Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:628
Date: 2025-06-25
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment - successful

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128). 38 That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a fund freezing measure and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited). 39 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. In that regard, it is important that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122). 40 In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 41 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). 42 It is in the light of those considerations, deriving from the case-law, that the Court must assess whether the Council made an error of assessment in considering that, in the present case, there was a sufficiently solid factual basis capable of justifying the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by the contested acts. Interpretation of the second part of amended criterion (g) 43 It is apparent from the statement of reasons reproduced in paragraph 16 above and restated by the Council in the contested acts that the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the second part of amended criterion (g). That part of amended criterion (g) makes it possible to include on such lists the names of immediate family members or other persons benefitting from a leading businessperson operating in Russia. 44 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, even though the preamble to an EU act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground either for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner that is clearly contrary to their wording, it may explain their content, since the recitals in that preamble constitute important elements for the purposes of interpretation that may clarify the intentions of the author of that act (see judgment of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C‑422/19 and C‑423/19, EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 45 In the present case, according to recital 5 of Decision 2023/1094, amended criterion (g) was introduced in order both to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation and to avoid the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures. In particular, it is apparent, in essence, from that recital that the need to designate immediate family members or other persons benefitting from leading businesspersons operating in Russia was justified by the fact that those businesspersons were distributing their funds and assets among their immediate family members and other persons in order, among other things, to conceal their assets, to circumvent the restrictive measures and to maintain control over the resources available to them. 46 Thus, the concept of ‘benefitting’, within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g), must be interpreted in the light of the objectives referred to in that criterion and set out in paragraph 45 above, which involve increasing the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation seeking to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Accordingly, a benefit for the purposes of that provision covers any benefit regardless of its nature, which is not necessarily undue, but which must be quantitatively or qualitatively non-negligible. It may therefore be a financial or non-financial benefit, such as a donation, a transfer of funds or of economic resources, an intervention to further the award of public contracts, an appointment or a promotion. Moreover, having regard to the objective of avoiding practices used to circumvent restrictive measures, expressly referred to in recital 5 of Decision 2023/1094, benefits granted by leading businesspersons operating in Russia in a situation which may lead to the circumvention of the restrictive measures which apply to them may also fall within the second part of amended criterion (g) (judgments of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 185, and of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 142). 47 Consequently, first, the concept of ‘benefitting’ within the meaning of amended criterion (g) is not limited solely to benefits in the form of transfers of funds and assets made with the aim of circumventing restrictive measures. Such a limitation of the concept of ‘benefitting’ is not apparent from the wording of that criterion and would not make it possible to capture the many forms that a benefit may take. In addition, while a situation capable of leading to circumvention may substantiate the existence of a benefit for the purposes of amended criterion (g) (see paragraph 46 above), proof of such a situation need not necessarily be adduced by the Council with a view to listing a person’s name on the basis of that criterion. Secondly, the Council cannot argue that amended criterion (g) should be understood in a similar way to the associated person criterion, laid down in Article 2(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145 as amended, in so far as it covers persons connected by common interests. Such an interpretation would have the effect of depriving amended criterion (g) of practical effect in that it would become meaningless as compared with the associated person criterion where the latter criterion is applied in relation to a person listed on the basis of amended criterion (g) (judgments of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 186, and of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 143). 48 Moreover, given that the interpretation of the second part of amended criterion (g) must be consistent with the principle of legal certainty and that the restrictive measures at issue are part of the continuation of the European Union’s reaction to the policies and activities of the Russian authorities in relation specifically to Ukraine, which started with the annexation of Crimea at the end of February 2014, the Council cannot, under amended criterion (g), rely on benefits which were granted prior to the end of February 2014 by leading businesspersons to members of their immediate family or to other persons (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 188, and of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 146). 49 However, such a time frame does not mean that any benefit granted after that date necessarily falls within the scope of amended criterion (g), since the circumstances in which it was granted and the passage of time between that grant and the date on which the name of the businessperson behind that grant was included on the lists at issue are also factors to be taken into account in assessing whether the inclusion, on those lists, of the name of the recipient of that benefit is well founded. In any event, the benefit received by the person whose name is included on the lists at issue under the second part of amended criterion (g), or at least its consequences, must still exist at the time when the restrictive measures against that person are adopted (judgment of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 145; see also, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 189). Application of the second part of amended criterion (g) to the applicant 50 In order to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council relied on the existence of a transfer of large assets from Mr Deripaska to the applicant. The Council submits, in essence, that it proved the existence of a ‘benefit’, for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), on the basis of that transfer, which covered, among other things, the ownership of a hotel in Lech, properties in France, the companies Terra Services, Rospechat, Ingosstrakh, BEL Development and For Media and the non-profit foundation Fidelitas. According to the Council, those transfers confer economic and reputational benefits on the applicant, given their value and strategic position, allowing influence to be exerted in key sectors. 51 In that regard, the Council relies on the evidence which it forwarded to the applicant in the six WK files, all of which are made up of publicly available information. In addition to the first to fifth WK files, which were forwarded to the applicant before the adoption of the September 2023 acts, the Council also relies, in support of its contention that the contested acts are well founded, on the sixth WK file, which was forwarded to the applicant on 21 December 2023 and contains the following six items of evidence: – an extract from the website ‘www.opensanctions.org’ concerning the applicant (exhibit 1); – an extract from the online platform ‘www.rusprofile.ru’ relating to Gost Hotel Management LLC (exhibit 2); – an article from the Russian newspaper Vedomosti published on 10 December 2021 (exhibit 3); – an article from the Russian newspaper Kommersant published on 13 April 2022 (exhibit 4); – two extracts from the online platforms ‘www.rusprofile.ru’ and ‘www.spark-interfax.ru’ of 14 November 2023 (exhibit 5); – an extract from the website ‘www.compromat.pro’ of 18 October 2023 (exhibit 6). 52 It should be observed that where, as here, the Council seeks to rely on a longstanding business relationship involving a leading businessperson operating in Russia and another person, a benefit, for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), cannot arise from that business relationship alone, or from the existence of transactions, even if they are numerous and involve significant amounts, between that businessperson and that other person. In such a situation, the Council must adduce sufficient evidence that one or more of those transactions, or all of those transactions taken together, conferred a non-negligible benefit specifically on the partner of the businessperson operating in Russia, in that it is the former who takes advantage of the latter, and not vice versa (judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 192). 53 In its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), the Court annulled the September 2023 acts in so far as they concerned the applicant on the ground that the evidence contained in the first to fifth WK files did not constitute a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that, on the date of adoption of those acts, the applicant was benefitting from Mr Deripaska within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g). 54 In the present case, in the contested acts, the Council did not amend the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under amended criterion (g) as compared with the reasons it had relied on in the September 2023 acts, which were annulled by the judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605). It should also be noted that, apart from the sixth WK file forwarded to the applicant on 21 December 2023 (see paragraph 18 above), in the instant case the Council puts forward arguments and evidence on which it previously relied in support of its contention that the September 2023 acts were lawful, in the case giving rise to the judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), as is clear from the grounds of that judgment. 55 It is therefore necessary to examine whether, in the light of the evidence furnished by it, the Council was entitled to take the view, on the basis of the assets which Mr Deripaska was said to have transferred to the applicant, that the applicant was benefitting from Mr Deripaska within the meaning of amended criterion (g) when the contested acts were adopted. 56 First, as regards the hotel in Lech, it is apparent from the evidence that, between December 2021 and January 2022, Mr Deripaska transferred ownership of that hotel to the applicant, through a company owned by the latter. In that connection, it follows from exhibit 1 (an article published on the website of the American magazine Forbes on 5 March 2022) and exhibit 4 (an extract from the online platform ‘Russian Asset Tracker’ published on the website of the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP)) in the first WK file that Mr Deripaska was, through a company established in Cyprus, the owner of a five-star hotel located in the ski resort of Lech in the Austrian Alps worth USD 3 million (approximately EUR 2.77 million) and that, since January 2022, that hotel has been owned by the applicant through a company established in Russia by the name of Gost Hotel Management. It also follows from exhibit 8 in the first WK file (an article published on the website of the Austrian newspaper Kronen-Zeitung on 8 March 2022) that the hotel in question was owned by Dornton Ltd, a company established in Cyprus and linked to Mr Deripaska, before being sold to the ‘Russian hotel group “Gost”’, which was owned by Mr Deripaska until the United States of America imposed sanctions on him, following which the applicant became the owner of that group. 57 Concerning the September 2023 acts, the Court held, in paragraphs 195 and 196 of its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), that the Council had not demonstrated that the arrangements for transferring ownership of that hotel, that is to say a synallagmatic contract of sale, supported the conclusion that such a transfer constituted a non-negligible benefit in favour of the applicant for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), in that it was the applicant who had taken advantage of Mr Deripaska to a non-negligible extent. 58 The additional evidence and arguments put forward by the Council in the present case are not such as to lead to a different conclusion as regards the situation at the time of the adoption of the contested acts. 59 First of all, exhibits 1 to 4 in the sixth WK file merely state that the applicant is the owner of Gost Hotel Management, which is already apparent from the first WK file, as stated in paragraph 56 above. 60 Next, in order to establish the grant of a benefit for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), the Council cannot rely in the present case on the fact, which is apparent from exhibits 3 and 4 in the sixth WK file, that Gost Hotel Management was transferred to the applicant after the United States of America imposed sanctions on Mr Deripaska. In its assessment of the lawfulness of the September 2023 acts, the Court found that fact to be irrelevant because the restrictive measures system put in place by the European Union against the Russian Federation is independent from that of third States and exhibit 2 in the first WK file (an article published on the website ‘www.opensecrets.org’ on 20 October 2021) stated that the sanctions imposed on Mr Deripaska by the United States Department of the Treasury were not linked to the situation in Ukraine, which is the reason for the restrictive measures taken by the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 196). 61 Lastly, the Council’s argument that the ownership of the hotel in Lech enhances the applicant’s reputation and authority on the European luxury real estate market, by providing him with a platform to expand his influence within elite business and social circles, also cannot succeed. In that regard, since it is apparent from paragraph 57 above that the arrangements for transferring that hotel did not support the conclusion that such a transfer constituted a non-negligible benefit in favour of the applicant for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), the likely consequences of the acquisition of such a property do not in themselves demonstrate that it was the purchaser who took advantage of the seller, and not vice versa, or therefore cast doubt on the synallagmatic nature of such an acquisition, which, moreover, is not disputed by the Council in the present case as regards the hotel in Lech. In any event, as the Council acknowledged at the hearing, there is nothing in the file to prove that the applicant enjoyed a special position in the luxury real estate sector or that he bolstered that position by acquiring the hotel in question. 62 Secondly, with respect to Terra Services, it is apparent from the extracts in exhibits 5 and 6 in the first WK file (two extracts from the website of the United Kingdom’s companies register concerning Terra Services) that, in January 2018, Mr Deripaska gave the applicant control of that company, transferring 75% of his shares and voting rights in the company to the applicant. 63 In that connection, as regards the September 2023 acts, the Court held, in paragraph 198 of its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), that the Council had not put forward any evidence to support the conclusion that the transfer, by Mr Deripaska, of shares in Terra Services to the applicant produced for the benefit of the latter specifically a non-negligible advantage. 64 In the present case, it must be stated that the Council has not presented any argument capable of leading to a different conclusion as regards the situation at the time of the adoption of the contested acts. 65 Exhibit 6 in the sixth WK file simply confirms that Mr Deripaska transferred Terra Services to the applicant and that that company ‘is linked’ to the other three companies that own properties in France which belonged to Mr Deripaska. Such a commercial link, which was also already apparent from exhibit 9 (an article published on the website of Seth Hettena, an investigative journalist, on 22 October 2021) and exhibit 10 (an article published on the website ‘quitrobbingohio.com’ on 20 October 2021) in the first WK file, is not sufficient to demonstrate that it was the applicant who took advantage of Mr Deripaska following that transaction, and not vice versa. 66 Similarly, the Council’s argument based on the fact that Terra Services is included on the list of creditors of those three companies cannot be upheld. That fact merely demonstrates the existence of commercial links between that company and the assets in question, but does not permit the inference that the transfer of that company by Mr Deripaska enabled the applicant to exercise any control over those assets. 67 Moreover, it must be held that the Council’s argument that the transfer of Terra Services affords the applicant the opportunity to exert influence in Europe and generate substantial income is not supported by any evidence. On the contrary, the abridged accounts of Terra Services for the accounting years ending 31 March 2023, 31 March 2022 and 31 March 2021, produced by the applicant, tend rather to show that, during those accounting years, that company did not carry out any transactions and that its accounts remained unchanged in relation to the preceding financial year. 68 Thirdly, as regards the properties in France, the Council does not dispute the applicant’s assertion that Mr Deripaska transferred to him 1% of the companies owning those properties between 2005 and 2006, that is to say, before the end of February 2014 and the annexation of Crimea. Therefore, such transfers are not relevant for establishing whether a benefit exists for the purposes of the second part of amended criterion (g), in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 48 above. 69 Fourthly, concerning the transfer of Rospechat to the applicant, it must be found, as the Court held in paragraph 200 of its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), in relation to the September 2023 acts, that, since that company was declared insolvent in September 2022, as is apparent from exhibit 3 in the second WK file (an article published on the website of the Union of Printing Industry Enterprises of Russia on 5 October 2022) and as the Council acknowledges, the transfer of Rospechat cannot constitute a benefit the consequences of which subsisted at the time the September 2023 acts were adopted, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 49 above. 70 Fifthly, as regards Ingosstrakh and BEL Development, it must be pointed out that the applicant claims that he has not been a shareholder of those companies since August 2018 and May 2023, respectively, and that the Council has not taken a position on that assertion. In addition, exhibit 4 in the sixth WK file is the only item of evidence to refer to those companies and it merely states that the applicant received them from Mr Deripaska, without there being anything to suggest that such a transfer produced a non-negligible advantage for the benefit of the applicant deriving from Mr Deripaska. 71 Sixthly, in the rejoinder, the Council refers to the company For Media and the non-profit foundation Fidelitas, by means of which the applicant allegedly benefits from Mr Deripaska. However, it must be stated that the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue do not mention either that company or that foundation and that none of the documents contained in the WK files or in the materials provided by the Council as annexes to its written pleadings in the present relate to them. Accordingly, the Council cannot rely on them to argue that the applicant was benefitting from Mr Deripaska within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g). 72 Seventhly and lastly, as regards the September 2023 acts, the Court held in paragraph 202 of its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), that the family relationship between the applicant and Mr Deripaska, his first cousin, was also not such as to indicate that the transactions between them necessarily entailed the grant of a non-negligible benefit in favour of the applicant. The same conclusion must be drawn as regards the contested acts. The applicant and Mr Deripaska have a longstanding business relationship and the transactions between them are part of that business relationship rather than being confined strictly to a family framework. The mere existence of shared or common interests between two business partners is not sufficient in itself to demonstrate that one of the two business partners benefits from the other (see paragraph 47 above). 73 It follows from the foregoing that the Council has not discharged the burden of proof borne by it to establish that the applicant was benefitting from a leading businessperson operating in Russia, within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g). 74 The third plea must therefore be upheld and the contested acts must be annulled in so far as they concern the applicant. It is therefore not necessary to examine the other pleas and arguments raised by the applicant against those acts or the request for a measure of organisation of procedure made by him in the application. The effects in time of the partial annulment of Decision 2024/847 and Decision 2024/2456 75 Given that the Council’s principal head of claim seeking dismissal of the action has not been upheld, it is necessary to examine its alternative head of claim seeking to have the Court maintain the effects of Decision 2024/847 and Decision 2024/2456 until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/849 and Implementing Regulation 2024/2455, respectively, takes effect as regards the applicant. In that connection, it should be recalled that, by those two successive decisions, the Council maintained the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue in respect of the applicant from 15 March to 15 September 2024 (see paragraph 19 above) and then from 15 September 2024 to 15 March 2025 (see paragraph 21 above). 76 By Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ L 2025/528), the Council again extended the imposition of the restrictive measures at issue in respect of the applicant until 15 September 2025. 77 Therefore, while the annulment of Decision 2024/847 and Decision 2024/2455, in so far as they concern the applicant, entails the removal of his name from the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145 for the period from 15 March 2024 to 15 March 2025, that annulment is, however, incapable of casting doubt on the lawfulness of that listing for the subsequent period, given that the present action does not concern Decision 2025/528. 78 Consequently, since the applicant is subject to further restrictive measures, the Council’s alternative claim relating to the maintenance in time of the effects of Decision 2024/847 and Decision 2024/2455 has become devoid of purpose. Costs 79 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 80 In the present case, since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as the name of Mr Pavel Ezubov was maintained on the lists of persons, entities and bodies to which those restrictive measures apply; 2. Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 June 2025. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.