Order — ECLI:EU:T:2026:251
Date: 2026-04-08
Language of the case: English

summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. That summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any other supporting information (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2017, Biogena Naturprodukte v EUIPO (ZUM wohl), T‑236/16, EU:T:2017:416, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited). According to well-established case-law, even though the body of the application may be supported and supplemented, with regard to specific points, by references to extracts of documents appended thereto, a general reference to other documents cannot compensate for the failure to set out the essential elements of the legal argument which must, under those provisions, appear in the application itself (see judgment of 16 November 2017, Nanogate v EUIPO (metals), T‑767/16, not published, EU:T:2017:809, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 25 Moreover, whilst the text of the application can be supported by references to specific passages in documents annexed to it, it is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, the annexes having a purely evidential and instrumental function. It follows that an application, in so far as it refers to written submissions lodged before EUIPO, is inadmissible to the extent that the general references in it cannot be linked to the pleas and arguments put forward in that application itself (see judgment of 22 June 2017, ZUM wohl, T‑236/16, EU:T:2017:416, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited). 26 However, it should be noted that the applicant does not at any time identify the specific points of its application that it wishes to supplement by those references. Nor does it specify the evidence that it submitted to EUIPO which, in its view, would be capable of supporting its assertions. The applicant therefore merely made a general reference to the administrative file, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above. It follows that the general reference made by the applicant to the evidence that it submitted before EUIPO must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2019, Hauzenberger v EUIPO (TurboPerformance), T‑349/18, not published, EU:T:2019:495, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited). 27 As regards the applicant’s line of argument that the services covered by the marks at issue are intended for different publics, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the relevant public for the purposes of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion is composed of users likely to use both the goods or services covered by the earlier mark and those covered by the mark applied for (see judgment of 24 May 2011, ancotel v OHIM – Acotel (ancotel.), T‑408/09, not published, EU:T:2011:241, paragraphs 38 and the case-law cited). 28 In addition, the relevant public must be defined on the basis of the list of goods and services as covered by the marks at issue and not on the basis of the commercial choices made by the proprietors of those marks (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 2019, K.A. Schmersal Holding v EUIPO – Tecnium (tec.nicum), T‑527/18, not published, EU:T:2019:798, paragraph 49). 29 Thus, even assuming that the intervener intended the services at issue covered by the earlier mark to be addressed to a public consisting of elderly persons – which differs from the intended public for the applicant’s services – that circumstance, as the Board of Appeal correctly stated, has no effect on the determination of the relevant public. That argument must therefore be rejected as ineffective. The comparison of the services 30 The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the services at issue were identical. In particular, as regards the services in Class 36, it concluded, in paragraph 23 of the contested decision, that the services covered by the mark applied for were all included in the broad category of services ‘real estate affairs’ covered by the earlier mark. As regards the services in Class 37, it concluded, in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, first, that the service ‘laundering’ was included identically in both lists of services covered by the signs at issue and, second, that the service ‘launderette facilities (provision of-)’ covered by the mark applied for was included in the broad category of ‘laundry’ covered by the earlier mark. As regards the other services in Class 37 covered by the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal concluded, in paragraph 25 of the contested decision, that they were included in the broad category of services ‘building construction and maintenance’ covered by the earlier mark. 31 The applicant submits that the general designation of ‘real estate affairs’ services in Class 36 cannot be taken into account as it is too generic. In that regard, it is apparent from a comparison of the lists of services covered by the signs at issue that the services designated by the mark applied for in Class 36 do not appear among those covered by the earlier mark in Class 36. Consequently, the list of services covered by the earlier mark is sufficiently extensive and detailed to exclude the possibility that the intervener sought to cover the services covered by the mark applied for. Similarly, as regards the list of services in Class 37 covered by the earlier mark, the applicant claims that it is so broad that it can be presumed that the intervener did not wish to include the services covered by the mark applied for. 32 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 33 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken), T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 34 It must be pointed out, as EUIPO rightly observed, that the applicant merely claims, first, that the category of services ‘real estate affairs’ in Class 36 is too generic and, second, that the list of services in Class 37 covered by the earlier mark is too broad to be able to include the services designated by the mark applied for. 35 In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law that services may be regarded as identical when the services covered by the trade mark application are included in a more general category covered by the earlier mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 2023, Flowbird v EUIPO – APCOA Parking Holdings (FLOWBIRD), T‑296/22, not published, EU:T:2023:613, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 36 As regards, in the first place, ‘real estate affairs’ services in Class 36, it must be stated that it has previously been held that ‘real estate services’, to which ‘real estate affairs’, in essence, correspond, are services connected with a property, namely, in particular, the lease, the purchase, the sale or the management of such a property (see judgment of 17 March 2021, Alvargonzález Ramos v EUIPO – Ursus-3 Capital, A.V. (URSUS Kapital), T‑114/20, not published, EU:T:2021:144, paragraphs 34 and 35 and the case-law cited). Those services correspond to the list of services in Class 36 covered by the mark applied for. 37 So far as concerns, in the second place, the services in Class 37 covered by the earlier mark, in view of their broad wording and in the absence of clarification as to their use, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that they could include the services in Class 37 covered by the mark applied for. 38 Consequently, in the absence of specific arguments aimed at demonstrating the difference between the services covered by the marks at issue, there is no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessments regarding the comparison of the services at issue. The comparison of the signs 39 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 40 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, without being challenged by the applicant, that the word elements of the signs at issue and the figurative elements of the earlier mark were distinctive and that the earlier mark did not contain any dominant element. Similarly, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s findings that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to an above-average degree and the conceptual comparison remained neutral. 41 As regards the visual similarity, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were, at the very least, visually similar to a below-average degree. In order to reach that conclusion, it found that the signs at issue consisted of an almost identical number of letters, that is six and seven, and coincided in the group of five letters ‘omity’. It found that the signs at issue differed in their initial consonants –‘d’ for the earlier mark and ‘h’ for the mark applied for – as well as in the circumflex accent over the letter ‘o’ of the mark applied for and in the last letter ‘s’ of the earlier mark. In addition, they differed also on account of the figurative elements of the earlier mark and in the stylisation of the word elements of the signs at issue, even though that latter aspect is rather perceived as decorative. 42 The applicant merely submits that the number of letters making up the signs at issue constitutes a weak ground irrelevant for establishing a similarity between those signs, since the relevant public will not stop to count the letters making up the marks at issue. 43 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 44 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant puts forward no specific argument capable of explaining why the number of letters is irrelevant in the present case in the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue. Consequently, that part of the application does not meet the minimum requirements of Article 177(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure as recalled in paragraph 24 above, with the result that that argument must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. The likelihood of confusion 45 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74). 46 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 51 to 54 of the contested decision, that, taking into account, inter alia, the identity between the services at issue, the at least below-average degree of visual similarity and the above-average degree of phonetic similarity between the signs at issue and the fact that no comparison of the conceptual similarity could be carried out and that those signs share a group of five identical letters out of six and seven, the different figurative elements of those signs are not sufficient to offset any similarity and to rule out the existence of a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 47 The applicant does not dispute, in essence, that the signs at issue are similar. It maintains that, given that the marks at issue are not addressed to the same public, that the services at issue are different and that the signs at issue are insufficiently similar, there is no likelihood of confusion. 48 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 49 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraphs 49 to 54 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal, in its global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, took into account all of the relevant factors, namely the distinctive character of the earlier mark, the services covered by the marks at issue, the relevant public and its level of attention and the degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. 50 In addition, as is set out in paragraphs 30 to 44 above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the merits of the Board of Appeal’s findings that the services at issue are identical and that the signs at issue are visually similar to a below-average degree and phonetically similar to an above-average degree. 51 Consequently, it must be held that, following a global assessment and taking into account all of the factors referred to above, the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question the merits of the Board of Appeal’s global assessment concerning the existence of a likelihood of confusion. 52 In the light of all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Costs 53 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 54 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by it. As regards the costs incurred by the intervener before EUIPO, it is sufficient to note that, since the present order dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, point 2 of the operative part of that decision continues to govern the costs incurred in the opposition proceedings and in the appeal proceedings before EUIPO (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Cole Haan v EUIPO – Samsøe & Samsøe Holding (Ø), T‑399/20, EU:T:2021:442, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 55 By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 2. Green Asset, SL shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Domitys SAS. 3. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 8 April 2026. V. Di Bucci I. Gâlea Registrar President * Language of the case: English.