Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2021:933
Date: 2021-12-21
Language of the case: Greek
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded;Action for damages - inadmissible
Origin: Greece

summary of those pleas in law. It is settled case-law that that information must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, if an action is to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the text of the application itself (see judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council, T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 63 In the present case, first, as regards Case T‑721/18, it must be observed that paragraphs 1 to 9 of the application contain a critical assessment of the approach taken by the Commission in the disputes between it and Isotis which gave rise to the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63). It must also be observed that the application contains numerous references to the procedure brought by the applicants for objecting to the enforcement of the abovementioned decisions initiated by the Commission before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens). However, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, it is sufficiently clear from the application that the present action does not seek to call into question the force of res judicata of the Court of Justice’s order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), or the General Court’s judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), or to challenge the decisions taken by the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) in the proceedings for the enforcement of those decisions. It is clear from the application that that action seeks to obtain compensation for the non-material damage allegedly caused to each of the applicants by the action of the lawyers representing the Commission and an OLAF official in the context of the procedure for objecting to the enforcement in question. 64 It must be observed that the facts alleged against the Commission in the procedure for objecting to enforcement are set out in a sufficiently precise manner in paragraphs 15 to 30 of the application, in which the applicants claim that the Commission’s lawyers and an OLAF official who was examined as a witness knowingly stated, incorrectly, in their written pleadings before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) and at the hearing of 12 December 2017, that, first, the applicants themselves were involved both in the management of co-financed European programmes in which Isotis was participating, and in the dispute relating to those programmes, and that, second, the applicants had caused significant damage to the European Union. 65 Similarly, the applicants set out with sufficient precision, in paragraphs 41 to 84 of the application, the reasons why they consider that the facts alleged against the Commission constitute unlawful conduct. It is thus clear from the application that the applicants consider that the conduct alleged against the Commission is unlawful in that it infringed, inter alia, their right to dignity within the meaning of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article 2 TEU and the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, breached the principle of good administration, the principles of legality, good faith and the protection of legitimate expectations, and infringed their right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and in that it constituted, in any event, an abuse of rights. 66 The Commission’s argument concerning the alleged lack of clarity in the application as to how the applicants calculated the amount of non-material damage for which they seek compensation must also be dismissed. Irrespective of the question whether the applicants’ claim for compensation is well-founded and whether the General Court should assess it ex aequo et bono, it must be observed that the first head of claim in the application sufficiently specifies how the applicants calculated the amount of EUR 500 000 of damage for each of them. It is stated that that amount represents the sum of the damage caused by five allegations made by the Commission’s representatives in the written pleadings lodged with the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) in the procedure for objecting to enforcement and in the proceedings for interim measures before that court, in respect of which the applicants seek compensation in the amount of EUR 100 000. 67 Second, as regards Case T‑81/19, it must be observed that, as in Case T‑721/18, paragraphs 1 to 9 of the application contain a critical assessment of the approach taken by the Commission in the disputes between it and Isotis which gave rise to the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63). It must also be observed that the application contains numerous references to the procedure brought by the applicants for objecting to the enforcement of the abovementioned decisions initiated by the Commission before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) and before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens). However, contrary to the Commission’s submissions it is sufficiently clear from the application that the present action does not seek to call into question the force of res judicata of the Court of Justice’s order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), or the General Court’s judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), or to challenge the decisions taken by the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) in the procedure for the enforcement of those decisions. 68 It is thus apparent from the application that that action seeks compensation for the non-material damage allegedly caused to each of the applicants by the action of the lawyers representing the Commission in the appeal proceedings against the judgment of the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) of 4 July 2018, concerning the possibility for the Commission to enforce against the applicants the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63). 69 As regards the facts alleged against the Commission concerning the proceedings before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), it must be observed that those facts are set out in sufficient detail in paragraphs 34 to 62 of the application, in which the applicants criticise the Commission’s lawyers not only for having repeated in their written pleadings lodged with the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) the false allegations made in the written pleadings lodged with the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens), which are the subject of the action in Case T‑721/18, but also for having deliberately made a large number of new false allegations with a view to misleading the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) on a number of facts so that it would be possible for the applicants to be held personally liable for Isotis’ debts to the Commission. 70 Similarly, the applicants set out with sufficient precision, in paragraphs 63 to 92 of the application, the reasons why they consider that the acts allegedly committed by the Commission’s lawyers constitute unlawful conduct. It is thus apparent from the application that the applicants submit that the conduct alleged against the Commission is unlawful in that it infringed, first, the requirement of truth and equity in proceedings, breached the fundamental general principle of the fair administration of justice and the right to a fair trial, second, breached the right to human dignity and the principle of good administration and, third, breached the principles of legality, good faith and protection of legitimate expectations. 71 Moreover, it must be observed that the application is sufficiently clear as to how the applicants calculated the amount of non-material damage for which they seek compensation. Irrespective of the question whether the applicants’ claim for compensation is well-founded and whether the General Court should assess it ex aequo et bono, it must be observed that the first head of claim in the application sufficiently specifies how the applicants calculated the amount of EUR 1 100 000 of damage for each of them. 72 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the content of the applications initiating proceedings did not make it impossible, or even excessively difficult, for the Commission to exercise its rights of defence and, consequently, satisfies the requirement of clarity imposed by Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 62 above. 73 The plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, alleging that the applications are imprecise as regards the subject matter of the dispute and the arguments put forward by the applicants in the present cases, must therefore be dismissed. – The identity of defendants 74 The Commission contends that the actions are inadmissible in that it is not clear from the applications who the defendants in those actions are. 75 The applicants dispute the Commission’s arguments. In their reply to the measures of organisation of procedure of 11 May 2020, they state that the actions in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 are brought against the Commission as an institution with its own legal personality and against the Commission in so far as it legally represents the European Union. The applicants also state in the reply that the sentence used in the applications, according to which the actions are directed against ‘the European Union, legally represented’, must be regarded as meaning that the actions are brought not only against the Commission as an institution, but also against the European Union legally represented by the Commission. 76 It must be observed that, in accordance with Article 76(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must state the name of the main party against whom the action is brought. 77 In the present case, it is apparent from the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 and from the applicants’ replies to the measures of organisation of procedure of 11 May 2020 that the present actions are both based on Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and directed, first, against the European Union ‘legally represented’ by the Commission and, second, against the Commission ‘as a separate legal person’. 78 As stated in paragraphs 63 and 68 above, it is also apparent from the applications in the present cases that, by their actions, the applicants seek compensation for damage which they claim to have suffered as a result of the alleged conduct of the Commission’s legal representatives and of an OLAF official. 79 In that regard, it must be observed that, under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, ‘in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties’. 80 It should also be borne in mind that Article 47 TEU confers legal personality on the European Union and not on the Commission. 81 Thus, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court, an applicant in an action for damages based on Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU is justified in bringing his action against the European Union, which has legal personality (see order of 2 February 2015, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union, T‑577/14, not published, EU:T:2015:80, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited). 82 However, it is also apparent from the settled case-law, both of the Court of Justice and of the General Court, that, where the liability of the European Union is incurred by the act of one of its institutions, it is represented before the General Court by the institution or institutions accused of the act giving rise to liability (see order of 2 February 2015, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union, T‑577/14, not published, EU:T:2015:80, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 83 It follows that the present actions are inadmissible in so far as they are directed against the Commission ‘as a separate legal personality’. – The scope of the second and third heads of claim 84 The Commission contends that the second head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 is inadmissible on the ground that it manifestly goes beyond the subject matter of the dispute in those two cases. The third head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 is also inadmissible because it is imprecise, since the applicants have not indicated the type of declaration the Commission could make or the procedure for making it. 85 The applicants dispute the Commission’s arguments. 86 First, as regards the second head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19, by which the applicants ask the Court, in essence, to order the Commission to refrain in future from any attack on their character, it must be observed that that head of claim must be regarded as an application for a prohibitory injunction. 87 In that regard, it is clear that Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, relating to the non-contractual liability of the European Union, that compensation in kind may, where appropriate, be granted by the EU judicature, in accordance with the general principles of non-contractual liability common to the laws of the Member States, and that such compensation may take the form of a mandatory injunction or a prohibitory injunction, which may lead the Commission to engage in a particular course of conduct (see, to that effect, orders of 3 September 2013, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, C‑34/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:552, paragraph 29 and of 20 December 2019, Dragomir v Commission, T‑297/19, not published, EU:T:2019:902, paragraph 66). 88 Furthermore, the second head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 is directly linked to the subject matter of the dispute in those two cases, in so far as the applicants are seeking by the present actions to obtain compensation for non-material damage, consisting of damage to their reputation, for which they hold the Commission liable. 89 Therefore, contrary to the Commission’s contention, it must be held that the second head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 is admissible. It should be borne in mind, however, that such an injunction can be obtained, where appropriate, only if interim measures have been granted on the basis of Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, and if the non-contractual liability of the European Union has already been established (order of 20 December 2019, Dragomir v Commission, T‑297/19, not published, EU:T:2019:902, paragraph 66). 90 Second, the third head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19, by which the applicants ask the Court, in essence, to order the Commission to restore their reputation by means of a public declaration, must be regarded as an application for a mandatory injunction. 91 In that regard, it must be observed that, although, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 87 above, it cannot be ruled out that compensation in kind may take the form of a mandatory injunction imposed on the Commission by the EU judicature, the application for an injunction must still meet the requirements of clarity and precision laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. 92 However, in the present case, it is clear that the applicants failed to specify in their applications either the form the declaration to restore their reputation should take or how it was to be made. It should also be noted that the explanations provided by the applicants in their replies to the measures of organisation of procedure of 11 May 2020 as to the exact scope of their third heads of claim are not sufficient in that regard. It is true that the applicants specified the form that declaration should take, stating that it was to be an extra-judicial declaration addressed to each of them, by which the Commission had to declare clearly and unconditionally that neither of the applicants had been involved in funding granted by the European Union and that they had not participated in the actual management of the projects funded, as was acknowledged by the OLAF. However, the applicants also stated that that declaration was to be sent not only to them, but also to each authority, bank and natural person which had, directly or indirectly, become aware of the false and defamatory allegations made by the Commission and its representatives, as described in the present actions. It is clear that such an application is, in itself, too imprecise to be regarded as meeting the requirements of precision and clarity laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. 93 It follows that the third head of claim in each of the applications in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 must be dismissed as inadmissible. Lis pendens 94 The Commission contends that the claims made by the applicants in Case T‑81/19 are identical to those made in Case T‑721/18 and that, in so far as those claims relate to the procedure for objecting to enforcement and to the arguments put forward by the Commission in that procedure before the action in Case T‑721/18 was brought, the bringing of a second action was not justified. 95 Having been asked by the Court to take a view on the possibility of lis pendens with regard to Case T‑721/18, the Commission states in its reply to the measure of organisation of procedure of 1 August 2019 that the conditions for a finding of lis pendens have been met. The Commission notes, in that regard that, in both cases, the applicants seek compensation for the same damage, namely the alleged harm to their character, which occurred as a result of the same harmful event consisting of the allegations made by the Commission in its pleadings at first instance and at second instance before the Greek courts in the same dispute. The Commission states that, in paragraphs 15 to 33 of the application in Case T‑81/19, the applicants set out arguments relating to the allegations made by the Commission in the proceedings for interim measures and the proceedings at first instance, which they had already challenged in the action in Case T‑721/18. The Commission also states that it confined itself to repeating, at the appeal stage, the allegations already made in the proceedings for interim measures and the proceedings at first instance because it is not permissible to introduce new allegations at the appeal stage. The repetition of those allegations does not constitute a separate practice capable of causing the applicants harm distinct from that allegedly caused when the same allegations were made at first instance. The same applies to the alleged unlawfulness of its conduct, since the applicants in Case T‑81/19 allege infringement of the principles of legality, good faith, the protection of legitimate expectations, human dignity and good administration, which they had already alleged in the application in Case T‑721/18. Lastly, the Commission notes that the forms of order sought are also identical, since the applicants claim, in both cases, that the Commission should pay them compensation for non-material damage and be ordered to refrain in future from any attack on their character, and to restore their honour and reputation by means of a declaration. Moreover, the sum of the individual fixed sums claimed by the applicants in the two cases amounts, approximately, to the same amount as their debt. Consequently, the Commission considers that the action in Case T‑81/19 must be dismissed as inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens with regard to the action brought in Case T‑721/18. 96 The applicants submit that the two actions do not relate to the same facts. They submit that, while the action in Case T‑721/18 seeks compensation for the non-material damage caused to them by the ‘false and defamatory’ allegations made by the Commission in the proceedings for interim measures and the proceedings at first instance, the action in Case T‑81/19, on the other hand, seeks compensation for the non-material damage caused to them by the repetition of those allegations and by the addition of new ‘false and defamatory’ allegations in the pleadings which, on 13 and 18 December 2018, the Commission’s lawyers lodged with the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), before which the applicants had brought an appeal against the judgment of the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) of 4 July 2018. 97 The applicants also submit that the two actions were not brought on the same legal basis. The applicants observe, in that regard, that in the application in Case T‑721/18, they submit that the conduct alleged against the Commission is unlawful, in particular, in that it infringes their right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and constitutes an abuse of rights, whereas those pleas of unlawfulness were not raised in the application in Case T‑81/19. Similarly, the applicants observe that the application in Case T‑81/19 contains a plea of unlawfulness, namely a plea alleging infringement of the requirement of truth and equity in proceedings, which is not raised in the application in Case T‑721/18. Furthermore, the applicants state that the pleas of unlawfulness which are common to both actions do not support the same heads of claim. The applicants further submit that the Commission’s argument that the compensation for the non-material damage alleged in Case T‑721/18 could not be sought again in Case T‑81/19 relates not to situations of lis pendens, but to situations in which an applicant seeks to call into question the force of res judicata, which is not the case here. 98 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, an action which is between the same parties, has the same purpose and is brought on the basis of the same pleas in law as an action brought previously, must be dismissed as inadmissible (order of 14 June 2007, Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, T‑68/07, not published, EU:T:2007:180, paragraph 16; see also, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 1985, Hoogovens Groep v Commission, 172/83 and 226/83, EU:C:1985:355, paragraph 9, and of 22 September 1988, France v Parliament, 358/85 and 51/86, EU:C:1988:431, paragraph 12). 99 In the present case, the actions in Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 were both brought on the basis of Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and are between the same parties. 100 However, the fact remains that, although the two actions seek compensation for non-material damage allegedly caused to each of the applicants by the Commission, the damage for which compensation is sought is not the same in each case, in so far as it arises from different facts. 101 First, it is conceivable, a priori, that the repetition of allegedly false and defamatory allegations could, in itself, give rise to damage distinct from that initially caused solely on the basis that repetition took place in the appeal proceedings. 102 Second, contrary to the Commission’s contention, the Commission did not confine itself, on appeal, to repeating the allegations already made in the proceedings for interim measures and at first instance. The applicants have thus identified 17 new allegations in paragraphs 40 to 56 of the application. In that regard, the Commission merely argues that it did not make new allegations in the appeal proceedings. However, it is noteworthy that it does not explain where the allegations identified as new by the applicants had already been made in the proceedings for interim measures or the objection procedure at first instance. 103 Therefore, it is possible that those new allegations, if harmful, could give rise to non-material damage distinct from that alleged by the applicants in Case T‑721/18. 104 Furthermore, the plea alleging breach of the duty of truth and equity in proceedings, relied on by the applicants in Case T‑81/19, was not raised as such in the application in Case T‑721/18. 105 Since the subject matter of the two actions is not strictly identical, for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 98 above, it is not possible to conclude that there is lis pendens. Consequently, the action in Case T‑81/19 must be regarded as admissible as regards the claim for compensation for the non-material damage allegedly caused to each of the applicants by the allegations contained in the written pleadings lodged by the Commission’s lawyers with the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens). Substance 106 Under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, in the case of non-contractual liability, the European Union must, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. 107 It is settled case-law that, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU for unlawful conduct of its institutions, a number of cumulative conditions must be satisfied: the institution’s conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage pleaded (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 September 1982, Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC, 26/81, EU:C:1982:318, paragraph 16, and of 14 December 2005, Beamglow v Parliament and Others, T‑383/00, EU:T:2005:453, paragraph 95). 108 If any one of the three conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the European Union is not satisfied, the claims for damages must be rejected, without it being necessary to examine whether the other two conditions are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 1994, KYDEP v Council and Commission, C‑146/91, EU:C:1994:329, paragraph 81, and of 20 February 2002, Förde-Reederei v Council and Commission, T‑170/00, EU:T:2002:34, paragraph 37). Furthermore, the EU judicature is not obliged to examine those conditions in any particular order (judgment of 9 September 1999, Lucaccioni v Commission, C‑257/98 P, EU:C:1999:402, paragraph 13). The conduct alleged against the Commission 109 In Case T‑721/18, the applicants complain that, in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), the Commission, through allegations made in its pleadings and the testimony of an OLAF official which the Commission knew to be false, portrayed the applicants as persons who had been directly involved in the management of the EU funds which Isotis had been ordered to reimburse to the Commission by those judgments. The Commission thus portrayed an image of the applicants, in the eyes of third parties, as insolvent and unreliable persons engaging in fraudulent acts, which seriously damaged their reputation. That serious harm to their reputation caused non-material damage amounting to EUR 500 000 for each of them. 110 In Case T‑81/19, the applicants complain that the representatives of the Commission made allegations before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) which the Commission knew to be false, some of which had already been made at first instance by those same representatives, and which sought, in essence, to mislead that court as to the first applicant’s involvement in Isotis’ management of European programmes and the fictitious nature of Isotis’ legal personality. The purpose of that conduct was, according to the applicants, to convince the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) that it was appropriate to disapply the provisions of national law which precluded the applicants from being held personally liable, in their capacity as partners, for Isotis’ debts to the Commission, which justified the enforcement of the judgments against the applicants. 111 The Commission denies the conduct alleged against it, stating that it did not portray the applicants as fraudsters before the Greek courts, but merely put forward some factual arguments to show that the conditions laid down in Greek law for enforcing the order of 31 May 2016 Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63) against the applicants were met in this case. 112 In that regard, first, as regards the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑721/18, it should be noted that the applicants refer to specific passages from the notes for deliberation of 14 December 2017, the submissions of 17 April 2018 and the supplementary statement of 20 April 2018, lodged by the Commission’s lawyers before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens), and to the testimony of an OLAF official before that court, of 12 December 2017, reproduced in one of the notes for deliberation of 14 December 2017. 113 It must be observed that the note for deliberation of 14 December 2017, lodged in response to the applicants’ application for suspension of enforcement of 11 September 2017, contained the following statement: ‘In the two actions, the defendants are seeking, totally illegally and unfairly, to evade any responsibility and to distance themselves from a business that they have been monitoring and directly managing themselves for ten years through the intermediary of a close family member.’ 114 That note for deliberation also contained the following statement: ‘… the first defendant was appointed as an administrator, legal representative and treasurer of the company and she alone managed all the company’s affairs under Article 748 et seq. of the Civil Code.’ 115 The note in question also stated, on the subject of Isotis’ debt, established in the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), that ‘this [was] a debt which [had not been] incurred by a legal entity [which was] unrelated to them, but under the contract of a company with legal personality behind which the defendants were operating, together with a close family member’. 116 The Commission’s lawyers also stated in that note that ‘… it [had] also been proved in law that [the Commission] had allegedly suffered significant damage which was the direct consequence of the acts and omissions committed over many years by the senior executives of the civil company (the opposing party)’. 117 Furthermore, also in that note, the Commission’s lawyers reported the statements made by the OLAF official at the hearing on 12 December 2017 in the following terms: ‘… the only means of recovering European funds is to implement an enforcement measure in respect of the assets of the defendants (who were also the natural persons behind e-Isotis). … In particular, the first defendant was in charge of e-Isotis, organised it and managed it (with the assistance of her husband).’ 118 It must be observed that the passages cited in paragraphs 113 to 117 above were reproduced in the second note for deliberation of 14 December 2017 lodged by the Commission’s lawyers, concerning the applicants’ application of 1 November 2017 for suspension of enforcement and for the protection of their character, and in the submissions of 17 April lodged by those lawyers. 119 It should also be noted that the supplementary statement which the Commission’s lawyers lodged with the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) on 20 April 2018 contained the following statement: ‘… the defendants remained the only partners in the civil company and, contrary to the claims made by their witnesses, were, from the beginning to the end, aware of the management, which was under their control, of the European public funds received by their company.’ 120 It is apparent from the passages in the written pleadings of the Commission’s representatives referred to above, the authenticity of which is not disputed by the Commission, that those representatives contended before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) that the applicants had played a very active role in the management of Isotis, including as regards the EU funding received by Isotis under the programmes managed by A, the first applicant’s husband and the second applicant’s son-in-law. 121 It should be noted that the OLAF report of 15 November 2011, concerning the investigation requested by the Commission into potential fraud affecting the European Union’s financial interests by Isotis, the first applicant and A stated the following: ‘[The first applicant] was in no way involved in the funding granted by the Commission, given that, in practice, she never participated in the management of the projects [and] was the company’s legal representative, while [A] was responsible for the management and, in particular, for the implementation of the European programmes. [The first applicant] participated as legal adviser/collaborator in some of the European projects for which [A] performed coordination and management functions. [The first applicant’s] main occupation consisted of monitoring and ensuring the lawfulness of the specific procedures required for the implementation of European projects, such as the protection of personal data, the nature of the end-users/pilots involved in the project, intellectual property issues and the use of the results delivered.’ 122 It must also be observed that, in his report of 23 May 2016, the Public Prosecutor at the Athens Criminal Court, to whom the Commission had sent OLAF’s investigation report of 15 September 2011, concluded that there had been no fraud against the financial interests of the European Union, stating, with regard to the first applicant, the following: ‘Finally, as regards the [first applicant], there is nothing in the documents before the court to support the conclusion that she was involved in any activity carried out by her husband in connection with the financing of the contracts in question, which is, moreover, expressly confirmed by OLAF in its report in question, and even her remuneration for the legal services she provided corresponded to her legal fees, for which she had been duly taxed and which were not paid to her in the form of dividend payments, and was not prohibited by [Isotis’] articles of association.’ 123 It is apparent from the findings made by OLAF and by the Greek Public Prosecutor that the first applicant did not play a decisive role in the management of the EU funding received by Isotis. 124 It must therefore be held that the Commission’s description before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) of the active role allegedly played by the applicants in managing Isotis is contradicted, as regards the first applicant, by the findings contained in the OLAF report of 15 September 2011 and by the Athens Public Prosecutor’s report of 23 May 2016. 125 However, it cannot be inferred from that finding alone that the Commission knowingly, and wrongly, portrayed the applicants as persons who had committed fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens). 126 In the written pleadings lodged with the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens), the representatives of the Commission complained not that the applicants were guilty of fraudulent acts, but that they played an active role in the management of Isotis and, therefore, in Isotis’ failure to meet its contractual obligations to the Commission, which led the General Court to order Isotis to reimburse all the pre-financing received under nine grant agreements, plus default interest and liquidated damages, by judgment of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679), and to reimburse some of the pre-financing received under a tenth grant agreement, plus default interest, by judgment of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63). 127 Furthermore, in his report of 23 May 2016, the Athens Public Prosecutor took the view that there was no evidence that A, who was directly responsible for the management of the European programmes in which Isotis participated, including those covered by the grant agreements covered by the audit of February 2010, had committed fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union. In those circumstances, the mere assertion that the applicants had played an active role in the management of Isotis, including as regards the management of EU financing, cannot be regarded as an accusation of fraud against them. 128 Second, as regards the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑81/19, the applicants refer to specific passages of the submissions and the supplementary statement which the Commission’s representatives lodged with the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), set out in paragraph 55 above, which, as regards one of the parties, reproduce the allegations already made at first instance regarding the active role played by the applicants in the management of Isotis and, as regards the other party, call into question the reality of Isotis’ activity and, therefore the existence of its legal personality. 129 In that regard, it must be observed that the considerations set out in paragraphs 126 and 127 above concerning the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑721/18 apply, mutatis mutandis, to the conduct alleged against it in Case T‑81/19. 130 Furthermore, irrespective of whether they are well-founded, the allegations made in the written pleadings which the Commission’s representatives lodged with the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), seeking to call into question the reality of Isotis’ activity and, therefore, the existence of its legal personality, do not in themselves imply an accusation of fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union against the applicants. 131 In those circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain whether the fact that the representatives of the Commission maintained, wrongly, that the applicants had played an active role in the management of Isotis and made a number of factual claims seeking to call into question the reality of Isotis’ activity and, therefore, the existence of its legal personality, before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) or before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), constitutes unlawful conduct capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. The unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the Commission 132 It must be recalled, as regards the condition relating to the unlawful conduct alleged against the institution or body concerned referred to in paragraph 107 above, the case-law requires that a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals has been established (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 36). Such a breach is established where it is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU institution (see judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). 133 In the present case, in Case T‑721/18, the applicants submit that the conduct alleged against the Commission before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) constituted a serious and manifest breach of rules intended to confer rights on individuals. Accordingly, the applicants claimed in their application that the Commission had infringed their right to human dignity, enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 2 TEU, the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. They also claimed that that conduct was contrary to the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff of the European Commission in their relations with the public (OJ 2000 L 267, p. 63) and Articles 4, 7 and 11 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. 134 It is important to point out that, in their application, the applicants also submitted that, by having sought to obtain the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016 Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and of the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63) against them, the Commission had breached the principle of legality, which included the principle of pacta sunt servanda, enshrined in Article 216(2) TFEU, the principle of good faith, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, their right to effective judicial protection, as well as their right to be heard and their right to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, the applicants submitted, ‘in the alternative’, that, even if the Commission had been entitled to seek enforcement against them, it had done so in an unfair and illegal manner. 135 Accordingly, in the first place, with regard to the breach of the principle of good faith and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by the Commission’s conduct, the applicants observed, first, that the Commission was obliged, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2321/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 concerning the rules for the participation of undertakings, research centres and universities in, and for the dissemination of research results for, the implementation of the European Community Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006) (OJ 2002 L 355, p. 23), to ascertain whether the bodies with which it intended to conclude a financing contract under the Sixth Framework Programme had legal personality and, secondly, that the conclusion of the financing contracts between the Commission and Isotis had been preceded, in respect of each of those contracts, by the Commission’s acceptance of Isotis’ articles of association, which explicitly excluded the liability of its members beyond their capital contribution in the event of Isotis’ failure to fulfil its contractual obligations. The applicants also stated that the Commission was aware of Article 784 of the Greek Civil Code, which excluded the liability of the partners in a civil company such as Isotis in respect of the civil company’s failure to fulfil contractual obligations, and that until the commencement of enforcement proceedings, the Commission had never brought proceedings against the applicants requiring them to pay the amounts claimed from Isotis, nor had it alluded to doing so at any stage of the proceedings before the General Court, and then before the Court of Justice in the context of the dispute between it and Isotis. 136 The applicants submitted that, in those circumstances, by concluding several financing contracts with Isotis under the Sixth Framework Programme and subsequently participating in their implementation, the Commission had repeatedly and consistently given them the precise and unconditional confirmation, each time, that it recognised Isotis as having legal personality. Consequently, by stating in the written pleadings lodged by its lawyers before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) that Isotis’ legal personality was disputed, that Isotis was not pursuing an economic aim and that, therefore, the conditions for the application of Article 784 of the Greek Civil Code were not met, the Commission breached the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of good faith in the performance of agreements. 137 In the second place, as regards the Commission’s breach of the principle of legality, the applicants submitted that the Commission had commenced enforcement proceedings against them without observing the pre-litigation procedure provided for in Article 80 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 2012 L 362, p. 1). The applicants also submitted that the Commission had breached the principle of legality by attempting to recover a debt for which, in the absence of a debit note having been notified to them, the limitation period had expired in 2016, in accordance with Article 93(1) of Delegated Regulation No 1268/2012 and Article 252 of the Greek Civil Code. 138 In the third place, as regards the infringement of the right to effective judicial protection, the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the applicants stated that, given the exclusive nature of the arbitration clauses contained in the grant agreements which were the subject of the audit of 10 February 2010, they had not had the opportunity to claim before the Court of Justice or the General Court, in the cases which gave rise to the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477) and to the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), or before a national court, that they could not be held personally liable, as partners, for the debts of Isotis. 139 Lastly, in the fourth place, as regards the argument that there was an abuse of rights, the applicants submitted that, in essence, the Commission had benefited from the results of the projects for which it had provided co-financing and which it used for its own purposes, that it had made savings on the co-financing of the ASK-IT and EU4ALL projects, which had never been paid to Isotis, that it had benefited from the applicants’ personal assets in the amount of EUR 200 600, which the applicants had made available for the implementation of the projects, that it knew that more than 85% of the co-financing which it had paid to Isotis had subsequently been repaid in the form of tax to the Greek State, social security contributions and salaries to Isotis employees, and that it had not attempted to limit its claim by withholding from the funds of the consortium responsible for the projects the sums which it considered to be owed to it by Isotis, as it was entitled to do. In those circumstances, the applicants considered that, by asking them to repay all the sums which it had paid to Isotis, together with the corresponding interest, the Commission was seeking to obtain an excessive, unfair and, therefore, unlawful benefit. 140 In Case T‑81/19, the applicants claim that the conduct alleged against the Commission infringed their right to human dignity and the principle of good administration as well as the principles of legality, good faith and protection of legitimate expectations, in terms identical to those used in Case T‑721/18. 141 The applicants also claim that the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑81/19 breached the requirement of truth and equity in proceedings and the fundamental general principle of the fair administration of justice. 142 The applicants submit in that regard that the Commission’s conduct flagrantly breached the requirement of truth and equity which it was obliged to observe during the proceedings against them, in accordance with Articles 116 and 261 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, as well as the fundamental general principle that lawyers acting on behalf of the Commission as its legal representatives, under the Greek code of conduct for lawyers, must contribute to the fair administration of justice by respecting the requirement of truth and equity, applicable to the procedure for objecting to enforcement under Article 299 TFEU. According to the applicants, those principles are set out in the Charter of core principles of the European legal profession, adopted at the plenary session of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) in Brussels (Belgium) on 24 November 2006, which contains principles of law governing the legal profession common to the Member States. 143 The Commission disputes the admissibility of the applicants’ arguments, since they relate to issues which have already been definitively assessed by the Greek court, whose jurisdiction in that regard is derived from Article 299 TFEU. 144 Furthermore, the Commission contends that its conduct during the procedure for objecting to enforcement before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) and before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) is not vitiated by any illegality capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the European Union. 145 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that the applicants’ arguments set out in paragraphs 135 to 139 above do not relate to the allegations made in the written pleadings which the Commission’s representatives lodged with the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens), in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63), or to the testimony of an OLAF official in that procedure, by which the applicants’ reputation was allegedly damaged, but to the very fact that the Commission initiated proceedings against the applicants for the enforcement of those decisions. 146 It is also important to note that, in response to a question from the General Court, the applicants stated at the hearing that their claims for compensation sought only to obtain compensation for the damage caused to them by the allegations contained in the written pleadings lodged by the Commission’s representatives and the testimony of an OLAF official before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens), and then before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, not published, EU:T:2016:63). The applicants stated that they criticised the Commission not for having sought to enforce those decisions against them, but for having knowingly made, for that purpose, false allegations before the Greek courts in order to call into question Isotis’ legal personality. 147 Furthermore, the applicants also stated at the hearing that their claims for damages were not based on the infringement of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and that they considered that their right to a fair trial had been respected by the Greek courts in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and of the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, EU:T:2016:63), and that they were no longer claiming an infringement of their right to a fair trial in the present proceedings. 148 Therefore, it must be held that the applicants’ arguments alleging breach of the principle of good faith, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the principle of legality, the right to a fair hearing, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the right to effective judicial protection and the right to be heard, as well as an abuse of rights, set out in paragraphs 135 to 139 above, must be dismissed as ineffective in that, by the applicants’ own admission, they do not support those claims for damages. 149 In the second place, as regards the alleged breach of the principle of good administration, enshrined in the EU legal order by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the applicants merely assert, in very general terms, that the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑721/18 and in Case T‑81/19 breached the principle of good administration, without in any way substantiating their arguments. It must therefore be held that that line of argument must be rejected as inadmissible, since the mere invocation of the principle of EU law which is alleged to have been infringed, without indicating the matters of fact and of law on which that allegation is based, does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 2018, Deza v Commission, T‑400/17, not published, EU:T:2018:712, paragraph 102). 150 In the third place, as regards the applicants’ argument alleging infringement of the right to human dignity, it should be observed that Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that human dignity is inviolable and must be respected and protected, constitutes a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 May 2017, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, T‑531/14, not published, EU:T:2017:297, paragraphs 75 and 76). It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether such an infringement is, in the present case, capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the European Union. 151 The applicants stated at the hearing that the Commission had offended their dignity by portraying them before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance (single judge), Athens) and before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) as having defrauded the Commission and the European Union. 152 In that regard, it must be observed that, as stated in paragraphs 126 and 127 above, the applicants’ line of argument is based on the incorrect premiss that the Commission portrayed them as persons who had committed fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union. 153 In any event, it should be borne in mind that the ability to assert one’s rights through the courts and the judicial control which that entails constitute the expression of a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and which is also enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (judgments of 15 May 1986, Johnston, 222/84, EU:C:1986:206, paragraphs 17 and 18 and of 17 July 1998, ITT Promedia v Commission, T‑111/96, EU:T:1998:183, paragraph 60), and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (judgment of 4 April 2019, Rodriguez Prieto v Commission, T‑61/18, EU:T:2019:217, paragraph 75). 154 The applicants’ line of argument implies that any assertion by the Commission of fraudulent conduct on their part, in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and of the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, EU:T:2016:63), necessarily entails an infringement of their right to dignity capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union, in so far as the assertion in question has been rejected by the Greek courts. 155 It follows that, if that line of argument were to be accepted, it would be tantamount to restricting the Commission’s right to bring proceedings before the national courts in order to obtain, on the basis of Article 299 TFEU, enforcement of a judgment of the General Court recognising its claim, in accordance with its obligations under Article 317 TFEU to ensure the sound management of EU resources and Article 325 TFEU to combat fraud and any other unlawful activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union. 156 The applicants’ arguments alleging infringement of their right to human dignity must therefore be dismissed. 157 In the fourth place, as regards the argument put forward by the applicants in Case T‑81/19 that the Commission, in the present case, infringed the principle of procedural fairness, the applicants do not allege infringement of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals, which is one of the conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the European Union laid down in the case-law referred to in paragraph 132 above, but infringement of Article 116(1) and Article 261 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure and of the provisions of the Greek code of conduct for lawyers. It should also be noted that, in so far as the principle of procedural fairness may be regarded as a principle common to the laws of several Member States, such a principle has not yet been enshrined in EU law. 158 Moreover, it should be observed that, first, as provided in the second paragraph of Article 299 TFEU, ‘enforcement shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in the territory of which it is carried out’ and, second, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 299 TFEU, the national courts have jurisdiction over complaints that enforcement is being carried out in an irregular manner. 159 It must be observed, in that regard, that the jurisdiction of national courts to review the lawfulness of enforcement measures extends not only to disputes connected with the enforcement of acts of the Council of the European Union, of the Commission or of the ECB, which impose an enforceable pecuniary obligation on persons other than States, but also to disputes connected with the enforcement of judgments of the General Court, in accordance with Article 280 TFEU and Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 160 Consequently, as the Commission rightly argues, it must be held that it was for the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), in the present case, to ensure that the conduct of the Commission’s representatives in the procedure for objecting to the enforcement of the order of 31 May 2016, Isotis v Commission (C‑450/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:477), and of the judgments of 16 July 2014, Isotis v Commission (T‑59/11, EU:T:2014:679) and of 4 February 2016, Isotis v Commission (T‑562/13, EU:T:2016:63) was compliant with the principle of procedural fairness and, in particular, with Article 116(1) and Article 261 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, and with the provisions of the Greek code of conduct for lawyers. 161 That finding cannot be called into question by the argument put forward by the applicants at the hearing that it is for the General Court to assess whether the Commission breached the principle of procedural fairness before the Efeteio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens), since, in the present case, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear actions to establish non-contractual liability of the European Union or its servants. 162 It is true that the General Court has jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 268 TFEU, to hear and determine disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, which provides that ‘in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties’. 163 However, the General Court cannot rule, in an action brought on the basis of Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, on the alleged infringement by the Commission of a rule of national procedural law, in the context of a dispute concerning the enforcement of a judgment of the General Court before a national court, without undermining the prerogatives expressly reserved to the latter by Article 299 TFEU and, therefore, the division of powers between the EU judicature and the national courts established by the TFEU. 164 It follows that the applicants’ argument that the conduct alleged against the Commission in the present case is unlawful in that it breached the principle of procedural fairness must be dismissed as unfounded. 165 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the applicants have not succeeded in demonstrating that the conduct alleged against the Commission in Case T‑721/18 and Case T‑81/19 constituted a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 132 above. 166 In those circumstances, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 108 above, the first head of claim for compensation and the second head of claim for compensation submitted by the applicants in both Cases T‑721/18 and T‑81/19 must be dismissed, without it being necessary to examine the other conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the European Union. 167 It follows that the actions must be dismissed as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. Costs 168 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber), hereby: 1. Dismisses the actions; 2. Orders Ms Zoï Apostolopoulou and Ms Anastasia Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki to pay the costs. Costeira Kancheva Perišin Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 December 2021. [Signatures] * Language of the case: Greek.