Judgment;Judgment (extracts);Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2023:347
Date: 2023-06-21
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Commercial policy
Procedure: Application to intervene;Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible;Action for damages - inadmissible

summary of the relevant criteria when choosing the representative country and of the reasons which led it to choose Türkiye. The Commission began by setting out the criteria used (recital 159 of the provisional regulation); listing the potential representative countries (recital 161 of the provisional regulation); explaining the process of consultation with the interested parties (recitals 160 to 163 of the provisional regulation and recitals 143 and 144 of the contested regulation); and setting out why the comments of certain interested parties could not be accepted (recitals 163 and 164 of the provisional regulation and recitals 145 to 151 of the contested regulation). The Commission thus explained that the two types of alloys (hard and soft) were produced in Türkiye (recital 164 of the provisional regulation); that the customs union could not make Türkiye an inappropriate representative country (recital 147 of the contested regulation); that Türkiye was the most appropriate representative country on the basis of the data available in relation to environmental and social standards (recital 148 of the contested regulation); and that Türkiye had the same level of development as China according to the World Bank classification (recital 151 of the contested regulation). 141 In addition, the argument that the Commission disregarded the applicants’ comments about the difference in the types and quantities of the products manufactured is intended to call into question the validity of the contested regulation. That argument has been dismissed in paragraphs 51 and 56 to 68 above. 142 Accordingly, in view of the fact that the institutions are not required to reply to all the points of fact and law raised by the persons concerned during the administrative procedure, the applicants cannot allege that the Commission breached the duty to state reasons. 143 Those arguments raised by the applicants and the fifth and sixth parts of the second plea in law as a whole must therefore be dismissed. … 2. The third plea in law, alleging errors made by the Commission when it found there to be injury to the Union industry and a causal link 153 In the context of their third plea in law, the applicants rely, in essence, on four parts and are supported by Airoldi, which also puts forward two parts. 154 As a preliminary point, it must be observed that Article 3(1) of the basic regulation defines the concept of ‘injury’ as meaning, unless otherwise specified, inter alia, material injury to the Union industry or a threat of material injury to that industry, and that it refers to the provisions of that article for the interpretation of that concept. 155 Article 3(2) of the basic regulation governs the determination of injury. That determination must be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of, first, the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of those imports on the prices in the EU market for like products and, second, the consequent impact of those imports on the Union industry. 156 Article 3(3) of the basic regulation provides, with regard to the volume of the dumped imports, that it is necessary to consider ‘whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the Union’; that, ‘with regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, consideration [must] be given to whether there has been significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the Union industry or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which would otherwise have occurred, to a significant degree’; and that ‘no one or more of those factors can necessarily give decisive guidance’. 157 Article 3(5) of the basic regulation provides that the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry concerned is to include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, whilst Article 3(6) of the basic regulation states that the EU institutions are required to establish, from all the relevant evidence relating to the state of the Union industry, the existence of injury suffered by that industry. In particular, that article provides that such proof is to entail demonstrating that the volume or price levels identified pursuant to paragraph 3 of the article are responsible for an impact on the Union industry, as provided for in paragraph 5 of the article, and that that impact exists to a degree which enables it to be classified as material (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2013, Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, C‑10/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:865, paragraph 49). 158 In accordance with well-established case-law, determination of injury involves the assessment of complex economic matters. In that respect, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion (see judgments of 7 May 1991, Nakajima v Council, C‑69/89, EU:C:1991:186, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited, and of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 226 and the case-law cited). The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether applicable rules of law have been complied with, whether the facts relied on have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or any misuse of powers. That is particularly the case as regards the determination of the factors causing injury to the Union industry in an anti-dumping investigation (see judgment of 20 January 2022, Commission v Hubei Xinyegang Special Tube, C‑891/19 P, EU:C:2022:38, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 159 In addition, it is for the applicants to adduce evidence enabling the General Court to find that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment when determining injury (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 228 and the case-law cited). 160 The applicants’ third plea in law must be examined in the light of those principles. (a) The economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry 161 In the context of the first part of their plea in law, the applicants put forward, in essence, four complaints with a view to arguing that the Commission incorrectly assessed the various economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry. (1) Account taken of the market share of the Union industry 162 In their first complaint, the applicants submit that the market share held by EU producers is over 85%. It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice and of the General Court that, when EU producers hold a significant market share, there can be no injury to the Union industry. A large market share of the Union industry naturally affords the Union industry a position of strength that precludes a finding of vulnerability on the part of EU undertakings. 163 In that regard, it must be observed, as is apparent from paragraphs 154 to 159 above, that the basic regulation does not provide for a threshold for the market share held by the Union industry below which that industry cannot be regarded as having suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that regulation. In addition, the Commission enjoys a broad discretion in that regard. 164 That being said, it cannot be disputed that the development of the Union industry’s market share constitutes a significant factor for an assessment of the existence of material injury to that industry (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2007, Aluminium Silicon Mill Products v Council, T‑107/04, EU:T:2007:85, paragraph 65). 165 It should also be observed that, although the examination by the institutions must lead to a finding that the injury to the Union industry is material, it is not necessary for all the relevant economic factors and indices to show a negative trend (judgment of 25 October 2011, CHEMK and KF v Council, T‑190/08, EU:T:2011:618, paragraph 114). Furthermore, the mere fact that certain injury factors improved during the period considered does not, however, mean that the Union industry has not sustained material injury (judgment of 23 April 2018, Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel v Commission, T‑675/15, not published, EU:T:2018:209, paragraph 93; see also, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2000, Miwon v Council, T‑51/96, EU:T:2000:92, paragraph 105). 166 In the present case, in order to find that the Union industry has suffered material injury, in sections 4 and 5 of the contested regulation the Commission analysed the impact of the dumped imports by assessing various economic factors, pursuant to Article 3(5) of the basic regulation. 167 Thus, it follows from Table 5, reproduced in recital 229 of the contested regulation, that the market share of free market sales of the Union industry was 84.4% during the investigation period and that it fell by 4% over the period considered. The Commission also provided a table that takes account of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (see recital 35 of the contested regulation), even though that withdrawal became effective after the investigation period and the period concerned. Thus, Table 5bis, reproduced in recital 275 of the contested regulation, shows that, excluding the United Kingdom, the market share of the Union industry was 85.4% during the investigation period and had lost 3.0 percentage points over the period considered. 168 In recitals 226 and 227 of the contested regulation, it is explained that EU free market consumption increased by 6%, a percentage confirmed for the Union industry, excluding the United Kingdom, by Table 4bis, reproduced in recital 271 of the contested regulation. 169 In recital 254 of the contested regulation, the Commission confirmed the conclusions concerning the situation of the Union industry set out in recitals 271 to 274 of the provisional regulation. Those conclusions in question state, inter alia, as follows: ‘271. Several indicators showed a positive trend such as production, capacity, sales volume on the Union market and employment. However, the positive development of these indicators related to the increase in consumption and, in fact, such indicators should have increased more strongly, if the Union industry would have been able to fully benefit from the growing market. Indeed, despite the increase in sales volume, the Union industry lost market share in the free market. 272. The prices of sales on the free market increased by 19%. However, these price increases did not keep up with increases in costs (20%). This development was caused by price suppression. The Union industry was unable to raise prices at the same extent as costs were increasing because of the downward pressure caused by imports from China which undercut the prices of the Union industry. Bearing in mind that profitability levels were below the target profit level throughout the period considered, and the volumes and low prices of the Chinese imports, the Commission concluded that price increases had been suppressed throughout the period considered. As a consequence, all financial performance indicators, namely profitability, return on investment and cash flow showed a declining trend, and profits made were below the target profit level throughout the period considered. This is particularly damaging because the market for the product under investigation was growing in the period considered, but the Union industry still suffered low and falling profits. Despite keeping investments as high as possible in order to remain competitive, the Union industry was clearly not delivering sufficiently high profit levels to encourage future investment. Furthermore, the decline of the Union industry was taking place in a period of growth on the Union market. The Union industry lost 5% in market share [this figure was modified in the contested regulation] in a growing market, and was visibly not able to take advantage from the growth of the Union market.’ 170 It follows from those elements that the Commission gave due consideration to the large market shared held by the Union industry and the existence of certain indicators recording a positive trend. The applicants have not put forward any argument or evidence capable of demonstrating that the Commission’s findings in recitals 271 and 272 of the contested regulation, in particular the effect on prices, were manifestly incorrect. Thus, they have failed to demonstrate that, in the light of the principles set out in paragraphs 163 to 165 above, the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in finding there to be a negative development of the Union industry’s market share and in concluding that that industry had suffered material injury, taking into account all the relevant factors and particularly the loss of market shares and the decline in profitability of the Union industry. On the contrary, the Commission observed that the increase in the volume of sales had been only 2% (see Table 5, reproduced in recital 245 of the provisional regulation) at a time when EU consumption had risen by 6% (see Table 4, reproduced in recital 226 of the contested regulation) and that the increase in prices had not kept up with the increase in costs (see Table 7, reproduced in recital 256 of the provisional regulation). 171 That finding is not called into question by the case-law of the Court of Justice and of the General Court cited by the applicants, as the Commission rightly points out. 172 It is true that the judgments of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems (C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94), and of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35), which both concern Council Regulation (EC) No 926/2009 of 24 September 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2009 L 262, p. 19), recognised the importance of the Union industry’s market shares as a factor in determining injury. 173 However, the main lesson provided by the judgments of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems (C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94), and of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35), is that the different indicators, including the Union industry’s market share, must not be seen in isolation but rather holistically as a whole (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems, C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94, paragraph 49, and of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paragraphs 61 to 63). 174 In addition, in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems (C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94), and of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35), the economic factors were all positive, despite the development of the Union industry’s market share (judgment of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paragraphs 59 to 61). In the present case, the provisional regulation states that capacity utilisation (Table 4, reproduced in recital 240 of the provisional regulation), profitability and return on investments of the Union industry (Table 10, reproduced in recital 265 of the provisional regulation) had shrunk over the period considered. 175 Furthermore, the extracts of the judgments of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems (C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94), and of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council (T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35), cited by the applicants, concern a different aspect of injury, namely the assessment of the vulnerable state of the Union industry at the end of the investigation period in order to find there to be a threat of material injury. 176 In addition, the judgment of 2 May 1995, NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko v Council (T‑163/94 and T‑165/94, EU:T:1995:83), on which the applicants rely, concerns a situation in which the Council had made errors of fact which had shown trends contrary to the true evolution of the market (see paragraph 114 of that judgment), errors which are not alleged in the present proceedings. As for the judgment of 14 March 2007, Aluminium Silicon Mill Products v Council (T‑107/04, EU:T:2007:85), also invoked by the applicants, it concerns a situation in which the Council had made an error of fact in presenting a picture of the development of the Union industry’s market share that was contrary to the data given in the provisional regulation (see paragraphs 63 to 66 of that judgment). 177 Airoldi claims, however, first, that some data relating to the injury, in particular those concerning the Union industry’s market share, are incorrect, because recent data about various factors such as the production volume were not provided at the definitive stage. Airoldi links that argument to the exclusion of a significant proportion of the imports under code CN 7610 90 90, which also includes products falling outside the scope of the investigation (see recital 202 of the contested regulation), and the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. 178 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that that argument raised by Airoldi is connected with the applicants’ plea in law concerning the analysis of the injury suffered by the Union industry. More specifically, it concerns the various factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, which the applicants address in the context of the first part of their third plea in law. 179 It follows that, contrary to what the Commission contends, those arguments do fall within the framework provided by the forms of order sought and pleas in law raised by the applicants, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 87 above. They are therefore admissible. 180 That being said, as the Commission states, the contested regulation states, in recital 278 thereof, that sales volumes by the Union industry to the UK market were assessed at around only 2% of the total sales of that industry, a volume which could not have any material impact on economic indicators of the Union industry. On that basis, the contested regulation concludes that the indicators relating to the Union industry are representative, including in the light of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, and are confirmed, as are the findings reached on the basis of those indicators. In addition, the market share of the Union industry, excluding that established in the United Kingdom, was recalculated by the Commission (see Table 5bis, reproduced in recital 275 of the contested regulation). In addition, the exclusion of a proportion of the imports under code CN 7610 90 90 was taken into account by the Commission, as is apparent from recitals 202 to 216 and Tables 1, 2 and 3, reproduced, respectively, in recitals 208, 217 and 220 of the contested regulation). 181 Airoldi does not put forward any arguments to demonstrate that the Commission’s explanations are manifestly incorrect or that adjustments were needed. Thus, in view of the burden of proof borne by it, these arguments must be dismissed. 182 Secondly, Airoldi also submits that, if the Commission had taken into consideration the segmentation of the aluminium market, the reduction in the allegedly injurious products imported under code CN 7610 90 90, the increase in the Union industry’s market share from 81.1% to 85.4% and the decline in imports from China from 9.6% to 5%, which occurred between the adoption of the provisional regulation and that of the contested regulation, it would have found that the Union industry’s position had, in fact, been strengthened. 183 It must be observed, once again, that that argument put forward by Airoldi relates to the applicants’ plea in law concerning the analysis of the injury suffered by the Union industry and concerns, more specifically, the various factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, which the applicants address in the context of the first part of their third plea in law. It is also linked to the second and third parts of the second plea in law, by which the applicants criticise the Commission for having taken the view that the aluminium extrusions from China were one single product. 184 It follows that those arguments fall within the framework provided by the forms of order sought and pleas in law raised by the applicants, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 87 above. They are therefore admissible, contrary to what the Commission contends. 185 That being said, as the Commission states, the contested regulation explains, in recital 56, why it considers the product concerned to be one single product (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above). In addition, the exclusion of a proportion of the imports under code CN 7610 90 90 was taken into account by the Commission, as is apparent from recitals 202 to 216 and from Tables 1, 2 and 3, reproduced, respectively, in recitals 208, 217 and 220 of the contested regulation. 186 With regard to the alleged decline in the market share held by imports from China and the increase in the Union industry’s market share, the following should be observed. 187 It is apparent from Table 5, reproduced in recital 245 of the provisional regulation, that at that stage of the procedure the Commission had estimated the Union industry’s market share on the free market over the investigation period to be 81.1%. At the end of the administrative procedure, that figure was revised upwards, namely to 84.4%, further to the revision of the import volumes from China (see Table 5, reproduced in recitals 229 and 230 of the contested regulation). The market share on which Airoldi relies, a market share of 85.4%, does concern the Union industry’s market share on the free market during the investigation period, but factoring in the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (see Table 5bis, reproduced in recital 275 of the contested regulation). First, it follows that the figures invoked by Airoldi are not directly comparable because their geographic scope is different. Second, the Commission explained, in recital 276 of the contested regulation, that, although the market share of the Union industry was reassessed to be slightly higher for the period considered, that market share had still decreased by 3.0 percentage points. 188 The same findings apply to the fall in imports from China. First, Airoldi compares the data taken into consideration in the provisional regulation with the data in the contested regulation excluding the United Kingdom (see Table 2, reproduced in recital 225 of the provisional regulation, and Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation). Second, the Commission took the view, in recital 263 of the contested regulation, that, on the basis of the adjusted import volumes, significant levels of imports could be observed in both relative and absolute terms, reaching 5% of market share in the investigation period. In absolute figures, imports from China had increased by 56% during the period considered and the total market share of the dumped imports had grown by 48%. 189 Airoldi does not submit any arguments to demonstrate that the Commission’s findings are manifestly incorrect and that the Union industry was in fact strengthened. Thus, in view of the burden of proof borne by it, these arguments must be dismissed. 190 The first complaint must therefore be dismissed. (2) The growth and profitability of the Union industry 191 In the context of the second complaint, the applicants allege that the Commission disregarded the purpose of the anti-dumping legislation in finding there to be injury to the Union industry against a backdrop of significant growth in consumption and in the profitability of the Union industry. 192 In that regard, as far as concerns EU consumption on the free market, it is, admittedly, established that it increased by 6% during the period considered (see Table 4, reproduced in recital 226 of the contested regulation, and Table 4bis (Union industry excluding the United Kingdom), reproduced in recital 271 of the contested regulation). 193 However, it is not necessary for all the relevant economic factors and indices to show a negative trend in order to find that the Union industry suffers injury such as to justify the adoption of anti-dumping duties (judgment of 25 October 2011, CHEMK and KF v Council, T‑190/08, EU:T:2011:618, paragraph 114). 194 In addition, the Commission qualified the increase in Union consumption, pointing out that, whilst it had increased over the period considered, it had fallen between 2018 and the investigation period (see recital 216 of the provisional regulation and Table 4, reproduced in recital 226 of the contested regulation). In addition, and in particular, the Commission rightly observed, in recital 271 of the provisional regulation, that, in the light of the available data, the Union industry had lost market shares despite the growth in demand. 195 As regards the profitability of the Union industry, it must be observed that it is apparent from Table 10, reproduced in recital 265 of the provisional regulation, that it is indeed 2% over the investigation period, but that it fell from 4.9% to 2% during the period considered. The Commission could infer from that fact that prices were being suppressed in a context in which, as is clear from Table 7, reproduced in recital 275 of the provisional regulation, the Union industry’s prices did not keep pace with costs. 196 It follows from the foregoing that the applicants have failed to demonstrate that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in finding there to be material injury to the Union industry, despite the increase in Union consumption and the 2% profitability of that industry. 197 The applicants’ second complaint must therefore be dismissed. (3) Account taken of the price and volume of imports from China 198 In the context of their third complaint, the applicants submit, first, that the Commission emphasised the price of the products imported from China whilst failing to acknowledge the relevance of the volume of the imports. Secondly, they argue that the contested regulation is vitiated by a contradiction between recitals 201 and 249 on that issue. 199 That complaint raised by the applicants is based on a misreading of the contested regulation. 200 First, it follows from section 4.3 of the contested regulation, entitled ‘Imports from the country concerned’, and more specifically from Tables 1, 2 and 3, that the Commission took into consideration, in a balanced way, not only the price of the products imported from China but also the volume of the imports of those products. 201 Secondly, there is no contradiction between recitals 201 and 249 of the contested regulation, since those recitals are concerned with different matters. Recital 201 of the contested regulation, under the heading ‘General’, explains in particular that ‘continuous pressure was exerted by abnormally low Chinese prices[, and that] this pressure had multiple implications[, since,] inter alia, it suppressed Union industry prices, prevented those prices from reflecting the international increase in raw material (aluminium) prices, and depressed profitability’, and that, ‘for this injurious picture to occur, massive import volumes are not necessary[, since] even relatively modest imports, or even the existence of a significant amount of low-priced imports (like indisputably in the present case), suffice to set a low price ceiling which affects the entire market’. 202 By contrast, in recital 249 of the contested regulation, the Commission replies to the arguments by which the group to which the applicants belong had contested the existence of material injury because the price comparisons performed by the Commission were inappropriate. In that regard, the Commission made the following comment: ‘The investigation has shown that when performing a comparison on a product type basis, the prices of these exporters were undercutting the Union industry ones by a significant margin, therefore resulting not only aligned but sensibly lower. Haomei Group also suggested using importer prices as a source for the price comparisons. However, …, the Commission based its price comparisons on an objective basis using a detailed methodology and calculations which were disclosed to Haomei Group. This methodology compared products on a type for type basis using several objective criteria and was therefore the most representative method available to the Commission.’ 203 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment and nor did it contradict itself by adopting recitals 201 and 249 of the contested regulation, which concern different matters. 204 The applicants’ third complaint must therefore be missed. (4) The growth in the market share of imports from China 205 In the context of their fourth complaint, the applicants put forward a number of arguments to claim that the Commission made errors in the consideration given to the market share of the imports from China. 206 In the first place, they allege that, following the additional final disclosure of 8 February 2021, the quantity of the products concerned imported from China fell from more than 300 000 tonnes (at the start of the procedure) to 128 853 tonnes. In that context, the Commission failed to take account of that decrease and made no alteration whatsoever to its injury and dumping assessment. 207 As is clear from Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation, the figure of 128 853 tonnes refers to the volume of the imports under eight codes of the combined nomenclature over the investigation period, taking into account the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. The total volume of imports into the European Union from China over the same period and on the same basis was 152 551 tonnes and China’s market share was 5% (see Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation). Excluding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, imports from China under eight codes of the combined nomenclature amounted to 164 641 tonnes and the total volume of imports from China was 191 981 tonnes, giving a market share of 6.2% (see Table 2, reproduced in recital 217 of the contested regulation). It is established that those figures are significantly lower than those presented in Table 2, reproduced in recital 225 of the provisional regulation, that is to say a volume of imports from China over the investigation period of 309 853 tonnes, giving a market share of 9.6%. 208 That being said, firstly, it must be observed that the applicants’ argument is based on a comparison between, on the one hand, the volume of the imports from China under eight codes of the combined nomenclature over the investigation period as found in the contested regulation and taking into account the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union and, on the other hand, the total volume of imports from China at the provisional regulation stage and before adjustments. It follows that that comparison is based on figures for volumes corresponding to different substantive and geographic scopes and which cannot be directly compared. 209 Secondly, it must be observed that, as the Commission rightly points out, although the Chinese import figures were revised downwards on account of differences of opinion about one CN code, in view of the data available, the Commission was able to confirm that the total volume of Chinese imports had remained significant and that a growth trend identical to that at the provisional stage could have been observed. 210 Following a more in-depth analysis of the volumes of imports from China, due to the fact that code CN 7610 90 90, which also includes products falling outside the scope of the investigation, gave rise to conflicting views (see recital 202 of the contested regulation), the Commission revised the figures downwards. The Commission considered that Chinese penetration would still have remained significant (recital 203 of the contested regulation) and that, while the Chinese market share had been revised downwards as a result, imports had remained significant and the same trend of growth as at the provisional stage had been observed (recital 213 of the contested regulation). After an analysis of the various factors and of the arguments of the interested parties in recitals 208 to 249 of the contested regulation, the Commission found, in recital 252 of that regulation, that the key indicators, which demonstrated the injury in this investigation, still showed evidence of the existence of injury even if Chinese imports were assessed excluding one CN code. 211 It follows that the applicants are wrong to claim that the Commission failed to take account of the downwards revision of the volumes of imports from China. Their arguments must therefore be rejected. 212 In the second place, the applicants submit that the market share of imports from China increased by only 49% between 2016 and the investigation period, an extremely modest figure which cannot be regarded as a threat to the Union industry, the results of which are stable and positive. In addition, any increase in market share is irrelevant, since the initial market share, in absolute terms, is minimal, that is to say, below 15%. 213 First, it must be observed that there is no basis for the applicants’ claim that a market share of imports from China below 15% is ‘minimal’. Although Article 5(7) of the basic regulation provides that proceedings are not to be initiated where the imports from a country represent a market share of below 1%, the market share of imports from China is significantly higher than that percentage (see Table 2, reproduced in recital 217 of the contested regulation, and Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation). The basic regulation does not specify any other market share threshold for the finding that imports from a third country are incapable of causing injury. 214 Secondly, the total volume of imports from China increased by 49% between 2016 and the investigation period, and the market share of those same imports rose by 41% between 2016 and that period. That increase cannot be regarded as ‘modest’ and the applicants do not put forward any arguments capable of calling into question that finding. 215 Thirdly, the applicants’ arguments concerning the state of the Union industry have been rejected in paragraphs 162 to 197 above, and the applicants do not raise, in the context of this complaint, any other arguments capable, if linked to the market share of imports from China, of supporting the conclusion that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment. 216 Those arguments raised by the applicants must therefore be dismissed. 217 In the third place, the applicants claim that the imports from China gained market shares to the detriment of third-country producers and not of EU producers. In addition, it is clear from the Hydro Group’s annual reports that the alleged increase by four percentage points of the market share of imports from China perhaps occurred to the detriment of the market shares held by that group, which is a company governed by Norwegian law and not an EU producer. 218 In that regard, the data relied on by the applicants in paragraphs 140 and 141 of the application regarding imports from third countries other than China and imports from China are taken, as the applicants explained at the hearing, from Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation (data relating not to the total volume of imports but to imports under eight CN codes), and from Table 6bis, reproduced in recital 304 of the contested regulation, and take into account the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. 219 It is apparent from the data contained in those tables that the total volume of imports from third countries other than China rose from 238 937 tonnes in 2016 to 295 248 tonnes over the investigation period, increasing the market share of those imports from 8.2% to 9.6%, whilst the total volume of imports from China rose from 97 535 tonnes in 2016 to 152 551 tonnes over the investigation period, pushing up the market share of those imports from 3.4% to 5%. Whilst it is established, as is likewise clear from the data submitted by the applicants, that imports from third countries other than China did fall between 2017 and the investigation period, the addition of the tonnes imported from third countries other than China and the tonnes imported from China each year points to a constant increase (and not a stable quantity, as the applicants allege). It is clear from that fact that the increase in the volume of imports from China exceeds the reduction in the volume of imports from third countries other than China. 220 In addition, it is apparent from Table 2, reproduced in recital 217 of the contested regulation, that over the period considered the total volume of imports from China increased by 49% (or by 56% taking into account the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, as set out in Table 2bis, reproduced in recital 262 of the contested regulation). At the same time, it follows both from Table 5, reproduced in recital 229 of the contested regulation, and from Table 5bis, reproduced in recital 275 of the same regulation, that the Union industry’s market share declined over the same period. 221 Furthermore, the applicants’ arguments that imports from China perhaps occurred to the detriment of the market shares of the Hydro Group, a company governed by Norwegian law, cannot be accepted. 222 The claims relating to the Hyrdo Group, assuming they were proven to be true, do not support the argument put forward by the applicants because, as the Commission observes without being contradicted by the applicants, the Hydro Group is part of the Union industry and one of the group’s companies, Hydro Extrusion Hungary k.f.t, established in Székesfehérvár (Hungary), was one of the sampled EU producers, as is clear from recital 22 of the provisional regulation. 223 The argument that the imports from China increased not to the detriment of Union industry sales but to the detriment of imports from third countries other than China must therefore be dismissed. 224 Accordingly, those arguments raised by the applicants must be dismissed, as must the first part of the third plea in law in its entirety. … IV. Costs 270 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, as applied for by the latter. 271 In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, pursuant to which institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs, the European Parliament shall bear its owns costs. 272 Under Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court may order an intervener other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 to bear its own costs. Since Airoldi intervened in support of the applicants, who have been unsuccessful, it shall bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Guangdong Haomei New Materials Co. Ltd and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology Co. Ltd to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 3. Orders the European Parliament and Airoldi Metalli SpA to bear their own costs. Papasavvas da Silva Passos Gervasoni Reine Pynnä Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 June 2023. [Signatures] * Language of the case: Italian. 1 Only the paragraphs of the present judgment which the General Court considers it appropriate to publish are reproduced here.