Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2023:120
Date: 2023-02-16
Language of the case: Polish
Subject matter: Consumer protection;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Summary C-520/21 – 1 
Case C-520/21 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
24 August 2021 
Referring court: 
Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia w Warszawie (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
12 August 2021 
Applicant: 
A.S. 
Defendant: 
Bank M. SA 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
A claim for a sum of money as payment for the use of money in connection with 
the plea that the loan agreement entered into with the bank was null and void.  
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The question whether, if a loan agreement is declared null and void, a party to the 
agreement may, in addition to the reimbursement of the monetary considerations 
made and interest paid, pursue further claims in connection with the use of the 
money. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-520/21 
 
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Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
‘Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts, and the principles of effectiveness, 
legal certainty and proportionality be interpreted as precluding a judicial 
interpretation of national legislation pursuant to which, where a loan 
agreement entered into by and between a bank and a consumer is found to 
have been null and void from the outset because it contains unfair terms, the 
parties, in addition to the reimbursement of the sums paid in the 
performance of that agreement (the bank – loan principal, and the 
consumer – monthly payments, fees, commissions and insurance premiums) 
and statutory interest for late payment from the date of the demand for 
payment, may pursue any other claims (including remuneration, 
compensation, reimbursement of expenses or indexation of the amounts paid) 
on the grounds that: 
1. the person making the monetary consideration was temporarily 
deprived of the use of his or her money, so that he or she has lost the 
opportunity to invest it and thus to make a profit; 
2. the person making the monetary consideration incurred the costs of 
servicing the loan agreement and of transferring the money to the other 
party; 
3. the recipient of the monetary consideration had the benefit of being 
able to temporarily use someone else’s money, including being able to invest 
it and thus to make a profit; 
4. the recipient of the monetary consideration was temporarily able to 
use someone else’s money free of charge, which would have been impossible 
under market conditions; 
5. the purchasing power of the money has decreased with time, which 
translates to a loss in real terms for the person making the monetary 
consideration; 
6. the temporary provision of money may be treated as rendering a 
service for which the person making the monetary consideration has not 
received remuneration?’ 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 169; 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 38; 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (‘Directive 93/13’) – Articles 6 and 7. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Constitution of the Republic of Poland) – 
Article 76; 
Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks cywilny (Law of 23 April 1964 – Civil 
Code; ‘the CC’) – Articles 5, 7, 221, 431, 44, 45, 58, 222, 224, 225, 3581, 359, 361, 
362, 363, 3851, 3852, 405, 406, 410, 415, 455, 481, 482; 
Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. Prawo bankowe (Banking Law of 29 August 
1997) – Article 69. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 Based on the evidence taken in the case, the referring court determined that on 
25 July 2008, E.S. and the applicant entered into a mortgage loan agreement with 
the defendant bank. The loan amount was PLN 329 707.24. The loan was intended 
for the construction of a house and the term of the loan was 336 months. The loan 
bore interest at a variable interest rate, which was the sum of the LIBOR 3M 
(CHF) reference rate and a margin of 0.9 percentage points. The loan was indexed 
to the Swiss franc (CHF) following conversion of the amount disbursed in 
accordance with the CHF buying rate listed in the Foreign Exchange Rate Table in 
force at the defendant bank on the disbursement date of the loan or tranche. The 
borrower agreed to repay the CHF loan amount following its conversion to Polish 
zlotys (PLN) at the selling rate listed in the Foreign Exchange Rate Table in force 
at the defendant bank on the date of the monthly payment. 
2 In the statement of claim filed on 31 May 2021, the applicant requested that the 
amount of PLN 3 660.76 be awarded against the defendant together with statutory 
interest for delay from 8 June 2021 until the date of payment. The applicant 
justified the above claim by pointing out that the loan agreement the applicant had 
concluded with the defendant bank on 25 July 2008 contained abusive clauses that 
rendered it null and void. As the loan agreement was null and void, the defendant 
bank had collected loan payments from the applicant without a legal basis, and 
consequently had also benefited from them without a legal basis. In particular, in 
the period from June to September 2011, the defendant bank had collected loan 
payments amounting in total to PLN 7 769.06 from the applicant. The applicant 
claims that in the period from 1 October 2011 to 31 December 2020, as a result of 
using the amount of PLN 7 769.06 belonging to the applicant, the defendant bank 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-520/21 
 
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had obtained a benefit amounting to PLN 7 321.51. The amount of the claim was 
calculated by the applicant as equivalent to the average interest rate on PLN loans 
granted to households for consumer purposes. At the same time, the applicant put 
forward alternative possibilities for calculating the amount of his claim, namely, 
using the average interest rate on PLN loans granted to households for the 
purchase of residential property (PLN 3 472.35), the average interest rate on 
household deposits (PLN 1 553.82) or the change in the purchasing power of 
money between 2011 and 2020 (PLN 963.37). 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
3 The applicant indicated that the following facts may constitute the basis for his 
claim against the bank: the transfer of money to the defendant bank, the decrease 
in the purchasing power of the transferred money, damage resulting from the loss 
of the applicant’s ability to use his money, and the defendant’s use of the 
applicant’s money. 
4 The defendant bank moved for the claim to be dismissed, indicating that in its 
opinion the loan agreement entered into by the parties was neither null and void 
nor contained abusive clauses. Furthermore, the defendant bank argued that even 
if the loan agreement were to be considered null and void, that would mean that 
the bank had a claim for payment for the use of capital against the consumer 
rather than the consumer against the bank. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
5 The need for the present question arises from the fact that EU law must be 
interpreted in order to enable the correct application of the provisions of national 
law relating to the settlement of claims arising from a contract which has been 
declared null and void on the ground that it contains abusive clauses. 
6 In the present case, the applicant challenges the contractual provisions stipulating 
that the loan principal and loan payments are to be converted from CHF into PLN 
and from PLN into CHF using the exchange rate set by the defendant bank (the 
so-called conversion clauses). Those clauses were taken from a standard 
agreement used by the defendant bank. At the same time, contractual provisions 
with identical wording have been repeatedly subject to judicial review. In the 
case-law, those provisions are uniformly considered to be abusive clauses and 
were entered in the Rejestr Klauzul Niedozwolonych (Register of Abusive 
Clauses) maintained by the Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów 
(President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection) pursuant to a 
final judgment by the Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów (Competition 
and Consumer Protection Court, Poland). 
7 However, the case-law is not unanimous as to the effect of abusive contractual 
clauses. Nevertheless, since the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-260/18 
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(Dziubak), that is to say, since 3 October 2019, the position that the inclusion of 
abusive conversion clauses in a loan agreement renders that agreement null and 
void has definitely prevailed in domestic case-law. The Sąd Rejonowy dla 
Warszawy-Śródmieścia (District Court for Warsaw-Śródmieście, Poland) in its 
present composition agrees with that position and considers the conversion clauses 
contained in the loan agreement to constitute unfair contractual terms, as a result 
of which the loan agreement is null and void. 
8 It remains a matter of controversy whether parties to a contract which is null and 
void may claim other amounts in addition to the return of the monetary 
considerations made together with statutory interest for late payment from the date 
of the demand for payment. In domestic case-law and in the literature, there is an 
ongoing debate as to whether parties to a contract may pursue claims (including 
remuneration, compensation, reimbursement of expenses or indexation of amounts 
paid) in regard to the use of money for a certain period of time without a legal 
basis (the concluded contract cannot provide such a basis, since it is null and 
void). There are divergent views on this issue. 
9 It is quite difficult to identify a legal basis for claims based on the use of capital 
without a contractual basis. Clearly, the provisions of the loan agreement cannot 
provide a legal basis, since it is null and void ex tunc and thus no rights or 
obligations can arise from it. As a result, the legal basis can only be a generally 
applicable provision of national law. 
10 The legal basis for such claims could arise from Articles 224 and 225 of the CC 
concerning so-called supplementary claims, and also from Article 415 of the CC 
concerning tort, although the doctrine points to various difficulties related to those 
solutions.  
11 The most frequently cited grounds for remuneration for the use of capital without 
a contractual basis are Article 405 of the CC (unjust enrichment) or Article 405 of 
the CC read in conjunction with Article 410(1) of the CC (undue benefit). This is 
undoubtedly because the concept of ‘undue benefit’, and even more so the concept 
of ‘unjust enrichment’, is relatively broad and covers a wide range of matters, 
including, potentially, the use of capital without a contractual basis. The literature 
indicates that the prerequisites for a claim for the return of unjust enrichment are 
the enrichment of one person, the impoverishment of another person, a connection 
between the aforementioned enrichment and impoverishment and the absence of a 
legal basis for the enrichment. ‘Enrichment’ is understood as obtaining a financial 
benefit, which may mean such diverse things as an increase in assets, cost savings, 
avoiding a decrease in assets, avoiding an expense, avoiding loss and using 
another person’s services free of charge. ‘Impoverishment’, in turn, is understood 
not only as the loss of a part of one’s assets, but also as the failure to obtain a 
benefit which the impoverished person could have obtained by allowing another 
person to use his or her assets or services for consideration, regardless of whether 
such benefit would have been obtained by him or her in the specific case in 
question. Moreover, pursuant to Article 405 of the CC the enriched person is 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-520/21 
 
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obliged not only to return the principal amount, but also the benefits obtained 
from its use. 
12 Interpreting the concepts of enrichment and impoverishment broadly, some 
authors point to the legitimacy of claims for payment of remuneration for the use 
of capital. It is argued in the literature that enrichment covers not just obtaining 
monetary consideration in the performance of a loan agreement, but also being 
able to use someone else’s money, which thus becomes part of the enriched 
person’s property. On the other hand, the impoverishment of the other person 
consists in the fact that he or she is deprived of the possibility to use the money he 
or she has disbursed (sometimes mention is made of additional costs which are 
incurred in connection with the necessity to perform the loan agreement and make 
the monetary considerations arising therefrom – these are primarily the cost of 
capital and the ongoing cost of servicing the loan agreement). Moreover, as a 
result of the ability to use someone else’s money, the enriched person also has the 
opportunity to invest it and thus to obtain further benefits, while the impoverished 
person is deprived of that opportunity. From this perspective, enrichment is 
clearly linked to impoverishment, since the enriched person gets the opportunity 
to use the impoverished person’s money because the impoverished person is 
deprived of that opportunity. 
13 From a slightly different perspective, unjust enrichment may be interpreted as 
follows: as a result of the performance of the loan agreement, the party that made 
the monetary consideration incurred certain costs. As a result, the other party 
received the money and, consequently, was also able to use this money (using the 
money borrowed, the consumer was able to acquire a property, while the bank, 
which received payments under the loan, had the means to grant loans to other 
customers). If the loan agreement is null and void, then none of the parties may 
claim payments such as interest on principal, fees, commissions, etc., and, 
moreover, the money is made available without any collateral (due to the 
invalidity of the loan agreement, all security established, including, inter alia, 
mortgage on property, likewise becomes invalid). Under market conditions, it 
would be impossible to use a substantial amount of someone else’s money for 
many years without paying any remuneration or establishing any security. 
Therefore, those cost savings must be seen as unjust enrichment vis-à-vis the party 
which made the money available. 
14 From yet another perspective, in view of the agreement being null and void and 
the consequent provision of money by one party to another for use over a certain 
period of time without a contractual basis, the first party de facto performs a 
service. The parties’ objectives were partly compatible – the first party wished to 
make capital available to the other party, while the other party wished to use that 
capital. That part of the parties’ agreement was also actually carried out. However, 
since the loan agreement itself was null and void, it also transpired that there was 
no legal basis for the service provided in the form of making the capital available 
for use. Yet that service has some market value, and there is no doubt that the 
consumer would not have agreed to give his or her money to the bank free of 
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charge and vice versa. Therefore, the performance of that service without a 
contractual basis should be compensated, and the legal basis for the compensation 
can be either Article 405 of the CC or Article 406 of the CC. 
15 Finally, the parties’ claims may be based on the decrease in the purchasing power 
of money. It is common knowledge that the purchasing power of money decreases 
in the long run. Inflation occurs almost every year, while deflation is rare and less 
pronounced. In terms of the present case, if in mid-2011 the borrowers paid the 
defendant bank PLN 7 769.06, it is clear that 10 years later, the value of this 
monetary consideration is lower. According to the applicant, the value of his 
monetary consideration fell by the equivalent of PLN 1 926.74, and he is entitled 
to half that amount, namely, PLN 963.37. In view of this, the applicant could 
demand not only that the nominal amount of the monetary consideration made be 
returned, but also that the decrease in the purchasing power of his money be 
compensated. In the Polish legal system, this is possible primarily through 
applying the so-called judicial indexation of cash benefits (Article 3581(3) of the 
CC). 
16 The concept of claims for remuneration for the use of capital without a contractual 
basis has gained some traction in the case-law. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
the literature and most Polish state institutions are critical of this approach. This 
position is justified primarily by the absence of a clear legal basis for claiming 
payment for the use of capital without a contractual basis. 
17 Most national courts have also dismissed claims related to the use of capital 
without a contractual basis, although it should be pointed out that their case-law 
has so far concerned claims brought on that basis by banks rather than borrowers. 
18 It follows from the foregoing that national law does not provide a clear and 
obvious answer to the question whether, in the event that monetary consideration 
is made under a contract that is null and void, payment may be claimed (over and 
above the statutory interest for late payment applicable from the date of the 
demand for payment) for the use of this money without a contractual basis. 
Although there appear to be more arguments against than in favour of the 
admissibility of such claims, it cannot be unequivocally ruled out. 
19 As a result, the referring court considers that the provisions of national law do not 
expressly exclude the possibility of making such a claim and therefore, under 
Polish law, it could not be ruled out that the applicant’s claim could be upheld by 
the court. In those circumstances, it is necessary to establish whether such a claim 
does not conflict with the provisions of Directive 93/13 (in particular Articles 6(1) 
and 7(1)), and also with the principles of effectiveness, proportionality and legal 
certainty. 
20 In its case-law to date, the Court of Justice has repeatedly ruled on the 
consequences of contractual terms being found unfair and on the claims that the 
parties may have in this connection. 
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21 From the judgments of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez 
Naranjo, C-154/15 and C-307/15 (paragraphs 61-62), and of 3 October 2019, 
Dziubak, C-260/18 (paragraph 43), it follows that unfair contractual terms 
contained in a contract must be regarded as never having existed. If the contract 
cannot objectively exist without those terms, then the entire contract must be 
considered null and void provided that the consumer accepts the invalidity of the 
contract or that the invalidity is advantageous for the consumer. The invalidity of 
the contract gives rise to claims for restitution on the part of the parties, which 
means that each party may demand repayment of the consideration it has made: 
the consumer may demand repayment of the loan instalments (and possibly other 
amounts paid to the bank), while the bank may demand repayment of the loan 
principal made available to the consumer. 
22 However, the Court of Justice has not yet addressed the issue of the admissibility 
of further claims by the parties beyond the obligation to return the nominal 
amounts of the monetary considerations made by the parties. In particular, the 
Court of Justice has not addressed the issue of whether the parties could claim 
payment for the use of capital without a contractual basis, the loss of an 
opportunity to earn profit through the temporary inability to use one’s money, the 
financial and organisational costs incurred in servicing the contract, and the 
decrease in the purchasing power of money over time. 
23 Facts somewhat similar to those of the present case were considered in the 
judgments of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2009, Messner, C-489/07 
(paragraph 29); of 15 April 2010, Heinrich Heine, C-511/08 (paragraphs 54-57); 
of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, C-565/12 (paragraph 55); of 2 March 
2017, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs Frankfurt am Main, 
C-568/15 (paragraph 26); of 4 June 2020, Leonhard, C-301/18 (paragraph 37); of 
27 January 2021, Dexia Nederland, C-229/19 and C-289/19 (paragraph 67); and 
of 29 April 2021, Bank BPH, C-19/20 (paragraph 59). Those cases, however, were 
significantly different from the present one. 
24 In the view of the referring court, Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 and the 
principle of effectiveness preclude a bank from claiming from a consumer any 
amounts in connection with the fact that by reason of an invalid contract the 
consumer was able to use the bank’s capital or that the bank incurred certain costs 
in servicing the loan agreement. Ultimately, the invalidity of the loan agreement 
results from the bank’s conduct, which must be negatively assessed, as it drafted 
the terms of the agreement in such a manner that it turned out to be null and void. 
The bank has the right to demand from the consumer the return of the money it 
disbursed to him or her (and possibly statutory interest for delay if the consumer 
fails to return the money to the bank despite being summoned to do so), but that is 
where the bank’s claims end. Otherwise, if the bank were able to pursue claims 
beyond the repayment of loan principal, this would mean that it could profit from 
the fact that it included unfair contractual terms in the agreement, and thus its 
conduct, which was contrary to the requirements of good faith and good practice, 
would bring it benefits. In such a situation, Directive 93/13 could hardly be 
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regarded as an effective deterrent, since economic operators would be guaranteed 
income from the conclusion of contracts containing unfair contractual terms. 
25 The foregoing arguments militate against the possibility of an economic operator 
pursuing claims for the use of capital without a contractual basis, but they do not 
provide the answer to the question of whether such claims could be pursued by a 
consumer. In the case of a consumer, the ability to pursue such claims would not 
conflict with the principle of effectiveness; on the contrary, the consumer would 
be motivated to assert his or her rights, since he or she could not only recover an 
amount equivalent to the loan payments, fees, commissions and insurance 
premiums paid (together with any statutory interest for delay), but could also 
obtain a benefit stemming from the fact that the bank used his or her money for a 
period of time. 
26 However, in the view of the referring court, the consumer should also not be 
entitled to pursue any claims for the other party’s use of capital without a 
contractual basis (with the exception of statutory interest for late payment from 
the date of the demand for payment). This is because the purpose of Directive 
93/13 appears to be clear – it seeks to dissuade economic operators from using 
unfair contractual terms and, if they do use such terms, to oblige them to return to 
consumers the benefits obtained from them through the use of those unfair terms. 
Therefore, the obligation to return loan payments, fees, commissions and 
insurance premiums charged to the borrower is compatible with the objective of 
Directive 93/13 and is also proportionate. On the other hand, allowing the 
consumer to pursue further claims such as obliging the economic operator to pay 
remuneration for having used the capital made available to it by the consumer 
without a contractual basis would be too far reaching and thus disproportionate. 
27 It should be added that if, hypothetically, a claim for remuneration for the use of 
capital were deemed to be justified, then in that case, as with the claim for 
repayment of the capital itself, the debtor might be in arrears, which would also 
give rise to interest claims. Accordingly, four claims could in fact be asserted: for 
the return of capital, statutory interest for late repayment of capital, remuneration 
for the use of capital without a contractual basis, and statutory interest for late 
payment of remuneration for the use of capital without a contractual basis. Three 
of these claims would be very similar in nature, and the last claim (statutory 
interest for late payment of remuneration for the use of capital without a 
contractual basis) would resemble interest on interest. Making it possible to 
simultaneously pursue so many claims of a very similar nature seems to lack 
rational justification, and is therefore contrary to the principle of proportionality. 
28 Requiring payment of the amount in question would also run counter to the 
principle of legal certainty which, in the present case, must be interpreted as 
meaning that, in the event that a loan agreement is declared null and void in its 
entirety because it contains unfair terms, both parties are required to return all the 
monetary considerations made in its performance. The settlement of an invalid 
contract consists exclusively in the parties returning to each other the monetary 
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considerations made in their nominal amounts (each party may demand the return 
of all amounts paid, but at the same time a set-off is possible), while any further 
claims are excluded. However, this remains questionable under EU law. 
29 Admissibility of the question referred for a preliminary ruling as to the 
amounts payable to the bank 
30 Finally, the referring court wishes to point out that the question referred for a 
preliminary ruling in the present case is formulated in general terms in the sense 
that it concerns the admissibility of claiming remuneration for the use of capital 
by both parties to the contract, that is to say, both the economic operator and the 
consumer. This may give rise to doubts as to whether the question, in so far as it 
concerns possible claims by economic operators, is relevant to the present case, 
since the case only concerns a claim pursued by a consumer and not by an 
economic operator. 
31 Nevertheless, in the view of the referring court, such doubts would not be 
justified. It should first be noted that if a contract is null and void, this has the 
effect of it having never been concluded. In those circumstances, the 
considerations made by the parties are essentially of the same nature, namely, they 
constitute undue benefits. From this point of view, the situation of both parties is 
the same and differs from a situation in which a loan agreement is valid, because 
then the considerations made by each party are actually different – the bank makes 
the loan principal available to the borrower for use, while the borrower pays back 
that loan principal plus interest. On the other hand, in the absence of a valid 
contract, both parties make considerations of the same nature, which are undue 
from the recipient’s point of view, and the question of the admissibility of such 
considerations by both parties is therefore legitimate. 
32 In court cases concerning the return of payments made under an invalid loan 
agreement, the banks often raise a plea of retention or set-off on the grounds that 
they have a claim against the consumer for the repayment of loan principal. It is 
therefore to be expected that such a plea would be raised by the bank. If, therefore, 
the Court of Justice were to answer the present question solely with respect to the 
consumer’s claim, this would in all probability result in the need for a subsequent 
identical question, differing only in that it would concern the economic operator’s 
claim. This, in turn, would unduly prolong the proceedings both before the 
referring court and before the Court of Justice. Thus, the question of whether the 
bank’s claim for remuneration for the use of capital without a contractual basis is 
justified is not merely hypothetical. 
33 It should also be pointed out that in domestic case-law, the position prevails (and 
this position is endorsed by the defendant bank) that in an action for restitution of 
unjust enrichment (undue benefit), the court may not restrict itself to analysing the 
legitimacy of the applicant’s claim while ignoring an identical claim to which the 
defendant is entitled. From this point of view, if both parties made considerations 
which were undue and of the same nature (for instance, payments in the same 
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currency), and their considerations arose out of the same legal relationship (for 
instance, an invalid loan agreement), then only the party that received the larger 
amount could be regarded as unjustly enriched, and the unjust enrichment would 
be only the difference between the two amounts. This position forces the court to 
analyse the legitimacy of the claims of both parties, even if only one of those 
claims has been brought before it.  
34 There is also another argument in favour of answering the question as to the 
admissibility of banks pursuing claims for the use of capital without a contractual 
basis. Namely, banks and their representatives publicly claim that where 
consumers pursue claims related to the invalidity of loan agreements, this may 
have far-reaching negative consequences for them, because banks will pursue 
claims (as remuneration or reimbursement of costs) against consumers for their 
use of capital without a contractual basis. According to the banks, such claims 
amount to significant sums, sometimes considerably exceeding the value of the 
loan agreement itself. As a result, a significant number of consumers, even if they 
are aware that their agreements contain unfair contractual terms and understand 
that they may accordingly seek the return of benefits received unduly by the 
banks, are reluctant to pursue their claims for fear that the bank may in retaliation 
demand that the consumer pay for the use of capital without a contractual basis, 
and the amount claimed will be so high as to it make it uneconomical for the 
consumer to pursue his or her claims. Consumers are thus deterred from 
exercising the rights conferred on them by Directive 93/13, and as a result the 
objectives of the directive cannot be achieved. In those circumstances, an 
unequivocal answer from the Court of Justice to the question of whether the 
banks’ claims for payment for the use of the loan principal without a contractual 
basis are admissible appears not only useful, but in fact essential to ensure that 
consumer rights are respected.