Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:768
Date: 2025-10-09
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Spain

Summary of the relevant facts 
The defendant VAERSA is a company forming part of the business and 
foundational public sector of the Generalitat Valenciana, with the legal status of a 
commercial company as provided for in the Seventh Additional Provision read in 
conjunction with Article 2.3.b of Ley 1/2015, de 6 de febrero, de la Generalitat, de 
Hacienda Pública, del Sector Público Instrumental y de Subvenciones (Law 
No 1/2015 of 6 February 2015 of the Generalitat on the public treasury, the 
official public service and subsidies). It is majority-owned by the Generalitat 
Valenciana and is attached to the Consellería de Agricultura, Desarrollo Rural, 
Emergencia Climática y Transición Ecológica (Department of Agriculture, Rural 
Development, Climate Emergency and Ecological Transition). 
VAERSA is considered to be an in-house procurement entity and technical service 
of the Generalitat’s Administration, the various entities that make up the local 
administration and the public sector entities subject to any of those institutions 
that have the status of contracting authorities, and is required to carry out 
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management assignments in accordance with the relevant projects, reports or other 
technical documents. 
With effect from 1 January 2018, VAERSA signed up to the 2nd collective 
bargaining agreement for personnel employed by the administration of the 
autonomous region. 
By a decision of the Dirección General de Medio Natural y de Evaluación 
Ambiental (Department for the Natural Environment and Environmental 
Assessment), investments were approved for the improvement of the European 
Natura 2000 protected areas network sites in the Community of Valencia for 
2022-2025, and VAERSA was entrusted with the performance of these works in 
accordance with the corresponding technical specifications. 
The scope of the structural assignment involves the performance of activities in 
the natural environment throughout the entire Community of Valencia. 
The personnel involved in the group action are those who appear in VAERSA’s 
job list as biodiversity workers, previously referred to as micro-reserve personnel 
and now called Natura 2000 personnel. 
To perform these activities, VAERSA has put together 15 provincial teams: six of 
these are in Valencia, four are in Alicante and five are in Castellón. They have the 
following composition, provincial distribution and departure points: 
– Alicante Norte Team, with its departure point at Alcoy, composed of one team 
leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Alicante Sur Team, with its departure point at Santa Faz, composed of one 
team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Alicante Jávea Team, with its departure point at Jávea, composed of one team 
leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Alicante Orihuela Team, with its departure point at Orihuela, composed of one 
team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Castellón Norte Team, with its departure point at Vistabella, composed of one 
team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Castellón Forcall Team, with its departure point at Forcall, composed of one 
team leader and two micro-reserve specialists. 
– Castellón Peñíscola Team, with its departure point at Peñíscola, composed of 
one team leader and two micro-reserve specialists. 
– Castellón Sur Team, with its departure point at VAERSA Castellón, composed 
of one team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
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– Castellón Altura Team, with its departure point at Altura, composed of one 
team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Norte Team, with its departure point at the Centro para la 
Investigación y Experimentación Forestal (Centre for Forestry Research and 
Experimentation, CIEF) in Quart de Poblet, composed of one team leader and 
three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Sur Team, with its departure point at Gandía, composed of one team 
leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Ontinyent Team, with its departure point at Ontinyent, composed of 
one team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Requena Team, with its departure point at Requena, composed of one 
team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Ayora Team, with its departure point at Ayora, composed of one team 
leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
– Valencia Aras de los Olmos Team, with its departure point at Aras de los 
Olmos, composed of one team leader and three micro-reserve specialists. 
VAERSA also has a provincial coordinating team leader and a manager 
responsible for the entire Autonomous Community. 
Each month, the team leaders are informed by whatsapp message of the monthly 
schedules, broken down by province, team and specific working day, indicating 
the exact location of the work sites, the work to be carried out by each team and 
other technical aspects. 
Workers travel by their own means from their homes to a predetermined 
VAERSA departure point, known as ‘the base’, where they must be at 08.00. 
Once there, they travel to the work site in a vehicle provided by VAERSA, which 
is driven by a VAERSA worker and loaded with the equipment required to carry 
out the work. At 15.00 the work at the site is finished and the employees are 
transported by company vehicle to the base, from where they return to their 
homes. 
The following clause is included in the employment contracts VAERSA has been 
signing with the workers who provide services in the micro-reserves: ‘The 
working day will begin when the worker arrives at the micro-reserve site. It will 
end when that individual leaves the company vehicle. Travel will be by company 
vehicle. Time spent travelling to and from work sites will not count as actual 
working time. This circumstance has been included in the specific salary 
supplement allocated to the worker.’ 
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The minutes of the VAERSA negotiating committee from 15 June 2018 state the 
following: ‘Management is introducing the concept of counting 50% of travel 
time for personnel without a fixed workplace as actual working time (as is already 
the case for some groups).’ 
From the start of the biodiversity management assignment, VAERSA has been 
counting the daily journey to the work site from the departure point or base as 
actual working time for the biodiversity team, but not the daily journey from the 
work site to the departure point or base at the end of the working day. 
SECOND.– Subject matter of the dispute 
The applicant trade union seeks a declaration that biodiversity personnel are 
entitled to have the time spent travelling by company vehicle from the base to the 
work site (at the start of the working day) and from the work site to the base (at 
the end of the working day) counted as actual working time, with the working day 
ending at 15.00 at the base. 
LAW 
FIRST.– Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
Under Article 19(3)(b) of the Treaty on European Union (OJ 2008 C 115, p. 13), 
Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2008 
C 115, p. 47), and Article 4-bis of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Basic Law 
on the Judiciary), the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts 
adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union. 
SECOND.– Text of the applicable national and EU provisions 
a) Spanish law 
Working hours are regulated under Spanish legislation in Articles 34 to 38 of the 
Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute), approved by Real Decreto 
Legislativo 2/2015, de 23 de octubre (Royal Legislative Decree No 2/2015 of 
23 October 2015) (BOE No 255 of 24 October 2015). 
… [National law not applicable to the case] 
The provision that refers to the subject matter of the present dispute is 
Article 34(1), (3) and (5) of the Workers’ Statute, which states as follows: ‘1. 
Working time shall be as specified in collective agreements or individual 
employment contracts. 
Normal working time shall average no more than 40 hours per week of actual 
work, calculated on an annual basis. 
… 
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3. There must be at least 12 hours between the end of one period of work and 
the beginning of the following period of work. 
The number of normal hours of actual work shall not exceed nine hours per day 
unless a different pattern of daily working time applies by virtue of a collective 
agreement or, failing that, by agreement between the employer and the 
representatives of the workers, subject in all cases to compliance with the rest 
period between two periods of work. 
… 
5. Working time shall be calculated in such a way that a worker is present at 
his or her place of work both at the beginning and at the end of the working day.’ 
b) EU Law: 
The basic legislation is Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time (OJ of 18 November 2003). The following provisions of that 
directive may be highlighted with regard to the subject matter of these 
proceedings: 
Article 1(1), which reads as follows: ‘This Directive lays down minimum safety 
and health requirements for the organisation of working time.’ 
Article 1(2), which states that the Directive will apply to: ‘a) minimum periods of 
daily rest, weekly rest and annual leave, to breaks and maximum weekly working 
time, […] all sectors of activity, both public and private, within the meaning of 
Article 2 of Directive 89/391/EEC, without prejudice to Articles 14, 17, 18 and 19 
of this Directive’. 
Article 2 contains the definitions. In particular: 
Paragraph (1), which defines working time as: ‘any period during which the 
worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or 
duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practice’. 
Paragraph 2 defines a rest period as: ‘any period which is not working time’. 
THIRD.– Relevant case-law of the Fourth Chamber of the Tribunal Supremo 
de España (Supreme Court of Spain) 
Judgment of the Supreme Court No 605/2020 of 7 July 2020, CASE NO 208/2018 
(ECLI:ES:TS:2020:23309), invoking the doctrine contained in the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union of 10 September 2015 (C-266/14), states 
that working time constitutes ‘any period during which the worker is at work, at 
the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with 
national laws and/or practices, and that that concept is placed in opposition to rest 
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periods, the two being mutually exclusive’, and considers that in the case in 
question, in which the activity of the company consists of the installation, 
maintenance and repair of lifts, which can only be carried out at the homes of its 
customers, the journey which the workers have to make from their homes to the 
towns of Eibar and San Sebastián is working time. The Supreme Court argues 
that: ‘if travelling to the customer’s home is essential for the business of the 
company, which could not install, maintain or repair lifts if it did not send its 
workers, with the necessary equipment and tools, to the customer’s home, with the 
consequent impact on the invoicing of those services, it is clear that those journeys 
must be regarded as working time’. 
In the same sense, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain No 617/2021 of 
9 June 2021 in Case No 27/2020 (ECLI:ES:TS:2021:2419) held, in a case in 
which the company decided at a given moment that, instead of starting and 
finishing their working day at the work centre as they had done until then, the 
field technicians or outdoor fitters should start at 08.00 at the home of the first 
client and finish at 17.00 at the home of the last client. 
Conversely, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain No 784/2019 of 
19 November 2019, Case No 1249/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:3880), rejects the 
group action claim asserting that the time spent by the airport firefighters in 
moving from the service building (technical block) to the site where their 
colleagues were being relieved should be considered as working time. The 
Supreme Court held as follows: ‘… during the time spent moving from the so-
called technical block to the fire and rescue services area, you are not really at the 
employer’s disposal, but are carrying out a preparatory task similar to that of 
travelling from the company’s changing room to the place of work. The fact that 
for security reasons the technical block has to be accessed first and a magnetic 
access card has to be used does not mean that the working time has started to run. 
In the meantime, workers must not carry out any personal tasks, nor may they be 
assigned to any task, as this is outside the circle of their productive activity’. 
FOURTH.– The position of the parties to the dispute 
a) Position of the applicant trade union, which is supported by the other trade 
unions appearing in the proceedings: 
The applicant contends that the journeys that the workers must make from the 
base to the work site (at the start of the working day) and from the work site to the 
base (at the end of the working day) should be counted as working time, since 
they are inherent to the activity of the company and to the performance of the 
work activity, bearing in mind that they are carried out using a company vehicle 
and that during those periods the workers are at the disposal of the company. 
They add that it is incomprehensible for the company to consider the journey from 
the base to the work site to be working time, but not to give the same 
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consideration to the reverse journey from the work site to the base at the end of 
the working day. 
b) Position of the company: 
The company contests the application by pointing out that Article 2 of Directive 
2003/88/EC establishes a strict concept of working time consisting of three 
concurrent elements: physical presence at the workplace, availability vis-à-vis the 
employer’s managerial authority and active performance of one’s duties. It 
considers that these circumstances are not present in this case because the workers 
are not ‘potentially’ tied to work during the travel period as their services are not 
required. 
FIFTH.– The reasons for the reference for a preliminary ruling and the 
position of this Social Division of the High Court of Justice of the Community 
of Valencia 
a) The reasons for the reference for a preliminary ruling 
The issue in the dispute is essentially a legal one as the parties do not dispute the 
factual situation from which the dispute arises. 
As explained above, the issue is whether the time spent by workers travelling in a 
company vehicle from the micro-reserve – or work site – where they carry out 
their work to the base established by the company should be counted as working 
time for the purposes of Article 34(5) of the Workers’ Statute and in accordance 
with the concept of working time laid down in Article 2(1) of Directive 
2003/88/EC, bearing in mind that the company does consider the same journey 
made at the start of the working day to be working time. 
The reasons why we have decided to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for a preliminary ruling are as follows: 
1) Because we are not aware that the Spanish Supreme Court or the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has so far ruled on a situation such as the one 
at issue in the present dispute. 
2) Because the answer to this question – which can be reproduced in other 
sectors – dictates whether the group action filed by the Sindicat de 
Treballadores i Treballadors de les Administraciones i el Serveis Publics 
STAS-IV against VAERSA is upheld. 
3) Because the answer given by this Social Division in two actions in which it 
has been asked this question in ordinary proceedings brought by VAERSA 
employees has been contradictory despite being based on the same EU case-
law, as stated in the judgments of 10 September 2015 (C-266/14) Tyco 
(ECLI:EU:C:2015:578) and 21 February 2018 (C-518/15) 
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(ECLI:EU:C:2018:82), which laid down the following criteria for 
determining the concept of ‘working time’: 
a) Working time is ‘any period during which the worker is at work, at the 
employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in 
accordance with national laws and/or practices, and that that concept is 
placed in opposition to rest periods, the two being mutually exclusive 
(judgments in Jaeger, C-151/02, EU:C:2003:437, paragraph 48; Dellas 
and Others, C-14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 42, and orders in 
Vorel, C-437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 24, and Grigore, C-258/10, 
EU:C:2011:122, paragraph 42)’. 
b) Directive 2003/88/EC ‘does not provide for any intermediate category 
between working time and rest periods (see, to that effect, judgment in 
Dellas and Others, C-14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 43, and orders 
in Vorel, C-437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 25, and Grigore, 
C-258/10, EU:C:2011:122, paragraph 43)’. 
c) ‘The journeys of the workers, who are employed in a job such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, to go to the customers designated by 
their employer, is a necessary means of providing those workers’ 
technical services to those customers. Not taking those journeys into 
account would enable an employer such as Tyco to claim that only the 
time spent carrying out the activity of installing and maintaining the 
security systems falls within the concept of “working time”, within the 
meaning of point (1) of Article 2 of Directive 2003/88, which would 
distort that concept and jeopardise the objective of protecting the 
safety and health of workers.’ 
d) The decisive factor for the second element of the concept of ‘working 
time’ ‘is that the worker is required to be physically present at the 
place determined by the employer and to be available to the employer 
in order to be able to provide the appropriate services immediately in 
case of need (see, to that effect, judgment in Dellas and Others, 
C-14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 48, and orders in Vorel, 
C-437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 28, and Grigore, C-258/10, 
EU:C:2011:122, paragraph 63)’. 
e) The characteristic features of the concept of ‘working time’ within the 
meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC do not include the 
intensity of the work performed by the employee or that employee’s 
output (judgment of 1 December 2005, Dellas and Others, C-14/04, 
EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 43). 
f) Only time linked to the actual provision of services should be regarded 
as ‘working time’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/88/EC (see, 
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to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2003, Jaeger, C-151/02, 
EU:C:2003:437, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). 
On the basis of those criteria, this Social Division of the court believes it 
necessary to ask for a preliminary ruling because the action being brought in these 
proceedings is a group action, regulated by Chapter VIII of Title II of Book Two 
of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Social (the Law governing employment 
courts), which means that the ruling will affect all biodiversity personnel – 
previously called micro-reserve personnel and later Natura 2000 personnel – and 
all personnel within the Natura 2000 network. 
And, finally, it is necessary to raise the question in view of the arguments made by 
the applicant trade union and by the Generalitat Valenciana in response to the 
request made by this court after the trial, since both parties have reached contrary 
conclusions by invoking the same directive (Directive 2003/88/EC) and the same 
case-law of the CJEU. 
b) The point of view of the Social Division of the High Court of Justice of the 
Community of Valencia 
As has already been stated, this Social Division of the High Court of Justice of the 
Community of Valencia does not have a common position on the question that is 
the subject of this dispute, since, when interpreting the same EU case-law, it has 
reached contradictory conclusions when deciding on the two cases brought by 
VAERSA workers who provided services in the micro-reserves within the 
framework of the NATURA 2000 assignment. 
In judgment No 2696/2021 of 21 September 2021 (Case No 2966/2020), the claim 
submitted by two workers was dismissed on the grounds that ‘during the time they 
remain in the company vehicle on their way to the base from the work site, they 
are not at the employer’s disposal and in a position to perform their duties. A 
travel task is being carried out’. 
Whereas in Judgment No 3555/2021 of 3 December 2021 (Case No 581/2021), 
the opposite conclusion was reached, based on the following argument: ‘These are 
therefore journeys inherent to the company’s activity and inherent to the 
performance of the work, which are carried out using a company vehicle, with the 
point of departure and arrival being the company facilities of the Generalitat 
Valenciana’s forestry nursery located in Santa Faz. If at the beginning of each 
working day the worker must go to the base, take a vehicle and go to the work 
site, and at the end of the day must leave the work site and deposit the vehicle at 
the base, we must conclude that the journeys from the base to the work site and 
vice versa are working time, because during those periods the worker is at the 
disposal of the company and should be considered to be “at work” within the 
meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC.’ 
The doubt arises because, although it is true that during the journey from the work 
site to the base the workers are not carrying out their duties, neither can they 
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freely dispose of their time, as the journey must take place in a company vehicle, 
at a predetermined time and according to a timetable determined by the company. 
SIXTH.– Question referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for 
a preliminary ruling 
… 
Orders that the following question be referred to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time be interpreted as meaning that 
the time spent by workers travelling in the company’s vehicle at the beginning and 
end of the working day from the base to the micro-reserve or work site at which 
they carry out their duties and from there to the base constitutes ‘working time’ 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive? 
… [Closing procedural formulae]