Abstract;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:353
Date: 2025-04-02
Language of the case: French
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

summary of reasons, the competent European Union authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114). 53 In the present case, it should be observed that the evidence in the file is capable of showing that, contrary to the applicant’s contentions, the Council communicated to all its delegations the applicant’s letters of 20 January, 15 February and 2 March 2023. 54 Furthermore, it follows from the Council’s letters to the applicant, and in particular the letter of 14 March 2023, that contrary to what she argues, the Council examined and replied to the objections raised against the maintenance of the measures. 55 In addition, it should be observed that the applicant has failed specify how the Council did not respond to her arguments, and it must be borne in mind that the right to be heard does not amount to the right for the applicant’s argument to prevail (see judgment of 14 September 2022, SŽ – Tovorni promet v Commission, T‑575/20, not published, EU:T:2022:551, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 56 Thus, since none of the evidence on which the applicant relies shows that the Commission infringed her right to be heard, the third plea must be rejected. The first plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment 57 By her first plea, the applicant claims that, in considering that she is associated with her husband, the Council made a manifest error of assessment, in circumstances in which, according to the case-law, a matrimonial relationship cannot in itself characterise the existence of an association between two spouses. 58 As regards, in the first place, the applicant’s property ties with her husband, she submits that the Council has failed to prove the allegations which it puts forward, either because the companies in question have ceased all activities or because the members of those companies do not include Mr Timchenko. 59 As regards, in the second place, the applicant’s role in the Timchenko Foundation, she claims that her role as an administrator on the board of trustees means that she has only a supervisory role in that structure and not, as the Court states in the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑361/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:502), that she is directly linked with the operational activities of that foundation. Furthermore, the creation of a foundation is a normal activity of a wealthy married couple. In the present case, the fact that Mr Timchenko has no active role in the Timchenko Foundation, that foundation does not in any way constitute a tool designed to promote his image or to participate in his public affairs. 60 In the reply, the applicant maintains her position on that topic. 61 In that regard, first, she claims that the Timchenko Foundation is required to act in concert the Russian public authorities in order to ensure the efficiency of its activities for vulnerable demographic groups, which it tries to protect. It is in the same desire for efficiency and with the intention of creating synergies that the members of the foundation carry out, pro bono, advisory functions within public bodies of the Russian Federation. 62 Second, she submits that, even if the Council proved that the Timchenko Foundation conferred a public image on Mr Timchenko, it does not, however, describe how such an image would be capable of serving him in both his personal and professional life. 63 Third, the applicant claims that, in the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑361/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:502), the General Court gave too broad an interpretation of the concept of ‘association’, whereas, in the judgment of 6 September 2023, Pumpyanskaya v Council (T‑272/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:491), it characterised the existence of an association more strictly. 64 Fourth, as regards the Council’s contention that the importance of the property ties and the family management of the assets are such as to characterise the existence of an association, on the ground that numerous Russian billionaires make use of various legal arrangements in order to circumvent restrictive measures, the applicant claims that the Council’s reasoning is tantamount to creating a presumption of circumvention. She argues that the introduction of such a presumption is not possible, since Decision 2014/145 makes no express provision to that effect. 65 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes those arguments. 66 As a preliminary point, it should be observed that the first plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment and not a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of all EU acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited). 67 It must also be recalled that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects individually the person or entity concerned, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122). 68 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123). 69 In addition, the assessment of whether those reasons are well founded must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person subject to a fund-freezing measure and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 70 Furthermore, restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to maintain them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the lists at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 71 In order to justify maintaining a person’s name on the lists in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence that justified the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous maintenance of the name of the person concerned on those lists, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned. Similarly, maintenance on the list at issue is justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been attained (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 169 and the case-law cited). 72 In such a context, the Council may decide to maintain the names of the persons concerned on the lists at issue for the same reasons relating to past acts relied on in previous decisions concerning those persons, provided that the maintenance of their names is still justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been attained (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 March 2023, Mutondo v Council, T‑94/22, not published, EU:T:2023:120, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 73 In the present case, it should be observed, by way of a preliminary point, that by judgment of today, delivered in the case Timchenko v Council (T‑297/23), the Court dismissed the action brought by Mr Timchenko against, in particular, Decision 2023/572 and Implementing Regulation 2023/571, pursuant to which his name was included on the lists at issue in respect of criteria (a) and (d). 74 It should be emphasised, moreover, that although the concept of ‘association’ is often used in acts of the Council relating to restrictive measures, it is not defined as such and its meaning depends on the relevant contexts and circumstances. However, the fact remains that it may be regarded as covering natural or legal persons who are, generally, linked by common interests without any need for a link via an economic activity. The concept of ‘association’ laid down in the relevant provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, may therefore be interpreted as meaning that it covers any natural or legal person or any entity having a link, going beyond a family relationship, with a person subject to restrictive measures on the basis, as in the present case, of providing financial support to or benefiting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the invasion of Ukraine or for supporting actions or policies that undermine or threaten the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (see judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council, T‑361/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:502, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). 75 As regards the applicant specifically, it should be observed that, in order to justify maintaining her name on the lists at issue, the Council relies on the items in the initial WK file, in WK maintenance file 1 and in WK maintenance file 2 and, in particular, on the following items: – item 2 in the initial WK file: an undated screenshot from the Timchenko Foundation’s page on the website LinkedIn website, to which the Council had access in March 2022; – item 5 in the initial WK file: a screenshot of a page, undated, on the Timchenko Foundation’s website, accessed by the Council in March 2022; – item 1 in WK maintenance file 1: a screenshot of an article from the publication Business Insider, dated March 2022, of which the Council became aware in November 2022. 76 In fact, both item 1 in WK maintenance file 1 and items 2 and 5 in the initial WK file show that Mr and Mrs Timchenko are involved in the Timchenko Foundation. That is confirmed by item 5 in the initial WK file, which proves that, far from being retired from that foundation’s activities, Mr and Mrs Timchenko are personally involved in those activities, since it was they who chose to show themselves publicly to present the association’s activities to visitors to that website. 77 In addition, the submissions made at the hearing revealed that the applicant was still a member of the board of trustees of the Timchenko Foundation and that, on the date on which the contested acts were adopted, the foundation’s articles of association had not been amended. 78 That means that, by participating in the board of trustees of the foundation, the applicant is still involved in its administration, irrespective of the fact that her task consists in ‘supervising’ its actions. In addition, as founding members of the Timchenko Foundation, Mr and Mrs Timchenko still have substantial powers within that foundation, in that they may not only obtain information about its activities and have access to its documents, but also appoint and dismiss the members of the foundation’s supervisory board, a body described by the foundation’s charter as the ‘supreme body’. 79 In addition to those factors, as is apparent from Annex A. 28 to the application, Mr Timchenko, like his wife, is fully associated, in operational terms, with the activity of their eponymous foundation in that, notably during the health crisis linked with the COVID-19 pandemic, he involved the companies of the Volga Group in the foundation’s activities, providing significant financial, logistical and relational support, in this instance, in particular by establishing air links with the People’s Republic of China in order to purchase and distribute various medical materials on behalf of the foundation. 80 In that regard, it is immaterial that such actions occurred in the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such intervention is capable of revealing that, in operational terms, Mr Timchenko achieves synergies between the undertakings of his group and the foundation, to supplement the action of the Russian public services. Furthermore, it should be noted that Mr Timchenko, who is one of the leading businesspersons in the Russian Federation, communicates with Russian public opinion concerning such actions, for the greatest benefit of his image. 81 Such factors are sufficient to establish the existence of an association, within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Directive 2022/329, and of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, within a common legal structure, in particular in that Mr and Mrs Timchenko, as founding members of the Timchenko Foundation, carry out institutional functions within that structure and both put considerable effort into its functioning, especially, in Mr Timchenko’s case, by using the resources of the Volga Group, of which he is the sole shareholder. 82 In that regard, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 74 above, it is irrelevant that the Timchenko Foundation has no commercial aims and that the activity of Mr and Mrs Timchenko in that foundation is voluntary. 83 Participating in a structure of the size of the Timchenko Foundation, which carries out numerous charitable activities throughout the Russian Federation and which, in order to achieve that aim, has already benefited from the involvement of the undertakings of the Volga Group, constitutes, independently of the extent of the wealth of the spouses concerned, a participation going beyond a mere family link. That analysis is all the more justified because that foundation contributes to giving an enhanced image of Mr and Mrs Timchenko, in particular of Mr Timchenko, in the eyes of Russian public opinion. That means that the Timchenko Foundation may be regarded not only as a benevolent instrument, but also as a communications tool serving the public image of Mr and Mrs Timchenko, which constitutes an enterprise that goes beyond a mere family relationship. 84 As for recital 7 of Decision 2022/582, it is sufficient to observe that that decision neither adopted nor altered the concept of ‘association’ and that it cannot therefore serve as a basis for the interpretation of that concept. 85 In addition, as regards the alleged contradiction between the judgments of 6 September 2023, Pumpyanskaya v Council (T‑272/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:491), and of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:496), it is sufficient to observe that the circumstances that prevailed in the first of those judgments were different from the circumstances that characterise the situation of Mr and Mrs Timchenko, in that, in the case that gave rise to that judgment, the applicant’s husband had no specific function within the foundation in question, which is not the case here. 86 In the light of all of those factors, the first plea must be rejected. The fifth plea, concerning infringement of the applicant’s fundamental right to freedom of movement as a Union citizen 87 By her fifth plea, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures to which she is subject infringe the provisions of Article 21 TFEU, and those of Article 45(1) and Article 52(1) of the Charter. 88 She submits that, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, it is not possible, in the absence of a special provision to that effect, to restrict the scope of Article 21 TFEU, on the freedom of movement of Union citizens. 89 In that regard, the applicant claims, in essence, that, contrary to what has already been held in the judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council (T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926), restrictive measures adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU cannot be regarded as a lex specialis or as capable of derogating from normative measures adopted on the basis of Article 21 TFEU, including, in particular, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77), Article 27 of which allows freedom of movement to be restricted, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, solely on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 90 She further claims that analysis of the legislation of various States of the European Union shows that there is a constitutional tradition common to the Member States by virtue of which freedom of movement can be restricted only on grounds of public policy, public security and public health, and subject to strict judicial review. 91 The applicant infers that the contradiction that exists between the practice of the European Union and that shared constitutional tradition means that the contested acts infringe Article 21 TFEU and Articles 45 and 52 of the Charter. 92 The Council disputes those arguments. 93 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, questioned at the hearing, the applicant stated and confirmed that she was not raising a plea of illegality against Article 1 of Decision 2014/145, in that that article provided that the Member States were to prevent the transit through their territories of persons subject to restrictive measures. She added that she was, however, challenging the legality of the measures to which she was subject in that, in particular, they did not comply with the principle of proportionality. 94 It should be observed that the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, is to be exercised, in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, under the conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties. As is clear from the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed by Article 45(1) of the Charter is the right guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The scope of that right is explained in Article 21 TFEU. 95 Under Article 21(1) TFEU, freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States is to be exercised subject to the limitations and conditions provided for in the Treaties and by the provisions adopted for their application. As that reservation, formulated in the second part of Article 21(1) TFEU, refers to the Treaties in the plural, it also includes the EU Treaty and the provisions adopted in application of that treaty. It follows that restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of movement and of residence of Union citizens enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter may be imposed by decisions coming within the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) which are adopted on the basis of Article 29 TFEU, such as Decision 2023/572 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 195 and 196, and of 4 December 2015, Sarafraz v Council, T‑273/13, not published, EU:T:2015:939, paragraphs 194 and 195). 96 In that regard, it should be observed that, in the field of the CFSP, Article 29 TEU, which is worded in broad terms, authorises the Council to adopt decisions that define the European Union’s position on a particular issue that is geographic or thematic in nature, pursuing the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, even if that results in a limitation of the freedom of movement of Union citizens within the territory of Member States of which they are not nationals. That means that that freedom may, in application of that article, be restricted on grounds other than those provided for in Directive 2004/38. 97 That is the position in the present case, since the restrictive measures at issue are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 98 However, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights set forth in Article 45(1) of the Charter must meet the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, which means that they must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, pursue an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union and not be disproportionate. That consideration also applies to the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, C‑452/20, EU:C:2021:855, point 60). Consequently, limitations on the exercise of the right set forth in Article 45(1) of the Charter, which are imposed in the context of the implementation of the CFSP, must satisfy those conditions. 99 In the present case, first, the limitations on the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States that result from Decision 2023/572 are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in an act which is, in particular, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and having a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU. 100 Second, in so far as concerns the question whether the limitations referred to in paragraph 99 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, regard must be had to the nature and the scope of the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 153). 101 In that connection, it must be held that the limitations referred to in paragraph 99 above respect the ‘essence’ of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States. First of all, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, those limitations comply with the principle of international law that a State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there. Next, under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that the names of persons who no longer meet the entry criteria are removed. Last, those limitations do not call into question that right as such, since they have the effect of temporarily suspending, under specific conditions and on account of their individual situations, the right of certain persons to move freely within the territory of the Member States, provided that those conditions continue to be fulfilled (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 48). 102 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 99 above are intended to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to bring to an end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is an objective of general interest which falls within those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176). 103 Fourth, with regard to the principle of proportionality, it should be recalled that, as a general principle of EU law, this requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited). 104 As regards the necessity of the limitations referred to in paragraph 99 above, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to show that the Council could envisage adopting measures which were less restrictive but just as appropriate as those provided for. Furthermore, the application of the restrictive measures at issue is subject to the exemption mechanism referred to in Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, which authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures imposed, in particular where travel is justified on the ground of urgent humanitarian need. 105 Moreover, while recognising the negative consequences for the applicant, as described by her, which result from the application of the restrictive measures at issue, it must be held that, in the light of the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures, the limitations referred to in paragraph 99 above are not manifestly disproportionate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 106 In that regard, it must be emphasised that the fact that the applicant cannot enjoy the real estate which she owns in the European Union owing to the restriction of her freedom of movement does not constitute a disproportionate restriction given the importance of the objectives pursued by those measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2009, Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 71). 107 Furthermore, it should be observed that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States do not establish a right for Union citizens to the Union to move within the territory of a State other than that of which they are a national. It follows that the applicant is not justified in maintaining that those traditions are such as to limit the Council’s competence to adopt, in the context of the CFSP, restrictions on the freedom of movement of citizens on grounds other than public policy, public security and public health. 108 It follows that the limitations on the applicant’s right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States satisfy the conditions laid down in the Treaties. 109 In the light of the foregoing, the fifth plea must be rejected. The sixth plea, concerning infringement of Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter in the light of the right to property and the right to respect for private life and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 110 By her sixth plea, the applicant claims that the restrictive measures to which she is subject infringe Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter, which protect the right to respect for private life and the right to property. 111 She submits that the infringement of the right to property was aggravated by the fact that, by Regulation (EU) 2022/1273 of 21 July 2022 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 194, p. 1), the Council inserted in Regulation No 269/2014 a new Article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which require persons whose names are on the lists at issue to report funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State that belong to or are owned, held or controlled by them; any failure to report such funds or resources is to be regarded as a circumvention of the restrictive measures. 112 She states that the application of the provisions of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/1273, along with those of Article 15(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/880 of 3 June 2022 (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 75), is liable to create a risk that her assets and possessions will be confiscated. 113 She claims that the infringement of the right to property by the restrictive measures constitutes an unlawful interference in the light of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 114 To that end, she states that national laws authorise the freezing of assets and possessions only on condition that there is a causal link between the personal conduct of the individual and the frozen property or asset, which may be the case, for example, where an asset has enabled an offence to be carried out or is the result of that offence. 115 She claims, furthermore, that the restrictive measures to which she is subject damage her reputation and therefore entail an infringement of the right to respect for her private life. To that end, she claims that she was associated with the actions of her husband and linked, in the eyes of public opinion, with the actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence in Ukraine, although she is not connected with the situations combated by the European Union. 116 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicant does not raise a plea of illegality against the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014 and those of Decision 2014/145, which provide for the freezing of the property and assets of the persons whose names are included on the lists at issue and for the exemptions from those fund-freezing measures, nor does she dispute, by means of a plea, the legality of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/1273, with Article 15(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/880. 117 Thus, as the applicant has failed to raise, by means of a plea, the illegality of those provisions, the Court cannot invalidate the restrictive measures to which she is subject on the grounds that the provisions on which those measures are based are illegal. 118 As regards, moreover, the infringement of the right to private life and the right to property by the restrictive measures at issue, it should be observed that those measures are precautionary measures which are not intended to deprive the persons concerned of those rights, enshrined in Article 7 and Article 17 of the Charter, respectively. However, those measures undeniably entail a restriction of those fundamental rights in the present case (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited). 119 Nonetheless, as stated in paragraph 98 above, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter must meet the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) thereof, namely that those measures must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, pursue an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. 120 In the present case, it is clear that those four conditions are satisfied. 121 First, it must be noted that the limitations on the applicant’s exercise of her right to property and the breach of her right to respect for her private life are ‘provided for by law’, since they are set out in acts that are, inter alia, of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and which have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively. 122 Second, since the contested acts apply for six months and are kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, the limitations referred to in paragraph 121 above are temporary and reversible. It must therefore be held that they do not infringe the essence of her right to respect for private and family life or her right to property. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting exemptions from the restrictive measures applied. In particular, with regard to the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility, first, of authorising the use of frozen funds to meet essential needs or to satisfy certain commitments and, second, of granting specific authorisations to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. 123 Third, the limitations referred to in paragraph 121 are intended to attain the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 102 above. 124 Fourth, as regards the appropriateness of those limitations, first of all, it should be observed that they are appropriate for attaining the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 102 above, in that they contribute to its attainment. Next, as regards their necessity, it should be noted that the applicant does not mention any alternative and less restrictive measures that would be as effective in achieving the objectives pursued. Lastly, the restrictions in question are temporary and reversible and provide for possible exemptions. Accordingly, it must be held that the disadvantages caused to the applicant are not disproportionate in view of the importance of the objective pursued by those acts. 125 Furthermore, the argument put forward by the applicant on the basis that there are constitutional traditions common to the Member States with respect to the right to property must be rejected. Aside from the fact that the applicant relies on a limited number of analyses of the national laws of the Member States, it should be observed that she has failed to show that those national laws require compliance with conditions that are essentially different from those laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 126 Having regard to the foregoing, the sixth plea must be rejected in its entirety. The fourth plea, concerning breach of the principle of proportionality 127 By her fourth plea, the applicant claims, in essence, that the measures at issue breach the principle of proportionality in that they are neither appropriate nor necessary. She further claims that the interpretation of the concept of ‘association’ given by the Council is too broad, in so far as she is not involved in actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and she has no power to influence the policies that lead to such actions. 128 In that connection, first of all, it should be observed that, for the reasons already stated in paragraphs 104, 105 and 124 above, the restrictive measures at issue are necessary and appropriate and do not constitute a breach of the principle of proportionality. 129 Next, as regards the complaints that the concept of ‘association’ is interpreted too broadly and that the applicant exercises no influence over Russian decision-makers, it must be observed that since the Council considered, without making an error of assessment, that the applicant was associated with her husband through the Timchenko Foundation, it was entitled to impose on her the restrictive measures to which she is subject. 130 Lastly, in so far as concerns the restrictive measures taken against her, irrespective of the fact that the applicant denies being at the root of the actions or policies pursued by the leaders of the Russian Federation or being able to exercise any influence whatsoever over them, it should be observed that the restrictions on freedom to move within the Member States of the European Union, like the freezing of the funds or resources of the persons whose names are included on the lists at issue, are such as to exert pressure not only on those persons, but also on the general functioning of the Russian economy and, ultimately, at least indirect pressure on the leaders of the Russian Federation. 131 It follows that the fourth plea, and the claim for annulment in its entirety, must be rejected. The claim for compensation 132 In support of this claim, the applicant submits that the contested acts caused her to suffer non-material damage in respect of which she seeks compensation. 133 The Council contends that this claim must be rejected. 134 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability for the unlawful conduct of its organs, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, a number of conditions must be satisfied: the institutions’ conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the conduct and the damage pleaded. Since those three conditions for the incurring of liability are cumulative, failure to meet one of them is sufficient for an action for damages to be dismissed, without there being any need to examine the other conditions (see judgment of 22 June 2022, Haswani v Council, T‑479/21, not published, EU:T:2022:383, paragraph 155 and the case-law cited). 135 As regards the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of the contested acts, it follows from the findings set out above in relation to the claim for annulment that the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is not vitiated by illegality. Accordingly, since one of the conditions referred to in paragraph 134 above has not been met, the claim for compensation must be rejected. 136 Having regard to all of the foregoing, that claim must be rejected and the action dismissed in its entirety. Costs 137 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by it. 138 Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Commission will therefore bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Ms Elena Petrovna Timchenko to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Tóth Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 April 2025. [Signatures] * Language of the case: French.