Information;Order — ECLI:EU:C:2025:757
Date: 2025-10-06
Language of the case: Bulgarian
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - inadmissible
Origin: Bulgaria

Summary C-114/25 – 1 
Case C-114/25 [Himov] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
3 February 2025 
Referring court: 
Sofiyski rayonen sad (Bulgaria) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
28 January 2025 
Applicant: 
SV 
Defendant: 
CY 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action for the payment of 15 000 Bulgarian leva (BGN) (approximately 
EUR 7 500) as compensation for non-material damage alleged to have arisen as a 
result of the dissemination of insulting and false information in public statements. 
This may, however, be a so-called ‘SLAPP action’, namely an abusive use of a 
procedural remedy with the purpose of restricting freedom of expression and 
information. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation of recitals 32, 97, 101 and 102, of Article 15(1)(a), Article 21(1), (2) 
and (7), Article 22 and Article 23 of Directive 2019/1937, and of Articles 1, 3, 11, 
12 and 14 of Directive 2024/1069; legal basis: Article 267 TFEU 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-114/25 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Is Article 15(1)(a) of Directive 2019/1937 to be interpreted as meaning that 
both an internal and an external report must be made in order for reporting 
persons to benefit from protection, or is it sufficient for only one of the two 
reports to be made? 
2. Is [the phrase] ‘no appropriate action was taken in response to the 
report’ in Article 15(1)(a) of Directive 2019/1937 to be interpreted as 
relating only to external reporting in accordance with Chapters II and III? 
3. Is Article 21(2) and (7) of Directive 2019/1937 to be interpreted as 
allowing a national legislation under which the reporting person incurs 
liability only if, following his or her reports, the competent authorities have 
failed to establish either an administrative or a criminal offence? 
4. Is Article 21(1) and (7) of Directive 2019/1937 to be interpreted as 
meaning that the reporting person does not incur liability if, at the time of 
the report or public disclosure …, he or she had a well-founded suspicion of 
a breach, namely a reasonable degree of plausibility before the investigation 
began? Is ‘reasonable ground’ to be interpreted as a well-founded suspicion 
warranting the initiation of an investigation by a competent authority, 
without there being a requirement, however, for that competent authority to 
establish a breach or a criminal offence? 
5. Are recitals 32, 97, 101 and 102 and Article 23(2) of Directive 2019/1937 
and Article 12 of Directive 2024/1069 to be interpreted as allowing a 
provision of national law to introduce a presumption of fault on the part of 
the reporting person for knowingly reporting false information? 
6. Is the presumption of innocence in the light of recitals 32, 97, 101 and 
102 and Article 23([2]) of Directive 2019/1937 and Article 12 of 
Directive 2024/1069 to be interpreted as requiring the person concerned to 
prove intent on the part of the reporting person in knowingly reporting and 
disseminating false information? 
7. Are the presumption of innocence under Article 22 of Directive 
2019/1937 and the presumption of fault under Article 12 of Directive 
2024/1069 to be interpreted as requiring the person concerned to prove that 
the action has not been brought in retaliation against the reporting person, if 
the reporting person contends that the action against him or her has been 
brought in retaliation for his or her reporting and public disclosure of 
information? 
8. Is Article 22 of Directive 2019/1937 to be interpreted as meaning that the 
person concerned is innocent in relation to the bringing of the action, until 
the reporting person objects that the action is a ‘SLAPP action’? 
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9. Are ‘unfounded claims’ within the meaning of Article 1 and ‘early’ 
within the meaning of Article 11 of Directive 2024/1069 to be interpreted 
as [relating to actions] brought in retaliation within the meaning of Directive 
(EU) 2019/1937? 
10. Is Article 3 of Directive 2024/1069 to be interpreted as allowing a national 
court to apply the directive if the party expressly relies on the directive, it is 
proved that the statements were made on a matter of public interest and none 
of the restrictions under Article 10(2) of the ECHR is present, but the cross-
border element is lacking? 
11. Is the principle of the proportionality of penalties imposed on a reporting 
person, referred to in recital 102 of Directive 2019/1937, to be interpreted as 
requiring the national court, when determining the amount of the penalty …, 
to take into account how and to whom the reports were made and the public 
disclosure took place? 
12. Are the principle of proportionality and absence of a chilling effect 
under Directive 2019/1937 and Article 14 of Directive 2024/1069 to be 
interpreted as allowing a provision of national law under which the reporting 
person is not to be ordered to pay a part of the costs where he or she … has 
proved that his or her actions fall within the scope of the protection afforded 
by those directives? Are those two principles to be interpreted as meaning 
that the reporting person may be ordered to pay a part of the costs of the 
proceedings where his or her objection that the directive is applicable has 
been granted, whereas it is not stated whether the costs claimed by the 
applicant relate to the application of the directive and which of them relate 
to the application of the general principle of not causing harm to others? 
Provisions of international law relied on 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(‘ECHR’), Articles 8 und 10. 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 11 
Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings 
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law – 
recitals 28, 32, 97, 101, 102, Article 2(1)(a)(viii), Articles 5, 15, 19, 21, 22 and 23 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-114/25 
 
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Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from 
manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits 
against public participation’) – Articles 1 and 3, Article 4(1), Article 4(2)(a) to (d) 
and Article 4(3), Articles 11, 12 and 14 
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting 
journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from 
manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against 
public participation’) 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 July 2020, Caixabank and Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria, C-224/19 and C-259/19, EU:C:2020:578 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 March 2024, Profi Credit Bulgaria, 
C-714/22, EU:C:2024:263 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (Code of Civil Procedure) – Article 78 
Zakon za zadalzheniata i dogovorite (Law on obligations and contracts) – 
Articles 45 and 52 
Zakon za zashtita na litsata, podavashti signali ili publichno opovestyavashti 
informatsia za narusheniaata (Law on the protection of persons who report or 
publicly disseminate information on breaches) – Articles 7, 37, 38 and 39 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicant brought against the defendant an action for the payment of 
BGN 15 000 (approximately EUR 7 500) as compensation for the non-material 
damage said to have been suffered by him as a result of the defendant’s having 
disseminated insulting and false information about him in several public 
statements. 
2 The applicant is a doctor in the largest hospital for obstetrics and gynaecology in 
Bulgaria. Since 2017, he has been the managing director of that hospital, which is 
a high-level management position. 
3 At the time of the material acts, the defendant was working as a doctor in the same 
hospital. From 23 December 2020 to 18 May 2023, she was employed as director 
of a clinic in that hospital. This is also an administrative management position. 
4 The hospital is State-run. It is financed from the State budget (public funds) and 
from private funds (namely, donations, fees, payments for treatments not covered 
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by health insurance). It is common ground that the hospital was having financial 
and staffing problems. 
5 The defendant, acting as director of a clinic and doctor, tried to organise several 
meetings with the hospital director and with other members of the hospital’s 
management in order to solve the problems of staff shortages, pay, financing, 
suspected corruption and others (internal reporting). Although those meetings took 
place, they were not attended by the director but by other members of the 
management. Those meetings did not lead to the result expected by the defendant. 
6 Between 15 May 2023 and 15 April 2024, the defendant reported the irregularities 
to the competent authorities (external reporting), since the hospital management 
had failed to respond. 
7 Between 11 July 2023 and 26 August 2024, investigative journalists published 
numerous media items describing cases of corruption, embezzlement and other 
irregularities at the hospital. 
8 Various competent authorities and institutions, including the Ministerstvo na 
zdraveopazvaneto (Ministry of Health) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
conducted a number of investigations at the hospital. Those investigations looked 
into the irregularities reported by the defendant and other persons. The defendant 
did not receive a response to all of the reports and was also not informed of the 
progress on the reports, that is to say, of their outcome. 
9 Following those reports, the defendant, together with other persons, gave two 
press conferences on 12 and 23 September 2023 and two interviews on national 
television on 11 March and 19 October 2023. Several (online, print and television) 
news media covered those two press conferences. 
10 It is common ground that, on those four occasions, the defendant stated that the 
applicant had a concealed employment contract, found himself in a conflict of 
interests, was spending public money unlawfully and was committing numerous 
breaches and acts of corruption. 
11 The employment relationship of the defendant as director of a clinic was 
terminated on 18 May 2023 by order of the applicant. This took place after the 
first external report against the applicant of 15 May 2023 had been made as well 
as following the internal reports and the attempts to organise a meeting between 
the defendant and the applicant. 
12 In the main proceedings, it has been established that the defendant had collected 
information on the irregularities: (1) in in her capacity as director of a clinic; (2) in 
her capacity as an employee of the hospital; (3) with the help of investigative 
journalists; (4) by way of the law governing access to public information; (5) by 
way of a judicial decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-114/25 
 
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13 In the view of the referring court, the applicant is a ‘person concerned’ and the 
defendant a ‘reporting person’ within the meaning of Directive 2019/1937. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
14 According to the applicant, the defendant’s actions constitute slander, defamation 
and, generally speaking, a tortious act. His dignity, honour and reputation have 
been violated. False information was passed on to an unlimited group of people. 
Various individuals and the competent authorities, which conducted investigations 
into the applicant, have been misled. 
15 The applicant claims that no breaches were established following the 
investigations conducted on the basis of the defendant’s external reports. 
According to him, since no breach of the law (neither a criminal nor an 
administrative offence) was established, the external reports or publicly 
disseminated information are false. 
16 The defendant contends that she expressed her opinion and her point of view in 
public in order to make public breaches of the law. She asserts her right to 
freedom of expression, in particular on an issue of public importance that forms 
part of a matter of public debate – healthcare. 
17 The defendant takes the view that the case pending before the referring court is a 
‘SLAPP action’ and contends that it should be dismissed. In her submission, this 
case has a chilling effect, since it will prevent others from voicing their opinion on 
matters concerning financing, the use of funds and corruption in the healthcare 
sector. By this action, the applicant is abusing procedural rights. The defendant 
asserts that Directive 2024/1069 should be applied, even though it has not yet 
been transposed into national law. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
18 In the view of the referring court, the right to freedom of expression and 
information is a fundamental human right, guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR 
and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
19 In their case-law, the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union have held that freedom of expression may 
be restricted only by law, where the restriction pursues a legitimate aim and is 
necessary. The penalty for breaching that restriction must be appropriate to the 
breach and must not dissuade others from expressing their views, so as not to 
create a chilling effect. 
20 The topics of healthcare and corruption in the healthcare sector are important 
issues for the public and affect a large group of people. They concern financing, 
the proper use of funds, reporting, public disclosure and transparency. Corruption 
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or the well-founded suspicion of corruption in the healthcare sector is a sign of a 
breakdown in public trust. 
21 The referring court refers to the case-law of the ECtHR to the effect that, since 
public discussion of corruption is an important component of the right to freedom 
of expression and of the rule of law, expressions of opinion may not be punished 
on the ground that they reveal shortcomings and irregularities in a system. 
22 The ECtHR takes the view that the restriction provided for in Article 10(2) ECHR 
does not apply in the case of statements made by persons in administrative 
management positions. According to the ECtHR, persons in administrative 
positions enjoy a virtually unrestricted freedom of expression, since they are part 
of the system whose problems they are aware of and must report to society. 
23 The defendant held an administrative position and, in that capacity, had access to 
more extensive information. She was aware of the irregularities in the hospital not 
only as a doctor but also as a director of a clinic. 
24 The ECtHR also states that the person concerned may assert his or her rights 
under civil law by bringing an action for compensation for non-material damage if 
he or she considers that a tortious act has been committed and the right to private 
and family life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR has been infringed. However, the 
national court must examine whether the success of any such action would not 
restrict the freedom of expression, giving rise to a violation of Article 10 ECHR, 
restricting the expression of the views of others, that is to say, whether the judicial 
decision would have a chilling effect. 
25 In the European Union, several legal acts have been adopted to protect the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression, in particular Directives 2019/1937 
and 2024/1069 (‘the directives’). 
26 The first directive guarantees the right of persons to report any irregularities 
identified by them to the competent authorities. In Bulgaria, it was transposed by 
the Law on the protection of persons who report or publicly disseminate 
information on breaches. The second directive is intended to protect reporting 
persons, inasmuch as they are not to be subject to actions, since that would deter 
others from expressing their views. That directive has not yet been transposed in 
Bulgaria. 
27 The referring court considers the present action to constitute retaliation for the 
purposes of Article 19(k) of Directive 2019/1937 and abuse of procedural rights 
for the purposes of Article 4(3) of Directive 2024/1069. 
28 The court has concerns that the present action is intended to intimidate the 
defendant so as to prevent her from expressing her opinion and continuing to talk 
about the problems at the hospital. There is a well-founded suspicion that the 
present action constitutes retaliation for the defendant’s actions. In the light of the 
compensation sought, the present action could have a chilling effect. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-114/25 
 
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Questions 1 and 2 
29 It is proved in the main proceedings that the defendant made a public disclosure 
within the meaning of Article 5(6) of Directive 2019/1937. However, it is not 
clear to the referring court when reporting persons benefit from protection under 
Article 15(1) of that directive. 
30 That provision provides protection only if one of two prerequisites referred to in 
paragraph 1 – under point (a) or point (b) – is present. It is unclear whether the 
defendant will benefit from that protection if she was supposed to make both an 
internal and an external report, or if it is sufficient for her to make only an internal 
report, without an external report being necessary. 
31 An interpretation is required to determine in response to which of those reports no 
appropriate action was taken within the timeframe referred to in Article 9(1)(f) of 
Directive 2019/1937. Is reporting in response to which no appropriate action has 
been taken in due time to be interpreted as being both an internal and an external 
report, or is it permissible for no action to have been taken in response to only one 
of those reports within the timeframe laid down by law? 
Questions 3 and 4 
32 Article 21(2) of Directive 2019/1937 establishes the principle that a person cannot 
incur liability of any kind only if that person had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the reporting or public disclosure of information was necessary for revealing a 
breach pursuant to that directive. The referring court is having difficulties 
applying that provision on account of the numerous ways of interpreting the 
phrase ‘reasonable ground’. 
33 A report or public disclosure of information may be correct yet the actions to 
which the reporting person is referring do not necessarily have to constitute a 
criminal or an administrative offence. The report might be sufficiently 
substantiated, in the light of the supporting information, at the time when it is 
made, but, after the review by the supervisory authorities, it may be established 
that no breach or criminal offence has been committed. 
34 To accept that the reporting person is exempt from liability only if the 
irregularities are proved by the investigation would make it impossible for persons 
to report, since at the outset they are not aware of all of the information. 
35 It is not clear to the referring court whether a breach established in the manner 
required by the law (by judgment or administrative decision) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of exemption from liability under Article 21(2) of Directive 
2019/1937. 
36 In accordance with national case-law, after it proves impossible to establish any 
irregularity on the basis of the report or public disclosure, the reporting person is 
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always liable for defamation, slander or another tortious act. However, the 
referring court emphasises that, at the time of making the report, the person in 
principle considers there to be a likelihood that an irregularity has been 
committed. The aim of reporting is the initiation of an investigation, not complete 
proof that an irregularity has been committed. 
37 The referring court wishes to ascertain whether the dismissal of the action within 
the meaning of Article 21(7) of Directive 2019/1937 is conditional upon proof of 
fault for the commission of the breaches, or whether it is sufficient for there to be 
a well-founded suspicion that the reports and public disclosures made were 
plausible/well-founded to a reasonable degree. 
Questions 5, 6, 7 and 8 
38 Under national law, the reporting person is liable only where he or she knowingly 
reports or publicly discloses false information. The reporting person incurs 
liability only where there is intent – whether direct or potential. That is also 
provided for in Article 23(2) of Directive 2019/1937, which requires that the 
reporting person knowingly report false information. 
39 Under national law, fault on the part of the reporting person (the defendant) is 
presumed until the contrary is proved. The person concerned must prove the 
existence of a tortious act, but does not have to prove fault on the part of the 
perpetrator, namely the reporting person. The fault of the reporting person is 
presumed. 
40 On the one hand, according to recitals 28 and 97 of Directive 2019/1937, the 
person concerned must prove that the reporting person acted with intent 
(presumption of innocence). On the other hand, under national law, the reporting 
person must rebut the presumption of fault on his or her part (presumption of 
fault). In the view of the referring court, the latter runs counter to EU law, under 
which the burden of proving fault lies with the person concerned. 
41 Article 12 of Directive 2024/1069 provides that, in the case of a ‘SLAPP action’, 
the applicant (the person concerned) must prove that the reporting person has 
committed a tortious act. In accordance with Article 12(2) of that directive, where 
the defendant (the reporting person) seeks to have the action dismissed, the 
applicant (the person concerned) must prove that the action is not likely to be 
unfounded and does not constitute retaliation. That directive is based on the 
principle that the person concerned is presumed to be at fault and that person must 
prove that he or she is not at fault for the bringing of the action in retaliation. 
42 Under that directive too, therefore, the burden of proving fault lies with the 
applicant (the person concerned) rather than with the defendant (the reporting 
person). Under national law, however, that is not the case. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-114/25 
 
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43 In the view of the referring court, the national law subjects the exercise of rights to 
unreasonably stringent requirements, which in practice prevents the exercise of 
the rights of defence of the reporting person, who is the defendant in defamation 
proceedings. 
44 The questions are relevant to the case, since the referring court must allocate the 
burden of proving fault – which of the two parties must prove whether an act 
constituting fault has been committed, if the information is false. 
Question 9 
45 It is unclear to the referring court how the terms ‘unfounded claims’ within the 
meaning of Article 1 and ‘early’ within the meaning of Article 11 of Directive 
2024/1069 are to be understood. It wishes to ascertain whether those terms are to 
be interpreted as relating to actions which have been brought in retaliation within 
the meaning of Directive 2019/1937. 
46 The referring court has not yet ruled on whether the defendant is at fault, that is to 
say, whether she is liable for the statements she made when reporting 
irregularities. In such a context, the national court may find that a part of those 
statements do not come within the scope of the directive or that they disregard the 
normal ethical notions of good conduct. In that case, the defendant would have to 
be penalised under national law for the statements that fall outside the scope of 
Directive 2019/1937. 
Question 10 
47 The time limit for transposing Directive 2024/1069 ends on 7 May 2026. In 
accordance with Article 2 thereof, that directive is to apply only to cross-border 
proceedings. The referring court takes the view that, in accordance with 
Commission Recommendation 2022/758, that directive should apply also to cases 
not having cross-border implications. The present case has no such implications. 
48 In accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2024/1069, that directive may also be 
applied in other proceedings so as to ensure the protection of persons in matters of 
public interest. In that context, it is unclear whether Article 3 of Directive 
2024/1069 is to be interpreted as meaning that the national court may apply that 
directive if the party expressly relies on it, it is proved that the statements were 
made on a matter of public interest, but the cross-border element is lacking. 
Question 11 
49 Recital 102 of Directive 2019/1937 introduces the principle of proportionality. 
Under national law, the compensation for non-material damage is determined by 
the court on the basis of fairness. 
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50 However, it is relevant how the report was made – whether internally, externally 
or by public disclosure. It makes a difference whether the reporting was done 
before staff in the workplace or before some authority, the consequences being 
completely different in each case. It is also relevant which the other authority is, 
for example whether it is the public prosecutor’s office, the police authorities or a 
commission for the investigation of corruption. The information might be 
disseminated via news media, such as television, newspapers, radio, or via social 
networks. In all those cases, the effect of the reporting is different. 
Question 12 
51 In many cases involving actions for slander and defamation brought against 
reporting persons, the reporting persons have been found to have committed 
tortious acts on the basis of the general principle of not causing harm to others, 
and not because they publicly disseminated false information for the purposes of 
the directives. The reporting person may thus make a report and express an 
opinion that comes within the scope of the protection afforded by the directives 
but incur liability on a general basis for another part of his or her statement. 
52 The action may therefore be upheld in part. Pursuant to the national law, if the 
action is upheld, the defendant is to pay the costs to the extent that the action has 
been upheld, and is entitled to reimbursement of the costs to the extent that the 
action has been dismissed. If the action is dismissed in part because it comes 
within the scope of the directives, and upheld in part because a tortious act has 
been committed, the reporting person, as defendant, will receive only some of his 
or her costs. 
53 In the view of the referring court, that legal provision runs counter to EU law, 
since the reporting person will have to bear a part of the costs which he or she has 
incurred in order successfully to raise his or her objection in relation to the 
application of the two directives.