Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2021:292
Date: 2021-04-15
Language of the case: Hungarian
Subject matter: Justice and home affairs;Approximation of laws;Area of freedom, security and justice;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Hungary

Summary C-564/19 — 1 
Case C-564/19 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
24 July 2019 
Referring court: 
Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Pest, 
Hungary) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
11 July 2019 
Defendant: 
IS 
Subject-matter of the main proceedings 
Criminal proceedings before the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District 
Court, Pest) against IS, a Swedish national, for an offence of misuse of firearms 
and ammunition. 
Subject-matter and legal basis of the request for a preliminary ruling 
The referring court seeks guidance on the interpretation of the right to a fair trial 
in relation, first, to the adequacy of language interpretation (I); second, the 
decision of the president of the Országos Bírósági Hivatal (National Office of the 
Judiciary, ‘OBH’) to withdraw the calls for applications to fill positions of judges 
and high level judicial posts (II); and, third, the salary situation of Hungarian 
judges (III). 
Legal basis of the request for a preliminary ruling: Article 267 TFEU 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1.A Must Article 6(1) TEU and Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU be 
interpreted as meaning that, in order to guarantee the right to a fair trial for 
defendants who do not speak the language of the proceedings, a Member 
State must create a register of properly qualified independent translators and 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C–564/19 
 
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interpreters or — failing that — ensure by some other means that it is 
possible to control the quality of language interpretation in court 
proceedings? 
1.B If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if, in the specific 
case, since the language interpretation is not of adequate quality, it is not 
possible to establish whether the defendant has been informed of the subject 
matter of the charge or indictment against him, must Article 6(1) TEU and 
Articles 4(5) and 6(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU be interpreted as meaning 
that, in those circumstances, the proceedings cannot continue in his absence? 
2.A Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union be interpreted as meaning that that principle is breached where the 
president of the National Office of the Judiciary, who is responsible for the 
central administration of the courts and who is appointed by the parliament, 
the only body to which he or she is accountable and which may remove him 
or her from office, fills the post of president of a court — a president who, 
inter alia, has powers in relation to organisation of the allocation of cases, 
commencement of disciplinary procedures against judges, and assessment of 
judges — by means of a direct temporary nomination, circumventing the 
applications procedure and constantly disregarding the opinion of the 
competent self-governance bodies of judges? 
2.B If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if the court 
hearing the specific case has reasonable grounds to fear that that case is 
being unduly prejudiced as a result of the president’s judicial and 
administrative activities, must the principle of judicial independence be 
interpreted as meaning that a fair trial is not guaranteed in that case? 
3.A Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, since 1 September 
2018 ― unlike the practice followed in previous decades — Hungarian 
judges receive by law lower remuneration than prosecutors of the equivalent 
category who have the same grade and the same length of service, and in 
which, in view of the country’s economic situation, judges’ salaries are 
generally not commensurate with the importance of the functions they 
perform, particularly in the light of the practice of discretionary bonuses 
applied by holders of high level posts? 
3.B If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, must the principle of 
judicial independence be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, 
the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed? 
IS 
 
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I. Quality control of language interpretation in the light of the right to a 
fair trial 
Provisions of EU law relied on 
– Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’): Article 6 
– Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’): Article 47 
– Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’): Article 82(1) and 
(2)(b) 
– Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1): Articles 5(1) and (2) and 9(1) 
– Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 
L 142, p. 1): Articles 4(5) and 6(1) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
– A büntetőeljárásról szóló 2017. évi XC. törvény (Law XC of 2017 on Criminal 
Procedure): Articles 78(1), 201(1), 866(2) and 755(1)(a)(aa) 
– A szakfordításról és tolmácsolásról szóló 24/1986. (VI.26.) minisztertanácsi 
rendelet (Decree 24/1986 of the Council of Ministers of 26 June on specialist 
translation and interpretation): Articles 2 and 6(1) 
– A szakfordító és tolmácsképesítés megszerzésének feltételeiről szóló 7/1986. 
(VI.26.) MM rendelet (Decree 7/1986 of the Ministry of Culture of 26 June 
1986 on conditions for the authorisation of specialist translators and 
interpreters): Article 1(1) and (2) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and the procedure in the main proceedings 
1 IS was arrested in Hungary on 25 August 2015 and questioned as a suspect on the 
same day. Before questioning, a defence lawyer and an interpreter were appointed 
for IS because he does not speak Hungarian. During the questioning of IS, in 
which the defence lawyer was unable to participate, IS was notified of the charge, 
following which, since it had not been possible for him to be advised by his 
defence lawyer, IS refused to make a statement. In addition, communications 
between IS and his defence lawyer can only be effected through an interpreter. 
Although the officer in charge of the investigation made use of a Swedish 
interpreter during the questioning, no information is available concerning the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C–564/19 
 
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system for selecting the interpreter or concerning whether proper checks were 
made of the interpreter’s suitability and of whether the interpreter and the suspect 
were able to understand one another. 
2 IS’s arrest came to an end after questioning and the defendant is currently abroad. 
Given that the prosecution is seeking the imposition of a fine, it was not possible 
to issue a European or national arrest warrant and, therefore, if IS fails to appear 
in court, despite having been duly summoned, the court must hear the criminal 
proceedings in his absence. 
Essential arguments of the parties to the main proceedings 
3 IS’s defence lawyer submits that it is necessary to make a request for a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2010/64/EU 
relating to the adequacy of language interpretation in the light of the exercise of 
the right to information. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
4 Directive 2010/64/EU was not properly transposed into national law either in 
2013 or subsequently. There is no register of translators and interpreters of any 
kind in Hungary; nor does any clear legislation or national practice exist regarding 
who can be appointed as an interpreter or translator, and under what 
circumstances, in each particular case. Specific legislation exists only in relation 
to certified translation. 
5 Quality control of language interpretation is not systematically guaranteed in 
Hungary. Neither the defence lawyer nor the judge can ensure the quality of 
language interpretation. However, if the interpreter lacks the appropriate specialist 
knowledge, the accused person’s right to information and right of defence may be 
breached. 
6 The referring court asks whether national legislation and practice are compatible 
with the EU directives on the rights of accused persons and whether it follows 
from the interpretation of EU law that, in the situation described, the court cannot 
continue the proceedings against the accused person in his absence. 
II. Effects on judicial independence of the decision to withdraw the calls 
for applications to fill positions of judges and high level judicial posts 
Provisions of EU law relied on 
– TEU: Articles 2, 6(1) and (3), and 19(1) 
– Charter of Fundamental Rights: Article 47 
IS 
 
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– Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular: 
judgments of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland (C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraphs 52 and 72) to 74; of 25 July 2018, Minister 
for Justice and Equality (C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586), 
paragraphs 48, 67 and 75, and of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 43); Opinion of 
Advocate General Tanchev in A.K. and Others (C-585/18, C-624/18 and 
C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551), points 120 to 122 and 125 to 128, and 
judgment of 27 May 2019, OG and PI (C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:456, paragraph 90) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
– Magyarország Alaptörvénye (Fundamental Law of Hungary): Article 25 
– A bíróságok szervezetéről és igazgatásáról szóló 2011. évi CLXI. törvény (Law 
CLXI of 2011 on the organisation and administration of the courts): Articles 76 
and 130 to 133 
Succinct presentation of the facts and the procedure in the main proceedings 
7 Responsibility for the central administration of the courts lies with the president of 
the OBH, who is appointed by the parliament for a term of nine years. The power 
to supervise the president of the OBH and to approve decisions adopted by her in 
relation to certain matters rests with the Országos Bírói Tanács (National Council 
of the Judiciary; ‘OBT’), which is elected by judges. 
8 On 2 May 2018, following an investigation, the OBT issued a report in which it 
concluded that the president of the OBH, without adequate factual reasons and, in 
a number of instances, without any explanation, withdrew the calls for 
applications to fill positions of judges and high level judicial posts, following 
which she filled the high level posts on a temporary basis by means of direct 
nomination. 
9 No president has been appointed to the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High 
Court, Hungary), in whose judicial district the district court seised of the present 
criminal proceedings is situated, since 5 January 2018. The president of the OBH 
published a call for applications to fill the post of president on a total of three 
occasions but each time she withdrew the call for applications and directly 
appointed a judge sitting in another court to that post for a term of one year. 
10 After issuing a total of eight warnings relating to legality, which, essentially, were 
ineffective, the OBT commenced before the parliament, on 8 May 2019, the 
procedure to remove the president of the OBH from office, on the grounds that 
she had systematically breached the constitutional principle of the scrutinised 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C–564/19 
 
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exercise of power. However, the parliament rejected the OBT’s initiative without 
any debate or examination of the substance. 
Essential arguments of the parties to the main proceedings 
11 IS’s defence lawyer requested that a request be made for a preliminary ruling on 
the incompatibility of that practice with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
12 The president of the OBH has wide-ranging powers. In that connection, the 
appointment and promotion of judges are also dependent on decisions made by 
her. She has a decisive influence on the training of judges, on their opportunities 
to take part in study trips abroad and on the daily practice of their profession. 
When the post of president of a tetörvényszék (high court) or of an ítélőtábla 
(regional court of appeal) is filled by direct nomination, the president of the OBH 
is able to exert considerable influence over the allocation of cases, judges’ liability 
to disciplinary action and the assessment of their judicial work. Judges who 
perform judicial functions are also faced with serious reprisals for expressing 
critical opinions of the activities of the president of the OBH or of the holders of 
high level office. 
13 In the judicial system, the OBT represents self-governance for judges and is the 
polar opposite of the OBH. Although the OBT is entitled to approve appointments 
to senor judicial posts when the advisory body does not support the candidates, in 
practice its powers are not sufficient for the effective supervision of the president 
of the OBH. A number of international bodies have described the fact that the 
power of the president of the OBH is not subject to effective scrutiny as a 
systemic failing. 
14 The referring court asks whether judges who perform judicial functions in a court 
in which the holder of the highest office has been appointed by direct nomination 
by the president of the OBH, without calling for applications or following an 
applications process which has been cancelled, can be regarded as independent. 
The judge hearing the present case performs his functions in the Pesti Központi 
Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Pest), which belongs to the judicial 
district of the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court). That judge is a 
member of the OBT and his applications for senior judicial posts were rejected in 
2017 by the president of the OBH without valid reason. On a proposal from the 
president of the OBH, the former president of the Fővárosi Törvényszék 
(Budapest High Court), who was appointed by direct nomination, began 
disciplinary proceedings against him in June 2018 and, owing to his membership 
the OBT, a number of defamatory articles were also published about him in the 
Hungarian press. 
IS 
 
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15 Powers relating to staff are currently exercised over judges of the Pesti Központi 
Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Pest) by a directly nominated president 
who, in his capacity as holder of a senior judicial office, expressed on a number of 
previous occasions views favourable to the president of the OBH in open letters. 
Moreover, after similarly withdrawing a call for applications, the president of the 
OBH also appointed by direct nomination the president of the criminal division, 
who is responsible for the professional management of criminal judges who 
perform their functions in the district of the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High 
Court), to carry out management duties. 
16 In view of the fact that, in the case of the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High 
Court), the president of the OBH is able to exert substantial political influence 
over judges, in particular over certain members of the OBT, the independence of 
the judges of those courts is questionable. 
III. Salary situation of Hungarian judges 
Provisions of EU law relied on 
– TEU: Article 6(1) and (3) 
– Charter of Fundamental Rights: Article 47 
– Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular, judgment 
of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 45) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
– Magyarország 2019. évi központi költségvetéséről szóló 2018. évi L. törvény 
(Law L of 2018 on Hungarian general budgets for the year 2019): Article 64(1) 
– A bírák jogállásáról és javadalmazásáról szóló 2011. évi CLXII. törvény (Law 
CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and remuneration of judges): Annex No 2 
– A legfőbb ügyész, az ügyészek és más ügyészségi alkalmazottak jogállásáról és 
az ügyészi életpályáról szóló 2011. évi CLXIV. törvény (Law CLXIV of 2011 
on the legal status of the Prosecutor General, prosecutors and other staff of the 
prosecution service and on the career of prosecutor) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and the procedure in the main proceedings 
17 The statutory amendment which entered into force on 1 September 2018 increased 
grade and management supplements in respect of prosecutors’ remuneration, 
whereas no changes were introduced in relation to the grade supplements or other 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C–564/19 
 
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salary components of judges. That broke with the practice whereby judges would 
receive the same salary as prosecutors of the equivalent category who had the 
same grade and the same length of service. 
18 The OBT has already told the Minister for Justice that a salary increase is 
necessary so that judges cannot be influenced by the practice of discretionary 
bonuses and additional incentives which may be granted by holders of senior 
posts. The OBT does not consider appropriate the practice of the president of the 
OBH which involves seeking to offset low salaries by one-off bonuses and 
incentives granted at her discretion. To date, no legislative bill has been presented 
which includes new salary scales. 
Essential arguments of the parties to the main proceedings 
19 IS’s defence lawyer has requested that an application be made for a preliminary 
ruling on the unfairly low level of Hungarian judges’ salaries compared with those 
of prosecutors, as regards the compatibility of this practice with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
20 The referring court asks whether, first, in the light of the judgment in Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, regard being had to inflation, the country’s 
economic standing and average incomes, the fact that judges’ salaries have not 
been reviewed for a long period of time has in reality the same effect as a salary 
reduction. The second question that arises is whether the Hungarian State, by 
increasing prosecutors’ salaries, has deliberately placed the Hungarian judiciary in 
a humiliating position, since, without any valid reason, it has not brought judges’ 
salaries into line with prosecutors’ salaries. 
21 Furthermore, the discretionary incentives granted by the president of the OBH and 
holders of high level judicial office raise in themselves the issue of the influence 
exerted over judges and the breach of judicial independence. Based on the 
foregoing considerations, the salaries of Hungarian judges, which are also 
humiliatingly low compared with other European countries, and the practice of the 
president of the OBH of granting bonuses generally and systematically breach the 
principle of judicial independence.