Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2025:740
Date: 2025-07-14
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible
Origin: Ireland

summary financial statement, namely an amount of EUR 1 882 543.75 in respect of eligible costs and an amount of EUR 1 317 780.63 in respect of the contribution sought from the European Union. 12 By its pre-information letter of 7 August 2022, Eismea informed the applicant of the final grant amount. It also informed the applicant of its intention to recover the amount of EUR 224 856.71, corresponding to the difference between the sum of EUR 1 542 637.34 which EASME had paid in its favour (see paragraph 5 above) and the final grant amount. It stated that it intended to recover that amount by means of, on the one hand, the contribution paid to the PGF, in the amount of EUR 102 193.97, and, on the other, a recovery procedure, in the amount of EUR 122 662.74. 13 By debit note of 25 September 2022, together with a confirmation letter, Eismea asked the applicant to pay the sum of EUR 122 662.74 by 2 November 2022. 14 Since the applicant did not comply with the request for payment, Eismea sent a reminder on 9 November 2022 and the Commission issued a letter of formal notice on 5 December 2022. 15 As a result of the applicant’s failure to pay the debit note of 25 September 2022, the mutual insurance mechanism, which had succeeded the PGF and replaced it with effect as from 1 January 2021, intervened, in accordance with its mission of protecting the European Union’s financial interests, in order to satisfy the claim. Consequently, on 3 August 2023, a new debit note, replacing the debit note of 25 September 2022, was issued for the same amount (EUR 122 662.74). 16 On 12 October 2023, the applicant having failed to pay the sum claimed, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the applicant. 17 On 17 February 2024, since the amount claimed had not been repaid, the Commission adopted the contested decision concerning the recovery of the sum of EUR 122 662.74, together with default interest. Forms of order sought 18 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested decision; – grant an extension of time for the completion of the grant agreement and the provision of funding; – in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant in exercise of the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction; – make an order for the costs it incurred; – make any further or alternative order that the Court deems fit. 19 The Commission contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible; – in the alternative, dismiss the action for annulment as inadmissible in part, as regards the second, third and fifth heads of claim, and dismiss the action as to the remainder as lacking any foundation in law or, in any event, as unfounded; – order the applicant to pay the costs. Law 20 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where it is clear that the General Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 21 In the present case, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file, has decided – pursuant to that provision – to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. The Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the second and third heads of claim 22 By its second and third heads of claim, the applicant claims that the Court should, first, grant an extension of time for the completion of the grant agreement and the provision of funding and, second, reduce, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the amount of the fine imposed on it. The Commission considers that such requests do not fall within the jurisdiction of the General Court. 23 In that regard, so far as concerns the second head of claim, it is akin to asking the Court to order the Commission to grant an extension of time for the completion of the grant agreement and the provision of funding. It is sufficient to observe that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see order of 26 October 1995, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, EU:C:1995:360, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 24 As regards the third head of claim, submitted in the alternative and seeking that the Court order, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, a reduction in the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, it must be stated that it is not apparent from any material in the file that the Commission imposed a fine on the applicant. The applicant claims that, even if the Commission had the power to request it to pay the amounts the latter regarded as due and owing, those amounts are unlawful and excessive, and that the Court should reduce them by exercising its unlimited jurisdiction. It must therefore be held that, by its third head of claim, the applicant is in fact asking the Court to reduce the amount which is subject to recovery. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it is not for the Court, in an action for annulment, to substitute another act for the contested act or to amend it (see order of 11 January 2012, Ben Ali v Council, T‑301/11, not published, EU:T:2012:4, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 25 It follows that the second and third heads of claim of the application must be rejected on the ground that the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction. Admissibility of the first and fifth heads of claim 26 As regards the first head of claim, concerning the annulment of the contested decision, the Commission contends that it is inadmissible by virtue of Articles 21 and 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 76(d) and (f) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 27 In the present case, it should be recalled that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, an application must contain, inter alia, a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That information must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if appropriate without any further supporting information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic factual and legal particulars on which it is based be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2024, Norddeutsche Landesbank – Girozentrale v SRB, T‑403/21, EU:T:2024:485, paragraphs 278 and 279 (not published) and the case-law cited). 28 In the present case, it is sufficient to note that the precise purpose and scope of the first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision, are sufficiently clear from the application, which shows that the applicant raises two pleas in law. First, the applicant submits that the Commission infringed the grant agreement’s force majeure clause by failing to recognise the implied suspension of that agreement during the COVID-19 pandemic and by failing to take measures to limit damage, contrary to the agreement’s provisions. Second, it submits that, by refusing or failing to examine its request for extension pursuant to the ‘Frequently asked questions’ published in December 2020 (‘the FAQ’), which provided for ‘favourable and flexible treatment’, the Commission acted in breach of its own commitments set out in that document, since no time limit was indicated for requesting those extensions. 29 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the first head of claim is admissible in the light of the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. 30 As regards the fifth head of claim, by which the applicant asks the Court to rule on any point not raised which it considers relevant, it should be noted that that head of claim is general and imprecise, with the result that it clearly does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(e) of the Rules of Procedure. It must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. Substance 31 In its first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision, in the first place, the applicant submits that Article 49.1.1 of the grant agreement provides that the beneficiary has the right to suspend any part of its obligations ‘if exceptional circumstances – in particular force majeure – make implementation impossible or excessively difficult’. 32 The applicant adds that, in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic at the material time, the dealings between the parties during the term of the grant agreement demonstrate the existence of an implied term that the grant agreement had been suspended during the period of restrictions linked to that pandemic. That implied term between the applicant and the Commission complies with the suspension procedure, as set out in Article 49.2.2 of the grant agreement. 33 However, the applicant submits that at no time during the term of the grant agreement did the Commission inform it of its decision or of its intention to terminate that agreement on account of force majeure, which it was required to do under Article 50.3.1(d) of that agreement. 34 By failing to limit any damage resulting from force majeure and to facilitate the resumption of the application of the grant agreement as soon as possible, the Commission was manifestly in breach of Article 51 of the grant agreement. 35 Moreover, the final paragraph of Article 51 of the grant agreement provides that ‘the party prevented by force majeure from fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement cannot be considered in breach of them’. In light of the foregoing, the Commission erred in fact and law in finding the applicant liable for the sums referred to in Article 1 of the contested decision. 36 In the second place, the applicant submits that, in the FAQ, the Commission expressly stated that it would apply favourable and flexible treatment to the recipients of funds that had suffered adverse consequences, such as those suffered by the applicant, by granting extensions of the funding term provided for by the financing agreements, namely, in the present case, the grant agreement. The FAQ did not indicate any time limit for requesting the extensions. 37 In February 2022, the applicant claims that it applied to the Commission for an extension of time under the grant agreement, in accordance with the FAQ. That request was made approximately three months after the expiry of the term for drawing down funding set in the grant agreement. The Commission refused or failed to consider the merits of the application because it argued that it was made out of time. 38 In its findings, the Commission did not refer to its FAQ, in which it promised favourable and flexible treatment, but based its decision on a dubious inference which it had drawn from the wording of a clause of the grant agreement. The applicant’s reliance on the FAQ which was issued following the COVID-19 pandemic was never envisaged in the clause on which the Commission sought to rely. 39 In addition, the applicant submits that, even if it is found that the Commission’s interpretation of the grant agreement, according to which that agreement imposes a time limit on the applicant for applying for an extension pursuant to the FAQ, is correct, the force majeure clauses in the grant agreement apply and exonerate the applicant from the consequences of its failure to apply for an extension of time, since the applicant’s failure to comply with the alleged time limit is entirely due to the disruptions caused by the pandemic, which the Commission has accepted was a force majeure event. 40 The Commission disputes those arguments. 41 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that a decision enforceable within the meaning of Article 299 TFEU constitutes a challengeable act pursuant to Article 263 TFEU when that decision, in the absence of any contrary indication in the FEU Treaty, is among those referred to in Article 288 TFEU. The merits of such an enforceable decision can be disputed only before the court hearing the proceedings for annulment, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU (see judgment of 4 July 2017, Systema Teknolotzis v Commission, T‑234/15, EU:T:2017:461, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited). 42 According to Article 125(1)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1), applicable in the present case, Union contributions under direct, shared and indirect management help achieve a Union policy objective and the results specified and may take the form of reimbursement of eligible costs actually incurred. 43 In accordance with Article 5.2 of the grant agreement, the EU contribution was limited in the present case to 70% of the action’s eligible costs. 44 The conditions for costs to be eligible are set out in Article 6 of the grant agreement, which provides, inter alia, that costs must be incurred during the period set out in Article 3 (that is to say, the duration of the action) and must comply with the principle of sound financial management. Under Article 5.3 of the grant agreement, the final grant amount depends on the actual extent to which the action is implemented in accordance with that agreement, and it is calculated by Eismea on the basis of the eligible costs declared by the beneficiary (Article 20) and approved by it (Article 21). 45 In addition, under Article 21.4 of the grant agreement, if the total amount of earlier payments is greater than the final grant amount, payment of the balance is to take the form of a recovery. 46 It follows from those provisions that the EU grant is strictly limited to 70% of the eligible costs incurred during the period of implementation of the action and must comply with the principle of sound financial management. The final grant amount, determined by Eismea, depends on the actual implementation of the action. If the advances paid are greater than that amount, Eismea is entitled to recover the surplus. 47 In the present case, the applicant stated in its final report that it had completed the action. It submitted a summary financial statement showing eligible costs amounting to EUR 1 882 543.75 and, on that basis, applied for an EU contribution of EUR 1 317 781. Eismea’s evaluation report found that the project had been properly completed, thus validating all the costs declared, that is to say EUR 1 882 543.75, and consequently fixing the final grant at EUR 1 317 780.63. 48 Eismea therefore accepted all the costs declared by the applicant in its final summary financial statement. In those circumstances, the final grant amount corresponded to the amount requested by the applicant. 49 Moreover, the applicant does not call into question the calculation of the final grant amount. Nor does it dispute the principle that the Commission is entitled to recover the difference between the final grant amount and the sums already received by way of advances, provided that those advances were greater than the subsidy ultimately granted. 50 In that context, as the Commission correctly observes, if the applicant intended to rely on additional expenditure incurred after the completion of the action, those costs could not have been accepted as eligible, under Article 6 of the grant agreement. 51 In the first place, the applicant submits that the dealings between the parties during the term of the grant agreement demonstrate the existence of an implied term that the grant agreement had been suspended during the period of restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. That implied term complies with the suspension procedure, as set out in Article 49.2.2 of the grant agreement. The applicant also complains that the Commission did not limit its own damage or facilitate the resumption of the implementation/application of the agreement, in breach of Article 51, which refers to the concept of ‘force majeure’. 52 In that regard, Article 49.1.1 of the grant agreement provides that the beneficiary may suspend, or suspend in part, the implementation of the action if exceptional circumstances – in particular force majeure – make implementation impossible or excessively difficult. 53 Moreover, in accordance with the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 49.1.2 of the grant agreement, (i) ‘the beneficiary must immediately formally notify to [Eismea] the suspension (see Article 52), stating … the reasons why and … the expected date of resumption’, (ii) ‘the suspension [takes] effect the day [the] notification is received by [Eismea]’ and (iii) ‘once circumstances allow for implementation to resume, the beneficiary must immediately formally notify [Eismea] and request an amendment of the Agreement to set the date on which the action will be resumed, extend the duration of the action and make other changes necessary to adapt the action to the new situation (see Article 55) – unless the Agreement has been terminated (see Article 50)’. 54 In the present case, it is not clear from the file that the applicant had informed Eismea of its intention to suspend the implementation of the action pursuant to Article 49.1.2 of the grant agreement during the course of the action or that it had formally notified Eismea of the suspension. Moreover, it is apparent from the periodic report for the second period and from the final report, in which the applicant describes the uninterrupted implementation of the action and declares costs for its entire duration, that no suspension was requested and put in place. 55 As regards the applicant’s argument that the dealings between it and its contracting partner during the term of the grant agreement demonstrate the existence of an implied term providing for the suspension of that agreement during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is sufficient to note that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of such a term. 56 In addition, according to the fifth paragraph of Article 49.1.2 of the grant agreement, ‘costs incurred during suspension of the action implementation are not eligible’. 57 Therefore, as the Commission correctly observes, the applicant thus cannot, at the same time, declare costs for the alleged period of suspension and claim that the implementation of the action was interrupted, and, even supposing that such a suspension had taken place, which has not been established, the applicant would be required to reimburse an even greater amount, since the costs incurred during that period would not be eligible. 58 As regards force majeure, paragraph 1 of Article 51 of the grant agreement defines it as ‘any situation or event that … prevents either party from fulfilling their obligations under the Agreement, … was [an] unforeseeable, exceptional situation … beyond the parties’ control, … was not due to error or negligence on their part (or on the part of third parties involved in the action), and … proves to be inevitable in spite of exercising all due diligence’. 59 The applicant merely refers to the COVID‑19 pandemic as a situation of force majeure, without demonstrating how the obligations arising from the grant agreement were breached. That imprecision is all the more noteworthy given that Eismea found that the action had been successfully completed (see paragraph 10 above). Furthermore, as the Commission maintains, the concept of force majeure was invoked for the first time by a Member of the European Parliament on 24 October 2022, that is to say, almost one year after the end of the action, whereas paragraph 3 of Article 51 of the grant agreement provides, inter alia, that any situation constituting force majeure must be formally notified to the other party without delay. 60 Consequently, the arguments put forward in support of a breach of Article 51 of the grant agreement must be rejected. 61 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument, based on the FAQ, that the Commission should, at the very least, have applied the ‘favourable and flexible treatment’ set out in the FAQ and granted it an extension of the term of the grant agreement, that argument clearly cannot succeed either. First, the FAQ relied on by the applicant has not been submitted to the file, with the result that the applicant’s claim cannot be verified and, in any event, there is nothing to indicate that it may have had an impact on the interpretation of the provisions of the grant agreement. 62 In any event, second, assuming that that FAQ provided that Eismea could grant an extension of the term of the grant agreements to any undertaking affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, it should be noted that the applicant submitted its request for an extension of the action more than three months after the expiry of the grant agreement (see paragraph 7 above). 63 In those circumstances, the pleas relating to an alleged misapplication of the clauses of the grant agreement, in particular those relating to a situation of force majeure, and to the FAQ must therefore be rejected as manifestly unfounded. As regards the applicant’s argument that the late submission of its request for extension of the action results from the COVID-19 pandemic – which amounts to a force majeure situation – it is sufficient to note that the applicant has failed to explain how that pandemic prevented it from submitting such an application before the expiry of the grant agreement. 64 Moreover, the applicant claims, in the alternative, that, even if the Commission has the power to request it to pay the amounts the latter regarded as due and owing, those amounts are unlawful and excessive, which should, in its opinion, lead the Court to annul the contested decision. Assuming that that argument may indeed be linked to the first head of claim, it should be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 65 Since the final grant amount was less than the total of the previous payments made by EASME to the applicant, the amount of which is not disputed by the applicant (namely, EUR 1 542 637.34), Eismea, on the basis of Article 21.4 of the grant agreement, claimed payment of the balance. On that ground, Eismea requested the applicant to reimburse the sum of EUR 122 662.74. As noted in paragraph 49 above, the applicant does not call into question either the calculation of the final grant amount or the principle that the Commission is entitled to recover advances in excess of the funding ultimately granted. 66 It follows that the first head of claim must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 67 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in part on the ground that the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it, in part as manifestly inadmissible and in part as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Costs 68 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Pinpoint Innovations Ltd shall pay the costs. Luxembourg, 14 July 2025. V. Di Bucci R. da Silva Passos Registrar President * Language of the case: English.