Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2007:699
Date: 2007-11-22
Language of the case: Italian
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Agriculture and Fisheries;Wine
Procedure: Action for damages - inadmissible;Appeal - successful
Origin: Italy

Summary of the Judgment Actions for damages – Limitation period – Point from which time starts to run (Arts 235 EC and 288, second para., EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46) The five-year limitation period for bringing proceedings against the Community in matters relating to non-contractual liability laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice cannot begin to run until all the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised. Therefore, in cases where the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen and, therefore, until the time at which the persons concerned were bound to have suffered certain damage. In that connection, the conditions to which the obligation to make good the damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is subject, and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions for compensation in respect of that damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria. If it were otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty on which the rules on limitation periods specifically rely and which require that legal rules be clear and precise in order that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by Community law. Furthermore, preventing the limitation period for proceedings against the Community for non-contractual liability from starting to run as long as the party who has allegedly been harmed is not personally convinced that he has suffered damage has the result that the point in time at which those proceedings become time-barred varies according to the individual perception that each party may have as to the reality of the damage, something which is at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods. In that connection, knowledge of the facts is not one of the conditions which must be met in order for the limitation period to start running. The subjective appraisal of the reality of the damage cannot therefore be taken into consideration in order to determine the moment at which that period starts to run. (see paras 54, 59-61)