Order — ECLI:EU:T:1998:64
Date: 1998-03-24
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Second Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Conditions of admissibility;Administrative complaint;Mandatory nature;Specific cases of acts having adverse effect
Procedure: Staff cases - inadmissible
Origin: Luxembourg

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber) 
24 March 1998 
Case T-181/97 
Huguette Meyer and Others 
v 
Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(Officials - Actions for annulment - Pay slip - Admissibility - Time-limits -
New and material fact - Time-barred) 
Full text in French 11-481 
Application for: annulment of the express decisions rejecting the applicants' 
claims for the repayment of amounts deducted from their 
household allowance pursuant to Article 67(2) of the Staff 
Regulations of Officials of the European Communities in 
respect of the household grant received by their spouses 
under the collective agreement of Luxembourg bank 
employees, and, so far as necessary, annulment of the 
decisions of 17 March 1997 expressly rejecting their 
complaints. 
Decision: Application dismissed. 
I-A- 151 
ABSTRACT - CASE T-I81/97 
Abstract of the Order 
The third paragraph of Article 62 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities ('the Staff Regulations') provides that officials' remuneration 
is to include family allowances. Under Article 67(1) of the Staff Regulations, these 
include the household allowance. Article 67(2) provides that '[officials in receipt 
of family allowances ... shall declare allowances of like nature paid from other 
sources'. Such latter allowances are to be deducted from those paid under the Staff 
Regulations. 
On the strength of the anti-overlapping rule contained in Article 67(2), until June 
1996 the Court of Justice deducted from the household allowance to which each of 
the applicants was entitled under the Staff Regulations the household grant paid to 
their husbands working in the Luxembourg banking sector under the collective 
agreement in force for that sector. 
In its judgment of 11 June 1996 in Case T-147/95 Pavan v Parliament [1996] 
ECR-SC 11-861, the Court of First Instance found that the household grant awarded 
to employees of Luxembourg breweries under their collective labour agreement was 
not an 'allowance of like nature' within the meaning of Article 67(2) of the Staff 
Regulations. Acting together with the other Community institutions in Luxembourg, 
the Court of Justice informed the applicants by letters of 19 July 1996 that, applying 
the Pavan judgment and having read the conditions for awarding the household 
grant under the Luxembourg bank employees' collective agreement, it had found 
that 'this grant can no longer be regarded as being of like nature with the household 
allowance' and that it had therefore decided to discontinue the deduction from the 
household allowance as from 1 July 1996. 
I-A - 152 
MEYER AND OTHERS v COURT OF JUSTICE 
Between 5 August and 22 November 1996, the applicants made identically-worded 
requests under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations for repayment of all sums 
deducted from their household allowance by virtue of the household grant awarded 
to their husbands, together with default interest. Those requests, and the complaints 
which followed them under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, were rejected by 
express decisions of the Court of Justice on the ground, essentially, that the 
applicants had not challenged the measures adversely affecting them, namely the pay 
slips in which the deductions had been carried out, within the time-limits prescribed 
by the Staff Regulations, and that die submission by diem of a retrospective request 
for repayment under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations was not sufficient to open 
a new period for making a complaint. 
Admissibility 
Under the system of remedies established by Articles 90 and 91 of die Staff 
Regulations, an action for damages, which constitutes an autonomous remedy, 
separate from the action for annulment, is admissible only if it has been preceded 
by a pre-litigation procedure in accordance with die provisions of the Staff 
Regulations. That procedure differs according to whether the damage for which 
reparation is sought results from an act having adverse effects within the meaning 
of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations or from conduct on the part of the 
administration which contains nothing in the nature of a decision. In the first case 
it is for the person concerned to submit to the appointing audiority, within the 
prescribed time-limit, a complaint directed against the act in question. In the second 
case, on the other hand, the administrative procedure must commence with die 
submission of a request, widiin the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff 
Regulations, for compensation and continue, where appropriate, with a complaint 
against the decision rejecting that request (paragraphs 21 and 22). 
See: T-64/91 Marcato v Commission [1992] ECR 11-243, paras 30 to 35; T-500/93 Y v Court 
of Justice [1996] ECR-SC 11-977, paras 64 to 66; T-15/96 Liao v Council [1997] ECR-SC 
11-897, paras 57 and 58 
I-A - 153 
ABSTRACT - CASET-181/97 
The loss for which reparation is requested arises from the deduction of the 
household grant in question from the amount of the household allowance to which 
the applicants are entitled, such deduction having been made by the appointing 
authority from the applicants' monthly pay slips until June 1996. The pay slips 
constitute measures adversely affecting officials, and may be the subject of a 
complaint and potentially an action. Communication of the monthly pay slip has the 
effect of causing the period prescribed for bringing an action against an 
administrative decision to run where that slip clearly shows the existence and scope 
of that decision. That is so in the case of a pay slip which reveals to the official 
concerned that a retention has been made in accordance with Article 67(2) of the 
Staff Regulations on the basis of information supplied by that official to the 
appointing authority (paragraphs 23 to 26) 
See: 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73, 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73, 117/73, 123/73, 132/73 and 
135/73 to 137/73 Schots-Kortnerand Others v Council, Commission and Parliament [197 4] ECR 
177, para. 18; 176/83 Alio v Commission [1985] ECR 2155, para. 13; 159/86 Canters v 
Commission [1988] ECR 4859, para. 6; 200/87 Giordaniv Commission [1989] ECR 1877, para. 
13; T-7/91 Schavoir v Council [1992] ECR 11-2307, para. 34; T-98/92 and T-99/92Ű/ Manio 
andLebedefv Commission [1994] ECR-SC 11-541, para. 24; T-7794 Adriaenssens and Others 
v Commission [1997] ECR-SC II-l, para. 29 
In this case, the applicants are barred through lapse of time from challenging the 
pay slips showing the deductions in question, since they did not do so within the 
time-limits prescribed by the Staff Regulations (paragraph 30). 
Moreover, the possibility of making a request within the meaning of Article 90(1) 
of the Staff Regulations does not enable an official to set aside the time-limits laid 
down by Articles 90 and 91 for submitting a complaint and bringing an action by 
indirectly calling into question, by means of a request, a previous decision which 
was not challenged within the time-limits. The time-limits for bringing an action 
are a matter of public policy, and are not at the discretion of either the judicature 
or the parties. Only the existence of new and material facts may justify the 
submission of a request or a complaint seeking reexamination of a decision that was 
not challenged within the time-limits. A judgment of the Court of Justice or the 
Court of First Instance annulling a measure is capable of constituting such a fact 
I-A - 154 
MEYER AND OTHERS v COURT OF JUSTICE 
only in relation to the persons directly concerned by the annulled measure 
(paragraphs 31 to 36). 
See: 43/64 Müller v Councils of the EEC, EAECand ECSC [1965] ECR 385, 396; Opinion of 
Advocate General Gand in 50/64,51 /64,53/64, 54/64 and 5TI64Loebischand Others v Councils 
of the EEC, EAEC and ECSC [1965] ECR 825, 833; 52/64 Pßoeschnerv Coimnission [1965] 
ECR 981, 986; Schots-Kortnerand Others v Council, Commission and Parliament, cited above, 
para. 38; 127/84 Esly v Commission [1985] ECR 1437, para. 10; 232/85 Becker v Commission 
[1986] ECR 3401, para. 8; 125/87 S/w/; v Court of Justice [1988] ECR 1619,para. 13; 161/87 
Mitysers and Ttilp v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 3037, para. 11; T-131/95 Progoulis v 
Commission [1995] ECR-SC 11-907, para. 41; Adriaenssens and Others v Commission, cited 
above, paras 27 and 28; C-151/97 P (I) and C-157/97 P (I) National Power and PowerGen v 
Commission [1997] ECR 1-3491, para. 73; T-16/97 Chauvin v Commission [1997] ECR-SC 
11-681, paras 37 and 43 
In this case, the applicants were not parties to the dispute in Pavan and do not claim 
to have been directly concerned by the measure annulled in that case. The Pavan 
judgment cannot therefore be regarded as a material new fact which is capable of 
reopening for their benefit the period prescribed for submitting a complaint. 
Operative part: 
The application is dismissed as inadmissible. 
I-A - 155