Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2012:271
Date: 2012-05-03
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Competition;Agreements, decisions and concerted practices
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Appeal against penalty
Origin: France

Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Comap SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission (Case C-290/11 P) Language of the case: 290/11 Parties Appellant: Comap SA (represented by: A. Wachsmann and S. de Guigné, avocats) Other party to the proceedings: European Commission Form of order sought Principally, annul, on the basis of Article 256 TFEU and 56 of Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the entirety of the judgment of the General Court of 24 March 2011 in Case T-377/06 Comap v Commission; grant the form of order sought by Comap SA at first instance before the General Court; consequently, annul European Commission Decision C(2006) 4180 final of 20 September 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F-1/38.121 - FITTINGS) inasmuch as it concerns Comap SA and the grounds underlying the operative part thereof inasmuch as that decision imposes a fine on Comap SA; in the alternative, annul, on the basis of Article 261 TFEU, the fine of EUR 18.56 million imposed on Comap SA by Article 2(g) of the abovementioned decision of the European Commission or, on the basis of Article 261 TFEU, reduce that fine to an appropriate amount; in any event, order the European Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred by Comap SA before the General Court. Pleas in law and main arguments The appellant raises four pleas in law in support of its appeal. By its first plea, Comap alleges infringement of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal since the review carried out by the General Court of the decision of the Commission, an institution which fulfils the functions both of inquiry and sanction, was limited to the manifest errors in law and of fact, without the unlimited power of review having been used on the basis of a full re-examination of the facts of the case and, in particular, the evidence adduced. By its second plea, the appellant complains that the General Court applied to it too restrictive an understanding of the notion of 'public distancing' which disregards the requirements of the principle of strict interpretation of criminal law, enshrined in Article 7(1) of the ECHR, which provides that the criminal law may not be applied broadly to the detriment of the defendant. That understanding also infringes the principle that the benefit of the doubt must be given to the undertaking to which the decision is addressed and which is necessary having regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence. By its third plea, Comap alleges distortion of a number of pieces of evidence which led to an incorrect legal qualification of certain bilateral contacts between the appellant and one of its competitors after the Commission inspections. By its fourth and last plea, finally, the appellant complains that the General Court failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons in that it took the view that the Commission had established Comap's participation to the requisite legal standard in a single and continuous infringement after March 2001. ____________