Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2021:654
Date: 2021-10-06
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Public procurement in the European Union
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Malta

summary of the pleas in law set out in the application initiating proceedings must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the EU Courts to rule on the application. Similarly, the form of order sought in the application initiating proceedings must be unequivocal to prevent the EU Courts from ruling ultra petita or from failing to rule on a complaint (order of 7 May 2013, TME v Commission, C‑418/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:285, paragraph 33, and judgment of 7 December 2018, GE.CO.P. v Commission, T‑280/17, EU:T:2018:889, paragraph 35). 27 Forms of order sought which, like those contained in the application, seek the annulment of measures that are related to those being challenged, including measures of which the applicant is not aware, but that are not identified, must be regarded as failing to meet those requirements since they lack precision as to their subject matter (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 November 2004, Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, T‑166/98, EU:T:2004:337, paragraph 79; of 23 May 2014, European Dynamics Luxembourg v ECB, T‑553/11, not published, EU:T:2014:275, paragraph 54; and of 7 December 2018, GE.CO.P. v Commission, T‑280/17, EU:T:2018:889, paragraph 36). 28 In the present case, the applicant has not identified any decisions taken by the Commission which could be regarded as ‘related’ to the contested decision. 29 The applicant cannot reasonably assert that ‘related decisions’ must be understood as decisions which ‘might have been taken by the [Commission]’ and of which it is not yet aware. 30 First, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 27 above, such an assertion cannot be regarded as being sufficiently precise as to the subject matter of the claim for annulment. Second, as the Commission correctly states, the applicant has misread the judgment of 27 April 2016, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v EUIPO (T‑556/11, EU:T:2016:248), on which it relies in support of its argument. It follows from paragraphs 30 and 261 of that judgment that the related decisions that were regarded as being inextricably linked to the decision to reject the tender had been specifically identified in the relevant head of claim put forward by the applicants in that case. 31 It follows that the first head of claim is inadmissible in so far as it seeks the annulment of ‘all related decisions of the [Commission]’. Substance 32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the tendering procedure at issue is governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1; ‘the Financial Regulation’). By contrast, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for bodies set up under the TFEU and the Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation 2018/1046 (OJ 2019 L 122, p. 1), to which the applicant refers in the application, is not applicable. The tendering procedure at issue was not launched by a body set up under the FEU Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of the Financial Regulation. 33 In support of the application for annulment of the contested decision, the applicant relies on four pleas in law, alleging, first, a manifest error of assessment by the Commission in the evaluation of the revision test; second, infringement of the principles of equal treatment and transparency and of the applicable legislation; third, failure to state reasons in the contested decision; and, fourth, breach of the duty of diligence and of the principle of sound administration. The first plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment by the Commission in the evaluation of the revision test 34 The applicant claims that the contracting authority made a manifest error of assessment by relying on a standard marking grid to evaluate the revision test. By using that grid, it departed from the evaluation method and the quality award criteria defined in the tender specifications. Such a grid, first, constitutes a material change made in the course of the tendering procedure and, second, goes beyond the defined objectives for evaluating the quality award criteria. 35 The applicant disputes, in particular, the evaluation of the two in-depth passages in the text to be revised, which candidates were required to improve (‘the passages to be improved’), and the evaluation of the predefined errors in that text, which candidates were required to correct (‘the predefined errors’). 36 In the first place, as regards the passages to be improved, the applicant is of the view that their inclusion in the text to be revised goes beyond the tender specifications, section 15.1 of which provides that ‘tenderers will be asked to revise a text of about [six] standard pages so that it meets the quality requirements and is usable as it stands’. According to the applicant, none of the quality requirements, linguistic or technical, laid down by the Commission in the tender specifications refers to a stylistic improvement being made to the text. Tenderers were expected to revise the text, not improve it. Stylistic improvements could not have been required to make the text ‘usable as it stands’. It is apparent from section 15.1 of the tender specifications that the latter requirement is separate from the quality requirements. 37 The instructions given to tenderers on the day of the test merely stated that they were ‘encouraged to incorporate any stylistic improvements [they] deem[ed] necessary’ and to achieve ‘a final version of the target text that is linguistically fully usable as it stands’. The applicant submits that those instructions were too vague for it to understand that it was required to make stylistic improvements to the text. In any event, those instructions cannot introduce an award criterion that was not provided for in the tender specifications. 38 The applicant claims that the allocation of eight points for the passages to be improved is important because, were it not for those eight points, it would have achieved the pass score for the revision test. 39 In the second place, as regards the predefined errors, the applicant submits that they do not correspond to any of the quality requirements laid down in the tender specifications and that revising them did not render the text usable as it stood. 40 Specifically, the applicant claims, first, that the standard marking grid gives different weighting to similar predefined errors. In particular, there is a penalty of four points for error 5, which is classified as a terminology error according to the revised document, whereas there is a penalty of two points for all other terminology errors. However, the Commission has provided no justification for that difference. Second, some of the predefined errors are not linguistic errors. Third, the Commission failed to identify certain other errors in the text put forward for the revision test, as shown by Annexes A.8 to A.10, with the result that that text was, in any event, unusable and contrary to the quality requirements prescribed by the tender specifications. By way of example, the applicant claims that the correction of predefined error 8 contains four inconsistencies. 41 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments. 42 In accordance with Article 166(2) of the Financial Regulation, the contracting authority is required to specify, in the procurement documents, the applicable exclusion, selection and award criteria. According to settled case-law, the contracting authority has a broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account when deciding to award a contract following an invitation to tender, and the review by the Court must be limited to checking that the rules governing the procedure and statement of reasons are complied with, that the facts are correct and that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. The contracting authority has that broad discretion throughout the procurement procedure, including in the choice and evaluation of the selection and award criteria (judgments of 17 September 2015, Ricoh Belgium v Council, T‑691/13, not published, EU:T:2015:641, paragraph 31; of 4 July 2016, Orange Business Belgium v Commission, T‑349/13, not published, EU:T:2016:385, paragraph 45; and of 10 February 2021, Sophia Group v Parliament, T‑578/19, not published, EU:T:2021:77, paragraph 58). 43 Article 167(3) of the Financial Regulation provides that the contracting authority is to apply the award criteria to evaluate the tender. 44 In the present case, the applicant disputes, not the choice of selection and award criteria, but the evaluation of the first quality award criterion laid down by section 15 of the tender specifications, namely the revision test. It argues, in essence, that the contracting authority made a manifest error of assessment by using the standard marking grid to evaluate that test and, specifically, by inserting predefined errors and passages to be improved in the text to be revised. 45 Section 15.1 of the tender specifications, relating to, inter alia, the revision test, provided that ‘the evaluators will base their evaluations of the revision […] tests on the quality requirements that apply to […] revisions delivered under the [framework contracts]’ that formed the subject matter of the call for tenders at issue. It was also stated that, for the revision test, ‘tenderers will be asked to revise a text […] so that it meets the quality requirements and is usable as it stands’. 46 The quality requirements applicable to revisions delivered under the framework contracts were set out in section 3 of the tender specifications, headed ‘Quality requirements and quality control’, and were specifically described in section 3.1 of those specifications. 47 Section 3.1 of the tender specifications, headed ‘Quality criteria’, stated that the text delivered in the context of the subject matter of the contract was to be such that ‘it can be used as it stands upon delivery, without further formatting, revision, review or correction by DGT’. That section laid down two types of requirements, namely linguistic quality requirements and technical quality requirements. As regards, specifically, linguistic quality requirements, there were six of these, which were listed as follows: – ‘the content of the source text must be accurately rendered in the target text without unjustified omissions or additions; – references to and explicit or implicit quotes from published documents must be checked and quoted correctly; – correct terminology must be used consistently throughout the text in line with the relevant domain, reference documents and appropriate naming conventions; – linguistic norms for the target language must be followed consistently, in particular as regards grammar, punctuation and spelling; – institutional and document-specific style requirements must be met, for example relevant style guides and document templates, specific instructions from the authorising department, etc.; and – general style requirements must be met, for example the text must be fluent, idiomatic, consistent and tailored to the target audience’. 48 To evaluate the revision test, the evaluators used a standard marking grid to record and calculate the points awarded to tenderers for correcting each of the predefined errors and for revising the passages to be improved and the candidate’s final test score after application of a proportional formula. That grid was based on the revised document, which indicated the predefined errors and the points available for identifying them. It also highlighted the two passages which tenderers were to improve (see paragraph 8 above). 49 Contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the evaluators assessed the revision test in accordance with what was provided for in the tender specifications, namely on the basis of the linguistic quality requirements referred to in paragraph 47 above. 50 As regards, first, the predefined errors, it is apparent from the revised document and, in particular, from the brief description of each of those errors that they correspond to failures to meet the linguistic quality requirements listed in paragraph 47 above. 51 Failure to adhere to the style guide specific to the language concerned (errors 1 and 3) corresponds to a failure to meet the quality requirement that institutional and document-specific style requirements must be met, for example the relevant style guide. A difference in meaning between the source and target texts (errors 2, 13, 25, 27 and 29), an omission (error 4) and an unjustified addition (error 10) correspond to failures to meet the quality requirement that the content of the source text must be accurately reflected in the target text, without unjustified omissions or additions. Terminology errors in the target language (errors 5, 7 and 23) and the use of inconsistent terminology or formulations in the target language (errors 12 and 18) correspond to failures to meet the quality requirement that correct terminology must be used consistently throughout the text in line with the relevant domain, reference documents and appropriate naming conventions. Punctuation errors (errors 6, 9 and 24), grammar errors (errors 14, 19, 21 and 30) and spelling errors (errors 15, 17, 20 and 26) correspond to failures to meet the quality requirement that linguistic norms for the target language must be followed consistently, in particular as regards grammar, punctuation and spelling. An incorrect quotation in the target language (error 8) and incorrect titles or references (errors 11 and 31) correspond to failures to meet the quality requirement that references to and explicit or implicit quotes from published documents must be checked and quoted correctly. Lastly, lack of precision or clarity (errors 16, 22 and 28) corresponds to a failure to meet the quality requirement that general style requirements must be met and that the text must be fluent, idiomatic, consistent and tailored to the target audience. 52 Accordingly, the inclusion of the predefined errors in the text to be revised and their scoring in the marking grid enabled the evaluators to determine whether the applicant was able to correct the failures to meet the linguistic quality requirements within that text. 53 As regards, second, the two passages to be improved, which were highlighted in the revised document, that exercise corresponds to the need to make the text to be revised adhere to, inter alia, the general style requirements set out in paragraph 47 above, which include, for example, the requirement that the text must be fluid, idiomatic, consistent and tailored to the target audience. 54 In addition, as the Commission states, that exercise also corresponds to the need to make the target text ‘usable as it stands’. Thus, section 3.1 of the tender specifications states that the text delivered in the context of the subject matter of the contract must be such that ‘it can be used as it stands upon delivery, without further formatting, revision, review or correction by DGT’. In that regard, the applicant cannot argue that the ‘quality requirements’ are separate from the requirement that the text be ‘usable as it stands’, given that the latter requirement appears in section 3.1 of the tender specifications relating to quality requirements. Furthermore, section 15.1 of the tender specifications contained a similar requirement (see paragraph 45 above). 55 Therefore, evaluating the need to improve the two passages is a practical implementation of the quality requirements, enabling the evaluators to assess whether the applicant was able to recognise that passages of the text to be revised needed improvement to ensure that it met the general style requirements and was usable as it stood. 56 It follows that, in accordance with Article 167(3) of the Financial Regulation, by relying on the revised document and the standard marking grid and, specifically, on the predefined errors and passages to be improved, the contracting authority did not depart from the award criteria defined in the tender specifications but, on the contrary, used them to evaluate the applicant’s ability to revise the text in order to make it conform with the linguistic quality requirements and usable as it stood. In so doing, the contracting authority did not make a manifest error of assessment when evaluating the first quality award criterion. 57 The applicant’s other arguments, relating to the predefined errors, cannot invalidate those conclusions. 58 First, the fact that the standard marking grid gives different weighting to similar predefined errors cannot lead to the finding that the contracting authority made a manifest error of assessment in the evaluation of the revision test. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, the contracting authority has a broad discretion in the evaluation of the award criteria. Accordingly, it was entitled to take the view that some errors, albeit similar, required a different deduction of points. 59 In addition, the Commission has plausibly explained that that error weighting resulted from the fact that the severity of the errors had been taken into account, with the result that a different number of points could be granted for identifying similar errors. In particular, as regards terminology error 5, specifically challenged by the applicant, the Commission has submitted that that error required four points to be deducted on account of its higher severity than the other terminology errors. It required, first, that tenderers look up the appropriate terminology in an important policy document and, second, that they correct a mistake which left the Maltese translation with a very different meaning to that of the original, whereas the implications of the other terminology errors for the understanding of the text were less serious. The applicant merely states that the Commission has not adequately substantiated those explanations, which is not sufficient to render them implausible. Moreover, the applicant has not sought to show that that error was no more serious than the other terminology errors. 60 Second, the argument that ‘some of the predefined errors’ are not linguistic errors to be corrected must be rejected. It should be pointed out, as observed by the Commission, that that argument is not substantiated in any way. The applicant has not identified those predefined errors which, in its view, are not linguistic errors. 61 The same is true of the argument that the contracting authority made a manifest error of assessment in so far as it failed to identify certain errors in the text to be revised, with the result that that text was unusable as it stood. The applicant has not identified those errors. 62 In that regard, the applicant’s reference to Annexes A.9 and A.10 to the application cannot be regarded as sufficient to substantiate its arguments. According to case-law, while specific points in the text of the application may be supported and supplemented by references to specific passages in the documents attached, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot compensate for the lack of essential elements in the application. It is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see order of 19 May 2008, TF1 v Commission, T‑144/04, EU:T:2008:155, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 4 July 2019, Italy v Commission, T‑598/17, not published, EU:T:2019:482, paragraph 30). 63 The only argument substantiated by the applicant is that specifically challenging error 8, consisting in an incorrect citation of an article of the FEU Treaty in the target language. However, that argument is, in any event, ineffective. Even if, as the applicant claims, the sentence in error 8 as corrected in the revised document still contained ‘inconsistencies’, it is sufficient to note that the applicant has neither demonstrated nor even argued that it had identified those inconsistencies during the revision test and that it had been unduly penalised in that regard. It is also apparent from the marking grid completed by the two evaluators for the applicant’s revision test that the applicant obtained the maximum points available for the correction of error 8. Accordingly, the applicant has not demonstrated that the evaluation method chosen infringed its rights. 64 Lastly, following the applicant’s request made in the email of 13 May 2020, its tender was re-evaluated by the evaluators on the basis of the two versions of the text to be revised that it had submitted and which indicated both the alleged errors which the Commission had failed to take into account and the alleged erroneous linguistic corrections. Nevertheless, at the end of that re-evaluation, the evaluators maintained their score (see paragraph 10 above). 65 It follows from all of the foregoing that the first plea must be rejected. The second plea, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and transparency and of the applicable legislation 66 The applicant submits that, by drawing up the standard marking grid and, in particular, by creating the predefined errors and the passages to be improved, the Commission infringed, first, the general principles of equal treatment and transparency which govern public procurement and, second, Article 160(1) and Article 166(2) of the Financial Regulation and points 16.3 and 21 of Annex I to that regulation. 67 The applicant argues that, according to case-law, the award criteria must be stated in the contract documents and must be aimed at identifying the offer which is economically the most advantageous. They must also be linked to the subject matter of the contract and be drafted in such a way that they do not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority. However, the standard marking grid does not meet those requirements. It also infringes the principles of equal treatment and transparency. 68 In that regard, the applicant submits that the standard marking grid changes the evaluation method for the revision test originally established in the tender documentation. It introduced an evaluation of passages to be improved whereas stylistic improvement was not a quality requirement indicated in the tender specifications. As a result, it argues, there was a lack of transparency. 69 In addition, the applicant submits, the criterion relating to the passages to be improved was created after the closing date for the submission of tenders. If the applicant had been aware that it would be evaluated on the passages to be improved, that would have influenced the preparation of its tender. 70 Furthermore, according to the applicant, the introduction of the criterion relating to the passages to be improved and the evaluation of those passages were neither foreseeable nor reasonable and nor were they linked to the subject matter of the contract. 71 Lastly, it is argued, the marking grid lacks transparency as to the allocation of points for the passages to be improved and inexplicably allocates a different number of penalty points to similar errors. The applicant refers again to error 5, which is the only terminology error in respect of which there is a penalty of four points, and the Commission has provided no justification for this differentiation. The marking grid does not therefore allow an objective evaluation to be made and, moreover, confers on the Commission an unrestricted freedom of choice. 72 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments. 73 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicant has indeed identified the provisions of the Financial Regulation which, in its view, constitute the ‘applicable legislation’ which it alleges has been infringed, namely Article 160(1) and Article 166(2) of, and points 16.3 and 21 of Annex I to, that regulation, with the result that the inadmissibility, pleaded by the Commission, of the second plea, in so far as it alleges infringement of the ‘applicable legislation’ rather than specific provisions, must be rejected. 74 As set out in Article 160(1) of the Financial Regulation, all public contracts financed in whole or in part by the EU budget must respect the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination. 75 Article 166(2) of the Financial Regulation requires the contracting authority to specify, in the procurement documents, inter alia, the applicable award criteria. As is apparent from points 16.3(b) and 21.2 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation, the contract award criteria and their relative weighting must be set out in the tender specifications. 76 According to settled case-law, the contracting authority is required to ensure, at each stage of a tendering procedure, observance of the principle of equal treatment and, thereby, equality of opportunity for all tenderers (see judgments of 14 July 2016, Alesa v Commssion, T‑99/14, not published, EU:T:2016:413, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited, and of 16 October 2018, Proof IT v EIGE, T‑10/17, not published, EU:T:2018:682, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C‑496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 108). 77 It is also clear from the case-law that the principle of equal treatment implies an obligation of transparency in order to permit verification that it has been complied with (judgments of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C‑496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 109; of 14 July 2016, Alesa v Commission, T‑99/14, not published, EU:T:2016:413, paragraph 63; and of 9 April 2019, Close and Cegelec v Parliament, T‑259/15, not published, EU:T:2019:229, paragraph 70). 78 The principle of transparency is essentially intended to preclude any risk of favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of the contracting authority. It implies that all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the notice or contract documents so that, first, all reasonably well-informed tenderers exercising ordinary care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, second, the contracting authority is able to ascertain whether the tenders submitted satisfy the criteria applying to the relevant contract (judgments of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C‑496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 111; of 4 July 2016, Orange Business Belgium v Commission, T‑349/13, not published, EU:T:2016:385, paragraph 50; and of 14 July 2016, Alesa v Commission, T‑99/14, not published, EU:T:2016:413, paragraph 64). 79 According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency entail, in particular, that tenderers must be in a position of equality both when they formulate their tenders and when those tenders are being assessed by the contracting authority (see judgment of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 80 Thus, the Court of Justice has held that the subject matter of each contract and the criteria governing its award must be clearly defined from the beginning of the award procedure and that a contracting authority cannot apply, by way of award criteria, sub-criteria which it has not previously brought to the attention of tenderers. Similarly, the contracting authority must interpret the award criteria in the same way throughout the procedure. Those requirements apply, in principle, mutatis mutandis to the obligation of contracting authorities to indicate, in the contract notice or the tender specifications, the ‘relative weighting’ of each of the award criteria (see judgment of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraphs 23 and 24 and the case-law cited). 81 However, the Court of Justice has held that there is no obligation on the contracting authority to bring to the attention of potential tenderers, by publication in the contract notice or in the tender specifications, the method of evaluation which the contracting authority intends to apply in order effectively to evaluate and assess the tenders in the light of the award criteria of the contract and of their relative weighting established in advance in the documentation relating to the contract in question (judgments of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraphs 27 and 28, and of 16 October 2018, Proof IT v EIGE, T‑10/17, not published, EU:T:2018:682, paragraph 51). 82 Similarly, the General Court has held that the contracting authority was not obliged to divulge its system of marking or its evaluation method and that it was only obliged to communicate the applicable award criteria, any sub-criteria and their relative weighting (judgments of 4 July 2016, Orange Business Belgium v Commission, T‑349/13, not published, EU:T:2016:385, paragraphs 138 and 139, and of 16 October 2018, Proof IT v EIGE, T‑10/17, not published, EU:T:2018:682, paragraph 52). 83 In that regard, the Court of Justice has held that an evaluation committee must be able to have some leeway in carrying out its task and, thus, it may, without amending the contract award criteria set out in the tender specifications or the contract notice, structure its own work of examining and analysing the submitted tenders (see judgments of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and of 16 October 2018, Proof IT v EIGE, T‑10/17, not published, EU:T:2018:682, paragraph 53). 84 That leeway is also justified by practical considerations. The contracting authority must be able to adapt the method of evaluation that it will apply in order to assess and rank the tenders in accordance with the circumstances of the case (judgments of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraph 30, and of 16 October 2018, Proof IT v EIGE, T‑10/17, not published, EU:T:2018:682, paragraph 54). 85 In the present case, the tender specifications provided, in section 15, headed ‘Award criteria’, that the contract would be awarded to the tender with the best quality/price ratio, calculated in accordance with a proportional formula set out in section 15.4. There were three quality award criteria consisting in a revision test, translation test and case study. Those quality criteria, together with their respective weighting, were set out in a table contained in the tender specifications. It is apparent from that table that a maximum of 40 points was available for the revision and translation tests, while a maximum of 20 points was available for the case study. In addition, for each test, candidates had to achieve the pass score expressly stated in that table (see paragraph 3 above). 86 As regards, more specifically, the quality criterion consisting in the revision test, section 2 of the tender specifications defined ‘revision’ as being the ‘systematic comparison of the source and target texts before delivery to ensure that the target text is an accurate and consistent rendering of the source text, [and] that it meets the quality requirements set out in these specifications …’. As is apparent from paragraphs 44 to 47 above, section 15.1, read in conjunction with section 3 of the tender specifications, stated, in essence, that tenderers who were candidates in the revision test would have to revise a text so that it met, inter alia, the quality requirements listed in paragraph 47 above and was usable as it stood. 87 The contract award criteria and their respective weighting were therefore defined from the beginning of the contract award procedure and enabled tenderers objectively to understand the actual significance attributed to the award criteria in their subsequent evaluation by the contracting authority. 88 The nature and scope of the quality criterion relating to the revision test and the available points for that test were explained in a manner that was sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal, so that all reasonably well-informed tenderers exercising ordinary care could understand what the Commission expected with regard to the revision test. The text to be revised was thus required to be fully compliant with all of the requirements of the tender specifications, taken together. 89 The applicant argues that the marking grid contravenes the requirements of the case-law relating to the transparency of award criteria, as set out in, inter alia, paragraph 80 above. However, that line of argument is irrelevant since, contrary to what the applicant appears to be claiming, the standard marking grid cannot be regarded as an award criterion. 90 That grid, which is based on the revised document, is merely the expression of the method implemented by the evaluators in order specifically to evaluate and rank the tenders in the light of the contract award criteria. The evaluators recorded the points awarded or deducted on the basis of possible improvements to the two passages and the correction of the predefined errors (see paragraph 48 above) and then calculated candidates’ scores. The applicant itself described the standard marking grid as an evaluation method in the context of the first plea. 91 In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 81 and 82 above, the contracting authority was under no obligation to bring to the attention of potential tenderers, by publication in the contract notice or tender specifications, the evaluation method which it intended to apply in order to evaluate the quality of the revision tests. 92 In addition, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 83 above, the evaluators were free to use the revised document and the standard marking grid to structure their work of examining and analysing the tenders submitted by the candidates. By using that evaluation method, they neither introduced new award criteria nor amended the existing award criteria. As is apparent, in essence, from paragraphs 52 and 55 above, the inclusion of passages to be improved and of predefined errors in the text to be revised and their scoring enabled the evaluators to assess the quality of the revision test on the basis of the linguistic quality requirements defined in section 15.1, read in conjunction with section 3, of the tender specifications. 93 As regards, more specifically, the passages to be improved, it is true, as the applicant submits, that the words ‘stylistic improvements’ do not appear expressly in the description of the linguistic quality requirements within the tender specifications. Nevertheless, the applicant cannot argue that the evaluation of the passages to be improved was neither foreseeable nor reasonable. It was stated in the tender specifications that the evaluators would base their evaluation of the revision tests on the quality requirements that apply to revisions delivered under the framework contracts. Furthermore, it follows from the very definition of the term ‘revision’ in section 2 of the tender specifications that the revision exercise must result in a text which meets the quality requirements. Those requirements included compliance with general style requirements, with the text having to be, for example, fluent, idiomatic, consistent and tailored to the target audience. It follows from, inter alia, the requirement to make the text idiomatic and tailored to the target audience that both linguistic and stylistic improvements had to be made to the revised text. 94 Contrary to what the applicant claims, it was therefore not necessary for the term ‘improve’ to appear expressly in the tender specifications since a reasonably well-informed tenderer exercising ordinary care would have been able to understand, on reading the terms of the tender specifications relating to the revision test and the linguistic quality requirements expected, that it might have to propose improvements to the text. 95 Nor was it necessary for the Commission to explain the objective and scope of the evaluation of the passages to be improved. In that regard, the Commission is right to argue that it is impossible for it to set out in the tender specifications, in detail, all of the possibilities for revising a text in order to meet the linguistic quality requirements without compromising, first, the very purpose of the test, which was to ascertain whether tenderers had the ability to recognise that a text did not meet those requirements, and, second, the requirement to ensure that there is genuine competition between potential tenderers. 96 Furthermore, the instructions given to the revisers on the day of the revision test expressly stated to candidates that they were to ‘correct the errors to achieve a final version of the target text that is … fully usable as it stands’ and that they were ‘encouraged to incorporate any stylistic improvements [they] deem[ed] necessary’. Those instructions therefore enabled candidates to prepare properly for the revision test. 97 The applicant also claims that an evaluation carried out by two evaluators is made redundant by the use of the marking grid because they inevitably achieve the same result. However, it is sufficient to state that that argument is not such as to call into question the transparency of the contract award procedure. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that evaluators may assess the passages to be improved differently. Moreover, as the Commission states, the use of a ‘standard’ marking grid which is based on the revised document makes it possible to carry out an objective and uniform comparison of tenders, even though the evaluation of a revision inherently involves a certain degree of subjectivity. 98 Accordingly, the applicant has not succeeded in showing that use of the standard marking grid infringes the principles of transparency and equal treatment, or Article 160(1) and Article 166(2) of, and points 16.3 and 21 of Annex I to, the Financial Regulation. 99 The second plea must therefore be rejected. The third plea, alleging a failure to state reasons for the contested decision 100 The applicant submits that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons for the contested decision, in infringement of Article 296 TFEU and Article 170 of, and point 31 of Annex I to, the Financial Regulation. 101 Despite numerous exchanges with the Commission, the applicant states that it remains unaware of the details of and reasons for the attribution of the points for the revision test, specifically as regards the passages to be improved. 102 In that regard, it argues, the Commission has failed to explain in a clear and unequivocal fashion how the passages to be improved were evaluated and how points were awarded. This has prevented the applicant, first, from understanding the reasons why it did not obtain the eight points available for those improvements, which would have meant that it obtained the pass score, and, second, from effectively challenging the evaluation method for those passages. 103 The Commission contends that it fulfilled its obligation to state reasons. 104 Under Article 170(2) of the Financial Regulation, the contracting authority is required to notify all tenderers of the grounds on which their tender was rejected. 105 Article 170(3)(a) of the Financial Regulation provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the contracting authority must inform all tenderers whose tender is compliant with the procurement documents and who make a request in writing of the name of the tenderer to whom the contract has been awarded and the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender, the price paid or contract value. 106 The first and second subparagraphs of point 31.1 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation provide: ‘The contracting authority shall inform all candidates or tenderers, simultaneously and individually, by electronic means of decisions reached concerning the outcome of the procedure as soon as possible … In each case, the contracting authority shall indicate the reasons why the request to participate or tender has not been accepted and the available legal remedies.’ 107 The first sentence of point 31.2 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation states that ‘the contracting authority shall communicate the information provided for in Article 170(3) as soon as possible and in any case within 15 days of receipt of a request in writing’. 108 According to case-law, where, as in the present case, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion, respect for the rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to provide adequate reasons for its decisions. Only in this way can the EU Courts verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the discretion depends were present (judgments of 17 September 2015, Ricoh Belgium v Council, T‑691/13, not published, EU:T:2015:641, paragraph 33, and of 10 February 2021, Sophia Group v Parliament, T‑578/19, not published, EU:T:2021:77, paragraph 162). 109 It follows from the legislative provisions referred to in paragraphs 104 to 107 above and from the Court’s case-law that the contracting authority fulfils its obligation to state reasons if, first, it immediately notifies all unsuccessful tenderers of the reasons for the rejection of their tender and then, if expressly requested to do so, informs all tenderers who have submitted an admissible tender of the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected and the name of the successful tenderer within 15 days from the date on which a written request is received (judgments of 17 September 2015, Ricoh Belgium v Council, T‑691/13, not published, EU:T:2015:641, paragraph 37, and of 10 February 2021, Sophia Group v Parliament, T‑578/19, not published, EU:T:2021:77, paragraph 163). 110 That approach is consistent with the purpose of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU, according to which the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal manner so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (judgments of 17 September 2015, Ricoh Belgium v Council, T‑691/13, not published, EU:T:2015:641, paragraph 38, and of 10 February 2021, Sophia Group v Parliament, T‑578/19, not published, EU:T:2021:77, paragraph 164). 111 As regards the period within which the statement of reasons must be provided, according to case-law that statement of reasons must, in principle, be disclosed to the person concerned at the same time as the decision adversely affecting him or her. Nevertheless, information provided at a later date may be taken into account to examine whether the statement of reasons is sufficient, in so far as it is limited to providing further details as to the initial statement of reasons and is based on the facts and law as they stood when the decision was adopted. The question of whether the obligation to state reasons has been fulfilled must be assessed in the light of the information available to the applicant, at the latest, when the action was brought (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2019, Trasys International and Axianseu – Digital Solutions v EASA, T‑741/17, EU:T:2019:572, paragraphs 51 to 53 and the case-law cited). 112 It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that it is necessary to examine whether the Commission has fulfilled its obligation to state reasons for rejecting the applicant’s tender. 113 First, by the contested decision, contained in the letter of 17 April 2020, the Commission informed the applicant of the reasons for the rejection of its tender and of the available legal remedies, in accordance with Article 170(2) of the Financial Regulation and the first and second subparagraphs of point 31.1 of Annex I to that regulation. 114 More specifically, it stated that the applicant’s tender had been rejected on the ground that it did not meet the required minimum quality threshold. It also stated that the applicant had obtained a score of 25.28/40 in the revision test, whereas the pass score for that test was 28/40. That score was accompanied by comments from the two evaluators (see paragraph 6 above). 115 The Commission also stated that ‘as tests were eliminatory, not all three tests [had] necessarily been marked’. The contested decision did not contain scores for the other tests. Instead of containing evaluators’ comments, the translation test and case study were marked ‘not applicable’. 116 It follows that a reading of the contested decision enabled the applicant to understand the reason why its tender had been unsuccessful. 117 Second, on 24 April 2020, the applicant submitted a request for additional information about the contract award decision (see paragraph 7 above). By email of 6 May 2020, the Commission provided it with the identity of the successful tenderer and a table showing the points received by that tenderer for the quality and price of its tender and the ratio of those two criteria. 118 The Commission therefore provided the applicant with information about the identity of the tenderer and about the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender within the 15-day period prescribed in the first sentence of point 31.2 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation, referred to in paragraph 107 above. 119 It follows that the Commission fulfilled the obligation to state reasons in two stages as provided for by the case-law cited in paragraph 109 above. 120 The applicant cannot argue that it did not obtain sufficient information to enable it to understand why its tender had been rejected, in particular as regards the evaluation of the passages to be improved in the revision test, on which its line of argument is focused. 121 Indeed, as soon as it was notified of the contested decision, which contained the two evaluators’ comments, it was aware that it had not made the expected improvements to the text to be revised (see paragraph 6 above). 122 In addition, by email of 6 May 2020, the Commission sent the applicant the revised document in which the passages to be improved were clearly identified. By email of 3 June 2020, the Commission informed the applicant that ‘no points [had been] added for improvements to the in-depth passages’, whereas ‘the marking grid … foresaw up to [eight] extra points for the improvement of certain passages’. By email of 11 June 2020, it clarified the calculation of the applicant’s total score. Lastly, by email of 16 June 2020, it sent the applicant the standard marking grids completed by the two evaluators in respect of its revision test. 123 In that regard, in order to determine whether the obligation to state reasons laid down in the Financial Regulation has been satisfied, the emails of 6 May and of 3, 11 and 16 June 2020 may be taken into account, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 111 above. Those emails contain information which, admittedly, was provided subsequent to notification of the contested decision, but which is limited to providing further details as to the initial statement of reasons. Furthermore, that information was in the applicant’s possession when the action was brought. 124 By being provided with the revised document, the applicant was able to acquaint itself with the passages to be improved which, according to the evaluators, required stylistic improvement. In addition, the explanations provided in those emails and the standard marking grids show the number of points that were available for the passages to be improved which the applicant failed to obtain. 125 As regards the alleged lack of explanation relating to the evaluation of the passages to be improved, such as an explanation of the possible options for improving the passages in question, the solutions which the evaluators considered satisfactory, how the eight points available for the passages to be improved were allocated and, in particular, how those points were distributed between the two passages concerned, it is sufficient to note that the applicant proposed no stylistic improvements to the two passages concerned. Accordingly, identifying the passages to be improved in the revised document was sufficient for the applicant to understand that, since it had not made improvements to those passages, it had not been awarded the corresponding points. 126 Moreover, the contracting authority cannot be required to communicate to an unsuccessful tenderer, first, in addition to the reasons for rejecting its tender, a detailed summary of how each detail of its tender was taken into account when the tender was evaluated and, second, in the context of notification of the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender, a detailed comparative analysis of the successful tender and of the unsuccessful tender (judgments of 3 May 2018, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, C‑376/16 P, EU:C:2018:299, paragraph 57, and of 14 October 2020, Close and Cegelec v Parliament, C‑447/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:826, paragraph 37). 127 It follows from the foregoing that all of the information provided to the applicant enabled it to understand the matters of fact and law on the basis of which the contracting authority took the view that the applicant had not obtained the pass score in the revision test. That statement of reasons, which, moreover, goes beyond that required by the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation (see paragraph 119 above), enabled the applicant to understand the reason for the rejection of its tender and to challenge the contested decision effectively before the Court. 128 Consequently, the third plea must be rejected. The fourth plea, alleging breach of the duty of diligence and of the principle of sound administration 129 The applicant takes the view that the Commission’s conduct in its exchanges with the applicant was contrary to the duty of diligence, the principle of sound administration and general principles of public procurement, including the principles of equal treatment, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality, enshrined in Article 160(1) of the Financial Regulation. The Commission, it argues, replied to its requests for information only in a piecemeal manner. 130 In particular, it submits, it took 53 days for the Commission to disclose the standard marking grid to the applicant, even though the applicant had requested this on 17 April 2020. It was only after that grid had been provided that the applicant was in a position to know the Commission’s reasoning and to assert its rights in relation to the predefined errors. 131 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments. 132 As a preliminary point, the inadmissibility, raised by the Commission, of an alleged claim based on infringement of the ‘principles of public procurement’, must be ruled out. The applicant has stated clearly that the fourth plea alleged infringement only of the ‘principles of due diligence and good administration’. In any event, as the applicant stated in the reply, the reference in paragraph 59 of the application to a breach of the ‘principles of … public procurement’ referred to the principles set out in Article 160(1) of the Financial Regulation. The infringement of those principles is also the subject of the second plea, in respect of which the Commission was given the opportunity to prepare its defence, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above. That plea has, moreover, been rejected (see paragraph 99 above). 133 Under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union. In that regard, case-law has made clear that it is for the administration, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of a case and to gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise its discretion and to ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of the procedures that it implements (judgments of 28 June 2016, AF Steelcase v EUIPO, T‑652/14, not published, EU:T:2016:370, paragraph 57, and of 13 June 2019, Strabag Belgium v Parliament, T‑299/18, not published, EU:T:2019:411, paragraph 113). 134 In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that the contracting authority examined carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of its file before rejecting its tender. 135 It merely claims that the Commission breached the duty of diligence and the principle of sound administration by responding in only a piecemeal manner to its requests, made subsequent to the contested decision, to be provided with explanations about the evaluation and scoring of the revision test. However, the applicant has not, by that line of argument, demonstrated that the alleged infringement of the above principles had a bearing on the adoption of the contested decision such as to lead to its annulment. 136 In any event, the Commission replied to all of the applicant’s requests for information made in its emails subsequent to the adoption of the contested decision, and did so within a reasonable period. 137 In particular, as regards the disclosure of the standard marking grids completed by the evaluators, the applicant requested disclosure of the ‘separate evaluations of both markers’ by email of 15 June 2020 and the Commission sent these to it on the following day, namely 16 June 2020. 138 The applicant states that it requested, as early as 17 April 2020, that it be informed of ‘all details and reasons of the attribution of the grades for the revision test’ and that that request included disclosure of those grids. Even if the Commission had understood that, by that request, the applicant was asking to be provided with the marking grids for its test, suffice it to note that the Commission nevertheless gave the applicant, in its emails subsequent to the contested decision, a sufficient number of explanations about the evaluation method and the scoring of its revision test. Moreover, the marking grids in question were disclosed to it before the present action was brought. 139 The fourth plea must therefore be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 140 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Global Translation Solutions ltd to pay the costs. Collins Csehi Steinfatt Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 October 2021. E. Coulon A.M. Collins Registrar President * Language of the case: English.