Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2024:150
Date: 2024-03-06
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of each plea in law relied on. In addition, it is settled case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without having to seek further information. It is also settled case-law that any plea which is not adequately articulated in the application initiating the proceedings must be held inadmissible. Similar requirements apply where a submission is made in support of a plea in law. That objection constitutes an absolute bar to proceedings which must be raised by the Court of its own motion (see judgment of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 138 and the case-law cited). 66 Consequently, since it is not substantiated by any argument whatsoever, that complaint must be rejected as inadmissible. 67 In the second place, it must be borne in mind that the right to effective judicial protection, which is affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter), requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, inter alia by reading the decision itself, so as to make it possible for that person to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his or her applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision in question (see judgment of 22 September 2021, Al-Imam v Council, T‑203/20, EU:T:2021:605, paragraph 128 (not published) and the case-law cited). 68 It must be stated that, in the present case, the applicant complains that the contested regulation is not reasoned. 69 In those circumstances, it is necessary to examine whether the restrictive measures provided for by the contested provision are adequately reasoned. 70 As concluded in paragraph 36 above, the restrictive measures provided for by the contested provision are measures of general application. 71 It must therefore be recalled that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Council, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures and to enable the EU judicature to exercise its powers of review. In addition, the question whether a statement of reasons satisfies the requirements must be assessed with reference not only to the wording of the measure but also to its context and to the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the extent of the requirement to state reasons depends on the nature of the measure in question, and that, in the case of measures intended to have general application, as in the present case, the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating the general situation which led to the measure’s adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited; judgment of 31 January 2007, Minin v Commission, T‑362/04, EU:T:2007:25, paragraph 80). 72 In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 3 to 5 of the contested regulation that that regulation was adopted in order to give effect, at EU level, to the contested decision. Furthermore, recital 4 of that regulation refers to the restrictive measures laid down in the contested decision, reproduced in the contested regulation. Therefore, the reasons stated in the contested decision in support of the introduction of those measures form part of the context in which they were adopted, which the applicant could understand from reading the contested regulation. 73 First, as regards the general situation which led to the adoption of the contested regulation, it is apparent from recital 3 thereof that the Council adopted the contested decision in order to ‘implement the conclusions of the European Council of 24 February 2022 following the involvement of [the Republic of] Belarus in the unacceptable and illegal Russian military aggression against Ukraine, which under international law qualifies as an act of aggression’. In recital 4 of that regulation, it is stated that the contested decision introduced further restrictions related inter alia to the iron and steel products sector. 74 Furthermore, in recital 3 of the contested decision, reference is made to the conclusions of the European Council and to the fact that, by those conclusions, the Council condemned, first, ‘the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’, which thus ‘grossly [violated] international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter’, and second, ‘the involvement of Belarus in this aggression’, calling on it ‘to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations’. In that context, the European Council called for ‘the urgent preparation and adoption of a package of further individual and economic sanctions, also covering Belarus’. Thus, in recital 4 of that decision, it is stated that, ‘in view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is appropriate … to introduce further restrictive measures’. 75 It is apparent from paragraphs 72 to 74 above that the contested regulation, read in conjunction with the contested decision which forms part of the context known to the applicant and to which that regulation gives effect at EU level, contains an adequate statement of reasons as regards the general situation which led to its adoption and, in particular, that of the contested provision. 76 Second, as regards the general objectives which the contested regulation is intended to achieve, it follows from recital 3 of the contested regulation and recital 3 of the contested decision that the restrictive measures were imposed, first, on account of the involvement of the Republic of Belarus in the aggression against Ukraine, and second, in order for the Republic of Belarus to refrain from ‘such action’ and in order to incentivise it to ‘abide by its international obligations’. 77 It is apparent also from the conclusions of the European Council of 24 February 2022, referred to in recital 3 of the contested regulation and recital 3 of the contested decision, that that institution ‘agrees on further restrictive measures that will impose massive and severe consequences on Russia for its action’ and ‘calls for the urgent preparation and adoption of a further individual and economic sanctions package that will also cover Belarus’. 78 It follows from that that the objective of the restrictive measures imposed by the contested regulation is to put pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from any involvement in the aggression against Ukraine and to incentivise it to abide by its international obligations. In that regard, the applicant cannot claim that those efforts are aimed at removing the current Belarusian regime. It is clear from the considerations set out in paragraphs 73, 74 and 76 above and from the title of Regulation No 765/2006, as amended by the contested regulation, that the latter was adopted in view of the involvement of the Republic of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. 79 Furthermore, even if, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 71 above, the Council was not required to provide a specific statement of reasons regarding the choice of the iron and steel products sector, having regard to the political context prevailing at the date of adoption of the restrictive measures at issue, its choice to adopt measures concerning that sector can readily be understood in the light of the declared objective of the contested acts, which is to incentivise the Republic of Belarus to refrain from any involvement in the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and to abide by its international obligations (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 124). It follows also that the annex referred to in paragraph 62 above, even supposing it were admissible, is not, in any event, relevant for the purpose of analysing the present plea in law. 80 It follows that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 71 above, the contested regulation is adequately reasoned, which enabled the applicant to ascertain the general situation which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures provided for in the contested provision and their general objectives, and the EU judicature to exercise its power of review. 81 As regards the applicant’s arguments relating to insufficient evidence and justification of the alleged facts, it should be pointed out that those allegations concern the merits of the contested regulation. 82 It must be borne in mind that the duty to state reasons on which an act is based is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the act in question. The reasoning of an act consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that act is based. If those grounds are unsupported or are vitiated by errors, that will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it (see judgment of 6 October 2020, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, C‑134/19 P, EU:C:2020:793, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 83 Moreover, since the restrictive measures provided for by the contested provision are measures of general application, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 71 above, the Council was not required to provide a specific statement of reasons relating to the individual situation of the applicant, which was not individually targeted by those measures. Contrary to what the applicant claims, it is not included on a list of persons subject to restrictive measures, at the very least in the contested regulation. 84 The first plea in law must therefore be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of Annex C.1, as is apparent from paragraph 79 above. The second plea in law, alleging failure to observe the principle of equal treatment and a misuse of powers 85 The second plea is divided into two parts, the first alleging failure to observe the principle of equal treatment and the second a misuse of powers. – The first part, alleging failure to observe the principle of equal treatment 86 The applicant submits that the Council has not shown that it is in a position that is any different than any other business that is economically important to the Republic of Belarus. According to the applicant, the declared objective of the contested restrictive measures does not justify the difference in treatment between the different national economic sectors. The applicant also submits that the principle of equal treatment was not observed on the ground that it does not enjoy the rights afforded to persons who are individually targeted by restrictive measures. 87 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 88 In the present case, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law, the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes a fundamental principle of law, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited). 89 In the first place, as regards the alleged difference in treatment between the applicant and any other business that is economically important for the Republic of Belarus, the applicant does not provide any specific example of other undertakings which are in a situation comparable to its own and which are treated differently. In those circumstances, the Court is not in a position to ascertain whether its allegations are in fact well founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Export Development Bank of Iran v Council, T‑89/14, not published, EU:T:2016:693, paragraph 120). 90 In the second place, as regards the argument relating to the difference in treatment between the different economic sectors, the applicant does not refer to any other sector that might be in a situation comparable to that of the iron and steel products sector. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Council has a broad discretion when it determines the purpose of restrictive measures, particularly where such measures prescribe, in accordance with Article 215(1) TFEU, the interruption or reduction, in whole or in part, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries. As regards the restrictive measures at issue aimed at the iron and steel products sector, it was, inter alia, open to the Council to impose, if it deemed it appropriate, restrictions which targeted specific sectors of the economy of the Republic of Belarus in order to exert pressure on that third State to refrain from involvement in the aggression against Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 132, and of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 144). 91 In any event, even assuming that the Council had failed to adopt restrictive measures against other undertakings or other economic sectors, that fact could not reasonably be relied on by the applicant, since the principle of equal treatment must be interpreted in the light of the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council when it determines on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the measures at issue are based are satisfied. In the present case, by choosing to target the iron and steel products sector rather than another sector of the Belarusian economy, it does not appear that the Council exceeded its broad discretion having regard to the general objective which it intends to achieve or that it failed to observe the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 132). 92 In the third place, the applicant does not specify what rights it is referring to that, in its submission, it does not enjoy, unlike persons individually targeted by restrictive measures. 93 It follows that the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected. – The second part, alleging a misuse of powers 94 The applicant claims that the contested restrictive measures are vitiated by a misuse of powers. In the first place, the applicant submits that its ties with the Belarusian Government are insufficient. In the second place, the contested regulation does not set out the connection between the entities targeted by those measures and the objective of those measures, that is to say, that of increasing the costs for the Republic of Belarus with a view to removing the current regime. Such an objective is inconsistent with the objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action laid down in Article 21 TEU. In the third place, the applicant claims that it has never had any involvement with the Belarusian army or contributed to or profited from the conflict in Ukraine. 95 The Council disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 96 In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law, a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken solely, or at the very least chiefly, for ends other than those for which the power in question was conferred or with the aim of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaties for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 135 and the case-law cited). 97 In the present case, first of all, by merely stating that it had no ties with the actions of the Belarusian Government or army, the applicant has not demonstrated that the contested restrictive measures were adopted for a purpose other than that apparent from the contested regulation, that is to say, that of exerting pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from involvement in the aggression against Ukraine, let alone provided objective, relevant and consistent evidence in that regard. 98 Furthermore, the restrictive measures provided for by the contested provision are of general application, covering certain economic sectors instead of certain entities identified by name. Therefore, the Council was not required to show a link between the entities that could be affected by the contested restrictive measures and the objective of those measures. 99 Next, in view of the objective of the contested restrictive measures, it was not required that the undertakings liable to be affected by those measures have ties with the Belarusian Government or contribute to or benefit from the war in Ukraine. 100 Lastly, the objective of the contested restrictive measures, that is to say, that of exerting pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from involvement in the aggression against Ukraine, corresponds to the objectives set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, aimed at preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security. 101 Consequently, the second part of the second plea in law must be rejected and, therefore, that plea must be rejected in its entirety. The third plea in law, alleging disproportionality of the contested restrictive measures and infringement of fundamental rights 102 The applicant alleges an infringement of its freedom to conduct a business and of its right to property inasmuch as the contested restrictive measures prevent it from freely pursuing an economic activity. According to the applicant, the conditions for limiting its fundamental rights are not satisfied in the present case. 103 Furthermore, in the applicant’s submission, there is a failure to observe the principle of proportionality, too, since the objective of removing the current Belarusian regime by means of economic pressure is not consistent with Article 21 TEU and that objective is not attained by disproportionately obstructing its access to an entire market. Moreover, the contested restrictive measures are neither necessary nor appropriate. 104 The applicant submits that it has no connection with the events in Ukraine or with the Belarusian regime. 105 In addition, in its observations on the Commission’s statement in intervention, the applicant submits that the Council has provided neither the criteria nor the reasons for its inclusion among the addressees of the restrictive measures. The applicant does not meet any criterion since it has no link with the Belarusian and Russian military. The applicant asserts that, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, the decision to impose restrictive measures on a person or entity concerned individually should be taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis, which entails a verification of the allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated. 106 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 107 In that regard, in so far as the applicant is challenging the proportionality of the restrictive measures laid down by the contested provision, which, as concluded in paragraph 36 above, are of general application, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Thus, the legality of a measure adopted in those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited). 108 Contrary to what the applicant claims, there is a reasonable relationship between those restrictive measures and the objective they pursue. In so far as that objective is to exert pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from any involvement in the aggression against Ukraine, the approach of targeting the Belarusian iron and steel products sector in which, according to the applicant, the Republic of Belarus is among the top five exporters to the European Union, is consistent with that objective and cannot, in any event, be regarded as manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objective pursued. 109 Furthermore, as regards the argument that there is no link between the applicant and the events in Ukraine or the Belarusian regime, it must be noted that, given that the restrictive measures provided for in the contested provision do not individually target the applicant, but relate generally to the iron and steel products sector, it is not necessary for a link between the applicant and the events in Ukraine or the Belarusian regime to be established. Contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, and as stated in paragraph 83 above, it is not included on a list of persons subject to restrictive measures, at the very least in the contested regulation. Therefore, the contested provision cannot be treated in the same way as a decision imposing restrictive measures on the applicant individually. 110 Consequently, the Court holds that the restrictive measures provided for by the contested provision are not disproportionate, especially since paragraph 2 of that provision provides for certain safeguards in respect of contracts that are in force as at the date of adoption of the contested regulation. 111 As regards the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, namely the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, it should be pointed out that those fundamental rights are not absolute and may therefore be subject to limitations, as provided in Article 52(1) of the Charter (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 161 and the case-law cited). 112 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the] Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [European] Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 113 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights concerned must satisfy three conditions. First, the limitation must be provided for by law. In other words, the measure in question must have a legal basis. Second, the limitation must refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Third, the limitation may not be excessive. It must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought, and the ‘essential content’, that is the substance, of the right or freedom at issue must not be impaired (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited). 114 In the present case, those three conditions are satisfied. 115 In the first place, the contested restrictive measures are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in an act which is, in particular, of general application, namely the contested regulation, has a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 215 TFEU, and has an adequate statement of reasons, as is apparent from paragraphs 70 to 84 above. 116 In the second place, as stated in paragraphs 76 to 78 above, the objective of the contested regulation is to exert pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from any involvement in the aggression against Ukraine. That objective is consistent with the objective of maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 115, and of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 166). 117 In the third place, as regards the principle of proportionality, reference should be made to the reasons set out in paragraphs 107 to 110 above and it must be added that restrictive measures, by definition, have consequences which affect rights to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions (judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 149, and of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 170). 118 However, the importance of the objective pursued by the contested restrictive measures, which is intended to exert pressure on the Republic of Belarus to refrain from any involvement in the aggression against Ukraine, the achievement of which, as is apparent from paragraph 100 above, is part of the objective of maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, is such as to justify the possibility that, for certain operators, which are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions, the consequences may be negative, even significantly so (judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 171; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 150). 119 In those circumstances, the interference with the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business and its right to property cannot be regarded as disproportionate. 120 The third plea in law must therefore be rejected. 121 Since all the pleas in law have been rejected, the action must be dismissed. Costs 122 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 123 Since the Council has applied for costs and the applicant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. 124 The Commission is to bear its own costs, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders AAT Byelorussian Steel Works – management company of ‘Byelorussian Metallurgical Company’ holding (BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding) to pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Declares that the European Commission shall bear its own costs. Papasavvas da Silva Passos Gervasoni Półtorak Pynnä Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 March 2024. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.