Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:1005
Date: 2025-12-18
Language of the case: Italian

Summary C-424/24 – 1 
Case C-424/24 
Summary of request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
17 June 2024 
Referring court: 
Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
6 June 2024 
Applicant: 
ZD 
Defendants: 
Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) 
Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) 
Procura federale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio 
(FIGC) 
Collegio di garanzia dello sport presso il Comitato Olimpico 
Nazionale Italiano (CONI) 
Corte federale d’appello presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco 
Calcio (FIGC) 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
1 The case in the main proceedings concerns an application for annulment of the 
decisions taken by the Federazione italiana giuoco calcio (Italian Football 
Federation; ‘the FIGC’) and the Comitato olimpico nazionale italiano (Italian 
National Olympic Committee; ‘CONI’), which imposed on the applicant a 
sanction consisting of a prohibition on undertaking professional activities that 
come within the area of competence of the FIGC for a period of 24 months. 
EN 
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Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
2 Interpretation of Articles 6 and 19 TEU, Articles 45, 49 and 56, 101 and 102 
TFEU, Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR, the principles of effective judicial 
protection, legality of criminal offences and penalties, legal certainty and 
sufficient precision of provisions relating to penalties, as well as due process, in 
order to establish whether EU law precludes national legislation under which, in 
judicial remedies against disciplinary sanctions imposed by national sports 
federations, including the FIGC, national courts are not permitted to annul 
unlawful sanctions, but only to award compensation for the injury caused by those 
sanctions. The referring court also raises the question of whether EU law 
precludes legislation of a Member State that allows a national sports federation, 
such as the FIGC, to impose a disciplinary sanction on a manager of a sports club, 
consisting of a prohibition on undertaking professional activities at national and 
supranational level for a period of 24 months, in accordance with an internal rule 
of the federation which is formulated in general and vague terms and which 
requires its members to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity. 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
3 (1) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, in the light of 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
Article 6 of the ECHR, in relation to the principle of effective judicial protection, 
be interpreted as precluding: 
- a national provision of a Member State, such as Article 2 of decreto-legge 
220/2003 (Decree-Law No 220/2003), converted into legge 280/2003 (Law 
No 280/2003), as interpreted in Italian case-law, once the instances of national 
sports justice have been exhausted, from excluding recourse to judicial protection 
that confers a power on the national court (in this case, the administrative court) to 
annul disciplinary sanctions in sport and their future effects, and to suspend the 
effect of those sanctions as an interim measure, thereby limiting the national court 
to awarding equivalent compensatory protection, where it appears that the 
disciplinary power has been exercised unlawfully? 
4 (2) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, interpreted in the light 
of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR, be interpreted, so as to ensure 
observance of the principles of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, of 
legal certainty and sufficient precision of offences, as well as of due process, as 
precluding: 
- a national provision, such as Article 2 of Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted 
into Law No 280/2003 – as interpreted in Italian case-law – which, in accordance 
with the principle of autonomy of sports law as enshrined in national law and 
interpreted in Italian case-law, allows sports governing bodies to impose a 
FIGC AND CONI 
 
3 
disciplinary sanction on a sports manager prohibiting him or her from undertaking 
professional activities on the ground that he or she infringed a provision of the 
sporting federation’s rules (Article 4(1) of the Codice di Giustizia Sportiva FGCI 
(FGCI Sports Justice Code)), which establishes, by a general clause formulated in 
vague terms, that all members and managers are required to observe, in addition to 
the by-laws and other regulations of the federation, the principles of honesty, 
fairness and integrity? 
5 (3) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be 
interpreted as precluding: 
- a national provision, such as Article 2 of Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted 
into Law No 280/2003, from allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary 
sanction on a manager of a sports club operating at international level which 
prohibits him or her from undertaking professional activities for 24 months at 
national and supranational level? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
6 TEU, in particular Articles 6 and 19; TFEU, in particular Articles 6, 45, 49, 56, 
101 and 102; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular 
Articles 47, 48 and 49. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
7 Italian Constitution, in particular: 
8 Article 24: ‘All persons are entitled to take judicial action to protect their 
individual rights and legitimate interests’; 
9 Article 103(1): ‘The Council of State and the other organs of administrative 
justice have jurisdiction in cases involving the infringement of legitimate interests 
and – in the specific areas laid down by law – individual rights by public 
authorities’. 
10 Article 113: ‘The judicial safeguarding of rights and legitimate interests before the 
organs of ordinary or administrative justice is always permitted against acts of the 
public administration. …’. 
11 Codice civile italiano (Italian Civil Code), in particular Article 2058: ‘The injured 
party may apply for compensation in a specific form, where possible in whole or 
in part. Nevertheless, the court may order the reparation to be made in kind, if 
compensation in a specific form is excessively onerous for the debtor’. 
12 Decreto legislativo del 2 luglio 2010, n. 104 – Attuazione dell’articolo 44 della 
legge 18 giugno 2009, n. 69, recante delega al governo per il riordino del processo 
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amministrativo (Legislative Decree No 104 of 2 July 2010 implementing 
Article 44 of Law No 69 of 18 June 2009 delegating powers to the Government 
for the reorganisation of administrative procedure) (‘the Code of Administrative 
Procedure’), in particular: 
Article 133(1): ‘The following shall be devolved to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the administrative court, unless otherwise provided for by law: … disputes 
concerning acts of the Italian National Olympic Committee or sports federations 
not reserved for sports tribunals and excluding those relating to financial 
relationships between clubs, associations and athletes’. 
13 Decreto-legge del 19 agosto 2003, n. 220 – Disposizioni urgenti in materia di 
giustizia sportiva (Decree-Law No 220 of 19 August 2003 – Urgent provisions on 
sports justice, converted into law, with amendments, by Law No 280/2003, in 
particular: 
14 Article 1: ‘The Italian Republic recognises and promotes the autonomy of national 
sports law as an expression of international sports law falling within the purview 
of the International Olympic Committee. 2. The relationship between sports law 
and Italian law is governed by the principle of autonomy, except in cases 
involving individual rights linked to sports law which are of relevance to the legal 
system of the Italian Republic’. 
15 Article 2: ‘1. In accordance with the principles laid down in Article 1, the 
regulation of the following matters is reserved for sports law: (a) compliance with 
and application of the regulatory, organisational and statutory provisions of 
national sports law and its structures in order to guarantee the integrity of sport; 
(b) relevant conduct at the disciplinary level and the imposition and application of 
the related sports disciplinary sanctions. 2. In the matters referred to in 
paragraph 1, clubs, associations, affiliates and members have the obligation, in 
accordance with the provisions of the by-laws and regulations of the Italian 
National Olympic Committee and the sports federations referred to in Articles 15 
and 16 of Legislative Decree No 242 of 23 July 1999, to bring such matters before 
the organs of sports justice’. 
16 Article 3: ‘Once the instances of sports justice have been exhausted and without 
prejudice to the jurisdiction of the ordinary court on financial relationships 
between clubs, associations and athletes, any other dispute concerning acts of the 
Italian National Olympic Committee or sports federations not reserved for the 
organs of sports justice pursuant to Article 2 shall be governed by the code of 
administrative procedure …’ 
17 Article 4: ‘1. The parties referred to in Article 2 are required to comply with the 
by-laws, the code, the internal organisational rules of the FIGC and any other 
federal regulations and to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity 
in any relationship however related to sport. 2. In the event of an infringement of 
FIGC AND CONI 
 
5 
the obligations laid down in paragraph 1, the sanctions [provided for by this law] 
shall apply. …’ 
18 Article 31: ‘The absence, alteration or material or ideological falsification, in 
whole or in part, of the documents required by the organs of sports justice, the 
Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Società di Calcio Professionistiche (Supervisory 
Commission for Professional Football Clubs; COVISOC) and other supervisory 
bodies of the federation, in addition to the bodies responsible for issuing UEFA 
and FIGC licences, or the submission of false, incomplete or partial information, 
constitute an administrative offence. Administrative offences also include any 
conduct aimed at circumventing federal legislation on administrative and 
economic matters, in addition to failure to execute the decisions of the competent 
federal bodies. Without prejudice to the application of the most severe sanctions 
provided for by UEFA licensing rules or other special rules, in addition to the 
most severe sanctions that may be imposed for other acts provided for in this 
article, any club that commits the offences referred to in this paragraph shall 
receive a fine and a warning’. 
Case-law relied on 
19 European Court of Human Rights, judgments of 8 June 1976, Engel and Others v. 
Netherlands (5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72); of 21 February 
1984, Öztürk v. Germany (8544/79); of 4 March 2014, Grande Stevens and Others 
v. Italy (18640/10); of 15 November 2016, A. and B. v. Norway (24130/11 and 
29758/11) 
20 Court of Justice, judgments of 12 December 1974, Walrave and Koch, C-36/74; of 
13 March 2007, Unibet, C-432/05; of 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais, 
C-325/08; of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz, C-558/18; of 10 March 2021, 
Konsul Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w N., C-949/19; of 15 July 2021, Commission v 
Poland, C-791/19; of 21 December 2021, Randstad Italia, C-497/20; of 7 July 
2022, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and Others, C-261/21; of 21 December 2023, 
European Superleague Company, C-333/21; of 21 December 2023, International 
Skating Union, C-124/21 P 
21 Constitutional Court, judgments of 7 February 2011, No 49; of 21 March 2019, 
No 63; and of 17 April 2019, No 160 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
22 The case in the main proceedings concerns the action brought by ZD, a manager 
of a sports club, against the decisions of the FIGC and CONI by which a sanction 
was imposed on him in the form of a prohibition on undertaking professional 
activities within the area of competence of the FIGC for 24 months. 
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23 The contested decisions were adopted in disciplinary proceedings brought by the 
Procura Federale (Federal Prosecutor’s Office), an organ of the FIGC, against 
several sports clubs and their managers, including the applicant, ZD. The FIGC 
alleges that the applicant infringed several provisions of the ‘Sports Justice Code’, 
an instrument of the FIGC that governs disciplinary proceedings within the 
federation’s purview. Specifically, according to the FIGC, the applicant infringed 
Articles 4 and 31 of the code, in so far as he altered, in combination with others, 
the accounting records of the sports club of which he was manager. 
24 The first instance of the disciplinary proceedings, which took place before the 
Tribunale Federale Nazionale (National Federal Court, Italy), an organ of the 
FIGC, concluded in April 2022 with the acquittal of all of the accused. The 
Federal Prosecutor’s Office lodged a complaint against that decision before the 
Corte Federale di Appello (Federal Court of Appeal, Italy), also an organ of the 
FIGC. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint in May 2022. 
25 The Federal Prosecutor’s Office thus brought an action for revision before the 
Federal Court of Appeal, pursuant to Article 63 of the Sports Justice Code, after 
receiving the documents contained in the criminal proceedings file. In that regard, 
the referring court notes that the criminal proceedings brought against the 
applicant for the offences covered by the disciplinary proceedings were 
subsequently closed. 
26 At the end of the revision procedure, by decision of January 2023, the Federal 
Court of Appeal imposed the sanction at issue on the applicant. That decision was 
confirmed by the Collegio di Garanzia dello Sport (Sports Guarantee Board), an 
organ of CONI. ZD brought an action before the Tribunale amministrativo 
regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy), the referring 
court, seeking the annulment of the decisions adopted during the disciplinary 
proceedings. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
27 In support of his action, ZD relies on the following pleas in law: 
infringement and misapplication of the law and of the principles and rules 
enshrined in the Italian Constitution and in the ECHR, in relation, as regards 
the first complaint, to Articles 25 and 117 of the Italian Constitution, 
Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR, Article 1 of legge n. 689/1981 (Law 
No 689/1981), Article 1 of legge n. 241/1990 (Law No 241/1990) and, as 
regards the second complaint, Articles 3, 24, 111 and 117 of the Italian 
Constitution, Article 6 of the ECHR, Article 1 of Law No 241/1990, 
Articles 2, 44 and 50 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code and Article 2 of the 
CONI Sports Justice Code. 
28 The applicant submits that Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into Law 
No 280/2003, on sports law is contrary to the principle of effective judicial 
FIGC AND CONI 
 
7 
protection and the right to an effective remedy, which are recognised by EU law. 
That law does not allow the administrative court to annul the unlawful disciplinary 
sanctions imposed by the FIGC, but only to order the FIGC to pay compensation 
for the injury caused by those sanctions. 
29 According to the applicant, in the case of administrative sanctions such as the one 
at issue in the main proceedings, consisting of a prohibition on carrying out 
certain activities for a significant period, the order to pay compensation for the 
injury caused by a sanction cannot be considered equivalent to the annulment of 
that sanction. 
30 In the opinion of the applicant, it is clear from the case-law of the ECtHR that 
sanctions that are punitive in nature, even if not formally classified as criminal in 
the laws of the ECHR Member States, must fall within the scope of the guarantees 
provided by the ECHR for criminal law sanctions. Accordingly, the principles of 
legal certainty must apply to such administrative sanctions. 
31 The applicant further submits that Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into Law 
No 280/2003, is contrary to Article 102 TFEU in so far as no detailed criteria have 
been provided for the exercise of the disciplinary power conferred on the FIGC. In 
particular, Law No 280/2003 does not identify the criteria for exercising 
disciplinary power in the event that such power entails a limitation of competition 
pursuant to Article 102 TFEU. Consequently, the power conferred on the FIGC is 
without limitations both as regards its subject matter and the conditions in which it 
is applied. 
32 According to the applicant, Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into Law 
No 280/2003, is contrary to Article 101 TFEU, since it does not lay down detailed 
rules capable of ensuring that decisions on disciplinary matters adopted by the 
organs of the FIGC are transparent, objective, certain, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate. 
33 The applicant points out that the actions of which he is accused involve the 
alleged infringement of accounting and budgetary rules, which have no bearing on 
the sport itself. Therefore, the administrative court should have the power to annul 
the disciplinary sanction at issue on the ground that it is unlawful. 
34 Lastly, the applicant seeks a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice on the following grounds in particular: 
35 the contested sanction, consisting of a temporary prohibition on undertaking 
professional activities within the area of competence of the FIGC, is related 
neither to the governance of sport nor to the powers vested in the organs of the 
FIGC responsible for disciplinary proceedings; 
36 the alleged infringements do not concern sport but are solely related to 
accounting; 
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37 the prohibition imposed by the sanction at issue is contrary to the freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaties, free competition, freedom of movement and the case-
law of the Court of Justice; 
38 the sanction at issue is based on the alleged infringement of general provisions 
resulting from the FIGC rules on disciplinary proceedings, the content of which is 
specified on a case-by-case basis according to an interpretation of the principles of 
fairness; 
39 in a situation such as that at issue in the present case, the powers of the Italian 
administrative court cannot be limited to equivalent compensatory protection (that 
is to say, the award of monetary compensation). In accordance with the principle 
of effective judicial protection, the court must have the power to annul and 
suspend the unlawful disciplinary sanction imposed by the organs of the FIGC. 
40 The FIGC points out that the action is inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded. 
Specifically, the inadmissibility of the action derives from the provisions of 
Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into Law No 280/2003, and 
Article 133(1)(z) of the Code of Administrative Procedure. In that regard, the 
FIGC recalls that individuals may apply for the annulment of decisions of CONI 
and of sports federations only before the organs of those organisations. 
Furthermore, the administrative court may examine such acts solely for the 
purpose of compensation, and only once those organs have issued a ruling. 
41 In addition, the FIGC disputes the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, 
arguing that they are unfounded on the merits. As regards the alleged infringement 
of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU, the sanction adopted by the FIGC only has effect 
within the area of competence of the FIGC. The sanction only covers the 
applicant’s professional activities in the sectors in which the FIGC operates and in 
Italy, such that the applicant’s ‘freedom of movement’ in the field of sport is not 
affected. 
42 The extension to UEFA and FIFA, requested in one of the disciplinary sanctions 
at issue in the main proceedings, relates to a measure which falls within the 
competence of UEFA and FIFA, which in any event is not the subject matter of 
the main proceedings. 
43 As for the infringement of the rules and principles on free competition, the FIGC 
submits that it does not exercise a dominant position in the market for services of 
sports club managers, as the sole organiser of competitions between Italian sports 
clubs competing internationally. 
44 CONI points out that the alleged infringements relate to sport, since the 
accounting activity involved in managing a sports club is closely connected with 
the club’s participation in the sport. 
FIGC AND CONI 
 
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45 Firstly, according to CONI, the national procedural system is not incompatible 
with Article 267 TFEU, provided that it guarantees compliance with the principles 
of equivalence and effective judicial protection. 
46 As for the infringement of EU law on the free movement of persons, services and 
capital, there is no limitation, for the applicant, on freedom of movement and the 
provision of his services, since the sanction in question consists solely of a 
temporary prohibition on undertaking professional activities that come within the 
area of competence of the FIGC, which is therefore purely national in scope. The 
application to extend the sanction to UEFA and FIFA is a matter for UEFA and 
FIFA themselves, which have adopted a specific measure that can be contested by 
the applicant before the competent international authorities. 
47 Lastly, CONI concludes that there is no relationship between the FIGC imposing a 
disciplinary sanction and freedom of competition. Disciplinary power in the field 
of sport is not without rules and limits, but is subject to specific provisions, 
including Legislative Decree No 242/1999. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
48 The referring court holds that the questions should be referred to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling, even though they have already been examined in 
previous rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
49 According to the referring court, the balance in Italian legislation between the 
autonomy of sports law and the judicial protection of individuals, in the light of 
the case-law of the Constitutional Court, seems to be contrary to the principles of 
EU law. 
50 The referring court recalls that Article 117 of the Italian Constitution provides that 
legislative power is to be exercised by the State and the regions in compliance, in 
particular, with the constraints deriving from EU law. The same court observes 
that the principles of EU law which the applicant claims have been breached 
(effectiveness of judicial protection, legality of criminal offences and penalties, 
legal certainty in the matter of administrative sanctions, free movement of persons 
and services, freedom of competition) are applicable in the main proceedings. 
51 According to the interpretation of national legislation adopted by the courts of first 
and last instance, as well as by the Constitutional Court, the applicant cannot seek 
the annulment or suspension of a sanction such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings in the administrative procedure. In that regard, the referring court 
points out that: 
52 the Constitutional Court has limited the judicial protection relating to the acts of 
sports federations to equivalent compensation, such that the national court 
examines the lawfulness of the contested sanction only incidentally and for the 
sole purpose of compensation; 
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53 the interpretation of national legislation given by case-law prevents the 
administrative court from annulling the disciplinary sanction adopted by the FIGC 
or suspending it as an interim measure, since it only allows the organs of the FIGC 
to annul such a sanction; 
54 the national system for the judicial protection of economic operators in the field of 
sport seems to be contrary to EU law. Moreover, according to the case-law of the 
Court of Justice, sport – in so far as it constitutes an economic activity – is fully 
subject to the provisions of EU law applicable to that activity, such as those on the 
protection of competition; 
55 the disciplinary sanction at issue undermines the applicant’s fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, prevents the applicant from undertaking 
professional activities and appears to be contrary to the principles of EU law on 
administrative sanctions. 
56 The referring court explains the concept of ‘sporting exception’, recognised in its 
opinion by the Court of Justice, according to which sport may fall within the 
scope of EU law only if it assumes economic significance. Accordingly, the 
provisions of EU law only apply to the provisions of sports law with direct or 
indirect economic relevance. 
57 In that regard, the referring court compares two principles: the primacy (primauté) 
of EU law and the principle of autonomy of sports law, as a guarantee of the 
specific nature of sport. The primacy of EU law entails its full application, 
whereas the principle of autonomy and the specific nature of sport mean that 
governance of that sector is reserved for national legislation. 
58 According to the referring court, the principle of autonomy of sports law must be 
coordinated in particular with the freedoms guaranteed by EU law and the 
principle of effective judicial protection. Furthermore, in view of the commercial 
importance of sport and the need to ensure full judicial protection for economic 
operators, the Italian administrative court must be permitted to exercise full 
jurisdiction over a sanction imposed by the organs of a sports federation on a 
manager of an Italian sports club, without any aspect of the matter being reserved 
for those bodies. 
59 The referring court has doubts as to whether Article 2 of Decree-Law 
No 220/2003, converted into Law No 280/2003, is compatible with EU law, in 
particular Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
in conjunction with Articles 45, 49 and 56 and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in so 
far as – according to the interpretation given by case-law – the administrative 
court does not have the power to adopt the interim measure of suspending and 
annulling disciplinary sanctions imposed by the organs of the FIGC, but may only 
give a ruling on the claim for compensation. 
60 By the first question, the referring court is asking whether, in the light of 
Articles 6 and 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
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the European Union, Italian domestic law and rules on the disciplinary 
proceedings of sports federations are compatible with the principle of effective 
judicial protection, taking into account the limits placed on such protection by 
Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into law by Law No 280/2003, as described 
in paragraph 42 above. 
61 The referring court recalls Articles 24, 103 and 113 of the Constitution, Articles 1, 
29, 30 and 133 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 31 
of Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into law by Law No 280/2003, and the 
case-law of the Constitutional Court, which has established that recourse against 
the sanctions imposed by the organs of sports federations before the 
administrative court is permitted solely to obtain compensation and that that court 
may examine the lawfulness of those sanctions only incidentally and for the 
purpose of awarding compensation. 
62 The referring court further recalls that, according to the Constitutional Court, 
Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into law by Law No 280/2003, provides for 
three forms of judicial protection. The first pertains to financial relationships 
between sports clubs, sports associations, athletes and members and comes under 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary court. The second concerns disciplinary sanctions 
in the field of sport, and therefore situations without relevance for national law, 
and is the responsibility of organs belonging to sports federations. The third is 
residual in nature, since it applies to all situations that do not come under the first 
or second form of protection, and consists of compensatory protection before the 
administrative court. 
63 The Constitutional Court has held that Article 1 of Decree-Law No 220 of 2003, 
converted into law by Law No 280/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, if a 
measure adopted by the sports federations or by CONI affects subjective legal 
situations relevant for the national legal system, individuals may submit an 
application aimed not at obtaining the annulment of the measure, but 
compensation before the administrative court. According to the Constitutional 
Court, such compensatory protection is not contrary to Article 24 of the Italian 
Constitution. Specifically, according to the Constitutional Court, that legislation is 
the result of a ‘not unreasonable balance made by the legislature between the … 
constitutional principle of full and effective judicial protection and the need to 
safeguard the autonomy of sports law’. 
64 The referring court observes that Decree-Law No 220/2003, converted into law by 
Law No 280/2003, since it prevents the court from annulling or suspending the 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by the organs of sports federations, is contrary to 
the principle of effective judicial protection, enshrined, in particular, in Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 19 TEU, 
with regard to the legal situations of individuals recognised by EU law. 
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65 The referring court points out, moreover, that the principle of effective judicial 
protection presupposes that the court possesses the fundamental characteristics of 
third-party status, impartiality and independence. 
66 By the second question, the referring court is uncertain whether the national 
legislation on disciplinary sanctions in the field of sport is compatible with the 
principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, in the light of EU law 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
67 In that regard, the referring court recalls, on the one hand, Article 6 TEU, 
Article 7 ECHR and Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and, on the other hand, the case-law of the ECtHR, according to 
which sanctions of a punitive nature, although not formally classified as criminal 
under the law of the ECHR Member States, must fall within the scope of the 
guarantees provided by the ECHR for criminal law sanctions. According to the 
ECtHR, the criminal nature of a provision relating to penalties must be assessed 
according to the nature of the offence provided for therein and the severity of the 
sanction imposed. The Constitutional Court links the principles of legal certainty 
and sufficient precision of the provision relating to penalties and the criminal law 
sanction to that case-law. 
68 By the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court is asking 
whether national law in the field of sport is compatible with the fundamental 
freedoms of movement and competition recognised by the Treaties. The referring 
court considers that it is necessary to examine whether EU law allows, in the 
present case, a limitation of such freedoms, whether there is an overriding reason 
in the public interest justifying such a limitation and whether, by virtue of that 
reason, national law may establish such a limitation. 
69 In that regard, the referring court recalls, on the one hand, Articles 6, 45, 49, 56, 
101 and 102 TFEU and, on the other hand, the case-law of the Court of Justice, 
according to which decisions adopted by associations governed by private law and 
organising football competitions, such as the FIGC, may be classified as 
‘decisions by associations of undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 101 
TFEU and therefore fall within the scope of the latter. Decree-Law No 220/2003, 
converted into law by Law No 280/2003, does not specify the criteria on the basis 
of which the FIGC must exercise its disciplinary power, such that there is no 
transparent, certain and precise regulatory framework for disciplinary 
proceedings.