Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:215
Date: 2024-03-07
Language of the case: Greek
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Action for damages;Appeal - successful
Origin: Greece

summary of the researchers’ replies in that report, that the majority of the researchers had in fact been aware that bank accounts had been opened in their names and that payments had been made into them. Thus, in her view, while it is apparent from all of the researchers’ replies that they had all been aware that their names were linked to the project, the press release at issue incorrectly states that none of the researchers had any knowledge thereof. Furthermore, the appellant submits that General Court’s assessment that that press release meant ‘a number of’ researchers while using the word ‘none’ constitutes a distortion of the press release. 74 In the second place, as regards paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant notes that it is apparent from paragraph 2.3.3.1 of OLAF’s final report that the only criticism levelled against her, as an attempt to obstruct the investigation, was the fact that she had sent a single email to a single researcher. Even if the sending of that single message, in which she had merely indicated to that researcher that he was not obliged to reply to the OLAF questionnaire, could be regarded as an attempt to obstruct the investigation, the finding in paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal that she had ‘on several occasions contacted a number of researchers’ would constitute a manifest distortion of the facts. 75 According to the Commission, the General Court correctly held, in paragraph 157 of the judgment under appeal, that OLAF had not disclosed in the press release at issue any inaccurate information distorting the conclusions of its final report. In any event, only a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of diligence would be capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. 76 Furthermore, the Commission argues that appellant’s arguments against paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal should also be rejected. Indeed, in order to substantiate the alleged distortion, the appellant relies on certain specific elements of OLAF’s final report, without taking into account the fact that other elements in that report indicated that she had also contacted a researcher to inform him that he did not have to reply to OLAF as well as another researcher so that he would rectify his initial replies. Moreover, according to the Commission, OLAF took the view that the spontaneous withdrawal or modification by certain researchers, during that period, of the replies which they had initially given was an indication that those researchers had received emails with similar content. 2. Findings of the Court 77 In paragraph 157 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, inter alia, that it was apparent from the file that, by using the words ‘none of [those researchers] were aware’ in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue to designate ‘a number of researchers’, OLAF had not disclosed inaccurate information which distorted the conclusions of its final report. In paragraph 169 of that judgment, it held, as regards the reference in the fourth paragraph of that press release to the appellant’s alleged ‘attempts’ to obstruct the investigation, that, as was apparent from OLAF’s final report, during its investigation OLAF had found that the appellant had on several occasions contacted a number of researchers and that it had regarded those acts as constituting an obstacle to its investigation. 78 It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without any need for a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 25 July 2018, Orange Polska v Commission, C‑123/16 P, EU:C:2018:590, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). Distortion exists where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is manifestly incorrect (judgment of 17 June 2010, Lafarge v Commission, C‑413/08 P, EU:C:2010:346, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). 79 Furthermore, although distortion of the evidence may consist of an interpretation of a document contrary to the content of that document, it must be obvious from the file before the Court of Justice, and it presupposes that the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of that evidence. In that regard, it is not sufficient to show that a document could be interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court (judgment of 16 February 2023, Commission v Italy and Spain, C‑635/20 P, EU:C:2023:98, paragraph 127 and the case-law cited). 80 In the light of that case-law, the findings of fact made by the General Court in paragraphs 157 and 169 of the judgment under appeal could be called into question only if it were shown that it is manifestly clear from the documents submitted to the General Court that those findings are incorrect. 81 As regards, in the first place, paragraph 157 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court distorted both the press release at issue and the findings of OLAF’s final report. 82 In that respect, it should be recalled that OLAF stated, in the third sentence of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, that it ‘[had] contacted number of the researchers who were said to be involved in the research project’. The statement, in the following sentence, that ‘none of them were aware that their name was linked to the project or had any knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names or of any payments made into them’ must therefore be understood as applying to all the researchers whom OLAF had contacted. 83 Accordingly, first, by interpreting, in that paragraph 157, that last sentence of the press release at issue as meaning that OLAF was seeking to establish that a number of researchers it had contacted either were not aware that their names were linked to the project or had no knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names or of any payments made into them, whereas the press release at issue can only be understood as referring to all the researchers contacted by OLAF, the General Court distorted the content of that press release. 84 Secondly, as regards the alleged distortion of the conclusions of OLAF’s final report, it must be noted that it is apparent from those conclusions, set out in paragraph 2.3.3.2 of that report, that ten researchers who were said to be involved in the project replied to the OLAF questionnaire and ‘confirmed that they were involved in the MINATRAN project’. It is also apparent that ‘however, a number of the researchers confirmed neither the expenses declared by [Aristotle University] in their name nor having a Greek bank account’. In those circumstances, it is clear that, contrary to what is stated in the press release at issue, it is not all the researchers contacted by OLAF who were not aware that their names were linked to the research project and had no knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names or of any payments made into them. The General Court therefore distorted the conclusions of that final report by holding, in paragraph 157 of the judgment under appeal, that OLAF had not disclosed inaccurate information in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue. 85 As regards, in the second place, paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal, it is apparent from the wording of paragraph 2.3.3.1 of the final report from OLAF, to which the appellant refers, that she was accused of sending, in an attempt to obstruct the investigation, an email to a single researcher, whereas the press release at issue refers in the abstract to several obstruction attempts. However, it is not obvious that OLAF intended, in that paragraph of the final report, to cover exhaustively the obstruction attempts of which the appellant is accused. 86 Thus, it is not obvious that the General Court distorted OLAF’s final report when it held, in paragraph 169 of the judgment under appeal, that, as is apparent from that report, during its investigation OLAF had found that the appellant had on several occasions contacted a number of researchers and that it had regarded those acts as constituting an obstacle to its investigation. 87 It follows that the third ground of appeal must be upheld only in so far as the General Court rejected the plea alleging infringement of the right to good administration as regards the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue. 88 Since the first and second grounds of appeal and part of the third ground of appeal have been upheld, the judgment under appeal must be set aside in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court rejected the form of order in the action seeking an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage resulting from OLAF’s infringement of its obligations under Regulation 2018/1725 of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the right to good administration. 89 The remainder of the appeal must be dismissed. VI. The action before the General Court 90 In accordance with the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the decision of the General Court is set aside, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits. 91 That is not the case here. 92 The General Court did not proceed to verify whether OLAF, by publishing the press release at issue, had infringed the presumption of innocence referred to in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and enshrined in Article 48(1) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 6(2) of the ECHR, or whether, in the event of such an infringement, the requisite conditions for a finding of non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union under Article 340 TFEU were satisfied. 93 In those circumstances, the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given in the matter. VII. Costs 94 As the case is to be referred back to the General Court, it is appropriate to reserve the costs relating to the appeal. On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 May 2022, OC v Commission (T‑384/20, EU:T:2022:273), in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court rejected the form of order of the action seeking an order that the European Commission pay compensation for the damage resulting from the infringement by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC, of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the right to good administration; 2. Dismisses the appeal as to the remainder; 3. Refers Case T‑384/20 back to the General Court of the European Union; 4. Reserves the costs. [Signatures] * Language of the case: Greek.