Order;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:277
Date: 2024-03-27
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Vice-President
Subject matter: Approximation of laws;Regulation of digital services
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Application for interim measures - unfounded;Appeal - successful

summary examination which the judge hearing the application for interim measures is required to carry out and without ruling on the merits of the third plea in law relied on by Amazon, which is a matter solely for the court adjudicating on the substance of the case, that that plea must be regarded, at first sight, as lacking in seriousness. 112 It follows that the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied in the light of the arguments based on the plea of illegality of Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065. Urgency Arguments 113 With a view to establishing that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied, Amazon submits that making the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 publicly available would cause it serious and irreparable damage. 114 First of all, making that repository publicly available would require Amazon to disclose confidential information about Amazon and its advertisers. In particular, that repository would indicate the targeting parameters that Amazon can provide and the number of customers that can be reached using those parameters. Once that information has been disclosed, Amazon’s competitors would retain knowledge of the most effective strategies and technologies. In addition, disclosure of that information would harm Amazon’s advertising partners by revealing their strategies. Amazon’s advertising activities would thus be seriously and irretrievably damaged. 115 Next, making the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 publicly available would irreversibly reduce Amazon’s market share both for its general retail activities and for its advertising activities. Making that repository publicly available would turn third-party sellers away from Amazon Store and make them more reluctant to advertise on it. In addition, the competitors of operators advertising on Amazon Store would be able to copy and replicate the most effective advertising strategies. In the long term, making that repository publicly available risks affecting the experience of consumers by reducing advertising and removing sellers from the Amazon Store platform. 116 Lastly, the damage suffered by Amazon is not merely pecuniary and cannot be quantified solely in financial terms. The deterioration of its competitive position could thus lead to the emergence of a negative feedback loop. Furthermore, it is probably impossible to calculate precisely the specific effect of making the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 publicly available, in particular in so far as making it publicly available would involve the disclosure of confidential information. 117 The Commission maintains that Amazon has not demonstrated that the condition relating to urgency was satisfied in the present case. 118 Amazon is limited to putting forward – in most cases in the conditional – unsubstantiated and unrelated claims. In addition, Amazon has not provided information establishing that the damage it alleges is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability. Furthermore, the fact that Amazon has difficulty in proving the merits of an application seeking compensation for its loss is not such as to establish that that loss is unquantifiable. 119 Furthermore, Amazon has not demonstrated that the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied as regards the confidential nature of the information that it has to include in the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065. It is only where that condition is satisfied, however, that the judge hearing the application for interim measures must assume, for the purposes of assessing the condition relating to urgency, that certain information is confidential. In any event, that information is not confidential. Assessment 120 It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the definitive future decision, in order to ensure that there is no lacuna in the legal protection provided by the Court. It is for the purpose of attaining that objective that urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage. While it is true that, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that serious and irreparable damage is likely (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 16 July 2021, Symrise v ECHA, C‑282/21 P(R), EU:C:2021:631, paragraph 40). 121 As regards, in the first place, Amazon’s claim that making the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 publicly available will lead to a decline in its market share and, therefore, cause it serious and irreparable harm, it should be recalled that, where the party applying for interim relief claims loss of its market share, it must demonstrate that obstacles of a structural or legal nature will prevent it from regaining a significant proportion of that market share in the event that its action in the main proceedings is ultimately upheld (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 February 2024, Mylan Ireland v Commission, C‑604/23 P(R), EU:C:2024:117, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). 122 Although Amazon does maintain that the loss of market share following the provision of that repository will be irreversible, it does not however refer, in its application for interim measures, to any specific obstacles that would prevent it from regaining that market share if it were subsequently no longer required to maintain that repository online, because of the annulment of the decision at issue. 123 It is true that Amazon also refers, in that regard, to certain points of an expert opinion annexed to its application for interim measures, from which it is apparent that it could be difficult for Amazon to ensure the return, to its platform, of sellers who had left it, since they could have become accustomed to using another platform and might wish to maintain the links they would have acquired with their customers on that latter platform. 124 However, first, that expert opinion merely mentions hypotheses, without assessing their likelihood of occurring. Second, that expert opinion does not contain any evidence or reference capable of establishing that the realisation of those hypotheses is actually likely. 125 Amazon cannot therefore be considered to have established the existence of obstacles of a structural or legal nature preventing it, in the event of annulment of the decision at issue, from regaining a significant proportion of any market share lost following the making publicly available of the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065. It follows that it has not shown, in any event, that the market losses resulting from the repository’s being made available would cause it irreparable damage. 126 As regards, in the second place, the arguments based on the disclosure of confidential information, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that when, first, the applicant for interim measures alleges that the information whose publication he, she or it wishes provisionally to prevent constitutes business secrets and, second, that allegation satisfies the condition that there is a prima facie case, that the judge hearing an application for interim measures is in principle required, when examining the condition of urgency, to start from the premiss that the information constitutes business secrets (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 12 June 2018, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, C‑65/18 P(R), EU:C:2018:426, paragraph 21). 127 Since it is apparent from paragraphs 96 to 105 of the present order that Amazon’s claim that at least some of the information referred to in Article 39(2) of Regulation 2022/2065 is confidential satisfies the condition that there is a prima facie case, it must be presumed, for the purposes of assessing the condition relating to urgency, that applying that provision will lead to the disclosure of confidential information. 128 The Commission’s argument that the information at issue is not confidential therefore cannot lead the Court to hold that the latter condition is not satisfied. 129 In that context, although Amazon submits that the damage resulting from making publicly available the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 cannot be quantified only in financial terms, it has not, however, demonstrated how making that repository available would cause it non-material damage. 130 By contrast, Amazon clearly claims pecuniary damage as a result of the repository being made available, resulting both from the reluctance of third-party sellers to publish advertisements on Amazon Store, which could eventually lead to some of those sellers leaving that platform, and from Amazon’s competitors acquiring knowledge of strategies that could be implemented to improve their competitive position. 131 In the light of the variety of the precise commercial information which is meant to appear in the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065, the interest of advertisers in being able to implement advertising practices which cannot be easily reproduced by their competitors and the advantage that Amazon’s competitors might derive from full access to such commercial information, the damage resulting from making that repository publicly available must be regarded as being of the serious nature required for the grant of interim measures (see, by analogy, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2013, Commission v Pilkington Group, C‑278/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:558, paragraph 47). 132 As regards the irreparable nature of that damage, it should be borne in mind that, admittedly, damage of a financial nature cannot, otherwise than in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since, as a general rule, pecuniary compensation is capable of restoring the aggrieved person to the situation that obtained before he, she or it suffered the damage. That is however not the case, and such damage can then be deemed to be irreparable, if it cannot be quantified (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). 133 However, the uncertainty linked to reparation for harm of a pecuniary nature in a possible action for damages cannot be regarded, in itself, as a circumstance capable of establishing that such a harm is irreparable, for the purposes of the case-law of the Court. At the stage of seeking interim relief, the possibility of subsequently obtaining compensation for pecuniary damage, if an action for damages is brought following annulment of the contested measure, is necessarily uncertain. Interlocutory proceedings are not intended to act as a substitute for an action for damages in order to remove that uncertainty, since their purpose is only to guarantee the full effectiveness of the final future decision that will be made in the main action, in this case an action for annulment, to which the interlocutory proceedings are an adjunct (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). 134 On the other hand, the situation is different where it is already clear, when the assessment is carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, that, in view of its nature and the manner in which it will foreseeably occur, the harm alleged, should it occur, may not be adequately identified or quantified and that, in practice, it will not therefore be possible to make good that harm by bringing an action for damages. That may be the case, inter alia, in a situation involving the publication of specific and confidential commercial information (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited). 135 In that regard, it is clear that the harm that is liable to be suffered by Amazon due to the publication of its business secrets would differ, both in nature and in scale, according to whether the persons who acquire knowledge of those business secrets are its customers, its competitors, financial analysts, or indeed members of the general public. It would be impossible to identify the number and status of all those who in fact had knowledge of the published information and thereby assess the consequences that the publication of that information might have on Amazon’s commercial and financial interests (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited). 136 That uncertainty, which is also present in the present case, is such as to demonstrate that the pecuniary damage alleged is irreparable (see, to that effect, orders of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 96, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), EU:C:2017:149, paragraphs 113 to 118). 137 Accordingly, it must be held that Amazon has demonstrated that the alleged damage has the requisite characteristics. Consequently, the condition relating to urgency is satisfied. The balancing of interests Arguments 138 Amazon submits that its interest in obtaining suspension of the operation of the decision at issue outweighs the other interests connected with the immediate enforcement of that decision for three reasons. 139 First of all, refusing to grant interim measures would undermine the effectiveness of a future decision annulling the decision at issue, since Amazon is likely to suffer irreparable damage even before such an annulment decision can be adopted. The information disclosed when the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 is made publicly available would thus have permanently lost its confidential nature. Similarly, that annulment decision would not allow third-party sellers who have already left that platform to return to Amazon Store. 140 Next, suspension of the operation of the decision at issue would merely have the effect of maintaining the status quo existing until the adoption of the decision on the substance of the case. 141 Lastly, the other measures provided for by Regulation 2022/2065, which will be applicable even in the event of suspension of operation of the decision at issue, are sufficient to achieve the objectives pursued by the EU legislature. Article 39 of that regulation cannot therefore be regarded as constituting a fundamental rule of that regulation, since the obligations which it lays down are not applicable to the vast majority of intermediary services. 142 The Commission considers that the reasons put forward by Amazon, taken individually or as a whole, are not sufficient for it to be considered that the balance of interests weighs in favour of granting the interim measures sought. First, the occurrence of irreparable damage is not a decisive argument, but a premiss of the balancing of interests by the judge hearing the application for interim measures. Second, suspension of the operation of the decision at issue does not preserve the status quo. On the contrary, granting such a suspension would result in Amazon being subject, for several years, to a different regime from that imposed on other very large online platforms. Third, the EU legislature provided for a specific regime for platforms of that kind of platform precisely because the general obligations laid down in Regulation 2022/2065 are not sufficient to ward off the systemic societal risks posed by those platforms, as is illustrated by a number of recent examples. There is an urgent need to ensure the application of that specific regime in order to deal with those risks, as is shown in particular by Article 93(2) of that regulation. Assessment 143 It is clear that, in most interim proceedings, the decision to grant or to refuse the suspension of operation sought is likely to produce, to a certain extent, certain definitive effects and it is for the court hearing the application for interim relief to weigh up the risks attaching to each of the possible solutions. In practical terms, this involves, in particular, examining whether or not the interest of the applicant for interim measures in obtaining suspension of the operation of the contested act outweighs the interest in that act’s immediate implementation. In that examination, it must be determined whether the possible annulment of that act by the judgment on the substance would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about by its immediate implementation and conversely whether suspension of its operation would be such as to impede the objectives pursued by the contested act in the event of the action in the main proceedings being dismissed (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 24 May 2022, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain, C‑629/21 P(R), EU:C:2022:413, paragraph 248 and the case-law cited). 144 As regards, in the first place, the interest in granting the interim measures sought, it must be pointed out that any decision annulling the decision at issue would not be rendered ineffective if the application for interim measures were dismissed and if, as a result, Amazon were required immediately to make the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 publicly available. 145 It is true that the information published in that repository pending a decision annulling the decision at issue would, in practice, be definitively deprived of its confidential nature, since it could no longer be withheld from the knowledge of third parties. 146 However, it follows from Article 39(1) of that regulation that that repository must be continuously updated, in so far as it must contain the information referred to in Article 39(2) of that regulation for the entire period during which the provider of the very large online platform concerned presents an advertisement and until one year after the advertisement was presented for the last time on its online interface. 147 It follows that, if the decision at issue is annulled, Amazon will no longer be required to compile the repository required by that Article 39. Accordingly, it will no longer be required to keep online information relating to advertisements presented on Amazon Store or to disclose information relating to developments in its advertising campaigns or new advertising campaigns. That annulment would therefore be such as to ensure that advertisers returned to a more attractive business environment and to enable Amazon to develop new strategies in the management of its advertising activities without its competitors being able to acquaint themselves with them by means of that repository. 148 The annulment of the decision at issue would therefore retain an interest for Amazon and a real effectiveness, even in the absence of the grant of interim measures. Such a situation distinguishes the present case from those in which the Court relied decisively, in its assessment of the balancing of the interests involved, on the fact that the disclosure of information contained in a decision or in a report would definitively render ineffective any annulment of the decision ordering disclosure of that information (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 105, and order of the President of the Court of Justice of 1 March 2017, EMA v PTC Therapeutics International, C‑513/16 P(R), EU:C:2017:148, paragraph 136). 149 That being so, as Amazon submits and as is apparent from paragraphs 126 to 137 of the present order, if interim measures are not granted, it is likely that Amazon will suffer serious and irreparable damage before any decision annulling the decision at issue is made. 150 That fact cannot, however, be regarded as being, in itself, decisive, since the very purpose of balancing the interests involved is to assess whether, despite the adverse effect on the interests of the applicant, which is at risk of suffering serious and irreparable damage, the taking into account of the interests in the immediate implementation of the contested decision is such as to justify the refusal to grant the interim measures sought (see, to that effect, order of 12 July 1996, United Kingdom v Commission, C‑180/96 R, EU:C:1996:308, paragraphs 90 to 92; order of the President of the Court of Justice of 11 April 2001, Commission v Cambridge Healthcare Supplies, C‑471/00 P(R), EU:C:2001:218, paragraph 120; and order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 8 April 2014, Commission v ANKO, C‑78/14 P‑R, EU:C:2014:239, paragraph 40). 151 For the purposes of that assessment, it should be noted that, although it follows from the examination of the condition relating to urgency that Amazon is in fact likely, if interim measures are not granted, to suffer serious and irreparable pecuniary damage, it is not apparent from the elements put forward by Amazon that the application to Amazon Store of Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065, pending the decision of the court adjudicating on the substance, would have the effect of jeopardising Amazon’s existence or long-term development. 152 First of all, it is not claimed, let alone demonstrated, that Amazon would be exposed to a risk that it would cease operations if interim measures were not granted. 153 Next, it is apparent from paragraphs 121 to 125 of the present order that Amazon has not established the existence of a significant and lasting risk of loss of market share if Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 were applicable to Amazon Store during the period between the date of the examination of its application for interim measures and that of the decision on the substance of the case. 154 Lastly, it is apparent from the application for interim measures that Amazon’s revenue from its advertising activities represents only 7% of its overall revenue. Accordingly, the limitation of the possibilities of developing advertising strategies that could result from the application of Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 would have direct effects only on a limited part of Amazon’s activities, given that it has not been established that the indirect effects of such a limitation on Amazon’s other activities are significant. 155 As regards, in the second place, the interest in the immediate application of the decision at issue, it must be emphasised that Regulation 2022/2065 is a central element of the policy developed by the EU legislature in the digital sector. In the context of that policy, that regulation pursues objectives of great importance, since it seeks, as is apparent from recital 155 thereof, to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to ensure a safe, predictable and trusted online environment in which the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are duly protected. 156 It is true that the Commission has not claimed, let alone demonstrated, that the grant of interim measures having the effect of excluding the application to Amazon Store of Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065 until judgment has been given on the substance of the case would be such as to impede definitively the achievement of those objectives. 157 It should nevertheless be noted that not applying certain obligations laid down by that regulation will lead to a delay, potentially for several years, in the full achievement of those objectives. Not applying those obligations will therefore give rise to a risk of potentially allowing an online environment which threatens the fundamental rights provided for in the Charter to persist and develop. 158 That finding cannot be called into question by Amazon’s argument that such a risk would be avoided as a result of the application to Amazon Store of the obligations imposed by that regulation on all intermediary services. 159 It is apparent from recitals 75 and 76 of Regulation 2022/2065 that the EU legislature considered, following an assessment which it is not for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to call into question, that very large online platforms play an important role in the digital environment and that they may give rise to risks for society which differ, in terms of their scale and impact, from those attributable to smaller platforms. 160 In particular, it is apparent from recital 95 of that regulation that the EU legislature considered that the advertising systems used by very large online platforms pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision. 161 It cannot therefore be held, without going beyond the jurisdiction of the judge hearing the application for interim measures by ruling out assessments of the EU legislature which have not been shown to be incorrect, that the application to Amazon Store only of the obligations imposed by Regulation 2022/2065 on all intermediary services would be capable of satisfactorily compensating for the application to that platform of the obligations arising from Article 39 of that regulation. 162 The EU legislature attached particular importance to applying that regulation as quickly as possible to very large online platforms. It is thus apparent from Article 92 and Article 93(2) of that regulation that, although it is applicable only from 17 February 2024, it may be applied in advance to very large online platforms. 163 It should also be noted that, contrary to what Amazon contends, the grant of the interim measures sought would not lead solely to preserving the status quo. Suspension of the operation of the decision at issue would have no effect either on the application of the general obligations laid down in Regulation 2022/2065 to all intermediary services or on the application of the obligations specific to very large online platforms to platforms other than Amazon which have been designated as such by the Commission, under Article 33(4) of that regulation. It follows that such a suspension of operation would be liable to alter the competitive situation in the digital sector in a manner which has not been provided for by the EU legislature, by making Amazon subject to a regime different from that applicable to other players in that sector which have, in view of the criteria defined by that legislature, characteristics comparable to that company. 164 In the light of all those factors, it must be held that the interests defended by the EU legislature prevail, in the present case, over Amazon’s material interests, with the result that the balancing of interests weighs in favour of dismissing the application for interim measures. 165 Consequently, the application for interim measures is dismissed in so far as it seeks suspension of the operation of the decision at issue, in so far as that decision requires Amazon to compile and make publicly available the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065. The request made in the alternative by Amazon Arguments 166 Amazon requests the Court, in the event that the appeal is upheld, to grant it, in order to comply with the obligation to compile and make publicly available the repository required by Article 39 of Regulation 2022/2065, a period of 28 days from the date of the judgment closing the appeal proceedings. It maintains that such a period is necessary, from a technical point of view, in order to comply with that obligation. Assessment 167 First of all, the request made by Amazon in the alternative cannot be regarded as being capable of being made under Article 174 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, in so far as that provision provides that the form of order sought in the response is to seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part. 168 Next, since it follows from Article 170(1) of those rules of procedure that the appellant may not supplement the form of order sought at first instance, such a prerogative cannot be conferred either, in the absence of a specific provision to that effect, on the respondent. 169 By its form of order sought at first instance, Amazon had in no way requested a time limit from the General Court in the event of dismissal of its application for interim measures. 170 Accordingly, even if the request made by Amazon in the alternative were to be understood as having been made with a view to supplementing the form of order sought at first instance, it would have to be dismissed in so far as it constitutes a new form of order (see, by analogy, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 20 March 2023, Xpand Consortium and Others v Commission, C‑739/22 P(R), EU:C:2023:228, paragraph 20). 171 Lastly, nor can that new form of order sought be viewed as an application for interim measures brought under Article 160 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, since Article 160(4) of those rules makes the admissibility of such an application subject to submission by separate document (see, by analogy, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 20 March 2023, Xpand Consortium and Others v Commission, C‑739/22 P(R), EU:C:2023:228, paragraph 21). 172 It follows that the request made by Amazon in the alternative must be rejected as inadmissible. Costs 173 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. 174 As regards the costs relating to the appeal proceedings, first, under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeals by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission has applied for Amazon to be ordered to pay the costs relating to the appeal proceedings and Amazon has been unsuccessful, Amazon must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and to pay those incurred by the Commission relating to those proceedings. 175 Second, under Article 140(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Parliament and the Council must bear their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings. 176 As regards the costs relating to the interlocutory proceedings at first instance, it is appropriate to decide, in accordance with Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, that the costs of the Commission and of Amazon are to be reserved. On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders: 1. Point 1 of the operative part of the order of the President of the General Court of the European Union of 27 September 2023, Amazon Services Europe v Commission (T‑367/23 R, EU:T:2023:589), is set aside. 2. The appeal is dismissed as to the remainder. 3. The application for interim measures is dismissed in so far it seeks suspension of the operation of Commission Decision C(2023) 2746 final of 25 April 2023 designating Amazon Store as a very large online platform in accordance with Article 33(4) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), to the extent that that decision requires Amazon Store to compile and make publicly available the repository required by Article 39 of that regulation. 4. The request made by Amazon Services Europe Sàrl seeking that, in the event that the appeal is upheld, it be granted a period of 28 days in order to comply with the obligation to compile an advertisement repository is rejected. 5. Amazon Services Europe shall bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission relating to those proceedings. 6. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union shall bear their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings. 7. The costs relating to the interlocutory proceedings at first instance are reserved. Luxembourg, 27 March 2024. A. Calot Escobar L. Bay Larsen Registrar Vice-President * Language of the case: English.