Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1104
Date: 2025-12-11
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber) 11 December 2025 (*) ( EU trade mark – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark HANDS FREE SLIP-INS – Absolute grounds for refusal – Descriptive character – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Obligation to state reasons – Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law ) In Case T‑254/25, Skechers USA, Inc. II, established in Manhattan Beach, California (United States), represented by J. Bogatz, Y. Stone and J. Graf Wrangel, lawyers, applicant, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by M. Eberl, acting as Agent, defendant, THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber), composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm and R. Pezzuto (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, makes the following Order 1 By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Skechers USA, Inc. II, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 17 February 2025 (Case R 1233/2024-4) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 On 15 January 2024, the applicant obtained from the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) international registration No 1 776 722 designating the European Union in respect of the word sign HANDS FREE SLIP-INS. 3 The goods in respect of which protection within the European Union was sought are in Class 25 under the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond to the following description: ‘Footwear’. 4 By decision of 11 June 2024, the examiner refused the registration of the mark applied for on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation. 5 On 18 June 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision. 6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the mark applied for was descriptive and devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001. In essence, it found that the link between the mark applied for and the goods at issue was sufficiently close in that the mark applied for conveyed direct and specific information about easily recognisable characteristics of those goods without any interpretative effort or cognitive leaps, by at least a significant part of the relevant public. Forms of order sought 7 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested decision and, consequently, order EUIPO to republish the mark applied for; – order EUIPO to pay the costs. 8 EUIPO contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened. Law 9 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 10 In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking any further steps in the proceedings, notwithstanding that one of the parties has requested a hearing (order of 6 October 2015, GEA Group v OHIM (engineering for a better world), T‑545/14, EU:T:2015:789, paragraph 13). Admissibility of a document produced before the Court 11 EUIPO considers that Annex A5 to the application is inadmissible since it was submitted for the first time before the Court. 12 Annex A5 comprises an article taken from a scientific journal. It should be noted that that article was submitted in Annex 6 to the applicant’s submissions of 26 April 2024, produced in response to the provisional refusal notified by the examiner. Thus, that document was not produced for the first time before the Court, with the result that it is admissible. Substance 13 The applicant relies on three pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, secondly, infringement of Article 94(1) of that regulation and, thirdly, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation. The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 14 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal made an incorrect assessment of the descriptive character of the mark applied for. 15 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 16 Under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, trade marks that consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service are not to be registered. Under Article 7(2) of that regulation, Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union. 17 Those signs or indications are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL), T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37). 18 In order for a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the sign and the goods and services in question to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM), T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB), T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 19 A sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods or services concerned, on the one hand, and by reference to the understanding which the relevant persons have of it, on the other (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg), T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 20 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether, as the applicant submits in the context of the present plea, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. – The relevant public and territory 21 The Board of Appeal found, as regards the goods at issue, namely footwear in Class 25, that the relevant public was the general public, whose level of attention was average. The Board of Appeal stated that, as the mark applied for was made up of English words, the absolute ground for refusal had to be assessed by reference to the English-speaking public of the European Union. The Board of Appeal found that, in addition to the public in Ireland and Malta, that public consisted of the public in those Member States in which English is widely understood, such as Denmark, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 22 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the general public has knowledge of English outside of countries where the official language is English, and all the more so since the sign HANDS FREE SLIP-INS is not composed of basic English words. Accordingly, the applicant claims that the descriptive character of the mark applied for can only be assessed with regard to the general public in Ireland and Malta. 23 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 24 In the present case, the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the relevant public is the general public with an average level of attention, which, moreover, is not challenged by the applicant, is well founded and can be upheld by the Court. 25 As regards the relevant territory and the applicant’s arguments challenging the taking into account of the English-speaking public in Member States other than Ireland and Malta, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is sufficient that an absolute ground obtains in part of the European Union for a mark to be refused registration and that part may be limited to a single Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2024, Bartex Bartol v EUIPO – Grupa Chorten (duch puszczy), T‑473/23, not published, EU:T:2024:458, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 26 In the present case, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraphs 17 and 26 of the contested decision, that the general public in Ireland and Malta were in the present case part of the relevant public, which the applicant does not dispute. In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments relating to the definition of the relevant public and whether the terms making up the mark applied for belong to basic English must be rejected as irrelevant. – The meaning of the mark applied for in relation to the goods at issue 27 The Board of Appeal found, as the examiner did, that the combination of the expressions ‘hands free’ and ‘slip-ins’ is understood by the consumer as meaning footwear that can be put on and taken off without the use of one’s hands. On the one hand, the Board of Appeal considered that the relevant public was liable to perceive the expression ‘slip-ins’ as a variant of the expression ‘slip-ons’, referring to shoes that can be slipped into. On the other hand, it noted that the expression ‘hands free’, taking into account the definition of its composite terms, is naturally understood by a significant part of the relevant public as referring to a product that can be used without hands. 28 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal was wrong in considering that the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ is perceived by the relevant public as referring directly to footwear. First, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal was wrong in considering that the expression ‘hands free’ was capable of designating a desirable quality for shoes. The applicant considers, on the contrary, that its use in relation to shoes could be surprising or even a source of confusion for the consumer. Secondly, the applicant submits that the expression ‘slip-ins’ is a fanciful and meaningless expression. It asserts that, given the use of the preposition ‘in’, the expression ‘slip-ins’ will not be directly and immediately perceived by the relevant public as a mere variant of the expression ‘slip-ons’. Accordingly, the applicant submits that the mark applied for, composed of an expression which does not appear in any dictionary, entails a complex thought process and may be interpreted in several possible ways. 29 EUIPO disputes those arguments. 30 First, as regards the expression ‘hands free’, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal correctly considered that the combination of the two terms making up that expression, as defined in the dictionary, meant literally that the product could be used ‘without hands’. In this respect, it should be observed that, in the case relating to the mark HANDS FREE FIT, the Court has already held, in essence, that the expression ‘hands free’ is capable of meaning, in relation to footwear, that that footwear may be put on and worn without the use of one’s hands (see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2025, Skechers USA v EUIPO (HANDS FREE FIT), T‑254/24, not published, EU:T:2025:393, paragraphs 31 and 33). Furthermore, the fact, put forward by the applicant, that the expression ‘hands free’ is commonly used in relation to technical devices, such as telephones, does not support the conclusion that that expression is surprising, or even fanciful, where it is used in relation to other goods, such as shoes. 31 Secondly, as regards the expression ‘slip-ins’, the following should be noted. 32 First of all, the Court has already held that the expression ‘slip in’ refers to the concept of ‘slipping in easily’ and that, in the context of footwear, that concept is likely to be understood by the relevant public as referring to the fact that that footwear may be put on by being slipped on. Furthermore, the Court also stated that the expression ‘slip-ins’ was reasonably close to the expression ‘slip in’ (see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2025, Skechers USA v EUIPO (JUST SLIP IN), T‑295/24, not published, EU:T:2025:391, paragraphs 31 and 35). 33 Next, it should be observed that, in its application, the applicant recognises that the expression ‘slip-ins’ may be read as including the phrasal verb ‘slip in’ which can have multiple meanings. It is apparent from the online version of the Collins dictionary, an extract of which was produced by the applicant before EUIPO, that among the possible meanings of the verb ‘slip in’ is the meaning accepted by the Court in the order of 7 April 2025, JUST SLIP IN (T‑295/24, not published, EU:T:2025:391), namely the meaning which indicates the action of slipping on. 34 Lastly, the applicant does not dispute the fact that even one of the possible meanings among those raised before EUIPO is sufficient to confer on the expression ‘slip-ins’ a descriptive character inasmuch as such a meaning evokes a characteristic of the goods at issue. 35 Thus, the expression ‘slip-ins’ is understood by the relevant public as conveying the message that the footwear may be put on by being slipped on. That is all the more so given that, in the mark applied for, the expression ‘slip-ins’ is associated with the expression ‘hands free’, which also conveys, in the context of footwear, the idea of putting on shoes without the use of one’s hands. 36 That conclusion cannot be called into question where, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 20 of the contested decision, the relevant public associates the expression ‘slip-ins’ with the expression ‘slip-ons’, that is to say with ‘slip-on’ shoes, and identifies the first expression as a mere variant or a misspelling of the second expression. In the context of footwear, a graphical distinction of a single letter does not preclude the relevant public from understanding immediately and without further thought the expression ‘slip-ins’, associated with the expression ‘hands free’, as meaning that the goods at issue may be put on simply by slipping one’s foot into the shoe without additional effort and, thus, without the use of one’s hands. Furthermore, in that regard, it should be noted that it is sufficient that the consumer understands a word, even if it is misspelled, in the same way as the correctly spelled word (see judgment of 22 May 2014, Walcher Meßtechnik v OHIM (HIPERDRIVE), T‑95/13, not published, EU:T:2014:270, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). 37 Thirdly, contrary to what the applicant maintains, the fact that the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’, taken as a whole, does not appear, as such, in the dictionary and that its composite terms are not commonly used together does not mean that a cognitive process is triggered in the mind of the relevant public when it perceives the mark applied for. The English-speaking public will be capable of recognising the various word elements of the mark applied for, which it can link to words found in English dictionaries, and, therefore, will be capable of identifying immediately and without further thought the meaning of those elements within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 18 above. Furthermore, in any event, it must be borne in mind that according to the case-law, EUIPO is under no obligation to prove that the sign in respect of which registration is sought as an EU trade mark is included in dictionaries (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2018, Dermatest v EUIPO (ORIGINAL excellent dermatest 5-star-guarantee.de CLINICALLY TESTED), T‑802/17, not published, EU:T:2018:971, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 38 Fourthly, in so far as the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal failed to take account of the other possible meanings of the terms making up the mark applied for or of the associations and concepts which can be conveyed by that mark, such as the image of a person slipping on their hands, it must be borne in mind that the fact that that mark may have several meanings does not preclude the application of the absolute ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. According to the case-law, a word sign is to be refused registration under that provision if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (judgment of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32). Furthermore, it must be stated that the picture of a person slipping footwear on their hands does not appear to be an image that would immediately be conjured from the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ in relation to footwear covered by the mark applied for. 39 Consequently, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraph 22 of the contested decision, that, in relation to the footwear covered by the mark applied for, the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ was liable to be perceived directly by the relevant public as conveying information about the kind of goods at issue and their method of use, namely shoes that can be put on without the use of one’s hands. – Assessment of the descriptive character in relation to the goods at issue 40 The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the mark applied for had a sufficiently direct link with the goods at issue, with the result that it would convey direct and specific information about characteristics of those goods which are easily recognisable by at least a significant part of the English-speaking public of the European Union, and was therefore caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. In particular, according to the Board of Appeal, the words ‘hands free’ directly qualify the noun ‘slip-ins’, informing the consumer about the characteristics of the shoes, which may be easily put on and taken off without the use of one’s hands. 41 The applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for wrongly finding that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods at issue. The applicant claims, in essence, that the mark applied for does not refer to a characteristic of shoes and does not constitute a description of such a characteristic. According to the applicant, the consumer, who is not accustomed to seeing the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ in relation to the goods at issue, would perceive the mark applied for as an unusual and unique mark. The applicant asserts, in that respect, that the Board of Appeal has not provided any proof or example of the use of the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ for shoes. 42 Furthermore, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the existence of numerous registrations of signs similar to the sign applied for, as EU trade marks, and the registration of the sign applied for in the United Kingdom, which shows that that sign is not descriptive for the English-speaking public. 43 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 44 In that regard, it must be borne in mind, as has been stated in paragraphs 30 and 32 above, that, in the context of the footwear covered by the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the expression ‘hands free’ meant that a product could be used ‘without hands’ and that the expression ‘slip-ins’ referred to the concept of ‘slipping in easily’. 45 Furthermore, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 19 above, a sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods concerned and by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of it. 46 In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for finding that the English-speaking public of the European Union would, upon encountering the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ in connection with footwear in Class 25, establish a direct and specific link between the mark applied for and those goods, enabling it immediately to perceive, without further thought, the characteristic of putting on those goods simply by slipping one’s feet into them. 47 Therefore, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that, for a significant part of the relevant public, the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods at issue. 48 Contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, which disputes that the mark applied for refers to a characteristic of the goods at issue, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the possibility of putting on footwear without bending over or dealing with fastenings was capable of constituting a characteristic relating to the kind, quality or method of use of those goods. 49 It must be held, as was found by the Board of Appeal, that in the context of footwear, the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ conveys direct and specific information about the kind and quality of the goods at issue, since, while it is customary to use one’s hands to put on shoes, the mark applied for, taken as a whole, conveys the message that footwear can be put on or adjusted without the use of one’s hands. Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, the characteristic which is objective and inherent to the nature of the footwear and is conveyed by the mark applied for is that those goods can be put on and adjusted to the foot without the use of one’s hands. For that reason, the example relied on by the applicant, relating to the case which gave rise to the judgment of 15 September 2017, Lidl Stiftung v EUIPO – Primark Holdings (LOVE TO LOUNGE) (T‑305/16, not published, EU:T:2017:607), cannot be transposed to the present case, since it concerned a sign conveying an abstract message not directly linked to the goods covered by the mark LOVE TO LOUNGE (order of 7 April 2025, HANDS FREE FIT, T‑254/24, not published, EU:T:2025:393, paragraph 43). 50 Furthermore, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, the efficacy of being able to put on the footwear without needing to use one’s hands is a marketable quality of the goods at issue (order of 7 April 2025, HANDS FREE FIT, T‑254/24, not published, EU:T:2025:393, paragraph 44). 51 Moreover, contrary to what is argued by the applicant, it is not for the Board of Appeal to provide proof or examples of use of the expression ‘hands free slip-ins’ to describe footwear. According to the case-law, it is not necessary that the signs and indications referred to in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 actually be in use at the time of the application for registration in a way that is descriptive of goods or services such as those in relation to which the application is filed, or of characteristics of those goods or services. It is sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such signs and indications could be used for such purposes (judgment of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley, C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32). 52 As regards the applicant’s arguments based on the numerous registrations of signs similar to the mark applied for as EU trade marks, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the decisions concerning registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which EUIPO is led to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of the decisions of Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice of those boards (judgment of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM, C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47; order of 11 February 2021, Klose v EUIPO, C‑600/20 P, not published, EU:C:2021:110, paragraph 21; and judgment of 21 February 2024, Roethig López v EUIPO – William Grant & Sons Irish Brands (AMAZONIAN GIN COMPANY), T‑756/22, not published, EU:T:2024:101, paragraph 46). 53 As regards the arguments based on the registration in the United Kingdom of a sign identical to the mark applied for, it must be borne in mind that the EU trade mark system is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system (see judgment of 6 September 2018, Bundesverband Souvenir – Geschenke – Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, C‑488/16 P, EU:C:2018:673, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the registrability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed by reference only to the relevant EU rules. EUIPO and, if appropriate, the EU judicature are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or in a third country, that the sign in question is registrable as a national mark (judgments of 27 February 2002, Streamserve v OHIM (STREAMSERVE), T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47, and of 11 May 2010, Abadía Retuerta v OHIM (CUVÉE PALOMAR), T‑237/08, EU:T:2010:185, paragraph 137). That is so even if such a decision was adopted in a country belonging to the linguistic area in which the word sign in question originated (judgments of 27 February 2002, STREAMSERVE, T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47, and of 14 June 2007, Europig v OHIM (EUROPIG), T‑207/06, EU:T:2007:179, paragraph 42). 54 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that the trade mark applied for was caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. 55 The first plea must therefore be rejected as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. The second and third pleas in law, alleging infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 and the infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation 56 In support of its second plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal did not provide a statement of reasons for the contested decision in finding that the mark applied for lacked distinctive character, even though it is required to provide reasoning for each absolute ground for refusal of registration, in accordance with the EUIPO examination guidelines. 57 In support of its third plea, the applicant submits that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law in so far as the Board of Appeal misapplied the criteria for assessing the distinctive character of a trade mark. 58 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 59 It is apparent from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed in that provision applies for the sign not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2002, DKV v OHIM, C‑104/00 P, EU:C:2002:506, paragraph 29, and of 15 October 2020, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO (FAKE DUCK), T‑607/19, not published, EU:T:2020:491, paragraph 67). 60 In the present case, since it has been established that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods at issue, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the applicant’s arguments relating to the distinctive character of the mark applied for, which concern the absolute ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 61 It follows from the foregoing that the third plea must be rejected as ineffective as, consequently, must the second plea, alleging a failure to state reasons for the examination of the absolute ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 62 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law, without there being any need to rule on the second part of the applicant’s first head of claim requesting that EUIPO be ordered to republish the mark applied for, which was formulated in only an ancillary manner to the first part of that head of claim and, therefore, in the event that the contested decision had been annulled (see paragraph 7 above). Costs 63 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 64 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO applied for it to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing was convened. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. Each party shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 11 December 2025 V. Di Bucci P. Škvařilová-Pelzl Registrar President * Language of the case: English.