Order;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:316
Date: 2024-04-10
Language of the case: Hungarian
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: Taxation;Value added tax
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Hungary

Summary C-532/23 – 1 
Case C-532/23 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
18 August 2023 
Referring court: 
Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
10 July 2023 
Applicant: 
Lear Corporation Hungary Autóipari Gyártó Kft. 
Defendant: 
Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
In the context of a claim for late payment interest submitted in consequence of the 
fact that, previously, contrary to EU law, it was not permitted to request a refund 
of value added tax, clarification is sought as to whether a supplementary claim for 
interest relating to another period is ancillary or autonomous in nature and, in the 
latter case, whether that supplementary claim is time-barred. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation of Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 
2006 on the common system of value added tax, and also the principles of fiscal 
neutrality, equivalence and effectiveness. 
Article 267 TFEU. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-532/23 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
(1) Must Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 
on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’), and also 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, be interpreted as meaning 
that, when a taxpayer requests a refund of value added tax (VAT) which he 
or she could not request previously due to the application of a regulatory 
requirement that has been declared, in a judgment of the Court of Justice, to 
be contrary to EU law, it is appropriate to consider that, in that case, the 
refund request at the same time constitutes a claim for late payment interest, 
in view of the incidental nature of the interest and the fact that the claim for 
late payment interest is governed by the same provision of national law as 
regulates the request for the refund of the VAT, the late repayment of which 
has caused the default? 
(2) Is a practice of a Member State compatible with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, and also, especially, with the principle of 
fiscal neutrality, where, pursuant to that practice, in the context of an 
administrative procedure relating to tax, relying on the principle that the 
parties have the right to limit the subject matter of an action (‘the dispositive 
principle’), a subsequent claim by the taxpayer for late payment interest is 
rejected on the grounds that his or her first claim for late payment interest, 
which gave rise to the procedure being initiated, did not include the 
additional period referred to in the subsequent claim, such that the 
subsequent claim is classified as a new claim and is declared time-barred, 
even though the tax authority did not consider itself to be bound in any way 
by the dispositive principle in relation to the taxpayer’s first claim, but rather 
has invoked that principle exclusively in relation to the late payment interest 
claimed for a period that, at the time when the claim giving rise to the 
initiation of the procedure was submitted, was not yet known, that period 
having been defined by case-law while that procedure was under way? 
(3) Having regard to the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and fiscal 
neutrality should a subsequent claim submitted in the context of an 
administrative procedure relating to tax, on the basis of the case-law 
established by the courts, be regarded as constituting a supplement to the 
first claim, which gave rise to the procedure being initiated, or as a 
modification of that first claim, where the two claims only differ as regards 
the interest payment period? 
(4) Is a practice of a Member State compatible with the principles of 
equivalence, effectiveness and fiscal neutrality where, pursuant to that 
practice, a claim submitted after the expiry of the limitation period is 
declared time-barred without examining whether admissible circumstances 
exist which may have suspended or interrupted the limitation period, 
especially in view of the fact that the first claim was submitted by the 
applicant in 2014, and also that, even though during the limitation period the 
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current legislation was not amended, given that that legislation only 
established the requirements for requesting a refund of the VAT, in the 
absence of relevant rules, the Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary) and the 
Court of Justice, by means of an extensive interpretation of that legislation, 
defined in case-law the requirements for claiming late payment interest, such 
that, during a decisive part of the limitation period of five years, the rules for 
claiming late payment interest were not only not known by or clear to 
taxpayers, but rather they did not even exist in the form of legislative 
provisions? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax: Article 183. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Az általános forgalmi adóról szóló 1992. évi LXXIV. törvény (Law LXXIV of 
1992 on value added tax; ‘the previous VAT Law’): Paragraph 48(7). 
Az általános forgalmi adóról szóló 2007. évi CXXVII. törvény (Law CXXVII of 
2007 on value added tax; ‘the VAT Law’): Paragraph 131(1) and 
Paragraph 186(1) and (2). 
Az általános forgalmi adóról szóló 2007. évi CXXVII. törvény jogharmonizációs 
célú módosításáról és az adó-visszaigénylés különös eljárási szabályairól szóló 
2011. évi CXXIII. törvény (Law CXXIII of 2011, amending with a view to 
harmonisation Law CXXVII of 2007 on value added tax and laying down rules on 
the special procedure for claims for the refund of VAT; ‘the amending law’): 
Paragraph 1. 
Az adózás rendjéről szóló 2003. évi XCII. törvény (Law XCII of 2003 on general 
taxation procedure; ‘the Law on general taxation procedure’): Paragraph 37(4) and 
(6); Paragraph 124/C; Paragraph 124/D(1) to (3); and Paragraph 164(1). 
A közigazgatási hatósági eljárás és szolgáltatás általános szabályairól szóló 2004. 
évi CXL. törvény (Law CXL of 2004, laying down general provisions on 
administrative services and procedure): Paragraph 35(1) and Paragraph 37(1). 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicant is a commercial company registered in Hungary and engaged in the 
manufacture of products for the automotive industry. During the tax periods 
falling between December 2005 and July 2011, the applicant could not, without 
limitation, exercise its right to a refund of value added tax (‘VAT’) due to the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-532/23 
 
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requirement known as ‘the paid consideration condition’, established in the 
provisions of the previous VAT Law and the VAT Law in force at that time. 
2 In its judgment of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C-274/10, 
EU:C:2011:530), the Court of Justice found that those provisions infringed EU 
law. That same year, on the basis of the amending law, which was enacted as a 
result of that judgment, the applicant submitted an extraordinary application for a 
VAT refund, asking to be repaid the sums for which it had not previously been 
able to request a refund because of national legislation [that was] contrary to EU 
law. The tax authority accepted the application and refunded the applicant the 
requested amount of VAT, but it did not pay it late payment interest. 
3 In its order of 17 July 2014, Delphi Hungary Autóalkatrész Gyártó (C-654/13, 
EU:C:2014:2127), the Court of Justice declared such rules or such a practice of a 
Member State, whereby the payment of interest is excluded, to be contrary to EU 
law. As a result of that, on 23 December 2014, the applicant claimed the payment 
of interest from the tax authority, amounting to HUF 457 916 030, due to the late 
repayment of the VAT (‘late payment interest’), and, on 2 November 2016, it also 
claimed from that authority the payment of interest due to the delay in paying the 
late payment interest (‘compound interest’). 
4 During the course of the administrative procedure initiated as a result of that 
claim, the defendant, in its capacity as the second-instance authority, ordered the 
first-instance authority to repeat the procedure on various occasions. Meanwhile, 
the Supreme Court, by a decision issued on 24 November 2016, announced in a 
press release of 2 December 2016 and published in its entirety in 2017 (‘decision 
of principle No 18/2017’), established how the interest to be paid as a result of the 
Delphi Hungary Autóalkatrész Gyártó order should be calculated. 
5 By a decision of 18 April 2017, the first-instance authority partially accepted the 
claim and, for the delay in refunding the VAT, it awarded the applicant late 
payment interest amounting to HUF 225 825 000, calculated at the central bank’s 
base rate and relating to the period between 1 January 2008 and 31 July 2011. On 
5 May 2017, the applicant brought an administrative appeal against that decision 
and, in a submission of 12 May 2017, made as an integral part of that appeal, it 
asked the defendant to amend the first-instance decision such that it also awarded 
the applicant late payment interest for the period between December 2005 and 
December 2007, that is, the whole of the period determined by the Supreme Court 
in decision of principle No 18/2017, given that the first-instance authority had 
omitted it. 
6 By a decision made at second-instance, the defendant changed the amount of the 
late payment interest and declared that, in accordance with the dispositive 
principle, the first-instance authority could not be considered to have committed 
an act of omission with regard to the late payment interest for the period between 
December 2005 and December 2007. Consequently, it asserted that that claim 
constituted a new claim and ordered it to be sent back to the first-instance 
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authority. By a decision issued by the first-instance authority on 1 September 
2017, against which an administrative appeal was brought and which was 
confirmed by the defendant in a decision of 1 December 2017, that claim was 
rejected on the grounds that it was time-barred. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
7 The applicant believes that it is also entitled to receive interest for the period 
between December 2005 and December 2007, given that, pursuant to decision of 
principle No 18/2017, both the application for a refund of the VAT and the claim 
for interest are governed by Paragraph 1 of the amending law. Accordingly, it 
argues that, when it exercised its right to a refund by submitting the tax return in 
accordance with the amending law, it complied, at the same time, with the 
requirements relating to the payment of interest, such that it also gave rise to the 
obligation on the part of the tax authority to pay it interest. 
8 The applicant maintains that, on 23 December 2014, all it did was ask the tax 
authority, within the limitation period, to comply with that obligation, clearly 
specifying the legal basis on which it was entitled to the interest, which should 
have led to the defendant awarding late payment interest for the whole of the 
period established in decision of principle No 18/2017 – that is, also including the 
period between December 2005 and December 2007 – without the defendant 
being bound, for those purposes, by the claim or by the calculations submitted by 
the applicant. Indeed, the applicant asserts that the principle of effectiveness takes 
precedence over the dispositive principle. Consequently, it argues that its 
submission of 12 May 2017 could not be considered time-barred. 
9 According to the defendant, in the procedure initiated as a result of the claim, the 
tax authority had to make a decision on the claim. The defendant argues that it 
was not able to make a decision on the part of the administrative appeal relating to 
the period between December 2005 and December 2007, as it had not been 
included in the first-instance procedure and, consequently, it had to be treated as a 
new claim. It maintains that decision of principle No 18/2017 makes the payment 
of late payment interest conditional on the submission of the relevant claim within 
the limitation period. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
10 The referring court notes that, even though, according to the case-law of the Court 
of Justice, in the absence of EU legislation, it is the responsibility of each Member 
State to determine the procedure and requirements for the calculation and payment 
of the interest in question in the present case, the applicant’s claim for interest is 
based on EU law and, therefore, it is appropriate to consider that that law also 
constitutes the legal basis for the questions that must be decided in these 
proceedings, especially given that the requirements established in the national 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-532/23 
 
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legal systems of the Member States must comply with the principles of 
equivalence and effective judicial protection. 
11 Although the Court of Justice has already examined the content of the principles 
of EU law relevant to the present case, it has done so in relation to different facts. 
That is also the case in the case of the judgment of 23 April 2020, Sole-Mizo and 
Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C-13/18 and C-126/18, EU:C:2020:292). Moreover, 
the referring court notes that, following that judgment, the Supreme Court has 
issued various decisions which are mutually contradictory and, consequently, it 
considers the guidance of the Court of Justice to be necessary. 
12 Unlike the facts of the cases which gave rise to the judgment in Sole-Mizo and 
Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági, the applicant in the present case exercised its right to a 
refund of the VAT on 30 September 2011, as a result of which it was repaid the 
VAT. Subsequently, the applicant submitted a claim for late payment interest and 
compound interest, stating the period from January 2008 to December 2011 as the 
period for calculating the interest, in accordance with the case-law applicable at 
that time. The company Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági Zrt., on the other hand, did not 
submit any application for a refund of the VAT, and only on 30 December 2016, 
as a result of the publication of the press release relating to decision of principle 
No 18/2017, did it make a claim for late payment interest. 
13 Furthermore, the judgment in Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági found the 
part of decision of principle No 18/2017 in which the national legislation 
applicable to late payment interest was determined to be contrary to EU law and 
declared that such interest, which is also the subject matter of these proceedings, 
is governed by Paragraphs 124/C and 124/D of the Law on general taxation 
procedure, which specifically regulate the taxpayer’s refund application and do 
not require a separate claim to be submitted for late payment interest. Therefore, 
the question arises of whether the applicant’s application for a refund of the VAT 
may also be regarded, at the same time, as a claim for late payment interest. 
14 In that regard, the referring court observes that the defendant has only considered 
a single element of the claim submitted by the applicant on 23 December 2014 to 
be binding, namely, that relating to the start date of the late payment interest, 
while, as regards the remaining elements, that is, the legislation that constitutes 
the legal basis for such interest, the procedure for calculating it, and its amount 
and scope, it differed in its decisions from what the claim stated. Thus, the 
defendant considered the applicant’s submission of 2 November 2016 to constitute 
a supplement to the above-mentioned claim, while it classified the applicant’s 
submission of 5 May 2017 as a new claim. The question arises of whether such 
divergent criteria in relation to claims – in the legal situation that has prevailed for 
years with regard to claiming late payment interest, which cannot be regarded as 
clear for the taxpayer – make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the 
right to late payment interest which the EU legal system confers on individuals; 
that is, whether they are consistent with the principle of effectiveness. 
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15 The referring court also expresses its concern that this practice may also have 
violated the principle of fiscal neutrality to the detriment of taxpayers who 
submitted their claims before the applicable rules were clarified. In its opinion, a 
good example of the uncertainty of the situation is the fact that only following the 
press release relating to decision of principle No 18/2017, published by the 
Supreme Court on 2 December 2016, were taxpayers able to know that their 
claims would become time-barred on 31 December 2016 and that they could also 
claim late payment interest for periods prior to the year 2008. 
16 These circumstances call into question the assertion that the applicant’s claim is 
time-barred, even supposing that the defendant’s decision is, in every other 
respect, in accordance with EU law and its principles. Indeed, in order to assert its 
right to late payment interest, the applicant submitted various claims during the 
course of a procedure that was repeated on various occasions and, moreover, after 
its first claim was submitted, the case-law progressively defined both the cases in 
which it is possible to exercise that right by means of a claim and the assessment 
of the aspects relevant to deciding such a claim. Thus, the applicant only became 
aware that it was able to claim late payment interest for periods prior to 2008 three 
weeks before that right would expire, by means of a press release which, by its 
nature, was not suitable to serve as the basis for a specific claim. 
17 Accordingly, in view of that permanent uncertainty, the referring court has doubts 
as to whether the administrative procedure which constitutes the subject matter of 
the main proceedings complied with the principles of equivalence, fiscal neutrality 
and effectiveness, which require that taxable persons should be able to exercise 
effectively the rights conferred on them by EU law.