Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2026:53
Date: 2026-01-29
Language of the case: Dutch
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Netherlands

Summary C-431/24 – 1 
Case C-431/24 [Multan] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
20 June 2024 
Referring court:  
Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond (Netherlands) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
20 June 2024 
Applicant:  
W 
Defendant:  
Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid 
  
Subject of the action in the main proceedings 
The main proceedings concern a dispute between W, an asylum seeker from 
Pakistan (‘the applicant’), and the staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (State 
Secretary for Justice and Security; ‘the State Secretary’). The applicant appealed 
against the State Secretary’s decision to declare his application for international 
protection unfounded, which also led to a return decision being issued against the 
applicant. 
Subject and legal basis of the request for a preliminary ruling 
By this request under Article 267 TFEU, the Rechtbank Den Haag (District Court, 
The Hague), sitting at Roermond (Netherlands; ‘the referring court’), asks the 
Court of Justice to clarify what information is included in the concept of 
‘information in the applicant’s file upon the basis of which a decision is or will be 
made’ within the meaning of Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32. That 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-431/24 
 
2  
interpretation is relevant to the question of whether the applicant and/or the 
referring court should be given access not only to the data in question but also to 
(non-anonymised) information on how that data was obtained, in particular in the 
context of the assessment of the risk of refoulement. 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Should Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with 
Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32, and having regard to Articles 4 and 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning 
that the (access to the) information in the applicant’s file on the basis of which a 
decision has been or will be made also includes (access to) information on the 
manner in which that information was gathered and obtained? 
2. Does Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 13(1) 
of Directive 2008/115, and having regard to Articles 4, 19(2) and 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, require the judicial 
authority reviewing the lawfulness of a return decision to ascertain how the 
information referred to in Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32 was gathered and 
obtained? 
Provisions of EU law relied on 
Articles 23 and 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (‘Directive 2013/32’) 
Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (‘Directive 2008/115’) 
Articles 4, 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(‘the Charter’) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Article 8:29 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General Law on Administrative 
Law) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 31 August 2014, the applicant lodged an application for international 
protection. That application was declared unfounded by a decision that had 
become final. On 21 November 2018, the applicant lodged a further application 
for international protection. The State Secretary rejected this application as 
MULTAN 
 
 
manifestly unfounded by a decision dated 31 May 2022. This decision includes a 
return decision with no deadline for voluntary departure and a two-year re-entry 
ban. The main proceedings concern the applicant’s appeal against this second 
rejection decision. 
2 The applicant based his application for international protection on the fact that he 
is a Christian and that, for that reason alone, he has reason to fear persecution in 
Pakistan. The applicant further stated that he had carried out evangelising 
activities in Pakistan and that a fatwa had therefore been issued against him and 
that he was also currently carrying out evangelising activities in the Netherlands. 
To substantiate his account, he has, inter alia, made statements and submitted a 
copy of the fatwa authenticated in a court in Pakistan. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
3 As in the first proceedings, the State Secretary considers the account only partially 
credible. He considers it credible that the applicant is a Christian from Pakistan 
and that a fatwa has been issued against him. The State Secretary does not 
consider it credible that the applicant performed evangelising activities in Pakistan 
nor that he is currently doing so in the Netherlands. The State Secretary takes the 
view that the part of the account deemed credible does not lead to the conclusion 
that the applicant should fear persecution or that he runs a risk of being subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment after his return. 
4 In order to be able to assess the application for protection, the State Secretary had 
a so-called individual official report (‘individueel ambtsbericht’) drawn up, on 
which he based his final rejection of the application. Such an official report is 
issued by the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
‘BZ’) at the State Secretary’s request. The State Secretary directs specific 
questions requiring investigation to the BZ which, in seeking to answer these 
questions, may conduct research in the country of origin of the third-country 
national concerned. 
5 The applicant takes the position, inter alia, that, by not allowing him full access to 
the underlying documents of the individual official report, the State Secretary is 
acting contrary to the rights of the defence guaranteed by EU law. In particular, 
the applicant wishes to know to whom his data was disclosed and whether his 
personal data was lawfully processed. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
6 The referring court observes, first of all, that it already follows from the judgment 
of the Court of Justice of 22 September 2022 in Case C-159/21 Országos 
Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság and Others (EU:C:2022:708) that the 
confidentiality procedure laid down in Article 8:29 of the Algemene wet 
bestuursrecht, by means of which the official report at issue in the present case 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-431/24 
 
4  
was anonymised, is not compatible with EU law because it does not fully 
guarantee the applicant’s rights of defence. 
7 By the present request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court wishes to 
ascertain what information falls under ‘the information in the applicant’s file upon 
the basis of which a decision is or will be made’ within the meaning of 
Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32. That interpretation will determine whether the 
applicant should also be given access to information on how the BZ conducted the 
investigation in the country of origin and whether the referring court should have 
such information available to it. 
8 The referring court points out that, throughout the procedure, no (ascertainable) 
assessment takes place of whether the investigation carried out by the BZ as such 
affects the risk of refoulement, and also that it was not subjected to judicial 
review. Thus, the risk of refoulement could have increased if, for example, local 
actors in the country of origin were asked specific questions about the applicant. 
In that case, the protection afforded by Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 and 
Articles 4 and 47 of the Charter would not be fully guaranteed if the rights of the 
defence did not extend to the manner in which the information in the file was 
gathered and the court competent to rule on the lawfulness of the decision on 
international protection could not fully assess the risk of refoulement. 
9 If the Court of Justice interprets Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32 to mean that 
the underlying non-anonymised documents cannot be regarded as the information 
in the applicant’s file on the basis of which the decision on his application for 
international protection was made, the applicant cannot derive a right of access to 
those documents from that provision. 
10 However, the question then arises as to whether Articles 5 and 13(1) of Directive 
2008/115 require the referring court to take cognisance of the investigative report 
of the BZ in order to ensure that the applicant does not have to fear persecution or 
risk being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment after returning to his country of origin. In fact, in the main 
proceedings, that court must also review the lawfulness of the return decision, and 
the obligation to respect the principle of non-refoulement when implementing 
Directive 2008/115 requires an independent, ex nunc assessment of all the 
relevant facts and circumstances. Indeed, the EU law prohibition of refoulement 
has an absolute character and must be respected at all stages of the procedure, 
while, in addition, an effective remedy before a tribunal is required at the judicial 
stage. 
11 The referring court finds that the confidentiality procedure laid down in national 
law is not compatible with Directive 2013/32, and refers to the Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling the questions set out above in order to determine the 
information to which the applicant must have access in order to be able to exercise 
his rights of defence, and the information to which the courts must have access in 
order to ensure that the prohibition of refoulement is not infringed. The referring 
MULTAN 
 
 
court cannot deduce the answers to the two questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling from the case-law of the Court of Justice and therefore considers it 
necessary that those questions be answered in order to be able to give a ruling in 
the main proceedings.