Order — ECLI:EU:T:2018:58
Date: 2018-02-01
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Privileges and immunities
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible;Action for damages - inadmissible
Origin: United Kingdom

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the essential matters of law and fact relied on are stated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. More specifically, in order to satisfy those requirements, the claims relating to compensation for the damage allegedly caused by a European Union institution must state the evidence from which the conduct alleged against the institution may be identified, the reasons why it considers that a causal link exists between that conduct and the damage which it claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage (see order of 14 July 2016, Alcimos Consulting v ECB, T‑368/15, not published, EU:T:2016:438, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 41 The applicant claims, first, that, ‘in refusing to defend the immunity of the Applicant under Article 8 of the Protocol, the Parliament ... [has] exposed the Applicant to substantial aggravated damages in the national courts for causing proceedings to be stayed under the principle of sincere cooperation in order for the request to the Parliament to be heard’. 42 That finding does not, however, make it possible to identify with the degree of clarity and precision required by Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure either the nature of the damage allegedly suffered, or the extent or the existence of a sufficiently direct causal link between the alleged unlawful acts and the alleged damage. Consequently, that claim is manifestly inadmissible. 43 As regards the substance of the claim, it is settled case-law that in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU for unlawful conduct on the part of its institutions, a number of conditions must be satisfied: the institutions’ conduct must be unlawful; actual damage must have been suffered; and there must be a causal link between the conduct and the damage pleaded. Since those three conditions are cumulative, the absence of any one of them is sufficient for an action for damages to be dismissed (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 2013, Gollnisch v Parliament, T‑346/11 and T‑347/11, EU:T:2013:23, paragraphs 210 and 211 and the case-law cited, and of 15 January 2015, Ziegler and Ziegler Relocation v Commission, T‑539/12 and T‑150/13, not published, EU:T:2015:15, paragraphs 59 and 60). 44 With regard more specifically to the condition relating to the existence of a causal link, it is met where there is a direct link of cause and effect between the fault committed by the institution concerned and the alleged damage, the existence of which the applicant must prove. In other words, the European Union can be held liable only for damage which is a sufficiently direct consequence of the wrongful act of the institution concerned, that is to say, the conduct must be the determining cause of the harm. By contrast, it is not for the Union to make good every harmful consequence, even a remote one, of the conduct of its institutions (judgments of 17 January 2013, Gollnisch v Parliament, T‑346/11 and T‑347/11, EU:T:2013:23, paragraph 222, and of 16 December 2015, Chart v EEAS, T‑138/14, EU:T:2015:981, paragraph 53). 45 It must be observed in that regard that, even assuming the admissibility of the statement in question referring to the stay of proceedings granted by the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court (England and Wales), the damage resulting from such a stay of proceedings is directly caused by the choice, made freely by the applicant, to ask the Parliament to defend her privileges and immunities. 46 In its application, the applicant maintains, secondly, that the comment on the case by an MEP, reproduced in the article of 27 October 2016 published by a BBC journalist, involves an assessment that is damaging to her reputation and which is the direct consequence of the contested decision. 47 However, it is clear from the wording of the contested decision, as reproduced in paragraph 6 above, that, in that decision, the Parliament merely recalled briefly the background to the case and the scope of Article 8 of the Protocol, before concluding that, in its view, the statements at issue had no connection with the applicant’s activity as a Member of the Parliament or with the policies of the European Union. The contested decision is drafted in neutral terms and does not reflect any opinion unfavourable to the applicant, especially with regard to the potentially libellous or defamatory nature of the statements at issue. Furthermore, under Article 115 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Parliament’s debates are open to the public, and the texts it adopts are also made public pursuant to Article 116 of those rules. Consequently, the applicant could not have been unaware, in her capacity as MEP, that the request that she had freely chosen to introduce for the defence of her immunity and privileges would lead to the adoption by the Parliament of a decision which would be made public. 48 In those circumstances, it cannot be concluded that there is a direct link of cause and effect between the alleged illegalities committed by the Parliament at the time of the adoption of the contested decision and the alleged damage to the applicant’s reputation, since such damage could ensue, by definition, only from the press article drafted by a journalist. 49 In its application, the applicant alleges, thirdly, that she suffered financial loss as a result of the fact that, in order to bring the present action before the Court, she was obliged to pay a lawyer. 50 However, it is settled case-law that the expenses incurred by the parties for the purposes of legal proceedings before a court of the European Union are not material damage but costs (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 June 1999, Commission v Montorio, C‑334/97, EU:C:1999:290, paragraph 54, and order of 17 February 2012, Dagher v Council, T‑218/11, not published, EU:T:2012:82, paragraph 39). 51 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant’s claims for compensation are in part manifestly inadmissible, and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 52 Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, in part as it is manifestly inadmissible, in part as it manifestly falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court, and in part as it is manifestly unfounded. Costs 53 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, and the Parliament has applied for costs, she must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Jane Maria Collins is ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those of the European Parliament. Luxembourg, 1 February 2018. E. Coulon H. Kanninen Registrar President * Language of the case: English.