Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2024:398
Date: 2024-06-19
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 52 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121; of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57; and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123). 53 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 115). 54 Furthermore, it should be noted that the conflict situation involving Russia and Ukraine can make it particularly difficult to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. Ensuing investigation difficulties can prevent specific evidence and objective information from being provided (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). 55 It is in the light of those rules of case-law that the merits of the applicant’s arguments concerning compliance with criteria (d) and (f), applied in the present case, must be examined. 56 In order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council based its decision on the following exhibits in the file of evidence: – an article from the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia concerning the applicant (exhibit No 1); – an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes, dated 8 March 2018, concerning an overview of the applicant’s assets and his revenue structure (exhibit No 2); – an article published on the website of the daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, dated 21 September 2020, concerning the transfer of assets within the Rotenberg family in order to circumvent the sanctions (exhibit No 3); – an article published on the website of the daily newspaper The Washington Post, dated 5 October 2021, concerning the effect of the sanctions on oligarchs and particularly in relation to the circumvention of those sanctions (exhibit No 4); – an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes, dated 22 February 2018, concerning the Russians who profit the most from state contracts and referring, inter alia, to the applicant on account of his 78.71% holding, as at 29 December 2017, in Gazprom Burenie, the successful company in calls for tender issued by the State companies Gazprom and Rosneft in 2017 (exhibit No 5); – a report, dated 29 July 2020, from the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the asset structure of Russian oligarchs, in particular on the art market and the use of those assets to undermine sanctions (exhibit No 6); – an article published on the website ‘rbc.ru’, dated 13 January 2018, stating that the applicant is one of the three owners of Gazprom Drilling (exhibit No 7); – an article published on the website ‘Fortune.com’, dated 23 February 2022, stating inter alia that the applicant is co-owner of the SGM Group and is ‘a close associate of Putin’ (exhibit No 8); – an article on the website of The Moscow Times, dated 17 November 2013, stating that the applicant benefitted from the Russian Government by winning the tender to build a highway (exhibit No 9). 57 The Court deems it relevant to examine, first of all, the maintenance of the applicant’s listing in the light of the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f). 58 The applicant disputes the claim that he benefits from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation. First, he states that he sold his shares in the SGM Group in 2014 to his father, who himself sold them in 2019, with the result that, as at 21 November 2019, the sole shareholder in the SGM Group was JSC Stroyinvestholding. It is claimed that JSC Stroygazmontazh (‘the company SGM’ or ‘SGM’) has been in liquidation proceedings since 28 April 2022. Second, he states that he sold the shares that he held in the company Gazprom Drilling on 26 July 2021 and therefore contests exercising control over that company. Third, he states that he sold his shares in the company Mostotrest in April 2015, and disputes that he exercised control over or held shares in that company on the date of the contested acts. In the reply, the applicant mentions various companies in which he no longer holds positions or owns shares and over which he has no power of control. He adds that being or, primarily, having been involved in certain companies which concluded state contracts is not sufficient grounds to consider that he benefits from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation. In the applicant’s view, the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or the Government of the Russian Federation’ requires that there be an undue benefit as compared with those assigned to third parties and which exceeds an ordinary benefit either qualitatively or quantitatively. However, receiving large state contracts cannot be grounds for considering that he has contributed to or supported Russia’s actions or that he has obtained an undue advantage as compared with other entrepreneurs. He concludes that the Council has failed to adduce evidence that he benefits from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation and submits that he does not benefit from any state contract awarded to those companies. 59 The Council disputes that line of argument. 60 It should be observed that, as to the condition relating to benefitting from Russian decision-makers or the Government of the Russian Federation, criteria (d) and (f) do not require that the persons or entities concerned benefit personally from the annexation of Crimea or from the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. It is sufficient that they benefit from one of the ‘Russian decision-makers’ or from the ‘government’ responsible for those events, and it is not necessary to establish a link between the advantages enjoyed by the designated persons and the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 87). 61 Consequently, the applicant’s argument that the fact of having received important state contracts does not allow it to be inferred that he contributed to or supported the actions of the Russian Federation is ineffective. 62 As regards the concept of ‘benefit’, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f), it is held to be a profit of any kind. Thus, it has been held that the acquisition of control of certain undertakings may in itself appear to be a profit, although that may not involve immediate financial profits (judgment of 7 June 2023, Shakutin v Council, T‑141/21, not published, EU:T:2023:303, paragraphs 172 and 173). 63 In the context of applying criteria (d) and (f), such a benefit may be constituted where the existence thereof is demonstrated. 64 In that connection, it should be recalled that the mere fact of being successful in one or several calls for tender is not in itself sufficient for it to be concluded that there are links enabling the person concerned to take advantage of Russian decision-makers or of the Russian Government, within the meaning of the applicable criteria (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2022, Sabra v Council, T‑249/20, EU:T:2022:140, paragraph 215). However, the concept of ‘benefit’ and the issue of its scope must be interpreted in the light of the factors in the case, having regard to the situation in Ukraine and the objectives pursued by the contested acts, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. 65 Furthermore, as regards the concepts of ‘Russian decision-makers’ and ‘Government of the Russian Federation’ at the root of the benefits from which the persons included on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d) and (f) profit, it is necessary that those decision-makers or that government should, at the very least, have begun to prepare for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Where that condition is satisfied, it must be concluded that the recipients of those benefits cannot be unaware of the involvement of those decision-makers and of that government in the preparations, and can expect their resources, derived at least in part from those benefits, to be targeted by restrictive measures, with the aim of preventing them from being able to support the decision-makers or the government in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 91). 66 On that point, it must be noted that the restrictive measures in question are a reaction to the policies and activities of the Russian authorities in relation specifically to Ukraine, and not to the conduct of those authorities in general. However, those policies and activities have been implemented since the end of February 2014 (judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 92) and were amplified in 2021 to culminate in the military operation in Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022, the gravity of which situation persists to this day. 67 Moreover, the concept of ‘Russian decision-makers’, placed in the context of the restrictive measures at issue, refers to high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation, including the President of the Russian Federation and the members of the Russian Government (judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 92). 68 It is in the light of those considerations that the question whether the Council justified, to the requisite legal standard, that criteria (d) and (f) had been met, must be examined. 69 The Court must rule beforehand on the admissibility of the supplementary evidence produced by the applicant. – The admissibility of the supplementary evidence produced by the applicant 70 It should be borne in mind that Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the main parties may, exceptionally, produce or offer further evidence before the oral part of the procedure is closed or before the decision of the General Court to rule without an oral part of the procedure, provided that the delay in the submission of such evidence is justified. 71 In the present case, the applicant produced five documents on 24 January 2024, stating that these were available only after the closure of the written part of the procedure on 24 May 2023. He claims that these documents are new and necessary to rebutting some of the Council’s assertions. 72 The Council contends that that evidence is out of time and therefore inadmissible, as well as being irrelevant in any event. 73 It should be noted that the first document, produced in Annex AE.1, is an extract from the State register concerning the liquidation of SGM on 20 July 2023. The second, third and fourth documents, produced in Annexes AE.2 to AE.4, comprise an extract from the State register dated 26 December 2023, an article published on the website ‘rbc.ru’ on 15 December 2023 and an article published on the website ‘tass.ru’ on 27 December 2023, all of which concern the transfer, on 26 December 2023, of the applicant’s shares in the company RT-Invest Transport Systems (RTITS) to the managing director of that company. 74 These documents thus refer to factual matters arising subsequent to the contested acts. The taking into account of those documents is therefore excluded for the purposes of assessing the lawfulness of those acts. Thus, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the offer of evidence, it must be held that, since those documents have no effect on the examination of the lawfulness of the contested acts, that offer of evidence is irrelevant in the context of the present case. 75 As regards Annexes AE.5 and AE.6, dated 28 July and 27 June 2023 respectively, these contain two reports commissioned by the applicant. These are (i) a report from an ‘independent Russian legal expert’ concerning the analysis of the applicant’s father’s will, which concludes that the applicant is not named therein, and (ii) an expert report on the perception of corruption in Russia. 76 According to the applicant, these reports seek to rebut the factual allegations put forward by the Council at a stage where the applicant no longer had the opportunity to respond. 77 However, it is clear that the grounds of the contested acts referred, from the moment that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue, to the concept of ‘heir’, to which the report of 28 July 2023 is intended to respond. 78 Similarly, the allegation relating to corruption in Russia was already contained in the observations in defence submitted by the Council, which produced in annex to its defence articles on nepotism and corruption in Russia, to which the report of 27 June 2023 is intended to respond. 79 The applicant, who commissioned those reports, has failed to set out the reasons why he was unable to produce them at the very least in support of the reply, with the result that he has failed to justify the late production thereof. 80 Accordingly, Annexes AE.5 and AE.6 were produced out of time and are therefore inadmissible. – The error of assessment concerning the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f) 81 It is necessary to examine whether the Council was right to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the grounds, inter alia, that he was the majority shareholder of Gazprom Drilling, co-owner of the SGM Group, and on account of his positions in leading Russian undertakings including SGM, Gazprom Drilling and Mostotrest PJSC, which have received important state contracts. 82 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s positions within the companies Gazprom Drilling, SGM and Mostotrest PJSC, the following should be noted. 83 First of all, the company Gazprom Drilling (or Gazprom Burenie) is the largest drilling undertaking in Russia, the result of the merger of the various drilling departments in the companies of the Gazprom Group, following the privatisation of assets in late 2010. The applicant’s father, who owned the company in 2011, transferred his shares to the applicant in 2014. 84 As the Council states, it is apparent from exhibit No 5 in the file of evidence that that company won several dozens of calls for tender issued by the undertakings Rosneft and Gazprom in 2017. It is also apparent from exhibit No 7 that the applicant held 78.71% of that company from 29 December 2017 onwards. Exhibits Nos 2, 5 and 7, which are corroborated by Annex B.2 to the defence, thus provide insight into the applicant’s fortune, estimated in 2018 at 1.1 billion United States dollars (USD) (approximately EUR 1.02 billion), in particular on account of his assets in the company Gazprom Drilling, the market value of which was estimated at 41 to 48 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 418 to 489 million) in 2020. 85 It is, however, apparent from the information before the Court that the applicant and the other shareholders in Gazprom Drilling transferred their shares to Gazprom on 26 July 2021 for RUB 67.929 billion (approximately EUR 692 million) in total. Furthermore, the applicant states that he has not been a member of the board of directors since 2019, which is not disputed by the Council. On the date of the contested acts, the applicant was therefore no longer a majority shareholder in Gazprom Drilling. 86 Next, it is apparent from the information before the Court that the company SGM managed, inter alia, the project to build the Kerch Strait Bridge which connects Crimea to Russia, and was involved in the construction thereof. The company SGM had previously been successful in tendering procedures and had also been awarded state contracts involving no calls for tender. The applicant does not dispute having controlled that company from 2012 to 5 August 2014, but states that his shares were sold in particular to his father in 2014, though another company, then sold on thereafter. He states that, in 2019, the sole shareholder in that company was JSC Stroyinvestholding, which was restructured into ‘JSC Stroygazmontazh’ in September 2020, before joining the Gazprom Group in 2021. He maintains that, when the contested acts were adopted, he no longer held any shares in the company SGM. He adds that that company has been in liquidation proceedings since 28 April 2022. 87 The Council does not dispute that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant’s shares had been sold. In that connection, the Council maintained, in its written pleadings, that the applicant’s shares in SGM were sold in November 2019. However, it is apparent from its answers given at the hearing that the shares sold in November 2019 were those held by the applicant’s father. Consequently, in the absence of challenge by the Council at the hearing and of any material to invalidate that claim, it must be found that the applicant sold his shares in SGM in 2014. 88 It follows from all of the above that the applicant was no longer a co-owner of SGM on the date on which the contested acts were adopted. Furthermore, his duties in SGM date back to a period which begins in 2012 and ends on 5 August 2014. 89 Finally, in so far as concerns Mostotrest PJSC (‘Mostotrest’), which was founded in 1992, it is apparent from exhibit No 9 in the file of evidence that, in 2013, that company, jointly owned by the applicant and his father, was successful in a call for tenders for the construction and operation of a 209-kilometre-long stretch of a toll motorway between Moscow and St Petersburg (Russia). That contract was to run for 22 years. The applicant states that, from July 2014 to April 2015, he held 38.63% of the shares in that company, but that he sold that holding on 28 April 2015 to a non-commercial pension fund for RUB 10 billion (approximately EUR 102 million). 90 It must be observed that the contract at issue is linked to a call for tenders awarded before the annexation of Crimea. Pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraphs 64 and 65 above, this is therefore a contract concluded with decision-makers whose involvement in the conflict referred to in the contested acts the applicant could not be unaware of. 91 Moreover, even if, as a matter of principle, benefitting from Russian decision-makers cannot be ruled out on account of the performance of a contract the term of which extended beyond 2014, the fact remains that, in the present case, the finding that the applicant is benefitting from Russian decision-makers cannot be based on his position within the company Mostotrest. 92 It follows from all of the foregoing that the grounds of the contested acts based on the applicant’s capacity as co-owner of SGM, his capacity as majority shareholder in Gaxprom Drilling or his position within SGM, Gazprom Drilling and Mostotrest, which do not rely on information contemporaneous to the contested acts, cannot be regarded as being of such a nature as to justify, by themselves, the finding that the applicant is benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation. 93 In the second place, it is necessary to examine the merits of the grounds of the contested acts in the light of the applicant’s position within the company Platon or RT-Invest Transport System (‘RTITS’). 94 Although that company is not itself referred to in the grounds, the phrase ‘including’ indicates sufficiently explicitly that the companies referred to by name in the grounds are given solely for illustrative purposes. Furthermore, exhibits Nos 1 and 2 in the file of evidence refer to the company RTITS, and the applicant himself mentioned it in his written pleadings and in his request to submit new evidence. 95 The applicant states that he joined the company RTITS in November 2014. It is apparent from the information in the case file that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant held 23.5% of the shares in that company. 96 It must be held that the company RTITS was awarded, without a call for tenders, the management of an electronic toll-collection system capable of following lorries on Russian federal roads and invoicing them for the tolls due. That is apparent, in particular, from (i) exhibit No 1 in the file of evidence, which is corroborated by Annex B.1 to the defence, containing an article published on the website ‘syl.ru’ on 19 March 2017 on the applicant’s biography, and (ii) exhibit No 2. In reply, the applicant states that RTITS and the Russian Federation, represented by the federal highways agency, entered into a concession agreement on 29 September 2014, in accordance with the Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 29 August 2014, for a total duration of 13 years as from the date of signature, with a base fee, pursuant to the concession agreement, of RUB 10 610 million (approximately EUR 108 million) (excluding VAT) per year. 97 Admittedly, according to the applicant, RTITS created and operates the toll-collection system at its own expense using the financing received, and transfers all collected funds to the federal budget on a daily basis. The funds collected are, according to him, channelled to the Russian Federation Federal Road Fund, since the source of the road funds is, in particular, toll payments from the toll-collection system, it being specified that Platon toll payments are not tax payments but are intended to compensate for the costs associated with the restoration of federal public highways. He refers to an article from 2015 in the daily newspaper Vedomosti and an article from 2017 published on the website ‘Forbes.ru’ in order to state that from the RUB 10.6 billion (approximately EUR 108 million) received annually for the management of the Platon system, ‘the company bears its operating expenses, credit costs, settlements with suppliers, and so on. According to the financial results for 2015, RTITS LLC had management expenses of [RUB] 473 million [(approximately EUR 4.82 million)], and also received a loss from financial and economic activities in the amount of [RUB] 621 million [(approximately EUR 6.33 million)]’. 98 However, it must be found, as the Council did, that through the concession granted with no tendering procedure to the company RTITS, the applicant had the guarantee of receiving from the Russian State budget a significantly large proportion of the RUB 10.6 billion (approximately EUR 108 million) paid to RTITS. In that connection, it is apparent from the article of 3 August 2021 on the applicant, annexed to the defence as Annex B.2, confirming the file of evidence, that between 2017 and 2020, ‘RT-Invest Transport Systems paid [RUB] 1.8 billion (approximately EUR 18 million) in dividends’. As the Council states, and notwithstanding the applicant’s claims at the hearing that the profit made by the applicant is not considerable for that type of investment compared to the valuation of the company RTITS, the fact that the applicant confirms that he holds 23.5% of RTITS entitles him to not inconsiderable, and even considerable, amounts every year, valued at more than EUR 7 million for the 2017 to 2020 period. 99 Furthermore, it is apparent from the applicant’s written pleadings that the concession agreement in favour of RTITS is the result of Order No 1662-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 29 August 2014, that the Platon system managed by RTITS was, moreover, funded by a loan from the State bank Gazprombank and that ‘the State was ready to give up other income for the sake of Platon. In December, President Vladimir Putin proposed to abolish the transport tax for heavy trucks as compensation’. It is also apparent from the 2015 article published on the website ‘vedomosti.ru’, to which the applicant refers in his written pleadings, that according to a member of the Coordinating Council of Truckers of St Petersburg, the company ‘“Platon” reveals all the hidden mechanisms of decision-making in the system of power: redistribution of income, when open competition is replaced by lobbying’. According to exhibit No 1, the applicant was guaranteed to receive from the State budget a very large portion of the RUB 10.6 billion (approximately EUR 108 million) from 15 November 2015 to 29 September 2027. 100 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the Council has thus sufficiently demonstrated that there exists a benefit, granted by the Government of the Russian Federation to the company RTITS through a concession agreement concluded without any call for tenders, a benefit from which the applicant profited from the moment he took up his position within the company RTITS and which lasted, at the very least, until the date on which the contested acts were adopted. 101 In that context, the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d) and (f) must be found to be justified to the requisite legal standard. 102 It follows that the present plea in law must be rejected, without there being any need to examine the applicant’s arguments concerning the association criterion. The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights and, in particular, of his right to the free exercise of an economic activity and of his right to property, as well as infringement of the principle of proportionality 103 The applicant maintains that the objective of the restrictive measures is to sanction those who threaten or at least support those who threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine. He does not, however, do so and the restrictive measures taken against him are therefore disproportionate. He requests that measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry be adopted with a view to obtaining access to the confidential file held by the Council. 104 The Council disputes that line of argument. 105 It should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is reproduced in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133). 106 Furthermore, the right to property is among the general principles of EU law and is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. Similarly, under Article 16 of the Charter, ‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. 107 In the present case, it should be observed that the restrictive measures contained in the contested acts entail limitations on the applicant’s exercise of his right to property and his right to freedom to conduct a business. 108 However, the fundamental rights on which the applicant relies are not absolute and their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union, provided that such restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very essence of the rights thus guaranteed (judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 148, and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 80). 109 In order to comply with EU law, an infringement of the fundamental rights at issue must be provided for by law, respect the essential content of that freedom, refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 222 and the case-law cited). 110 It is clear that those four conditions are met in the present case. 111 It has thus been held that the restrictive measures laid down by Decision 2014/145 and by Regulation No 269/2014 and taken against natural or legal persons, entities and bodies on the lists annexed to those acts met those four conditions (judgments of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraphs 195 to 200, and of 6 December 2023, Zubitskiy v Council, T‑359/22, not published, EU:T:2023:779, paragraphs 98 to 105). 112 Moreover, in so far as concerns the harm suffered by the applicant, it is true that the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business are restricted by the contested acts. However, the inconvenience caused to the applicant is not disproportionate to the importance of the objective pursued by the contested acts. Those acts in fact provide for the periodic review of inclusion on the lists at issue with a view to ensuring that the names of persons and entities that no longer meet the criteria for inclusion on those lists be removed. Furthermore, the contested acts make provision for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 113 Finally, that finding as to the absence of infringement of the principle of proportionality is not invalidated by the applicant’s argument based on the fact that the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f), makes it possible to take restrictive measures against persons on the sole ground that they are active in tendering procedures and thus obtain ‘ordinary benefits’ not linked to the crisis in Ukraine. Admittedly, it is correct that the mere fact of being successful in one or several calls for tender is not sufficient for it to be concluded that there are links enabling the person concerned to take advantage of Russian decision-makers or of the Russian Government, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f) (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2022, Sabra v Council, T‑249/20, EU:T:2022:140, paragraph 215). However, the context must be taken into consideration in that regard. Furthermore, it must be held that while the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f) may concern persons active in tendering procedures, the fact remains that it is applied whilst taking all of the circumstances of the case into account. Moreover, in the present case, the benefit linked to the shareholding in the company RTITS is not the result of a call for tenders. 114 Consequently, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that that interpretation of the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’ – which concerns, inter alia, persons active in tendering procedures – goes beyond what is necessary in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. 115 It follows that contested acts have not disregarded the principle of proportionality and, in particular, have not disproportionately infringed the applicant’s right to property and his freedom to conduct a business. 116 In the light of the foregoing, the third plea in law must be rejected and, accordingly, the action dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary to grant the applicant’s application seeking production of the confidential file, it being noted that the Council has stated in that connection that the file of evidence provided to the applicant was complete. Costs 117 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Igor Rotenberg to pay the costs. Spielmann Gâlea Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 19 June 2024. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.