Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:T:2026:347
Date: 2026-05-13
Language of the case: Polish

summary of the facts giving rise to the dispute, (6) two interpretations of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 appear possible. 28. In order to give the General Court the best possible guidance on the interpretation of that provision to be given, I shall begin, as a first step, with a number of preliminary remarks, which will allow the scope of the question to be defined (A). As a second step, I shall address the option of analysing each transaction separately from the series of transactions at issue in the main proceedings (B) before considering, as a third step, the possibility of examining the transactions forming that series of transactions together (C). That will enable me, in the fourth and final step, to provide an answer to the General Court as to the interpretation of the scope of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 which it should, in my view, adopt (D). A. Preliminary remarks 29. In order to gain a better understanding of the two possible options for interpreting the scope of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 available to the General Court, I consider it necessary to provide some clarification on the factual context (1), the case-law (2), and the concept of ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ in that provision (3). 1. Factual context 30. In the light of the questions which the Commission was able to raise in its written observations and which the judges of the General Court and I myself were able to raise at the hearing, it seems to me important to clarify the following factual elements. 31. In wishing to make a gift of 50% of her undertaking to each of her daughters, A.K. and P.K., it is the shares in her undertaking, that is to say, her assets, that D.B. will pass on to them. 32. Consequently, as the tax authority stated, by receiving by transfer a 50% share of D.B.’s undertaking, A.K. and P.K. obtain a fraction of the right of ownership over each asset held by their mother. 33. It is therefore necessary to classify the transfer of the shares of D.B.’s undertaking to A.K. and P.K. as a transaction whereby a taxable person transfers, without consideration, the assets of her business to non-taxable persons. The transfer of A.K. and P.K.’s shares to their partnership is a transaction whereby two non-taxable persons make a contribution in kind to a company. 34. The transactions in question being thus defined, it is possible to respond to the doubts expressed by the Commission regarding whether or not the question referred is hypothetical. Its doubts arise from the fact that the referring court has not indicated on what legal basis the transfer of the assets of D.B.’s undertaking to A.K. and P.K., in the amount of 50% each without consideration, could, in principle, be subject to VAT. In my view, such a transfer could be subject to VAT under Article 7(2)(1) of the Law on VAT, which transposes the first paragraph of Article 16 of Directive 2006/112. That, however, is a matter for the national court to determine. (7) 35. In any event, I would point out that, according to settled case-law, in the factual and legislative context which the national court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court of Justice to determine, the questions submitted by the national court enjoy a presumption of relevance. (8) 36. It is clear from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court considers that the transfer of the shares of D.B.’s undertaking to her daughters will be subject to VAT if it does not fall within the scope of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112. 2. Case-law 37. It should be borne in mind that the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is drafted in identical terms to Article 5(8) of Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC (9) and must be interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to the latter provision. (10) 38. As regards the existing case-law relating to the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, it provides, in my view, a reasonably comprehensive interpretation of the scope of that provision. I would like to recall the following lessons for the purposes of the present Opinion. 39. In the first place, it seems to me to follow from the case-law of the Court of Justice that two cumulative conditions must be satisfied in order for the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 to apply: first, the transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof must enable an independent economic activity to be carried on and, second, the transferee must intend to carry on such an activity. (11) 40. As regards the first condition, the concept of ‘a transfer … of a totality of assets or part thereof’ must be interpreted as meaning that it covers the transfer of a business or an independent part of an undertaking including tangible elements and, as the case may be, intangible elements which, together, constitute an undertaking or a part of an undertaking capable of carrying on an independent economic activity, but that it does not cover the simple transfer of assets, such as the sale of a stock of products. (12) 41. Moreover, in order for there to be a transfer of a business or an independent part of an undertaking, all of the elements transferred must, together, be sufficient to allow an independent economic activity to be carried on. (13) 42. As regards the second condition, the transferee must have intended to operate the business or the part of the undertaking transferred and not simply to immediately liquidate the activity concerned and sell the stock, if any. (14) 43. In the second place, it should be noted that the wording of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 uses the term ‘transferor’ in the singular, which implies that it is not envisaged that that provision will apply where a number of transferors are selling their shares to the same transferee. (15) 44. In the third place, the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 provides that ‘the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor’. It is apparent from the clear wording of that provision that the treatment to which it refers is a consequence of the fact that no supply is deemed to have taken place. (16) 45. That interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is supported by the objective of that provision, which is to enable the Member States to facilitate transfers of undertakings or of parts of undertakings by making such transfers simpler and by preventing the resources of the recipient from being overburdened by a disproportionate charge to tax which, in any event, would ultimately be recovered through deduction of the input VAT paid. (17) 3. Concept of ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ 46. Since, in the present case, D.B.’s undertaking is transferred to several persons, it is necessary to consider the concept of ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ in the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 and whether, under that provision, a totality of assets may be transferred to several such persons. 47. That question involves understanding the scope of the phrase ‘the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor’. 48. In that regard, I would point out that, according to settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. (18) 49. It seems to me to be clearly evident from the case-law that the person to whom the goods are transferred designates the person to whom a totality of assets or part thereof, enabling an independent economic activity to be carried on, is transferred, and who intends to carry on such an activity. Since a transfer of a totality of assets may be in part, a totality of assets may be the subject of several separate transfers (all in part, in such a case), which, in turn, implies the existence of several beneficiaries. 50. That said, since, in the phrase ‘the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor’, the term ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ is used in the singular, (19) it must be understood, in my view, that the transfer of a totality of assets, whether whole or in part, may, in any event, be made only to a single beneficiary. 51. That literal interpretation seems to me not only to be consistent with the case-law referred to in point 43 of this Opinion concerning the term ‘transferor’ in that phrase, but also supported by a contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112. 52. As regards the context in which Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 was adopted, I would note, like Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Abbey National, (20) that there is little information, whether in the preamble to the Sixth Directive or Directive 2006/112 or in the Commission’s proposals for directives, (21) to clarify the choice made by the legislature as to the wording used in both the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 and Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive. 53. However, it should be noted that the predecessor to Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive, which was a note relating to Article 5(1) in Annex A to Directive 67/228/EEC, (22) already stated that ‘in case of contribution to a company of the whole or part of the contributor’s assets, Member States may regard the benefiting company as the successor in title of the contributor’. 54. In other words, from the outset, the provisions of EU law referred to a single person to whom the goods are transferred and a single transferor. 55. A teleological interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 confirms that that is a deliberate choice on the part of the legislature. As recalled in point 44 of the present Opinion, that provision seeks, by providing that ‘the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor’, to ensure that the transferor’s rights and obligations in relation to VAT are assumed by the person to whom the goods are transferred. The person to whom the goods are transferred will therefore be required, where appropriate, to adjust the tax deducted by the transferor, as if the transferor had continued to use the assets. (23) 56. The first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is therefore based on the principle that the proper functioning of the common system of VAT will not be compromised by the mere change of ownership of an undertaking (or part of an undertaking); as if there is ultimately only ever one and the same taxable person. (24) 57. That is why, in my view, the term ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ is, like the term ‘transferor’, in the singular. 58. It follows from the foregoing that, in my view, a transfer of a totality of assets, whether in whole or in part, may be made only to a single recipient. B. Option of a separate analysis of the transactions at issue 59. A separate analysis of the transactions at issue is justified by the principle that, for VAT purposes, each transaction must normally be regarded as distinct and independent, as follows from the second subparagraph of Article 1(2) of Directive 2006/112, (25) and also by the fact that the application of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 presupposes that a totality of assets is transferred between a transferor and a person to whom the goods are transferred. (26) 60. Since A.K. and P.K. are two distinct natural persons, they do not share the same assets. Thus, in the present case, there are four transactions: the first, between D.B. and A.K.; the second, between D.B. And P.K.; the third, between A.K. and A.K. and P.K.’s partnership, and the fourth, between P.K. and that partnership. 61. From that perspective, it is necessary to determine whether the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is applicable both to the transaction between D.B. and A.K. and to that between D.B. and P.K. (27) 62. In the light of the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, (28) the first question which arises is whether, individually, A.K. and P.K. are in a position to carry on an independent economic activity by each holding half the shares in their mother’s undertaking. 63. In my view, the answer to that question should be in the negative. 64. It is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the distribution between D.B.’s two daughters consists in giving each of them a 50% share of the undertaking and not of allocating among them, specifically, the assets of that undertaking, with the result that they could, ‘each on their own’, have carried on an independent economic activity. 65. The fact that they will hold 100% of D.B.’s undertaking between them and therefore between them hold the totality of assets enabling them to carry on an independent economic activity is not capable of calling that conclusion into question, since they do not have common assets, with the result that each transaction, as defined in point 60 of the present Opinion, must be analysed separately. It is therefore in relation to each daughter that the condition that it must be possible to carry on an independent economic activity must be examined. 66. Since one of the two conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is not satisfied, it must be concluded that that provision is not applicable, without it even being necessary to consider the intention of the transferees, since the conditions set out in point 39 of the present Opinion are cumulative. 67. That said, it is also reasonable to question whether, in the present case, the second condition of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, namely A.K. and P.K.’s intention to carry on the economic activity of D.B.’s undertaking, is satisfied. It is true that their intention is to carry on the economic activity of their mother together, but such an activity will take place through their partnership. That presupposes, therefore, that they contribute their shares to their partnership. In other words, their intention is, as regards the shares which they will receive, to relinquish them to the benefit of their partnership. Moreover (and perhaps most importantly), they have no intention of becoming liable to VAT themselves and thus of themselves being D.B.’s successor. Thus, neither of them will take over any of D.B.’s rights or obligations in relation to VAT. In the light of the case-law referred to in point 42 of the present Opinion, it must therefore be concluded that the second condition laid down in the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 is not satisfied either. 68. In any event, even if one were to regard the transfer of D.B.’s undertaking to her two daughters as a single transaction, on the basis that, between them, they are able to carry on the economic activity of that undertaking and intend to do so, the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 would still be inapplicable, since, as I have established in point 58 of the present Opinion, a transfer of a totality of assets may take place only in respect of one beneficiary. 69. Consequently, the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as excluding from its scope the transfer by a taxable person of a totality of assets in equal shares to two non-taxable persons. C. Option of a joint analysis of the transactions at issue 70. While a separate analysis of the transactions at issue appears consistent with the principle referred to in point 59 of the present Opinion, the question nevertheless arises as to whether a joint analysis of such transactions would not be more ‘natural’, in the sense that it would appear to be more consistent with the economic reality of those transactions. 71. The concept of ‘economic reality’, although regularly cited by the Court, has not been defined by it. (29) In my view, the aim of that concept is to avoid adopting a merely formalistic approach to transactions and to see them for what they really are and the effects which they produce, taking into account the aims of the business community. (30) 72. Such a concept may thus serve as a criterion for establishing the existence of an abuse of rights, as well as for correctly interpreting and applying the provisions of Directive 2006/112. (31) 73. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the concept of ‘economic reality’ is capable of calling into question the conclusion reached in point 69 of the present Opinion. Taking account of the economic reality constitutes a fundamental criterion for applying the common system of VAT. (32) 74. From that point of view, for the purposes of interpreting the scope of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, preference could be given to the objective pursued by the series of transactions at issue, as submitted by D.B., namely the pursuit of the economic activity of D.B.’s undertaking by A.K. and P.K’s partnership. Such an approach would justify considering the series of transactions at issue as a whole and adapting the application of that provision to that situation as (re)defined. 75. Focusing on the ultimate objective of that series of transactions involves adopting a less formalistic approach, (33) thus giving greater effect to the objective pursued by Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, which is, it will be recalled, to facilitate the transfer of undertakings. 76. Such an approach involves determining how to classify and deal with a series of transactions. 77. In that regard, it is necessary to ascertain, in the first place, whether the series of transactions at issue could be classified as a ‘single transaction’. The rule of principle referred to in point 59 of the present Opinion is subject to two exceptions, linked to the concept of a ‘single transaction’. (34) 78. In the first place, there is a single transaction where two or more elements or acts supplied by the taxable person are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split. (35) 79. In the second place, a single transaction must also be found to exist where a supply consists of a principal supply and the other supply or supplies constitute one or more ancillary supplies which are treated in the same way for tax purposes as the principal supply. In particular, a supply must be regarded as ancillary to a principal supply if it does not constitute for customers an end in itself but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied. (36) 80. It seems to me to follow from that case-law that a single transaction is, schematically, an economic supply provided by a single taxable person and made up of various elements regarded as inseparable in the eyes of his or her customer. (37) 81. In my view, in the present case, we find ourselves neither in the first nor the second situation referred to in points 78 and 79 of the present Opinion. On the one hand, the persons involved in the various transactions are different. On the other, the different transactions can be carried out independently of each other and serve different purposes. The only link between those transactions is therefore D.B., A.K. and P.K.’s intention. While the declared intention of the parties concerning the VAT liability of a transaction must be taken into consideration, that is on the condition that it is supported by objective evidence. (38) However, I do not believe that that intention is actually supported by objective evidence, since, from a strictly economic point of view, each of those transactions could exist without the others and would retain its entire economic meaning, even in isolation from the other transactions. (39) Moreover, it appears that D.B.’s intention amounts to the transfer of her undertaking to her daughters, as a gift. 82. In the second place, leaving aside the notion of a ‘single transaction’, it is possible to consider, in the light of the sequence of events, that the acquisition of the undertaking by A.K. and P.K. was, in reality, a mere ‘intermediate’ or ‘transitional’ acquisition. In such circumstances, it would be necessary, in my view, to verify that the conditions for the application of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 are satisfied in the case of the final recipient, in the present case, A.K. and P.K.’s partnership. In so far as that partnership receives the totality of the assets from D.B.’s undertaking and intends to carry on its economic activity, that provision would apply. Moreover, such an interpretation is consistent with the requirement that there can be only one beneficiary, as set out in point 58 of the present Opinion, since, in this case, the final recipient is indeed a single entity: A.K. and P.K.’s partnership. 83. Should the General Court be inclined to follow that approach, I would encourage it, in order to limit the risks of abuse, to focus on the timing of the transmissions concerned. In that regard, I note that the referring court has indeed highlighted, both in its request for a preliminary ruling and in the question which it has referred, the fact that A.K. and P.K. will immediately make the contribution in kind of their shares to their partnership. (40) 84. Indeed, I consider that the ‘functional’ interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 could work provided that it is demonstrated that there was no possibility that the intermediate (or transitional) acquisition would be converted into a final acquisition. That would prevent a situation where, under the guise of intending to transfer an undertaking at a later date, persons who cannot deduct input VAT evade the payment of VAT and thereby acquire assets at a lower cost, in breach the first paragraph of Article 16 of Directive 2006/112 and the principle of fiscal neutrality, understood as an expression of the general principle of equal treatment in VAT matters. (41) 85. Consequently, a consideration of the economic reality should lead to transactions linked by a common objective and immediately successive in time being regarded as forming a whole, and to a verification that the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 have been met in the case of the final recipient. D. Proposed option 86. It follows from the foregoing that the choice between the two possible interpretations of the scope of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 depends on the way in which it is decided that a series of transactions which have to be carried out are to be understood. 87. Either a preference is shown for the classic route, in accordance with the fundamental principle referred to in point 59 of the present Opinion, or the decision is taken to strike out on a different path, one which is paved by the concept of ‘economic reality’. 88. While the second option is not without its allure and even appeared to me, at first sight, to be the most logical one, it does not succeed in overcoming certain reservations and, therefore, even taking into account the temporal nature of the succession of transactions, fails to win my full conviction. 89. First, if the application of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 to a series of transactions had to be subject to the condition that the final acquisition must immediately follow the intermediate acquisition, the question would inevitably arise as to what is meant by ‘immediately’. Should it be a matter of hours or days? Could it be accepted that the final acquisition takes place several weeks, or even months, after the intermediate acquisition? 90. Second, the individual transactions comprising the series of transactions are different in nature and none of them may be classified as a transfer of totality of assets. In other words, it is the whole which would be classified as such, whereas the transactions constituting it are two gifts of half of the assets of an undertaking to separate persons and two contributions in kind made by those persons. Thus, on the one hand, there would be a mismatch between the classification of the elements making up a whole and the classification of that whole. On the other, if, for one reason or another, the third and fourth transactions, as defined in point 60 of the present Opinion, were ultimately not to take place, difficulties would certainly arise in relation to the adjustment of VAT. 91. Third, I would point out that the Court of Justice has already held that requiring the tax authorities to carry out inquiries to determine the intention of the taxable person would be contrary to the objectives of the common system of VAT of ensuring legal certainty and facilitating the measures necessary for the application of VAT by having regard, save in exceptional cases, to the objective character of the transaction concerned. (42) 92. In the present case, the type of transactions envisaged by D.B. and her daughters, as well as the sequence of those transactions, are perfectly clear, with the result that, taken individually, they do not pose any difficulties when it comes to classification. (43) Moreover, as D.B. acknowledged at the hearing, there was nothing to prevent her from transferring the totality of the assets of her undertaking to A.K. and P.K.’s partnership. The decision to give her undertaking to her daughters, who would then contribute it to the capital of their partnership, is therefore a choice made by persons involved. That decision has tax consequences for D.B., her daughters and their partnership which they cannot attempt to circumvent by seeking to have clearly defined transactions treated the same way as another type of transaction which they preferred not to carry out for reasons which, I hasten to add, are their own. (44) Moreover, that would be contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality, since it would amount to treating different situations in the same way. (45) 93. Furthermore, while the concept of ‘economic reality’ is intended to focus on the effects of transactions rather than on their form, it cannot be relied on in such a way as to favour the intention of the parties over the consequences of the specific choices they made, contrary to the case-law referred to in points 81 and 91 of the present Opinion. 94. It is for all of those reasons that, despite the attractiveness of the option of a joint analysis of the transactions at issue, I am led to adopt the interpretation based on a separate examination of those transactions. Moreover, it seems to me to be consistent not only with the principle relating to VAT recalled in point 59 of the present Opinion, but also with the objective pursued by Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, which is to facilitate the transfer of undertakings and not tax schemes. 95. Accordingly, I propose that the General Court answer the question referred to the effect that Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that a transfer of a totality of assets does not occur when there is a transfer without consideration by a taxable person of a 50% share each of a totality of assets to two individuals who are not taxable persons and who intend to contribute those shares immediately as a contribution in kind to a business partnership in which they are partners. VI. Conclusion 96. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the following answer be given to Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, Poland): Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a transfer of a totality of assets does not occur when there is a transfer without consideration by a taxable person of a 50% share each of a totality of assets to two individuals who are not taxable persons and who intend to contribute those shares immediately as a contribution in kind to a business partnership in which they are partners. José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 May 2026. [Signatures] 1 Original language: French. i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 2 Von Jhering, R., Der Kampf um’s Recht, G.J. Manz, Vienna, 1872, p. 7, translated into French by Meydieu, A.F., Le combat pour le droit, A. Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, Paris, 1875, p. 1. That work was subsequently enriched and improved, giving rise to 11 different editions in the author’s lifetime. 3 Von Jhering, R., Zweck im Recht, Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf & Härtel, Leipzig, 1877, translated into French based on the third German edition by Meulenaere, O., Chevalier-Marescq et Cie, Paris, 1901. 4 Council Directive of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1). 5 It should be noted that, in the request for a preliminary ruling, mention is made of the fact that it is D.B. and her husband, the father of A.K. and P.K., who intend to make a gift of the entire undertaking to their two daughters. However, D.B.’s husband is mentioned only once and neither his status nor his role in the series of transactions at issue in the main proceedings is specified, with the result that it appears to follow from the facts available to me that only D.B. must be regarded as the transferor, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112. Moreover, at the hearing, it was confirmed that the transactions at issue in the main proceedings have actually taken place. 6 See points 5, 20 and 21 of the present Opinion. 7 See, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2017, Túrkevei Tejtermelő Kft. (C‑129/16, EU:C:2017:547, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 8 See judgment of 15 May 2003, Salzmann (C‑300/01, EU:C:2003:283, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 9 Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1). 10 See order of 16 January 2023, Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi (C‑729/21, not published, EU:C:2023:74, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). 11 See, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, X (C‑651/11, EU:C:2013:346, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). That is also the view of the tax authority, the Polish Government and the Commission, as is apparent from their written observations. However, it is worth noting that, under the second paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112, ‘Member States may, in cases where the recipient is not wholly liable to tax, take the measures necessary to prevent distortion of competition. They may also adopt any measures needed to prevent tax evasion or avoidance through the use of this Article.’ For an overview of the other conditions imposed by the national laws of the Member States: Annacondia, F., EU VAT Compass 2021/2022, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2021, pp. 803-805. 12 See judgments of 27 November 2003, Zita Modes (C‑497/01, EU:C:2003:644, paragraph 40); of 10 November 2011, Schriever (C‑444/10, EU:C:2011:724, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited); and order of 16 January 2023, Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi (C‑729/21, not published, EU:C:2023:74, paragraph 30). On the actual impact of the definition of the concept of ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’ given by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 27 November 2003, Zita Modes (C‑497/01, EU:C:2003:644), in certain national legal systems: Culot, A., and Thilmany, J., Manuel des droits d’enregistrement et de la TVA applicables aux actes de société, Larcier-Intersentia, Brussels, 2025, p. 145 and 146; Calderón Carrero, J.M., and Quintas Seara, A., ‘El IVA en la transmisión del patrimonio empresarial: la progresiva flexibilización comunitaria de la regla de no sujeción’, Revista técnica tributaria, No 102, 2013, pp. 95-117 (p. 108). That judgment also resolved the difficulties which had previously existed relating to the classification of a partial transfer of activity: Wäger, C., ‘Nicht steuerbare Veräußerung eines Geschäftsbetriebs im ganzen bei Absicht der Fortführung des übertragenen Geschäftsbetriebs oder Unternehmensteils durch den Erwerber’, Umsatzsteuer-Rundschau, 2004, pp. 24-27 (p. 26). 13 See, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2011, Schriever (C‑444/10, EU:C:2011:724, paragraph 25). 14 See, to that effect, judgment of 27 November 2003, Zita Modes (C‑497/01, EU:C:2003:644, paragraph 44). 15 Judgment of 30 May 2013, X (C‑651/11, EU:C:2013:346, paragraph 46). 16 See, to that effect, order of 16 January 2023, Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi (C‑729/21, not published, EU:C:2023:74, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited) and Opinion of Advocate General Brkan in A&P Deco (T‑397/25, EU:T:2026:263, points 41 and 45). 17 See judgment of 10 November 2011, Schriever (C‑444/10, EU:C:2011:724, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 18 Judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck (292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12); of 9 March 2023, ACER v Aquind (C‑46/21 P, EU:C:2023:182, paragraph 54); and of 18 December 2025, E. (Set-off of claims) (C‑481/24, EU:C:2025:996, paragraph 29). 19 The term ‘person to whom the goods are transferred’ is used in the singular in all the language versions of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112. 20 (C‑408/98, EU:C:2000:207, point 23). 21 See the proposal for a Sixth Council Directive on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, COM(73) 950 final of 20 June 1973 and, as regards Directive 2006/112, the proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of value added tax, COM(2004) 246 final of 15 April 2004. 22 Second Council Directive of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes – Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value added tax (OJ 1967 L 71, p. 1303). 23 Sánchez Gallardo, F.J., IVA para expertos, Francis Lefebvre, Madrid, 2024, 4th ed., pp. 1790-1798 (point 20547), and Serlooten, P., Debat, O., Droit fiscal des affaires, Dalloz, Paris, 2022/2023, 21st ed., p. 344. 24 Consequently, the adjustment of the rules aimed at taxing supplies of goods in order to promote economic activity appears both pragmatic and sensible. 25 See judgment of 1 August 2025, Határ Diszkont (C‑427/23, EU:C:2025:596, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 26 See paragraph 58 of the present Opinion and, in that regard, judgment of 30 May 2013, X (C‑651/11, EU:C:2013:346, paragraphs 46 and 47). 27 The question whether the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112 applies to the third and fourth transactions does not arise, in that context, since the transactions are examined separately and are the subject of a dispute separate from the dispute in the main proceedings, as the referring court specifies. 28 See point 39 of the present Opinion. 29 The absence of any definition has been criticised by some authors: Nellen, F., and van Doesum, A., ‘Economic Reality in EU VAT’, EC tax review, 2020, Vol. 29, No 5, pp. 213-226; van Abswoude, K., ‘The Principle of Fiscal Neutrality and Economic Reality in EU VAT: Two Peas in a Pod?’, International VAT Monitor, 2022, Vol. 33, No 5. 30 On the importance of focussing on transactions’ effects rather than their form: Beisse, H., ‘Die paradigmatischen Gob’, in Hommelhoff, P., Zätzsch, R., Erle, B. and Müller, W., Gesellschaftsrecht, Rechnungslegung, Steuerrecht: Festschrift für Welf Müller zum 65. Geburtstag, Beck, Munich, 2001, pp. 731-753 (p. 739). 31 On the application of the concept of ‘economic reality’ in the case-law of the Court of Justice: Nellen, F., and van Doesum, A., (footnote 29 of the present Opinion), and, by the same authors, ‘Economic Reality in EU VAT and the Reductionist Approach’, EC tax review, 2025, Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 222-230. 32 Judgment of 28 June 2007, Planzer Luxembourg (C‑73/06, EU:C:2007:397, paragraph 43). 33 In his Opinion in Kopalnia Odkrywkowa Polski Trawertyn P. Granatowicz, M. Wąsiewicz (C‑280/10, EU:C:2011:592, points 1, 31, 36 and 38), Advocate General Cruz Villalón warned precisely against the risk of an overly formalistic interpretation of Directive 2006/112. 34 See, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2019, KPC Herning (C‑71/18, EU:C:2019:660, paragraph 38); Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Solar Electric Martinique (C‑303/16, EU:C:2017:507, point 57), and Opinion of Advocate General Pitruzzella in Finanzamt X (Permanently installed equipment and machinery) (C‑516/21, EU:C:2022:976, point 27). 35 See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Solar Electric Martinique (C‑303/16, EU:C:2017:507, point 58 and the case-law cited). 36 See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Solar Electric Martinique (C‑303/16, EU:C:2017:507, point 59 and the case-law cited). 37 See, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in BLV Wohn- und Gewerbebau (C‑395/11, EU:C:2012:564, points 46 and 47). 38 See judgment of 4 September 2019, KPC Herning (C‑71/18, EU:C:2019:660, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). 39 If, for example, A.K. decided to resell her portion rather than contribute it to the partnership which she manages with P.K., that would in no way prevent P.K. from transferring her portion to that partnership. That would enable A.K. to benefit from the money from the sale of her portion and P.K. to obtain shares within the partnership. 40 It should also be noted that, at the hearing, D.B. stated that the transfer of the shares held by A.K. and P.K. to their partnership actually took place a few days after the transfer of those shares from D.B. to her daughters. 41 See, to that effect, judgments of 16 September 2020, Mitteldeutsche Hartstein-Industrie (C‑528/19, EU:C:2020:712, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited), and of 17 December 2020, WEG Tevesstraße (C‑449/19, EU:C:2020:1038, paragraph 48). 42 Judgment of 27 September 2007, Teleos and Others (C‑409/04, EU:C:2007:548, paragraph 39). 43 See, to that effect, point 81 of the present Opinion. 44 See, by analogy, judgment of 13 March 2014, Malburg (C‑204/13, EU:C:2014:147, paragraphs 46 and 47). 45 See, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2008, Marks & Spencer (C‑309/06, EU:C:2008:211, paragraph 49).