Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2023:1029
Date: 2023-12-21
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;Police cooperation;Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Germany

Anonymised version 
Translation C-396/22 – 1 
Case C-396/22 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
15 June 2022 
Referring court: 
Kammergericht (Berlin, Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
14 June 2022 
Applicant: 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin 
  
KAMMERGERICHT (HIGHER REGIONAL COURT, BERLIN) 
Order 
[…] 
In the extradition case concerning 
a Polish national 
[…] Berlin, […] 
the Criminal Chamber of the Higher Regional Court, Berlin, made the following 
order on 14 June 2022: 
The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU: 
1. Must proceedings for the subsequent determination of a cumulative 
sentence still also be considered to fall within the scope of Article 4a(1) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 
EN 
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2009/299/JHA, where the decision is taken by way of a judgment following 
a hearing, but, in that judgment, the finding of guilt cannot be reviewed and 
the sentence imposed in respect of the individual offence cannot be 
amended? 
2. Is it compatible with the primacy of EU law for the German legislature 
to have configured the case of conviction in absentia as an absolute 
impediment to surrender in Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die 
internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters), even though Article 4a(1) of Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA, provides only for an optional ground for refusal in that 
regard? 
G r o u n d s: 
1 A. Facts 
1. By European arrest warrant issued by the Sąd Okregowy w Piotrkowie 
Trybunalskim ([…] [Regional Court], Piotrków Trybunalski) on 5 February 2021 
[…], the Polish authorities seek the surrender of the requested person for the 
purpose of executing the cumulative custodial sentence of 3 years deriving from 
the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of the Sąd Rejonowy w Piotrkowie 
Trybunalskim ([…] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski) of 30 October 2019 
[…], a custodial sentence of which 2 years, 11 months and 27 days remain to be 
executed. 
2 That judgment imposing an aggregate sentence is based on the sentences deriving 
from the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of the […] [District Court], 
Piotrków Trybunalski, of 25 April 2019 […] and from the judgment of that […] 
[district court] of 10 June 2019 […]. Sentences deriving from the judgments of the 
Sąd Rejonowy w Skierniewicach ([…] [District Court], Skierniewice) of 
30 January 2017 […] and of the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 
15 May 2017 […] were included in the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence 
of 25 April 2019, which determined a cumulative custodial sentence of 2 years 
and 10 months. 
3 Specific details regarding the judgments: 
a) In case […], the […] [District Court], Skierniewice, imposed on the requested 
person a cumulative custodial sentence of 1 year and 2 months (individual 
sentences: two sentences of 10 months). It found him guilty of having stolen, 
together with co-perpetrators on 21 April 2016 in Skierniewice, the injured party’s 
wallet, containing PLN 210 in cash, an identity card, a senior citizen’s identity 
card, a cash card and a bank card on a bus on line 5, and of having subsequently 
used the injured party’s Maestro credit card to make contactless payments for 
purchases totalling PLN 80.88 at the Zabka store and at a grocery store/cake shop 
in Skierniewice. 
GENERALSTAATSANWALTSCHAFT BERLIN 
 
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4 b) In case […], the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, imposed on the 
requested person a cumulative custodial sentence of 2 years (individual sentences: 
one sentence of 1 year and 6 months and two sentences of 1 year). It found him 
guilty of having committed the following offences in Piotrków Trybunalski on 
16 July 2015: 
aa) beating, together with another person, in the dwelling […], a further injured 
party on her head and all over her body, as a result of which the injured party 
suffered numerous bruises, scratches and grazes; the requested person also 
knocked out an incisor tooth of the injured party; 
bb) beating, together with […], near No 10 of the street […], the injured party […] 
on his head and all over his body, as a result of which the injured party suffered 
bruises and grazes as well as a cut on his left browridge; 
cc) beating, while sitting in a passenger car on the street […], the driver […], 
ripping out the mirror and gear knob and pulling the car key out of the ignition, 
causing the driver to lose control of the car and hit a lamppost; the vehicle 
sustained damage in the amount of PLN 15 000. 
5 c) In case […], the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, imposed on the 
requested person a cumulative custodial sentence of 5 months (individual 
sentences: 4 months and 2 months). It found him guilty of having insulted two 
police officers in Piotrków Trybunalski on 6 August 2018 in the public house […] 
as well as in the police station […], of having carried 0.47 grams of cannabis at 
that time and of having kept a further 0.14 grams of cannabis in his dwelling. 
6 2. a) The requested person participated in part of the hearings on which the 
judgment of the […] [District Court], Skierniewice, of 30 January 2017 was 
based. He appeared at the hearing held on 17 November 2016. He did not appear 
at the further hearing held on 19 December 2016, to which he had been 
summoned in person at the hearing held on 17 November 2016, but he did appear 
at the next hearing, held on 23 January 2017. On that date, he was notified in 
person of the date of delivery of the judgment on 30 January 2017, but he 
nevertheless did not appear for the delivery of the judgment. No defence lawyer 
participated in those proceedings. 
7 b) The requested person participated in the hearing held on 15 May 2017, on 
which the judgment of the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of the 
same date was based. He was also represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 
8 c) The requested person did not participate in the hearing on which the 
judgment of the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 10 June 2019 was 
based. He was not represented by a defence lawyer either. The summons was 
served in accordance with Article 139(1) of the Kodeks postępowania karnego 
(Polish Code of Criminal Procedure; ‘the kpk’), by way of two notices sent by 
Polish post to the address most recently provided by the requested person. 
Article 139(1) of the kpk is worded as follows: 
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If the party, without providing notification of a new address, changes his or 
her place of residence or does not reside at the address provided by him or 
her, the procedural document shall be deemed to have been served if it was 
sent to the address provided. 
9 Under Polish law (Article 75(1) of the kpk), an accused person is obliged to 
inform the investigating authorities of changes of address. Article 75(1) of the kpk 
is worded as follows: 
If the accused person remains at liberty, he or she is obliged to appear in 
response to any summons in the course of the criminal proceedings and to 
notify the authority conducting the proceedings of any change, of a duration 
exceeding seven days, of his or her address or place of residence; the 
accused person shall be informed of those obligations at the first hearing. 
10 Since, in this case, the requested person was arrested at 1:50 a.m. and released at 
1:15 p.m. on 6 August 2018, it must be assumed that he was informed of the 
requirement laid down in Article 75(1) of the kpk to provide notification of any 
change, of a duration exceeding seven days, of his address or place of residence, 
but that he did not comply with that requirement, with the result that the place 
where he was actually residing was not known to the […] [District Court], 
Piotrków Trybunalski, when the summons was served. 
11 d) The requested person also did not participate in the hearing on which the 
judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of the […] [District Court], Piotrków 
Trybunalski, of 30 October 2019 was based. He was also summoned to that 
hearing in accordance (only) with Article 139(1) of the kpk, since he was no 
longer residing at the address which he had most recently provided. The court had 
arranged for an ‘on-site interview’ to be conducted at that address, and no one 
responded to the message that was left there. The probation officer had also been 
unable to make contact with the requested person. Neighbours reported that they 
had not seen the requested person for three months (prior to 14 October 2019). It 
was also checked whether the requested person was in custody; the check 
established that this was not the case. No defence lawyer participated in those 
proceedings either. 
12 3. a) The Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (General Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin) 
had initially requested that detention pending extradition be ordered in respect of 
the requested person. 
In that respect, it proceeded on the assumption – correctly so, in the view also of 
the present Chamber – that there was no impediment to surrender under 
Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in 
Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters; ‘the 
IRG’) with regard to the judgments of the […] [District Court], Skierniewice of 
30 January 2017 and the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 15 May 
2017. In that regard, Paragraph 83 of the IRG, which transposes Article 4a of 
GENERALSTAATSANWALTSCHAFT BERLIN 
 
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Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA, into national law, is worded as follows: 
(1) Extradition shall not be permissible where 
1. … 
2. … 
3. … in the event of a request for the purpose of executing a sentence, the 
convicted person did not appear in person at the hearing of the trial which 
resulted in the conviction, or 
4. … 
(2) Notwithstanding subparagraph (1)(3), extradition shall, however, be 
permitted where 
1. the convicted person 
(a) in due time 
(aa) was summoned in person to the trial which resulted in the conviction or 
(bb) actually received, by other means, official information of the scheduled 
date and place of that trial in such a manner that it was unequivocally 
established that the convicted person was aware of the scheduled trial; and 
(b) was informed that a decision may also be handed down in his or her 
absence, 
2. the convicted person, being aware of the proceedings against him or 
her, and in which a defence lawyer participated, prevented a summons in 
person through absconding or 
3. the convicted person, being aware of the scheduled trial, gave a 
mandate to a lawyer to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed 
defended by that lawyer at the trial. 
(3) Notwithstanding subparagraph (1)(3), extradition shall also be 
permitted where the convicted person, after being served with the judgment, 
1. expressly stated that he or she would not challenge the judgment 
handed down or 
2. did not request a retrial or appeal within the applicable time frames. 
The convicted person must have been expressly informed in advance of his 
or her right to a retrial, or an appeal, in which the person has the right to 
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participate and which allows the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, 
to be re-examined, and which may lead to the original decision being 
reversed. 
(4) Notwithstanding subparagraph (1)(3), extradition shall also be 
permitted where the convicted person will be personally served with the 
judgment immediately after his or her surrender to the requesting Member 
State and he or she will be informed of his or her right to a retrial or appeal 
as referred to in the second sentence of subparagraph (3) and of the time 
limits applicable thereto. 
13 However, the General Prosecutor’s Office considered that the impediment to 
surrender under Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the IRG does exist with regard to the 
judgment of the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 10 June 2019, 
since the summons by way of deemed service as provided for in Article 139(1) of 
the kpk could not provide the requested person with actual knowledge of the 
hearing, as required in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
24 May 2016, C-108/16 PPU (EU:C:2016:346) (see also, present Chamber, order 
of 18 March 2015, [4] 151 AuslA 147/13 [268/13, 183/14], 
ECLI:DE:KG:2015:0318.4.151AUSLA147.13.0A). 
14 By contrast, with regard to the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of the 
[…] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 30 October 2019, the General 
Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin took the view that, despite the summons which had 
likewise been issued only by way of deemed service as provided for in 
Article 139(1) of the kpk, there was no impediment to surrender under 
Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the IRG. 
15 In that regard, the General Prosecutor’s Office first stated that, in accordance with 
the judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 August 2017, C-271/17 PPU 
(EU:C:2017:629), the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’ in Article 4a of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA, must be interpreted as also relating to a decision – such as the 
judgment imposing an aggregate sentence in the present case – which (without a 
fresh decision on the finding of guilt and the sentences imposed in respect of the 
individual offences) amends the level of the sentence to be executed, inasmuch as 
the competent court which adopted the latter decision enjoyed a certain discretion 
in that regard. The General Prosecutor’s Office stated that, on the basis of that 
interpretation and the standard to be applied to the summons in accordance with 
the judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 May 2016, C-108/16 PPU, surrender for 
the purpose of executing the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of 
30 October 2019 is impermissible. The General Prosecutor’s Office took the view 
that, as a result, surrender for the purpose (only) of executing the sentences 
deriving from the judgments of the […] [District Court], Skierniewice, of 
30 January 2017 and the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 15 May 
2017, which were included in the judgment imposing the aggregate sentence and 
to which there is no objection per se, would have to be declared to be permissible. 
GENERALSTAATSANWALTSCHAFT BERLIN 
 
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16 However, the General Prosecutor’s Office considers that that outcome places a 
convicted person apprehended in a Member State other than the convicting State 
at a disadvantage in relation to convicted persons apprehended in the convicting 
State itself. In that connection, it refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
15 April 2021, C-221/19 (EU:C:2021:278), and the fact, emphasised in that 
judgment, that a judgment imposing an aggregate sentence necessarily leads to a 
more favourable result for the person concerned because the quantum of the 
aggregate sentence is always less than that resulting from the individual sentences 
deriving from the previous convictions. Therefore, the requested person is placed 
at a disadvantage where his or her surrender to the sentencing State cannot take 
place on the basis of the judgment imposing the aggregate sentence, but can take 
place only for the purpose of executing the sentences deriving from the previous 
convictions taken into account (the quantum of which is greater), whereas, if 
apprehended in the convicting State, he or she would have to serve the sentence 
deriving from the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence (the quantum of 
which is lower). 
17 The General Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin therefore takes the view that, in order to 
avoid that disadvantage, surrender for the purpose of executing the judgment 
imposing the aggregate sentence must be permissible (account also being taken, in 
the present case, of the finding that surrender is impermissible with regard to the 
sentences deriving from the judgment of the […] [District Court], Piotrków 
Trybunalski, of 10 June 2019). 
18 b) After the present Chamber stated that the individual judgments lost their 
character as an independent basis for enforcement once they had been included in 
the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence, and that the […] [Regional Court], 
Piotrków Trybunalski, had also not sought surrender for the purpose of enforcing 
those judgments, and after having obtained further information from the […] 
[Regional Court], the General Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin now requests that the 
surrender of the requested person be declared to be impermissible. 
19 4. The condition of double criminality, to which surrender is subject, is met with 
regard to all the offences which are the subject of the proceedings. 
20 5. To date, the requested person has not been heard in relation to the European 
arrest warrant, since it is to be feared that, if he were to become aware of the 
request for surrender, he would evade the German authorities, as he already has 
done with respect to the Polish authorities. If the request of the General 
Prosecutor’s Office in Berlin that the surrender be declared impermissible were to 
be complied with after the response to the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling, it would also not be necessary to hear the requested person, since he would 
not be adversely affected by the decision. Should the answers to the questions 
referred establish that surrender could be permissible, the question of 
permissibility would not have to be ruled on immediately. Rather, the proceedings 
would have to be continued by detaining the requested person, who, in that case, 
would also have to have legal counsel appointed and be given a fair hearing. 
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21 It is requested that, to the extent possible, the requested person not participate in 
the proceedings before the Court of Justice, so as not to give him cause to evade 
the authorities. 
B. Grounds for the questions referred 
22 1. As rightly stated by the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Fifth Chamber of the 
Court of Justice held that the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’, within the 
meaning of Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, also refers to subsequent proceedings which 
led to the judgment handing down the cumulative sentence, at the end of which 
the decision that finally amended the level of the initial sentence was handed 
down, inasmuch as the authority which adopted the latter decision enjoyed a 
certain discretion in that regard (judgment of 10 August 2017, C-271/17). Those 
conditions are met in the case of the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of 
the […] [District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, of 30 October 2019, since, 
according to the information provided by the […] [Regional Court], Piotrków 
Trybunalski, Article 86(1) of the Polish Criminal Code provides that, in the 
determination of the aggregate sentence, the court may, at its discretion, deliver a 
sentence the lower limit of which equates to the greatest individual sentence and 
the upper limit of which equates to the sum of all the individual sentences. 
Moreover, the abovementioned judgment of the Fifth Chamber of the Court of 
Justice also related to a judgment imposing an aggregate sentence delivered under 
Polish law. 
23 However, the present Chamber has doubts as to whether supplementary 
proceedings in which the finding of guilt is not reviewed and, moreover, the 
sentence delivered in respect of the individual offence is not amended are in fact 
covered by Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, especially given that the question as to 
whether Article 4a of the Framework Decision applies would therefore depend on 
the form taken by those supplementary proceedings in the national law of the 
convicting State, namely on whether those supplementary proceedings are 
conducted within the framework of a trial resulting in a decision. Accordingly, in 
German criminal procedural law, under Paragraphs 460 and 462(1) of the 
Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure; ‘the StPO’), supplementary 
proceedings for the determination of an aggregate sentence take the form of 
proceedings for the adoption of an order without an oral procedure being 
conducted. 
24 The Fifth Chamber of the Court of Justice bases its view on two decisions of the 
ECtHR, namely the judgment of 15 July 1982 in Eckle v. Germany, no. 8130/78 
(CE:EHCR:1982:0715JUD000813078) […] and the judgment of 28 November 
2013 in Dementyev v. Russia, no. 43095/05 
(CE:EHCR:2013:1128JUD004309505). 
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25 The judgment in Eckle v. Germany related to an infringement of Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR due to the excessive duration of criminal proceedings. In that 
connection, the ECtHR stated, in paragraph 77 of its judgment, that the period to 
be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the duration of proceedings 
ends only when the cumulative sentence is determined. Although, with regard to 
the determination of a cumulative sentence, the ECtHR states in that respect that 
‘the Koblenz Court of Appeal delivered its judgments [French: arrêts]’ (end of 
paragraph 77), it is apparent from the description of the facts in paragraphs 35 and 
36 of its judgment that what was in fact at issue was the subsequent determination 
of a cumulative sentence in proceedings for the adoption of an order under 
Paragraphs 460 and 462(1) of the StPO. This is because, as evidenced by the 
grounds of the judgment, the decision of the Landesgericht Trier (Regional Court, 
Trier) determining a cumulative sentence was challenged by way of an 
‘immediate appeal’ (sofortige Beschwerde), on which the Oberlandesgericht 
Koblenz (Higher Regional Court, Koblenz) ruled. The remedy of an ‘immediate 
appeal’ exists only in proceedings for the adoption of an order. If the Regional 
Court, Trier, had ruled by judgment (‘Urteil’), the latter would have been subject 
to an appeal on a point of law (‘Revision’), on which the Bundesgerichtshof 
(Federal Court of Justice) would have had to rule. Moreover, in the proceedings 
for the adoption of an order, the decision of the Higher Regional Court, Koblenz, 
could be issued only by way of an order, not a judgment. 
26 In the case of Dementyev v. Russia, the ECtHR was called on to rule on an alleged 
infringement of Article 6(1) and (3)(c) of the ECHR in proceedings concerning 
the determination of an aggregate sentence, in which, under Russian law, the 
decision, which is subject to the discretion of the court, is issued by order 
following a hearing; the convicted person may participate in the hearing or be 
represented by defence counsel, but may also waive both rights. In that 
connection, the ECtHR held that proceedings concerning the determination of an 
aggregate sentence come within the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR (paragraph 26 
of the judgment). 
27 Therefore, it is true that it follows from the decisions of the ECtHR relied on by 
the Fifth Chamber of the Court of Justice that Article 6 of the ECHR also applies 
in principle to subsequent proceedings concerning the determination of an 
aggregate sentence and that the right of the convicted person to be heard also 
applies in such proceedings. However, it cannot be inferred from those decisions – 
both of which relate to proceedings for the delivery of an order, not of a 
judgment – that the right to be heard can be granted only by way of participation 
in a (public) main trial. The present Chamber takes the view that the case-law of 
the ECtHR therefore does not provide any compelling indications regarding the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘trial’ in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA. This is 
without prejudice to the (self-evident) fact that the rights of the defence must also 
be observed in the proceedings concerning the subsequent determination of an 
aggregate sentence. 
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28 The present Chamber attaches greater importance to the circumstance that – as 
outlined above – proceedings concerning the subsequent determination of an 
aggregate sentence take different forms in the Member States. Whereas, in 
accordance with the decision of the Fifth Chamber of the Court of Justice, 
Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA, would be applicable to Member States in which – like 
the Republic of Poland – the determination of an aggregate sentence is ruled on by 
way of a judgment following a hearing, the substantively identical proceedings in, 
for example, the Federal Republic of Germany would not be covered by the 
concept of ‘trial’, because under the code of criminal procedure such proceedings 
take the form of proceedings for the adoption of an order without an oral 
procedure being conducted, to which, on the sole basis of its wording, 
Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA, is not applicable. 
29 The present Chamber therefore asks: 
30 [Question 1 repeated] […] 2. If Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, is applicable 
to the judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of the […] [District Court], 
Piotrków Trybunalski, of 30 October 2019, it would have to be assumed, in 
accordance with the judgment of the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice of 
24 May 2016, C-108/16 PPU, that the summons served on the requested person in 
accordance with Article 139(1) of the kpk does not satisfy the requirements of 
Article 4a(1)(a)(i) of that framework decision, since it did not provide the 
requested person with certain knowledge of the hearing. 
31 However, the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice also held that the executing 
judicial authority may also take into account other circumstances that enable it to 
be assured that the surrender of the person concerned does not mean a breach of 
his or her rights of defence, in particular his or her conduct, whereby particular 
attention might be paid to any lack of diligence on the part of the person 
concerned in the exercise of his or her rights, notably where it transpires that he 
sought to avoid service (paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment). The Fourth 
Chamber of the Court of Justice therefore takes into account the fact that 
Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA, prescribes only an optional ground for refusal in the case 
of a conviction in absentia, the assertion of which is at the discretion of the 
executing judicial authority (see also judgments of the Fifth Chamber of the Court 
of Justice of 10 August 2017, C-270/17 PPU, [EU:C:2017:628], paragraph 96, 
and C-271/17, paragraphs 106 and 107; judgment of the Fourth Chamber of the 
Court of Justice of 17 December 2020, C-416/20 PPU, [EU:C:2020:1042], 
paragraphs 51 and 52). 
32 However, Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, has not been transposed into national law in 
full in that regard. Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the IRG establishes an absolute obstacle 
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to surrender, which does not apply only in the exceptional cases set out in 
Article 4a(1) of that framework decision and in the case – which had already been 
developed in the German case-law – that the requested person, being aware of the 
proceedings against him or her, and in which a defence lawyer participated, 
prevented a summons in person through absconding (Paragraph 83(2)(2) of the 
IRG). German law does not provide for a possibility for the executing judicial 
authority to exercise discretion. 
33 The present Chamber is precluded from applying that framework decision 
directly, as framework decisions do not have direct effect (see Court of Justice, 
judgment of 24 June 2019, C-573/17, [EU:C:2019:530], paragraph 69, in respect 
of the framework decisions which are relevant in the present case). However, it is 
obliged to interpret national law in conformity with the framework decision in 
order to achieve the result sought by that decision (see Court of Justice, loc. cit., 
paragraphs 72 and 73), but an interpretation contra legem is ruled out (see Court 
of Justice, loc. cit., paragraph 76). 
34 Therefore, it is not possible to interpret Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the IRG as meaning 
that, in examining the impediment to surrender, the present Chamber has a margin 
of discretion that goes beyond the exceptions under Paragraph 83(2) to (4) of the 
IRG. It is true that it would have to be considered whether the conduct of the 
requested person, who can no longer be contacted by the Polish court, is to be 
regarded as ‘absconding’ within the meaning of Paragraph 83(2)(2) of the IRG. 
However, since the requested person was not represented by a defence lawyer in 
the proceedings concerning the determination of an aggregate sentence, the 
application of that exception is also excluded on the basis of the clear wording of 
that law, which is not open to interpretation in that regard. 
35 If the present Chamber were entitled to take a decision in the exercise of its 
discretion as provided for in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 
as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, it would consider the transfer 
of the requested person to be permissible. Contrary to his obligation arising from 
Article 75(1) of the kpk, the requested person did not inform the Polish criminal 
prosecution authorities of the fact that he had left his previous address or of his 
new place of residence, with the result that he could not be contacted by them. 
Due to that failure to comply with the statutory obligations of which he was 
aware, he frustrated the attempts to summon him to the main trial before the […] 
[District Court], Piotrków Trybunalski, and thus to his hearing concerning the 
determination of the aggregate sentence. There is therefore no legitimate interest 
in not transferring him for the purpose of executing the custodial sentence 
imposed by the judgment imposing the aggregate sentence. 
36 The present Chamber therefore asks: 
[Question 2 repeated] […] 
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37 3. The above question applies equally to the judgment of the […] [District Court], 
Piotrków Trybunalski, of 10 June 2019. In that respect, too, the requested person 
frustrated the attempts to summon him in person by failing to provide notification 
of the change of his place of residence, contrary to the obligation which arises 
from Article 75(1) of the kpk and of which he was aware. 
[…]