragraph 71). 56 In the case-law on which the applicant relies, that conclusion was also based on other circumstances. Thus, it has been held that the final word elements of the sign concerned would not be pronounced because they were written in characters appreciably smaller than the first word element of the sign (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2018, Hotelbeds Spain v EUIPO – Guidigo Europe (Guidego what to do next), T‑346/17, not published, EU:T:2018:134, paragraph 42, and order of 21 December 2022, Suicha v EUIPO – Michael Kors (Switzerland) International (MK MARKTOMI MARKTOMI), T‑264/22, not published, EU:T:2022:861, paragraph 54), they had a low degree of distinctiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2019, M. I. Industries v EUIPO – Natural Instinct (Nature’s Variety Instinct), T‑287/18, not published, EU:T:2019:641, paragraph 45), or they had a secondary position and were descriptive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 February 2022, CCLABELLE VIENNA, T‑694/20, not published, EU:T:2022:45, paragraph 76). 57 However, in the present case, those circumstances taken into account in the case-law on which the applicant relies are not present, and the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of other elements capable of showing that consumers tend to omit the word element ‘ermelinda freitas’ in the earlier sign. The Board of Appeal considered, moreover, that the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ had an average degree of distinctiveness in relation to the relevant goods, like the group of letters ‘ef’ of that sign, and the applicant does not claim that that group of words has a lower degree of distinctiveness than that group of letters. Last, it should be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in considering that the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ occupied an ancillary position by comparison with the expression ‘ermelinda freitas’ and that the relevant consumer would above all remember the latter element (see paragraphs 35 to 37 above). 58 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in taking the view that the earlier sign would be pronounced ‘ermelinda freitas’ or ‘ef ermelinda freitas’ and not only ‘ef’, and, therefore, in considering that the signs at issue had at most a low degree of phonetic similarity owing to the additional presence of the group of words ‘ermelinda freitas’ in the earlier sign. 59 Furthermore, as for the examples of signs provided by the applicant which, in its view, are abbreviated by consumers by using their initials, namely the trade marks CK for CALVIN KLEIN, YSL for YVES SAINT LAURENT, IBM for International Business Machines, BMW for Bayerische Motoren Werke, KFC for Kentucky Fried Chicken, HP for Hewlett Packard, it is sufficient to observe, as the intervener does, in essence, that the applicant’s argument is not substantiated by any solid evidence. 60 Consequently, it must be held that the applicant is not justified in claiming that the Board of Appeal ought to have concluded that there was at least an average degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. The conceptual comparison of the signs at issue 61 In paragraph 53 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that the earlier sign would be perceived either as a first name and surname preceded by its initials, or simply as a fanciful sign, while the sign applied for would be perceived as a group of ‘two or three letters’ without any particular meaning. It concluded that the signs at issue did not bear any relevant conceptual similarity or that the comparison remained, in any case, neutral. 62 The applicant maintains that some consumers, who have already had contact with the earlier sign, know that the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ correspond to the initials of the words ‘ermelinda’ and ‘freitas’. In its view, the signs at issue may therefore evoke the same semantic content, namely the specific name of a person. The signs at issue are therefore conceptually similar for part of the relevant public. 63 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 64 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, where neither of the signs at issue has any meaning taken as a whole, it must be found that a conceptual comparison is not possible (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 2017, Novartis v EUIPO – Meda (Zymara), T‑214/15, not published, EU:T:2017:637, paragraph 149, and of 5 October 2017, Forest Pharma v EUIPO – Ipsen Pharma (COLINEB), T‑36/17, not published, EU:T:2017:690, paragraph 96). 65 As regards the applicant’s argument, based, in essence, on the fact that the letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ in the sign applied for evoke the specific name of a person for consumers who have already encountered the earlier sign, it should be observed that that argument amounts to invoking the reputation of the earlier mark among part of the relevant public. However, the reputation of the earlier mark is not relevant for the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2021, Chanel v EUIPO – Innovative Cosmetic Concepts (INCOCO), T‑196/20, not published, EU:T:2021:365, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). In any event, that argument is not supported by any evidence. The applicant has therefore not established that the Board of Appeal had made an error of assessment in finding that the sign applied for would be perceived as a group of letters without any particular meaning. 66 In addition, as regards the earlier sign, the Board of Appeal correctly took the view that it would be perceived either as a first name and a surname preceded by its initials, or simply as a fanciful sign. 67 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 64 above, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs at issue did not bear any relevant conceptual similarity, or that the conceptual comparison remains, in any event, neutral. 68 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal made errors of assessment in its analysis of the similarity of the signs at issue. The distinctiveness of the earlier mark 69 In paragraph 57 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the intrinsic distinctiveness of the earlier mark should be considered to be normal. The applicant does not dispute that finding. The likelihood of confusion 70 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame, and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74). 71 In paragraph 64 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal considered that, applying the interdependence principle, and given the low degree of visual and phonetic similarity of the signs at issue and the absence of any relevant conceptual similarity, it was improbable that an averagely attentive public would consider that those signs originate from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from undertakings that were economically linked, despite the fact that they cover similar goods. In paragraph 65 of that decision, it emphasised that that was explained by the clearly noticeable differences due to the dominant element ‘ermelinda freitas’ of the earlier sign, which had no equivalent in the sign applied for, and that the stylisation of that sign would not be overlooked and would contribute to differentiating the signs at issue. 72 In paragraph 66 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion, notwithstanding the similarity of part of the goods covered by the signs at issue. 73 The applicant disputes that conclusion. It maintains that, given the similarity of the goods in question, the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, the reproduction of the group of letters ‘ef’ of the earlier sign in the sign applied for, the distinctive character of that group of letters, the absence of distinctiveness of the trivially stylised letters and the lack of any other element in the sign applied for that might help consumers to distinguish the signs at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. 74 In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first, that the applicant’s arguments relating to the comparison of the signs at issue have been rejected. 75 It should be borne in mind, second, that, according to the case-law, there can be no question of mechanically applying the principle of interdependence, without taking account of all the relevant factors. In particular, there is nothing to preclude a finding that, in the light of the circumstances of a particular case, there is no likelihood of confusion, even where the goods are identical and there is a low degree of similarity between the marks at issue. The same considerations apply a fortiori, as the case may be, where the goods are similar to an average or a low degree and there is a low degree of similarity between the signs. The analysis of the likelihood of confusion is based on a global assessment of all the relevant factors (judgment of 15 October 2020, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – Bio-tec Biologische Naturverpackungen (BIOPLAST BIOPLASTICS FOR A BETTER LIFE), T‑2/20, not published, EU:T:2020:493, paragraph 79). 76 In the present case, in the light of all of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in concluding, applying the interdependence principle, that there was no likelihood of confusion in view of the significant visual and phonetic differences between the signs at issue, notwithstanding the similarity of part of the goods in question. 77 In those circumstances, the single plea put forward by the applicant must be rejected and the present action must therefore be dismissed. Costs 78 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 79 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, given that no hearing was held, be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Casa Ermelinda Freitas – Vinhos, S. A. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Eggers & Franke Holding GmbH; 3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs. Półtorak Petrlík Dimitrakopoulos Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 January 2026. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.