Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:420
Date: 2025-04-30
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: Trade marks;Intellectual, industrial and commercial property
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment
Origin: Germany

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) 30 April 2025 (*) ( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Figurative mark hey car select – Earlier national figurative mark geicar vehículos seminuevos y de ocasión – Likelihood of confusion – Similarity of the signs – Similarity of the services – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 ) In Case T‑338/24, Mobility Trader Holding GmbH, established in Berlin (Germany), represented by C. Rehaag and C. Goldstein, lawyers, applicant, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája, acting as Agent, defendant, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being Gestión e intermediación Cala and Ruiz SL, established in Móstoles (Spain), represented by A. Vela Ballesteros and S. Fernandez Malvar, lawyers, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber), composed of R. Mastroianni, President, M. Brkan and I. Gâlea (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, gives the following Judgment 1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mobility Trader Holding GmbH, seeks, in essence, the annulment and alteration of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 24 April 2024 (Joined Cases R 1094/2023-1 and R 1105/2023-1) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 On 1 April 2020, the applicant designated the European Union for international registration No 1 547 231 in respect of the following figurative sign: 3 The goods and services in respect of which protection of the international registration was sought are in Classes 9, 35, 36, 38, 39 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, for Classes 35 and 39, to the following description: – Class 35: ‘Office functions; advertising, marketing and promotional services; marketing studies; product range and price research; arranging and concluding commercial transactions for others; arranging contracts for the buying and selling of goods and services; presentation of goods and services on the Internet; retail/wholesale services in relation to motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and motor vehicle accessories; order placement for electronic ordering systems; arranging and rental of advertising space and classified advertisement space, in particular on the Internet and other new media; provision of an on-line marketplace for buyers and sellers of goods and services; grouping together of goods, services and information offers in electronic form; updating, maintenance, systematic ordering and collating of data in computer databases; providing information and consultancy for consumers in commercial and business affairs; collection of data’; – Class 39: ‘Rental of vehicles’. 4 On 9 December 2020, the intervener, Gestión e intermediación Cala and Ruiz SL, filed a notice of opposition to protection of the international registration in the European Union in respect of all the goods and services covered by the mark applied for. 5 The opposition was based on the earlier Spanish figurative mark reproduced below: 6 The services covered by the earlier mark were in Class 35 and corresponded to the following description: ‘Wholesale, retail and through global networks of reporting of new, pre-owned and occasion vehicles; services provided by a franchisor in particular assistance in the operation or management of industrial or commercial companies’. 7 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). 8 On 29 March 2023, the Opposition Division partially upheld the opposition, namely for the services in Classes 35 and 39, and rejected it with regard to the goods and the other services. 9 On 25 May 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision in so far as it had upheld the opposition. On 31 May 2023, the intervener also filed a notice of appeal against the Opposition Division’s decision, in so far as it had rejected the opposition. 10 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed both appeals. In particular, first of all, it found, inter alia, that the services in Classes 35 and 39 were, for some of them, identical and, for others, at least similar to a low degree. Next, as for the comparison of the signs at issue, it found that they were not visually and conceptually similar, whereas they were phonetically similar to a high degree. Lastly, as regards the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal found that, since the services at issue could be recommended and advertised orally, in particular on the radio, particular importance should be given to the phonetic similarity, and that there was a likelihood of confusion at least for part of the relevant public in respect of the services in Classes 35 and 39. Forms of order sought 11 The applicant claims that the Court should: – alter the contested decision by rejecting the opposition; – order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal. 12 EUIPO contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened. 13 The intervener contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs, including those incurred before EUIPO. Law Subject matter of the dispute 14 Under Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, the General Court has jurisdiction both to annul and to alter the contested decision. It should be pointed out, however, that the annulment of all or part of a decision constitutes a necessary prerequisite in order to allow an alteration of that decision. Accordingly, an application for alteration cannot be granted in the absence of a claim for annulment. 15 In the present case, it is true that, formally, the application contains, besides the request for EUIPO to be ordered to pay the costs, only one head of claim seeking the alteration of the contested decision. 16 However, in the part of the application which relates to the legal argument, the applicant claims that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment and therefore disregarded Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. Thus, it should be stated that, by its head of claim seeking the alteration of the contested decision, the applicant necessarily seeks, not only such alteration, but also the annulment of that decision. The merits 17 The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In support of that plea, it claims that the Board of Appeal’s assessment was incorrect in two respects, namely, first, as to the comparison of the services at issue, included in Classes 35 and 39 and, secondly, as to the comparison of the signs at issue. 18 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. 19 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited). 20 For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 21 The applicant’s arguments must be assessed in the light of those considerations. The relevant public 22 In paragraphs 100 to 103 of the contested decision, first, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant public consisted of the public at large and business customers and that, in particular, in so far as the services related to vehicles were concerned, the level of attention of the public was rather high. Secondly, it found that the relevant territory for the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was that of Spain, since the earlier mark was a Spanish mark. 23 The applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessments. The comparison of the services at issue 24 In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken), T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 25 In the present case, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding concerning the identity of the retail or wholesale services in relation to motor vehicles included in Class 35 and which are contained in both lists of services, nor concerning the high similarity between those same services and the sale services for motor vehicle parts and motor vehicle accessories, included in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for. 26 In contrast, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s finding of a similarity at least to a low degree between the other services included in Class 35 and the services included in Class 39, covered by the mark applied for, on the one hand, and some services covered by the earlier mark, on the other. – The comparison between the retail services for vehicles included in Class 35 covered by the earlier mark and the provision of online marketplaces and grouping together of goods in electronic form services included in Class 35 covered by the mark applied for 27 In paragraphs 57 to 69 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the services of ‘provision of an on-line marketplace for buyers and sellers of goods and services; grouping together of goods, services and information offers in electronic form’, included in Class 35 and covered by the mark applied for, were at least similar to a low degree to the services of ‘retail and sales through global computer networks of new, pre-owned and occasion vehicles’ included in Class 35 and covered by the earlier mark. 28 The applicant disputes that finding and claims, in essence, that the provision of online marketplaces services are dissimilar from the retail services for vehicles, since (i) they do not have the same nature nor the same purpose, and (ii) they do not target the same consumers and are not in competition. In that regard, the applicant stresses that the services covered by the mark applied for relate to online selling platforms which connect a buyer and a seller, whereas the services covered by the earlier mark relate to the direct sale of products from a seller to a buyer. Thus, the categories of services in question are clearly distinguished by consumers. 29 In that regard, admittedly, retail services, on the one hand, and online intermediation services between buyers and sellers, on the other, do not have the same nature, purpose or use. However, since those intermediation services facilitate the completion of retail sales between buyers and sellers, the purpose and use of the services at issue are not entirely different, but at least similar to a low degree (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 3 October 2018, Unipreus v EUIPO – Wallapop (wallapop), T‑186/17, not published, EU:T:2018:640, paragraph 44). 30 In the present case, since the application for registration of the mark applied for does not specify the nature of the products concerned by the provision of online marketplace services, it should be stated that those services cover, in particular, online marketplaces for vehicles. For the relevant public, the acquisition of vehicles can be carried out in an equivalent manner both through the use of an online selling platform which connects buyers and sellers, and directly via the website of a retail undertaking. Thus, from the end consumer’s point of view, the fact that the latter does not buy directly from the platform’s holder, but from a third party, is not such as to rule out any similarity between the services at issue. 31 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal correctly recognised the interdependence between the services in question. Online marketplaces’ operators generally need retail undertakings to connect them with potential buyers. Conversely, a retail undertaking selling vehicles can rely on a platform enabling to connect with potential buyers, either as an alternative to its own website to facilitate their operations, or in addition to such a website in order to reach more customers. 32 The relationship between the services in question is also reinforced by the fact, noted by the Board of Appeal, that undertakings initially specialised in the provision of online marketplaces aimed at connecting buyers and sellers now also sell their own products directly, via the same website. 33 Lastly, the applicant’s argument that the intervener does not offer its products via its own website, but via an online sales space, must be rejected as irrelevant. In order to assess the similarity of the goods or services at issue within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the group of goods or services protected by the marks at issue must be taken into account, and not the goods or services actually marketed under those marks (see judgment of 31 January 2013, Present-Service Ullrich v OHIM – Punt Nou (babilu), T‑66/11, not published, EU:T:2013:48, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). 34 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal correctly found that the services relating to the sale of vehicles covered by the earlier mark and described in paragraph 27 above, on the one hand, and the provision of online marketplaces services covered by the mark applied for, on the other, were similar at least to a low degree. 35 As the Board of Appeal correctly found, the same finding of at least a low degree of similarity applies to the comparison between the ‘grouping together of goods, services and information offers in electronic form’ services covered by the mark applied for and the sales of vehicles services covered by the earlier mark, since, in essence, the grouping together of offers in electronic form implies that the goods or services concerned by those offers are offered for sale. In that regard, although the applicant states that those categories of services are dissimilar, it must be stated that the latter does not put forward any specific arguments in support of such an assertion. 36 Furthermore, the applicant’s argument alleging that there is a difference between the ‘updating, maintenance, systematic ordering and collating of data in computer databases; providing information and consultancy for consumers in commercial and business affairs; collection of data’ services, covered by the mark applied for, on the one hand, and the ‘wholesale, retail and through global networks of reporting of new, pre-owned and occasion vehicles’ services, covered by the earlier mark, on the other hand, must be rejected as ineffective, since the Board of Appeal did not find that there was a similarity between the two categories of services referred to in the present paragraph. – The comparison between the services provided by a franchisor included in Class 35 covered by the earlier mark and some business support services included in Class 35 covered by the mark applied for 37 The Board of Appeal found the following to be similar at least to a low degree: ‘services provided by a franchisor in particular assistance in the operation or management of industrial or commercial companies’, covered by the earlier mark and included in Class 35, and the ‘office functions; advertising, marketing and promotional services; marketing studies; product range and price research; arranging and concluding commercial transactions for others; arranging contracts for the buying and selling of goods and services; presentation of goods and services on the Internet; order placement for electronic ordering systems; arranging and rental of advertising space and classified advertisement space, in particular on the Internet and other new media; updating, maintenance, systematic ordering and collating of data in computer databases; providing information and consultancy for consumers in commercial and business affairs; collection of data’, covered by the mark applied for and included in Class 35, on the grounds that those services coincided at least in their purpose, relevant public and providers. 38 The applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment. According to the latter, the mark applied for covers intangible services provided electronically by undertakings responsible for offering their expertise, tools or networks to other undertakings, so that the latter can enhance their commercial activities. By contrast, the services covered by the earlier mark are provided physically, within a contractual framework, by a franchisor to its franchisees in the automotive sector, that is to say, by dealers, distributors or manufacturers whose ultimate objective is to satisfy the needs of individuals wishing to acquire a vehicle and, thus, to generate revenue on the automotive market. 39 At the outset, it must be found that the applicant incorrectly claims that the ‘services provided by a franchisor’ covered by the earlier mark concern only those relating to the automotive sector. The earlier mark covers services provided by a franchisor relating, generally, to assistance in the operation or management of businesses. 40 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that franchising is a system for marketing products, services or technologies, based on close and continuous collaboration between legally and financially distinct and independent undertakings, the franchisor and its franchisees, in which the franchisor grants to its franchisees the right, and imposes the obligation, to operate a business in accordance with the franchisor’s concept. The right thus granted authorises and obliges the franchisee, in exchange for a direct or indirect financial contribution, to use the brand, the mark of products or services, the know-how and other intellectual property rights, supported by the continuous provision of commercial or technical assistance, within the framework and for the duration of a written franchise agreement concluded between the parties for that purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2015, Inditex v OHIM – Ansell (ZARA), T‑584/14, not published, EU:T:2015:604, paragraph 27). 41 Thus, in the light of the ongoing commercial or technical assistance that a franchisor must provide to its franchisee, the franchising services covered by the earlier mark are likely to cover a very wide range of activities through which a franchisor provides its expertise or tools to enable its franchisee to improve the management of its business and, ultimately, to be a more efficient operator, as the Board of Appeal essentially considered. 42 The services covered by the mark applied for and listed in paragraph 37 above are also intended to support businesses in general, including franchisees, on aspects concerning their management or activities, such as advertising, marketing or carrying out market research, in order to help them to become more efficient operators. As EUIPO emphasises, while a franchisee should be able to seek assistance from its franchisor, it may also seek further business support from specialised external undertakings. 43 Consequently, it must be found, as the Board of Appeal did, that there is at least a low degree of similarity between the services covered by the earlier mark and those covered by the mark applied for, which are listed in paragraph 37 above. – The comparison between the retail services for vehicles included in Class 35 covered by the earlier mark and the rental services for vehicles included in Class 39 covered by the mark applied for 44 The Board of Appeal found that the rental services for vehicles covered by the mark applied for and the retail services for vehicles covered by the earlier mark were similar to an average degree, on the grounds that they coincided in their providers, public and distribution channels. 45 The applicant disputes that assessment. According to the latter, the services at issue are dissimilar, since they do not have the same subject matter and do not seek to satisfy the same need; while some aim at transferring the ownership of a vehicle, others seek its temporary enjoyment. Those services therefore do not have the same purpose and are neither complementary nor in competition. 46 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. 47 In that regard, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal did, that the rental services for vehicles include not only short-term rental, but also long-term rental. For the consumer, the long-term rental of vehicles, which, in some cases, includes a purchase option, is likely to be an alternative to transferring the full ownership of the same vehicle from a retailer, and it is common for those two types of services to be offered by the same companies, particularly car dealers. 48 Thus, although the purchase or the rental of a vehicle are not identical, the Board of Appeal validly found that the services at issue coincided in their providers, public and distribution channels, so that they were at least similar to an average degree. 49 It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant has not succeeded in establishing that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment as to the comparison between the services at issue covered by the mark applied for and those covered by the earlier mark. The comparison of the signs at issue 50 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 51 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43). 52 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were not visually and conceptually similar and were phonetically similar to a high degree. 53 The applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment, claiming, first, that the signs at issue are phonetically dissimilar and, secondly, that, conceptually, the earlier mark conveys a concept which the Board of Appeal incorrectly rejected. – The distinctive and dominant elements 54 It should be stated that, first, the mark applied for consists of the word elements ‘hey’, ‘car’ and ‘select’, written in lower-case, black letters, where the word ‘car’ is underlined. Secondly, the earlier mark consists of the word element ‘geicar’, written in capital letters, the letters ‘gei’ appearing in blue while the letters ‘car’ appear in orange. Below the element ‘geicar’, the group of words ‘vehículos seminuevos y de ocasíon’, written in blue capital letters, appears in a much smaller size. To the right of those word elements, the earlier mark includes a figurative element consisting of the representation of a curved road on a blue circular background. 55 The Board of Appeal found that the word element ‘hey’ of the mark applied for would be understood by the relevant public as a greeting with distinctive character, since it has no relation to the services at issue. It also considered that the element ‘car’ was part of basic English vocabulary referring to a motor vehicle and was therefore at best weakly distinctive, whereas the element ‘select’ of the mark applied for had reduced distinctiveness because of its laudatory connotation. According to the Board of Appeal, the slight stylisation of the font and the underlining of the word ‘car’ had a mainly decorative nature and therefore would not distract the relevant public’s attention. 56 As regards the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal found that the element ‘geicar’ would be broken down into two elements, namely ‘gei’ and ‘car’, and that the element ‘gei’ had normal distinctive character since it was meaningless for at least a significant part of the relevant public. It also found that the terms ‘vehículos seminuevos y de ocasíon’ (‘pre-owned and bargain vehicles’) were not distinctive in respect of the services at issue and that the decorative element of the earlier mark and the stylisation of the word elements was at best weakly distinctive. 57 Admittedly, first, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the meaning given by the relevant public to the element ‘gei’ of the earlier mark and, secondly, it stresses that the element ‘select’ of the mark applied for has no equivalent in the earlier mark. However, it does not dispute, as such, the Board of Appeal’s findings concerning the distinctive character of the various elements making up the signs at issue. – The visual comparison 58 In paragraph 122 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue coincided in the weakly distinctive element ‘car’ and differed in all their remaining elements. It therefore concluded that those signs were visually not similar. 59 The applicant does not call that assessment into question. – The phonetic comparison 60 In paragraphs 123 to 127 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the words ‘hey car’ in the mark applied for would be pronounced in a virtually identical manner to the element ‘geicar’ in the earlier mark. According to the Board of Appeal, as regards the word ‘hey’, the letter ‘h’ is not mute, but read by the relevant public as an aspirated sound. It noted that, since the element ‘vehiculos seminuevos y de ocasión’ of the earlier mark would not be pronounced, the signs at issue differed only in the word ‘select’ contained in the mark applied for, the impact of which was weak, so that they were phonetically similar to a high degree. 61 The applicant disputes that assessment, arguing that the signs at issue are dissimilar phonetically. First, in the Spanish language, the letter ‘h’ is mute, whereas the letter ‘g’, if it precedes an ‘e’ or ‘i’, as in the element ‘geicar’, will be pronounced ‘j’ or ‘ch’. Therefore, the signs at issue differ in the pronunciation of their first syllable, which is the one that catches the public’s attention. Secondly, according to the applicant, the pauses between the three word elements of the mark applied for, namely ‘hey’, ‘car’ and ‘select’, contain a pause in their pronunciation, which is not the case with the element ‘geicar’, which will be read in a single flow. 62 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument. 63 In the first place, as regards the argument based on the mute character of the letter ‘h’ in Spanish, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal accepted that the letter ‘h’ would, as a general rule, not be pronounced in that language. However, it also stated, by referring to a page on the website of the Diccionario panhispánico de dudas of the Real Academia Española (panan-hispanic dictionary of doubts of the Royal Spanish Academy), that in the element ‘hey’ of the mark applied for the letter ‘h’ would be pronounced as an aspirated sound. 64 In that regard, it is apparent from that page that, in some cases, particularly in the case of foreign words, sounds such as the aspirated ‘h’ which is pronounced like the first letter of the English word ‘home’, are pronounced even though they do not belong to the Spanish phonological system. Therefore, contrary to what the applicant maintains, and as EUIPO and the intervener correctly maintain, the Spanish public, when confronted with the term ‘hey’, which is an interjection of English origin, will pronounce the first letter of the word as an aspirated sound. 65 The pronunciation by the Spanish public of the letter ‘h’ placed at the beginning of an English word and followed by a vowel is very close to the pronunciation of the letter ‘g’ in the Spanish language if it is followed by an ‘e’ or ‘i’, or of the letter ‘j’ in that language if it is followed by a vowel. 66 Accordingly, it should be stated, like the Board of Appeal did, that the word ‘hey’ present at the beginning of the mark applied for would be pronounced by the Spanish public in a similar way to the sound ‘gei’, present at the beginning of the earlier mark. 67 In the second place, contrary to what the applicant claims, there is no reason to consider that an oral reference to the sign constituting the mark applied for contains a pause between the three words which compose it, namely ‘hey’, ‘car’ and ‘select’. Since those words are separated only by spaces and without any punctuation mark, it should be assumed that they will be pronounced in a single flow. 68 In those circumstances, it must be stated, like the Board of Appeal did, that the pronunciation of the first two syllables of the signs at issue, namely ‘hey’ and ‘car’, on the one hand, and ‘gei’ and ‘car’, on the other, is virtually identical. 69 Admittedly, as the applicant stresses, the element ‘select’ of the mark applied for has no equivalent in the earlier mark. However, as follows from paragraphs 55 to 57 above, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that, in essence, the importance of the word element ‘select’ must be put into perspective due to its weak distinctive character. Furthermore, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the element ‘vehículos seminuevos y de ocasión’ of the earlier mark will not be pronounced by the relevant public. 70 Consequently, it must be concluded that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a high degree due to the coincidence in the elements ‘hey car’ and ‘geicar’. – The conceptual comparison 71 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that (i) the signs at issue were not conceptually similar, on the grounds that the word ‘hey’ in the mark applied for referred to the idea of greeting someone, (ii) the element ‘gei’ in the earlier mark would be perceived as meaningless by at least a significant part of the relevant public, and (iii) the word ‘car’, shared by the signs at issue, had very little impact in view of its at-best-weak distinctive character. 72 The applicant maintains that the signs at issue are conceptually clearly dissimilar, on the grounds that the relevant public perceives the element ‘gei’ of the earlier mark as the acronym by which greenhouse gases (‘gases de efecto invernadero’) are referred to in Spain, which it alleges the Board of Appeal disregarded. 73 EUIPO and the intervener dispute that line of argument. 74 In that regard, it is apparent from the various items of evidence provided by the applicant, namely the article in the Spanish-language version of the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia, devoted to greenhouse gases, and press articles from Spanish general news newspapers, that the acronym GEI can be used in Spain to refer to greenhouse gases. 75 However, that circumstance is not sufficient to consider that a significant part of the relevant public, confronted with the sequence of letters ‘g’, ‘e’ and ‘i’, will see it as a reference to greenhouse gases. In that regard, it must be stated that, in the various articles produced by the applicant, the first occurrence of the acronym GEI always appears, in parentheses, immediately after the full name ‘gas/gases de efecto invernadero’. Likewise, despite that acronym, the full form ‘gas/gases de efecto invernadero’ is still used many times in those articles. Those findings tend to establish that the relevant public is essentially familiar with the full expression ‘gas/es de efecto invernadero’ (greenhouse gases), rather than with the acronym GEI. 76 As argued by the intervener, it is all the less likely that the element ‘gei’ of the earlier mark will be perceived as a reference to greenhouse gases, since such a reference has a negative connotation. Greenhouse gases are primarily known to the relevant public because of the increase in their emissions and the climate changes likely to result from them, and, consequently, the numerous public policies aimed at limiting them. 77 The applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal should have found that, conceptually, the earlier mark is perceived as referring to greenhouse gases must therefore be rejected. 78 The Board of Appeal therefore correctly found that the signs at issue were not conceptually similar. The likelihood of confusion 79 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74). 80 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of at least part of the relevant public, due to the similar or identical nature of the services at issue and the particular importance of the phonetic similarity between the signs at issue, since those services could be recommended and be the subject of oral advertising, in particular on the radio. 81 The applicant argues that the conceptual differences between the signs at issue are likely to neutralise the elements of similarity between them, since the earlier mark has a clear and unambiguous meaning in the eyes of the relevant public, who perceives it as referring to greenhouse gases. 82 According to settled case-law, the conceptual differences between two signs at issue may counteract their visual and phonetic similarities, provided that at least one of those signs has a clear and specific meaning for the relevant public, with the result that that public is capable of grasping it immediately (see judgment of 5 October 2017, Wolf Oil v EUIPO, C‑437/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:737, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 83 The neutralisation of the visual and phonetic similarities of the signs at issue by their conceptual differences is examined when making the global assessment of the similarity of those signs, which is based on the overall impression given by those signs. That case-law deals more specifically with the assessment of the degree of conceptual differences which may lead to the neutralisation of visual and phonetic similarities. That analysis must be preceded by a finding of the conceptual differences between the signs at issue (see judgment of 5 October 2017, Wolf Oil v EUIPO, C‑437/16 P, not published, EU:C:2017:737, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). 84 In the present case, first, it follows from the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs were phonetically highly similar. Secondly, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessment that particular importance should be given to phonetic similarity, since the services at issue may be recommended and be the subject of oral advertising, in particular on the radio. 85 It is therefore appropriate to examine, as the applicant maintains, whether the conceptual differences neutralise the phonetic similarity, on the grounds that the earlier mark clearly refers to greenhouse gases. 86 In that regard, it is sufficient to note, as is apparent from paragraphs 74 to 77 above concerning the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, that the applicant has failed to establish that the earlier mark was perceived by the relevant public as referring to greenhouse gases. 87 Accordingly, the argument by which the applicant calls into question the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion by the Board of Appeal on the grounds that the various conceptual differences between the signs at issue neutralise the similarities between them should be rejected. 88 The Board of Appeal therefore did not make an error of assessment in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue. 89 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, since the single plea in law relied on by the applicant in support of its claims must be rejected, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 90 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 91 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener during the proceedings before the Court, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must bear its own costs, as no hearing was held. 92 Furthermore, the intervener has also applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs incurred before EUIPO. In that regard, it is sufficient to point out that, since the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, it is point 3 of the operative part of that decision which continues to govern the costs incurred before the Opposition Division and before the Board of Appeal (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2023, Guma Holdings v EUIPO – XTB (XTRADE), T‑67/22, not published, EU:T:2023:436, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mobility Trader Holding GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Gestión e intermediación Cala and Ruiz SL during the proceedings before the General Court; 3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 April 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.