Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1110
Date: 2025-12-17
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 72 There is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU Courts the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act annulment of which is sought. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 67). 73 The assessment of whether the factual basis for the Council’s decision is sufficiently solid must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation, but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the persons or entities subject to a measure freezing their funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124). 74 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. For that purpose, there is no requirement that the Council produce before the EU Courts all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the act whose annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraphs 66 and 67; see also judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 75 In accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In this respect, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited). 76 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 77 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information from being provided (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116). 78 As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the maintenance of the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it is important to bear in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list in question or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67). 79 It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). On that basis, changes in the context include taking into consideration, first, the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established and the particular situation of the person concerned (judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 101), and, second, all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 56; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 82 to 84 and the case-law cited). 80 In the present case, it should be noted that, by the judgment of 26 February 2025, Melnichenko v Council (T‑498/22, under appeal, EU:T:2025:180), the Court dismissed the action brought by the applicant against the initial acts, the September 2022 acts, the March 2023 acts and the April 2023 acts, pursuant to which her name was included and maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of the association criterion. 81 It should be observed that the grounds of the contested acts are based, first, on the fact that the applicant is an immediate family member of her husband, Mr Melnichenko, from whom she benefits, and, second, that she is linked to him by common financial interests. 82 Given that the grounds for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, contained in the September 2023 acts, the March 2024 acts, the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts, remained unchanged, there is no need to make a distinction between those acts, for the purposes of examining the present plea, since the verification of the information put forward in the statement of reasons and in the evidence relates, in essence, to the same factual circumstances. The second part of amended criterion (g) 83 As is apparent from paragraph 57 above, the second part of amended criterion (g) requires two conditions to be satisfied, namely, in the first place, that the person concerned is an immediate family member of a leading businessperson operating in Russia and, in the second place, that the person concerned benefits from that businessperson. 84 In that context, it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 78 above, the Council could, following its updated assessment of the situation carried out in the context of the review of the restrictive measures at issue, and on the basis of new evidence, maintain the restrictive measures against the applicant, on the basis of the second part of amended criterion (g). 85 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the general context of the situation in Ukraine, so far as concerns threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, has remained unchanged since the April 2023 acts were adopted. Similarly, the restrictive measures at issue meet the objective pursued, namely to put pressure on the Russian Government to put an end to its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. 86 Second, as regards the applicant’s individual situation, it should be noted that she does not dispute that she is married to Mr Melnichenko or the fact that, following the latter’s relinquishment of the status of first beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, she became the beneficiary of that trust. 87 The applicant disputes, however, that the status of beneficiary of FirstLine Trust confers any benefit on her, since it does not imply any right or control over the assets held by that trust. 88 In that regard, it should be recalled that the applicant became, on 8 March 2022, that is to say the day before the inclusion of her husband’s name on the lists at issue, the beneficiary of a trust which indirectly manages the majority of the shares held in the interveners, of a total value of several billion euros. In view of the nature and size of those shareholdings, it must be held that the applicant benefited from Mr Melnichenko and that that benefit is both quantitatively and qualitatively not insignificant. 89 Thus, in the light of those circumstances, which are not called into question by the applicant, the Council was entitled to find, without making an error of assessment, that the applicant benefited from Mr Melnichenko who, as was found in the judgment delivered today in Case T‑1114/23, was lawfully regarded by the Council as a leading businessperson operating in Russia. 90 That finding cannot be called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicant. 91 In the first place, the applicant claims that the transfer of the status of beneficiary of Firstline Trust cannot be regarded as a commercial transaction, since neither she nor her husband were the owners of the assets held in Firstline Trust at the time of the respective inclusion of their names on the lists at issue. According to the applicant, the opinions submitted as annexes to the application and to the reply confirm that the beneficiary of a discretionary and irrevocable trust, such as Firstline Trust, does not have a right of ownership or control over the assets held by that trust. 92 In that regard, it should be noted that the use of trusts and intermediate companies for the management of assets does not have the effect of distancing the common interest linking persons and covering those assets (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 8 May 2024, Ismailova v Council, T‑234/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:287, paragraph 151). In the present case, the fact that the shares in the interveners are indirectly managed by the trust which was set up in order to protect Mr Melnichenko’s fortune and in relation to which the applicant obtained the status of beneficiary, following Mr Melnichenko’s renunciation of that status, is sufficient to establish that a situation of ‘benefit’ within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g). 93 The applicant’s arguments based on the formal status of a beneficiary of a discretionary and irrevocable trust, and on the fact that a beneficiary of such a trust does not enjoy the right to own or control the assets held by that trust, are not such as to call into question the Council’s finding as to the benefit obtained by the applicant from her status as a beneficiary within the trust which was set up in order to protect Mr Melnichenko’s fortune. The evidence produced by the applicant, which is of a general nature, shows at most that the fiduciary ownership of the assets in a trust, such as Firstline Trust, is formally transferred to the trustee of that trust, which does not alter the fact that the applicant has the status of beneficiary of the trust created in order to protect her husband’s wealth, which shows that, economically, she benefits from her husband within the meaning of the second part of amended criterion (g). Moreover, this is borne out by the fact that, as is apparent from the evidence produced by the applicant and annexed to the application, the applicant was the recipient of a transfer of the assets managed by the trust at issue, and accordingly she indirectly holds a not insignificant shareholding in a company managed by that trust (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2025, Melnichenko v Council, T‑498/22, under appeal, EU:T:2025:180, paragraph 101). 94 Last, the applicant cannot validly claim a lack of clarity of the contested acts, by criticising the Council’s use of the terms ‘beneficiary owner’ and ‘ultimate owner’. It is clear from the wording used in the grounds of the contested measures that the Council relied, inter alia, on the applicant’s status as a beneficiary of the trust Firstline Trust, which indirectly manages the shares in EuroChem Group, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant. 95 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council is not able to demonstrate that the applicant knowingly and intentionally took part in activities the object or result of which is to circumvent the sanctions imposed on her husband, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 61 above, the Council is not required to establish such circumstances for the purposes of applying the second part of amended criterion (g). 96 In any event, it should be noted that, as beneficiary of the trust at issue, the applicant participated in a scheme designed to prevent the assets transferred by Mr Melnichenko to that trust from being frozen as a result of the application of the restrictive measures adopted against him (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 2024, Ismailova v Council, T‑234/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:287, paragraph 146, and of 26 February 2025, Melnichenko v Council, T‑498/22, under appeal, EU:T:2025:180, paragraph 97). 97 It follows from all the foregoing that the Council did not commit an error of assessment in taking the view, in the contested acts, that the applicant satisfied the conditions of the second part of amended criterion (g). 98 Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected. 99 Furthermore, according to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the EU Courts consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). 100 Therefore, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the third and fourth pleas in law raised by the applicant, seeking to call into question the merits of maintaining her name on the lists at issue on the basis of the association criterion. The fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights 101 The applicant, supported by the interveners, claims that the restrictive measures taken against her undermine the essence of her fundamental rights, which include, in particular, her right to respect for private and family life, her freedom to choose an occupation and her right to engage in work, her freedom to conduct a business, her right to property and her right, like any citizen of the Union, to move and reside freely, and are manifestly inappropriate. Thus, a travel ban and a freeze on her assets prevent her from accessing her funds located in the Member States and in Switzerland, and from entering or transiting through the territory of the European Union, which has negative consequences for her family and prevents her from going to her residence in Switzerland and enjoying it. The applicant submits that none of the interferences mentioned are lawful for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter. She adds that, since there is no link between her and the Russian Federation, the inclusion of her name on the lists at issue in no way contributes to attaining the objectives of Regulation No 269/2014, which consist in applying pressure on the Russian authorities, and is harmful to the interveners. In addition, the restrictive measures run counter to the European Union’s policy of guaranteeing global food security. Accordingly, maintaining the restrictive measures adopted against her is unnecessary and disproportionate. 102 In her third statement of modification, the applicant submits, relying on Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77), that maintaining her name on the lists at issue, in the absence of compelling reasons relating to her personal conduct, is disproportionate to the objectives of the restrictive measures. In particular, she submits that limitations on the exercise of the right, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, of citizens of the Union to move and reside freely may be imposed only in accordance with the derogations expressly provided for in Article 45(3) and Article 52(1) TFEU, that is to say limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 103 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 104 In the first place, it must be borne in mind that, as regards the fundamental rights relied on by the applicant, enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter, according to settled case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). 105 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 106 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, it must respect the essence of those rights. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 145 and 222 and the case-law cited). 107 In the present case, it is clear that those four conditions are satisfied. 108 First, it must be noted that the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of her right to respect for her private and family life, and home, and her right to property are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts which are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 109 Second, it should be noted that, given that the contested acts apply for a period of six months and are kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of her rights enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter are temporary and reversible. Therefore, it must be held that they do not infringe the essence of her right to respect for private and family life, her freedom to choose an occupation, her right to engage in work, her freedom to conduct a business and her right to property. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting exemptions to the restrictive measures applied. In particular, so far as concerns the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of frozen funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 110 Third, the limitations on the applicant’s rights provided for in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 111 Fourth, with regard to the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that, as a general principle of EU law, this requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 112 So far as concerns the appropriateness of the limitations on the exercise by the applicant of her rights enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter, it must be noted that, in the light of objectives of general interest which are as fundamental to the international community as those covered by the contested acts, those limitations cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate. Furthermore, as regards their necessity, it should be noted that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued. Moreover, the restrictions in question are temporary and reversible and provide for possible exemptions. Therefore, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in view of the importance of the objective pursued by those acts. 113 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the inclusion of her name on the lists at issue has serious repercussions on her right to respect for family life and the home and on that of her husband and of her children, in particular because the entry and residence ban stemming from the contested acts has the indirect effect of cutting her family off from their main residence in Switzerland, it must be held that any measures taken against her by third States cannot be attributed to the contested acts. 114 It follows that the limitations on the applicant’s exercise of her rights enshrined in Articles 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures. 115 As regards, in the second place, the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of her right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, it must be noted that in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof, the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those treaties. As is clear from the Explanations relating to the Charter (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed by Article 45(1) of the Charter is the same right as that guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The scope of that right is described further in Article 21 TFEU. 116 It should be noted that, according to Article 21(1) TFEU, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. As that reservation, formulated in the second part of Article 21(1) TFEU, refers to the Treaties in the plural, it also includes the EU Treaty and the measures adopted to give it effect. It follows that limitations on the exercise of the right to move and reside freely of Union citizens enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter may, in the field of the CFSP, be imposed by acts which are adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, such as the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 195 and 196, and of 4 December 2015, Sarafraz v Council, T‑273/13, not published, EU:T:2015:939, paragraphs 194 and 195). 117 However, as recalled in paragraph 106 above, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 52(1) thereof, namely they must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, pursue an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. That consideration also applies to the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, C‑452/20, EU:C:2021:855, point 60). Therefore, the limitations on the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, imposed in the context of the implementation of the CFSP, must satisfy those conditions. 118 In the present case, first, the limitations on the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States resulting from the contested acts are ‘provided for by law’ since they are set out in acts which are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 119 Second, as regards the question whether the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, regard must be had to the nature and scope of the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 153). 120 In that connection, it must be held that the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. First of all, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, those limitations comply with the principle of international law according to which a State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there. Next, under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that the names of persons who no longer meet the listing criteria are removed from the lists. Last, those limitations do not call into question that right as such, since they have the effect of temporarily suspending, under specific conditions and on account of their individual situation, the right of certain persons to move freely within the territory of the Member States, provided that those conditions continue to be satisfied (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 48). 121 Third, the limitations set out in paragraph 118 above meet an objective of general interest which is as fundamental for the international community as that of increasing the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions seeking to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 198). 122 Fourth, as regards the appropriateness of the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above, it should be noted that they are such as to allow the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 121 above to be met, in that they contribute to its attainment. 123 As regards the necessity of the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Council could have considered adopting measures which were less restrictive but just as appropriate as those provided for. Furthermore, the application of the restrictive measures at issue is subject to the exemption mechanism referred to in Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, which authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures imposed, inter alia, where travel is justified on the ground of urgent humanitarian need. 124 As for the applicant’s argument that the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above are not necessary, since the freezing of funds is sufficient to achieve the objectives pursued, it should be noted that that argument is ineffective. The prohibition on the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of the natural persons listed in the annex to Decision 2014/145 is indeed provided for in Article 1(1) of that decision, as amended by Decision 2022/329. However, the applicant does not claim that that provision is unlawful. 125 Moreover, while recognising the negative consequences for the applicant, as described by her, which result from the application of the restrictive measures at issue, it must be held that, in the light of the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures, the limitations referred to in paragraph 118 above are not manifestly disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 126 As regards the applicant’s reference to the right of her minor children to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, it must be borne in mind that Article 24(2) of the Charter provides that, in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 127 In the present case, it should be noted that, in so far as the applicant refers to the situation of her children in order to demonstrate the allegedly disproportionate nature of the limitation on her own right to move freely within the European Union, that argument is in no way substantiated. In that connection, it should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue, first, do not cover the applicant’s children and, second, do not restrict the applicant’s right to enter and reside freely in the territory of the Member State of the European Union of which she is a national, namely Croatia. Moreover, it should be recalled that Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures at issue, inter alia, where a person’s travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, and that provision is to be interpreted and applied, in the light of Article 24(2) of the Charter, taking into account the best interests of the child. 128 As regards the argument that the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate on account of the dangers to which they give rise for global food security, it is sufficient to note that the subject matter of the contested acts is not trade in agricultural products and that no causal link between the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and risks for global food security has been demonstrated. Similarly, the applicant’s argument, raised in that context, based on the alleged negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions for civilian populations, must also be rejected, in so far as, according to the case-law, the infringement of an individual right may, in principle, be relied on only by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties (judgments of 18 December 2024, Rosbank v Council, T‑270/23, not published, EU:T:2024:904, paragraph 164, and of 26 March 2025, A2B Connect and Others v Council, T‑307/22, EU:T:2025:331, paragraph 138). 129 In addition, on 16 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2479 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 687) and Regulation (EU) 2022/2475 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 315), which provide for a derogation from the freezing of funds and economic resources where transactions are necessary for the sale, supply, transfer or export of agricultural and food products. 130 Last, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging harm suffered by the interveners, it is sufficient to note that the review of the lawfulness of the contested acts is limited to reviewing the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and that neither SUEK nor EuroChem Group is covered by the restrictive measures at issue. 131 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality, must be rejected. The pleas in law of the interveners 132 In their statements in intervention, the interveners, in addition to their arguments relied on in support of the pleas in law in the application, raise two separate pleas in law, alleging, first, misuse of powers by the Council and, second, infringement of their fundamental rights. 133 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, while the fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute and Article 142(3) of the Rules of Procedure, do not preclude an intervener from submitting arguments which are new or differ from those of the party which he or she supports, as otherwise his or her intervention would be limited to restating the arguments put forward in the application, it cannot be held that those provisions allow him or her to alter or distort the context of the dispute defined by the application by raising new pleas in law. In other words, those provisions give the intervener the right to set out, independently, arguments as well as pleas, in so far as they support the form of order sought by one of the main parties and are not entirely unconnected with the issues underlying the dispute, as established by the applicant and defendant, which would result in a change in the subject matter of the dispute (see judgment of 20 September 2019, Port autonome du Centre et de l’Ouest and Others v Commission, T‑673/17, not published, EU:T:2019:643, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited). 134 In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the alleged misuse of powers, the interveners claim that the contested acts have a serious impact on their situation. According to the interveners, although the Council did not intend to affect their situation, it should be noted that the contested acts have no rational connection with the stated objective of Regulation No 269/2014, which is to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation If, on the other hand, the Council’s real intention was to make them subject to restrictive measures, it would have circumvented the listing procedure provided for by Regulation No 269/2014 by adopting the contested acts. 135 In that regard, it should be noted that, under the guise of a plea alleging misuse of powers, the interveners raise, first, the alleged lack of a link between the measures at issue and the objective of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian Federation. That argument must be rejected for the reasons set out in paragraphs 110 and 121 above. 136 Second, as regards the interveners’ argument that, by mentioning their names in the contested acts, the Council in fact intended to make them subject to the restrictive measures at issue, it should be noted that that argument, which in essence criticises the interveners’ inclusion in the grounds of the contested acts, does not support the form of order sought by the applicant seeking annulment of the contested acts in so far as they maintain her name on the lists at issue. Accordingly, that argument is entirely unconnected with the considerations underlying the dispute as established between the main parties, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 133 above. 137 In any event, it must be held that the argument based on the alleged intention of the Council to subject the interveners to the restrictive measures is unfounded, in so far as it is based on the premiss that the mere mention of the names of the interveners in the grounds of the contested acts affects their legal situation by requiring the authorities of the Member States to freeze their funds and economic resources and by prohibiting EU economic operators from making funds and economic resources available to them or for their benefit. That premiss is incorrect, given that the fact that a legal person or an entity is owned, held or controlled by a person whose name is included on the lists at issue must be established, in the case of the freezing of funds and economic resources, by the authorities of the Member States, and, where appropriate, in the case of the prohibition laid down in Article 2(2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Article 2(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, by the persons required to comply with those provisions (see, to that effect, orders of 21 October 2024, EuroChem Group v Council, T‑1111/23, not published, EU:T:2024:751, paragraphs 56 and 57, and of 21 October 2024, Suek v Council, T‑1112/23, not published, EU:T:2024:753, paragraphs 52 and 53). 138 Consequently, the plea alleging misuse of powers must be rejected. 139 In the second place, as regards the plea alleging infringement of the interveners’ fundamental rights, they claim, first, that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, which led to a ‘de facto’ inclusion of their names, deprived them of access to any legal remedy, in infringement of Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter, and, second, that the mention of their names in the grounds of the contested acts infringes their right to property, as guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter, in so far as that mention incentivised operators to sever commercial ties with them, depriving them of their ability to operate. 140 It should be noted that, by relying on the alleged infringement of their right to a judicial remedy and their right to property, the interveners criticise, in essence, the mention of their names in the grounds of the contested acts. It follows that the present plea does not support the form of order sought by the applicant seeking annulment of the contested acts in so far as they entail the maintenance of her name on the lists at issue and, therefore, is entirely unconnected with the considerations underlying the dispute as established between the main parties, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 133 above. 141 Accordingly, the plea alleging infringement of the interveners’ fundamental rights must be rejected. 142 As a result, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 143 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those of the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. 144 Furthermore, according to Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order an intervener other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof to bear his or her own costs. In the present case, the interveners must each bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Ms Aleksandra Melnichenko to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders Siberian Coal Energy Company AO (SUEK) and EuroChem Group AG each to bear their own costs. Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 December 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.