Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2017:75
Date: 2017-02-01
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible
Origin: Italy

Appeal brought on 23 December 2014 by Portovesme Srl against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 October 2014 in Case T-291/11 Portovesme v Commission (Case C-606/14 P) Language of the case: Italian Parties Appellant: Portovesme Srl (represented by: G. Dore, M. Liberati, A. Vinci, F. Ciulli, avvocati) Other party to the proceedings: European Commission Form of order sought The appellant claims that the Court should: set aside the judgment under appeal and, consequently, annul the contested decision, granting the form of order sought in the application at first instance (and expunging the phrase ‘or in so far as is deemed reasonable’ at point 1 of the form of order sought); in the alternative, uphold the present appeal and refer the case back to the General Court for a reassessment of the application at first instance, adhering to the points of law to be established by the Court on appeal; order the Commission to pay the costs incurred both at first instance and on appeal. Grounds of appeal and main arguments In support of the present appeal, the appellant puts forward seven different grounds for setting aside the judgment under appeal: 1. By its first ground, the appellant challenges the judgment under appeal on the basis of the incorrect assessment of the principle that administrative proceedings must take place within a reasonable time and the principle of legitimate expectations, in so far as concerns the part of the contested decision in which the recovery of the aid granted is ordered. 2. By its second ground, the appellant considers that the judgment under appeal is unlawful and should be set aside on account of the General Court’s failure to state reasons in so far as it concluded that the contested decision did not infringe the principles that administrative action should be conducted with diligence and impartiality. 3. By its third ground, the appellant alleges that the General Court infringed Article 19 TEU in the parts of the judgment under appeal in which that court provided its own interpretation of the national rules, at odds with the literal wording of those rules, in clear breach of the limits of its jurisdiction. 4. By its fourth ground, the appellant contends that the General Court erred in its assessment of the alleged unequal treatment which it suffered by comparison with another operator (Alcoa-Alumix) in respect of a similar aid measure, and also infringed Article 108 TFEU, in so far as it found that the aid had to be regarded as ‘existing’ aid. 5. By its fifth ground, the appellant alleges infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU, in so far as, contrary to the finding of the General Court, the disputed measure neither constitutes an undue advantage nor affects trade between Member States. 6. By its sixth ground, the appellant criticises the lack of/insufficient/erroneous assessment by the General Court of the challenge regarding the selective nature of the measure. 7. By its seventh and final ground, the appellant complains that the General Court infringed Article 174 TFEU and Article 107(3) TFEU, in so far as the compensatory measure, on the one hand, is consistent with the social cohesion policies for island regions lacking infrastructure and, on the other hand, comes within the derogations referred to in Article 107 TFEU.