Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2022:478
Date: 2022-07-21
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Economic and monetary policy
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded
Origin: Cyprus

summary of those pleas in law. Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without further information (see order of 13 May 2020, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑308/19, not published, EU:T:2020:207, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). 32 In the present case, the applicants, at the time of the entry into force of the decrees of 29 March 2013, were depositors with Laïki, as is apparent from the bank statements annexed to the application. 33 First, it is true that the applicants have not been entirely consistent in the choice of the terms used to describe the unlawful conduct of which they complain in the application. However, it is possible to interpret their arguments as criticising the defendants for having contributed, during the negotiations conducted in the context of the ESM Treaty with the Cypriot authorities from 27 June 2012 to 12 April 2013, to making the FAF conditional on the implementation of the restructuring measures for the banks concerned, as is apparent from the MoU of 26 April 2013, even though those measures appeared to be contrary to EU law. In addition, the applicants argue that the application of the restructuring measures caused a loss due to the substantial reduction in the value of their deposits. 34 Those particulars are sufficiently clear and precise to permit an understanding of the harmful conduct and causal link alleged. 35 Second, it is true that the first column of the table set out in the application, relating to the quantification of the loss for which the European Union is allegedly liable, contains the names of third parties and not those of the applicants. However, having regard, in particular, to the bank statements annexed to the application, this is clearly a clerical error which does not render unintelligible that quantification or, therefore, the applicants’ line of argument relating to the damage. 36 It follows that, as regards the formal requirements, the Court is in a position to rule on the action, whereas it is apparent from the written pleadings of the ECB that it has been able to prepare its defence. 37 Accordingly, the ECB’s arguments alleging breach of the formal requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure must be rejected. Jurisdiction of the General Court 38 The ECB argues, first of all, that it is apparent from the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), that the measures taken by the Commission and the ECB in the context of the ESM Treaty commit the ESM alone. Next, according to the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), only certain measures taken by it or by the Commission in the framework of the grant of the FAF to the Republic of Cyprus are capable of incurring liability on the part of the European Union. If the Court were to find that the conduct at issue in the present case does not correspond to one of those measures, the action would have to be dismissed as inadmissible. Last, the damage for which compensation is sought stems from sovereign decisions of the Cypriot authorities that were not imposed by the defendants. 39 The Commission, while acknowledging that it must ensure that the memoranda of understanding which it signs on behalf of the ESM comply with EU law and that the Court may consider an action in that regard, makes two observations. First, it submits that, if the action had to be regarded as seeking compensation for the damage caused by the Republic of Cyprus during the restructuring of the banks concerned, only the courts of that Member State would have jurisdiction to hear it. Second, the applicants also complain about the participation of Commission officials in technical discussions with the Cypriot authorities in connection with the adoption of the MoU of 26 April 2013. However, the measures taken by the national authorities on the basis of the non-binding technical advice of an EU institution cannot engage the responsibility of that institution. Moreover, the restructuring measures were not part of the conditions negotiated by the Commission, since they were not included in the draft memorandum of understanding agreed at staff level and were not negotiated with a view to their inclusion in the final memorandum of understanding. 40 The applicants, first of all, argue that it is apparent from the judgments of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028) and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487) that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognisance of the unlawful conduct of the Commission and the ECB at the time of the negotiation and signing of a memorandum of understanding in the context of the ESM Treaty. 41 Next, the conduct of which the applicants complain is neither the measures adopted by the Cypriot authorities nor the fact that the Commission and the ECB required the adoption or maintenance of those measures. It lies in the fact that the Commission and the ECB, in the negotiation in which they participated pursuant to Article 13(2) to (4) of the ESM Treaty, either required the FAF to be made conditional on the adoption of the restructuring measures or did not object to such a condition. 42 Last, it is to prove the involvement of the Commission and the ECB in the decisions taken in the negotiation of the MoU of 26 April 2013 and the conditions then imposed on the Republic of Cyprus that the applicants rely on that memorandum of understanding and on statements relating to it. Furthermore, the applicants state that the liability of the European Union may be incurred on account of the adoption of an act which produces legal effects without that act being required to have binding force. 43 It is apparent from the case-law that the tasks conferred on the Commission and the ECB by the ESM Treaty do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU Treaty and the FEU Treaty. As regards, in particular, the Commission, Article 13(3) and (4) of the ESM Treaty imposes on it the obligation to ensure compliance with EU law of the memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM, so that it retains, in the context of the ESM Treaty, its role as guardian of the Treaties, as follows from Article 17(1) TEU, according to which it ‘shall promote the general interest of the Union’ and ‘shall oversee the application of Union law’ (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 201 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 200 and the case-law cited). 44 Consequently, an applicant is entitled to rely as against the Commission on unlawful conduct related to the adoption of the MoU of 26 April 2013 on behalf of the ESM in the context of an action for damages (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 202 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 201 and the case-law cited). 45 Furthermore, it cannot be inferred from the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701) that the Commission’s unlawful conduct linked to the adoption of an MoU is the only unlawful conduct of an EU institution in the context of the ESM Treaty which is capable of incurring non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. The Court of Justice held in that judgment that the legal nature of acts of the ESM, which commit the ESM alone and fall outside the EU legal order, could not prevent unlawful conduct linked, as the case may be, to the adoption of a memorandum of understanding on behalf of the ESM from being raised against the Commission and the ECB in an action for non-contractual liability (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 203 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 202 and the case-law cited). 46 In the present case, as has been noted in paragraph 33 above, the arguments set out in the application may be interpreted as criticising the defendants for having contributed, during the negotiations conducted in the context of the ESM Treaty with the Cypriot authorities from 27 June 2012 to 12 April 2013, to making the FAF conditional on the implementation of the restructuring measures for the banks concerned, as is apparent from the MoU of 26 April 2013, even though those measures appeared to be contrary to EU law. 47 In the reply, the applicants explain that the sole complaint made against the Commission and the ECB is that they either required the FAF to be conditional on the adoption of the restructuring measures or did not oppose such a condition, and that their claim is not based on the assumption that the measures taken by the Cypriot authorities are attributable to the defendants. 48 Such a line of argument consists in alleging unlawful conduct against the defendants linked to the adoption of the memorandum of understanding relating to the FAF in the context of the ESM Treaty. 49 It follows that the Court has, to that extent, jurisdiction to hear and determine the present action for damages, in accordance with the case‑law cited in paragraphs 43 to 45 above. 50 As for the Commission’s argument that its contribution to the negotiations on the FAF did not relate to the restructuring measures, it must be stated that it is not substantiated in any way. In any event, that argument goes to the substance of the conduct at issue, and therefore to the merits of the claim for damages, and not to the jurisdiction of the Court to examine that claim. 51 It follows from all of the foregoing that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present action and that the action is admissible. Substance 52 It is apparent from settled case-law, applicable mutatis mutandis to the non-contractual liability of the ECB provided for in the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, that, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU a number of conditions must be satisfied, namely the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the EU institution, actual harm suffered, and the existence of a causal link between the institution’s conduct and the damage alleged. In so far as those three conditions must be cumulatively satisfied, the fact that one of them is not satisfied is sufficient for an action for damages to be dismissed (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 245 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 244 and the case-law cited). 53 In the present case, it is necessary to examine at the outset whether the first of those conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the defendants, is satisfied. 54 In that regard, the Court of Justice has already pointed out on many occasions that the incurring of non-contractual liability by the European Union requires the establishment of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intending to confer rights on individuals (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 247 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 246 and the case-law cited). 55 In their application, the applicants claim, in essence, that, during the negotiations conducted in the context of the ESM Treaty with the Cypriot authorities, the defendants contributed to making the FAF conditional on the implementation of the restructuring measures for the banks concerned even though those measures breached in a sufficiently serious manner three rules of EU law, namely the principle of equal treatment, the right to property and the principle of proportionality. 56 In their observations on the consequences which they drew for the present dispute from the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), and, in so far as necessary and in so far as they had not been set aside by the Court of Justice, from the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), the applicants state that they withdraw the plea alleging infringement of the right to property. 57 Consequently, it is necessary to examine only the applicants’ pleas alleging infringement, first, of the principle of equal treatment and, second, of the principle of proportionality. Plea alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment 58 It is apparent from settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. The elements which characterise various situations, and hence their comparability, must be determined and assessed, in particular, in the light of the subject matter of the acts at issue, and of the aim they pursue, whilst account must be taken for that purpose of the principles and objectives of the field to which those acts relate (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 441 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 440 and the case-law cited). 59 In the present case, as a preliminary point, the applicants claim that none of the MSCEs which requested financial assistance in the context of the financial crisis was subjected to measures involving the contribution of depositors to the restructuring of banking institutions, such that, in comparison, the singular treatment imposed on the Republic of Cyprus appears to be punitive and unjustified. They refer, in that regard, to the case of the Hellenic Republic in 2011 and 2012, on which occasion an ‘approach by the Union’ was defined by the ECB and the Commission, of the Portuguese Republic in 2011 and of the Kingdom of Spain in 2012. The applicants also refer to Iceland, a third country which, in 2008, received financial assistance from the IMF. 60 First, the applicants complain of discrimination on grounds of nationality. They submit that although the banks concerned, established in Cyprus, were in a situation comparable, in particular, to banks established in Greece when the Hellenic Republic sought financial assistance, they were not treated in the same way as those latter banks. 61 Second, the applicants claim that they were victims of ‘discrimination by association’ on account of the fact that they held deposits in Cypriot banks, since they would not have suffered the consequences of the restructuring measures had they made deposits in banks established in other States that had requested a financial assistance measure. 62 However, before the negotiation of the MoU of 26 April 2013, the economic situation of the Republic of Cyprus was at no point depicted as presenting specificities compared to the economic situation of the other MSCEs. On the contrary, the banking and public finances crisis in that Member State was closely linked to the Greek bond haircut and, therefore, to the economic situation of the Hellenic Republic in 2011. 63 According to the applicants, the difference in treatment is explained by economic reasons, such as the comparatively small size of the Cypriot economy, ‘monetary fatigue’ or ‘experimentation’, none of which amounts to a sufficient economic justification, since it would have been easy to support the Cypriot economy in the same way as support was given to other MSCEs. For the same reasons, the restructuring measures are, in addition, disproportionate. Furthermore, that discriminatory treatment cannot be justified by the objective of financial stability or the public interest of the Republic of Cyprus and the euro area, since measures other than those consisting in rendering inaccessible bank deposits above EUR 100 000 would have made it possible to preserve financial stability. 64 In the observations on the consequences which they drew, for the present dispute, from the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028) and, in so far as necessary and in so far as they had not been set aside by the Court of Justice, from the judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), and Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others (T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487), first, the applicants submit that, in the abovementioned judgments, the General Court and the Court of Justice have confused the demonstration of the comparability of the situations of persons in respect of whom discrimination is alleged and the objective justification of such discrimination, by reversing the evidential burden. In the present case, the General Court must, first of all, find that the applicants were discriminated against vis-à-vis depositors of banks of other Member States and then require the Commission and the ECB to demonstrate that the restructuring measures were justified having regard to the economic circumstances. 65 Second, they argue that the measures for restructuring the banks concerned ought not to be justified on the ground that they were adopted to prevent any contagion from the Cypriot banking system to the Greek financial system, since the Greek bond haircut, which was carried out in 2012, was itself liable to cause contagion to Cyprus. It is contrary to the principle of equal treatment that the EU institutions allow economic damage to be transferred from a larger Member State to a smaller Member State. 66 In the reply, the applicants submit that the defendants have not proved that the situations of the various MSCEs that received financial assistance were not comparable, whereas, in particular, the situations of the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus have many similarities. In that regard, the ECB’s claims relating to the excessive size of the Cypriot financial sector do not constitute a valid explanation. Furthermore, the defendants have not provided any justification for the difference in treatment at issue. 67 The defendants contest that line of argument. 68 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that both the arguments alleging discrimination based on nationality and those alleging discrimination ‘by association’ amount, in essence, to claiming that the applicants suffered discrimination on account of the fact that they had made deposits in banks established in the Republic of Cyprus and that that Member State, unlike other MSCEs or Iceland, had its request for financial assistance made subject to measures involving a contribution by depositors to the restructuring of the banks concerned. 69 The applicants’ line of argument must therefore be examined as pleading discrimination with regard to depositors of banks of other States that received financial assistance. 70 First, as regards the discrimination against the applicants as compared with depositors of Icelandic banks, it is sufficient to note that the applicants themselves submit that only the IMF participated in the negotiations relating to the financial assistance granted to Iceland in 2008. Consequently, the applicants are manifestly not justified in criticising the Commission and the ECB for having, in the context of the negotiations relating to the FAF, imposed on depositors of Cypriot banks a treatment different from that of depositors of Icelandic banks, since the Commission and the ECB were not involved in defining the latter treatment. 71 Second, as regards the alleged discrimination against the applicants as compared with depositors of the banks of other MSCEs, it is apparent from the case-law that since the applicants have invoked an infringement of the principle of equal treatment, it is for them to identify precisely the comparable situations which they consider to have been treated differently, or the different situations which they consider to have been treated identically (see judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 442 and the case-law cited, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 441 and the case-law cited). 72 In that respect, it should be borne in mind, inter alia, that the measures to which the grant of financial assistance by the ESM (or by other international organisations, bodies and institutions of the European Union or States) may be subject in order to resolve the financial difficulties encountered by a State facing the need to recapitalise its banking system are likely to vary significantly from case to case depending on the experience acquired and on a set of specific circumstances. Those circumstances can include in particular the economic situation of the recipient State, the size of the assistance in relation to the whole of its economy, the prospects of the banks concerned becoming economically viable again and the reasons which led to the difficulties encountered by them, including, where appropriate, the excessive size of the banking sector of the recipient State in relation to its national economy, the development of the international economic environment or an increased likelihood of future ESM interventions (or interventions of other international organisations, bodies and institutions of the European Union or States) in support of other States in difficulty which can require a preventive limitation of amounts dedicated to each intervention (judgments of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 311, and of 13 July 2018, Bourdouvali and Others v Council and Others, T‑786/14, not published, EU:T:2018:487, paragraph 310). 73 In the present case, the applicants refer to the financial assistance granted to the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, mentioning the amounts granted or the economic difficulties faced by those MSCEs in terms, in particular, of public deficit, access of the public authorities to financial markets or unemployment rates. 74 In addition, the applicants put forward an argument based on the lack of difference between the situation of the Republic of Cyprus and that of other MSCEs, claiming that at no point prior to the negotiation of the MoU of 26 April 2013 was the Cypriot economic situation officially depicted as being substantively different. 75 However, the information provided elsewhere in the applicants’ own written pleadings demonstrates that there was in fact such a difference. 76 As is apparent from paragraph 72 above, the excessive size of the banking sector makes it possible to distinguish the economic situation of a country requesting financial assistance. 77 It is apparent from the application that, at the time of the negotiation of the FAF, the value of the assets of the Cypriot banking sector was eight times the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The applicants also state that that GDP was approximately EUR 18 billion, while the losses suffered by the banks concerned amounted to approximately EUR 4 billion. 78 However, when the applicants set out the situation of the Hellenic Republic, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain at the date at which those MSCEs requested financial assistance, they do not indicate that their banking sector was excessive in size. On the contrary, it is apparent from the application that the size of its banking sector put the Republic of Cyprus in a situation similar to a single MSCE that received financial assistance, namely Ireland, the situation of which is not, however, detailed in the applicants’ written pleadings. 79 In addition, the documents placed on the file by the applicants confirm the specific nature of the situation of the Cypriot economy in that regard. It is apparent from the Eurogroup statement of 25 March 2013 that the economic adjustment programme the main components of which had been agreed ‘will address the exceptional challenges that [the Republic of] Cyprus is facing and restore the viability of the financial sector’ and, in particular, ‘will contain a decisive approach to addressing financial sector imbalances’ by ‘an appropriate downsizing’ of that sector. However, such considerations do not appear at all in the Eurogroup statements of 2 May 2010, 16 May 2011 and 9 June 2012 relating to the financial assistance granted to the Hellenic Republic, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, respectively. 80 Accordingly, the evidence brought to the Court’s attention by the applicants themselves shows that the excessive size of the banking sector of the Republic of Cyprus compared to its national economy, at the time when the negotiations relating to the FAF were held, makes it possible to distinguish the situation of that Member State from that of the Hellenic Republic, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain when those MSCEs made their own requests for financial assistance. 81 It is to no avail that, in the reply, the applicants claim that the capital needs of Cypriot banks amounted to 44% of the GDP of the Republic of Cyprus and that the amount of financial assistance granted to the Hellenic Republic represented a far higher proportion of that country’s GDP, or that the risk of a massive withdrawal of capital and an ‘exit from the euro’ existed in those two MSCEs. Those considerations, which are, moreover, unsubstantiated, are not capable of overturning the finding of the excessive size of the banking sector of the Republic of Cyprus compared to its national economy. 82 Moreover, the applicants do not explain how the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index to which they refer is relevant to assessing the comparability of the situation of the banking sectors of two different countries. Similarly, the mere fact, mentioned by the applicants, that Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ 2000 L 126, p. 1) refers to ‘comparable types of credit institutions’ and is applicable both to Cypriot banks and to Greek banks, like Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338), is not, in itself, sufficient to establish that the measures to which the grant of financial assistance to the Republic of Cyprus and the Hellenic Republic could be made subject should have been similar. 83 It follows that the applicants’ situation, such as they describe it themselves, is manifestly not comparable to that of depositors of the other MSCEs that received financial assistance to which the applicants refer. 84 Since it was for the applicants to identify precisely the comparable situations which they consider to have been treated differently (see paragraph 71 above), the plea alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment must be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation. Plea alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality 85 The applicants claim that the restructuring measures placed a disproportionate burden on them and that, if they are compared with those agreed with other MSCEs, ‘for example’ Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic or the Hellenic Republic, other less onerous measures could have been implemented in order to achieve the objectives pursued. They also maintain that the defendants ‘did not publicly debate the consequences of their new “experiment” with regard to the ESM agreements’ and that there was therefore no possibility for the applicants to put forward arguments in favour of stronger protection of their interests. Furthermore, the fact that nine months passed between the request for assistance from Cyprus and the conclusion of the MoU of 26 April 2013 prevents the Commission and the ECB from pleading ‘urgency and necessity’. 86 The defendants contest that line of argument. 87 It should be recalled that the principle of proportionality requires that the means employed by a provision of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraph 160). 88 First, it must be noted that that principle does not provide that, in a situation such as that at issue in the present case, the Commission and the ECB would be required to ‘publicly debate’ any ‘new “experiment”’ with regard to the agreements concluded within the framework of the ESM in order for persons such as the applicants to be able to submit their comments. The applicants’ arguments in that regard must therefore be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 89 Second, as is apparent from paragraphs 161 to 164 of the judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others (C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028), which the defendants cite in their written pleadings, the negotiation of the conditions of the FAF, during which the restructuring measures were agreed, met a public interest objective consisting in ensuring the stability of the Cypriot financial system and of the euro area as a whole. 90 In order to argue that the restructuring measures went beyond what was necessary to achieve that objective, the applicants merely submit that, having regard to the conditions laid down in the context of the financial assistance granted to other MSCEs, such as the Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic or the Hellenic Republic, it was possible to make the FAF subject to conditions less detrimental to their rights, not providing for the contribution of depositors to the restructuring of the banks concerned. 91 However, as has been noted in paragraphs 75 to 80 above, it is apparent from the applicants’ written pleadings and from the documents placed by them on the file that, compared to the situation prevailing in the Kingdom of Spain or the Portuguese Republic at the date at which those MSCEs requested financial assistance, the situation of the Republic of Cyprus was characterised by the excessive size of its banking sector in relation to the size of its economy. 92 It follows that, in the light of the evidence brought to the Court’s attention by the applicants themselves, the comparison, for the purpose of demonstrating that the restructuring measures went beyond what was necessary, between the situation of the Republic of Cyprus and that of other MSCEs that received financial assistance is manifestly unfounded. The claims that the defendants cannot rely on considerations relating to the urgency and necessity of the measures decided upon are not capable of overturning that finding. 93 As regards the comparison with Ireland, the applicants merely refer to the situation of that Member State in the context of their line of argument concerning the principle of proportionality, without ever describing it in detail. 94 Accordingly, the plea in law alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 95 It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Costs 96 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and the ECB, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the latter parties. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Fersher Developments LTD and Mr Vladimir Lisin shall pay the costs. Luxembourg, 21 July 2022. E. Coulon H. Kanninen Registrar President * Language of the case: English.