Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2009:250
Date: 2009-04-23
Language of the case: Greek
Court formation: Third Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Social Policy
Concepts: General
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Greece

summary, it can be concluded: Even where for the purposes of clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work annexed to Directive 1999/70 national law already contains equivalent legal provisions to prevent abuse, it remains open to Member States to introduce measures in the area of fixed-term work provided that such rules satisfy all Community requirements. 2. The prohibition of regression 59. In accordance with clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, implementation of that agreement may not constitute valid grounds for reducing the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of the agreement. That prohibition is commonly referred to as a prohibition of regression. (40) a) The material scope of the prohibition of regression 60. Specifically by its second question in Case C‑378/07, the referring court seeks in substance to establish whether the prohibition of regression applies only to the protection of workers in the case of abuse arising from the multiple use of fixed-term employment relationships or, however, also to a reduction in the protection afforded to workers in the case of abuse arising from the single or first use of a fixed-term employment relationship. Underlying that question is the fact that the single or first use of fixed-term employment relationships appears not to be within the scope of Presidential Decree No 164/2004. 61. The prohibition of regression prohibits a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of the Framework Agreement, which is defined in clause 2 of the agreement. According to clause 2(1) of the Framework Agreement, the agreement covers fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practice in each Member State. Neither clause 2(1) nor clause 2(2) provides any grounds on which to restrict the scope of the Framework Agreement to workers with successive fixed-term employment relationships. Nor may such restriction be derived from the definition of fixed-term worker in clause 3(1) of the Framework Agreement. 62. Admittedly, the obligation imposed by the specific provisions of clause 5(1) (in conjunction with clause 1(b)) of the Framework Agreement is limited to a requirement that Member States take particular measures to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. (41) However, that in no way implies that all the other provisions of the Framework Agreement, in particular the prohibition of regression contained in clause 8(3), are also only limited to successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. That can clearly be seen from the definitions of the material and personal scope of the Framework Agreement set out in clauses 2(1) and 3(1) of the agreement. 63. The scope of the Framework Agreement in general and that of the prohibition of regression in particular cannot be interpreted restrictively. (42) The purpose of the Framework Agreement is to contribute towards a better balance between flexibility in working time and security for workers. (43) Fundamental social policy objectives of the Community are thereby expressed, such as are laid down in particular in the first paragraph of Article 136 EC, especially the improvement of living and working conditions and ensuring proper social protection. The same objectives are alluded to also in the preambles to the EU Treaty (44) and to the EC Treaty (45) and in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (46) and the European Social Charter. (47) They support the view that the principles and prohibitions established by the Framework Agreement should be construed as broadly as possible. 64. Given that context, the prohibition of regression also must apply if a Member State decides to reduce its hitherto more favourable system of worker protection to the mandatory minimum level established by the Framework Agreement. Every reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in relation to fixed-term work has to respect the requirements resulting from clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement. 65. Thus, if the domestic law of a Member State protects workers not only in the case of multiple use but also in the case of abuse arising from the single or first use of a fixed-term employment contract or relationship, the prohibition of regression established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement applies also to that protection. (48) 66. For the sake of completeness, I wish to add that clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement does not apply only in the case of a reduction to the protection affected to workers established by way of ‘equivalent legal measures’ within the meaning of clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement. Whilst the referring court and some of the parties appear to assume such a reciprocity, neither the wording nor the purpose or context of clause 8(3) points to a restriction of that kind on its material scope. Rather, the prohibition of regression applies to the entire protection which national law affords to fixed-term workers regardless of whether it exceeds or, indeed, falls below the standard which clause 5(1) demands in relation to an equivalent legal measure for the prevention of abuse. b) The content of the prohibition of regression 67. However, the broad material scope of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, as I outlined immediately above, (49) stands in contrast to its relatively modest substantive content. In content terms, the prohibition of regression requires simply that implementation of the Framework Agreement cannot constitute valid grounds for reducing the general level of protection afforded to workers. From that, two propositions result. 68. First, reduction in the protection which workers are guaranteed in the sphere of fixed-term contracts is not prohibited as such by the Framework Agreement; rather such reduction remains permissible where it is in no way connected to the implementation of that agreement. (50) Thus, the prohibition of regression established by clause 8(3) does not constitute a standstill clause imposing an absolute prohibition on reducing the level of protection existing at the time of the transposition of Directive 1999/70. The Member States and social partners remain entitled to reach their own legislative or collectively agreed decisions in the field of fixed-term work; those decisions must simply be reached on a transparent basis, independently of the implementation of the Framework Agreement, and self-evidently may not result in an infringement of other rules of Community law and, in particular, in any reduction in the level of protection below the minimum established by the Framework Agreement. (51) 69. Second, the prohibition of regression established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement relates only to a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of fixed-term work. Thus, the prohibition of regression does not preclude the abolition or weakening of a particular measure of worker protection, unless, that is, such action reduces the level of protection of fixed-term workers as a whole. The possibility cannot be excluded that a measure reducing the level of worker protection, by reference to the general level of protection, is only of marginal importance or that it accompanies other measures increasing the level of protection which offset its effects, thus resulting in an overall outcome of no reduction in the general level of protection. 70. Applying that reasoning to a case such as the present, the following should be noted. 71. The question of whether the abrogation of Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 – emphasised by the referring court – took effect in relation to the public sector prior to the transposition of Directive 1999/70 or only in the course of that transposition cannot be resolved definitively on the basis of the information on the domestic legal framework available in this case. However, it is clear in relation to the Greek public sector that Law No 2190/1994 had already established a prohibition on the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts to such of indefinite duration. (52) That circumstance suggests that the foundation, at any rate, for the abrogation of Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 in relation to the public sector was laid long before the entry into force of Directive 1999/70 and, thus, that abrogation was based on an independent decision of the Greek legislature unconnected to the transposition of Directive 1999/70. 72. However, in all cases, abrogation of Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 only infringes the prohibition of regression if that action is sufficiently significant as to result in a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of fixed-term work. That matter is for the national court to assess. In the course of that examination, it must consider also whether other measures improving worker protection offset the abrogation of Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920. (53) 73. In that connection, no significance attaches to the circumstance that some of the amendments to Greek law disputed by the parties – in particular, insertion of the new Article 103(8) of the Greek Constitution – were effected during the period prescribed for the transposition of Directive 1999/70. (54) Although during the period prescribed for transposition Member States may not seriously jeopardise the realisation of the objectives which a directive pursues, (55) that general prohibition on frustrating the objectives of a directive cannot be interpreted as imposing requirements which are any more extensive than those resulting from the specific rules established by the Framework Agreement, in particular, the prohibition of regression. c) Interim conclusion 74. The following interim conclusion can therefore be drawn: The scope of the prohibition of regression established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work is not restricted to the protection of workers against abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. A national provision which merely abrogates or weakens a specific measure of worker protection does not fall within the scope of the prohibition established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term employment contracts unless that measure results in an overall reduction in the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers. B – Questions on the compatibility with the Framework Agreement of legislation such as that adopted by Greece 75. The questions considered in the following analysis (third, fourth and sixth questions in Case C‑378/07 and second, third and fifth questions in Cases C‑379/07 and C‑380/07) concern specifically the compatibility with the Framework Agreement of legislation such as Greek Presidential Decree No 164/2004. 1. The prohibition of regression and sanctions for the misuse of fixed-term employment relationships 76. By its third and fourth questions in Case C‑378/07 and its second and third questions in Cases C‑379/07 and C‑380/07, in substance, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether an amendment of the law as effected in Greece in relation to the public sector infringes the prohibition of regression established in clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement. In so doing, the referring court seeks to compare the level of worker protection in the area covered by Presidential Decree No 164/2004 with that in the area covered by Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920. 77. Ultimately, the matter at issue is whether in withdrawing the possibility which previously existed to convert, ex tunc, fixed-term employment contracts to contracts of indefinite duration or in considerably tightening the requirements, in the case of existing contracts, for the exercise of that possibility and also in restricting that operation merely to ex nunc effects (Articles 5 to 7 and 11 of Presidential Decree No 164/2004), the Greek legislature contravened the prohibition of regression. Further, Case C‑378/07 specifically raises the question whether the prohibition of regression precluded the Greek legislature’s action in excluding from the protective scope of Presidential Decree No 164/2004 the single or first use of fixed-term contracts in their entirety. 78. The Court cannot provide a final response to those questions, since to do so requires an interpretation of national law, a task falling exclusively within the competence of the national court. (56) However, the Court can give the national court comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of the Community prohibition of regression and the other requirements of the Framework Agreement. (57) 79. First, it must be stressed that the contested amendment to Greek law introduced by Presidential Decree No 164/2004 concerns only one specific measure for the protection of fixed-term workers, that is, the possibility to convert fixed-term contracts of employment to contracts of indefinite duration or to interpret them as such. 80. However, for the purposes of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, the issue of regression arises, as I have already observed, (58) only where an amendment to the applicable legislation results in a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of fixed-term work. In contrast, the prohibition of regression does not preclude the abrogation or weakening of a specific worker protection measure, unless such act results in an overall reduction in the level of protection afforded to workers. 81. Admittedly, for the public sector, Presidential Decree No 164/2004 greatly restricts the possibility to convert fixed-term employment contracts to such of indefinite duration and in relation to future contracts withdraws that possibility completely. In the assessment of the national court, in cases of misuse, national law no longer provides for a sanction equivalent to conversion. Specifically, the national court considers the payment of wages and a severance allowance (Article 7 of Presidential Decree No 164/2004) always to be required regardless of any misuse and not to constitute a specific penalty for misuse. In addition, the plaintiffs in the main proceedings indicate that criminal law and disciplinary actions against the person responsible for instituting the misuse scarcely have any practical relevance in Greece. 82. Such a situation gives rise to the inference that domestic law, following the entry into force of Presidential Decree No 164/2004, contains sanctions penalising the misuse of fixed-term work in the public sector which are less effective than was the position under the previous legal regime identified by the national court. 83. However, that does not necessarily imply a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers as envisaged by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement in relation to fixed-term work. 84. First, the reform introduced by Presidential Decree No 164/2004 does not concern fixed-term workers in Greece in general, but only a specific group of those workers, that is, fixed-term workers in the Greek public sector. In relation to the exclusion from the protective sphere of Presidential Decree No 164/2004 of the single or first use of a fixed-term employment contract, specifically contested in Case C‑378/07, only a subset of fixed-term work in the public sector is affected by that measure. That of itself points against the presumption of a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of fixed-term work. 85. Second, it is possible to offset a weakening of domestic law in the sphere of sanctions through the adoption of new preventive measures as envisaged in clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement. In that vein, Articles 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No 164/2004 introduce various new measures to prevent the misuse of fixed-term work in the public sector: a requirement for objective reasons, provisions on the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships and on the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships. 86. Such new regime reflects a shift in emphasis from the sanctioning to the prevention of abuse, a development which must not necessarily result, for the purposes of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, in a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to workers. In any event, in the Framework Agreement, the European social partners also placed their emphasis on the prevention of abuse, in particular, in relation to the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. That is apparent not least from clause 1(b) which mentions the establishment of a framework intended to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. 87. Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement is further evidence of the fact that from the Community perspective the main focus is on the prevention of abuse: according to clause 5(1), unless equivalent legal measures already exist, Member States must introduce one or more of the measures to prevent abuse as are provided for in that provision. However, there is no requirement to have specific sanctions for misuse. Even the sanction of conversion expressly mentioned in clause 5(2)(b) of the Framework Agreement, by which fixed-term employment contracts or relationships are deemed to be of indefinite duration, is by reason of the introductory qualification ‘where appropriate’ at the discretion of Member States: domestic law may include such form of sanction; however, it may rely equally on other sanctions, provided always that overall effective measures exist with which to prevent and, where relevant, punish misuse. (59) 88. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view in a case such as the present that, for the purposes of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers cannot necessarily be presumed. 89. However, each individual amendment to the protection afforded to workers in the field of fixed-term work, independently of its compliance with the prohibition of regression, in addition, must comply with the other requirements of the Framework Agreement and the rest of Community law. Thus, even if Presidential Decree No 164/2004 has not resulted in a reduction in the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers within the meaning of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement, the weakening, effected by that presidential decree, of the sanctions applying to the misuse of fixed-term work may in no circumstances result in protection for fixed-term workers which falls below the minimum standards prescribed by Community law in that regard. 90. Even though the Framework Agreement, as described immediately above, places the emphasis in clause 5 on the prevention of abuse, none the less, Member States are obliged to provide for appropriate sanctions to address cases of actual misuse. (60) In that regard, although it is incumbent on Member States or, where applicable, the social partners to define and shape the relevant sanctions, (61) it must be ensured, none the less, that infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the sanction effective, proportionate and dissuasive. (62) 91. Thus, where misuse has taken place, a measure offering effective and equivalent guarantees for the protection of workers must be capable of being applied in order duly to punish that abuse and nullify the consequences of the breach of Community law. (63) On that issue, the Framework Agreement, in particular, clause 5(2)(b), indicates simply that the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships to such of unlimited duration constitutes a conceivable sanction; (64) that does not, however, preclude the possibility of other forms of penalty. 92. In determining the effectiveness of the penalties established in relation to the Greek public sector in Article 7 of Presidential Decree No 164/2004, the national court will have to examine, inter alia, whether a genuine incentive exists on the part of the workers concerned to exercise and enforce the rights which Community law confers on them. For example, where fixed-term employment relationships are misused, the workers concerned might be tempted, none the less, to tolerate such misuse in the hope of continued public sector employment with its attendant social security cover. Fearing the denial of future employment contracts, even only on a fixed-term basis, certain workers might shy away from claiming their right to a severance allowance or denouncing those responsible for the misuse with a view to the instigation of disciplinary or criminal law measures. 93. To summarise, therefore: The abolition or weakening of a sanction for the misuse of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships in relation to a particular category of fixed-term workers does not infringe clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, if at the same time such effect is offset by the strengthening of measures intended to prevent misuse. None the less, in order to combat misuse, Member States are obliged to introduce or, as the case may be, maintain effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. 2. The concept of ‘objective reasons’ for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement 94. By Question 6(a) in Case C‑378/07 and Question 5(a) in Cases C‑379/07 and C‑380/07, the referring court seeks guidance in interpreting the concept of ‘objective reasons’ for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement. In essence, the national court seeks to establish whether the mere fact that a legislative provision was used as authority for recourse to a fixed-term employment relationship is capable of constituting an objective reason for the purposes of the Framework Agreement, even if the requirements of that legislative provision were not satisfied. 95. At first sight, this question raises an issue already addressed in Adeneler. In that case, the Court held that a national provision which merely authorises recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts in a general and abstract manner by a rule of statute or secondary legislation does not constitute adequate justification for recourse to that form of employment. Instead, national law must ensure that recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts is justified by the presence of specific factors relating in particular to the activity in question and the conditions under which it is carried out. (65) 96. However, in the present case, in fact, the national court is wholly unconcerned whether the provision authorising recourse to the employment relationships at issue here was too generalised or too abstract. Rather, it presumes that the perfectly detailed legislative requirements governing recourse to fixed-term work, in this case, simply were not observed. According to the national court, recourse was had to fixed-term work on the basis of provisions authorising its use ‘to meet seasonal, periodic, temporary, unforeseen or additional social needs’, (66) whereas, in fact, it covered ‘fixed and permanent needs’. 97. In that regard, it must be observed at the outset that the national court alone has jurisdiction to interpret national law and to apply it in an individual case. (67) However, it is for the Court to give guidance on the requirements of Community law, (68) in the present case, in particular, on those of the Framework Agreement. 98. The Framework Agreement does not impose as a mandatory rule that use of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships should be based on objective reasons. Admittedly, the Framework Agreement presumes fixed-term work to be an exception (69) and that the use of fixed-term employment contracts based on objective reasons constitutes a mechanism to prevent abuse. (70) None the less, the Framework Agreement ultimately leaves it to the discretion of Member States which of the three measures mentioned in clause 5(1)(a) to (c) to introduce, (71) provided that the measures adopted are binding and facilitate the effective prevention of abuse. (72) 99. A Member State is therefore not necessarily required to introduce the first of the three possible measures mentioned in clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, that is, the requirement for renewals to be based on objective reasons. There is nothing to prevent a Member State from simply defining the maximum total duration of successive employment relationships or the maximum number of renewals of fixed-term employment relationships in order to prevent abuse, instead of defining objective reasons. (73) 100. A fortiori, Member States are not obliged under the Framework Agreement to introduce a requirement that the first or single use of a fixed-term employment contract or relationship is based on objective reasons. Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement is concerned simply with the definition of objective reasons capable of justifying the renewal of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships; in other words, it governs cases in which multiple use is made of fixed-term employment relationships. 101. However, if a Member State introduces the measure provided for in clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement and defines objective grounds which are, or ought to be, capable of justifying, at any rate, the renewal of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, the third paragraph of Article 249 EC obliges it to exercise its discretion in conformity with the objectives of Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement annexed thereto. (74) 102. According to case-law, the definition of such objective reasons must be linked to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity, which are capable, therefore, in that particular context of justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts. Such circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks for the performance of which such contracts have been concluded and, further, from the inherent characteristics of those tasks or, as the case may be, from pursuit of a legitimate social policy objective of a Member State. (75) 103. The national provisions contained in Laws No 2190/1994, No 2527/1997 and No 3250/2004, which the referring court cites, establish, each using similar wording, the specific grounds on which fixed-term employment relationships may be concluded. As already mentioned, those consist in meeting seasonal or temporary needs (Article 21(1) of Law No 2190/1994), coping with additional requirements for the purposes of serving the public (Article 1 of Law No 3250/2004), not the meeting of fixed and permanent needs (Article 6(1) of Law No 2527/1997). 104. In essence, according to the information supplied by the referring court, the effect of those provisions cited and Greek case-law in general is to permit the public service to conclude fixed-term employment contracts only for the purposes of meeting temporary needs, not, however, for the purposes of meeting fixed and permanent needs. 105. Undoubtedly, an employer’s need which is merely of a temporary nature may for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement constitute an objective reason which, in principle, is apt to justify recourse to fixed-term employment relationships. That is particularly self-evident, for example, in the case of seasonal work and in carrying out specific projects limited both in period and substance, provided that such constitute a peak workload for the employer and do not result in ongoing work requirements. 106. However, if an employer’s temporary needs in that sense are defined by legislation to constitute an objective reason for having recourse to fixed-term work, all national authorities, including the public administration and the courts, must ensure in their respective fields of competence that precisely those provisions are applied in accordance with the requirements of Directive 1999/70 such that they can operate effectively in preventing misuse. (76) 107. The objective to prevent misuse underlying clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement would be contradicted, if, in practice, the said provisions were inverted in their meaning and could serve as authority for recourse to fixed-term employment relationships even also in situations in which, in fact, such employment meets not an employer’s temporary needs but its fixed and permanent needs. 108. To summarise, therefore: If in national legislation a Member State defines objective reasons for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, it is incumbent on national authorities in their respective fields of competence to ensure in all cases the application of that legislation in conformity with Directive 1999/70 in order to prevent, in an effective manner, abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. 3. Prohibition on conversion of fixed-term employment relationships to relationships of indefinite duration in the Greek public sector 109. By Question 6(b) in Case C‑378/07 and Question 5(b) in Cases C‑379/07 and C‑380/07, in substance, the referring court wishes to ascertain whether an absolute prohibition in the public sector on the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships to such of indefinite duration is compatible with Community law. 110. Underlying that question is the prohibition in such terms which the Greek legislature introduced for the public sector, first, by Article 21 of Law No 2190/1994 and, second, by the newly inserted Article 103(8) of the Greek Constitution. 111. That prohibition, at any rate as set out in ordinary legislation in Article 21 of Law No 2190/1994, was already addressed by the Court in Adeneler. In that case, the Court held that the Framework Agreement precludes the application of national legislation which in the case of misuse, in the public sector alone, prohibits absolutely the conversion into an employment contract of indefinite duration of a succession of fixed-term contracts. (77) 112. However, that finding in Adeneler applies expressly only ‘in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings’ which, in essence, may be summarised as follows: – The dispute concerned a succession of fixed-term contracts which, in fact, were intended to meet ‘fixed and permanent needs’ of the employer and had therefore to be regarded as constituting an abuse. (78) – Those employment contracts covered the period between May 2001 and September 2003, (79) that is, their terms expired prior to the entry into force of Presidential Decree No 164/2004. – According to the information supplied to the Court in that case, domestic law did not include in the public sector, at any rate prior to Presidential Decree No 164/2004 entering into force, any other effective measure to prevent and, where relevant, punish the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts. (80) 113. Given those particular circumstances it would be premature to conclude from Adeneler that the prohibition in the Greek public sector on the conversion to relationships of an indefinite duration of fixed-term relationships continues to contravene the Framework Agreement. Admittedly, in the present case, too, the referring court presumes the conclusion of fixed-term contracts with the plaintiffs in the main proceedings to constitute an abuse, as their employment met a fixed and permanent need. However, in addition, the national court will have to examine in detail whether the remaining circumstances of the main proceedings, in fact, can also be regarded as comparable to those giving rise to the judgment in Adeneler. 114. In particular, it is for the national court to determine whether Greek law has subsequently introduced other effective measures to prevent and, where relevant, sanction the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts. If, in fact, other effective measures to prevent and, where relevant, sanction the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts are now applicable, the Framework Agreement no longer precludes a public sector prohibition on conversion. In particular, such measures may comprise mandatory rules governing the duration and renewal of fixed-term contracts or relationships and establishing a right to compensation in the event of misuse. (81) 115. In that connection, further reference must be had to Presidential Decree No 164/2004 (82) which has meanwhile entered into force, containing, as I indicated earlier, (83) various measures newly introduced to prevent and sanction the misuse of fixed-term work in the public sector: a requirement for objective reasons, provisions on the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships and on the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships, as well as a right to a severance allowance and, where appropriate, criminal law and disciplinary penalties. (84) 116. Neither Directive 1999/70 nor the Framework Agreement imposes a general obligation on Member States to provide for the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into contracts of indefinite duration: (85) whether misuse arises from the use of successive fixed-term contracts or from the single use of a fixed-term employment relationship, clause 5(2)(b) of the Framework Agreement prescribes no such general obligation of conversion; nor elsewhere in the Framework Agreement is such obligation to be found. 117. Nor does the Framework Agreement preclude Member States from treating abuse of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships differently according to whether those contracts or relationships were entered into with a private sector or public sector employer. (86) The Framework Agreement itself expressly recognises ‘that ... detailed application [of the agreement’s principles and minimum requirements] needs to take account of the realities of specific national, sectoral and seasonal situations’. (87) Those realities may include certain principles governing public service employment, for example, the ‘established post’ principle, the model of the established public servant and the requirement for success in a selection competition in order to be employed on an indefinite basis; principles which, naturally, must be applied in conformity with the rest of Community law. (88) 118. To summarise, therefore: The Framework Agreement on fixed-term work does not preclude national legislation prohibiting, in the public sector, the conversion of fixed-term employment relationships to relationships of indefinite duration, unless in the sector concerned national law does not include any other effective measure to prevent and, where relevant, punish the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts. C – Consequences of any infringement of the Framework Agreement 119. By its fifth question in Case C‑378/07 and fourth question in Cases C‑379/07 and C‑380/07, the referring court seeks to ascertain the implications for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings which result from an infringement of Directive 1999/70 or the Framework Agreement annexed thereto. Specifically, those questions seek to establish whether as a matter of Community law the national court is obliged to ‘revive’ to a certain extent an earlier, allegedly more favourable provision such as Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 and to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings on the basis of such provision. 120. According to established case-law, when applying domestic law national courts are bound to interpret that law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of a directive in order to achieve the result sought by it and thus to comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC. (89) 121. Admittedly, the obligation on a national court to interpret domestic law in conformity with a directive is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity; furthermore, that obligation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem. (90) 122. Notwithstanding that qualification, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with a directive none the less requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it. (91) Putting it another way, national courts are obliged to take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by Directive 1999/70 (see the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70) and remedies for the consequences of a Community law infringement. (92) In that regard, they must make use to the full extent of their discretion under national law. (93) 123. It is for the national court to examine whether and to what extent the domestic law applicable in the present case can be interpreted in the terms mentioned in conformity with the requirements of Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement annexed thereto. Likewise, it is for the national court alone to determine the legal consequences of such an interpretation for the disputes at issue in the main proceedings. Ultimately, that includes resolving the question of whether in the disputes at issue in the main proceedings national provisions must be disapplied and in lieu thereof a provision such as Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 may be applied instead. 124. If it is impossible to achieve the objective imposed by Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement by construing domestic law in conformity with Community law, the defaulting Member State may be required (in accordance with Francovich and subject to the conditions laid down in that case) to compensate citizens in respect of any loss or damage caused by the failure properly to transpose Directive 1999/70. (94) 125. Simply for the sake of completeness, I should like to point out that in the present case, notwithstanding the vertical relationship between workers and their public sector employers, (95) there is no question of clauses 5 and 8(3) of the Framework Agreement having direct effect. 126. In relation to clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, the Court has expressly held already that the provision does not have direct effect. (96) The same considerations apply a fortiori in relation to clause 5(2) which is phrased with even less precision and grants the Member States even greater discretion in its implementation than clause 5(1) does. The mere wording of the provision, with its introductory phrase ‘where appropriate’, indicates that Member States are under no obligation whatsoever to introduce any of the measures mentioned in clause 5(2)(a) and (b). 127. Nor is the prohibition of regression established in clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement apt for direct applicability. That results less from the fact that the provision employs undefined legal terms such as ‘general level of protection afforded to workers’ (97) but more from the fact that the provision’s purpose is not to grant individuals enforceable rights with which to defend their interests as workers. That follows, first, from the schematic position of the prohibition of regression in clause 8 of the Framework Agreement amidst ‘provisions on implementation’, which merely clarify the discretion retained by Member States and social partners in the field covered by the Framework Agreement. Second, however, that is evident from the actual substance of clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement: ultimately, the provision does not prohibit a reduction in the general level of protection as such afforded to workers but merely precludes the competent national authorities from reducing the level of that protection under the cloak of implementing the Framework Agreement. (98) 128. To summarise, therefore: Within the scope of their obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with directives, national courts are obliged to take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by Directive 1999/70 and remedies for the consequences of Community law infringements. In that regard, they must make use to the full extent of their discretion under national law. VII – Conclusion 129. In the light of the above considerations, I propose that the Court should answer jointly the three references for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Monomeles Protodikio Rethimnis in the following terms: (1) Even where for the purposes of clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work annexed to Directive 1999/70 national law already contains equivalent legal provisions to prevent abuse, it remains open to Member States to introduce measures in the area of fixed-term work provided that such rules satisfy all Community requirements. (2) (a) The scope of the prohibition of regression established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work is not restricted to the protection of workers against abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. (b) A national provision which merely abrogates or weakens a specific measure of worker protection does not fall within the scope of the prohibition established by clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term employment contracts unless that measure results in an overall reduction in the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers. (c) The abolition or weakening of a sanction for the misuse of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships in relation to a particular category of fixed-term workers does not infringe clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, if at the same time such effect is offset by the strengthening of measures intended to prevent misuse. None the less, in order to combat misuse, Member States are obliged to introduce or, as the case may be, maintain effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. (3) If in national legislation a Member State defines objective reasons for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, it is incumbent on national authorities in their respective fields of competence to ensure in all cases the application of that legislation in conformity with Directive 1999/70 in order to prevent, in an effective manner, abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. (4) The Framework Agreement on fixed-term work does not preclude national legislation prohibiting, in the public sector, the conversion of fixed-term employment relationships to relationships of indefinite duration, unless in the sector concerned national law does not include any other effective measure to prevent and, where relevant, punish the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts. (5) Within the scope of their obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with directives, national courts are obliged to take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by Directive 1999/70 and remedies for the consequences of Community law infringements. In that regard, they must make use to the full extent of their discretion under national law. 1 – Original language: German. 2 – Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057. 3 – Order of 12 June 2008 in Case C‑364/07 Vassilakis and Others, paragraph 49. 4 – Case C‑144/04 [2005] ECR I‑9981. 5 – OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43. 6 – First paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement; see also paragraphs 3 and 5 of its general considerations. 7 – Second paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement; see also paragraph 6 of its.general considerations. 8 – Paragraph 8 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement; see also the second paragraph in the preamble to the agreement. 9 – Paragraph 7 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement. 10 – Recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 1999/70. 11 – Paragraph 10 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement; see also the third paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement. 12 – See also Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 12. 13 – FEK A’ 124 of 7 July 2004. 14 – FEK A’ 77 of 2 April 2003. 15 – FEK A’ 160 of 23 August 2004. According to Article 5(1) of Presidential Decree No 180/2004, unless otherwise provided in individual provisions, the decree is to enter into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette. 16 – See Article 1 of Presidential Decree No 180/2004. 17 – FEK A’ 134 of 19 April 2004. According to Article 12(1) of Presidential Decree No 164/2004, unless otherwise provided in individual provisions, the decree is to enter into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette. 18 – FEK A’ 28 of 3 March 1994; on that point, see Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 19. 19 – FEK B’ 11 of 18 March 1920. 20 – In that regard, the national court refers, in particular, to the requirement for written notice of termination of employment contracts and the obligation to make severance payments. 21 – As a matter of clarification, the Greek Government points out that the wording mentioned relates to Article 8 of Law No 2112/1920, as amended by Law No 547/1937. 22 – Supreme Court of Cassation. 23 – Arios Pagos, Judgment No 18/2006 of 22 June 2006. 24 – Arios Pagos, Judgments No 19/2007 and No 20/2007 of 11 June 2007. 25 – Prefectural Authority of Rethimnon. 26 – The defendant local authority states that one of the contracts was for the period from 3 May 2006 to 2 November 2006; all other contracts ran from 20 April 2005 to 21 October 2006. 27 – Municipality of Geropotamos. 28 – In the case of the plaintiff in Case C‑379/07, at issue are three successive contracts for work, the first covering the period from 1 December 2003 to 30 November 2004, the second the period from 1 December 2004 to 30 November 2005 and the third the period from 5 December 2005 to 4 December 2006. In relation to the first plaintiff in Case C‑380/07, three successive contracts for work are at issue, the first covering the period from 1 July 2004 to 1 December 2004, the second the period from 29 December 2004 to 28 December 2005 and the third the period from 30 December 2005 to 29 December 2006. In relation to the second plaintiff in Case C‑380/07, at issue is a fixed-term employment contract for the period from 1 July 2004 to 1 December 2004, followed by two contracts for work covering the periods from 29 December 2004 to 28 December 2005 and from 30 December 2005 to 29 December 2006. In addition to the municipality of Geropotamos, in Case C‑380/07 the public law body ‘O Geropotamos’, a municipal undertaking, was a party to the contracts. 29 – Rethimnon Court of First Instance, single judge. 30 – The employment legislation at issue concerns, in particular, the requirement for written notice of termination and the obligation to make a severance payment. 31 – Set out in point 34 of this Opinion. 32 – Joined Cases C‑482/01 and C‑493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I‑5257, paragraph 42; Case C‑500/06 Corporación Dermoestética [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20; Case C‑360/06 Heinrich Bauer Verlag [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 15; and Case C‑404/07 Katz [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34. 33 – This is the consistent case-law of the Court: see, by way of example, Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 24; Case C‑404/06 Quelle [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 19 and 20; and Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraphs 40 to 43. 34 – The issue of whether, in fact, Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920 was commonly used in the Greek public sector appears not uncontested; on that point, see my Opinion in Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, point 81. 35 – On that issue, see point 40 of this Opinion and the case-law mentioned therein. 36 – On that point, see clauses 1(b) and 5(1) of the Framework Agreement and Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraphs 65, 80, 92 and 101. 37 – Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 71. 38 – On that issue, see immediately below, points 59 to 71 of this Opinion. 39 – In its controversial judgment in Mangold, cited in footnote 4, paragraphs 55 to 78, the Court tested a national rule in the area of fixed-term work not only against the prohibition of regression established by the Framework Agreement on part-time work but also against the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of age. 40 – On that point, see the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Mangold, cited in footnote 4, point 54, with further references and explanations. 41 – On that issue, see also Mangold, cited in footnote 4, paragraphs 40 to 43. 42 – To the same effect, see Case C‑307/05 Del Cerro Alonso [2007] ECR I‑7109, paragraph 38, and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 114, in each case with reference to the prohibition of discrimination in clause 4 of the Framework Agreement. 43 – First paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement; see also paragraphs 3 and 5 of its general considerations. 44 – In the preamble to the EU Treaty, the importance of fundamental social rights is confirmed (fourth recital) and the objective of economic and social progress emphasised (eighth recital). 45 – In the preamble to the EC Treaty, the importance of economic and social progress is emphasised (second recital) and the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of the peoples of Europe is defined as an essential objective (third recital); see, in that regard, also Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraphs 10 and 11. 46 – The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers was adopted at the European Council meeting held on 9 December 1989 in Strasbourg and is set out in Commission document COM(89) 471 of 2 October 1989. Article 7 of the charter is worded as follows: ‘The completion of the internal market must lead to an improvement in the living and working conditions of workers in the European Community. This process must result from an approximation of these conditions while the improvement is being maintained, as regards in particular the duration and organisation of working time and forms of employment other than open-ended contracts, such as fixed-term contracts, part-time working, temporary work and seasonal work.’ The first paragraph of Article 10 of the charter adds: ‘According to the arrangements applying in each country … [e]very worker of the European Community shall have a right to adequate social protection …’. 47 – The European Social Charter was signed by Member States of the Council of Europe on 18 October 1961 in Turin. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Part I of the charter emphasise the right of all workers to just conditions of work and to a fair remuneration, albeit that that right is to be considered as a declared aim (see Part III, Article 20(1)(a) of the charter). 48 – In Mangold, cited in footnote 4, paragraphs 50 to 54, the Court had already interpreted the prohibition of regression in the context of a case concering the first use of a fixed-term employment relationship. 49 – Points 60 to 65 of this Opinion. 50 – Mangold, cited in footnote 4, paragraph 52. 51 – On that whole issue, see the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Mangold, cited in footnote 4, points 61, 62, 63, 65 and 70. 52 – On that point, see Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, in particular, paragraphs 19 and 99. 53 – On that issue, see in detail points 76 to 93 of this Opinion. 54 – That circumstance is stressed by the referring court and some of the parties to the case; see also the Court’s order in Vassilakis and Others, cited in footnote 3, paragraph 29. 55 – Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR I‑7411 and Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 121. 56 – On that issue, see point 40 of this Opinion and the case-law cited therein. 57 – See, by way of example, Case C‑420/06 Jager [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 46, and Case C‑54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 19. 58 – See point 69 of this Opinion. 59 – To the same effect, see Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraphs 102 and 105; see also my Opinion in that case, point 73. 60 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 94; Case C‑53/04 Marrosu and Sardino [2006] ECR I‑7213, paragraph 51; and Case C‑180/04 Vassallo [2006] ECR I‑7251, paragraph 36. 61 – Recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 1999/70 and paragraph 10 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement. 62 – Consistent case-law, first established in Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, paragraphs 23 and 24; see, more recently, Joined Cases C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraph 65, and in addition, specifically with reference to the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 94, Marrosu and Sardino, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 51, and Vassallo, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 36. 63 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 102; Marrosu and Sardino, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 53; and Vassallo, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 38. 64 – On that issue, see, in addition, my observations in points 109 to 118 of this Opinion. 65 – See the Court’s reasoning on the second question in Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, in particular, paragraphs 71 to 75. 66 – The national court refers expressly to Law No 3250/2004; similar requirements result from Laws No 2190/1994 and No 2527/1997 (in that regard, see points 22 to 24 of this Opinion). 67 – Case C‑265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I‑923, paragraph 51, and Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32. 68 – On that point, see the case-law cited in footnote 57. 69 – See paragraphs 6 and 7 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement and the second paragraph of the preamble thereto; to the same effect, see also Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 62. 70 – See paragraph 7 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement. At this point it must be mentioned that in the German version of the Framework Agreement there is an absence of uniform terminology: paragraph 7 of the general considerations refers to ‘objektive Gründe’ [in the English version: ‘objective grounds’] whereas clause 5(1)(a) refers to ‘sachliche Gründe’ [in the English version also: ‘objective grounds’]. However, an examination of other language versions reveals that this is a peculiarity of the German version and that those terminology differences do not reflect a conceptual distinction. 71 – In addition, Member States can rely on their existing equivalent legal measures to prevent abuse; see Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 71. 72 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 101, see also paragraphs 65, 80 and 92, and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 70. 73 – See my Opinion in Impact, cited in footnote 37, point 112. 74 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 68. 75 – Ibid., paragraphs 69 and 70. 76 – On the requirement for effective prevention of misuse, see Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 101, and also paragraphs 65, 80 and 92, and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 70. 77 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 105. 78 – Ibid., paragraphs 99 and 105. 79 – Ibid., paragraph 24. 80 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraphs 100 and 105; see also Marrosu and Sardino, paragraph 49, and Vassallo, paragraph 34, both cited in footnote 60. 81 – Marrosu and Sardino, paragraph 55, and Vassallo, paragraph 40, both cited in footnote 60. 82 – By its insertion of the phrase ‘at any rate until Presidential Decree No 164/2004 entered into force’, the Court in Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 100, hints that a different assessment of the domestic legal position may apply to the period following the entry into force of the presidential decree. 83 – See point 85 of this Opinion. 84 – In determining the effectiveness of sanctions, the observations I made in point 92 of this Opinion apply. 85 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 91, and Marrosu and Sardino, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 47. 86 – Marrosu and Sardino, paragraph 48, and Vassallo, paragraph 33, both cited in footnote 60. 87 – Third paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement; see also paragraph 10 of its general considerations. 88 – On that whole issue, see my Opinion in Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, points 84 to 86, and the Joined Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Cases C‑53/04 Marrosu and Sardino and C‑180/04 Vasallo [2006] ECR I‑7215, points 42 and 43. 89 – See, for example, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26; Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 113; Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 108; and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 98. 90 – Case C‑105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I‑5285, paragraphs 44 and 47; Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 110; and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 100. 91 – Pfeiffer, cited in footnote 89, paragraphs 115, 116, 118 and 119, Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 111, and Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraph 101; similarly, the earlier judgment in Case C‑106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I‑4135, paragraph 8, in which the Court stressed that the national court ‘is required to [interpret national law], as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive’. 92 – Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 102; Marrosu and Sardino, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 53; and Vassallo, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 38. 93 – Von Colson and Kamann, cited in footnote 89, paragraph 28; see also Case 157/86 Murphy and Others [1988] ECR 673, paragraph 11, and Case C‑208/05 ITC [2007] ECR I‑181, paragraph 68. 94 – Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I‑5357, paragraphs 30 to 46, and thereafter a consistent feature of the Court’s case-law; see also Adeneler, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 112, and Case C‑356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I‑3067, paragraph 43. 95 – Directly effective provisions of a directive can be invoked against the State also in its capacity as employer; see, for example, Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 49, and Case C‑187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I‑2741, paragraphs 31 and 71. 96 – Impact, cited in footnote 37, paragraphs 69 to 80. 97 – A Community law provision may be directly effective notwithstanding the fact that it incorporates undefined legal terms; on that issue, see my Opinion in Impact, cited in footnote 37, point 98 with further references. 98 – Mangold, cited in footnote 4, paragraph 52; see, in addition, point 67 of this Opinion.