Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2020:431
Date: 2020-06-04
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Sixth Chamber
Subject matter: Consumer protection;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Anonymised version 
Translation C-495/19 — 1 
Case C-495/19 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
26 June 2019 
Referring court: 
Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
14 May 2019 
Appellant: 
Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków 
Respondent: 
RN 
  
DECISION 
[…] 
The Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Regional Court in Poznań, Poland), 15th 
Civil Appeals Division, 
… 
having examined on 14 May 2019 … 
the case brought by Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków, 
against RN 
concerning payment 
arising from an appeal lodged by the appellant 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 14. 5. 2019 — CASE C-495/19 
 
2  
Anonymised version 
against the judgment of the Sąd Rejonowy w Trzciance (District Court in 
Trzcianka, Poland) 
of 30 October 2018 
… 
decides: 
to refer the following question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a 
preliminary ruling: 
Should Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29; ‘Council Directive 
93/13/EEC’) be interpreted as precluding procedural rules under which a court 
may issue a default judgment on the basis merely of an applicant’s statements 
contained in the application, and which the court is obliged to accept as true, in a 
case where the defendant (a consumer), who has been duly notified of the date of 
the hearing, does not appear when summoned and does not mount a defence? 
… 
Grounds 
I. Facts and procedure in the main proceedings. 
1. The appellant, Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków, brought an action 
for payment of PLN 1 231 together with interest from the respondent RN. In 
support of its action, the appellant stated that the amount claimed resulted from 
the loan agreement concluded by the respondent with the appellant’s legal 
predecessor, Kreditech Polska Spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością 
[Kreditech Polska limited liability company], established in Warsaw. 
2. With the statement of claim, the appellant enclosed documents confirming the 
conclusion of an agreement on assignment of claims with its legal predecessor 
[Or. 2] and a copy of a framework agreement without the respondent’s signature. 
3. The court of first instance dismissed the action, holding that ‘the documents 
submitted to the case file by the applicant cannot in any way lead to the 
conclusion that its claim has been substantiated. It is impossible to accept that the 
documents submitted: a power of attorney ad litem together with documents 
confirming the correctness of the power of attorney granted, a photocopy of the 
claim assignment agreement, an extract from Appendix 1 to the claim assignment 
agreement, a request for payment dated 2 November 2016 and a notice of claim 
assignment dated 2 November 2016, without proof that they had been delivered to 
the defendant, and a photocopy of framework loan agreement No 83043008033, 
could be used to prove the claim pursued. These are private documents which … 
KANCELARIA MEDIUS 
 
3 
Anonymised version 
merely prove that the person who signed them made the representation contained 
therein. However, they do not confirm in any way that a loan agreement was 
concluded between the defendant and the applicant’s legal predecessor and that 
the amount of PLN 770 was transferred to the defendant’. As the respondent failed 
to mount a defence, the court of first instance issued a default judgment but 
dismissed the action. 
4. The appellant brought an appeal against the judgment, alleging that the court of 
first instance had breached, inter alia, Article 339(2) of the Kodeks postępowania 
cywilnego (Polish Code of Civil Procedure) by failing to apply it and failing to 
base its judgment solely on the appellant’s assertions contained in the statement of 
claim. In support of its appeal, the appellant set out to demonstrate, inter alia, that 
the court of first instance should have relied primarily on the assertions contained 
in the statement of claim and only where these had been ‘negatively assessed’ 
should it have conducted an evidentiary hearing. In this respect, it submitted, the 
court of first instance breached the rules of procedure by failing to issue an 
evidentiary ruling with respect to the documents on which it based its findings and 
which became direct grounds for dismissing the action (the Sąd Rejonowy held 
that the appellant had failed to substantiate its claim). As a consequence, the 
appellant requested that the contested judgment be amended and that the claim be 
upheld in full. 
5. In support of its position, the appellant enclosed a number of court judgments 
confirming its position. In these judgments, the courts presented the view that 
where a defendant fails to mount a defence, the court should issue a default 
judgment solely on the basis of the assertions made by the applicant in the 
statement of claim. [Or. 3] 
II. Provisions of national and EU law which may be applicable to the 
case. 
6. Provisions of national law [passages cited from the Code of Civil Procedure] 
FIRST PART  
EXAMINATION OF CIVIL LAW CASES  
TITLE VI PROCEEDINGS  
SECTION III. EVIDENCE  
CHAPTER 1. Subject Matter and Assessment of Evidence 
Article 227. The subject matter of evidence consists of facts which are of vital 
importance for the adjudication of a case. 
Article 228 § 1. Facts which are commonly known do not need to be proved. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 14. 5. 2019 — CASE C-495/19 
 
4  
Anonymised version 
§ 2. The same relates to facts which are known to the court ex officio, however, 
the court should indicate such facts to the parties in the course of the proceedings. 
Article 229. Facts which are admitted by the opposite party in the course of 
proceedings do not need to be proved either, provided that such admission does 
not raise doubts. 
Article 230. If a party does not comment on the facts alleged by the opposite 
party, the court, bearing in mind the outcome of the entire proceedings, may 
consider such facts to have been admitted. 
Article 231. The court may consider as established facts which are of vital 
importance for the adjudication of a case, if such conclusion may be drawn from 
other established facts (presumption of fact). 
Article 232. Parties shall be obliged to present evidence in order to establish facts 
from which they derive legal consequences. The court may admit evidence which 
has not been presented by a party. 
Article 233 § 1. The court shall assess the reliability and validity of evidence at its 
discretion, following comprehensive deliberations of the available material. 
§ 2. The court shall assess on the same basis the significance of a party’s refusal to 
present evidence or a party’s interference with the taking of evidence despite the 
court decision. 
Article 234. Legally established presumptions (presumptions of law) shall be 
binding on the court; however, these may be rebutted whenever legislation does 
not exclude such a possibility. 
CHAPTER 2. Evidentiary Hearing 
SUBCHAPTER 1. General Provisions 
Article 235 § 1. An evidentiary hearing shall be held before the adjudicating court, 
unless where precluded by the nature of the evidence, or by major inconveniences 
or disproportionately high costs in relation to the matter at issue. If this is the case, 
the adjudicating court [Or. 4] shall delegate the taking of evidence to one of its 
members (delegated judge) or to another court (delegated court). 
SECTION IV RULINGS 
CHAPTER 1. Judgment 
Subchapter 1. Issue of a Judgment 
Article 316 § 1. Having closed proceedings, the court shall issue a judgment on 
the basis of the actual state of affairs at the time of the closing of the proceedings; 
KANCELARIA MEDIUS 
 
5 
Anonymised version 
in particular the fact that a claim becomes due while a case is pending shall not be 
an obstacle to the awarding of such claim. 
Subchapter 3. Default Judgments 
Article 339 § 1. If a defendant does not appear for a scheduled hearing or appears 
for but does not participate in the proceedings, the court shall issue a default 
judgment. 
§ 2. In such case, the applicant’s assertions of facts referred to in the complaint or 
pleadings served on the defendant prior to the proceedings shall be considered 
true, unless they raise reasonable doubts or were referred to for the purpose of 
circumventing the law. 
7. EU legislation 
Article 6 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
1. Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded 
with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national 
law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind 
the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the 
unfair terms. 
Article 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of 
competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of 
unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers. 
2. The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby 
persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in 
protecting consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned 
before the courts or before competent administrative bodies for a decision as to 
whether contractual terms drawn up for [Or. 5] general use are unfair, so that they 
can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such 
terms. 
3. With due regard for national laws, the legal remedies referred to in 
paragraph 2 may be directed separately or jointly against a number of sellers or 
suppliers from the same economic sector or their associations which use or 
recommend the use of the same general contractual terms or similar terms. 
Article 267 TFEU [cited in full] 
… 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 14. 5. 2019 — CASE C-495/19 
 
6  
Anonymised version 
III. Legal doubts of the national court and their significance for the 
resolution of the legal question. 
8. Polish civil procedure provides for the possibility of a default judgment being 
issued ‘if a defendant does not appear for a scheduled hearing or appears for but 
does not participate in the proceedings’ (Article 339(1) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure), which constitutes a departure from the inter partes procedure (this 
procedure being stipulated, in particular, by Article 316(1) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and by Article 227 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure). [Or. 6] 
9. A default judgment may also be issued in cases brought by sellers or suppliers 
against consumers. 
10. Grounds for issuing a default judgment exist in particular where, as in the present 
case, the defendant (consumer) fails to mount a defence after he has been duly 
served with a copy of the statement of claim. It should be borne in mind that 
Polish procedure acknowledges notional service where a party fails to collect a 
court writ served on it despite the fact that it was enabled to do so in accordance 
with detailed regulations (substituted service; see Article 139 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure). Consequently, situations similar to that in the present case are 
relatively frequent: a seller or supplier brings an action for payment and the 
defendant, who is a consumer, fails to mount a defence. 
11. In this procedural situation, crucial importance attaches to the wording of 
Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which, when issuing a 
default judgment, ‘the applicant’s assertions of facts referred to in the complaint 
or pleadings served on the defendant prior to the proceedings shall be considered 
true, unless they raise reasonable doubts or were referred to for the purpose of 
circumventing the law’. From that provision, it follows that the factual grounds for 
issuing a default judgment are unilateral and therefore based on the facts as 
presented by the applicant as the active party to the proceedings. Therefore, the 
factual basis for the default judgment consists of the applicant’s contentions, 
unless these raise ‘reasonable doubts’ on the part of the court or unless the court 
finds that these contentions are made ‘for the purpose of circumventing the law’ 
(Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
12. It should be stated that Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure does not 
explicitly indicate whether the circumstances precluding its application set forth 
therein (‘reasonable doubts’, ‘circumventing the law’) must arise on the basis of 
an analysis of an applicant’s statements or in a broader context, and thus also, in 
particular, on the basis of an analysis of the ‘pleadings’ or other documents 
enclosed with the application. 
13.  [brief presentation of the positions indicated in legal doctrine] …. 
14. … [Or. 7] 
15. … 
KANCELARIA MEDIUS 
 
7 
Anonymised version 
16. … The wording of Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure fails to dispel 
doubts as to whether the rule in question, which allows for a default judgment to 
be issued against a consumer on the basis of the mere assertions made by an 
applicant (seller or supplier), unless these raise ‘reasonable doubts’ or unless the 
court finds that the assertions were made ‘for the purpose of circumventing the 
law’, respects the standard of consumer protection required, in particular, by 
Directive 93/13/EEC, taking into account the court’s obligation to examine 
whether ‘terms of the contract concluded with the consumer are unfair’, as 
stipulated in the case-law of the Court of Justice (see, in particular, the judgment 
in Profi Credit Polska, C-176/17, EU:C:2018:711, paragraph 41). 
17. In a case such as the present, that is, where an action is brought by a seller or 
supplier against a consumer who fails to mount a defence, the Sąd Okręgowy has 
doubts arising from the fact that the circumstances precluding the application of 
Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure do not impose a uniform standard of 
protection, because, while both ‘reasonable doubts’ and claims made ‘for the 
purpose of circumventing the law’ lend themselves to flexible interpretation, it is 
certainly not a mechanism which would guarantee equal protection for consumers 
in identical procedural situations, as in each individual case the level of consumer 
protection will largely depend on the level of detail of the claims made by the 
applicant. 
18. Moreover, after analysing the provision in question it may be concluded that the 
more laconic an applicant’s assertions, the less likely it is that the court will have 
‘reasonable doubts’ or conclude that the assertions were made ‘for the purpose 
[Or. 8] of circumventing the law’, and thus the greater will be an applicant’s 
chances of obtaining a default judgment in its favour without the court conducting 
an in-depth analysis of the grounds for that applicant’s claims. 
19. In particular, it should be noted that, while incorrect in the light of Article 339(2) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, the steps taken by the court of first instance made 
it possible to conclude that there were grounds for dismissing the action. In the 
circumstances of the present case, if it had acted on the basis of the correct 
interpretation of the provision in question, the Sąd Rejonowy would have been 
obliged to grant the present appellant’s claim. 
20. However, the court is obliged to ensure an effective protection of the rights which 
the consumer derives from Directive 93/13/EEC (judgment in Aqua Med, 
C-266/18, EU:C:2019:282, paragraph 4[3]). In its settled case-law, the Court of 
Justice has placed emphasis on the nature and significance of the public interest 
constituted by the protection of consumers, who are in a position of weakness vis-
à-vis sellers or suppliers (judgment in Profi Credit Polska, C-176/17, 
EU:C:2018:711, paragraph 40 and the case-law there cited). 
21. The Court of Justice also stresses that, in principle, EU law does not harmonise 
the procedures applicable to examining whether a contractual term is unfair and 
that those procedures accordingly come under the domestic legal system of the 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 14. 5. 2019 — CASE C-495/19 
 
8  
Anonymised version 
Member States, on condition, however, that they are not less favourable than those 
governing similar situations subject to domestic law (principle of equivalence; 
Profi Credit Polska, C-176/17, paragraph 57, and Aqua Med, C-266/18, 
paragraph 47). 
22. The provisions of national law must also provide for a right to an effective 
remedy, as required by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Profi Credit Polska, C-176/17, paragraph 57, and Aqua Med, 
C-766/18, paragraph 47). 
23. The assessment of the aforementioned facts of the case and of the legal context 
does not indicate that, where a court issues a ruling pursuant to Article 339(2) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, the principle of equivalence might be breached, since 
this provision applies uniformly to all civil cases brought before the Polish courts, 
irrespective of whether the defendant is a consumer or another party to legal 
transactions. 
24. At the same time, however, it should be pointed out that, if the court applies 
Article 339(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure in the circumstances of the present 
case, it will have no grounds for reviewing the terms of the contract concluded 
between the parties, even potentially abusive terms. As a consequence, defendants 
who are consumers will be deprived of protection [Or. 9], one element of which is 
a review by the court, of its own motion, of the contract on which the claim 
brought before that court is based. 
25. As a result, the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu takes the view that there is a need for 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, to 
resolve the matter set out in the question featuring in the operative part of this 
decision.  
…