Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2015:363
Date: 2015-06-04
Language of the case: French
Subject matter: Citizenship of the Union;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: France

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 6 October 2015 1. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Request for interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — National legislation having a link to EU law — Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 267 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1)) 2. European Parliament — Elections — Right to vote and eligibility — Beneficiaries — Competence of the Member States — Limits (Art. 14 TEU; Arts 22 TFEU and 223(1) TFEU; Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, Arts 1(3) and 8) 3. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits —Questions which are manifestly irrelevant, hypothetical questions put in a context precluding a useful answer and questions bearing no relation to the purpose of the main proceedings — None — Admissibility (Art. 267 TFEU) 4. Fundamental rights — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union —Limitation of the exercise of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter — Conditions — Right to vote and eligibility — Retroactive effect of the more lenient criminal law — National legislation providing for the deprivation of the right to vote in the case of a criminal conviction by a final judgment delivered before 1 March 1994 — Lawfulness (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 39(2), 49(1), last sentence, and 52(1)) 1. See the text of the decision. (see paras 25-27, 33, 34) 2. See the text of the decision. (see paras 31, 32) 3. See the text of the decision. (see paras 36-39) 4. Article 39(2) and the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which excludes, by operation of law, from those entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament persons who were convicted of a serious crime and whose conviction became final before 1 March 1994. It is admittedly clear that such deprivation of the right to vote represents a limitation of the exercise of the right guaranteed in Article 39(2) of the Charter. Nevertheless, Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Article 39(2) of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. In that regard, since the deprivation of the right to vote at issue stems from the application of the combined provisions of national law, it must be held that it is provided for by law. Furthermore, that limitation respects the essence of the right to vote referred to in Article 39(2) of the Charter. The limitation does not call into question that right as such, since it has the effect of excluding certain persons, under specific conditions and on account of their conduct, from those entitled to vote in elections to the Parliament, as long as those conditions are fulfilled. Lastly, such a limitation is proportionate in so far as, first, it takes into account the nature and gravity of the criminal offence committed and the duration of the penalty and, secondly, national law provides for the possibility of a person who is subject to a ban on voting applying for, and obtaining, the lifting of that ban. As regards the rule as to the retroactive effect of a more lenient criminal law, set out in the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, that rule states that if, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty is to be applicable. That rule does not preclude the national legislation at issue since that legislation is limited to maintaining the deprivation of the right to vote resulting, by operation of law, from a criminal conviction only in respect of final convictions by judgment delivered at last instance under the old Criminal Code. (see paras 45-49, 51, 53, 56, 58, operative part)