Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:76
Date: 2026-02-05
Language of the case: Polish

Summary C-232/25 – 1 
Case C-232/25 [Idziski] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date received: 
27 March 2025 
Referring court: 
Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
21 February 2025 
Applicants: 
Z.R. 
Ś. 
Defendants: 
U. 
Z. 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Proceedings on a point of law relating in particular to the establishment of 
international jurisdiction for the Polish courts in a case relating to the infringement 
of personality rights as a result of the broadcasting in Poland of a series produced 
in another Member State 
Subject matter and legal basis of the reference 
Establishment of international jurisdiction for the courts in a given Member State 
in a case involving the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the 
content of a series broadcast inter alia in that Member State, which is not the 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-232/25 
 
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Member State where the series was produced (Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) 
Questions referred 
1. Must Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1) be interpreted as meaning that in a case 
concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the 
content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which 
the film was broadcast, which is different to the Member State in which the 
film was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action 
seeking: 
(a) non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of 
the infringement of personality rights, including an order for a statement 
containing an apology to be issued by the television channels that broadcast 
the film, regardless of the location from which it was broadcast, and also to 
be displayed on websites, as well as an order to display a similar statement 
prior to any broadcast of the film, regardless of the location from which it is 
broadcast, or 
(b) pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the 
entirety of the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of 
personality rights, inter alia in connection with the dissemination 
(broadcasting) of the film in other Member States, 
having regard to the fact that: 
– the applicants have their centre of interests and place of residence 
(head office) in that Member State, 
– the applicants assert that their personality rights have been infringed as 
a result of the way in which the film depicts the soldiers belonging to a 
military unit from that Member State ([…]), whereby one of the 
applicants is a former soldier of that military unit, and the other is an 
association of former soldiers of that military unit, the particular aim of 
which, according to its articles of association, is to defend the memory, 
historical truth and dignity of that unit; 
– given the historical, cultural and social context, the content of the film, 
including the way in which the soldiers of the abovementioned military 
unit ([…]) are depicted is objectively of considerable importance for 
the territory of that Member State? 
IDZISKI 
 
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2. [I]n the event that the first question is answered in the negative, should 
Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 22 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that in a case concerning the 
infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a 
cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was 
broadcast that is different to the Member State in which the film was 
produced have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking: 
(a) non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of 
the infringement of personality rights that occurred in connection with the 
broadcasting of the film in the Member State where the action was brought, 
including an order for an apology to be issued in this Member State, and also 
an order to display a corresponding statement prior to any broadcast of the 
film in that Member State, or 
(b) pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the 
damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights as 
a result of the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in the Member State 
where the action was brought, 
having regard, where necessary, to the circumstances referred to in Question 
1(1)–(3)[?] 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; 
recitals 11 and 12, Article 5(3); 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters: Article 66(1). 
Provisions of national law referred to 
Act of 23 April 1964 on the Civil Code; Articles 23, 24 and 43, Article 480(1); 
Act of 17 November 1964 on the Code of Civil Procedure; Article 222, 
Article 39813(1) and (2), Articles 39819 and 1099. 
Succinct presentation of the facts of the case 
1 The action brought against the defendants U. and Z. in M. (Federal Republic of 
Germany) by the applicants Z.R. and Ś. involves claims regarding an infringement 
of personality rights in connection with certain substantive aspects of a series co-
produced by the defendants. The contested series traces the fates of a number of 
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characters (a friendship group of young Germans) during World War II. Part of 
the story involving one of the main characters takes place in the Polish territories 
under German occupation. A crucial aspect of this plot strand is a meeting 
between this character and the underground military unit mentioned in the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling; the soldiers belonging to the relevant 
military unit make clear their attitudes towards Jews during this meeting. 
2 The applicant Z.R., who was born in 1924, was a prisoner at the Auschwitz-
Birkenau concentration camp, and also served in the underground forces and 
belonged to the relevant military unit as a soldier. He took part in many rescue 
operations and helped to conceal people of Jewish ethnicity. After the war, he was 
arrested by the Communist authorities and sentenced to 12 years in prison. He 
never personally encountered any anti-Semitism on the part of the soldiers 
belonging to the relevant military unit. 
3 The applicant Ś. is an association that brings together former soldiers of the 
relevant military unit. Its purpose is to defend the dignity, good name and memory 
of this unit and its soldiers. 
4 In the statement of grounds for the application, the applicants note that the series 
in question was broadcast on the Polish television network Telewizja Polska and 
also on other channels. Moreover, the series was and is available for streaming 
online, both in its entirety and in fragments. In the applicants’ opinion, the series 
depicts the soldiers of the relevant military unit as anti-Semites and nationalists 
who collaborated with the Germans during the Holocaust; this represents an 
infringement of their personality rights, such as the right to national pride, the 
right to cultivate a national identity, the right to accurate history, the right to 
dignity and a good name, and also the right to the character used as the symbol of 
the relevant unit. 
5 Finally, the applicants are seeking (among other things): 
– that the defendants be obliged to issue a corresponding statement, including an 
apology, on the Polish television network Telewizja Polska; 
– that the defendants be obliged to issue a corresponding statement, including an 
apology, on the specified websites (in German), and on the television channels 
where the series was broadcast in other countries (in the language appropriate 
for that country); 
– that the defendants be obliged to display the stipulated information as part of 
the opening credits whenever the series is broadcast, regardless of the location 
from which it is broadcast; 
– that the defendants be obliged to pay the applicant Z.R. an amount of 
PLN 25 000 as compensation for the infringement of personality rights. 
IDZISKI 
 
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6 The defendants have raised the plea that the Polish courts lack international 
jurisdiction, which is instead held by the German courts. In a decision dated 
18 July 2016, the court of first instance rejected the plea that the Polish courts lack 
international jurisdiction; in a decision dated 16 May 2017, the court of second 
instance dismissed an appeal against this decision. 
7 The court of second instance found that the international jurisdiction of the Polish 
courts resulted from Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. Citing a number 
of rulings by the Court (judgment of 7 March 1995, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading 
Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, 
C-68/93, EU:C:1995:61 (‘Shevill judgment’) and judgment of 25 October 2011, 
eDate Advertising GmbH and Others v X and Société MGN LIMITED, C-509/09 
and C-161/10, EU:C:2011:685 (‘eDate Advertising judgment’)), the court of 
second instance held that the damage suffered by the applicants involved an 
infringement of personality rights as a result of the broadcasting of the film trailer 
and parts of the film. The film was broadcast in Poland and elsewhere, and the 
applicant Z.R. watched the film in K., which is also where his centre of interests is 
located. 
8 Having considered the case on its merits, the court of first instance handed down a 
ruling on 28 December 2018 in which it granted most of the claims in the action 
(both non-pecuniary and pecuniary). 
9 In response to appeals brought by both parties, the ruling handed down by the 
court of first instance was amended by a ruling handed down on 23 March 2021 
by the court of second instance, in which it essentially obliged each of the 
defendants to display an apology on the Polish television network Telewizja 
Polska (in Polish) and on the relevant German television channels (in German). 
Moreover, the court of second instance obliged the defendants to display the 
relevant statement on websites (in German). The court of second instance rejected 
the remainder of the action brought by Ś. and rejected the application brought by 
Z.R. in its entirety. 
10 In the statement of reasons for the ruling, the court of second instance held that the 
personality rights of the applicant Z.R. had been infringed with regard to his 
national identity, but that this infringement was not unlawful, since the content of 
the series was within the limits allowed by the freedom of creative expression in 
this respect. The honour of the applicant Z.R. had not however been infringed, 
given the absence of any link identifying the applicant as an individual involved in 
the defamatory scenes in the film. 
11 In the opinion of the court of second instance, however, there had been an 
infringement of personality rights of Ś. in connection with the good name of this 
organisation and the soldiers of the former unit it brings together. 
12 The applicants and the defendants lodged cassation appeals against the ruling 
handed down by the court of second instance. The defendants raised a plea that 
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the proceedings were invalid since the case had been heard even though the Polish 
courts had no international jurisdiction. 
Brief statement of and reasons for the reference 
13 Pursuant to Article 1099 of the Code of Civil Procedure, proceedings are invalid if 
the Polish courts do not have international jurisdiction. The Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court) is consequently obliged to review whether the Polish courts had 
international jurisdiction in the case at hand. 
14 Since the defendants in the present case are domiciled in Germany, international 
jurisdiction is determined under Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in 
conjunction with Article 66(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. Yet the 
applicants ascribe international jurisdiction to the Polish courts on the basis of 
Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, according to which in matters 
relating to tort or delict, the application can be brought in the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred or may occur. The term ‘tort’ which is used in 
this provision also encompasses an infringement of personality rights. 
15 The ambiguity in the case at hand however pertains to the interpretation of another 
phrase that is used in this provision, namely the ‘place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur’, in the context of an infringement of personal rights on the 
grounds of the content of a series produced in Germany and broadcast in Poland 
and other countries. 
16 It follows from the Court’s settled case-law that if the harmful event involves 
more than one Member State, international jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is granted to the courts both in the place where the 
damage occurred and in the place of the event giving rise to it. 
17 The limits of international jurisdiction for the courts in the place where the 
damage occurred and the courts in the place of the event giving rise to it are not 
the same, however. While the courts in the place where the damage occurred, 
similarly to the courts in the place where the defendant is domiciled (Article 2(1) 
of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001), have international jurisdiction in respect of the 
totality of the harm suffered as a result of the infringement of personality rights, 
regardless of where said harm occurred (full international jurisdiction), the 
international jurisdiction of the courts in the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage is limited to the harm that occurred in the forum state (the ‘mosaic 
principle’). 
18 In its case-law, the Court has found that in the event of an infringement of 
personality rights involving the internet, the links between the place where the 
damage occurred (the perpetrator’s location) and the place of the event giving rise 
to said damage should moreover be adapted to the specific nature of this medium. 
The Court has held as a result that full international jurisdiction, including the 
making good of the totality of the damage resulting from the infringement of 
IDZISKI 
 
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personality rights, should also be granted to the courts in the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage, or in other words where the content infringing 
personality rights was made available, if the victim has his or her centre of 
interests in this country (as per the eDate Advertising judgment). 
19 The courts of first and second instance based their viewpoint – namely that the 
Polish courts have full international jurisdiction – on the similarity between an 
infringement of personality rights involving the internet and an infringement of 
personality rights on the grounds of the content of a film broadcast in a number of 
Member States, including Poland, whereby the applicants had their centre of 
interests in Poland. 
20 In a judgment handed down on 17 June 2021 (after the final decision in the case at 
hand had been handed down by the court of second instance), Mittelbayerischer 
Verlag KG v SM, C-800/19, EU:C:2021:489, ‘Mittelbayerischer Verlag 
judgment’, the Court however held that Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the court of the place in which 
the centre of interests of a person claiming that his or her personality rights have 
been infringed by content published online on a website is situated has 
international jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the totality of the damage caused, 
an action for damages brought by that person only if that content contains 
objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or 
indirectly, that person as an individual. This position undoubtedly also applies to 
Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, and is valid for the case at hand. 
21 The applicants believe that the content of the film allows them to be identified at 
least indirectly, which – despite the constraints laid down in the Mittelbayerischer 
Verlag judgment – serves as justification for granting full international jurisdiction 
to the Polish courts on the grounds that the film was broadcast in Poland and the 
applicants have their centre of interests in Poland. In the applicants’ opinion, since 
the film indisputably identifies the relevant military unit as a specific group, it also 
indirectly allows the identification of the applicants (one of which used to serve in 
the unit as a soldier, and the other of which is an association bringing together its 
former members). 
22 Before deciding whether the applicants’ position as set out above can be regarded 
as correct, however, it is necessary to examine whether the Court’s approach in 
the eDate Advertising judgment can be applied to a situation where the potential 
infringement of personality rights did not take place by publishing the relevant 
content on the internet (in which case it would in principle be available online in 
all of the Member States), but by producing the film and then broadcasting it, with 
the producer’s agreement, on television channels in other Member States. 
23 In this respect, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) believes that broadcasting a 
film via forms of traditional media such as television or cinemas differs from 
broadcasting it on the internet, since the universal availability of content 
disseminated via the internet cannot be assumed a priori in the case of television 
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and cinemas. A showing of a film in a cinema is localised to the environs of that 
cinema, even if it is shown in cinemas in several different Member States at the 
same time. The reach of a television broadcast (for traditional broadcasting 
methods) is also limited by the range of the relevant transmitters. 
24 In spite of these differences, arguments nevertheless exist against differentiating 
the aforementioned methods of broadcasting content as a basis for granting 
international jurisdiction; on the one hand, various technologies such as streaming, 
VoD and internet television are currently very popular and rapidly evolving, and 
on the other hand geoblocking and geolocation technologies are also available and 
becoming more sophisticated, which means that the differences between these 
broadcasting methods are becoming blurred. 
25 The universality of the aforesaid technologies and services means that even if a 
film is distributed in the traditional fashion (on television or in cinemas), it can 
also be made available concurrently on the internet, either straight away or after a 
certain delay. Moreover, the showing of a film on traditional media is often 
preceded by an information and advertising campaign on the internet. At the same 
time, the broadcaster may use technological capabilities to limit the reach of the 
internet broadcast to a specific area, and the content of websites may differ 
depending on the location where they are displayed thanks to methods such as 
geoblocking or geolocation. 
26 In a scenario where it is only possible to utilise the option of bringing an 
application seeking the making good of the entirety of the damage in the country 
where the applicant has his or her centre of interests if the film has been 
disseminated on the internet, the dispute may be unacceptably fragmented if the 
film is made available online and offline concurrently, which is typically the case 
nowadays. It is also difficult to conceive of a clear distinction between the damage 
caused by the dissemination of the film using traditional methods and the damage 
caused by making the film available on the internet. Against this background, the 
challenges faced could become even greater if – as per the Court’s previous case-
law – the limited international jurisdiction of courts in a particular country 
excludes jurisdiction over non-pecuniary claims resulting from an infringement of 
personality rights due to indivisibility. 
27 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) notes that the approach taken in the Shevill 
judgment related to the printed press, and the Court’s later case-law relates 
exclusively to the dissemination via the internet of content infringing personality 
rights, founded on the assumption that the reach of this disseminated content is 
unlimited and basically uncontrollable. It is therefore legitimate to query whether 
there is sufficient justification, as things currently stand, for retaining 
fundamentally different approaches to an assessment of international jurisdiction 
for courts in the Member States in cases relating to the infringement of personality 
rights depending on the technology used to broadcast over long distances (online 
or offline), given that technological advances have led to a blurring of the 
IDZISKI 
 
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boundaries between traditional forms of long-distance broadcasting and the 
distribution of the content via the internet. 
28 If one assumes, against the backdrop of the above considerations, that it may in 
principle be admissible to find that the Polish courts have full international 
jurisdiction in the case at hand, it is necessary to analyse the consequences of the 
Mittelbayerischer Verlag judgment in terms of the constraints imposed on the 
option of establishing full international jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
applicant’s centre of interests is in the forum state. 
29 There can be no question about the fact that the contested film does not identify 
the applicants directly. The issue of how to interpret the possibility that the 
potential victim of an infringement of personality rights may have been indirectly 
identified was not examined in further detail in the Mittelbayerischer Verlag 
judgment, but appears to pertain to the need for the person in question to be 
identified in each case (whether directly or indirectly) ‘as an individual’. 
30 If identification ‘as an individual’ is interpreted as meaning (as alleged by the 
defendants) that it is necessary to identify the specific individuals that have lodged 
claims and invoked a centre of interests in the country where the application was 
brought, the plot of the contested film does not allow either of the applicants to be 
identified in this way, if only because it is a work of fiction, and the script does 
not contain any explicit or implicit references to real personages, whether 
contemporary or historical. 
31 Yet it should be noted that the situation in the case at hand is different to that in 
the Mittelbayerischer Verlag case, where the content infringing personality rights 
pertained to an entire nationality, and the applicant invoked membership of this 
nationality; in the present case, however, the plot of the film describes the 
behaviour of a narrower and closed group of individuals, namely the soldiers of 
the relevant military unit, and unambiguously and undeniably identifies this unit. 
32 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) therefore queries whether, in the context of 
the Mittelbayerischer Verlag judgment and given the circumstances of the present 
case, it is possible to find that the contested film indirectly identifies the applicants 
on the grounds that one of them is a member of the specified group of individuals 
(former soldiers ascribed certain behaviours and traits by the plot of the film), and 
the second is an association bringing together these individuals. 
33 At the same time, however, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) is uncertain 
whether the fact that the applicants may not have been identifiable as individuals 
in the film to the extent required by the Court’s case-law should in fact preclude a 
finding that the Polish courts have international jurisdiction in the case at hand in 
respect of the entirety of the damage suffered by the applicants as a result of the 
dissemination of the film’s content in Poland and in other Member States. In the 
opinion of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), an interpretation to the effect that 
the Polish courts have only limited international jurisdiction in the case at hand, in 
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line with the mosaic principle, on the grounds that the event giving rise to the 
damage took place in Poland, would raise serious doubts from the point of view of 
Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 
thereof. 
34 With a view to clarifying these doubts, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) firstly 
submits that it is aware of the assumptions that served as a basis for the Court’s 
decision to eliminate the option of granting full international jurisdiction to the 
courts of a Member State in a case regarding the infringement of personality rights 
on the basis that the applicant has his or her centre of interests in this Member 
State if the content alleged to have infringed his or her personality rights is 
admittedly available in said Member State, but is not targeted at an individual. 
35 If a broadcast that infringes personality rights is targeted at a group rather than at 
persons identified as individuals, a person who felt targeted by the broadcast as a 
member of the group could theoretically have his or her centre of interests in any 
Member State, with the end result that the forum state with full international 
jurisdiction might become unforeseeable for the defendant. 
36 On the other hand, the fact that the disputed content does not identify individuals 
but instead pertains to a specific group should not mean that it is assumed from 
the outset that the designation of a country (other than the country in which the 
harmful event occurred) in which an application might be brought for the making 
good of the entirety of the damage suffered as a result of the infringement of 
personality rights would be unforeseeable by the perpetrator. 
37 This would result in the unjustified preferential treatment of persons responsible 
for a broadcast that was harmful, contained unjustifiable generalisations and 
stigmatised a group of people but did not allow the members of said group who 
had brought applications to be identified individually. The persons responsible for 
this type of broadcast would then merely need to defend a claim seeking the 
making good of the entirety of the damage pursuant to Article 5(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 in the place where the harmful event took place, which would 
typically coincide with the place of residence of its perpetrator. This would mean 
that the principle of lex delicti commissi was no longer a real alternative in view of 
the general international jurisdiction resulting from Article 2(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001. 
38 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) is aware that the victim of an infringement 
of personality rights resulting from content that does not allow the victim to be 
identified as an individual could theoretically bring an application for the making 
good of the damage caused in every country where there has been an event giving 
rise to said damage (mosaic principle). However, given that the scope of 
international jurisdiction of the courts in these countries is limited, this solution 
falls far short of offering the applicant full judicial protection; for example, it 
would preclude the assertion of non-pecuniary claims as a means of protecting 
personality rights. 
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39 The mosaic principle is moreover questionable in so far as it entails a systemic 
risk of parallel court proceedings in multiple Member States between the same 
parties relating essentially to ‘the same’ case; among other things, this would 
increase the risk that contradictory rulings might be handed down by different 
courts. 
40 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) considers that to date the negative 
consequences of the mosaic principle have been somewhat obscured in practice 
due to the option of bringing an application for the making good of the entirety of 
the damage before the courts in the country where the applicant has his or her 
centre of interests, which is beneficial for victims and preferred by them. 
However, the requirement for the applicant to be identifiable as an individual may 
mean that there is an increase in the number of cases where persons not meeting 
this requirement (and who are left with the sole alternative of bringing an 
application for the making good of the entirety of the damage in the country where 
the perpetrator of the infringement is domiciled) seek to bring an application – 
perhaps for only a symbolic amount of compensation – in the country where the 
event giving rise to the damage took place, in order to gain satisfaction by having 
the court confirm that their personality rights were infringed. 
41 Nevertheless, if the Court were to develop appropriate criteria allowing an 
alternative forum to be designated which had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in 
respect of the entirety of the damage and which, even if it were impossible to 
identify specific persons as individuals on the basis of the disputed content, would 
be adequately foreseeable for the defendant and guarantee proximity between the 
court and the dispute, this might allow the mosaic principle and the attendant risks 
to be eliminated. 
42 The structural weakness of the requirement imposed in the Mittelbayerischer 
Verlag judgment (namely that the option of granting full international jurisdiction 
in the place of the event giving rise to the damage should in each case depend on 
whether the applicant is identifiable as an individual) stems from the fact that the 
assessment of said identifiability is frequently a complex task; more importantly, 
this assessment often goes to the merits of the case. In this context, it should be 
emphasised that international jurisdiction is a prerequisite for assessing an 
application on its merits, irrespective of whether the court grants or dismisses the 
application.  
43 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) thus queries the approach that should be 
taken in a scenario where the criterion pertaining to the applicant’s centre of 
interests (as a result of the availability of the contested material in a specific 
Member State) no longer fulfils the principle whereby international jurisdiction 
must be foreseeable (a principle emphasised by the Court in the eDate Advertising 
judgment in relation to the defendant), since the alleged perpetrator of the damage 
is responsible for a broadcast that does not allow the addressees to be identified as 
individuals. 
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44 In the opinion of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), such a scenario should not 
mean that it is entirely impossible to bring an application for the making good of 
the entirety of the damage in the country where the event giving rise to the 
damage took place and where the victim has his or her centre of interests. In this 
scenario, consideration should instead be given to whether the granting of full 
international jurisdiction to the courts in the country where the applicant has his or 
her centre of interests is sufficiently foreseeable and justifiable with regard to the 
totality of the other circumstances of the case. 
45 If it is impossible to meet the requirement for the applicant to be identifiable as an 
individual, the principle of foreseeability of international jurisdiction should not 
be viewed solely in the context of the location of the centre of interests of the 
persons who have suffered harm as a result of the disputed content. Instead, the 
actual content of the broadcast that may have infringed personality rights and the 
location (determined on the basis of said content) where this broadcast is 
‘objectively of substantial importance’ should be used in this context as the 
primary point of reference for the foreseeability of international jurisdiction.  
46 This approach, which emphasises the object of the dispute and its significance in 
the relevant location (country) rather than who might potentially bring an 
application and where said applicant might have his or her centre of interests, 
appears to be more consistent with a correct understanding of the principle of 
foreseeability of international jurisdiction. 
47 For content similar to that in the case at hand, it should be regarded as foreseeable 
for the defendant if an application is brought for the making good of the entirety 
of the damage in the location where the impact of the disputed content 
(determined using objective criteria) is greatest on the basis of the potential 
victim’s centre of interests. When assessing this matter, it may be useful to 
consider (among other things) where the disputed content is likely to arouse the 
most interest among potential viewers. It is therefore necessary to carry out a 
comprehensive and holistic assessment of where a broadcast targeted at a specific 
group (taking into account many factors, such as the geographical, historical, 
cultural or social context) is objectively of substantial importance, may provoke 
the strongest reactions (including negative reactions), or may have the greatest 
public resonance. 
48 A further advantage of this approach is that it would allow international 
jurisdiction to be assessed in isolation from the circumstances playing into a 
consideration of the merits of the case, with a focus on facts that are objectively 
verifiable during the initial examination of the case. In the opinion of the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court), this solution is significantly more operational and in 
line with the spirit of the EU’s system for establishing international jurisdiction. 
49 If the above approach is applied to the case at hand, this seems to suggest that the 
international jurisdiction of Polish courts in relation to the entirety of the damage 
potentially caused by the content of the series complies with both the principle of 
IDZISKI 
 
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foreseeability of international jurisdiction and the requirement for proximity. The 
plot of the series, and in particular the ‘Polish’ plot strand, is objectively of 
substantial importance in Poland and for Polish viewers, and the film’s creators 
can reasonably be presumed to have expected this. 
50 In the event that the Court finds that the first question should be answered in the 
negative, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) assumes for the purpose of its 
further remarks that the Polish courts are granted limited international jurisdiction. 
In this context, however, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) queries whether the 
scope of this international jurisdiction might encompass at least some of the non-
pecuniary claims lodged by the applicants. 
51 In a ruling handed down on 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ, Ingrid 
Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, C-194/16, EU:C:2017:766, the Court further restricted 
the limited international jurisdiction based on the availability of the disputed 
content in the territory of the specific country by finding that the demand to rectify 
or remove content published on the internet was an indivisible application, and 
thus could be brought only before the courts in the country which had 
international jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of the damage caused by the 
potential infringement of personality rights. In the case at hand, the applicants are 
not however seeking the removal of the film from the internet or the cessation of 
television broadcasts of the film; instead, they are asserting a different type of 
claim, namely that specific information be displayed whenever the film is 
broadcast and that a corresponding statement be published. 
52 The constraints on international jurisdiction resulting from the mosaic principle 
presuppose that the court’s jurisdiction relates to the consequences of the 
infringement of personality rights only within the territory of the forum state. In 
this context, it should be noted that certain non-pecuniary claims asserted on the 
grounds of the infringement of personality rights may be such that their 
examination falls within the remit of a court whose jurisdiction is limited to an 
assessment of the consequences of an infringement committed within the territory 
of the forum state. For example, an individual whose personality rights were 
infringed on the internet or by a film broadcast in several countries might not 
necessarily request the publication of a corresponding statement on the internet, 
but instead via another medium whose impact is limited. This individual might 
also place constraints on the demand for a corresponding statement to be issued by 
stating that its content should relate solely to the effects of the infringement of 
personality rights within the territory of the relevant country. 
53 The Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) notes in this connection that non-pecuniary 
claims may acquire a greater significance for the protection of the victim’s interest 
than pecuniary claims in cases relating to the infringement of personality rights 
such as honour or good name. In this context, it should be noted that if – in 
keeping with the mosaic principle – the victim of an infringement of personality 
rights can without hindrance lodge demands for payment of a symbolic sum of 
monetary compensation in every country where there was an event giving rise to 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-232/25 
 
14  
damage, with the aim of having the infringement of personality rights confirmed 
by the court rather than of being granted financial satisfaction, it would appear 
inconsistent and poorly substantiated to preclude the lodging of any non-pecuniary 
claims whatsoever in those countries. 
54 The deliberations so far have assumed that the place where the film was broadcast 
is the place where there was an event giving rise to damage. In addition, the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court) notes that it might be considered that under the given 
circumstances, the harmful event is not only the production of the film, but also its 
broadcasting in the specific Member State, or alternatively the broadcasting of the 
film in the specific Member State alone, since it is only the broadcasting of the 
film that directly plays a role in encroaching on the personality rights – such as 
honour and good name – of the persons affected by the film’s content. 
55 If such an approach were adopted, the courts in the Member State where the film 
was broadcast would have international jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
harmful event took place in this Member State; this would be significant in terms 
of the limits of the international jurisdiction granted to the courts of this country, 
which could encompass all claims (non-pecuniary and pecuniary) in a scope 
corresponding at least to the damage caused as a result of the film being broadcast 
in the specific Member State.  
56 In the case at hand, however, the defendants before the Polish court are all 
producers of a film that was produced in Germany, and the film was broadcast in 
Poland by another entity that is not party to the proceedings; this means that the 
alleged perpetrator of the damage did not take action personally within this court’s 
jurisdictional territory. According to the Court’s case-law, this precludes a finding 
by the court that it has international jurisdiction on the grounds of the location of 
the harmful event. 
57 Yet given that the defendants granted a licence to a third party with full 
distribution rights to the film, and thus accepted that it would also be disseminated 
in other countries, including Poland, there are grounds for wondering whether this 
line of action by the defendants might be deemed equivalent to their having taken 
action in each of the countries where the film was broadcast with their consent. If 
this question were answered in the affirmative, however, it would furthermore be 
necessary to decide whether the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts 
established on this basis might also encompass harm resulting from the 
broadcasting of the film in other Member States.