Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:263
Date: 2016-05-03
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see judgment in Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, cited in paragraph 84 above, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 109 In that respect, it is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, where it is challenged, that the reasons relied on against the person or the entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of the person or the entity concerned to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment in Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, cited in paragraph 84 above, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). 110 It should however be recalled that, for the purposes of assessing the merits of the reasons given against a person subject to restrictive measures, such as fund-freezing measures, the EU judicature may rely on all of the evidence which has been submitted to it, both inculpatory or exculpatory, by the parties, during the judicial proceedings as the case may be (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, cited in paragraph 94 above, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 123 and 137, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, cited in paragraph 84 above, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68). The fact that a piece of evidence has been submitted as exculpatory evidence by the person subject to the restrictive measures does not prevent that evidence from possibly being used against him to support the merits of the reasons underpinning the restrictive measures taken against him (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, cited in paragraph 94 above, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 123 and 137; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, cited in paragraph 84 above, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68; of 29 April 2015 in National Iranian Gas Company v Council, T‑9/13, on appeal, EU:T:2015:236, paragraphs 163 and 164, and Bank of Industry and Mine v Council, T‑10/13, ECR, on appeal, EU:T:2015:235, paragraphs 182, 183 and 185). 111 The question whether the Council was entitled to consider, when adopting the contested measures, that the applicant could be subject to restrictive measures pursuant to the criterion at issue must be determined in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 106 to 110 above. 112 In the present case, according to what the Council had stated in the letter of 10 October 2013, the contested measures are based on a new statement of reasons, which states as follows: ‘Company which is majority owned by the Government of Iran and provides financial support to the Government of Iran.’ 113 In addition, by the letter of 18 November 2013, which, as is apparent from the non-confidential version of the email produced by the applicant in response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court (paragraph 41 above), was communicated to the applicant by its lawyer on 20 November 2013, the Council sent to it the following clarifications: ‘In particular, since [the applicant] is majority-owned by the Government of Iran and is engaged in commercial activities, the Government of Iran would benefit from profits made by [the applicant].’ 114 Finally, attached to the letter of 18 November 2013, and following a request by the applicant in the letter of 31 October 2013, the Council sent to the applicant the documents from RELEX of 19 September 2013, bearing the reference MD 126/13 and of 30 September bearing the reference MD 140/13 to 144/13 which reproduced pages from the applicant’s website and which were freely accessible on the internet. Those documents proving that the Iranian Government, through the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Iran, holds a majority stake in the capital of the applicant, even if the figures presented in these vary between 75% and 59%. 115 All those grounds and that evidence, which were notified to the applicant in good time before the present action was brought on 29 January 2014, must be taken into consideration, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 110 above, in order to assess whether the Council erred, in the present case, in its assessment of the facts by imposing restrictive measures on it on the basis of the criterion at issue. 116 It is clear from paragraphs 88, 92 and 93 above that the Council can lawfully impose restrictive measures on any person or entity engaged in activities which, even if they do not have as such a link, direct or indirect, with nuclear proliferation, are, however, likely to promote it, by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, enable it to pursue nuclear proliferation. 117 In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that it is majority owned by the Iranian Government. In response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court (paragraph 40 above), it has also indicated that, on 16 November 2013, when the contested measures had been published, that shareholding was 51%. The applicant does not deny having made quantitatively significant profits in the exercise of its commercial activities. In response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court (paragraph 40 above), it has thus indicated that it made a profit of 75 397 million Iranian Rials (IRR) (approximately EUR 6 million at the official exchange rate published on the website of the Iranian Central Bank on the internet, in effect at the end of fiscal year 2009) for the period between 20 March 2008 to 20 March 2009, in the amount of IRR 124 025 million (approximately EUR 9 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of fiscal year 2010) for the period from 20 March 2009 to 20 March 2010, amounting to IRR 204 123 million (approximately EUR 14 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2011) for the financial period from 20 March 2010 to 20 March 2011, amounting to IRR 63 139 million (almost EUR 4 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2012) in respect of the period from 20 March 2011 to 20 March 2012 and IRR 69 739 million (approximately EUR 4.5 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of fiscal year 2013) in respect of the period from 20 March 2012 to 20 March 2013. 118 In the absence of objection by the applicant, the Council was not required to provide, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 109 above, other evidence than that related to the transfer of the profits realised by the applicant to the State or the Iranian Government budget and the qualitatively or quantitatively significance of the financial support thus given to substantiate, in that regard, the validity of the contested measures. 119 The applicant complains that the Council assumed that it transferred the profits made in the exercise of its business to the State or the Iranian Government budget. The Council contends that the distribution of dividends to shareholders is a consequence resulting from the company law applicable to the applicant, without providing further details. 120 However, it is apparent from Article 29 of the applicant’s Articles of Association, which it placed in the case-file for the present proceedings, that the members of the board of directors ‘are selected from among shareholders [at an ordinary] general assembly’ and that ‘[a]ll of them can be removed ...’ According to Article 27 of the Articles of Association, in the general meeting of shareholders, ‘decisions are approved by a majority plus 1 of votes’ and ‘[a] [r]elative majority is used to select the directors ...’. Thus, the Iranian Government, which always has a relative majority in the applicant’s general assembly of shareholders, exercises, in principle, control over the appointment of members of the applicant’s board of directors and thus over the decisions taken by that board of directors and over the decisions taken in the ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the applicant. As is apparent respectively from Articles 39 and 20 of the Articles of Association, the board of directors has power to ‘[suggest] dividing profit[s] among shareholders’ and the Annual General Meeting has jurisdiction to ‘[approve] dividends amounts’. Through this, as the Council, supported by the Commission, correctly observes, the Iranian Government is able to secure a substantial share of the profits made by the applicant in the course of its commercial activities, which is transferred to it in the form of dividends. 121 The applicant does not dispute that the aforementioned articles of its Articles of Association allow the Iranian Government to obtain the distribution of profits in the form of dividends, but simply observes that those provisions ‘do not impose’ any such distribution and the Council has not demonstrated that such distribution occurred in the present case. 122 In the present case, it is true that the applicant’s Articles of Association impose no obligation to distribute dividends. The Court therefore needs to determine whether, in the present case, there is evidence or indicia that such distribution did indeed occur and whether it was likely to provide the Iranian Government with qualitatively or quantitatively important financial support. 123 In response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court (paragraph 40 above), the applicant stated that profits were, inter alia, allocated to a capital increase which took place during the fiscal year 2014 (financial year 1393 in the Iranian calendar) and that they were never distributed as dividends, for various accounting and legal reasons. In addition, the applicant claimed that ‘Articles 7, 8 and 10 of the Iranian Law [on] Usury [Interest free] provide[d] for possible alternative use of the Bank’s profits [other] than [for] redistribution’. 124 First, regarding the provisions of the Iranian Law on Usury cited by the applicant, they are included in the chapter of the law devoted to ‘banking facilities’. The funding envisaged in those facilities relate, in principle, to the very exercise of the banks’ banking activities and not, as the applicant submits, to the method of the allocation of the profits which they make. In any event, the applicant does not claim that the rules governing allocations are mandatory such that they do not prejudice the possibility for the Iranian Government, in its capacity as the majority shareholder in the applicant, of having the profits made by the applicant in connection with its commercial activities transferred to it in the form of dividends. 125 Second, regarding the distribution of dividends by the applicant and as stated by the Council at the hearing, according to the documents submitted by the applicant in response to a measure of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court (paragraph 40 above) either, pursuant to the applicant’s Articles of Association, or pursuant to a legal obligation on the applicant, part of the profits made by the applicant was distributed to the Iranian Government, which corresponds to the deferred payment, in March 2009, of IRR 4 036 million (approximately EUR 319 000 at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2009) for the financial year 2007-2008, the immediate payment of IRR 33 819 million (approximately EUR 2.7 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of fiscal year 2009) for the financial year 2008-2009, and the deferred payment, in March 2011, of IRR 49 524 million (approximately EUR 3.4 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2011) for the financial year 2009-2010. Furthermore, it is apparent from those documents that deferred dividend payments were decided in March 2011 in the amount of IRR 12 402 million (approximately EUR 844 000 at the rate of exchange in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2011) for the financial year 2009-2010, in March 2012, amounting to IRR 12 402 million (approximately EUR 768 000 at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of the fiscal year 2012) for the financial year 2008-2009 in March 2013, in the amount of IRR 16 103 million (approximately EUR 1 million at the official exchange rate in effect at the end of fiscal year 2013) for the financial year 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. 126 Given the amounts set out in paragraph 125 above, particularly those specifically rewarding the government for its stake in the capital of the applicant, which, contrary to what it argued at the hearing, are far from modest, the Court must conclude that the Council was entitled, without committing any error of assessment, to find that the applicant provided quantitatively significant financial resources to the Iranian Government enabling it to pursue nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, the Council was entitled, without committing any error of assessment, to apply the criterion at issue to the applicant in the contested acts. 127 The Court must therefore reject the complaint alleging error of assessment of the facts as unfounded. 128 In the second place, the Court must examine the claim that the Council infringed Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Article 1(7) of Decision 2012/35, and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012, in that, in the contested acts, it did not establish a link, be it direct or indirect, between the applicant’s activities and nuclear proliferation. 129 In that regard, suffice it to note that, as is clear from paragraphs 88 and 92 above, the criterion at issue does not require the Council to demonstrate that the specific activities of the person or entity concerned have, as such, a direct or indirect link to nuclear proliferation. For that criterion to be applicable, it is enough that those activities are capable of encouraging nuclear proliferation, by providing the Iranian Government with resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which enable it, by their quantitative or qualitative importance, to pursue nuclear proliferation activities. 130 Accordingly, the Court must reject, as unfounded, the complaint alleging infringement of Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Article 1(7) of Decision 2012/35, and of Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012. 131 Therefore, the first plea must therefore also be rejected in its entirety as unfounded. The second plea, alleging infringement of the principles of equality, non-discrimination and sound administration 132 The applicant maintains that, by adopting the contested acts solely on the ground that it was a company majority-owned by the Government of Iran and that it was engaged in commercial activities, the Council infringed the principle of equality and the principle of non-discrimination, as affirmed inter alia in Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in that it treated the applicant differently from other companies majority-owned by the Government of Iran which have not been subject to restrictive measures. In the letter of 18 November 2013, the Council itself acknowledged that it made an arbitrary choice of companies to subject to restrictive measures, according to its view of the impact those measures would have in the context of the European Union’s policy objectives. In those pleadings, the Council, supported by the Commission, also failed to explain the reasons why the applicant had been treated differently to other Iranian publicly-owned companies. By acting in that way, the Council also infringed the principle of sound administration — according to which it is required to act with due care and in good faith — by adopting the contested measures in an arbitrary way without complying with the ruling of the Court in the judgment in Post Bank v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402). 133 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments, and contends that the second plea should be dismissed as unfounded. 134 In the present case, the applicant was found, in the contested acts, to be a person providing financial support to the Iranian Government, pursuant to the criterion at issue, and, as is clear from the examination of the present action, the applicant has not put forward any plea in law capable of calling into question the validity of that finding. 135 In those circumstances, even if the Council had in fact failed to adopt measures freezing the funds of certain persons meeting the criterion at issue and to examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant evidence relating to those persons, the applicant cannot successfully rely on that fact, because the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the principle of sound administration must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which no one may rely, to his own benefit, on an unlawful act committed in favour of another (see, judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 85 above, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). 136 The second plea in law must therefore be rejected as being unfounded. The third plea, alleging a failure to state adequate reasons 137 The applicant maintains that, in so far as the reason for the contested acts is the impact they must have in the context of the European Union’s general objectives, those acts are based on reasons which are inadequate and, as such, should not be taken into account by the Court, in accordance with the case-law. The inadequacy of that statement of reasons stems from the fact that it is based on a vague and unclear criterion and, in essence, does not state to what extent the contested acts would enable it to combat nuclear proliferation effectively. 138 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments and contends that the third plea should be rejected as unfounded. 139 By the present plea, the applicant disputes, in substance, the validity of the grounds based on the impact of restrictive measures taken against it in the context of the general objectives of the European Union, which, according to the applicant, were adopted by the Council in the contested acts. 140 As the Council correctly states, it is clear from the letters of 10 October and 18 November 2013 and the contested acts themselves that they were adopted on the sole ground that the applicant fulfilled the conditions set out by the criterion at issue to have a measure freezing funds imposed on it (see paragraphs 112 and 113 above). 141 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant contends, the reference, in the letter of 18 November 2013, to the impact of the contested acts in the context of the general objectives of the Union should not be understood as the Council having expressed its intention to apply an additional criterion to the applicant, but as it having expressed that, in the present case, the application of the criterion at issue met the general objectives of the European Union, when it put that latter criterion in place. 142 Consequently, the third plea must be rejected as unfounded. The fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of power 143 The applicant maintains that, by adopting the contested acts, the Council committed a misuse of powers, since it used its power to impose restrictive measures on certain persons or entities arbitrarily and without complying with the decision of the Court in the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402), thus deviating from the objective for which that power had been conferred on it. Following that judgment, the Council should have either ceased to impose restrictive measures on the applicant, or, before continuing to impose such measures on it based on the criterion at issue, it should have investigated the reality of the accusations against the applicant, its actual commercial activities and the possible relationship between those activities and nuclear proliferation. By providing a new reason for the restrictive measures, the Council merely sought to circumvent the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402). 144 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments, and contends that the fourth plea should be dismissed as unfounded. 145 As the Council correctly observes, it is apparent from the letter of 10 October and 18 November 2013 and the contested acts themselves that they were adopted on the sole ground that the applicant fulfilled the conditions under the criterion at issue to have a fund-freezing measure imposed on it (see paragraphs 112 and 113 above). That criterion differs from the criterion relating to ‘[helping] a listed person, [entity or body] to infringe or evade the restrictive measures imposed on it’ set out in Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413, Article 16(2)(b) of Regulation No 961/2010 and Article 23(2)(b) of Regulation No 267/2012, which had been applied by the Council in the measures annulled by the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402, paragraph 96). 146 Contrary to what the applicant contends, the Council, in acting on the basis of a new, lawfully adopted criterion justifying the imposition of restrictive measures against the applicant, accordingly did not circumvent the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402), or fail to adopt a measure which that judgment required to be adopted. 147 Moreover, as has already been stated in paragraph 134 above, it is clear from the examination of the present action that the applicant has not put forward any plea in law capable of calling into question the validity of the findings, set out in the contested measures, that it meets the criteria at issue, since the applicant provides financial support to the Iranian Government. 148 Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations 149 The applicant maintains that, by adopting the contested acts, the Council infringed the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, since it did not take into account the expectations which the applicant might legitimately have, following the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402), that it would no longer be subject to restrictive measures or, at the very least, not without a possible link being established between its commercial activities and nuclear proliferation. In any event, in the light of the agreement concluded on 24 November 2013 between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, supported by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on a Joint Action Plan, which sets out an approach towards reaching a long-term comprehensive solution to nuclear proliferation, and of the measures implementing that plan, such as Council Decision 2014/21/CFSP of 20 January 2014 amending Council Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2014 L 15, p. 22) and Council Regulation No 2014/42/EU of 20 January 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (OJ 2014 L 15, p. 18), which are based on the premiss that the Islamic Republic of Iran has put an end to nuclear proliferation and that certain restrictive measures adopted against the latter may be withdrawn, the applicant may legitimately have expected that the justification for the imposition of restrictive measures would no longer be the provision of financial support to the Government of Iran. 150 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments, and contends that the fifth plea should be rejected as unfounded. 151 In response to the arguments put forward by the Council, supported by the Commission, the applicant maintains that the clear undertakings given by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the first stage of the Joint Plan of Action corresponded to an immediate halt in nuclear proliferation and that recital 3 et seq. of Decision 2014/21 suggested that the European Union was itself persuaded that compliance with those undertakings corresponded to the halting, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, of nuclear proliferation, as was subsequently confirmed by Statement No 140120/02 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 January 2014 on the Joint Plan of Action with Iran. Therefore, after the first stage of the Joint Plan of Action had been implemented, the applicant could legitimately take the view that new restrictive measures could not be imposed on it solely on the ground that it was an Iranian Government-owned company. 152 In view of the conclusions reached in paragraph 145 above, the Court must note that, as the Council correctly argues, the applicant is not justified in claiming that it was able to, from the fact that the measures previously adopted by the Council had been annulled by the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402), derive any legitimate expectations as to the application to it, of the criterion at issue. Those latter measures had been adopted applying a different criterion, namely ‘[helping] a listed person, [entity or body] to infringe or evade the restrictive measures imposed on it’ set out in Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413, Article 16(2)(b) of Regulation No 961/2010 and Article 23(2)(b) of Regulation No 267/2012 (judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above, EU:T:2013:402, paragraph 96). 153 Moreover, neither the agreement concluded on 24 November 2013, nor the measures for implementing it contain assurances from the Union to the effect that no new fund-freezing measures would be adopted on the basis of the criterion at issue. It is not apparent either from the agreement concluded on 24 November 2013, or Decision 2014/21 or Regulation 2014/42, that Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Article 1(7) of Decision 2012/35 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 was to be abrogated or even that their application was to be suspended. The only restrictive measures for which suspension was provided, for a period of six months, by those latter acts are measures which are distinct from the fund-freezing measures provided for in Article 20 of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012. Thus, as the Council correctly argues, the applicant is not justified in claiming that, from the agreement of 24 November 2013 and the measures for implementing it, it could derive a legitimate expectation that the criterion at issue would not be applied to it. 154 The fifth plea in law must therefore be rejected as being unfounded. The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality 155 The applicant maintains that, by adopting the contested acts, the Council infringed the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5(4) TFEU, since those acts were manifestly inappropriate in the light of the ruling of the Court in the judgment in Post Bank Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2013:402), which required the Council, if it wished to continue subjecting the applicant to restrictive measures, to establish a direct or indirect link between its commercial activities and nuclear proliferation. Since the Council did not establish such a link, the restrictive measures which it imposed on the applicant are disproportionate, a fortiori because some restrictive measures imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran have already been withdrawn by Regulation No 2014/42. 156 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments, and contends that the sixth plea should be rejected as unfounded. 157 For the reasons already set out in paragraphs 99 to 101 above, the criterion at issue, on the basis of which the contested acts were adopted, cannot be regarded as infringing the principle of proportionality. 158 Furthermore, as has already been observed in paragraphs 134 and 147 above, it appears from the examination of the present action that the applicant has not put forward pleas such as to call into question the validity of the findings contained in the contested acts, according to which it meets the criterion at issue, in so far as it provides financial support to the Iranian Government. 159 In that context, the Court cannot take the view that the contested acts, which apply the criterion at issue to the applicant, are themselves disproportionate. 160 The sixth plea in law must therefore be rejected as being unfounded. 161 Therefore, the present action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 162 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 163 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Post Bank Iran to pay the costs. Kanninen Pelikánová Buttigieg Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 May 2016. [Signatures] Table of contents Background to the disputeII – 2 Restrictive measures adopted against the Islamic Republic of IranII – 2 Restrictive measures applying to the applicantII – 2 Procedure and forms of order soughtII – 7 LawII – 8 The interpretation of the applicant’s claims seeking that certain provisions be declared inapplicable to itII – 8 AdmissibilityII – 8 SubstanceII – 10 The first plea of illegality, directed against Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012, alleging infringement of Article 215 TFEUII – 11 The second plea of illegality, directed against Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Article 1(7) of Decision 2012/35, and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012, alleging infringement of the values and fundamental rights protected by Articles 2 TEU, 21 TEU and 23 TEU and by the Charter of Fundamental RightsII – 14 The first plea, alleging a manifest error in the assessment of the facts and infringement of Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Article 1(7) of Decision 2012/35, and of Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012II – 19 The second plea, alleging infringement of the principles of equality, non-discrimination and sound administrationII – 25 The third plea, alleging a failure to state adequate reasonsII – 26 The fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of powerII – 27 The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectationsII – 28 The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionalityII – 29 CostsII – 30 * Language of the case: English.