Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2006:201
Date: 2006-07-12
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Second Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: External relations;Free movement of capital;Common foreign and security policy
Concepts: General;Applications by natural or legal persons;Admissibility and examination of applications, forms of order sought and pleas in law;Rights of the defence and procedural guarantees;Right to a judicial remedy;Right to property;Respect for private life
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded
Origin: United Kingdom

summary of the grounds relied on. The applicant has made no effort to do so. 133 If the claim for damages should none the less be held to be admissible, the Council submits that it is, in any event, unfounded. The Council states that, according to case-law, the Community can incur non-contractual liability only where a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred (Joined Cases C‑104/89 and C‑37/90 Mulder and Others v Council andCommission [1992] ECR I‑3061, paragraph 12). Now, for the reasons already stated, the contested regulations do not infringe any rule of law currently in force. 134 In addition to the lack of legal arguments, the Council contends that there is a lack of factual arguments in support of the claim for damages. It is for the applicant to produce to the Community judicature the evidence to establish the fact and the extent of the loss which he claims to have suffered (Case T‑575/93 Koelman v Commission [1996] ECR II-1, paragraph 97). 135 The Council maintains that, in any event, the damage alleged in the present case cannot be attributed to the Community, but only to the Security Council. It refers, to that effect, to Case T‑184/95 Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II‑667, paragraphs 73 and 74. 136 In his reply, the applicant states that, as with costs, the claim for damages is contingent on the outcome of the claim for annulment, without its being necessary to set out a separate plea in law. The essential point is that damages should be sought in the application and that the defendants should have been put on notice of that point. The applicant submits, for the avoidance of doubt, that the conditions to which damages are subject under Community law will be satisfied in the present case if the alleged infringements are established. It is only after the latter have been held to exist, however, that the Court may rule on any damages and costs. 137 The arguments set out at paragraphs 69 and 70, above, are sufficient to show the draconian effect of Regulation No 881/2002 on the applicant’s financial position. Furthermore, the basis on which the applicant claims damages is clear and manifest. As regards the cause of the damage, the applicant maintains that the Council’s contention that its source lies in the action of the Security Council falls away if his arguments relating to annulment are accepted. Findings of the Court 138 As the Council and the Commission have observed, in the forms of order sought in his application the applicant did no more than claim that the Council should be ordered to pay damages, without further detail. The application itself contains no qualitative or quantitative argument concerning that claim. 139 Now, by virtue of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, every application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and contain a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, if necessary, without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on should be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission [2005] ECR II‑315, paragraph 64). 140 In order to satisfy those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damage caused by a Community institution must state the evidence from which the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution can be identified, the reasons why the applicant considers there is a causal link between the conduct and the damage it claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage (see Guérin Automobiles v Commission, paragraph 131, above, paragraphs 42 and 43, and Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission, paragraph 139, above, paragraph 65, and the case-law cited there). 141 In contrast, a claim for an unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as inadmissible (Case 5/71 Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, paragraph 9; Joined Cases T-79/96, T‑260/97 and T-117/98 Camar and Tico v Commission and Council [2000] ECR II-2193, paragraph 181, and Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission, paragraph 139, above, paragraph 66). 142 Although the application need not necessarily contain figures quantifying the loss allegedly suffered, it must at the very least state clearly the factors that make it possible to assess the nature and extent of the loss, so that the institution may defend itself. In such circumstances, the lack of numerical information in the application does not affect the rights of the defence, so long as the applicant produces that information in the reply, so allowing the defendant to take issue with it both in its rejoinder and at the hearing (Joined Cases 29/63, 31/63, 36/63, 39/63 to 47/63, 50/63 and 51/63 Usines de la Providence and Others v High Authority [1965] ECR 911, at p. 935; Case T-13/96 TEAM v Commission [1998] ECR II-4073, paragraph 29, and Case T‑277/97 Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors [1999] ECR II‑1825, paragraph 67). 143 In the present case, the claim for damages in the application wants even a hint of any particulars and must therefore be declared inadmissible. Indeed, even if the application did contain the information that made it possible to identify the actions which it is complained the institutions committed, it says nothing about the nature or character of the alleged damage or the reasons why the applicant believes that there is a causal link between those actions and that damage. 144 The applicant has not even made any serious effort in his reply to make good those defects. Contrary to what he maintains in his reply (see paragraph 136, above), the conditions for the admissibility of a claim for damages cannot be reduced to no more than simply putting forward an abstract request, as in the case of costs. 145 In any event, having regard to the documents before the Court and the arguments put forward in support of the claim for annulment, the claim for damages must be dismissed as unfounded given that, in the first place, consideration of the claim for annulment has revealed no illegality that might constitute a wrongful act capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the Community. In the second place, the applicant has adduced no evidence to prove the reality and extent of the loss alleged. In the third place, such loss is not to be ascribed to the adoption of the contested regulation, but rather to the Security Council resolutions given effect by those regulations, with the result that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of a direct causal link either (see, to that effect, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission, paragraph 135, above, paragraphs 73 and 74). 146 The action must therefore be rejected in its entirety. Costs 147 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Council and the Commission. On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders the applicant to pay the costs. Pirrung Forwood Papasavvas Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 July 2006. Registrar President E. Coulon J. Pirrung Table of contents Legal context Background to the dispute Procedure Forms of order sought Facts The claim for annulment Admissibility Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court Substance Arguments of the parties – The objection based more particularly on infringement of the right to property and the right to respect for private and family life – The objection based more particularly on infringement of the right to be heard – The objection based more particularly on infringement of the right to an effective judicial remedy Findings of the Court The claim for damages Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court Costs * Language of the case: English.