Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2023:246
Date: 2023-03-23
Language of the case: Greek
Subject matter: Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Greece

Summary C-590/21 – 1 
Case C-590/21 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
23 September 2021 
Referring court: 
Areios Pagos (Greece) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
25 June 2021 
Appellants:  
Charles Taylor Adjusting Limited 
FD 
Respondents:  
Starlight Shipping Company 
Overseas Marine Enterprises INC 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Request for the recognition and a declaration of enforceability of a foreign 
judgment and foreign court orders impeding and preventing judicial protection by 
the court of another Member State or the continuation of proceedings already 
commenced in that State – Definition of public policy within the meaning of 
point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Article 267 TFEU, interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-590/21 
 
2  
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
(I) Is the expression ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ in the EU and, by 
extension, to domestic public policy, which constitutes a ground for non-
recognition and non-enforcement pursuant to point 1 of Article 34 and 
Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to be understood as meaning that it 
extends beyond explicit anti-suit injunctions prohibiting the commencement 
and continuation of proceedings before a court of another Member State to 
judgments or orders delivered by courts of Member States where: (i) they 
impede or prevent the claimant in obtaining judicial protection by the court 
of another Member State or from continuing proceedings already 
commenced before it; and (ii) is that form of interference in the jurisdiction 
of a court of another Member State to adjudicate a dispute of which it has 
already been seised, and which it has admitted, compatible with public 
policy in the EU? In particular, is it contrary to public policy in the EU 
within the meaning of point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation 
No 44/2001, to recognise and/or declare enforceable a judgment or order of 
a court of a Member State awarding provisional damages to claimants 
seeking recognition and a declaration of enforceability in respect of the costs 
and expenses incurred by them in bringing an action or continuing 
proceedings before the court of another Member State, where the reasons 
given are that: (a) it follows from an examination of that action that the case 
is covered by a settlement duly established and ratified by the court of the 
Member State delivering the judgment (or order); and (b) the court of the 
other Member State seised in a fresh action by the party against which the 
judgment or order was delivered lacks jurisdiction by virtue of a clause 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction? 
(II) If the first question is answered in the negative, is point 1 of Article 34 of 
Regulation No 44/2001, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, to be understood as constituting a ground for non-
recognition and non-enforcement in Greece of the judgment and orders 
delivered by a court of another Member State (the United Kingdom), as 
described under (I) above, where they are directly and manifestly contrary to 
national public policy in accordance with fundamental social and legal 
perceptions which prevail in Greece and the fundamental provisions of 
Greek law that lie at the very heart of the right to judicial protection 
(Articles 8 and 20 of the Greek Constitution, Article 33 of the Greek Civil 
Code and the principle of protection of that right that underpins the entire 
system of Greek procedural law, as laid down in Articles 176, 173(1) to (3), 
185, 205 and 191 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure cited in paragraph 6 
of the statement of reasons) and Article 6(1) of the [European Convention on 
Human Rights], such that, in that case, it is permissible to disapply the 
principle of EU law on the free movement of judgments, and is the non-
recognition resulting  therefrom compatible with the views that assimilate 
and promote the European perspective? 
CHARLES TAYLOR ADJUSTING 
 
3 
Provisions of EU law and case-law relied on 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), Article 47 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 
2001 L 12, p. 1), in particular point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1), Articles 66, 80 
and 81 
Judgments of the Court of 13 October 2011, Prism Investments, C-139/10, 
EU:C:2011:653; of 28 March 2000, Krombach, C-7/98, EU:C:2000:164; of 
11 May 2000, Renault, C-38/98, EU:C:2000:225; of 23 October 2014, flyLAL-
Lithuanian Airlines, C-302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 45; of 28 April 2009, 
Apostolides, C-420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 55; of 9 December 2003, 
Gasser, C-116/02, EU:C:2003:657, paragraphs 48 and 72; of 27 April 2004, 
Turner, C-159/02, EU:C:2004:228; of 27 June 1991, Overseas Union Insurance 
and Others, C-351/89, EU:C:1991:279, paragraphs 23 and 24; and of 10 February 
2009, Allianz and Generali Assicurazioni Generali, C-185/07, EU:C:2009:69 
Provisions of international law relied on 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), Article 6(1) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Greek Constitution, Articles 8 and 20 
Greek Civil Code (‘the CC’), Article 33 
Greek Code of Civil Procedure (‘the CCP’), Article 176, Article 173(1) to (3) and 
Articles 185, 205 and 191 
Brief presentation of the facts and proceedings 
1 The first respondent, the Starlight Shipping Company (‘Starlight’), was, inter alia, 
the owner, and the second respondent, Overseas Marine Enterprises (‘OME’), was 
the managing agent of a ship which sank and was lost, together with its cargo, as 
the result of an accident at sea on 3 May 2006. 
2 At the time of its loss, that ship was insured by three underwriters. Following the 
underwriters’ initial refusal to pay the insurance indemnity, Starlight brought an 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-590/21 
 
4  
action before the English courts against the first two underwriters and initiated 
arbitration against the third underwriter seeking payment of the insurance 
indemnity. 
3 While the proceedings in question were pending, settlement agreements were 
executed between the respondents and the three underwriters of the ship. Those 
agreements put an end to the proceedings initiated between them, and the 
underwriters agreed to pay the insurance indemnity provided for in the insurance 
policies in full and final settlement of all claims in connection with the loss of the 
ship. The settlement agreements were submitted to an English court and were 
ratified by it on 14 December 2007 and 7 January 2008. 
4 Subsequently, the respondents and the other owners of the ship lodged actions, 
including against the appellants, before the Polymeles Protodikio Peiraios (Court 
of First Instance, Piraeus, Greece). Those actions, which were actions in tort, 
sought damages for direct losses and financial satisfaction for the non-material 
damage which they claimed to have suffered as a result of that tort. 
5 In particular, the respondents argued that, while the action was pending before the 
English courts and the underwriters were refusing to pay the insurance indemnity, 
the underwriters’ employees and agents, including the appellants Charles Taylor 
Adjusting Limited (acting as a legal and technical consultancy) and FD (the 
private individual acting as its manager at the material time), who were handling 
the underwriters’ defence of the first respondent’s claims on the instructions of the 
ship’s underwriters, had spread false and defamatory rumours among third parties 
which had damaged the respondents’ reputation and credibility. 
6 In the wake of that, the underwriters and their employees or agents (including the 
appellants) – who were the defendants in the actions before the Court of First 
Instance, Piraeus – lodged actions before the English courts seeking a declaration , 
that the actions brought in Greece infringe the settlement agreements, and the 
award of damages. 
7 Those actions and appeals gave rise, inter alia, to the judgment of 26 September 
2014 and two orders delivered by Justice Flaux of the High Court of Justice 
(England and Wales), Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court. 
8 In the first place, the aforementioned judgment found, inter alia, that, according to 
the settlement agreements, ‘employees and agents’ included the appellants, and 
that Starlight and OME had also settled their claims against the appellants. It also 
found that the actions brought in Greece, including against the appellants, 
infringed all the settlement agreements without exception. According to that 
judgment, the settlement agreements have the effect of settling all potential claims 
against those employees or their agents as the persons jointly responsible for 
tortious acts (which allegation forms the basis for the actions brought against them 
in Greece). Lastly, on the damages sought by the appellants, Justice Flaux held 
CHARLES TAYLOR ADJUSTING 
 
5 
that they were entitled to an interim payment of GBP 100 000 on account of 
damages. 
9 Second, the two orders find that the settlement agreements relieve the appellants 
(and others) of liability in respect of any claims which Starlight and OME may 
have in connection with the loss of the ship, including all liability in connection 
with the claims made in the actions brought in Greece, and that the 
commencement and continuation of the proceedings in Greece by Starlight and 
OME against the appellants infringes the terms of the settlement agreements 
concerning full and final settlement and exclusive jurisdiction. 
10 By the first order, the respondents were ordered to pay the appellants: (a) an 
interim payment of GBP 100 000 to cover losses incurred up to 9 September 
2014; and (b) costs of the second appellant fixed at GBP 120 000. 
11 By the second order, the respondents were ordered to pay the appellants the costs 
of the second appellant fixed at GBP 30 000. 
12 Both orders also include terms warning Starlight and OME and the natural persons 
representing them that, if they fail to comply with the order, they may be held in 
contempt of court, their assets may be confiscated, or they may be fined or the 
natural persons imprisoned. 
13 By their application of 7 January 2015 to the Monomeles Protodikeio Peiraios 
(Court of First Instance (single judge), Piraeus, Greece), the appellants requested 
recognition and a declaration of enforceability in Greece of the aforementioned 
judgment and the two orders under Regulation No 44/2001. The Court of First 
Instance (single judge), Piraeus, upheld their application. 
14 On 11 September 2015, the respondents lodged an appeal with the Monomeles 
Efetio Peiraios (Court of Appeal (single judge), Piraeus, Greece) under Article 43 
of Regulation No 44/2001. The Court of Appeal (single judge), Piraeus, upheld 
the appeal, set aside the judgment of the court of first instance and dismissed the 
appellants’ application. 
15 In particular, the Court of Appeal (single judge), Piraeus, found, inter alia, that the 
appellants had sought judicial protection from the English courts and held that the 
settlement agreements deprive the Greek courts seised of the actions of the 
necessary jurisdiction. Next, the court held that the judgment and the two orders 
do not include an anti-suit injunction, but that both the judgment and the orders 
contain findings that prevent the proceedings commenced in Greece from 
progressing, order damages to be paid and warn of the obligation to pay damages 
to the persons seeking satisfaction of their claims in proceedings before the Greek 
courts. Consequently, those texts include ‘quasi’ anti-suit injunctions which 
impede the action before the Greek courts, in breach of the provisions of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 8(1) and Article 20 of the Greek 
Constitution, articles which go to the very heart of the notion of public policy. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-590/21 
 
6  
16 On 7 October 2019, the appellants brought an appeal on a point of law before the 
referring court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal (single judge), 
Piraeus. 
Principal arguments of the parties to the main proceedings 
17 By their appeal before the Court of Appeal (single judge), Piraeus, the respondents 
in these proceedings argued that the form of order sought (recognition and a 
declaration of enforceability of the aforementioned judgment and orders) is 
manifestly contrary to EU and national substantive and procedural public policy, 
as it impedes their fundamental right to judicial protection and constitutes an 
unacceptable interference in the jurisdictional powers of the courts of another 
Member State, namely of the Greek courts. 
18 The appellants claim that the judgment under appeal is vitiated, inter alia, by an 
erroneous interpretation and a misapplication of the provisions of point 1 of 
Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001 (which must be applied restrictively), of 
Article 33 of the CC, of Articles 8 and 20 of the Greek Constitution and of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR. In particular, they submit that, on a proper 
interpretation of those provisions, it should have been held that the judgment and 
orders are not manifestly contrary to national and EU public policy and do not 
infringe fundamental principles thereof,, in that the award of provisional damages 
to the appellants for proceedings commenced in Greece before the related claims 
were brought before the English courts does not prevent continued access to the 
Greek courts and to judicial protection by them, and that the judgment and orders 
were wrongly treated in the same way as anti-suit injunctions. 
Brief presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
19 First, the referring court finds that, in a case such as this, in which recognition and 
a declaration of enforceability are sought for judgments or orders delivered before 
10 January 2015 in respect of actions or applications lodged prior to that date, it is 
the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 that apply, and not the provisions of 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. 
20 In Greece, public policy, as regards the recognition of foreign judgments, is 
understood within the meaning of Article 33 of the CC, which also reflects 
international public policy. To that effect, a judgment cannot be recognised or 
declared enforceable in Greece where, by reason of its content, its enforcement 
would run counter to cultural, moral, social, legal or economic perceptions which 
prevail in the country and govern its way of life. Thus, a judgment cannot be 
recognised or declared enforceable where the content and operative parts of the 
foreign judgment conflict with fundamental cultural or legal principles and with 
the fundamental rights of individuals recognised by the rule of law. 
CHARLES TAYLOR ADJUSTING 
 
7 
21 Furthermore, the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Greek Constitution states that 
‘no person shall be deprived of the judge assigned to him by law against his will’ 
and Article 20(1) of the Greek Constitution states that ‘every person shall be 
entitled to receive legal protection by the courts and may plead before them his 
views concerning his rights or interests, as specified by law’. Those provisions of 
the Constitution, read in conjunction, fully guarantee that everyone has the right of 
access to and the full legal protection of the Greek courts. That is a fundamental 
right which goes to the very heart of public policy in the Greek legal order, 
underpins all Greek substantive and procedural law, and is given concrete 
expression in various forms. Thus, under Greek law, it is inconceivable and 
unacceptable to preclude judicial protection a priori or to put obstacles or barriers 
in its way. An order requiring a claimant in court proceedings to make an interim 
payment on account of damages, made against him precisely because he has 
sought judicial protection, is one such obstacle. 
22 In paragraph 6 of its reasoning, the referring court states that the Greek legal 
system also provides, in a number of procedural provisions, for penalties for 
abusive procedural conduct. In particular, the costs are imposed on the 
unsuccessful party (Article 176 of the CCP), but this is done by the court when it 
delivers its final decision on the dispute, in which case it has now been decided, 
whereas at the earlier stages each party pays in advance the costs for each 
procedural step taken (Article 173 (1) to (3) of the CCP), except in specific cases 
expressly provided for. It also provides for the imposition of court costs (by 
issuing the final judgment) even against the successful claimant, if he has failed to 
fulfil the duty of truth or is responsible for other abusive procedural conduct 
(Article 185 of the CCP), the imposition by the final judgment of the court of a 
penalty payment on the party who has acted in bad faith, brought a manifestly 
unfounded action or appeal, employed dilatory tactics in the proceedings, failed to 
comply with the rules of public morality, and so on (Article 205 of the CCP), and 
for ordering the applicant to pay the costs of staying the proceedings 
(Article 241(1) of the CCP). Lastly, Greek procedural law provides that an order, 
even a final judgment of a court of first instance, which may be challenged by 
ordinary appeal (Article 909(2) of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure), i.e. by 
means of an objection to judgment in default or an appeal, cannot be declared 
provisionally enforceable. Thus, without exception, the order for costs cannot be 
enforced before the judgment has become final, in order not to prevent the 
unsuccessful party from bringing an ordinary appeal. It follows from the case-law 
of the Greek courts that a claimant who makes false allegations and is thus guilty 
of abuse of process is automatically ordered to pay damages in tort (Articles 914 
and 919 of the Greek Civil Code) to the other party (defendant), but only where 
the force of res judicata established by the final judgment delivered on the 
claimant’s action is not contradicted. It is also apparent from Greek case-law 
when dealing with this issue that the courts are under an obligation to safeguard, 
in principle, the fundamental right of the claimant to bring an action before the 
courts, even if his conduct may be regarded as abusive, without any possibility of 
preventive action, prejudging the outcome of the proceedings on his claim, or 
awarding costs by way of compensation before the outcome of the proceedings is 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-590/21 
 
8  
known, with a view to deterring the claimant from obtaining the judicial 
protection sought. At the same time, the possibility of awarding damages ex post 
facto is safeguarded if it appears compatible with the outcome of the proceedings 
on the action brought. Furthermore, under domestic law, the only court which is 
granted the power to award court costs for proceedings brought before it is the 
court which will give final judgment on it (Article 191 of the CCP). 
23 Moreover, Article 6(1) of the ECHR protects every person’s right to judicial 
protection. That fundamental right is also enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, 
which establishes a right of appeal to the courts. That right also forms part of the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States of the European Union and 
of international treaties on the protection of human rights. Its protection therefore 
extends, even for the purposes of the interpretation and application of point 1 of 
Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001, to substantive and procedural European 
public policy, and thus also to domestic public policy.  
24 It is from that perspective that the question arises as to whether a judgment and 
orders delivered by a court of a Member State taxing and awarding in advance 
court costs in the form of provisional damages in a case pending before the courts 
of another Member State (thereby in essence imposing a penalty on the pretext of 
awarding damages) are compatible with EU public policy. While such an award is 
not prohibited, it necessarily makes it difficult to obtain judicial protection, since 
the applicant before the courts of another Member State is obliged (even if the 
judgment of the State of origin is declared enforceable in his principal place of 
residence or principal place of business, where most of his assets are located) to 
pay, in addition to his own costs of commencing proceedings, such costs also to 
the other party before a final decision is given by the court seised. The nature of 
that award, as a means of deterring him from pursuing the proceedings, is all the 
more evident if the judgment provides that further compensation is possible if his 
costs are increased, that is to say, if the proceedings are continued. This question 
does not only concern economic interests, but has a clear impact on the exercise of 
the fundamental right to unhindered judicial protection. 
25 Moreover, an anti-suit injunction, which is primarily a feature of English law, is a 
court order prohibiting a person from commencing or continuing court 
proceedings or arbitration before a foreign court or arbitral tribunal. Originally, an 
anti-suit injunction had the effect of prohibiting proceedings from being instituted 
or pursued before the English courts. Later, however, a cross-border form of anti-
suit injunction emerged and was used in cases in which proceedings were pending 
abroad. Such injunctions are issued mainly on the ground that bringing an action 
or pursuing proceedings before a court of another State, which is contrary to good 
faith or abusive, would adversely affect the applicant. In essence, the purpose of 
that legal remedy is to request that the court of one State intervene in proceedings 
in another State. Thus, the court therefore rules not only on its own jurisdiction 
but also on the jurisdiction of a foreign national court. 
CHARLES TAYLOR ADJUSTING 
 
9 
26 The referring court next cites the judgment of 27 April 2004, Turner (C-159/02, 
EU:C:2004:228), by which the Court held that the Brussels Convention, which 
was replaced by Regulation No 44/2001, ‘is to be interpreted as precluding the 
grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to 
proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings 
before a court of another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad 
faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings’. 
27 An injunction by which a court prohibits a party, on pain of penalties, from 
commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court to adjudicate the dispute. In fact, any injunction 
prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as constituting 
interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is 
incompatible with the system of the Brussels Convention (judgment of 27 April 
2004, Turner, C-159/02, EU:C:2004:228). 
28 Under Article 35(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, the international jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Member State of origin is not to be reviewed for the purposes of 
recognition and a declaration of enforceability, and the test of public policy 
referred to in point 1 of Article 34 is not to be applied to the rules relating to 
jurisdiction; therefore, failure to apply those rules cannot be given as a reason for 
refusing the request in question. 
29 However, interference on the part of a court of one Member State in the 
jurisdiction of a court of another Member State is a different matter entirely. In 
addition to purely anti-suit injunctions, a similar issue also arises where court 
costs are taxed in advance and are awarded in advance in the form of provisional 
damages (which are, in essence, a penalty imposed on the pretext of awarding 
damages) for a case pending before the courts of another Member State. That is 
true irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings before those courts, which 
may also go against the claimants; it may ultimately be found that those courts do 
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. However, in that case, they are the 
only courts with the jurisdiction to tax and award the costs incurred in the 
proceedings before them. Although such judgments and orders do not expressly 
prevent actions being brought or proceedings being continued before the court of 
another Member State, the fact remains that a penalty is imposed in advance in 
respect thereof. 
30 From that perspective, the further question arises as to whether judgments and 
orders to that effect, which in essence prejudge the outcome of the proceedings 
before a court of another Member State, by finding that that court does not have 
the jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, interfere in its jurisdiction, in breach of 
EU, and by extension, national public policy. 
31 In the present case, the Chamber hearing the case has doubts concerning the 
following points of law with regard to the interpretation of provisions of EU law. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-590/21 
 
10  
32 First, is the term ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ in the EU and, by 
extension, to domestic public policy, which is one of the reasons listed for 
refusing recognition and a declaration of enforceability pursuant to point 1 of 
Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to be understood, in its 
true sense, as meaning that it extends beyond explicit anti-suit injunctions 
prohibiting the commencement and continuation of proceedings before a court of 
another Member State to judgments or orders delivered by courts of other Member 
States which impede or obstruct the claimant in obtaining judicial protection by a 
court of another Member State or from continuing proceedings already 
commenced before that court, and is that form of interference in the jurisdiction of 
a court of another Member State to adjudicate a particular dispute of which it has 
already been seised compatible with EU public policy (first question referred, 
point (i))? 
33 In particular, the question arises as to whether it is contrary to EU public policy, 
within the meaning of point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation 
No 44/2001, to award provisional damages to claimants seeking recognition and a 
declaration of enforceability of a judgment or order delivered by a court of one 
Member State in respect of the costs and expenses incurred by them in bringing an 
action or continuing proceedings before the court of another Member State, where 
the reasons given are that: (a) it follows from examination of that action that the 
case is covered by a settlement duly established and ratified by the court of the 
Member State delivering the judgment (or order); and (b) the court of the other 
Member State seised in a fresh action by the party against which the judgment or 
order was delivered lacks jurisdiction by virtue of a clause conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction (first question referred, point (ii))? 
34 Second, in the light of the provisions of Greek law cited and of Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR, where judgments and orders which conflict with the fundamental rules 
that lie at the very heart of the right to judicial protection in the Member State of 
recognition (Greece) are delivered to that effect, does point 1 of Article 34 of 
Regulation No 44/2001 constitute a ground for the non-recognition and non-
enforcement of such judgments and orders, such that the principle of the free 
movement of judgments is disapplied, and is the non-recognition resulting 
therefrom compatible with the views that assimilate and promote the European 
perspective (second question referred)?