Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2025:979
Date: 2025-12-18
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: France

Summary C-182/24 – 1 
Case C-182/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
5 March 2024 
Referring court:  
Tribunal judiciaire de Paris (France) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
8 February 2024 
Applicants:  
RB and Others, as successors in title to Claude Chabrol 
RZ and Others, as successors in title to Paul Gégauff 
Defendants:  
Brinter Company Ltd. 
Artedis 
BS 
MW 
Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (SACD) 
Société des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique (SACEM) 
and Others 
  
1. Subject matter of the main proceedings: 
1 Between 1967 and 1974, Claude Chabrol produced around ten films, five of which 
he made in collaboration with Paul Gégauff, who wrote the dialogue, screenplay 
or adaptation.  
EN 
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2 By agreements of 8 June 1990, the exploitation rights for those films were 
assigned to Brinter Company Ltd., represented by BS, which in turn assigned the 
exploitation rights for some of the films to third parties.  
3 Initially concluded ‘for a term of 30 years’, those agreements are still in force 
for 11 films.  
4 On 11 July 2019, the heirs of Claude Chabrol and Paul Gégauff sued, inter alia, 
Brinter Company Ltd for copyright infringement in respect of 14 films made by 
Claude Chabrol, 5 of which had Paul Gégauff as co-author.  
5 The applicants complain, in essence, of the absence or mediocrity of the 
exploitation of the films in the past, claim that particular contracts have expired, 
that the others have been terminated for non-performance or improper 
performance, and seek damages for breach of contract, copyright infringement and 
infringement of their moral right to the integrity of the works by reason of the 
poor conservation and restoration conditions of the negatives and film media.  
6 The defendants raised a plea of inadmissibility on the ground that 19 co-authors of 
the films at issue had not been joined to the proceedings. 
7 By separate acts of 5 May and 12 June 2020, the applicants sought to have joined 
to the proceedings natural persons in their capacity as successors in title to 
predeceased co-authors as well as the ‘Charlotte Armstrong Estate’, the ‘Daniel 
Boulanger Estate’, the ‘Nicholas Blake Estate’, the ‘Edward Atiyah Estate’, the 
‘Ellery Queen Estate’, the ‘Richard Neely Estate’, the ‘Patricia Highsmith Estate’ 
and the ‘Claude Brulé Estate’.  
8 They also sued the Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (Society of 
Dramatic Authors and Composers, abbreviated to ‘the SACD’) as the 
representative of various co-authors and the Société des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs de musique (Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers of Music, 
abbreviated to ‘the SACEM’).  
2. Legal framework: 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  
9 Article 17 provides: 
‘Right to property  
1. … 
2. Intellectual property shall be protected.’ 
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10 Article 47 provides: 
‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial  
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article.  
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.’  
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society  
11 Recital 9 reads as follows: 
‘Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights must take as a basis a high 
level of protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual creation. Their 
protection helps to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the 
interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the 
public at large. Intellectual property has therefore been recognised as an integral 
part of property.’ 
12 Article 2 provides: 
‘Reproduction right 
Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct 
or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, 
in whole or in part: 
… 
(d) for the producers of the first fixations of films, in respect of the original and 
copies of their films; …’ 
13 Article 3 provides: 
‘Right of communication to the public of works and right of making available to 
the public other subject matter 
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
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2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
the making available to the public, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that 
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them: 
… 
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the original and copies of 
their films; …’ 
14 Article 4 provides: 
‘Distribution right 
1. Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the original of their 
works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any form of 
distribution to the public by sale or otherwise. 
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in 
respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other 
transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder 
or with his consent.’ 
15 Article 8 provides: 
‘Sanctions and remedies 
1. Member States shall provide appropriate sanctions and remedies in respect 
of infringements of the rights and obligations set out in this Directive and shall 
take all the measures necessary to ensure that those sanctions and remedies are 
applied. The sanctions thus provided for shall be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. 
2. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that 
rightholders whose interests are affected by an infringing activity carried out on its 
territory can bring an action for damages and/or apply for an injunction and, 
where appropriate, for the seizure of infringing material as well as of devices, 
products or components referred to in Article 6(2). 
3. Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe a copyright or related right.’ 
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
16 Article 2 provides: 
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‘Scope 
1. Without prejudice to the means which are or may be provided for in 
Community or national legislation, in so far as those means may be more 
favourable for rightholders, the measures, procedures and remedies provided for 
by this Directive shall apply, in accordance with Article 3, to any infringement of 
intellectual property rights as provided for by Community law and/or by the 
national law of the Member State concerned. 
…’ 
17 Article 3 provides: 
‘General obligation 
1. Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies 
necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by 
this Directive. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and 
equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays. 
2. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the 
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their 
abuse.’ 
Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property 
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related 
rights  
18 Article 1 provides: 
‘Duration of authors’ rights 
1. The rights of an author of a literary or artistic work within the meaning of 
Article 2 of the Berne Convention shall run for the life of the author and 
for 70 years after his death, irrespective of the date when the work is lawfully 
made available to the public. …’ 
19 Article 2 provides: 
‘Cinematographic or audiovisual works 
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1. The principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be 
considered as its author or one of its authors. Member States shall be free to 
designate other co-authors. 
2. The term of protection of cinematographic or audiovisual works shall expire 
70 years after the death of the last of the following persons to survive, whether or 
not these persons are designated as co-authors: the principal director, the author of 
the screenplay, the author of the dialogue and the composer of music specifically 
created for use in the cinematographic or audiovisual work.’ 
20 Article 9 provides: 
‘Moral rights 
This Directive shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Member States 
regulating moral rights.’ 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Code de la propriété intellectuelle (Intellectual Property Code) 
21 Article L. 111-1 provides: 
‘The author of a work of the mind shall enjoy in that work, by the mere fact of its 
creation, an exclusive incorporeal property right which is enforceable against all 
persons. That right shall include attributes of an intellectual and moral nature as 
well as attributes of an economic nature …’  
22 Article L. 113-2 provides: 
‘“Work of collaboration” shall mean a work in the creation of which more than 
one natural person has participated …’  
23 Article L. 113-3 provides:  
‘A work of collaboration shall be the joint property of its co-authors. Co-authors 
must exercise their rights by mutual agreement. In the event of disagreement, it is 
for the civil courts to give a ruling. …’ 
24 Article L. 113-7 provides:  
‘Authorship of an audiovisual work shall belong to the natural person or persons 
who have carried out the intellectual creation of the work. Unless proved 
otherwise, the following shall be presumed to be co-authors of an audiovisual 
work made in collaboration: 1° the author of the script; 2° the author of the 
adaptation; 3° the author of the dialogue; 4° the author of the musical 
compositions, with or without words, specially composed for the work; 5° the 
director. …’ 
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3. The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings: 
The defendants 
25 The defendants claim that the action is inadmissible on the ground that the 
applicants failed to have joined to the proceedings all the co-authors of the films 
or the successors in title to those co-authors. In their view, an ‘estate’ cannot 
properly be summoned to the proceedings as it does not have legal personality and 
cannot prove its name, domicile or address. They claim that the fact that collective 
management organisations have been joined to the proceedings does not allow 
that state of affairs to be regularised, since they are not representatives of the co-
authors. In support of the plea of inadmissibility, they list 13 co-authors who, on 
the day of their last written pleadings on 8 June 2023, had not been summoned to 
the proceedings. 
26 As to the substance, the defendants claim that the action is unfounded in so far as 
the acts of exploitation did not take place and have not been proven. They state 
that particular contracts have come to an end but have not given rise to subsequent 
acts of exploitation. By contrast, nine contracts are still being exploited because 
the applicants have not given the assignee formal notice to comply with the terms 
of the termination clause, the conditions of which have not been fulfilled. They 
also dispute the lack of exploitation of the films and the other contractual 
breaches. As regards moral rights, they consider that the restoration of the films in 
question is of good quality, with the exception of one which has since been 
corrected. They maintain that the films are correctly exploited but that the 
applicants or some of them often oppose the planned acts of exploitation. They 
exclude the personal liability of the executives and strongly object to the return of 
the film material of which they claim ownership. 
The SADC 
27 The SACD, a forced intervener, declares that it does not represent, in the present 
proceedings, the following actors or the successors in title to those actors: 
Charlotte Armstrong, Daniel Boulanger, Nicolas Blake, Edward Atiyah, Ellery 
Queen, Richard Neely, Patricia Highsmith, Eugène Archer, Paul Gardner, and 
requests to be exonerated on that basis. 
28 It states that it communicated the details of the estates of Charlotte Armstrong, 
Daniel Boulanger and Patricia Highsmith and undertakes to provide, if requested, 
those of Claude Brulé. 
29 The SACD claims that, in order for the action of a co-author of a work of 
collaboration to be admissible, the case-law requires the other co-authors to be 
joined to the proceedings so that they may take a position individually, in respect 
of both their economic rights and their moral rights, on the action brought before a 
court in relation to their joint work. It considers that, in that context, it cannot 
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validly represent the authors, a fortiori since the authors concerned are not 
members of the SACD. 
30 It recalls its commitment to the rule of unanimity between co-authors and its 
procedural corollary, which is that all the co-authors must be joined to the 
proceedings. It considers that this court has the means to deal with the question of 
the admissibility of the action in compliance with the European standards of high 
copyright protection recognised by the directives concerned. In its view, this court 
could override the unanimity rule in the light of the exceptional constraints 
specific to the present case, particularly through Article 6(1) of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights arising from Golder (judgment 
of 21 February 1975, Golder v. United Kingdom, 4451/70, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1975:0221JUD000445170). 
The other parties to the proceedings  
31 Having been summoned by separate documents, the other parties did not appear 
and were not represented by a lawyer. 
The applicants 
32 AD claims, with regard to the plea of inadmissibility, that his status as heir 
establishes his interest in bringing proceedings. He adds that the applicants made 
every effort, including with three copyright collecting societies, * to identify the 
successors in title and on occasion sought to have ‘estates’ joined to the 
proceedings for lack of further information, in particular because the defendants 
have provided only the contact details of publishers. In the alternative, the plea of 
inadmissibility cannot in any event be upheld in respect of the contractual claims. 
33 The applicants ultimately rely on a fundamental right to bring any legal action in 
order to preserve their rights, which must lead this court to give a broad 
interpretation of the case-law of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, 
France), which requires that all co-authors be joined to the proceedings. 
34 RB considers that, in any event, applicants should not be deprived of the 
possibility of protecting their rights as a result of the absence of some of the 
parties or inertia caused by an inextricable situation. He adds that the director has 
a predominant status as the principal author and that, moreover, appropriate 
sanctions and remedies are provided for in Directive 2001/29/EC. 
 
* According to the order of the pre-trial judge of 16 February 2023, in order to obtain the contact details of other co-authors or the successors in title 
to those co-authors, the applicants also ‘initiated contact’ with SACD, SACEM and SIAE (Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori [Italian Society of 
Authors and Publishers, abbreviated to ‘SIAE’]. See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000047910860  
SACD AND OTHERS 
 
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4. Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary 
ruling: 
35 The applicants essentially complain of the lack of exploitation of the films. The 
defendants dispute that and submit that it is the applicants and, in particular, AD 
who oppose the exploitation. 
36 The applicants have brought an action for infringement of the economic and the 
moral rights of the author, those infringements being tortious in nature, and, on 
that basis, submit their various claims for damages. They have also brought an 
action for contractual liability and submit that the contracts have been terminated 
by the effect of either their term or the termination clause or seek their judicial 
termination for breach of contractual obligations. 
37 Since 27 January 2020, the date on which the defendants lodged their claims 
raising a plea of inadmissibility based on the failure to join the co-authors of the 
films to the proceedings, the dispute has been paralysed by the fact that it is 
impossible to identify their multiple successive heirs. 
38 In order to regularise their claims, the applicants sought to have joined to the 
proceedings seven persons thought to be co-authors or successors in title and eight 
‘estates’ of co-authors. In response to the claim that an estate does not have legal 
personality, they state that they were unable to identify the natural persons who 
are heirs. They also sought to have joined to the proceedings the SACD, a 
collecting society, describing it as the representative of the successors in title to 
the eight ‘estates’, which the SACD disputes. 
39 The preparation of the case is thus prolonged by the search for co-authors or the 
successors in title to those co-authors, whom, in many cases, it is still impossible 
to summon to the proceedings.  
40 The parties accuse each other of unjustified refusals to disseminate the works and 
of thus making it impossible to bring them to the attention of the public, fearing, 
in the absence of a decision on the merits, that they will be forgotten. 
(a) National law and case-law 
41 The applicable national law consists of the combined provisions of the Intellectual 
Property Code (see paragraphs 21 to 24 of this summary) defining the category of 
audiovisual works, into which classification the films in question fall, as ‘works of 
collaboration’ which are co-owned by their co-authors, and the Code de procédure 
civile (Code of Civil Procedure), which provides for a plea of inadmissibility in 
accordance with the rules of ordinary law where not all of the co-authors have 
been joined to the proceedings. 
42 In its judgment of 10 May 1995 (First Civil Chamber, 10 May 1995, appeal 
No 93-10.945), the Court of Cassation clarified that ‘the co-author of a work of 
collaboration who brings an action to defend his economic rights is obliged, on 
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pain of the inadmissibility of his action, to seek to have joined to the proceedings 
the other authors of the work, since his contribution cannot be separated from that 
of the co-authors’. 
43 It is required that the co-authors in question only be joined to the proceedings, 
without their actually having to appear before this court or comply with the 
request (First Civil Chamber, 11 January 2000, appeal No 98-20.446). 
44 Under national law, the system arising from Article L. 113-3 of the Intellectual 
Property Code is one of indivisible ownership. The indivisibly owned property is 
that of the co-authors referred to in Article L. 113-7 of that code, which 
establishes a presumption in order to attribute that status to them. 
45 Article L. 113-3 creates a special system based on the rule of the unanimity of the 
indivisible co-authors. 
46 There are few exceptions to the unanimity rule at this stage and it entails the 
obligation, once again, to seek to have joined to the proceedings the other co-
authors in an action based on indivisible rights. That is true for an action for 
infringement of both the economic rights of the author and the moral rights of the 
author. 
47 It is therefore for the applicant seeking to protect his or her intellectual property 
rights to seek to have joined to the proceedings all the co-authors of a work of 
collaboration. Where, as in the present dispute, there are co-authors, it is for him 
to seek to have them joined to the proceedings or prove that the presumption 
conferring that status on them, laid down in Article L. 113-7 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, is unfounded. 
48 The national law and the relevant case-law therefore engender a wide-ranging 
preliminary debate on the admissibility of the action. It requires the applicant to 
establish facts which necessitate, on his part, a significant effort to legally classify 
the respective contributions to the collective work and provide evidence. The 
intensity of that effort is proportional to the number of co-authors and, depending 
on the circumstances, the successors in title to those co-authors. 
49 Is that system consistent with EU legislation and, in particular, with the Charter 
and the directives on copyright and the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights? 
(b) EU law 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
50 The Court of Justice has recalled that ‘the fundamental right to property, which 
includes intellectual property rights such as copyright (see, to that effect, 
Case C-479/04 Laserdisken [2006] ECR I‑ 8089, paragraph 65), and the 
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fundamental right to effective judicial protection constitute general principles of 
Community law (see respectively, to that effect, Joined Cases C-154/04 
and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I‑ 6451, 
paragraph 126 and the case-law cited, and Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] 
ECR I‑ 2271, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited)’ (judgment of 29 January 
2008, Promusicae, C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54, paragraph 62) and that ‘under 
Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in 
the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, 
subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of 
property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. 
Article 17(2) provides that intellectual property is to be protected’ (judgment 
of 9 February 2012, Luksan, C-277/10, EU:C:2012:65, paragraph 68). 
51 Furthermore, the fundamental right to an effective remedy guaranteed by 
Article 47 of the Charter seeks to ensure ‘the effective exercise of the fundamental 
right to property, which includes the intellectual property right protected in 
Article 17(2) of the Charter. As noted by the Advocate General in point 31 of his 
Opinion, the first of those fundamental rights is a necessary instrument for the 
purpose of protecting the second’ (judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty 
Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 29). 
The directives on copyright and the protection of intellectual property rights  
52 The Court of Justice has held that, ‘subject to the exceptions and limitations laid 
down exhaustively in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29, any use of a work carried out 
by a third party without such prior consent must be regarded as infringing the 
copyright in that work (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2014, UPC 
Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, paragraphs 24 and 25). Nevertheless, 
Article 2(a) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 do not specify the way in which 
the prior consent of the author must be expressed, so that those provisions cannot 
be interpreted as requiring that such consent must necessarily be expressed 
explicitly. It must be held, on the contrary, that those provisions also allow that 
consent to be expressed implicitly. … However, the objective of increased 
protection of authors to which recital 9 of Directive 2001/29 refers implies that the 
circumstances in which implicit consent can be admitted must be strictly defined 
in order not to deprive of effect the very principle of the author’s prior consent’ 
(judgment of 16 November 2016, Soulier and Doke, C-301/15, EU:C:2016:878, 
paragraphs 34, 35 and 37). 
53 As regards Directive 2004/48, any infringement of copyright requires the 
necessary, effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures, procedures and 
remedies, as provided for in Articles 2 and 3 thereof.  
54 The Court of Justice has held that ‘if, in situations such as those at issue in the 
main proceedings, national legislation, as interpreted by the relevant national 
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courts, has the effect of creating an obstacle to a national court before which a 
tortious action has been brought from being able to compel, on application of the 
claimant, the providing and obtaining of evidence relating to the opposing party’s 
family members, proving the alleged infringement of copyright and who was 
responsible for that infringement are rendered impossible, and, consequently, the 
fundamental rights to an effective remedy and to intellectual property, enjoyed by 
the holder of the copyright, are seriously infringed, and thereby the requirement to 
ensure a fair balance between the various fundamental rights in question is not 
respected (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C-580/13, 
EU:C:2015:485, paragraph 41)’ (judgment of 18 October 2018, Bastei 
Lübbe, C-149/17, EU:C:2018:841, paragraph 51). 
55 In that context, the referring court wishes to clarify the scope of the applicants’ 
right to an effective judicial remedy and the fair balance to be struck between that 
right and the high level of protection of the intellectual property rights of all co-
authors. 
(c) Clarifications sought 
1. Protection of the right to an effective judicial remedy  
56 Having been brought on 11 July 2019, the state of the proceedings still does not 
permit final judgment to be given. The parties have taken great pains to identify 
the co-authors or the successors in title to those co-authors without it being 
possible for those persons to be duly summoned to the proceedings as required by 
the national case-law based on Article L. 113-3 of the Intellectual Property Code. 
In particular, actions have been brought against ‘estates’, which do not have legal 
personality. 
57 In its case-law, the Court of Justice has been able to reason on the basis of the 
principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States. 
58 However, Directive 2001/29/EC requires Member States to provide for 
appropriate sanctions and remedies and effective proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions. 
59 Meanwhile, Directive 2004/48/EC provides for measures, procedures and 
remedies without prejudice to the means of national legislation but ‘in so far as 
those means may be more favourable for rightholders’ and provided that they are 
not ‘unnecessarily complicated or costly’ and do not include ‘unreasonable time 
limits’ or ‘unwarranted delays’. 
60 The Charter also guarantees applicants an effective judicial remedy. Those 
persons are, in fact, denied access to the court ruling on the substance of their civil 
claim if they cannot have joined to the proceedings all the successors in title to the 
co-authors of the works at issue given that several estates are being administered, 
including abroad. 
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61 In seeking to maintain the balance of the rights of co-authors, those limitations 
restrict the rights of applicants and impose on them a high risk of the 
inadmissibility of their application by requiring them to carry out significant tasks, 
whatever the circumstances, to verify the identity of the successors in title to the 
co-authors. 
62 This court, bound by the principle that national law must be interpreted in 
conformity with EU law, is therefore uncertain as to the interpretation to be given 
to those provisions of EU law as allowing or, on the contrary, excluding the 
limitation of the author’s right to bring an action for infringement. It raises the 
first question referred for a preliminary ruling on that point.  
2. The high level of protection of intellectual property rights and the fair 
balance to be struck between intellectual property rights and the right to an 
effective remedy 
63 The system arising from Articles L. 113-3 and L. 113-7 of the Intellectual 
Property Code and the domestic case-law also strike a balance between the rights 
of indivisible co-authors in order to preserve them. Those provisions transpose the 
directives referred to above. 
64 The Court of Justice carries out a comparable analysis by requiring, on the basis 
of Directive 2001/29/EC, the ‘prior consent’ of the rightholder (judgment 
of 27 March 2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192). However, 
that judgment concerns use of the work by a third party and not specifically by 
another co-author. 
65 Above all, the judgment of 16 November 2016, Soulier and Doke, C-301/15, 
EU:C:2016:878, delivered on the basis of that same Directive 2001/29/EC, 
accepts the existence of consent on the part of the author assessed ‘implicitly’. In 
the present case, that criterion would allow for a distinction to be made according 
to the situation of the various co-authors or successors in title. Some of them, as a 
result of several inheritances, probably have residual property rights and have 
never come forward to exercise them. However, the case-law of the Court of 
Justice requires such implicit consent to be defined ‘strictly’ because of the 
objective of a high level of protection of authors referred to in recital 9 of the 
directive. That is a fortiori the case for the moral rights of the author relied on in 
the present case. 
66 This court would point out that copyright has not been fully harmonised and 
questions whether those solutions are actually implemented in the case-law. 
67 On the basis of Directive 2004/48/EC, the case-law of the Court of Justice refers 
to a balance between several fundamental rights (judgment of 18 October 2018, 
Bastei Lübbe, C-149/17, EU:C:2018:841), which were nevertheless different in 
nature, in particular by comparing the right to intellectual property with the right 
to respect for private life.  
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68 In the case at issue in the main proceedings, the rights being weighed are either of 
the same nature or of a comparable nature between indivisible co-authors; the plea 
of inadmissibility makes it possible to guarantee absent co-authors that a court 
will not limit those rights without allowing them to defend themselves. 
69 The effect of that procedural rule is to place the burden of informing co-authors 
who may wish to control the exploitation of the joint work on applicants who hold 
their own intellectual property rights rather than on the person responsible for 
exploiting it. 
70 The Court of Justice was able to hold that the rights of the owner of an intellectual 
property right were infringed if he could not, on application, request evidence 
relating to the family of his opposing party (judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty 
Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485). The Court refers directly to the concepts of 
‘serious infringements’ of intellectual property rights and of an effective remedy, 
but also to the concept of a ‘fair balance’ between the various fundamental rights 
at issue. 
71 In the situation at issue in the main proceedings, the infringement is likely to 
affect both the applicants, who are the successors in title to the co-authors, and 
unidentified successors in title, who could have their intellectual property rights 
affected by the outcome of the proceedings without having knowledge of it. 
72 In view, in particular, of the extended term of protection provided for by EU law 
and the Berne Convention, this court is therefore uncertain whether or not it is 
necessary to give precedence to the rights of the applicants. 
73 This court refers the second question referred for a preliminary ruling on that 
point.  
5. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling: 
74 This court asks the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the following 
questions: 
Question 1: Can Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 of Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001, 
Articles 1 to 3 of Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 and Articles 1, 2 and 9 
of Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006, in so far as they guarantee to the 
author and co-author of a cinematographic or audiovisual work both the exclusive 
right to authorise or prohibit the reproduction of their works and the right of their 
communication to the public and a term of protection ending 70 years after the 
death of the last survivor amongst the collaborators of the work, at the same time 
as they require the Member States to provide for effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions and remedies which are appropriate in respect of copyright 
infringements, as well as for measures, procedures and remedies which are not 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or which do not entail unreasonable time 
limits or give rise to unwarranted delays, be interpreted as meaning that an action 
SACD AND OTHERS 
 
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for infringement of the copyright of a work of joint authorship, by its holder, 
requires, in order for it to be admissible, that all of the co-authors be joined to the 
proceedings? 
Question 2: Must the copyright holder’s right to an effective judicial remedy and 
access to a court, a component of the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed, together, 
by Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 of Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001, Articles 1 to 3 
of Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004, Articles 1, 2 and 9 of 
Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006, Directive 2006/115 
of 12 December 2006 and Articles 17 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that the admissibility of 
an action for infringement of copyright is, or is not, conditional on all of the co-
authors of the work being joined to the proceedings?