Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2002:26
Date: 2002-02-07
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Agriculture and Fisheries;Milk products;Non-contractual liability
Concepts: Limitation periods
Procedure: Action for damages - successful
Origin: Germany

Summary of the Judgment 
1. Actions for damages — Limitation period — Starting point — Liability on account 
of Regulation No 857/84 resulting in a reference quantity not being allocated to milk 
producers who entered into a non-marketing undertaking — Date to be taken into 
consideration 
(EC Treaty, Arts 178 and 215 (now Arts 235 EC and 288 EC); EC Statute of the Court 
of Justice, Art. 43; Council Regulations Nos 1078/77 and 857/84) 
II - 4 1 5 
SUMMARY — CASE T-201/94 
2. Actions for damages — Limitation period — Interruption — Conditions — Bring­
ing of proceedings before the Community judicature or lodging of a preliminary 
application with the relevant institution 
(EC Treaty, Art. 173 (now, after amendment, Art. 230 EC) and Art. 175 (now 
Art. 232 EC); EC Statute of the Court of justice, Art. 43; Council Regulations Nos 
1078/77, 857/84 and 2187/93; Communication of the Council and Commission 92/C 
198/04) 
1. The l imitat ion period for actions 
against the Community on grounds of 
non-contractual liability, such as those 
seeking compensation for damage suf­
fered by producers of milk or milk 
products who, on account of non-mar­
keting or conversion undertakings 
e n t e r e d i n t o u n d e r R e g u l a t i o n 
N o 1078/77, could not, in the light of 
Regulation N o 857/84, be allocated a 
reference quanti ty, and were con­
sequently unable to market any quan­
tity of milk exempt from the additional 
levy, started to run the day after the 
non-marketing undertaking expired 
and the date on which Regulation 
N o 857/84 began to have injurious 
effects on the applicant by preventing 
him from resuming marketing milk. 
Since, moreover, that damage was not 
caused instantaneously but recurred on 
a daily basis, the time bar under 
Article 43 of the Statute of the Court 
of Justice applies to the period preced­
ing by more than five years the date of 
the event which interrupted the limi­
tation period and does not affect rights 
which arose during subsequent periods. 
(see paras 62-64) 
2. Under Article 43 of the Statute of the 
Court of Justice the limitation period is 
interrupted only if proceedings are 
instituted before the Community judi­
cature or if, prior to such proceedings, 
an application is made to the relevant 
C o m m u n i t y in s t i t u t ion , p rov ided 
always that, in the latter case, inter­
ruption only occurs if the application is 
fol lowed by proceedings b rought 
within the time-limits determined by 
reference to Article 173 of the Treaty 
(now, after amendment, Article 230 
EC) or Article 175 of the Treaty (now 
Article 232 EC), depending on the case. 
With respect to damage suffered by 
producers of milk or milk products 
who, on account of non-marketing or 
conversion undertakings entered into 
under Regulation No 1078/77, could 
no t , in the l ight of R e g u l a t i o n 
N o 857/84, be allocated a reference 
quan t i t y , and were consequent ly 
unable to market any quantity of milk 
exempt from the additional levy, the 
waiver of the right to plead limitation 
contained in the Communication of the 
Council and the Commission relating 
to the subsequent adoption of Regu­
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KUSTERMAN v COUNCIL AND COMMISSION 
lation No 2187/93 providing for an 
offer of compensation to the producers 
concerned is a unilateral act which was 
intended to limit the number of actions 
brought by encouraging producers to 
await the introduction of the flat-rate 
compensation scheme provided for by 
that regulation. Under that regulation, 
producers could apply for a compen­
sation offer to be made to them, the 
time-limit for acceptance of which was 
two months. Consequently, under 
Article 14 of Regulation No 2187/93, 
as from expiry of that time-limit the 
institutions were no longer bound by 
that offer and could again plead limi­
tation. 
However, where the offer of compen­
sation for damage falls within a con­
text in which producers were asked not 
to make a preliminary application or 
institute proceedings for compensation, 
because the institutions were introduc­
ing a system of flat-rate compensation 
by way of settlement, refusal of the 
compensation offer, whether express or 
resulting from expiry of the period for 
acceptance laid down in that context, 
may not have stricter consequences as 
regards the calculation of the limitation 
period than those which would ensue 
from a decision by the administration 
rejecting an application for compen­
sation made by an individual. Such a 
refusal embodies, in the same way as a 
decision rejecting such an application, 
the disagreement between the adminis­
tration and the person applying for 
compensation. 
It follows that, in such a case, the event 
which causes the period of two months 
laid clown in Article 43 of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice by reference to 
Article 173 of the Treaty to start to run 
is the date of expiry of the period for 
accepting the offer or, as the case may 
be, the date of express refusal of the 
offer. Only that interpretation allows 
due regard to be had to the purpose of 
the period for acceptance, which is to 
afford the individual a certain time for 
reflection before making a decision on 
the compensation offered to him by 
way of settlement, a decision which, 
depending on its nature, will avoid 
recourse to legal action. Thus, pro­
ducers who waited, on the basis of the 
undertaking given by the institutions to 
make them an offer of compensation, 
before instituting proceedings for com­
pensation before the Court of First 
Instance, then instituted such proceed­
ings within a period of two months 
following the expiry of the period for 
accepting the offer made to them, must 
be entitled to rely on the undertaking 
given by the institutions to waive the 
right to plead limitation, and to have 
the period of limitation of their action 
interrupted, in accordance with 
Article 43 of the Statute of the Court 
of Justice, on the date of the Com­
munication of the Council and Com­
mission. 
(sec paras 67-69, 73-76) 
II - 417