Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2018:542
Date: 2018-09-13
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 91 In the first place, it must be examined whether the ‘explicit mandate’ condition set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation is an alternative condition to the concept of ‘major credit institution’, as the Council and the Commission contend, or a cumulative condition to that concept, as the applicant submits. 92 It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that the wording of Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation, which is slightly more precise and detailed than that of Article 1(1)(a) of the contested decision, provides that ‘it shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 to 12 September 2014, or with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014 by … a major credit institution, or other major institution having an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment, established in Russia with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014, as listed in Annex III’. 93 It is true that a literal reading of several of the language versions of Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation might suggest that the alternative is between, on the one hand, ‘a major credit institution’ and, on the other, ‘other major institution’ and that both types of institution must, in all cases, have an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment, as the applicant submits. 94 In addition, reading the different language versions of Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation cannot, as such, support the Council’s argument that there is in fact an alternative between, on the one hand, ‘a major credit institution’ and, on the other, ‘other major institution having an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment’. Moreover, as the Council acknowledged at the hearing, certain language versions are ambiguous and could be interpreted in the sense put forward by the applicant, that is to say as requiring, even for a major credit institution, the existence of an ‘explicit mandate’. 95 However, it must be noted in that regard that it is settled case-law that provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment of 8 December 2005, Jyske Finans, C‑280/04, EU:C:2005:753, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 1974, Moulijn v Commission, 6/74, EU:C:1974:129, paragraphs 10 and 11). 96 In the present case, given that the objective of Article 5(1) of the contested regulation is, in accordance with Article 215 TFEU, the adoption of measures necessary to give effect to Article 1(1) of the contested decision, the terms of that regulation must be interpreted, so far as possible, in the light of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 141). 97 Article 1(1)(a) of the contested decision refers to ‘major credit institutions or finance development institutions established in Russia with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014, as listed in Annex I’ (paragraph 17 above). There is indeed an alternative, therefore, between ‘major credit institutions’ and ‘finance development institutions’, the latter being defined more precisely in Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation as being ‘other major institution having an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment’. 98 Consequently, the applicant incorrectly argues that ‘a major credit institution’ also had to have an ‘explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment’, in addition to satisfying the other conditions laid down in Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation, in order to be able to listed in Annex III to that regulation. 99 In the second place, it must be pointed out that the applicant does not deny that it is more than 50% owned by the Russian State, given that, in the present case, 60% of its shares are owned by the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management. 100 The Council did not, therefore, err in law or commit an error of assessment when it considered that the applicant was a ‘major credit institution … established in Russia with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014’, thus satisfying the conditions provided for in Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation in order to be able to be listed in Annex III to that regulation. 101 The applicant’s second plea in law must, therefore, be rejected as unfounded. The third plea in law, alleging, in essence, an infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection 102 In the context of its third plea in law, the applicant alleges an infringement of its rights of defence and of the right to effective judicial protection, in the light, first, of the fact that the Council failed to publish a notice in the Official Journalor send a letter notifying it of its inclusion in the contested acts and, secondly, of the fact that the Council failed to provide any evidence to support the reasons justifying that inclusion. 103 The applicant also submits that the Council may not rely upon the evidence attached to its letter of 9 December 2014, for that evidence had not been sent to the applicant before it brought its action. Consequently, the applicant has not been given an opportunity of effectively making known its views on the evidence relied upon by the Council in taking its decision to include it in the contested acts. Moreover, those documents contain no explanation of the reasons for listing the applicant’s name in the contested acts. 104 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes those arguments and contends that, because the contested acts are not ‘targeted’ restrictive measures and do not directly and individually concern the applicant, it was not obliged to notify the applicant individually. Furthermore, the applicant has not demonstrated how the lack of individual notification has hampered its rights of defence in the present case. The Council argues, in addition, that it is not obliged automatically and spontaneously to give a listed entity access to the documents on the Council’s file. Nonetheless, it responded to the applicant’s request on 9 December 2014 and provided the applicant with the evidence and documents on the Council’s file relating to the contested decision. 105 It must be borne in mind that respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection are fundamental rights, forming an integral part of the EU legal order, in the light of which the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review — which in principle should be a full review — of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 May 2016, Good Luck Shipping v Council, T‑423/13 and T‑64/14, EU:T:2016:308, paragraphs 47 and 48 and the case-law cited). 106 Respect for the rights of the defence, which is expressly affirmed in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, includes during a procedure preceding the adoption of restrictive measures the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 60, and of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 139 and the case-law cited). 107 The right to effective judicial protection, which is affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for him to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgment of 24 May 2016, Good Luck Shipping v Council, T‑423/13 and T‑64/14, EU:T:2016:308, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 108 When that disclosure takes place, the competent EU authority must ensure that that individual is placed in a position in which he may effectively make known his views on the grounds advanced against him (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 112). 109 The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of those principles. 110 First of all, the Council’s argument that the case-law on individual restrictive measures is not applicable in the present case, since the measures are of general application and are not targeted restrictive measures, must be rejected. The jurisdiction of the General Court as regards the contested decision arises precisely from the fact that the present action concerns the review of the legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, as the Court of Justice held in the case giving rise to the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236). 111 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council ought to have notified it individually of the contested acts, since those acts provide for restrictive measures against it, it must be noted that while the absence of individual communication of the contested acts has an impact on the point at which time starts to run for the purposes of the bringing of an action, it does not in itself justify the annulment of the acts at issue. The applicant does not put forward any arguments that would demonstrate that, in the present case, the failure to communicate those acts individually resulted in a breach of its rights that would justify the annulment of those acts in so far as they concern it (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited). 112 In the second place, as regards the alleged failure by the Council to communicate the evidence supporting the applicant’s listing in the contested acts, the Court must examine separately (i) the initial acts by which the applicant was included in the lists of the entities subject to the restrictive measures for the first time (‘the initial acts’) and (ii) the subsequent acts which confirm that listing and maintain its name in those lists. 113 First, as regards the initial acts, it should be borne in mind that it has been acknowledged in the case-law that, in the case of an initial decision to freeze funds, the Council was not obliged to inform the person or entity concerned beforehand of the grounds on which that institution intended to rely in order to include that person or entity’s name in the relevant list. So that its effectiveness may not be jeopardised, such a measure must be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to apply immediately. In such a case, it is, as a rule, enough if the institution notifies the person or entity concerned of the grounds and affords it the right to be heard at the same time as, or immediately after, the decision is adopted (judgment of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61). 114 When questioned on that matter at the hearing, the Council argued that the case-law cited in paragraph 113 above did not apply in the present case, given that the restrictive measures at issue concerned restrictions on the access to the EU capital market, of general application, not fund freezing measures in the strict sense. In the alternative, the Council considers that, even if that case-law did apply to the present case, it was under no obligation to hear the applicant prior to the adoption of the initial acts or to communicate to it the evidence concerning it at that stage. 115 Such an interpretation cannot be upheld. 116 Indeed, it must be borne in mind that the fundamental right of respect for the rights of the defence during a procedure preceding the adoption of a restrictive measure stems directly from Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter (see paragraph 106 above). 117 Consequently, since the restrictions imposed on the applicant under the relevant provisions of the contested acts constitute restrictive measures that are of individual application to it and in the absence of the proven need to give a surprise effect to those measures in order to ensure their effectiveness, the Council ought to have communicated the grounds concerning the application of those measures with regard to the applicant prior to the adoption of the contested acts. 118 It must, however, be borne in mind that, in the present case, the grounds on which the Council imposed restrictive measures on the applicant, which are set out in the relevant provisions of the contested acts themselves, are the fact that the applicant is a credit institution established in Russia, with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014. 119 The applicant has not explained to what extent the absence of prior communication by the Council of certain evidence in the file concerning those grounds may have affected its rights of defence or its right to effective judicial protection so as to result in the annulment of the initial acts. 120 It should be borne in mind that before an infringement of the rights of the defence can result in the annulment of an act, it must be demonstrated that, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 September 2014, Georgias and Others v Council and Commission, T‑168/12, EU:T:2014:781, paragraph 106, and of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 153). 121 In the present case, the applicant has not explained which arguments or information it could have relied on if it had received the documents at issue earlier, nor has it demonstrated that those arguments or that information could have led to a different outcome in its case. The applicant cannot validly claim that it was unaware, at the time the initial acts were adopted, that it was a credit institution established in Russia, with over 50% public ownership or control. In addition, although the applicant denied, in the context of its second plea in law, that it met the criteria laid down in the relevant provisions of the contested acts, it has not explained how the failure to communicate those criteria beforehand could have affected its rights of defence in the present case. The present complaint cannot, therefore, result in the annulment of the initial acts. 122 Secondly, as regards the successive acts by which the restrictive measures were maintained with regard to the applicant, it has been made clear in the case-law that, in the context of the adoption of a decision to maintain the name of a person or an entity in a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council had to respect the right of that person or entity to have communicated to itself the incriminating evidence against it and the right to be heard before the adoption of that decision where that institution was including new evidence against that person or entity, namely evidence which was not included in the initial listing decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 63, and of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 123 In the present case, the criteria accepted in order to maintain the applicant’s name in the lists annexed to the contested acts have appeared from the outset in Article 1(1)(a) of the contested decision and Article 5(1)(a) of the contested regulation. It is because of its status as a major credit institution established in Russia, with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014, that the applicant was listed in Annex I to the contested decision and Annex III to the contested regulation. Those factors were well known to the applicant and cannot, therefore, be considered new evidence, within the meaning of the abovementioned case-law. 124 It must be borne in mind, lastly, that when sufficiently precise information has been communicated, enabling the person concerned to make known its point of view effectively on the evidence adduced against it by the Council, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence does not mean that that institution is obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in its file. It is only on the request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue (see judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). 125 In the present case, it is clear that the Council complied with that obligation and replied to the applicant’s request for information of 23 October 2014 by letter of 9 December 2014. In that context, the Council granted access to the documents in its possession relating to its decision to impose restrictive measures on the applicant. 126 Consequently, it must be found that that information was communicated within a reasonable time and was sufficient to enable the applicant to exercise its rights effectively and for its rights of defence to be respected. 127 The applicant’s second complaint must, therefore, be rejected, as must the third plea in law in its entirety. The fourth plea in law, alleging, in essence, an infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights, including the right to property, business and reputation 128 The applicant submits that the Council’s decision to adopt the restrictive measures at issue amounts to an unjustified and disproportionate infringement of its fundamental rights, including its rights to property, business and reputation, which arise from Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 in annex to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950. 129 The applicant submits, in the first place, that it is an international commercial bank and has had no involvement with recent events in Ukraine. 130 In the second place, the applicant maintains that the contested acts are causing significant harm to it and to its subsidiaries outside Russia, including those in Ukraine, for example its Ukrainian subsidiary VTB Bank PJSC. A document confirming the extent of its losses was, moreover, annexed to the reply. 131 In the third place, the applicant claims that the adverse effects of the contested acts extend far beyond the intended purpose of those acts. The applicant observes that, in accordance with the case-law, the Council must demonstrate that the stated purpose of the contested acts is or may be achieved by cutting off the applicant’s access to an integral source of finance necessary for its on-going business operations. The Council is, however, unable to do this. 132 In the applicant’s view, the measures at issue have in particular had disproportionate, unjustified effects on its EU subsidiaries. It has also experienced significant delays in the settlement of payments and exchange of information which have had a negative impact on its business operations and those of its subsidiaries, their clients and partners. Given the scale of the bank and its subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, the adoption of the contested acts has had adverse effects on the economies of those regions and on their populations. Furthermore, its shareholders, which include various private investors, have also been affected by those acts, in particular because the value of shares has declined. 133 Lastly, the applicant submits that qualifications to the fundamental right to the peaceful enjoyment and use of its property guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter and Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, are permitted only if the restrictions in question are not disproportionate. The measures provided for by the contested acts are, however, a disproportionate and ineffectual means of securing the stated aims of those acts. 134 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes those arguments. 135 First, it should be borne in mind that under Article 16 of the Charter, ‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. 136 Secondly, Article 17(1) of the Charter provides as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.’ 137 It is indeed true that restrictive measures such as those at issue in the present case undeniably limit the rights which the applicant enjoys under Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 September 2016, NIOC and Others v Council, C‑595/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:721, paragraph 50 and the case‑law cited). 138 However, the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant are not absolute, and may, therefore, be subject to limitations, as provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 121, and of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 195 and the case-law cited). 139 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be ‘provided for by law’ and ‘respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, secondly, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are ‘necessary’ and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 140 Consequently, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue must satisfy three conditions. First, the limitation must be provided for by law. In other words, the measure in question must have a legal basis. Secondly, the limitation must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Thirdly, the limitation may not be excessive. It must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought, and the ‘essential content’, that is, the substance, of the right or freedom at issue must not be impaired (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraphs 170 to 173 and the case-law cited). 141 It is clear that those three conditions are met in the present case. 142 In the first place, the restrictive measures at issue are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts which are, in particular, of general application, have a clear legal basis in EU law and are sufficiently reasoned (see paragraphs 69 to 85 above). 143 In the second place, it is apparent from recitals 1 to 8 of the contested decision and from recital 2 of the contested regulation that the stated objective of those acts is to increase the costs to be borne by the Russian Federation for its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Such an objective is consistent with the objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 115). 144 In the third place, with regard to the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that, as a general principle of EU law, this requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 145 In that connection, it is made clear in the case-law that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited). 146 First, the applicant considers that the restrictive measures imposed on it by means of the contested acts cannot achieve the aim pursued by the latter, which is to impose pressure on the Russian Government by restricting access to capital markets by the Russian State-owned banks identified by the Council, since the applicant has no role whatsoever in the Russian Federation’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. 147 However, the fact that the applicant did not play the slightest role in the actions of the Russian Federation destabilising the situation in Ukraine is irrelevant, since restrictive measures were not imposed on it for that reason, but because of the fact that it is a major credit institution established in Russia, with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014. 148 In addition, it is true that restrictive measures, by definition, have consequences which affect rights to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions. That is a fortiori the case with respect to the consequences of targeted restrictive measures on the entities subject to those measures (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited). 149 However, the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in that country, the achievement of which is part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action stated in Article 21 TEU, is such as to justify the possibility that, for certain operators, which are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 149 and 150 and the case-law cited). 150 Secondly, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, there is a reasonable relationship between the restrictive measures at issue and the objective pursued by the Council in adopting them. In so far as that objective is, in particular, to increase the costs to be borne by the Russian Federation for its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, the approach of targeting Russian State-owned banks is consistent with that objective and cannot, in any event, be considered to be manifestly inappropriate with respect to the objective pursued (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147). 151 The Council could legitimately find that the fact of restricting the applicant’s access to the EU capital market was capable of contributing to the objective of the contested acts, which consisted in increasing the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation designed to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and in promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see paragraph 15 above). In that regard, as the Council argued at the hearing, it is apparent from the evidence provided by the applicant that, following the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue, it had to seek alternative sources of funding, which tends to show that those measures enable their objective to be attained, since, in the event of financial difficulties, it is for the Russian State as a last resort to bail the applicant out. 152 The Council could, therefore, legitimately find that in order to achieve that objective, it was appropriate to target major credit institutions or finance development institutions established in Russia with over 50% public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014. 153 Thirdly, it must be pointed out that the measures adopted by the Council in the present case consist in targeted economic sanctions, which cannot be considered a total interruption of economic and financial relations with a third country, although the Council has such a power under Article 215 TFEU. 154 In those circumstances, and having regard, in particular, to the fact that the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in reaction to the crisis in Ukraine have become progressively more severe, interference with the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and its right to property cannot be considered to be disproportionate (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). 155 As regards, lastly, the right to reputation, relied upon by the applicant, it should be noted, first, that damage caused to the reputation of a person subject to restrictive measures as a result of the reasons given to justify those measures cannot, by itself, amount to a disproportionate interference with that person’s right to property and freedom to conduct a business. Thus, in the absence of details of the link between the damage which the applicant claims has been caused to his reputation and the abovementioned interference with fundamental rights to which this plea relates, that argument is ineffective. Secondly, and in any event, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, like the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business, the right to the protection of one’s reputation is not an absolute right and its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the reputation of the persons or entities concerned (see judgment of 30 June 2016, Al Matri v Council, T‑545/13, not published, EU:T:2016:376, paragraphs 167 and 168 and the case-law cited). 156 In view of the foregoing considerations, the fourth plea in law must be rejected. The plea of illegality in respect of Article 1 of the contested decision and Article 5 of the contested regulation 157 The applicant claims that the Court should, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare Article 1 of the contested decision and Article 5 of the contested regulation unlawful. 158 The applicant submits that the Council may include only criteria for listing that are appropriate and proportionate to the measures at issue. The applicant considers that, in the present case, the Council has failed to demonstrate how imposing prohibitions relating to transferable securities and money-market instruments on the institutions covered by the contested measures is justified by the purposes of those acts, still less how it is a proportionate way of achieving those aims. 159 The Council, supported by the Commission, contends that the plea of illegality must be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded. 160 It must be pointed out that the arguments relied on in support of such a plea, alleging that the restrictive measures at issue are inappropriate and disproportionate, are identical to or overlap considerably with those which have already been examined in the context of the fourth plea in law above. 161 Accordingly, reference must necessarily be made to the considerations set out in paragraphs 145 to 156 above and the applicant’s plea of illegality rejected on the same grounds. 162 Consequently, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant must be rejected, there being no need to rule on whether it is admissible, and the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 163 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 164 In addition, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and the institutions which intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Commission must, therefore, bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders VTB Bank PAO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. Berardis Spielmann Csehi Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 September 2018. E. Coulon G. Berardis Registrar President * Language of the case: English.