Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:471
Date: 2016-09-14
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 76 It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union are to disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 to 123). 77 Furthermore, the Court has held that, having regard to the preventive nature of restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72). 78 In the present case, it is apparent from the statement of reasons for the contested measures that the Council decided to re-list the applicant on the basis of the criterion relating to entities that provide support to the Government of Iran. Two grounds were relied on in order to justify the application of that criterion: first, the ground relating to financial support; second, the ground relating to logistical support. 79 It is appropriate to examine the applicant’s arguments directed at disputing the ground relating to logistical support first, and then, if necessary, those directed at disputing the ground relating to financial support. 80 In the first place, it should be noted that, in accordance with the analysis set out in the context of the first plea in law (paragraphs 40 to 68 above), there was nothing to preclude the Council justifying its decision to re-list the applicant on the basis of the ground relating to logistical support, even though the Council was aware of the facts relied on in support of that ground at the time of the first listing and no new circumstances had arisen as regards those facts since the first listing. 81 In the second place, as regards whether the criterion relating to entities that provide support to the Government of Iran is proportionate in the light of the objectives pursued by Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012, it must be pointed out that that question concerns the lawfulness of that criterion. The arguments put forward by the applicant in that regard will therefore be examined, where appropriate, in the context of the fifth plea in law by which the applicant raises, in the alternative, a plea of illegality against the criterion in question. 82 In the third place, it should be noted that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council has not alleged that the applicant provides indirect support to the Government of Iran through a third company that pays dividends to that government. It is clear from the statement of reasons for the contested measures, and from the letter of 23 October 2014 by which the Council informed the applicant of its intention to re-include it in the lists at issue and of the reasons justifying that re-listing, that it is on account of the significance of the applicant’s transport activities in the Iranian oil sector, which is controlled by the Government of Iran, that the applicant is regarded as providing support, characterised as logistical support, to that government. 83 It is therefore appropriate to examine whether the Council erred in concluding that the applicant provided logistical support to the Government of Iran on account of its activities in the transport of Iranian oil. 84 In this connection, first of all, it must be pointed out that the applicant does not dispute the nature or the scale of its activities in the Iranian energy sector. According to the statement of reasons for the contested measures and the documents provided to the applicant by emails of 27 October 2014, the applicant operates the largest tanker fleet in the Middle East and is one of the main transporters of Iranian crude oil. Moreover, its main business activity consists in providing essential services to NIOC, an entity owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and which has also been included in the lists at issue. The applicant’s transport activities are thus essential for the proper functioning of the Iranian oil industry, which is controlled by the Government of Iran through various State-owned undertakings. 85 Next, it should be recalled that the criterion at issue, which is the only relevant criterion in the present case, is to be distinguished from the criterion relating to the provision of support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, laid down in Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 267/2012. That criterion is to be construed as being aimed at any support which, although having no direct or indirect connection with the development of nuclear proliferation, is nonetheless capable, by its quantitative or qualitative significance, of encouraging such development, by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which allow it to pursue nuclear proliferation activities (judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 79 and 80). 86 Lastly, the connection established by the applicable legislation between the Iranian energy sector and the development of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be noted. Recital 22 in the preamble to Decision 2010/413, which refers to Resolution 1929, notes the potential connection between the revenue derived by the Islamic Republic of Iran from its energy sector and the funding of its nuclear activities (see paragraph 5 above). 87 Therefore, in the present case, having regard, first, to the significance of the applicant’s transport activities in the Iranian oil sector, which allow the Government of Iran to meet specific logistical needs in that sector, which it controls, and, second, to the connection that exists between the energy sector and nuclear proliferation activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, mentioned in paragraph 86 above, it must be held that the Council did not err in finding that the applicant provided support to the Government of Iran, within the meaning of the criterion at issue. 88 Moreover, that conclusion cannot be called in question by the suspension of certain restrictive measures taken against the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided for in the Joint Plan of Action. 89 In this connection, it should be recalled that, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action relied on by the applicant, the Council adopted, on 20 January 2014, Decision 2014/21 and Regulation No 2014/42 in order to suspend temporarily the prohibition on transporting oil originating in or exported from the Islamic Republic of Iran to any other country, laid down in Article 3a of Decision 2010/413 and Article 11 of Regulation No 267/2012 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The suspension of that prohibition, which was extended by various successive measures of the Council, therefore contributes to easing the sanctions regime applying to the Islamic Republic of Iran by allowing entities incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State, to whom the prohibition in question applied under Article 49 of Regulation No 267/2012, provide transport services in relation to Iranian crude oil sales to current customers. 90 However, neither the elements set out as part of the first step of the Joint Plan of Action, nor the measures adopted by the Council to implement that Plan of Action, provide for a suspension of individual restrictive measures or for an amendment of the criteria on the basis of which such measures may be adopted. It is therefore apparent from those measures that, despite the introduction of sanctions relief, the Council considered it necessary, at that stage, to maintain and continue to adopt fund-freezing measures against entities that satisfy one of the criteria for inclusion laid down in Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012. 91 Consequently, the fact that, following the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, certain activities in relation to the transport of Iranian crude oil were temporarily no longer prohibited in no way prevented the Council from re-listing the applicant, since, as is apparent from the analysis set out above (paragraphs 80 to 87), the applicant satisfied the criterion of providing support to the Government of Iran. 92 Accordingly, and in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 77 above, it must be held that the re-listing of the applicant was justified, and it is not necessary to examine the ground relating to financial support. 93 The second plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded. The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to good administration and breach of the principle of effective judicial protection 94 The applicant claims that the Council infringed its rights of defence, its right to good administration and was in breach of the principle of effective judicial protection. 95 First, it submits that the Council did not provide it with the actual grounds on which it envisaged re-including it in the lists at issue, nor did the Council provide it with the evidence establishing that it directly provided financial or logistical support to the Government of Iran. According to the applicant, the Council did not, therefore, provide it with a full copy of its file as it was obliged to do. 96 Second, the Council did not allow it to effectively make known its views on the actual grounds for its re-listing. In that regard, the applicant submits that it was granted insufficient time to submit its observations regarding the Council’s letter of 23 October 2014 and the supporting documents provided by emails of 27 October 2014. Furthermore, it submits that it was not in a position to comment on the material contained in the extract from the proposal to re-list it since that document was provided to it belatedly without justification. 97 Third, the Council did not grant the applicant a hearing before re-including it in the lists at issue, despite the request made to that effect in its letter of 5 November 2014. 98 Fourth, the Council provided no evidence showing that it had examined carefully and impartially the observations that the applicant had made in its letter of 5 November 2014. 99 First of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, respect for the rights of the defence, especially the right to be heard, in all proceedings initiated against an entity which may lead to a measure adversely affecting that entity, is a fundamental principle of EU law which must be guaranteed, even when there are no rules governing the procedure in question (see judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited). 100 First, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence requires that the entity concerned must be informed of the evidence adduced against it to justify the measure adversely affecting it. Second, it must be afforded the opportunity effectively to make known its views on that evidence (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 December 2006, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, T‑228/02, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 93). On the other hand, neither the legislation in question, namely Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012, nor the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence, gives the persons concerned the right to a formal hearing (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 23 October 2008 in People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, T‑256/07, EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). 101 Next, in contrast to an initial measure whereby the funds of an entity are frozen, any subsequent decision to freeze funds must, in principle, be preceded by disclosure of any new incriminating evidence, unless overriding considerations pertaining to the security of the European Union or of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations preclude it, and by an opportunity for the entity concerned to make known its views (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 December 2006, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, T‑228/02, EU:T:2006:384, paragraph 137). 102 Moreover, it must be observed that when sufficiently precise information has been communicated, enabling the entity concerned to make its point of view on the evidence adduced against it by the Council known to advantage, the principle of respect for the rights of the defence does not mean that that institution is obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in its file. It is only at the request of the party concerned that the Council is required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue (see judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). 103 Lastly, as regards the principle of effective judicial protection, it must be recalled that that principle is a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That principle means that the European Union authority which adopts an act imposing restrictive measures against a person or entity is bound to communicate to that person or entity the grounds on which it is based, so far as possible, either at the time when that measure is adopted or, at the very least, as swiftly as possible after it has been adopted, in order to enable that person or entity to exercise its right to bring an action, within the time limits (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2011, Bank Melli Iran v Council, C‑548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). 104 Since, in the present case, it has been held in paragraph 92 above that the re-listing of the applicant was justified on the sole basis of the ground relating to logistical support, it is appropriate to verify, in the context of the present plea in law, whether the Council observed the principles set out in paragraphs 99 to 103 above in so far as that ground is concerned. 105 First, as regards the disclosure of incriminating evidence and access to the file, first of all, it should be noted that, by letter of 23 October 2014, that is to say almost four months before the adoption of the contested measures, the Council informed the applicant of the reasons why it considered that the applicant provided support to the Government of Iran. In that letter, it stated, inter alia, that the applicant provided logistical support to the Government of Iran because it was a key transporter in the Iranian oil sector and that sector was controlled by the Iranian State. 106 Next, by emails of 27 October 2014, the Council provided the applicant with documents in its file that it had omitted to attach to its letter of 23 October 2014 (see paragraph 25 above). Those documents, which the Council contends justified the re-listing of the applicant, contained, inter alia, information regarding the applicant’s shareholders and its activities in the oil transport sector. 107 Lastly, the Council replied to the request for access to documents made by the applicant in its letter of 29 October 2014 by providing the applicant, by letter of 5 February 2015, with a declassified extract from the proposal to re-include it in the lists at issue. 108 In this connection, it must be pointed out, first, that the declassified extract referred to in paragraph 107 above was disclosed to the applicant more than three months after its request for access to the file and only seven days before the adoption of the contested measures, and, second, that the Council did not state whether the file regarding the re-listing of the applicant contained documents other than those provided by emails of 27 October 2014 and by letter of 5 February 2015. However, it must be recalled that the belated disclosure of a document on which the Council relied in order to adopt or maintain the restrictive measures concerning an entity, or the failure to disclose such a document, does not constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence that would justify the annulment of the acts concerned unless it is established that the restrictive measures concerned could not lawfully have been adopted or maintained if the document in question had to be excluded as incriminating evidence (judgments of 6 September 2013, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑35/10 and T‑7/11, EU:T:2013:397, paragraph 100, and Persia International Bank v Council, T‑493/10, EU:T:2013:398, paragraph 85). 109 Consequently, in the present case, even if the disclosure of the document contained in the letter of 5 February 2015 were to be regarded as belated and the Council were to be regarded as having granted the applicant only partial access to its file, as the applicant claims, those circumstances could justify the annulment of the contested measures only if it were also established that the re-listing of the applicant could not be justified having regard to the material to which it had access in good time, namely the reasons for its listing provided by letter of 23 October 2014 and the documents provided by emails of 27 October 2014. It is apparent from the analysis set out in paragraphs 84 to 87 above that that material, to which the applicant had access almost four months before the adoption of the contested measures, constituted a sufficient basis to justify the re-listing of the applicant. 110 Accordingly, the fact that the applicant may not have obtained access to certain documents, or may not have obtained access to them in good time, is not, in any event, liable to justify the annulment of the contested measures. 111 Second, as regards the applicant’s right to make known its views, it should be recalled that, in the letter of 23 October 2014, the Council informed the applicant that it had until 5 November 2014 to submit observations on the evidence adduced against it, thereby allowing the applicant a period of thirteen days within which to make known its views. 112 In that regard, first of all, it must be pointed out that the Council did not reply to the applicant’s various requests, made in its letters of 27 and 29 October 2014, for an extension to the period within which to make known its views. Although that unjustified failure to reply is not, in itself, liable to constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence, it nevertheless left the applicant in a state of uncertainty as to a possible extension of the deadline by which the applicant was required to submit its observations and it therefore in no way helped the applicant to conduct its defence. 113 Next, the imposition of a deadline within which to submit observations, although not expressly provided for by the applicable legislation, may well be justified inasmuch as it makes it possible for the Council to know when it will have all the material necessary for assessing a possible re-listing and therefore when it will be able to take a decision. However, in the present case, the Court considers, like the applicant, that having regard to the fact that the supporting documents mentioned in the letter of 23 October 2014, which the Council omitted to attach to that letter, were only provided on 27 October 2014, the deadline of 5 November set in the letter of 23 October 2014 allowed the applicant only a relatively short period within which to submit its observations. 114 Lastly, the period prescribed in the letter of 23 October 2014 did not make it possible for the applicant to make known its views, before the adoption of the contested measures, on the declassified extract from the proposal to re-include it in the lists at issue provided by letter of 5 February 2015. 115 Consequently, in the light of those factors, and given the obligation of rigour that was required of the Council when adopting the contested measures (see paragraph 66 above), it should be held that, because of the short period imposed on the applicant within which to submit its observations on the charges against it, the contested measures are vitiated by an irregularity. However, that irregularity clearly did not prevent the applicant from effectively making known its views before the adoption of those measures. 116 In its letter of 5 November 2014, the applicant submitted observations concerning, inter alia, the merits of the ground relating to logistical support relied on against it. Those observations are, however, in essence identical to the arguments made in the context of the present action, which was brought almost six months after the disclosure of the incriminating evidence by the letter and emails of 23 and 27 October 2014. The applicant cannot claim, therefore, that the granting of an additional period was necessary in order to enable it properly to defend its rights. 117 Moreover, the document provided to the applicant by letter of 5 February 2015 does not add anything new regarding the ground relating to logistical support. Consequently, even if the applicant had had knowledge of that document in good time, that circumstance would not, in any event, have enabled it to put forward views different from those submitted in its observations of 5 November 2014. 118 Accordingly, the irregularity identified in paragraph 115 above cannot justify the annulment of the contested measures. 119 Third, as regards the applicant’s right to be heard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 100 above, the Council was not required to grant the applicant a formal hearing before re-including it in the lists at issue, since the possibility that was afforded the applicant of submitting its observations in writing was sufficient for the purposes of respecting the applicant’s right to make known its views. 120 Fourth, the applicant’s argument that the Council did not carefully examine the observations set out in its letter of 5 November 2014 is unfounded. In the letter of 16 February 2015 by which the applicant was informed of its re-listing, the Council replied to each of the applicant’s observations, thereby showing that it had taken them into account before adopting the contested measures. However, it considered that the applicant’s arguments, which concerned the respect for its rights of defence, were not liable to call in question the lawfulness of that re-listing. 121 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the arguments put forward by the applicant concerning its rights of defence and the Council’s obligation carefully to examine its observations do not justify the annulment of the contested measures and must therefore be rejected. As regards the claimed infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and breach of the principle of good administration, it must be observed that, in so far as the applicant has not put forward any specific argument in this connection, that claim has no independent scope and must therefore also be rejected. 122 Consequently, the third plea in law must be rejected in its entirety. The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights to property and reputation and the freedom to conduct a business 123 The applicant claims that its re-listing constitutes an unjustified and disproportionate infringement of its fundamental rights. 124 First, it states that it was unable to put its case properly. Second, it submits that the contested measures have had a far-reaching impact on its business and reputation. Third, it argues that the Commission has failed to demonstrate that the freezing of its assets would prevent the development of nuclear proliferation. Fourth, it submits that permitting the listing of an entity that provides only indirect support to the Government of Iran with no link to the Iranian nuclear programme is manifestly disproportionate. Fifth, it states that the Joint Plan of Action permits companies which fall within the territorial scope of the sanctions regime adopted against the Islamic Republic of Iran to transport crude oil. Imposing restrictive measures on the applicant on the ground that it engages in activities that are nevertheless authorised by the Council as regards the abovementioned companies is therefore discriminatory and disproportionate. Sixth, it submits that, in the light of the context, its re-listing was not necessary to achieve the objective pursued. In this connection, it states that it was already subject to certain restrictions under Articles 10a, 10b, 35 and 37a of Regulation No 267/2012 and that fund-freezing measures had already been adopted against the largest oil supplier, namely NIOC. Moreover, it notes that its activities consist in the transport of oil to China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, which is not prohibited by any sanctions regime. Seventh, it states that the measures taken against it could have a devastating effect on the pension fund beneficiaries of its shareholders. 125 A preliminary point to note in respect of the first argument raised by the applicant is that, as is apparent from the analysis of the third plea in law above (see paragraphs 94 to 122), the contested measures are not vitiated by an infringement of the applicant’s procedural rights such as to justify their annulment. Accordingly, the applicant cannot usefully rely, in the context of the present plea in law, on an infringement of the right to make known its views, in order to support the claim that the measures taken against it constitute an unjustified restriction on its fundamental rights. 126 Furthermore, as regards the third and fourth arguments, to the effect that the freezing of the applicant’s funds was neither an appropriate nor a proportionate measure for preventing the development of nuclear proliferation, it must be stated that these are directed at challenging the lawfulness of the provisions of Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012 on the basis of which the contested measures were adopted. Consequently, those arguments will be examined in the context of the fifth plea in law below (see paragraphs 139 to 146). 127 As to the substance, it should be recalled, in the first place, that, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures should be appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 6 September 2013, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑35/10 and T‑7/11, EU:T:2013:397, paragraph 179 and the case-law cited). 128 However, first, as recalled in paragraph 85 above, the freezing of the funds of entities providing support to the Government of Iran is intended to deprive that government of the resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which allow it to pursue proliferation activities. In the present case, it is apparent from the examination of the second plea in law (see paragraphs 80 to 93 above) that the Council was correct in finding that the applicant provided logistical support to the Government of Iran. Accordingly, the re-listing of the applicant corresponds to the legitimate objective pursued by the applicable legislation. 129 Second, although the applicant claims that the restrictive measures against it have serious repercussions on its business and reputation and are likely to affect the pension fund beneficiaries of its shareholders, it must be noted that it has not substantiated its claims with evidence or specific information. 130 In any event, it is indeed true that the applicant’s rights are restricted to some extent by the restrictive measures taken against it, since it cannot, inter alia, use its funds that may be located within the European Union or held by its nationals, or transfer its funds to the European Union, except where special authorisation has been granted. Similarly, the measures concerning the applicant may, in some circumstances, give rise to some mistrust regarding it. 131 However, the case-law makes it clear that the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant are not absolute rights and that their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by public interest objectives pursued by the European Union. Thus, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences affecting the right to property and the right to the free exercise of economic activity, so causing harm to parties who have not been found to be responsible for the situation giving rise to the measures in question. The importance of the objectives pursued by the legislation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators (see judgment of 9 July 2009, Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, EU:T:2009:266, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited). 132 In the present case, given the prime importance of the preservation of international peace and security, the difficulties caused to the applicant are not disproportionate to the ends sought. That is particularly so because the freezing of funds concerns, at most, only a part of the applicant’s assets and Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012 provide for certain exceptions enabling in particular the entities concerned by the fund-freezing measures to meet essential expenditure. Moreover, it should be observed that the Council has not alleged that the applicant is itself involved in nuclear proliferation. Since it is therefore not personally associated with behaviour posing a risk to international peace and security, the degree of mistrust arising regarding it is therefore lower. 133 In the second place, it must be pointed out that the context in which the contested measures were adopted cannot call in question the conclusion that the restrictions on the applicant’s fundamental rights were justified. 134 First of all, neither the provisions of Regulation No 267/2012 relied on by applicant, nor the inclusion of NIOC in the lists at issue, are liable to call in question the necessary nature of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant. Under Article 49 of Regulation No 267/2012, the prohibitions laid down in Articles 10a, 10b, 35 and 37b of that regulation (see paragraphs 10 and 16 above) do not apply to the applicant, but are directed solely at entities incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State. Although it is true that those provisions may affect the applicant since they prohibit the provision of certain services and equipment to Iranian entities, such as the applicant, it must be noted that they have nevertheless not prevented the applicant pursuing its transport activities in the Iranian oil sector, in particular, because the prohibitions in question do not prevent it obtaining the services and equipment necessary for pursuing its activities from undertakings established outside the European Union. Moreover, as is apparent from the documents provided to the applicant by emails of 27 October 2014, the restrictive measures taken against NIOC have in no way prevented that entity, owned by the Government of Iran, pursuing its activities in the Iranian energy sector or turning to the applicant in order to obtain essential services. None of the abovementioned measures have therefore prevented the applicant providing logistical support to NIOC and, therefore, to the Government of Iran, which controls the energy sector. Consequently, in order to achieve the objective pursued, namely exerting pressure on the Government of Iran, the re-listing of the applicant remained necessary. 135 Next, although the transport of oil to countries such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey is not, in itself, prohibited by the applicable legislation and, following the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, certain prohibitions relating to the transport of Iranian oil have been suspended (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), it must be recalled that it is on account of the significance of the applicant’s transport activities, which are essential for the proper functioning of the Iranian oil sector, that the Council considered that the applicant provided support to the Government of Iran, within the meaning of the criterion at issue. The applicant’s situation cannot therefore be compared to that of other entities, which admittedly transport oil, but which do not do so on a scale permitting the inference that the abovementioned criterion is satisfied. The applicant is therefore wrong in claiming that the measures taken against it are discriminatory. 136 Lastly, it is of little importance that it is the second time the applicant has been included in the lists at issue. Following the annulment of the first listing, it was for the Council to carry out, on the basis of Article 266 TFEU, a further examination in order to assess whether the applicant ought to be re-listed, on the basis of reasons which are supported to the requisite legal standard. 137 It is apparent from the analysis of the second plea in law above that the re-listing of the applicant is justified under the criterion at issue. 138 In the light of all the foregoing, the fourth plea in law must therefore be rejected. The fifth plea in law, alleging that Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 are unlawful 139 The applicant submits that if the criterion at issue includes the provision of indirect financial support or the provision of logistical support with no link to nuclear proliferation, that criterion is disproportionate in the light of the objective pursued and, therefore, unlawful. It submits that, in not requiring that a link be established between the entity covered and nuclear proliferation, that criterion is not consistent with the principle of legal certainty. 140 A preliminary point to note is that since it is apparent from the analysis set out above that the contested measures are justified on the basis of the criterion at issue, inasmuch as the applicant provides direct support, characterised as logistical support, to the Government of Iran, it is not necessary to examine whether that criterion may also be interpreted as covering, without breach of the principles of legal certainty and proportionality relied on by the applicant, those entities that provide indirect financial support to that government. 141 As to the substance and, in the first place, as regards the principle of legal certainty, according to settled case-law, that principle, which is a general principle of EU law, requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings (judgment of 18 November 2008, Förster, C‑158/07, EU:C:2008:630, paragraph 67). A penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 1987, Maizena and Others, 137/85, EU:C:1987:493, paragraph 14). The principle of legal certainty implies, inter alia, that any EU legislation, in particular when it imposes or permits the imposition of penalties, must be clear and precise so that the persons concerned may know without ambiguity what rights and obligations flow from it and may take steps accordingly (judgment of 5 April 2006, Degussa v Commission, T‑279/02, EU:T:2006:103, paragraph 66). 142 That requirement of a clear and precise legal basis has also been enshrined in the sphere of restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2013, Nabipour and Others v Council, T‑58/12, EU:T:2013:640, paragraph 107). 143 In the present case, the applicant submits, in essence, that the criterion at issue does not meet the requirement of foreseeability, in so far as it covers any support to the Government of Iran, without requiring that the persons or entities concerned be involved in nuclear proliferation activities. 144 However, it has already been held that the criterion at issue limits the Council’s discretion, by establishing objective criteria, and guarantees the degree of foreseeability required by EU law. Indeed, interpreted by reference to the objective of applying pressure on the Government of Iran in order to oblige it to put an end to its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, that criterion is aimed in a targeted and selective manner at the relevant person or entity’s own activity, which, even if it has no actual direct or indirect connection with nuclear proliferation, is nonetheless capable of encouraging it, by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which allow it to pursue proliferation activities (judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 79 and 80). 145 In the second place, as regards the principle of proportionality, having regard to the prime importance of the preservation of international peace and security, the Council was entitled to take the view, without exceeding the bounds of its discretion, that the freezing of the funds of entities that provide support to the Government of Iran, within the meaning of the criterion at issue, constituted a necessary and appropriate measure for the purposes of exerting pressure on the Government of Iran in order to oblige it to cease its nuclear proliferation activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2012, Melli Bank v Council, C‑380/09 P, EU:C:2012:137, paragraph 61). 146 The fifth plea in law must therefore be rejected, and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 147 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, under Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may decide, exceptionally, if equity so requires, that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his own, or even that he is not to be ordered to pay any. 148 In the present case, the Court considers that it is equitable, having regard to the lack of procedural rigour on the part of the Council identified in paragraph 115 above, that each party should bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders National Iranian Tanker Company and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs. Van der Woude Wiszniewska-Białecka Ulloa Rubio Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 September 2016. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.