Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2003:188
Date: 2003-07-08
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Third Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951);Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;ECSC matters;Acts of the institutions;Agreements and concentrations
Concepts: Applications by undertakings or their associations;Statement of reasons;Applications by natural or legal persons;Agreements and concentrations. Interference with conditions of competition;General;Relevant market;Commission discretion;Assessment criteria
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible
Origin: Germany

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based (Commission v Greece, paragraphs 28 and 29, and Commission v Germany, paragraphs 5 to 9). 93. Finally, the order of the Court of Justice in Case C-338/93 P De Hoe v Commission [1994] ECR I-819, paragraphs 28 to 30, does not confirm the applicants' claims. In the context of an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance dismissing his action, Mr De Hoe complained that the Court of First Instance was mistaken in maintaining that the reproduction in the body of the application of the entire content of the complaint did not satisfy either the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice or those of Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure. The judgment of the Court of Justice dismissed this complaint, observing that, in the circumstances of the case, the mere reproduction in the body of the application of the entire content of the complaint could not mitigate the failure to state the grounds on which the action was based (paragraph 29 of the order). It is clear that this reasoning cannot be applied to the present case, which concerns a reference to a statement in intervention lodged by another intervener in the same contentious proceedings. The substance of the case A - Plea relating to error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded steel pipes 1. Arguments of the parties 94. The applicants contend that the Commission erred in its assessment of the effects, both horizontal and vertical, of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded steel pipes. 95. Regarding the horizontal effects, the applicants claim that the accuracy of the size of the shares held by the parties to the concentration in the large pipes market, given in the EC decision, is doubtful in so far as the Commission took into account the sales volume of an undertaking which was never active in that market (Linde), another undertaking which has not operated in that market since 1993 (Gräbener) and, finally, an undertaking which was the subject of insolvency proceedings at the date of adoption of the contested decision (Klöckner Muldenstein). In addition, the applicants observe that, assuming that the Commission's figures are correct, it follows that, with a market share of 30.5% (paragraph 36 of the EC decision) and in view of the considerable gap between them and the other competitors, the parties to the concentration dominate the large welded pipe market. 96. With regard to the vertical effects of the concentration at issue, the applicants submit that it is clear from Form CO annexed to Regulation No 447/98 and from Article 2(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 4064/89 that, in the appraisal of concentrations, the Commission must take account not only of the horizontal effects, but also the vertical effects of the notified concentration on a given market. They consider that this assessment is all the more important in the present case in so far as, following the concentration at issue, the very strong position of the parties to the concentration on the large welded pipes market was strengthened by their position in the market for the raw materials intended for the production of such pipes, namely, first, hot-rolled wide strips and, secondly, quarto plates. The applicants claim that the Commission did not take account, or sufficient account, of these vertical effects. 97. Accordingly, with regard to quarto plates used in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding, the applicants observe that, as appears from paragraphs 17 to 19 of the ECSC decision, the parties to the concentration have a very strong position in that market because, together with Usinor/DH and Riva, they have a market share of 96%, which indicates that they form an oligopoly in that market. According to the applicants, this factor is all the more important in that the three undertakings in question, with a market share of 50%, occupy a strong position in the market downstream of the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding. However, they observe that the Commission omitted to take account of that factor in the EC decision which, according to the applicants, is a breach of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 4064/89. 98. Regarding hot-rolled wide strips for the production of pipes, the applicants consider that the concentration at issue has fundamentally changed the situation of the parties to the concentration in that market because, thanks to Salzgitter's production of hot-rolled wide strips, MRW now has an independent source of supply of raw materials, which strengthens its position in the market downstream of the market for large pipes with spiral welding, to the detriment of independent producers, including Ferndorf. 99. The applicants add that Salzgitter's assertion that the parties to the concentration have only a 4.2% share of the market for hot-rolled wide strips is based on the mistaken assumption that this market brings together all such strips, disregarding their intended use. The applicants observe that, from the viewpoint of the relevant technical and standardisation constraints, the production of hot-rolled wide strips for the production of steel pipes differs so much from the production of such strips for other purposes such as, for example, vehicle manufacture, that there is no interchangeability between the two categories of products. According to the applicants, the lack of interchangeability is made more acute by the fact that the steel producers charge different prices according to whether the hot-rolled wide strips are for making pipes or for other purposes. The applicants add that this error regarding the definition of the market for reference products has numerous repercussions on the statement of Salzgitter and the Commission because, if the definition of the product market proposed by the applicants is applied, it transpires that Salzgitter's market share is much larger that it claims. They observe that, in the footnote on page 20 of the statement in defence, the Commission implicitly recognised the accuracy of the definition of the product market proposed by the applicants. 100. The applicants likewise assert that the Commission erred in its assessment concerning the definition of the geographical market for hot-rolled wide strips. According to the applicants, there are several indications that the market does not extend to the whole of the Community, but is limited to national markets: first, only a small part of the production of hot-rolled wide strips in the Community is the subject of intra-Community trade; second, imports of such strips from non-member countries was limited by the imposition of very high anti-dumping duties [Commission Decision No 283/2000/ECSC of 4 February 2000 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more, not clad, plated or coated, in coils, not further worked than hot-rolled, originating in Bulgaria, India, South Africa, Taiwan and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered by certain exporting producers and terminating the proceedings concerning imports originating in Iran (OJ 2000 L 31, p. 15); Commission Decision No 1758/2000/ECSC of 9 August 2000 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of non-alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China, India and Romania, accepting an undertaking with regard to India and Romania and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed (OJ 2000 L 202, p. 21)]; third, in the course of 2000 the prices invoiced by Salzgitter for supplying hot-rolled wide strips had risen by almost 74% and, finally, there were considerable differences in the prices charged in the different Member States for hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates. 101. In addition, the applicants consider that, in calculating market shares with respect to hot-rolled wide strips, the Commission ought also to have taken account of the production of such strips by MRW, even if the latter sub-contracts such work to TKS. According to the applicants, the mere fact that MRW is not authorised to sell those strips to third parties by reason of public obligations imposed on it by the Commission does not alter that conclusion because, in the event of the cancellation of those obligations, MRW would in any case be a potential seller of hot-rolled wide strips and therefore a potential competitor of Salzgitter and other undertakings. 102. The applicants also observe that, in paragraph 14 of the ECSC decision, the Commission left open the question whether there was any overlapping between the market for hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates. According to the applicants, there cannot be the slightest doubt that, even in the Commission's concept, supplies of hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates are available on the same market so that, for the purpose of calculating shares in the quarto plate market, the Commission ought to have included the quantities of hot-rolled wide strips sold by Salzgitter. Consequently the applicants consider that, as the Commission made no findings whatever concerning the market for hot-rolled wide strips, its assessment of the quarto plates market is flawed. According to the applicants, this conclusion is inevitable particularly as, in paragraph 17 of the ECSC decision, the Commission found that the parties to the concentration had a 28% market share in sales of quarto plates alone, so that the share would have been even greater if the Commission had taken account of Salzgitter's sales of hot-rolled wide strips. 103. Finally, the applicants consider that Salzgitter's declaration of non-discrimination is not sufficient to mitigate the shortcomings of the decision regarding the assessment of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue, even if only because of the non-binding nature of the declaration and the resultant difference in treatment of the interested parties. The applicants also observe that their criticisms give rise to so many doubts as to the factual findings and the legal assessment in the EC decision that the very existence of that decision should be doubted. 104. The Commission, supported in this respect by the interveners, disputes the whole of the applicants' argument that it erred in its assessment of the horizontal and vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes. 2. Findings of the Court 105. First, it must be observed that the basic provisions of Regulation No 4064/89, in particular Article 2 thereof, confer a discretion on the Commission, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature. Consequently, review by the Community judicature of the exercise of that discretion, which is essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the discretionary margin implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations (Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, paragraphs 223 and 224; Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 165, and Case T-221/95 Endemol v Commission [1999] ECR II-1299, paragraph 106). 106. The applicants' argument that the Commission erred in its assessment of the horizontal effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes and, then, the same argument in relation to the vertical effects must be examined in the light of these principles. a) The horizontal effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes 107. In paragraph 11 et seq. of the EC decision, the Commission examined the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding and with spiral welding. In this connection, the Commission stated that the question whether large pipes with longitudinal welding and large pipes with spiral welding form a single market or separate markets, and the question whether the relevant geographical market is the European Economic Area (EEA) or the world market could be left open in so far as, in the present case, none of the market definitions was conducive to a finding that a dominant position had been created or strengthened as a result of the concentration. 108. In particular, the Commission found that, assuming that the relevant market is defined as the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding and with spiral welding at the world level or at the EEA level, the concentration at issue did not have the effect of creating or strengthening a dominant position. If the market in question was a world market, the Commission observed that, although the parties to the concentration had the leading position with a market share of 17%, first, the other competitors had a total market share of more than 80%, second, in the period 1997-1999 only 36% on average of the production capacity for large pipes at the world level was used and, third, the major international oil and gas companies had a very strong position in terms of demand. Likewise the Commission stated that, on the assumption that the market in question was confined to the EEA, the concentration would again not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position even though the parties to the concentration had the leading position with a market share of 30.5%. First, the other competitors had a total market share of approximately 70%, second, in the period 1997-1999 only 51% on average of the production capacity for large pipes in the EEA was used, third, the claim under consideration, namely that the market is limited to the EEA, is based mainly on specific segments such as water and construction, which represent only a secondary activity of the parties to the concentration and in which they have numerous competitors, and, fourth, the major international oil and gas companies have a very strong position in terms of demand in this market too. 109. In addition, the Commission considered that the concentration at issue did not have the effect of creating or strengthening a dominant position in the (narrower) market of large pipes with spiral welding at the world level or that of the EEA. At the world level, the combined market share of the parties to the concentration was only 8.6%. At the EEA level, the concentration likewise did not have the effect of creating or strengthening a dominant position although the parties to the concentration had a leading position in the EEA with a market share of 21.2%. First, they had a relatively limited market share and they had significant competitors, second, in the period 1997-1999 only 51% on average of the production capacity for large pipes in the EEA was used, third, the case under consideration, namely that the market is limited to the EEA, is based mainly on specific segments such as water and construction, which represent only a secondary activity of the parties to the concentration and in which they have numerous competitors, and, fourth, the major international oil and gas companies have a very strong position in terms of demand in this market too. 110. The foregoing grounds show, clearly and unequivocally, that, with regard to horizontal effects on the market for large welded pipes, the concentration at issue was not such as to raise serious doubts concerning its compatibility with the common market. 111. This conclusion is not invalidated by any of the applicants' arguments in that respect. 112. Contrary to the applicants' assertion, the mere fact that, according to paragraph 36 of the EC decision, the parties to the concentration together have a 30.5% share of the EEA market for large pipes with longitudinal welding and spiral welding does not mean, as such, that the concentration has the effect of creating or strengthening a dominant position in that market. Although the relationship between the market shares of the undertakings involved in the concentration and those of their competitors, especially those of the next largest, is relevant evidence of the existence of a dominant position (see the judgment in Gencor v Commission, cited in paragraph 105 above, paragraph 202), in the present case the Commission nevertheless set out clearly and unambiguously the reasons why it found that there was no dominant position (see paragraph 108 above). The applicants have failed to produce any evidence which would refute those grounds. 113. In addition, it is necessary to reject the applicants' argument that the accuracy of the size of the shares held by the parties to the concentration in the longitudinally welded and spirally welded large pipes market is doubtful in so far as, for the purpose of calculating market shares, the Commission took into account the sales volumes of Linde, which was never active in that market, of Gräbener, which has not operated in that market since 1993 and, finally, of Klöckner Muldenstein, which was the subject of insolvency proceedings on the date of notification. 114. Leaving aside Gräbener, which confirmed in a letter of 7 September 2001 that it had ceased the production of pipes in 1997, the applicants' allegations concerning Linde and Klöckner Muldenstein are not based on any concrete evidence and are furthermore refuted by the information provided by the Commission. The 2000 edition of the study Tube Mills of the World, various extracts from which were produced by the Commission, clearly mentions the names of those companies and carefully describes the nature and extent of their activities in the pipe production sector. Moreover, although Klöckner Muldenstein, which replied to the Commission's questionnaire, was the subject of insolvency proceedings on the date of adoption of the EC decision, that did not prevent the Commission from taking account of its market position. There was nothing to stop all or part of that company's pipe production from being continued, particularly if its business was taken over by another undertaking. 115. In any case, it must be observed that, in reply to a written question from the Court, the Commission showed clearly and convincingly that, even if the market shares of the three companies in question were not to be taken into account, the situation of the parties to the concentration in the market for large welded pipes would not have been fundamentally different, so that this circumstance would not have affected the Commission's assessment of the compatibility of the concentration with the common market. This statement of the Commission has not been challenged by the applicants. 116. Therefore the applicants' argument that the Commission erred in its assessment of the horizontal effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes must be dismissed. b) The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes 117. The parties' submissions concerning the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding must be considered separately from such submissions in relation to the market for large pipes with spiral welding. It is clear from paragraphs 12 and 13 of the EC decision that large pipes with longitudinal welding are made from quarto plates, whereas large pipes with spiral welding are made from hot-rolled wide strips. The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding 118. According to the applicants, the Commission erred in its assessment of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding in so far as it appears from paragraphs 17 to 19 of the ECSC decision that the parties to the concentration have a very strong position in the upstream market for quarto plates used in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding, which strengthens their position in the latter market. Together with Usinor/DH and Riva, they have a 96% share of the market for quarto plates used in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding, which indicates that they form an oligopoly in that market. 119. However, the Court observes that the Commission pointed out, in its pleadings and in reply to a written question from the Court, that the market shares mentioned in paragraphs 17 to 19 of the ECSC decision were not market shares in the technical sense of the term because, in addition to deliveries of quarto plates to third parties, they also included deliveries of quarto plates which were internal to the group. According to the Commission, the market shares of the parties to the concentration in the open market for quarto plates for all uses and in the (narrower) market for quarto plates used in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding were distinctly smaller because they fluctuated between 6.2% and 7.3% for quarto plates for all uses and were 10.6% for 1997 and 9.1% for 1999 for plates used in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding. 120. In view of these figures, which have not been challenged by the applicants, the Commission was justified, without making an erroneous assessment, in considering that the position of the parties to the concentration in the upstream market for quarto plates was not capable of creating or strengthening a dominant position of any kind in the downstream market for large pipes with longitudinal welding and, therefore, of giving rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. 121. Next it must be observed that, even accepting that the market shares mentioned in paragraphs 17 to 19 of the ECSC decision are shares in the open market, the mere fact that three undertakings together have a very large share of a given market is not, as such, proof that they form an oligopoly. It has consistently been held that a finding of a collective dominant position depends on three conditions being fulfilled: first, each member of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other members are behaving in order to monitor whether or not they are adopting the common policy; second, the situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable over time, that is to say, there must be an incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market; third, the foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of consumers, should not jeopardise the results expected from the common policy (see Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paragraph 62). The applicants have produced no evidence to show that these conditions are fulfilled in the present case. 122. Finally, it must be observed that, in paragraphs 20 to 22 of the ECSC decision, the Commission gave the reasons why it considered that the concentration at issue would not have the effect of threatening the supply of quarto plates to undertakings competing with the parties to the concentration in the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding. In particular, the Commission pointed out, first, that Salzgitter's share of supplies of quarto plates to the open market was too small for its possible withdrawal from the market to be a cause of concern, second, that pipe manufacturers obtained quarto plates from a number of producers other than DH, third, that any reduction by DH in deliveries of quarto plates to third parties in order to give preference to Europipe would affect the profitability of its rolling mills and would therefore automatically affect Europipe's competitive position in the downstream market for large pipes with longitudinal welding and, fourth, very little use was being made of the capacity of quarto plate rolling mills in Europe, so that the other producers of quarto plates for large pipes with longitudinal welding could perfectly well supply pipe manufacturers who at present obtained supplies from Salzgitter. 123. It must be observed that these reasons form part of the context in which the EC decision was adopted. According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons is not required to discuss all the issues of fact and of law in so far as the question whether a statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see Case T-290/94 Kaysersberg v Commission [1997] ECR II-2137, paragraph 150, and the cases cited there). This means that, where a decision-making authority is competent to adopt, in simultaneous procedures, two separate decisions concerning the same factual situation and that authority gives notice of the decisions to one and the same interested party within a short interval, each decision may, from the viewpoint of the duty to state reasons to that party, be regarded as forming part of the context of the other decision and may therefore properly serve as an additional statement of reasons in relation to that party. 124. It follows that, in a case such as the present, where the Commission adopts two separate decisions in simultaneous procedures in order to authorise one and the same concentration and the applicants are notified of the decisions simultaneously, the statement of reasons given in one of the decisions must necessarily be assessed in the light of the statement of reasons in the other. In such a case, although the appraisal carried out by the Commission in the decisions is based on different substantive and procedural rules (see paragraphs 70 to 72 above), the separate decisions nevertheless relate to one and the same concentration, so that in some respects the Commission's assessment may overlap. 125. In view of the foregoing, the applicants' argument that the Commission erred in its assessment of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding must be dismissed as unfounded. The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with spiral welding 126. According to the applicants, the Commission erred in its assessment in so far as it did not take account of the fact that the concentration at issue altered the situation of the parties to the concentration in the market for large pipes with spiral welding because, thanks to the production of hot-rolled wide strips by Salzgitter, MRW would thereafter have a secure source of supply, which would strengthen its position in the said market to the detriment of independent producers such as Ferndorf. 127. However, it must be observed that the Commission, in its pleadings and in reply to questions from the Court, pointed out that it was clear from the notification and from various information in its possession at the date of the notification that, first, MRW did not sell hot-rolled wide strips to third parties and, second, that Salzgitter had a market share of distinctly less than 25% because it sold to third parties only a small proportion of the hot-rolled wide strips which it produced. These figures were confirmed by the interveners who stated, in their pleadings and at the hearing, that Salzgitter's share of the Community market for hot-rolled wide strips was of the order of 4.2% for 1999. 128. In view of these figures, the Commission was justified, without making a manifestly erroneous assessment, in considering that the position of the parties to the concentration in the upstream market for hot-rolled wide strips was not capable of creating or strengthening a dominant position of any kind in the downstream market for large pipes with spiral welding and, therefore, of giving rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. 129. This conclusion is not invalidated by any of the applicants' arguments. 130. In the first place, the applicants are wrong in claiming that, apart from the quantities of hot-rolled wide strips sold to third parties by Salzgitter, the Commission ought to have taken into account those produced by MRW. 131. As the applicants themselves admit, at the date of notification MRW was not making hot-rolled wide strips, but subcontracted that work to Thyssen. The Commission pointed out, without being contradicted by the applicants, that it is extremely unlikely that a manufacturer with no production plant of its own for hot-rolled wide strips could be a significant competitor in that market. Furthermore, it must be observed that, although the applicants had received copies of Commission decision COM(70)25 of 20 January 1970 on the acquisition of certain parts of Mannesmann AG by August Thyssen-Hütte AG and the formation of the joint venture Mannesmannröhren-Werke and another joint venture by Thyssen-Hütte AG and Mannesmann AG, to which they referred in their pleadings and which was produced by the Commission before the hearing, the applicants have never been able to show to what extent that decision confirmed their view that the Commission required MRW not to sell hot-rolled wide strips to third parties. In those circumstances, the Commission did not err in its assessment in concluding that, with regard to such strips, there was no reason to take account of MRW, even as a potential competitor. 132. Second, it is necessary to reject the applicants' submissions seeking to show that the assertion by the Commission and the interveners that the parties to the concentration had a very limited share of the market for hot-rolled wide strips is based on an erroneous delimitation of the market for reference products. Although, contrary to the Commission's allegation, this submission cannot be deemed to be out of time, having been raised in sufficient detail in paragraphs 61 and 62 of the application, it nevertheless proves to be completely unfounded. 133. It must be observed that, in its pleadings, the Commission pointed out that, in its established practice [see, in particular, the Commission decisions authorising a concentration, 28 July 1997 (Case IV/ECSC.1243 - Krupp Hoesch/Thyssen, paragraph 19); 4 February 1999 (Case IV/ECSC.1268 - Usinor/Cockerill Sambre, paragraph 16) and 15 July 1999 (Case IV/ECSC.1310 - British Steel/Hoogovens, paragraph 13)], it has found that hot-rolled wide strips and the other hot-rolled products belong to one and the same market in so far as their production is characterised by a high degree of flexibility and capacity for adaptation which enables producers to offer and sell different types and qualities of hot-rolled wide strips without substantially increasing their costs. The applicants have not successfully challenged that finding. Contrary to the applicants' assertion, the mere fact that end users do not consider the different types and qualities of hot-rolled wide strips to be interchangeable does not show that those types and qualities belong to different markets, as the lack of interchangeability at the demand level is compensated for by interchangeability with regard to supply. 134. It must, moreover, be observed that certain passages of the application confirm that the Commission's findings are correct. For example, at paragraph 21 of the application, the applicants asserted that, when car sales are good, production capacities of hot-rolled wide strips are fully used, so that the demand from independent pipe producers encounters considerable bottlenecks with the main European suppliers. Furthermore, although the definition of the reference markets was mentioned in the questionnaire sent by the Commission in the administrative procedure, neither Ferndorf nor any other party claimed that hot-rolled wide strips for the production of pipes formed a market separate from that of strips for other purposes. 135. In this connection, the Court must reject the applicants' submission that, in footnote 20 of the defence, the Commission implicitly admitted that the market definition which they approve accords with its administrative practice. In the footnote the Commission merely stated that it was aware that demand exists in the car industry for products with greater value added, in particular demand for cold-rolled sheets. These are in turn made from hot-rolled wide strips. The Commission has consistently considered, and also in the present case, that these sheets should not be included in the market for hot-rolled wide strips. Contrary to the applicants' assertion, this passage does not at all confirm their market definition with regard to hot-rolled wide strips. In it the Commission does not assert that such strips intended for the production of pipes and such strips intended for other uses form two separate markets, but it does say that hot-rolled wide strips on the one hand and cold-rolled sheets obtained from hot-rolled wide strips - which are therefore on a market situated downstream of the latter - on the other hand, do not belong to one and the same market. 136. For the same reason, it is also necessary to reject the applicants' argument that the price comparisons which they produced in paragraphs 52 to 54 of the reply confirm the existence of separate markets, depending on the intended use of hot-rolled wide strips. It must be observed that those comparisons are not of the prices of different types and qualities of hot-rolled wide strips according to their use, but merely compare, on the one hand, the prices of hot-rolled wide strips with those of cold-rolled products with or without tinning and, on the other hand, the prices of cold-rolled products in different Member States. In no way do such comparisons make it possible to confirm the applicants' arguments regarding the definition of the market for hot-rolled wide strips. 137. Finally, it must be noted that, even if the applicants' proposed narrower definition of the product market had to be accepted, it would not have the repercussions they attribute to it. In particular, their statement that the total volume of sales to third parties of hot-rolled wide strips intended for the production of pipes is 300 000 tonnes per year turns out to be incorrect. As the interveners point out and as appears from table no. 6 entitled Share of Community sales in 1999 of flat hot-rolled carbon steel products on page 29 of the Commission decision authorising a concentration, of 21 November 2001 (COMP/ECSC.1351 - Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia) produced by the Commission, the total sales volume of hot-rolled wide strips at Community level was approximately 21.26 million tonnes in 1999 and Salzgitter's share of that market was smaller than 5%. Contrary to the applicants' argument, that figure relates only to sales of hot-rolled wide strips to third parties and does not include such sales within groups. Therefore, even assuming, as the applicants say, that in 1999 only 28% of the total volume of hot-rolled wide strips at Community level were used in the production of pipes, nevertheless the total volume of that market in 1999 was 6 050 000 tonnes and not 300 000 tonnes. 138. In this connection it should, however, be observed that the applicants' figure of 300 000 tonnes is not convincing because of the calculation method used, which consists in adding the volume of hot-rolled wide strips purchased by Ferndorf and Flender to the presumed volume of the same products purchased by the four other independent pipe producers still operating in the Community (according to the applicants), namely Technotubi, Tubemeuse, De Boer Buizen and Wilson Byard. As shown by the documents produced by the Commission and the interveners, there are in the Community many more than six undertakings producing pipes from hot-rolled wide strips which do not belong to a large integrated steel group. 139. Likewise the applicants' argument that the purchases of hot-rolled wide strips by the large integrated steel groups should not be taken into account must be rejected. Although the large groups have substantial internal production of those raw materials, they still find it necessary to buy such strips from their competitors in order to cover temporary requirements. On this point, the applicants' argument that these purchases should not be taken into account because they take place outside the market in accordance with procedures which are not subject to supply and demand is not based on concrete evidence. 140. Third, the applicants' argument that the Commission's assessment regarding the position in the upstream market for hot-rolled wide strips of the parties to the concentration is also based on an incorrect definition of the geographical reference market must be rejected. 141. It has been consistently held that the relevant geographical market is a defined geographical area in which the product concerned is marketed and where the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous for all economic operators, so that the effect on competition of the concentration notified can be evaluated rationally (see Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paragraphs 11 and 44, and the judgment in France and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 105 above, paragraph 143). 142. In the present case the Commission has put forward a number of considerations to show that, as also appears from its established practice (see, in particular, paragraph 25 of decision IV/ECSC.1243, paragraph 26 of decision IV/ECSC.1268 and paragraph 20 of decision IV/ECSC.1310, cited in paragraph 133 above), the geographical reference market for hot-rolled wide strips covers, at the very least, the territory of the entire Community. In particular, the Commission observed that transport costs are not very high, there are no barriers to entry and customers show only little preference for certain Community producers. 143. This viewpoint is confirmed by the study of the situation in the steel industry carried out by the Commission in 2001 (the steel industry study), extracts from which were reproduced in the annex to the Commission's reply. It appears from the summary table of visible consumption in the Member States and imports into each of them (page 23 et seq. of the study) that, contrary to the applicants' assertion, imports are especially high when compared with the total volume of consumption of hot-rolled wide strips in the Community. 144. Furthermore, the existence of a Community market for hot-rolled wide strips is confirmed in various passages of the applicants' submissions. In paragraph 21 of the application, they point out that Flender obtained supplies of hot-rolled wide strips from European sources and had asked well-known European suppliers to supply it. The applicants added, in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the reply, that approximately 25% to 30% of their imports of hot-rolled wide strips were from producers in other Member States, which confirms the hypothesis that a Community market in hot-rolled wide strips exists. 145. On this point the applicants are wrong in claiming that their price comparison in the reply shows that the geographical reference market is national rather than Community. It must be noted that, in paragraph 80 of the reply, they compare the prices of quarto plates with those of hot-rolled wide strips, which is irrelevant for assessing the geographical reference market for hot-rolled wide strips. It is true that, in paragraph 81 of the reply, the applicants compare the prices of hot-rolled wide strips which are charged in the Community. However, it must be observed that the comparison relates only to minimum and maximum prices for those products, which gives a distorted picture of the true situation. Moreover, even assuming that this comparison is accepted, the applicants state that price differences are of the order of 10% to 15%. As the Commission correctly points out, such an order of magnitude does not rule out the existence of a Community market. 146. Furthermore, it is also necessary to reject the applicants' allegation that, in paragraph 16 of the ECSC decision, the Commission wrongly referred to the importance of imports from non-member countries to support the argument concerning a Community market in hot-rolled wide strips. In actual fact, it is clear from the general context of the decision that the passage in question did not relate to hot-rolled wide strips, but only to quarto plates and semi-finished products. The previous sentence states clearly that the definition of the geographical market in question relates to quarto plates and semi-finished products, which seems logical in so far as the Commission pointed out, in paragraph 13, that the activities of the parties to the concentration did not overlap so far as those products were concerned. It also seems clear, from reading this passage, that, by reference to imports from non-member countries, the Commission did not intend to show that the geographical market covered the territory of the Community, but that it could possibly have a world dimension. In addition, the Commission's steel industry study makes it clear that, contrary to the applicants' assertion, the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of hot-rolled wide strips from non-member countries on the basis of decisions 283/2000/ECSC and 1758/2000/ECSC did not lead to a reduction in such imports. On the contrary, it appears from page 7 of the study that they actually increased. 147. Fourth, it must be noted that there is no concrete evidence for the applicants' statement concerning Salzgitter's alleged policy in relation to Flender concerning deliveries and prices of hot-rolled wide strips. The documents produced by the parties show that the price increases referred to by the applicants related not only to the hot-rolled wide strips supplied to them but to all steel products and that the increases were at least partly attributable to the boom in the whole of that market during 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, even assuming that the applicants' information is correct, they have by no means shown how Salzgitter's alleged acts are proof of a manifest error of assessment by the Commission regarding the effects of the concentration at issue. 148. Finally, it is necessary to reject the applicants' assertion that the Commission ought to have taken account of overlapping in the activities of the parties to the concentration in relation to the production of hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates and that the Commission ought to have included, for the purpose of calculating market shares, the quantities of hot-rolled wide strips sold by Salzgitter on the open market. It must be observed, first, that this argument contradicts the applicants' argument concerning the definition of the market for reference products for hot-rolled wide strips. It is contradictory to suggest on the one hand that the Commission ought to have found that hot-rolled wide strips for the production of pipes and such strips intended for other purposes form separate markets and, on the other hand, that the Commission ought to have found that there was a wider market bringing together hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates. Second, the Commission correctly pointed out in its pleadings that where, in paragraph 14 of the ECSC decision, it left open the possibility of replacing, for certain uses, quarto plates by plates cut in hot-rolled wide strips, that is precisely because it considered that, even by reference to the narrower definition of the market, the concentration did not give rise to competition problems. As noted above, the market shares of the parties to the concentration in the market for quarto plates (paragraph 119) and in that for hot-rolled wide strips (paragraph 127), taken separately, were very limited. Conclusion concerning the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes 149. In light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicants have not shown that there was a manifest error of assessment on the Commission's part with regard to the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes. 150. It is also clear from the foregoing reasoning that the applicants are mistaken in criticising the alleged shortcomings of Salzgitter's declaration of non-discrimination. As it has been shown that there was no manifest error of assessment by the Commission in finding that the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes were unlikely to raise serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with the common market, the question whether Salzgitter's declaration was or was not sufficient to mitigate those effects is irrelevant. In the circumstances, it was not even necessary to provide for such an undertaking on the part of Salzgitter. There was even less need to provide that the concentration at issue should be conditional upon such an undertaking. c) General conclusion 151. Having regard to the foregoing, the plea that there was an error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration on the markets for large welded pipes must be dismissed in its entirety. B - Plea relating to error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding 1. Arguments of the parties 152. The applicants consider that the EC decision contains an error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding. They submit that the Commission cannot claim, in that respect, that it did not have to assess the effects of the concentration on that market because the parties' activities did not overlap. The applicants observe that such an approach, which is confined to the purely horizontal effects of a concentration, is contrary to the principle expressed in form CO annexed to Regulation No 447/98 and in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 4064/89, namely that when appraising concentrations, the vertical effects must also be taken into account. According to the applicants, this is the necessary conclusion particularly in the present case, where the concentration constitutes a threat to the existence of independent producers of small pipes who, first, depend on Salzgitter for supplies of raw materials and, second, compete with Salzgitter in the downstream market for the production of small pipes. In this connection the applicants dispute the Commission's statement that the market shares of the parties to the concentration in the upstream markets for raw materials were not such as to give rise to doubts concerning the strengthening of their position in the downstream market for small tubes. According to the applicants, that statement is based on incorrect delimitation of the market for hot-rolled wide strips and on miscalculation of the volume of the market. 153. The applicants add that the fact that the Commission appraised the effects of the concentration on the market for the production of large pipes without taking account of the situation in the market for small pipes is all the more surprising in that, when appraising the pipe distribution market (paragraphs 18 to 20 of the EC decision), the Commission did not distinguish between trade in large pipes and that in small pipes, although such a distinction was essential in so far as the production and distribution of pipes coexist in the same market. They also consider that, in the EC decision, the Commission was wrong to treat pipe distribution as an independent reference market to be distinguished from the pipe production market on the basis of its previous decision of 7April 1999 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market (Case IV/M.1369 - Thyssen/Mannesmann, mentioned in paragraph 18 of the EC decision). 154. The Commission, supported in this respect by the interveners, denies that it erred in its assessment of the effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding. 2. Findings of the Court 155. Regarding the horizontal effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding, it is sufficient to observe that, as the applicants themselves admitted in paragraph 70 of the application, the activities of the parties to the concentration did not overlap in that market because only MRW operated in it through two of its subsidiaries, Mannesmann Präzisrohr GmbH and Röhrenwerk Gebrüder Fuchs GmbH. 156. As for the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding, it must be observed that, as shown in paragraph 127 above, the parties to the concentration at issue had a share of less than 5% of the upstream market of hot-rolled wide strips and the Commission could reasonably take the view that such effects could not give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, as appears from paragraph 132 et seq. above, the applicants are wrong in claiming that, with regard to hot-rolled wide strips, the calculation of volume and the definition of the reference market accepted by the Commission and the interveners are erroneous. 157. In addition, it is necessary to reject the applicants' argument that the exclusion of small pipes when appraising the effects of the concentration on the pipe production market conflicts with the fact that, in the appraisal of the pipe distribution market in paragraphs 18 to 20 of the EC decision, the Commission did not distinguish between trade in large pipes and trade in small pipes. 158. This argument is based on the erroneous premiss that pipe production and pipe distribution constitute one and the same market and are therefore subject to the same considerations regarding the definition of narrower markets. The Commission pointed out that, in past decisions and, in particular, in paragraph 7 of decision IV/M.1369, cited in paragraph 153 above, it found that the pipe production market constituted a separate market from the pipe distribution market because of the different customer structure, differences in the quantities sold and the difference in the ability to react to customers' wishes. In answer to this, the applicants put forward no effective argument to show that this finding was mistaken. In this connection, the mere fact that, as the applicants contend, the pipe distributor sells the same product as the pipe producer does not prove that pipe production and pipe distribution constitute a single market. 159. In view of the foregoing, it must be found that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding that the effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding could not give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with the common market. 160. Consequently this plea must be dismissed. C - Plea relating to failure to take account of the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings that resulted from the concentration at issue 1. Arguments of the parties 161. In essence, the applicants contend that the Commission erred in its assessment in so far as, when examining the notified concentration, it omitted to investigate, with reference to Article 81 EC and Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89, the harmful consequences for competition of the corporate ties between Salzgitter and other undertakings resulting from the concentration at issue. In particular, the applicants refer to the fact that, as a result of the operation, first, Salzgitter controls, jointly with Usinor/DH, the joint venture Europipe, which produces large welded pipes from quarto plates and hot-rolled wide strips, and, secondly, Salzgitter controls, jointly with Thyssen/TKS, the joint venture HKM which produces crude steel, slabs and quarto plates. The applicants consider that under Article 81 the Commission must take account of the relationships between the parties concerned and must investigate the relevant consequences for competition in each of the markets in question. Furthermore, according to the applicants, the Commission has an obligation, when investigating concentrations, to take account of the degree of the potential risk to effective competition arising from the fact that competing producers form a joint venture in view of their common interests, which may affect their trading practices in spheres of joint or related activities. 162. The Commission, supported by the interveners, considers this plea unfounded (defence, paragraphs 54 to 75; statement in intervention, paragraphs 32 to 35; report for the hearing, paragraphs 96 to 108). 2. Findings of the Court 163. Through the concentration at issue Salzgitter acquired control of MRW which, in turn, had joint control, with DH which forms part of the Usinor group, of Europipe. As is apparent from paragraph 30 of the EC decision Europipe is the world leader in the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding and spiral welding. 164. In addition, as appears from paragraph 6 of the EC decision, Salzgitter also acquired indirectly joint control of HKM by taking control of MRW. Before the concentration at issue, MRW already held directly 20% and indirectly 30% of the shares of HKM through Vallourec & Mannesmann Tubes, of which it has joint control. Salzgitter now shares control with TKS, which is part of the Thyssen group. HKM produces mainly semi-finished products. 165. It follows that, by means of joint control of Europipe and HKM, the concentration at issue has had the effect of creating indirect links between Salzgitter and, respectively, Usinor/DH and Thyssen/TKS. 166. Therefore it is necessary to establish whether, as the applicants claim, the Commission erred in its assessment in so far as it omitted to appraise the consequences of those indirect links in relation to Article 81 EC and Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89. a) Assessment by reference to Article 81 EC 167. The applicants contend that the Commission neglected to take account, by reference to Article 81 EC, of the fact that, as a result of the indirect acquisition of joint control of Europipe and HKM, there is a risk that the parent companies of those joint ventures will coordinate their activities in the markets where the joint ventures operate or in associated markets. 168. However, it must be observed that, as the Commission rightly points out, the concentration was notified on 1 August 2000 on the basis of Article 4 of Regulation No 4064/89 and not on the basis of Article 81 EC. 169. It is true that, as mentioned in paragraph 76 above, according to settled case-law, the Commission must in principle avoid inconsistency which may arise in the implementation of different provisions of Community law (see the judgments in the cased of Matra v Commission, cited in paragraph 61 above, paragraphs 41 to 47, and DIR International Film and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 61 above, paragraphs 21 and 30), and that the Court of First Instance has inferred from this principle that, in adopting a decision on the compatibility with the common market of a concentration between undertakings, the Commission cannot ignore the consequences which the grant of State aid to those undertakings has on the maintenance of effective competition in the relevant market (RJB Mining v Commission, cited in paragraph 61 above, paragraph 114). According to the applicants, it follows from this case-law that the Commission has the same obligation if, when assessing the compatibility of a concentration with the common market, it is informed of the existence of a cartel binding one of the parties to the concentration. 170. However, it must be noted that, in the present case, the Commission had no information on the existence of such a cartel and the applicants have not shown, or even asserted, that the parties to the concentration had concluded restrictive agreements with Usinor and/or Thyssen. The latter merely refer to the risk that, by virtue of their participation in Europipe and HKM, those companies may be tempted to act in that way. However, it is clear that, when assessing the compatibility of a notified concentration with the common market, the Commission cannot be obliged, under Article 81 EC, to consider the hypothetical risk that the parties to the concentration may be required to conclude such restrictive agreements as a result of the concentration. According to the clear wording of Article 81(1) EC, the prohibition which it lays down applies only when anti-competitive agreements have actually been concluded. Furthermore, it has consistently been held that the appraisal by the Commission of the compatibility of a concentration with the common market must be carried out solely on the basis of matters of fact and law existing at the time of notification of that transaction, and not on the basis of hypothetical factors, the economic implications of which cannot be assessed at the time when the decision is adopted (Air France v Commission, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 70). 171. It follows from the foregoing that the Commission had no obligation to assess the consequences, if any, of the indirect links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings by reference to the prohibition laid down by Article 81(1) EC and therefore the Commission made no error of assessment in that respect. b) Assessment by reference to Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89 172. The applicants allege that the Commission failed to take account, by reference to Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89, of the degree of potential risk to effective competition arising from the fact that competing producers may take part in a joint venture in view of common interests which may affect their trading practices in spheres of joint or related activities. 173. On this point it must be stressed that, generally, it cannot be ruled out that indirect links such as those called into question by the applicants in this case may affect the competition behaviour of undertakings connected in that way in certain markets. In exercising joint control of a joint venture, the parent companies will necessarily have to agree on the commercial management of the venture and, to some extent, on their own positions in relation to the joint venture in certain markets. 174. It follows that the existence of such indirect links of a financial and structural nature is a factor which must be taken into account when assessing a concentration by reference to the conditions laid down in Article 2(2) and (3) of Regulation No 4064/89 (see, to that effect, in relation to collective dominant positions, the judgment in Gencor v Commission, cited in paragraph 105 above, paragraph 277 et seq.). 175. However, in the present case it has not been shown that the indirect links referred to by the applicants between Salzgitter and various other undertakings were likely to give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. 176. The applicants have produced no evidence to show that the existence of indirect links between Salzgitter and Thyssen/TKS arising from control of the joint venture HKM was capable of having any effect whatever on the markets for slabs, quarto plates and hot-rolled wide strips and, therefore, of raising serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. As the Commission rightly points out, that cannot have been the case here because, at the date of notification, HKM was not producing quarto plates or hot-rolled wide strips and was not selling slabs to third parties. 177. Likewise the applicants have produced no evidence to show that the existence of indirect links between Salzgitter and Usinor/DH arising from control of the joint venture Europipe was capable of having any effect whatever on the markets for quarto plates and hot-rolled wide strips and, therefore, of raising serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. As the Commission points out, that can hardly have been the case here because the shares of the parties to the concentration in those markets were very small. 178. In addition, it must be observed that, in response to the doubts expressed by third parties who feared that, because of the links between Salzgitter and Usinor/DH arising from the concentration at issue, they might be tempted to limit their supplies of quarto plates to competitors of Europipe, the Commission set out, in paragraphs 20 to 22 of the ECSC decision, the reasons why it considered that those links could not possibly have any such effect. First, it pointed out that, as Salzgitter's deliveries of quarto plates in 1999 were only 33 000 tonnes, the complete withdrawal of that company would not have a noticeable effect on the market for quarto plates in any case and/or on the (narrower) market for quarto plates intended for the production of large pipes with longitudinal welding. Second, the Commission observed that, although Usinor/DH already had joint control of Europipe before the concentration at issue, that company had continued to supply quarto plates to pipe producers competing with Europipe. Furthermore, if Usinor/DH stopped supplying those producers, that would have the effect of increasing the production costs of quarto plates and, thereby, damaging Europipe's competitiveness. Consequently, there was no need to fear that Usinor/DH would act in that way. Third, the Commission pointed out that plate production capacity in Europe is largely under-used, so that other producers of quarto plates for the production of pipes could supply quarto plates to pipe producers previously supplied by Salzgitter. Finally, the Commission noted that there were no obstacles to entry which would prevent plate producers from switching to the production of quarto plates. 179. These various reasons, which are not disputed by the applicants and which form part of the context of the EC decision (see paragraph 123 above), show clearly and unambiguously that the links between Salzgitter and Usinor/DH arising from the concentration at issue could not, in any case, have the disastrous vertical effects attributed to them by the applicants. 180. Therefore it must be concluded that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding that the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings could not give rise to doubts concerning the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. c) Conclusion 181. In view of the foregoing, the present plea must be dismissed as unfounded. D - Plea of breach of the obligation to state reasons 1. Arguments of the parties 182. The applicants submit that, when adopting the EC decision, the Commission breached its obligation to state reasons in so far as it gave no reasons for its appraisal of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the markets for large welded pipes and of the horizontal and vertical effects of the concentration on the markets for small pipes with longitudinal welding. In addition, the applicants consider that the Commission breached its obligation to state reasons in so far as the EC decision contains no reasons regarding its assessment of the effects of the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings. 183. The Commission, supported on this point by the interveners, denies that it breached its obligation to state reasons when adopting the EC decision. 2. Findings of the Court 184. It has consistently been held that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (see Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63, and the judgments cited there). 185. It follows that, when the Commission declares a concentration compatible with the common market on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation No 4064/89, it is a necessary and sufficient condition in relation to the duty to state reasons that the decision states clearly and unequivocally the reasons why the Commission considers that the concentration at issue does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. However, contrary to what the applicants suggest, it cannot be inferred from that obligation that, in such a hypothetical case, the Commission must provide reasons for its assessment of all the matters of law and of fact which may be connected with the notified concentration and/or which were raised during the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, the judgment in the case of Air France v Commission, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 92). 186. Not only is such a requirement difficult to reconcile with the need for promptness on the Commission's part when it exercises its power to examine concentrations and, in particular, when it approves a concentration on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation No 4064/89, but, in addition, such a requirement is difficult to justify from the viewpoint of the very nature of that power. It must be observed that, in the framework of the system established by Regulation No 4064/89, the Commission is obliged to assess, using a prospective analysis of the reference markets, whether the concentration which has been referred to it creates or strengthens a dominant position with the consequence that effective competition is significantly impeded in the common market or a substantial part thereof. Such a procedure requires that there be a close examination in particular of the circumstances which, in each individual case, are relevant for assessing the effects of the concentration on competition in the reference markets (see the judgment in Air France and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 105, paragraph 222). It follows that, if a concentration does not modify, or modifies only to a very limited extent, the competition situation in a given market, the Commission cannot be required to set out specific reasoning on that point. Likewise, the Commission does not fail in its duty to state reasons if, in its decision, it does not include specific reasons concerning the assessment of a number of aspects of the concentration which seem to it manifestly irrelevant or insignificant or plainly of secondary importance for the assessment of the concentration (see, to that effect, the judgment in the case of Sytraval and Brink's France, cited in paragraph 184 above, paragraph 64). 187. It follows from the foregoing that the mere fact that a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation No 4064/89 does not give reasons in relation to some matters of fact or of law does not mean, as such, that the Commission failed in its duty to state reasons when it adopted that decision (see, to that effect, the judgments in Air France v Commission, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 92, and Kaysersberg v Commission, cited in paragraph 123 above, paragraph 150). The absence of reasons may also be interpreted as meaning that, in the Commission's opinion, those matters cannot raise serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. 188. It is necessary to determine, in the light of those principles, whether, as the applicants submit, the Commission failed in its obligation to state reasons by not including in the EC decision explicit reasons regarding its appraisal of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the markets for large welded pipes and its horizontal and vertical effects on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding, and its appraisal of the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings. 189. On this point the Court finds that, as is clear from its examination of the different pleas relating to alleged errors of assessment, the Commission set out clearly and unequivocally in the EC decision the reasons why it considered that the concentration at issue did not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. 190. Although the EC decision gives no reasons for the Commission's appraisal of the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes, it must nevertheless be observed that, as found in paragraph 117 et seq. above, mainly by reason of the parties' very small shares of the upstream markets for hot-rolled wide strips and quarto plates, those factors could not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. 191. Moreover, in response to the submissions of EBM and Ferndorf during the administrative procedure, the Commission set out, in paragraphs 20 to 22 of the ECSC decision, which form part of the context of the EC decision (see paragraph 123 above), the reasons why it considered that the concentration at issue did not have the effect of threatening the supply of quarto plates for undertakings competing with the parties to the concentration on the downstream market for large pipes with longitudinal welding. Furthermore, in paragraph 23, the Commission took note of Salzgitter's declaration of non-discrimination, which sought to respond to the concerns of independent producers of pipes with regard to their raw material supplies from Salzgitter. 192. Accordingly the Commission did not breach its obligation to state reasons regarding the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes. 193. Likewise it must be concluded that the Commission did not fail to fulfil its obligation to state reasons by not including in its decision reasons for, first, its appraisal of the horizontal and vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for small pipes and, second, its appraisal of the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings. As found in paragraphs 155 et seq. and 163 et seq. above, those factors could not give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market. Furthermore, it must be noted that during the administrative procedure neither EBM nor Ferndorf raised any objections in that respect. 194. In view of the foregoing, this plea must be dismissed. E - Plea that the adoption of separate decisions was illegal 1. Arguments of the parties 195. On the basis of the arguments summarised in paragraph 59 et seq. above, the applicants submit that it was illegal for the Commission to adopt two separate decisions to authorise the concentration at issue. 196. The Commission rejects the applicants' arguments in their entirety. 2. Findings of the Court 197. As is clear from paragraph 67 et seq. above, it was not illegal for the Commission to adopt separate decisions to authorise the concentration at issue. Therefore this plea must be dismissed. F - Application for production of documents 1. Arguments of the parties 198. The applicants submit that Salzgitter and the Commission are not entitled to rely on material statements contained in the notification of the concentration because neither the Court nor the applicants have had an opportunity to examine the document. According to the applicants, the references to such material statements are inadmissible by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 116(4)(c) of the Rules of Procedure. As a precaution, should the Court consider that such references are nevertheless admissible, the applicants request the Court to order the Commission to produce the administrative file relating to the concentration at issue for the purpose of taking evidence or, at least, to order the Commission to produce the notification(s) of the concentration. 199. The Commission considers it inexpedient for the Court to take such measures for the organisation of procedure in so far as, irrespective of their legal basis, they form part of an action which, according to the Commission, is manifestly inadmissible. 2. Findings of the Court 200. First of all, it must be observed that the request for production of the notification of the concentration at issue has become devoid of purpose because the Commission produced a copy of the notification, annexed to its letter of 16 December 2002, a copy of which was sent to the applicants. 201. With regard to the request for production of the administrative file for the concentration at issue, although, as the applicants claim, the Commission and the interveners cannot rely on documents to which neither the Court nor the applicants have had access, it must be observed that this circumstance alone does not, as such, justify an order by the Court for the production of documents on the basis of Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure. The Court may order such a measure for the organisation of procedure only if the applicants make out a plausible case that the documents are necessary and relevant for the purposes of judgment. In the present case the applicants have made no submissions at all to that effect. Moreover, not only do the applicants not specify what they mean by administrative file of the concentration, but the Commission and the interveners have never referred to any such file. 202. Consequently there are no grounds for granting the applicants' request for production of the administrative file. Costs 203. Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. As the applicants have failed in their submissions, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission and the interveners. On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Declares the action inadmissible in so far as it seeks the annulment of decision COMP/ECSC.1336 of 14 September 2000; 2. Declares the action admissible but unfounded in so far as it seeks the annulment of decision COMP/M.2045 of 5 September 2000; 3. Orders the applicants to pay their own costs together with those of the Commission and those of Salzgitter and Mannesmann. Lenaerts Azizi Jaeger Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 8 July 2003. H. Jung K. Lenaerts Registrar President Table of contents Legal context II - 2 A - Legal context of the ECSC decision II - 2 B - Legal context of the EC decision II - 4 Facts and procedure II - 5 Forms of order sought by the parties II - 8 Admissibility II - 8 A - Admissibility of the application for annulment of the ECSC decision II - 8 1. Arguments of the parties II - 8 2. Findings of the Court II - 9 B - Admissibility of the application for annulment of the EC decision II - 10 1. Arguments of the parties II - 10 2. Findings of the Court II - 12 C - The applicants' submission that the action is admissible in its entirety in so far as it seeks the annulment of two decisions which in reality form a single decision II - 14 1. Arguments of the parties II - 14 2. Findings of the Court II - 15 D - Admissibility of Mannemann's statement in intervention II - 20 1. Arguments of the parties II - 20 2. Findings of the Court II - 21 The substance of the case II - 23 A - Plea relating to error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded steel pipes II - 23 1. Arguments of the parties II - 23 2. Findings of the Court II - 26 a) The horizontal effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes II - 26 b) The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes II - 28 The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with longitudinal welding II - 29 The vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large pipes with spiral welding II - 31 Conclusion concerning the vertical effects of the concentration at issue on the market for large welded pipes II - 36 c) General conclusion II - 37 B - Plea relating to error of assessment concerning the effects of the concentration on the market for small pipes with longitudinal welding II - 37 1. Arguments of the parties II - 37 2. Findings of the Court II - 38 C - Plea relating to failure to take account of the links between Salzgitter and various other undertakings that resulted from the concentration at issue II - 39 1. Arguments of the parties II - 39 2. Findings of the Court II - 39 a) Assessment by reference to Article 81 EC II - 40 b) Assessment by reference to Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89 II - 41 c) Conclusion II - 43 D - Plea of breach of the obligation to state reasons II - 43 1. Arguments of the parties II - 43 2. Findings of the Court II - 43 E - Plea that the adoption of separate decisions was illegal II - 46 1. Arguments of the parties II - 46 2. Findings of the Court II - 46 F - Application for production of documents II - 46 1. Arguments of the parties II - 46 2. Findings of the Court II - 47 Costs II - 47 1: Language of the case: German.