Order — ECLI:EU:C:2026:64
Date: 2026-02-03
Language of the case: English

ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 3 February 2026 (*) ( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed ) In Case C‑620/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 18 September 2025, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health Co. Ltd, established in Guangzhou (China), represented by P. Groß, Rechtsanwalt, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, Multi Access Ltd, established in Road Town (British Virgin Islands), intervener at first instance, THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, N. Jääskinen and R. Frendo (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, J. Kokott, makes the following Order 1 By its appeal, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health Co. Ltd seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 9 July 2025, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO – Multi Access (Representation of three Chinese characters) (T‑128/24, ‘the contested judgment’, EU:T:2025:684), by which the General Court dismissed its action for annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 December 2023 (Case R 329/2023-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health and Multi Access Ltd. The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed 2 Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3 The third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute provides that an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 4 Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request. 5 In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is to rule as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed in the form of a reasoned order. Arguments of the appellant 6 In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant relies on eight pleas, by which it submits that its appeal raises issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. 7 By its first plea in law, the appellant criticises the General Court for having, in paragraphs 25 to 37 and 94 to 100 of the contested judgment, rejected as inadmissible the evidence annexed to its application and intended to demonstrate the alleged bad faith of the intervener at first instance at the time of filing the application for registration of the contested mark. 8 It submits that that evidence is directly linked to the ground for invalidity based on bad faith, as provided for in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), a ground which it had relied on in the invalidity proceedings before EUIPO. It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the assessment of bad faith requires all the relevant circumstances to be taken into account (judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraphs 43 to 47). The appellant thus criticises the General Court for having disregarded that case-law requirement, so that the General Court cannot disregard the evidence in question on the sole ground that it was produced for the first time before it or that it was not presented before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO. 9 Accordingly, the General Court infringed the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the appellant’s right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It also misinterpreted Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The appellant therefore considers that the first plea raises a fundamental legal question, namely whether the General Court may reject evidence seeking to establish the existence of an absolute ground for invalidity that had already been raised before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO. 10 By its second plea in law, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 38 to 52 of the contested judgment, the General Court unlawfully restricted its examination of the question relating to the ‘true proprietor of the trade mark’. It criticises the General Court for having refused to assess the claim that the intervener at first instance followed a strategy of systematic filing of applications for registration of the contested mark, even though such conduct constitutes, according to the case-law, a significant indication that the applicant was acting in bad faith (judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 42). The appellant considers that the question whether arguments essential to demonstrating bad faith may be rejected on grounds relating to the organisation of the proceedings before the various adjudicating bodies of EUIPO is important in order to ensure the consistency of the case-law of the EU Courts. 11 By its third plea in law, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 114 to 117 of the contested judgment, that extending the protection of a national trade mark by registering it as an EU trade mark was part of a normal commercial strategy, without taking into account the existence, in the present case, of a contractual obligation not to file an application for registration of the contested mark. In that regard, it submits that, according to the case-law, even where conduct may be economically explicable, it may nevertheless be dictated by malicious intent (judgment of 29 January 2020, Sky and Others, C‑371/18, EU:C:2020:45, paragraph 75). 12 By its fourth plea in law, the appellant claims that the General Court failed to carry out a global assessment of the evidence submitted in order to establish bad faith on the part of the intervener at first instance, in that it examined that evidence in isolation and based its assessment solely on the existence of a ‘normal commercial logic’. According to the appellant, clarification of the question whether the obligation to carry out an overall assessment of bad faith, within the meaning of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, is complied with in such a context is of crucial importance for the unity and consistency of EU law. 13 By its fifth plea in law, the appellant submits, referring to paragraphs 87 to 92 and 98 to 112 of the contested judgment, that the General Court confined itself to a purely formal reference to the earlier registrations of a mark by the intervener at first instance in France and the United Kingdom and to the ‘first to file’ principle, without examining the question of the ‘true owner’ of the mark in the context of a ‘global assessment’. Accordingly, the General Court restricted the scope of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, thus undermining the uniform application of EU law. 14 By its sixth plea in law, the appellant criticises the General Court for having applied the ‘first to file’ principle in a contradictory manner, in that, in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the contested judgment, it relied on that principle in order to rule out the existence of bad faith on the part of the intervener at first instance concerning national trade marks registered in France and the United Kingdom, while stating, in paragraphs 91 and 92 of that judgment, that that principle does not apply where a trade mark application is filed in bad faith. Such reasoning, described by the appellant as a ‘circular’, presupposes that good faith justifies the first filing and thus neutralises the independent examination of bad faith. Since the ‘first to file’ principle is laid down in the context of the provisions relating to the relative grounds for refusal of registration of a mark and not to the absolute grounds for that refusal, such as bad faith on the part of the appellant, the question relating to the relationship between those two grounds for refusal should be clarified. 15 By its seventh plea in law, the appellant claims that the General Court infringed its obligation to assess all the relevant factors in order to determine whether the intervener at first instance acted in bad faith by holding, in paragraphs 106 to 111 of the contested judgment, that the decisions of the Chinese and Philippine authorities and courts were irrelevant. It submits that the question which arises is whether the autonomy of EU trade mark law is sufficient to generally exclude the taking into account of foreign decisions. 16 By its eighth plea in law, the appellant submits that the General Court carried out a contradictory assessment of the foreign decisions referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present order. It found, in paragraph 95 of the contested judgment, that the appellant’s group of companies should have known that the intervener at first instance was using the marks concerned, but refused to accept, in paragraph 109 of that judgment, that that party had acted dishonestly, even though that is apparent from those foreign decisions. In so far as that analysis disregards the principles of global assessment and equal treatment, the appellant considers that clarification by the Court of Justice is necessary in order to avoid any contradiction in the application of EU trade mark law. Findings of the Court 17 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 15). 18 Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 16). 19 Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each plea in law, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the contested judgment or order, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the contested judgment or order. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the contested judgment or order which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 17). 20 A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot, from the outset, be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (order of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). 21 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the line of argument summarised in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the present order, relating to the General Court’s treatment of the evidence produced for the first time before it, it must be held that the appellant merely sets out errors of law allegedly committed by the General Court, without, however, setting out specifically the reasons why those errors, even if established, raise issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 22 In particular, as regards, first of all, the claim that the General Court disregarded the case-law of the Court of Justice, it should be noted that such a claim is not sufficient, in itself, to establish, in accordance with the burden of proof incumbent on the appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. The appellant must comply to that end with all the requirements set out in paragraph 19 of the present order (order of 15 December 2025, Abacus Research v EUIPO, C‑610/25 P, EU:C:2025:974, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). Although the appellant identifies both the contested paragraphs of the contested judgment and those of the case-law of the Court of Justice which is allegedly infringed, it has failed to demonstrate the specific reasons why that alleged failure raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 23 Next, as regards the alleged infringement by the General Court of its obligation to state reasons, it must be borne in mind that, while it is true that a failure to state reasons or an inadequate statement of reasons constitutes an error of law which may be relied on in the context of an appeal, an appeal is nevertheless allowed to proceed subject to compliance with the specific conditions set out in paragraph 19 of the present order, consisting of the appellant demonstrating that the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the appellant does not put forward any reason why the absence or inadequacy of the statement of reasons in the contested judgment, even if proved, would raise such a question. 24 Lastly, as regards the appellant’s argument relating to the infringement of its right to effective judicial protection, as guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be noted, without prejudice to the important place occupied by that right within the EU legal order, that a mere allegation of its infringement is not sufficient to establish that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, since the appellant must comply, to that end, with all the requirements set out in paragraph 19 of the present order (see, by analogy, order of 11 September 2025, Hecht Pharma v EUIPO, C‑152/25 P, EU:C:2025:728, paragraph 23). It must be stated that that is clearly not the case here. 25 In the second place, as regards the line of argument summarised in paragraphs 10 to 16 of the present order, it must be noted that the appellant merely makes various claims by which it disputes the General Court’s assessment concerning the alleged bad faith of the intervener at first instance and the factors that may be taken into account for that purpose. That line of argument is manifestly too general to constitute a demonstration meeting the requirements set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the present order, since it relates more to the resolution of the substance of the dispute at issue than to whether the appeal raises issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 26 Furthermore, as regards the arguments referred to in paragraphs 12, 15 and 16 of the present order, it must be held that the appellant seeks to call into question factual assessments made by the General Court with regard to the evidence produced before it. However, such arguments cannot demonstrate that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 1 October 2025, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma v EUIPO, C‑44/25 P, EU:C:2025:740, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 27 In those circumstances, the Court of Justice finds that the request submitted by the appellant that the appeal be allowed to proceed is not capable of establishing that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 28 In the light of the foregoing, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed. Costs 29 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 30 Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed. 2. Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health Co. Ltd shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 3 February 2026. A. Calot Escobar T. von Danwitz Registrar President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed * Language of the case: English.