Nejvyšší soud; 2019-09-26; 30 Cdo 5120/2017
Decision by national courts in the field of European Union law — ECLI:CZ:NS:2019:30.CDO.5120.2017.1
Date: 2019-09-26
Subject matter: Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Origin: Czechia

82019CZ0926(51)_ENG_SUMJURE
JURE summary
JURE summary
This case regards a question of international jurisdiction in a dispute concerning the provision of services brought before the Nejvyšší soud (hereinafter ‘the Supreme Court’).
A company domiciled in the Czech Republic (hereinafter ‘the plaintiff’) applied before the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 4 (hereinafter ‘the Court of First Instance’) for the payment of an amount owed by a company domiciled in Switzerland (hereinafter ‘the defendant’) as a consequence of investment advisory services provided.
The Court of First Instance cited Article 5(2) of the contract signed between the parties according to which all disputes connected to this contract shall be resolved by the courts of Zurich (Switzerland) and, consequently, invoked Article 23 of the new Lugano Convention, declared the lack of jurisdiction of the Czech courts and terminated the proceedings.
The plaintiff appealed to the Městský soud v Praze (hereinafter ‘the Court of Appeal’) which assessed all relations between the parties including two other oral agreements. It concluded that, due to uncertainties in the relations, only the circumstances provided in the plaintiff's action may lead to a reliable conclusion and disregarded the defendant's allegation that the jurisdiction clause is not relevant for the current claims. The Court of Appeal considered the claim belonging to the contract for the provision of services, cited Article 5(1)(b) of the new Lugano Convention and declared that the Court of First Instance should have jurisdiction over the dispute since the services should have been provided at the plaintiff’s registered office situated within the local jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The same conclusion would follow from the application of Article 5(3) of the new Lugano Convention too. Therefore, the Court of Appeal modified the first instance conclusion and ordered the continuation of the proceedings.
The defendant appealed the second instance conclusion before the Supreme Court, alleging an erroneous assessment of international jurisdiction mainly due to ignorance of its allegations. The Supreme Court cited the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-375/13 (1), according to which that ‘although the national court seised is not […] obliged, if the defendant contests the applicant’s allegations, to conduct a comprehensive taking of evidence at the stage of determining jurisdiction, it must be pointed out that both the objective of the sound administration of justice, which underlies [the Brussels I Regulation] (2) and respect for the independence of the national court in the exercise of its functions require the national court seised to be able to examine its international jurisdiction in the light of all the information available to it, including, where appropriate, the defendant’s allegations.’ Therefore, the Court of Appeal erred when it decided only on the pleas laid down by the plaintiff and disregarded the defendant's arguments.
The Supreme Court annulled the conclusion of the Court of Appeal and referred the case back to that court for further proceedings, where the Court of Appeal must assess if the jurisdiction clause contained in Article 5(2) of the contract applies to the claims in this dispute or not.
(1) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 28 January 2015, Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc., C-375/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 64.
(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.