Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2012:311
Date: 2012-05-24
Language of the case: Dutch
Subject matter: Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Netherlands

summary form in Article 1(1) of the regulation: – either an indirect method of taking evidence, as laid down in Articles 10 to 16 of Regulation No 1206/2001, whereby the court of a Member State A (so-called ‘requesting court’) (19) requests a court of a Member State B (so‑called ‘requested court’) to perform the taking of evidence requested in accordance with the law of Member State B, where necessary by using coercive measures under Article 13 of the regulation, – or a direct method of taking evidence, as laid down in Article 17 of Regulation No 1206/2001, whereby the court of a Member State A, or a person appointed by it, (20) goes to a Member State B in order to perform the taking of evidence directly following agreement by the authorities of that other State, (21) it being established that, in such case, no form of coercion can be used against the witness resident there. 33. In essence, the referring court is asking the Court, for the first time, whether, where a court wishes to perform taking of evidence with a cross-border element, such as the hearing of a witness located in the territory of another Member State, it is obliged to choose one of the two methods of obtaining evidence provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001 described above, namely indirect taking of evidence through a requested court or direct taking of evidence by the requesting court, as Lippens and Others alone argue before the Court, or whether that court can use the methods laid down by the procedural law of the Member State in which it is situated. The reference for a preliminary ruling makes it necessary to define the material scope of Regulation No 1206/2001. 34. Other issues are implicitly raised by the grounds of the order for reference and by the questions asked by the Court to be answered orally. They concern certain practical consequences of the interpretation that will be given in the forthcoming judgment: firstly, the possibility for the court requesting the hearing of using coercive or unfavourable measures (22) if the witness residing in another Member State refuses to give evidence and, secondly, the possible effect of the witness who is to be heard being a party to the dispute. 35. The Court’s case‑law does not provide any clear answer to the question asked by the referring court. 36. In fact, the judgment in St. Paul Dairy, referred to in the order for reference, which concerns the interpretation of the rules governing jurisdiction contained in the Brussels Convention, merely alludes to Regulation No 1206/2001 (23) and mentions it only as an obiter dictum, without in any way clarifying the matter referred to the Court in the present case. The same applies to the judgment in Aguirre Zarraga, which also concerned jurisdiction, which suggests that the national court can choose whether or not to use the mechanism provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001. (24) In view of the special nature of those two judgments, which did not concern the interpretation of the regulation but that of provisions with a very different purpose and scope, (25) even if they are also intended to create a European judicial area, the Court must here state more clearly on what conditions application of the regulation is binding on a court. 37. Although it is the only judgment which, to my knowledge, has been delivered by the Court (26) on the interpretation of Regulation No 1206/2001 itself, Weryński does not seem to me to provide the evidence necessary for the Court to give a ruling in the present case. (27) 38. I should point out straightaway that, along with the majority of the parties, I consider that, where a court of a Member State seeks to obtain evidence from another Member State, it is obliged to use the mechanisms provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001 only in certain situations, and not systematically, for the reasons set out below. B – The substantive scope of Regulation No 1206/2001 39. The wording of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001, of which the referring court is, in particular, requesting an interpretation, makes it possible in part to answer the question whether the two methods of obtaining cross-border evidence which it describes must be applied broadly, that is to say in all cases where a foreign element, such as the witness’s place of residence in the present case, links the evidence in question to another Member State in civil or commercial matters. 40. By stating, as a preliminary condition, ‘where the court of a Member State … requests’, (28) that article, in my view, limits the substantive scope of Regulation No 1206/2001 to the two specific cases which it then describes. It therefore reserves its applicability for cases where the judge seeking to perform the taking of evidence considers the cooperation of a court ‘of another Member State’ to be necessary or the judge wishes to perform the taking of evidence himself ‘in another Member State’. Conversely, the regulation is not applicable to the situation if the judge considers that he can obtain the evidence, even if it is situated in another Member State, without having to use one of these means of accessing the evidence, that is without having to request the intervention of the judicial authorities of that Member State and without having to go there himself. 41. Similarly, recitals 7 and 15 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 indicate that its purpose is to enable a court of a Member State to take evidence ‘in another Member State’ and not in national territory, as the Netherlands court sought to do in the main proceedings by summoning the witness to appear before it. 42. Moreover, on the basis of a teleological analysis and not merely an analysis of the wording, I would add that recital 2 in the preamble to the regulation states that the aim of the regulation is that ‘cooperation between courts in the taking of evidence should be improved, and in particular simplified and accelerated’, which is reiterated at the end of recital 7. The title of Regulation No 1206/2001 also emphasises that it aims solely to establish mechanisms facilitating ‘cooperation between the courts of the Member States’ and not to put an end to the methods of obtaining evidence in force in the Member States through harmonisation. Where such cooperation is not essential or sought by a court, the simplified judicial cooperation methods (29) established by that provision should not, in my view, be used even if, as in the main proceedings, the witnesses, who are also parties in this case, request that they be used. 43. In fact, Regulation No 1206/2001 does not seek to interfere with the functions of the competent court by restricting its power to ensure the proper conduct of procedure within the limits of the rules of international law, European Union law or national law imposed on it, but reinforces that power and delimits it in order to protect the rights of the parties and respect the prerogatives of the other Member States. I consider that the purpose of that instrument is to facilitate the cross-border activity of the courts of the Member States and not to impede it by restricting the means which they have of taking evidence. 44. The very spirit of the regulation would be called into question if its mandatory implementation led to a reduction in the means of gathering evidence by excluding the possibility for the court of a Member State of using alternative evidence-gathering methods where it considers them to be preferable to the methods of cross-border judicial cooperation contained in Regulation No 1206/2001. (30) 45. I would point out in this regard that Article 21(2) of the regulation, in conjunction with recital 17 in the preamble thereto, makes clear that the intention is not to preclude Member States from maintaining or concluding agreements or arrangements between two or more of them to ‘further’ (31) facilitate cooperation in the taking of evidence, provided that they are compatible with the regulation. This reservation shows that, in their concern for efficiency, the drafters of Regulation No 1206/2001 were not averse to the idea of leaving room for other instruments in this area, where they might prove to be more appropriate, in terms of the guarantees they provide and their actual effects, in the light of the substance of the dispute. 46. In practice, methods of inquiry provided for by national law may be just as efficient as or even more so than those provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001. Thus it is clear from the Commission report assessing the application of Regulation No 1206/2001 of 5 December 2007 (32) that, according to the empirical study carried out, (33) in most cases, requests for the taking of evidence under the regulation were executed within a longer period than that provided for in Article 10(1), namely 90 days after the requests were received, which sometimes extended to more than 6 months. In these circumstances, it is understandable that a court of a Member State may choose a method that does not require intermediaries, such as the direct summoning of a witness to give evidence before it, in order to ensure that the procedure is conducted quickly and efficiently. 47. I would point out that this interpretation of the provisions of the regulation in no way undermines its effectiveness, as it is intended to apply not to all situations where evidence is located in another Member State, but only to the situation where the court which is seeking to obtain it recognises that it requires the assistance of the authorities of another Member State. In such a case, it must choose between the indirect method of taking evidence, which has the disadvantage of having to rely on the evidence being taken well by the requested court and of the court called upon to rule on the proceedings not being able to hear the witness itself, (34) and the direct method of taking evidence, which requires the authorisation of the Member State in which the evidence to be obtained is located (35) and deprives the court of the possibility of using coercive measures. (36) An exclusive application of Regulation No 1206/2001 would therefore result, at least potentially, in the quality of the hearing of witnesses located outside national territory being sometimes poorer than in a situation where the regulation did not exist. That cannot be regarded as satisfactory, bearing in mind the regulation’s aim of facilitating the taking of evidence. 48. In view of these factors, I consider that the European legislature did not intend that the judicial cooperation methods provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001 should be applied systematically where the court of a Member State wishes to take evidence linked to another Member State. I consider this to be obligatory only in the case, which is not that applicable in the main proceedings, where the taking of evidence must be performed outside the territory of the Member State of the court concerned. It seems to me to be appropriate in practice that, in the interests of the sound administration of justice, that court should be able to assess on a case-by-case basis which method of taking evidence, among those derived from national law and those derived from European Union law, will be most effective in obtaining the evidence which it requires for the purpose of giving a ruling. 49. Having thus explained the reasons why I consider, like the Member States submitting observations and the Commission, that the court of a Member State wishing to hear a witness residing in another Member State is required to use the methods of cooperation provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001 only if that court wishes him to be heard in the other Member State by means of one or other of those methods, but not if it deems it preferable that he should come to be heard in its national territory, I shall now examine the specific consequences of this proposed interpretation to the Court with regard to two particular cases mentioned in the reference for a preliminary ruling. C – Two particular problems relating to the hearing of witnesses 1. The hearing of a witness who refuses to give evidence 50. According to the terms of the question submitted, the referring court is not expressly asking the Court whether coercive measures (37) or unfavourable measures (38) might be used by a court of a Member State against a witness residing in another Member State who does not wish to comply with the summons to appear before it. 51. However, this question is explicit in the grounds of the order for reference, since the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden states that, in its view, ‘Regulation No 1206/2001 does not preclude … the power of a Netherlands judge to summon a witness who resides in another Member State to appear before him, and the Regulation likewise does not preclude the judge from attaching to the non‑appearance of the witness the consequences laid down in its national procedural law’. (39) 52. As a preliminary point, I recognise that this question does not arise in undoubtedly the most normal situation in practice, where the witness residing in another Member State spontaneously accepts that he must go to give evidence before the court that summoned him. As the participation in the taking of evidence is then voluntary, there is no need in that case to use the judicial cooperation mechanisms provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001. 53. Nevertheless, in cases where a witness refuses for no valid reason (40) to be heard by the competent court and if that court still intends to hear him, a distinction should be drawn between two situations. 54. Firstly, if, as the Netherlands court wished to do in the main proceedings, the competent court wishes to hear a witness residing in another Member State in the territory of the Member State in which it is situated, in that case it can use coercive measures against the person concerned only within the limits set by the rules of public international law. (41) In the light of the exchange of argument and evidence at the hearing, it appears to me that the Member States submitting observations all share the view that it is not possible to use such measures against a witness located outside national territory except in special cases (42) or if it is permitted by a bilateral or multilateral convention which is binding on the two Member States concerned. 55. European Union law, as it currently stands, does not contain any rules governing this matter. However, the general principles of European Union law, such as the principle of proportionality, limit the discretion available to the Member States in this area. 56. Secondly, if the hearing of such a witness were to take place in the territory of the Member State in which he resides because the person concerned refuses to appear before the court of another Member State which insists on it, that court would be obliged to use either the direct or the indirect method of taking evidence provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001, as stated above. 57. If that court wished to perform the taking of evidence abroad itself by the so-called ‘direct’ method, it could do so only ‘on a voluntary basis’ and ‘without … coercive measures’, in accordance with Article 17(2) of the regulation, which precludes the witness from being forced to be heard directly, unless cooperation agreements exist between the Member States concerned. 58. Where, on the other hand, the performance of the taking of evidence is delegated to a court of the Member State in which the witness is resident, Article 13 of the regulation allows the requested court to ‘apply the appropriate coercive measures in the instances and to the extent as are provided for by the law of the Member State of the requested court for the execution of a request made for the same purpose by its national authorities or one of the parties concerned’. However, it seems to me that the decision to adopt a coercive measure authorised by local law against a resistant witness is not a matter for the court hearing the substantive proceedings but for the requested court, which must assess whether it is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 13 in limine. (43) Moreover, as there is no penalty for refusing to implement the coercive measure, it is likely to be ineffective in practice, which reveals one of the limitations of the system put in place by Regulation No 1206/2001. 59. An even more special case of the hearing of a witness may arise where, as in the main proceedings, the person concerned is also a party to the substantive proceedings. 2. Hearing of a witness who is also a party 60. As is clear from the questions that it submitted to the parties, the Court intended to assess whether it is decisive for the purposes of answering the question referred whether the witness is a party to, or a third person in relation to, the dispute. 61. In this regard, it asked the Member States that made oral submissions to state whether the fact of introducing such a distinction in the answer to the question referred would have an impact on the national rules of procedure in force in their respective territories. 62. It is not necessary, in my view, to rule on that matter in order to answer the question referred, as the referring court has not formulated, even implicitly, a request to that effect. However, as the parties to the main proceedings and the Member States that have submitted observations were asked to discuss it at the hearing, I would like to make a few points in connection with it. 63. It should be noted that Regulation No 1206/2001 does not provide for a difference in treatment based on the status of the persons heard as witnesses depending on whether or not they are parties to the substantive proceedings. Article 11 of the regulation merely refers, in connection with the indirect method of taking evidence, to the possible presence and participation of a party, either in person or through a representative, where the requested court performs taking of evidence such as the hearing of a witness; it should be noted that the witness might be a third person or indeed an opposing party since the wording of the article makes no distinction in that regard. 64. In my view, where the witness to be heard is a party to the dispute and agrees to appear before the court of another Member State for that purpose, Regulation No 1206/2001 should not interfere and the hearing can take place if the lex fori so permits. Where such a witness refuses to or does not appear in the territory of the Member State in which the court is situated, the national law should also determine what specific consequences the court concerned may attach to such behaviour where that law allows a party to be heard as a witness. 65. I would point out that, from the viewpoint of international law, the legal situation of a witness who is also a party differs from that of a witness who is not a party in that the international jurisdiction of the court concerned extends its judicial power and therefore its power to use coercive measures such as fines (44) against parties to the dispute even if they are resident abroad, which is not the case for other witnesses. 66. On the other hand, where that court wishes to hear a party as a witness in the territory of the Member State in which that individual is resident by hearing the party itself or by having the party heard by a court of that other Member State, it would have to use one of the two methods of cooperation provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001 in order to perform such cross-border taking of evidence, if necessary using the coercive measures permitted by Article 13 of the regulation, in the same way as if the witness were a third party in relation to the dispute. V – Conclusion 67. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court reply as follows to the question submitted for a preliminary ruling by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden: Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, in particular Article 1(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State that wishes to hear a witness who is resident in another Member State in connection with a dispute relating to such matters is obliged to use the simplified judicial cooperation methods provided for by the regulation only where it decides to perform the taking of evidence either by requesting the assistance of the competent court of the other Member State or by requesting authorisation to take evidence directly in the territory of that State. Where, on the other hand, as in the main proceedings, a court wishes to hear a witness residing in another Member State in the territory of the Member State in which it is situated, it has the option of using the methods provided for by its national procedural law, such as, for example, summoning the witness to appear before it, if it considers that such methods will be sufficiently effective in the case in question. 2 – Original language: French. 3 – OJ 2001 L 174, p. 1. 4 – In this Opinion, the concept ‘Member State’ will refer to the Member States of the European Union, except for the Kingdom of Denmark, in accordance with Article 1(3) of Regulation No 1206/2001. 5 – OJ 2000 L 160, p. 37. 6 – I would point out that the order for reference reproduces verbatim only Article 176(1) of the WBR, in the version published in the Law of 26 May 2004 (Stb. 2004, No 258), and that the other extracts from the WBR cited below are based on the observations submitted to the Court in Dutch, the translation of which is not official. 7 – Hendrikus Cornelis Kortekaas, Kortekaas Entertainment Marketing BV, Kortekaas Pensioen BV, Dirk Robbard De Kat, Johannes Hendrikus Visch, Euphemia Joanna Bökkerink and Laminco GLD N-A. 8 – Fortis NV became Ageas NV during the main proceedings. 9 – Maurice Robert Josse Marie Ghislain Lippens, Gilbert Georges Henri Mittler and Jean Paul François Caroline Votron. 10 – Recital 5 contains the standard reference to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5(3) TEU. 11 – See recital 6 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001 and Article 21(1) thereof. 12 – The referring court cites the judgment of 15 June 1987 in Aérospatiale (ILM 1987, pp. 1021‑1045; 482 U.S. 522, 1987), in which that court ruled that the convention lays down procedures for the taking of evidence in another signatory State which are not exclusive and binding but optional for theUS courts. 13 – It refers to paragraph 23 of the judgment in Case C‑104/03 St. Paul Dairy [2005] ECR I‑3481. I would point out at this stage that that judgment concerns the interpretation not of Regulation No 1206/2001 but of the Convention signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as amended by the conventions on the accession of new Member States (the ‘Brussels Convention’). 14 – Recital 7. 15 – In fact, under Article 1(2), the regulation applies both to judicial proceedings which have already substantively commenced, as in the dispute in the main proceedings, and those which are merely contemplated. 16 – See point 40 et seq. of the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the case that gave rise to the order in Case C‑175/06 Tedesco [2007] ECR I‑7929. 17 – Article 4(1)(e) of Regulation No 1206/2001 expressly mentions ‘the examination of a person’, a sufficiently broad wording to cover the hearing of a witness who is also party to the main proceedings. According to paragraph 8 of the ‘Practice Guide for the Application of the Regulation on the Taking of Evidence’, drawn up by the Commission departments in consultation with the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (the ‘Practice Guide’, which can be accessed on the internet at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/evidence/evidence_ec_guide_en.pdf), ‘[t]he concept of “evidence” … includes for instance hearings of witnesses of fact, of the parties, of experts, the production of documents, verifications, establishment of facts, expertise on family or child welfare’. 18 – See recital 2 in the preamble to the regulation. 19 – See the definitions given in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001. 20 – Article 17(3) of the regulation allows the requesting court to designate a member of the judicial personnel or any other person, such as an expert, or, according to the Practice Guide, a consular or diplomatic officer, in accordance with the law of the Member State in which that court is situated. 21 – On the responsibilities of the central body and/or competent authority of the Member State in which the evidence is to be taken, see Article 3(1) and (3) of Regulation No 1206/2001. 22 – I will return later (see point 50 below) to the wording of these two concepts. 23 – Paragraph 23 of which states: ‘Moreover, an application to hear a witness in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings could be used as a means of sidestepping the rules governing, on the basis of the same guarantees and with the same effects for all individuals, the transmission and handling of applications made by a court of a Member State intended to have an inquiry carried out in another Member State (see Regulation [No 1206/2001])’. 24 – Case C‑491/10 PPU [2010] ECR I‑14247 relating to the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1; the ‘Brussels IIa Regulation’). Paragraph 67 of that judgment states that, where a court of a Member State decides to hear a child, it must, in so far as possible and always taking into consideration the child’s best interests, use ‘all means available to it under national law as well as the specific instruments of international judicial cooperation, including, when appropriate, those provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001’. 25 – Unlike Regulation No 1206/2001, the Brussels Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation are intended to harmonise the provisions of the Member States which they respectively cover and expressly prohibit the residual application of national rules, in particular those relating to cross‑border jurisdiction (see Article 3 of the convention and Article 6 of the Brussels IIa Regulation). Moreover, Regulation No 1206/2001 covers procedures relating to matters which are excluded from those instruments (see Title I of the convention and Article 1(3) of the Brussels IIa Regulation). 26 – I would point out that the Tedesco case, in which the Court was asked for the first time to interpret Regulation No 1206/2001, was removed from the register. 27 – Case C‑283/09 [2011] ECR I‑601, concerning the interpretation of Articles 14 and 18 of the regulation, which indeed concerns the hearing of witnesses but merely rules that a requesting court is not obliged to pay an advance to the requested court for the expenses of a witness or to reimburse the expenses paid to the witness examined. 28 – Emphasis added. This wording was already included in the initial draft of Regulation No 1206/2001 (see Preparatory Acts, Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to adopting a Council Regulation on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters (2000/C 314/01)). 29 – Advocate General Kokott has also described the system established by Regulation No 1206/2001 as a ‘simplified mechanism for judicial assistance’ in point 43 of her Opinion in Tedesco. 30 – A position comparable to that adopted by the Court in paragraph 67 of the judgment in Aguirre Zarraga. 31 – This word was not contained in the initial draft of Regulation No 1206/2001, mentioned above. 32 – Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Regulation No 1206/2001 (COM(2007) 769 final, point 2.1). The Commission states in the report that ‘[t]he Regulation has simplified and accelerated the taking of evidence … The extent to which this has occurred varies, however, to a significant extent between Member States’ (point 2.12). 33 – Study on the application of Regulation No 1206/2001 carried out at the Commission’s request on over 11 000 professionals in the 24 Member States where the regulation applies, the results of which were published in 2007 and can be accessed at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/final_report_ec_1206_2001_a_09032007.pdf. 34 – The questions that are to be put to the witness are, in principle, worded by the requesting court in its request for the taking of evidence, in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001. Moreover, a representative of that court can be present, under Article 12(1) of the regulation. However, he can intervene only in order to question the witness in an interactive and impromptu manner if the requested court so agrees (see Practice Guide, paragraphs 14 and 57). 35 – Although the grounds for refusal are limited under Article 17(5) of Regulation No 1206/2001, even if direct taking of evidence is agreed, a court of the requested Member State may control the hearing of the witness and intervene while it is being conducted under the second subparagraph of paragraph 4 of that article. 36 – It emerges from the study on the application of Regulation No 1206/2001, mentioned above, that in practice the impossibility of using coercive measures in this context is capable of significantly limiting the number of cases in which that method is used (p. 95, point 4.1.11.1.2). 37 – In order to force a person to come and give evidence, a civil or commercial court might use financial means of exerting pressure (fine or other penalty) or even use detention measures if the lex fori so permits. 38 – The court hearing the substantive proceedings may conclude from a person’s refusal to come and give evidence that the facts on which he was to give evidence are not established, which will penalise the party that was to benefit from his giving evidence. 39 – In Netherlands law, see Article 164(3) of the WBR. 40 – I exclude the cases provided for in Article 14(1) of Regulation No 1206/2001 where a person is prohibited from giving evidence or is exempted from the requirement to do so, either under the law (for example, against a spouse) or for reasons of force majeure (such as his state of health making it impossible for him to travel). 41 – See point 19 et seq. of the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 5193. 42 – Thus, at the hearing, the German Government affirmed that a German court could impose on a German national living abroad all obligations and actions provided for by its national law. It stated that this followed from the exercise by a Member State of its sovereign public power over its nationals, as the personal link that results from nationality continues to exist even where a person resides abroad. It added that a German court which had summoned such a national to appear before it could threaten him with coercive measures in the event of his non-appearance and, unless there was a legitimate reason for his absence, impose a fine or even a prison sentence on him, it being established that the enforcement of those measures would take place only on German territory. 43 – None the less, as in the case of rejection of a request for the taking of evidence, the refusal to implement a coercive measure should be exceptional, since the purpose of Regulation No 1206/2001 is to facilitate the obtaining of evidence by one Member State from another. 44 – However, a court ruling on a civil or commercial matter covered by Regulation No 1206/2001 cannot exercise public authority outside the territory of the Member State in which it is situated by carrying out substantive acts necessitating the use of State coercion such as using the State’s police force to bring a party resident in another Member State by force to appear before it.