Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2025:744
Date: 2025-07-23
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or at the very least one of those reasons, deemed to be sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 84 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing that person’s funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgments of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124). 85 It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. For that purpose, there is no requirement that the Council produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act sought to be annulled. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see, also, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 86 In such a situation, it is the task of the Courts of the European Union to determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and to assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 87 As regards, specifically, the review carried out of the legality of the acts maintaining the name of the person concerned on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, it should be borne in mind that those measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgments of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 88 It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence as that justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person in question on that list, provided that, first, the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and, second, the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). In that respect, assessment of the changes in the context involves taking into consideration, first, the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established and the particular situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101) and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited). 89 It is in the light of those principles that it is necessary to examine whether, as a result of the adoption of the acts of September 2023, and then as a result of the adoption of the acts of March 2024, the Council made an error of assessment by deciding to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. 90 In that regard, it is apparent from the wording of the contested acts that the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the criterion of supporting materially or financially Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine (Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended (‘the (d) criterion’)). It was also included on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. 91 The Court finds it appropriate to determine, first of all, whether the Council made an error of assessment by maintaining the applicant’s name on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. (b) The acts of September 2023 92 By his arguments disputing the legality of the acts of September 2023, the applicant claims that the evidence put forward by the Council is unreliable and submits that his name was wrongly maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. (1) The reliability of the evidence 93 The applicant claims that many of the sources used by the Council are mediocre in quality, and specifically disputes the reliability of certain items of evidence. 94 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 95 In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In that regard, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited). 96 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment by the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 97 Furthermore, it must be observed that the situation of armed conflict involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigative difficulties may therefore be a factor in preventing the provision of specific evidence and objective information (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). 98 In the present case, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the Council relied on the evidence in file WK 3073/2022 INIT of 12 March 2022, including on an article entitled ‘Why Mueller named a Russian Oligarch in Court’, published on 6 April 2018 on the website of The Daily Beast (Exhibit 1). 99 The Council also relied on one of the items in file WK 17621/2022 INIT to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, namely a page from the ‘Putin’s list’ website, relating to the applicant, consulted on 23 November 2022 (Exhibit 2). 100 The Council also took into account, to support its justification for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, certain items in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 of 10 August 2023, namely: – a presentation of AlfaStrakhovanie published on that company’s website, consulted on 25 May 2023 (Exhibit 2); – an article entitled ‘AlfaStrakhovanie ruled out the sale of business to third-party buyers’, published on 4 May 2023 on the website of Radio Liberty (Exhibit 9); – a presentation of the shareholdings in X5 Retail Group published on that company’s website, consulted on 1 June 2023 (Exhibit 10); – a page from the Rupep website, on the applicant’s business relations, consulted on 12 June 2023 (Exhibit 17); – an article entitled ‘AlfaStrakhovanie confirmed the change of ownership of the company’, published on 4 May 2023 on the website of Vedomosti (Exhibit 19); – an article entitled ‘Fridman’s Alfa Group to exit all Russian assets’, published on 5 May 2023 on the website of bne IntelliNews (Exhibit 20). 101 To justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the Council also took into consideration a number of items in file WK 10555/2023 INIT of 14 August 2023, namely: – a letter of 5 June 2023 from the Central Bank of Ukraine to the European Commission relating to Ukraine’s concerns regarding attempts to circumvent sanctions (Exhibit 1); – a Central Bank of Ukraine press release relating to Sense Bank, published on 20 July 2023 (Exhibit 2). 102 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, at the hearing, the applicant withdrew his arguments on the unreliability of the TAdivser information source. 103 In addition, as regards the arguments by which the applicant claims, on the basis of an article published by POLITICO and annexed to the application, that the great majority of the sources used by the Council are mediocre in quality, it should be noted that the article in question does not systematically question all the information in the evidence files prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS), but rather raises only questions about the reliability of certain sources of information, such as social media, blogs or information generated by artificial intelligence. 104 It should be noted that the article in question does not refer to the evidence files on which the Council relies in the present case and that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the items of evidence referred to in paragraphs 98 to 101 are from sources whose reliability is called into question by that article. 105 As regards the applicant’s arguments that, in essence, the information about him given in documents 19 and 20 of evidence file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 is unreliable because it relies on anonymous sources, it should be noted that those documents are articles from specialised economic media, that is to say, Vedomosti and bne IntelliNews, which rely on facts referred to in a BBC article, on the reported statement by a member of the board of directors of ABH Holdings highlighting the need to relocate that company’s assets and on anonymous sources. The mere fact that some information in those documents is from anonymous journalists’ sources does not render them unreliable. Since these are sources inside the companies that are the subject of investigation by those specialised economic media, to require the journalists systematically to reveal the identity of their sources to the public could breach the protection of journalists’ sources. 106 As regards the applicant’s arguments disputing the reliability of document 1 in evidence file WK 5142/2023 ADD 1 relating to evidence of the Russian business environment and economy, that is to say, an investigation report published on the ‘Proekt’ website, those arguments must be rejected as ineffective since the Council did not rely on that document to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. 107 In the light of the foregoing, having regard to the specific context of the situation of the Russian Federation and because the Council has no investigative powers in third countries (see paragraphs 96 and 97 above), the applicant has failed to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the probative value of the documents in the evidence files referred to in paragraphs 98 to 101 above. (2) Application of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant 108 The applicant submits that the Council was wrong to maintain his name on the lists at issue on the basis of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. 109 In the first place, the applicant claims that the Council made an error of assessment by finding him to be a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium, which includes Alfa Bank, Alfrastrakhovanie and X5 Retail Group. 110 First of all, the applicant asserts that the Alfa Group consortium has no structure and does not exist in legal terms. Next, he maintains that he has provided evidence that he transferred his shares, first, in ABH Holdings, which owns Alfa Bank Russia, Alfa Bank Ukraine and AlfaStrakhovanie, and, second, in CTF Holdings, which owns A1, X5 Retail Group and IDS Borjomi. According to the applicant, the Council cannot argue that he did not transfer those shareholdings to Mr [confidential]. (1) 111 In addition, the applicant submits that the transfer of his shares in CTF Holdings is proven by an extract from the register of beneficial owners of that company. 112 Furthermore, the applicant alleges that the Council denied the probative value of the documents produced to substantiate the share transfer in reliance on the unsubstantiated fact that a counter-letter was purportedly concluded with the purchaser of his shares, that is to say, Mr [confidential]. He therefore claims that the Council is requiring him to produce evidence of a negative in order to prove the transfer of the shares in question. 113 What is more, the applicant disputes the Council’s arguments that he controls AlfaStrakhovanie, on the ground that the information available to the Council is hypothetical. 114 In the second place, the applicant claims, in essence, that he is the only businessperson whose name is included on the lists at issue without account being taken of past or present executive functions. In that regard, he submits that the Council should have taken into account the fact that he performed no executive function in the 10 years preceding the initial inclusion of his name on those lists. 115 In the third place, the applicant states that he does not pursue an economic activity in one or more sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and therefore submits that he cannot be regarded as a leading businessperson in Russia. According to the applicant, it is clear from both the case-law on Value Added Tax (VAT) and from the recent case-law on restrictive measures adopted in the context of the invasion of Ukraine that the mere fact that he holds shares does not mean that the Council can find that he pursues an activity in an economic sector. 116 In the fourth place, the applicant submits that the presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Russian Government contained in the provisions of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is not applicable to him. He maintains that the documents in files WK 5142/2023 INIT and WK 5142/2023 ADD1 containing information on the Russian business environment and economy do not mention him and that certain documents relating to the companies in the Alfa Group consortium establish that Alfa Bank does not form part of the close circle of dominant economic players close to Mr Putin. He asserts that neither he nor the companies in that consortium nor his partners belong to one of the categories of interdependent businesspersons, are friends of Mr Putin linked to the KGB or to Mr Putin’s network in Saint Petersburg (Russia), operate in state-controlled sectors or benefit from public contracts, tax advantages or special treatment. Similarly, according to the applicant, none of the companies in that consortium has had a minister in the Russian Government or a personal trustee on its board of directors. 117 In the fifth place, the applicant submitted at the hearing that Rosvodokanal did not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation because that company represented only between 25% to 30% of the private water supply and waste water treatment sector in Russia, representing only 10% of that sector as a whole. 118 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 119 As regards the general context associated with the situation in Ukraine, it is clear that, on the date on which the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the situation in Ukraine remained grave. Similarly, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 120 It should be noted that, before it was amended, the (g) criterion covered only ‘leading businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’. The amendment of that criterion by Decision 2023/1094 had the effect of extending its scope to ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ (first part of the amended (g) criterion) and to ‘businesspersons … involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ (third part of the amended (g) criterion). 121 In the first place, as regards the first part of the amended (g) criterion, it should be noted that the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ refers to the importance of the businesspersons in the light of, as the case may be, their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143). 122 It is clear from the first part of the amended (g) criterion that the amendment of the initial (g) criterion was intended only to extend the scope of the restrictive measures so that they apply to all leading businesspersons operating in Russia, including those not involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. 123 The reasons justifying extension of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, are set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094. That recital describes the functioning of the Russian economy, in which there is a relationship of interdependence between the leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, by targeting those businesspersons, the Council aims to exploit the influence which that category of person is likely to exert over the Russian regime, by prompting them to put pressure on that government so that it changes its policy with regard to Ukraine. 124 In order to apply the first part of the amended (g) criterion to the individual situation of each person whose name is included on the lists at issue, the Council must show, first, that a natural person can be classified as a ‘leading businessperson’ within the meaning given in paragraph 121 above and, second, that that natural person operates in Russia. In that regard, it should be emphasised that the mere fact of belonging to the category of leading businesspersons operating in Russia is sufficient to justify the necessary restrictive measures being taken under that part, and there is no requirement to provide evidence of a link between being a leading businessperson and the Russian regime, or between being a leading businessperson and support to or a benefit derived from that regime (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 66, and order of 6 September 2022, Haikal v Council, C‑113/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:640, paragraph 41). 125 In the present case, as regards the applicant’s personal situation, it is clear from the reasons for inclusion that he is regarded as being one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium. 126 According to the information in, inter alia, document 1 in file WK 3073/2022 INIT, the applicant is a co-founder of the Alfa Group consortium, a major Russian private industrial and financial group with interests in various economic sectors. 127 It should also be noted that a presentation of the Alfa Group consortium by Alfa Bank Ukraine, dated June 2019, submitted as Annex B.2 to the defence, refers to the companies in that consortium, which include ABH Holdings, AlfaStrakhovanie, X5 Retail Group and A1, and supports information in document 2 in file WK 17621/2022 INIT (judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 94). That information is also confirmed by document 2 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, which indicates that, as at 26 May 2023, Alfa Group consortium included Alfa Bank, AlfaStrakhovanie, Rosvodokanal, X5 Retail Group and A1. 128 Furthermore, it is common ground and clear from documents 9 and 19 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 that ABH Holdings, established in Luxembourg, indirectly owns, first, Alfa Bank Russia, including via ABH Financial, established in Cyprus, and via AB Holding, established in Russia, and, second, AlfaStrakhovanie, including via AlfaStrakhovanie Holdings, established in Cyprus, and via Yuns-Holdings, established in Russia. It should be noted that, as is apparent from, inter alia, document 17 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, the applicant does not dispute that he held 16.3239% of ABH Holdings. 129 Moreover, it is clear from document 10 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1 and is not disputed by the applicant that 47.86% of X5 Retail Group is owned by CTF Holdings, established in Luxembourg. Similarly, at the hearing, it was common ground that CTF Holdings also owned A1 indirectly via companies established in Cyprus and in Russia. It is apparent from that file that CTF Holdings indirectly owns A1 via A1 Investment Holding, established in Luxembourg, via A1 Capital, established in Cyprus, and via Management Company Group A1, established in Russia. It should be noted that the applicant disputes neither that he is one of the founders of CTF Holdings, as is apparent from document 2 in evidence file WK 17621/2022 INIT, or that he held shares in that company, which is established in Luxembourg. At the hearing, the applicant disputed the Council’s claim that he held 11% of the shares in that company via Intertrust Trustees but acknowledged that, as is apparent from Annex C.12 to the reply, he had held approximately [confidential]% of the capital of CTF Holdings. 130 Accordingly, the Council considers that, as a result of his shareholdings in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings, the applicant was one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium. 131 The applicant criticises the Council, first, for failing to take into account the fact that he transferred his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings in March 2022 and, second, for reversing the burden of proof by requiring him to produce additional evidence showing that he had relinquished any capital holding in the Alfa Group consortium. 132 It is therefore necessary to determine, first, whether the Council is unduly reversing the burden of proof by requiring the applicant to produce evidence proving that he transferred his capital holdings and, second, in the light of the evidence produced by the applicant, whether the Council made an error of assessment when it found that he was still one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium. 133 As regards the applicant’s argument concerning reversal of the burden of proof, it is true that, as noted in paragraph 85 above, it is for the Council to establish the validity of the reasons relied on against the person or entity whose name is included on the lists at issue. However, where persons subject to restrictive measures, such as the applicant, claim that their personal situation has changed compared with facts established by the Council, it is for the person concerned to provide evidence demonstrating that such a change has in reality occurred and, therefore, that the Council erred in its assessment of that evidence. 134 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 126 to 130 above, the Council had a body of evidence demonstrating that the applicant was one of the largest shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium as a result of his capital holdings in a number of companies belonging to that consortium, in particular via ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings. It is therefore for the applicant to demonstrate that he did in fact transfer his shares in those companies and did in fact relinquish his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them. That requirement does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof, since it is the applicant who is relying on the change in his personal situation and is required to demonstrate that change, namely the transfer of his shares in the companies in the Alfa Group consortium (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 50, and of 27 June 2024, Servier and Others v Commission, C‑201/19 P, EU:C:2024:552, paragraph 124). Since the evidence of the procedures, arrangements and conditions for transferring shares in companies takes the form of documents to which neither the Council nor the Member States have access, the applicant is therefore best placed to provide such evidence in order to substantiate the change in his personal situation (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2024, Timchenko and Timchenko v Council, T‑644/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:621, paragraph 64). 135 In the present case, according to the applicant, his holdings of approximately 16% in ABH Holdings and approximately [confidential]% in CTF Holdings were transferred to the purported transferee on 14 March 2022, that is to say, the day before his name was included on the lists at issue. Furthermore, as the applicant notes, the purported transferee of those holdings also acquired, at the same time, approximately [confidential]% of the shares in ABH Holdings and approximately [confidential]% of the shares in CTF Holdings held by a different shareholder. A single transferee, Mr [confidential], therefore simultaneously acquired not only approximately 36% of the shares in ABH Holdings but also approximately 54% of the shares in CTF Holdings. In view of the assets held by ABH Holdings, that is to say, Alfa Bank Russia and AlfaStrakhovanie, and by CTF Holdings, that is to say, the distribution company X5 Retail Group and the Russian investment firm A1, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that the purported transfers involved significant sums. 136 Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of the present case and given that the applicant is relying, inter alia, on a change in his personal situation occurring the day before his name was included on the lists at issue, it was for him to submit evidence to demonstrate that, before that inclusion, the purported transfers had constituted an effective transfer of ownership of his holdings to an identifiable transferee at arm’s length. Accordingly, the evidence of the transfers to the purported transferee of the shares owned by the applicant in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings must serve to establish that the transfer complied with the provisions of EU law relating to restrictive measures, which, in the present case, involved establishing that the share transfers had become effective, in accordance with national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes, before the measures to freeze the applicant’s funds came into force. In the present case, therefore, the evidence of the effective transfers of shares in those two holding companies had to include, inter alia, the documents relating to the transfer of those shares, the relevant provisions of the applicable national law and the provisions of the statutes of the holding companies in question. 137 In addition, in order to demonstrate that he had in actual fact relinquished his prerogatives as shareholder, the applicant was required to provide evidence of the conditions and arrangements for the purported transfers and of the other contracting parties, and in particular of the transfer price of those shares. Contrary to the applicant’s submissions at the hearing, that evidence of the transfer price is necessary in order to determine whether the purported transfers of his shares involve an effective relinquishment of his prerogatives as a shareholder of ABH Holdings and of CTF Holdings. Where a transferor sells shares for a price manifestly below the value of the assets transferred, the transfer cannot be regarded as being made to a third party at arm’s length (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 101), since, in those circumstances, by reason of the favour that that price would represent for the transferee, the transferor might continue, through the transferee, to exert influence over the business of the company whose shares were transferred, which would cast doubt on the credibility of that transfer (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2025, Ponomarenko v Council, T‑249/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:202, paragraph 130). Accordingly, in the present case, the evidence submitted was also required to contain information about the price for which the shares were transferred and the arrangements for paying for them. 138 It should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, production of the evidence referred to in paragraphs 136 and 137 above cannot represent an unreasonable burden or one involving the undue disclosure of confidential information. The applicant is best placed to provide evidence of the effective transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings and of the effective relinquishment of his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them (see paragraph 134 above). 139 Moreover, in circumstances such as those of the present case, involving significant share transfers that allegedly took place the day before measures to freeze the applicant’s funds came into force (see paragraph 135 above) and the use of legal arrangements entailing companies established in several countries (see paragraphs 128 and 129 above), the efficiency and effectiveness of the restrictive measures could be jeopardised if purported transfers of company shares were taken into account without any evidence to demonstrate that they were genuine. 140 As regards the evidence produced in the present action, it is necessary to determine whether that evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant had effectively transferred his shares in ABH Holdings and CTF Holdings and effectively relinquished his prerogatives as a shareholder of those companies and of the entities associated with them and, accordingly, that the Council made an error of assessment when it found that he was still one of the main shareholders of Alfa Group consortium. 141 First, the applicant claims that the purported transfer of shares in CTF Holdings to Mr [confidential] took place the day before that on which his name was included on the lists at issue, namely 14 March 2022. 142 As is apparent from paragraph 136 above, it is nevertheless for the applicant to provide, in particular, evidence to demonstrate that the transfer in question took place in compliance with the provisions of EU law relating to restrictive measures. 143 In accordance with Article 2 of Decision 2022/429 and Article 2 of Implementing Regulation 2022/427, the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant came into force on the date on which those acts were published in the Official Journal of the European Union, namely 15 March 2022, that is to say, the day after the purported transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings. 144 In that regard, it must be noted that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides, in particular, that all the funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies whose names are included on the lists at issue are to be frozen. Under Article 1(f) of that regulation, the concept of ‘freezing of funds’ is defined as ‘preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or any other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management’. According to Article 1(g) of that regulation, the concept of ‘funds’ is defined as financial assets and benefits of every kind, which include, as is apparent from Article 1(g)(iii), publicly- and privately traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts. 145 In the present case, therefore, from 15 March 2022, all the funds that the applicant owned, held or controlled in the territory of the European Union were frozen, including the company shareholdings he owned in the European Union, which could no longer undergo any move, transfer, alteration, use or access that would result, inter alia, in a change in their ownership or possession or any other change that would enable them to be used. Consequently, the aforementioned shareholdings owned by the applicant could only be unfrozen either by his name being removed from the lists at issue or by the competent authorities granting one of the derogations under Regulation No 269/2014. 146 In order to demonstrate the transfer of his shares in CTF Holdings, the applicant produced three documents. 147 First of all, as regards the document submitted as being an extract of the share register of CTF Holdings (Annex A.27 to the application), the applicant indicates, as at 16 May 2023, the number of shares by absolute value held by each of the two companies established in Cyprus referred to in that document, without any further information. Although it is not necessary to rule on the probative value of that document, suffice it to note that it does not serve to demonstrate that the transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings took place before 15 March 2022. 148 Next, the applicant produces a declaration of ownership relating to a company established in Lichtenstein, confirming, according to the applicant, that on 18 January 2022 he was the ultimate beneficial owner and shareholder of that company (Annex C.10 to the reply). Although it is not necessary to rule on the probative value of that document, suffice it to note that that declaration is irrelevant for the purposes of demonstrating any transfer of ownership of his shares in CTF Holdings before 15 March 2022. That declaration, dated 18 January 2022, merely states that the applicant was the ultimate beneficial owner of the company in question, established in Lichtenstein, before the purported change of ownership of CTF Holdings. 149 Last, the applicant submits an extract of the register of effective beneficial owners of CTF Holdings drawn up by Luxembourg Business Registers (Annex C.11 to the reply), which effectively indicates that all the shares in the capital of that company were held indirectly by Mr [confidential] and Mr [confidential]. 150 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the extract in question contains no indication of the date on which the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings were transferred to Mr [confidential] or of the terms of that transfer. The information relating to the effective beneficial owners contained in that extract therefore does not serve to establish that the applicant did in fact transfer the ownership of those shares before the restrictive measures taken against him came into force on 15 March 2022. 151 Examined by the Court at the hearing on the fact that the extract in question did not state the date on which his shares in CTF Holdings were actually transferred and that it indicated that information had been amended on 25 April 2023, that is to say, more than a year after the freezing of his funds came into force on 15 March 2022, the applicant maintained that the extract demonstrated that the transfer of those shares took place before that date on the ground that the registrar had verified the information declared. Since he has not substantiated that claim by demonstrating, in particular on the basis of the national legislation applicable to that register, that the registrar in question was obliged systematically to verify the declarations submitted to it, it must be found that the extract in question does not serve to prove that those shares had actually been transferred before 15 March 2022. 152 It must therefore be found that the evidence produced by the applicant does not serve to demonstrate that he actually transferred his shares in CTF Holdings before the restrictive measures taken in relation to him came into force on 15 March 2022. 153 Moreover, it must be noted that, since the purported transfer took place close to the date on which the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, the production of a sale agreement pre-dating 15 March 2022 cannot, on its own, suffice to demonstrate an effective transfer of ownership of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings before the measures freezing his funds came into force. First, in order to find that the transfer of ownership was effective and complied with EU law, it must be demonstrated that it took place before the entry into force of those measures in accordance with the rules of national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes. Second, given that the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he had still not been paid the price for those shares, he must also demonstrate that the contractual provisions governing the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the sale price or of deferred payment. 154 It should moreover be recalled that, from 15 March 2022, all the holdings owned by the applicant in companies established in the European Union had been frozen, with the consequence that, from that date, any move, transfer or alteration of the holdings he owned in companies established in Luxembourg would have required an authorisation to be obtained from the competent authorities (see paragraphs 143 to 145 above). It is clear that the applicant is not relying on any derogation issued by the competent authorities in order to have those shareholdings unfrozen after the adoption of the restrictive measures relating to him. 155 It follows that, since there is no evidence that the purported transfer of the applicant’s shares in CTF Holdings complied with the provisions of EU law on restrictive measures, or of an effective transfer with no contractual provisions providing for rescission, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the applicant was a shareholder of that company. 156 Second, as regards the purported transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings, the applicant submits that it took place the day before that on which his name was included on the lists at issue, that is to say, 14 March 2022. 157 It is indeed apparent from documents 9, 19 and 20 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, which are press articles reporting a transfer to Russia, allegedly involving the applicant, of Russian assets held by ABH Holdings, that the applicant transferred his shares in that company to Mr [confidential] in March 2022. However, those articles give no indication of the exact date on which ownership of the applicant’s shares was actually transferred to Mr [confidential] or, in particular, of whether that transfer was finalised before adoption of the restrictive measures in respect of the applicant. 158 Similarly, as regards the evidence from the National Bank of Ukraine, it is true that it is clear from document 1 in file WK 17621/2022 INIT and from document 2 in file WK 10555/2023 INIT, namely press releases from that institution published on 28 October 2022 and 20 July 2023 respectively, that Mr [confidential] (2) owned a 40.9614% qualifying holding in Sense Bank (formerly Alfa Bank Ukraine, which was owned by ABH Holdings) following a purported transfer of the shares in that latter company held by the applicant and another shareholder. Nevertheless, those press releases from the Ukrainian national bank also state that the acquisition of those shares had taken place without its prior authorisation. In addition, it is clear from a letter of 5 June 2023 from that national bank to the Commission (document 1 in file WK 10555/2023 INIT), that, under Ukrainian law, the consent allowing Mr [confidential] to acquire a significant shareholding in Sense Bank had to be treated as null and void. 159 As regards the decision of the National Bank of Ukraine of 15 April 2022 annexed to the reply (Annex C.3 to the reply), it must be noted that, in point 1 of the enacting provisions of that decision, the institution notes the acquisition by Mr [confidential] of a substantial shareholding in Sense Bank in breach of Ukrainian law, which, in principle, requires any person intending to acquire a substantial holding in a Ukrainian financial institution to inform that national bank in advance and to await its prior approval. In addition, neither the enacting provisions nor the grounds of that decision state explicitly that Mr [confidential] acquired ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings on 14 March 2022. Accordingly, as regards the assets of ABH Holdings located in Ukraine, that national bank found only that the transfer took place in breach of Ukrainian banking law. 160 It follows that the decision of the National Bank of Ukraine of 15 April 2022 cannot prove that ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings had been transferred to Mr [confidential] before 15 March 2022. 161 It should be noted that the other evidence produced by the applicant is likewise not such as to prove that ownership of his shares in ABH Holdings had actually been transferred to Mr [confidential] before 15 March 2022. 162 As regards the statement drawn up by the auditors of ABH Holdings (Annex A.30 to the application) and the statement drawn up by the legal firm acting for that company (Annex A.25 to the application), it should be noted that neither of those statements concludes unequivocally that the transfer of the ownership of the applicant’s shares in that company was effective before that date. The first of those statements indicates that ‘in March 2022 [the applicant] sold all his shares and was no longer [a] shareholder of [the company in question]’, without expressly indicating the exact date of the effective transfer of the shares. The second of those statements, for its part, merely notes that the shareholders could vote freely. That statement admittedly sets out a list of documents which include the transactional documentation relating to the sale of the applicant’s interests in that company to Mr [confidential] on 14 March 2022, the articles of association of the company in question, a shareholders’ agreement, information about the contractual relationships between that company and designated persons and a deed of undertaking executed on 25 April 2022 by that company and Mr [confidential]. Nevertheless, since those documents, which are not annexed to the statement, have not been produced, it is impossible to determine whether the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective before 15 March 2022. 163 As regards the statement issued on 6 April 2022 by the director of ABH Holdings (Annex A.30 to the application), according to which the applicant had no longer held any ownership interests since the sale of his holdings in that company to a third party, which purportedly took place on 14 March 2022, it should be noted, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 95 above, that the probative value of that statement, which originates from the director of the company of which the applicant was a shareholder, should be qualified (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 153). Accordingly, in the absence of other evidence supporting that assertion, that statement is not, on its own, capable of proving that the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective as from 14 March 2022. 164 As regards the extract from the register of effective beneficial owners of ABH Holdings drawn up by Luxembourg Business Registers, irrespective of the reliability of that document, which is not signed by the registrar, it must be noted that the date of the most recent amendment is given as 22 March 2022, that is to say, a week after the measures freezing the applicant’s funds came into force. In the circumstances of the present case, which involve significant share transfers that allegedly took place the day before those measures came into force (see paragraph 135 above), that extract cannot be sufficient to prove that the applicant had actually transferred the ownership of his shares in that company before his funds were frozen. For the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 151 above, that extract is not capable of proving that the transfer of ownership of those shares was effective before 15 March 2022. 165 It must also be noted that, since the purported transfer took place close to the date on which the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, the production of a sale agreement pre-dating 15 March 2022 cannot be sufficient, on its own, to demonstrate an effective transfer of ownership of the applicant’s shares in ABH Holdings before the fund-freezing measures came into force. First, in order for the transfer of ownership to comply with EU law, it must be demonstrated that it was finalised, in accordance with the rules of national law and the applicable provisions of the statutes, before the entry into force of those measures. Second, given that the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he had still not been paid the transfer price for those shares, he must also demonstrate that the contractual terms of the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the sale price or of deferred payment. 166 Accordingly, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 157 to 165 above, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023, the applicant was a shareholder of ABH Holdings. 167 Accordingly, since the Council was correct to find that the applicant was a shareholder of CTF Holdings (see paragraph 155 above) and of ABH Holdings (see paragraph 166 above), it cannot be accused of making an error of assessment by describing him as being one of the main shareholders of Alfa Group consortium at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted. 168 It is not in issue that Alfa Bank Russia is one of the largest Russian private commercial and investment banks, that AlfaStrakhovanie is one of the largest insurance companies in Russia or that X5 Retail Group is one of the most important companies in the retail sector in Russia. A1 (formerly Alfa-Eco), for its part, appears to be an investment firm based in Russia. 169 Consequently, in view of the importance of the business carried on in Russia by the companies in the Alfa Group consortium, the Council was entitled, without thereby making an error of assessment, to find that the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion. 170 The applicant’s other arguments cannot call that conclusion into question. 171 First, the applicant’s arguments that performance of an executive function is a necessary condition in order to be regarded as ‘leading’ within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion cannot succeed. Since merely owning significant capital holdings in one or more important companies may be sufficient for a person to be described as a leading businessperson, performance of an executive function is not a necessary condition for a natural person to be described as a ‘leading’ businessperson (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 151). Consequently, the fact that, a number of years before the adoption of the initial acts, the applicant was no longer performing an executive function in the entities associated with the Alfa Group consortium is irrelevant. 172 Second, it is also appropriate to reject the applicant’s arguments that he did not operate in Russia on the ground that it was clear from the VAT case-law that the mere holding of shares, whether actual or presumed, was insufficient, in itself, to amount to pursuit of an ‘economic activity’. It is sufficient to bear in mind that the concept of ‘economic activity’ in relation to VAT belongs to a different legal context from that of the amended (g) criterion, the first part of which refers to leading businesspersons ‘operating [in French, literally, ‘pursuing activities’] in Russia’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 92). 173 Third, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments that he did not fall within the presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Russian Government because he did not belong to the category of businesspersons close to Mr Putin and because none of his companies had enjoyed preferential treatment by the public authorities. In that regard, first of all, it must be noted that the sole purpose of the first part of the amended (g) criterion was to introduce an objective, autonomous and sufficient criterion capable of justifying the inclusion of the names of certain persons on the lists at issue, which requires the Council to prove two cumulative elements, namely, first, that the person targeted is a leading businessperson and, second, that the person in question operates in Russia. Consequently, the applicant cannot maintain that the first part of that criterion established a presumption (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). Next, as noted in paragraph 124 above, in order to justify inclusion of a person’s name under that part, it is not necessary to provide evidence of a link between the applicant and the Russian regime, or of support provided to that regime or of a benefit derived from it. Accordingly, for the purposes of applying the first part of the amended (g) criterion, whether the applicant is a close associate of Mr Putin linked to the KGB or to the Saint Petersburg network, whether he operates in state-controlled sectors or whether he benefited from public contracts, tax advantages or special treatment is irrelevant. The same is true of the fact that none of his companies has had a minister in the Russian Government or a personal trustee on its board of directors. 174 Fourth, in so far as the applicant is attempting to argue that the Council made an error of assessment because the Alfa Group consortium has no legal personality, with the consequence that it is impossible to be a shareholder of it, those arguments cannot succeed. Status as a shareholder of that consortium can cover all the companies that are part of it (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraph 116). In addition, as is apparent from document 2 in file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, namely a page from the website of AlfaStrakhovanie, that company presents itself as belonging to the ‘[Alfa Group [financial and industrial c]onsortium’. 175 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Council made an error of assessment when it maintained his name on the lists at issue, by the acts of September 2023, on the basis of the first part of the amended (g) criterion. 176 In the second place, for the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that, by contrast to Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 in its initial version resulting from Decision 2022/329 and to the first part of the amended (g) criterion, which refer specifically to ‘leading businesspersons’, the third part of the amended (g) criterion extends the scope rationae personae of the restrictive measures by no longer requiring businesspersons to be ‘leading’. 177 It should be noted that, in the light of the objectives pursued by the Council, set out in recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, consisting of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, the concept of ‘businesspersons’ refers only to natural persons who pursue a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, in respect of whom the inclusion of their names on the list at issue is therefore likely to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and, consequently, to increase the pressure exerted on the Russian Federation which is responsible for the invasion of Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2025, Vinokurov v Council, T‑1106/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:106, paragraph 48). 178 Moreover, as regards the economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, it is unequivocally clear from the wording of the third part of the amended (g) criterion that it is the economic sector rather than the natural or legal person whose name is included on the lists at issue that must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Admittedly, Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not define the concept of ‘substantial source of revenue’. Nevertheless, the fact remains that use of the adjective ‘substantial’, qualifying the nominal group ‘source of revenue’, means that the source of revenue in question must be significant and therefore non-negligible (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2025, Vinokurov v Council, T‑1106/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:106, paragraph 49). 179 In the present case, the applicant acknowledges that, at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023, he was still a shareholder of Rosvodokanal. It must be noted that, in the document presenting the Alfa Group consortium (Annex B.2 to the defence), that company is described as being one of the leading Russian private operators in the field of water supply and treatment, providing services to approximately 5 million customers, operating in seven Russian cities and employing approximately 10 000 people. In addition, as is apparent from document 2 in evidence file WK 10524/2023 REV 1, that company is referred to as belonging to the Alfa Group consortium. 180 Consequently, it must be found that, due solely to the fact of being a shareholder of Rosvodokanal, the applicant pursues a qualitatively or quantitatively non-negligible economic activity, with the result that he qualifies as a businessperson within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion. 181 According to the case-law, the water supply and treatment sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government given that it had generated tax revenue of more than 94 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 967 million) in 2022 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, OT v Council, T‑286/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:606, paragraphs 126 and 127). 182 The applicant’s arguments, raised at the hearing, that the tax paid by Rosvodokanal represents only a very small part of the total tax paid by that sector cannot succeed. As noted in paragraph 178 above, it is the revenue generated by the sector that is relevant rather than the tax paid by the person or entity concerned. 183 It follows that the mere fact that the applicant was a shareholder of Rosvodokanal at the time when the acts of September 2023 were adopted was sufficient for his personal situation to fall within the third part of the amended (g) criterion. 184 In the light of all the foregoing, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, on the date on which the acts of September 2023 were adopted, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion and a businessperson involved in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion. 185 According to case-law, with regard to the review of the legality of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 186). 186 Accordingly, with no requirement to examine the applicant’s other arguments disputing the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the (d) criterion, it is necessary to reject the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment by the Council when it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the acts of September 2023. (c) The acts of March 2024 187 The applicant claims that, since March 2022, he has no longer been a shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium. He submits that he transferred his shares in Alfa Bank Russia, AlfaStrakhovanie Russia and CTF Holdings. 188 In view of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), the applicant asserts that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified difference in treatment between his personal situation and that of the applicants in the cases that gave rise to those judgments. 189 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 190 As regards the general context justifying the Council’s adoption of the restrictive measures at issue (see paragraph 88 above), it is clear that, on the date on which the acts of March 2024 were adopted, the situation in Ukraine remained grave. Similarly, those restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 191 As regards the applicant’s personal situation, in the reasons for the inclusion of his name, in the acts of March 2024, he is no longer described as being ‘one of the largest [in French, ‘l’un des plus grands’] shareholders of the Alfa Group consortium’, but as being ‘a major shareholder [in French, ‘un actionnaire majeur’] of the Alfa Group consortium’. It must therefore be found that these are, in essence, the same reasons as those of the acts of September 2023. 192 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the context of the reconsideration procedure that led to adoption of the acts of March 2024, the applicant did not rely on any new evidence to demonstrate that he was no longer a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium. 193 In connection with the statement of modification, in order to demonstrate that he was no longer a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium, via ABH Holdings, the applicant produced an extract from the register of effective beneficial owners of that company, issued by Luxembourg Business Registers (Annex E.5 to that statement), which, unlike the extract in Annex A.28 to the application, is signed by the registrar. 194 First, as regards application of the first part of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant, it should be noted that the applicant has not produced any new evidence to demonstrate that the transfer of ownership of his shares in CTF Holdings was effective before the date on which the restrictive measures taken against him came into force. Consequently, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 142 to 155 above, it must be found that the Council did not make an error of assessment by finding that the applicant was a shareholder of that company at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted. 195 As regards the purported transfer of his shares in ABH Holdings, since the extract of the register of effective beneficial owners signed by the registrar does not refer to the exact date on which those shares were transferred to the transferee, it should be found, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 164 and 165 above, that that extract cannot be sufficient to demonstrate that ownership of those shares had in actual fact been transferred before 15 March 2022. Similarly, given that the transferee had not discharged his payment obligation, it is also necessary to demonstrate that the contractual provisions governing the transfer were not coupled with a condition allowing rescission in the event of non-payment of the price. Consequently, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 157 to 166 above, it must be found that the Council did not make an error of assessment by finding that the applicant was a shareholder of that company at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted. 196 It follows that the Council was entitled to find that the applicant was a major shareholder of the Alfa Group consortium at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted, with the effect that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the first part of the amended (g) criterion was well founded. 197 In any event, since the applicant acknowledged at the hearing that he was still a shareholder of Rosvodokanal at the time when the acts of March 2024 were adopted, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 179 to 183 above, due solely to the fact that he was a shareholder of that company, the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue is justified under the third part of the amended (g) criterion. 198 In addition, the applicant cannot argue that the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified difference in treatment compared with the situation of Mr Fridman and of Mr Aven because the acts concerning them were annulled by the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215). As is apparent from the grounds of the judgments of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council (T‑301/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:214), and of 10 April 2024, Fridman v Council (T‑304/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:215), the inclusion of the respective applicants’ names on the lists at issue in the cases that gave rise to those judgments was based neither on the initial (g) criterion nor on the amended (g) criterion. 199 In the light of the foregoing, the Council did not make an error of assessment when it found that, on the date on which the acts of March 2024 were adopted, the applicant was a leading businessperson operating in Russia within the meaning of the first part of the amended (g) criterion and a businessperson involved in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of the third part of the amended (g) criterion. 200 According to case-law, with regard to the review of the legality of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (judgments of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 186). 201 Accordingly, with no requirement to examine the applicant’s other arguments disputing the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the (d) criterion, it is necessary to reject the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2024. 202 The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, must therefore be rejected in its entirety. 3. The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality 203 The applicant claims that the restrictive measures taken against him infringe the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU. According to the applicant, as Alfa Bank’s name was included on the lists at issue by the acts of 13 March 2023 referred to in paragraph 12 above, it is inappropriate to maintain the restrictive measures taken against him in order to achieve the objectives pursued. He submits that, since he at no time ran that company, which is subject to restrictive measures, since he does not live in Russia and since he is not a taxpayer in that country, maintenance of his name on the lists at issue cannot achieve the objectives pursued, that is to say, it cannot exert pressure on Russian decision-makers. He also claims that, as he is no longer a company shareholder and holds no management or executive position in any company, he is not in a position to exert influence over any companies. 204 In addition, the applicant claims that the derogations under which the unfreezing of certain funds can be requested in order to meet basic needs are ineffective, in view of the obstacles he is experiencing in connection with their implementation by the national authorities and in having funds made available by financial institutions. 205 Moreover, the applicant submits that, in view of the Commission’s plans to adopt rules allowing frozen assets to be confiscated and seized, the restrictive measures can no longer be regarded as not being temporary, precautionary and preventive. 206 The applicant also criticises the Council for failing to review the impact of the restrictive measures in order to ascertain whether they had in fact contributed to achieving the objectives sought. He submits that the objectives sought by the restrictive measures have not been achieved in the circumstances of the present case, given that the war has been lost. 207 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 208 It should be noted that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is reflected in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133). 209 The case-law makes clear in that respect that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 179 and the case-law cited). 210 In the present case, it must be noted that the restrictive measures at issue meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, capable of justifying the possibility that, for certain operators, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). They are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. Specifically, by adopting restrictive measures targeting leading businesspersons operating in Russia and businesspersons involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, the Council is seeking, first, to exploit the influence which those persons are likely to exert over the Russian regime, by prompting them to put pressure on that government to change its policy and, second, to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is therefore apparent that the European Union is seeking to reduce the revenue of the Russian State and to put pressure on the Russian Government with the aim of limiting its capacity to finance the actions of that State undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and of bringing an end to those actions in order to maintain European and global stability. That is an objective among those pursued under the common foreign and security policy and referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, such as the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security. 211 It must therefore be found that the restrictive measures taken in respect of the applicant are not manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objectives pursued. That finding is not called into question by the fact that the name of Alfa Bank was added to the lists at issue. Since the applicant falls within the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion, the mere fact that an entity with which he is associated is also subject to restrictive measures is not such as to render the measures in respect of the applicant manifestly inappropriate for the purposes of achieving the objectives pursued, given that his personal funds cannot be combined with the funds of that company. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Alfa Group consortium is not limited to that company, but also includes AlfaStrakhovanie, X5 Retail Group, A1 and Rosvodokanal. 212 As regards whether the restrictive measures at issue are necessary, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, set out in paragraph 210 above (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). 213 In that regard, to the extent that the applicant is arguing that the inclusion of the name of Alfa Bank on the lists at issue may constitute a less restrictive alternative measure that is likely to be as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, those arguments must be rejected. The applicant’s assets are distinct from those of Alfa Bank and are not limited to the assets held by that financial institution. 214 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible restrictions and that possible derogations from them have been established. 215 The applicant cannot cast doubt on that finding by claiming that he is experiencing difficulties in relation to implementation of the derogations under Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and under Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the competent national courts alone to review the validity of national measures implementing EU acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 1996, Branco v Commission, T‑271/94, EU:T:1996:103, paragraph 53, and of 14 April 2016, Ben Ali v Council, T‑200/14, not published, EU:T:2016:216, paragraph 268). Accordingly, if the national courts were to encounter difficulties in interpreting the aforementioned derogations, it is possible for them to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. Similarly, the General Court does not have jurisdiction, under Article 263 TFEU, to hear disputes between the applicant and financial institutions that decline to make funds available to him even though authorisation has been granted by the competent national authority. 216 Nor is the fact that the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible called into question by the Commission’s plans with a view to confiscating frozen assets. As the Council notes, the legislation in force at the time of adoption of the acts of September 2023 and of March 2024 lays down no possibility to confiscate the funds of the persons subject to restrictive measures unless there is infringement of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 15(1) of that regulation provides for ‘appropriate measures’ of confiscation of the proceeds of infringements of that regulation. The Council accordingly left a measure of discretion to the national authorities as regards the definition, nature and scope of that confiscation (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, Timchenko and Timchenko v Council, T‑644/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:621, paragraph 104). It must also be noted that the applicant is not claiming that the restrictive measures taken against him involved the confiscation of his funds. Consequently, the applicant has no grounds for claiming that those measures are no longer temporary and reversible in nature. 217 It follows that, in the present case, the disadvantages to the applicant are not manifestly disproportionate in view of the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts. 218 Last, the applicant is incorrect to maintain that the Council failed to review the impact of the restrictive measures and that, at the time when the contested acts were adopted, because the war had been lost, maintenance of the restrictive measures taken against him was no longer justified. As is apparent from recital 3 of Decision 2023/1767 and from recital 4 of Decision 2024/847, at that time, the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine was continuing, thereby justifying the extension of the restrictive measures for a period of six months. Moreover, contrary to his assertions, his personal situation was reviewed periodically, which resulted in the Council maintaining the restrictive measures taken against him. As is apparent from examination of the first plea in law, the Council correctly established that the applicant fell within the categories of persons covered by the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion. 219 It follows from the foregoing that the second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, must be rejected. 220 Accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. V. Costs 221 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders OT to pay the costs. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 July 2025. [Signatures] Table of contents I. Background to the dispute II. Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action III. Forms of order sought by the parties IV. Law A. The Court’s jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s second head of claim B. Substance 1. The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection (a) The acts of September 2023 (b) The acts of March 2024 2. The first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment (a) Preliminary observations (b) The acts of September 2023 (1) The reliability of the evidence (2) Application of the first and third parts of the amended (g) criterion to the applicant (c) The acts of March 2024 3. The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality V. Costs * Language of the case: French. 1 Confidential information redacted. 2 Confidential information redacted.