Order — ECLI:EU:T:2015:975
Date: 2015-12-04
Language of the case: English
Court formation: President of the Chamber
Subject matter: Energy
Procedure: Action for annulment;Application for interim measures - inadmissible
Origin: Austria

summary of the pleas in law and arguments relied on. 8 It follows from a combined reading of those provisions of the Rules of Procedure that an application for interim measures must be sufficient in itself to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the judge hearing the application to rule on it, where necessary, without other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, it is necessary, if such an application is to be admissible, that the essential elements of fact and law on which it is founded be set out coherently and comprehensibly in the application for interim measures itself. While the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to particular passages in documents which are annexed to it, a general reference to other written documentation, even if annexed to the application for interim measures, cannot make up for the absence of essential elements in that application (see order in Wilders v Parliament and Others, paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:564, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, order of 30 April 2010 in Ziegler v Commission, C‑113/09 P(R), EU:C:2010:242, paragraph 13). 9 Moreover, point 264 of the Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court expressly states that the application for interim measures must be intelligible in itself, without necessitating reference to the application lodged in the main proceedings, including the annexes thereto. 10 In the present case, it must be found that, in order to establish a prima facie case, the applicant confines itself in the application for interim measures to making a general reference to the application lodged before the Court in the main proceedings. That reference clearly does not suffice to establish a prima facie case capable of justifying the grant of the suspension of operation sought. It is not for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to seek, in the applicant’s stead, those matters contained in the annexes or in the main application which could support the application for interim measures. For such an obligation to be imposed on the judge hearing the application for interim measures would, moreover, render ineffective the provision of the Rules of Procedure which requires the application for interim measures to be made by a separate document (see, to that effect, order in Wilders v Parliament and Others, paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:564, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited). 11 It follows that, as regards the requirement of a prima facie case, the application for interim measures does not comply with the requirements laid down in Article 156(3) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure. 12 It must be added that the application for interim measures also fails to comply with those requirements as regards the condition relating to urgency. 13 In that respect, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, urgency must be assessed in the light of the need of an interlocutory order so as to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief (see, to that effect, order of 11 March 2013 in Calestep v ECHA, T‑89/13 R, EU:T:2013:123, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited). 14 In order to determine whether the harm alleged is serious and irreparable, the judge hearing the application for interim measures must have actual and specific information, supported by detailed, certified documentary evidence showing the financial situation of the party seeking interim measures and enabling an assessment of the consequences likely to occur if the measures sought are not granted. It follows that that party must provide, with supporting documentation, an accurate and comprehensive picture of the situation which it claims justifies the grant of those measures (see, to that effect, orders of 16 October 2013 in Spain v Commission, T‑461/13 R, EU:T:2013:545, paragraph 35; 20 August 2014 in Alsharghawi v Council, T‑532/14 R, EU:T:2014:732, paragraph 22, and 27 November 2014 in SEA v Commission, T‑674/14 R, EU:T:2014:1009, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). 15 In the present case, the applicant merely refers, inter alia, to the binding nature of the contested act and to the period of four months laid down for its implementation, the negative effects of which would, according to the applicant, cause serious and irreparable damage to it and other market participants. 16 Such allegations, which are not supported by any evidence, can in no circumstances be regarded as providing an accurate and comprehensive picture of the applicant’s situation. Consequently, the judge hearing the application for interim measures is not in a position to assess whether the harm alleged is serious and irreparable. 17 It follows from all the foregoing that the present application for interim measures must be dismissed as inadmissible. On those grounds, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT hereby orders: 1. The application for interim measures is dismissed. 2. The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 4 December 2015. E. Coulon M. Jaeger Registrar President * Language of the case: English.