Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:104
Date: 2016-02-26
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Appeals Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Staff cases;Action for damages

Summary 1. Officials — Staff of the European Investment Bank — Regulatory nature of the employment relationship — Organisation of departments and fixing of staff remuneration — Administration’s discretion (Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, Arts 13, 20, first and second paras, and Annexes I and II) 2. Officials — Staff of the European Investment Bank — Remuneration — Reform of the system of remuneration and salary progression — Administration’s discretion — Observance of the principle of proportionality — Judicial review — Limits 1. As regards the nature of the employment relationship, according to Article 13 of the Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, relations between the Bank and the members of its staff are, in principle, governed by individual contracts in conjunction with those Staff Regulations. Where contracts are concluded with a European Union body entrusted with public interest responsibilities and authorised, like the European Investment Bank, to lay down, by regulation, provisions applicable to its staff, the consent of the parties to such a contract is necessarily circumscribed by all manner of obligations deriving from those particular responsibilities and incumbent upon both the management bodies of that body and its staff. The European Investment Bank’s relations with its contract staff are, to a large extent, determined by the Staff Regulations, by which staff agree to be bound when they countersign the letter of appointment. More particularly, it is clear from the first and second paragraphs of Article 20 of the Staff Regulations and from Annexes I and II thereto that basic salaries and supplementary allowances are fixed by regulation. The European Investment Bank, in order to carry out its public interest responsibilities, therefore has discretion to organise its departments and to fix unilaterally the remuneration of its staff, notwithstanding the legal instruments of a contractual nature on which that employment relationship is based. (see paras 35, 37-39) See: Judgment of 14 October 2004 in Pflugradt v ECB, C‑409/02 P, ECR, EU:C:2004:625, para. 34 2. The principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. With regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions, the Union legislature has, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it, a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political, economic and social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and evaluations. Thus the criterion to be applied is not whether a measure adopted in such an area was the only or the best possible measure, since its legality can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue. Those considerations also apply by analogy to review of the proportionality of decisions taken by the European Investment Bank in the reform of its system of remuneration and salary progression. That reform involves political, economic and social choices for the Bank, in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments, so that it has a broad discretion which must be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the measures in question. (see paras 116-118) See: Judgments of 8 June 2010 in Vodafone and Others, C‑58/08, ECR, EU:C:2010:321, para. 52 and 17 October 2013 in Schaible, C‑101/12, ECR, EU:C:2013:661, para. 29 and the case-law cited therein