Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2012:705
Date: 2012-11-08
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Freedom to provide services;Public procurement in the European Union
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Action for damages
Origin: Greece

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 8 November 2012 1. Actions for damages — Limitation period — Point from which time starts to run — Liability due to an individual measure — Date of the appearance of the harmful effects of the act as regards the person affected — Taking into consideration of the subjective assessment of the reality of the harm — Not permissible (Art. 340, para. 2, TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46) 2. Actions for damages — Non-contractual liability — Limitation period — Limitation in time not an absolute bar to admissibility – Time-limit different by its nature from a procedural time-limit — Non-application of the time allowed on account of distance to that limitation period (Art. 340, para. 2, TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46(1); Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 102(2)) 1. See the text of the decision. (see paras 37-42) 2. In contrast to procedural time-limits, the limitation period in question, laid down in Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice for the institution of proceedings alleging non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union, by resulting in the extinction of the legal action, is a matter of substantive law. It has the function, inter alia, firstly, of ensuring protection of the rights of the aggrieved person, who must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action, and, secondly, of preventing the aggrieved person from being able to delay indefinitely the exercise of his right to damages. Limitation therefore constitutes an objection to admissibility which, unlike procedural time-limits, is not absolute, but extinguishes the action for liability solely at the request of the defendant. To that end, as is apparent from Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice, which lays down the duration of the limitation period, the calculation of the limitation period cannot be based on criteria which are anything other than strictly objective nor can that calculation differ according to whether the interruption of that period is caused by the bringing of an action or the making of a prior application. Thus, application of the extension on account of distance to the limitation period would have the consequence that limitation would occur at the end of a different period depending on whether the aggrieved party has chosen to bring the matter directly before the General Court or to make a prior application to the competent European Union institution, something which would be at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods. Accordingly, the duration of the limitation period, laid down in Article 46(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice, does not appear comparable to that of the periods for the bringing of an action or an appeal, with the result that it cannot be claimed that the application of an extension to that limitation period on account of distance is necessary in order to ensure genuine enjoyment of the right to damages referred to in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. (see paras 52-56, 58)