Order — ECLI:EU:C:1998:2
Date: 1998-01-15
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Appeals
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Staff cases

summary of pleas mentioned in connection with the first head of claim. 42. In this connection it is sufficient to find that the appeal does not specify the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on in support of the claim, since a mere reference to the summary of the pleas previously considered, which relate to annulment of the Commission's decision of 22 March 1993, does not amount to a precise indication of the elements of the judgment which the appeal seeks to have set aside (see, inter alia, Case C-153/96 P De Rijk v Commission [1997] ECR I-2901, paragraph 15). It follows that this plea is clearly inadmissible. Compensation for material and non-material damage 43. The head of claim seeking compensation for material and non-material damage is divided into two separate pleas. 44. With regard, first, to the plea concerning material damage, the appellant alleges that the Court of First Instance misinterpreted his claims. In his view, it was wrong to hold that he was claiming payment of damages, when he had simply requested a declaration that the Commission was bound to make good all material damage which might follow in the future. According to the appellant, such a claim is admissible, since he has a legitimate interest in the determination of the appointing authority's future obligations to pay compensation. The claim is also well founded inasmuch as, if his candidature had not been unlawfully rejected, he would have been appointed to the post in question. 45. It should at this point be noted that in paragraphs 86 and 87 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance held: '86 As regards the alleged material damage, it is settled case-law that the Community can only be held liable to pay damages if a number of conditions are satisfied as regards the illegality of the conduct of the institutions complained of, the actual harm suffered and the existence of a causal link between the act and the alleged damage (see, for example, Case T-27/90 Latham v Commission, cited above, paragraph 63). 87 In this instance, there is no need to give a decision on the admissibility of this claim, since it is not disputed that the applicant has not until now suffered any material loss, because the post in issue was filled at Grade A 4,which is the applicant's present grade. It is thus clear from the case-law that the applicant cannot plead any material loss (see Case T-27/90 Latham v Commission, cited above, paragraph 43). 46. The Court of First Instance rightly, after considering that one of the conditions for the incurring of liability by the Community is that actual harm should have been suffered, rejected the applicant's claim without ruling on the admissibility of that head of claim. Even if, as the appellant asserts, what he claimed before the Court of First Instance was not payment of damages and interest but a declaration that the Community was bound to pay compensation, for such an obligation to be established the damage must be real, that is to say it must exist at the time the action is brought. Since the Court of First Instance found at paragraph 87 that the appellant had not as yet suffered any material damage, his pleas as to damage had to be rejected. 47. In consequence, this plea is clearly unfounded. 48. With regard, second, to the plea relating to non-material damage, the appellant considers that it is much greater than the sum of ECU 2 000 which the Commission was ordered to pay him, since the cause of that damage was not only the failure to give reasons for not appointing him, but also in essence the unlawful rejection of his candidature, which deeply hurt and wounded him. 49. This plea is based on the assumption that the rejection by the appointing authority of the appellant's candidature is unlawful. 50. As stated above, the ground of appeal regarding the unlawful rejection of that candidature has been dismissed. In consequence, this plea is clearly unfounded. 51. In those circumstances, the pleas put forward by the appellant must be dismissed as clearly inadmissible or unfounded, pursuant to Article 119 of the Rules of Procedure. Costs before the Court of First Instance 52. Finally, the appellant takes the view that, having regard to the attitude adopted by the Commission, the Court of First Instance should have ordered it to pay the costs. 53. On this point, it suffices to note that where all the other pleas advanced in an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance have been rejected, the plea concerning the order for costs must, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, be declared inadmissible (Case C-396/93 P Henrichs v Commission [1995] ECR I-2611, paragraphs 65 and 66). 54. In the light of all the preceding considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 55. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeals by virtue of Article 118 of those Rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs. Under Article 70 of those Rules, institutions are to bear their own costs in proceedings brought by their servants. However, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 122 of those Rules, Article 70 does not apply to appeals brought by an official or other servant of an institution against that institution. Since Mr Obst's appeal has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings. On those grounds, THE COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. The appellant shall pay the costs. Luxembourg, 15 January 1998. R. Grass H. Ragnemalm Registrar President of the Fourth Chamber 1: Language of the case: German.