Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2000:156
Date: 2000-06-16
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Invalidity pension;Plea alleging misuse of powers;Sufficient compensation provided by annulment of the act
Procedure: Action for damages - successful;Staff cases - successful

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based, which is not the case in the present instance. In any event, the effect of annulling Decision No 677/97 is to remove the legal basis for decisions which the appointing authority might eventually adopt on the basis of the annulled decision (see, by analogy, the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-197/98 Rudolph v Commission [2000] ECR-SC II-0000, paragraph 93). It should be added that, at the hearing, the Council's agent stated that, if Decision No 677/97 were to be annulled, the Council would have to re-examine all other decisions which might have been taken on the basis of the annulled decision. 92. With regard, second, to the claim for annulment of the conclusions ('opinion) reached by the Invalidity Committee on 9 July 1997, it is settled case-law that the opinion delivered by the Invalidity Committee constitutes a preparatory act forming part of the compulsory retirement procedure. Since preparatory acts cannot be the subject of an action for annulment, it is only in connection with an action brought against the decision taken at the conclusion of that procedure that the applicant can contest the legality of earlier steps which are closely linked to it (Case T-196/95 H v Commission [1997] ECR II-403, paragraphs 48 and 49). It follows that, in so far as the action seeks annulment of the opinion of the Invalidity Committee of 9 July 1997, it is inadmissible. Since the opinion of the Invalidity Committee is a preparatory act, the same holds good a fortiori for the decision of the Director-General of the Council of 14 June 1996 to refer the applicant's case to the Invalidity Committee, so that the claims relating thereto must also be held to be inadmissible (order in Joined Cases 78/87 and 220/87 Santarelli v Commission [1988] ECR 2699). 93. Third, with regard to the claims for annulment of the appointing authority's decision of 12 February 1998 rejecting the applicant's complaint, it must be pointed out that any decision simply rejecting a complaint only confirms the act or failure to act complained of and is not, by itself, a decision open to challenge. It is only when this decision upholds all or part of the complaint of the person concerned that it will, in appropriate circumstances, constitute by itself a decision against which an action can be brought. Since the decision of the appointing authority of 12 February 1998 does not uphold in whole or in part the applicant's complaint, theclaims against that decision must also be declared inadmissible (order in Case T-195/96 Alexopoulou v Commission [1998] ECR-SC II-117, paragraph 48). 94. Finally, since the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to issue directions to Community institutions, the action must also be declared inadmissible in so far as it seeks an order that the Council should reinstate the applicant in her former post or position. It is for the institution which issued the act annulled to take the measures required to comply with a judgment (Case T-183/95 Carraro v Commission [1998] ECR-SC II-329). The claims for compensation for material and non-material damage allegedly suffered Arguments of the parties 95. If the contested decision is annulled, the applicant requests to be put in the position in which she would have found herself if the decision had never existed. That means, inter alia, her reinstatement in her post with all the rights and benefits pertaining thereto and payment of all arrears of salary accruing after 1 August 1997, the date on which her salary ceased to be paid, together with interest at a rate of 10%. 96. The applicant also claims compensation for the considerable non-material damage which she claims she has suffered on account on the state of uncertainty and anxiety in which she was placed by the procedure which led to the adoption of the contested decision and to the consequences thereof. In particular, besides the difficulties which she had in defending herself against an illegal procedure, she also suffered the trauma of losing her job and the stigma of being branded an invalid when she is willing to discharge her duties as an official of the Council. In consequence, she claims BEF 3 000 000 as compensation for non-material damage (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 111/86 Delauche v Commission [1987] ECR 5345, and Plug v Commission, cited above). 97. The Council maintains that the claim for damages is unfounded, the applicant alone being responsible for creating the situation. An award of damages would amount to unjust enrichment. Findings of the Court 98. It is settled case-law that the Community can incur non-contractual liability only if a set of conditions relating to the illegality of the conduct alleged against the institution concerned, the occurrence of actual damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct complained of and the harm alleged are fulfilled (Case T-129/98 Sabbioni v Commission [1999] ECR-SC II-0000, paragraph 96). 99. Since in the present case it has been established that the Council acted unlawfully (see above paragraph 90) and the existence of a causal link is not contested either, the Court must examine the extent of the material and non-material damage suffered by the applicant. 100. Since the material damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the adoption of the contested decision is the difference between the remuneration which she received before her retirement and that granted to her on the basis of the contested decision, the Council must be ordered to pay that amount and any other amount corresponding to the benefits which the applicant received before her retirement, together with interest at an annual rate of 5.5%. 101. As regards the claim for compensation for the non-material loss suffered, it must be remembered that, according to case-law, the annulment of a measure may in itself constitute compensation and, in principle, sufficient compensation for any non-material harm which the person concerned may have sustained, in particular if the measure did not involve an injurious assessment with respect to the applicant (see, most recently, Joined Cases T-282/97 and T-57/98 Giannini v Commission [1999] ECR-SC II-151, paragraph 40). However, in so far as the contested decision concludes that the applicant is suffering from total permanent invalidity and is incapable of performing the duties connected with her post, it involves an unfavourable assessment of her abilities (Case C-343/87 Culin v Commission [1990] ECR I-225) and therefore constitutes an act seriously damaging her character and professional reputation, so that the non-material damage cannot be indemnified merely by annulling Decision No 677/97. 102. It must be added that, through its improper conduct, the Council has also kept the applicant in a situation of uncertainty and anxiety for more than a year as to the real reasons for referring her case to the Invalidity Committee. 103. The Council must consequently be ordered to pay the applicant, as compensation for the non-material loss sustained, the sum of BEF 2 000 000 (see, most recently, Case T-48/97 Frederiksen v Parliament [1999] ECR-SC II-0000, paragraph 110), together with interest at an annual rate of 5.5%. Costs 104. Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been asked for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Council Decision No 677/97 of 11 July 1997 by which it retired the applicant on its own initiative on grounds of total permanent invalidity; 2. Orders the Council to pay the applicant the difference between the salary which she received before her retirement and that granted to her on the basis of the contested decision, and any other amount which the applicant received before her retirement, together with interest at an annual rate of 5.5%; 3. Orders the Council to pay the applicant the sum of BEF 2 000 000 as compensation for the non-material damage caused to her, together with interest at an annual rate of 5.5% until the date of payment; 4. Dismisses the remainder of the action; 5. Orders the Council to pay the costs. Vesterdorf Vilaras Forwood Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 June 2000. H. Jung B. Vesterdorf Registrar President 1: Language of the case: English.