Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:273
Date: 2025-04-10
Language of the case: French
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Action for damages

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated. (24) 48. In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that none of the arguments put forward in the appeal seeks to challenge the analytical method advocated by the General Court in paragraphs 109 and 110 of the judgment under appeal for determining whether the appellant could be declared personally responsible for the financial support provided by Bank Rossiya to Mr Putin under Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. It is, by contrast, the Council that requests the Court of Justice to substitute the grounds of the judgment under appeal in so far as the General Court interpreted the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in the abovementioned article too strictly, limiting it solely to shareholders capable of exerting an influence over the company in which they have a shareholding. 49. It should be recalled that, in the abovementioned paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that, since the restrictive measures were not criminal penalties, a natural person may be subject to such measures for acts committed by a company in which that person is a shareholder where he or she exerts a substantial or even decisive influence over that company. The same could hold true, according to the General Court, where, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case, relating inter alia to the shareholder structure and capital stock of the company in question, the shareholder in that company has sufficient power that the positions he or she adopts as a shareholder are capable of influencing the direction of decisions taken by the company. 50. In my view, even if, as the Council claims, the wording used by the General Court for determining the responsibility of a natural person for financial support which he or she has provided through a company might not cover all possible forms of support for Russian decision-makers responsible for the destabilisation of Ukraine, the judgment under appeal does not require a substitution of grounds since, on my understanding, such wording is not intended to be exhaustive. 51. I note in that regard that, as the Council submits, if the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, were to be understood as applying solely to shareholders capable of exerting an influence within a company, the listing criterion laid down in that provision could not be applied, for example, to minority shareholders who, without having any real influence over that company’s decision-making, are nevertheless capable of supporting its policy through their financial investment. The possibility cannot be ruled out that support for the purposes of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, may be found to be provided by a minority shareholder in multiple undertakings, without any real influence within them, where those undertakings all pursue a policy favouring the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. 52. The objectives of Decision 2014/145, as amended, which are to maximise pressure on the Russian authorities and the economy of the Russian Federation in order to weaken financially its destabilising ability in the territory of Ukraine and the military aggression suffered by Ukraine, (25) seem to me to support that interpretation. Furthermore, that interpretation can readily be based on the guidance derived from the judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128), in which a listing criterion similar to that at issue in the present case was interpreted by the Court. In essence, in that judgment, the Court found that the aspect to be taken into account in determining the existence of support of a material or financial nature is its quantitative or qualitative significance, even if that support has no direct or indirect connection with the ultimate aim pursued by the restrictive measures. (26) It is clear that the ratio decidendi behind that case-law, which is, in my view, applicable in the same manner to the system of restrictive measures in the present case, is to put an end to the actions targeted by those measures by reducing the financial resources available for that purpose, irrespective of their origin and, in particular, of a shareholder’s ability to exercise influence in the companies in which he has shareholdings. 53. It follows that the notion of ‘supporting … financially’ in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, cannot be confined to cases where the shareholder in question is capable of exerting a substantial or even decisive influence over the company or to cases where the positions adopted by the shareholder are capable of influencing the direction of decisions taken by the company. However, given that none of the statements made in the judgment under appeal limits the scope of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, to those two situations alone, I take the view, without prejudice to any clarification the Court of Justice might wish to proffer in its future judgment, that the General Court did not make an error of interpretation which needs to be rectified by the substitution of grounds requested by the Council. 54. As regards the appellant, his arguments invite the Court to consider that, in order to establish his responsibility for the actions of Bank Rossiya, the Council was obliged to put forward further evidence in addition to mere findings regarding the bank’s shareholder structure. That other evidence would have to be capable of demonstrating positive, specific decisions by the appellant in favour of financially supporting Russian decision-makers in accordance with Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. 55. At the outset, in so far as, in accordance with the considerations set out in points 51 to 53 above, the central element in establishing the existence of financial support is the quantitative or qualitative significance of that support in maintaining actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the appellant’s investment in Bank Rossiya, in connection with that bank’s importance in terms of capitalisation, as was stated in paragraphs 98 and 105 of the judgment under appeal, seems to me to be enough to confirm the Council’s assessment in the acts at issue and that of the General Court in the judgment under appeal. 56. Furthermore and in any event, I take the view that the fact that the appellant is the second largest shareholder in Bank Rossiya, as part of a stable core of majority shareholders known to be close to Mr Putin, was also sufficient, as the General Court correctly held in the judgment under appeal, to support a finding that the appellant was able to exert a substantial influence over the decisions of Bank Rossiya, without the need for the Council to adduce other additional evidence. That reasoning is not based on a legal presumption, as the appellant claims, but on the application of the most basic principles of governance of undertakings and on the influential power of a shareholder such as the appellant in accordance with those principles. 57. In those circumstances, it must be concluded that all the facts and evidence underpinning the General Court’s reasoning in the judgment under appeal were correctly assessed by it and that, contrary to the appellant’s claims, the assessments by the Council and by the General Court were made on a sufficiently solid factual basis. 58. The second part put forward by the appellant as part of the first ground of appeal should therefore be rejected. 59. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, and in particular in the light of points 45 and 58 of the present Opinion, I take the view that the General Court did not err in law in interpreting the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as the appellant claims. 60. The first ground of appeal should therefore be rejected. B. The second ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended 61. The appellant claims that, in holding that he supported actions or policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine solely by reason of his passive attitude to the policy pursued by Bank Rossiya in Crimea, the General Court interpreted Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in a manner incompatible with its objectives and contrary to the applicable case-law. In his view, even assuming that Bank Rossiya could be criticised for conduct on the basis of which it was responsible for actions or policies within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that responsibility cannot be transposed as it stands to the appellant. First, his inclusion within the scope of the criterion laid down in that article would require positive, specific acts of support from him. Second, the notion of ‘action’ in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision cannot include a passive attitude or failure to act like that found by the General Court in the judgment under appeal. 62. The Council disputes those arguments. 63. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, if the Court of Justice were to conclude, as has been proposed in point 59 of this Opinion, that the General Court did not err in upholding the decision to include the appellant in the acts at issue on the basis of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the second ground of appeal relied on by the appellant should be examined only for the sake of completeness. (27) 64. It should also be noted that, in paragraph 120 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that, in the context of the present case and for the reasons mentioned in its examination of Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the Council did not make an error of assessment in holding that, by adopting a passive attitude to Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea, the appellant himself was responsible for supporting actions and policies which undermined the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 65. It is therefore clear that, contrary to the appellant’s contention, the General Court did not establish his responsibility under Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, solely on the basis of his passive attitude to Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea. On the contrary, in establishing that responsibility, the General Court expressly made reference not only to the context of the present case, but above all to the reasons set out in paragraphs 109 to 115 of the judgment under appeal. 66. It follows that, in line with the reasoning developed concerning Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the General Court held that the Council had legitimately based the restrictive measures adopted against the appellant under Article 2(1)(a) of that decision on the fact that, first, he was a very influential shareholder within Bank Rossiya and, second, he could not have been unaware of the actions and policies pursued by that bank which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 67. It must therefore be held, for reasons similar to those set out in connection with the examination of the first ground of appeal, that, since the General Court relied on other factors in establishing the appellant’s responsibility on the basis of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the arguments put forward by the appellant claiming that his passive attitude was taken into consideration as the sole factor capable of justifying the application of the criterion laid down in that article to him should be rejected as ineffective. 68. In any event, it should be noted that, for the reasons set out in point 43 of the present Opinion, the appellant’s passive attitude to, or failure to distance himself from, Bank Rossiya’s support for the policy of annexation of Crimea, as noted in paragraphs 119 and 120 of the judgment under appeal, are factors which permitted the General Court, as part of its judicial review, to establish that that support by the bank could be attributed to the appellant. Once again, the Court finds that, even though that passive attitude did not formally appear as a factor in the acts at issue, it was necessarily part of the reasoning thereof. 69. It follows from the foregoing that the General Court’s reasoning correctly and adequately reflects the reasons adopted by the Council in the acts at issue to justify the adoption of restrictive measures against the appellant on the basis of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. 70. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude that it cannot be claimed that the General Court erred in law in interpreting the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, as the appellant claims. 71. The second ground of appeal should therefore be rejected. 72. Since none of the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in support of his appeal has been upheld, the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 73. Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. 74. Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 75. Since the Council has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs. V. Conclusion 76. Having regard to the analysis set out in the present Opinion and in the light of the proposals set out in points 72 and 75 above, I propose that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; – order Mr Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko to pay the costs. 1 Original language: French. 2 Together, ‘the original acts at issue’. 3 Together, ‘the maintaining acts at issue’. 4 Together, ‘the acts at issue’. 5 See point 10 of this Opinion. The reference to the criteria for inclusion applied to the appellant is reversed so as to match the order in which the General Court conducted its examination. 6 See also, in that regard, judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180). 7 Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16). 8 Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6). 9 ‘Decision 2014/145, as amended’. 10 The freezing of funds and economic resources also follows, in similar terms, from a combined reading of Article 2(1) and Article 3(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation No 269/2014, in its version as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘Regulation No 269/2014, as amended’). 11 Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 97 to 116. 12 Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 106 to 108. 13 Judgment under appeal, paragraph 109. 14 Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 110 and 111. 15 Judgment under appeal, paragraph 112. 16 Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 117 to 124. 17 Judgment under appeal, paragraph 117. 18 Judgment under appeal, paragraph 118. 19 Judgment under appeal, paragraphs 119, 120 and 124. 20 In setting out those two grounds of appeal, the appellant also makes reference to Article 1(1)(b) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended. However, because, as stated in point 10 of this Opinion, the content of Article 1(1)(b) and (a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, is the same as Article 2(1)(d) and (a) of that decision, the analysis may be confined to the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in so far as they relate to the latter provision. It should also be borne in mind that similar inclusion criteria are provided for by Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. 21 See, inter alia, judgment of 12 December 2024, Euranimi v Commission (C‑772/23 P, EU:C:2024:1025, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 22 See, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123). 23 The consideration of the appellant’s failure to distance himself publicly as possible exculpatory evidence in his favour supports the conclusion in point 40 of the present Opinion, given that, by the first part of this ground of appeal, the appellant did not dispute the inculpatory evidence used by the Council to substantiate his inclusion in the list, as adopted by the General Court. 24 See, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 25 See, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council (C‑729/18 P, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 59), and of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 123). See also, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council (T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 144), in which the General Court describes the objectives of Decision 2014/145, as amended, in a way which the Court of Justice could easily endorse. 26 See judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 85 to 87). 27 See, in that regard, the case-law cited in footnote 21 to this Opinion.