Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:34
Date: 2026-01-21
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Procedure: Arbitration clause;Staff cases;Action for damages

summary of those pleas in law. In that regard, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union are not required to respond to the arguments of a party which are not sufficiently clear and precise, in that they have not been expanded upon or accompanied by a specific line of argument intended to support them (see judgment of 12 October 2022, Paesen v EEAS, T‑88/21, EU:T:2022:631, paragraph 205 (not published) and the case-law cited). It must be stated that the applicant confines himself, as regards the first part of the fourth plea, to making a general claim which is not clearly developed, and that he does not explain, in particular, which elements of law and fact could provide a basis for that claim. 109 In those circumstances, the first part of the fourth plea does not comply with the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and must be rejected as inadmissible. (2) The second part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration on the basis that the abolition of the post held by the applicant was announced ‘at the last minute’ 110 The applicant claims that Eulex Kosovo infringed the principle of sound administration by publishing a call for contributions for the post of Knowledge and Information Management Officer on the Goalkeeper recruitment platform, intended for thousands of staff working for CSDP missions and possible external candidates, on 18 September 2023, only a few hours after informing him of the abolition of the post he held. 111 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 112 As stated in paragraph 75 above, the Courts of the European Union may reject as ineffective a plea or complaint where they find that it is not capable, in the event that it is well founded, of supporting the claim advanced, in this case that the acts at issue should be declared unlawful. 113 In the present case, even supposing that Eulex Kosovo was obliged to inform the applicant earlier of the publication of a call for contributions for the newly created post, a failure to comply with that obligation would not, as such, vitiate the legality of the acts at issue, which concern the termination of the applicant’s employment contract. 114 In any event, Article 17.1 of the applicant’s final employment contract expressly provided for one month’s notice of termination. The applicant does not rely on any other provision of or applicable to his employment contract or on any provision of the SOP relating to reconfiguration providing for him to be informed before the publication of a call for contributions for a specific post, even if, as in the present case, that post includes certain tasks which he was performing on the date of publication. Given that the applicant’s employment contract contains an express provision concerning notice, the applicant cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, rely on the principle of sound administration as giving rise to an obligation on Eulex Kosovo to provide information on a date prior to that laid down in that contract. Furthermore, the applicant has not even stated the date on which, according to him, he should have been informed of the publication of a call for contributions for the newly created post, or the extent to which his situation would have changed if he had been informed earlier. The publication in question did not, as such and automatically, entail the termination of his employment contract. 115 Consequently, the second part of the fourth plea must be dismissed as ineffective and in any event unfounded. (3) The third part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration in that Eulex Kosovo did not consult the Staff Committee 116 The applicant submits, referring to the judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA (F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89), that Eulex Kosovo infringed Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration by not consulting the Staff Committee before proposing the abolition of his post. That article does not provide for an exception on account of the confidentiality of the procedure. The applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo cannot argue that consulting the Staff Committee would have had no impact on the deployment plan, as such a line of argument would deprive the obligation laid down by the SOP and the case-law of any purpose. 117 According to the applicant, that fact constitutes a ‘substantial mistake’ as to the applicable regulations, within the meaning of Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. 118 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 119 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant. In any event, in the present action, the applicant’s admissible challenges relate only to the acts at issue, by which Eulex Kosovo terminated his contract and rejected his internal appeal against that termination (see paragraph 35 et seq. above). 120 In any event, according to Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, during a reconfiguration procedure, ‘whenever applicable, and in line with limitations arising from operational requirements, data protection and security concerns, the Staff Representatives and National Contingent Leaders/National Points of Contact, within their [respective mandates], will be consulted by the [m]ission on the process of organisational changes and the possible impact on the staff’ and ‘this consultation should include but not be limited to an explanation on the substantial changes to job descriptions and the consequences of such changes’. 121 It follows from the words ‘whenever applicable’ that, contrary to what the applicant claims, Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration does not lay down any obligation to consult the Staff Committee during a reorganisation procedure. Furthermore, Eulex Kosovo submits that it was not possible to consult that committee in the present case, given the confidentiality surrounding that procedure. 122 In addition, the applicant’s argument based on the judgment of 16 July 2015, Murariu v EIOPA (F‑116/14, EU:F:2015:89, paragraph 86), must be rejected, since the regulations applicable in the case which gave rise to that judgment provided for an obligation to consult the Staff Committee, which is not the case here. 123 Consequently, the third part of the fourth plea is unfounded. (4) The fourth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration, on the basis that the abolished post and the newly created post are not significantly different, and the sixth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the principle of sound administration and an ‘abuse of authority’ resulting from the lack of any objective reason for abolishing the post in question 124 By the fourth part of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo had no valid reason to abolish the post he held. He states that the newly created post is not significantly different from the former post. No substantial change was made to the job description, within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. The change to the job title was minor and the tasks and responsibilities, as well as the qualifications and experience required, were essentially the same as for the post he held. The applicant adds that the requirements concerning qualifications and experience for the former post were stricter. 125 The abolition of the post held by the applicant was not based on an operational needs assessment or on external factors. 126 The applicant submits that the decision to abolish the post he held and then to announce the creation of a new post with a slightly amended job title constitutes a breach of the principle of sound administration. The applicant states that the message informing him that his post was no longer provided for as part of the mission structure was misleading, and that this constitutes an infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration, and is evidence of the arbitrariness of the decision. 127 It also constitutes a ‘case of substantial mistake of fact’ pursuant to Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. 128 By the sixth part of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that the reconfiguration of the post he held was not based on objective criteria. The new Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo was not in a position to objectively assess or make the case for the importance of knowledge management. Those circumstances demonstrate a breach of the principle of sound administration and a misuse of powers. 129 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 130 In the first place, as regards the argument that the newly created post was not significantly different from the post held by the applicant, it should be stated that the post held by the applicant was that of Knowledge Management Officer. The engagement regime applicable to that post was ‘seconded/contractual’. The professional experience required was five years. 131 By contrast, the engagement regime for the newly created post was that of ‘seconded’ staff only. As Eulex Kosovo pointed out at the hearing, that difference is important for two reasons. First, limiting the engagement regime to seconded staff reflects the desire of the Member States to increase the proportion of seconded staff within the mission. Secondly, that difference has a significant impact on the mission’s budget. 132 It follows that the difference referred to in paragraph 131 above is, in itself, sufficient to reject the applicant’s argument that the newly created post is not substantially different from the post he held. 133 In any event, it should be stated that there are other substantial differences between the two posts. 134 First, the newly created post is a Knowledge and Information Management post. Contrary to what the applicant suggests, that is not just a change of job title. It is apparent in particular from a comparison of the two job descriptions provided as Annexes A.6 and A.19 to the application that the newly created post includes substantial additional tasks relating to information management, such as developing an information strategy and contributing to the development of information management in the mission as a whole. 135 According to Eulex Kosovo, information management focuses on the organisation and storage of information, which requires, in particular, skills relating to archiving, indexing and record keeping. Knowledge management focuses on the analysis of data and of the information that is gleaned from that data and needs to be communicated to staff, which requires, in particular, analytical and advisory skills. 136 The arguments raised by the applicant in the reply, where he submits that information management is inherent in knowledge management and that, during the currency of his employment contract, he had also been responsible for information management, cannot succeed. 137 The applicant does not provide any evidence in support of his assertion that he carried out tasks relating to information management. 138 Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the way in which the concepts of ‘information management’ and ‘knowledge management’ are understood by Eulex Kosovo – which is responsible for defining and specifying the responsibilities of its staff in accordance with the mission entrusted to it – is incorrect. 139 Secondly, the professional experience required for the newly created post is four years and is thus lower than that required for the post which the applicant held. 140 It follows that the newly created post has characteristics that differ significantly from those of the post held by the applicant in terms of responsibilities, experience required and engagement regime. 141 Consequently, the line of argument by which the applicant claims that the newly created post is not significantly different from the post he held must be rejected as factually incorrect. 142 In the second place, the arguments based on a breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and the principle of sound administration must, consequently and in any event, also be rejected, as they are based on the false premiss that the two posts were not substantially different. 143 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument based on Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, it is sufficient to observe that that article relates to ‘substantial change[s] to [the] [j]ob [d]escription’ – that is, changes to an existing post which is not being abolished. In the present case, the post held by the applicant was not retained. By contrast, Article 4.1 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, which is headed ‘Elimination of a [s]pecific [p]ost from the [d]eployment [p]lan’, concerns the situation in which a post is abolished, as arose in the present case. 144 Consequently, the line of argument advanced by the applicant on the basis of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration must be rejected, on the ground that that article is not applicable in the present case. 145 In any event, even if Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration were applicable in the present case, it must be observed that that article allows the termination of a contract if there is a substantial change to the job description. According to that article, that procedure for terminating a contract applies even if the current holder of the post matches the new profile. 146 It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 130 to 140 above that the differences between the newly created post and the post held by the applicant, particularly when taken together, are significant, such that they constitute a substantial change to the job description. 147 In the fourth place, as regards the applicant’s argument that there was no objective reason to abolish the post he occupied, it has already been held in paragraph 37 et seq. above that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, including the decision to abolish the post held by the applicant. 148 In any event, in the present action, the applicant’s admissible challenges relate only to the acts at issue, and not to the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, which provided for the abolition of the post he held (see paragraph 35 et seq. above). 149 Consequently, the applicant’s argument must be rejected. 150 Furthermore, even supposing that the lack of an objective reason for the changes to the deployment plan, as proposed by Eulex Kosovo and adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, could call into question the legality of the acts at issue, it must be stated that the very nature of Eulex Kosovo – inasmuch as its ultimate fate is to cease to exist – necessarily determines the temporary nature of the conditions of employment of its staff (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2021, Jenkinson v Council and Others, T‑602/15 RENV, EU:T:2021:764, paragraph 181). Thus, as the applicant seems to acknowledge explicitly, the Council, the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander and Eulex Kosovo have the right to reorganise the mission, as is also apparent from Article 17 of the applicant’s final employment contract. According to that article, the contract may be terminated on one month’s notice. The cases of termination mentioned in Article 17.2 of that contract, in which the Council decides to close or downsize the mission, are only examples. Moreover, the existence of the SOP relating to reconfiguration demonstrates the need for restructuring. 151 Furthermore, the arguments raised by the applicant cannot call into question the objective nature of the reasons put forward by Eulex Kosovo for abolishing the post he held. 152 First, and contrary to what the applicant seems to suggest, Eulex Kosovo’s explanation that it had been decided that his tasks no longer justified a full-time position is neither new nor inadmissible. Even if Eulex Kosovo had not established that that explanation had been given at the interview of 2 October 2023, it is inherent in the fact that the newly created post combines the tasks associated with the post which the applicant held with other tasks. 153 Secondly, the applicant’s argument that the percentage of seconded staff at Eulex Kosovo has always fluctuated and has never reached the target of 80% does not call into question the reason put forward by Eulex Kosovo in that regard. In a situation in which that percentage is not reached, every post that is assigned to a seconded staff member rather than a contracted staff member contributes to achieving the 80% target. Consequently, that argument is ineffective. The same is true of the applicant’s arguments that that objective is impossible to achieve, that such objectives have never been achieved, that Eulex Kosovo continues to recruit contracted staff, and that certain posts held by seconded staff have also been abolished. Such circumstances, even if established, would not call into question the objective nature of the efforts made to achieve the target rate of 80%. 154 Thirdly, the applicant’s arguments relating to the identified need for information management have all been rejected in paragraph 134 et seq. above. 155 In the fifth place, the arguments alleging misuse of powers will be dealt with in addressing the ninth part of the fourth plea. 156 Consequently, the fourth and sixth parts of the fourth plea must be rejected. (5) The ninth part of the fourth plea, alleging ‘abuse of authority’ and a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ under Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, in that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo wished to ‘get rid’ of the applicant 157 The applicant submits that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo’s proposal to abolish the post he held constitutes either a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ or an ‘abuse of authority’ under Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. 158 He states that the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo wanted to ‘get rid’ of him. First, the applicant had witnessed and been closely involved in a major conflict between the Chief of Staff and the section in which the applicant worked, which had had humiliating consequences for the Chief of Staff. Secondly, the applicant had assisted the Chair of the Staff Committee and shared ideas on how the employment conditions of contracted staff could be improved. Thirdly, according to the applicant, the Chief of Staff had little awareness of the importance of knowledge management or of the applicant’s past record in that field. 159 The applicant also states that it is difficult to fill the extremely specialised post he held. It was foreseeable that no qualified member of the seconded staff would be found who met the requirements. Furthermore, the applicant had acquired institutional knowledge over a period of more than five and a half years which is now lost to Eulex Kosovo. 160 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 161 In that regard, it should be recalled that the concept of misuse of powers has a very precise meaning and encompasses the use by an administrative authority of its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred upon it. An act is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent factors, to have been adopted with the purpose of achieving ends other than those stated. In that regard, it is not sufficient to refer to certain facts in support of claims; evidence of a sufficiently specific, objective and consistent nature must also be adduced to support their truth or, at the very least, their probability, failing which the material accuracy of the statements of the institution concerned cannot be challenged. Thus, the overall assessment of evidence of misuse of powers cannot be based on mere assertions or on evidence that is insufficiently clear or is neither objective nor relevant (judgment of 7 June 2018, OW v EASA, T‑597/16, not published, EU:T:2018:338, paragraph 98). 162 In the present case, the applicant simply presumes that the Chief of Staff wanted to ‘get rid’ of him on account, in particular, of the fact that he had perceived a situation which had arisen at work as humiliating for the Chief of Staff and on account of the applicant’s cooperation with the Staff Committee. However, the applicant does not put forward any objective element or indeed any evidence to support that presumption. Moreover, he does not even refer to a situation in which the Chief of Staff treated him with hostility. The assertion that the Chief of Staff had little awareness of the importance of knowledge management or of the applicant’s record is also unsubstantiated. 163 In those circumstances, the applicant’s mere assertions cannot call into question the accuracy of those of Eulex Kosovo that the revised deployment plan including the abolition of the post which the applicant held was based on operational needs and not on personal considerations. 164 As regards the arguments relating to the alleged difficulties in finding a member of seconded staff for the newly created post, it is sufficient to note that such difficulties, even if established, would not call into question the legality of the acts at issue, by which the applicant’s contract was terminated and the internal appeal against that termination was rejected. The issue of whether Eulex Kosovo is able to fill the newly created post has no legal connection with the issue of whether the termination of the applicant’s employment contract was unlawful. 165 Consequently, the ninth part of the fourth plea must be rejected. (6) The fifth part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principles of competence and experience 166 The applicant submits that in abolishing the post he held, Eulex Kosovo failed to comply with the principle, laid down in Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, that selections must be based on relevant competence and experience, respecting the principle of non-discrimination. He states in particular that Eulex Kosovo disregarded the ‘institutional memory’ that he had accumulated in a highly specialised position, his skills, expertise and professional experience. The Chief of Staff did not explain why he had identified the applicant’s post as redundant. 167 In the reply, the applicant submits that he intended to allege an infringement of the introductory wording of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, and not an infringement of Article 4.2 of that SOP. 168 The applicant argues that that circumstance constitutes a ‘substantial mistake of fact’ within the meaning of Article 5 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration. 169 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 170 In so far as the applicant challenges, in the fifth part of the fourth plea, the decision to abolish the post he held, that part must be rejected on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that it is ineffective in the context of the present action (see paragraph 32 et seq. above). 171 If the applicant’s arguments are to be understood as relating to the termination of his employment contract, the following must be stated. 172 In the first place, the argument concerning Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration must be rejected. That article is not applicable to the present case, which concerns the abolition – not the modification – of a post, as stated in paragraphs 142 and 144 above. 173 In the second place, the introductory wording of Article 4 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration states that, in a reconfiguration, Eulex Kosovo must comply with the principle that ‘selections should be based on relevant competence and experience’. 174 It may be necessary to make a choice between several candidates where, in particular, there has been a substantial change to the job description, within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration, a reconfiguration of several posts with the same job description, within the meaning of Article 4.3 of that SOP, a merger of several posts, within the meaning of Article 4.4 of that SOP, or the creation of a new post, within the meaning of Article 4.6 of that SOP. 175 Where, as in the present case, a specific post has been abolished, there is no selection between several candidates in the context of which Eulex Kosovo could be required to comply with the principle that selections must be based on relevant competence and experience. 176 Consequently, the fifth part of the fourth plea must be dismissed. (7) The seventh part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff and misuse of powers, in that Eulex Kosovo should have offered the applicant another post within the mission 177 The applicant submits that Eulex Kosovo should have used reasonable efforts to reassign him, particularly in view of the fact that he had been in post for an uninterrupted period of four and a half years. Its failure to do so constitutes an infringement of the principle of sound administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, and is evidence of a misuse of powers. 178 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 179 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicant’s employment contract does not impose any obligation on Eulex Kosovo to avoid termination by finding other posts for him. 180 Article 4.1 of the SOP relating to reconfiguration indicates in that regard that, in the event of a specific post being removed from the deployment plan, as occurred in the present case, the employment of a contracted member of staff may be terminated before the expiry of the contract provided that prior notice is given in accordance with the OPLAN and the employment contract. Neither that provision, nor any other provision of that SOP, nor any other contractual provision imposes an obligation on Eulex Kosovo to avoid termination by finding other posts for the staff member concerned within the mission. Nor does such an obligation arise from the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, since such an approach would amount to giving the applicant a right of priority which is not provided for and which would undermine the interests of other members of staff wishing to see their own employment contracts renewed or hoping to be successful in selection procedures opened for vacant posts (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 135). Furthermore, to recognise such an obligation would run counter to the very nature of Eulex Kosovo, inasmuch as its ultimate fate is to cease to exist, and to the temporary nature of the conditions of employment of its staff, referred to in paragraph 150 above. 181 Thus, a failure ‘to use efforts’ on the part of Eulex Kosovo in that regard, if it were established, would not constitute a breach of the principle of sound administration, a breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, or a misuse of powers. (8) The eighth part of the fourth plea, alleging an infringement of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of sound administration, on the basis that other members of staff whose posts were abolished were treated differently 182 The applicant submits that the process of terminating his employment contract was unfair, as the majority of the other international posts affected by the 2023 reconfiguration of Eulex Kosovo were not terminated until six months later, namely on 15 June 2024. The members of staff concerned were informed of that termination in advance. 183 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 184 As a preliminary point, it should be stated that, in this eighth part of the fourth plea, the applicant is alleging, in essence, an infringement of the principle of equal treatment. 185 In that regard, it must be stated that the implementation of the two-stage reconfiguration is a direct result of the revised deployment plan. As has been stated in paragraph 37 et seq. above, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review and assess the legality of the revised deployment plan adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander. 186 In any event, it must be borne in mind that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression (see judgment of 29 October 2020, Veselības ministrija, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 187 According to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, whether the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment (see judgment of 29 October 2020, Veselības ministrija, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, C‑243/19, EU:C:2020:872, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 188 The requirement that situations must be comparable, for the purpose of determining whether there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment, must be assessed in the light of all the elements that characterise them and, in particular, in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the act that makes the distinction in question. To that end, the principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must be taken into account. If the situations are not comparable, a difference in the treatment of the situations concerned is not in breach of equality before the law as enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter (judgment of 2 September 2021, État belge (Right of residence in the event of domestic violence), C‑930/19, EU:C:2021:657, paragraph 58). 189 In the present case, it must be stated that the other posts which were abolished have a different profile from that held by the applicant. The post held by the applicant was the only Knowledge Management Officer post. Thus, the situation in which the applicant found himself was not comparable to that of the members of staff who occupied the other posts, in particular as regards operational needs. Eulex Kosovo submits, without demur from the applicant on this point, that the other posts related to security, which is why it was decided to abolish them six months later in order to avoid deficiencies in the safety and security arrangements of Eulex Kosovo. 190 Consequently, the eighth part of the fourth plea must be rejected, and with it the fourth plea in its entirety. (d) Third plea: infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations 191 The applicant claims that, by terminating his contract, Eulex Kosovo infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. He submits that he relied on various precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, given to him between June 2023 and August 2023, that his job was not at risk. 192 First, at a barbecue on 12 June 2023, the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo assured the applicant that the rumours that his contract would be terminated at the end of the year were only rumours and that his position was safe. 193 Secondly, on 15 June 2023, Eulex Kosovo extended the applicant’s contract for two additional years until 14 June 2025. That was the first time that the applicant had obtained an employment contract for a period of two years. 194 Thirdly, the applicant, relying on Annex A.12 to the application, claims that, on 23 June 2023, at a meeting between the section in which he worked and the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo, the Chief of Staff assured him that his position was safe and informed him that the new Head of Mission ‘[put] a lot of importance’ on knowledge management. 195 Fourthly, on 27 June 2023, the new Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo addressed all members of staff at an open meeting. The applicant submits that the new Head of Mission stated on that occasion that Eulex Kosovo had no budget problems, that it was only infrastructure costs that were to be optimised, that there would be no impact on staff, that the strength of the mission would remain the same, that there would be no impact on the various forms of employment and that the adjustment to the mission was driven by the CSDP Compact. 196 Fifthly, on 13 and 14 July 2023, the applicant was designated as Eulex Kosovo’s point of contact for the ‘Knowledge Management Network’ set up by the EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. 197 Sixthly, in August 2023, the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo asked the applicant to set up a meeting with the new Head of Mission about the role of knowledge management and the future Knowledge Management Network to be hosted by the EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. According to the applicant, that was a sign that the Chief of Staff had realised how important the topic of knowledge management and his post were. The applicant, relying on Annex A.12 to the application, states that, during that meeting, which took place on 21 August 2023, the Head of Mission emphasised the importance of knowledge management for Eulex Kosovo. He asked the applicant to keep him informed of further steps. The Head of Mission also said that it was necessary to ensure that the section in which the applicant worked had at least one local staff member at its disposal so that the applicant could accomplish his tasks. 198 In reliance on those assurances that he would remain employed by the Eulex Kosovo mission until at least June 2025, the applicant renewed the lease of his accommodation, purchased a vehicle in September 2023 and did not look for another job. 199 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 200 In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is among the fundamental principles of the European Union (judgment of 5 May 1981, Dürbeck, 112/80, EU:C:1981:94, paragraph 48). The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations presupposes, first, that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised, reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union. By contrast, a person may not plead breach of that principle unless he or she has been given those assurances (see judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission, C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). Secondly, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed. Thirdly, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (see judgment of 7 November 2019, WN v Parliament, T‑431/18, not published, EU:T:2019:781, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited). 201 The first of the conditions referred to in paragraph 200 above is not met in the present case. 202 In the first place, the applicant’s employment contract provided, without any ambiguity, for the possibility of terminating that contract by giving one month’s written notice stating the reason for the termination (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). 203 In the second place, it is apparent from the file that the then Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo informed all mission staff, by email of 2 June 2023, of the ‘new mandate and contracts’, and of the fact that new two-year employment contracts would be offered to all contracted staff, with the caveat that, if the new deployment plan that was to be drawn up led to the abolition of a post, the contract of the staff member concerned would be terminated with a notice period. 204 In the third place, and having regard, in particular, to what has been stated in paragraphs 202 and 203 above, the fact that the applicant’s employment contract was extended in June 2023 for a period of two years cannot be equated with a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance that his employment contract would not be terminated. 205 In the fourth place, neither the fact that tasks were assigned to the applicant during the currency of his employment contract (see paragraph 196 above), nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Head of Mission or Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo regarded knowledge management as important (see paragraphs 194 and 197 above), nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Head of Mission stated that at least one local staff member should be provided for those tasks, nor the fact that, according to the applicant, the Chief of Staff dismissed rumours about the termination of the applicant’s employment contract (see paragraph 192 above) can be equated with precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 200 above, that the applicant’s employment contract would not be terminated. 206 In the fifth place, the statements made by the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo on 27 June 2023, reproduced in Annex A.20 to the application, also cannot be treated as a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance that the applicant’s employment contract would not be terminated. Those statements are general and vague and it is apparent from that annex that the Head of Mission observed that there would be no impact on the overall manpower of Eulex Kosovo, that the total number of staff in the mission would be the same as under the previous mandate, and that there was no reason ‘for the time being’ for there to be an impact on the different forms of employment. It is apparent from the same annex that the Head of Mission also stated that it would be presumptuous of him to say that he was in a position, only one day after his appointment, to answer all the questions of the members of staff, and that he could only read and understand the OPLAN and announce, first of all, that Eulex Kosovo’s two-year mandate had been renewed. 207 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s assertion, disputed by Eulex Kosovo, that the head of the mission’s human resources division stated that she had considered the ‘promises [made by the Head of Mission] shortly after his arrival [to be] problematic’. First, that statement does not specify what was ‘promised’. Secondly, the mere fact that the alleged ‘promise’ was described as ‘problematic’ does not mean that it amounted to a precise, unconditional and consistent assurance within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 200 above. Thirdly, and in any event, an interpretation of the Head of Mission’s statements by the head of the human resources division does not amount to an unconditional assurance. 208 In the sixth place, with regard to the evidence from the applicant’s former colleague, provided as Annex A.12 to the application, according to which the Chief of Staff of Eulex Kosovo assured the applicant that his position was safe (see paragraph 194 above), the following must be stated. First, that fact, which is disputed by Eulex Kosovo, would, if proved, be isolated. It is the only matter relied on by the applicant that directly and explicitly concerns the continued existence of his post. Secondly, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Chief of Staff cannot be regarded as a competent authority in that regard. The fact that the Chief of Staff was his line manager does not alter the fact that the decision to abolish his post was adopted by the EEAS Civilian Operations Commander. Moreover, the email from the Head of Mission referred to in paragraph 203 above expressly stated that, if the new deployment plan that was to be drawn up led to the abolition of a post, the staff member concerned would be informed of termination with prior notice. The new deployment plan had not been adopted when the Chief of Staff allegedly assured the applicant that the post he held would continue to exist. 209 In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument based on the evidence of his former colleague must be rejected, and there is no need to determine whether the Chief of Staff assured the applicant that his position was safe. 210 It follows from all of the foregoing that the third plea, and consequently the first two principal heads of claim, must be rejected. 4. The third principal head of claim, seeking compensation for the material and non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant 211 The applicant seeks compensation for the material damage suffered, comprising loss of income resulting from the allegedly unlawful termination of his employment contract, up to the expiry of that contract, which represents 19 months of salary and emoluments. He states that he was unable to find alternative employment, despite applying to numerous EU and United Nations missions. He states that he did not receive any unemployment benefit. 212 As regards the non-material damage allegedly caused, the applicant describes repercussions on his health and his psychological balance. First, he suffered migraine attacks and chronic insomnia. Secondly, intense stress also profoundly affected his wife. Thirdly, the applicant had strong feelings of injustice and anxiety. 213 The applicant also submits that his dignity, reputation and career prospects were affected. First, according to the applicant, if his employment contract had not been terminated, he would have had the opportunity to continue working for Eulex Kosovo or other missions. Secondly, he finds it humiliating that the newly created post remains vacant and that no suitable candidate has been found. Thirdly, he suffered separate damage as a result of having to undertake pre-litigation and litigation procedures to secure recognition of his rights. 214 The applicant submits that he is not obliged to produce evidence in order for his non-material damage to be recognised, arguing that this follows from an application by analogy of the principles established by the judgment of 18 November 2020, H v Council (T‑271/10 RENV II, EU:T:2020:548). 215 The applicant submits that the damage referred to above is the direct consequence of unlawful acts of Eulex Kosovo which vitiate the acts at issue, such as: – first, the abolition of the post he held and the termination of his employment contract despite the assurances he received; – secondly, the failure to consult the Staff Committee; – thirdly, the failure to hear the applicant; – fourthly, the fact that he was not informed until after the post he held had been abolished, on the same day on which the newly created post was advertised; – fifthly, the failure to state adequate reasons for the abolition of the post he held; – sixthly, the pretence that the newly created post was significantly different from the abolished post; – seventhly, the fact that no attempt was made to reassign him to a different post; – eighthly, misuse of powers. 216 The applicant submits that the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and the requirement for a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on him are not applicable in the context of contractual liability. 217 The applicant assesses the non-material damage suffered, ex aequo et bono, at EUR 45 000. 218 Eulex Kosovo disputes those arguments. 219 It must be stated that it is apparent from the assessment of the four pleas raised in support of the first and second principal heads of claim that the applicant is wrong in alleging that Eulex Kosovo breached contractual provisions and general principles of EU law and the Charter by the acts referred to in paragraph 215 above. 220 Accordingly, the applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of contractual loss, which is advanced as a principal claim under the third head of claim, must be dismissed as unfounded. C. The alternative heads of claim based on Articles 263 and 268 TFEU 221 In the first place, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, an action for annulment based on Article 263 TFEU is available in respect of all acts adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to produce binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the applicant by bringing about a significant change in his or her legal position (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 222 Nonetheless, where there is a contract between the applicant and one of the institutions, an action may be brought before the Courts of the European Union on the basis of Article 263 TFEU only if the contested act is intended to produce binding legal effects which are outside the contractual relationship between the parties and which involve the exercise of prerogatives of a public authority conferred on the contracting institution in its capacity as an administrative authority (see judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). 223 Therefore, where, as in the present case, the applicant and the defendant are bound by a contract, the court with jurisdiction in respect of the contract has jurisdiction in principle. The situation referred to in paragraph 222 above is therefore an exception to that principle, so that the conditions governing it must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 30). 224 As stated in paragraph 22 above, the present action concerns the termination of the contract at issue and the rejection of the internal appeal against that termination, which are contractual in nature. Such acts are therefore not intended to produce binding legal effects outside the contractual relationship between the applicant and Eulex Kosovo and involving the exercise by the latter of prerogatives of a public authority. Consequently, those acts cannot be regarded as subject to an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 July 2022, JF v EUCAP Somalia, T‑194/20, EU:T:2022:454, paragraph 40). 225 The application brought in the alternative under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the acts at issue must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible. 226 In the second place, it must be stated that there is a genuine contractual context surrounding the applicant’s claim for compensation, having regard in particular to the contractual nature of the acts said to have caused the alleged damage and the nature of the alleged material and non-material damage, such that that claim falls within the scope of the European Union’s contractual liability. Consequently, the claim for damages which the applicant advances, in the alternative, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, and which has as its object the non-contractual liability of the European Union for the actions of Eulex Kosovo, must be rejected as inadmissible. D. The application for measures of inquiry 227 The applicant requests, by way of measures of inquiry as referred to in Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, first, that he appear in person and, second, that his colleague, who is able to give evidence of the assurances given by the Chief of Staff and the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo at the meetings of 23 June 2023 and 21 August 2023, be heard as a witness. 228 Eulex Kosovo opposes the hearing of the applicant as a witness. 229 In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it concerning the cases before it (see judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). 230 It is therefore for the Court to assess first, whether a request for the appearance in person or for the examination of witnesses is relevant to the subject matter of the dispute and, second, whether it is necessary to order the appearance in person or to examine the witnesses named (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2007, Sniace v Commission, C‑260/05 P, EU:C:2007:700, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). 231 In the present case, besides the fact that the applicant has not explained, in accordance with Article 88(2) of the Rules of Procedure, why his applications for measures of inquiry were not made until after the close of the written part of the procedure, it must be observed that the information in the file and the explanations given at the hearing are sufficient to enable the Court to adjudicate, given that it has been able to give a useful ruling on the basis of the forms of order sought and the pleas in law and arguments put forward during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. 232 There is therefore no need for the measures of inquiry sought by the applicant. 233 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed. IV. Costs 234 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 235 However, according to Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, if equity so requires, the Court may decide that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his or her own, or even that he or she is not to be ordered to pay any. 236 It follows from the grounds set out above that the applicant is the unsuccessful party. Furthermore, Eulex Kosovo expressly claimed in its pleadings that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs. However, as the circumstances of the present case justify the application of Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders DT and Eulex Kosovo each to bear their own costs. Svenningsen Mac Eochaidh Laitenberger Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 January 2026. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.