Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2022:774
Date: 2022-10-13
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Second Chamber
Subject matter: Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Social Policy
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary C-344/20 – 1 
Case C-344/20 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice  
Date lodged:  
27 July 2020 
Referring court:  
Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
17 July 2020 
Applicant:  
L.F. 
Defendant: 
S.C.R.L. 
__________________________________________________ 
IN THE CASE OF: 
Ms L. F. (ʻthe applicantʼ), 
V 
The S.C.R.L. … (ʻthe defendantʼ), 
1. Application 
The application seeks inter alia a declaration that the defendant infringed the anti-
discrimination rules by failing to conclude an internship agreement on the basis, 
either directly or indirectly, of religious belief and gender/sex.  
2. Facts 
1 The defendant is a property 
management company. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
2  
2 The applicant is a Muslim and 
wears the Islamic headscarf. 
3 On 14 March 2018, the applicant 
submitted an application to the defendant for an internship.  
4 At an interview on 22 March 2018, the defendant addressed the 
issue of the wearing of a headscarf in light of the policy of neutrality promoted 
within the company and reflected in Article 46 of the terms of employment, 
worded as follows:  
ʻWorkers undertake to respect the company's strict policy of neutrality.  
They will therefore make sure not to manifest in any way, either by word or 
through clothing or any other way, their religious philosophical or political 
beliefs, whatever those beliefs may be.ʼ 
5 During that meeting, 
representatives of the defendant: 
– ʻ… mentioned and explained the requirement of neutrality within the 
company, citing in particular the example of two employees …. removing 
their veils on entering the premisesʼ; 
– told the applicant that, as an administrative intern, she would regularly have 
to greet project developers, consultancy firms, contractors and couriers; 
– expressing their positive opinion of her application, asked her if she could 
agree to comply with that general rule, but the applicant refused.  
6 The 
applicant confirms that on that occasion she indicated that she would refuse to 
remove her headscarf. No further action was taken on her application.  
7 On 
24 April 2018, the applicant renewed her application for an internship with the 
defendant proposing that she wear another type of head-covering.  
8 On 
25 April 2018, the defendant informed her that that would not be possible, 
because no head-covering is permitted in the offices, whether it be a cap, a hat or a 
headscarf. 
9 On 
9 May 2019, the applicant brought the present action. 
L.F. 
 
3 
3.  Substance 
10 A
ccording to its Article 1 *, the Law of 10 May 2007 to combat certain forms of 
discrimination 1 (ʻthe General Anti-discrimination Lawʼ) transposes into Belgian 
law Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, p. 16). 
Its objective is to create, in the areas it covers, a general framework for combating 
discrimination on grounds of protected criteria, including religious or 
philosophical beliefs. It applies to all persons, particularly with regard to 
ʻemployment relationshipsʼ. The employment relationship is accorded a broad 
meaning which includes more than just the employment agreement and also 
encompasses relationships which are formed as part of unpaid work, work carried 
out under internship, apprenticeship and work experience agreements.  
11 T
he applicant's application for an internship with the defendant constitutes an 
employment relationship within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the General Anti-
discrimination Law.  
12 T
he following considerations will be set within the legal context of the General 
Anti-discrimination Law, as well as Directive 2000/78 which it transposes and the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Particular attention will 
also be paid to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, as regards 
more specifically the protected criterion of religion at the heart of this dispute, 
since the European legislature itself was guided, in that regard, by the European 
Convention of Human Rights and by the Charter fundamental Rights. 2 
3.1. Legal framework 
13 T
he General Anti-discrimination Law prohibits all forms of discrimination, direct 
or indirect, in the areas which fall within its scope. Direct and indirect 
discriminations are themselves linked to direct or indirect distinctions. 
14 A
rticle 4(4) of the General Anti-discrimination Law establishes the list of protected 
criteria, namely: ʻage, sexual orientation, marital status, birth, financial situation, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, political opinions, trade union activities, 
      
* [NdT: Article 2] 
1 http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/loi/2007/05/10/2007002099/justel  
2 See judgment of 14 March 2017, G4S Secure Solutions (C-157/15, EU:C:2017:203, 
paragraph 28), and judgment of 14 March 2017, Bougnaoui and ADDH (C-188/15, 
paragraph 30). 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
4  
language, current or future state of health, disability, physical or genetic 
characteristics, social originʼ. This list is longer than that contained in Article 1 of 
Directive 2000/78. 
15 T
he concept of religion is not defined by Directive 2000/78. In the judgment of 
14 March 2017, G4S Secure Solutions (C-157/15, EU:C:2017:203) (ʻthe judgment 
in Achbitaʼ), the Court specifies the meaning which is to be given to it:  
ʻ26 Nevertheless, the EU legislature referred, in recital 1 of Directive 
2000/78, to fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 (ʻthe ECHRʼ), which provides, in Article 9, that 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, a 
right which includes, in particular, freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
27 In the same recital, the EU legislature also referred to the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of EU law. 
Among the rights resulting from those common traditions, which have been 
reaffirmed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(ʻthe Charterʼ), is the right to freedom of conscience and religion enshrined 
in Article 10(1) of the Charter. In accordance with that provision, that right 
includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. As is apparent from 
the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007, C 
303, p. 17), the right guaranteed in Article 10(1) of the Charter corresponds 
to the right guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance with 
Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope.  
28 In so far as the ECHR and, subsequently, the Charter use the term 
ʻreligionʼ in a broad sense, in that they include in it the freedom of persons 
to manifest their religion, the EU legislature must be considered to have 
intended to take the same approach when adopting Directive 2000/78, and 
therefore the concept of ʻreligionʼ in Article 1 of that directive should be 
interpreted as covering both the forum internum, that is the fact of having a 
belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of religious faith in 
public.ʼ 
16 A
ccording to Article 4(7) of the General Anti-discrimination Law, direct 
discrimination means ʻdirect distinction, based on one of the protected criteria, 
which cannot be justified on the basis of the provisions of Title IIʼ, which is 
entitled ʻJustification for distinctionsʼ and comprises Articles 7 to 13.  
L.F. 
 
5 
17 D
irect distinction is defined by Article 4(6) of that law, as being ʻthe situation 
which arises when, on the basis of one of the protected criteria, a person is 
treated less favourably than another person either is or has been or would be 
treated in a comparable situationʼ. 3 
18 A
rticle 7 of the General Anti-discrimination Law provides that ʻAny direct 
distinction based on one of the protected criteria constitutes direct discrimination, 
unless that direct distinction is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessaryʼ. 
19 H
owever, Article 8(1) of that law provides that a direct distinction based on 
religious belief can be justified only by ʻgenuine and determining occupational 
requirementsʼ. 
20 I
n general, for there to be direct distinction and therefore direct discrimination, the 
following three elements must be present:  
– a difference in treatment (less favourable treatment);  
– persons in a comparable situation;  
– a causal link between the treatment in question and the protected criterion 
(in the present case religious beliefs).  
21 T
he situations being weighed up only need to be comparable. They do not have to 
be identical. Also, the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in 
a global and abstract manner but in a specific and concrete manner. 4 
3.2. Positions of the parties 
22 I
n her pleadings, under the heading ʻExistence of direct discriminationʼ and 
referring to Articles 4(6) and 8 of the General Anti-discrimination law, the 
applicant maintains, apparently as the principal argument, that a ʻdistinction based 
on the fact that a woman wears a headscarf constitutes a distinction based on 
religious beliefs and genderʼ. In her view and ʻin the light of the statement of 
factsʼ, the refusal to hire an intern wearing a headscarf ʻcannot be justified by a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement and has no objective and 
      
3 Emphasis added by the [referring court]. 
4 Judgment of 12 December 2013, Hay (C-267/12, EU:C:2013:823, paragraph 33 and the case-
law cited). 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
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reasonable justification since it cannot be considered, whatever the defendant 
claims, that simply by wearing the veil the applicant would not respect the 
principle of neutralityʼ.  
23 F
or its part, the defendant distinguishes between: 
– Discrimination on the basis of gender: 
For the defendant, there is nothing to indicate the existence of discrimination 
on the basis of sex. 
– Discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs:  
It refers principally to the judgment in Achbita to maintain that the 
prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf, which stems from an internal 
rule of private company prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, 
philosophical or religious symbol in the workplace, does not constitute 
direct discrimination based on religion or belief.  
3.3. Assessment 
3.3.1. Direct discrimination based on gender  
24 T
he applicant does not establish facts from which it may be inferred that there has 
been direct discrimination based on gender.  
3.3.2. Direct discrimination based on religious belief  
25 T
he fact that the applicant's application for an internship with the defendant was not 
considered was due entirely to the refusal of the former, who is a Muslim, to 
remove her headscarf in order to comply with the latter's terms of employment. 
The defendant's response to the applicant's renewed application leaves no doubt in 
that regard, since it rejects the proposal that she confine herself to wearing another 
type of head covering, on the ground that no head covering is permitted in the 
office.  
26 A
 prohibition on wearing religious symbols constitutes an interference in the 
exercise of the right to manifest her religious beliefs protected by Article 9 
ECHR. 5 
      
5 See to that effect ECtHR, 15 January 2013, Eweida and Others v Union Kingdom 
(CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010, § 94) (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre ?i= 001-116097); see 
L.F. 
 
7 
27 T
he defendant's terms of employment therefore undoubtedly have the effect of 
restricting the right of workers to manifest their religious beliefs, in particular 
through clothing. 
28 T
hat means that the rule at issue clearly creates a disadvantage for a worker who 
wishes to exercise his or her right to manifest his or her religion through clothing. 
It should also be stated that that treatment is less favourable to that worker than 
another worker or workers in a comparable situation.  
29 D
irect discrimination has a priori greater visibility, owing to the fact that it is 
directly connected to the protected criterion. Thus, in Maruko, the Advocate 
General considered that there was no direct discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 2 of Directive 2000/78 in a situation in which the homosexual complainant 
had been refused a survivor's pension on the grounds that he was not married to 
his partner and was therefore not a ʻwidowerʼ, since the refusal was not based on 
the protected criterion, namely sexual orientation. 6 That is also what led to the 
Court to consider, in the light of the fact that a legal provision which had been 
criticised, relating to absences because of illness, applied in the same way to 
disabled and non-disabled persons who had been absent for more than 120 days 
on those grounds, that that provision ʻdoes not contain direct discrimination on 
grounds of disability, in so far as it uses a criterion that is not inseparably linked 
to disabilityʼ. 7 
30 I
n the judgment in Achbita, the Court concluded that no direct discrimination was 
generated by an internal rule of the company which ʻrefers to the wearing of 
visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs and therefore covers 
any manifestation of such beliefs without distinctionʼ since such a rule ʻmust, 
therefore, be regarded as treating all workers of the undertaking in the same way 
by requiring them, in a general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress 
neutrally, which precludes the wearing of such signsʼ (paragraph 30). 
31 H
owever, the Court's case-law is not a rigid collection of established and immutable 
principles. The interpretation given by the Court of Justice regarding the question 
referred for a preliminary ruling binds the national court but leaves it free to assess 
      
also, with regard to education, ECtHR, 10 November 2005, Leyla Şahin v Turkey 
(CE:ECHR:2005:1110JUD004477498, § 78) (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre ?i= 001-70954) . 
6 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Maruko (C-267/06, EU:C:2007:486, 
point 96). 
7 Judgment of 11 April 2013, HK Danmark (C-335/11 and C-337/11, EU:C:2013:222, 
paragraph 74). 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
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whether it is sufficiently enlightened by the preliminary ruling or whether it is 
necessary for it to make a further reference to the Court. 8 In a different case, the 
court may choose to ask the Court again about a question which has already been 
addressed, if it considers that the reply given lacks clarity or that the interpretation 
provided relates to a specific factual situation, or if controversy remains and 
certain arguments do not seem to have been taken into consideration. 
32 S
ome academic lawyers 9 consider that the Court's conclusions in the judgment in 
Achbita are incorrect . 
33 T
he existence of direct discrimination, within the meaning of Directive 2000/78, 
ʻpresupposes, first, that the situations being weighed up are comparableʼ 10 and 
ʻthe assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a global and 
abstract manner, but in the specific and concrete mannerʼ. 11 The ʻappreciation of 
the facts from which it may be inferred that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination is a matter for national judicial or other competent bodies, in 
accordance with the rules of national law or practiceʼ.12 It is therefore for the 
referring court ʻto take account of all the circumstances surrounding the practice 
at issue, in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for a finding 
that the facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct 
discrimination … have been establishedʼ. 13 In particular, the assessment of 
comparability falls within the jurisdiction of the national court. 14 It is therefore 
important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the interpretive power of the 
Court and, on the other hand, the application of the law to the facts of the case 
which falls within the jurisdiction of the national court.  
      
8 Judgment of 24 June 1969, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor (29/68, EU:C:1969:27, paragraph 3). 
9 BUSSCHAERT, G. and DE SOMER, S., ʻPort des signes convictionnels au travail: la Cour de 
justice lève le voile ? À propos de l’arrêt Achbita n°C 157/15 du 14 mars 2017ʼ, J.T.T., 2017, 
p. 279(https://www.stradalex.com/fr/sl_rev_utu/search/jtt_2017-fr 
?docEtiq=jtt2017_18p277&page= 5); WATTIER, S., ʻL’impact du fait religieux sur le droit 
social et économique de l’Union européenneʼ, J.D.E., 2020, p. 97 
(https://www.stradalex.com/fr/sl_rev_utu/search/jtde_2020-fr 
?docEtiq=jtde2020_3p94&page= 4); BRIBOSIA, E. and RORIVE, I., ʻAffaires Achbita et 
Bougnaoui:entre neutralité et préjugésʼ, R.T.D.H., no 112, 2017, p. 1027 
(https://www.stradalex.com/fr/sl_rev_utu/search/rtdh_2017-fr ?docEtiq=rtdh2017_112p1017) . 
10 Judgment of 10 May 2011, Römer (C-147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 41). 
11 Ibidem, paragraph 42. 
12 Directive 2000/78, recital 15. 
13 Judgment of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria (C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480, 
paragraph 80). 
14 Judgment of 10 May 2011, Römer (C-147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 52). 
L.F. 
 
9 
34 T
he above should clarify the reading of the judgment in Achbita, since it seems 
apparent that the Court relies on the finding that there had been a ʻgeneral and 
undifferentiatedʼ application of the internal rule prohibiting the wearing of visible 
signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace, but does not 
exclude the possibility that, on the basis of material in the file which it has not 
received, that rule may have been applied to the person concerned differently from 
the way in which it was applied to any other worker. 15 
35 However, 
that qualification in the grounds of the judgment does not appear to be reflected in 
its operative part: ʻArticle 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 
27 November 2000 …, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on 
wearing an Islamic headscarf, which arises from an internal rule of a private 
undertaking prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or 
religious sign in the workplace, does not constitute direct discrimination based on 
religion or belief within the meaning of that directiveʼ. 
36 Does the 
national court still have any discretion or is it deprived of any opportunity to 
assess comparability in this case? More particularly, in the face of an internal rule 
such as that which is at issue in the present case, can the national court still 
conclude that there has been direct discrimination?  
37 In an order 
delivered in a similar case, 16 the referring court has already held that it ʻcannot 
seriously be disputed that A's terms of employment, which specifically prohibit the 
wearing of any sign of religious belief, results in ʻʻless favourable or 
disadvantageous treatmentʼʼ for adherents of a religion which, according to them, 
prescribes the wearing of a particular sign or for whom the wearing of a given 
sign is of greater importance and who intend to exercise their freedom of religion, 
as opposed to the other members of A's staffʼ. 
38 As regards the 
prohibition laid down by the defendant's terms of employment, the same 
observation may be made from different points of view: 
– the applicant who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by wearing a 
visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is treated less 
favourably than another worker who adheres to no religion, has no 
      
15 Judgment in Achbita, paragraphs 30 and 31. 
16 26 November 2015, R.G. 13/7828/A, paragraph 81, extracts and note in A.P.T., 2016, p.491 
(https://www.stradalex.com/en/sl_rev_utu/search/apt_2016-fr ?docEtiq=apt2016_4p491 ) 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
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philosophical beliefs and no political allegiance and who, therefore, 
harbours no need to wear any political, philosophical or religious sign; 17  
– the applicant who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by wearing a 
visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is treated less 
favourably than another worker who holds any philosophical or political 
beliefs but whose need to display them publicly by wearing a sign (with 
connotations) is less, or even non-existent;  
 – the applicant who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by wearing a 
visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is treated less 
favourably than another worker who adheres to another or the same religion, 
but whose need to display it publicly by wearing a sign (with connotations) 
is less, or even non-existent;  
– given that beliefs are not necessarily religious, philosophical or political and 
that they may be of another kind (artistic, aesthetic, sporting, musical, etc.), 
18 the applicant who wishes to exercise her freedom of religion by wearing a 
visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is treated less 
favourably than another worker who holds beliefs other than religious 
philosophical or political beliefs, and who manifests them through clothing; 
– assuming that the negative aspect of the freedom to manifest religious 
beliefs also means that a person cannot be required to reveal his religious 
affiliation or beliefs, 19 the applicant who intends to exercise her freedom of 
religion by wearing a headscarf which is not in itself an unambiguous 
symbol of that religion, since another woman might choose to wear it for 
aesthetic, cultural or even health reasons and it is not necessarily 
distinguishable from a simple bandana, is treated less favourably than 
another worker who manifests his religious, philosophical or political beliefs 
by word, since for the worker wearing the headscarf that implies an even 
more fundamental infringement of freedom of religion, on the basis of 
Article 9 .1 of the ECHR since, unless prejudice is prevalent, the religious 
significance of a headscarf is not manifest and, more often than not, can only 
be brought to light if the person who is wearing it is required, if only 
implicitly, to reveal her reasons to her employer, which has indeed been the 
situation in this case; 20  
      
17 See also the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bougnaoui and ADDH (C-188/15, 
EU:C:2016:553, point 88) 
18 Ibidem, point 110. 
19 See Guide on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, updated on 31 December 
2019, p. 23, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf  
20 See above paragraph 2, chronology of the facts. 
L.F. 
 
11 
– the applicant who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by wearing a 
visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is treated less 
favourably than another worker with the same beliefs who chooses to 
manifest them by wearing a beard, which is not specifically prohibited by 
the terms of employment, unlike manifestation through clothing. 
39 In the judgment against 
which an appeal in cassation was brought before the referring court in Achbita, the 
Higher Labour Court, Antwerp had considered that there was nothing in the file to 
indicate that the employer company ʻhad taken a more conciliatory approach 
towards any other employee in a comparable situation, in particular as regards 
the worker with different religious or philosophical beliefs who consistently 
refused to comply with the banʼ. This approach to the issue of comparability is 
flawed in that it seeks the person of reference only among workers who come 
under the same protected criterion and, even worse, among workers who come 
under the same artificially enlarged protected criterion. That amounts to saying, 
absurdly, that a company rule which prohibits the recruiting of any ʻblackʼ worker 
creates no difference in treatment and does not constitute direct discrimination, on 
the grounds that any ʻblackʼ worker who seeks employment with the employer 
concerned would have his application rejected.  
40 That reasoning renders the anti-
discrimination rule meaningless, since it will be enough to find that all persons 
covered by the same protected criterion are subject to the same regime under the 
measure at issue to conclude that there is no unfavourable treatment or any 
disadvantage and, consequently, to rule out the existence of any discrimination. 
That reasoning also conceals the fact that two workers sharing the same religion 
do not necessarily feel the same need to express their beliefs through clothing and 
that those differences are sources of disadvantages for the worker who attaches 
great importance to wearing a religious symbol. In that regard, it should be 
pointed out that the right to freedom of religion denotes views that attain a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance and that, provided this is 
satisfied, ʻthe State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any 
power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way in 
which those beliefs are expressed 21 and that ʻthere is no requirement on [the 
person concerned] to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty 
mandated by the religion in questionʼ. 22 
41 The judgment in Achbita seems to follow the same 
simplistic reasoning, which contains an apparent discrepancy. The Court 
precludes the existence of direct discrimination on the grounds that it does not 
consider that the internal rule at issue ʻwas applied differently [to Ms Achbita] as 
      
21 ECtHR, 15 January 2013, Eweida and Others v United Kingdom 
(CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010, § 81) (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre ?i= 001-116097). 
22 Ibidem, § 82. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
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compared to any other workerʼ, but it nevertheless opens the door to an 
examination of the case from the point of view of indirect discrimination which 
might stem from the finding that the internal rule, which appears to be neutral, 
ʻresults, in fact, in persons adhering to a particular religion or belief being put at 
a particular disadvantageʼ. 23 Now, if the internal rule does not create any 
disadvantage for the worker covered by the protected criterion from the point of 
view of direct discrimination, how can there be indirect discrimination, since there 
is a basic assumption that there is no disadvantage?  
42 Moreover, in order to assess the existence of direct discrimination, the Court 
appears to merge religious beliefs, philosophical beliefs and political beliefs into a 
single protected criterion. Does that mean that those criteria are not to be 
distinguished from each other, although Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 
nevertheless seems to make a distinction by indicating ʻreligion or beliefʼ, in the 
same way as Article 4(4) of the General Anti-discrimination Law refers to 
ʻreligious or philosophical beliefs, political beliefsʼ? That is to say, is Article 1 of 
Directive 2000/78 to be interpreted as meaning that religion and belief are two 
facets of the same protected criterion or, on the contrary, that religion and belief 
form two distinct criteria, on the one hand, that of religion, including the 
associated beliefs and, on the other hand, that of belief, whatever that belief may 
be?  
43 The reply to this question is crucial, because if religion is classed in the same 
category as beliefs other than religious beliefs, that limits the scope for seeking the 
reference person. That would lower the level of protection given to the persons 
concerned. Where there is a rule such as the rule at issue, a worker who holds 
religious beliefs cannot be compared with a worker who holds philosophical 
beliefs or political convictions.  
44 Finally, if it were necessary to consider that religion and belief are two facets of a 
single protected criterion within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2000/78, it 
would have to be noted that that is not the interpretation given in national law by 
Article 4(4) of the General Anti-discrimination law, which clearly refers to 
ʻreligious or philosophical beliefs, political beliefsʼ. In view of the fact that the 
protection afforded separately for religious, philosophical and political beliefs is 
likely to strengthen the degree of that protection by highlighting their specific 
features and making them more visible, should the national court not be 
authorised to continue to promote that diversity when applying the law to the 
facts? 
45 Directive 2000/78 lays down ʻminimum requirementsʼ leaving Member States free 
to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions and its implementation 
ʻshould not serve to justify any regression in relation to the situation which 
already prevails in each Member Stateʼ (recital 28). This is reflected in Article 8 
of that directive which provides:  
      
23 Judgment in Achbita, paragraphs 31 and 34. 
L.F. 
 
13 
ʻ1 Member States may introduce or maintain provisions which are more 
favourable to the protection of the principle of equal treatment than those 
laid down in this Directive.  
2 The implementation of this Directive shall under no circumstances 
constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of protection against 
discrimination already afforded by Member States in the fields covered by 
this Directive.ʼ 
46 In the light of the foregoing considerations and in order better to define the 
concept of direct discrimination which is at the heart of this dispute, it is necessary 
to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling  
4.  Questions referred for a preliminary ruling  
1) Must Article 1 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation be interpreted as meaning that religion and belief are two facets 
of the same protected criterion or, on the contrary, as meaning that religion 
and belief form different criteria, on the one hand, that of religion, including 
the associated beliefs and, on the other, that of belief, whatever that belief 
may be?  
2) If Article 1 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation education is to be interpreted as meaning that religion and belief 
are two facets of the same protected criterion, would that prevent the 
national court, pursuant to Article 8 of that directive and in order to prevent 
a lowering of the level of protection against discrimination, from continuing 
to interpret a rule of national law such as Article 4(4) of the Law of 10 May 
2007 to combat certain forms of discrimination, as meaning that religious, 
philosophical and political beliefs are separate protected criteria?  
3) Can Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/C of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation be interpreted as meaning that the rule contained in a company's 
terms of employment prohibiting workers from ʻmanifest[ing] in any way, 
either by word or through clothing or any other way, their religious, 
philosophical or political beliefs, whatever those beliefs may beʼ constitutes 
direct discrimination, if the practical application of that internal rule shows 
that: 
a) a female worker who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by 
wearing a visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is 
treated less favourably than another worker who adheres to no religion, 
has no philosophical beliefs and no political allegiance and who, 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-344/20 
 
14  
therefore, harbours no need to wear any political, philosophical or 
religious sign? 
b) a female worker who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by 
wearing a visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is 
treated less favourably than another worker who hold any 
philosophical or political beliefs but whose need to display them 
publicly by wearing a sign (with connotations) is less, or even non-
existent? 
c) a female worker who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by 
wearing a visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is 
treated less favourably than another worker who adheres to another or 
the same religion, but whose need to display it publicly by wearing a 
sign (with connotations), is less, or even non-existent? 
d) given that beliefs are not necessarily religious, philosophical or 
political and that they may be of another kind (artistic, aesthetic, 
sporting, musical, etc.), a female worker who intends to exercise her 
freedom of religion by wearing a visible sign (with connotations), in 
this case a headscarf, is treated less favourably than another worker 
who holds beliefs other than religious philosophical or political beliefs, 
and who manifests them through clothing? 
e) assuming that the negative aspect of the freedom to manifest religious 
beliefs also means that a person cannot be required to reveal his 
religious affiliation or beliefs, a female worker who intends to exercise 
her freedom of religion by wearing a headscarf which is not in itself an 
unambiguous symbol of that religion, since another woman might 
choose to wear it for aesthetic, cultural or even health reasons and it is 
not necessarily distinguishable from a simple bandana, is treated less 
favourably than another worker who manifests his religious, 
philosophical or political beliefs verbally, since for the female worker 
wearing the headscarf that implies an even more fundamental 
infringement of freedom of religion, on the basis of Article 9.1 of the 
ECHR since, unless prejudice is prevalent, the religious significance of 
a headscarf is not manifest and, more often than not, can only be 
brought to light if the person who is wearing it is required, if only 
implicitly, to reveal her reasons to her employer? 
f) a female worker who intends to exercise her freedom of religion by 
wearing a visible sign (with connotations), in this case a headscarf, is 
treated less favourably than another worker with the same beliefs who 
chooses to manifest them by wearing a beard (which is not specifically 
prohibited by the terms of employment, unlike manifestation through 
clothing)?