Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2025:905
Date: 2025-11-20
Language of the case: Czech
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Czechia

Summary C-57/23 – 1 
Case C-57/23 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
2 February 2023 
Referring court:  
Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
26 January 2023 
Applicant: 
JH 
Defendant:  
Policejní prezidium 
  
Background to the main proceedings  
Application to determine whether the performance of identification procedures, 
the retention of samples and information concerning the applicant, and the 
subsequent retention of personal data thus obtained in connection with his 
prosecution for a criminal offence constitute an unlawful interference. 
Factual and legal context of the request for a preliminary ruling 
Article 267 TFEU 
The questions referred  
(1) What degree of distinction between individual data subjects is required by 
Article 4(1)(c) or Article 6 in conjunction with Article 10 of Directive 
2016/680? Is it compliant with the obligation to minimise personal data 
processing, and with the obligation to distinguish between various categories 
of data subjects, for national law to permit the collection of genetic data in 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-57/23 
 
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respect of all persons suspected or accused of having committed an 
intentional criminal offence? 
(2) Is it in accordance with Article 4(1)(e) of Directive 2016/680 if the necessity 
of continued retention of a DNA profile is assessed, with a reference to the 
general prevention, investigation, and detection of criminal activity, by 
Police authorities on the basis of their internal regulations, which frequently 
means in practice that sensitive personal data is retained for an unspecified 
period without a maximum limit for the duration of the retention of that 
personal data being set? If not, by what criteria should the proportionality of 
the period of the retention of the personal data collected and retained for that 
purpose be assessed? 
(3) In the case of particularly sensitive personal data falling under Article 10 of 
Directive 2016/680, what is the minimal scope of the substantive or 
procedural conditions for obtaining, retaining, and deleting such data that 
must be regulated by a ‘provision of general application’ in the law of a 
Member State? Can judicial case-law qualify as ‘Member State law’ within 
the meaning of Article 8(2) in conjunction with Article 10 of Directive 
2016/680? 
Applicable European legislation  
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 89) – Articles 4 to 6, 8, 
and 10. 
Applicable national legislation  
Zákon č. 273/2008 Sb., o Policii České republiky (Law 273/2008 on the Police of 
the Czech Republic; the ‘Police Law’) – Paragraph 65: 
‘(1) The Police may, in performing their tasks for the purpose of future 
identification of 
(a) A person suspected of having committed an intentional criminal offence or a 
person who has been informed that he or she is suspected of having committed 
such a criminal offence, 
[…] 
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take fingerprints, identify physical features, perform measurements of the body, 
obtain visual, audio, and similar recordings, and take biological samples that 
make it possible to obtain information about genetic make-up. 
[…] 
(5) The Police shall delete the personal data obtained pursuant to paragraph 1 
as soon as their processing is no longer required for the purpose of the 
prevention, investigation, and detection of criminal activity or for the prosecution 
of criminal offences […].“ 
Paragraph 65 of the Police Law is implemented by means of internal procedural 
measures of the Police of the Czech Republic, in the form of pokyny policejního 
prezidenta (Guidelines of the Police President). The contents of those guidelines 
are not public and access to them is provided to individual applicants. The 
referring court has not been privy to their contents. 
The case-law of the referring court is also of relevance, as, according to it, the 
lawfulness of the obtaining or retention of personal data requires not only 
compliance with the conditions set in Paragraph 65 of the Police Law but also the 
performance of a proportionality test in every particular case. 
Facts of the case and original proceedings  
1 The Police of the Czech Republic, Department for the Investigation of Corruption 
and Financial Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Group at the Pilsen 
Office (‘Defendant’) launched criminal prosecution of the applicant on 
11 December 2015 for the offence of breach of trust. The offence allegedly 
consisted of the granting of a subsidy, despite the applicant knowing that the 
application under assessment does not meet the requirements for the provision of a 
subsidy. 
2 On 13 January 2016, the defendant questioned the applicant in the course of 
criminal proceedings and ordered identification procedures to be performed. 
Despite the disagreement voiced by the applicant, the defendant took fingerprints, 
performed a buccal smear from which it created a DNA profile, took the 
applicant’s photographs and description, which it then placed in the relevant 
Czech Police databases (‘the contested interference’). 
3 By final judgment of the Městský soud v Praze (Prague City Court) of 15 March 
2017, the applicant was convicted of both the offence of a breach of trust and the 
crime of misconduct in public office. The applicant committed that crime and that 
offence as Deputy Minister, thereby making use of his significant influence on the 
decision to approve the subsidy, and he purposefully advanced the approval of a 
subsidy application for a civil association and the payment of that subsidy despite 
knowing that the subsidy applicant failed to meet the conditions for the provision 
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of that subsidy. By those actions, the applicant caused damage to the Czech 
Republic amounting to a total of CZK 4,500,000. 
4 By an application lodged on 8 March 2016, the applicant sought a decision 
determining the contested interference as unlawful. 
5 By judgment of 23 June 2022, Prague City Court granted the application and ruled 
the contested interference unlawful. Furthermore, it ruled that the retention of the 
personal data of the applicant thus obtained in databases of the Police of the Czech 
Republic is also unlawful. Consequently, the Prague City Court ordered that the 
defendant delete all of the applicant’s personal data retained by it from databases 
of the Police of the Czech Republic. 
6 The defendant challenged the judgment of the Prague City Court by an appeal 
lodged with the referring court. 
Basic arguments of the parties to the original proceedings 
7 The defendant claims that the contested interference was not conducted 
unlawfully. It claims that the only criterion for the collection of genetic material 
is, in cases such as the present case, set by Paragraph 65 of the Police Law, which 
states that the person concerned must be a person accused of an intentional 
criminal offence or a person who has been informed that he/she is suspected of 
having committed an intentional criminal offence. That criterion was met in this 
case. The defendant holds that it was not competent to assess any other criteria. 
8 Furthermore, the defendant stresses that it assessed the proportionality of the 
collection and retention of the applicant’s personal data. In doing so, it took into 
account the factor of recidivism, the potential escalation of the actions, as well as 
the fact that the applicant had already committed administrative offences on 
several occasions in the past, i.e., repeatedly committed unlawful conduct. As 
regards the duration of the retention of the applicant’s personal data, the defendant 
stressed that the Police of the Czech Republic has an established mechanism of 
regular (internal) review of the necessity of the retention of personal data. 
Furthermore, it states that criminal proceedings in the applicant’s case were 
completed in 2017, with the imposition of a four-year suspended sentence, i.e., 
relatively recently. Finally, in view of the alleged insufficient publication of 
internal police regulations, the defendant stressed that the internal regulations 
concerned were provided to the public within the framework of the right to 
information and that legal regulation is always inevitably supplemented by case-
law, which is also the case of Paragraph 65 of the Police Law. 
9 The applicant stressed in his statement, first and foremost, that, at the time of the 
actions taken by the Police of the Czech Republic, no review of the 
proportionality of the interference took place. The action was simply conducted 
automatically by the police authorities, with a reference to Paragraph 65(1)(a) of 
the Police Law, and the fact that the applicant had been accused of an intentional 
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criminal offence. The arguments added by the defendant ex post, as to the 
offender having committed other unlawful actions in the form of administrative 
offences, and that therefore his personal data should continue to be kept in police 
databases, are unconvincing, just like the abstract and unfounded references to the 
possibility of recidivism. The applicant expresses his surprise at the fact that, 
according to the defendant, 5 years after conviction is a period too short for the 
deletion of that data, when, in some cases, the conviction may be expunged within 
the same period. Furthermore, the applicant criticises the lack of publication of 
police guidelines pertaining to the performance of identification procedures in a 
situation when the publication of legislation is a necessary foundation of the rule 
of law. In a state respecting the rule of law, all measures that may interfere with 
fundamental rights must be regulated directly by statute. Internal police 
organisational rules, which do not constitute legislation, and cannot substitute for 
such statutory rules. 
Summary of the grounds for the order for reference 
General remarks  
10 The referring court has questions as to the compliance of certain aspects of 
national legislation concerning the obtaining and retention of personal data for the 
purpose of future identification, in particular sensitive personal data in the form of 
a DNS profile, with EU legislation, as well as with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In this context, the 
referring court holds that the interpretation of Directive 2016/680 is key for the 
decision in the case at hand; however, before elucidating the background to the 
individual questions referred, the referring court deems it appropriate to mention 
two general points that are shared by all three questions referred. 
11 First: Directive 2016/680 is a relatively new EU legal instrument with respect to 
which there is no relevant case-law of the Court of Justice. Existing case-law 
concerning Regulation 2016/679 (‘GDPR’) or its predecessor in the form of 
Directive 95/46 certainly does provide useful bases for interpreting a number of 
the issues before the referring court in the present case; however, it is not evident 
to what extent the GDPR regulation is indeed automatically applicable by analogy 
to the specific application framework of Directive 2016/680. After all, if both 
regimes were to be automatically identical, it is not evident why the EU legislator 
deemed it important to enact a comprehensive and specific legal regulation in the 
form of Directive 2016/680 as a lex specialis in relation to the GDPR. 
Consequently, it can be assumed that the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data for the purposes of the prevention, investigation 
or prosecution of criminal offences is to differ in certain aspects from the general 
regime of personal data protection. The common denominator of all three 
questions referred is the effort to discover wherein exactly that difference lies. 
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12 Second: the case referred concerns the extensive collection of a particularly 
sensitive type of personal data: genetic material and the DNA profile of persons 
obtained therefrom. That type of personal data is expressly referred to in 
Article 10 of Directive 2016/680, which delimits genetic information to the 
regime of “processing of special categories of personal data” for which it 
envisages the regime of “strict necessity” of processing, connected with the 
existence of “appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data 
subject’; however, it is not evident from that legal framework or from existing 
case-law of the Court of Justice, including that related to the similar regulation 
under the GDPR, how this “extra-special” framework is to differ in practical terms 
from the already special framework of Directive 2016/680 and the high level of 
protection of personal data envisaged therein. 
13 It is characteristic of the entire situation that the criteria on the basis of which a 
decision is made not to carry out identification procedures, or an order is issued to 
delete personal data already obtained, exist in the form of an exemplary list solely 
in case-law; however, there is no prototype for them in the law. Furthermore, in 
practice, the decision about such an interference being (dis)proportionate, made on 
the basis of many of these criteria, will be made with a considerable delay, by an 
administrative court. It is not common for a police authority performing 
identification procedures, typically in the early stages of investigation, to be able 
to carry out the required type and scope of evaluation, because the information 
concerned may not even be available to it. 
The first question  
14 ECtHR case-law has repeatedly formulated a requirement with a view to the 
protection of the right to privacy pursuant to Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), that the national law of an ECHR contractual party 
distinguish between criminal offences in connection with which DNA samples are 
collected having regard to their societal gravity. In the opinion of the ECtHR, 
perpetrators of serious criminal acts, in particular of violent acts, with respect to 
which the collection and storage of a DNA sample is legitimate, cannot be 
approached in the same manner as the perpetrators of less serious criminal 
offences (cf., in particular, judgments of 13 February 2020, Trajkovski and 
Chipovski v. North Macedonia, complaints No 53205/13 and 63320/13; of 
13 February 2020, Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, complaint No 45245/15; of 
22 June 2017, Aycaguer v. France, complaint No 8806/12; or of 4 December 
2008, S and Marper v. the United Kingdom, complaints No 30562/04 and 
30566/04). 
15 In general the case-law of the Court of Justice also, although in the context of the 
interpretation of legislation other than Directive 2016/680, insists on the 
requirement of proportionality between the seriousness of an interference with 
fundamental rights (in the form of collection of personal data) and the seriousness 
of the criminal activity – cf., for example, judgments of 6 October 2020, La 
Quadrature du Net and Others, C-511/18, C-512/18 a C-520/18, EU:C:2020:791, 
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paragraph 140; of 21 December 2016, Tele2, C-203/15 and C-698/15, 
EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 102; of 2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16, 
EU:C:2018:788, paragraphs 56 and 57, or Opinion 1/15 (PNR Agreement EU-
Canada) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592, paragraph 149). 
16 It remains unclear as to what type of proportionality is envisaged here and to what 
extent the logic of the building of databases (systemic, legislative proportionality) 
can automatically be replaced by an assessment of individual proportionality 
having regard to the specific perpetrator in each individual case (specific, casuistic 
proportionality). In other words, if the legislator made a sufficient distinction on 
the legislative level (in terms of the types of criminal offences and in view of their 
seriousness, and setting additional general, proportionate criteria), would it then 
still be necessary to assess the proportionality of each individual collection in each 
individual case? 
17 It appears that the national legislator is of the opinion that it has already 
considered the proportionality of the obtaining of identification details at first 
hand in Paragraph 65(1) of the Police Law, as it restricted its application solely to 
intentional criminal offences, whereby it adequately differentiated between 
individual data subjects. Based on this logic, no further considerations concerning 
individual proportionality in specific cases are required; however, this line of 
thinking is deemed inadequate. 
18 Hence, the question arises as to the degree of legislative or judicial differentiation 
expected in this regard from Member States by Directive 2016/680. Article 6 of 
Directive 2016/680 seems to require only a distinction between the personal data 
of suspects and convicted persons, on the one hand, and victims and third parties 
on the other; however, this list is only illustrative (introduced with the words 
“such as”). The requirement as to the proportionality of the data processed clearly 
follows from the principles set out in Article 4 of the Directive, as well as from 
case-law; nevertheless, the specific scope of the provision remains unclear 
regarding the question at hand. 
The second question  
19 The second question concerns the proportionate duration of the period of retention 
of identification data by police authorities. Neither Directive 2016/680 nor 
applicable national legislation set out a specific timeframe. 
20 It follows from Article 4(1)(e) of Directive 2016/680 as well as from general 
principles and case-law of the Court of Justice merely that personal data are to be 
kept for no longer than is necessary having regard to the purposes for which they 
are processed; however, it is not clear how that logic is to be applied in a situation 
when the declared purpose is the prevention, investigation, and detection of 
criminal activity, a purpose which is, by its nature, prospective and unlimited in 
time. 
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21 In practice, two different types of proportionality, pursuing different objectives, 
collide in the assessment of the proportionality of the term for which personal data 
is kept: structural on the one hand and individual on the other. If the prevention, 
investigation, and detection of criminal activity were accepted as a legitimate 
objective on a general level, the logical and appropriate means for achieving it 
would be to retain information about a maximum number of data subjects for a 
maximum possible period of time. A police database from which an applicant 
would have to be removed upon request after a certain period would no longer 
fulfil a meaningful role in the detection of criminal activity. 
22 Conversely, in the context of an examination of proportionality in the case of 
applications for deletion from police databases with regard to individual persons 
or offenders, the continued registration in a police database is seen as a 
continuation of a type of a punishment, which will, sooner or later, focus on the 
question of the expiration of a period from the formulation of a suspicion or 
conviction of the offender and his or her subsequent orderly life, including 
speculation regarding the risk of recidivism. 
23 It is understandable that a periodic internal review by the Police of the Czech 
Republic of the continued legitimacy of the retention of identification data 
obtained will lean towards pursuing the structural objective of effective 
investigation and discovery of criminal activity. Hence, the question arises 
whether it is compatible with EU law for national law not to set a maximum limit 
on the period of retention possible, with the understanding that on the basis of 
periodic internal review by police authorities, DNA profiles obtained will tend to 
be kept without any time restriction. 
24 In this context, the referring court notes that it is familiar with the concept of the 
‘right to be forgotten’ embodied in the case-law of the Court of Justice and 
subsequently codified in Article 17 GDPR. The question arises, however, to what 
extent that approach and case-law are transferable to the context of police 
databases and Directive 2016/680, the meaningful functioning and usability of 
which can only be ensured if those databases – in metaphorical terms – ‘do not 
forget’. 
The third question 
25 The referring court has no doubt that the internal police regulations, in the form of 
the Guidelines of the Police President, do not meet the conditions as to the quality 
or as to the publication of legislation. They do not constitute legislation and 
conceptually cannot possess the qualities of ‘law’, within the meaning of 
Article 8(2) of Directive 2016/680. 
26 The provisions of Paragraph 65 of the Police Law undoubtedly have the qualities 
of “law of a Member State”. However, in itself this provision is not sufficiently 
certain and detailed as to meet the requirements of Article 8(2) in conjunction 
with Article 10 of Directive 2016/680. The provisions of Paragraph 65 of the 
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Police Law do not contain, among other things, any regulation of specific 
conditions for retention, the types of information that may be obtained from a 
sample, and in terms of the continued retention of DNA profiles, the conditions 
subject to which they should be deleted. And it does not contain any of the 
guarantees required by Article 10 of Directive 2016/680. 
27 That statutory regulation is, however, made complete by constitutionally 
conforming interpretation and case-law. In this regard, recital 33 of Directive 
2016/680 stipulates that ‘where this Directive refers to Member State law, a legal 
basis or a legislative measure, this does not necessarily require a legislative act 
adopted by a parliament  […]. However, such a Member State law, legal basis or 
legislative measure should be clear and precise and its application foreseeable for 
those subject to it […].’ 
28 It also follows from settled ECtHR case-law that ‘law’ in the context of a test of 
the legality of restrictions of fundamental rights includes not only law but also 
case-law (judgments of 26 April 1979, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom 
(No 1), complaint No 6538/74, paragraph 47; of 24 April 1990, Kruslin v. France, 
complaint No 11801/85, paragraph 29, and of 10 November 2005, Leyla Şahin v. 
Turkey, complaint No 44774/98, paragraphs 84-98). 
29 More recent case-law of the Court of Justice has been, however, marked in this 
regard by higher requirements in terms of the quality and publication of the ‘law’ 
that restricts fundamental rights. The Court of Justice ruled, for example, that, 
given the high level of protection in cases of particularly serious restrictions of 
fundamental rights, ‘only a provision of general application could meet the 
requirements of clarity, predictability, accessibility and, in particular, protection 
against arbitrariness’ (cf., e.g., judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, C-528/15, 
EU:C:2017:213, paragraph 43). A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of 
Justice in a number of cases concerning personal data protection, when it insisted 
on the requirement that legal regulation ‘must also lay down the substantive and 
procedural conditions’ governing any use and access to traffic and location data 
obtained (cf., more recent judgments of 2 March 2021, Prokuratuur, C-746/18, 
EU:C:2021:152, paragraph 49, or of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda 
Síochána and Others, C-140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 104). 
30 The logic of stricter requirements in terms of the quality of legislation laying 
down minimum requirements for the obtaining, retention, and destruction of DNA 
samples and DNA profiles obtained therefrom should probably also apply to the 
present case. After all, Article 10 of Directive 2016/680 in conjunction with 
recital 37 of the Directive, which places this personal data in a specific category of 
data requiring special protection, would support this conclusion. In that case, EU 
law would require that general legislation lay down at least a general framework 
for the database, the question of access, a type of use of the DNA information that 
is more precise, including barriers to their use, but, above all, in line with 
Article 10, appropriate safeguards for rights and freedoms, including in the form 
of a clear differentiation of the types of criminal offences in which DNA profiles 
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may be obtained and the conditions subject to which they must or may be 
subsequently destroyed. 
31 National law applicable to the present case does not, however, regulate any such 
matters. If similar requirements were to be automatically applied in the case at 
hand and in other cases before administrative courts on the basis of the present 
Paragraph 65 of the Police Law, the consequence would necessarily be radical: the 
court would be obliged to declare the national legal regulation as incompatible 
with Article 8(2) in conjunction with Article 10 of Directive 2016/680, and any 
biological DNA samples and DNA profiles obtained on their basis as 
automatically unlawful.