Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2008:398
Date: 2008-09-24
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Commercial policy
Concepts: General;Applications by natural or legal persons;Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible

summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, if necessary, without any further information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 68 above, paragraph 64; see the order of 8 March 2006 in Case T‑238/99 Service station Veger v Commission, paragraph 28 and the case‑law cited). 71 In the present case, the application satisfies the requirements set out above. It identifies in a sufficiently clear manner the subject-matter of the proceedings, the form of order sought and the plea in law on which it is based. Apart from the claims relating to the unlawfulness of Regulation No 2603/2000, Regulation No 2604/2000 and Decision 2000/745, the inadequacy of which has led the plea of illegality to be partially inadmissible (see paragraph 69 above), the application also indicates the essential legal and factual particulars upon which the applicant relies in order to show that the contested Notices of Initiation are unlawful. 72 The contentions of inadmissibility put forward by the Commission on the basis of Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure must therefore be rejected to that extent. Substance 73 The single plea relied upon by the applicant relates to the belated initiation of the review of Regulation No 2603/2000, Regulation No 2604/2000 and Decision 2000/745. The plea has three limbs. The first alleges infringement of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements. The second limb alleges breach of the principle of legal certainty. The third limb, formulated in the alternative, alleges that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation are unlawful. The first limb, alleging infringement of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements Arguments of the parties 74 The applicant, after pointing out that the Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers (Case C‑286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I‑6019, paragraph 9, and Case C‑405/92 Mondiet [1993] ECR I‑6133, paragraph 12; Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C‑341/95 Bettati [1998] ECR I‑4355, I‑4358, point 33), maintains that it is apparent from the judgment in Bettati, cited in paragraph 20, that Community legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the Community. The applicant refers to this as ‘the Bettati obligation’. The primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with those agreements (Case C‑61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I‑3989, paragraph 52). 75 It follows, according to the applicant, that the provisions of the Basic Anti‑Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements. Moreover, the Court has explicitly recognised that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation has to be interpreted in the light of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (Case T‑188/99 Euroalliages v Commission [2001] ECR II‑1757, paragraph 44; see also Case T‑256/97 BEUC v Commission [2000] ECR II‑101, paragraphs 66 and 67). 76 In the present case, Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation do not specify the final date for initiating a review of the anti-dumping and countervailing measures. However, since the express aim of the Basic Regulations is to transpose the WTO Agreements into Community law (Case C‑76/00 P Petrotub and Republica v Council [2003] ECR I‑79, paragraphs 53 to 57), those provisions of the Basic Regulations must be regarded as bearing the same meaning as the corresponding provisions in the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements. 77 It is apparent from Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement that any review of measures approaching expiry had to be initiated before the end of the five-year period following the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. In the present case, the review should therefore have been initiated on 30 November 2005 at the latest. Furthermore, Article 12.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 22.7 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement require any decision to initiate a review to be the subject of a public notice. Since the contested Notices of Initiation were published on 1 December 2005, they were not published, as the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements require, before the date of expiry of the measures to which they related. It follows, according to the applicant, that the contested Notices of Initiation infringe the provisions of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. The duties and undertakings under Regulation No 2603/2000, Regulation No 2604/2000 and Decision 2000/745 therefore expired on 1 December 2005. 78 In its reply, the applicant maintains, first, on the basis of the case‑law of the Court and the reports of the Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body of the WTO, that the meaning of ‘before that date’ must be determined by considering the general context of that phrase and its usual meaning in everyday language, by reference to the date on which the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements were concluded in 1994. 79 Various dictionaries published at and after the time of the conclusion of the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidies Agreements confirm that the consistent and primary meaning of the word ‘date’ in the period from 1994 to the present day is that of a calendar date. 80 Similarly, the other authentic versions (namely the French and Spanish versions), which need to be taken into account when interpreting the WTO Agreements (Case C‑89/99 Schieving‑Nijstad and Others [2001] ECR I‑5851), confirm that position. Those versions use the words ‘date’ and ‘fecha’ which, in the light of the meaning given to those terms in the French and Spanish dictionaries, envisage a calendar date, rather than a specific point in time. 81 In support of its argument that the word ‘date’ in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement must be understood as referring to a calendar date, the applicant also relies on the judgment of the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) in Trow v IND Coope [1967] 2 All ER 900. 82 Moreover, the Commission itself, in its Notice of the impending expiry of the measures imposed by Regulations No 2603/2000 and No 2604/2000 and Decision 2000/745, of 2 March 2005, invited producers to submit a written request for a review ‘at any time from the date of the publication of the present notice but no later than three months before the date mentioned in the table below’. The date given in that Notice was 1 December 2005, not a particular moment on 1 December 2005. 83 The use of the word ‘date’ to mean ‘calendar date’, rather than a specific point or moment in time, is also consistent with the terms of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time-limits (OJ, English Special Edition, 1971 (II), p. 354) and, in particular, with Article 4(2) and (3) and Article 5(2) thereof. Generally speaking, Community law treats the word ‘date’ as a reference to a calendar date rather than to any particular moment within a calendar date (Case 139/73 Münch [1973] ECR 1287, paragraph 10; Case C‑200/91 Coloroll Pension Trustees [1994] ECR I‑4389, paragraphs 48 and 59; Case C‑398/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I‑5643; the order in Case T‑126/00 Confindustria and Others v Commission [2001] ECR II‑85, paragraphs 12 and 14; and Case T‑187/94 Rudolph v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II‑367, paragraph 65). Where an act can be undertaken ‘on’ a particular calendar date, the relevant legislative provision uses the expression ‘by … at the latest’, whereas the expression ‘before …’ connotes the requirement to perform the act before the end of the preceding calendar day (see Article 102(2) EC, Article 116(1) to (3) EC, and Article 121(3) and (4) EC; see also Joined Cases C‑442/03 P and C‑471/03 P P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2006] ECR I-4845, paragraph 28). 84 Secondly, the applicant submits that its interpretation of the word ‘date’ is consistent with the legislative context of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement, which are designed to allow a specific derogation from the general rule that the measures concerned expire after a maximum period of five years. Indeed, a strict approach is always adopted by the Community when construing derogations from its own rules. The applicant’s interpretation is also consistent with the object and purpose of those provisions of the agreements concerned. The effect of an expiry review being initiated is to prolong the legal effect of trade defence measures that would otherwise expire five years from their imposition. The applicant submits that its construction of the expression ‘before that date’ promotes legal certainty and sound administration, inasmuch as importers will know before the date of anticipated expiry that the anti-dumping or countervailing measures are in fact being maintained in force and will be able to conduct themselves accordingly. If the argument of the Commission is accepted, the publication of the Notices of initiation at 23.59 hrs on 1 December 2005 would have sufficed to let traders know that imported products being cleared through national customs minutes later on the next day would continue to bear anti-dumping duty, contrary to their expectations that the measures would expire with the end of their five-year term. The WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements are intended to avoid the confusion and uncertainty that such a situation would bring about by requiring Notices of Initiation to be published, at a minimum, before the date on which the relevant antidumping measures would expire. 85 Thirdly, the applicant explained at the hearing that its interpretation of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement was confirmed by the Appellate Body of the WTO itself in its report of 12 April 2007 relating to Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (WT/DS268/AB/RW). The applicant refers, in that regard, to paragraph 163 of that report, which states the following, inter alia: ‘Article 11.3 provides that an anti-dumping duty must be terminated “five years from its imposition” unless there is a determination that “the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury”. According to the Appellate Body, this provision thus operates as “a mandatory rule with an exception” [footnote reference to the Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paragraph 104]. There is the additional requirement that the sunset review be initiated by the investigating authority on its own initiative or upon a request by the domestic industry “before that date”, that is, before the fifth anniversary of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty order.’ 86 The Commission contends that it is not apparent from Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation or from Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement, that an expiry review of the anti‑dumping or countervailing measures must be initiated at the latest on the day before the day on which the measures concerned expire. Those provisions require merely that the review be initiated before midnight on the last day of the normal period of applicability of the measures subject to the review. Findings of the Court – Preliminary observations 87 It is apparent from settled case-law that, in view of their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Community judicature is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions under the first paragraph of Article 230 EC (Case C‑149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I‑8395, paragraph 47, and Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 53). 88 However, where the Community has intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to precise provisions of WTO agreements, it is for the Community judicature to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (Portugal v Council, cited in paragraph 87 above, paragraph 49; Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 54; and Case C‑351/04 Ikea Wholesale [2007] ECR I‑7723, paragraph 30). 89 In that regard, it is clear from the preambles to the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation (recital 5) and to the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation (recitals 6 and 7), that the purpose of those regulations is, inter alia, to transpose into Community law as far as possible the new and detailed rules contained in the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements, which include, in particular, those relating to the duration and review of anti-dumping and countervailing measures, with a view to ensuring a proper and transparent application of those rules (see, to that effect, Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 55, and BEUC v Commission, cited in paragraph 75 above, paragraph 66). 90 The Community therefore adopted the Basic Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations in order to satisfy its international obligations under the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements. Thus, by Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation, it intended to implement the specific obligations laid down in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, and by Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, it intended to implement the particular obligations laid down in Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement (see, to that effect, Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 56). 91 It follows that the above provisions of the Basic Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations must be interpreted, in so far as is possible, in the light of the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements (see, to that effect, Bettati, cited in paragraph 74 above, paragraph 20, and Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 57; BEUC v Commission, cited in paragraph 75 above, paragraph 67; Euroalliages v Commission, cited in paragraph 75 above, paragraph 44; and Case T‑35/01 Shanghai Teraoka Electronic v Council [2004] ECR II‑3663, paragraph 138). – The interpretation of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement 92 In the context of the present limb, the applicant submits that it is apparent from Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement, that the contested Notices of Initiation were adopted out of time. 93 In that regard, it should first be noted that the Basic Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations do not contain any provision which states explicitly the latest point in time at which an expiry review of anti‑dumping or countervailing measures must be initiated. However, it is quite clear from the broad logic of the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation that such a review must be initiated, at the latest, before the measure to which it relates expires. 94 The first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation state that an anti‑dumping or countervailing measure is to expire ‘five years from its imposition … unless it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence’ of the dumping or of subsidisation and injury. Those provisions also state that the measures are to remain in force pending the outcome of the review. In addition, recital 18 in the preamble to the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and recital 22 in the preamble to the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation explain that the anti‑dumping and anti‑subsidies measures are to lapse after five years ‘unless a review indicates that they should be maintained’. Under the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, a review thus concerns measures ‘in force’ which are, where appropriate, to be ‘maintained’, which necessarily implies that such a review must be initiated before those measures expire. 95 Second, it is necessary to determine whether an interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation in the light of the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements requires an expiry review of anti‑dumping or countervailing measures to be initiated at the latest – as submitted by the applicant – the day before the expiry of the measures to which the review relates. 96 It should be pointed out that Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement state that any definitive anti-dumping or countervailing duty ‘shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition …, unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date’ that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Those provisions also state that ‘[t]he duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review’. 97 First, it is not disputed between the parties that the measures concerned by the contested Notices of Initiation should have expired, in the absence of a review, on 1 December 2005 at midnight. According to the applicant, the review in the present case should have been initiated ‘before that date’, and thus on 30 November 2005 at the latest. 98 It must be held that Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement specify only the time‑limits within which the review must be ‘initiated’. They do not contain any obligation concerning the publication of the Notices of Initiation. Where a measure of the Commission is published in the Official Journal of the European Union on a particular date, it may legitimately be considered that the measure itself was adopted at the latest the day before that of its publication. Since, in the present case, the contested Notices of Initiation were published on 1 December 2005, the Commission necessarily took the decision to initiate the review on 30 November 2005 at the latest and thus, in any event, within the time‑limits laid down in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 99 Second, even supposing that the date of initiation of the review under Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement is the same as the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation, it must be determined whether the construction placed by the applicant on those provisions – according to which the initiation of a review should took place, at the latest, the day before the day on which the measures to which it relates expire – is really dictated by the provisions of those agreements (see, to that effect, BEUC v Commission, cited in paragraph 75 above, paragraph 68). 100 It should be pointed out, in that regard, that a treaty under international law, such as the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements, must, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties of 23 May 1969, ‘be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 101 That rule of interpretation corresponds to the rule applied by the Community judicature when called upon to interpret a provision of Community law. Thus, the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and its aims (Case 337/82 Kniepf‑Melde [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10; Case C‑83/94 Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I‑3231, paragraph 22; and Case C‑84/95 Bosphorus [1996] ECR I‑3953, paragraph 11). 102 First, as is apparent from the dictionaries referred to by the applicant in its reply, the word ‘date’ has many different meanings, including ‘a day of the month’ (New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1993) but also ‘the time at which something is to happen’ (New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1993). By way of literal meaning, the word ‘date’ thus does not necessarily refer to a calendar date, since that word may also be used to indicate a precise moment in time. 103 Next, as regards the context of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement and the aim pursued by those provisions, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which preceded the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and which was approved, on behalf of the Community, by Council Decision 80/271/EEC of 10 December 1979 concerning the conclusion of the Multilateral Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations (OJ 1980 L 71, p. 1) did not set a specific period for the application of anti‑dumping duties. Article 9 thereof provides merely that ‘[a]n anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as, and to the extent, necessary to counteract [the] dumping which [caused] injury’. Article 4(9) of the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, approved on behalf of the Community by Decision 80/271, contained a similar provision for countervailing duties. 104 The aim of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement is to provide for the automatic lapse of the duties concerned five years after their imposition unless a review is initiated. As was rightly pointed out by the Commission in its pleadings, in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement, the clause which provides for the possibility of maintaining existing duties in force following the initiation of an expiry review of anti‑dumping and countervailing measures was introduced during the negotiations for the Uruguay round in order to compensate for the introduction of the ‘sunset clause’ triggering the automatic expiry of anti-dumping and countervailing measures five years after their imposition. 105 In that context and regard being had to the aim of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement, it is necessary for the review to be initiated, at the latest, before the automatic expiry of the anti‑dumping and countervailing measures. In so far as those provisions lay down an absolute deadline for the initiation of a review, they refer to the time at which the duties concerned expire. The duties to which the review relates must still be in force at the time the review is initiated. 106 It follows that the phrase ‘before that date’ in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and in Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the contracting parties to undertake a review of the anti‑dumping or countervailing measures concerned at the latest the day before the day on which those measures expire. On the contrary, in the light of the findings in paragraphs 102 to 105 above, legislation of a contracting party which permits a review to be initiated right up until the last minute of the period of validity of the measures to which it relates must be regarded as being in conformity with Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 107 The argument which the applicant draws from the report of the WTO Appellate Body of 12 April 2007 concerning Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (WT/DS268/AB/RW) cannot be upheld. 108 First, that report did not concern the interpretation of the phrase ‘before that date’ in Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. In accordance with paragraph 160 of that report, the question raised related to the ‘determination of likelihood of dumping, for the purpose of implementing the recommendations and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement Body]’. 109 Second, in so far as paragraph 163 states obiter dictum that a review must be initiated ‘before that date’, that is, before the fifth anniversary of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty order’, it must be pointed out that that extract does nothing more than paraphrase a paragraph in another report of the Appellate Body to which reference is made in a footnote, namely paragraph 104 of the Appellate Body report of 9 January 2004 concerning a Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (WT/DS244/AB/R), which states that ‘a review [must] be initiated before the expiry of five years from the date of the imposition of the duty’. It is thus in no way stated in paragraph 163 that a review must be initiated at the latest the day before the day on which the measures in force expire. In referring to the need to initiate the review before the expiry of five years from the date of the imposition of the duty, it confirms, on the contrary, that legislation of a contracting party which permits a review to be initiated right up until the last minute of the period of validity of the measures to which it relates must be regarded as being in conformity with Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 110 It is apparent from the foregoing that a review which is initiated before midnight on the last day of the normal period for the application of measures must be regarded as being in conformity with Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 111 Bearing in mind that, in the present case, it is common ground that the anti‑dumping and countervailing duties concerned by the review should, in the absence of that review, have expired on 1 December 2005 at midnight, it must be held that the review – of which the parties concerned were informed through the publication of the contested Notices of Initiation in the Official Journal on 1 December 2005 – was initiated within the time‑limits prescribed for that purpose in the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and in Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 112 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the applicant’s argument that the review should have been initiated, at the latest, the day before the expiry of the measures concerned for reasons related to legal certainty and sound administration. 113 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case‑law, the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law which requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (Case C‑143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C‑110/03 Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR I‑2801, paragraph 30). 114 It is apparent from the preceding analysis that the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation – even if those provisions are interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement – state clearly and precisely that a review of anti‑dumping and countervailing duties must be undertaken before the expiry of those duties. 115 Furthermore, the applicant does not put forward any concrete evidence in support of its claim that observance of the principle of legal certainty requires a Notice of Initiation to be published, at the latest, on the day before the expiry of the measures to which the review relates. It has also failed to show, or even to claim, that on 30 November 2005 it had made export sales to the Community because, after seeing the Official Journal for that day, it had believed that the measures concerned were going to expire on 1 December 2005 at midnight. 116 The argument alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty must therefore be rejected. 117 Finally, as regards the argument alleging breach of the principle of sound administration, it must be held that, where a Community institution is allowed a set length of time in which to take certain action, it does not infringe the principle of sound administration if it does not act until the last day of the period of time allowed. 118 As it is, in the present case, the contested Notices of Initiation were published on the last day of the period prescribed in the first subparagraph of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement (see paragraphs 110 and 111 above). No breach of the principle of sound administration can therefore be imputed to the Commission. 119 It follows from the above that the first limb of the single plea is unfounded. The second limb, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty Arguments of the parties 120 The applicant states that, where Community legislation imposes obligations on the individual in ambiguous terms, the principle of legal certainty requires that any ambiguity be resolved in favour of the individual (Case 169/80 Gondrand [1981] ECR 1931, paragraph 17; Joined Cases 92/87 and 93/87 Commission v France and United Kingdom [1989] ECR 405, paragraph 22; and Van Es Douane Agenten, cited in paragraph 113 above, paragraph 27). That requirement of legal certainty must be observed all the more strictly in the case of a measure liable to have financial consequences in order that those concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations which it imposes on them (see Case T‑115/94 Opel Austria v Council [1997] ECR II‑39, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 121 The applicant maintains that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light of the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, are not ambiguous. The applicant argues, however, that if the Court were to consider that the relevant provisions of the Basic Anti-Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations are ambiguous or uncertain in their meaning, the general principle of legal certainty requires that any such ambiguity or uncertainty should be resolved in favour of the construction which is most favourable to the applicant out of those which may be identified (see, to that effect, Petrotub and Republica, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraphs 56 to 60, and Case C‑78/01 BGL [2003] ECR I‑9543, paragraphs 71 and 72). 122 It follows, according to the applicant, that the final date for initiating a review in the present case was 30 November 2005. The contested Notices of Initiation, which were published on 1 December 2005, are therefore unlawful. 123 The Commission replies that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation reveal no ambiguity to be resolved in favour of the applicant. Findings of the Court 124 It is apparent from the analysis made in relation to the first limb that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation clearly show that a review of anti‑dumping and countervailing duties may be initiated up until the expiry of those duties. The same is true where those provisions are interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 125 Accordingly, the second limb also cannot be upheld. The third limb, alleging that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation are unlawful Arguments of the parties 126 The applicant refers to the judgment in Case C‑69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR I‑2069, from which it emerges that the Community judicature reviews the legality of the Basic Anti-Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations in the light of the provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, since, by adopting the Basic Anti-Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Regulations, the Community intended to implement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of the WTO (see Petrotub and Republica v Council, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraphs 53 to 57; Case C‑377/02 Van Parys [2005] ECR I‑1465, paragraphs 39 and 40; and Shanghai Teraoka Electronic v Council, cited in paragraph 91 above, paragraph 138). In that regard, the applicant refers in its pleadings to ‘the Nakajima obligation’. 127 According to the applicant, it is clear from the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements that an expiry review of anti-dumping and countervailing measures must be initiated ‘before that date’, that is to say, on a date falling before the date of expiry, not at a certain time on the day of expiry. By merely confirming, in its letter of 3 February 2006, that in the present case the date of expiry of the measures at issue and the date of initiation of the review were the same, the Commission has failed to give due effect to the WTO agreements on that point. 128 Even if it were not possible to interpret Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation in a manner consistent with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, and the interpretation of the Basic Regulations proposed by the Commission in its letter of 3 February 2006 were the one which ought normally to have been used – which the applicant disputes – it would have to be held that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation are unlawful because they are incompatible with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements. 129 In its reply, the applicant argues that the Nakajima obligation is not limited to an obligation to construe Community law in a manner compatible with the WTO Agreements. In fact, the Court of First Instance has held on a number of occasions that the legality of Community measures can be reviewed by reference to the WTO Agreements (Euroalliages v Commission, cited in paragraph 75 above, paragraph 57, and Chiquita Brands and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 68 above, paragraphs 117 to 126). 130 The Commission contends that review by the Community judicature of the legality of a Community anti-dumping measure in the light of the WTO rules is based on the principle of consistent interpretation ‘so far as possible’ (Petrotub and Republica, cited in paragraph 76 above, paragraph 57). There is therefore no difference between what the applicant calls ‘the Bettati obligation’ and ‘the Nakajima obligation’. In the present case, if the relevant provisions of the Basic Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations do not permit an interpretation consistent with the WTO Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements, the applicant cannot rely on the conflict between Community law and the WTO rules as grounds for the annulment of those provisions of the Basic Regulations. Findings of the Court 131 It is apparent from the analysis made in relation to the first limb that the contested Notices of Initiation, which were published in the Official Journal on the day on which the measures to which they relate expired, satisfy the requirements of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement. 132 The present limb, which takes the form of a plea of illegality, cannot be upheld. It is based on an assumption which is not confirmed in the present case, namely that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation do not permit an interpretation consistent with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti‑Dumping and the Anti‑Subsidy Agreements. 133 It follows that the last limb also is unfounded. 134 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed. Costs 135 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Council and the Commission, be ordered to pay the costs. On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Eighth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Reliance Industries Ltd to pay the costs. Martins Ribeiro Wahl Dittrich Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 September 2008. E. Coulon M.E. Martins Ribeiro Registrar President Table of contents Legal framework World Trade Organisation Anti‑Dumping and Anti‑Subsidy Agreements Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation Background to the dispute Procedure and forms of order sought Admissibility Admissibility of the action is so far as it seeks annulment of the contested Notices of Initiation and in so far as it is directed against the Council Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court – The applicant’s legal interest in bringing proceedings – The applicant’s locus standi – The admissibility of the action in so far as it is directed against the Council The admissibility of the action in so far as it seeks the annulment of Regulation No 2603/2000, Regulation No 2604/2000, Decision 2000/745, Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court The plea of illegality Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court Fulfilment of the requirements of Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court Substance The first limb, alleging infringement of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation, interpreted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court – Preliminary observations – The interpretation of Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti‑Subsidy Regulation in the light, respectively, of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO Anti-Subsidy Agreement The second limb, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court The third limb, alleging that Article 11(2) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and Article 18(1) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation are unlawful Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court Costs * Language of the case: English.