Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2012:349
Date: 2012-06-14
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: Consumer protection;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Spain

summary proceedings within the structure of ordinary civil procedure or even provisional measures that are quasi-definitive, as in practice main proceedings hardly ever ensue, are the principal procedural instruments to cope with uncontested claims. In several Member States, however, a payment order procedure has proven to be a particularly valuable tool to ensure the rapid and cost-effective collection of claims that are not the subject of a legal controversy. Originally, 11 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) knew such a procedure as an integral part of their civil procedural legislation, the French injonction de payer and the German Mahnverfahren being the most famous examples. In 1999 a similar procedure was also introduced in Spain (proceso monitorio) (cf. Commission Green Paper of 12 December 2002 on a European order for payment procedure and on measures to simplify and speed up small claims litigation, COM(2002) 746 final). This development testifies to the growing appreciation of this type of procedure throughout the European Union. 16 – See Hess, B., Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, Heidelberg 2010, p. 556, § 10, paragraph 40. 17 – See, for example, with regard to the rules on jurisdiction in Germany Prütting, H./Gehrlein, M., ZPO — Kommentar, 2nd edition, Cologne 2010, p. 1455, § 689, paragraph 2; Zeiss, W./Schreiber, K., Zivilprozessrecht, 10th edition, p. 305, in Austria Rechberger, W./Simotta, D.-A., Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, Vienna 2003, p. 302, paragraph 515/3, and in Spain Alonso Crespo, E., ‘Algunos medios preventivos o alternativos del proceso civil atribuidos al secretario judicial’, Estudios jurídicos, 2004, p. 6687 and Rodríguez Tirado, A.M., Las funciones procesales del Secretario judicial, Barcelona 2001, who deal with, respectively, the status of the German and Austrian Rechtspfleger and of the Spanish secretario judicial within the system for the administration of justice. 18 – See, for example, with regard to the rules on jurisdiction in France Guinchard, S., Droit et pratique de la procédure civile, Paris 2004, p. 629, and in Italy De Stefano, A., Procedura Civile, Milan 2010, p. 662, paragraph 5144. 19 – As Sujecki, B., ‘Das Europäische Mahnverfahren’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2007, p. 1625, explains using the example of the wording of Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006, which requires interpretation, a limited scope of review to the effect that no conclusiveness test is necessary, but manifestly unfounded claims are to be rejected is intended to permit an assessment by a judicial officer at a level lower than the judiciary. Such a scope of review will also allow a fully automated assessment of applications for orders for payment, as a result of which the order for payment procedure has the desired effect of rationalising processes and easing the burden on the courts. 20 – See, with regard to the rules in France, Guinchard, S., loc. cit. (footnote 18), p. 631, in Germany Zeiss, W./Schreiber, K., loc. cit. (footnote 17), p. 306, paragraph 779, in Austria Rechberger, W./Simotta, D.-A., loc. cit. (footnote 17), p. 304, paragraph 515/7, and in Italy De Stefano, A., loc. cit. (footnote 18), p. 671, paragraph 5210. 21 – See Gruber, U., loc. cit. (footnote 14), p. 275, paragraph 3, who states that the procedure under Regulation No 1896/2006 is based on the same basic idea as the national order for payment procedure. The creditor is intended to obtain an enforceable instrument in a simple, quick and low-cost procedure. Only where the debtor makes a challenge is the procedure transferred to regular civil proceedings. 22 – See Alonso Crespo, E., loc. cit. (footnote 17), p. 6687, and Rechberger, W.,/Simotta, D.-A., loc. cit. (footnote 17), p. 301, paragraph 515/2, who point out the benefits of obtaining an enforceable instrument at low cost using the order for payment procedure. 23 – See Joined Cases C‑240/98 to C‑244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I‑4941, paragraph 25, and Case C‑168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I‑10421, paragraph 25. 24 – See Mostaza Claro, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 36, and Case C‑243/08 Pannon GSM [2009] ECR I‑4713, paragraph 25. For a criticism of this case‑law, see Hesselink, M., ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses’, Towards a European Contract Law (ed. Reiner Schulze/Jules Stuyck), Munich 2011, p. 132 et seq. 25 – See Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 27; Mostaza Claro, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 26; and Case C‑40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones [2009] ECR I‑9579, paragraph 31. 26 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 32. See, with regard to the substantive judicial review of general business terms in the light of the requirement of good faith, Basedow, J., ‘Der Europäische Gerichtshof und das Privatrecht’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, Vol. 210 (2010), p. 172 et seq. 27 – Case C‑473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I‑10875, paragraph 32, and Mostaza Claro, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 27. 28 – Cofidis, cited above in footnote 27, paragraph 33, and Mostaza Claro, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 28. 29 – Pannon GSM, cited above in footnote 24. 30 – Ibid., paragraph 35. 31 – Case C‑137/08 [2010] ECR I‑10847. 32 – Ibid., paragraph 56. 33 – Ibid., paragraph 14 et seq. 34 – Ibid., paragraph 18. 35 – Ibid., paragraph 52. 36 – Ibid., paragraph 53. 37 – Ibid., paragraph 54. 38 – Ibid., paragraph 55. 39 – See my Opinion in Pénzügyi, judgment cited above in footnote 31, point 113. 40 – See paragraph 65 of the Commission’s observations. 41 – See point 4 of the present Opinion. 42 – See Chapter 8 (Articles 79 to 86 — ‘unfair contract terms’) of the proposal for a regulation. 43 – See Part VI, Chapter 16, Section 2 (Articles 166 to 171 — ‘Interest on late payments: general provisions’) of the proposal for a regulation. 44 – Article 167(3) of the proposal for a regulation provides: ‘A term of the contract which fixes a rate of interest higher than that provided in Article 166, or accrual earlier than the time specified in paragraph 2 of this Article is not binding to the extent that this would be unfair according to Article 83’. 45 – Article 83(2) of the proposal for a regulation defines the criteria (transparency of the term, the nature of what is to be provided under the contract, the circumstances prevailing during the conclusion of the contract, the other contract terms, and the terms of any other contract on which the contract depends) on the basis of which the unfairness of a contractual term is to be assessed. This provision is modelled on Article 4 of Directive 93/13. 46 – According to the 17th recital in the preamble to Directive 93/13, for the purposes of the directive, the annexed list of terms can be of indicative value only and, because of the minimal character of the directive, the scope of these terms may be the subject of amplification or more restrictive editing by the Member States in their national laws. 47 – See Pannon GSM, cited above in footnote 24, paragraph 38, and Case C‑237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I‑3403, paragraph 20. 48 – See Case C‑478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I‑4147, paragraph 20, and Freiburger Kommunalbauten, cited in footnote 47, paragraph 20. 49 – See point 23 et seq. of the present Opinion. 50 – See also De Stefano, A., loc. cit. (footnote 18), p. 655, paragraph 5100, with regard to the order for payment procedure (specifically the Italian procedimento di ingiunzione), which manages without inter partes proceedings and a thorough assessment of the pecuniary claim made, and allows the creditor to obtain an enforceable instrument quickly and at low cost with a view to applying for enforcement. 51 – See paragraph 22 of the observations submitted by the German Government. 52 – See, for example, with regard to the order for payment procedure in France, Guinchard, S., loc. cit. (footnote 18), p. 629, and in Germany Zeiss, W./Schreiber, K., loc. cit. (footnote 17), p. 305. In the legal orders of those Member States, the national court may refuse the application for an order for payment if it is clear from the documents submitted that the debt manifestly cannot exist. 53 – See Case 32/62 Alvis [1963] ECR 49; Case 136/79 National Panasonic [1980] ECR 2033, paragraph 21; and Case C‑48/96 P Windpark Groothusen [1998] ECR I‑2873, paragraph 47. 54 – See point 41 of the present Opinion. 55 – See paragraph 65 of the Commission’s observations. 56 – See point 24 of the present Opinion. 57 – See inter alia Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 13; Case C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I‑6297, paragraph 29; Case C‑13/01 Safalero [2003] ECR I‑8679, paragraph 49; Case C‑432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I‑2271, paragraph 39; and Case C‑246/09 Bulicke [2010] ECR I‑7003, paragraph 25. 58 – See Lupoi, M.A., ‘The Harmonization of Civil Procedural Law within the EU’ (ed. Justin Orlando Frosini/Michele Angelo Lupoi/Michele Marchesiello), A European Space of Justice, Ravenna 2006, p. 209, in whose opinion the European Union is the integration system in which the law of civil procedure has been most harmonised. However, the author concedes that thus far harmonisation has been limited to the adoption of individual uniform instruments, with the result that it is for the Member States alone to adopt their national civil procedure systems in order to make the uniform mechanisms work. The harmonising effects thus ultimately prove to be only ‘indirect’. In the view of the author, the future of harmonisation in matters of civil procedure is a matter for speculation. See also Wagner, G., in Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (ed. Stein/Jonas), 22nd edition, Vol. 10, Tübingen 2011, p. 46, paragraph 88, who considers the core of the law of civil procedure — the procedural rules governing internal disputes — to be unaffected thus far, despite the dynamic growth of European legislation in this field. In the view of the author, the unification of European law of civil procedure is, realistically, still a long way off. 59 – Under Article 81(2)(f) TFEU, the European Union has the power to adopt rules on civil procedure in so far as the internal market is affected. Comprehensive rules are contained in Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 174, p. 1), Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79), Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes (OJ 2003 L 26, p. 41), and Council Decision 2001/470/EC of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 174, p. 25). See Rörig, U., ‘Einfluss des Rechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das nationale Zivilprozessrecht’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2004, p. 18 et seq. Furthermore, many instruments have been created at EU level to facilitate the settlement of cross-border disputes and cross-border enforcement, such as Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 1), Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (OJ 2006 L 399, p. 1), and Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15). 60 – See Joined Cases C‑430/93 and C‑431/93 van Schijndel and van Veen [1995] ECR I‑4705, paragraph 17; Joined Cases C‑279/96 to C‑281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others [1998] ECR I‑5025, paragraphs 16 and 27; Case C‑326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-7835, paragraph 18; Case C‑78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I‑3201, paragraph 31; Case C‑472/99 Clean Car Autoservice [2001] ECR I‑9687, paragraph 28; Case C‑129/00 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑14637, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C‑392/04 and C‑422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I‑8559, paragraph 57; Mostaza Claro, cited above in footnote 23, paragraph 24; Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I‑4233, paragraph 28; Case C‑2/08 Fallimento Olimpiclub [2009] ECR I‑7501, paragraph 24; Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 38; and Case C‑177/10 Rosado Santana [2011] ECR I‑7907, paragraph 89. 61 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 28. 62 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 37. 63 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 38. 64 – See Wagner, G., loc. cit. (footnote 58), p. 39, paragraph 68, who points out that in so far as European law of civil procedure governs a subject, it also has primacy over national law. Where that is not the case, the Member States enjoy procedural autonomy. However, the Member States must respect the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 65 – See Case C‑118/08 Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales [2010] ECR I‑635, paragraph 33; Case C‑231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 36; Levez, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 41; Preston and Others, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 55; and i-21 Germany and Arcor, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 62. 66 – See Rosado Santana, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 90; Bulicke, cited above in footnote 57, paragraph 28; Levez, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 43; Preston and Others, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 56; and Case C‑63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I‑10467, paragraph 45. 67 – See Rosado Santana, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 90, and Bulicke, cited above in footnote 57, paragraph 29. 68 – See Rosado Santana, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 91. 69 – See Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 50, and Levez, cited above in footnote 60, paragraph 40. 70 – See Rosado Santana, cited in footnote 60, paragraph 91, and Case C‑261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I‑4025, paragraph 33. 71 – See Girerd, P., ‘Les principes d’équivalence et d’effectivité — encadrement ou désencadrement de l’autonomie procédurale des États membres?’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2002, p. 75 et seq. 72 – See point 24 of the present Opinion. 73 – Pannon GSM, cited above in footnote 24, paragraph 35. 74 – Case C‑227/08 [2009] ECR I‑11939. 75 – OJ 1985 L 372, p. 31. 76 – Martín Martín, cited above in footnote 74, paragraph 18. 77 – Ibid., paragraph 19. 78 – Ibid., paragraph 20. 79 – See points 55 and 56 of my Opinion of 7 May 2009 in Martín Martín (judgment cited above in footnote 74). 80 – Martín Martín, cited above in footnote 74, paragraph 27. 81 – See point 70 of the present Opinion. 82 – Martín Martín, cited above in footnote 74, paragraph 35. 83 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 28. 84 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraph 33. 85 – See point 82 of my Opinion of 14 May 2009 in Asturcom Telecomunicaciones (judgment cited above in footnote 25). 86 – Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, cited above in footnote 25, paragraphs 53 to 55 and 59. The Court was able to infer from information provided by the Spanish Government that under Spanish law the court or tribunal responsible for enforcement of an arbitration award which has become final had jurisdiction to assess of its own motion whether an arbitration clause in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier is null and void on the ground that such a clause is contrary to national rules of public policy. A number of recent judgments of the Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Provincial Court, Madrid) (Spain) and the Audiencia Nacional (National High Court) (Spain) had also acknowledged that jurisdiction. However, the Court gave the referring court the task of assessing whether that was also the situation in the case before it. 87 – This is also pointed out by Tinzo, V., ‘Il potere del giudice di rilevazione della nullità di protezione’, Diritto del commercio internazionale, 2011, p. 584. In the understanding of the author, before the national court determines that the unfair term in question is not binding, it must ask the consumer whether he nevertheless wishes to retain it. The only crucial factor is therefore ultimately the will of the consumer. In the author’s view, the approach developed by the Court stems from a doctrine which seeks to reconcile the aim of consumer protection pursued by Directive 93/13 with the principle of continued contractual relations. See also Milanesi, S., ‘Le pronunce Pannon ed Eva Martín Martín sulla rilevabilità d’ufficio delle nullità di protezione’, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2010, Vol. II, p. 805, who also welcomes the Court’s approach, as it is consistent with the principle of protective nullity (‘nullità di protezione’). In the author’s view, this approach also ensures a balance of power in inter partes proceedings. 88 – See with regard to the model of the consumer in the Court’s case‑law, Case C‑373/90 X [1992] ECR I‑131, paragraphs 15 and 16; Case C‑210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR I‑4657, paragraph 31; Joined Cases C‑108/97 and C‑109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee [1999] ECR I‑2779, paragraph 29; Case C‑220/98 Estée Lauder [2000] ECR I‑117, paragraph 27; Case C‑30/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I‑4619, paragraph 32; Case C‑99/01 Linhart and Biffl [2002] ECR I‑9375, paragraph 31; Case C‑44/01 Pippig Augenoptik [2003] ECR I‑3095, paragraph 55; Case C‑363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland [2004] ECR I‑1619, paragraph 77; Case C‑218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I‑1725, paragraph 50; Case C‑421/04 Matratzen Concord [2006] ECR I‑2303, paragraph 24; and Case C‑356/04 Lidl Belgium [2006] ECR I‑8501, paragraph 78. 89 – See Heinig, J., ‘Die AGB-Kontrolle von Gerichtsstandsklauseln — zum Urteil Pannon des EuGH’, Europäische Zeitschrift zum Wirtschaftsrecht, 24/2009, p. 885. Josipovič, T., ‘Verbraucherschutz in der Republik Kroatien’, Konsumentenschutz in Zentral- und Osteuropa (ed. Rudolf Welser), Vienna 2010, p. 72, also highlights the distinctiveness of this approach in the Court’s case‑law. In the author’s opinion, however, this case‑law has not yet been implemented in Croatia, as an acceding State, since national law only provides for an unfair term to be declared void. It is not therefore possible to retain it in force if the consumer so wishes. 90 – See paragraph 68 of the Commission’s observations. 91 – See point 35 et seq. of the present Opinion. 92 – See point 37 et seq. of the present Opinion. 93 – See point 48 et seq. of the present Opinion. 94 – See point 69 et seq. of the present Opinion. 95 – See Case C‑484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid [2010] ECR I‑4785, paragraphs 28 and 29. 96 – See my Opinion of 29 October 2009 in Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid (judgment cited above in footnote 95, point 86). 97 – When exercising the authority granted in Article 8 of the directive, the Member States must observe the general limits to EU law, meaning primary law, including the fundamental freedoms, and other secondary legislation (cf. Kapnopoulou, E., Das Recht der missbräuchlichen Klausel in der Europäischen Union, Tübingen 1997, p. 163). 98 – See Neisser, H./Verschraegen, B., Die Europäische Union — Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Vienna 2001, p. 297, paragraph 14.103; Koenig, C./Pechstein, M./Sander, C., EU-/EC‑Prozessrecht, 2nd edition, Tübingen 2002, p. 401, paragraph 767; Leanerts, K./Arts, D./Maselis, I., Procedural Law of the European Union, 2nd edition, London 2006, p. 174 et seq. 99 – See Case 24/64 Dingemans [1964] ECR 647; Case 33/65 Dekker [1965] ECR 901; Case 80/71 Merluzzi [1972] ECR 175; Case C‑292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR I‑6787, paragraph 8; Case C‑237/04 Enirisorse [2006] ECR I‑2843, paragraph 24; Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraphs 49 and 50; Case C‑213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I‑9999, paragraph 51. 100 – See Case C‑107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I‑8121, paragraph 34; Case C‑425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I‑4861, paragraph 21; and Joined Cases C‑223/99 and C‑260/99 Agorà and Excelsior [2001] ECR I‑3605, paragraph 24. 101 – See Kapnopoulou, E., loc. cit. (footnote 97), p. 151, who also points out that Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 does not, in principle, provide for any ‘replacement’ of non-binding terms. Instead, the contract must be treated in future as if the unfair burdens on the consumer were not present. 102 – See point 30 of the present Opinion. 103 – Consideration must be given in this connection to the statements made by Advocate General Tizzano in point 80 of his Opinion of 22 September 2005 in Case C‑302/04 Ynos [2006] ECR I‑371. As he rightly stated, ‘the aim of the Directive is to rebalance the contractual position of the consumer by preventing him “from being bound by an unfair term” rather than to safeguard the contractual freedom of the parties, and particularly that of the seller or supplier, who might indeed have every interest in escaping the obligations of a contract which, when the balance has been adjusted, would be less advantageous to him’. From this perspective, a modification of the contract would ultimately serve only the interests of the seller or supplier, which is not, in the view of the Advocate General, the aim of Directive 93/13. 104 – See paragraph 55 of the Commission’s observations. 105 – See Pfeiffer, T., in: Das Recht der Europäischen Union — Kommentar (ed. E. Grabitz/M. Hilf), Vol. IV, A5, Article 6, paragraph 7, p. 2, who considers ‘partial retention’, i.e. maintenance of the unfair term with the still lawful content, to be incompatible, as a rule, with Directive 93/13. 106 – See Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 113. 107 – See point 4.2 of the order for reference. 108 – See paragraph 72 of the Commission’s observations and paragraph 41 of the observations submitted by the Spanish Government. 109 – See inter alia Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑18/01 Korhonen and Others [2003] ECR I‑5321, paragraph 19; Case C‑380/01 Schneider [2004] ECR I‑1389, paragraph 21; Case C‑295/05 Asemfo [2007] ECR I‑2999, paragraph 30; and Joined Cases C‑261/07 and C‑299/07 VTB-VAB [2009] ECR I‑2949, paragraph 32. 110 – See inter alia Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 18; Joined Cases C‑422/93 to C‑424/93 Zabala Erasun and Others [1995] ECR I‑1567, paragraph 29; Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 61; Case C‑314/96 Djabali [1998] ECR I‑1149, paragraph 19; PreussenElektra, cited above in footnote 109, paragraph 39; Schneider, cited above in footnote 109, paragraph 22; Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 29; and VTB-VAB, cited above in footnote 109, paragraph 33. 111 – According to Article 1(2) of Regulation No 1896/2006, the regulation does not ‘prevent a claimant from pursuing a claim within the meaning of Article 4 by making use of another procedure available under the law of a Member State or under Community law’. Gruber, U., loc. cit. (footnote 14), p. 279, paragraph 21, concludes that the regulation does not replace the existing national declaration and order for payment procedures. The creditor may therefore, as an alternative to the procedure under the regulation, have recourse to the existing national order for payment procedures, as before. If the national order for payment procedure results in an instrument, the creditor may have that instrument certified as a European enforceable instrument pursuant to Regulation No 805/2004 and seek enforcement in the other Member States, without the need for a prior declaration of enforceability there. 112 – It is certainly not possible to infer binding requirements from Regulation No 1896/2006. However, it cannot be ignored that, according to the will of the EU legislature, the European order for payment procedure was intended to serve as a model by virtue of its efficiency (cf. Hess, B., loc. cit. [footnote 16], p. 139, § 4, paragraph 23). 113 – See paragraph 77 of the Commission’s observations. 114 – See Stuyck, J., ‘Enforcement of consumer rights and legal redress for consumers in the EU: An institutional model’, New frontiers of consumer protection (ed. Fabrizio Cafaggi/Hans-W. Micklitz), Oxford 2009, p. 72 et seq., who points out the Member States’ freedom to organise the enforcement possibilities at national level, but also draws attention to the fact that Directive 2005/29 lays down certain minimum standards under EU law with which the Member States must comply. 115 – See Stolze, C., Harmonisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts in der EU — Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sanktionssysteme, Hamburg 2010, p. 158, in whose view the flexible wording of Directive 2005/29 allows the Member States a broad margin of formative freedom in transposing the rules on enforcement under Article 11 et seq. 116 – See Case C‑540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag [2010] ECR I‑10909, paragraph 27. 117 – See Abbamonte, G., ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and its General Prohibition’, The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29, Oxford 2007, p. 30, who points out that Directive 2005/29 fully harmonises the substantive law of the Member States related to unfair commercial practices, but does not harmonise the enforcement mechanisms that are in place to combat these unfair practices. Member States must organise their own enforcement system, designate the persons and bodies having the right to bring legal actions under the directive, and determine the sanctions for infringement of the provisions of the directive. The author states that effective enforcement is critical to achieving the full potential of the directive. 118 – See heading 7 (‘La posible práctica desleal de la entidad bancaria’) in the order for reference.