Order — ECLI:EU:C:1998:329
Date: 1998-06-25
Language of the case: English
Court formation: President of the Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: External relations;Overseas countries and territories
Concepts: Application for interim measures: suspension of operation of the contested measure and other interim measures;Appeals
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Application for interim measures

Summary of the Order
1. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Decision to
grant or refuse suspension likely to have irreversible effects — Balance of interests
(EC Treaty, Art. 185)
2. Appeals — Grounds of appeal — Incorrect assessment of facts — Inadmissible — Application
in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory order
(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 50, second para., and 51)
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SUMMARY — CASE C-159/98 P(R)
3. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Conditions for
granting — Serious and irreparable damage — Contested decision in breach of a Treaty pro­
vision — Criterion not automatically met
(EC Treaty, Art. 185)
4. Appeals — Grounds of appeal — Incorrect assessment of evidence — Inadmissible
(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51)
5. Appeals — Grounds of appeal — Inadequate reasoning — Application in the case of an inter­
locutory order
(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51)
6. Applications for interim measures — Interim measures — Conditions for granting — Serious
and irreparable harm — Prima facie case — Application refused on the ground of lack of
urgency and on the supererogatory ground of failure to establish a prima facie case — Con­
sequences in the event of an appeal
(EC Treaty, Art. 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2); Rules of Pro­
cedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
1. In most interlocutory proceedings, the
decision to grant or to refuse suspension
of application of a measure as sought is
likely to produce, to a certain extent, cer­
tain definitive effects, and it is for the
judge hearing an application for interim
suspension to weigh up the risks attach­
ing to each of the possible solutions.
Assessment of whether the suspension
sought is provisional in nature thus can­
not, in principle, be separated from that
of the balance of interests.
2. Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of
Justice, under which an appeal is limited
to points of law and may lie only on
grounds of lack of competence of the
Court of First Instance, a breach of pro­
cedure before it or infringement of Com­
munity law by it, applies equally to
appeals brought under the second para­
graph of Article 50 of that Statute against
decisions of the Court of First Instance
given in interlocutory proceedings.
3. A breach, if any, of a Treaty provision by
a Council Decision, whilst it may affect
the validity of that decision, cannot in
principle be sufficient on its own to estab­
lish that any damage caused is serious and
irreparable and thereby fulfil one of the
criteria for granting suspension of opera­
tion of the decision.
4. In an appeal, the Court of Justice does
not in principle have jurisdiction to
examine evidence which the Court of
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First Instance has accepted in support of
its findings or assessments of the facts.
Where the general principles of law and
rules of procedure governing the burden
of proof and the taking of evidence have
been observed, it is for the Court of First
Instance alone to assess the weight to be
attributed to the evidence produced.
5. A judge hearing an application for
interim measures cannot be required to
reply explicitly to all the points of fact
and law raised in the course of the inter­
locutory proceedings. It is sufficient that
the reasons given validly justify the order
in the light of the circumstances of the
case and enable the Court of Justice to
exercise its powers of review.
6. Where an appeal is brought against an
order dismissing an application for
interim measures not only on the ground
that no prima facie case had been made
but also because the appellant had not
established the existence of serious and
irreparable harm such as to justify sus­
pending application of the contested
decision, so that the reasoning in the
order under appeal relating to the issue of
a prima facie case is supererogatory, a
ground of appeal relating to the existence
of a prima facie case, but which does not
call into question the lack of urgency of
the measures sought, cannot form
grounds for setting aside, even partially,
the order under appeal.
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