Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2021:411
Date: 2021-07-07
Language of the case: German
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Provisions governing the Institutions;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded;Action for damages - inadmissible
Origin: Germany

Summary of the case-law on the non-contractual liability of the European Union 83 It must be recalled that an action for damages is an autonomous remedy which is not directed at the annulment of a particular measure, but rather at obtaining compensation for the damage caused by an institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 1971, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council, 5/71, EU:C:1971:116, paragraph 3), and that an action for annulment is not a precondition for bringing an action for damages before the General Court. 84 Furthermore, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, a number of conditions must be satisfied, namely the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured parties (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 April 2012, Artegodan v Commission, C‑221/10 P, EU:C:2012:216, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited, and of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 32). 85 According to settled case-law, the conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, are cumulative (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 December 2010, Fahas v Council, T‑49/07, EU:T:2010:499, paragraph 93, and order of 17 February 2012, Dagher v Council, T‑218/11, not published, EU:T:2012:82, paragraph 34). Accordingly, where any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the entire action must be dismissed and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 1999, Lucaccioni v Commission, C‑257/98 P, EU:C:1999:402, paragraph 14, and of 26 October 2011, Dufour v ECB, T‑436/09, EU:T:2011:634, paragraph 193). 86 It emerges from settled case-law that a finding, in an action for annulment, for example, that a legal act of the European Union is illegal, however regrettable that unlawfulness may be, is not a sufficient basis for holding that the non-contractual liability of the European Union, flowing from illegal conduct on the part of one of its institutions, has automatically arisen. In order for that condition to be met, the case-law requires the applicant to demonstrate that the institution in question has not merely breached a rule of law, but that the breach is sufficiently serious and that the rule of law was intended to confer rights on individuals (see judgment of 5 June 2019, Bank Saderat v Council, T‑433/15, not published, EU:T:2019:374, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 87 Furthermore, the requirement for proof of a sufficiently serious breach is intended to avoid, in the field inter alia of restrictive measures, the institution concerned being obstructed in the exercise of the functions which it is responsible for carrying out, in the general interest of the European Union and its Member States, by the risk of having to bear losses, be they financial or non-material, which the persons concerned by its acts might potentially suffer, without however leaving individuals to bear the consequences of flagrant and inexcusable misconduct on the part of the institution concerned (judgment of 5 June 2019, Bank Saderat v Council, T‑433/15, not published, EU:T:2019:374, paragraph 49). 88 The wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action stated in Article 21 TEU, is in fact such as to justify negative consequences for economic operators, even significant negative consequences, arising from decisions implementing acts adopted by the European Union with a view to achieving that fundamental objective (judgment of 5 June 2019, Bank Saderat v Council, T‑433/15, not published, EU:T:2019:374, paragraph 50). Summary of the principles established in the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P) 89 In paragraph 33 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice called to mind that a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals is established where the breach is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU institution. 90 The Court of Justice observed in that respect, first, in paragraph 34 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), that the requirement that there be a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law stems from the need to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the protection of individuals against unlawful conduct of the institutions and, on the other, the leeway that must be accorded to the institutions in order not to paralyse action by them. That balancing exercise proves all the more important in the field of restrictive measures, in which the obstacles encountered by the Council in terms of availability of information often make the assessment that it must carry out particularly difficult. 91 Second, in paragraph 43 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice stated that non-contractual liability of the European Union could arise only if an irregularity is found that would not have been committed in similar circumstances by an administrative authority exercising ordinary care and diligence. 92 Third, in paragraphs 44 and 46 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice found that the parameters that are required to be taken into account when assessing whether there is a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law all relate to the date on which the decision or the conduct was adopted by the institution concerned, meaning that the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law necessarily has to be assessed on the basis of the circumstances in which the institution acted on that particular date. 93 Fourth, in paragraph 41 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice established that, where a regulation adopting a restrictive measure is annulled by a judgment of the General Court that has the force of res judicata, the first component of the first condition for non-contractual liability of the European Union, that is to say, a breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals, is fulfilled as regards that regulation. 94 Fifth, in paragraphs 77 to 79 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice held that, for the purposes of the adoption of measures, acting under the control of a person or entity and acting on behalf of such a person should be equiparated. It stated that this conclusion was borne out by analysis of the aim of the provision in question which had the objective of enabling the Council to adopt effective measures against persons involved in nuclear proliferation and of preventing such measures from being circumvented. It also noted that the foregoing conclusion was also supported by analysis of the context of Article 16(2)(d) of Regulation No 961/2010. Findings of the General Court 95 Whether or not the conditions for the non-contractual liability of the European Union to arise are satisfied in the present case must be examined in the light of the principles summarised in paragraphs 83 to 94 above. 96 It must be observed, as a preliminary matter that, in the light of paragraph 93 above, because the listings at issue were annulled, by the judgments of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), and of 18 September 2015, HTTS and Bateni v Council (T‑45/14, not published, EU:T:2015:650), respectively, which have the force of res judicata, the first component of the first condition for the non-contractual liability of the European Union to arise, that is to say, a breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals, must be found to be fulfilled in respect of those listings. It is therefore now necessary to determine whether the material adduced by the applicant demonstrates that those listings constitute a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. – The first complaint, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the substantive listing conditions in breach of the obligation to verify the facts and provide evidence to substantiate the grounds for restrictive measures 97 The General Court is called upon to determine whether the Council committed a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals by adopting the listings at issue, having regard solely to the evidence available to it on the dates of those listings. 98 As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to call to mind what material was available to the Council on the date of the first listing, since that material forms part of the context in which the listings at issue were adopted. Specifically, the Council has stated that the first listing was based on the fact that the applicant had been the director of IRISL until 2008, before settling in Europe and founding HTTS. It also stated that HTTS was established in Hamburg (Germany), at Schottweg 7, and that IRISL Europe, IRISL’s European subsidiary, was established at Schottweg 5, Hamburg. As the Council notes, on the date on which it adopted the first listing, it did indeed have information about HTTS’s address, as can be seen from the identifying information about the undertakings included on the list in Annex V to Regulation No 423/2007, as amended by Part III, point 1(d) and (j) of the Annex to Implementing Regulation No 668/2010. 99 Furthermore, the Council notes that it also had access to Resolutions 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) on IRISL and the report of the Security Council sanctions committee which recorded three manifest breaches by that company of the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1747 (2007). First, as the Council correctly states, the fact that those documents are referred to in the grounds for IRISL’s listing in Annex II, Part III, to Decision 2010/413 and in Part III of the Annex to Implementing Regulation No 668/2010 is evidence that they were indeed in its possession. 100 Second, it has not been disputed that the three violations of the arms embargo established in that report did in fact occur, and the contents of that report are also common ground, in so far as they show that IRISL had begun to engage in activities in order to circumvent the measures adopted by transferring its activities to other undertakings and that its registered office in Europe was close to that of HTTS, a company founded and managed by the applicant. As the Council has, in essence, asserted, those were evidence for the first listing, since that listing was a direct consequence of the listing of IRISL, and also of HDSL, for which HTTS acted and whose name had been included in Annex II, Part III to Decision 2010/413 and in Part III of the Annex to Implementing Regulation No 668/2010 as itself acting on behalf of IRISL. 101 Moreover, it must be observed that the applicant has not disputed that the registered offices of IRISL Europe and HTTS were geographically close. As regards that proximity, at the hearing the applicant even acknowledged that at the time of the listings at issue HTTS was able to use the employees of IRISL Europe, which had made some of its staff available to it. 102 Last, the Council asserts – without being challenged by the applicant as to the veracity of the facts – that at the time of the first listing HTTS, of which the applicant was the director, traded as a shipping agent on behalf of HDSL, which was regarded as closely linked to IRISL and whose name was also included on the list of entities suspected of facilitating nuclear proliferation in Iran on 26 July 2010 on the grounds that it ‘act[ed] on behalf of IRISL performing container operations using vessels owned by IRISL’, and that Mr Bateni had been the director of IRISL until 2008 before settling in Europe and founding HTTS. 103 That context must be borne in mind when examining the material that formed the basis of the second listing. The Council states that the second listing was underpinned in essence by one precise undisputed circumstance, that is to say, the fact that the applicant had been the director of IRISL until 2008 and was the director of HTTS at the time of the first listing. It states that that is moreover clearly apparent from the letter of 17 January 2012 in which the applicant disputed the grounds of the first listing. 104 In respect of the third listing, the Council states that the documents referred to in Annexes A.3 and A.5 to the application were also available and had been disclosed to the applicant, before that measure was adopted. They related in particular to a public source in the form of the New York Times article of 7 June 2010 entitled ‘Companies Linked to IRISL’, which contained a list of 66 undertakings, including HTTS and HDSL, which were linked to IRISL and to which IRISL had allegedly transferred vessels, and documents substantiating the fact that the applicant had been the director of IRISL Europe since 2009 and of HTTS since 2010. 105 Furthermore, it is clear from Annexes A.3 and A.5 to the application that, before it adopted the third listing, the Council disclosed to the applicant material substantiating the fact that he had been the director of IRISL until 2008 and then the director of IRISL Europe and that HTTS was the European agent for SAPID and HDSL for the supply of essential ship broking services. 106 Moreover, the Council asserts that, at the time of the third listing, it took into account the final report, of 12 June 2012, of the Panel of Experts created by Resolution 1929 (2010), and the final report of that Panel of Experts of 5 June 2013, from which it can be seen that IRISL had transferred vessels to two connected companies, namely HDSL and SAPID. Furthermore, since 2008, IRISL and the companies connected to it had made many changes to the actual owner and registered owner of vessels, and vessels whose actual owners were IRISL and its connected companies had constantly changed names, flags and registered owners. As regards the availability of those final reports of the United Nations Panel of Experts, it is common ground that they constitute internationally recognised facts. 107 The Council also states that, at the time of the third listing, it had access to information from a public source, in particular the Iran Watch report of 2 August 2012 and statements made by the Federal Republic of Germany in the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409). It is apparent from those statements by the Federal Republic of Germany, first, that HTTS maintained relations with HDSL, which had been created in spring 2009 in connection with the privatisation of IRISL; second, that at the end of November 2009, HDSL had taken over IRISL’s fleet of container vessels and that, concurrently, HTTS was incorporated, allegedly with the sole aim of circumventing the restrictive measures against IRISL; third, that HTTS was HDSL’s agent in Europe, while IRISL Europe continued to be IRISL’s agent for the rest of that company’s fleet; and, fourth, that HTTS carried on all its activities for IRISL. 108 It is important to clarify in that respect that the Council had access to those statements at the time of the third listing, given that they are referred to in the judgment of 12 June 2013, HTTS v Council (T‑128/12 and T‑182/12, not published, EU:T:2013:312), as can be seen from paragraph 53 of that judgment, and given that the judgment was delivered before that listing. 109 Last, replying to request from the General Court at the hearing, the Council clarified that the material referred to in Annexes A.3 and A.5 to the application and referred to in paragraphs 104 and 105 above was in its possession at the time it adopted the third listing and that the General Court took it into consideration in the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 18 September 2015, HTTS and Bateni v Council (T‑45/14, not published, EU:T:2015:650). 110 It can be seen from the foregoing that the Council has provided evidence in the present proceedings that it had access to a matrix of indicia when it adopted the restrictive measures at issue and did not adopt them without any evidence. 111 Further, the applicant’s argument that in the present case direct evidence of a serious and manifest breach flows, first, from the Council’s statements in the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), and, second, from that judgment and the judgment of 18 September 2015, HTTS and Bateni v Council (T‑45/14, not published, EU:T:2015:650), is not such as to demonstrate a sufficiently serious breach by the Council of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. 112 With regard to the Council’s statements in the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the Council did not admit in those proceedings that it included the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis solely of information from the Member States and without any evidence. It merely stated that a Member State had informed it that the applicant was the director of IRISL Europe, that is to say, a fact that had not been mentioned in the grounds of the second listing and which the General Court therefore did not analyse in the context of the action against that listing. Furthermore, although the Council stated, at the hearing in the case giving rise to that judgment, that at the time it adopted the second listing neither the information provided by the Federal Republic of Germany nor the New York Times article of 7 June 2010 were available to it, it is apparent that the second listing was not based on those two elements alone but on a larger number of indicia. The material referred to in paragraphs 98 to 103 above supports that finding. 113 Second, as regards the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), in which the General Court found that the Council had made a ‘manifest error of assessment’, and the judgment of 18 September 2015, HTTS and Bateni v Council (T‑45/14, not published, EU:T:2015:650), it must be observed at the outset that a manifest error of assessment adduced as a plea in support of an action for annulment must be distinguished from the manifest and grave disregard for the limits set on an institution’s discretion relied upon when alleging a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals in an action for damages. 114 Next, as can be seen from paragraph 44 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), and as indicated in paragraph 92 above, the parameters that must be taken into account when assessing whether there is a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals must all relate to the date on which the decision or the conduct was adopted by the institution concerned. 115 Therefore, the applicant’s arguments concerning the judgments of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), and of 18 September 2015, HTTS and Bateni v Council (T‑45/14, not published, EU:T:2015:650), cannot be taken into account as material available on the date of the listings at issue for the purpose of determining whether there was a sufficiently serious breach by the Council of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals when it adopted those listings. 116 Last, as regards the line of argument that the third listing took place after the judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council (T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, not published, EU:T:2013:409), and that, pursuant to the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), such a listing constitutes a serious and manifest violation of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, it must be observed that, between the date on which that judgment was delivered and the date of the third listing a new listing criterion was established by Decision 2013/497 and Regulation No 971/2013 – in Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(e) of Regulation No 267/2012 respectively – which is broader than the criterion covering legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by IRISL or acting on its behalf. That new criterion which also mentioned ‘persons and entities providing insurance or other essential services to … IRISL, or to entities owned or controlled by [it] or acting on [its] behalf’ was, therefore, not limited to persons owned, controlled or acting on behalf of IRISL but targeted also those providing services to entities owned, controlled or acting on behalf of that company. 117 Furthermore, at the time of the third listing, the Council did not merely reiterate the grounds given at the time of the second listing. The third listing was founded, inter alia, on the fact that the applicant was the managing director of HTTS which, as their general agent, provided essential services to SAPID and HDSL. The applicant’s relisting was therefore based on a new listing criterion, that is to say, the provision of essential services to entities acting on behalf of IRISL. 118 As regards the applicant’s line of argument that the Council’s conduct in the present case was identical to that in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), it must be held that although the General Court held, in that judgment, that the Council had acted unlawfully, as it did not have any discretion, that illegality arose due to the fact that, on the date on which it adopted the measures at issue, the Council did not have information or evidence to substantiate the reasons for the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant and had therefore infringed an obligation that already existed, on the date on which those measures were adopted, under the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, and in respect of which the Council had no discretion (see judgment of 5 June 2019, Bank Saderat v Council, T‑433/15, not published, EU:T:2019:374, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). 119 However, the present case does not concern whether or not the Council discharged its obligation to provide evidence in support of the listings at issue. Here, it is necessary to determine whether, by adopting those listings on the basis of the material available to it on the date on which it adopted them, including that referred to in paragraphs 98 to 109 above, the Council committed a sufficiently serious breach such as to give rise to the non-contractual liability of the European Union. It is necessary to bear in mind in that regard the discretion that the Council enjoyed when it assessed the indicia used to substantiate the restrictive measures at issue. 120 Addressing the applicant’s argument that, when the listings at issue were adopted there was no particular difficulty preventing the Council from finding that an earlier activity could not in itself justify imposing restrictive measures against a person and that, therefore, the Council had no discretion in that regard or had at most a considerably reduced margin of discretion, it must be observed that the second listing is based on the fact that the applicant had been the director of HTTS, a company sanctioned as acting on behalf of IRISL, and the legal director of IRISL, and that the third listing was based on the fact that the applicant acted on behalf of IRISL, had been IRISL’s director until 2008 and then the managing director of IRISL Europe and, last, managing director of HTTS which, as their general agent, provided essential services to SAPID and HDSL, both of which were designated as entities acting on behalf of IRISL. 121 The listings at issue were therefore based both on the personal link between the applicant and IRISL and on the fact that he had a management role within a company allegedly controlled or owned by IRISL, in particular HTTS, which provided essential services to other companies allegedly controlled or owned by IRISL, in particular HDSL and SAPID. 122 In any event, as regards whether a person’s earlier activity could sufficiently justify adopting restrictive measures against that person or whether there must be other indicia, it should be noted that, depending on the circumstances, reference to an activity carried on in the past may constitute sufficient justification for adopting a restrictive measure (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 July 2016, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, C‑330/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:601, paragraph 86). 123 In addition, on the date on which the listings at issue were adopted, the concept of a company ‘owned or controlled by another entity’, in so far as concerned restrictive measures, also left a measure of discretion to the Council. Moreover, although, in the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694), the Court of Justice clarified the meanings of the terms ‘owned’ and ‘controlled’, in paragraph 70 of that judgment it confirmed what the General Court had recalled in the judgment of 13 December 2017, HTTS v Council (T‑692/15, EU:T:2017:890), namely that in the area of restrictive measures the concept of a ‘company owned or controlled’ does not have the same meaning as it generally has in company law, where it serves to ascertain the commercial liability of a company which is legally subject to the control, as regards decision-making, of another commercial entity. The Court of Justice has favoured a fairly broad definition of ‘control’ in the area of restrictive measures and has not provided any strict definition of the terms ‘owned’ and ‘controlled’, as can be seen in essence from paragraphs 74 and 75 of the judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council (C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694). 124 Therefore, it must be held, concurring with the Council and the Commission, that, on the date on which the listings at issue were adopted, there may have been some uncertainty as to the exact meaning of ‘company owned or controlled by another entity’ and that, in consequence, the Council had a certain discretion when assessing the material capable of establishing that HTTS, of which the applicant was the director, was owned or controlled by a company directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s nuclear activities and therefore engaged in those activities. 125 Last, the applicant argued that, at the time of the third listing the Council disregarded the circumstance that by the judgment of 16 September 2013, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council (T‑489/10, EU:T:2013:453), the General Court had annulled IRISL’s listing and that of other companies to which it referred, including SAPID and HDSL, and that the ‘evidence’ provided was therefore, from the outset, completely irrelevant. As the Court of Justice stated in paragraph 48 of the judgment of 31 January 2019, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council (C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2019:82), the actual occurrence of the three violations of the embargo established by Resolution 1747 (2007) was not called into question by the judgment of 16 September 2013, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council (T‑489/10, EU:T:2013:453). In paragraph 66 thereof the General Court found that ‘it appear[ed] appropriate to regard the fact that IRISL was involved in the three incidents concerning the shipment of military material in breach of the prohibition laid down in paragraph 5 of Resolution 1747 (2007) as increasing the risk that IRISL may also [have been] involved in incidents relating to the shipment of material linked to nuclear proliferation’. 126 Accordingly, it does not follow from the fact that the listings of IRISL, SAPID and HDSL were annulled subsequently to the second and third listings that the Council infringed substantive listing conditions in a manner giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. 127 It is clear from all of the foregoing that, contrary to the applicant’s assertions in his first complaint, on the dates on which it adopted the second and third listings, material was available to the Council that can be regarded as evidence that the applicant had links to IRISL and was able to act on behalf of IRISL in Europe and to act in IRISL’s interests within HTTS. 128 Therefore, in those circumstances, even if the Council did commit a manifest error of assessment in connection with the second and third listings by relying on the circumstances adduced, that error cannot be regarded as flagrant and inexcusable and it cannot be found that an administrative authority exercising ordinary care and diligence would not have made that error in similar circumstances (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2019, Bank Saderat v Council, T‑433/15, not published, EU:T:2019:374, paragraph 73). 129 It must therefore be held that, on the dates on which the listings at issue were adopted, the Council did not depart from the conduct that would have been followed by an administrative authority exercising ordinary care and diligence. 130 The first complaint, alleging that the Council has failed to establish by means of adequate evidence that the applicant was controlled by IRISL, must accordingly be rejected. – The second complaint, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection 131 In respect of the second complaint, it is apparent from the case file that the applicant did receive the information necessary to understand the reasons for adoption of the restrictive measures against him and that he was in a position to bring a claim that the restrictive measures against him were unlawful and to have them annulled. 132 Moreover, it must be recalled that, since the applicant brought an action against the restrictive measures against him and the General Court annulled those measures, he cannot rely on any sufficiently serious breach of his right to effective judicial protection in the present case (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2018, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, T‑552/15, not published, EU:T:2018:897, paragraph 51). 133 The second complaint must therefore be dismissed as unfounded. – The third complaint, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the right to respect for private and family life, the right to the protection of personal data, the right freely to conduct business and the right to property 134 It must be observed, as pointed out by the Council, that the applicant’s arguments in respect of the third complaint are not supported by any evidence and therefore do not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. 135 In that regard, it must be recalled that, under Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must include a summary of the pleas in law relied upon. In addition, according to consistent case-law, that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and for the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary without needing to request further information. If an action is to be admissible, the essential points of fact and law on which it is based must be apparent from the text of the application itself, even if only stated briefly, provided the statement is coherent and comprehensible, in order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice. Likewise, according to settled case-law, any plea which is not adequately articulated in the application initiating the proceedings must be held to be inadmissible. Similar requirements apply where a complaint is relied upon in support of a plea. That absolute bar to proceedings must be raised ex officio by the EU court (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 May 2016, Italy v Commission, T‑384/14, EU:T:2016:298, not published, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Kampete v Council, T‑164/18, not published, EU:T:2020:54, paragraph 112). 136 In the present case, it must be observed that, in his application, the applicant merely summarises the substance of the principles relied upon and fails to provide any material to substantiate the existence of serious breaches of the right to respect for private and family life, the right to the protection of personal data, the right freely to conduct business and the right to property. Furthermore, in response to a question by the General Court at the hearing, the applicant stated that the matters he had addressed in the part relating to the existence of non-material damage as a result of the adoption of the restrictive measures against him could not be used to demonstrate the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of those fundamental rights. 137 Therefore, it is clear from the foregoing that the applicant has not pleaded the arguments in support of the alleged serious infringement of the foregoing fundamental rights to the requisite legal standard. 138 The third complaint must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible. 139 It emerges from the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety and that it is unnecessary to examine whether the other conditions for the non-contractual liability of the European Union to arise are satisfied. Costs 140 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 141 Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. 142 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. The Commission is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded; 2. Orders Mr Bateni to bear his own costs and those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. Kanninen Jaeger Porchia Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 July 2021. [Signatures] * Language of the case: German.