Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2011:350
Date: 2011-05-26
Language of the case: Dutch
Subject matter: State aids;Competition;Taxation
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary of the Judgment 1. Union law – Direct effect – National charges incompatible with Union law – Repayment – Procedures – Application of national law – Provision, thereby, of limitation periods or time-limits 2. Union law – Direct effect – National charges incompatible with Union law – Repayment – Procedures – Application of national law – Provision, thereby, of a longer limitation period for obtaining the repayment of charges from a individual intermediary than that applicable to the State – Whether permissible – Condition 3. Preliminary rulings – Interpretation – Temporal effects of judgments by way of interpretation – Retroactive effect – Judgment finding the retroactive nature of a national law incompatible with Union law (Art. 267 TFEU) 1. EU law does not preclude, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the application of a five-year limitation period, laid down in the national legal system for claims in respect of debts owed by the State, to claims for the reimbursement of charges paid in breach of that law under a ‘hybrid system of aid and charges’. In the absence of harmonised rules governing the reimbursement of charges imposed in breach of EU law, the Member States retain the right to apply procedural rules provided for under their national legal system, in particular concerning limitation periods, subject to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. There is no breach of the principle of equivalence so long as the five-year limitation period applies to all debts owed by the Member State at issue and its applicability does not depend on the question whether those debts arise from a breach of national law or Union law, which it is for the referring court to determine. As regards the principle of effectiveness, fixing reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings, if the latter are not to be out of time, in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the authorities concerned, is compatible with Union law. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Union law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought. (see paras 34-36, 38, operative part 1) 2. Union law does not preclude national legislation which grants an individual a longer limitation period to recover charges from another individual acting as an intermediary, to whom he unwarrantedly paid the charges and who paid them on behalf of that first individual for the benefit of the State, whereas, if that first individual had paid those charges directly to the State, his action would have been restricted by a shorter time-limit, derogating from the ordinary rules governing actions between private individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, on condition that the individuals acting as intermediaries may effectively bring actions against the State for sums which may have been paid on behalf of other individuals. (see para. 45, operative part 2) 3. The Court’s finding, in a judgment following a reference for a preliminary ruling, that the retroactive nature of a national law is incompatible with Union law has no bearing on the starting date of the limitation period laid down by national law in respect of claims against the Member State at issue. First, the question of determining the starting-point of the limitation period in principle comes under national law. Second, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory, with the consequence that in principle it takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force. Consequently, Union law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period unless the conduct of the national authorities combined with the existence of a limitation period result in totally depriving a person of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the national courts. (see paras 47-48, 51, 53, operative part 3)