Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:313
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: Dutch

Summary C-249/25 – 1 
Case C-249/25 [Jilin] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
2 April 2025 
Referring court: 
Raad van State (Netherlands) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
2 April 2025 
Appellant: 
Minister van Asiel en Migratie 
Respondent:  
UB 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
The foreign national UB (‘the foreign national’) lodged an appeal with the 
rechtbank (District Court), alleging that the minister van Asiel en Migratie 
(Minister for Asylum and Migration; ‘the Minister’) had failed to take a timely 
decision on his asylum application. The District Court declared this appeal well-
founded and ruled that the Minister must take a decision within eight weeks. The 
Minister lodged an appeal against this judgment with the referring court, the Raad 
van State (Council of State). 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
This request under Article 267 TFEU concerns the question of how the decision 
time limits set out in Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60; 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-249/25 
 
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‘Directive 2013/32’) apply in the case of a foreign national who has lodged an 
application for international protection but also benefits from temporary 
protection under Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum 
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between 
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof 
(OJ 2001 L 212, p. 12; ‘Directive 2001/55’). 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
Question 1: Must Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (OJ 2001 L 212) be 
interpreted as conferring on Member States the power to suspend the examination 
of an application for international protection of a person enjoying temporary 
protection, during the period of temporary protection? 
Question 2: Must the decision time limits in Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU 
(OJ 2013 L 180) be interpreted as meaning that, where an application for 
international protection was made before or during the period of temporary 
protection by a beneficiary of Directive 2001/55/EC, those time limits only start 
running or only resume running at the end of the period of temporary protection? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 
Article 31(5) of Directive 2013/32 
Article 2(1)(c) Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 
establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine 
within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of 
introducing temporary protection (‘Implementing Decision 2022/382’) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The foreign national has Chinese nationality. He stated that he lived in Ukraine 
from 2009 to 2014, and from 2018 until his departure in February 2022. He 
married a Ukrainian woman on 5 May 2012 and they have a son. The foreign 
national entered the Netherlands with his wife and child on 7 March 2022 and 
lodged an asylum application on 13 April 2022. His wife and child are not part of 
this procedure. The parties agree that the foreign national qualifies for temporary 
protection under Directive 2001/55 because he is a family member of a Ukrainian 
national as referred to in Article 2(1)(c) of Implementing Decision 2022/382. 
2 The Minister initially started examining the asylum application. When he found 
out that the foreign national was eligible for temporary protection, he informed 
him that his asylum application would not be examined further. By letter of 
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16 January 2024, the foreign national put the Minister on notice for failing to take 
a timely decision on his asylum application. As the Minister subsequently failed to 
take a decision within two weeks, the foreign national lodged an appeal with the 
District Court, requesting it to order the Minister again to take a decision within 
two weeks. 
3 At first instance, the District Court considered that in all cases the 21-month time 
limit set out in Article 31(5) of Directive 2013/32 begins at the time of the asylum 
application and must be complied with even if temporary protection has already 
been granted. The Minister should thus have taken a decision on the asylum 
application in January 2024. Since this had not happened, the District Court 
ordered the Minister to issue a decision within eight weeks. The Minister lodged 
an appeal against this ruling of the District Court. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
4 The Minister argues that the District Court interpreted the relationship between 
Directive 2001/55 and Directive 2013/32 incorrectly. He points to the independent 
basis and exceptional nature of Directive 2001/55 and to the fact that this 
Directive is at the service of the Common European Asylum System (‘CEAS’), in 
the sense that it is a tool to ensure that, in the event of a mass influx, the CEAS 
functions properly and does not collapse. According to the Minister, it follows 
neither from the text nor from the rationale behind Directive 2013/32 that the time 
limits set out therein also apply to the exceptional situation regulated by Directive 
2001/55. In addition, the Minister argues that it follows from the text of 
Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 that the examination of an asylum application 
can be completed after the temporary protection has ended. According to the 
Minister, this is in line with the objective of this Directive. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
5 To qualify for temporary protection in the Netherlands, a person who claims to 
have been displaced by the security situation in Ukraine must register with a 
municipality. This registration is considered an expression of a desire for 
international protection. Thereafter, the displaced person has lawful residence in 
the Netherlands. He is then given the opportunity to make an appointment with the 
Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalisation Service) (‘the 
IND’). At this appointment, the IND assesses, on the basis of the available 
documents, whether a person is actually covered by Directive 2001/55, and the 
displaced person officially lodges an asylum application. The displaced person is 
then given proof of temporary protected status. The decision time limit for the 
asylum application is suspended for the duration of the temporary protection. 
According to the Minister, he therefore only has to take a decision on the asylum 
application after the temporary protection ends. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-249/25 
 
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6 In the present case, the question that arises is how the decision time limit 
pertaining to an asylum application lodged by a person enjoying temporary 
protection should be determined. The referring court provisionally agrees with the 
Minister’s view that Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 provides for the possibility 
of suspending the time limit for a decision on an asylum application lodged before 
or during the period of temporary protection. However, since doubt exists in this 
regard, the referring court first looks at the literal text of Article 17(2) of Directive 
2001/55. It then examines how this Directive relates to Directive 2013/32 and 
considers several other aspects of the context, the purpose and the general scheme 
of Directive 2001/55. 
Textual examination 
7 Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 states that the examination of any asylum 
application not ‘processed’ before the end of the period of temporary protection 
‘shall be completed’ after the end of that period. It seems to follow from this that 
it is up to the Member State concerned to complete the examination of the asylum 
application either during the temporary protection or after its expiry. This 
provision does not prescribe when the processing of the asylum application should 
actually start and how long that processing may last, but it does make it clear that 
it is possible to complete the processing after the expiry of the temporary 
protection. The word ‘complete’ implies a final decision on the asylum 
application. The English, French and German language versions give no reason to 
doubt this. 
8 Based solely on the text of this provision, it cannot be concluded that a Member 
State may always suspend the processing of the asylum application for the entire 
period of temporary protection. On the face of it, the decision time limits in 
Directive 2013/32 and the rule on the processing of asylum applications of 
temporarily protected persons in Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 do not appear 
to be consistent with each other, given the possible total duration of temporary 
protection. Furthermore, the possibility of suspending the time limit for the 
processing of the asylum application does not follow expressly from the 
aforementioned Article 17(2). The latter merely states that, where the temporary 
protection ends and no decision has yet been taken on an asylum application, the 
examination thereof must be completed thereafter. A possible reading is that this 
provision merely emphasises that the expiry of temporary protection does not 
mean that a decision need no longer be taken on an asylum application that has 
already been lodged. Thus, a textual examination of the provisions in question 
does not resolve the legal question before us. 
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Context, purpose and general scheme 
Relationship between Directive 2001/55 and Directive 2013/32 
9 The referring court notes that Directive 2001/55 was a first step in support of the 
CEAS, within which it has an exceptional character. Indeed, this Directive allows 
a Member State to provide an appropriate form of protection to displaced persons 
on a temporary basis. At the same time, Directive 2013/32 allows Member States 
to examine, in accordance with common procedures, whether a person qualifies 
for refugee status or subsidiary protection. It is apparent from point 1.4 of the 
Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for Directive 2001/55 
[COM (2000) 0303 final] that temporary protection in the event of a mass influx is 
not a ‘third’ form of protection, alongside refugee status and subsidiary protection. 
In other words, Directive 2001/55 does not relieve Member States of their 
obligation to conduct an examination of international protection needs. 
10 Furthermore, although Directive 2013/32 is of a later date than Directive 2001/55, 
the latter regulates a more specific situation. Directive 2013/32 provides rules for 
the examination of an asylum application made under usual circumstances, 
whereas Directive 2001/55 concerns an exceptional situation that results in the 
activation of a form of temporary protection. As soon as the temporary protection 
ends, there is no longer an exceptional situation and, consequently, the rules for 
examining an asylum application under normal circumstances, namely, those of 
Directive 2013/32, apply. The standards of both directives thus appear to apply 
side by side. 
Purpose and useful effect 
11 In the provisional view of the referring court, the obligation to determine, during 
the period of temporary protection, whether displaced persons are also eligible for 
international protection potentially undermines the useful effect of the special 
regime of Directive 2001/55, which specifically allows Member States to provide 
an immediate and temporary form of protection so that the regular asylum system 
can continue to function properly. It could also impede the effective and efficient 
processing of asylum applications in general. 
12 On the other hand, the foreign national in the main proceedings has pointed out 
that he wishes to be considered for asylum status because temporary protection 
does not offer the prospect of a permanent status and therefore creates uncertainty. 
Postponing the examination of his asylum application during the period of his 
temporary protection therefore prolongs the uncertainty about his residence status. 
Judgment in the Kaduna case 
13 The referring court cannot deduce with certainty from the judgment in Kaduna 
(C-244/24 and C-290/24, EU:C:2024:1038), delivered on 19 December 2024, that 
there is the possibility of not taking a decision on the asylum application of a 
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temporarily protected person during the period of temporary protection. Thus, 
while it seems to follow from paragraph 127 of this judgment that a displaced 
person benefiting from temporary protection must have the effective possibility of 
obtaining international protection also during the period of temporary protection, 
it follows from paragraph 128 that an asylum application made by a temporarily 
protected person must in any event be completed after the expiry of the temporary 
protection, in strict compliance with the time limits set out in Directive 2013/32. 
The latter point provides a basis for the view that Article 17(2) of Directive 
2001/55 may be interpreted as meaning that, if an asylum application is lodged 
before or during the period of temporary protection, the time limit for a decision 
thereon may be suspended. 
Travaux préparatoires 
14 There are indications in the travaux préparatoires of Directive 2001/55 that the 
possibility was envisaged of not taking a decision on an asylum application during 
the period of temporary protection. However, even those travaux préparatoires 
are not unambiguous. 
15 The Commission pointed out in paragraph 5.7 of its Explanatory Memorandum to 
the proposal for Directive 2001/55 [COM (2000) 0303 final] that the Directive 
should not prohibit Member States from introducing mechanisms for suspending 
the examination of applications. This suggests that the intention was to leave 
Member States free to suspend the examination of an asylum application. This is 
also apparent from the text of Article 16(2) of the proposal for the directive (OJ 
2000 C 311E, p. 251; ‘the Commission proposal’), which expressly stated that the 
consideration of an asylum application submitted before or during temporary 
protection could be suspended for the duration of such protection. 
16 However, the text of the Commission proposal was amended to reflect the 
different views of Member States. Most Member States were in favour of the 
possibility of suspending the examination of an asylum application. However, a 
number of Member States were opposed to such a possibility, stressing the 
fundamental right to be able to apply for asylum. On the basis of these comments, 
the text was adapted to produce a compromise text. Unlike the Commission 
proposal, the compromise text does not explicitly provide for the possibility of 
suspending the examination of an asylum application. However, the compromise 
text does describe the possibility of an asylum application not being fully 
examined for the duration of the temporary protection. In that case, the 
examination must be completed as soon as possible thereafter. 
17 It cannot be concluded with certainty from the travaux préparatoires whether, by 
the amendments referred to above, the Member States expressly intended to 
include or exclude the possibility of suspension in the final text of that directive. 
The provisional view of the referring court is that the Member States intended to 
leave that possibility open. Although that possibility is not expressly included in 
the text, it is also not excluded. 
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Application in other Member States 
18 The referring court also notes, for information purposes, that it has learned that, in 
at least seven other Member States, the examination of an asylum application is 
suspended for the duration of temporary protection. 
Provisional conclusion 
Having regard to the objective of Directive 2001/55 and the exceptional situation 
which that directive seeks to regulate, the provisional conclusion of the referring 
court is that Article 17(2) of that directive must be read as providing for the 
possibility of derogating from the decision time limits subsequently laid down in 
Article 31 of Directive 2013/32, namely, in the case where an asylum application 
has been lodged by a beneficiary of Directive 2001/55 before or during the period 
of temporary protection. In that case, those time limits only start running or only 
resume running from the day that the temporary protection ends. That 
interpretation does justice to the effective and efficient processing of asylum 
applications and the useful effect of the special regime of Directive 2001/55, 
which must make it possible for the Member States to provide an immediate and 
temporary form of protection to a group of displaced persons without the risk that 
the asylum systems of the Member States may not be able to cope adequately with 
the influx. While this possibility gives rise to a longer period of uncertainty for 
temporarily protected persons, they are always assured of lawful residence during 
the temporary protection, and the power to suspend does not relieve the Minister 
of his obligation to take a decision at a later stage on any asylum application 
lodged. Therefore, this possibility does not detract from that obligation or from the 
fundamental right to seek asylum. 
19 However, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the referring court is not 
certain of that interpretation. It therefore refers to the Court the questions set out 
above for a preliminary ruling.