Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2024:99
Date: 2024-02-21
Language of the case: English
Subject matter: Agriculture and Fisheries
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible
Origin: Cyprus;Finland;Romania

summary of the pleas relied on. It is settled case-law that that information must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, if necessary without any further information (see judgment of 25 January 2018, BSCA v Commission, T‑818/14, EU:T:2018:33, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited). 175 In the present case, the Court notes that, in their written pleadings, the applicants set out in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the basis of their fifth plea in law, including that it alleges infringement of Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, of which they cite paragraphs 2 to 4. Consequently, even if the Commission did intend to challenge the admissibility of this plea in its defence and rejoinder, the Court finds that the plea is in any event admissible. (b) The merits of the plea 176 The fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants comprises two parts, alleging, first, that the Commission was required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation and, second, that the annulment of measures adopted by the Cypriot authorities prior to the lodging of the application for registration with the Commission entails unlawfulness of the contested regulation. 177 Those two parts should be examined in turn. (1) The Commission’s alleged obligation to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation 178 The applicants submit that the Commission, informed of the bringing of the action before the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court), could not complete the registration procedure as long as the national judicial proceedings were pending, as there was a risk that the measure adopted by the Commission might be based on an invalid national measure. The applicants submit that the Commission’s obligation to wait for the outcome of judicial proceedings brought before national courts before deciding on the application for registration follows from Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 and the principle of sound administration. 179 The Commission contends that it was not legally required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before proceeding with registration of the name at issue. 180 In the first place, it should be borne in mind that Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 62 above, governs the procedure applicable before national authorities when an application for registration of a name is lodged. Although those provisions provide, inter alia, that persons having a legitimate interest must have an opportunity to appeal when the Member State adopts a favourable decision following examination of the application for registration, they do not, in their wording applicable to the dispute, provide for any obligation for the Commission to refrain from taking a decision pending final judgment by a national court when actions are brought against measures adopted by national authorities in the procedure governed by that article. Nor does such an obligation result from any other provision of Regulation No 1151/2012. 181 In the second place, it should be borne in mind that the principle of sound administration is included among the guarantees conferred by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings, that principle entailing the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited). 182 In the present case, there is nothing in the case file suggesting that the Commission failed to take all of the relevant factors into account when it took a decision on the application for registration. On the date of adoption of the contested regulation, the proceedings before the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) were still pending. There is nothing in the case file suggesting that the Commission had information enabling it to know when the judgment bringing the proceedings to an end would be delivered. Nor is it apparent from the case file that there was anything that might lead the Commission to doubt the validity of the application for registration. Consequently, whilst the principle of sound administration also places an obligation on the Commission to deal with matters lodged with it within a reasonable time, it cannot be criticised for having adopted the contested regulation without waiting for the outcome of the national judicial proceedings. 183 Furthermore, although the applicants rely on the judgment of 23 April 2018, CRM v Commission (T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208) in support of their line of argument, that judgment does not cast doubt on the conclusion set out in paragraph 182 above. 184 It should be noted that facts of the present case differ from those of the case that gave rise to the judgment of 23 April 2018, CRM v Commission (T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208). In that case, the national court ruling at first instance had partly annulled the specification of the name proposed for registration as a protected geographical indication (PGI), whereas the Commission had not yet taken a decision on the application for registration. Once informed of the existence of that judgment, the Commission asked the authorities of the Member State concerned whether they intended to continue with the registration procedure. The national authorities confirmed to the Commission that they intended to continue with the registration procedure, adding that they had lodged an appeal against the judgment delivered at first instance. The Commission then proceeded with registration of the name at issue. 185 In view of those facts, the Court held that the Commission, in taking the view that it did not have to consider independently the inferences to be drawn from partial annulment of the specification for the application for registration pending before it and in registering the name notwithstanding that annulment, had infringed, inter alia, the principle of sound administration (judgment of 23 April 2018, CRM v Commission, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 75). The Court further held, in response to the Commission’s argument that Regulation No 1151/2012 provided for the possibility of amending the specification or annulling the registration of a PGI, that that option could not justify registration of the PGI when, at the time of adoption of the corresponding regulation, the specification for that PGI had been partly annulled. The Court took the view that it would have been contrary to the principle of sound administration to register a PGI, only to then annul it or commence the procedure for amending the specification in the light of facts of which the Commission was already aware at the time of adoption of the regulation registering the PGI (judgment of 23 April 2018, CRM v Commission, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 82). Thus, the Court found that the principle of sound administration had not been observed in view of the fact, specific to that case, that the Commission registered the name when it could not be unaware, on the date when it adopted the corresponding regulation, that the specification had been partly annulled by the national court having jurisdiction. 186 Be that as it may, the principle of sound administration does not entail, in a general and absolute manner, an obligation for the Commission to suspend the registration procedure for a name as from the time when it is informed that an action has been brought before a national court against a measure adopted in the national phase of that registration procedure. 187 It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants must be rejected. (2) The inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court on the lawfulness of the contested regulation 188 The applicants submit that the effect of the judgment of 14 June 2021 was that the decision by which the Minister for Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment of the Republic of Cyprus dismissed the objections raised against the application for registration and ruled in favour of forwarding the application for registration to the Commission was annulled. 189 The applicants submit that the contested regulation is accordingly based on domestic measures which, by effect of that annulment, have been removed from the national legal order. The contested regulation cannot continue to exist following the annulment pronounced by the national court and, consequently, should itself be annulled. 190 The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, submits that the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) cannot entail annulment of the contested regulation. 191 It should be borne in mind, as stated in paragraph 64 above, that, taking into account the decision-making power which belongs to national authorities under the system of division of powers introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012, it is for national courts alone to rule on the lawfulness of measures adopted by those authorities, such as measures relating to applications to register a name (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2020, GAEC Jeanningros, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 192 Where a measure adopted by the authorities of the Member State concerned in the national phase of the registration procedure is annulled after registration of the name at issue in a given case, it is for the Commission to review the case (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2020, GAEC Jeanningros, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). 193 The Commission, although not bound by the assessment by the national authorities, must determine independently the inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2018, CRM v Commission, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraphs 75 and 84). In that context, the Commission may be led to take account of the nature and gravity of the unlawfulness committed and any measures adopted by the Member State in order to remedy that unlawfulness. 194 At the end of any review undertaken, the Commission may, on its own initiative, initiate the procedure for annulling the PDO provided for in Article 54 of Regulation No 1151/2012 (see, to that effect, order of 7 December 2015, POA v Commission, T‑584/15 R, not published, EU:T:2015:946, paragraph 36). 195 Nevertheless, given the system of division of powers introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012 and the Commission’s powers in reviewing the case, the subsequent annulment of a measure adopted by the authorities of the Member State concerned in the national phase of the registration procedure cannot automatically entail nullity of the registration act adopted by the Commission and automatically lead to its annulment. 196 It follows that the applicants may not claim in the present case that the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) must automatically entail annulment of the contested regulation. 197 Nor is there anything in Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, which specifies the conditions in which applications for registration are lodged and examined at national level, providing that annulment by the national court of a measure adopted pursuant to that article automatically entails unlawfulness of the regulation by which the Commission registers the name at issue in a given case. 198 Similarly, as stated in paragraph 181 above, since the principle of sound administration entails a duty for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case on the date on which it is called upon to take a decision, the contested regulation cannot be regarded as having been adopted in disregard of that principle due to the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) subsequently to its adoption. 199 Consequently, the second part of the fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants must also be rejected. 200 It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety. V. Costs 201 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, as applied for by the latter. 202 In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, Member States which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. It follows that the Republic of Cyprus must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Papouis Dairies Ltd and the other applicants listed in the Annex to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 3. Orders the Republic of Cyprus to bear its own costs. Porchia Madise Nihoul Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 February 2024. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President Table of contents I. Background to the dispute II. Facts subsequent to the adoption of the contested regulation III. Forms of order sought IV. Law A. Consideration of the requests to modify the application B. Substance 1. Fourth plea in law: insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation 2. The plea alleging irregularities vitiating the procedure by which the contested regulation was adopted (a) The national opposition procedure (b) The opposition procedure conducted at the EU level 3. The plea alleging excessive length of the registration procedure 4. The plea alleging failure by the Commission to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration (a) The application for registration is allegedly contrary to the 1985 standard (b) Manifest errors vitiating, in the applicants’ submission, the application for registration (c) The allegedly inadequate analysis of the market and the situation of the undertakings marketing the product covered by the name at issue 5. The plea alleging that the contested regulation is unlawful in the light of the inferences that should be drawn from the proceedings that led to the judgment of 14 June 2021 (a) Admissibility of the plea in law (b) The merits of the plea (1) The Commission’s alleged obligation to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation (2) The inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court on the lawfulness of the contested regulation and the resulting annulment V. Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 The list of other applicants is attached only to the version notified to the parties.