Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2019:468
Date: 2019-07-02
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Provisions governing the Institutions;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for damages - successful;Action for damages - unfounded;Action for damages - inadmissible

summary statements at 30 June 2011), reproduced on pages 80 and 81 of the file of annexes to the application, that under the section ‘Bank loans and overdrafts’, line 455002 ‘MAHMOUDIAN Féreidoun’ reports a debt amount of EUR 220 000 net on 30 June 2011. Since Codefa was liquidated more than six months after those summary statements were drawn up, it is not possible to know for certain that the loans granted by the applicant to Codefa had not been reimbursed, in part or in full, in the meantime. Therefore, even if the Court is able to take into account that document in Annex A.5 to the application, to which the applicant did not expressly refer in the application, in any event, such a reference would not be capable of demonstrating the fact of the alleged damage. 149 Secondly, with regard to Société Générale’s decision to close Codefa’s accounts and to cancel an overdraft facility that it had, principally, it must be pointed out that, in the footnote to paragraph 73 of the application, the applicant refers solely and without giving detail to ‘Annex A.5, see letter from Société Générale dated 2 September 2010’. As has already been considered in paragraph 144 above, a reference of that kind is insufficient with respect to an annex containing a multitude of documents reproduced over a total of 114 pages. Accordingly, the applicant has not adduced evidence of the existence of such decisions taken by Société Générale and, therefore, in the light of the provisions contained in paragraph 76 of the Rules of Procedure, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 150 For the sake of completeness, even if that reference was considered to be sufficient in the present case, with the result that the Court should research in Annex A.5 to the application which document is the ‘letter from Société Générale dated 2 September 2010’, it would then have found that that document is reproduced on the first page of Annex A.5, namely on page 41 of the file of annexes to the application. It must be noted, as the applicant himself acknowledged at the hearing, that nowhere in that letter from Société Générale does it state that the closure of Codefa’s account, and the cancellation of the EUR 80 000 overdraft facility it had, result from the adoption of the acts at issue. 151 Thirdly, with regard to the alleged refusal by another banking institution to open a bank account in the name of Codefa on account of the acts at issue against the applicant, it must be stated that that allegation in the application is not substantiated by any evidence. Accordingly, in the light of the provisions contained in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 152 Fourthly, with regard to the allegation that Codefa was not able to benefit from the aid usually granted to companies in difficulty even though it was eligible nevertheless, it must again be stated that that allegation in the application is not substantiated by any evidence. Accordingly, in the light of the provisions contained in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 153 Fifthly, with regard to the allegation that, as a result of Codefa’s liquidation, he was unable to ‘recoup directly or indirectly his investment [in the form] of purchasing shares in 2009’, it must be stated that that argument in the application is not substantiated by any evidence. In particular, the applicant does not specify the total amount he invested to buy the shares in Codefa, the number of shares or their nominal value. Accordingly, in the light of the provisions contained in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 154 In the light of all the foregoing considerations that, since the arguments put forward in support of the claim for compensation for damage resulting from losses relating to Codefa are partly inadmissible and partly unfounded, the applicant has not substantiated that claim. Accordingly, it must be concluded that that claim must be rejected as unfounded. 155 Therefore, in the light of the conclusions drawn in paragraphs 133 and 154 above, the claim for compensation for damage resulting from losses incurred by the applicant in European companies must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded. (4) The legal costs incurred in order to obtain a partial unfreezing of the applicant’s funds and then to release the bank accounts that had been seized 156 With regard to the legal costs incurred in order to obtain a partial unfreezing of his funds and then to release the bank accounts that had been seized, the applicant submits that no information had been given to him with regard to the procedure to be followed in order to access the necessary funds to cover his personal expenses. Accordingly, to release EUR 1 000 per month, he used a law firm, in France, which sent him a statement for fees of EUR 8 875. Similarly, he appointed a law firm in Belgium, first to contact the Belgian authorities and then, following the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian (C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775), to take the necessary steps to release his bank accounts that had been seized, which warranted a statement for fees of EUR 8 838. In total, the legal costs at issue therefore amount to fees of EUR 17 713. 157 At the reply stage, the applicant noted that, given his age and personal circumstances, he needed specialist advice in order to assert his rights effectively before the banks and public authorities; the fact that it took a year to obtain the unfreezing of the amounts necessary to cover his essential expenses demonstrates that that battle was difficult and complicated; moreover, it is clear from the documents in the case file that the blocking of his accounts in Belgium was directly linked to the acts at issue. 158 The Council, supported by the Commission, contests the applicant’s arguments. 159 In essence, in respect of the damage resulting from the legal costs he incurred in order to obtain, in France and in Belgium, a partial unfreezing of his funds, during the period at issue, and then to release his bank accounts that had been seized, the applicant requests the reimbursement of the lawyers’ fees he claims to have paid for that purpose. In that regard, he has submitted, in annexes to the application, first, exchanges between the law firm established in France and the Directorate-General of the Treasury (France) and exchanges between the law firm established in Belgium and the Brussels Public Prosecutor’s Office and, secondly, two fee statements prepared by the respective law firms. It must be held that, by ‘period at issue’, the applicant is referring to the period from the first listing of his name on 26 July 2010 (see paragraph 10 above) to his name being removed from the lists at issue on 19 December 2013 (see paragraph 22 above) (‘the period at issue’). 160 In that regard, as far as adducing evidence that actual damage was sustained is concerned, a task which falls to the applicant, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 86 above, without there being any need to adjudicate on the question whether, in the context of the national proceedings at issue in the present case, the applicant was obliged to appoint a lawyer, it must be noted that he has merely submitted two fee statements, issued by his lawyers, which were addressed to him personally, for a total amount of EUR 17 713. However, he has adduced no evidence that those two fee statements have not only been paid, but above all, since he is requesting the reimbursement of those fees in respect of the present head of damage, that they were paid using his own funds. 161 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the applicant has clearly adduced no conclusive evidence of the existence and the extent of the damage he alleges in respect of the lawyers’ costs he chose to incur in the form of assistance in dealings with the French and Belgian national authorities. Thus, he has clearly failed to prove that the damage, resulting from legal costs he incurred in France and Belgium and for which he is seeking compensation, was actual and certain. Accordingly, the request for reimbursement of the lawyers’ fees incurred by the applicant in France and in Belgium must be rejected (see, to that effect, order of 7 February 2018, AEIM and Kazenas v Commission, T‑436/16, not published, EU:T:2018:78, paragraphs 46 and 47). 162 In the light of the conclusions drawn in paragraphs 107, 116, 155 and 161 above, the claim for compensation for the material damage allegedly sustained must be rejected as being partly inadmissible and, in any event unfounded, and partly unfounded. (b) The non-material damage alleged and the existence of a causal link 163 The applicant submits that the adoption of the acts at issue and maintaining his name on the lists at issue caused him two types of non-material damage, namely, first, the damage caused to his repute and his reputation, in respect of which he seeks EUR 100 000 and, secondly, the suffering that ensued in terms of both the difficulties he faced in his day-to-day life and the damage to his health, in respect of which he seeks EUR 500 000. 164 In his reply to the question put to him in the context of the second measure of organisation of procedure regarding the consequences of the judgment of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402), for the present case, he takes the view that, in view of the aggravating circumstances resulting, in particular, from the misuse of power by the Council, the full reparation for the non-material damage he has suffered must be greater than the amount agreed in the case which gave rise to the abovementioned judgment. 165 The Council, supported by the Commission, considers that the claim for compensation for the non-material damage alleged must be rejected. (1) The damage to his repute and his reputation 166 The applicant submits that the damage caused to his repute and his reputation by the adoption and the publication of the acts at issue caused him non-material damage, distinct from any material loss, resulting from an impact on his personal relations with third parties. 167 Moreover, the subsequent annulment of the acts at issue is not able to make good in full the non-material damage he has suffered as a result of the damage they caused to his repute and his reputation, which was prolonged and exacerbated by the fact that the Council exhausted all of the legal remedies available. It is only in the appeal proceedings that the Council, for the first time, alleged the existence of confidential material justifying the adoption of the acts at issue. This has never been established. Despite his objections, which were well founded, the Council decided, without any evidence and without carrying out any checks, to maintain his name on the lists at issue for almost three and a half years, from 26 July 2010 to 19 December 2013. 168 The inclusion of his name in the lists at issue attracted some publicity, in particular as a result of the Council’s use of media, in the business communities in both Iran and Europe, which tarnished his reputation further. 169 In response to the Council's arguments, the applicant submits that, in the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), the Court acknowledged that, under certain conditions, non-material damage could stem from restrictive measures, without making a distinction between natural and legal persons; the BBC programmes and the report on the French television channel TF1, broadcast on 6 July 2014, to which he refers, demonstrate the scale of media coverage his case has received and give an accurate indication of the non-material damage he has suffered having been stigmatised by the Council in France in particular and in the West in general. 170 As regards the damage caused to the applicant’s repute and reputation, the Council, supported by the Commission, contests the applicant’s arguments. 171 First, it submits that, as far as reparation for non-material damage is concerned, the damage caused to the reputation of a natural person must be distinguished from that caused to a company engaged in a commercial activity. Thus, the present case must in particular be equated to the case giving rise to the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), and not to the case giving rise to the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986). Therefore, according to the Council, the annulment of the acts at issue that were taken against the applicant, who is a natural person, constitute appropriate reparation for the damage caused to his reputation. 172 Secondly, the applicant has adduced no tangible evidence of damage to his personal reputation or to his repute, or, in other words, that the damage he alleges is actual and certain. 173 In the first place, it is necessary to examine at the outset the Council’s argument that the damage caused to the reputation of a natural person must be distinguished, as far as reparation for non-material damage is concerned, from the damage caused to the reputation of a company engaged in a commercial activity. Thus, the present case is similar to the cases that gave rise to the judgments of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), and of 18 February 2016, Jannatian v Council (T‑328/14, not published, EU:T:2016:86), and not to the case giving rise to the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), since the annulment of the acts at issue that were taken against the applicant, who is a natural person, constitute appropriate reparation for the damage caused to his reputation. Unlike a commercial company, in respect of which damage to reputation leads to financial repercussions and may be quantified in monetary terms, it is difficult to apply the same principle to a natural person. 174 The Council’s argument, which assumes that, in respect of the non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union, the Court of Justice has established a distinction between a natural person and a legal person, cannot succeed. First, it should be noted that, in paragraph 72 of the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), the Court of Justice merely held that the illegality of the act at issue in that case, the nature and subject matter of which were similar to the acts at issue, was capable of rehabilitating the applicant in that case, a natural person, or constituting a form of reparation for the non-material harm which he had suffered by reason of that illegality, and of thereby establishing that he retained his interest in bringing proceedings. It is clear from the abovementioned paragraph of that judgment that the Court of Justice merely considered, in that case, that the recognition of the illegality of the act at issue was capable of justifying that the applicant retained his interest in bringing proceedings, even though his name had been removed from the list at issue in that case. 175 Thus, contrary to what the Council essentially submits, in the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), the Court of Justice did not adopt a position on whether such a finding was sufficient to fully rehabilitate the applicant in that case or to constitute a form of full reparation for the non-material damage he had suffered. Moreover, it must be noted that, in paragraph 49 of the judgment of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402), the Court of Justice ruled that, while, in the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), it held that the annulment of unlawful restrictive measures was capable of constituting a form of reparation for non-material damage suffered, it did not follow from this that that form of reparation was necessarily sufficient, in every case, to ensure full reparation for such damage. 176 Furthermore, it must be stated that, again in paragraph 72 of the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), the Court of Justice also did not limit the effects of the finding in that paragraph to natural persons only. In that regard, it should also be recalled that, in paragraph 70 of that judgment, the Court of Justice noted in particular that the restrictive measures concerned had substantial negative consequences and a considerable impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons covered by those measures. Those measures had been adopted under Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (OJ 2002 L 139, p. 9). That regulation was capable of targeting both natural persons and legal entities. 177 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Council is wrong to submit, in essence, that the damage caused to the reputation of a natural person must be distinguished, as far as reparation for damage is concerned, from the damage caused to the reputation of a company engaged in a commercial activity. 178 In the second place, turning now to the claim for compensation for the non-material damage alleged by the applicant resulting from the damage caused to his repute and his reputation, it should be recalled that the measures at issue have substantial negative consequences and a considerable impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons covered (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 70). In that regard, when a person is the subject of restrictive measures because of the support he has allegedly given to nuclear proliferation, he is publicly associated with conduct which is considered a serious threat to peace and international security, as a result of which he becomes an object of opprobrium and suspicion, which thus affects his reputation, and he is therefore caused non-material damage (judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 80). 179 First, the opprobrium and suspicion provoked by restrictive measures such as the measures at issue relate to his willingness to be involved in activities regarded as reprehensible by the international community. Thus, the effect on the person concerned goes beyond the sphere of his current financial and economic interests (judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 82). 180 Secondly, the injury to the reputation of the person concerned is all the more serious since it is caused not by the expression of a personal opinion, but by an official statement of the position of an EU institution, which is published in the Official Journal of the European Union and entails binding legal consequences (judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 83). 181 In view of the foregoing, it must be held that, in the present case, the adoption of the acts at issue and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue caused him non-material damage, distinct from any material loss resulting from an impact on his financial and economic interests. Consequently, he must be recognised as having a right to receive compensation for that damage (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 85). 182 As regards the actual non-material damage allegedly suffered, it should be recalled that, concerning such damage in particular, if adducing or offering evidence is not necessarily held to be a condition for the recognition of that damage, it is for the applicant to at least establish that the conduct alleged against the institution concerned was capable of causing damage to him (see judgment of 16 October 2014, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T‑297/12, not published, EU:T:2014:888, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 1999, BAI v Commission, T‑230/95, EU:T:1999:11, paragraph 39). 183 Moreover, while the Court of Justice held, in the judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331), that the annulment of unlawful restrictive measures was capable of constituting a form of reparation for non-material damage suffered, it does not follow from this that that form of reparation is necessarily sufficient, in every case, to ensure full reparation for such damage, every decision in that regard being required to be taken on the basis of an assessment of the circumstances of the case (judgment of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 49). 184 In the present case, it is true that the annulment of the acts at issue by the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), which found that the applicant’s association with nuclear proliferation is unjustified and, consequently, unlawful, is capable of constituting a form of reparation for the non-material damage the applicant has suffered and for which he seeks compensation in the present case. However, in the circumstances of the present case, that annulment cannot represent full reparation for that damage. 185 It follows from the case-law recalled in paragraph 178 above that the adoption of the acts at issue and, accordingly, the allegation that the applicant was involved in nuclear proliferation, resulted in him becoming an object of opprobrium and suspicion, which thus affected his reputation and, therefore, his social and family relations (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 88). 186 Those effects, which lasted for almost three and a half years and are the cause of the non-material damage suffered by the applicant, cannot be wholly offset by a subsequent finding, in the present case, that the acts at issue are unlawful, for the following reasons. 187 First, the adoption of restrictive measures against a person tends to attract more attention and provoke a greater reaction, in particular outside the European Union, than does their subsequent annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 88). 188 Secondly, the allegation levelled by the Council at the applicant is particularly serious inasmuch as it associates him with nuclear proliferation, in other words, an activity representing, in the Council’s view, a threat to international peace and security (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 89). 189 Thirdly, as is clear from paragraph 21 above, that allegation has not been substantiated by any relevant information or evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 90). 190 Fourthly, and in any event, although the listing of the applicant’s name, which was published in the Official Journal, could have been withdrawn by the Council at any time, or at the very least amended or supplemented, in order to remedy any possible unlawfulness which could invalidate it, it was maintained for almost three and a half years despite the applicant’s objections, in particular with regard to the lack of evidence regarding the allegation made against him. In that regard, the file does not contain anything which suggests that the Council, at any time or in any way, either on its own initiative or in response to the applicant’s objections, checked whether that allegation was well founded in order to limit the harmful consequences which it would entail for the applicant (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraph 91). 191 Such checks would in any event have been particularly justified in this case, following the delivery of the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), in the light of the severity of the unlawful conduct it found, on the basis of settled case-law. Although that judgment was capable, at least in part, of constituting reparation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant, it cannot in any event have had any effect in that respect with regard to the period after it was delivered, a period of approximately one year and nine months during which the applicant’s name was maintained on the list. 192 Without in any way seeking to call into question the right of the institution concerned to bring an appeal against the General Court’s final decision or the deferral of the effects of that decision, arising from the second paragraph of Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it must be held that, in a Union governed by the rule of law, in the light of the severity of the unlawful conduct found by the Court, the institution concerned must, even if it is alongside bringing an appeal, check the findings that were penalised by the Court. The aim of such a requirement is not to force the institution concerned to have already executed the Court’s judgment but, as is clear from paragraph 91 of the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), to check whether, in the light of the conclusions drawn by the Court, the contested acts may, or even must, be withdrawn, replaced or amended in order to limit their harmful consequences. 193 The non-material damage thus caused, by maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists after the delivery of the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), as the applicant expressly alleges in the application, is different from the damage that occurred prior to the delivery of that judgment. Accordingly, in that judgment, the Court formally concluded, as the applicant submits, that the listing of his name was unlawful, in the light of settled case-law, as there was no evidence to support the allegation made against him. 194 In the present case, the Council was therefore able to assess whether maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists as it stands, namely without any evidence to support the allegation made against him, was justified, in particular in the light of the assessments made and conclusions reached by the Court in the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), without risking causing more damage than the applicant had already suffered on the date of delivery of that judgment. 195 That conclusion cannot be altered in the light of the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian (C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775). In that judgment, the Court of Justice only examined and dismissed the appeal brought by the Council against the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), annulling the acts. It was unable to give a ruling on the compensation for the non-material damage caused by maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue after that latter judgment was delivered. 196 In the light of the foregoing considerations and, in any event, of the considerations in paragraphs 190 to 195 above, it must be concluded that the annulment of the listing of the applicant’s name by the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), did not constitute full reparation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant. 197 In the third place, it is necessary to examine whether, as the applicant claims, certain additional factors may have contributed to exacerbating the non-material damage he suffered and, therefore, should be taken into account when evaluating the compensation for the damage he has suffered. 198 First of all, with regard to the alleged protraction and exacerbation of the non-material damaged suffered by the applicant, on the ground that the Council, first, exhausted the remedies available to it under the FEU Treaty, in particular by bringing an appeal against the judgment of 21 March 2012, Fulmen and Mahmoudian v Council (T‑439/10 and T‑440/10, EU:T:2012:142), and, secondly, put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a number of pleas or arguments in support of that appeal, including by referring, without having sent it however, to confidential material in the acts at issue, that argument cannot succeed. In the same way and for the same reasons that it was held in paragraphs 70 to 76 above that such circumstances cannot constitute a factor that makes the unlawful act committed by the Council worse, they cannot also, in principle, be the cause of any non-material damage that may give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. 199 Secondly, as regards the broadcast of the report on the programme ‘sept à huit’ by the French television channel TF1, far from stating, as the applicant alleges, on account of its content, that he suffered greater non-material damage, that programme, which is available on the internet, focussed exclusively on the effects of the acts at issue on Fulmen and not on the applicant. In any event, even if it is assumed that that programme also related to the applicant’s interests, it is clear that the programme was able to contribute to restoring his reputation. In particular, it publicises the annulment of the acts at issue by the EU Courts. However, with regard to the particularly serious allegation levelled by the Council at the applicant, the broadcast of that programme cannot, contrary to the Council’s submissions, be regarded as capable of counteracting the negative effects of the measures at issue on the applicant’s reputation. 200 Finally, with regard to the broadcast by the BBC of a photograph of the applicant and, on 24 May 2011, of a programme in which, according to the applicant, the Council’s spokesperson played a part and stated, with regard to a number of individuals who were subject to the Council’s sanctions, that ‘finally, it has been proven that all of the decisions taken by the European Union were fair’, in addition to the fact that the applicant does not provide any information in the application to enable the Court to establish the existence and content of those broadcasts, it must be considered that the broadcasts in question and the views expressed, according to the Council, by the spokesperson for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and not the Council, cannot have exacerbated the damage caused to the applicant by the acts at issue. Although those views were expressed even though the proceedings had been brought before the Court seeking the annulment of the acts at issue, those views, as reported by the applicant in the application, reflect only the views of the person involved, an agent of an EU institution, with regard to the lawfulness of decisions that that institution has adopted against a ‘certain number individuals sanctioned by the Council’. Thus, in addition to the fact that all parties to a case pending before an EU court are free to express their views as to their rights, it must be stated that, in any event, the views expressed were not directed at the applicant individually. 201 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the claim for compensation for non-material damage resulting from the damage caused to the applicant’s repute and reputation must be upheld. In that regard, evaluating that damage ex aequo et bono, the Court considers that an award of EUR 50 000 would constitute appropriate compensation. (2) The damage related to difficulties faced in day-to-day life and damage to health 202 The applicant assesses the damage resulting from the suffering endured on account of difficulties faced in day-to-day life and the damage to his health at EUR 500 000. 203 The Council, supported by the Commission, considers that the documents provided by the applicant are not sufficient to justify compensation for non-material damage which amounts to EUR 500 000. (i) The damage resulting from the suffering endured on account of difficulties faced in day-to-day life 204 The applicant submits that, following the adoption of the acts at issue, since the funds he held within the European Union had been frozen, his personal and financial situation became very difficult. He was deprived of the opportunity not only to maintain his lifestyle, but also to meet his basic needs or even those of his close relatives, such as, inter alia, paying medical expenses, replacing his mobile phone and paying his home insurance. He claims that it was only from January 2012, thus 18 months after the first acts at issue were adopted, that he was given EUR 1 000 per month to meet his day-to-day needs. Thus, for over a year, he had to rely on loans from his friends and family. 205 As regards his expenses, he notes that he had to submit a reasoned request to the competent authority in order to obtain the amount required. Since the authorisation to pay his taxes, insurances and expenses was not issued until 25 March 2011, this resulted in significant delays in payments, penalties and numerous administrative issues. He adds that all payments required the submission of the invoice and special permission from the bank or competent administrative authority or the use of cash payments, which caused him huge worries and additional anxiety in his everyday life. He was prohibited from travelling in European countries other than France and from stopping over at an EU airport outside of France when travelling outside the European Union. He states that everyone in his family, social and professional circles, including the tenant living in his apartment in Belgium, have been interviewed by the security services of the Member States. His niece’s application for French citizenship was refused on the grounds that she was linked to the applicant and had done a two-month internship at Fulmen, which for the applicant, had been the source of feelings of guilt. Having to borrow money from his close relatives, amounting to over EUR 20 000, in order to meet his basic needs, humiliated him and he lived in a state of anxiety about the future, in the event of his health deteriorating. He was also left with a strong sense of injustice with regard to his situation. The televised report on the programme ‘sept à huit’, broadcast on the French television channel TF1 on 6 July 2014, shows the extent of the impact that the restrictive measures have had on his personal situation. 206 In the reply, the applicant categorically rejects the Council’s insinuation that he simply had to leave France and move to Iran. 207 In respect of the suffering endured on account of difficulties faced in day-to-day life, the Council states that it does not dispute that the measures at issue affected the applicant’s day-to-day life. However, in the rejoinder, it states that it does not expressly acknowledge that the applicant has suffered non-material damage for which reparation may be granted. It submits that the expenses to which the applicant refers, namely health costs, insurance or taxes, are covered by Article 26 of Regulation No 267/2012 which provides for the release of funds that are necessary to cover the basic needs of the person subject to a fund-freezing measure. It cannot be held responsible for the slowness or poor functioning of the system implemented by the Member States under that provision. Nor can it be held responsible for the questioning of the applicant’s family, social and professional circles, including his tenant, which was decided on by the security services or the police in the Member States. With regard to the refusal to grant the applicant’s niece French citizenship, the EU rules on restrictive measures contain no provisions whose object or effect is to prevent the naturalisation of the family members of persons subject to those measures. In any event, first, this is not personal harm suffered by the applicant and, secondly, the refusal to grant citizenship relied on is based on the fact that the applicant’s niece had worked as an intern within Fulmen and not the family connection with the applicant. 208 With regard to the fact that the applicant was unable to maintain his lifestyle, this is a factor which is difficult to classify as actual and certain damage and the true extent of that damage is, in any case, questionable. Given the nature of the alleged damage, in the circumstances of the present case, there is no need to award compensation. The applicant’s life was not disrupted to the extent he claims since he always retained his Iranian nationality and his residence and economic links in Iran, where he could have continued to enjoy the lifestyle he was accustomed to, even when that lifestyle was affected in Europe. 209 The applicant is not entitled to claim compensation for alleged damage resulting from a restriction on admission, in the present case being denied boarding in an airport outside of France, since, unlike the measures for the freezing of funds, restrictions on admission are not implemented by the adoption of a regulation on the basis of Article 215 TFEU. 210 As regards the damage resulting from the suffering endured on account of difficulties faced in day-to-day life, a distinction must be established between the three categories of damage alleged by the applicant. 211 First, in respect of the ban on travelling in European countries other than France and stopping over at an airport outside of France when travelling outside the European Union, with the result that the applicant was the subject of a decision to deny boarding on 17 July 2011, it must be recalled that, as the Council has submitted, those measures are based on Article 19 of Decision 2010/413, which replaces Article 4 of Common Position 2007/140. As held in paragraphs 47 and 48 above, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s claim for compensation, in so far as he seeks compensation for the damage that he allegedly suffered as a result of the adoption of Decision 2010/413. Accordingly, the applicant is not entitled to claim compensation for that damage. 212 Secondly, the applicant is wrong to direct a complaint towards the Council which alleges, in essence, sluggishness exhibited by the national authorities when dealing with the applicant’s requests to receive a monthly amount in order to meet all of his basic day-to-day needs. 213 Article 19 of Regulation No 961/2010, namely one of the acts at issue, provided that, by way of derogation from Article 16 of Regulation No 961/2010, the competent authorities of the Member States, as identified on the websites listed in Annex V to that regulation, were able, in certain conditions, to authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, in particular, under Article 19(1)(a)(i) of that regulation, that are ‘necessary to satisfy the basic needs of persons listed in Annex VII or VIII, and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges’. 214 The applicant is therefore wrong to hold the Council liable for damages that he may have suffered as a result of delays when dealing with his requests, to the competent authorities of the Member States, to release or make available his frozen funds or economic resources in order to meet his basic day-to-day needs, namely, therefore, in particular, paying medical expenses, including those for a member of his family, since the applicant does not specify whether it was a dependant family member, home insurance, his taxes, his expenses, a telephone line or even a new telephone. Such damages, even if established, can be attributed only to the competent authorities of the Member States, as designated by Regulation No 961/2010. 215 Thirdly, with regard to the damage resulting, in essence, from stress and feelings of anxiety, humiliation and guilt, in particular towards his close relatives, caused to the applicant by the acts at issue, depriving him of any means of maintaining his previous lifestyle, it should be noted at the outset that that damage is different from the damage resulting from the damage caused to the applicant’s repute and reputation, which has been examined above and in respect of which the Court has decided, in paragraph 201 above, to award him compensation of EUR 50 000. As is clear from paragraph 82 of the judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986), that damage is a consequence, in particular, of the opprobrium and suspicion provoked by restrictive measures such as the measures at issue, which relate to the willingness of the person concerned to be involved in activities regarded as reprehensible by the international community. 216 In the present case, with regard to the non-material damage alleged, which relates to damage caused by the measures at issue to the applicant’s social and family life, it should be noted that that damage is not a consequence of the opprobrium or suspicion which calls into question the alleged willingness of the applicant ‘to be involved in activities regarded as reprehensible by the international community’ but, as a natural person, of the tarnishing, in essence, of his family or even social image, on account of him being suddenly unable, because his financial and economic assets had been frozen, to maintain his previous lifestyle. 217 It is apparent from all of the documents in the case file that relate specifically to the applicant’s social standing and his family’s living standards that he has adduced evidence that the damage alleged and examined here is actual and certain. In addition, it is clear from those documents that that damage is the direct and inevitable consequence of the acts at issue. Furthermore, although the Council does not acknowledge any non-material damage in that regard, it is clear from both its pleadings and the views it expressed at the hearing that it does not dispute that the measures at issue affected the applicant’s day-to-day life. 218 In view of the foregoing, it must be held that the adoption of the acts at issue and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue caused him non-material damage for which reparation may be granted, which is distinct not only from the material damage resulting from an impact on his financial and economic interests, but also from the non-material damage resulting from the damage caused to his repute and his reputation. 219 As regards the amount of the compensation to be awarded to the applicant in respect of that non-material damage, in the circumstances of the present case, although the annulment of the listing of the applicant’s name should have allowed him, in principle, to restore carte blanche to use his assets and economic resources that had been frozen, by contrast, this cannot in any way have made good the damage examined here the impact of which was felt during the period at issue. As the Court of Justice has already held, the freezing of funds as such, through its broad scope, seriously disrupts both the family and working life of the persons covered (see judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, it must be held that the annulment of the acts at issue is not capable, in itself, of constituting full reparation for that damage, or even of limiting the amount of compensation awarded. 220 In the light of the type and the gravity of the non-material damage thereby sustained by the applicant and as it is impossible to calculate that type of non-material damage on the basis of quantitative and measurable elements, it must be assessed ex aequo et bono. In that regard, by way of appropriate compensation, an award corresponding to EUR 500 for each month during which the applicant’s name was included in the lists at issue must be upheld. Since the applicant appeared on those lists from July 2010 to December 2013, thus for 42 months, an award of EUR 21 000 would constitute appropriate compensation for the damage resulting from the suffering endured on account of difficulties faced in day-to-day life, namely, in essence, the damage cause to the applicant’s social standing and his family’s living standards. (ii) The damage resulting from damage to health 221 Turning now to the damage resulting from the damage to his health, the applicant submits that, following the adoption of the acts at issue, he had to take antidepressant medication and, in that regard, in Annex A.11 to the application, he submits a medical certificate. 222 In Annex C.8 to the reply, the applicant attaches, ‘if necessary’, a new medical certificate. 223 In respect of the damage caused to the applicant’s health, the Council submits that any compensation must be based on tangible evidence. It states that, in the present case, the applicant has not submitted a medical report, but has merely submitted a first medical certificate which mentions damage to his health which is neither permanent nor irreversible, as well as, in the reply, a second medical certificate which is particularly brief and does not enable an assessment to be made of the effects that the acts at issue may have had on the applicant’s health. 224 With regard to the damage resulting from the damage to his health, the applicant claims to have taken antidepressant medication and, in that regard, in Annex A.11 to the application, he submits a medical certificate, dated 14 December 2010, issued by a psychiatrist at a Paris hospital. It is clear from that certificate that that doctor certifies that the applicant presented ‘anxiety and major depression’ which required very regular pharmacological and psychiatric treatment. According to that doctor, there was a significant deterioration in the applicant’s state of health at the end of July 2010. 225 It is true that that medical certificate submitted by the applicant is, in itself, capable of corroborating his claim that he had to take antidepressant medication following the adoption of the acts at issue. However, it is implicitly clear from the final paragraph of that certificate that it was issued solely on the basis of information given by the applicant. There is nothing in the medical certificate at issue to show that the doctor’s diagnosis is based on either a medical follow-up of the applicant that he had carried out in the past, or on medical reports and examinations by one or more doctors who had previously monitored the applicant. Furthermore, it should be noted that, as testified by that doctor, he did not treat the applicant until September 2010, thus two months after the acts at issue were adopted. In those circumstances, for the purposes of adducing evidence of the deterioration in his health which occurred at the time when the acts at issue were adopted, the applicant must, at the very least, have had to send to that doctor documents which would have enabled him to assess the state of his general or even psychiatric health before those acts were adopted. There is nothing in the file to support a finding that such communication had taken place. Moreover, the fact remains that the applicant has not produced any documents demonstrating that he was prescribed antidepressant medication after that medical certificate was issued. 226 In respect of the medical certificate submitted at the reply stage, in Annex C.8 to the reply, it should be noted that that certificate is dated 12 January 2016 and was issued by a psychiatrist. As far as the admissibility of that document is concerned, it is impossible not to note that the applicant provides no justification, except for the common wording ‘if necessary’, as to why that new certificate was submitted at the reply stage. However, with regard to the damage resulting from damage to health, it would have been entirely possible or even sufficient, in the present case, for the applicant to state that he wished to share the changes in his health since the first medical certificate was issued in 2010. In any event, even if it is assumed that that document in the case file is admissible, that certificate does not reveal a specific change in the applicant’s state of health; at most it attests that the applicant presents anxiety and depression requiring continued treatment. 227 Therefore, although the medical certificates submitted by the applicant show that he suffered certain health problems in 2010 and 2016, they do not contain any evidence to suggest that those problems are related to the acts at issue. They are not capable of demonstrating the existence of a causal link and the claim for compensation for damage resulting from the damage to the applicant’s health must therefore be rejected (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 September 2007, Combescot v Commission, T‑250/04, EU:T:2007:262, paragraph 100). 228 It follows from the foregoing considerations that that applicant has not adduced any evidence that the damage resulting from the damage to his health is actual and certain, or of a causal link. Therefore, the claim for compensation for that damage must be rejected as unfounded. 229 In the light of the conclusions drawn in paragraphs 201, 220 and 228 above, the claim for compensation for the non-material damage alleged by the applicant must be partially upheld. The Court considers that, in respect of the evaluation ex aequo et bono of the non-material damage suffered by the applicant, the award of EUR 71 000 would constitute appropriate compensation. 230 To conclude, the present action for compensation must be upheld and, accordingly, the applicant must be awarded compensation of EUR 71 000 in respect of the non-material damage he has suffered. However, his claim for compensation for material damage is rejected. IV. Costs 231 Under Article 134(2) of its Rules of Procedure, where there is more than one unsuccessful party, the General Court must decide how the costs are to be shared. 232 In the present case, the Council was unsuccessful in part in respect of the claim for compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant, whereas the applicant was unsuccessful in his claim for compensation for material damage. In those circumstances, each party should bear its own costs. 233 In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Commission must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Orders the Council of the European Union to pay Fereydoun Mahmoudian compensation of EUR 71 000 in respect of the non-material damage suffered; 2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder; 3. Orders Fereydoun Mahmoudian, the Council and the Commission to bear their own respective costs. Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 July 2019. [Signatures] Table of contents * Language of the case: French