Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:316
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: English

AN CHUIRT UACHTARACH
THE SUPREME COURT
S:AP:IE:2024:000111
[2025] IESC 1
O’Donnell C.J.
Dunne J.
Charleton J.
Woulfe J.
Hogan J.
Collins J.
Donnelly J.
BETWEEN
GR WIND FARMS 1 LIMITED AND OTHERS
Applicants/Respondents
AND
THE COMMISSION FOR REGULATION OF UTILITIES
Respondent/Appellant
AND
EIRGRID PLC
Notice Party
AND
(BY ORDER) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Notice Party
S:AP:IE:2024:000110
BETWEEN
ENERGIA GROUP HOLDINGS (ROI) DAC AND OTHERS 
Applicants/Respondents
AND
THE COMMISSION FOR REGULATION OF UTILITIES 
Respondent/Appellant
AND
EIRGRID PLC
Notice Party
AND
(BY ORDER) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Notice Party
TO THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 267(3) 
OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Order for Reference delivered by the Supreme Court on 21 January 2025
The Referring Court
1. This reference is made by the Supreme Court of Ireland (Mr Justice Donal O’ Donnell 
(Chief Justice), Ms Justice Elizabeth Dunne, Mr Justice Peter Charleton, Mr Justice 
Seamus Woulfe, Mr Justice Gerard Hogan, Mr Justice Maurice Collins and Ms Justice 
Aileen Donnelly) in two appeals presenting similar issues concerning the meaning and 
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effect of Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (“the Regulation"). The 
Applicants are all participants in the electricity market in the island of Ireland. The 
Appellant, the Commission for the Regulation of Utilities (CRU), is the statutory body 
responsible for the regulation of the electricity market in Ireland. The Attorney General 
is a party to the appeals at the invitation of the Court, reflecting the importance of the 
issues raised.
Subject Matter of the Dispute in the Main Proceedings
Preliminary
2. Some of the Applicants own and operate wind farms in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Others operate as intermediaries for renewable generators.
3. There is a single electricity market (SEM) on the island of Ireland. The CRU is the 
statutory regulator and the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for that sector in this 
jurisdiction. The Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (NIAUR) is the 
regulator in Northern Ireland. As regards the SEM, the relevant functions of the CRU 
and NIAR are exercised by the Single Electricity Market Committee (SEMC), which is 
the collective description of committees with common membership appointed for that 
purpose by the CRU and the NIAUR. The SEMC is not a legal person, which explains 
why these proceedings were brought against the CRU.
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4. The Notice Party, Eirgrid plc ^Eirgrid") is the transmission system operator (TSO) in 
Ireland. The TSO in Northern Ireland is the System Operator for Northern Ireland Ltd 
(SONI). Eirgrid and SONI jointly act as the single energy market operator (SEMO).
Relevant Provisions of the Regulation
5. Article 12 of the Regulation deals with the dispatching of generation and demand 
response. Article 12(1) provides that the dispatching of power-generating and demand 
response shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and, save to the extent otherwise 
provided for in Article 12, market-based. Article 12(2) requires Member States to 
ensure that priority is given in dispatching to generating installations using renewable 
energy and having an installed electricity capacity of less than 400 kW (to be reduced 
to 200kW as from 1 January 2026). The generators operated by the Applicants exceed 
those thresholds but Article 12(6) provides that generators commissioned before 4 July 
2019 (which, when commissioned, were subject to priority dispatch under Article 15(5) 
of Directive 2012/27/EC or Article 16(2) of Directive 2009/28/EC) shall continue to 
benefit from priority dispatch (though that priority may cease to apply in certain 
circumstances). Priority dispatch may be surrendered voluntarily and Member States 
may provide incentives to installations eligible for priority dispatch to give it up: Article 
12(3).
6. Article 13 of the Regulation deals with redispatching, defined in Article 2(26) as 
meaning "a measure, including curtailment, that is activated by one or more 
transmission system operators or distribution system operators by altering the 
generation, load pattern, or both, in order to change physical flows in the electricity 
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system and relieve a physical congestion or otherwise ensure system security". 
Redispatch differs from dispatch instructions intended to balance supply and demand. 
Redispatch arises when there is a ""physical congestion" or "constraint" operative in the 
system or where, for system-wide reasons, a "curtailment" is necessary. A curtailment 
may arise where the applicable System Non-Synchronous Penetration (SNSP) limit is 
exceeded. Renewable generation is non-synchronous and where the level of renewable 
generation is such that the SNSP limit is or is likely to be exceeded, it may be necessary 
to reduce the level of renewable energy in the system (by the downward dispatch of 
renewable generators), with a corresponding increase in non-renewable generation (by 
the upward dispatch of non-renewable generators).
7. Article 13 (1) of the Regulation provides that the dispatching of generation and demand 
response "shall be based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria". 
Article 13(2) provides that the resources to be redispatched shall be selected ""using 
market-based mechanisms and shall be financially compensated". However, Article 
13(3) permits the use of non-marketing based redispatching in (and only in) certain 
specified circumstances. Article 13(4) requires system operators to report at least 
annually to the regulatory authority, including as to the measures they have taken to 
reduce downward redispatching of renewable generators. Article 13(5) obliges system 
operators to (a) guarantee the capability of transmission and distribution networks to 
transmit electricity produced from renewable energy sources or high-efficiency 
cogeneration with minimum possible redispatching; (b) take appropriate grid-related 
and market-related operational measures in order to minimise the downward 
redispatching of electricity produced from renewable energy sources or from high- 
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efficiency co-generation and (c) ensure that their networks are sufficiently flexible so 
that they are able to manage them.
8. Notwithstanding Article 13(5), it is apparent from the evidence in these proceedings 
that renewable generators, including those with the benefit of priority dispatch, are 
frequently redispatched downwards and that the rate at which such redispatching occurs 
has increased in recent years. The issue of the proper calculation of the compensation 
payable where such redispatching occurs is therefore one of huge commercial 
significance.
9. Article 13(6) of the Regulation sets out a number of principles which apply where non­
market based downward redispatching is used, the first of which is that '"power­
generating facilities using renewable energy sources shall only be subject to downward 
redispatching if no other alternative exists or if other solutions would result in 
significantly disproportionate costs or severe risks to network security'.
10. Article 13(7) then provides:
“Where non-market based redispatching is used, it shall be subject to financial 
compensation by the system operator requesting the redispatching to the 
operator of the redispatched generation, energy storage or demand response 
facility except in the case of producers that have accepted a connection 
agreement under which there is no guarantee of firm delivery of energy. Such 
financial compensation shall be at least equal to the higher of the following 
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elements or a combination of both if applying only the higher would lead to an 
unjustifiably low or an unjustifiably high compensation:
(a) additional operating cost caused by the redispatching, such as additional 
fuel costs in the case of upward re-dispatching, or backup heat provision in 
the case of downward redispatching of power-generating facilities using 
high-ejficiency cogeneration;
(b) net revenues from the sale of electricity on the day-ahead market that the 
power-generating, energy storage or demand response facility would have 
generated without the redispatching request; where financial support is 
granted to power-generating, energy storage or demand response facilities 
based on the electricity volume generated or consumed, financial support 
that would have been received without the redispatching request shall be 
deemed to be part of the net revenues. ”
11. While Article 64 of the Regulation provides for a power to derogate, it does not apply 
to Article 13, at least so far as Ireland is concerned. Article 71(2) provides that, subject 
to exceptions that are not material, the Regulation ""shall apply from 1 January 2020.” 
Article 71 provides that the Regulation ""shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States”.
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The SEMC Decision of March 2022
12. Following a consultation process, the SEMC adopted a Decision Paper on Dispatch, 
Redispatch and Compensation Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on 22 March 
2022 (SEM-22-009) fthe Decision"). The CRU has identified Article 59 of Directive 
(EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on 
common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 
2012/27/EU as the legal basis for the Decision.
13. The decisions set out in the Decision are said to be "the first step" in the implementation 
of the requirements of the Regulation. The SEMC decided that in order to implement 
the requirements of Article 13(7), it was necessary to separate the compensation 
mechanisms in terms of costs associated with lost revenues in the market and revenues 
""associated with foregone government support associated with the jurisdictional 
renewable support schemes" (page 2). As regards market revenue, all units would 
initially receive compensation in the SEM for non-market based redispatch (in relation 
to both constraints and curtailment) at the better of their complex bid/offer price or 
imbalance settlement price up to the level of their firm access quantity. Compensation 
payable for curtailment should begin in tariff year 2024/25.
14. In relation to foregone financial support, the SEMC decided that the decision in relation 
to compensation needed to be made jurisdictionally and in coordination with the 
respective Departments of Government. It expressed the view that, where there was a 
difference between market revenue compensation and a renewable unit’s foregone 
support payment where non-market redispatch had occurred, in order to prevent 
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potential distortions of competition within the SEM resulting from divergent 
jurisdictional approaches, the following principles should apply:
(a) For renewable units commissioned after 4 July 2019, compensation based 
on the higher of a unit’s ex-ante revenues or foregone support should not be 
considered ^unjustifiably high" unless there is good cause to find otherwise;
(b) For renewable units commissioned prior to 4 July 2019, compensation 
based on the higher of a unit’s ex-ante revenues or foregone support should 
be considered ""unjustifiably high" unless there is good cause to find 
otherwise.
The effect of these principles would be that units commissioned prior to 4 July 2019 
(units which generally benefit from priority dispatch) will generally be compensated at 
a lower level than units commissioned after 4 July 2019 (which do not benefit from 
priority dispatch).
15. The Decision excludes compensation for generators that do not operate on the ex ante 
(day ahead) market. These include de minimis generators (generators below the 
threshold for mandatory participation in the SEM, currently set at 10MW maximum 
export capacity) that have not chosen to participate in the market voluntarily. The 
Decision proposes that compensation be paid within the SEM which, it is said, means 
that compensation will be payable to electricity suppliers (who may not be the affected 
generator). Finally, the Decision’s interpretation of "financial support" in Article 
13(7)(b) - as limited to financial support provided under Government incentive 
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schemes or support mechanisms - has implications for generators who supply 
electricity pursuant to certain Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), which is explained 
below.
The Judicial Review Proceedings
16. Each group of Applicants brought judicial review proceedings challenging the 
lawfulness of the Decision, contending that Article 13(7) required that compensation 
for non-market-based redispatching should fully compensate the affected generators for 
any loss arising from the redispatching, such that they would be ''indifferent" to the 
prospect of being redispatched. The Applicants maintain that the Decision restricts their 
entitlement to compensation, particularly for downward redispatching, in a manner 
inconsistent with Article 13(7). In particular, the Applicants object to (i) the 
postponement of any compensation for curtailment until 2024; (ii) the separation of 
compensation for market revenue foregone and compensation for foregone market 
support and the deferral of any compensation for foregone market support; (iii) the 
proposed methodology for calculating compensation involving foregone financial 
support, including the proposed differential treatment of generators depending on the 
date they were commissioned and whether they had the benefit of priority dispatch; (iv) 
the exclusion of generators who do not participate in the ex ante market, such as de 
minimis generators, from compensation; (v) the failure to provide for compensation to 
be paid to the affected generators and (vi) the limitation of the compensation payable 
to generators who supply electricity pursuant to certain PPAs.
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17. The High Court (Sanfey J) upheld the Applicants’ challenges and made an order 
quashing the Decision: [2023] IEHC 620.
18. This Court granted the CRU leave to appeal based on the general importance of the 
issues raised.
The Arguments on Appeal and the Grounds for a Reference
19. While there is a significant dispute between the parties as to the proper interpretation 
of Article 13(7) of the Regulation, their dispute is even more fundamental, extending 
to the legal status and effect of Article 13(7) in the Irish legal order and whether and to 
what extent it is justiciable in these proceedings and whether it may properly be relied 
on by the Applicants as a basis for challenging the legality of the Decision before the 
Irish courts at all.
20. While the CRU accepts that the entirety of the Regulation is binding and directly 
applicable in the State, in accordance with Article 288 TFEU, it says that Article 13(7) 
lacks direct effect. It says that the reference to '''unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high 
compensation' in Article 13(7) leaves such a broad discretion to Member States in 
implementing that provision that it cannot be said to be sufficiently " clear, precise and 
unconditional" to have direct effect. On that basis, the CRU says that it follows from 
the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Case C-573/17 Poplawski ECLI: EU:C:2019:530 
(Poplawski II) that Article 13(7) cannot be relied upon to disapply a provision of a 
national law measure (which, according to the CRU, includes a measure of 
implementation, such as the Decision here) and it cannot be enforced before a national 
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court: its enforcement is a matter for the European Commission in an action under 
Article 258 TFEU. The CRU accepts that, as a matter of principle, any conflicting 
provision of national law must, so far as possible, be interpreted so as to conform with 
Article 13(7), but considers that no such issue arises on the facts here.
21. The Attorney General, whose participation was requested by the Court in light of the 
significance of the issues in the appeals, broadly supports the position of the CRU. He 
submits that, if Article 13(7) lacks direct effect, and if indirect effect cannot be given 
to it by way of a conforming interpretation of national law, no remedy is available to 
the Applicants in an Irish court and any non-compliance with Article 13(7) can only be 
remedied by legislative or executive action or by way of infringement proceedings.
22. The Applicants make a number of arguments in response. Firstly, they say that Article 
13(7) does have direct effect. In that context, the Applicants say that a provision of EU 
law may be sufficiently precise to have direct effect even if it contains undefined or 
indeterminate concepts and even if a preliminary reference is required to clarify the 
meaning of those concepts. They further say that, even if a provision of EU law requires 
or permits measures of implementation or application and confers a degree of latitude 
on Member States when adopting such measures, it will be regarded as sufficiently 
precise and unconditional where it imposes a precise obligation as to the result to be 
achieved and/or where the margin of discretion is sufficiently delimited so as to permit 
judicial review of whether the implementing measure exceeds that margin of discretion 
(citing, inter alia, Case C-205/20 NE ECLI:EU:C:2022:168). Secondly, they say that 
the direct applicability of a regulation means that it may be relied on independently of 
any measure of reception into national law, including, if necessary, in order to disapply 
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conflicting provisions of national law. That position is, they say, unaffected by 
Poplawski II, which was concerned with a measure - a framework decision - that did 
not have direct applicability, not with a regulation (citing inter alia Case C-34/21 
Hauptpersonalrat ECLI:EU:C:2023:270). Thirdly, the Applicants say that it is a well- 
established principle of EU law that, where Member States adopt measures of 
implementation or application to facilitate the implementation of a regulation, they 
must not exceed the parameters of the margin of discretion conferred by the regulation 
and national courts may review such measures of implementation and, where 
appropriate, annul such measures. They point to a line of authority to that effect, going 
back at least to Case C-230/78 Eridania ECLI:EU:C:1979:216, which had been 
reiterated without qualification since Poplawski II (citing, inter alia, Case C-319/20 
Meta Platforms Ireland ECLI:EU:C:2022:322, Case C-372/20 QY 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:962, and Case C-390/22 Obshtina Pomorie ECLI:EU:C:2024:75). 
Finally, the Applicants argue that the need for a remedy before the national courts is 
reinforced by the obligation of Member States to ensure that an effective remedy is 
available when there is a breach of EU law, referring to Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 
of the Charter and cases such as Case C-64/16 Associagdo Sindical dos Juizes 
Portugueses ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 and Case C-107/23 PPU Lin 
ECLI:EU:C:2023:606. The Applicants also say that they have a right to a remedy as a 
matter of national law.
23. It appears to this Court that the question of whether Article 13(7) has direct effect may 
depend on its proper interpretation, which is a matter of significant dispute. As to 
whether, in the absence of direct effect, Article 13(7) may be relied on by the Applicants 
as a basis for challenging the legality of the Decision, the jurisprudence cited by the 
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Applicants appears to indicate that, as a measure having direct application in the Irish 
legal order, Article 13(7) may be relied on for that purpose. However, having regard to 
the decision of the Grand Chamber in Poplawski II, the position is not so obvious as to 
leave no scope for reasonable doubt.
24. There is also significant dispute between the parties as to the proper interpretation of 
Article 13(7). According to the Applicants, the fundamental principle of Article 13(7) 
is that generators who are redispatched (and particularly generators who are 
redispatched downward) should be ''made whole" by the system operator i.e. that they 
should be fully compensated for all loss sustained by them as a result of being 
redispatched, such that generators should be ^indifferent" to the prospect of being 
redispatched. That, the Applicants say, is reflected in Article 13(7)(b) (which is the limb 
of Article 13(7) relevant to downward dispatching of renewable generators, given that 
renewable generators will not generally incur additional operating costs if dispatched 
downwards). The reference to "unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high compensation" 
in Article 13(7) is simply a "safety valve" which reflects the possibility that, in 
particular circumstances, compensation calculated in accordance with subparagraph (b) 
may be unduly low or unduly high and would thus undercompensate or overcompensate 
generators for the loss arising from being redispatched. In such circumstances, the 
application of the default compensation rule in Article 13(7) (which in the case of 
renewables dispatched downwards will be compensation in accordance with 
subparagraph (b)) may need to be adjusted.
25. The CRU disputes that interpretation of Article 13(7). It says that the reference to 
"unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high compensation" gives a broad discretion to 
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Member States to determine the basis for compensation, which is not required to be full 
compensation. According to the CRU, Article 13(7) allows Member States to have 
regard to broad issues of market policy and organisation, including the investment 
expectations of generators and the interests of consumers, in determining how 
compensation is to be calculated.
26. Many of the specific disputes between the parties follow from their different 
understandings of the meaning and effect of Article 13(7). The CRU says that it was 
entitled to defer payment of compensation for curtailment to 2024/2025. That is 
disputed by the Applicants. The CRU says that it was entitled to limit compensation to 
generators who participate in the ex ante (day ahead) market. Again, that is disputed by 
the Applicants. The Applicants also say that the Decision is flawed in that it fails to 
provide for payment of compensation to generators (compensation is to be paid within 
the SEM and thus payments will be made to suppliers of electricity, who may be 
intermediaries who have purchased from the generators). The Applicants say that the 
Decision fails to give effect to Article 13(7) in that it does not provide for recovery of 
foregone financial support and instead improperly defers consideration of that issue. 
They also say that the suggested methodology for calculating compensation set out in 
the Decision does not comply with Article 13(7), inter alia because it treats generators 
differently depending on whether they were installed prior to or after 4 July 2019 i.e. 
whether or not they enjoy priority dispatch. The Applicants contend that, for the 
purpose of assessing compensation under Article 13(7), whether a generator has the 
benefit of priority dispatch or not is an irrelevant consideration.
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27. There are a number of schemes of financial support for renewable generators. The 
treatment of financial support for the purposes of compensation is therefore of great 
commercial significance for generators. A related issue is the treatment of PPAs. Article 
19a of the Regulation requires Member States to promote PPAs. Certain renewable 
generators operated by the Applicants have entered into PPAs with private companies 
by which the companies agree to purchase electricity at an agreed price ("the strike 
price"), which may be higher or lower than the market price from time to time. Such 
PPAs (referred to as Corporate Power Purchase Agreements or CPPAs) generally take 
the form of contracts for difference, whereby if the market price is higher than the strike 
price, the generator pays the difference to the purchaser, and where the market reference 
price is lower, the purchaser makes good the difference to the generator.
28. The Decision limits the recovery of "financial support" under Article 13(7)(b) to 
financial support provided under Government incentive schemes or support 
mechanisms. The CRU maintains that where a generator under a CPPA is entitled to be 
paid more than the relevant market price (i.e. where the strike price exceeds that market 
price) that is a form of financial support which is outside the scope of Article 13(7)(b) 
and which therefore does not have to be the subject of compensation by the system 
operator in the event that the generator is redispatched downward. In such cases 
(according to the CRU), Article 13(7)(b) requires only that the generator be 
compensated on the basis of the net revenues it would have received from the sale of 
electricity on the day ahead ex ante market that it would have generated if it had not 
been redispatched, without any regard being had to any additional payment it would 
have received under the CPPA if it had in fact generated as dispatched.
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29. The Applicants contend that such a limitation of the compensation payable by the 
system operator is not consistent with Article 13(7)(b) and would result in under­
compensation of generators who have entered into CPPAs, contrary to the fundamental 
principle in Article 13(7) that generators should be fully compensated for all loss arising 
from redispatch, such that they should be commercially indifferent to being 
redispatched. The Applicants say that there is no basis in the Regulation for treating 
CPPAs differently from State support schemes (some of which also take the form of 
contracts for difference). According to the CRU, the reference in Article 13(7)(b) to 
"financial support... granted to" generators is properly understood as referring only to 
State support, having regard to both the text of Article 13(7)(b) and the intent of the 
Regulation generally, which (the CRU says) is to encourage CPPAs so as to avoid the 
need for State support. It also points to the practical difficulties of assessing 
compensation by reference to CPPAs, given that they are private contracts of which it 
has limited or no visibility. It also refers to concern about the possibility of contracting 
parties "gaming the system".
30. This issue of whether renewable generators who have entered into CPPAs are entitled 
to recover the revenue that would have been payable to them had they not been 
redispatched, including any payment in excess of the day ahead market rate where the 
contract strike price exceeds that rate, is commercially very significant and may have 
significant implications for the use of CPPAs.
31. The proper interpretation of Article 13(7) is an issue of significance in its own right and 
may also have a significant bearing on the issue of whether it is of direct effect and/or 
whether it may be relied on by the Applicants to challenge the Decision. The Court 
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considers that the interpretation of Article 13(7) is not so obvious as to leave no scope 
for reasonable doubt.
Questions Referred for Preliminary Ruling
32. Accordingly, following an oral hearing which took place on 12 and 13 December 2024, 
the Supreme Court of Ireland has decided to refer the following questions to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU:
1 (a) Does Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 require that generators with firm 
access who are dispatched downwards by the system operator be fully compensated for 
the revenue lost as a result of being redispatched (including any foregone financial 
support) such that the generator is put in the same financial position as it would have 
been in had it not been redispatched and is accordingly indifferent to the prospect of 
being redispatched?
(b) In this context, what is meant by the words " unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high 
compensation ' and by reference to what criteria or benchmark is the assessment of 
whether compensation is "unjustifiably low or unjustifiably high” to be made?
(c) In particular, does Article 13(7) permit the adoption of a measure of application that 
distinguishes between electricity generators in relation to their entitlement to 
compensation depending on whether the generators enjoy the benefit of priority 
dispatch or not?
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2 (a) is Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional, whether in its terms or with the assistance of a reference under Article 
267, such that it is directly effective in national law?
(b) To what extent does Article 13(7) require or permit the adoption of national 
measures of implementation or application?
3 (a) If Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not directly effective, may it 
nonetheless be invoked before a national court for the purposes of challenging the 
legality of a provision of national law (including any purported national implementing 
measure) allegedly inconsistent with it and as a basis for annulling or setting aside such 
a provision or measure if found to be inconsistent with it or is the exercise of such a 
jurisdiction by a national court excluded by Poplaw ski II?
(b) If Article 13(7) is not directly effective, and if it cannot be invoked before a national 
court for the purpose set out in (a) above, what remedies are available to an undertaking 
who claims that a purported national implementing measure wrongly restricts its 
entitlement to compensation under Article 13(7), whether pursuant to Article 19(1) 
TEU, Article 47 of the Charter or otherwise ?
4 As regards the correct meaning and effect of Article 13(7):
(a) Having regard to the provisions of Article 71 of Regulation (EU) 2019/343, was it 
open to the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) to adopt a measure of application 
deferring payment of compensation under Article 13(7) to 2024?
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(b) Was it open to the NRA to adopt a measure of application that deferred the decision 
as to whether (and if so to what extent) compensation should be payable under Article 
13(7) in respect of foregone financial support?
(c) Does Article 13(7) permit the adoption of a measure of application that (i) restricts 
compensation to generators participating in the ex ante (day ahead) market, thus 
excluding de minimis generators from being compensated in the event of being 
redispatched and/or (ii) provides for payment of compensation to suppliers of 
electricity, who may be intermediaries rather than the generators who have been 
redispatched?
(d) In the event that a renewable generator that is a party to a Corporate Power Purchase 
Agreement (CPPA) is redispatched downwards, must the compensation payable under 
Article 13(7) include compensation for the loss of any payments that would have been 
payable under the CPPA (in the event that the generator had not been redispatched) due 
to the contract strike price exceeding the relevant market price or do such payments 
constitute a form of financial support falling outside the scope of Article 13(7)(b)?
Priority
33. This reference raises issues of systematic importance for the functioning of the 
electricity market in the island of Ireland and therefore the Court of Justice is 
respectfully requested to give the reference as much priority as possible.
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Dated: 21 January 2025
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