Order — ECLI:EU:F:2015:87
Date: 2015-07-15
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Third Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded

Summary 1. Officials — Obligation of administration to provide assistance — Scope — Limits — Criminal proceedings against an official (Staff Regulations, Art. 24) 2. Actions brought by officials — Assessment of the legality of the contested measure in the light of the law and facts existing at the time when it was adopted (Staff Regulations, Art. 91) 3. Officials — Decision adversely affecting an official — Obligation to state reasons — Scope (Art. 296, second para., TFEU; Staff Regulations, Art. 25, second para.) 1. The purpose of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is to provide officials and other servants with protection both at the present time and in the future in order to enable them to carry out their duties better in the general interest of the service. An institution’s duty to provide assistance is therefore intended both to protect its staff and to safeguard its own interests, and is thus based on the premise of shared interests. Consequently, the administration cannot be required to assist an official who is suspected of having seriously breached his professional obligations and is thereby liable to disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, Article 24 of the Staff Regulations requires the administration to intervene with all the necessary vigour when faced with an incident which is incompatible with the good order and tranquillity of the service. More specifically, the duty to provide assistance laid down in Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is concerned with the defence of officials, by their institution, against acts of third parties and not against acts of the institution itself, the review of which falls under other provisions of the Staff Regulations. In that regard, in a situation where an institution is a civil party in criminal proceedings brought against an official by national authorities for acts capable of having constituted fraud of the Communities’ budget, the institution is pursuing an interest which conflicts with that of the official concerned. Consequently, and regardless of the alleged role of third parties in those proceedings, the institution can, without infringing Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, refuse to provide the official with assistance in the criminal proceedings against him on account of the steps taken or accusations made in the context of those proceedings. (see paras 32, 33) See: Judgments of 17 December 1981 in Bellardi-Ricci and Others v Commission, 178/80, EU:C:1981:310, para. 23; and 12 June 1986 in Sommerlatte v Commission, 229/84, EU:C:1986:241, para. 19 Judgment of 27 June 2000 in K v Commission, T‑67/99, EU:T:2000:169, para. 35 Judgments of 23 November 2010 in Wenig v Commission, F‑75/09, EU:F:2010:150, para. 49; 20 July 2011 in Gozi v Commission, F‑116/10, EU:F:2011:124, para. 12; and 26 March 2015 in CW v Parliament, F‑124/13, EU:F:2015:23, para. 37 and the case-law cited therein, on appeal before the General Court of the European Union, Case T‑309/15 P 2. The legality of a measure must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of law and of fact existing at the time when the contested measure was adopted. That principle in judicial proceedings means that any subsequent development which is favourable to the person concerned may not, in any event, be taken into account when assessing the legality of that measure. (see para. 34) See: Judgment of 13 March 2013 in Inglewood and Others v Parliament, T‑229/11 and T‑276/11, EU:T:2013:127, para. 72 and the case-law cited therein 3. Although the statement of reasons for an act adversely affecting an official must indicate clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution concerned, it must be assessed on the basis of the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not, moreover, necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if it was adopted in circumstances known to that person which enable him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him. It follows that a statement of reasons is sufficient provided that it sets out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision, and that the administration is not required to give the grounds for its reasoning. In any event, the statement of reasons for a measure must be sufficient but not exhaustive, and it is sufficient for the administration to set out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision. Consequently, the inaccuracy of one element of the statement of reasons which is not decisive does not affect the validity of the contested measure. (see paras 38, 39, 41) See: Judgments of 25 November 1976 in Küster v Parliament, 123/75, EU:C:1976:162, para. 33; and 22 December 2008 in Régie Networks, C‑333/07, EU:C:2008:764, para. 70 Judgment of 11 July 2007 in Sison v Council, T‑47/03, EU:T:2007:207, para. 188 and the case-law cited therein Judgments of 29 September 2011 in AJ v Commission, F‑80/10, EU:F:2011:172, para. 117 and the case-law cited therein; and 6 March 2013 in Scheefer v Parliament, F‑41/12, EU:F:2013:31, para. 30