Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2020:119
Date: 2020-03-26
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

summary drawn up after the closure of CTS (Annex A.14) that the implementation of that measure led to the early departure of 7 persons under the age of 45, 15 persons aged between 45 and 54 and 23 persons over the age of 54. Those figures show that, in practice, the contested length-of-service criterion did not favour, or disadvantage, among members of staff, those in a particular age bracket. 81 Furthermore, even assuming that there may be a link in the present case between the years-of-service criterion and age, it should be noted that, in any event, any difference in treatment would appear to be justified on the same grounds, relating to the interests of the service, as those set out in paragraphs 48 and 50 to 54 above, in the context of the response to the first plea, since the principle of non-discrimination, based inter alia on grounds of age, laid down in Article 21 of the Charter, is merely a particular expression of the principle of equal treatment, which is enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2019, RK v Council, T‑11/17, EU:T:2019:65, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). 82 Consequently, it must be held that Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules did not discriminate on grounds of age to the detriment of staff members in a salary broadband in so far as it set an eligibility threshold for the CTS pilot programme corresponding to 12 years of service for members of staff allocated to the salary broadbands, whereas that threshold was 8 years of service for those in single salary bands. 83 Therefore, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded. Third plea, alleging manifest error of assessment and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff 84 The applicant submits that the ECB made both a manifest error of assessment and breached the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff by failing to carry out a sufficiently detailed examination of the implications of the disputed length-of-service condition, even though that condition resulted in distortion in the light of the principle itself of career transition and discrimination or injustice in certain cases, and by failing to interpret Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules in such a way as to avoid those consequences. That could particularly have been the case, in respect of the applicant, by applying the new rules, which no longer make any distinction according to single salary bands or salary broadbands, in the context of the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 17 November 2017, Teeäär v ECB (T‑555/16, not published, EU:T:2017:817). 85 The ECB disputes the merits of that plea. It argues in particular that the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff is circumscribed by compliance with the rules, so that it could not apply derogations not provided for in Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules or misconstrue the scope ratione temporis of that provision and of the provision which replaced it. 86 It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that it follows from the response to the first plea that the present plea cannot be upheld in so far as it is based on the assumption that the disputed length-of-service condition leads to a distortion in the light of the principle itself of career transition. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff required the ECB to accept the applicant’s application for CTS on the ground that, in his case, the eligibility condition laid down in Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules led to an unfavourable and inappropriate result. 87 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the provision at issue did not provide for any exception or possibility to derogate from the length-of-service condition, with the result that the ECB was bound to apply it. 88 The duty of the administration to have regard for the welfare of its staff reflects the balance of the reciprocal rights and obligations in the relationship between the public authority and its staff. That duty implies in particular that when the authority takes a decision concerning the situation of an official or other staff member, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision, and when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the member of staff concerned. However, the protection of the rights and interests of members of staff must always be limited by compliance with the rules in force (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 December 2006, Angelidis v Parliament, T‑416/03, EU:T:2006:375, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited). 89 Consequently, the ECB cannot be criticised for having applied Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules in the version in force on the date when the applicant’s application for the CTS pilot programme was submitted. 90 Therefore, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules 91 The applicant submits that the concept of ‘salary broadband’ is not clearly defined in the rules applicable to the staff of the ECB and points out that his contract does not state that the F/G — Band to which he was allocated is a ‘salary broadband’. In the light of that lack of precision, it must be held that the applicant was allocated to a single salary band, within the meaning of Article 2.3.1 of the Staff Rules, and, therefore, that he had to demonstrate only eight years of service, so that his application for the CTS pilot programme was admissible. 92 The ECB submits that paragraph 4 of Annex 1 to the Conditions of Employment contains a definition of the concept of salary broadbanding. It also notes that the Conditions of Employment were expressly made part of the applicant’s contract and that he was contractually allocated to the adjacent F and G salary bands. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the applicant’s contract referred to ‘the F/G salary band’, without specifying that it was a salary broadband. 93 It should be noted that the concept of salary broadband is in fact defined in paragraph 4 of Annex 1 to the Conditions of Employment as ‘a combination of two adjacent salary bands’. That definition must be seen in the light of the salary structure in paragraph 1 of that annex, which includes bands A, B, C, D, E, F, E/F, G, F/G, H, I, J, K and L, from which it follows that only the E/F and F/G salary bands are a combination of two adjacent salary bands. 94 As the ECB submits, the Conditions of Employment formed part of the applicant’s contract of employment, since they were annexed to the ECB’s letter of 9 February 2004 containing the conditions of his employment as an integral part of that contract. 95 Consequently, the words ‘F/G — Band’ in that letter must be interpreted as providing that the applicant is to be allocated to the F/G salary broadband as a production expert, irrespective of the fact that the word ‘broad’ was not used. 96 Moreover, it follows from the note annexed by the applicant to his application for the CTS pilot programme that he had interpreted the ECB’s letter of 9 February 2004 containing the conditions of his employment in that way. 97 Consequently, the fourth plea put forward by the applicant in support of his claim for annulment and, therefore, the application for annulment must also be rejected as unfounded. The claim for damages 98 The applicant requests that the ECB be ordered to pay him a sum corresponding to the support which he would have received had his application for the pilot project for CTS been accepted, estimated at EUR 101 447, plus interest. 99 The ECB contends that the claim for damages should be dismissed since, in its view, the application for annulment, which is closely associated with that claim, must also be dismissed. 100 In that regard, suffice it to note that claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected where they are closely associated, as in the present case, with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as unfounded (judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑570/16, EU:T:2017:283, paragraph 69; see also, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 129, and of 14 September 2006, Commission v Fernández Gómez, C‑417/05 P, EU:C:2006:582, paragraph 51). 101 Since the application for annulment of the contested decision must be dismissed, the claim for damages must be dismissed as unfounded and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 102 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the ECB. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Raivo Teeäär to pay the costs. Nihoul Svenningsen Öberg Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 March 2020. E. Coulon M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.