Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2026:342
Date: 2026-05-13
Language of the case: English

summary of reasons underpinning that measure, with the consequence that the judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question of whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that measure, is substantiated (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 35 That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation, but in their context. The Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 36 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. To that end, the Council is not required to produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence relating to the grounds alleged in the act whose annulment is sought. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced supports the grounds relied on against the person or entity concerned (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). 37 In such a situation, it is for the Courts of the European Union to determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and to assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 38 As regards, more specifically, the review of legality carried out with regard to the maintenance of the name of the person concerned on the lists at issue, it should be recalled that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus incumbent on the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to achieve the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 39 It follows that, in order to justify maintaining a person’s name on a list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the applicant’s name on the list in question, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. On that basis, changes in the context include the taking into consideration of, first, the situation in the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures has been established as well as the specific situation of the person concerned and, second, all of the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved (see judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 40 It is in the light of those preliminary observations that it is necessary to ascertain whether the Council made an error of assessment in deciding, by means of the adoption of the contested acts, to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of the listing criterion at issue. (a) The applicant’s business interests in Belarus 41 The applicant maintains, in essence, that, since June 2022, he no longer has any business interests in Belarus, as is clear from the schedule of divestments of his assets that he submitted to the Council at the latter’s request. 42 First, the applicant denies being chairman of the board of directors and a shareholder in JSC Mospromstroi, Industrial Financial Group Safmar JSC and LLC Proekt Grad. 43 Second, concerning interests in the energy sector, the applicant assumes that, by referring to the oil company Safmar, the Council is in fact referring to the companies Russneft and Neftisa, which the applicant describes as operating under the Safmar brand name. 44 With regard, in the first place, to Neftisa, the applicant argues that he has not been a member of the company’s board of directors since 28 June 2021, that he currently only has an indirect shareholding of 6.75% and that, in any event, the company has no interests in Belarus. In support of that statement, the applicant produces a letter dated 8 February 2022 from the CEO of that company stating that he does not hold a controlling interest. In the second place, with regard to the company Russneft, the applicant claims that he currently only holds a minority stake. He also states that he transferred the majority of his shares in those companies to his brother on 10 June 2021, and thus 11 days before the initial acts were adopted, to settle a dispute with him, as can be seen from the share transfer deed dated 31 March 2020. Finally, the applicant submits that the Council has not adduced any evidence that he had any interests in fuelling stations and oil depots. In the third place, regarding the activities of the Safmar Group during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in 2020 and the allegation that the applicant supported President Lukashenko in his disputes with Russia over oil supplies, he argues that not only is that ground no longer relevant and insufficiently substantiated, but also that Russneft and Neftisa had continued to supply Belarus on the basis of pre-existing obligations and not in order to support the regime of President Lukashenko. 45 Third, as regards interests in the potash sector, the applicant claims, in essence, that the development of the potassium chloride mining and processing plant in Nezhinsky (Belarus) (‘the Nezhinsky project’) was nationalised by the Belarus State in 2023. 46 In support of that assertion, the applicant produces a letter from the Belarusian Council of Ministers dated 30 August 2023 and a letter dated 5 September 2023 signed by the director of the company Slavkali stating that the Nezhinsky project was nationalised and Slavkali is no longer in charge of that project which was awarded to the state-owned company Nedra Nezhyn, in which Slavkali has no shareholding. In addition, the investment agreement concluded between the English public limited company GCM Global Energy Plc (‘GCM’), which created Slavkali, and the Belarusian Government relating to that project of 5 October 2011 (‘the investment agreement of 5 October 2011’) was terminated. The applicant infers from this that, since Slavkali is no longer in charge of that project and since the applicant has not held any shares in GCM since 24 June 2022, as can be seen from the extract from the United Kingdom Companies Register, he no longer derives any benefit from the Nezhinsky project. 47 Fourth, with regard to business interests in the commercial property sector, namely the ‘Renaissance’ hotel in Minsk (Belarus), the business centre and the airport terminal that are mentioned in the contested acts, the applicant maintains, relying on a table showing his investments and divestments of assets in Belarus, that that infrastructure no longer belongs to him and that, in any case, he has never benefited from them. According to the applicant, that infrastructure was built as part of the implementation of the investment agreement of 5 October 2011, under which, in order to retain the building licence for the Nezhinsky project, GCM was obliged to invest up to 250 million United States dollars (USD) in socioeconomic projects in Belarus. Furthermore, the infrastructure in question benefits the people of Belarus and is not intended for the use of the Belarusian Government or the regime of President Lukashenko. 48 The Council disputes those arguments. 49 With regard, first, to the entities referred to in paragraph 42 above, the Council submits that the information concerning those companies serves only to identify the applicant, not to substantiate the grounds for listing. 50 Second, the Council responds – with regard to interests in the energy sector – that the applicant does not deny that he is still a shareholder in Russneft and Neftisa. Furthermore, according to the Council, the share transfer deed of 31 March 2020 is not reliable in so far as it was drawn up between members of the same family, with no involvement by a third party, so that the date of transfer cannot be independently verified. The same applies to the schedule of divestments provided to the Council, since it is not accompanied by supporting documents proving the sale of the assets. The Council also maintains that the applicant has not provided any evidence that he is no longer involved in the strategic development of those companies, or that those companies have ceased their activities in Belarus. It follows, according to the Council, that it is likely that the applicant has not lost his influence over the companies in question and that this is therefore a case of the restrictive measures being circumvented. 51 The Council adds, in the rejoinder, that, as the General Court noted in paragraph 58 of its judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council (T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975), document WK 231/2025 INIT also does not contain updated evidence concerning the companies Russneft and Neftisa. However, the Council considers that, as the Belarusian oil sector is heavily regulated by the State, that during a fairly recent crisis Russneft and Neftisa provided oil to the Belarusian regime, that on his social media channel the applicant still portrays himself in 2025 as “President of SAFMAR Group JSC” and that at least one previous appointment of the applicant in the energy sector had been made by approval of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Belarus, the Council does not exclude that the applicant could again become active on Belarusian soil with his Russian undertakings, if the situation in Belarus, or its Presidency or that of Russia, so required. 52 Third, the Council maintains, with regard to interests in the potash sector, that the disposal of Slavkali’s assets on 24 June 2022 is doubtful because, in his request of 27 November 2023 to be removed from the lists at issue, the applicant mentioned that, on that date, he still held a 3.66% shareholding in Slavkali. Furthermore, the Council states that while it is true that the applicant provided the extract from the United Kingdom Companies Register concerning the change in shareholding within GCM, he did not produce a copy of the deed of transfer of assets underlying that change. Finally, the Council argues that the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project is merely a means of circumventing the restrictive measures, since the applicant, who benefits from a long-standing friendship with President Lukashenko, is still involved in that project and continues to benefit from it. Furthermore, as the documents relating to the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project are confidential, it is not possible to assess whether, as the applicant maintains, he is no longer involved in it, or whether he will receive or has received compensation for the alleged nationalisation. 53 In that regard, the Council adds, in the rejoinder, in the first place, that it is apparent from an article published on the website ‘news.zerkalo.io’ on 23 May 2025 that the state-owned company Nedra Nezhyn is likely to be linked to the applicant. 54 In the second place, the Council refers to an interview given by the applicant to Forbes and reported on the website ‘news.zerkalo.io’ on 25 November 2024, during which he stated that Slavkali ‘is a matter of negotiations’ and that, as yet, he had not recovered the money he had invested. According to the Council, that interview also highlights an inconsistency with the applicant’s assertions in the reply, particularly regarding the amount of money invested in the Nezhinsky project and the progress of that project. 55 In the third place, the Council argues that it is apparent from an article published on 31 May 2025 on the website ‘news.zerkalo.io’ that, in a system marked by loyalty to the regime, it is not excluded that offers of favours to the President could influence such pending negotiations about the applicant’s earlier investments, even in a changing environment where the President proceeds to the nationalisation of businesses. Furthermore, according to President Lukashenko’s website, he visited the Nezhinsky project site on 23 May 2025, where mining operations had commenced, which would indicate the Belarusian regime’s current interest in the potash sector. 56 In the fourth place, the Council considers it noteworthy that, on 4 November 2025, following the first signs of a thaw in relations with the Belarusian regime, the United States Government lifted sanctions on three aircraft, including Slavkali’s, which is alleged to have been used by President Lukashenko for journeys between his residence and Minsk. 57 Fourth, with regard to business interests in the commercial property sector, the Council replies that, although they were made within the framework of the investment agreement of 5 October 2011, that infrastructure represents investments made for commercial purposes. 58 The Court considers it appropriate to examine first of all the applicant’s interests in the potash sector, then those in the energy sector, and finally those in the commercial property sector. (1) The interests in the potash sector 59 The applicant’s business interests in that sector concern the development of the Nezhinsky project. 60 In that regard, it is apparent from the letter from the Belarusian Council of Ministers dated 30 August 2023 submitted by the applicant that, on the basis of Decree No 51 rp-dsp of the President of Belarus of 14 March 2022, as amended on 17 November 2022, the Nezhinsky project was nationalised and that Slavkali is no longer in charge of that project which was awarded to the state-owned company Nedra Nezhyn, in which Slavkali has no shareholding. Furthermore, the investment agreement of 5 October 2011 was terminated. 61 The Council does not seriously dispute the reliability of that evidence. The Council never called into question the content of that letter, which was submitted to it by the applicant on 27 November 2023 in the context of his request that his name be removed from the lists at issue, since it did not check whether the company Nedra Nezhyn existed, how its shareholding was composed or whether the applicant had any involvement in that company. In that regard, it must be noted that document WK 231/2025 INIT, which compiles evidence relating to the contested acts, contains no updated evidence regarding the applicant’s business interests in the potash sector following the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project. 62 In particular, the Court notes that Exhibit No 7, an article dated 11 February 2024 from the website ‘tochka.by’, states that work on the Nezhinsky project resumed in 2023 under the management of the company Nedra Nezhyn, which succeeded Slavkali, and that that project had been discussed between the applicant and President Lukashenko in 2019. It must be noted that that exhibit merely confirms the version of events as recounted by the applicant and provides no clarification as to whether the latter is involved in that company. Furthermore, Exhibits Nos 1 and 9, respectively an undated article from the website ‘tadviser.com’ and an article dated 15 August 2024 from the website ‘trap.org’, which mention, amongst other things, the applicant’s interests in the potash sector, make no reference whatsoever to the state-owned company Nedra Nezhyn succeeding Slavkali. The fact that the company Nedra Nezhyn is now in charge of the Nezhinsky project is undisputed between the parties. Thus, those two exhibits do not take into account the applicant’s current situation, or that of the Nezhinsky project. 63 In its written pleadings, the Council only asserts that the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project is merely a means of circumventing the restrictive measures, since the applicant, who benefits from a long-standing friendship with President Lukashenko, is still involved in that project and continues to benefit from it. 64 It should be noted that such an assertion is not sufficient to demonstrate that, despite the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project, the applicant continued to have, on the date of adoption of the contested acts, business interests in the potash sector in Belarus. In the absence of any evidence at that date establishing a current link between that project and the applicant, the Council cannot maintain that the latter still has business interests in the Nezhinsky project by virtue of his past role in Slavkali, as is apparent from the wording of the contested acts (‘[The applicant] has been the chairman of the board of directors of, and a shareholder in, the Slavkali company’; see paragraph 15 above), and from that company’s past involvement in that project. Such reasoning would amount to asserting that a businessman is presumed to continue to have links with the regime of President Lukashenko, even though he no longer has any investments in Belarus. However, such a presumption cannot be accepted without reversing the burden of proof which rests on the Council, as stated in paragraphs 36 and 38 above (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 49). 65 Admittedly, in support of that assertion, the Council has, at the stage of the rejoinder, produced several items of evidence, which are referred to in paragraph 53 above. However, and without it being necessary to rule on their admissibility, those items of evidence do not prove, to the requisite legal standard, that the applicant is still involved in the Nezhinsky project. 66 In the first place, the article published on the website ‘news.zerkalo.io’ on 23 May 2025 states that it is possible that the state-owned company Nedra Nezhyn is linked to the applicant, given that it is unlikely that such a major player in the sector as Slavkali would have a competitor in such a limited area. That assertion is entirely hypothetical and is, moreover, contradicted by other information contained in the same article. The article mentions that the deputy director of the Nezhinsky project is currently Mr Ivan Golovaty and that the management of that company has been entrusted to four senior officials, namely the Deputy Minister for Architecture and Construction, the First Deputy Minister for Finance, the First Deputy Minister for the Economy and the First Deputy Chairman of the State Property Committee. Similarly, the article published on 31 May 2025 on the same website confirms that, like other businessmen with business interests in Belarus, the applicant has been stripped of a large part of his investments, which were nationalised by President Lukashenko. In particular, it is clear from that article that the latter is using nationalisation to control the Belarusian economy, by depriving companies of their assets and then allocating them to the new Belarusian elite, namely the security forces comprising members of the Ministry of the Interior, the Committee for State Security (KGB) or the State Property Committee. The Council does not prove, or even allege, that the applicant is linked to that new elite. 67 In the second place, the interview given by the applicant to Forbes and reported by ‘news.zerkalo.io’ on 25 November 2024 does not confirm that the applicant is still involved in the Nezhinsky project either. It is clear from that interview that the applicant is attempting to recover part of his investment, but that it is not certain he will succeed in that endeavour. Even assuming that the applicant may receive compensation for his ousting from that project, such compensation cannot, in itself and in the absence of evidence to assess its terms and extent, be regarded as a form of benefit within the meaning of the listing criterion at issue. Furthermore, the mere fact that the applicant is currently negotiating said compensation with the regime with the aim of offsetting the losses associated with the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project cannot, in itself, suffice to justify the conclusion that he still has interests in the potash sector, as that would amount, as stated in paragraph 64 above, to asserting that a businessman is presumed to continue to have links with the regime of President Lukashenko, even though he no longer has any investments in Belarus. 68 Furthermore, that article confirms that the applicant is not in charge of the state-owned enterprise Nedra Nezhyn, since the management of that enterprise has been entrusted to four senior officials, namely the Deputy Minister for Architecture and Construction, the First Deputy Minister for Finance, the First Deputy Minister for the Economy and the First Deputy Chairman of the State Property Committee. 69 In the third place, the evidence regarding the United States of America’s lifting of sanctions against ‘blocked aircraft’, including Slavkali’s aircraft, does not demonstrate that the applicant – who, moreover, is not mentioned in those documents – is still involved in that company, or, even less so, that that company is still in charge of the Nezhinsky project. 70 Finally, regarding President Lukashenko’s visit on 23 May 2025 to the Nezhinsky project site, it should be noted that such evidence demonstrates, at most, that the Belarusian regime remains interested in investments in that sector, particularly those made in a project now run by a state-owned enterprise, but not that the applicant – who, moreover, is not mentioned in the article – is still involved in such investments. 71 It follows from paragraphs 66 to 70 above that the new evidence produced by the Council in its rejoinder, assuming it is admissible, does not support the conclusion that the regime of President Lukashenko uses the nationalisation of economic structures such as the Nezhinsky project in order to enable businesspersons such as the applicant to circumvent the restrictive measures adopted against them, while retaining links with the regime. 72 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the Council’s argument that, as the documents relating to the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project are confidential, it is not possible to assess whether, as the applicant maintains, he is no longer involved in that project or whether he will receive or has received compensation for the alleged nationalisation. 73 In that regard, it should be noted that, as the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty of obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited), an applicant cannot be required to produce evidence to which he or she does not have access. 74 In the present case, the applicant submitted a request to the Belarusian Council of Ministers for a copy of the decree by which President Lukashenko nationalised the Nezhinsky project. That request was refused on the grounds that ‘the content of [Decree] No 51 rp-dsp is restricted official information [which] was communicated to the concerned parties at the time of its issuance’. It must be noted that the Council has not presented any evidence that could cast doubt on the veracity of the procedure initiated by the applicant or on the decision adopted by the Belarusian Council of Ministers. 75 Consequently, that institution cannot rely on the confidential nature of the documents relating to the nationalisation of the Nezhinsky project to conclude that the applicant is still involved in that project, let alone that he continues to benefit from it. 76 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Council made an error of assessment in finding that the applicant still had, on the date of adoption of the contested acts, interests in the potash sector in Belarus. (2) The interests in the energy sector 77 The applicant’s business interests in the energy sector referred to in the contested acts relate, in essence, first, to Safmar Group’s activities in that sector, and more particularly to the fact that that undertaking was the only Russian oil firm to continue supplying Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in early 2020, and, second, to fuelling stations and oil depots owned by the applicant. 78 In the first place, with regard to the Safmar Group’s activities in the oil sector, referred to in the contested acts, it should be noted at the outset that the parties agree that those relate to the activities of that part of the Safmar Group involved in the production and refining of Russian oil, namely the Russian companies Russneft and Neftisa. The applicant does not call into question his status as a ‘shareholder’ in those companies, but claims to have only a minority shareholding in them. Nor does the applicant dispute that those companies were the only Russian oil firms to continue supplying oil to Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in early 2020 but he asserts that Russneft and Neftisa no longer operate in Belarus. 79 The Court points out that the factual basis of the grounds for listing relating to the activities of the companies Russneft and Neftisa in Belarus refers exclusively to past events. As stated in paragraph 78 above, it is apparent from the statement of reasons that the business interests in the oil sector concern, in essence, the activities of the companies Russneft and Neftisa in Belarus during the energy crisis between that country and Russia in 2020, that is to say, five years before the adoption of the contested acts. 80 If such circumstances, in themselves, at the time of the adoption of the initial acts and the first confirmatory acts, were sufficient to regard the applicant as a prominent business person with business interests in the energy sector (judgment of 6 September 2023, Gutseriev v Council, T‑526/21, not published, EU:T:2023:512, paragraph 98), the same is not true as regards maintaining acts, such as the contested acts, which are based on a periodic review of the restrictive measures at issue in order to enable the Council to take account of any changes in circumstances concerning, inter alia, the individual situation of the persons subject to them. Such acts represent the outcome of that periodic review (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). 81 The Council cannot presume that, merely because two Russian companies, in which the applicant is a shareholder, supplied Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in 2020, the applicant still had interests in the energy sector in Belarus, even several years after that event, namely when the contested acts were adopted. That would have the effect of freezing the applicant’s situation and depriving of all practical effect the periodic review procedure provided for, inter alia, in Article 8 of Decision 2012/642 and Article 8a(4) of Regulation No 765/2006 (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). 82 Therefore, it remains to be ascertained whether the extent of the activities of the companies Russneft and Neftisa in Belarus continued, at the time of the extension of the restrictive measures in question by the contested acts, to be such that the applicant could still be regarded as a prominent businessperson with business interests in the energy sector in that country, by virtue of his status as a shareholder in those companies. 83 In that regard, it suffices to note that document WK 231/2025 INIT contains no updated evidence demonstrating the extent of the activities of Russneft and Neftisa on the Belarusian oil market at the time the contested acts were adopted, a fact which the Council itself acknowledges, as is apparent from paragraph 51 above. 84 In its written submissions, the Council merely asserts that the applicant has not provided any evidence that he is no longer involved in the strategic development of those companies – although he is still listed on his social media channels as the chairman of the Safmar Group – or that those companies have ceased their activities in Belarus. Moreover, the Council merely argues that the continued supply of oil to Belarus during the 2020 energy crisis by Russneft and Neftisa and the applicant’s appointment as chairman of Slavneft in 2000 constitute evidence of the applicant’s continuing close ties with the regime. 85 First, the Council cannot criticise the applicant, without reversing the burden of proof, for failing to prove that he is no longer involved in the strategic development of those companies or that those companies have ceased their activities in Belarus. It was for the Council, in the context of the constant and periodic review of the restrictive measures provided for in Article 8 of Decision 2012/642 and Article 8a(4) of Regulation No 765/2006, to examine carefully the evidence substantiating the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. Of course, this does not prevent the applicant from submitting, at any time, observations or new evidence. However, this is a power vested in the applicant which cannot relieve the Council of the burden of proof incumbent on it (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the applicant’s role as chairman of the board of directors of the Safmar Group is of no assistance to the Council, since, in the present case, the Council itself has stated, as set out in paragraph 49 above, that that information does not serve to support the grounds for inclusion. 86 Secondly, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraph 81 above, the supply of Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in 2020, which is based on events dating back almost five years before the adoption of the contested acts, is no longer sufficient to justify the conclusion that the applicant could still be regarded as a prominent businessman with business interests in the energy sector in Belarus. It should be noted that, even though the oil sector is heavily regulated in Belarus, such a circumstance does not permit the inference, without other evidence that was up to date at the time of adoption of the contested acts and demonstrating the extent of the activities on the Belarusian oil market of the Russian companies in which the applicant is a shareholder, that the applicant still has business interests in the energy sector in Belarus (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). 87 In the second place, it should be noted that the Court has already held, with regard to Slavneft and the fuelling stations and oil depots referred to in the grounds of the judgment, that the evidence adduced by the Council merely demonstrated that the applicant had been chairman of that company from 2000 to 2002, a fact which, moreover, he confirms, and that his appointment to that role had been made by approval of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Belarus. However, it does not prove that the applicant ever held shares in that company (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2023, Gutseriev v Council, T‑526/21, not published, EU:T:2023:512, paragraphs 99 and 100). Furthermore, for the reasons set out in paragraph 86 above, that fact, which is based on events dating back more than 20 years before the adoption of the contested acts, is not sufficient to justify the applicant’s still being regarded as a prominent businessperson with business interests in the energy sector in Belarus (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). 88 It follows from the foregoing that the Council erred in considering that the applicant still had, on the date of adoption of the contested acts, business interests in the energy sector in Belarus. (3) The interests in the commercial property sector 89 In this regard, it should be noted that the applicant does not deny having made investments in that sector relating to the Renaissance Hotel in Minsk, a business centre and an airport terminal. He disputes, however, that he benefits from them, since they were implemented under the investment agreement of 5 October 2011 for the benefit of the Belarusian people and, in any event, he no longer owns them. 90 Even assuming that the applicant is still the owner of those buildings constructed under that agreement, there is nothing in the file before the Court to indicate the current scale of those companies’ operations on the Belarusian property market, or indeed whether the applicant has made any further investments in that sector. It must be noted that document WK 231/2025 INIT contains no evidence in that regard. 91 Furthermore, it should be noted that those investments were crucial to the continuation of the Nezhinsky project, from which the applicant expected substantial revenue. As has been stated in paragraphs 60 and 76 above, following the nationalisation of that project, the applicant no longer had interests in the potash sector on the date of adoption of the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 64). Consequently, it appears that the applicant’s potential interests in that sector are not, in themselves, sufficient to justify maintaining his name on the lists at issue. (4) Conclusion on the applicant’s business interests in Belarus 92 It is apparent from paragraphs 76 and 88 above that the Council erred in its assessment that, on the date of adoption of the contested acts, the applicant could still be considered to be a prominent businessperson with business interests in the potash and energy sectors in Belarus. 93 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s business interests in the commercial property sector, assuming that he is still the owner of the Renaissance Hotel in Minsk, the business centre and the airport terminal referred to in the statement of the contested acts, it should be noted that those interests do not, in themselves, allow him to be regarded as a prominent businessman in Belarus, since those interests are secondary to those in the potash sector, which are no longer relevant (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 66). 94 Thus, the Council cannot rely on the applicant’s business interests in the commercial property sector in order to draw the conclusion that the applicant benefits from or supports the regime of President Lukashenko (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 67). 95 To accept the contrary would amount to introducing a presumption that any businessperson in Belarus supports or benefits from that regime. Within the framework of the restrictive measures adopted in response to the situation in Belarus and Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the fact of being a prominent businessman in Belarus, taken in isolation, is not sufficient to establish that the applicant maintains good contacts with the public authorities and that his activities indicate sufficient proximity to the regime of President Lukashenko to constitute support for it. At the time of the adoption of the contested acts, neither Decision 2012/642 nor Regulation No 765/2006 had established a presumption of support for the regime of President Lukashenko against prominent businesspersons operating in Belarus (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 68). (b) The personal relationship between the applicant and President Lukashenko 96 The applicant submits, in essence, that he was a mere acquaintance of President Lukashenko and that, as someone who had invested substantial funds in Belarus, he maintained professional relations with the political leadership there as a matter of prudence. However, the applicant asserts that he has not had any communication with President Lukashenko for a considerable period of time. In particular, he maintains that, contrary to the Council’s assertion, he did not meet with President Lukashenko in May and November 2023. He also denies having facilitated the victory of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition organised in Russia by his radio station (Radio Chanson). Lastly, the applicant acknowledges that he has accumulated considerable wealth, but argues that this is not because of his links with President Lukashenko and that, in any case, he no longer derives any wealth from his investments in Belarus, in particular on account of the fact that the Nezhinsky project was nationalised. 97 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 98 First of all, the Council states that, as the Court stated in its judgment of 6 September 2023, Gutseriev v Council (T‑526/21, not published, EU:T:2023:512, paragraphs 106 to 110), the applicant is, at the very least, a long-standing acquaintance of President Lukashenko and a person whom President Lukashenko trusts implicitly, and that President Lukashenko has made statements on several occasions praising the applicant. 99 Next, the Council maintains that the applicant flew to Belarus in May and November 2023 to meet President Lukashenko, notably at a residence that he confirms having owned and which President Lukashenko has regularly visited in the past. In that regard, the Council has doubts about the reliability of the exhibit of the airline that operated the flights in question, since it was produced at the request of the applicant. Furthermore, the Council notes that the applicant has not proved that he was in Moscow (Russia), as he claims, on the date of those flights. 100 Finally, the Council considers that the victory of Ms Anna Seluk, President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law, in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition, organised in Russia by the radio station owned by the applicant, demonstrates the continuing close ties between the latter and the Belarusian regime. The Council notes in particular that Ms Seluk’s career took a sudden turn following that victory, enabling her to lead President Lukashenko’s most recent election campaign. 101 In support of that claim, the Council has submitted several new items of evidence in both its defence and its rejoinder, the admissibility of which was contested by the applicant at the hearing, namely: – Annex B.12, which contains a screenshot of the applicant’s personal website describing the ‘Chanson of the year’ award as ‘one of the largest events in Russian song culture’; – Annex B.13, which contains a screenshot of the applicant’s personal website stating that he is ‘a Russian poet, a member of the Union of Writers of Russia, the author of more than 300 popular songs performed by the brightest Russian pop stars’ and that, ‘today, [the applicant’s] songs, in some of which he also acts as a talented composer, are constantly rotated on all leading radio stations of the country, decorate the first lines of the charts and receive prestigious music awards and prizes’; – Annex B.14, which contains a screenshot of an article published on 19 December 2023 on President Lukashenko’s website entitled ‘The winners of the Belarusian President’s Special Prize for Outstanding Figures in the Arts, the “For Spiritual Revival” prize’, in which it is stated that ‘special prizes were also bestowed upon … the song writer Anna Seluk (Anna Sergeyevna [Lukashenko]) in recognition of a big personal contribution to the development of modern music art, realisation of cultural initiatives of social importance’; – Annex B.15, which contains a screenshot of a post published on 21 April 2024 on Ms Seluk’s Instagram page, in which she states that she has received the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ award and thanks the organisers, including the applicant’s Instagram account, namely ‘@gutserievmedia’; – Annex B.16, which contains a screenshot of a post published on 24 January 2024 on Ms Seluk’s Instagram page regarding the presentation of President Lukashenko’s Special Prize in the field of arts and culture; – Annex B.17, which contains a screenshot of a post published on 3 March 2024 on Ms Seluk’s Instagram page, in which she states that she received the Belarusian ‘Chanson of the year 2023’ award for best lyricist; – Annex B.18, which contains a screenshot of a post published on 9 August 2024 on Ms Seluk’s Instagram page, in which she states that, at the ‘Slavic Bazaar in Vitebsk’, she received an award ‘for the creative embodiment of the ideas of friendship between the peoples of Belarus and Russia’; – Annex B.19, which contains a screenshot of the applicant’s personal website stating that the ‘Slavic Bazaar’ has become a ‘hallmark of the Republic of Belarus’, and that, during the 2024 edition of the event, ‘the stars of the first magnitude of Russia and Belarus appeared on the main stage of the festival’ and that ‘the real [highlight] of the gala evening, according to the audience, [was the] songs based on [the applicant’s] poems’. That information is also confirmed by Annex B.20, which contains a screenshot of a post published on 14 July 2024 on the applicant’s Instagram account; – Annex B.21, which contains a screenshot of an article published on 21 November 2024 by the BelTA news agency stating that Ms Seluk is the head of the working group for President Lukashenko’s election campaign entitled ‘Marathon of Unity’; – Annex B.22, which contains a screenshot of an article published on 17 September 2024 on President Lukashenko’s website, mentioning the start of the ‘Marathon of Unity’ election campaign, which concluded with a concert on 24 January 2024, according to the information contained in Annex B.23, which also originates from President Lukashenko’s website, specifically from an article published on the same day; – Annex B.24, which contains a screenshot of an article published on 25 May 2025 on President Lukashenko’s website, stating that he awarded honours to prominent figures from various sectors, including those who contributed to the ‘Marathon of Unity’, amongst whom was Ms Seluk, who received the ‘Francysk Skaryna’ award; – Annex C.13, which contains an article published on 26 September 2024 on the Belarusian Government’s information analysis portal, stating that culture was one of the key elements of the ‘Marathon of Unity’ election campaign. 102 At the outset, it should be noted that the applicant does not deny knowing President Lukashenko personally. He submits, however, that they are mere acquaintances and that they have not been in contact for ‘a considerable period of time’, contrary to what is claimed by the Council, which maintains that the applicant flew to Belarus in May and November 2023 to meet President Lukashenko and allegedly facilitated his daughter-in-law’s victory in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition in Russia. 103 As regards the applicant’s alleged meetings with President Lukashenko in May and November 2023, it should be noted that, having ruled on the same evidence as that submitted in the present case, the Court has already held that the Council has not proved in a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent manner that he travelled to Belarus on 20 May and on 18 and 19 November 2023 to meet President Lukashenko (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraphs 73 to 79). The Council further confirmed at the hearing that document WK 231/2025 INIT contains no new evidence regarding those alleged meetings. 104 With regard to the victory of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition, organised in Russia by the applicant’s radio station, the Court notes that that event is not expressly mentioned in the grounds for inclusion, a fact which the Council acknowledged during the hearing. Furthermore, document WK 231/2025 INIT contains only one item of evidence on that subject, namely Exhibit No 5, which consists of an article dated 3 May 2024 published on the website ‘zerkalo.io’, which deals with the professional activities of President Lukashenko’s family members in the context of the launch of a new radio station by a company under their control. That article mentions the victory of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition, organised in Russia by the radio station belonging to the applicant, who is identified as a ‘friend’ of that president. It must be noted that that exhibit in no way demonstrates that the applicant facilitated the victory of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law in order to secure favours from the Belarusian regime. That article does not specify the arrangements for organising and conducting the competition, or to what extent the applicant may have intervened to benefit President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law. 105 In any event, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the new evidence submitted by the Council, the fact, assuming it to be established, that the applicant sought to highlight President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law by facilitating her victory in a competition held in a country other than Belarus and one year prior to the adoption of the contested acts cannot suffice to justify maintaining his name on the lists at issue. 106 It should be noted that, even though the Court has already recognised that there was a long-standing relationship between President Lukashenko and the applicant and that that relationship had enabled the applicant to accumulate considerable wealth and gain influence in Belarus (judgment of 6 September 2023, Gutseriev v Council, T‑526/21, not published, EU:T:2023:512, paragraphs 110, 128 and 129), the Council is not exempt from proving that that was still the case at the time of the adoption of the contested acts. 107 In the present case, the Council has not demonstrated that that relationship was still thriving. In particular, the Council has not proved that, by facilitating the victory of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in-law in the ‘Chanson of the year 2024’ competition, the applicant was able to carry out new large-scale economic projects. 108 In view of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Council erred in its assessment when it stated, in the grounds of the contested acts, that, at the time those acts were adopted, the applicant was continuing to forge links with President Lukashenko, enabling him to amass a considerable fortune and gain influence within the Belarusian political elite. (c) The applicant’s activities during the COVID-19 pandemic 109 As regard the supply of scanners to a hospital during the COVID-19 pandemic, the applicant maintains that this fact, which he does not deny, is irrelevant for the purposes of the listing criterion at issue, since those scanners were supplied exclusively to support the Belarusian people during that pandemic. 110 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments, asserting that the scanners were supplied in response to a personal, direct request made to the applicant by President Lukashenko, that the President’s office published the initiative on its website, and that, consequently, that gesture is a sign of support for the President’s regime. 111 In that regard, it suffices to note that, even assuming that the applicant purchased scanners for Belarus during the COVID-19 crisis at the request of President Lukashenko, the events referred to in that ground date from November 2020, that is to say, more than four years before the adoption of the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 89). 112 The Court held, in paragraphs 92 to 95 and 108 above, that the Council had not proved that the applicant continued to have, at the time of the adoption of the contested acts, business interests in Belarus enabling him to be regarded as a prominent businessperson with substantial business interests in several sectors, such as potash, energy and commercial property, or as having a prosperous personal relationship with President Lukashenko. It must therefore be concluded that the present ground for listing, which has a factual basis that relates exclusively to past events, is obsolete and does not, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 39 above, demonstrate that the applicant’s support for the regime of President Lukashenko was ongoing on the date of adoption of the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T‑233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 90). 2. Conclusion on the second limb of the first plea in law 113 In view of all of the foregoing, by finding that, at the time of the adoption of the contested acts, the applicant could still be regarded as a person who benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko, the Council made an error of assessment. 114 It follows that, since the second limb of the first plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, must be upheld, the contested acts must be annulled, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas in law raised by the applicant. IV. Costs 115 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 116 In the present case, since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the applicant, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/385 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/386 of 24 February 2025 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in so far as they concern Mr Mikail Safarbekovich Gutseriev; 2. Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. Sampol Pucurull Laitenberger Stancu Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 May 2026. V. Di Bucci E. Buttigieg Registrar President * Language of the case: English.