Order — ECLI:EU:C:2004:690
Date: 2004-10-29
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Second Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Concepts: General;Appeals;Admissibility and examination of applications, forms of order sought and pleas in law;Measures of inquiry and measures of organisation of procedure
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded
Origin: Italy

Summary of the Order 1. Procedure – Time-limits for bringing an action – Appeals – Conditions relating to service for the purpose of the proceedings – Failure of the Registry of the Court of First Instance to notify service – Time-bar based on third subparagraph of Article 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance – None (Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Arts 44(2), third subpara., 100(2) and 114(1)) 2. Procedure – Measures of organisation of procedure – Written questions put to the parties – No automatic effect on the outcome of the dispute – Freedom of the Court of First Instance in its absolute discretion to assess the facts and evidence (Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Arts 49, 64 and 65) 3. Appeals – Grounds of appeal – Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment of the facts and evidence – Excluded save in cases of distortion (Art. 225 EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58) 4. Procedure – Obligation of the Court of First Instance to rule on an objection of inadmissibility after initiating the oral procedure – None (Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 114(1) to (3)) 5. Procedure – Time-limits for bringing an action – Time-bar – Excusable error – Concept – Scope 1. It cannot be inferred from the absence of advice by the Registry of the Court of First Instance, by telefax or other technical means of communication, as to the service of a judgment or an order of that Court that the applicant is precluded from bringing an appeal and is automatically subject to the third subparagraph of Article 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, which provides that service is deemed to have been duly effected by the lodging of a registered post letter at the post office of the place where the Court of First Instance has its seat. That provision applies only where there is no statement of an address for service in Luxembourg and/or no agreement by the applicant’s lawyer or agent that service may be effected on him by telefax or other technical means of communication. (see paras 22-23) 2. The decision to put written questions is a matter which is entirely within the discretion of the Court of First Instance, which may, at any stage of the proceedings, prescribe any measure of organisation of procedure or any measure of enquiry referred to in Articles 64 and 65 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance. The use of that power does not, however, have any automatic effect on the outcome of the dispute, as the Court of First Instance remains free in its absolute discretion to assess the value to be given to the whole of the facts and evidence which have been submitted to it or which it has itself adduced. (see para. 28) 3. It is not the task of the Court of Justice in an appeal to rule on the assessment of the facts and evidence by the Court of First Instance, save where there has been a clear distortion of those facts and evidence by that Court. (see para. 29) 4. Provided that it considers itself to be sufficiently informed by the documents before it, Court of First Instance may rule on an objection of inadmissibility without initiating the oral procedure, as Article 114(1) to (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance does not impose any duty to hold a hearing. (see para. 35) 5. An individual may plead excusable error in exceptional circumstances in order to avoid the time-bar applying to actions of annulment, in particular when the conduct of the institution which was the author of the contested measure has been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to pardonable confusion in the mind of a party acting in good faith and exercising all the diligence required of a normally well-informed person. (see para. 50)