Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2018:268
Date: 2018-04-19
Language of the case: Bulgarian
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Subject matter: Trade marks;Intellectual, industrial and commercial property
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded
Origin: Bulgaria

Summary of the arguments of the parties 27. EUIPO submits, in the first place, that the Court has clearly set out the requirements to be met by any party opposing the registration of a trade mark: it is necessary not only to fulfil the two conditions relating to national law referred to in Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, but also to provide evidence of the wording of that legislation. (17) Failure to meet those requirements cannot be rectified before the Board of Appeal when the opponent has failed, within the time limit, to provide the Opposition Division with any information relating to the national legislation. 28. In the second place, according to EUIPO, Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95, applies only to facts and evidence which are submitted for the first time before the Board of Appeal and are additional or supplementary to the facts and evidence produced to fulfil the requirement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009. 29. In the third place, it considers that the General Court erred in accepting that any information which was produced relating to the national legislation was to be understood to be supplementary to the evidence previously provided in the context of the conditions for the application of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009. 30. In the fourth place, EUIPO claims that the judgment under appeal failed to establish whether there was a sufficiently close link between the information concerning the national legislation provided to the Board of Appeal and that provided, within the time limit, to the Opposition Division. In the absence of such a link, the evidence should be considered to be ‘completely new’ and not ‘additional’ or ‘supplementary’. 31. Group OOD challenges EUIPO’s arguments and, in particular, denies that the reference to Article 12(6) of the Bulgarian trade marks law constitutes a claim or evidence which is completely new and maintains that the dispute turns purely on that question. 32. It submits, sharing the view of the General Court, that the discretion provided for in Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 may be exercised when the information provided is of some importance to the outcome of the dispute and the stage of the proceedings at which it is presented and the surrounding circumstances do not preclude that information from being taken into consideration. 33. According to Group OOD, Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 requires evidence not of the national legislation but of the content of the earlier right. National rules are only one of the elements used to prove the existence of a valid right in respect of a non-registered trade mark, on which its proprietor’s opposition is based. Moreover, Regulation No 2868/95 does not state which specific evidence makes it possible to establish the content of the national rules which govern the rights attaching to non-registered trade marks. 34. Lastly, Group OOD claims, contrary to EUIPO’s submissions, that the exercise by the Board of Appeal of its discretion would not have been detrimental to Mr Iliev’s rights of defence. It was, on the contrary, Group OOD’s own rights of defence which were infringed, as its claims were not discussed even though the requirements of Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 were met. 2. Analysis of the ground of appeal 35. In EUIPO’s view, since the evidence of national law was introduced into the proceedings for the first time before the Board of Appeal, the General Court should have confirmed that it was valid to reject it, as the Board of Appeal has no discretion to examine new evidence. (18) 36. Analysis of the appeal could, in principle, be limited merely to a legal characterisation of the evidence (relating to Bulgarian law) produced by Group OOD. From that perspective, it would be a question merely of ascertaining whether it was ‘new’ or ‘additional’ evidence. Once characterised, it would be necessary to consider the legal consequences of its character on the exercise by the Board of Appeal of its discretion. 37. It is my view, however, that the issue raised has a wider scope, which justifies a more in-depth assessment. In examining the functions of the Boards of Appeal, it will be necessary to take into account, in particular: (i) the status of national law in that type of proceedings; (ii) the limits on the discretion to assess evidence submitted late; and (iii) when evidence is to be considered new or additional. It is only when those issues have been resolved that it will be possible to give an appropriate response to EUIPO’s claim. (a) Treatment of national law in proceedings under Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 38. Where Regulation No 207/2009 refers to national law, that law may become a key factor in deciding, for example, whether there is a relative ground for refusing the trade mark applied for. That is the case with Article 8(4) of that regulation, under which, in order to resolve the dispute, it is permissible to take into account both the ‘Community legislation’ and the ‘law of the Member State governing that sign [a non-registered trade mark or another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance]’. 39. In those cases, the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO have the greatest interest in preventing the registration of signs which may then be successfully challenged in invalidity proceedings. That public interest justifies taking into account evidence which is submitted late. (19) 40. The Court has held that, in invalidity proceedings pursuant to Article 53(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, it is for ‘the applicant to provide OHIM not only with particulars showing that he satisfies the necessary conditions, in accordance with the national law of which he is seeking application, in order to be able to have the use of a Community trade mark prohibited by virtue of an earlier right, but also particulars establishing the content of that law’. (20) 41. There are certain difficulties involved in the automatic application of that case-law to opposition proceedings such as those in this case. The requirements of that case-law derive from the interpretation of Rule 37(b)(iii) of the Implementing Regulation, (21) which refers, expressis verbis, to national law, which is understood as national legislation. By contrast, Rule 19(2)(d) of that regulation requires as evidence for the opposition based on Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 evidence which relates to the ‘acquisition, continued existence and scope of protection’ of the earlier right relied on by the opponent. The reference to national law understood as ‘national legislation’ is, at best, a reference to overlapping concepts. 42. Rule 19(2)(d) of the Implementing Regulation must therefore be regarded as a procedural provision which specifically governs the burden placed on an opponent relying on an earlier non-registered trade mark (as in the present case). 43. However, the reference in Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009 to the ‘law of the Member State governing that sign’ requires some clarification as to who is responsible for proving the existence and content of such (national) legislation. It is true that Rule 19 of the Implementing Regulation does not require the opponent to produce the national law, if he finds other evidence to prove the acquisition, existence and scope of protection of his non-registered priority trade mark. However, if his rights over the non-registered sign (including that of prohibiting the use of the trade mark applied for by his opponent) are protected by the national legislation on which he relies, (22) he must specify, at least, the content of that legislation. 44. In that situation, the usual provisions relating to evidence (the party making the claim must provide the evidence), as set out in the second part of Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, will apply. In the case of national legislation, however, some qualification of that principle is necessary. 45. As I have already stated, EUIPO has an interest in preventing the registration of signs which may be successfully challenged in invalidity proceedings, if only on account of the principle of sound administration. Given the significance of the decision which they have to adopt, the EUIPO bodies must not avoid making a full assessment which, where appropriate, will include the duty to examine, of their own motion, evidence relating to national law. The EUIPO bodies cannot become ‘mere boards for the registration of the national law produced by the applicant’, (23) that is to say, they must not be limited ‘to the role of mere validation of the national law as submitted by the applicant for a declaration of invalidity’. (24) 46. The case-law of the Court on this subject could be described as ambivalent. On the one hand, it requires the applicant to adduce evidence of the use or of the existence, validity and scope of protection of a trade mark. (25) On the other hand, it emphasises EUIPO’s obligation to examine, of its own motion, the conditions of application and the scope of the rules of national law relied upon. (26) 47. It is my view that, in order to prove the content of the national law protecting a non-registered sign, the second of these approaches is more appropriate. That was the approach taken in the judgment in OHIM v National Lottery Commission, (27) in which the Court stated unequivocally, that ‘it was without making any error of law that the General Court held, in paragraph 20 of the contested judgment, that “in circumstances in which OHIM may be called upon to take account, in particular, of the national law of the Member State in which protection is given to the earlier mark on which the application for a declaration of invalidity is based, it must — of its own motion[(28)] and by whatever means considered appropriate — obtain information about the national law of the Member State concerned, where such information is necessary for the purposes of assessing the applicability of a ground for invalidity relied on before it and, in particular, for the purposes of assessing the accuracy of the facts adduced or the probative value of the documents submitted”’. 48. The adjudicating bodies of EUIPO (29) must, therefore, seek to supplement the evidence of national law, so that the file relating to the opposition decision is as detailed as possible, with a view to any future challenge of the decision. In this way, moreover, the General Court may more easily exercise its power of (unlimited) jurisdiction to interpret national law, pursuant to Article 65(2) of Regulation No 207/2009. (30) 49. That requirement does not affect the burden of proof which lies with the opponent. EUIPO will carry out an examination of its own motion when it has information relating to national law, either in the form of claims relating to its content, or in the form of evidence placed on the file whose probative value is relied on, (31) or even mere prima facieevidence. (32) 50. Ascertaining whether or not that information is sufficient to trigger the requirement to examine the national legislation of its own motion will depend on the circumstances of each case. One of those circumstances is, precisely, whether the information relating to the national law was submitted late in the proceedings, for the purposes of Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009. Another may be that both parties know, or ought to know, both the language and the national law in question, as they are of the same nationality and, in particular, because the origin of the dispute is confined to that Member State. (b) Evidence submitted late before the Boards of Appeal 51. Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, the infringement of which was relied on by EUIPO, establishes, in the first part thereof, the (general) principle that the Office is to examine the facts of its own motion, which extends to all the EUIPO bodies. However, the second part of that paragraph introduces a modification for ‘proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration’: the examination is then restricted to the grounds relied upon and the forms of order sought by the parties. The latter clarification is an expression of the principle of the prohibition on ruling ultra petita, which is not surprising in the case of inter partes proceedings, the limits of which are determined by the parties. (33) 52. Against that background, Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 introduces an exception to the inadmissibility of facts and evidence submitted or produced, in both cases, late. In accordance with that article, EUIPO may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned. (34) 53. In its case-law, (35) the Court has invariably interpreted that provision as meaning that ‘as a general rule and unless otherwise specified, the submission of facts and evidence by the parties remains possible after the expiry of the time limits to which such submission is subject under the provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 and EUIPO, including the Boards of Appeal, is in no way prohibited from taking account of facts and evidence submitted or produced late.’ (36) 54. It is also settled case-law that, since the word ‘may’ is used, the provision at issue grants EUIPO wide discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision, whether or not to take into account, in each specific case, evidence submitted late. (37) 55. As regards the exercise of that discretion in the context of opposition proceedings, that case-law justifies its use by the Office when it considers, first, that the material which has been produced late is, on the face of it, likely to be relevant to the outcome of the opposition and, secondly, that the stage of the proceedings at which that late submission takes place and the circumstances surrounding it do not argue against this. (38) 56. Subsequent to the judgment under appeal, the Court delivered a judgment which limited (39) that discretion. In EUIPO v Grau Ferrer, the third paragraph of Rule 50(1) of the Implementing Regulation was interpreted as meaning that, in opposition proceedings, the discretion is not to be extended to new evidence, as that provision refers only to additional evidence. (40) 57. EUIPO bases much of its appeal (41) on that clarification in the case-law. It is my view, however, that the separate issues should not be conflated: (a) the appeal in EUIPO v Grau Ferrer concerned evidence of the existence and validity of a national trade mark; (42) (b) the present case, however, concerns evidence of national legislation, with the difference which this entails. 58. The national law applicable pursuant to Regulation No 207/2009 cannot be regarded, in this context, as a mere fact, since, under Article 65(2) of that regulation, at least its interpretation by the EUIPO bodies is subject to a full review of legality by the General Court, which can determine of its own motion the content of that law and the conditions of its application. (43) I shall refer to this dual nature below. (c) New, additional or supplementary evidence 59. In its appeal, EUIPO claims that, in order to accept supplementary evidence concerning national legislation, other evidence concerning that legislation must have been submitted previously and in due time. That did not happen in this case, as Group OOD submitted information relating to Bulgarian law only before the Board of Appeal (and not before the Opposition Division, the first-tier body). 60. New evidence, (44) for the purposes of this case, is characterised by the absence of a link with another previously submitted document and by its late submission. Supplementary or additional evidence is, on the other hand, evidence which supplements other evidence which has previously been submitted, in due time. 61. That distinction and the effects of each category of evidence underpin the case-law of the Court: ‘when no proof of use of the mark concerned is submitted within the time limit set by the Office, the opposition must automatically be rejected by it. However, when evidence is produced within the time limit set by the Office, the production of supplementary evidence remains possible (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, New Yorker SHK Jeans v OHIM, C‑621/11 P, EU:C:2013:484, paragraphs 28 and 30)’. (45) 62. The content of national law combines, in that context, factual elements (the party relying on it must put it forward and provide at least some evidence of it) and strictly legal elements (it is for the General Court and, as the case may be, the Court of Justice, to ascertain whether that content has been properly or wrongly interpreted by the EUIPO bodies). 63. Indeed, this symbiosis requires the EUIPO bodies actively to gauge the meaning and scope of the national rules, where prima facie evidence of those rules has been submitted to those bodies. On the basis of that submission, with minimal documentary support, any subsequent production of evidence before the Boards of Appeal will make it possible for such evidence to be classified as supplementary or additional evidence and not as new evidence. 64. It must be asked, however, whether any of those classifications is consistent with the evidentiary requirements relating to national law in a situation such as that in this dispute, which is between two parties of the same nationality that are subject to the same national legal order and have brought before EUIPO a dispute which they had already initiated in their country, Bulgaria. (d) Application to this case of earlier criteria for interpretation 65. In paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court considered that the three provisions of Bulgarian law relied on by Group OOD before the Board of Appeal were not new evidence, as they formed part of the evidence used to prove the acquisition, continued existence and scope of protection of the non-registered trade mark relied on in the opposition. (46) 66. As regards legal characterisation, that assessment of the nature of the evidence is subject, in principle, to the scrutiny of the Court of Justice on appeal. (47) Some clarifications should be made in that regard. 67. In the first place, paragraph 27 of Grau Ferrer should be read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, paragraph 26, from which it is clear that that case concerned proof of use, the total lack of which required EUIPO automatically to reject the opposition. (48) In that case, the opponent had failed to provide the Opposition Division with proof of the existence of the trade mark on which it partially based its opposition. In the present case, however, there is no dispute as to whether there is evidence of use, in particular, in Bulgaria, of the opposing non-registered trade mark, irrespective of the degree to which such evidence is convincing. 68. In such circumstances, the evidence of the Bulgarian law adduced before the Board of Appeal supplemented, from a legal viewpoint, the acquisition, the continued existence and (in particular) the scope of protection of the non-registered trade mark, pursuant to Rule 19(2)(d) of the Implementing Regulation. From that perspective, therefore, the General Court did not err in classifying the evidence as additional. 69. In the second place, it may be inferred from paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal that Group OOD had not submitted before the Opposition Division any evidence relating to the applicable national legislation. It was made clear at the hearing that the express references to Article 12(6) of the Bulgarian trade mark law were first made before the Board of Appeal. (49) 70. However, in the third place, it cannot be overlooked that both the applicant for the new trade mark and Group OOD were Bulgarian and were represented by professionals who could be expected to be familiar with their national law, in particular, as regards the protection of non-registered trade marks. Contrary to EUIPO’s claims, in that situation there would be neither a reduction of the rights of the defence nor the legal uncertainty to which it refers. (50) 71. Moreover, there is no indication that before the Opposition Division the two parties concerned had any uncertainties as to the content of the national law applicable to them. The applicant for the new sign (Mr Iliev), a Bulgarian citizen, had been represented by Bulgarian lawyers before the Bulgarian courts, where he relied on Bulgarian law, before he extended his dispute to EUIPO, by seeking registration of a European Union trade mark. In those circumstances, Group OOD could have taken the view that the burden of proof forming the basis of its opposition concerned only the relevant facts (that is to say, use in the course of trade of more than mere local significance of the earlier non-registered sign) and not the national law, the content of which did not appear to be in dispute. However, what is the position so far as EUIPO is concerned? 72. With respect to national law, the Office takes a particular position in relation to opposition proceedings based on Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009. The Bulgarian national legislation at issue was that referred to in the table setting out national rights which was published by EUIPO in its Guidelines for examination of European Union trade marks (specifically, in the chapter on the filing of oppositions on the basis of that article). (51) It is understandable that, in the light of that information and the earlier vicissitudes in the relationship between the applicant and the opponent, the latter would not feel obliged to make, before the Opposition Division, references to the national rules which were more explicit than those already set out in those guidelines. 73. In those specific circumstances, the Opposition Division could have easily asked the opponent for clarifications concerning the national law, without, for that reason, undermining the principle of equality of arms, since the other party could have subsequently put forward any arguments which they deemed appropriate in that regard. Nothing prevented the Opposition Division from adopting, for example, a means of giving or obtaining evidence, in accordance with Article 78(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, (52) if it had doubts as to the applicability and the interpretation of the national law relied on, exercising its powers of verification, as referred to by the General Court. (53) 74. Lastly, requiring, as EUIPO appears to do, that, from the outset, in opposition proceedings evidence should be provided of each and every one of the four requirements of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, would result in an excessively formalistic approach, which is incompatible with the aim of avoiding the registration of trade marks that may subsequently be annulled. Furthermore, such a requirement would reduce to a minimum the discretion to accept evidence submitted late, which, it should be recalled, is a ‘general rule’, in the words of the Court itself. (54) 75. In short, I consider that there were sufficient reasons for the evidence of the three provisions of Bulgarian law adduced before the Board of Appeal to be regarded as supplementary to the other evidence submitted before the Opposition Division. Consequently, there is no error of law in the judgement under appeal in relation to Rule 50 of the Implementing Regulation. The General Court could rightly consider, however, that the references to Bulgarian law before the Board of Appeal were additional and not new. (55) 76. On that basis, nor does the General Court err in law when it states: (a) that, in this case, restricted use of ‘the Board of Appeal’s discretion in taking into account facts and evidence adduced late’ was not relevant, an assertion which EUIPO did not challenge on appeal; (56) and (b) that the Board of Appeal was ‘incorrect in failing to exercise the discretion with which it was vested and [using] that discretion to refuse to take account of the references to Bulgarian law produced before it. In so doing, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 and the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95’. (57) 77. The first ground of appeal therefore cannot be upheld. B. The second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 19(2) of the Implementing Regulation 1. Summary of the parties’ positions 78. In its second ground of appeal, EUIPO maintains that the judgment under appeal infringed Rule 19(2)(d) of the Implementing Regulation in declaring that there are no formal requirements in relation to the submission of evidence relating to national legislation. It adds that respect for the rights of the defence in inter partes proceedings necessitates compliance with certain formal requirements. 79. Thus, in the light of the principle of ‘congruent forms’, the requirements relating to evidence that a trade mark has been registered, referred to in Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 2868/95, must be applied by analogy to evidence relating to national rules which confer legal effects on non-registered trade marks. 80. Group OOD disputes that claimed application by analogy, arguing that the circumstances described in point (a) of Rule 19(2) of the Implementing Regulation and those described in the remaining points of Rule 19(2) differ with regard to the evidence required, depending on the type of earlier right claimed in the opposition. That rule does not lay down one single method of furnishing proof for the various cases (national trade mark which is registered, is applied for, is well-known, has a reputation, is non-registered or even is fraudulently registered). 81. In any event, Rule 19(2)(d) does not require the opponent to submit to the EUIPO bodies a copy of the official text, in the original language, of the national legislation on which it relies. The Office has the power to review and verify the national law to establish the exact content of that legislation. 2. Analysis of the ground of appeal 82. In the form in which it has been worded by EUIPO, the second ground of appeal is, in my view, unconvincing. 83. In the first place, as regards the comparison with the evidence required in the case of registered trade marks (Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of the Implementing Regulation), I agree with Group OOD: the legislature varied the supporting documents according to the type of right relied on in each case. 84. Thus, for registered trade marks, it seems logical that it required the presentation of registration certificates and other certificates, documents which are generally issued at the point of registration and whose probative value is beyond doubt. A reasonably careful proprietor of a registered trade mark would be expected to have such certificates in his possession or to be able to obtain them without great difficulty. 85. According to the same logic, when an opponent relies on a prestigious registered trade mark (Rule 19(2)(c)), he should be required to produce those certificates and ‘evidence showing that the mark has a reputation’. Without restrictions and using the evidence he deems appropriate, each trade mark proprietor may establish the reputation claimed, of which there is usually no record in official documents. 86. That same line of thought applies to evidence required in the case of non-registered trade marks. Because the nature of those signs means that there are no official records of them, it is understandable that the description of the evidence to prove their use and the rights attaching to them are more vague, precisely to avoid rigorous formal requirements in a domain where such requirements cannot be fulfilled. 87. Furthermore, the evidence which must be provided by the proprietor of a non-registered sign, when opposing the registration of a new trade mark, is fundamentally linked to the right relied on by that proprietor. The acquisition, continued existence and scope of protection of those non-registered trade marks may be established if, pursuant to the national rules (or, where applicable, which is not the case here, pursuant to EU rules), their proprietor has been granted the priority right to use the sign and to prohibit the use of subsequent signs. 88. Consequently, imposing formal evidentiary requirements where the legislative text deliberately opted (in my opinion, rightly) to allow a certain freedom, would be tantamount to redrafting the Implementing Regulation in a way that is not compatible with the EU legislature’s intention. 89. In the second place, it would be acceptable, in theory, to require the inclusion of a translation of the national rules relied on in the opposition when the opposing party (that is to say, the trade mark applicant) is unable to understand them. However, in the present case, it need only be pointed out that the applicant, Mr Iliev, was also a Bulgarian national and at no point was there any indication that he was not fluent in the language of that Member State. 90. In the third place, it is very contrived to invoke the parallel nature of the formal requirements on the basis of Article 94(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, in which the national courts or tribunals are asked to include, in addition to the text of the questions referred, the tenor of the national provisions applicable in the case and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law. Those documents help the Court better to understand the legal question raised before the national court, guidance which is essential for giving, erga omnes, a judgment interpreting a legislative text. 91. It is clear that there is no similarity with opposition proceedings against a trade mark registration. In such proceedings, evidence of and reliance on national law are used to support a right against an opponent’s right, in the context of inter partes administrative proceedings, the outcome of which will affect only those parties. It almost need not be pointed out that the judicial function of the Court of Justice when answering questions referred for a preliminary ruling is not comparable to that of EUIPO’s own bodies. 92. I therefore consider that, in the judgment under appeal, there is no infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 19(2) of the Implementing Regulation, when it states, in particular in paragraphs 69, 70 and 81 thereof, that there are no formal requirements relating to evidence of national legislation. 93. The second ground of appeal therefore cannot be upheld and, since the first ground of appeal was also rejected, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. 94. Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, EUIPO must be ordered to pay the costs, because it has been unsuccessful and Group OOD has applied for costs. VI. Conclusion 95. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should: (1) Dismiss the appeal; (2) Order EUIPO to pay the costs of these proceedings. 1 Original language: Spanish. 2 Council Regulation of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1). 3 Judgment of 29 June 2016, Group OOD v EUIPO — Iliev (Group Company TOURISM & TRAVEL) (T‑567/14, EU T:2016:371); ‘the judgment under appeal’. 4 The latest version of this legislative text, Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 [of 14 April 2017; OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1], which is not applicable ratione temporis to this case, is a result of the changes introduced by Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OJ 2015 L 341, p. 21). 5 Footnote concerning only the Spanish-language version. 6 Commission Regulation (EC) of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1; ‘the Implementing Regulation’), most recently amended by Regulation 2015/2424, cited in footnote 4. 7 Community Trade Mark Bulletin No 72/2012 of 16 April 2012. 8 Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended. 9 Decision of 2 June 2014 (Case R 1587/2013-4); ‘the contested decision’. 10 Bulgarian law on trade marks and geographical indications (‘the Bulgarian trade mark law’). 11 See paragraphs 52 to 56 of the judgment under appeal. 12 It cites the judgment of 3 October 2013, Rintisch v OHIM (C‑120/12 P, EU:C:2013:638), pointing out that, in that judgment, the Court stated that the Board of Appeal was to exercise its discretion restrictively when the documents to be attached in support of the opposition are set out precisely and exhaustively in Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 2868/95. That was not true in this case, in the light of the wording of Rule 19(2)(d) of that regulation. 13 Paragraphs 57 to 61 of the judgment under appeal. 14 Paragraphs 69 and 70 of the judgment under appeal. 15 Judgment of 27 March 2014 (C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:186). 16 Paragraphs 77 to 82 of the judgment under appeal. 17 It refers, in that respect, to the judgment of 5 July 2011, Edwin v EUIPO (C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 50). 18 It refers, in that regard, to the judgment of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P, EU:C:2016:579, paragraph 27), which postdates the judgment under appeal here. 19 See, in that regard, the judgment of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul (C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 48). 20 Judgment of 5 July 2011, Edwin v OHIM (C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 50). 21 Ibid., paragraph 49. That wording of that rule provides that: ‘An application to [EUIPO] for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity … shall contain: … (b) as regards the grounds on which the application is based, … (iii) in the case of an application pursuant to Article 52(2) of the regulation, particulars of the right on which the application for a declaration of invalidity is based and particulars showing that the applicant is the proprietor of an earlier right as referred to in Article 52(2) of the regulation or that he is entitled under the national law applicable to lay claim to that right’ (emphasis added). 22 Conditions of application of Article 8(4)(a) and (b), respectively, of Regulation No 207/2009. 23 I have taken this citation, adapting it to opposition proceedings, from Advocate General Bot’s Opinion in OHIM v National Lottery Commission (C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:782, point 94). 24 Judgment of 27 March 2014, OHIM v National Lottery Commission (C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:186, paragraph 43). 25 See judgments of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P, EU:C:2016:579, paragraphs 26 and 27); and of 18 July 2013, New Yorker SHK Jeans v OHIM (C‑621/11 P, EU:C:2013:484, paragraphs 28 and 29). 26 Judgment of 27 March 2014, OHIM v National Lottery Commission (C‑530/12 P, EU:C:2014:186, paragraphs 41 to 44). 27 Ibid., paragraph 45. 28 Emphasis added. 29 In particular, the Boards of Appeal, as a result of the duties which they perform. 30 Judgment of 5 April 2017, EUIPO v Szajner (C‑598/14 P, EU:C:2017:265, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 31 This has been the understanding, which is in my view correct, of several judgments of the General Court. See, inter alia, the judgment of 2 March 2013, El Corte Inglés v OHIM — Chez Gerard (CLUB GOURMET) (T‑571/11, EU:T:2013:145, paragraphs 38 to 41). 32 In paragraph 62 of the appeal, EUIPO appears to accept the idea that prima facie evidence is sufficient. 33 However, in order to defend the general interest, EUIPO will have to examine, of its own motion, in accordance with Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, the facts likely to show that the sign whose registration is sought is included within the scope of one, or several, of the absolute relative grounds for refusal of Article 7 of Regulation No 207/2009. See, in that regard, A. Bender. ‘XI. Verfahren vor dem HABM’, in Fezer, K.-H., Handbuch der Markenpraxis — Band 1, Markenverfahrensrecht, publisher C.H. Beck, Munich, 2007, p. 497. 34 That possibility applies to all proceedings, including those concerned with relative grounds for refusal, since, unlike in Article 76(1), no exception is established in that regard. 35 See the summary of the case-law in Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinion in EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P, EU:C:2016:2, points 40 to 53). 36 Judgment of 4 May 2017, Comercializadora Eloro v EUIPO (C‑71/16 P, EU:C:2017:345, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). 37 Ibid., paragraph 56 and the case-law cited. 38 Ibid., paragraph 59 and the case-law cited. 39 There is another restriction which, as it concerns Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of the Implementing Regulation, has no relevance in this appeal: according to the Court, the opponent is deemed to be aware, even before filing his opposition, of the precise documents which must be produced in support of it, since they are set out precisely and exhaustively in that rule. In that situation, the discretion must be exercised restrictively and the evidence submitted late may be allowed only if the circumstances justify the appellant’s delay in submitting it (judgment of 3 October 2013, Rintisch v OHIM (C‑120/12 P, EU:C:2013:638, paragraph 39). 40 Judgment of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P, EU:C:2016:579, paragraph 27). 41 Paragraphs 48 to 53 of the appeal. 42 As is clear from paragraph 10 of the judgment of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P; EU:C:2016:579). 43 Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in EUIPO v Szajner (C‑598/14 P, EU:C:2016:915, point 54 and the case-law cited). 44 The judgment of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P; EU:C:2016:579, paragraph 27), rejects the submission of ‘new’ evidence after comparing, in paragraph 23, the German, Spanish and English versions of Rule 50 (which refer to ‘additional’ facts and evidence) with the French version (which refers to ‘new or supplementary’ evidence and facts). 45 Judgment of 21 July 2016, EUIPO v Grau Ferrer (C‑597/14 P; EU:C:2016:579, paragraph 26). 46 In that paragraph of the judgment under appeal, the General Court refers, furthermore, to another passage (paragraph 35) of that judgment, in which reference is made to abundant evidence of the use of the non-registered sign. 47 Order of the Court of 3 June 2015, The Sunrider Corporation v OHIM (C‑142/14 P, EU:C:2015:371, paragraph 56). 48 The judgment itself cites another of 18 July 2013, New Yorker SHK Jeans v OHIM (C‑621/11 P, EU:C:2013:484, paragraphs 28 and 30). 49 It is apparent from the hearing that, before the Opposition Division, Group OOD merely ticked the box relating to Bulgarian law on the corresponding form, giving no further details as regards the specific provisions relied on. That explains both paragraph 4 of the Board of Appeal’s decision, which reads: ‘the table “national law” annexed to the Guidelines could be helpful but would not relieve the opponent from filing proof of the respective national law’, and the Opposition Division’s decision, which, in the third paragraph beneath the heading ‘The law governing the sign’, expressly states: ‘It is not sufficient to make a general reference to the national law, which is listed merely for information purposes in the “Table with National Legislation” of the Office’s Manual Concerning Opposition on Article 8(4) CTMR.’ 50 In paragraph 71 of the appeal, EUIPO puts forward those two arguments to claim that the opponent can be required, even at the opposition stage, to provide the best possible evidence of the national law relied on. 51 See, currently, EUIPO, Guidelines for examination of European Union trade marks — Part C — Opposition — Section 4 — Rights referred to in Article 8(4) and (4a) EUTMR [version of 1.08.2016], p. 40. 52 Now Article 97 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). 53 Paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal. 54 See point 53 of this Opinion and the case-law cited. 55 Paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal. 56 Ibid., paragraph 56. 57 Ibid., paragraph 61.