Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2006:669
Date: 2006-10-26
Language of the case: Greek
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Greece

Summary of the Judgment Approximation of laws – Insider dealing – Directive 89/592 – Prohibition on taking advantage of inside information (Council Directive 89/592, Arts 1 and 2) Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 89/592 coordinating regulations on insider dealing must be interpreted as meaning that, when the main shareholders and members of the board of directors of a company agree to effect between themselves stock-market transactions in the transferable securities of that company in order to support artificially the price of those securities, they are in possession of inside information of which they do not take advantage with full knowledge of the facts when they carry out those transactions. Knowledge of the existence of such a decision and of its content constitutes, for those who participated in its adoption, inside information within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 89/592. However, where all of the contracting parties have the same information, they are on an equal footing and the information ceases to be inside information for them in the context of the implementation of the decision adopted within the group. Against this background, since none of them is in a position to derive an advantage over the others, the transactions effected between the members of the group on the basis of that information do not constitute taking advantage, with full knowledge of the facts, of inside information within the meaning of Article 2 of that directive. (see paras 33, 39, 44 and operative part)