Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2026:5
Date: 2026-01-15
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Ireland

[2024] IEHC 28 
THE HIGH COURT 
PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT  
[HC.MCA.2022.0000278] 
IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 84C OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS AND 
REGULATION 13 OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT) REGULATIONS 2007 TO 2014 (BY ORDER) 
BETWEEN 
COILLTE CUIDEACHTA GHNÍOMHAÍOCHTA AINMNITHE 
APPELLANT 
AND 
COMMISSIONER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION 
RESPONDENT 
AND 
PERSON(S) UNKNOWN AKA JOHN AND/OR JANE DOE, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL (BY ORDER) 
NOTICE PARTIES 
AND 
RIGHT TO KNOW CLG 
AMICUS CURIAE 
(No. 2) 
JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Wednesday the 24th day of January, 2024 
Subject-matter of the dispute 
1. This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 2(5), 3(1) and 
(5)(c), 4(1)(b) and 6(1) of Directive 2003/4. 
2. The request is being made in proceedings concerning an appeal to the High Court by Coillte 
against a decision of the Commissioner for Environmental Information which in essence held that 
apparently anonymous or pseudonymous requests for information under Directive 2003/4 were 
nonetheless valid. 
Legal context 
European Union law 
3. The following provisions of EU law are relevant:   
(i) The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 
1998 (“Aarhus Convention”), as a part of EU law  
(https://unece.org/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf), particularly: 
(a). Article 2(4);   
(b). Article 4(1) to (3); and   
(c). Article 9(1).   
(iv) Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC (OJ L 41/26, 14/2/2003) particularly: 
(a). Article 2; 
(b). Article 3;   
(c). Article 4; and 
(d). Article 6.  
4. EU case law relevant to the issues includes the following:    
(i) Judgment of 16 December 1976, Rewe v Landwirschaftskammer fur das Saarland, 
C-33/76 ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=89192&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7404984);   
(ii) Judgment of 17 June 1998, Mecklenburg v Kreis Pinneberg, C-321/96, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:300 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=43940&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7410618);  
(iii) Opinion of the Advocate General of 28 January 1999, Commission v Germany, C-
217/97,  ECLI:EU:C:1999:34 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=44395&doclang=EN&
mode=&part=1);  
(iv) Judgment of 24 September 2002, Grundig Italiana, C-255/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:525 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=47690&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1018533); 
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(v) Judgment of 25 March 2004, Azienda Agricola Ettore Raffa and Others, C-482/00 
(Joined cases C-480/00, C-481/00, C-482/00, C-484/00, C-489/00, C-490/00, C-
491/00, C-498/00, C-499/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:179 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=49022&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1026789); 
(vi) Judgment of 13 April 2005, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission of the 
European Communities, T-2/03, ECLI:EU:T:2005:125 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=60314&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7409764);   
(vii) Judgment of 16 June 2005, Maria Pupino, C-105/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:386 (Grand 
Chamber) 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=59363&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7409325);   
(viii) Judgment of 22 June 2010, Melki & Abedi, C-188/10 ECLI:EU:C:2010:363 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80748&pageI
ndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7407421);   
(ix) Judgment of 14 February 2012, Flachglas Torgau v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-
204/09, ECLI:EU:C:2012:71 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119426&page
Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7408798);   
(x) Judgment of 19 December 2013, Fish Legal and Shirley v Information Commissioner, 
C-279/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:853 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145904&page
Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7409121);   
(xi) Judgment of 15 March 2018, North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Limited v. An Bord 
Pleanála, C 470/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:185 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=200265&page
Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7817550); and 
(xii) Judgment of 20 January 2021, Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Communications 
Internes), C-619/19, ECLI:EC:C:2021:35 
(https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=18145EB5575C3
BBA145C9614CB714BD3?text=&docid=236684&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1017760). 
5. Other materials include: 
(i) Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] 
UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 169, 
(https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd041021/kirin-1.htm); 
and 
(ii) the UNECE publication, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (2nd Ed., 
UN, 2014) at pp. 55-56 (https://unece.org/environment-policy/publications/aarhus-
convention-implementation-guide-second-edition). 
Domestic law 
6. The transposing legislation, the European Communities (Access to Information on the 
Environment) Regulations 2007 to 2014 are consolidated at 
https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2007/si/133/front/revised/en/html.   
7. It should be noted that the respondents’ website (https://www.ocei.ie/en/collection/148e9-
legislation/#aie-regulations, archived at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20240116224437/https://www.ocei.ie/en/collection/148e9-
legislation/#aie-regulations)  incorrectly references these regulations as the European Communities 
(Access to Information on the Environment) Regulations 2007 to 2018, merely because they were 
most recently amended in 2018.  This misunderstands the concept of a collective citation.  The 
amendment of an enactment does not in itself update the collective citation.  The latest collective 
citation was provided by the European Communities (Access to Information on the Environment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014 (S.I. No. 615 of 2014), art. 2, and remains the 2007 to 2014 
regulations.  The citation has not been updated since then, either by the 2018 regulations or 
otherwise.  Hence the title to the present proceedings in the originating notice of motion is incorrect 
by referring to a non-existent collective citation.  The referring court will make an order correcting 
this before matters go further.  
8. Article 6 allows the making of a request for information on the environment: 
“Request for environmental information  
6. (1) A request for environmental information shall—   
(a) be made in writing or electronic form,   
(b) state that the request is made under these Regulations,   
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(c) state the name, address and any other relevant contact details of the applicant,     
(d) state, in terms that are as specific as possible, the environmental information that is the 
subject of the request, and   
(e) if the applicant desires access to environmental information in a particular form or 
manner, specify the form or manner of access desired.   
(2) An applicant shall not be required to state his or her interest in making the request.” 
9. Insofar as Article 6(1)(c) of the 2007 regulations requires a “name” and “address”, the 
referring court is determining that as a matter of domestic law, and unless a conforming 
interpretation to the contrary is required by EU law, “name” means actual name and not a 
pseudonym, and “address” means a current physical address at which the requester may be 
contacted, although not necessarily a residential address. Details of an email address if any would 
arise only under the phrase “any other relevant contact details”.  
10. Article 7 provides for the mechanics of making an appeal: 
“Action on request  
7. (1) A public authority shall, notwithstanding any other statutory provision and subject 
only to these Regulations, make available to the applicant any environmental information, 
the subject of the request, held by, or for, the public authority.   
(2) (a) A public authority shall make a decision on a request and, where appropriate, make 
the information available to the applicant as soon as possible and, at the latest, but subject 
to paragraph (b) and subarticle (10), not later than one month from the date on which such 
request is received by the public authority concerned.   
(b) Where a public authority is unable, because of the volume or complexity of the 
environmental information requested, to make a decision within one month from the date 
on which such request is received, it shall, as soon as possible and at the latest, before the 
expiry of that month—   
(i) give notice in writing to the applicant of the reasons why it is not possible to do so, and   
(ii) specify the date, not later than 2 months from the date on which the request was 
received, by which the response shall be made, 
 and make a decision on the request and, where appropriate, make the information available 
to the applicant by the specified date.   
(3) (a) Where a request has been made to a public authority for access to environmental 
information in a particular form or manner, access shall be given in that form or manner 
unless—   
(i) the information is already available to the public in another form or manner that is easily 
accessible, or   
(ii) access in another form or manner would be reasonable.   
(b) Where a public authority decides to make available environmental information other than 
in the form or manner specified in the request, the reason therefore shall be given by the 
public authority in writing. 
(4) Where a decision is made to refuse, in whole or in part, a request for environmental 
information, the public authority concerned shall—   
(a) subject to paragraph (b), notify the applicant of the decision not later than one month 
following receipt of the request,   
(b) in a case to which sub-article (2)(b) applies, notify the applicant as soon as possible but 
not later than 2 months following receipt of the request,   
(c) specify the reasons for the refusal,   
(d) inform the applicant of his or her rights of internal review and appeal in accordance with 
these Regulations, including the time within which such rights may be exercised.   
(5) Where a request is made to a public authority and the information requested is not held 
by or for the authority concerned, that authority shall inform the applicant as soon as 
possible that the information is not held by or for it.   
(6) Where sub-article (5) applies and the public authority concerned is aware that the 
information requested is held by another public authority, it shall as soon as possible—   
(a) transfer the request to the other public authority and inform the applicant accordingly, 
or   
(b) inform the applicant of the public authority to whom it believes the request should be 
directed.   
(7) Where a request is made to a public authority which could reasonably be regarded as a 
request for environmental information but which is not a request that has been made in 
accordance with—   
(a) article 6(1), or   
(b) the Freedom of Information Acts 1997 and 2003,   
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the public authority concerned shall inform the applicant of his or her right of access to 
environmental information and the procedure by which that right can be exercised, and shall 
offer assistance to the applicant in this regard.   
(8) Where a request is made by the applicant in too general a manner, the public authority 
shall, as soon as possible and at the latest within one month of receipt of the request, invite 
the applicant to make a more specific request and offer assistance to the applicant in the 
preparation of such a request. 
(9) Where, in a request for information on factors affecting or likely to affect the 
environment, the applicant specifies that he or she requires information on the measurement 
procedures, including methods of analysis, sampling and pretreatment of samples, used in 
compiling that information, the public authority shall, as Article 8(2) of the Directive requires, 
either make the information available to the applicant or refer the applicant to the 
standardised procedures.   
(10) A public authority shall, in the performance of its functions under this article, have 
regard to any timescale specified by the applicant.   
(11) Where a request is made for information which has been provided to the public authority 
on a voluntary basis by a third party and, in the opinion of the public authority, release of 
the information may adversely affect the third party, the public authority shall take all 
reasonable efforts to contact the third party concerned to seek consent or otherwise to 
release the information, pursuant to article 8(a)(ii) and article 10.” 
11.  Hence, where no decision is made on a request within the statutory time limit, the request 
is in principle deemed to be refused: for examples see Friends of the Irish Environment v. 
Commissioner for Environmental Information [2019] IEHC 597, [2019] 5 JIC 2108 (O’Regan J.); 
Right to Know CLG v. Commissioner for Environmental Information [2022] IESC 19, [2023] 1 
I.L.R.M. 122, [2022] 4 JIC 2902 (Baker J.). 
12. Article 11 provides for internal review.  The terms of engagement on which such review can 
happen are as follows: 
“11. (1) Where the applicant’s request has been refused under article 7, in whole or in part, 
the applicant may, not later than one month following receipt of the decision of the public 
authority concerned, request the public authority to review the decision, in whole or in part.   
(2) Following receipt of a request for a review under sub-article (1), the public authority 
concerned shall designate a person unconnected with the original decision whose rank is the 
same as, or higher than, that of the original decision-maker to review the decision and that 
person shall—   
(a) affirm, vary or annul the decision, and   
(b) where appropriate, require the public authority to make available environmental 
information to the applicant,    
in accordance with these Regulations.” 
13. Article 12 provides for appeal to the Commissioner.  Sub-para. (3) provides for the scope of 
jurisdiction: 
“(3) Where—   
(a) a decision of a public authority has been affirmed, in whole or in part, under article 11, 
or   
(b) a person other than the applicant, including a third party, would be incriminated  by the 
disclosure of the environmental information concerned,   
the applicant, the person other than the applicant or third party may appeal to the 
Commissioner against the decision of the public authority concerned.” 
14. Domestic caselaw relevant to answering the questions includes: 
(i) Murphy v. The Law Society [2010] IEHC 175, [2010] 5 JIC 1002, (Kearns P.); 
(ii) Kelly v. Information Commissioner [2014] IEHC 479, [2014] 10 JIC 0701 (O’Malley 
J.); 
(iii) National Asset Management Agency v. Commissioner for Environmental Information 
[2015] IESC 51, [2015] 4 I.R. 626, [2015] 2 I.L.R.M. 165, [2015] 6 JIC 2301 
(O’Donnell J.);   
(iv) Minch v. Commissioner for Environmental Information [2017] IECA 223, [2017] 7 
JIC 2807 (Hogan J.); 
(v) Right to Know v. Commissioner for Environmental Information [2020] IEHC 228, 
[2020] 2 JIC 2808 (Meenan J.); 
(vi) Redmond & Anor v. Commissioner for Environmental Information [2020] IECA 83 
[2021] 3 I.R. 695, [2020] 4 JIC 0306 (Collins J.);    
(vii) Right to Know v. An Taoiseach [2020] IEHC 228, [2020] 2 JIC 2808 (Meenan  J.); 
(viii) Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 610, [2021] 10 JIC 0406; 
(ix) Grange v. Information Commissioner [2022] IECA 153 (Haughton J.);   
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(x) Right to Know v. An Taoiseach [2023] IECA 68 (Faherty J.); and  
(xi) Coillte Cuideachta Ghniomhaiochta Ainmnithe v. Commissioner for Environmental 
Information (No. 1) [2023] IEHC 640. 
15. In terms of academic material, in a paper on the German AIE legislation (known as UIG) 
available at https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/7701-anhang-a-rechtsgutachten-
20200923_konvertiert/, (Umweltforschungsplan des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz, 
Bau und Reaktorsicherheit Forschungskennzahl [3716 17 103 0] UBA-FB-00 [trägt die UBA-
Bibliothek ein] Evaluation des Umweltinformationsgesetzes (UIG) Analyse der Anwendung der 
Regelungen des UIG und Erschließung von Optimierungspotentialen für einen ungehinderten und 
einfachen Zugang zu Umweltinformationen Anhang A: Rechtsgutachten von Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. 
Thomas Schomerus RiOVG, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg für das Unabhängiges Institut für 
Umweltfragen (UfU) e.V., Greifswalder Straße 4, 10405 Berlin unter Mitarbeit von Karl Stracke, 
Unabhängiges Institut für Umweltfragen e.V.Berlin, Lüneburg, Januar 2020 Im Auftrag des 
Umweltbundesamtes), the learned authors refer to both views on the question.   
Facts 
16. A requester (probably singular but possibly plural) engaged in a sustained exercise of writing 
to Coillte by way of a very large number of probably anonymised or pseudonymised requests in 
identical or near identical format between 13th March and 30th May, 2022 seeking access to 
information on the environment.  No physical addresses were provided.  The names are generally 
inspired by film characters played by prominent actors, with a focus on American cinema from the 
1980s onwards. 
17. Earlier requests from requesters using some of the names used by the requesters in these 
proceedings had been processed in the normal way by the appellant because, at that juncture, they 
appeared to be typical or one-off requests. It is only when the significant numbers of anonymous / 
pseudonymous requests of similar style, type and phraseology and approach began to be received 
by the appellant from 10th March, 2022 onwards that this issue became apparent. It was at that 
point that the appellant became aware of what appears to be an organised campaign and took steps 
to verify the identity of requesters.  
18. Between 10th March, 2022 and 7th June, 2022, the appellant received 130 verified and 
anonymised / pseudonymised requests. This equates to just over 2 voluminous AIE requests 
received per working day during March to May 2022 (62 working days) with a further 1 received in 
June, 2022. Since 7th June, 2022 the appellant has received no new anonymised / pseudonymised 
requests. This pattern makes it likely in the view of the appellant and the referring court that these 
requests all originate from a single source and / or form part of a co-ordinated campaign because 
they all abruptly ceased at the same time.  
19. The impacts on the appellant’s operations were serious. In addition to significant expenditure 
of management time and resources, the appellant increased the AIE Team from 0.5 staff FTE (full-
time equivalent) to 3.5 staff FTE.  
20. The appellant formed the view, reasonably so in the opinion of the referring court, that the 
requests the subject matter of these proceedings are not designed to elicit environmental 
information and appear to be a part of a wider campaign engaged in by persons unknown for 
questionable motives. The campaign has very significant implications for the appellant’s operations 
and has the effect of diverting time and resources away from genuine requests for environmental 
information with attendant delays and frustration for genuine applicants looking to utilise the 
machinery provided by the AIE Regulations in order to access information on the environment. 
21. The Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (DAFM) also received a huge spike in 
requests in 2022, in circumstances where the same apparently pseudonymous name was used as 
was the case with Coillte.  The evidence shows that DAFM received an annual average of about 167 
requests for access to information on the environment in the 3-year period 2019 to 2021 inclusive 
ranging from 69 in 2019 to 290 in 2021. Typically, 50-70% of these requests related to forestry 
matters. During that 3-year period there was a total of 23 referrals to the Office of the Commissioner 
of Environmental Information (OCEI) of which 18 related to forestry matters.  The number of AIE 
requests increased to 32,297 in 2022 of which 30,630 related to forestry matters. Some 105 of the 
latter were referred to the OCEI. Many of the requests were made in the names of film characters 
(similar to the experience of the appellant) and of Hazel Wood and Willy Wonka, a fictional character 
in Roald Dahl’s novel, Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (1964), definitively portrayed by Gene 
Wilder in the 1971 film version.   
22. The evidence from the Department, which the referring court accepts, establishes that a 
trend emerged whereby DAFM received numerous requests from one of these names for a period of 
time which was then replaced by a new name but asking for very similar information.  Anonymous 
AIE requests and / or the use of pseudonyms by requesters is a source of concern for DAFM as 
experience has shown that anonymity can be utilised by some requesters to intentionally abuse the 
AIE process to taunt DAFM staff and cause operational disruption. This is apparent from an AIE 
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request received from a requester calling themselves Willy Wonka. Mr Wonka made 745 individual 
requests between 29th September, 2022 and 4th October, 2022 - a period that covers 4 working 
days. These requests were made by email only and contained abusive and disparaging remarks 
about DAFM staff members. As DAFM was considering his requests “Willy Wonka” withdrew them on 
12th October, 2022 offering the observation “Boo Hoo”, only to resubmit them again on 17th 
October, 2022 with all the attendant administration implications for the DAFM. It became clear at 
this point that this requester had little or no legitimate interest in the information they were 
purporting to seek and instead appeared to be more interested in using the AIE process to undermine 
DAFM operations and frustrate DAFM staff.    
23. Generally, Coillte replied to these requests by seeking a (current) address from the 
applicants, and confirmation that the names were the applicants’ actual (legal) names.  The referring 
court finds as a fact that in the circumstances, Coillte formed the reasonable view that there was a 
prima facie question over the genuineness of information regarding his or her identity provided by 
the applicants. The referring court further finds that given the quantity of requests made, the public 
authority concerned acted reasonably for the purposes of determining whether the requests were 
manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests made 
by the same applicant, 
24. Coillte therefore sought confirmation as to the applicant’s actual name and/or a current 
physical address.  The referring court finds on the facts and in the absence of contrary evidence that 
this exercise was for the purpose of verifying the identity of the applicant, and not for the purpose 
of determining the interest of the applicant.  There is no evidence to the effect that the provision of 
the actual name and/or current physical address of an applicant could indirectly create the potential 
for inference or speculation on the part of the public authority or otherwise as to the interest if any 
of the applicant referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive.  However one could not rule out the 
potential for inference or speculation as a theoretical possibility.  
25. None of this information was provided. Accordingly, Coillte regarded each of the requests as 
incomplete and invalid, none of the purported requesters received the information sought within the 
one-month timeframe set out in domestic law.   
26. In total Coillte received 97 apparently anonymised / pseudonymised AIE requests, all of 
which were rejected as invalid. 
27. The requesters then issued a request to Coillte to carry out an internal review.  Again Coillte 
sought contact details and asked the requesters to “confirm that the name given by you in your 
application is your actual legal name” or to “provide [Coillte] with your actual name” and to “state 
your current address”.  Coillte advised the requesters that it was not asking them to state why they 
were making the request but was “simply asking...for confirmation of your name and address” and 
that “unless and until [Coillte] receive[d] the information sought above, your request will not be 
processed”. These requests were again ignored so the applications for internal reviews were in effect 
rejected as invalid.  
28. Of the various rejections, 81 were appealed to the Commissioner between 13th June and 
4th July, 2022.  The Commissioner addressed on the first 58 cases received en bloc, with a further 
23 cases currently remaining to be decided upon. 
29. The Commissioner sought further submissions in relation to the appeals from both Coillte 
and the requesters. Coillte made a submission on 29th July, 2022 on foot of a number of questions 
posed by the Commissioner but, despite a request to that effect, was not provided with sight of the 
submissions made by the requesters.    
30. The outcome was an omnibus decision on 29th August, 2022 which is identified by the 
Commissioner as “Case Number OCE-124853-T4T4P0, [PLUS 57 OTHER CASES]”.  The 
Commissioner decided that he did have jurisdiction to consider the appeal and that Coillte was not 
justified in treating the requests as invalid under article 6(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations.  
Procedural history 
31. The matter comes before the referring court as an appeal on a point of law under art. 13(1) 
of the 2007 regulations and by originating notice of motion in accordance with Order 84C r. 2(1) 
RSC. 
32. The proceedings were initiated on  27th October, 2022.  A hearing date of  14th November, 
2023 was fixed.  The matter was heard on that date and judgment was reserved.  Judgment was 
delivered by the referring court on 22nd November, 2023 to the effect that the court would in 
principle refer certain questions to the CJEU.   
33. On 11th December, 2023, Ireland and the Attorney General were added as notice parties 
and Right to Know CLG was added as an amicus curiae on its own application, the existing parties 
being relatively neutral on that issue, on the basis of usual amicus terms under Eco Advocacy CLG 
v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 265, [2021] 10 JIC 0406 including generally seeking to minimise 
costs.   The State was permitted to file an affidavit prior to finalisation of the order for reference and 
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was afforded time for submissions on the questions referred.   On 22nd December, 2023, the State 
indicated that it would not be filing a further affidavit. 
34. The parties all delivered written submissions on the proposed questions.  While the referring 
court was initially minded to refer a question regarding the correctness of certain reservations in 
domestic caselaw regarding the right of a domestic court or tribunal to refer issues notwithstanding 
a domestic judgment of a higher court, in fact it was apparent from the respondent’s submission on 
the questions that it was not particularly making an issue of the right to refer the questions 
notwithstanding a judgment of an appellate court.  Thus the proposed question on that issue does 
not currently appear necessary.  However the question can be revisited in a future case or at a future 
time should anyone seek to make an issue of it.  In that regard the referring court can record its 
endorsement of the amicus curiae’s submission regarding any contrary domestic rule of stare decisis: 
“... a national court is required to disapply such a rule.  
This is based on a long line of consistent Court of Justice case law which confirms that the 
discretion to refer questions to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU is autonomous 
and cannot be constrained or qualified by national rules such as stare decisis. For example 
in Case 166/73 [Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel] the Court of Justice held: 
‘4. It follows that national Courts have the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court 
of Justice if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving 
interpretation, or consideration of the validity of provisions, of provisions of Community Law 
necessitating a decision on their part. 
It follows from these factors that a rule of national law whereby a court is bound on points 
of law by rulings of a superior court cannot deprive the inferior courts of their power to refer 
to the Court questions of interpretation of Community law involving such rulings.  
It would be otherwise if the questions put by the inferior court were substantially the same 
as questions already put by the superior court. 
On the other hand the inferior court must be free, if it considers that the ruling on law made 
by the superior court could lead it to give a judgment contrary to Community law, to refer 
to the Court questions which concern it. 
If inferior courts were bound without being able to refer matters to the Court, the jurisdiction 
of the latter to give preliminary rulings and the application of Community law at all levels of 
the judicial systems of Member States would be compromised. 
5. The reply must therefore be that the existence of a rule of domestic law whereby a court 
is bound on points of law by the ruling of the court superior to it cannot of itself take away 
the power provided by Article [267 [ex 177]] of referring cases to the Court.’ 
A further example is Case C-416/10, Križan: 
‘A rule of national law, pursuant to which legal rulings of a higher court bind another national 
court, cannot take away from the latter court the discretion to refer to the Court of Justice 
questions of interpretation of the points of European Union law concerned by such legal 
rulings. That court must be free, if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling could lead it 
to deliver a judgment contrary to European Union law, to refer to the Court of Justice 
questions which concern it.’” 
35. In the foregoing circumstances, the referring court is staying the proceedings and referring 
the questions below to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
The first question 
36. The first question is: 
Does the word “request” in Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/4 read in the light of 
Article 4(1) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 
25 June 1998 mean only a request that is valid by reference to the Directive and 
by reference to the transposing domestic law of the member state concerned? 
37. The appellant’s proposed answer is that the question should be answered in the affirmative.  
The Directive clearly envisages that, in circumstances where the scheme of the Directive did not 
define the requirements for a valid request, it was to be left to the Member States to identify the 
relevant requirements. This is made express in Recital 15: “Member States should determine the 
practical arrangements under which such information is effectively made available” and Article 
3(5)(c) of the Directive.  The requirement in Article 6(1) of the AIE Regulations for applicants to 
provide a name and address is entirely consistent with Article 3(5)(c) of the Directive. The 
requirement for a name and address imposes no cognisable burden on bona fide applicants and is 
entirely consistent with the requirement to determine the practical arrangements for the effective 
exercise of the right of access to environmental information. 
38. The respondent’s proposed answer is that having regard to the objectives of the Aarhus 
Convention, Directive 2003/4 and the regulations which give effect to them in Irish law, the concept 
8 
 
 
 
of “request” in Articles 3 to 6 of Directive 2003/4 cannot be interpreted in such a way to undermine 
the wide right of access to environmental information and the right of access to justice in respect of 
such access provided for under the Directive. 
39. The State’s proposed answer is that the obligation on Member States and public authorities 
to make available environmental information only exists “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Directive” (Article 3(1) of the Directive).  As has been observed, the right of access to environmental 
information “applies only to the extent that the information requested satisfies the requirements for 
public access laid down by that directive…” (Case C-279/12 Fish Legal and Shirley v Information 
Commissioner at §39, C-619/19 Land Baden Wurtenberg v JD at §29 and §30.   The provisions of 
the Directive obviously include Article 3(5)(c), which requires Member States to ensure that “the 
practical arrangements are defined for ensuring that the right of access to environmental information 
can be effectively exercised”. That is reflected in Recital 15 which requires Member States to 
“determine the practical arrangements under which information is effectively made available”.  It 
follows that a request for environmental information must be made in accordance with the Directive 
and any relevant national transposing legislation setting out the “practical arrangements” envisaged 
by Article 3(5)(c).  It is noted that the Commissioner has not directly addressed the question posed 
by the Court but, instead, has suggested that the concept of “request” cannot “be interpreted in 
such a way to undermine the wide right of access to environmental information and the right of 
access to justice in respect of such access provided for under the Directive”. This submission is not 
understood. A conclusion that a request must be made in accordance with the minimal procedural 
requirements of the Directive and national implementing legislation could not be seen to undermine 
the right of access to environmental information or the right of access to justice. Instead, an 
acknowledgement that a request must be made in accordance with the requirements of the Directive 
and national implementing legislation gives effect to the Directive and ensures that only those 
requests which fall within the scope of the Directive are required to be considered by public 
authorities.  
40. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is a qualified yes. The word request means a request 
that is valid by reference to the Directive. However, it is impermissible for a Member State to impose 
additional validity requirements, for example by requiring that the applicant provide an actual (legal) 
name or a (current) address in every case. While it may be the case that for practical purposes, 
some or all of this information is required to facilitate making available environmental information, 
it is not required for a valid request to be made. 
41. The referring court’s proposed answer is Yes.  The term “request” can only mean a valid 
request.  The validity of a request depends on compliance both with the Directive and with valid 
transposing legislation. 
42. The relevance of the question is that domestic law (article 6 of the 2007 regulations as set 
out above) prescribes certain formal requirements for a request including a statement of name and 
address.  As the requests do not comply with the 2007 regulations on their normal interpretation 
based in domestic law, the requests are invalid for failure to state valid names and addresses within 
the meaning of domestic law (that is real names and physical addresses) unless a conforming 
interpretation is required or, if that is not possible, unless the court is required to disapply those 
regulations.    
The second question 
43. The second question is: 
Does the word “applicant” in Article 2(5) of Directive 2003/4 read in the light of 
inter alia Article 4(1)(b) and/or Article 6(1) and/or (2) and/or Articles 2(5) and 
4(1) and (3)(b) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus 
on 25 June 1998 mean a natural or legal person identified by their actual name 
and/or a current physical address, as opposed to an anonymous or pseudonymous 
person and/or an applicant whose contact details are identified by email only? 
44. The appellant’s proposed answer is that the question should be answered on the basis that 
the term “applicant” means a natural or legal person identified by their actual name and/or a current 
physical address. The concept of a “request” does not appear as a defined term in the AIE Directive, 
nor are there any requirements set out in the Directive as to the format of a request. Instead, Article 
3(1) of the Directive simply states that “Member States shall ensure that public authorities are 
required, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, to make available environmental 
information held by or for them to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an 
interest”. Significantly, however, an applicant is defined in the Directive as “any natural or legal 
person requesting environmental information” (see also Recital 8 of the Directive) and the only 
exceptions to the requirement to provide environmental information to an applicant, at their request, 
are contained in Article 4 of the Directive. The fact that under Article 6 of the AIE Regulations a 
public authority was entitled to seek the name of that natural and legal person or ensure that a 
9 
 
 
 
request was not being submitted by someone, or something, other than a natural or legal person, 
in the name of a fictional person or someone using a pseudonym or nom de plume, is fully consistent 
with the requirements of Article 3(1) of the Directive and the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3(1) 
of the Directive. If the Directive purported to extend the right of access to pseudonymous individuals 
or to unincorporated associations, it would have said so and/or dispensed with the reference to 
“natural or legal persons”.  This is particularly the case where, as identified by the referring court, 
the 2007 regulations and the Directive envisage that the ultimate resolution of disputes in relation 
to the proceedings will be via court proceedings, participation in which must be on the basis of the 
provision of an actual name and a physical address.  On this basis, it is inconceivable that the 
legislative scheme envisaged that an applicant could be entitled to request information and seek an 
internal review using a pseudonym, in circumstances where they would then have to participate with 
their actual name and address in relation to any Court proceedings. 
45. The respondent’s proposed answer is that neither the provisions of the Directive nor the 
provisions of the Convention impose any requirement that a natural or legal person must provide, 
and/or be identified, by their actual name and a current physical address in order to make a request 
for access to environmental information. 
46. The State’s proposed answer is that Article 3(1) of the Directive defines the right of access 
to environmental information by reference to requests for such access to environmental information 
made by “an applicant”.  Article 2(5) of the Directive defines an applicant as “any natural or legal 
person requesting environmental information”. Similarly the “public” is defined by Article 2(6) as 
“one or more natural or legal persons, and in accordance with national legislation or practice, their 
associations, organisations or groups”. Those Articles are reflected in Recital 8 to the Directive which 
states that “it is necessary to ensure that any natural and legal person has a right of access to 
environmental information held by or for public authorities without his having to state an interest”. 
As the Directive only provides for a right of access to environmental information for natural or legal 
persons, it follows that a request must be made by a natural or legal person.  This in turn implies a 
requirement to provide an actual name and/or physical address so as to enable the public authority 
to confirm that the request is made by a natural or legal person. The Directive does not operate to 
permit the submission of anonymous or pseudonymous requests. This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that Article 6 of the Directive provides for a right of access to justice, including access to a 
review procedure before a court of all or other independent and impartial body established by law 
in which the acts or omissions of the public authority concerned can be reviewed and whose decision 
may become final. Article 6(2) also provides for access to legal recourse for “third parties 
incriminated by the disclosure of information”. The rights pursuant to Article 6 could not be 
vindicated where requests for access to environmental information are made on an anonymous or 
pseudonymous basis.   
47. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is that the word applicant includes anonymous or 
pseudonymous persons and persons whose contact details are identified by email only.  Article 2(5) 
of Directive 2003/4 defines “applicant” as “any natural or legal person requesting environmental 
information.” Since no reference is made to national law in the definition it must be given an 
autonomous EU-law definition.  It is clear from the Directive that environmental information may be 
made available in many different forms and in a variety of manners. The Directive uses the neutral 
term “made available” and not words such as sent, posted, transmitted etc. Therefore information 
can be made available in a variety of ways, many of which do not require identifying the applicant 
or the need for their physical address or indeed even an email address. For example, environmental 
information may be made available to an applicant in the offices of a public authority (either by way 
of inspection or collection), online through a website or a download, by email, through an agent, to 
a PO box etc.  There may be good reason for an applicant to remain anonymous or pseudonymous. 
For example, they may be a whistleblower, a journalist, a client of a lawyer or someone who fears 
penalisation, persecution or harassment for exercising their Aarhus Convention rights and ought to 
be protected per Article 3(8) of the Aarhus Convention.  
48. The referring court’s proposed answer is Yes.  The conferral of rights on natural and legal 
persons by the directive inherently involves the consequence that the applicant must furnish an 
actual name and/or physical address to establish an entitlement to be treated as an applicant.  
Furthermore the fact that disputes under the 2007 regulations will come before a court, as has 
happened in the main proceedings, renders it necessary that the interested parties should be 
identifiable by the minimum information required to participate in proceedings.  The absence of that 
information here has led to the unsatisfactory position of having no alternative but to name John or 
Jane Doe as pseudonymous notice parties. 
49. The relevance of the question is that if the answer is Yes, the appeal should be allowed 
because the requester(s) failed to furnish information as to their real names and physical addresses.  
The third question 
50. The third question is: 
10 
 
 
 
If the answer to the second question is No, does Article 3(1) and/or (5)(c) of 
Directive 2003/4 read in the light of Article 4(1) of the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 1998 have the effect of 
precluding national legislation that requires an applicant to furnish his or her 
actual name and/or current physical address in order to make a request? 
51. The appellant’s proposed answer is that the question should be answered in the negative. 
Strictly speaking, the Directive does not require the provision of a name and address from applicants 
requesting environmental information. Rather, it requires that the applicant be a natural or legal 
person and leaves the practical measures for the implementation of the Directive to the Member 
State. Ireland has exercised that discretion in a manner that is consistent with the Directive in 
requiring the provision of a name and address. Neither Article 3(1) nor 5(c) of the Directive in any 
way trench on that analysis. The right of access is not dependent on having an interest, but it is 
dependent on being a qualified and/or identifiable applicant.  The concepts of having an interest and 
being a qualified and/or identifiable applicant are distinct, and the AIE Regulations correctly seek 
evidence to substantiate the latter while correctly disavowing any interest in the former.  The 
requirement to provide a name and address is not a barrier to effective access – in these 
proceedings, it is clear that it in fact operates as a positive tool to facilitate access by giving public 
authorities the ability to identify manifestly unreasonable requests and therefore facilitate quick and 
efficient access for genuine and qualified applicants.  Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention does not 
add anything to the analysis. It specifically identifies that information on the environment has to be 
made available “within the framework of national legislation” and repeats the stipulation (already 
reflected and present in both the Directive and the AIE Regulations) that it is not necessary to state 
an interest.   
52. The respondent’s proposed answer is Yes, the relevant provisions of the Convention and the 
Directive – which provide for a wide right of access to environmental information and, in recital (15) 
of the Directive make it clear that practical arrangements for access shall guarantee that the 
information is effectively and easily accessible and progressively becomes available – preclude 
national legislation that requires, or is interpreted as requiring, an applicant to furnish his, her or its 
actual name and current physical address in order to make a request. 
53. The State’s proposed answer is that the Directive does have the effect that an applicant is 
required to furnish an actual name and/or physical address.  As also set out above, Member States 
are required by Article 3(5)(c) to put in place “practical arrangements under which environmental 
information” is made available.  In this respect, the Directive does not identify all the practical 
arrangements which are to be put in place by Member States, nor does it contain the detailed 
procedural rules for the implementation of the rights which are the subject of the Directive. 
Consequently, it is for the Member States to determine those rules, subject to the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness (see, for example, Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana SpA at §33).  
Member States are therefore entitled to put in place national procedural rules to ensure that the 
right of access to environmental information (and all associated rights) is only exercised by a natural 
or legal person. That includes a requirement that a person provide their name and address to the 
public authority which is directly related to the question of whether a natural or legal person has 
made the request for environmental information. The requirement to provide a name and address 
gives effect to the requirement of the Directive that a request be made by a natural or legal person 
within the meaning of Article 2.  
54. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is that Directive 2003/4 precludes national legislation 
that requires an applicant to furnish his or her actual name and/or current physical address in order 
to make a request.  The detailed reasons set out above under the second question also apply to this 
question. 
55. The referring court’s proposed answer is that this question does not arise because the answer 
to the second question is Yes, but if it does arise the answer is No.  In accordance with the principle 
of national procedural autonomy, there is nothing inherently contrary to the aims of the Directive in 
a member state opting to transpose it in a manner that envisages the provision by requesters of 
their names and addresses so as to verify that they are the natural or legal persons on whom rights 
of applicants are conferred (as opposed to, for example, requests produced by artificial intelligence 
or by unincorporated bodies). 
56. The relevance of the question is that the requests did not comply with national legislation in 
its ordinary meaning.  If the national legislation in its ordinary meaning is not preluded by EU law 
then the requests must be rejected as invalid.   
The fourth question 
57. The fourth question is: 
If the answer to the second question is No, and the answer to the third question in 
general is Yes, does Directive 2003/4 read in the light of Article 4 of the Convention 
11 
 
 
 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 1998 have the effect 
that where a public authority forms the reasonable view that there is a prima facie 
question over the genuineness of information regarding his or her identity 
provided by an applicant, the public authority is precluded from seeking 
confirmation as to the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address, 
for the purpose of verifying the identity of the applicant, and not for the purpose 
of determining the interest of the applicant, even if the provision of the actual 
name and/or current physical address of an applicant could indirectly create the 
potential for inference or speculation on the part of the public authority or 
otherwise as to the interest if any of the applicant referred to in Article 3(1) of the 
Directive? 
58. The appellant’s proposed answer is that the limitation in the Directive that confines 
applicants to a natural or legal person (as opposed to a pseudonym, an AI-generated request or an 
unincorporated association) and the latitude accorded to Member States to provide for the practical 
mechanisms to determine the implementation of the Directive, transposed by inter alia Article 
6(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations in Ireland, necessarily connotes a jurisdiction vested in the public 
authority to make reasonable enquiries in the event that there is a prima facie question over the 
genuineness of the identity-information submitted by an applicant for environmental information.  If 
this was not the case, then applicants could provide clearly inaccurate information (e.g. Willy Wonka 
c/o The Chocolate Factory) but which nominally complied with the practical mechanisms provided 
by a Member State in order to transpose Article 3(1) of the Directive. It would be destructive of the 
purpose of the Directive if public authorities, uniquely in the context of the Directive, were precluded 
from making basic and reasonable enquiries, where these prima facie suggested themselves to be 
appropriate, in order to establish the veracity of identifying information submitted.  The two issues 
are conceptually distinct, and the Directive is unequivocal that under no circumstances is an 
applicant required to state or have any or any particular interest in the information requested. That 
position has been restated in Flachglas Torgau (§31) and Fish Legal (§36) and even if, 
counterintuitively, a public authority used information relating to identity to speculate as to the 
interest of the applicant, any such speculation would be necessarily irrelevant to processing of the 
request and could, in no circumstances, provide a basis for a refusal of the request. 
59. The respondent’s proposed answer is that in circumstances where the Directive seeks to 
ensure a wide right of access for the public to environmental information, expressly provides that 
an applicant may make a request without stating an interest and does not make provision for the 
verification of the identity of requesters, it must be interpreted as precluding any measures of 
Member State law which would serve to undermine the right of access (for example, by imposing 
additional requirements and obligations on applicants requesting access which could deter or 
dissuade applicants from making such requests). In the event that a public authority has reasonable 
concerns regarding possible misuse or abuse of the regime for access to environmental information, 
such concerns are properly addressed within the context of the exceptions available under Article 4 
of the Directive, including in particular Article 4(1)(b). 
60. The State’s proposed answer is that the question as framed may conflate aspects of the 
Directive which are not relevant to each other. The Directive creates a right of access to 
environmental information which can be exercised by natural and legal persons. There is nothing in 
the Directive which precludes a public authority from confirming that a request is made by a natural 
or legal person. The entitlement to verify that a request complies with the requirements of the 
Directive is an inherent feature of the legal regime established by the Directive. To find otherwise 
would be to suggest that the requests for environmental information should be processed otherwise 
than in accordance with the Directive and that the right of access to environmental information 
extends beyond that which has been established by the Directive. Further, it prevents abuse of the 
right of access to information and permits public authorities to refuse requests where they are 
manifestly made by fictional characters (e.g. Willy Wonka).  The legal regime established by the 
Directive includes the principle that a request for environmental information can be made without a 
person having to state an interest (see Recital 8 and Article 3(1), Case C-204/09 Flachglas Torgau 
at §31, Fish Legal at §36). That a request can be made without having to state an interest does not 
preclude a public authority being entitled to verify the identity of the requester. The identity of a 
requester and whether they have an interest in the request are entirely separate things. While the 
former goes to the question of whether they meet the criteria in the Directive to make a request, 
the latter is irrelevant to the entitlement to make a request and to the manner in which a request 
would be processed by a public authority. Whether the disclosure of an identity or physical address 
would permit speculation as to the interest of the requester is also irrelevant as this is not a factor 
which can be considered by the public authority in the consideration of a request for environmental 
information.  It is noted that the Commissioner suggests that permitting public authorities to verify 
12 
 
 
 
the identity of requesters would undermine the right of access to environmental information. There 
are three difficulties with that suggestion.  First, it implies that public authorities are not entitled to 
confirm that a request is made in accordance with the legal regime established by the Directive. 
That is obviously incorrect.  Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the right of access to 
environmental information has been or would be undermined by public authorities being permitted 
to verify that the requirements of the Directive are met. The basis of this assertion by the 
Commissioner is unclear. Third, and finally, the suggestion that concerns about the abuse of the 
legal regime established by the Directive can be addressed by the use of exceptions conflates the 
question of whether a request is made in accordance with the Directive and the application of 
exemptions to an individual request. These are distinct matters and while in some instances it may 
be appropriate for a public authority to invoke Article 4(1)(b), the existence of exemptions does not 
address the logically prior question of whether a request is made in accordance with the Directive. 
61. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is that Directive 2003/4 has the effect that where a 
public authority forms a reasonable view that there is a prima facie question over the genuineness 
of information regarding his or her identity provided by an applicant it is nonetheless precluded from 
seeking confirmation of the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address, for the 
purpose of verifying the identity of the applicant, and in fact the public authority is precluded from 
forming this view in the first place.  Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4 provides that environmental 
information must be made available to an applicant without the applicant having to state an interest. 
Therefore, the duty on a public authority to make available environmental information does not 
depend on who the applicant is or where they live or are established.  Neither Directive 2003/4 nor 
the AIE Regulations give an express power to a public authority to request information from an 
applicant to verify their identity or address.  There is no other basis under Directive 2003/4 for a 
public authority even to consider the genuineness of the information regarding the applicant’s 
identity or residence let alone to seek confirmation of an actual name and/or address, particularly 
given that it is not necessary to provide this information in the first place. 
62. The referring court’s proposed answer is that this does not arise because the answer to the 
second question is Yes and to the third question is No, but if it does arise the answer is No.  The 
general doctrine of abuse of rights applies here.  Provision of false or incomplete information 
constitutes abuse of rights.  Such an abuse, as here, can require the waste of public resources, delay 
to genuine requests for information, and may demoralise public officials, including junior officials, 
especially where accompanied by abuse of such officials as was the case in the requests to DAFM 
which were in the view of the referring court more likely than not to have been co-ordinated with 
the requests in the main proceedings.  If a public authority has reasonable grounds to suspect such 
abuse it may request further information.  The fact that such information could conceivably result in 
speculation as to the interest of the requester is irrelevant. If the public authority was precluded 
from making such inquiries, then the practical scope of the Directive would be expanded beyond 
what had been enacted by the European legislature, and the limitation of rights to natural and legal 
persons would lack meaning and enforceability.  
63. The relevance of the question is that if the appellant was entitled to request further 
information then the failure of the requester(s) to furnish that information rendered the dismissal of 
the requests lawful.   
The fifth question 
64. The fifth question is: 
If the answer to the second question is No, and the answer to the third question in 
general is Yes, does Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive read in the light of Article 
4(3)(b) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 
25 June 1998 have the effect that a public authority is precluded from seeking 
confirmation as to the applicant’s actual name and/or a current physical address, 
for the purposes of determining whether a given request is manifestly 
unreasonable by reference to the volume, nature and frequency of other requests 
made by the same applicant, and not for the purpose of determining the interest 
of the applicant, even if the provision of the actual name and/or current physical 
address of an applicant could indirectly create the potential for inference or 
speculation on the part of the public authority or otherwise as to the interest if any 
of the applicant referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive? 
65. The appellant’s proposed answer is that the scheme of the Directive is clear.  It allows for 
qualifying applicants to be refused environmental information if, in the view of the public authority 
the request is manifestly unreasonable (and any such view being subject to internal review, appeal 
to the Commissioner and, on appeal on a point of law, to judicial determination). It does not allow 
a qualifying applicant to be refused access to environmental information on the basis of the presence 
or absence of any interest in the environmental information sought. Information adduced in respect 
13 
 
 
 
of the identity of the applicant may legitimately be relevant to the question as to whether any issue 
of manifest unreasonableness arises. For example, if one individual had hypothetically submitted 3, 
30, 300, 3,000 or 30,000 near-identical requests, each such factual scenario might give rise to 
differing, and legitimate, considerations as to whether Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive was engaged 
in respect of those requests, particularly if the requests might be coming from the same individual, 
but using different pseudonyms so as to disguise the unreasonable number/nature/complexity of 
the requests that they alone were submitting. The interest or the reason for those requests having 
been made is, however, completely irrelevant in each of those scenarios and is a matter that is 
outside the bounds of any decision for the purposes of Article 4(1)(b), and any speculation or 
inference that might be drawn could never form a proper basis for a conclusion of manifest 
unreasonableness or a refusal of access for the purposes of the Directive. It would be a remarkable 
conclusion if a public authority was denied a jurisdiction to make reasonable enquiries to establish 
the identity of an applicant (i.e. name and address) in cases where there was a prima facie question 
over the genuineness of the details supplied in that regard by the applicant, simply because of a 
concern that any such information might be used for purposes that were categorically prohibited by 
the Directive. Any decision to refuse a request for access to environmental information on the basis 
of speculation or inference as to interest would be swiftly and correctly set aside by the 
Commissioner or, if necessary, in an appeal on a point of law to the High Court. 
66. The respondent’s proposed answer is that it is not necessary to answer this question. If the 
question arises, the respondent submits that – if and insofar an assessment of whether a request is 
manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive requires consideration 
of the name and address furnished by the applicant and/or the interest of the applicant in making 
the request – such assessment is undertaken at the stage of determining whether there are grounds 
for refusing a request under Article 4, rather than at the initial stage of determining whether there 
is a request within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive.  
67. The State’s proposed answer is that as noted above, the Directive does not preclude public 
authorities from verifying the name and/or address of the requester for the purposes of confirming 
that the request complies with the requirements of the Directive.  A public authority is also permitted 
to verify the name and/or address of a requester for the purpose of determining whether a request 
is manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive. It is noted that it 
is common case between all parties that a public authority may seek to verify the identity of a 
requester for the purposes of determining whether Article 4(1)(b) can be invoked to refuse the 
request.  As explained above, whether the verification of identity allows inference or speculation as 
to the interest of the requestor is irrelevant as this is not a factor to which the public authority is 
entitled to have regard in the consideration of the request for access to environmental information. 
68. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is that Directive 2003/4 prohibits a public authority 
from seeking confirmation of an applicant’s actual name and/or current physical address for the 
purpose of determining whether a request is manifestly unreasonable by reference to the volume, 
nature and frequency of other requests made by the same applicant.  Directive 2003/4 seeks to 
ensure the widest possible systemic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental 
information. With that in mind Directive 2003/4 requires public authorities to organise the 
environmental information which is relevant to their functions and which is held by or for them, with 
a view to its active and systematic dissemination to the public, in particular electronically and that 
environmental information progressively becomes available through the internet.  As identified by 
Advocate General Fennelly, in light of this obligation, requests for environmental information should 
only concern points of detail or clarification.  It should also be noted that Directive 2003/4 does not 
make reference to the volume, nature or frequency of requests in Article 4(1)(b) which permits a 
request to be refused if it is manifestly unreasonable.  In fact, there is in principle no limit to the 
frequency or volume of information that an applicant may request, given that environmental 
information ought to be disseminated to the widest extent possible. Directive 2003/4 itself envisages 
voluminous and complex request and provides the possibility for those requests to be handled in an 
extended timeframe under Article 3(2)(b).  There are other safeguards such as the possibility of 
refusing a request for materials in the course of completion or unfinished documents or data and 
where a request remains formulated in too general a manner after an applicant has been given the 
opportunity to make a more specific request.  
69. The referring court’s proposed answer is that this does not arise because the answer to the 
second question is Yes and to the third question is No, but if it does arise the answer is No.  The 
general doctrine of abuse of rights applies here, and the points made by the referring court under 
the heading of the fourth question also apply.  A public authority is entitled to refuse a manifestly 
unreasonable request, for example by reference to the volume of information sought.  It necessarily 
follows that the public authority is entitled to seek sufficient information to determine whether the 
request is manifestly unreasonable or not, which may include the actual name and/or physical 
address of the applicant (see by analogy the judgment of 13 April 2005, Verein für 
14 
 
 
 
Konsumenteninformation v Commission of the European Communities, T-2/03, 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:125).  The fact that such information could conceivably result in speculation as to 
the interest of the requester is irrelevant.  
70. The relevance of the question is that if the appellant was entitled to request further 
information then the failure of the requester(s) to furnish that information rendered the dismissal of 
the requests lawful.   
Order 
71. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that: 
(i) the title to the proceedings be amended by the deletion of “the European 
Communities (Access to Information on the Environment) Regulations 2007 to 2018” 
and the substitution of “the European Communities (Access to Information on the 
Environment) Regulations 2007 to 2014”; 
(ii) the questions set out in this judgment be referred to the CJEU pursuant to article 
267 TFEU; 
(iii) the substantive determination of the proceedings be adjourned pending the 
judgment of the CJEU, without prejudice to the determination of any appropriate 
procedural or interlocutory issues in the meantime; 
(iv) the parties be required to comply with the directions regarding preparation of papers 
for transmission to the CJEU as set out in Guidance Notes attached to Practice 
Direction HC124, so that all papers are received by the List Registrar in electronic 
format within 21 days from the date of this judgment; 
(v) the parties be required to comply with the directions to keep the referring court 
informed of progress of the reference as set out in para. 100(vii) of Eco Advocacy 
CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 265, [2021] 10 JIC 0406; 
(vi) the matter be listed for mention on 19th February, 2024, to advise the referring 
court of progress; and 
(vii) the costs of the proceedings to date not already disposed of be reserved until further 
order.