Judgment;Judgment (extracts) — ECLI:EU:T:2016:421
Date: 2016-07-20
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Data protection
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded;Application for measures of inquiry - unfounded
Origin: Greece

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT 27 November 2013 (*) (Interim relief – Investigation conducted by OLAF – Action for damages – Financial and non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant – Application for interim measures – Inadmissibility – Lack of urgency) In Case T‑483/13 R, Athanassios Oikonomopoulos, residing in Athens (Greece), represented by N. Korogiannakis and I. Zarzoura, lawyers, applicant, v European Commission, represented by J. Baquero Cruz and A. Sauka, acting as Agents, defendant, APPLICATION for interim measures in an action for damages seeking compensation for the loss which the applicant is alleged to have suffered in his professional activities and to his reputation following allegedly unlawful conduct by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) in an investigation carried out by its agents, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT makes the following Order Background to the dispute 1 The applicant, Mr Athanassios Oikonomopoulos, is an electrical engineer and businessman active on the robotics and informatics market. He founded, and then managed from 1987 to 2006, the Greek company Zenon Automation Technologies (‘Zenon’) which, over the 18 years of the applicant’s management, performed more than 50 contracts relating to EU-funded research projects. Between 2004 and 2006, the Commission of the European Communities (‘the Commission’) concluded 23 contracts with Zenon under the Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities, contributing to the creation of the European Research Area and to innovation (2002 to 2006). In November 2008, an audit was carried out at Zenon on behalf of the Commission in relation to several contracts under that programme. 2 According to the draft audit report, Zenon had claimed as funding from the Commission a significant amount of the costs which had been invoiced to it by the Cypriot company Comeng Computerised Engineering (‘Comeng’). Those costs were, however, disallowed in full, since they were not considered eligible either as personnel costs or subcontracting costs. Taking the view that the claims for funding had been systematic in nature and that Comeng had served only as a vehicle for Zenon intentionally to inflate, by means of false invoices, claimed personnel costs in a non-transparent manner, the Commission ordered a further investigation. 3 That further investigation was opened in December 2009 by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), which has the task, under Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 1), of conducting external investigations, that is outside the EU institutions, and internal investigations, that is within those institutions. In February 2010, OLAF carried out an on-the-spot check at the premises of Comeng in Cyprus and in February 2011 issued the final audit report. 4 On 19 July 2011, OLAF notified the applicant that he was a ‘person concerned’ in the investigation. In the context of the investigation, OLAF invited the applicant to an interview, which was held on 7 September 2011 at his home address in Greece. By letter of 19 September 2012 addressed to him, OLAF stated that the investigation was closed and that it had recommended, first, to the Greek judicial authorities that they should initiate proceedings, since there were grounds for believing that criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the European Union had been committed, and, second, to the Commission that it should recover the sum of EUR 1.5 million from Zenon. 5 By letter of 10 June 2013, the applicant requested OLAF to grant access to the investigative file in question, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43). The Commission rejected that request by letter of 13 August 2013. Procedure and forms of order sought 6 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 10 September 2013, the applicant brought an action for damages under Article 268 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU seeking, first, a declaration that the measures adopted by OLAF were legally non-existent and that the information concerning him and any documents forwarded to the national authorities (‘the file at issue’) constituted inadmissible evidence and, second, an order that the Commission pay EUR 2 million in damages for its unlawful conduct and for the damage caused to the applicant’s professional activity and reputation. 7 In support of his action, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission and OLAF unlawfully gathered and forwarded personal data concerning him to the Greek judicial authorities and to third parties. The investigation against him was without any legal basis whatsoever and was conducted in misuse of powers. The Commission and OLAF infringed a series of provisions conferring rights on him, in particular the right to respect for his private life and his rights of defence, which caused damage to his reputation and professional activity. In the applicant’s submission, that illegal conduct renders all the evidence which OLAF forwarded to the Greek authorities inadmissible. 8 By separate document, lodged at the Court Registry on 10 September 2013, the applicant brought the present application for interim relief, in which he claims, in essence, that the President of the Court should: – order, first, the temporary withdrawal and safekeeping of the file at issue by a ‘treasurer’ and, second, the prohibition of any further use of that file, until final judgment is given in the main action; – reserve the costs. 9 In its written observations on the application for interim relief, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 18 October 2013, the Commission contends that the President of the Court should: – dismiss the application for interim relief; – reserve the costs. 10 The applicant replied to the Commission’s observations in a pleading of 8 November 2013. The Commission adopted a final position on that pleading in its pleading of 19 November 2013. Law 11 Under Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 256(1) TFEU, the judge hearing the application for interim measures may, if he considers that the circumstances so require, order that application of an act challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. 12 In addition, Article 104(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court provides that an application for interim relief is to state the subject-matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for. Thus, the judge hearing the application for interim measures may order suspension of operation of an act, or other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the interests of the person seeking the measures, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action (order of the President in Case C‑149/95 P(R) Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others [1995] ECR I‑2165, paragraph 22). Those conditions are cumulative, so that an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is absent (order of the President in Case C‑268/96 P(R) SCK and FNK v Commission [1996] ECR I‑4971, paragraph 30). Where appropriate, the judge hearing such an application must also weigh up the interests involved (order of the President in Case C‑445/00 R Austria v Council [2001] ECR I‑1461, paragraph 73). 13 In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be analysed and assessed (order in Commission v Atlantic Container Line and Others, paragraph 23). As the conditions of admissibility for any application for interim measures are a matter of public policy, the judge hearing the application may, even of his own motion at the start of the procedure, ascertain that they have been satisfied (see the order of the President of 23 January 2012 in Case T‑607/11 R Henkel and Henkel France v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). 14 Having regard to the material in the file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim relief, without needing first to hear oral argument from the parties. 15 In the present case, in order to establish urgency, the applicant submits that the Commission and OLAF have unlawfully communicated to third parties, namely Zenon, Comeng and their employees, the information which they had obtained in the context of the investigation against him. The applicant submits that that conduct has damaged his reputation and professional activity. The name of the applicant, ‘a prominent member of the Greek Academic and business community for 3 decades’, has therefore been associated and is still associated with possible fraud against the European Union. Pending proceedings by the Greek authorities, the applicant has been forced to retire from any business or academic endeavours, to refuse his appointment to prestigious positions and renounce any advisory role with the Greek authorities. In addition, within his professional circle, ‘insulting allegations’ have been uttered about him. As long as the file at issue is kept by the Greek authorities, the applicant cannot envisage any future business activity. 16 While acknowledging that so far no judicial proceedings have been brought against him before the Greek courts, the applicant submits that, if such proceedings were indeed brought, further damage would be caused to his reputation, since under the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure such proceedings would be public. Even if eventually any such judicial proceedings were not successful, and it were held that the file at issue had been compiled and transmitted illegally or it were to be concluded that no fraud had been committed, the applicant’s reputation could not be restored. He would be stigmatised in the eyes of his peers and the wider public by the initiation of official judicial proceedings before the Greek courts. 17 The applicant states that, if the rumours concerning him were further supported by the initiation of proceedings before the Greek courts before the legality of the transmission of the file were examined, the damage to his reputation would be irreversible, since the initiation of judicial proceedings and the subsequent publicity could not, by their very nature, be eliminated retroactively. However, since any judicial proceedings that might be initiated by the Greek authorities would only be based on the file at issue, the Greek authorities must be prevented provisionally from using that file as evidence until the General Court has ruled on whether the use of such evidence is admissible. That is how any further damage to the applicant’s reputation could be avoided. 18 The Commission, by contrast, contends that instead of establishing the urgency of his situation, the applicant has simply put forward mere assertions unsupported by evidence. In any event, the application for interim relief is inadmissible for various reasons. 19 In that regard, the Court notes that the main action seeks, in essence, an order that the Commission compensate the damage it is alleged to have caused the applicant. In so far as the present application for interim relief is therefore an adjunct to an action for damages, it must be noted, at the outset, that the purpose of proceedings for interim relief is not to ensure reparation for damage which has already occurred (see, to that effect, orders of the President of 27 August 2008 in Case T‑246/08 R Melli Bank v Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 53; of 8 June 2009 in Case T‑149/09 R Dover v Parliament, not published in the ECR, paragraph 37; and of 29 October 2009 in Case T‑352/09 R Novácke chemické závody v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 43). It follows that the application for interim relief must be declared inadmissible in so far as it is based on the financial and non-material damage which the applicant has already suffered as a result of the allegedly unlawful communication to Zenon, Comeng and their employees of the information which the Commission and OLAF had obtained in the investigation against him (see paragraph 15 above). It is clear that that damage, which had already occurred, could no longer be avoided by granting the interim measures sought. 20 It must be borne in mind, next, that the purpose of interlocutory proceedings is to ensure the full effectiveness of the final decision to be given in the main proceedings to which the interlocutory proceedings are an adjunct (see, to that effect, orders of the President in Joined Cases C‑486/01 P-R and C‑488/01 P-R Front national and Martinez v Parliament [2002] ECR I‑1843, paragraph 87, and in Case C‑7/04 P(R) Commission v Akzo and Akcros [2004] ECR I‑8739, paragraph 36). It follows that that procedure is simply an adjunct to the main proceedings (order of the President in Case T‑228/95 R Lehrfreund v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II‑111, paragraph 61), that the judge hearing the application for interim measures cannot adopt interim measures falling outside the scope of the final decision which the Court may reach on the main application and that, in order for an application under Article 279 TFEU to be admissible, there must be a sufficiently close connection between the interim measures sought, on the one hand, and the claims and subject-matter of the main proceedings, on the other (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C‑313/90 R CIRFS and Others v Commission [1991] ECR I‑2557, paragraphs 23 and 24, and of the President of the General Court of 17 December 2009 in Case T‑396/09 R Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited). 21 In the light of the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph, and in order to ascertain whether the present application for interim relief is admissible, it is appropriate to examine the various interim measures sought in the light of each of the heads of claim in the action for damages brought in the main proceedings. 22 As regards the head of claim seeking an order, in the main proceedings, that the Commission pay the applicant the sum of EUR 2 million, it is true that it has not been ruled out in the case-law, as a matter of principle, that payment by way of an advance, even in an amount corresponding to that sought as principal relief, may be applied for in interlocutory proceedings, when such a payment appears necessary in order to ensure the practical effect of the decision on the substance of the case (see, to that effect, the order of the President in Case C‑393/96 P(R) Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I‑441, paragraph 37). However, none of the interim measures put forward by the applicant in his application for interim relief seeks an order that the Commission pay him an advance on the sum of EUR 2 million. It follows that the objective of the present application for interim relief is not to ensure the full effectiveness of a possible order that the Commission pay damages at the end of the main proceedings. 23 As regards the two remaining heads of claim, seeking a declaration from the Court that the measures taken by OLAF were legally non-existent and that the file at issue forwarded to the national authorities includes inadmissible evidence, it has been held that, since the Courts of the European Union have exclusive jurisdiction to hear actions seeking compensation for damage attributable to the European Union, they have the power to impose on the European Union any form of reparation that accords with the general principles of non-contractual liability common to the laws of the Member States. This includes, if it accords with those principles, compensation in kind, if necessary in the form of an injunction to do or not to do something (see, to that effect, Case T‑279/03 Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission [2006] ECR II‑1291, paragraphs 63 and 67). 24 The question therefore arises as to whether the applicant is entitled to submit the two heads of claim in question in the context of his action for damages in order to be compensated in kind for the damage allegedly suffered, even though OLAF’s acts, including the investigation reports and their transmission, cannot be the subject of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, Case T‑193/04 Tillack v Commission [2006] ECR II‑4017, paragraphs 66, 68 and 82, and Case T‑261/09 P Commission v Violetti [2010] ECR II‑0000, paragraph 47). 25 The Commission contends that the interim measures applied for seek, in essence, to ‘suspend’ OLAF’s final report and its transmission to the Greek authorities, whereas the applicant does not challenge the legality of OLAF’s conduct by an action for annulment and indeed cannot do so. Accordingly, the action for damages is aimed, in fact, at circumventing the inadmissibility of an action for annulment and should therefore be declared inadmissible, thereby rendering the corresponding application for interim relief itself inadmissible. 26 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, an action for damages is an independent form of action, with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of actions and is subject to conditions on its use dictated by its specific purpose, which must be distinguished from that of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, the order of 15 October 2013 in Case T‑13/12 Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited). However, the President of the Court cannot rule out, at the outset, that the two heads of claim at issue are admissible, in so far as the applicant thereby seeks to counteract the injurious effects on his professional activity and reputation caused by the transmission of the file at issue to the Greek authorities. 27 In the circumstances of the present case, it is not, however, necessary for the President of the Court to rule on that issue of admissibility raised by the Commission, all the more so because the admissibility of the main action must not, in principle, be examined in the context of proceedings for interim relief (see the order of the President of 29 August 2013 in Case T‑5/13 R Iran Liquefied Natural Gas v Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 28 Even if, first, the two heads of claim at issue may in fact be regarded as seeking compensation in kind in accordance with the criteria laid down in the judgment in Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission and, second, the interim measures sought by means of interlocutory proceedings (see paragraph 8 above) are capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the final decision bringing the main proceedings to an end, the President of the Court would still be required to examine whether or not those measures fall outside the scope of the main action and whether they are an adjunct to it and have a sufficiently close connection (see paragraph 20 above). 29 As regards, first, the measure prohibiting any further use of the file at issue communicated to the Greek authorities, the applicant submits that the measure is urgent on the ground that the initiation of judicial proceedings by the Greek criminal courts would, because of their public nature, cause further damage to his reputation, and even make it irreversible, since the publicity of such proceedings could not be eliminated retroactively. Stating that judicial proceedings initiated by the Greek authorities would be based on the file at issue alone, the applicant takes the view that it is necessary to prevent those authorities and the competent court provisionally from using that file as evidence (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). 30 In that regard, it must be found that, in so far as only the applicant and the Commission are parties to the main action for damages, an interim measure precluding the Greek authorities and courts from using the file at issue would clearly fall outside the scope of the final decision to be given by the Court in those proceedings. Consequently, the claim that such a measure should be granted is not simply an adjunct to the main action seeking an order that the Commission pay damages either, nor does it have a sufficiently close connection with that action. 31 In addition, in paragraph 33 of his order in Case T‑353/94 R Postbank v Commission [1994] ECR II‑1141, the President of the Court laid down the principle that the judge hearing the application for interim measures could not issue directions to individuals who, like the Greek authorities in the present case, are not parties to the dispute, and still less to national courts, such as the Greek criminal courts in the present case. It is true that that principle has subsequently been weakened in the sense that it cannot be ruled out that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, in exceptional circumstances, address orders directly to third parties, if necessary, provided that he has due regard to the right of the addressees of interim measures to be heard and if it is apparent that, without those orders, the party seeking those measures would be exposed to a situation liable to endanger its very existence (see, to that effect, the order of the President in Case T‑411/07 R Aer Lingus Group v Commission [2008] ECR II‑411, paragraph 56). However, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that the specific conditions concerning admissibility laid down in that order are met in the present case. 32 In any event, the applicant has not established that it is urgent for the President of the Court to grant a measure prohibiting the use of the file at issue by the Greek authorities and courts. 33 In that regard, it is settled case-law that the action taken by the national authorities in response to the information forwarded to them by OLAF is within their sole and entire responsibility and that those authorities ascertain themselves whether such information justifies or requires the bringing of criminal proceedings. Consequently, judicial protection against such proceedings must be ensured at national level with all the guarantees provided by national law, including those which follow from the fundamental rights and the possibility of the court seised of making a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU (see the order of the President in Case C‑521/04 P(R) Tillack v Commission [2005] ECR I‑3103, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited). It has also been made clear that where the national authorities decide to open an investigation, they are to assess the inferences to be drawn from any unlawful conduct by OLAF and that that assessment can be challenged before the national courts. Where criminal proceedings are not commenced or are terminated by an acquittal, the bringing of an action for damages, before the Courts of the European Union, is sufficient to ensure that the interests of the person concerned are protected, by allowing him to obtain reparation for all damage arising from OLAF’s unlawful conduct (see, to that effect, Commission v Violetti and Others, paragraph 59). 34 The effect of that case-law, as regards the dispute concerning OLAF’s transmission of information to the national authorities, is therefore to make the interlocutory proceedings before the Courts of the European Union incidental to those which may be brought at the national level, provided, however, that the national proceedings enable the person concerned by that information actually to avoid serious and irreparable damage (see, to that effect and by analogy, the order of the President of 29 August 2013 in Case T‑366/13 R France v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 45). 35 In the present case, the applicant has not in any way shown in what way he would be prevented from contesting before the national courts, if necessary by way of interlocutory proceedings, a possible decision by the national authorities to institute legal proceedings (see, to that effect, the order of the President in Case T‑193/04 R Tillack v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3575, paragraph 45). Nor has the applicant demonstrated that the domestic remedies available under Greek law for challenging the national measures that may be adopted following the transmission of the file at issue by OLAF would not allow him in fact to rely, before the national court, on the unlawful conduct complained of in his application for interim relief in order to avoid suffering serious and irreparable damage (see, to that effect, the order of the President in Case T‑181/02 R Neue Erba Lautex v Commission [2002] ECR II‑5081, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited). 36 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that it is not necessary to grant the interim measure prohibiting the Greek authorities and courts from using the file at issue, since the applicant has failed to prove to the required legal standard that the Greek legislation precluded access to other more appropriate avenues for that purpose in applying to the Greek courts (see, to that effect, the order of the President in Case T‑37/04 R Região autónoma dos Açores v Council [2004] ECR II‑2153, paragraph 184). 37 In so far as the applicant complains that he will be excluded from any business activity as long as the file at issue is in the hands of the Greek authorities and that the rumours suspecting him of fraud will persist as long as those authorities have not closed that file, it is apparent from paragraphs 30 and 31 above that the claim that the President of the Court should order the Greek authorities and courts to decline jurisdiction over the file at issue provisionally or to close it swiftly must be declared inadmissible. In any event, the applicant has not proved that national law does not enable him to mitigate the effects of the alleged slowness of the Greek authorities and actually to speed up the procedure concerning him, either by officially referring the matter to the Greek authorities and maintaining his innocence, or by bringing the case before the national courts in order to request, if necessary in interlocutory proceedings, that directions be issued with regard to the national authorities. 38 In addition, in so far as the applicant claims that, if criminal proceedings were brought in Greece, his reputation would be tarnished and could no longer be restored, even if those proceedings did not succeed or resulted in his acquittal, that assertion cannot avail him. As has been acknowledged in the case-law, where a decision adopted by an EU institution has harmed the reputation of a trader, the latter can have its reputation restored if that decision is annulled, where appropriate by means of an organised publicity campaign aimed at the circles concerned to which it belongs (see, to that effect, the orders of the President in Case T‑195/05 R Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission [2005] ECR II‑3485, paragraph 126; of 18 June 2008 in Case T‑475/07 R Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 100; and of 28 April 2009 in Case T‑95/09 R United Phosphorus v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 61). The same also applies to the case of the applicant, whose reputation might be compromised by the bringing of criminal proceedings in Greece, based on allegedly unlawful evidence. The applicant has not proved that it would be impossible for him to restore his reputation if he were acquitted at the end of those proceedings, if the evidence provided by OLAF were expressly criticised in the acquittal decision and if appropriate publicity were given to that outcome of the criminal proceedings brought against him. 39 Moreover, even if the President of the Court adopted the interim measures sought by the applicant for the purposes of preserving his reputation, that reputation would nevertheless continue to be under threat in the circles concerned, since the applicant would still be exposed, for the duration of the main proceedings, to the risk that his action for damages might be dismissed and criminal proceedings then being brought in Greece. 40 Consequently, the applicant has failed to prove that it is urgent to grant the first interim measure in question and to prohibit the Greek authorities and courts from using the file at issue. 41 As regards, second, the interim measure seeking the temporary withdrawal and safekeeping of the file at issue by a ‘treasurer’, it is true that, inasmuch as it aims to have directions issued to the Commission alone, that measure does not seem to raise the same issues of admissibility as the first measure considered in the preceding paragraphs. 42 However, since the applicant simply used the arguments in paragraphs 15 to 17 above in order to establish urgency, without putting forward any specific complaints against the Commission, it must be found that, ultimately, the claim that the second measure should be granted also seeks to prevent the Greek authorities and courts from bringing judicial proceedings against him. Accordingly, the considerations set out in paragraphs 32 to 40 above showing the lack of urgency, in particular, by virtue of the subsidiary nature of the interlocutory proceedings before the Courts of the European Union compared with those which may be brought before the national courts, must also apply in the present context. 43 In addition, the effectiveness of the Commission withdrawing the file at issue is doubtful. The applicant has not adduced any evidence in support of his assertion that criminal proceedings before the Greek courts would be based just on the file at issue, as transmitted by the Commission, namely the original documents in the folders compiled and sent by it. Consequently, he has not shown that, in accordance with the Greek rules of criminal procedure, only those original documents could serve as the legal basis for bringing judicial proceedings. In the absence of such proof, the President of the Court must find that the Greek authorities, in possession of the file at issue for several months, were themselves permitted to initiate possible criminal investigations or proceedings. The information in the file at issue would therefore only have served as a trigger and source of information for the Greek authorities in order to conduct their own investigations and ascertain whether the results obtained by those investigations gave good grounds for initiating criminal proceedings. Consequently, it is not necessary to order the Commission to withdraw the file at issue and entrust its safekeeping to a ‘treasurer’. Indeed, in so far as the Greek authorities have already used that file, the damage relied on by the applicant has already occurred and could no longer be avoided by granting the second interim measure in question (see paragraph 19 above). 44 Lastly, in so far as the applicant argues, in its pleading of 8 November 2013, that any further use of the file at issue by the Commission must be prohibited, that claim can reasonably refer only to OLAF’s recommendation to the Commission that it should recover the sum of EUR 1.5 million from Zenon (see paragraph 4 above). However, it is not apparent that the implementation of that recommendation, based on the file at issue, is capable of causing the applicant serious and irreparable personal damage (see, concerning the requirement for personal damage, the order of the President of 24 March 2009 in Case C‑60/08 P(R) Cheminova and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 35 and 36). Consequently, that argument cannot establish urgency either. 45 It follows from the foregoing that the application for interim relief must be dismissed in part as inadmissible and in part on grounds of lack of urgency, and there is no need to consider the condition relating to a prima facie case or to weigh up the interests involved. On those grounds, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT hereby orders: 1. The application for interim relief is dismissed. 2. The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 27 November 2013. E. Coulon M. Jaeger Registrar President * Language of the case: English.