Judgment;Abstract;Judgment (extracts) — ECLI:EU:T:2021:821
Date: 2021-11-24
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that the judicial review is not limited to the assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but focuses on whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 101 It is for the EU judicature, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited). 102 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121). 103 For that purpose, there is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU judicature all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the measure sought to be annulled. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122). 104 If the competent EU authority provides relevant information or evidence, the EU judicature must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 105 In accordance with the Court of Justice’s case-law, the assessment as to whether a listing was well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence not in isolation, but in the context in which it fits (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 51, and of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 50). 106 Lastly, in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime to stop the violent repression against the population and of the difficulty of obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46). 107 It should be borne in mind, as is apparent from paragraphs 44 and 45 above, that the listing of the applicant’s name is based on the criterion defined in Article 27(1) and Article 28(1) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and in Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828 (criterion of association with the regime). 108 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine the applicant’s first plea and its arguments seeking, in essence, to call into question the sole reason for listing, namely that of association with the Syrian regime. The evidence submitted by the Council 109 In order to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council produced document WK 54/2019 INIT containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots from: – the website ‘The Syria Report’, which contains a first article, published on 19 April 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Samer Foz, Syria’s Most Powerful Businessman’, which states that Mr Samer Foz became one of the most powerful players in the Syrian economy; he is believed to have close ties to President Bashar Al-Assad and to have acted as intermediary between the Democratic Union Party (Syrian Kurdistan) (PYD) and the Islamic State to trade wheat; that article also states that Mr Foz is responsible for the day-to-day management of Aman Holding, which was established in 1988 by Mr Foz’s father; according to that article, Aman Holding, together with Damascus Cham Holding, established a joint venture called Aman Dimashq, with a capital of 10 thousand million Syrian pounds (SYP) (approximately USD 18.9 million and approximately EUR 16.8 million); the applicant was responsible for developing construction projects, including the ‘Basateen Al-Razi’ project in the Mazeeh neighbourhood of Damascus, which is now referred to as the ‘Marota City project’, on expropriated land that was inhabited by people who supported the opposition to the Syrian regime; in addition, the Marota City project is controversial because it is based, first, on Decree No 66/2012, which allows for the expropriation of homeowners in two districts of Damascus and, secondly, on Decree No 19/2015, which authorises governorates and municipalities to establish private joint-stock companies to manage assets within their administrative boundaries; lastly, according to that article, in September 2017, Damascus Cham Holding, which is the investment arm of the Damascus Governorate, granted the applicant the right to build 3 skyscrapers with up to 70 floors each and 5 residential buildings, valued at USD 312 million (approximately EUR 278.1 million); – the website ‘The Syria Report’, which contains an article of 16 January 2018 headed ‘Syrian Investor Signs Deal Over [Basateen] Al-Razi Project’, and a second article of 1 June 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Marota City, Syria’s Most Controversial Investment Project’ where it is stated that the development project for the upscale city referred to as ‘Marota City’ is a project backed by the Syrian regime under Decree No 66/2012, which allowed the expropriation and redevelopment of certain lower socio-economic tiers of land, including the Mazeeh neighbourhood, called Basateen Al-Razi, situated in Damascus; Marota City is the new name given to the neighbourhood covering 2.15 million square metres; that area is located at the south-west entrance to the capital Damascus and is close to the city centre, the embassies and the security services, which makes it attractive to real estate developers; those articles also state that private company Damascus Cham Holding is owned by the Damascus Governorate and created, with Mr Foz in July 2017, the joint venture Aman Dimashq, with a capital of SYP 10 thousand million (USD 18.9 million); those articles add that Aman Holding owns the majority share in the joint venture and has three representatives on its board of directors; in addition, it is stated that, in September 2017, Damascus Cham Holding granted the applicant the right to build 3 skyscrapers with up to 70 floors each and 5 residential buildings, valued at USD 312 million; lastly, according to those articles, Mr Foz has become one of the most powerful economic players and his ascent to the upper echelons of Syria’s business elite is attributed to his close ties to President Bashar Al-Assad; – the website ‘The Syria Report’, which, in a final article, includes, in a list of joint ventures created between Damascus Cham Holding and private investors, published on 17 April 2018, the applicant, which was created in September 2017 by, on the one hand, Mr Foz, as sole shareholder of the applicant through his company Aman Holding, and, on the other, the company owned by the Damascus Governorate, Damascus Cham Holding, in order to develop the Marota City project; it is stated that Mr Foz owns the majority share in that joint venture; it has a capital of USD 18.9 million, the list of projects developed by that joint venture is set out in detail and reference is made to the development of three skyscrapers and five residential buildings, with a total investment cost of SYP 150 thousand million (approximately USD 312 million); – Damascus Cham Holding’s website ‘Damacham.sy’, the page from which is dated 5 September 2017 and was accessed on 20 September 2018, according to which the founding general assembly of the applicant took place on 7 October 2017 at the Damascus Cham Holding headquarters, which is located on the site of the Marota City project; according to that website, the chairman of the board of directors of Damascus Cham Holding and that of the board of directors of Aman Holding, a number of senior executives from both companies and a representative from the Syrian Chamber of Commerce and Consumer Protection were present; in addition, the project carried out by the applicant is, in view of its scale, one of the most important and largest of the Marota City project and the investment value exceeds SYP 150 thousand million; – the Syrian Government’s website ‘66.damascus.gov.sy’, which, on a page dated 18 September 2012, reproduces the part of Decree No 66/2012 which states that the south-east neighbourhood of Mazeeh in Damascus is one of two areas designated for a residential and commercial development project; – the website ‘Eqtsad News’, which, in an article published on 14 January 2018 headed ‘You know them … Big businessmen are sharing a project behind Al-Razi’, describes the Marota City project as a project backed by the Syrian regime through which the regime is supporting loyal businesspersons; in addition, Damascus Cham Holding is administering the project, signs the contracts and allocates partnership interests to businesspersons, and that function was entrusted to it by the Damascus Governorate; according to that article, Mr Foz signed a contract with the Damascus province involving an investment of SYP 150 thousand million in the construction of a number of buildings; – the website ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, which, in an article published in April 2018, sets out the motives behind the adoption of Decree No 66/2012; that source states that, according to the Syrian authorities, Decree No 66/2012 sought to improve the living conditions of inhabitants by replacing poorly constructed properties with more modern and comfortable ones; according to that article, only two residential areas of Damascus, the inhabitants of which supported the opposition, were designated in that decree, while the decree left intact neighbourhoods of Damascus where the inhabitants lived in similar conditions, but, by contrast, supported the Syrian regime; lastly, the article states that the decree will facilitate the rapid development of major development projects as a source of enrichment for businesspersons close to the regime, while serving as a punitive instrument against sections of the population opposed to the Syrian regime; – the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, which, in an article published on 6 April 2018, headed ‘Alliance of Companies Monopolizes New Damascus Development Organizations’, states that businesspersons close to the Syrian regime are investing in new development projects driven by that regime in Damascus and its suburbs; according to that source, those businesspersons are selected by the Syrian regime on the basis of their obedience, loyalty and foreign business links; – the website ‘Brookings Institution’, which published a report dated June 2018 headed ‘Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States’ referring to the measures adopted by the Syrian regime, including Decree No 66/2012, in order to seize land and property, punish opponents, reward persons close to the Syrian regime and governors, reassert authority in the territory, tighten control over the Syrian economy and ‘alter’ Syria’s demography to achieve what Mr Bashar Al-Assad has described as a ‘healthier and more homogeneous society’; according to that report, the Syrian regime, on the basis of new and pre-existing legislation, expropriated neighbourhoods in Damascus that were known as pro-opposition areas and property belonging to displaced persons suspected of supporting the opposition in order to benefit certain businesspersons; lastly, according to that article, the development project for the luxury city ‘Marota City’ is cited in that report as the most vivid example of that policy; – the website ‘Open Democracy’, which, in an article published on 5 September 2017 headed ‘Militias and Crony Capitalism to Hamper Syria Reconstruction’, mentions the benefits which the Syrian regime derives from Decree No 66/2012, in particular as an investment instrument for rapid and large-scale development projects benefiting allies of the regime operating at the same time as a punitive force against populations opposed to the regime; according to that article, the development of residential projects will be carried out by holding companies owned by governorates or municipalities, but the development and management of those projects will be contracted to private sector companies owned by investors linked to the regime; in addition, that article states that, in August 2017, Aman Holding, managed by Mr Foz, who has close links to the Syrian regime, announced its contribution to the reconstruction of the Basateen Al-Razi area in the Mazeeh neighbourhood of Damascus, in partnership with the Damascus Governorate through its company Damascus Cham Holding; according to the article, the applicant, a joint venture established by Aman Holding, was created to carry out that project and has a capital of USD 18.9 million; – the website ‘Reuters’, which states, in an article published on a page consulted on 14 November 2013, that Aman Holding acts on behalf of the Syrian regime in grain deals; in particular, according to that article, the Aman Holding Group, run by the Foz family from the coastal city of Latakia (Syria), acts as a broker for grain deals for Hoboob, a company owned by the Syrian State; – the website ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, which, on a page dated 25 March 2016, describes Mr Foz as the most powerful Syrian economic player in the country; in addition, according to that article, Mr Foz invests in a company licensed exclusively to produce sugar; it is also stated that Mr Foz benefited from the sale by auction of property owned by opponents to the Syrian regime and from the acquisition of property belonging to businesspersons marginalised by the Syrian regime; it is also clear from that article that Mr Foz imports and distributes goods according to the demands of the Syrian regime; lastly, that article refers to Mr Foz as the founder of a group called ‘Military Security Shield Forces’, which fought alongside President Bashar Al-Assad in Latakia; – the website ‘Sasa Post’, which, in an article published on 7 April 2018, states that Mr Foz funded the Military Security Shield Forces, which is described as a paramilitary group belonging to the ‘Military Intelligence Division’. 110 At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the measure was adopted (see judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). Consequently, it is incumbent on the Court to take into account only those facts which existed at the time of the adoption of the contested measures and on which the Council relied at that date (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 127, and of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council, T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraphs 102 to 104). 111 First, it should be pointed out that the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’, dated 19 April 2018, headed ‘Factsheet: Samer Foz, Syria’s Most Powerful Businessman’, which is contained in document WK 54/2019 INIT, does not correspond to any of the hyperlinks to the articles in document WK 54/2019 INIT that are listed in the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18. In response to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the Council confirmed that it was not in possession of the article of 19 April 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ when the initial measures were adopted. Thus, in the light of the explanations given by the Council at the hearing, it must be inferred that that article was not part of the evidence on which it relied in order to adopt the initial measures. Therefore, that article must be disregarded when reviewing the legality of the initial measures. 112 Conversely, since the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 19 April 2018 is mentioned in document WK 54/2019 INIT and served as the basis for the adoption by the Council of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be taken into account when analysing the legality of those acts. 113 Secondly, the article from the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’, which was wrongly stated by the Council in the defence as forming part of document WK 54/2019 INIT, must be excluded from the analysis of the legality of all the contested measures. 114 That article is neither part of the proposal for listing COREU CFSP/0195/18 nor part of document WK 54/2019 INIT, with the result that, since it is not part of the evidence on which the Council relied in order to adopt the contested measures, it must be disregarded, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 110 above. In any event, even if it were accepted, as the Council states in its replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020, that that article contains only background information relating to the general situation in Syria, it should be noted that the Council did not produce it as an annex to the defence, in the body of which it is nevertheless referred to, or to the rejoinder, nor did it attach it as an annex to the said replies. Consequently, the article from the website ‘Syrian Law Journal’ cannot be admitted in the examination of the legality of the contested measures. The reliability of the evidence produced by the Council 115 The applicant disputes the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council in document WK 54/2019 INIT, claiming that that document is merely a compilation of screenshots of partisan websites and press articles, devoid of any probative value and not ‘seriously documented’. 116 More specifically and first, as regards the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, the applicant states, first of all, that it is a Syrian news publication company which claims to be ‘editorially and politically independent’. Next, the applicant submits that the main function of that website is to translate articles from Syrian publications into English without, however, verifying the content of those publications. That website also states that it does not endorse the viewpoints expressed in the abovementioned publications. Furthermore, according to that website, articles are selected on the basis of two criteria, namely the seriousness of the publication and the extent to which the article reflects the authors’ political positions. 117 Secondly, as regards the website ‘The Syria Report’, the applicant notes, first of all, that that Syrian news website is structured around a ‘large database of news, data and statistics, including a database of Syrian institutions’. It is primarily an economic news bulletin. Next, the applicant states that A is the founder and editor of the website ‘The Syria Report’ as well as co-founder of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’. According to the applicant, that explains why the websites ‘The Syria Report’ and ‘The Syrian Observer’ often publish the same information and opinions in different forms and in different publications. In so doing, those websites give the impression that the published information is widely shared by different media and could therefore be considered as objective. Furthermore, the applicant expresses doubts as to the integrity of A, who, according to the applicant, in his capacity as visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, works closely with the EU institutions, including the Council, on issues concerning Syria, in particular in view of the fact that he has published reports on Syria’s war economy and decentralisation during the war. In that context, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Council uses its links with A in order to obtain articles supporting the policies that it intends to apply before those articles are published on those websites, in order to use them subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. In support of that claim, the applicant produces a page taken from the website ‘News Deeply’ containing a short description of A and an article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’. Lastly, the applicant submits that the website ‘The Syria Report’ failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, since it never approached the applicant in order to verify the content of the information published on its website or to seek its views on that information. 118 In the reply to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 23 July 2020, the Council maintains that it has no information concerning the sources of information on which it relied other than what can be inferred from document WK 54/2019 INIT. Next, it reproduces information that is publicly available on the internet concerning the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Reuters’, ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, ‘The Syrian Observer’, ‘Brookings Institution’, ‘Eqtsad News’, ‘Open Democracy’ and ‘Zaman al-Wasl’. At the hearing, in its observations on the second statement of modification, the Council contested the applicant’s arguments and argued that the applicant’s assertions do not call into question the reliability of those sources. 119 It should be borne in mind, first, that in carrying out the assessment of the importance of what was at stake, which forms part of the review of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue, account may be taken of the context of those measures, of the fact that there was an urgent need to adopt such measures intended to put pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to stop the violent repression against the population, and of the difficulty in obtaining more specific evidence in a State at civil war and having an authoritarian regime (judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46). 120 Secondly, pursuant to settled case-law, the activity of the Court of Justice and of the General Court is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before them which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In addition, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains, and in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 224, and of 12 February 2020, Kande Mupompa v Council, T‑170/18, EU:T:2020:60, paragraph 107 (not published)). 121 In the present case, as regards the applicant’s argument that most of the press articles are not ‘seriously documented’, it should be pointed out that the state of war in Syria makes it difficult, if not impossible, in practice, to gather evidence from persons who are prepared to be identified and the ensuing difficulties of investigation and the danger to which those providing information are exposed constitute a barrier to the production of precise sources of personal conduct in support of the regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, point 204). 122 Furthermore, it should be observed, first of all, that the evidence in document WK 54/2019 INIT, the probative value of which is disputed by the applicant, comes from digital information sources of various origins, not only local but also foreign. Thus, the local information sources include ‘The Syria Report’, the leading source of economic, business and financial information on Syria, which is independent and not connected with any religious, social or political organisation; ‘The Syrian Observer’, an online news service which essentially collects and translates into English news content produced by the official Syrian press, opposition groups to the regime or civil society and which is financed by donors, including, inter alia, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, a Syrian news website; ‘Eqtsad News’, a press body forming part of ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, which belongs to the largest media group independent of the Syrian regime. The foreign information sources include ‘Reuters’, a reputable press agency; ‘Open Democracy’, a website that examines social and political issues whose founders are active in established media and in political activism and whose contributors include internationally known figures; ‘Brookings Institution’, a leading US think tank, and ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, an independent not-for-profit organisation recognised in France as a public benefit foundation. In addition, the Council produced pages from the websites of Damascus Cham Holding and the Syrian Government. Those various sources relay corroborating information, with the result that the applicant cannot rely solely on the fact that they are screenshots of websites and press articles in order to challenge their soundness and reliability. 123 Moreover, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the website ‘The Syrian Observer’, it should be noted, first of all, that the description of that source of information contains nothing to cast doubt on its reliability. On the contrary, by indicating in a transparent manner that the content of the articles published on that website is not systematically verified, that source informs its readers that it may be necessary to cross-reference the information communicated by the published articles in order to assess its veracity. That is why it is also useful that that website publishes articles from various sources, some close to the Syrian regime and others opposing it. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected. 124 The same applies to the applicant’s arguments concerning the website ‘The Syria Report’. More specifically, as regards the claim that that publication failed to comply with journalistic rules of professional conduct, it is clear that, first of all, the applicant does not specify the rules under which it should have been approached by that website. Furthermore, there is nothing in the file to indicate that the applicant reacted to that alleged failure to comply with such rules, in particular by bringing an action for defamation. Lastly, and in any event, the fact that the applicant was not contacted in order to verify the information relayed, even if that were true, is not, in itself, sufficient to refute the reliability of the information published on that website. That argument must therefore be rejected. 125 Next, as regards, first, the applicant’s claim that the websites ‘The Syrian Observer’ and ‘The Syria Report’ essentially publish the same information in order to make it appear objective, it is clear, first of all, that the applicant has adduced no evidence demonstrating this alleged collusion. Nor does it follow from document WK 54/2019 INIT that the information published on those two websites is so similar as to attest to any such collusion. At the hearing, in support of its claim, the applicant argued that the articles whose reliability is disputed were cross-referenced and overlapped because they come from a single source of information. In that regard, it should be noted that, irrespective of the fact that A is the editor of the website ‘The Syrian Observer’ and co-founder of the website ‘The Syria Report’, the fact that two sources publish the same information cannot be sufficient to call into question the reliability of that information, since it is commonplace, in journalism, for different newspapers or news sites to relay the same facts. Lastly, at the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that some of the information reported on Damascus Cham Holding’s website, which also appears in the article from ‘The Syria Report’, is correct, with the result that, even if it was presented subjectively by the author, it is nonetheless reliable. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected. 126 As regards, secondly, the doubts expressed by the applicant as to A’s integrity, it is clear that the applicant has not put forward any evidence in support of that claim. The applicant’s brief description of A does not mention the existence of relations between A and the Council. Nor can that circumstance be inferred from the article headed ‘Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill’ of which A is the author. Lastly, the applicant also fails to explain what interest A would have in publishing articles supporting the policies which the Council intends to apply, in order for those articles to be used subsequently as justification for restrictive measures to be adopted or for newly adopted ones. That argument must therefore be rejected. 127 In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds, in the absence of any material in the file capable of calling into question the reliability of the sources used by the Council, that they must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 120 above. Association with the Syrian regime 128 It should be borne in mind that, according to the sole reason for listing, the applicant benefits from the Syrian regime and supports it by virtue of its participation in the development of the Marota City project, a luxury development project backed by the Syrian regime, and its status as a joint venture between Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding. 129 It is necessary to ascertain whether all of the evidence submitted by the Council discharges the burden of proof incumbent on it under the case-law referred to in paragraph 102 above and thus constitutes a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia to support the sole reason for listing. 130 As a preliminary point, the applicant’s argument that it no longer has any link with Mr Assi, referred in paragraph 98 above, must be rejected as ineffective, since it is not apparent from the reasons for listing that the Council relied on that link in order to justify including and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. 131 Next, it should be noted that, first, the applicant admits, in the application, that it is a joint venture formed by the companies Foz Trading, Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding, which are shareholders of the applicant. Article 8 of its articles of association, dated 5 October 2018 and produced by the applicant, confirms the identity of its shareholders. In that respect, Foz Trading owns 11% of the shares, Aman Holding owns 40% and Damascus Cham Holding owns 49%. It is also apparent from that article that the total capital value of the joint venture is USD 18.9 million, as stated in the reasons for listing. In the contested measures, the Council identified the applicant as having its headquarters in Damascus, which the applicant also confirmed in the application. 132 Secondly, the applicant acknowledges in the application that its company objects consist in the development of new residential, commercial and leisure buildings on a portion (approximately 3.1% of the size) of the plots of the Marota City project contributed in kind in the capital of Damascus Cham Holding, which oversees the rights to 30% of the plots of the Marota City project. In addition, the applicant confirms its involvement in the Marota City project by providing, as an annex to the reply, a presentation of that project in which its role is described. Thus, the applicant acknowledges that it is involved in the Marota City project. 133 However, the applicant denies that it has any link to the Syrian regime as a result of its participation in the development of the Marota City project. In that regard, it submits, in a first complaint, that it is not a joint venture that is supported by the Syrian regime and, on that basis, is neither personally nor in any way linked to the Syrian regime. In a second complaint, it submits that, in the context of the Marota City project, it did not develop expropriated land belonging to persons that were displaced because of the conflict in Syria, which prevented them from returning to their homes. Furthermore, the land on which the Marota City project will be developed has not been the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and the neighbourhoods of Damascus in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria. 134 In the first place, in order to analyse the first complaint, it is necessary to ascertain whether the applicant has links to the Syrian regime. For that purpose, it is necessary to turn to its shareholders. 135 First, as regards Aman Holding, it is apparent from numerous items of evidence taken from, inter alia, the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Eqtsad News’ and ‘Open Democracy’, that Mr Foz is the director of that company. As is apparent from the websites ‘Open Democracy’, ‘Zaman al-Wasl’, ‘Sasa post’ and ‘Reuters’, Mr Foz became one of the most powerful economic players in Syria and his ascent to the upper echelons of Syria’s business elite is attributed to his close links to the Syrian president. Furthermore, in the analysis of the legality of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it is apparent from the article of 19 April 2018, taken from the website ‘The Syria Report’, that Mr Foz is responsible for the day-to-day management of Aman Holding, including its subsidiaries such as Foz Trading, which is also a shareholder of the applicant. As is clear from that article, Aman Holding was established in 1988 by Mr Foz’s father. The applicant did not dispute the evidence produced by the Council on that point. 136 Secondly, as regards Damascus Cham Holding, the articles from the websites ‘The Syria Report’, ‘Open Democracy’ and ‘Eqtsad News’ show that that company was created by the Damascus Governorate. The articles from ‘The Syria Report’, published on 17 April and 1 June 2018, state that Damascus Cham Holding is owned by the Damascus Governorate. This is confirmed by the company’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in the replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020. The website ‘Open Democracy’ mentions a partnership between Aman Holding and the Syrian regime, through its company Damascus Cham Holding, for the development of the project at Basateen Al-Razi. Furthermore, Damascus Cham Holding’s website states that, at the applicant’s founding general assembly, a representative of the Syrian Chamber of Commerce and Consumer Protection was present. In addition, Damascus Cham Holding’s function relating to the administration of the Marota City project, the signing of contracts and the allocation of stakes to businesspersons was entrusted to it by the Damascus Governorate, as is apparent from the website ‘Eqtsad News’. Thus, the website ‘Open Democracy’ states that the development of residential projects under Decree No 66/2012 will be carried out by holding companies owned by governorates or municipalities, but that the development and organisation of those projects will be allocated to private sector undertakings owned by investors linked to the regime. Lastly, in the analysis of the legality of the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, it should be noted that the article ‘The Syria Report’, published on 19 April 2018, identifies Damascus Cham Holding as the investment arm of the Damascus Governorate. 137 Furthermore, it is apparent from Decree No 19/2015 that Syrian legislation authorises the establishment by governorates of private joint stock companies, such as Damascus Cham Holding, which is a shareholder of the applicant. 138 It follows from the foregoing that the shareholders of the applicant, namely Aman Holding and Foz Trading, on the one hand, and Damascus Cham Holding, on the other, have links to the Syrian regime because of the involvement within them of, respectively, Mr Foz and the Damascus Governorate, which means that the applicant itself has such links. Furthermore, in view of the background to the applicant’s creation, it must be concluded that it is a joint venture supported by the Syrian regime. The applicant’s first complaint must therefore be rejected. 139 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments. 140 First of all, the applicant claims that the Damascus Governorate, which formed Damascus Cham Holding, is an entity that is separate from the Syrian State. Given the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime, the Council was entitled to regard as a matter of common experience the fact that the activities of the Damascus Governorate could not have prospered had it not received favours from that regime and provided it with a degree of support in return (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Anbouba v Council, T‑592/11, not published, EU:T:2013:427, paragraph 48). Moreover, the applicant’s argument is a general assertion, which is not substantiated by any specific evidence illustrating, for example, the decentralised institutional organisation of the Syrian regime within which governorates enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis the President or the Syrian regime. That argument must therefore be rejected. 141 Next, the applicant submits that Decree No 66/2012 merely enjoined the Damascus Governorate to allow the creation of private companies. However, it should be noted that, in support of that submission, the applicant does not substantiate its claim, citing, for example, the article of the decree which contains the alleged order, nor does it explain how that would call into question the existence of a link between the applicant and the Syrian regime. Moreover, the existence of such an order is evidence that the Marota City project and the involvement in the project of Damascus Cham Holding and, consequently, the applicant, are clearly supported by the Syrian regime. 142 In addition, the applicant claims that the Damascus Governorate merely authorised the formation of Damascus Cham Holding but does not participate in the company’s activities. However, that claim is contradicted by the statement in the application that Damascus Cham Holding was formed ‘in order to centralise and coordinate the involvement of real estate developers interested in participating in the development of the 30% of the shares owned by the [Damascus] Governorate in the [Marota City] project, “by entering into partnerships with them”’. In addition, paragraph (D) of Article 2, headed ‘Purpose of the Company (Objectives)’, of Damascus Cham Holding’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in response to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted on 23 July 2020, states that Damascus Cham Holding carries out various tasks in favour of the Damascus Governorate and under its supervision. Consequently, the Damascus Governorate cannot be regarded as having merely formed Damascus Cham Holding and as being wholly unrelated to its activities. On the contrary, by the evidence adduced and the arguments put forward, the applicant confirms what is apparent from the evidence produced by the Council, namely that Damascus Cham Holding is the company of the Damascus Governorate through which it participates in partnerships with private undertakings. This is confirmed by that company’s articles of association, produced by the applicant in its replies to the measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court on 23 July 2020. It is also apparent from those articles that, of the eight members who, in addition to the Governor of Damascus, make up that company’s board of directors, four must be experts in trade, law and finance, not forming part of the Damascus Governorate, but appointed by it. The articles of association also state that the Damascus Governorate, as chairman of the company’s board of directors, has a casting vote. Thus, it follows from all of those factors that Damascus Cham Holding was created by the Damascus Governorate and is an instrument controlled by the latter for the purpose of participating in the Marota City project. That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the fact that that company is governed by private law. 143 The applicant’s argument that no public entity holds shares in its capital must therefore also be rejected. Through Damascus Cham Holding, the Damascus Governorate, which is a public entity, indirectly holds shares in its capital. 144 Lastly, the applicant submits that Damascus Cham Holding does not have the majority on its board of directors, which, it is argued, clearly means that the legal and operational procedures conducted by the applicant originate from the private sector and not the public sector. 145 It is true that, within the applicant, Aman Holding is the applicant’s majority shareholder, since Damascus Cham Holding has only two members on the board of directors, whereas Aman Holding has three representatives on the board, according to the articles published on 17 April and 1 June 2018 on the website ‘The Syria Report’. That composition of the applicant’s board of directors is confirmed by Article 13 of its articles of association. 146 However, in arguing that Damascus Cham Holding does not have the majority, and therefore the decision-making power, on its board of directors, the applicant nevertheless acknowledges that Damascus Cham Holding has privileged access to its board of directors. Furthermore, it is apparent from the content of the article from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 1 June 2018, that it is Damascus Cham Holding which granted the applicant the right to construct 3 skyscrapers, each with up to 70 floors, and 5 residential buildings as part of the Marota City project, which the applicant does not dispute. Thus, in addition to holding shares in the applicant, Damascus Cham Holding does have a certain decision-making power on the applicant’s board of directors. 147 Moreover, even if it is accepted that the applicant’s legal and operational procedures originate from the private sector and not the public sector, as the applicant submits, that would have no bearing on the fact that the applicant has links to the Syrian regime. 148 In the second place, as regards the second complaint concerning, in essence, the Marota City project as referred to in paragraph 133 above, the following should be noted. 149 First, it must be borne in mind that the applicant has acknowledged participating in the development of the Marota City project. In that regard, the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’, published on 16 January and 1 June 2018, even mention that the applicant was created, in particular, in order to carry out the Marota City project. In addition, it is apparent from the articles of 16 January, 17 April and 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ and from Damascus Cham Holding’s website that that project is a large-scale project. That was confirmed by the applicant through the presentation of the Marota City project which it produced in the present action and from which it is apparent that the project for which it is responsible relates to, inter alia, the development of commercial complexes, residential buildings and leisure buildings on an area representing a portion (approximately 3.1% of the size) of the plots contributed in kind in the capital of Damascus Cham Holding, which oversees the rights to 30% of the plots in the Marota City project, the total size of which covers 2.15 million square metres. 150 In addition, the evidence produced by the Council, in particular the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’ of 1 June 2018, and the list of joint ventures created by Damascus Cham Holding, published on 17 April 2018, detail the projects developed by the applicant, namely the construction of 3 skyscrapers, each with up to 70 floors, and 5 residential buildings. According to the articles from the website ‘The Syria Report’ published on 16 January, 17 April and 1 June 2018, and Damascus Cham Holding’s website, that investment had a value of USD 312 million, which is equivalent to SYP 150 thousand million. Damascus Cham Holding’s website describes the project carried out by the applicant as being, in view of its scale, one of the most important and largest of the Marota City project. Lastly, the ‘Brookings Institution’ report describes the general Marota City project as a luxury construction project. It is thus apparent from the evidence produced by the Council that, by reason of both its scale and investment value, the portion of the Marota City project entrusted to the applicant is significant. 151 Secondly, the precise location of the Marota City project provides some evidence as to its link to the Syrian regime. The Marota City project is situated in the Basateen Al-Razi neighbourhood in Mazeeh, at the south-west entrance to Damascus, as is apparent from a combined reading of the website ‘Open Democracy’ and the articles published on 16 January and 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’. According to the latter article, published on 1 June 2018, that area is close to the city centre, the embassies and the security services. That location makes it attractive to real estate developers. In the application, the applicant confirms that location and adduces, as annexes to the reply, a series of maps and satellite photographs confirming the geographical location of the Marota City project. 152 In that regard, it is apparent from a reading of all the information produced by the Council and taken from the websites of Damascus Cham Holding, the Syrian Government, ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’, ‘Brookings Institution’ and the article published on 1 June 2018 from the website ‘The Syria Report’ that the Syrian regime adopted Decree No 66/2012 in order to develop large-scale real estate projects, including the Marota City Project, on expropriated land. More specifically, the websites of the Syrian Government and ‘The Foundation for Strategic Research’ indicate that the south-east neighbourhood of Mazeeh in Damascus is one of two areas designated by Decree No 66/2012 for carrying out residential and commercial redevelopment. 153 It follows from the foregoing that, by participating in the Marota City project, the applicant benefits from the Syrian regime, but also supports it. First, it benefits from a partnership the investment value of which has been estimated at USD 312 million, which represents a significant sum and, secondly, it contributes to the implementation of the policies which the Syrian regime seeks to put in place through large-scale reconstruction projects. 154 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments. 155 First of all, the applicant submits that the Marota City project is not built on expropriated land that belonged to persons displaced by the conflict in Syria. It submits, to that effect, that the land on which the Marota City project is built was never subject to compulsory expropriation, but rather was the subject of negotiation with the owners of unregulated housing situated on that land. In addition, it adds, in essence, that a rent allowance was paid to owners of unregulated housing who did not wish to sell their property. It should be noted that those arguments are irrelevant, since they do not affect the benefit which the applicant derives from the Syrian regime or the support provided by that regime to the Marota City project. 156 Next, the applicant’s line of argument that the land on which the Marota City project is to be built was not the scene of conflicts between opposition forces and the Syrian regime and that the neighbourhoods of Damascus in that area were never destroyed during the armed conflict which took place in Syria is ineffective, since the Council has not submitted that that land was the scene of such conflicts. 157 Lastly, the applicant disputes the significance of its participation in the Marota City project. In that regard, the applicant submits that it did not make significant investments. According to the applicant, the percentage it holds in the Marota City project represents only 0.00445% of the project. However, that argument must be rejected. The Syrian regime’s backing of the Marota City project has been proved. Therefore, the applicant’s degree of participation in the Marota City project is not, in itself, decisive for assessing the link to the Syrian regime which it has and maintains. The applicant’s argument does not deprive of any factual basis the reason for including and maintaining its name on the lists at issue, namely that it supports and benefits from the Syrian regime. 158 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the Council has demonstrated that the applicant is an undertaking which was created jointly by Damascus Cham Holding and Aman Holding and has a capital of USD 18.9 million. In addition, it is involved in the Marota City project, that is to say, a large-scale development project backed by the Syrian regime for the purpose of implementing its policies in the neighbourhoods which were politically opposed to it, while allowing certain entities as well as businesspersons close to it to benefit from it. 159 Thus, it must be concluded that the Council has adduced a set of specific, precise and consistent indicia capable of demonstrating that the applicant supports the Syrian regime and/or benefits from it. Therefore, the sole reason for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue owing to its association with the Syrian regime is sufficiently substantiated, with the result that that listing is well founded. 160 Accordingly, the first plea must be rejected as unfounded. The fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of power’ 161 In support of its plea, the applicant argues that the Council adopted the contested measures in order to target not the Syrian regime but the applicant itself, although it has at all times, first, complied with the sanctions ordered by the European Union and the international community and, secondly, remained independent of the Syrian regime. Thus, the applicant claims that it is excluded from the market in order to favour other business operators. In submitting that argument, the applicant must be regarded as pleading a misuse of powers. 162 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 163 It should be borne in mind that a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 164 In the present case, the applicant merely raises suspicions as to the existence of an ‘abuse of power’ and does not explain how the Council pursued an objective other than that of exerting pressure on the Syrian regime in order for it to change its policies of repression. The applicant has in no way substantiated that claim or adduced any evidence or argument in support of it. 165 In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected. The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity 166 First, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures concerning it are disproportionate. The applicant submits that, in view of the fact that a substantial part of its business is conducted with European and international suppliers and customers and that it is therefore excluded from international trade, some of the numerous contracts which it has concluded are null and void, which renders it liable to its customers and contractual partners. 167 Secondly, it takes the view, in essence, that the contested measures infringe its right to property and its freedom to pursue an economic activity, which also constitutes an infringement of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 168 Thirdly, the applicant submits, in the first and second statements of modification, that the extension of the restrictive measures concerning it under, respectively, the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for it. 169 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 170 It should be borne in mind that it is apparent from case-law that the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, namely the right to property, enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, and the freedom to pursue an economic activity, enshrined in Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter, are not absolute rights and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity of the person or entity subject to that measure, so causing harm to that person or entity. The importance of the aims pursued by the restrictive measures at issue is, however, such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for the persons or entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2015, Central Bank of Iran v Council, T‑563/12, EU:T:2015:187, paragraph 115). 171 Furthermore, while respect for fundamental rights is a condition for the legality of EU acts, according to established case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection under EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society. Consequently, restrictions may be placed on the use of those rights, provided that they actually correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and do not constitute, in the light of the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which would undermine the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). 172 Moreover, it is clear from settled case-law that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is referred to in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122; of 25 June 2015, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑95/14, EU:T:2015:433, paragraph 60 (not published); and of 14 March 2017, Bank Tejarat v Council, T‑346/15, not published, EU:T:2017:164, paragraph 149). 173 As regards the applicant’s right to property and freedom to pursue an economic activity, it is true that those rights are restricted by the restrictive measures concerning it, since it cannot, inter alia, make use of any of its funds which may be situated in the territory of the European Union, nor transfer them to the European Union, unless given special authorisation. 174 However, in the present case, the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant is appropriate, since it is compatible with an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as the protection of civilian populations. The freezing of funds, financial assets and other economic resources cannot, in themselves, be regarded as inappropriate (see judgment of 13 September 2013, Makhlouf v Council, T‑383/11, EU:T:2013:431, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited). 175 As regards the allegedly disproportionate nature of the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it should be borne in mind that Article 28(6) of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and Article 16 of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, provide for the possibility, first, to authorise the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, secondly, to grant specific authorisation for the release of certain funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 364, and of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 127). 176 It follows that, given the overriding importance of the protection of civilian populations in Syria, any restrictions on the applicant’s rights caused by the contested measures are justified by an objective of general interest and are not disproportionate to the aims pursued. 177 Lastly, as regards the extension of the temporal application of the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the applicant, pursuant to the 2019 maintaining acts and the 2020 maintaining acts, which, according to the applicant, exacerbates the disproportionate consequences of those measures for it, it should be pointed out that, in the context of such restrictive measures, the Council is required to carry out a periodic re-examination, in accordance with the second and third sentences of Article 34 of Decision 2013/255, as amended by Decision 2015/1836, and with Article 32(4) of Regulation No 36/2012, as amended by Regulation 2015/1828, which entails each time the possibility for the person or entity concerned to put forward arguments and submit facts supporting its assertions (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Haswani v Council, C‑241/19 P, EU:C:2020:545, paragraphs 106 and 107). 178 Accordingly, the Council was entitled, on the basis of a re-examination of whether to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, to decide to extend those restrictive measures until 1 June 2020, and then until 1 June 2021. 179 In the light of all of the foregoing, the second and third pleas, taken together, must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 180 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 181 In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Aman Dimashq JSC to pay the costs. Gervasoni Madise Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 November 2021. E. Coulon M. van der Woude Registrar President Table of contents Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action Procedure and forms of order sought Law The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons The sixth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to a fair trial and the right to effective judicial protection The first plea, alleging an error of assessment Preliminary observations The evidence submitted by the Council The reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council Association with the Syrian regime The fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of power’ The second and third pleas, taken together, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.