Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:1998:547
Date: 1998-11-19
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Quotas - third countries;External relations;Commercial policy
Concepts: Statement of reasons;Intervention;General;Principle of equality and non-discrimination;Principle of proportionality;Imports, exports and quantitative quotas
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: United Kingdom

summary 
form satisfies the requirements of Article 190 
of the Treaty, when the initial application has 
been approved, the decision reducing the 
amount of assistance originally granted entails 
more serious consequences for the applicant 
and must therefore clearly state the grounds 
justifying that reduction. 
184. I would point out that, like Regulation 
No 519/94, Regulation N o 1921/94 is an act 
of general application and not a decision. 
185. Consequently, it had to satisfy the obli­
gation to give reasons as laid down in the 
Beus judgment, cited above in section 39. That 
obligation could, where appropriate, vary 
according to the details given in the judg­
ments quoted in sections 40 and 41 above. 
Therefore the statement of reasons could at 
first merely have set out, on the one hand, the 
overall situation which had led to the adop­
tion of the act and, on the other, the general 
objectives which that act was intended to 
attain. 
59 — Case C-358/90 Compagnia Italiana Alcool v Commission 
[1992] ECR I-2457, paragraph 42. 
60 — Third recital in the preamble. 
61 — Judgment cited above, paragraph 41. 
62 — Case C-181/90 Consorgan v Commission [1992] ECR I-3557. 
63 — Paragraphs 15, 16 and 18. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASES C-150/94 AND C-284/94 
186. The preamble to Regulation N o 1921/94 
contains the following reasons: 
— Regulation N o 519/94 subjected imports 
of a limited number of products to Com­
munity quantitative quotas, owing to the 
sensitivity of certain sectors of Commu­
nity industry (first recital); 
— the Council, in setting the level of these 
quotas, strove to find a balance between 
an appropriate level of protection for the 
sectors of the Community industry con­
cerned and the need to maintain an accept­
able level of trade with China, taking into 
account the various interests involved (sec­
ond recital); 
— however, in the case of toys falling within 
C N Code 9503 41, the implementation 
and administration of the quota have 
revealed that this objective has not been 
achieved in an entirely satisfactory way in 
1994; disruptions have occurred in trade 
with China that have affected Community 
economic sectors involved in the import, 
marketing and processing of those toys 
originating in that country and caused 
economic difficulties (third recital); 
— in view of this, and without prejudice to 
a review of the situation, the quota in 
question should be adjusted upwards for 
the year 1994, in order to ease the transi­
tion between the previous import regime 
and the regime established by Regulation 
N o 519/94 (fourth recital). 
187. The regulation contains, therefore, a per­
fectly clear description of the overall situa­
tion. In particular, it notes the existence of a 
problem in the transition to the new regime 
under Regulation N o 519/94 which appeared 
at the time when that measure entered into 
force. It necessarily follows from the wording 
of the recitals in the preamble that the quota 
set for toys falling under H S / C N Code 
9503 41 proved insufficient to satisfy the needs 
of Community traders involved in imports 
during the period from 15 March to 31 
December 1994, taking into account quite 
clearly the volume of transactions in progress 
and short-term commitments. As the fourth 
recital indicates, the regulation simply 'adjusts' 
the quota in question for that transitional 
period only. 
188. Furthermore, Regulation N o 1921/94 
explains unambiguously the objective it pur­
sues. It seeks to achieve a balance between an 
appropriate level of protection for the sectors 
of the Community industry concerned and 
the need to maintain an acceptable level of 
trade with China, taking into account the 
various interests involved. The objective is 
the same as that pursued in that respect by 
Regulation N o 519/94, but which the latter 
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UNITED KINGDOM v COUNCIL 
did not fully attain as regards the toys in 
question. 
189. Consequently, the Council did fulfil the 
obligation to state reasons imposed on it by 
the judgment in Bern, cited above. It did not 
have to provide in addition specific factual 
details justifying the extent of the temporary 
increase in the quota, that is to say the tech­
nical choice made. 64 
190. The two judgments specifically relied 
upon by the Kingdom of Spain are not rel­
evant to the circumstances of this case. 
191. They both concern decisions. The obli­
gation to state the reasons for a decision is 
frequently wider than the obligation to state 
the reasons for an act of general application. 
192. When the Court, in its judgment in Case 
C-358/90 Compagnia Italiana Alcool v Com­
mission, cited above, emphasises that a deci­
sion must 'state the effect' of the factors which 
influenced its adoption, it is referring to the 
amount of further detail which a decision 
must contain relating to the position of the 
individual(s) specifically affected by that deci­
sion. That requirement is not to be found in 
the rules concerning the obligation to give 
reasons for acts of general application. I would 
add for the sake of completeness that the 
statements in Regulation N o 1921/94 to the 
effect that '... disruptions have occurred in 
trade with the People's Republic of China 
that have affected Community economic sec­
tors involved in the import, marketing and 
processing of ... toys originating in that 
country and caused economic difficulties' 65 
do not constitute 'factual observations'. Those 
statements clearly imply that the original 
quota did not enable the needs of traders 
involved in imports to be satisfied to a suf­
ficient extent in 1994. 
193. Quite apart from the fact that Consorgan 
v Commission, cited above, concerns a deci­
sion, it relates to a situation in which that 
decision had overturned an earlier decision 
which had granted a certain amount of assis­
tance to an individual and thus given rise to a 
legitimate expectation that the sum in ques­
tion would actually be paid over. In the present 
case, the contested regulation, far from 
depriving a trader of individual rights which 
had been recognised in principle, merely 
increases for all traders operating in the sector 
in question the degree of competition liable to 
be created by Chinese products. To my mind, 
therefore, there can be no question of applying 
by analogy the principle laid down in the 
judgment referred to. 
64 — Sec Eridania and Others, cited above, at the end of para­
graph 38. 65 — Third recital in the preamble. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASES C-150/94 AND C-284/94 
194. In those circumstances, the ground 
alleging breach of Article 190 of the Treaty 
must be rejected. 
Breach of the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectation 
195. The Kingdom of Spain considers that 
the Community legislature disregarded the 
legitimate expectations entertained by traders 
regarding the level of protection under Regu­
lation N o 519/94. In its view, the Council 
failed to take account of the position of the 
traders concerned who, in the absence of a 
change in the original circumstances, saw the 
status quo established by the earlier regula­
tion altered in a very short space of time, 
without reference to any higher public interest. 
According to the applicant, any prudent and 
well-informed trader cannot be required to 
foresee a change depriving the previous quota 
of all substance, barely four months after it 
was introduced. Finally, it maintains, Regula­
tion N o 1921/94 caused serious damage to all 
Community traders who had terminated or 
delayed their contracts by reason of the initial 
regulation. 
196. Moreover, it claims that in its defence 
the Council provides no evidence either that 
the traders had no such expectations or that 
a higher public interest warranted disregarding 
those expectations. 
197. Before requesting the Court to reject 
that plea as unfounded, the defendant ques­
tions whether it is open to a Member State to 
plead a breach of traders' legitimate expecta­
tions. 
198. On that point, I consider that a Member 
State, as a privileged applicant, may plead a 
breach of the legitimate expectations of the 
traders concerned, as it may plead the breach 
of any other rule of Community law. It is 
difficult in my view to make a Member State's 
right to put forward a particular plea depend 
on the existence of a specific interest. Would 
such an approach, if applied to other pleas in 
law, not be likely to cause awkward and 
unnecessary problems in practice? Above all, 
it would inevitably restrict the scope for 
review of the legality of a measure. That 
would be an unfortunate result for natural 
and legal persons, whose access to the Com­
munity judicature is limited by Article 173 of 
the Treaty. 
199. Before I consider this ground of annul­
ment, I would note that the burden of proving 
that it is well founded in the circumstances of 
the case clearly falls on the applicant. In its 
pleadings, the latter may not therefore seek to 
reverse the burden of proof by claiming that 
the Council should provide all relevant evi­
dence, some of it, moreover, negative. 66 
66 — Sec section 196 above. 
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UNITED KINGDOM v COUNCIL 
200. As the Council points out, the Court 
has already explained the limits of the prin­
ciple of the protection of legitimate expecta­
tion where Article 113 of the Treaty applies: 
'Since Community institutions enjoy a margin 
of discretion in the choice of the means needed 
to achieve their policies, traders are unable to 
claim that they have a legitimate expectation 
that an existing situation which is capable of 
being altered by decisions taken by those 
institutions within the limits of their discre­
tionary power will be maintained.' 67 
201. Competing Community toy producers 
cannot plead a vested right to the mainte­
nance of an advantage which they derive from 
the introduction of quotas by Regulation N o 
519/94. 68 Quota adjustments form part of 
the actual pursuit of commercial policy. In 
particular, increasing a quota merely raises 
the level of competition on the Community 
market; it does not diminish the positive 
expectations of Community producers. Ulti­
mately, alterations in quantitative restrictions 
constitute economic risks inherent in the sec­
tors covered by those restrictions. 
202. I would observe that the Kingdom of 
Spain does not expressly refer to the position 
of Community producers. 
203. Strangely, it refers instead to the posi­
tion of traders concerned with imports from 
China when it mentions the serious harm suf­
fered by Community traders who, on account 
of the original regulation, had terminated or 
delayed their contracts. By definition, only 
traders concerned with imports could have 
been obliged to reduce the volume of their 
transactions as a result of the introduction of 
quotas under Regulation N o 519/94. Their 
expectations were not diminished, but on the 
contrary raised anew, by Regulation N o 
1921/94. Accordingly, that situation in no 
way constitutes a breach of the principle of 
the protection of legitimate expectation. 
204. In short, the contested regulation could 
have adversely affected competing Commu­
nity producers only as regards some of their 
prospects, but in a context and from a point 
of view unrelated to the concept of legitimate 
expectation. 
205. It merely adjusted the level of one of the 
quotas set by Regulation N o 519/94, having 
regard to information which came to light 
when that regulation was brought into opera­
tion. 69 
67 — Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 
68 — Sec, by analogy, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Com­
mission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 34. 
69 — For a similar case of amendments to safeguard measures 
within one and the same year, see the Dürbeck judgment, 
cited above, paragraph 36. 
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASES C-150/94 AND C-284/94 
206. The second ground of annulment put 
forward by the Kingdom of Spain must there­
fore be rejected. 
Costs 
207. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Pro­
cedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered 
to pay the costs, if they have been applied for 
in the successful party's pleadings. Article 
69(4) provides that the Member States and 
institutions which intervene in the proceed­
ings are to bear their own costs. 
208. Those provisions should be applied to 
the two cases under consideration. 
209. In Case C-150/94, the United Kingdom 
should consequently be ordered to bear, in 
addition to its own costs, those incurred by 
the Council, while the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Commission should as interveners bear their 
own costs. 
210. In Case C-284/94, the Kingdom of Spain 
should be ordered to bear, in addition to its 
own costs, those incurred by the Council, 
while the Commission should as intervener 
bear its own costs. 
Conclusion 
211. I therefore p ropose that the C o u r t give judgment as follows: 
In Case C-150/94 
(1) T h e application is dismissed. 
(2) T h e Uni t ed K i n g d o m is o rdered to p a y the costs incurred b y the Counc i l , and 
to bear its o w n costs . 
(3) T h e Federal Republ ic of Germany , the K i n g d o m of Spain and the C o m m i s s i o n 
are to bear their o w n costs . 
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UNITED KINGDOM v COUNCIL 
In Case C-284/94 
(1) The application is dismissed. 
(2) The Kingdom of Spain is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Council, 
and to bear its own costs. 
(3) The Commission is to bear its own costs. 
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