Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2015:222
Date: 2015-04-22
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary list of annexes, ‘Elements … of public knowledge corroborating the information given in the contested [restrictive] measures’. According to the Council, what is stated in the annexes to the contested acts, with regard to the conduct of the applicants undermining fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy in Zimbabwe, is public knowledge, as is shown, in detail, in the various documents submitted in Annex B.19. 179 In the light of the foregoing, that annex need not be taken into consideration in order to assess whether the statement of reasons for the contested acts is sufficient. The Court considers, accordingly, that there is no need to adopt the measure of organisation of the procedure proposed by the applicants with regard to that annex (see paragraph 25 above). 180 Having regard to the Council’s explanation, as summarised in paragraph 178 above, it is plain that the documents in Annex B.19 to the Council’s defence must be distinguished from the documents requested by the applicants in their request mentioned in paragraph 19 above. As stated previously, shortly after the submission of the applicants’ request for the adoption of a measure of organisation of the procedure as mentioned in paragraph 25 above, the Council sent to the applicants the documents sought in their request mentioned in paragraph 19 above. It follows that the documents in Annex B.19 to the Council’s defence are not, as such, documents on which the Council relied when adopting Decision 2012/97 and Implementing Decision 2012/124. 181 The purpose of Annex B.19 to the Council’s defence must, rather, be considered to have been not to state reasons ex post for the contested acts, but to show that, having regard to the background to the adoption of those acts, the statement of reasons for those acts was sufficient (see, to that effect, Council v Bamba, paragraph 141 above, paragraph 62). 182 Last, the Court also considers that the specific grounds, as they are set out in the annexes to Decision 2012/97 and Implementing Regulation No 151/2012 with regard to the applicants who are legal persons, in order to justify their being listed in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue, are likewise sufficient. With respect to each of the entities concerned, it is stated that the entity is either owned by one or other of the natural persons who are subject, under the same acts, to restrictive measures, or that it is associated with the Zimbabwean Government, an agency of the government or the ‘ZANU-PF faction’ in the Zimbabwean Government. Those reasons are sufficient to enable the entities concerned to challenge their merits and to enable the Court to carry out its review. 183 In conclusion, the Court must hold that the reasons stated in the contested acts meet the requisite legal standard with regard to all the applicants and the third plea in law must therefore be rejected as being unfounded. The fourth plea in law: infringement of the rights of the defence 184 The applicants claim that the principle of respect for the rights of the defence in the context of this case requires the institutions of the European Union to meet two main obligations. First, they must inform the person or entity concerned of the case and the evidence adduced against it to justify the imposition of restrictive measures. Second, the person or entity concerned must be afforded the opportunity effectively to make known its point of view on that evidence. Further, the applicants state that, in the event of the renewal of a restrictive measure previously decided on with respect to a person or entity, the need to protect the rights of the defence and the right to be heard make it necessary that the person or entity is provided with the incriminating evidence and that the person or entity is able to submit its observations on that evidence before any decision on the renewal of the measure at issue. 185 Yet in this case, according to the applicants, none of them were provided, either before the adoption of the contested acts or after it, with evidence capable of justifying with regard to each of them the acts at issue. Nor did they have the opportunity to submit observations on that evidence. The contested acts do not contain any safeguards in that respect. Furthermore, those acts include allegations of serious criminal misconduct, without giving any indication of the source of those allegations and without taking account of the data protection concerns identified by the Commission and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) which may arise where the Council or the Commission processes data concerning criminal offences or convictions. 186 As the Court of Justice has stated, in a review of restrictive measures the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see the judgment of 28 November 2013 in Case C‑280/12 P Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian [2013] ECR, paragraph 58 and case-law cited). 187 One of those fundamental rights is respect for the rights of the defence, which is affirmed in Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and includes the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality (see Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, paragraph 186 above, paragraphs 59 and 60, and case-law cited). 188 According to the same case-law, the question whether there is an infringement of the rights of the defence must be examined in relation to the specific circumstances of each particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of its adoption and the legal rules governing the matter in question (see Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, paragraph 186 above, paragraph 63 and case-law cited). 189 In this case, it is clear that, although the applicants have narrated, in their application, the provisions, general principles and case-law applicable in this area, their specific complaint, as summarised in paragraph 185 above, is that the Council failed to disclose to them, before the adoption of the contested acts, the evidence for the conduct which is imputed to them by those acts and which constitutes the justification for the measures adopted with respect to them, and failed to give them the opportunity to submit their observations on that evidence. 190 Yet it is not appparent from the file and, it may be added, the applicants do not claim, that, prior to the request for the disclosure of evidence which they sent to the Council five days before the bringing of the action (see paragraph 19 above), the applicants had made a request to the Council for disclosure of the evidence on which the Council relied as justification for the imposition on them of the restrictive measures at issue. 191 It follows that the applicants start from the premise that if the Council was to respect their rights of defence, it ought to have disclosed to them that evidence on its own initiative and without any request having been made to it. That premise is however incorrect. 192 As the Court held in its judgment in Case T‑390/08 Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009] ECR II‑3967, paragraph 97, when sufficiently precise information has been disclosed, enabling the entity concerned effectively to state its point of view on the evidence adduced against it by the Council, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence does not mean that the institution is obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in its file. It is only on the request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue. It would in fact be excessive to require spontaneous disclosure of the material in the file, given that when a fund-freezing measure is adopted it is not certain that the person concerned intends to check, by means of access to the file, the matters of fact supporting the allegations made against it by the Council. 193 Yet following the analysis of the third plea in law, it has been concluded that the reasons stated in the contested acts meet the requisite legal standard (see paragraph 183 above). In other words, the Court must hold that the applicants had in their possession information which was sufficiently precise, as required by the case-law concerned, and that, accordingly, it was the responsibility of the applicants themselves to request, if they wished, disclosure of the evidence concerning them on which the Council had relied. As has been stated, the applicants made such a request only five days before the lodging of the initiating application. 194 There is nothing in the file to suggest that the applicants could not, had they wished, have submitted such a request earlier. On the contrary, there is material which indicates that the applicants were aware of the possibility of contacting the Council on the subject of the restrictive measures imposed on them and, in that context, of requesting disclosure of the evidence concerning them. 195 In particular, it must be observed that the Council lodged in the file a letter dated 1 September 2011, which applicant No 1, Mr Johannes Tomana, had sent to the President of the European Council, ‘on behalf of all the natural and legal persons and legal entities’ listed in the Annex to Decision 2011/101. In that letter, Mr Johannes Tomana disputed that the grounds stated in that annex to justify the imposition of restrictive measures on all those persons were either sufficient or well founded. On the other hand, Mr Johannes Tomana made no request for the disclosure of the evidence for the claims made in the annex concerned. 196 It must also be observed that, in their response to a written question from the Court, the applicants, with the exception of Mr Johannes Tomana, have not stated that they had not authorised Mr Tomana to write the letter concerned also on their behalf. They merely denied that Mr Johannes Tomana acted on their behalf ‘for the purposes of being notified of their designations’. 197 It may be added that it is not only by means of sending the abovementioned letter that Mr Johannes Tomana asserted that he also acted on behalf of the other applicants. With their initiating application, the applicants lodged a letter sent to their representatives by Mr Johannes Tomana, in which the latter asserts that he represents all the other applicants and, on their behalf and his own, gives instructions to those representatives to initiate proceedings. 198 It must also be observed that a reply was given to Mr Johannes Tomana’s letter dated 1 September 2011 by a letter dated 20 September 2011 from the Head of Cabinet of the President of the European Council, in which it was stated that the grounds for the imposition of restrictive measures on the persons and entities concerned were set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/101 and reference was made, in addition, to the Council Notice of 16 February 2011 for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies to which restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2011/101 apply (OJ 2011 C 49, p. 4). That notice mentioned, inter alia, that the persons, entities and bodies concerned by the restrictive measures at issue could ‘submit a request to the Council … that the decision to include them on the [list concerned] should be reconsidered’ and indicated the address to which such a request was to be sent. A similar notice was moreover published in the Official Journal on 18 February 2012 (OJ 2012 C 48, p. 13), following the adoption of Decision 2012/97. 199 Irrespective of whether those factors justified the Council’s decision to notify Mr Johannes Tomana of the adoption of Decision 2012/97 and thereby notify the other natural persons mentioned in that decision, as the Council asserts that it did, those factors confirm that the applicants could have contacted the Council earlier in order to obtain the evidence which they requested and obtained following the request made by them which is referred to in paragraph 19 above. 200 As regards the latter request, the Council’s response to it, by sending the evidence requested (in a non-confidential version), was somewhat delayed, by around seven months, a period justified according to the Council by the need to obtain the ‘declassification’ of many of the documents concerned. In the absence of any reason to suggest otherwise, one can imagine that the Council’s response to any earlier request by the applicants on the same subject would have been the same, in other words the Council would have sent to them a non-confidential version of the evidence requested. 201 It must be added that the fact that the Council did not send to the applicants the evidence requested by their letter mentioned in paragraph 19 above until 27 November 2012 had no effect on whether the applicants had the opportunity to present their point of view before the Court. The applicants requested and obtained from the Court an extension, on two occasions, of the period for the lodging of their reply and they therefore had the opportunity of commenting on that evidence in their reply. Their arguments concerning those documents are examined below, as part of the analysis of the second plea in law. 202 In their reply, after repeating the complaint summarised in paragraph 185 above, the applicants also claimed that, following the disclosure by the Council of the evidence on which it had relied to adopt the contested acts, they were seriously prejudiced by the fact that only in 2013 were they called on to respond to allegations relating to alleged conduct dating from around five years earlier. 203 An assertion which is so succinct and general cannot however be sufficient ground for the annulment of the contested acts on the basis of an infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence. The applicants do not identify either the specific allegations the rebuttal of which caused them difficulties, or the nature and causes of the difficulties they experienced. Further, the applicants do not explain why their first request for the disclosure of that evidence was made only five days before the bringing of these proceedings. 204 Even if this plea in law is to be understood as meaning that the applicants claim that, prior to the adoption of the contested acts, the defendant institutions did not make it possible for them effectively to make known their point of view on the grounds adduced against them in those acts, it must be observed that, according to the case-law, the right of a person or entity, with respect to whom restrictive measures previously imposed are renewed by a further act, to be heard prior to the adoption of that act must be respected where the author of the act concerned has adduced new evidence against those persons or entities and not where the renewal is based, in essence, on grounds which are the same as those which justified the adoption of the original act imposing the restrictive measures concerned (judgments in Case T‑383/11 Makhlouf v Council [2013] ECR, paragraph 43, and Joined Cases T‑174/12 and T‑80/13 Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank v Council [2014] ECR, paragraph 149; see also, to that effect, the judgment in Case C‑27/09 P France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran [2011] ECR I‑13427, paragraph 62). 205 Yet in this case the grounds set out in the contested acts as justification for the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue on the applicants are not essentially different from those set out in the earlier acts, namely Decision 2011/101, in the version prior to its amendment by Decision 2012/97, and in Regulation No 314/2004, before its amendment by Implementing Regulation No 151/2012. 206 While the grounds in the contested acts contain further detail on the conduct imputed to many of the applicants, or a more detailed description of that conduct, the grounds justifying the listing of the applicants in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue remain essentially the same as those set out in the earlier acts. In no instance is it apparent that, when the restrictive measures at issue were renewed, the grounds mentioned in the earlier acts were abandoned in order to be replaced by different grounds, as was the situation in the case which gave rise to the judgment in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, paragraph 204 above. 207 As regards, in particular, persons named in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue by reason of the posts which they held or had held in the past, in other words all the applicants with the exception of those referred to in paragraph 169 above, it has already been observed (see paragraph 163 above) that reference to the posts which they held when the contested acts were adopted, or which they had held earlier, is, in itself, sufficient ground for their being listed in the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue. Both the earlier acts and the contested acts refer, with respect to each of those persons, to the same posts. 208 It follows that, if the applicants are also putting forward a complaint such as that envisaged in paragraph 204 above, that complaint cannot be accepted. 209 The other arguments put forward by the applicants within this plea in law do not relate to an alleged infringement of their rights of defence. The applicants claim, in essence, that the defendant institutions had no solid evidence to support the imposition on them of the restrictive measures at issue. They state, in that context, that if they had been brought before a criminal court with respect to the conduct imputed to them in contested acts, relevant and robust evidence would have had to be presented to secure their conviction. Further, according to the applicants, the United Kingdom has recognised that there is no evidence against some of the applicants of their alleged conduct as described in the contested acts. 210 Yet those arguments are of no relevance to the question of whether there was any infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence. Where appropriate, those arguments might be of relevance if it were disputed that the contested acts are well founded and that the facts on which those acts are based are true and accurate. The question of whether the applicants have actually made such a challenge is examined in paragraphs 261 to 266 below. 211 The applicants further claim that, in its proposal for a regulation mentioned in paragraph 120 above, the Commission provided for a number of safeguards designed to ensure respect for their rights of defence, which have not been respected in this case. Yet the Commission’s proposal alluded to by the applicants was never adopted, and consequently the question of whether the safeguards which it provided for were respected in this case is of no relevance. For the same reason, there is no need to analyse the opinion of the EDPS on various legislative proposals imposing certain specific restrictive measures in respect of Somalia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Korea and Guinea (OJ 2010 C 73, p. 1), also alluded to by the applicants (see paragraph 185 above). That opinion also concerns the Commission proposal referred to above, which was not followed by the Council. 212 In their reply, the applicants also claimed that the defendant institutions had never written to them to inform them that their names had been entered on the list of names of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue. According to the applicants, publication of a notice relating to that information in the Official Journal cannot be regarded as sufficient. 213 Yet that is an argument which relates to the question of service of the contested acts on the applicants, which is of no relevance in the context of examination of whether their rights of defence were respected prior to the adoption of those acts. Service of those acts necessarily follows their adoption. The question of whether the Council ought to have served the contested acts by post on each of the applicants concerned by those acts and, in particular, whether service by post on Mr Johannes Tomana is also equivalent to service on all the other applicants, as contended by the Council (see paragraph 199 above) is relevant to the identification of the starting point for the period for initiating proceedings. However, in this case, and in any event, there is no question but that the action was brought in time, and it may be added that this point has not been disputed by the defendant institutions. 214 Since none of the complaints submitted by the applicants within the fourth plea in law can be accepted, that plea must be rejected. The second plea in law: manifest error of assessment 215 By the second plea in law, the applicants claim that the Council and the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in considering that the criteria for including the applicants in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue were met. Preliminary observations 216 The Court has previously held, in Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 192 above (paragraph 36), that, so far as the general rules defining the procedures for giving effect to restrictive measures are concerned, the Council has broad discretion as to what to take into consideration for the purpose of adopting economic and financial sanctions on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, consistent with a common position adopted on the basis of the CFSP. Because the Courts of the European Union may not, in particular, substitute their assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that of the Council, the review carried out by the General Court must be restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts have been made out, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review applies, especially, to the Council’s assessment of the considerations of appropriateness on which such measures are based. 217 Those considerations are equally applicable to restrictive measures adopted under Article 215 TFEU, the content of which reflects that of Articles 60 and 301 EC (see paragraph 122 above). 218 It is however clear from that case-law that the discretion enjoyed in this area by the Council does not prevent the courts of the European Union from determining, when carrying out the review of lawfulness, whether the facts on which the Council has relied are true and accurate. The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights also requires that the Courts of the European Union should ensure that a decision which affects the person or entity concerned individually is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, paragraph 186 above, paragraph 64 and case-law cited). 219 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination. That is because it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. There is no requirement that that authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act annulment of which is sought. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (see Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, paragraph 186 above, paragraphs 65 to 67, and case-law cited). 220 If the competent European Union authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them, namely the statement of reasons in the contested measure, the observations and exculpatory evidence that may have been produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent European Union authority to those observations. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing. If, on the other hand, the competent European Union authority provides relevant information or evidence, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person concerned (see Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, paragraph 186 above, paragraphs 68 and 69, and case-law cited). 221 It must however be emphasised that, as stated moreover in the case-law cited in paragraph 219 above, the Courts of the European Union must determine whether the facts relied on to justify the adoption of restrictive measures are made out solely where the persons affected by those measures challenge those facts before those courts. Such a determination is part of the analysis of the question whether the contested acts are well founded, which it is not for the Courts of the European Union to examine of their own motion. 222 Further, in circumstances where the Council defines abstractly the criteria which may justify the listing of a person, or an entity, in the list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, it is the task of the Courts of the European Union to determine, on the basis of pleas in law raised by the person or entity concerned or, where appropriate, raised by the courts of their own motion, whether the situation of the person or entity concerned corresponds to the abstract criteria defined by the Council. That review extends to the assessment of the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying the listing of the person or entity concerned in the list of those who are subject to restrictive measures, and to the verification of the evidence and information on which that assessment is based (see, to that effect, Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 192 above, paragraph 37). 223 Those are the considerations which must be taken into account when the Court undertakes an analysis of the complaints and arguments put forward by the applicants within this plea in law. In that regard, the Court will first examine the complaints and arguments presented in the application, before proceeding to an examination of the question whether the complaints and arguments put forward in the reply are admissible, and if so, well founded. The complaints and arguments presented in the application 224 The applicants claim that the restrictive measures at issue, like those which preceded them, target, under Articles 4 and 5 of Decision 2011/101, the persons and entities ‘whose activities seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe’. It follows, according to the applicants, that the Council and the Commission could impose those measures solely on persons and entities with respect to whom there existed evidence that they were currently engaged in activities which seriously undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Further, that involvement should be continuing. 225 Yet the conclusion of the Council and the Commission, that each of the applicants satisfies that criterion is, according to the applicants, in error, for several reasons. First, some of the applicants were subject to the restrictive measures at issue on the ground that they were ‘member[s] of the ZANU-PF government’ or belonged to the ‘ZANU-PF faction’. That ground is, according to the applicants, not sufficient since it does not represent an allegation of wrongdoing. Further, to be a member of a political party is a right guaranteed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Moreover, the restrictive measures at issue target the members of the former government of Zimbabwe. They do not target either the Government of National Unity, which was in power in Zimbabwe when the contested acts were adopted, or ZANU-PF. What is more, the European Union expressly supports the Government of National Unity. 226 Second, some applicants were, it is claimed, listed as persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue on the ground that they were associated with, or had ties with, a ZANU-PF member of the government or the ZANU-PF faction in the government. That ground is, it is claimed, insufficient. In the first place, those applicants are not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing, let alone to have actually participated in activities that can genuinely be described as seriously undermining democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In the second place, in the judgment Tay Za v Council, paragraph 119 above, the Court of Justice clearly stated that the mere claim that a person or entity is associated with the leaders of a third country is not sufficient ground for the imposition of restrictive measures on that person or entity. 227 Third, with regard to a large number of the applicants, the grounds relied on to justify their listing as persons or entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue refer, according to the applicants, to conduct which allegedly took place in the past, and, in many cases, several years before the adoption of the measures at issue and even before the formation of the Government of National Unity. Such grounds are insufficient in the light of the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, which is to encourage the persons concerned to ‘reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom of expression and of good governance’. Targeting individuals that have no involvement in or influence over government policy on the basis of their past conduct alone cannot conceivably encourage them to reject these policies. In that regard, the applicants consider, referring also to the recitals of Common Position 2002/145 and to a statement of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that the conduct of persons concerned which occurred solely in the past is not sufficient ground for their being named in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures such as those at issue in this case. 228 It is clear that those arguments of the applicants are based on a mistaken premise, in that the applicants seem to take the view that the restrictive measures at issue could affect only the persons or entities whose activities seriously undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Such a claim is incorrect. 229 As has already been stated as part of the analysis of the first and third pleas in law, it is clear from the wording of Articles 4 and 5 of Decision 2011/101 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above) that that is but one of three categories of persons on whom the restrictive measures envisaged by that decision can be imposed. The other two categories consist, respectively, of the ‘members of the Government of Zimbabwe’ and ‘any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them’. In other words, the status of a person or an entity, the fact of being a member of the Government of Zimbabwe or associated with such a member is, in itself, sufficient ground for the imposition on that person or entity of the restrictive measures laid down by Decision 2011/101. 230 Moreover, it is apparent, in essence, from the considerations set out in paragraphs 129 to 133 above, that the persons and entities whose activities seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe constitute only one particular category of associates of the leaders of that country. That is why their listing in Annex III to Regulation No 314/2004 is justified, even though the text of that regulation does not specifically mention that category of persons and entities. 231 In the light of those considerations, the applicants’ arguments summarised in paragraphs 225 and 226 above cannot be accepted. It is very clear from the judgment in Tay Za v Council, paragraph 119 above (paragraph 63), that, on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC or of Article 215 TFEU, restrictive measures can be imposed on members of the Government of Zimbabwe, who are undoubtedly to be categorised as among the leaders of that country, and on their associates. Any reference to specific conduct of the latter category of persons serves, ultimately, only as evidence of their status as associates of members of the government of that country. It follows that such references are not essential either with respect to members of the government, nor even with respect to their associates where, in the case of the latter, their status as associates of members of the government can be inferred from other circumstances, such as the posts which they hold or held in the past. 232 Further, the reference to the fact that the members of the government concerned are members of ZANU-PF does not mean, as the applicants appear to claim, that the persons concerned (and the entities associated with them) are subject to sanctions for the sole reason that they are members of a political party. It must be recalled that ZANU-PF is not just any political party, but the party which monopolised power during the period of violence, intimidation and infringements of the fundamental rights of the Zimbabwean people relied on by the authors of the contested acts and the other acts which preceded them to justify their adoption. It must also be recalled that the Government of National Unity, which was in power in Zimbabwe when the contested acts were adopted, was composed of (i) individuals who were members of the ZANU-PF party, and who were moreover, in the majority of cases, previous members of the government of Zimbabwe prior to the formation of the Government of National Unity, that is to say during the period of violence, intimidation and infringements of fundamental rights justifying the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue and (ii) individuals proposed by the opposition parties (see, also, paragraphs 104, 109 and 110 above). 233 In those circumstances, it is evident that the reference, in the grounds for the contested acts, to the fact that a member of the government targeted by those acts was a member of ZANU-PF, or of ‘the ZANU-PF faction’ in the government, serves to explain why that member of the government was the target of restrictive measures, whereas comparable measures were not imposed on other members of the same government that were proposed by the former opposition parties. 234 Further, it follows from what has been stated in paragraph 110 above that, even after the formation of the Government of National Unity, it was legitimate to impose restrictive measures on the members of that government who had previously been among the leaders of Zimbabwe before its formation, and on their associates. Accordingly, as regards those persons, the issue of a manifest error of assessment can arise only in the event that the authors of the contested acts erred in taking the view that one or other of the persons or entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue was a member of the Government of Zimbabwe who was proposed by ZANU-PF or associated with such a member, when that was not the case. Yet in the application the applicants make no such claim. 235 It must further be observed that the applicants misinterpret the judgment in Tay Za v Council, paragraph 119 above, when they assert that the Court of Justice confirmed there that the mere association of a person or entity with the leaders of a third country is not sufficient ground for the imposition on that person or entity of restrictive measures. In paragraph 63 of that judgment, the Court of Justice expressly stated that, ‘in order for it to be possible for them to be adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC as restrictive measures imposed on third countries, the measures in respect of natural persons must be directed only against the leaders of such countries and the persons associated with those leaders’. It is only family members of persons associated with the leaders of a third county who were excluded by the Court of Justice from the application of such measures, where those measures are imposed for the sole reason that the persons concerned have a family link with associates of the leaders of the country concerned, irrespective of the personal conduct of the persons concerned (see paragraph 128 above). 236 Nor can the Court accept the applicants’ argument that, for a large number of them, the grounds for the contested acts referred to their conduct in the past, indeed to a rather distant past in some cases. Plainly, since the authors of the contested acts had decided to refer to the specific conduct of one or other of the persons or entities targeted by the contested acts, there could be no question of conduct other than in the past. Such a reference cannot be deemed to be of no relevance solely because the conduct in question dates from the more or less remote past. In the absence of arguments and evidence to the contrary, the view can properly be taken that individuals who, in the past, were personally involved in the acts of violence and in the infringements of fundamental rights which the authors of the contested acts impute to those who alone formed the leadership of Zimbabwe before the formation of the Government of National Unity, and to the political party of which they were members, namely ZANU-PF, remain, for the purposes of the case-law mentioned in paragraph 235 above, ‘associates’ of the leaders of that country, and consequently the imposition on them of restrictive measures is, according to that same case-law, legitimate. 237 As regard the applicants’ argument that, in essence, the restrictive measures at issue targeted, solely on the basis of their conduct in the past, individuals who were not involved in the policy-making of the Government of Zimbabwe and were without influence on that policy, that argument can only be understood as meaning that the applicants claim that the contested acts target, at least in part, persons or entities who were neither leaders of Zimbabwe nor associates of those leaders. 238 As part of the analysis of the third plea in law, the Court examined the question whether the grounds set out in the contested acts were sufficient to justify the imposition of those measures on all the applicants and concluded that they were (see paragraphs 155 to 182 above). It must also be stated that the applicants have not made clear which of them were concerned by that argument. Further, it must be observed that those who are to be categorised as ‘associates’ of the members of governments of a third country are not only those who are involved in the formulation of the policies of that government and who exercise an influence on those policies, but also individuals involved in the implementation of those policies, particularly where the policies in question consist in the perpetration of violence, intimidation and infringements of the fundamental rights of the people. For all the above reasons, that argument must be rejected. 239 The applicants also state that the names of some persons were removed from the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue. The applicants mention, by way of example, Mr Charumbira, Mr Gambe and Mr Kuruneri, who had been subject to the restrictive measures imposed on Zimbabwe until 2011, but with respect to whom those measures have not, thereafter, been renewed. According to the applicants, the individuals with respect to whom the restrictive measures at issue were repealed had originally been listed because of their conduct in the past. The applicants claim that the position of the Council and the Commission as regards the individuals maintained on the list in question is arbitrary and is in breach of the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment. Further, the United Kingdom authorities have confirmed that individuals no longer associated with ZANU-PF had been removed from the list in question. The applicants claim that it is therefore difficult to understand why some individuals who are alleged to have been involved in misconduct in the past should be maintained on the list in question, while others are removed from it. 240 The ground for the listing, in the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue, of the three persons mentioned by the applicants in the context of that argument are stated in Annex III to Regulation No 314/2004, in the version amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 77/2009 of 26 January 2009 amending Regulation No 314/2004 (OJ 2009 L 23, p. 5), and in the Annex to Common Position 2004/161, as amended by Council Common Position 2009/68/CFSP of 26 January 2009 renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (OJ 2009 L 23, p. 43). In the case of Mr Charumbira, it is stated in the grounds that he is ‘Former Deputy Minister for Local Government, Public Works and National Housing [and] Former member of the Government with ongoing ties’. In the case of Mr Gambe, it is stated that he is ‘Chairman, Electoral Supervisory Commission [and that he] Shares responsibility for fraudulent elections in 2005’. Last, as regards Mr Kuruneri, the abovementioned two texts state that he is ‘Former Minister of Finance and Economic Development [and] Former member of the Government with ongoing ties’. 241 In response to a question put to the Council, as a measure of organisation of procedure, on why it had decided not to renew the restrictive measures imposed on those three individuals, the Council stated, in essence, that it ‘wanted to relax the pressure on Zimbabwe somewhat, in order to acknowledge the improvement in the state of the country’. 242 The Court observes that it is indicated in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004, and in Article 4(1) and Article 5(1) of Decision 2011/101, that the restrictive measures at issue are to be imposed on members of the Government of Zimbabwe and their associates, the latter category also including ‘natural persons whose activities seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe’. 243 However, it does not follow from those provisions that the Council and the Commission are required to list on the list of persons subject to those measures all members of the Government of Zimbabwe and all associates of such members. If the case-law cited in paragraph 216 above is also taken into account, the Court can, on the contrary take the view that those provisions are to be interpreted as meaning that a person who is neither a member of the Government of Zimbabwe nor a person associated with such a member cannot be subject to those measures but that, as far as the members of the Government of Zimbabwe and their associates are concerned, the Council has a broad discretion enabling it, when appropriate, not to impose those measures on such a person, where the Council considers that, in the light of the objectives of those measures, it would not be appropriate to do so. 244 In this case, the reasons why the restrictive measures at issue were not renewed with respect to other persons are of no relevance to the situation of the applicants. 245 Before it can be concluded that the contested acts are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment with regard to the applicants, it must be demonstrated either that those acts are founded on an incorrect factual basis, or that, while the facts adduced with regard to the applicants are true and accurate, the Council committed a manifest error of assessment when it held that was necessary to maintain in force the restrictive measures at issue with respect to the applicants. Yet as regards the first possibility, the applicants do not deny, in the application, that the facts adduced against them in the contested acts are true and accurate (see also paragraphs 261 to 263 below). As regards the second possibility, the applicants offer no explanation as to why the Council ought to have taken the view that the restrictive measures to which they were subject ought not to have been renewed against them. 246 Pleading, in vague and general terms, the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty cannot fill those gaps in the applicants’ arguments. 247 According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 192 above, paragraph 56 and case-law cited). Yet in this case the applicants do not explain how their situation is comparable to that of the persons with respect to whom the restrictive measures were not renewed. 248 It must be observed, in that regard, that if the non-renewal with respect to those other persons is justified on valid grounds, the applicants had to indicate what those grounds were and why they would also be applicable to their situation. In that event, a comparison with the situation of other persons and, consequently, recourse to the principle of equal treatment would have been redundant. If there are valid reasons why the restrictive measures at issue ought not to have been renewed with respect to the applicants, that in itself is sufficient to justify the annulment of contested acts, irrespective of how the Council has chosen to treat other persons previously subject to the same restrictive measures. 249 On the other hand, if, hypothetically, the non-renewal of the restrictive measures at issue with respect to other persons was not justified on any valid ground, the Council would have committed an illegal act, which cannot be used by the applicants to their advantage. It is a matter of settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, that no person may seek to rely, in his own favour, on an illegal act in favour of others (see Bank Melli Iran v Council, paragraph 192 above, paragraph 59 and case-law cited). 250 Likewise, as regards the applicants’ reference to the principle of legal certainty, suffice it to state that the applicants offer no explanation as to how that principle was infringed by reason of the renewal of the restrictive measures at issue with respect to them. In particular, they do not even claim that, having regard to the provisions applicable at the time of adoption of contested acts, they were entitled to expect, as far as they were concerned, the non-renewal of the restrictive measures at issue. 251 In conclusion, there is nothing in the arguments set out in the application in support of the second plea in law to show that the contested acts are vitiated by any form of illegality, or that the contested acts are based on a manifest error of assessment. The complaints and arguments presented in the reply 252 In order to dispute the grounds relied on by the authors of the contested acts to justify the imposition of restrictive measures at issue are well founded, the applicants put forward, in their reply, different arguments. The Court must examine first whether those arguments are admissible, and then, if they are, whether they are well founded. In that regard, a distinction will be made between the arguments relating to the applicants who are natural persons and those relating to the applicants who are legal persons. – The applicants who are natural persons 253 In a section of the reply headed ‘The procedure followed by the defendants’, it is stated that the Council and the Commission ‘incorrectly assume that the applicants do not challenge the truthfulness of the reasons provided’ for their listing on the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue. The applicants produced, as an annex to their reply, ‘witness statements’ drawn up by 40 of them. The applicants maintain that those statements were ‘the … first chance to have their say on the grounds for their designation in the contested [acts], and on the documents in Annex B19’ to the Council’s defence. In those statements, the applicants concerned dispute the allegations made with regard to each of them in the grounds for the contested acts. Some of those statements are accompanied by annexes. 254 The applicants add that many of those of their number who have provided such a statement say that they have never before seen the material which served as the basis for their listing in the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue, or the documents to be found in Annex B19 to the Council’s defence. The same applicants say that they do not know the ‘sources or the dates’ of the documents included in that annex, many of which seem to have been produced by their political opponents. In any event, the applicants declare that the allegations against them ‘are seriously damaging and completely unfounded’. They ‘rebut the allegations in the strongest terms possible, given the vagueness of the allegations’. 255 According to the applicants, in some cases, those of their number who have provided statements also explain that they were working closely with the MDC party within the Government of National Unity and that, consequently, they could not understand why the restrictive measures at issue had been imposed on them, when not imposed on their MDC counterparts occupying comparable government posts. 256 Next, in the section of their reply devoted to ‘manifest errors of assessment’, the applicants claim that the Council and the Commission failed to prove that their listing in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue was justified. Further, that section of the reply repeats, in essence, the same arguments as those put forward in support of the second plea in law in the application, which have already been examined above (see paragraphs 228 to 251 above). 257 It is therefore plain that, in their reply, the applicants dispute the truth and accuracy of the facts relied on in the contested acts to justify the imposition on them of the restrictive measures at issue. Yet it is no less plain that the arguments put forward in the application in support of the second plea in law, as summarised in paragraphs 224 to 227 above, contain no challenge of that kind. 258 That is, in essence, why the Council challenges the admissibility of that section of the applicants’ arguments. For its part, the Commission, while emphasising the fact that only in their reply did the applicants challenge, for the first time, the truth and accuracy of the facts adduced against them in the grounds for the contested acts, does not raise an objection that that section of the applicants’ argument is inadmissible. 259 When invited, in the context of a measure of organisation of procedure, to reply to the arguments summarised in paragraph 258 above, the applicants stated that they had raised, in their application, a plea in law alleging a manifest error of assessment and that they had clearly stated, again in the application, that the allegations made in the contested acts were vague and unsupported, with the result that they were unable to provide a substantive response. The applicants added that they cannot be criticised, since, with the exception of applicant No 1, Mr Johannes Tomana, none of them were notified of the restrictive measures at issue. The applicants further stated that they had requested from the Council the material on which the allegations against them in the contested acts were based and that they had provided a substantive response to those allegations, once they had knowledge of the explanations provided by the Council in its defence and in the supporting documents produced by the Council. 260 The Court recalls that, under the first paragraph of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a plea in law which constitutes an amplification of a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which is closely connected therewith, must be declared to be admissible. Moreover, arguments which in substance have a close connection with a plea raised in the application initiating the proceedings cannot be considered new pleas and they may be raised at the stage of the reply or the hearing (see the judgment of 12 September 2012 in Case T‑394/06 Italy v Commission, paragraph 48 and case-law cited). 261 In this case, the Court finds that the applicants did not assert, in the application, that the facts relied on in the grounds for the contested acts as regards each of them were inaccurate. In other words, the applicants did not dispute, in the application, the truth and accuracy of those facts, which, as was stated in paragraph 221 above, is a prerequisite of their truth and accuracy being reviewed by the Courts of the European Union. The essence of the second plea in law, as presented in the application, is that the authors of the contested acts committed a manifest error, in so far as they considered that the grounds stated with respect to each of the applicants in those acts justified the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue on the applicant concerned. A plea claiming such an error, whether it is characterised as an error in law or as a manifest error of assessment, must be distinguished from a plea which calls into question the truth and accuracy of the grounds concerned. It does not constitute an amplification of such a plea and has no close connection with it. 262 Further, it is not possible to link the arguments put forward by the applicants in their reply, as they are described above, to some of the claims put forward by them in the application, with regard to the first and fourth pleas in law (see paragraphs 81, 82, 90, 108 and 185 above). It must be stated that those two pleas are not designed to claim that the contested acts are not well founded and, more specifically, to challenge the truth and accuracy of their grounds, but rather to claim, respectively, that there is no adequate legal basis to justify the adoption of the contested acts and that the rights of the defence were not respected. Moreover, even if that consideration is set aside, it is clear that while, in the sections of the application devoted to the arguments summarised in paragraphs 81 and 185 above, the applicants refer to the absence of proof of the ‘allegations’ within the grounds of the contested acts, they do not assert that those ‘allegations’ are either inaccurate or untrue, far less undertake a full and detailed refutation of them. Such a full refutation is even more necessary when there are a large number of applicants and various grounds are stated in the contested acts. 263 It follows that the arguments put forward for the first time in the reply to call into question the truth and accuracy of the grounds in the contested acts constitute a new plea in law. The Court cannot hold that this plea is based on matters of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure, since, when the application was lodged, the applicants were aware of the grounds stated in the contested acts with respect to each one of them and had ample opportunity to dispute the truth and accuracy of those grounds. 264 Contrary to what is claimed by the applicants, the production in the course of proceedings by the Council of, first, Annex B.19 to its defence and, second, its response to the applicants’ request mentioned in paragraph 19 above, cannot permit any other conclusion. It is clear that, by the arguments which they put forward for the first time in their reply, the applicants are not disputing the reliability or relevance of one or other piece of evidence supporting the grounds in the contested acts, but the truth and accuracy of those grounds as such. However, since the applicants had already become acquainted with those acts before the bringing of proceedings, it was undoubtedly possible for them to challenge, as early as in the application, the truth and accuracy of those grounds, even though they were not then aware of the evidence supporting those grounds. As is apparent from the case-law mentioned in paragraph 219 above, had there been such a challenge, it would have been the task of the Courts of the European Union to request from the competent authority the production of the evidence concerned and to examine whether the evidence produced supported those grounds. Yet the applicants made no such challenge in their application. 265 The consideration that the applicants could have challenged in the application the truth and accuracy of the grounds in the contested acts concerning them is even more apposite if account is taken of the fact that those grounds relate to either to posts, in the Zimbabwean government or public authorities, held by the applicants, or to their alleged conduct. Even if each of the applicants was unaware of the evidence which supported the grounds stated with respect to them in the contested acts, each of them was undoubtedly capable of determining, merely on reading the grounds relating to them, whether those grounds were or were not true and, if not, of challenging their truth and accuracy, already in the application. 266 It follows that the arguments put forward in the reply by the applicants who are natural persons, in order to challenge the truth and accuracy of the grounds justifying the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue on them, are inadmissible and must be disregarded as such, there being no need to examine the substance of those arguments. – The applicants who are legal persons 267 While the assertions made by the applicants in the reply and summarised in paragraph 253 above make no distinction between natural persons and legal persons, it is plain that the truth and accuracy of the grounds justifying the listing, in the list of entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue, of the legal persons named among the applicants is again challenged in the reply. For the reasons stated above (see paragraphs 260 to 266 above), those arguments must be rejected as being inadmissible, since they are out of time. 268 The applicants also put forward in their reply a number of other arguments relating to the legality of the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue on legal persons. 269 The applicants state that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 and Article 5 of Decision 2011/101 provide for the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to legal persons who are associated with members of the Government of Zimbabwe or ‘whose activities seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe’. Accordingly, the authors of the contested measures were not entitled, according to the applicants, to freeze the funds of entities allegedly associated with government associates, with the government generally, or with one faction of the government. 270 On that basis, the applicants call into question, first, the freezing of funds of applicant No 113, Divine Homes. That applicant is allegedly associated with an alleged associate of the government, namely applicant No 6, Mr David Chapfika. According to the applicants, even if it is accepted that Mr David Chapfika is an associate of the government, which they deny, that status alone is insufficient to justify freezing the funds of applicant No 113. 271 Second, no member of the government is mentioned, in the contested acts, as being associated with the applicants No 115 to No 121 inclusive, Jongwe Printing, M & S Syndicate (Private) Ltd, Osleg, Swift Investments (Private) Ltd, Zidco Holdings (Private) Ltd, Zimbabwe Defence Industries or Zimbabwe Mining Development. The essential prerequisite of those entities being included among those subject to the restrictive measures at issue is not therefore present. 272 Third, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the grounds put forward in the contested acts to justify the freezing of funds and economic resources of the entities in question are insufficient. The authors of the contested acts ought to have carried out a case-by-case analysis in order to assess the degree to which each entity was owned or controlled, the nature of the control alleged, and its relevance to the restrictive measures at issue. No analysis of that kind was carried out with respect to those entities. 273 Fourth and last, according to the applicants, the proposal was made to the Council that the name of Zimbabwe Mining Development should be removed from the list of entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue and the Council and the Commission have given no explanation of why that proposal was not ultimately acted upon. 274 In response to a question, as part of a measure of organisation of procedure, as to the plea in law in the application to which those arguments relate and, as the case may be, as to whether there were matters of fact and law which came to light in the course of proceedings which justified the presentation of those arguments for the first time in the reply, the applicants stated that those arguments related to the first three pleas in law of the action and that, in addition, they were in response to certain arguments put forward by the Council in its defence. 275 The Court finds that the arguments summarised in paragraphs 272 and 273 above raise, in essence, an issue which relates to the sufficiency of the reasons stated in the contested acts, which the Court must, when necessary, review on its own motion (see the judgment in Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 67 and case-law cited). It follows that the substance of those arguments must be examined. 276 To support their argument summarised in paragraph 272 above, the applicants refer to the judgments in Joined Cases T‑246/08 and T‑332/08 Melli Bank v Council [2009] ECR II‑2629, Case T‑562/10 HTTS v Council [2011] ECR II‑8087 and in Case T‑53/12 CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council [2012] ECR. Yet none of those cases supports the applicants’ arguments. 277 It is admittedly true that, in Melli Bank v Council, paragraph 276 above (paragraph 146), the Court stated that the provision at issue in that case required an assessment on a case-by-case basis, as regards the entity concerned, of the status of an entity which is ‘owned or controlled’ and that, in addition to indicating the legal basis of the measure adopted, the obligation to state reasons incumbent on the author of that measure relates to that very circumstance. However, even if the fact that that judgment concerns the interpretation and application of a provision other than those at issue in this case is disregarded, it is in any event clear that, in this case, the authors of the contested acts did in fact carry out an analysis on a case-by-case basis and stated reasons in the contested acts on the basis of the results of that analysis. 278 As stated in the context of analysis of the third plea in law, the contested acts state to the requisite legal standard the grounds which justified the listing, in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue, of all the applicants, including applicant No 121, Zimbabwe Mining Development. The contested acts state, with respect to each applicant, whether a natural person or a legal person, the specific and particular grounds which justify the imposition on them of the restrictive measures at issue. Further, the authors of the contested acts were not required to offer a specific explanation of why they did not decide to act on a proposal to withdraw, from that list, the name of applicant No 121. 279 Further, it must be observed that the Court referred to the abovementioned consideration in Melli Bank v Council, paragraph 276 above (paragraph 146), in order to reject an argument of the Council that there was no need to state, in the decisions at issue in that case, the names of entities which were owned or controlled and to which fund freezing measures applied. That consideration is therefore of no relevance to this case, where the names of all the entities to which the restrictive measures at issue apply are clearly stated in the contested acts. 280 In the other two judgments relied on by the applicants, the Court annulled the contested acts because of infringements of the obligation to state reasons. Yet in this case it has already been held, in the analysis of the third plea in law, that the statement of reasons in the contested acts met the requisite legal standard with respect to all the applicants. Consequently, the other two judgments relied on by the applicants are also of no relevance to this case. 281 As regards the arguments summarised in paragraphs 269 and 270 above, they are linked to the argument put forward as part of the second plea in law and summarised in paragraph 237 above, with the result that they constitute an amplification of the second plea in law and must be held to be admissible. 282 As regards the substance, the arguments concerned cannot be accepted. The applicants’ position is, in essence, that only entities belonging to, or controlled by, the members of the Government of Zimbabwe can be considered to be associated with them, for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 and Article 5 of Decision 2011/101. That position cannot be accepted. An interpretation of the two provisions at issue that the entities belonging to, or controlled by, natural persons (or, as may be, legal persons) associated with members of the Government of Zimbabwe may also be subject to the restrictive measures laid down by those provisions is wholly compatible with their wording. The same is true of the interpretation that the entities belonging to, or controlled by, the Government of Zimbabwe itself must be considered to be associated, within the meaning of those two provisions, with the members of that government. 283 Moreover, that interpretation of the abovementioned provisions is the only one which is compatible with the objective of the restrictive measures at issue (see paragraph 97 above). The interpretation suggested by applicants would be likely to result in those measures losing a large part, if not all, of their effectiveness. It would be paradoxical if a natural person associated with members of the Government of Zimbabwe were to be subject to a freezing of his funds and economic resources, without it being possible to extend that freezing to the entities which that natural person controls, directly or indirectly. In that event, it would be very simple for the natural person concerned to evade the freezing of funds established by the restrictive measures at issue, by making use for that purpose of legal persons or other entities controlled by him. That would also apply if it was accepted that the abovementioned provisions do not permit the implementation of freezing of funds and economic resources with respect to entities directly controlled by the Government of Zimbabwe or the State of Zimbabwe. 284 In the light of all the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected. The fifth plea in law: infringement of the applicants’ fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality 285 The greater part of the applicants’ arguments in support of this plea in law consists of references to case-law and to various texts, namely the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the United Nations Charter, Council Document 15114/05 of 2 December 2005 titled ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’, the opinion of the EDPS mentioned in paragraph 210 above and a report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom. 286 Essentially, the applicants plead, rather succinctly, an infringement of their fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality. They repeat their arguments, examined above in the analysis of the first plea in law, particularly in paragraph 106 above, that the restrictive measures at issue do not pursue any legitimate objective of the CFSP. However, according to the applicants, even if those measures do pursue such an objective, they are disproportionate to that objective. In support of that complaint, the applicants refer in a lapidary fashion to certain arguments which have already been examined and rejected above. In particular, the applicants claim that, with respect to some of their number, it is not even claimed in the contested acts that they were responsible, at the time when the measures at issue were adopted, for the policies of the government of Zimbabwe or that they had any influence on those policies. The applicants also claim, in essence, that the statement of reasons in the contested acts is inadequate, in that the authors of those acts failed to explain how the restrictive measures at issue could contribute to the realisation of any legitimate objective of the CFSP. They also state that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) calls for the restrictive measures to be lifted. There is no need for further analysis of those arguments, since they broadly overlap with the arguments, much more fully stated, put forward with respect to the first three pleas in law. For the reasons set out above in the analysis of those pleas, the Court must again reject those arguments, which, it may be added, have no connection with the principle of proportionality. 287 The applicants also refer, in support of their complaint that the restrictive measures at issue are ‘disproportionate’, to the alleged ‘far-reaching nature’ of these measures, their ‘severe negative economic and reputational impact’, and the ‘nature of the allegations’ made against them in the grounds of the contested acts. 288 Since, in their arguments, the applicants also refer, if only by citation, to other texts, to respect for private and family life, to the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, it must be recalled that, under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications’. Further, under Article 16 of the Charter, ‘[t]he freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. Last, Article 17(1) of the Charter provides: ‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.’ 289 In this case, there is no doubt that the restrictive measures contained in the contested acts entail restrictions on the exercise by the applicants of their fundamental rights as described above (see, to that effect, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, paragraph 119 above, paragraph 358, and the judgment in Case T‑187/11 Trabelsi and Others v Council [2013] ECR, paragraph 76). 290 However, according to settled case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy, in EU law, absolute protection, but must be viewed in relation to their social function (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case C‑348/12 P Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft [2013] ECR, paragraph 121, and Makhlouf v Council, paragraph 204 above, paragraph 99 and case-law cited). Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights so guaranteed (see Makhlouf v Council, paragraph 204 above, paragraph 97 and case-law cited). 291 In particular, Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides, first, that ‘[an]y limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter of Fundamental Rights] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and, second, that ‘[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 292 Yet the restriction on the exercise of the fundamental rights described above to which the applicants are entitled must be regarded as having been ‘provided for by law’ since, as is clear from what is stated above in relation to the first and second pleas in law, the criteria laid down in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 314/2004 and in Article 4(1) and Article 5(1) of Decision 2011/101 were respected. 293 Further, it is clear from the analysis of the first plea in law that the measures concerned do in fact contribute to the achievement of objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or to the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (see paragraph 93 above). 294 That being the case, this plea in law can only be understood as meaning that the applicants plead a breach of the principle of proportionality, with which Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires compliance. 295 In that regard, it must be recalled that the principle of proportionality, as one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (the judgment in Case C‑189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I‑5689, paragraph 81, and the judgment of 6 May 2010 in Case T‑388/07 Comune di Napoli v Commission, paragraph 143). 296 It must however also be recalled that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the Court of Justice has held that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The Court of Justice concluded that the legality of a measure adopted in such spheres can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate with regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, paragraph 290 above, paragraph 120 and case-law cited). 297 In this case, it must be recalled that, as was stated in paragraph 97 above, the objective of the restrictive measures at issue is to encourage the persons and entities affected by them to reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights and freedom of expression and the hindrance of good governance. Admittedly, those measures are supposed to act indirectly, the underlying idea being that those targeted by them will reject the abovementioned policies in order to have the restrictions imposed on them revoked as far as they are concerned. None the less, in the case of a sovereign third country, such as Zimbabwe, it is self-evident that the Union can influence its policies only indirectly. 298 It must also be recalled that the contested acts are the product of the deep concern felt by the European Union authorities as regards the situation in Zimbabwe, that concern being first expressed ten years earlier (see paragraph 1 above). Yet that concern, which the applicants have not in these proceedings claimed to be unjustified, was still present when the contested acts were adopted. The competent EU authorities cannot therefore be accused of an infringement of the principle of proportionality by reason of having maintained in force the previously imposed restrictive measures and of having extended their scope, with the intention of bringing to an end a situation of deep concern of such long standing (see, to that effect, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, paragraph 290 above, paragraph 126). 299 Moreover, it is clear that the applicants have not suggested any specific less onerous measure which would have had an effect comparable to that of the measures at issue and which might have achieved the same objectives. 300 It must also be noted that the restrictive measures at issue are inherently temporary and reversible and therefore do not impair the ‘essential content’ of the fundamental rights relied on by the applicants. That is even more the case when all the applicants are natural or legal persons established in Zimbabwe and not within the European Union, which means that the disadvantages arising from those measures, although undeniably significant, are not as onerous as in the case of natural or legal persons established within the European Union. 301 Last, it must be observed that both Regulation No 314/2004 and Decision 2011/101 provide for exceptions to the restrictive measures which they establish. Thus, under Article 7(1) of Regulation No 314/2004, the competent authorities may authorise the release of funds or economic resources ‘necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums and public utility charges’ or ‘intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services’. Further, Article 4(3) to (5) of Decision 2011/101 provides for derogations from the prohibition on entry into or transit through the territory of the Member States, inter alia ‘where travel is justified on urgent and imperative humaritarian grounds’. 302 In the light of all the foregoing, and taking into account, in particular, the case-law cited in paragraph 298 above, the Court considers it to be established that the restrictive measures are proportionate. Accordingly the fifth plea in law must be rejected, and this action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 303 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs of the Council and the Commission, as applied for by the latter. The United Kingdom must bear its own costs, in accordance with Article 87(4) of the Rules of Procedure. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) Hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Johannes Tomana and the 120 other applicants listed in the annex hereto to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission; 3. Orders the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear its own costs. Gratsias Kancheva Wetter Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 April 2015. [Signatures] Annex List of applicants Johannes Tomana, residing in Harare (Zimbabwe), Titus Mehliswa Johna Abu Basutu, residing in Harare, Happyton Mabhuya Bonyongwe, residing in Harare, Flora Buka, residing in Harare, Wayne Bvudzijena, residing in Harare, David Chapfika, residing in Harare, George Charamba, residing in Harare, Faber Edmund Chidarikire, residing in Harare, Tinaye Chigudu, residing in Harare, Aeneas Soko Chigwedere, residing in Harare, Phineas Chihota, residing in Harare, Augustine Chihuri, residing in Harare, Patrick Anthony Chinamasa, residing in Harare, Edward Takaruza Chindori-Chininga, residing in Harare, Joseph Chinotimba, residing in Harare, Tongesai Shadreck Chipanga, residing in Harare, Augustine Chipwere, residing in Harare, Constantine Chiwenga, residing in Harare, Ignatius Morgan Chiminya Chombo, residing in Harare, Martin Dinha, residing in Harare, Nicholas Tasunungurwa Goche, residing in Harare, Gideon Gono, residing in Harare, Cephas T. Gurira, residing in Harare, Stephen Gwekwerere, residing in Harare, Newton Kachepa, residing in Harare, Mike Tichafa Karakadzai, residing in Harare, Saviour Kasukuwere, residing in Harare, Jawet Kazangarare, residing in Harare, Sibangumuzi Khumalo, residing in Harare, Nolbert Kunonga, residing in Harare, Martin Kwainona, residing in Harare, R. Kwenda, residing in Harare, Andrew Langa, residing in Harare, Musarashana Mabunda, residing in Harare, Jason Max Kokerai Machaya, residing in Harare, Joseph Mtakwese Made, residing in Harare, Edna Madzongwe, residing in Harare, Shuvai Ben Mahofa, residing in Harare, Titus Maluleke, residing in Harare, Paul Munyaradzi Mangwana, residing in Harare, Reuben Marumahoko, residing in Harare, G. Mashava, residing in Harare, Angeline Masuku, residing in Harare, Cain Ginyilitshe Ndabazekhaya Mathema, residing in Harare, Thokozile Mathuthu, residing in Harare, Innocent Tonderai Matibiri, residing in Harare, Joel Biggie Matiza, residing in Harare, Brighton Matonga, residing in Harare, Cairo Mhandu, residing in Harare, Fidellis Mhonda, residing in Harare, Amos Bernard Midzi, residing in Harare, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, residing in Harare, Kembo Campbell Dugishi Mohadi, residing in Harare, Gilbert Moyo, residing in Harare, Jonathan Nathaniel Moyo, residing in Harare, Sibusio Bussie Moyo, residing in Harare, Simon Khaya Moyo, residing in Harare, S. Mpabanga, residing in Harare, Obert Moses Mpofu, residing in Harare, Cephas George Msipa, residing in Harare, Henry Muchena, residing in Harare, Olivia Nyembesi Muchena, residing in Harare, Oppah Chamu Zvipange Muchinguri, residing in Harare, C. Muchono, residing in Harare, Tobaiwa Mudede, residing in Harare, Isack Stanislaus Gorerazvo Mudenge, residing in Harare, Columbus Mudonhi, residing in Harare, Bothwell Mugariri, residing in Harare, Joyce Teurai Ropa Mujuru, residing in Harare, Isaac Mumba, residing in Harare, Simbarashe Simbanenduku Mumbengegwi, residing in Harare, Herbert Muchemwa Murerwa, residing in Harare, Munyaradzi Musariri, residing in Harare, Christopher Chindoti Mushohwe, residing in Harare, Didymus Noel Edwin Mutasa, residing in Harare, Munacho Thomas Alvar Mutezo, residing in Harare, Ambros Mutinhiri, residing in Harare, S. Mutsvunguma, residing in Harare, Walter Mzembi, residing in Harare, Morgan S. Mzilikazi, residing in Harare, Sylvester Nguni, residing in Harare, Francis Chenayimoyo Dunstan Nhema, residing in Harare, John Landa Nkomo, residing in Harare, Michael Reuben Nyambuya, residing in Harare, Magadzire Hubert Nyanhongo, residing in Harare, Douglas Nyikayaramba, residing in Harare, Sithembiso Gile Glad Nyoni, residing in Harare, David Pagwese Parirenyatwa, residing in Harare, Dani Rangwani, residing in Harare, Engelbert Abel Rugeje, residing in Harare, Victor Tapiwe Chashe Rungani, residing in Harare, Richard Ruwodo, residing in Harare, Stanley Urayayi Sakupwanya, residing in Harare, Tendai Savanhu, residing in Harare, Sydney Tigere Sekeramayi, residing in Harare, Lovemore Sekeremayi, residing in Harare, Webster Kotiwani Shamu, residing in Harare, Nathan Marwirakuwa Shamuyarira, residing in Harare, Perence Samson Chikerema Shiri, residing in Harare, Etherton Shungu, residing in Harare, Chris Sibanda, residing in Harare, Jabulani Sibanda, residing in Harare, Misheck Julius Mpande Sibanda, residing in Harare, Phillip Valerio Sibanda, residing in Harare, David Sigauke, residing in Harare, Absolom Sikosana, residing in Harare, Nathaniel Charles Tarumbwa, residing in Harare, Edmore Veterai, residing in Harare, Patrick Zhuwao, residing in Harare, Paradzai Willings Zimondi, residing in Harare, Cold Comfort Farm Cooperative Trust, established in Harare, Comoil (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Divine Homes (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Famba Safaris (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Jongwe Printing and Publishing Company (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, M & S Syndicate (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Osleg (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Swift Investments (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Zidco Holdings (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (Private) Ltd, established in Harare, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., established in Harare. Table of contents Background to the dispute Procedure and forms of order sought by the parties Law 1. The applicants who have died 2. Whether the lawyers who signed the application were instructed by all the applicants who are natural persons 3. Whether the applicants continue to have an interest in bringing proceedings 4. Arguments put forward by the Commission challenging the admissibility of the action 5. Substance The first plea in law: there was no adequate legal basis for including persons or entities who are neither leaders of Zimbabwe nor their associates in the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures at issue The legal basis of Decisions 2011/101 and 2012/97 and Implementing Decision 2012/124 The legal basis of Implementing Regulation No 151/2012 The third plea in law: infringement of the obligation to state reasons The relevant case-law The grounds for the adoption and renewal of restrictive measures against Zimbabwe The specific grounds justifying the adoption and renewal of the restrictive measures at issue against each of the applicants The fourth plea in law: infringement of the rights of the defence The second plea in law: manifest error of assessment Preliminary observations The complaints and arguments presented in the application The complaints and arguments presented in the reply – The applicants who are natural persons – The applicants who are legal persons The fifth plea in law: infringement of the applicants’ fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality Costs * Language of the case: English.