Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:989
Date: 2025-12-18
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Third Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Italy

Summary C-325/24 – 1 
Case C-325/24 [Bissilli] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
2 May 2024 
Referring court: 
Tribunale Ordinario di Firenze (Italy) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
5 February 2024 
Accused person: 
HG 
  
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
In criminal proceedings against the accused person, HG, who was in custody in 
Belgium, the Tribunale di Firenze (District Court, Florence) issued a European 
Investigation Order (‘EIO’) for the purpose of holding the hearing of HG by 
videoconference in order to ensure his participation in the trial and to obtain 
evidence through that participation. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The reference for a preliminary ruling, made pursuant to Article 267 TFEU by the 
District Court, Florence, concerns the interpretation of Directive 2014/41/EU 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters and seeks to 
ascertain whether the decision of the Belgian authorities to refuse the EIO 
complies with European law, in order to determine the way in which the trial 
should be carried out in Italy. 
 
i The name of the present case is fictitious. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings. 
EN 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Does Article 24 of the [EIO Directive], read in conjunction with Article 3 
[of the EIO Directive], permit an EIO to be issued for the hearing by 
videoconference of an accused person who is in custody in the executing State 
during the hearing of oral argument, for the purpose of gathering evidence as part 
of his or her examination and with the additional aim of ensuring that he or she 
participates in the trial, having regard to the provisions of Article 24 and 
recitals 25 and 26, in particular where the conditions for issuing an EAW are not 
met and the national law of the issuing State recognises the right of the accused 
person to participate in the trial and to be examined, including by 
videoconference, in order to make statements of probative value? 
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, can the rule laid down 
in Article 10 of the [EIO Directive], which empowers the executing State to 
refuse the execution of an EIO if the investigative measure would not be 
authorised in a similar domestic case, be interpreted as empowering the executing 
State to refuse the execution of an EIO for the hearing of an accused person who 
is in custody abroad by videoconference in the trial, in the light of Article 24 [of 
the EIO Directive], which governs the specific rules for the hearing by 
videoconference without including the ground for refusal at issue? 
3. Must Article 11(1)(f) of the [EIO Directive], read in the light of Article 47 
of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that the execution of an EIO for the 
hearing of an accused person who is in custody abroad by videoconference at the 
hearing of oral argument cannot be refused if the procedural safeguards applicable 
to that videoconference under the law of the issuing State are appropriate in the 
particular case to ensure the accused person’s effective exercise of his or her 
rights of defence and the fundamental right to a fair trial within the meaning of 
Article 47 of the Charter? 
4. Can the concept of ‘fundamental principles of [the law of] the executing 
State’, which may constitute a special ground for refusal within the meaning of 
Article 24(2)(b) of the [EIO Directive], constitute a limit to the execution of any 
request for hearing an accused person by videoconference in the trial, on the basis 
of a general national directive binding on all executing authorities, without any 
assessment of the particular circumstances of the specific case and the 
requirements contained in the national law of the issuing State to guarantee the 
rights of defence of the accused person, applicable in the specific case, or, on the 
contrary, is it incorrect to regard the refusal of execution as an exception which 
must be interpreted strictly, in relation to specific procedural aspects provided for 
in the national law of the issuing State or to particular relevant elements of the 
specific case? 
5. Does Article 22(1) of the [EIO Directive], read in conjunction with Article 3 
of the [EIO Directive], permit the issuing of an EIO for the temporary transfer of 
an accused person who is in custody abroad in order to allow him or her to be 
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heard at a hearing of oral argument, where that hearing has investigatory value 
under the national law of the issuing State? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters (‘the EOI’), 
and in particular recitals 25 and 26 and Articles 1, 10, 11, 22 and 24 thereof. 
Article 6 TEU. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 47. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Legge n. 67 (Law No 67) of 28 April 2014, as amended by decreto legislativo n. 
150 (Legislative Decree No 150) of 10 October 2022. 
Codice di procedura penale (Code of Criminal Procedure), Articles 133a and 
133b. Article 133b defines the scope of application of remote participation in the 
trial. Article 133b sets out a series of rules which must be complied with in order 
to combine remote participation with respect for the fundamental rights of the 
parties and the adversarial principle. 
Disposizioni di attuazione del Codice di procedura penale (Implementing 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure), Articles 146 and 205b. The latter 
regulates participation in the trial of the accused person in custody abroad. That 
participation may be by way of physical presence, temporary transfer to Italian 
territory, or, where international agreements so provide and in accordance with the 
rules contained therein, videoconference. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 26 February 2015, the judge in the preliminary hearing committed HG for trial 
before the District Court, Florence (‘the Court’) in relation to numerous episodes 
of transfer in Italy of large quantities of narcotic drugs imported from Belgium 
and for having set up and managed an association for the purpose of drug 
trafficking with its head office in Belgium and branches in several European 
countries (Italy, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands). According to the 
charge, from 2007 to 2009, HG had been one of the heads of the association and 
had coordinated the illegal activities of the organisation from Antwerp, where he 
was residing. 
2 During the preliminary investigation, HG served his provisional detention in 
prison as ordered by a European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’), in conjunction with 
detention for the purpose of serving a sentence imposed in Belgium. However, at 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-325/24 
 
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the time of the committal for trial, HG had already been released by the judge for 
preliminary investigations of Florence. 
3 At the oral argument stage, HG did not appear before the Court and was declared 
absent, on the ground that he was aware of the trial and represented by a lawyer. 
The progress of the trial was slowed down by various changes in the composition 
of the Court and HG’s lawyer, for serious health reasons of a witness and by some 
legitimate impediments, on health grounds of HG himself or his lawyer, which 
made it impossible to carry out some hearings and delayed the hearing of the 
accused person, as requested by his lawyer. 
4 At the hearing on 24 May 2022, the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that HG 
had been detained in Bruges prison since 15 February 2022. The Court, after 
hearing the parties and in agreement with them, ordered the participation of the 
accused person, HG, by videoconference and interpreter assistance and then 
issued an EIO for the hearing by videoconference. On 17 February 2023, the 
Belgian authorities refused the execution of the EIO, while confirming HG’s 
detention in Belgium, not only provisional detention for a proceeding pending 
there, but also in the context of serving a sentence. 
5 As the detention abroad results in the legitimate impediment to HG appearing, the 
trial in Italy against him was further postponed to another date. The District Court, 
Florence approached Eurojust, requesting assistance in the judicial cooperation 
procedure. The Belgian authorities continued to refuse the hearing of the accused 
person by videoconference, and also refused the request in the alternative for a 
temporary transfer of the person held in custody to Italy. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
6 The referring court notes that, under Italian law, there is no obligation on the 
accused person to participate in the trial and the system of trial in absentia applies. 
Under the trial in absentia regime, the trial may take place even in the absence of 
the accused person provided that it is certain that he or she is actually aware of it 
and that his or her non-participation in it is the result of a voluntary choice. Given 
that the accused person has the right to participate in the trial, if he or she is 
informed of the trial and does not appear as a result of unforeseeable 
circumstances, force majeure or any other absolute impediment, the trial must be 
postponed until the impeding ground ceases. Grounds for legitimate impediment 
to appear include detention (also abroad). In that case the court, if it does not 
obtain a formal and express waiver of the right of the accused person to appear, 
must postpone the hearing until such time as his or her participation is possible. 
7 The referring court notes that if it is not possible to issue an EAW, because the 
requirements laid down by Framework Decision No 2002/584/JHA are not met, 
the only alternative is the issuing of an EIO in order to ensure the participation of 
the accused person in custody abroad in the trial and the gathering of evidence by 
means of his or her participation. It therefore considers that the EIO issued in the 
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present case falls within the scope of application of the EIO Directive and that it is 
the correct instrument in the absence of the requirements laid down in the 
aforementioned Framework Decision. 
8 The referring court, after observing that the EIO Directive is clear in providing 
that an EIO may be issued where the sole purpose of the hearing by 
videoconference is to gather evidence through the participation of the accused 
person in the trial, has doubts as to whether it is equally legitimate to issue an EIO 
where, as in the present case, the purpose of the hearing by videoconference is, in 
addition, to ensure the participation of the accused person in the trial. It also states 
that the present case differs from that currently pending before the Court of Justice 
(C-285/23 Linte), which seeks to clarify whether an EIO may be issued for the 
hearing of the accused person by videoconference solely in order to ensure the 
participation of the accused person in the hearing and not, in contrast, also for the 
collection of evidence. 
9 According to the referring court, even where the purpose of the hearing by 
videoconference of an accused person who is in custody abroad is to ensure the 
participation of that person in the trial, in addition to the purpose of obtaining 
evidence, the EIO Directive provides a legal basis for the requested measure, if 
the domestic law of the issuing State allows the hearing by videoconference, 
provided that the rights of the accused person are guaranteed and without 
prejudice to the possibility for the executing State to refuse the execution of that 
EIO on the basis of the grounds for non-recognition listed in the EIO Directive. 
Finally, the referring court notes that, on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition, it is for the issuing authority alone to assess whether the measure 
requested by the EIO (also) pursues an evidence-gathering purpose, on the basis 
of its national legislation. 
A. Arguments of the Belgian authority 
10 By letter of 17 February 2023, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bruges, replied to 
the EIO issued by the District Court, Florence, refusing its execution without 
referring to any specific ground for refusal laid down in the EIO Directive and 
explaining that it could not execute the request on the ground that: (i) at national 
level, in Belgium it is not possible for an accused person to appear at trial by 
videoconference. During substantive proceedings, only witnesses threatened or 
resident abroad or experts residing abroad may be heard by videoconference; (ii) 
Article 33(4) of the Belgian Law of 22 May 2017, which transposes Directive 
2014/41/EU, provides that the hearing of an accused person by videoconference is 
possible provided that the accused person agrees and that the implementation of 
that investigative measure does not infringe fundamental principles of Belgian 
law; (iii) the use of videoconferencing during the substantive proceedings in 
Belgium is currently contrary to respect for the fundamental right to a fair trial. It 
is also possible to conclude from Judgment No 76/2018 of the Belgian 
Constitutional Court that the appearance of an accused person in provisional 
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detention by videoconference infringes respect for the right of defence. Finally, 
the Belgian executing authority refers to the guidelines issued by the College of 
Public Prosecutors, Belgium, in 2021. These guidelines provide that foreign 
requests to hear a suspect, accused person or convicted person by videoconference 
during the trial cannot be executed in Belgium because: (i) there is no legal basis 
in Belgium for hearing a suspect or accused person by videoconference in order to 
ensure his or her participation in the trial; (ii) the EIO Directive does not provide a 
legal basis for that practice; (iii) there are no appropriate technical means to 
ensure the rights of the defence during a hearing by videoconference with an 
international connection in Belgium. 
B. Submissions of the referring court on the arguments of the Belgian 
authority 
11 The referring court notes that the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bruges, put forward 
a first, general, ground for refusal relating to the non-availability of 
videoconferencing in a similar domestic case. In addition, it put forward a further, 
specific, ground for refusal relating to the incompatibility of videoconferencing 
with fundamental rights under Belgian law. 
(i) The general ground for refusal 
12 According to the referring court, it is apparent from the explanations provided by 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bruges, that, while hearing by videoconference is 
provided for witnesses and experts in certain situations, physical presence is the 
rule for the accused person in a trial before the court which may convict him. The 
existence in the executing State of a different legal regime for the arrangements 
for the appearance of witnesses and experts at the hearing, on the one hand, and of 
suspects or accused persons, on the other, leads to the classification of the first 
point of the Belgian reply as a refusal for the, general, ground of non-availability 
of the investigative measure in a similar domestic case. The hearing by 
videoconference is not a technique unknown in the Belgian legal system, a 
circumstance which would have given rise to a scenario in which the measure did 
not exist under national law, but rather a measure that is inapplicable to the 
hearing of accused persons or suspects. 
13 The referring court notes that, while it is true that executing authorities may refuse 
the execution of a specific investigative measure, subject to a particular regime 
within the meaning of the EIO Directive, where that measure ‘would not be 
authorised in a similar domestic case’, by contrast, in Article 24, which governs 
the issuing of an EIO for the hearing by videoconference, the ground for refusal at 
issue is not included and therefore should not apply. 
14 In addition, the same letter from the Belgian Public Prosecutor’s Office clarifies 
that under the Belgian law which transposes the EIO Directive, videoconferencing 
for the hearing of an accused person is possible, subject to two conditions: (i) that 
he or she agrees; (ii) that the implementation of that investigative measure does 
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not infringe the fundamental principles of Belgian law. According to the referring 
court, those two conditions may give rise to specific grounds for refusal, within 
the meaning of Article 24(2)(a) and (b) of the EIO Directive, which must therefore 
be examined. 
(ii) The specific grounds for refusal 
15 As regards Article 24(2)(a), there is no indication that the accused person did not 
consent to the hearing by videoconference, so it does not appear to be the case that 
the Belgian authorities can refuse the execution of the EIO if they did not first ask 
the accused person whether he consents to the hearing by videoconference. 
16 As regards Article 24(2)(b), this additional ground for refusal was not explained in 
relation to the specific procedural safeguards provided for by the law of the Italian 
State or in relation to certain relevant circumstances of the specific case (such as 
the type of offence or the lack of available technical means). The Belgian 
authorities simply state that the use of videoconferencing during substantive 
proceedings in Belgium is currently contrary to respect for the fundamental right 
to a fair trial in general. It should be noted that the EIO was issued for the hearing 
by videoconference of an accused person who is at liberty in the context of the 
criminal proceedings pending before the District Court, Florence. Moreover, the 
judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court does not state that a hearing by 
videoconference would in itself constitute an infringement of the fundamental 
principles of domestic law. 
(iii) Respect for the fundamental rights of the European Union 
17 The referring court notes that the relevant level of protection within the meaning 
of Article 11(1)(f) of the EIO Directive is that guaranteed at European level and 
not that provided for by the national legal system. It notes that Article 6 TEU 
refers not only to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR). In that regard, the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) has 
repeatedly held that the participation of the accused person in the trial by 
videoconference is not in itself contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR, provided that 
compliance with certain conditions set out in that case-law of the ECtHR is 
ensured, so that the accused person can effectively exercise his or her rights of 
defence and is not materially disadvantaged by participation by videoconference. 
The referring court notes that, in accordance with Article 24(5)(c) of the EIO 
Directive, the hearing by videoconference takes place in accordance with the law 
of the issuing State and that the legal framework of the Italian legal system 
complies with the requirements of the case-law of the ECtHR. Moreover, it is 
clear that the executing State, while implementing the measure under the law of 
the issuing State, in turn ensures compliance with the conditions laid down in the 
Directive, including in the light of Article 24(3) and (5)(a) thereof. 
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18 Thus, according to the referring court, the execution of that EIO cannot be refused 
on the ground that it is incompatible with the fundamental rights of the European 
Union without first assessing whether or not the procedural safeguards provided 
for by Italian law for the hearing by videoconference applicable in the present 
case are compatible with the requirements laid down by the case-law of the 
ECtHR. To that end, the executing authority must request all necessary 
information from the issuing authority, in accordance with the principle of sincere 
cooperation. That conclusion seems to be in line with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, which has emphasised, albeit in the context of the EAW, that refusal 
based on the risk of infringement of fundamental rights requires the presence of 
elements which demonstrate the existence of a specific risk for the person 
concerned. 
(iv) The temporary transfer of the person held in custody 
19 From the point of view of issuing an EIO for the temporary transfer of the person 
held in custody in the issuing State, for the purposes of his hearing, the referring 
court points out that the Belgian authorities renewed the refusal on the ground that 
the hearing of the accused person on trial does not constitute an investigative 
measure. The referring court notes that the temporary transfer of the person held 
in custody in the issuing State appears to be an alternative investigative measure, 
within the meaning of Articles 10 and 22 of the EIO Directive. Moreover, in the 
Italian legal system, the examination of the accused person on trial constitutes a 
means of proof and it is for the issuing authority alone to determine whether or not 
the measure requested by the EIO, within the meaning of its national legal system, 
constitutes an investigative measure. The principle of mutual recognition would 
be rendered meaningless if the executing authority could call into question the 
evidentiary or non-evidentiary purpose of the requested measure under its national 
law, and refuse its execution on that ground. The executing authority may 
therefore refuse the execution of that measure only on the grounds for refusal 
referred to in Article 11 and Article 22(2)(a) and (b) of the EIO Directive. The 
provision does not include the scenario that the investigative measure would not 
be authorised in a similar domestic case among those grounds. 
20 If the person in custody does not consent (Article 22(2)(a)), his detention abroad 
would cease to constitute a legitimate impediment to appearance, since failure to 
appear in that case would be an expression of the accused person’s entitlement to 
waive his right to appear, so the trial could take place properly. 
21 Finally, as regards the duration of the transfer, the District Court, Florence, would 
request the physical presence of the person held in custody for a hearing or, at the 
most, for a limited number of one-day hearings, which would be scheduled taking 
into account any hearings set before the Belgian judicial authority, so that the 
return would take place within the time limit set by Belgium.