Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2015:739
Date: 2015-09-30
Language of the case: Greek
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Greece

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber), 30 September 2015 1. Actions for annulment — Jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Claim seeking that directions be issued to an institution — Inadmissibility (Art. 263 TFEU) 2. Actions for annulment — Grounds — Infringement of essential procedural requirements — Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons — To be considered of the Court’s own motion (Arts 263 TFEU and 296 TFEU) 3. Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Commission decision refusing to register a proposal for a European citizens’ initiative (Arts 24, first para., TFEU and 296 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 211/2011, first recital and Art. 4(3)) 4. Actions for annulment — Grounds — Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons — Separate ground from the one concerning substantive legality (Arts 263 TFEU and 296 TFEU) 5. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Competence of the Union to grant financial assistance to Member States in difficulty — Scope — Adoption of legislation establishing a principle of the state of necessity allowing a Member State facing serious financing problems to not repay all of part of its debt — Not included (Art. 122 TFEU) 6. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Coordination of economic policies — Competence of the Union — Scope — Adoption of legislation establishing a principle of the state of necessity allowing a Member State facing serious financing problems to not repay all of part of its debt — Not included (Art. 136 TFEU) 7. EU Treaties — Solidarity clause — Scope — No obligation to adopt legislation establishing a principle of state of necessity allowing a Member State facing serious financing problems to not repay all of part of its debt (Art. 222 TFEU) 8. Commission — Powers — Power to initiate legislation — Possibility of basing a legislative initiative on a principle of international law in the absence of a competence in the Treaties — Not included (Art. 13(2) TEU) 1. See the text of the decision. (see para. 12) 2. See the text of the decision. (see para. 21) 3. The purpose of the obligation, under Article 296 TFEU, to state the reasons for an individual decision is to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to determine whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by an error which may make it possible for its validity to be contested, and to enable the Courts of the European Union to review its lawfulness. In the case of a decision rejecting an application for registration of European citizens’ initiative, the fact that the proposal has not been registered is an action that may impinge upon the very effectiveness of the right of Union citizens to submit a citizens’ initiative that is enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 24 TFEU. Consequently, such a decision must clearly disclose the grounds justifying the refusal. A citizen who has submitted a proposed citizens’ initiative must be put in a position to be able to understand the reasons for which the initiative was not registered by the Commission. It is incumbent on the Commission, when it receives a proposal for a citizens’ initiative, to appraise it and also to give reasons for any refusal to register it, given the effect of such a refusal on the effective exercise of the right enshrined in the Treaty. That follows from the very nature of this right which, as is pointed out in recital 1 of Regulation No 211/2011, is intended to reinforce citizenship of the Union and enhance the democratic functioning of the Union through the participation of citizens in the democratic life of the Union. (see paras 22, 25, 26) 4. See the text of the decision. (see para. 33) 5. Article 122(1) TFEU cannot constitute an appropriate legal basis for the adoption in EU legislation of the principle of a state of necessity, in accordance with which a Member State would be entitled unilaterally to decide not to repay all or part of its debt because it is confronted with severe financing problems. In that regard, whilst it is true that it does not follow from the wording of that provision that its scope is necessarily restricted to the adoption by the Council of measures in the event of severe difficulties arising in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy, the spirit of solidarity between Member States that must inform the adoption by the Council of measures appropriate to the economic situation, within the meaning of Article 122(1) TFEU indicates that such measures must be founded on assistance between the Member States. Moreover, the adoption of such a principle of the state of necessity clearly cannot be classified amongst the assistance measures that the Council is empowered to take on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU. Whilst that provision enables the Union to grant ad hoc financial assistance to a Member State, subject to certain conditions, it cannot, on the other hand, justify the introduction into the legislation of a mechanism for the abandonment of debt, if for no other reason than because such a mechanism would be general and permanent. Furthermore, since the subject matter of Article 122 TFEU is solely financial assistance granted by the Union and not that granted by the Member States, the adoption of a principle of the state of necessity, even if it could be classified as financial assistance within the meaning of that provision, could not be regarded as a measure of assistance granted by the Union under that provision, in particular because it would cover not only debts owed by the Member States to the Union, but also debts contracted by that State to other natural or legal persons, both public and private, and that situation is clearly not addressed by Article 122 TFEU. (see paras 42, 43, 48-50) 6. The role of the Union in the area of economic policy is restricted to the adoption of coordinating measures. In that regard, the adoption of a legislative act authorising a Member State not to repay its debt, however, far from constituting economic policy guidance within the meaning of Article 136(1)(b) TFEU, would in fact result in replacing the free will of contracting parties with a legislative mechanism for the unilateral writing-off of sovereign debt, which is something that the provision clearly does not authorise. (see para. 58) 7. A refusal to introduce into EU legislation a principle of the state of necessity, in accordance with which a Member State would be entitled unilaterally to decide not to repay all or part of its debt because it is confronted with severe financing problems, is not inconsistent with the solidarity clause set out in Article 222 TFEU, if for no other reason than that that clause clearly does not relate to economic and monetary policy, or economic circumstances or the budgetary difficulties of the Member States. (see para. 60) 8. Even if there is a rule of international law which enshrines the principle of the state of necessity, in accordance with which a Member State would be authorised to not repay its sovereign debt in exceptional circumstances, the mere existence of such a principle of international law would not suffice, in any event, as a basis for a legislative initiative on the Commission’s part, since there is there is no conferral of powers to that effect in the Treaties. (see para. 65)