Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2002:481
Date: 2002-09-12
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951)
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Belgium

Summary of the Judgment 
1. ECSC — Aid to the steel industry — Meaning — Financing by public funds of 
supplementary pay to compensate for a reduction in wages ensuing from a reduction in 
working time — Included 
(Art. 4(c) CS) 
I - 11991 
SUMMARY — CASE C-5/01 
2 . ECSC — Aid to the steel industry — Time-limit fixed by Article 6(5) of the Sixth 
Steel Aid Code for the Commission to take a decision on the compatibility of aid — 
Time-limit not a prescription period linked to loss of competence 
(General Decision No 2496/96, Art. 6(5)) 
3. Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — ECSC 
decision 
(Arts 4(c) and 15 CS) 
4. ECSC — Aid to the steel industry — Commission authorisation — Authorisation by 
way of individual decision — Condition — Prior application by the Member State 
concerned 
(Art. 95 CS) 
1. The expression 'aid', for the purposes 
of Article 4(c) CS, necessarily implies 
advantages granted directly or indi­
rectly through State funds or constitut­
ing an additional charge for the State 
or for bodies designated or established 
by the State for that purpose. That is 
the case where public funds finance 
supplementary pay to compensate the 
employees of an undertaking for a 
reduction in their working week in 
consideration of their being employees 
of that undertaking and as compen­
sation for their work for the firm. Such 
supplementary pay, irrespective of 
whether or not it stems from legal 
obligations or collective agreements, in 
fact constitutes an incidental element 
of the salary received and consequently 
comes under the labour costs which 
that undertaking must normally meet. 
The fact that public authorities meet 
the cost out of social concerns is there­
fore not sufficient to exclude it from 
being categorised as aid. Measures of 
State intervention are not characterised 
by reference to their causes or aims but 
defined in relation to their effects. 
(see paras 33, 36-37, 39, 45-46) 
2. In the context of the implementation of 
Article 6(5) of the Sixth Steel Aid 
Code, a Member State may legally 
put into effect an aid measure only 
pursuant to a formal decision by the 
Commission in that regard. In the 
absence of such a decision, the expiry 
of the three-month time-limit set for 
the Commission's decision cannot 
therefore have the effect of implicitly 
authorising the Member State to imple­
ment the planned aid measure. If that 
I - 11992 
BELGIUM v COMMISSION 
three-month time-limit were to be 
interpreted as a prescription period 
linked to loss of competence, the effect 
of there being no decision by the 
Commission within that period would 
be that the Member State concerned 
would, on the one hand, be prevented 
from implementing that aid measure 
and, on the other, find it impossible to 
obtain an authorisation decision to that 
effect from the Commission under the 
procedure initiated by the latter; that 
would be contrary to the orderly func­
tioning of the rules on State aid. A 
decision taken after the expiry of that 
time-limit is therefore not vitiated by 
lack of competence. Although in its 
relations with the Member States, the 
Commission is bound to observe a 
condition which it has imposed on 
itself, failure to comply with such a 
condition is likely to constitute a 
breach only if it would render nugatory 
a procedural safeguard granted to the 
Member States. Since the above period 
of three months was established in the 
interest of protecting legal certainty, in 
order to ensure a rapid decision by the 
Commission, failure to comply with 
that time-limit cannot lead to loss of 
competence, which would merely serve 
to delay a decision, which could be 
obtained only as a result of a new 
procedure, without offering any addi­
tional safeguard to the Member State. 
That is without prejudice to the possi­
bility of bringing an action for damages 
where the delay in the Commission's 
decision has caused real damage to one 
of the parties concerned. 
(see paras 57-64) 
3. The statement of reasons required by 
Article 15 CS must be appropriate to 
the act at issue and must disclose in a 
clear and unequivocal fashion the rea­
soning followed by the institution 
which adopted the measure in question 
in such a way as to enable the persons 
concerned to ascertain the reasons for 
the measure and to enable the Court 
having jurisdiction to exercise its 
power of review. It is not necessary 
for the reasoning to go into all the 
relevant facts and points of law, since 
the question whether the statement of 
reasons meets the requirements of 
Article 15 CS must be assessed with 
regard not only to its wording but also 
to its context and to all the legal rules 
governing the matter in question. The 
Commission is, in particular, not 
required to form a view on a matter 
which is manifestly immaterial. Nor is 
it required, in connection with the 
application of Article 4(c) CS to the 
measures in question, to give any 
explanation concerning the con­
sequences and economic impact of 
those measures on the common mar­
ket, since an aid measure does not 
necessarily need to have an effect on 
trade between Member States or on 
competition in order to be caught by 
the provisions of that article. 
(see paras 68, 71, 75) 
I - 11993 
SUMMARY — CASE C-5/01 
4. The logic inherent in that system of 
authorisation, by way of exception, of 
aid necessary for the orderly function­
ing of the common market in coal and 
steel entails, in regard to the adoption 
of an individual decision by the Com­
mission, that the Member State con­
cerned applies to the Commission for 
the procedure laid down in Article 
95 CS to be initiated before the Com­
mission considers whether aid is 
needed in order to attain the Treaty's 
objectives. 
(see paras 82, 85) 
I - 11994