Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil; 2019-06-12; ROJ ATS 6417/2019
Decision by national courts in the field of European Union law — ECLI:ES:TS:2019:6417A
Date: 2019-06-12
Subject matter: Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Origin: Spain

82019ES0612(51)_ENG_SUMJURE
JURE summary
JURE summary
This case regards a question of the admissibility of a cassation appeal brought before the Tribunal Supremo (hereinafter ‘the Supreme Court’).
The dispute originated in a traffic accident, in which a moped driver (hereinafter ‘the defendant’) hit and injured a pedestrian (hereinafter ‘the plaintiff) who was crossing the road, and subsequently the moped crashed into a parked car and damaged it.
The plaintiff requested compensation for his injury in proceedings initiated before by the Juzgado de Primera Instancia n.º 7 de La Coruña (hereinafter ‘the Court of First Instance’) which further continued before the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Sección tercera) (hereinafter ‘the Court of Appeal’). The dispute was closed on the second instance by a decision according to which both parties have responsibility for the accident since the plaintiff ignored the red traffic light and the defendant, despite not speeding and having reduced visibility due to local circumstances, did not pay sufficient attention to driving as he had not even used his brakes. The Court of Appeal, therefore, reduced the requested amount by 50%.
The defendant filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court based on several grounds. Firstly, the defendant alleged the sole responsibility of the plaintiff due to his ignorance of traffic rules (red light). The Supreme Court recalled that a cassation appeal does not constitute a third instance, i. e. the review of the assessment of the evidence made by the Court of Appeal is not admissible. The cassation appeal must respect the facts stated in the judgment under appeal, which was not the case here since the Court of Appeal clearly concluded the shared responsibility for the accident, while the defendant refers to the sole responsibility of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court dismissed this ground of appeal.
The defendant further claimed the termination of the current proceedings due to res iudicata principle, since the same traffic accident was already previously resolved by the Court of First Instance. The Supreme Court dismissed this ground of appeal too, explaining that the previous proceedings to which the defendant refers to concerned the material damage caused to the owner of the parked vehicle, whilst the current proceedings regard the personal injury of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court denied also the grounds of appeal in which the defendant alleged an erroneous assessment of expert’s forensic evidence provided to the Court of Appeal. The court must value the expert evidence according to the rules of sound criticism, without being obliged to accept the opinion of the experts, moreover, if the experts were called by the parties and not appointed by the court itself. The Supreme Court found no signs of illegal or irrational valuation of expert opinion by the Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court partially admitted the grounds of appeal related to a procedural infringement related to Articles 469 to 473 of the LEC (1). The defendant argued that the total amount of the compensation was counted wrongly, which was acknowledged also by the plaintiff who itself admitted that the total amount should be reduced. This was not sufficiently considered by the Court of Appeal and therefore not all grounds of admissibility of the appeal were assessed properly.
The Supreme Court held the cassation appeal partially admissible and set 20 days from the date of notification of its decision to lodge a written objection to the claim.
(1) Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC) (Code of Civil Procedure).