Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:17
Date: 2026-01-15
Language of the case: English

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL MEDINA delivered on 15 January 2026 (1) Case C‑801/24 P NKO AO National Settlement Depository (NSD) v Council of the European Union ( Appeal – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Inclusion and maintenance of the appellant’s name on the lists of persons, entities and bodies concerned – Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Definition of ‘supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation’ – Freedom to conduct a business – Right to property – Proportionality ) I. Introduction 1. The present Opinion concerns an appeal brought by NKO AO National Settlement Depository (NSD) (2) seeking to have the judgment of 11 September 2024, NSD v Council (T‑494/22, EU:T:2024:607), (3) set aside. By that judgment, the General Court dismissed the action brought by the appellant, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, against: – Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 92), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 15); (4) – Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1); (5) and – Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3), (6) to the extent that those acts included the appellant’s name on the list annexed thereto. By way of those acts, the Council of the European Union froze all the appellant’s funds and economic resources in the territories of the Member States. 2. The present case is part of the set of appeals brought before the Court of Justice regarding the restrictive measures adopted by the Council in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. (7) It affords the Court of Justice the opportunity to establish the interpretation of the listing criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP, (8) as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2022/329, (9) and in Article 3(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, (10) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/330. (11) That criterion, commonly referred to as ‘criterion (f)’, provides for the listing, inter alia, of legal persons and entities supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the Court will have the opportunity to clarify whether a company providing financial services can claim the infringement of the general principle of proportionality on account of the effects generated by an EU restrictive measure on its clients. II. Facts and procedure A. Background to the dispute 3. The background to the dispute is described in paragraphs 2 to 20 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present Opinion, that background can be summarised by reference to the following undisputed facts. 4. The appellant is a company, incorporated under Russian law, that is a licensed depository providing securities record-keeping and custody services as the central depository and which also provides financial services, in particular as a non-bank credit institution licensed to provide bank settlement services. 5. On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145 on the basis of Article 29 TEU. On the same date, the Council, acting on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, adopted Regulation No 269/2014. Both acts concerned restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 6. On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted, first, Decision 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 and, second, Regulation 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014, in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria according to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue. 7. Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, in the version as amended by Decision 2022/329, (12) provides: ‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by: … (f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; … shall be frozen. 2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’ 8. The detailed rules for the freezing of those funds are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended. 9. Regulation No 269/2014, in the version as amended by Regulation 2022/330, (13) requires measures to be adopted for the freezing of funds and lays down the detailed rules governing that freezing of funds in terms which are identical, in essence, to those used in Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1)(f) of that regulation essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(f) of that decision. 10. On 3 June 2022, in view of the Russian Federation’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, the Council adopted the initial acts. The appellant’s name was added to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145, as amended, and to the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, (14) on the following grounds: ‘[The appellant] is a Russian non-bank financial institution and Russia’s central securities depository. It is the largest securities depository in Russia by market value of equity and debt securities held in custody and the only one which has access to the international financial system. [The appellant] is recognised as a systemically important Russian financial institution by the Government and the Central Bank of Russia. It plays an essential role in the functioning of Russia’s financial system and its connection to the international financial system, thus directly and indirectly enabling the Russian Government in its activities, policies and resources. [The appellant] is almost fully owned by Moscow Exchange, whose mission is to provide exhaustive access to the Russian financial markets. Moscow Exchange is in turn, through its role and shareholders, under a high degree of control of the Russian Government. [The appellant] is therefore an entity or body supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’ 11. The measures taken against the appellant in the initial acts, which were applicable until 15 March 2023, were extended, first, until 15 September 2023 by the maintaining acts of March 2023 and, second, until 15 March 2024 by the maintaining acts of September 2023, without amending the grounds for including its name on the lists at issue. B. The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 12. By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 12 August 2022, the appellant brought an action for annulment of the contested acts. 13. In support of its action for annulment, the appellant raised four pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, second, manifest error of assessment, third, disproportionate infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights, and, fourth, failure to meet the requisite standard of proof. 14. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action in its entirety and ordered it to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. 15. In the first place, as regards the plea in law alleging an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the General Court considered that the initial acts and the maintaining acts of March 2023 and of September 2023 all specified the context, together with the legal bases, for the adoption of those acts. In addition, the wording of the factual circumstances provided by the Council to the appellant constituted a sufficiently clear and precise statement of reasons to enable it to understand why its name was included, then maintained, on the lists at issue, and to allow the Court to exercise its power of review. As to the appellant’s argument alleging that the Council failed to state the reasons why the restrictive measures at issue involved the freezing of its clients’ assets, the General Court declared that the obligation to state reasons does not entail the obligation to go into all of the consequences of adopting the contested acts on other people, any more than it requires that the Council identify all of the persons liable to be affected indirectly by the restrictive measures against the appellant. 16. In the second place, as regards the pleas in law alleging manifest error of assessment and failure to meet the requisite standard of proof, which the General Court examined together, that court concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the Council had made an error in finding that it was a systemically important financial institution playing an essential role in the functioning of Russia’s financial system. Moreover, the Council did not make an error of assessment in finding that the appellant enabled the Russian Government in its activities, policies and resources. Bearing in mind the importance of the financial services provided by the appellant, to both that government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and its wider contribution to the proper functioning of Russia’s financial system, the Council could validly consider that, from both a quantitative and a qualitative perspective, the appellant was significantly supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation, by enabling it in its financial resources with the aim of pursuing its actions to destabilise Ukraine. As a reply to the specific arguments submitted by the appellant, the General Court further noted that the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not require that it be established that the Government of the Russian Federation controls the person, entity or body supporting it. Nor does that provision require the demonstration of the existence of a link which goes beyond the material or financial support laid down by the listing criterion, namely a link between the appellant and the Russian Government. 17. In the third place, as regards the plea alleging disproportionate breach of fundamental rights, the General Court examined, first, the line of argument by which the appellant claimed that the restrictive measures taken against it entailed the freezing of funds or economic resources belonging to its customers, with the result that those measures infringed their right to property. In that connection, the General Court noted that the appellant could not rely, in support of its action for annulment, on a right to property that it did not hold, since, according to its case-law, the infringement of a subjective right can, in principle, be relied upon solely by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties. The appellant’s customers had legal remedies available to them before the national courts, before which they could, inter alia, claim infringement of their right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (15) Moreover, as regards the appellant’s argument that the derogation laid down in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, did not enable its customers to obtain the unfreezing of their funds or economic resources owing to the inaction of the national authorities or to overly restrictive conditions imposed by those authorities, the General Court observed that, by that argument, the appellant was actually disputing the lawfulness of the measures taken by national authorities in the implementation of that derogation, over which only the national courts have jurisdiction. For the appellant’s customers who were not subject to any restrictive measures and whose funds or economic resources were frozen on account of the restrictive measures taken against the appellant, it was for the national authorities to ensure that the interference with their right to property was in compliance with the Charter. 18. Second, with respect to the line of argument by which the appellant claimed that the restrictive measures taken against it interfered with its fundamental rights, namely its freedom to conduct a business and its right to property, the General Court rejected the appellant’s claims after carrying out an assessment of the conditions laid down in Article 52 of the Charter. In particular, the General Court concluded that the interference of the contested acts with the appellant’s rights could not be regarded as disproportionate. Furthermore, as a reply to other specific arguments of the appellant, the General Court noted that, when the contested acts were adopted, the derogations provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and in Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, allowed national authorities to authorise the release of the appellant’s funds or economic resources in order to enable it to make a payment taking the form of the return of its customers’ securities/bonds which it held in its frozen accounts with securities depositories established in the European Union. III. Forms of order sought and procedure before the Court of Justice 19. By its appeal, lodged with the Court of Justice on 20 November 2024, the appellant claims that the Court should: – set aside the judgment under appeal; – annul the contested acts; – order the Council to pay the costs. 20. In its response lodged on 3 February 2025, the Council, supported by the European Commission, requests that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs. IV. Assessment 21. In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds, alleging three errors in law as regards, first, the Council’s obligation to state reasons, second, the interpretation of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and, third, the assessment of the principle of proportionality. 22. The Court of Justice has requested that the specific arguments regarding the interpretation of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, be examined, which essentially concern the second ground of appeal. Moreover, the Court of Justice has requested an assessment of the appellant’s arguments concerning the principle of proportionality as put forward in the third ground. My assessment will thus focus on those main issues. A. The second ground of appeal 23. By the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in interpreting Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. 24. That ground of appeal is divided in two parts, alleging, first, that the General Court misinterpreted the term ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’, contained in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and, second, that the General Court applied an inappropriate standard of proof. 1. The first part of the second ground of appeal 25. By the first part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court interpreted Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in a broad, vague and erroneous manner. In that regard, it puts forward two main arguments. 26. In the first place, the appellant claims that the criterion contained in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, merits a strict interpretation, referring only to forms of support consisting in the direct delivery of goods or transfer of funds to the Russian Government through the financial resources of the person or entity concerned. In that regard, the appellant contends that the concept of material or financial support in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, should be interpreted in a manner consistent with that of ‘financial assistance’ in Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, (16) which, according to that regulation, is defined as any action whereby the person or entity concerned disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources. 27. In the second place, the appellant argues that, as a central securities depository, it simply provides the technical means necessary for the organisation of State bond issuances. Its task cannot be considered to fall, in any event, under the scope of the concept of financial support within the meaning of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. The appellant highlights that the judgment under appeal does not suggest at all that it provides direct financial support to the Russian Government, namely in the form of revenue transferred to the State. 28. The Council and the Commission dispute those arguments. 29. As is clear from point 7 of the present Opinion, Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, provides for the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by ‘natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’. 30. Moreover, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court pointed out that the criterion of material or financial support to the Russian Government, contained in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not require that the persons or entities concerned provide support that is directly or indirectly linked to the annexation of Crimea or to the destabilisation of Ukraine. By reference to the Court of Justice’s judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council (C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208), (17) the General Court further held that material or financial support within the meaning of that criterion must be understood as any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, to provide that government with resources or facilities of a material or financial nature allowing it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine. 31. According to settled case-law, when interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its legal context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. That is, in particular, the case when the terms of the provision of EU law concerned make no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining their meaning and scope, which is the case here as regards Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (18) 32. Concerning the literal interpretation, I observe that Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, does not contain any definition of the term ‘supporting’. Therefore, following the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, the meaning and scope of that term must be determined by reference to the general context in which it is used and its usual meaning in everyday language. (19) 33. In that regard, the term ‘supporting’, as it is formulated in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, corresponds to the present participle of the verb ‘support’. That verb is defined in a number of ways. First, it can be defined as ‘to reinforce the position of [something] by one’s assistance’. Second, it can be defined as ‘to provide resources for the maintenance of [something]’. (20) Similar meanings can be found for the verb ‘support’ in the other language versions of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. (21) Furthermore, since the verb ‘support’ is qualified by the phrase ‘materially or financially’, it can be interpreted as referring either to the reinforcement of a position by material or financial assistance or, alternatively, to the furnishing of material or financial resources. 34. It is important to note that the first meaning attributed to the verb ‘support’ appears to endorse the interpretation of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, proposed by the Council and the Commission, which is aligned with the General Court’s interpretation in the judgment under appeal. In essence, both institutions argue that the phrase ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ refers to persons or entities that facilitate, from a qualitative or quantitative perspective, the military actions of the Russian Government against Ukraine, without requiring proof of a direct transfer of resources to that government. By contrast, the second meaning attributed to the verb ‘support’ appears to align more closely with the interpretation advocated by the appellant, according to which the listing criterion contained in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, should be confined to individuals or entities that provide direct financial support or material resources to the Russian Government in favour of its actions against Ukraine. 35. It follows that, from the perspective of the literal interpretation, the wording of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is not conclusive in itself to determine whether the interpretation proposed by the Council and the Commission or, alternatively, the interpretation proposed by the appellant should prevail. The answer to that question must therefore be sought within the legal context of which Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, forms part and considering its main objectives. 36. With regard to the contextual interpretation, I would point out, similarly to my Opinion in Mazepin v Council (C‑35/24 P, EU:C:2025:412), (22) that the listing criterion provided for in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, was first introduced by Decision 2022/329. (23) That latter decision was adopted on 25 February 2022, that is, the day after the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and Russian armed forces began an attack on that country. (24) As the Council rightly observes, that decision broadened the scope of the individual restrictive measures adopted against the Russian Federation by enlarging the persons and entities targeted, in particular through the introduction of new listing criteria. (25) 37. Moreover, it is important to note that, before being amended by Decision 2022/329, Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145 already contained a listing criterion which made it possible to target legal persons capable of providing direct material or financial support to the actions of the Russian Government concerning the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. That was, more specifically, the case of Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145, which referred to ‘legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’. That criterion was retained in Decision 2014/145, as amended, which suggests to me that interpreting Article 2(1)(f) thereof as requiring proof of support in the form of direct funding or delivery of supplies to the Government of the Russian Federation, as the appellant essentially claims, would simply be redundant and not consistent from a contextual point of view, since it would render the amendments introduced by Decision 2022/329 into Decision 2014/145 as of no consequence. 38. Nevertheless, the appellant contends that, in the interest of maintaining contextual consistency, the concept of ‘material or financial support’ in Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, should be defined in the same way as that of ‘financial assistance’ in Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014. According to the definition given to that term by Article 1(o) of the same regulation, financial assistance requires the disbursement or the commitment to disburse funds or economic resources by the person or entity concerned. 39. However, as the Commission essentially points out, Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014, on the one hand, and Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, on the other hand, have completely different material scopes. In particular, the first of those provisions refers specifically to the technologies enumerated in Annex II to Regulation No 833/2014, in respect of which the provision of financing or financial assistance to persons, entities or bodies in Russia, while not explicitly prohibited, (26) necessitates prior authorisation from the designated competent authority. By contrast, as already explained, the second of those provisions sets out one of the listing criteria that leads to the freezing of the funds or economic resources of the person or entity concerned. Inasmuch as there is manifestly no material relationship between Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014 and the listing criterion resulting from Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, I do not consider that an element common to both provisions can be identified as relevant for interpretative purposes. For this same reason, contrary to the appellant’s argument, the interpretation given by the Court of Justice to the expression ‘financial assistance’ in its judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), is of no consequence. 40. It follows that the contextual assessment of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, appears to support the interpretation advocated by the Council and the Commission, as it is described in point 34 above, which basically coincides with that used by the General Court in the judgment under appeal. 41. As regards the teleological interpretation, I also pointed out in my Opinion in Mazepin v Council that the criteria contained in Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, form part of a legal framework which enacted an unprecedented set of restrictive measures aiming, as correctly noted by the General Court in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities and the economy of the Russian Federation. The ultimate objective of that legal framework is to weaken the financial capacity of the Russian Government and, therefore, to put an end to the military aggression perpetrated by that government in Ukraine. (27) The question to be answered is whether that objective of paramount importance can be considered to be more effectively attained by following the interpretation of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, proposed by the Council and the Commission, on the one hand, or by that proposed by the appellant, on the other hand. For that purpose, account must be taken that, according to the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, preference must be given to the interpretation which ensures the effectiveness of the provision concerned. (28) 42. In my view, it is evident that, if Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, were interpreted as entailing only support in the form of direct funding or direct supply of material resources to the Russian Government, as the appellant contends, apart from being inconsistent from a contextual point of view, as already explained, (29) that would largely limit the effectiveness of the criterion contained in that provision, since it would not make it possible to maximise the pressure that can be exerted over the Russian authorities for the purpose of putting an end to its actions and policies in Ukraine. After all, that interpretation, rather than impairing the financial capacity of the Government of the Russian Federation, would maintain at best the same financial capacity that that government had before the adoption of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. 43. By contrast, if Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, were to be interpreted as referring to any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of providing the Russian Government with resources or facilities enabling it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine, regardless of the direct or indirect link of that support with the actions targeted, that interpretation would be directly aligned with the aims of the legal framework of which Decision 2014/145, as amended, forms part and, consequently, those aims could reasonably be more effectively attained. 44. The appellant contests the previous conclusion, arguing that that interpretation, which results essentially from the judgment in Central Bank of Iran, was adopted by the Court of Justice as regards a different regime of individual restrictive measures and, more precisely, as regards a listing criterion that was drafted in a different manner as compared to that of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. However, despite the differences between the wording of the criterion under examination in the judgment in Central Bank of Iran (30) and the criterion concerned by the present case, both criteria should be approached from the same interpretative viewpoint. After all, as I observed in my Opinion in Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:273), (31) the ratio decidendi behind the Court of Justice’s case-law (32) is to enhance the possibilities to put an end to the activities targeted by the restrictive measures in question, in particular by eroding the material and financial means available for that purpose, irrespective of the direct or indirect connection of the legal entity concerned with those activities. 45. In view of the foregoing considerations, I conclude that neither the contextual interpretation of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, nor the teleological interpretation of that provision requires, as the appellant submits, the finding of material and financial support consisting in the direct supply of goods or the transfer of funds by the person or entity concerned for the benefit of the Government of the Russian Federation. On the contrary, that provision only requires that that person or entity is capable of facilitating the actions carried out by the Russian Government in Ukraine from a quantitative or qualitative perspective. 46. It follows that, inasmuch as, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court grounded its assessment of the lawfulness of the contested acts in that interpretation, that court cannot be said to have committed an error of law. 47. As regards the application of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to the appellant, it is important to point out that central securities depositories play a central role in every country’s capital market and financial system, since they operate the infrastructure that enables the settlement of securities – such as shares or bonds – in financial markets. (33) The General Court was therefore right to hold, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, that central securities depositories, like the appellant, are systemically important entities that are critical, in particular, for the effective implementation of monetary policy, the credibility of a government’s debt management programme, collateral management, and safe and efficient securities markets. Moreover, by impinging on the activity of those central securities depositories, Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is likely to curtail the financial means that the Government of the Russian Federation obtains from the issuance of State bonds, thus increasing the cost of its military actions and limiting its ability to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. (34) 48. To my mind, therefore, the General Court was entitled to find in paragraph 106 of the judgment under appeal, without committing an error of law, that, bearing in mind the importance of the financial services provided by the appellant, to both the Russian Government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and its wider contribution to the proper functioning of Russia’s financial system, from both a quantitative and a qualitative perspective, the appellant was significantly supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. Contrary to the appellant’s arguments, that conclusion can be reached without examining whether the Russian Government had any direct or indirect shareholder interest in the appellant since, pursuant to the interpretation proposed for Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that is simply not an element that needs to be fulfilled in order to apply the criterion contained in that provision. 49. In the light of the foregoing, and since, according to what I have stated in points 46 and 48 of the present Opinion, the General Court did not commit any error of law when interpreting Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145 and when considering that the appellant could fall under the concept of ‘material or financial support’ resulting from that provision, the first part of the second ground of appeal should be rejected. 2. The second part of the second ground of appeal 50. By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant contests the standard of proof applied by the General Court in order to assess whether the reasons stated in the contested acts were substantiated. The appellant argues that, in the absence of an explicit legal provision – a circumstance that is not present in the present case –, the Council cannot merely be obliged to provide a ‘body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence’. 51. The Commission takes the view that this part of the second ground of appeal is inadmissible, given the absence of clarity as regards the error of law committed by the General Court, as alleged by the appellant. With respect to the substance, both the Council and the Commission submit that the General Court correctly applied the Court of Justice’s settled case-law concerning the standard of proof applicable in the domain of restrictive measures. 52. At the outset, concerning the admissibility, it is important to recall that, according to the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, a ground of appeal or a part of it, in order to be admissible in relation to its substance, must satisfy two conditions. (35) First, it is required that the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside be indicated with precision. Second, it is imperative that the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of a ground of appeal or a part of it be indicated in a sufficiently clear and precise manner. Should either of those two conditions not be met, the Court of Justice would be unable to exercise its powers of judicial review and, consequently, the ground of appeal in question, or the part concerned thereof, would have to be dismissed as inadmissible. (36) 53. In the present case, however, it is apparent from the appellant’s written submissions that, by the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant challenges paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal. The appeal therefore complies with the admissibility condition that requires the precise indication of the contested element of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside. With regard to the indication of the legal arguments advanced in support of its ground of appeal, the appellant’s written submissions also specify that the appellant does not agree with the standard of proof applied by the General Court in the present case. The appellant’s argument is that that standard should only be admitted if it is explicitly provided for by law. Despite their concise formulation, the appellant’s arguments are sufficiently clear and precise to enable their scope and substance to be understood. 54. It follows that the second part of the second ground of appeal fulfils the two conditions set out by the Court of Justice’s established case-law, thereby enabling that court to carry out its judicial review. Consequently, the Commission’s submission that this part should be declared inadmissible should be rejected. 55. With regard to the substance, in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court established the standard of proof that the Council was required to meet in order to determine that the restrictive measures adopted, and subsequently maintained, against the appellant were grounded on a sufficiently solid factual basis. (37) According to the General Court, the Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the listing criterion applied to that entity. 56. The concept of standard of proof refers to the amount and type of evidence required to demonstrate a fact. In the field of restrictive measures, an individual listing can be demonstrated through direct evidence – that is, evidence that can prove by itself a factual allegation made by the Council in the statement of reasons (38) – or, quite often as well, through indirect evidence, such as presumptions or the so-called set of indicia. (39) In the latter case, the General Court’s assessment is not based on a separate evaluation of the individual items of evidence produced by the Council. Instead, that assessment is based on an examination of the entirety of the evidence, acknowledging that, while individual items may lack sufficient weight to establish a sufficiently solid factual basis for the statement of reasons to be proved, the cumulative effect of the entire body of evidence may still meet the required standard of proof. 57. In the present case, the standard of proof set out by the General Court in the judgment under appeal is based, as is apparent also from the references appearing in paragraph 50 thereof, on that court’s settled case-law. The General Court has consistently applied that standard of proof (40) since the Court of Justice originally formulated it in its judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248). (41) In that case, the Court of Justice, sitting in its Grand Chamber, held that a person’s inclusion on the lists subject to restrictive measures can be considered to be well founded when it is based on a set of indicia relating, for instance, to that person’s situation, functions and relations in the context of the regime to which that person belongs. (42) The Court of Justice has subsequently applied the same standard of proof in its case-law, (43) including quite recently, as regards the restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine. (44) 58. Consequently, it cannot be considered that the General Court committed an error of law, since that court was permitted to rely on a standard of proof based on a set of indicia in order to assess whether the statement of reasons provided by the Council as regards the appellant was grounded on a sufficiently solid factual basis. Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit provision in EU law, it is sufficient to indicate that that standard is predicated on the Court of Justice’s settled case-law. For its part, the appellant does not provide a comprehensive explanation in its written submissions regarding the specific rule or general principle of law that is purportedly infringed by that circumstance. 59. The second part of the second ground of appeal should be rejected and, therefore, that ground of appeal in its entirety. B. The third ground of appeal 60. By the third ground of appeal, the appellant essentially argues that the General Court committed an error of law in its assessment of the principle of proportionality. 61. This ground is divided in two parts. The first part criticises the failure to assess the plea in law alleging infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights from the perspective of the right to property of the appellant’s customers; the second calls into question the General Court’s finding that the contested acts complied with the principle of proportionality. 1. The first part of the third ground of appeal 62. By the first part of the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in finding that the assessment of the infringement of fundamental rights alleged by the appellant did not require the consequences of the contested acts on the fundamental right to property of the appellant’s customers to be taken into account. In its view, compliance with the principle of proportionality should not have been analysed by the General Court as the exercise of an ordinary subjective right, but as verification of compliance with a fundamental principle which involves considering the consequences of a measure in its entirety. The appellant underlines that its main duty in the European Union markets consists in performing the role of a central security depository and, as such, that of a nominee holder of securities belonging to Russian entities and individuals. Sanctioning the appellant is therefore tantamount to sanctioning its users, namely the intermediary and end customers of Russian financial institutions. 63. The Council objects to the admissibility of the present part of the third ground of appeal. It argues that, by the present part, the appellant questions whether the contested acts have complied with the general principle of proportionality, and not the assessment made by the General Court of that principle in the assessment of the infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights. That would constitute a new plea in law, which was not formulated at first instance. With regard to the substance of the matter, both the Council and the Commission express disagreement with the arguments submitted by the appellant. 64. In the first place, as regards the admissibility of the first part of the third ground of appeal, I would recall that, according to the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, allowing a party to put forward for the first time before it a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court. (45) That, however, does not preclude the possibility for an appellant to submit pleas arising from the judgment under appeal itself which seek to criticise, in law, its merits. (46) 65. In the present instance, it is apparent from the judgment under appeal (47) that, before the General Court, the appellant raised a plea in law alleging disproportionate breach of fundamental rights. In that plea, the appellant put forward a line of argument by which it claimed that the restrictive measures taken against it entailed the freezing of funds or economic resources belonging to its customers, with the result that those measures also infringed their right to property. For its part, the General Court examined that line of argument and concluded, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant could not rely, in support of its action for annulment, on a right to property that it did not hold. According to the case-law, the infringement of a subjective right can, in principle, be relied upon solely by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties. The General Court further explained that the appellant’s customers had legal remedies available to them before the national courts, before which they could, inter alia, claim infringement of their right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. 66. It follows that the arguments presented by the appellant, in the first part of the third ground of appeal, are related to the assessment made by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, in particular of the plea in law raised at first instance alleging infringement of fundamental rights. Consequently, without prejudice to the answer to be given by the Court of Justice in the present instance, the first part in question does not constitute a new set of arguments that would alter the subject matter of the dispute before it. I would therefore propose that it be declared admissible, despite the objection raised by the Council. 67. In the second place, as regards the substance, the appellant challenges the relevance of the case-law cited in the judgment under appeal, according to which, as mentioned previously, an applicant cannot rely, in order to support its action for annulment, on the infringement of a subjective right of a third party. In its view, that case-law has not been established in the context of restrictive measures or in that of compliance with the principle of proportionality. 68. I observe that, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court cites, for the purpose of supporting its reasoning, two judgments delivered by that same court in the fields, on the one hand, of economic and monetary policy and, on the other hand, of anti-dumping. (48) Even though neither of those judgments falls within the domain of restrictive measures, they are consistent with the Court of Justice’s case-law, which essentially states that it is for the parties that are holders of a subjective right to effectively exercise it, (49) irrespective of the nature of the proceedings to which they are subject. (50) The General Court was therefore not wrong to hold that the infringement of a subjective right can be relied upon solely by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties. (51) 69. Moreover, it is important to note that, as the General Court explained in paragraph 152 of the judgment under appeal, when the initial acts were adopted, Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 provided for a derogation procedure that enabled the appellant’s customers to request the release, before the competent national authorities, of the funds frozen by virtue of the appellant’s listing. (52) As is apparent also from paragraphs 156 and 159 of the judgment under appeal, further amendments to that derogation procedure were subsequently introduced in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, aiming to facilitate the return to the appellant’s customers of the securities that it held in its frozen accounts with depositories established in the European Union. (53) 70. It follows that Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, established a framework that differentiated the legal situations of the appellant as a central securities depository, on the one hand, and its customers, on the other. For those customers who were not subject to any restrictive measures and whose funds or economic resources were frozen on account of the restrictive measures taken against the appellant, it was for the national authorities to adopt a decision releasing those funds or resources. The General Court was accordingly right in finding that, since that procedure entailed the implementation of EU law, those authorities were obliged to observe the Charter by virtue of Article 51(1) thereof. That court was also right in highlighting that, in the context of any dispute arising from the implementation of those derogations, the appellant’s customers had legal remedies available to them before the national courts, before which they were able, inter alia, to claim infringement of their right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. (54) It cannot be excluded that, in those procedures, a request for a preliminary ruling could be addressed to the Court of Justice on whether the derogations laid down in Regulation No 269/2014 are compatible with EU law. (55) 71. Consequently, the General Court cannot be criticised for considering that the assessment of the infringement of fundamental rights alleged by the appellant did not require the consequences of the contested acts on the fundamental right to property of the appellant’s customers to be taken into account. 72. The first part of the third ground of appeal should, in my view, be rejected. 2. The second part of the third ground of appeal 73. By the second part of the third ground of appeal, the appellant essentially challenges the assessment carried out by the General Court of the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter in relation to its freedom to conduct a business and its right to property. 74. The Council and the Commission contest those arguments. 75. As pointed out in point 18 of the present Opinion, in paragraphs 134 to 146 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the appellant’s claim that the restrictive measures taken against it disproportionately interfered with its fundamental rights, namely its freedom to conduct a business and its right to property. In particular, the General Court considered that the interference of the restrictive measures taken against the appellant could not be regarded as disproportionate, since: – they were appropriate in the light of objectives of general interest as fundamental for the international community as maintaining peace and international security; – the appellant had failed to raise any alternative and less restrictive measure or demonstrate that the Council could have envisaged adopting less restrictive measures that were just as appropriate as those laid down by the contested acts; – the weighing up of the competing interests showed that the disadvantages of the restrictive measures for the appellant were not disproportionate given the fundamental importance of maintaining peace and international security; – the effects of the restrictive measures were confined to the territory of the European Union, with the result that they concerned, at most, only a proportion of the own funds or economic resources belonging to the appellant; – the restrictive measures at issue did not deprive the appellant of the right to receive, in accordance with Article 2(6)(a) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 7(2)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, interest or other earnings on its frozen accounts in which those funds and resources have been deposited, provided that such interest and other earnings are also frozen; and – those measures provided for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds or economic resources in order to satisfy the basic needs of legal persons, entities or bodies included on the lists at issue. 76. As regards, first, the appellant’s argument that the restrictive measures at issue are not provisional, but permanent, since they have remained in place for more than two years, suffice it to note that, according to Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the contested acts were applicable to the appellant for a limited period of time. Those measures were also kept under constant review. Moreover, while the appellant takes issue with the General Court for making its assessment on the basis of ‘theoretical considerations, but not on the basis of concrete effectiveness’, such an argument is not substantiated, as the Council points out, with specific reasons. 77. Second, inasmuch as the appellant claims that the General Court did not take into account, in its assessment of the proportionality of the contested acts, the effects on its customers, I have already noted that that court did actually refer to the derogations provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended, which allowed national authorities, as of the adoption of the initial acts imposing restrictive measures on the appellant, to authorise the release of the appellant’s funds or economic resources in order to enable the appellant to make a payment taking the form of the return of its customers’ securities/bonds which it held in its frozen accounts with securities depositories established in the European Union. Moreover, even though the appellant claims that its customers ‘[had] nothing to do with the conflict in Ukraine’, suffice it to recall that, in accordance with settled case-law, restrictive measures, by definition, may cause harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of those measures. (56) 78. As regards, third, the appellant’s argument that, by its listing in the contested acts, the Council actually intended to freeze the assets of all Russian investors, without listing them individually and with the required level of identification, I observe that that is a specific argument raised for the first time at the appeal stage. According to settled case-law, already cited in point 64 of the present Opinion, that argument should be rejected as inadmissible. 79. In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the General Court did not commit any error of law when assessing whether the contested acts complied with the principle of proportionality. 80. The second part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected and, consequently, the third ground of appeal in its entirety. V. Conclusion 81. Following the analysis set out in the present Opinion, I propose that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal as regards the second and third grounds. 82. I express no opinion as regards the remainder of the grounds of appeal submitted by the appellant, or which party ought to be ordered to pay the costs pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 1 Original language: English. 2 ‘The appellant’. 3 ‘The judgment under appeal’. 4 Together, ‘the initial acts’. 5 Together, ‘the maintaining acts of March 2023’. 6 Together, ‘the maintaining acts of September 2023’, and, taken together with the initial acts and the maintaining acts of March 2023, ‘the contested acts’. 7 See also judgments of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180); of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605) and Timchenko v Council (C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:608); and of 16 October 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑805/24 P, EU:C:2025:792). 8 Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16). 9 Council Decision of 25 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1). 10 Council Regulation of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6). 11 Council Regulation of 25 February 2022 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1). 12 ‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’. 13 ‘Regulation No 269/2014, as amended’. 14 ‘The lists at issue’. 15 ‘The Charter’. 16 Council Regulation of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1) 17 ‘The judgment in Central Bank of Iran’. See, in particular, paragraphs 44 and 45 of that judgment. 18 Judgment of 1 August 2025, Tradeinn Retail Services (C‑76/24, EU:C:2025:593, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 19 See, inter alia, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir (C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). 20 See, inter alia, the definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, available at: https://www.oed.com/dictionary/support_v?tl=true. 21 See, for instance, the definitions of the French verb ‘soutenir’ provided by the Le Robert dictionary, available at: https://dictionnaire.lerobert.com/definition/soutenir; of the German verb ‘unterstützen’ provided by the Duden dictionary, available at: https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/unterstuetzen_unterstuetzt; of the Italian verb ‘supportare’ provided by the Treccani dictionary, available at: https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/supportare/; and of the Spanish verb ‘apoyar’ provided by the Real Academia Española dictionary, available at: https://dle.rae.es/apoyar. 22 ‘My Opinion in Mazepin v Council’, in particular points 42 to 44. The case is still pending before the Court of Justice. 23 See also my Opinions in Pumpyanskiy v Council (C‑696/23 P, EU:C:2025:409, points 39 to 41); in Khudaverdyan v Council (C‑704/23 P, EU:C:2025:410, points 43 to 45); in Rashnikov v Council (C‑711/23 P, EU:C:2025:411, points 45 to 47); and in Khan v Council (C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2025:413, points 41 to 43). Those cases are still pending before the Court of Justice. 24 See recital 9 of Decision 2022/329. 25 See recital 11 of Decision 2022/329. 26 Cf. Article 4(1) and (2) of Regulation No 833/2014, which prohibits inter alia the provision of certain goods, technologies and services to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 27 See, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123), and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 59). 28 Judgment of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others (C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). 29 See point 37 of the present Opinion. 30 See Council Decision of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), as amended by Council Decision 2012/635/PESC of 15 October 2012 (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 58), which laid down a listing criterion applicable to ‘other persons, entities or bodies that provide support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with them’. See also Article 23(2)(d) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1). 31 See, in particular, point 52 of that Opinion. 32 See also judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 79 to 83). 33 See, as regards the systemic relevance of central securities depositories in the eyes of EU law, recitals 2, 4, 6, 35, 48 and 69, as well as Articles 19 and 22 of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (OJ 2014 L 257, p. 1). See also European Commission, ‘Central securities depositories (CSDs)’, available at: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/financial-markets/post-trade-services/central-securities-depositories-csds_en. 34 See, by analogy, my Opinion in Mazepin v Council, point 47. 35 See the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 36 See, inter alia, judgments of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited), and of 26 June 2025, EVH and Others v Commission (C‑464/23 P, C‑465/23 P, C‑467/23 P, C‑468/23 P and C‑470/23 P, EU:C:2025:478, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 37 See the judgment under appeal, paragraph 49. See also, in that regard, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 38 See, in that regard, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 124). 39 See Filpo, F., ‘Evidence standards in the judicial review of restrictive measures’, ERA Forum, No 20, 2020, pp. 620 and 621. 40 See, for instance, as for its most recent case-law, judgments of 15 May 2024, Anbouba v Council (T‑471/22, EU:T:2024:315, paragraph 54); of 12 June 2024, Shammout v Council (T‑649/22, EU:T:2024:376, paragraph 64); of 18 December 2024, Mironovich Shor v Council (T‑489/23, EU:T:2024:912, paragraph 139); and of 18 December 2024, Tauber v Council (T‑493/23, EU:T:2024:913, paragraph 133). 41 ‘The judgment in Anbouba’. 42 See, in particular, the judgment in Anbouba, paragraphs 52 and 54. See also Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council (C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, point 208). 43 See judgments of 28 July 2016, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission (C‑330/15 P, EU:C:2016:601, paragraph 82), and of 21 September 2016, Commission v Spain (C‑139/15 P, EU:C:2016:707, paragraphs 60 and 61). 44 Judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council (C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 39). 45 See, inter alia, judgment of 17 October 2024, PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri and PT Permata Hijau Palm Oleo v Commission (C‑112/23 P, EU:C:2024:899, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 46 See, inter alia, judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Siemens Österreich and Others and Siemens Transmission & Distribution and Others v Commission (C‑231/11 P to C‑233/11 P, EU:C:2014:256, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited). 47 See points 13 and 17 of the present Opinion. 48 See, respectively, judgments of 19 September 2019, Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission (T‑228/17, EU:T:2019:619), and of 22 June 2022, Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB (T‑797/19, EU:T:2022:389, paragraph 285). 49 See, inter alia, judgments of 10 September 2015, Fliesen-Zentrum Deutschland (C‑687/13, EU:C:2015:573, paragraph 73), and of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 223 and the case-law cited). 50 Judgment of 9 September 2021, Adler Real Estate and Others (C‑546/18, EU:C:2021:711, paragraph 59). It is true that the latter case-law has been developed in relation to the rights of the defence, and not with respect to other fundamental rights, such as the freedom to conduct a business or the right to property, concerned by the present case. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice’s case-law expressly refers, in a broad manner, to rights ‘of a substantive nature’, which entails, in my view, that that case-law is fully applicable to a case concerning the alleged infringement of a fundamental right, as in the present instance. 51 As the Council rightly points out, the approach adopted by the Court of Justice and by the General Court in their case-law is also supported, by analogy, by that of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, in particular as regards the exercise of the shareholders’ rights by a company. According to that court, in principle, shareholders of companies cannot be seen as ‘victims’, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of acts and measures affecting their companies. 52 See, in particular, Article 2(5) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. 53 See, in particular, Article 2(19) and (25) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 6b(5) and (5a) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. 54 See, in particular, paragraphs 131 to 133, 155 and 158 of the judgment under appeal. 55 See, in that regard, judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament (294/83, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23). 56 See, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 149), and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 81).