Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2014:1049
Date: 2014-12-10
Language of the case: French
Subject matter: Competition;Agreements, decisions and concerted practices
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible;Appeal against penalty - unfounded;Appeal against penalty - successful
Origin: France

summary of the pleas in law relied on, and that new pleas in law may not be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a plea which amplifies a plea put forward previously, whether directly or by implication, in the application initiating the proceedings, and which is closely connected therewith, must be declared admissible (see Case T‑94/98 Alferink and Others v Commission [2008] ECR II‑1125, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 335 In the present case, in the reply, the Association challenges the existence of a so-called overall plan which ‘constitutes a single and continuous infringement’. In its submission, this amounts to an artificial construction which does not stand up to an analysis of the facts. 336 The Court must consider whether, in so far as it is possible to infer from that argument a challenge to the single and continuous infringement, it constitutes a new plea. 337 In that regard, two passages in the application refer indirectly to the overall plan, a key element in the Commission’s analysis of the existence of a single and continuous infringement. 338 First, in the seventh plea, as set out in the application, the Association submits that the Commission exceeded the terms of reference of the inspection by seizing certain documents relating to prices in the course of the inspection, which in its view entailed a breach of its rights of defence. The Association adds in the reply that the Commission attempted, artificially and a posteriori, to establish a link between the problem relating to the development of groups of laboratories and the problem associated with discounts, in order to justify the use of evidence gathered during the inspection in an overall plan. 339 Second, the Association disputes, in the context of the first part of the ninth plea presented in the application, the Commission’s view that its principal objective in relation to discounts was to target groups of laboratories, given the large number of small laboratories to which the letters in question related. 340 The ninth plea raised in the application concerns whether the Commission proved to the requisite legal standard that there had been an infringement of Article 101 TFEU in respect of the Association’s policy on discounts. It is solely in order to claim, in the context of the first part, that the Commission was wrong to consider that, in order to protect the interests of small laboratories, the Association had systematically attempted to impose a minimum price in the market for clinical biology test services, that the Association refers to the large number of small laboratories concerned by its letters relating to discounts. 341 It must be stated that in the application the Association did not raise, either in the context of the argument raised in support of the seventh plea, or in the context of the first part of the ninth plea, even indirectly, any challenge to the single and continuous nature of the infringement. 342 In those circumstances, the plea challenging the single and continuous nature of the infringement, raised for the first time in the plea, cannot be regarded as amplifying a plea put forward previously. It must therefore be declared inadmissible on the ground that it is out of time. Conclusion on the application of the Wouters case-law and the pleas in support of the claim for annulment 343 At this stage of the examination, it is still necessary to determine whether the Wouters case-law is applicable to the present case. 344 It follows from the examination of the second and third pleas above that the Association’s behaviour concerning the SELs’ duty to communicate certain information to it relates, first, to an unwarranted insistence on the part of the Association that the effects of changes during the lifetime of an SEL were subject to a suspensory condition and that the documents of certain companies must be amended in that sense and, second, requests for the communication of information not required by the law, under threat of penalties, in particular, towards SELs in the Labco group, which were identified by the managing bodies of the Association as constituting a threat. 345 Those acts in any event go beyond the advisory role played by the Association in procedures relating to approval by the prefect, nor are they justified by the fact that the Association takes account of prefectoral decrees when managing the register, which is based on specific provisions. The Association cannot therefore claim to act as a mere extension of the power of the prefect in that regard. Furthermore, as the Commission correctly observes, the Association has no regulatory power. 346 In addition, it follows from the examination of the third plea that the strict interpretation of the rules applied by the Association in its requests for information concerning movements in shares within the SELs cannot be justified by its remit of a posteriori verification of the legal provisions. In order to preclude the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, a party cannot therefore rely with regard to the behaviour at issue on the argument that any effects restrictive of competition are necessary for the proper practice of the profession as organised by the law, as was accepted for certain rules of the Ordre des avocats at paragraphs 109 and 110 of the judgment in Wouters, paragraph 21 above. 347 Furthermore, the Association’s behaviour with respect to the development of groups of laboratories, at issue in the fourth and fifth pleas, or in relation to discounts, may be analysed in the same way. Admittedly, the Association must ensure compliance with the ethical rules in the context of its legal remit, including the defence of the independence of pharmacist-biologists and the promotion of public health. However, its action must remain within the legal framework set up by the legislature and the administrative authorities, as the Association itself has no regulatory power. Accordingly, when it acts on the basis of an interpretation that is contrary to the literal meaning of the relevant provisions, and indeed adopts the most restrictive interpretation in the context of a particular strategy, its conduct cannot fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU on the basis of the argument that it is inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate objective. The Commission rightly finds in that regard that it is not for a body representing private persons to extend the scope of protection of the law with the desire of protecting the interest of a group when the legislature had defined the limits of the protection offered and left the possibility for a certain amount of competition. 348 The principles that emerge from the judgment in Wouters, paragraph 21 above, therefore do not permit the general view that the Association’s restrictive conduct referred to in the contested decision is not caught by the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU. 349 It follows that the first plea must be rejected. 350 Consequently, the claim for annulment must be rejected. 2. The alternative claim, seeking a reduction of the amount of the fine 351 It should be borne in mind that review of the lawfulness of decisions adopted by the Commission is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the Courts of the European Union by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU. That jurisdiction empowers the Courts, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission’s and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed. 352 It is therefore for the Court, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, to assess, on the date on which it adopts its decision, whether the applicants received a fine the amount of which correctly reflects the gravity and duration of the infringement in question (see, to that effect, Case T‑343/06 Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission [2012] ECR, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited). 353 It must be pointed out, however, that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction does not amount to a review of the Court’s own motion, and that proceedings before the Courts of the European Union are inter partes (judgment in Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 57 above, paragraph 64). 354 In the present case, as explained at paragraph 11 above, the Commission applied point 37 of the Guidelines when determining the amount of the fine. That provision reads as follows: ‘Although these Guidelines present the general methodology for the setting of fines, the particularities of a given case or the need to achieve deterrence in a particular case may justify departing from such methodology or from the limits specified in point 21.’ 355 It follows that the Commission fixes the amount of the fine at recital 769 to the contested decision at EUR 5 million in an abstract fashion, although it refers there to the factors which it must take into account when setting the fine. The determination of the amount of the fine is discussed at recitals 746 to 772 to the contested decision. It follows from those recitals that when setting the fine the Commission took into account the very serious nature of the infringement, the fact that it affected an important market, the fact that this is the first case in which Article 23(4) of Regulation No 1/2003 could be applied and also the fact that the members of the Association might not have been fully aware of the scope of the applicable provisions. It also took account of the fact that the conduct at issue was not carried out in secret. As regards the duration of the single and continuous infringement, the Commission found the total duration was 6 years, including a period of 2 years and 11 months during which the 2 manifestations of the unlawful conduct were established. Last, the Commission rejected the mitigating circumstances put forward by the Association. 356 The Court observes, as a preliminary point, that the Association does not dispute the fact that the amount of the fine was set in an abstract fashion. In that regard, although it might have been desirable for the Commission to set out in the contested decision reasons including figures, to enable the various parameters taken into account when determining the amount of the fine to be weighed up, the fact is that the contested decision is not vitiated by a failure to state reasons, since the Commission specified the factors which enabled it to determine the gravity of the infringement and its duration (see Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑8375, paragraphs 463 and 464 and the case-law cited). 357 However, while it does not dispute the use of point 37 of the Guidelines in its case, the Association asks that the amount of the fine be reduced, on a number of grounds. 358 In the first place, the Association submits that it ought to have been contemplated in this case that no fine would be imposed, in accordance with Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. At most, if a fine had to be imposed, it ought to have been symbolic, because that would have been a sufficiently deterrent and proportionate measure in the case of a professional association entrusted with a public service remit that does not seek to make a profit. The Association also points out that the deterrent effect of any fine has been neutralised since the adoption of Order No 2010-49 on discounts. Last, it maintains that the Commission ought to have treated it in the same way as it treated the Ordre des architectes belge (Belgian Architects’ Association) in its decision of 24 June 2004 (Case COMP/A.38549 — Belgian Architects’ Association), which had been ordered to pay a fine of only EUR 100 000 for a horizontal agreement on prices. 359 In that regard, although Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, which provides that the imposition of a fine is a possibility offered to the Commission and in no case the logical and automatic consequence of the finding of an infringement, leaves to the Commission’s discretion the decision whether or not to impose a fine when it finds an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, a symbolic fine, or even no fine at all, was not appropriate in the present case. 360 As for the fine of EUR 100 000 imposed on the Belgian Architects’ Association for having forced its members to use a minimum price, it should be borne in mind that the Commission’s practice in previous decisions cannot itself serve as a legal framework for the imposition of fines in competition matters and that decisions in other cases can give only an indication for the purpose of determining whether there might be discrimination, since the facts of those cases, such as markets, products, the undertakings and the periods concerned, are not likely to be the same (see Case T‑73/04 Carbone-Lorraine v Commission [2008] ECR II‑2661, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). 361 Furthermore, in that decision the Commission had first of all set the basic amount of the fine at EUR 4 500 000, which, however, was reduced to EUR 100 000, taking into account the fact that that fine was imposed in 2004, at a time when the Commission was beginning to reflect on competition in professional services. At the date of the infringements committed by the Association, however, the Commission had already published a report on competition in professional services, containing recommendations to the Member States in that respect. Another circumstance that distinguishes the two cases is the fact that the Belgian Architects’ Association, unlike the Association, immediately changed its practices when the procedure was initiated by the Commission. 362 As for the fact that the deterrence of a fine imposed in the present case is neutralised by the legislative amendment introduced in 2010, namely by the adoption of Order No 2010-49, which prohibited discounts without exception (see paragraph 242 above), it should be observed that deterrence is aimed at any future infringements of competition law, which need not necessarily relate to the same type of infringement as the conduct at issue in the contested decision. Furthermore, the Association’s conduct in relation to discounts concerns only one aspect of the single and continuous infringement penalised in the contested decision. The argument is therefore ineffective. 363 Likewise, the fact that the Association does not seek to make a profit and carries out a public service remit does not mean that it cannot, when carrying out that remit, confer advantages on certain private interests; therefore that argument, too, cannot justify the imposition of no fine at all or of a symbolic fine. The fact that, according to the Association, it is unimaginable that a professional association created by law should not comply with an order made by a European institution is also a purely speculative argument which, too, cannot be decisive in that respect. 364 In the second place, the Association observes in the reply that it is apparent from the defence that the Commission wrongly failed to take account of two factors that would enable the fine to be reduced, namely, first, the Association’s spontaneous cooperation with regard to pricing in its reply to the request for information based on Article 18(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 and, second, the fact that the Commission exceeded the terms of reference of the inspection, which constitutes a breach of the Association’s rights of defence. It submits that the Court ought to take the latter procedural irregularity into account, even if it should take the view that the irregularity should not lead to annulment of the contested decision. 365 Without there being any need to rule on the Commission’s argument that those arguments are inadmissible, on the ground that they are out of time, in application of the first subparagraph of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure, they must be rejected. It follows from the examination undertaken above of the pleas in support of the claim for annulment that the Commission did not exceed the terms of reference of the inspection and did not breach the Association’s rights of defence. As for the argument based on what the Association claims to have been its spontaneous cooperation with the Commission in its reply of 10 February 2009 to the Commission’s request for information of 3 February 2009, the Commission correctly maintains that the pricing aspect of the infringement does not arise from an admission or disclosure made spontaneously by the Association, since it was on the basis of information already in its possession, in particular the minutes of meetings of the Association’s bodies, that the Commission requested further information concerning the practices in relation to discounts. 366 In the third place, the Association relies on certain circumstances specific to the case that would justify a reduction of the amount of the fine. 367 In its submission, mitigating circumstances ought to have been applied in its case, owing to the fact that its conduct in relation to discounts had only marginal effects, that it was not its intention to favour small laboratories, that its practice concerning the development of laboratories was aimed at protecting the independence of pharmacists and was in accordance with the law, that the conduct in question was public in nature and that membership was compulsory. 368 First, as regards the public nature of the conduct in question, it should be pointed out that the Commission states at recital 756 to the contested decision that it took that into account, noting that the conduct in question was not conduct that should be regarded as particularly serious. 369 Likewise, as regards the compulsory nature of membership of the Association, the Commission states at recital 757 to the contested decision that it took that into account, in the exercise of its discretion, when determining the amount of the fine, because undertakings might be held liable for the consequences of the Association’s acts, irrespective of their actual degree of involvement. In fact, it is clear that that degree of involvement could vary and that, as observed at recital 754 to the contested decision, some decisions may have been imposed on the members of the Association against their will. 370 However, those factors must be weighed up against other features of the infringement. Thus, the conduct relating to discounts is a form of horizontal agreement on prices, which is among the most serious restrictions of competition. As for the decisions aimed at preventing the development of groups of laboratories, these constitute barriers to production, technical development and investment on the market that may reasonably have had the effect of slowing down action on the French market by international groups and compartmentalising the internal market, as the Commission observes at recital 755 to the contested decision. Also taking into account the duration of the infringement (see paragraph 355 above), as well as the size of the relevant market, with an estimated value of EUR 4.4 billion in 2008 (recital 759 to the contested decision) and also the fact that the impact of the Association’s action was considerable, since the pharmacist-biologists on the Association’s register have a combined market share of 95% for clinical biology test services, the Commission was entitled to consider that the circumstances invoked had not altered the gravity of the infringement. 371 Second, as regards the fact that the infringement relating to discounts did not have a great effect and that, in particular, the conduct relating to discounts was not designed to protect small laboratories, it should be borne in mind that the effect of an anti-competitive practice is not a conclusive criterion for assessing whether the fine is appropriate and that other factors, such as intent, may be of greater importance than those relating to the effects in that context, especially in the case of infringements which are intrinsically serious, such as price-fixing and market-sharing (see, to that effect, Case T‑138/07 Schindler Holding and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II‑4819, paragraph 222 and the case-law cited). 372 It is clear from the examination of the claims for annulment above that the Commission has documentary evidence illustrating, first, the intention of the managing bodies of the Association to impede the development of certain structures of groups of laboratories and, second, to oppose discounts in excess of 10%, an objective which has no legal basis and cannot therefore be justified by the reference to the protection of the independence of pharmacist-biologists, or indeed of public health. 373 Furthermore, the Commission’s conclusion, set out at recital 761 to the contested decision, that the practices relating to discounts were implemented has not been successfully challenged by the Association, as is apparent, in particular, from the examination of the first part of the ninth plea above. 374 The Commission therefore did not err by not according weight to those factors when determining the amount of the fine. 375 Third, as regards the argument that it was merely interpreting the law, the Association has not put forward any arguments that would permit a conclusion different from that reached by the Commission, namely that the Association’s interpretation of the law ran counter to the provisions themselves and formed part of a logic restrictive of competition in the case of the great majority of the aspects of the single and continuous infringement it was found to have committed. The Commission did not err in not recognising, at recital 768 to the contested decision, the existence of a mitigating circumstance in respect of the Association’s argument that its conduct was authorised, indeed encouraged, by the public authorities or by the regulations. 376 However, that conclusion must be qualified with regard to the objections set out in the contested decision (recital 450 et seq.) concerning the taking effect of the amendments to the statutes and contracts for SELs. 377 Although it follows from the examination of the second plea at paragraphs 128 to 157 above that the Commission did not make an error of assessment because of a misinterpretation of the French legislation as regards the immediate effect of changes to the statutes and contracts for SELs during their lifetime, the Court none the less considered at paragraph 155 above that it was regrettable that the decision was virtually silent on the impact of Circular No 98-585 in that context, apart from the reference in footnote 562 to the fact that that circular contains a different interpretation of the applicable regime when it states that ‘[t]he company must first request approvable on the basis of the changes’. 378 Although that circular, and the prefects’ ensuing practice of adopting decrees amending approvals, do not call into question the legality of the Commission’s analysis, those circumstances may have influenced the positions adopted by the Association, in respect of which it is criticised. Independently of the question of the legality, on that specific point, of Circular No 98-585 and the prefects’ practice, they may explain the analysis advocated by the Association of a dual system: alteration of the authorisation of the laboratory subject to a declaratory regime, but the need for new approval for the SEL, of a suspensory nature. Yet the hypothesis of that dual system is not addressed in the contested decision. 379 Therefore, also taking into account the fact that it follows from recital 453 et seq. to the contested decision that a number of positions which the Association is alleged to have adopted towards the SELs predated Circular No 2005/206, it must be considered in the present case that the Commission erred in not recognising the existence of a mitigating circumstance for that specific aspect of the infringement during part of the period in question, namely before Circular No 2005/206 entered into force on 14 November 2005. 380 In the light of the foregoing, the complaint that certain mitigating circumstances were not taken into account by the Commission when it determined the amount of the fine must be upheld. The consequences that must follow for the determination of the amount of the fine will be examined below. 381 It must be pointed out that the mitigating circumstance identified at paragraphs 376 to 379 above relates to only one of the four types of decision which the Association is found to have adopted as regards the aspect of its conduct designed to prevent the development of groups of laboratories. Furthermore, it relates to only a part of the period during which acts of that type were adopted (the period between the end of 2003 and 2005). The Commission has evidence of other decisions adopted in respect of the development of groups of laboratories which related to the period before 2005. 382 In the light of those circumstances, the error in question can reasonably lead to only a small reduction in the amount of the fine. The Court therefore considers that a reduction of EUR 250 000 is appropriate in order to take that error into account, and the fine imposed on the Association must therefore be set at EUR 4 750 000. 383 Last, it is still necessary to examine the Association’s arguments relating to the disproportionate or inappropriate nature of the fine, given the weak financial capacity of the Association, which is such that its proper functioning might be jeopardised. That examination must be carried out by reference to the fine as thus recalculated. 384 As the Commission states at recital 743 to the contested decision, the fact that the method of setting the fine does not take the Association’s weak financial capacity into account is not conclusive, since under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 the turnover of each member active on the market affected by the infringement may be taken into account. 385 It follows, in particular, from recital 744 to the contested decision that the Commission imposed the fine by reference to Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. The third subparagraph of Article 23(2) provides that where the infringement of an association of undertakings relates to the activities of its members, the fine is not to exceed 10% of the sum of the total turnover of each member active on the market affected by the infringement of the association. It will be necessary to undertake the verification provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 23(2) by reference to the amount as recalculated in order to ensure that it is not excessive. 386 Furthermore, the first subparagraph of Article 23(4) of Regulation No 1/2003 states that ‘[w]hen a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the turnover of its members and the association is not solvent, the association is obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine’. 387 It must be held that the reasoning which the Commission sets out in the contested decision specifically incorporates consideration of the ability of the members of the Association to pay the fine. At recitals 746 to 751, the Commission refers to the novel nature of that provision, introduced by Regulation No 1/2003, and also to the possibility that the Association must actually call for contributions from its members, who may however have exercised varying degrees of supervision over the decisions adopted by the managing bodies, in order to be able to pay the fine. The Commission thus justifies the fact that it distances itself in the present case from the method of setting fines provided for in the Guidelines and the Association does not dispute that the application of point 37 of the Guidelines is more favourable to make contributions, to it than the application of the general method laid down in those Guidelines, as the Commission observes at recital 751 to the contested decision. 388 As regards the verification of the financial impact of the fine, the Association does not dispute the financial data used by the Commission. It may be inferred from recital 771 to the contested decision that 95% of the value of the fees invoiced by clinical laboratories in France in 2008 represented EUR 4.2 billion (and not ‘EUR 4 205 033 million’, as mentioned on what may be the basis of a typographical error), more recent figures not being available at the time. Furthermore, it also follows from recital 771 that the figure of 95% of the value of total fees is taken into account by the Commission in order to exclude the turnover of laboratories whose only partners are biologist-physicians, and which represent around 5% of all private laboratories. Those figures are confirmed at recitals 23 and 759 to the contested decision, which refer to a turnover of EUR 4.4 billion achieved by private laboratories in 2008 when describing the size of the market. 389 The Court does not have a different turnover achieved by clinical laboratories on the relevant market than that presented in the contested decision. It should be emphasised, however, that there has been no suggestion that that figure might no longer be representative today. In any event, it may reasonably be considered that that figure does not overestimate the value of the relevant market on the date of the judgment. 390 The amount of the fine imposed, as reduced by the Court, corresponds to only a little over 1% of that figure. It is therefore not excessive. 391 Furthermore, in the light of the evidence in the file, it does not appear that the amount as recalculated might reasonably affect the viability of the members of section G active on the relevant market in the event that they should be called upon to make their contribution in the future. 392 In the light of the foregoing, Article 3 of the contested decision should be annulled and the fine reduced to an amount of EUR 4.75 million, which the Court, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, considers appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, in particular those relating to the gravity and the duration of the infringement found by the Commission and also to the resources on which the Association can call, and the action should be dismissed as to the remainder. Costs 393 Under Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the Court may order that the costs be shared or that each party bear its own costs. 394 Under Article 87(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order an intervener to bear its own costs. 395 In the present case, only one complaint in support of the alternative claim for a reduction of the amount of the fine was upheld in part and the amount of the fine imposed on the Association was reduced accordingly. Therefore, on an equitable assessment of the facts of the case, the Court decides that the Commission should bear its own costs and pay one tenth of those incurred by the Association, which shall bear nine tenths of its own costs. 396 Labco shall bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber) hereby: 1. Sets the amount of the fine imposed jointly and severally on the Ordre national des pharmaciens (ONP), the Conseil national de l’Ordre des pharmaciens (CNOP) and the Conseil central de la section G de l’Ordre national des pharmaciens (CCG) in Article 3 of Commission Decision C(2010) 8952 final of 8 December 2010 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 101 [TFEU] (Case 39510 — Labco/ONP) at EUR 4.75 million; 2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one tenth of those incurred by the ONP, the CNOP and the CCG; 4. Orders the ONP, the CNOP and the CCG to bear nine tenths of their own costs; 5. Orders Labco to bear its own costs. Berardis Czúcz Popescu Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 December 2014. [Signatures] Table of contents Background to the dispute Procedure and forms of order sought Law 1. The claim for annulment First plea, alleging an error of interpretation and application of Article 101 TFEU in the light of the judgment in Wouters The pleas concerning the conduct aimed at the development of groups of laboratories The pleas relating to the composition of and change in the capital of the SELs – Fourth plea, alleging, in essence, failure to have regard to the role of the CCG as guarantor of the professional independence of the partner as regards his minimum shareholding in the capital of SELs – Fifth plea, alleging, in essence, an error of assessment of the legislature’s intention as regards the dismemberment of the shareholding in SELs above a maximum holding of 25% and failure to have regard to the legal framework applicable to the dismemberment of shareholdings in SELs The pleas relating to the SELs’ duties to communicate certain information during their lifetime – Second plea, alleging, in essence, an error of assessment resulting from a misinterpretation of the French legislation as regards the respective roles of the prefect and the CCG when changes occur during the lifetime of an SEL – Third plea, alleging, in essence, failure to have regard to the scope of the obligation to communicate certain information provided for in the French legislation and the CCG’s role in the context of its remit of a posteriori verification of the company documents Sixth plea, alleging, in essence, an error in the interpretation and application of Article 101 TFEU in so far as the disciplinary penalties imposed reinforce the potential or actual effects of the decisions in question The pleas relating to the objections concerning prices Seventh plea, raised by way of principal plea, alleging, in essence, misuse of powers owing to failure to observe the limits of the inspection remit – First complaint – Second complaint Eighth plea, raised in the alternative, alleging, in essence, an error of assessment of the scope of the applicable legal framework and the intention of the legislature Ninth plea, raised in the alternative, alleging, in essence, an error in the assessment of the facts, leading to an error of law – The second part – First part The assertion that there was not a single and continuous infringement Conclusion on the application of the Wouters case-law and the pleas in support of the claim for annulment 2. The alternative claim, seeking a reduction of the amount of the fine Costs * Language of the case: French.