Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2018:528
Date: 2018-07-04
Language of the case: German
Subject matter: Area of freedom, security and justice;Judicial cooperation in civil matters
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Austria

summary contained in paragraph 10 of that judgment, the Greek Government’s citation of Article 1(9) of Law No 4050/2012 should be reiterated. In accordance with that provision: ‘With effect from the publication in the Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic of the approval decree by the Council of Ministers, the bondholders’ decision, as certified by the administrator of the procedure, shall have effect erga omnes, it shall be binding on all bondholders and investors in eligible securities and it shall prevail over any general or specific provisions of any law, regulatory act or agreement which provide otherwise. Where eligible securities are replaced, by registering new securities in the system, the eligible securities replaced by new securities shall be cancelled automatically, ending entitlement to any right or obligation stemming from them, including all of the rights and obligations which form part of them at any given moment.’ 32. Article 1(11) of Law No 4050/2012, which is also cited in the judgment in Mamatas (§ 48), provides: ‘The aim of the provisions of this article is to protect an overriding public interest. They are mandatory provisions which are directly applicable and shall prevail over any general or specific provisions of any law, regulatory act or agreement …, and their application shall not create or activate any contractual or legal right to the benefit of the bondholder or the investor, or any contractual or legal obligation to the detriment of the issuer or the guarantor of securities …, unless expressly provided for in this article.’ III. Facts and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 33. Mr Kuhn, domiciled in Vienna (Austria), purchased, through a custodian bank established in Austria, acting as a commission agent, (23) bonds with a nominal value of EUR 35 000, (24) issued by the Hellenic Republic and subject to Greek law. Those government bonds were credited to a securities account, managed by the custodian bank, of which Mr Kuhn is the holder. (25) They are bearer securities which, in accordance with the borrowing terms, confer entitlement to repayment of the capital on maturity and to ‘punctual payment’. (26) 34. The referring court states that the Greek State issued those bonds in Greece and that they were subject to Greek law and traded on the Athens stock exchange as ‘uncertificated securities’, that is to say book entry securities. Those securities were registered in the Greek Central Bank’s securities settlement system, in which participants in that system, who have been authorised by the Governor of that Central Bank, have an account in their name. 35. According to that court, it follows from the provisions of Law No 2198/1994 and from the borrowing terms relating to the government bonds at issue that the participants in that system were the first to become the holders and creditors of those bonds, which were transferred on being credited to their account, before they granted the rights attaching to those bonds to third party investors, and that a legal act of that kind has effect only with respect to the parties concerned, with the exception of the Hellenic Republic. 36. Following the adoption of Law No 4050/2012, the Hellenic Republic converted the bonds that had been purchased by Mr Kuhn, replacing them with new government bonds with a lower nominal value. 37. The referring court states that, according to Mr Kuhn’s assertions, up until the date of that conversion, the Hellenic Republic had paid interest to an account opened in Mr Kuhn’s name with a bank established in Austria. It states that Mr Kuhn sold (27) the converted bonds for EUR 7 831.58, as a result of which he sustained a loss of EUR 28 673.42, which is the amount corresponding to the nominal value of the bonds on the maturity date of 20 February 2012, (28) plus interest and charges. 38. In those circumstances, Mr Kuhn brought an action before the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Civil Court, Vienna, Austria) (29) seeking to enforce the borrowing terms relating to the bonds at issue or for compensation for non-fulfilment of those terms. 39. By order of 8 January 2016, that court declared that it did not have international jurisdiction to hear and determine that action. 40. An appeal against that order was brought before the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna, Austria) which, by order of 25 February 2016, rejected the objection of lack of jurisdiction of the Austrian courts on the grounds that Mr Kuhn’s claim was based not on a Greek legislative act, but on the initial borrowing terms relating to the government bonds at issue and that the court with jurisdiction is designated under Greek law, which is applicable depending on the parties, and in the present case is the court where the creditor is domiciled and the place where the debt should have been discharged. 41. The Hellenic Republic lodged an extraordinary appeal against that order before the referring court. 42. According the referring court, in so far as Mr Kuhn is seeking enforcement of the borrowing terms of the government bonds at issue by the Hellenic Republic, Mr Kuhn rightly refers to the alleged legal relationship between himself as the purchaser of the government bonds, and the Hellenic Republic, as the issuer of those bonds, and therefore there is a ‘(secondary)’ (30) contractual claim under Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. 43. The referring court also states, first, that Mr Kuhn is asserting a claim for enforcement of the borrowing terms based on the commitment to pay given by the Hellenic Republic as the obligor and, secondly, that the issue of ‘(bearer)’ (31) bonds cannot be treated the same way as acta iure imperii. It infers from this that the dispute concerns civil and commercial matters. 44. In those circumstances, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that: – even in the case — as here — of the repeated contractual transfer of a claim, the place of performance within the meaning of that provision is determined by the first contractual agreement? – in the case of the assertion of a claim seeking compliance with the terms of a government bond such as that specifically issued by the Hellenic Republic in the present case, or seeking damages for non-fulfilment of that claim, the actual place of performance is established immediately upon the payment of interest from that government bond into an account of a person holding a domestic securities portfolio [ (32)]? – the fact that a legal place of performance within the meaning of [that provision] was established by the first contractual agreement precludes the assumption that the subsequent actual performance of a contract establishes a — further — place of performance within the meaning of [the same] provision?’ IV. My analysis 45. By its three questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a person, through a custodian bank, has purchased bonds issued by a Member State and asserts a claim against that Member State based on the terms of the bond, Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘place of performance of the obligation in question’ is determined by the terms of the loan when those bonds are issued, notwithstanding the subsequent transfers of those bonds, or by the place where the terms of the loan, such as the payment of interest, are actually performed. 46. It must be stated that the Hellenic Republic and the Greek and Italian Governments submit that the dispute in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope ratione materiae of Regulation No 1215/2012 since, in essence, it is based on the sovereign right of a Member State to legislate for the purpose of restructuring its public debt, or under ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) on the ground that there is no contractual relationship between the Member State and the holder of the government bonds. Consequently, first of all, the Court must determine whether the action may be classified as concerning ‘civil and commercial matters’, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of that regulation. (33) Only if that question is answered in the affirmative must the Court take a view on the second preliminary question set out above. A. Does the dispute fall within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012? 47. To support its view that the dispute falls within the scope of civil and commercial matters, the national court has referred to the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others, after having found that the applicant is requesting that the borrowing terms be enforced or is seeking damages for the non-fulfilment of those terms by the defendant State, which issued the government bonds on the basis of the commitment to pay that was made by that State as the obligor. (34) Although that approximation may appear to be relevant to a certain extent, I take a fundamentally different view on the conclusions that should be drawn from it, on the ground that the analysis of jurisdiction must be established on different bases, which I shall examine. 1. The scope of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others 48. As regards the first element in common, it may be observed that the subject matter of the dispute, which arises in quasi-analogous factual circumstances, (35) is similar, since, in one of the cases (Kickler and Others, C‑578/13) on which the Court based its judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others, the holders of Greek bonds requested, in addition to the payment of damages, that the Hellenic Republic perform the contract in respect of the original bonds which had matured. The ground of the claim is, in all cases, infringement of the rights and obligations under the contract. (36) 49. In those circumstances, the second element in common is particularly important since the Court gave a ruling on the interpretation of Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007, (37) the wording of which is identical to Article 1 of Regulation No 1215/2012. Their scope is confined to ‘civil and commercial matters’ and, in particular, does not cover the ‘liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii)’. (38) 50. In Fahnenbrock and Others, the Court held that ‘Article 1(1) of Regulation [No 1393/2007] must be interpreted as meaning that legal actions for compensation for disturbance of ownership and property rights, contractual performance and damages, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, brought by private persons who are holders of government bonds against the issuing State, fall within the scope of that regulation in so far as it does not appear that they are manifestly outside the concept of civil or commercial matters’. (39) 51. However, the scope of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others is not, in my view, the same as that attributed to it by the referring court. Particular attention should be paid to the interpretative limits laid down by the Court. 52. In that regard, it is essential to start by pointing out that the Court took a different approach from the previous solutions which aimed to harmonise the interpretation of same concept, on account of the specific objectives to be attained. (40) Therefore, it follows from the methodological grounds for that decision (41) that the Court clearly favoured the mechanism established by Regulation No 1393/2007 in order to ensure its full effectiveness with the aim of guaranteeing swift access to the trial court and the right to a fair trial. (42) 53. The Court then held that the assessment undertaken by the court at the stage of the request for service was of a specific nature, taking the view that, in the subsequent adversarial proceedings, it is for the court hearing the case to settle the debate on jurisdiction. (43) 54. In that regard, it took the view that the return of the request for service by the receiving agency should have been reserved to disputes which, clearly, fall outside the scope definition of civil and commercial matters. (44) 55. Finally, the Court gave two useful answers for the purposes of a prima facie examination or, in other words, a review that is of an intensity appropriate to the objective of speedy service pursued, in the specific case which is such as to cast doubt a priori on whether the action is of a civil nature since it is directed against a State and concerns the issue of government bonds by that State. 56. First, the Court stated that ‘the issue of bonds does not necessarily presuppose the exercise of powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between individuals’. (45) Secondly, it noted certain elements warranting a detailed examination of the nature of the State’s relationship with the holder. These are the financial conditions of the securities concerned which may have been fixed ‘on the basis of market conditions which govern the exchange and profitability of those financial instruments’ (46) and changes to those financial conditions which ‘were to give effect to a decision of a majority of the bondholders’ on the basis of the exchange clause incorporated into the contract of issue. (47) 57. The Court, which had previously noted the complexity of matters which have a bearing on State immunity, (48) inferred from this that ‘it cannot be concluded that the cases in the main proceedings are manifestly not “civil or commercial matters”, within the meaning of Regulation No 1393/2007; that regulation is therefore applicable to those cases’. (49) 58. Consequently, where it is for the court hearing the case to examine whether it has jurisdiction, as the Court has observed, (50) the analysis of the classification of a dispute must be resumed by focusing the debate on the factors highlighted by the Court in the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others in order to justify its reservations regarding the manifest nature of the exercise of State authority. 2. The classification of the dispute 59. As a preliminary point, it seems appropriate to me to point out that the interpretative methods in the previous instruments governing jurisdiction, which have been used to date, (51) are intended to apply to Regulation No 1215/2012. (52) 60. Therefore, according to settled case-law, the interpretation of the independent concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ results in determining the scope of the instruments governing jurisdiction ‘by reason either of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject matter of the action’. (53) It is therefore necessary to identify the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute, the basis of the action brought and the detailed rules governing the bringing of that action. (54) 61. In the present case, it is necessary to examine whether the substantive basis of the action for compensation brought by an individual against the State issuing the bond is an act in the exercise of public powers or, more specifically, whether the legal relationship between the Greek State and Mr Kuhn under the terms of the bond is characterised by an exercise of public powers on the part of the debtor State, in that it entails the exercise of powers going beyond those existing under the rules applicable to relations between private individuals. (55) 62. In my view, in this case as in the previous cases regarding the restructuring of Greek debt, that exercise is the result of both the nature of and the detailed rules for the changes to the contractual relationship between the Greek State and the holders of securities and the context in which those changes took place. 63. The general terms of the ‘adjustment’ or the ‘conversion’ of securities, which are commonly used, temper substantially the reality of the bond exchange carried out: (56) the original securities were cancelled and replaced by new securities with a lower nominal value, leading to a capital loss of 53.5%, or even more if account is taken of the change to the date on which the earlier securities should have matured, (57) as some of them were due to mature between 2023 and 2042. The annual rates for the payment of coupons were revised. Finally, the securities are no longer subject to Greek law, but to United Kingdom law. (58) 64. As it is substantive in nature, that substitution of securities cannot be treated in the same way as adjustments that are generally regarded as risks inherent in that type of investment, which are fully controlled by the borrower Member State, (59) and which can be expected by a purchaser of bonds who is reasonably circumspect. (60) 65. The detailed rules for that substitution must also be highlighted since they were not provided for in the terms of the bond or in the Greek law governing the bonds when they were issued. The detailed rules were imposed by the Greek legislature as a result of Law No 4050/2012 by introducing CACs retroactively. 66. As a result of those clauses, the agreement concluded between the State and the bondholders, having decided, by qualified majority, to accept the contractual amendments proposed by the Greek State, enabled those amendments to be imposed on the minority of holders, including those who wanted to refuse them. 67. The use of that mechanism cannot bring into doubt that the amendments to the terms of the bonds for the minority of holders were direct and immediate, (61) in particular because the aim of Law No 4050/2012 was specifically to achieve that result in order to prevent Greece from being in default. (62) The European Court of Human Rights has also inferred from the CAC mechanism that ‘the detailed rules on the basis of which the exchange [had] taken place clearly demonstrate that [the applicants] did not participate voluntarily in the haircut process’. (63) 68. To answer the question at issue in this case as to whether Regulation No 1215/2012 applies, it cannot be argued that, as a result of CACs, the consent of holders has been given in a contractual context. (64) This cannot be separated from the circumstances in which the retroactive insertion of those clauses into the borrowing terms was accepted. 69. Whilst Law No 4050/2012 implements the agreement resulting from the negotiations between the Hellenic Republic and private investors (PSI), the involvement of whom has been regarded as ‘[having] a vital role in establishing the sustainability of the … debt [of the Hellenic Republic]’, (65) it has been established that natural persons, who constituted only a minority of the holders of Greek State bonds and who accounted for approximately 1% of Greece’s overall public debt, did not participate in those negotiations with institutional investors, such as, inter alia, banks and credit agencies. (66) 70. Moreover, other aspects of the exceptional context in which Law No 4050/2012 was enacted must also be taken into consideration. 71. First, the compulsory procedure, imposed by that law, is the outcome of the search for ‘an exceptional and unique solution’ (67) to the situation in the Hellenic Republic. It is inextricably linked to the monetary policy of the European Union since its objective was to safeguard the financial structure of a Member State and, more broadly, to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. (68) 72. Secondly, the unprecedented reliance (69) on the retroactive inclusion of CACs sought to prevent the risk that the restructuring plan could fail (70) as a result of, inter alia, the absence of CACs (71) when the bonds were issued by the Hellenic Republic on the national market. Since the objective to be attained was to ensure that all individual creditors participated, the Greek authorities took advantage of the fact that over 90% of the bond debt was subject to Greek law in order to adjust that debt by imposing those clauses. (72) 73. Thirdly, the implementation of a procedure of that kind by the State, acting as both contracting party and legislature, is time-bound. (73) First, the new bonds arising from the conversion are subject to United Kingdom law and that law provides for CACs. (74) Secondly, following the decision of the euro-area Finance Ministers in November 2010, which was confirmed in the European Council’s conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011, (75) to make the use of CACs compulsory, in accordance with Article 12(3) of the Treaty establishing the European stability mechanism (ESM), concluded in Brussels on 2 February 2012, (76) as of 1 January 2013, CACs are to be included in all securities with a duration exceeding one year concerning the public debt of Member States of the euro area. (77) They are now one of the ways to ensure the financial stability of the euro area and therefore play a part in the objective ‘to ensure that solvency crises encountered by the States are managed’ (78) and to reassure investors. 74. All of those considerations highlight the pursuit of an objective in the general interest, which is not limited to the interests of Greece, but concerns the whole of the euro area. To find, in such circumstances, that the dispute is not upheld within the strict scope of matters relating to a contract (79) does not, in my view, appear to facilitate the recourse by the borrower States to the law in order to ‘immunise’ (80) sovereign debt contracts by amending the borrowing terms, in particular retroactively. 75. I infer from this that the substantive origin of the dispute in the main proceedings is an act of public authority by which the conversion of securities and the adjustment of the initial borrowing terms were imposed retroactively, in exceptional circumstances and under exceptional conditions, in order to prevent the Greek State from defaulting and to ensure the stability of the euro area. 76. Consequently, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling to the effect that an action brought by a natural person who has purchased bonds issued by a Member State, against that Member State, seeking to enforce the initial borrowing terms or seeking damages for the non-fulfilment of those terms, on account of those bonds having been exchanged for bonds of a lesser value, that exchange having been imposed on that natural person by a law, adopted by the national legislature in exceptional circumstances, unilaterally and retrospectively amending the conditions applicable to the bonds by inserting a CAC enabling the majority of the bondholders to impose such an exchange on the minority, does not fall within the scope of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. 77. If, however, the Court were to take the view that the action at issue simply ‘make[s] relationships governed by private law [between the purchaser of the government bond and the State which has performed an act jure gestionis] subject to review by the courts’, (81) it would then be necessary to determine whether the dispute falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of that regulation. B. Does the dispute fall within the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012? 78. After having provided the bases of the reasoning and specified how the judgment in Kolassa cannot serve as a reference, I shall set out my view as to the classification of the dispute in the main proceedings. 1. Reminder of the principles of interpretation 79. As a preliminary point, I shall point out the bases on which every interpretation of ‘matters relating to a contract’ are founded. 80. As with the interpretation of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, (82) reference must be made to the interpretation given by the Court concerning Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, as this also applies to Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 which replaced it. (83) 81. It follows, first, that Article 7 must be interpreted restrictively since it offers the applicant a choice of jurisdiction and, therefore, the option to be an exception to the principle that the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled should have jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the settled case-law of the Court, special jurisdictional rules cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by the regulation. (84) 82. Secondly, it is important to identify solutions which are consistent with the general objective pursued, set out in recital 16 of Regulation No 1215/2012. This is to facilitate the sound administration of justice where ‘there is a close connecting factor between the dispute and the court called upon to resolve it’. (85) The court of the place where the contractual obligation giving rise to the action is to be performed will normally be the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence. (86) The assurance that the decision will be implemented quickly may also be taken into consideration. (87) 83. Thirdly, again according to settled case-law regarding the independent concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’ (88) and, therefore, to the exclusion of ‘referring to the national law of one or other of the States concerned’, (89) the application of the rule of special jurisdiction provided for in that regard in Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 presupposes the identification of a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based, and the fact that no contract was concluded, (90) or that the contract is governed by mandatory provisions, (91) is of little importance. 84. In that regard, the Court has stated that an action to establish liability may fall within the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’ ‘where the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the contract’ and that ‘[t]hat will a priori be the case where the interpretation of the contract which links the defendant to the applicant is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by the latter’. (92) The term ‘matters relating to tort’ is chosen only where the action is not closely related to a contract. (93) 85. In respect of an action such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it would be sufficient, in the Hellenic Republic’s view, to transpose the case-law in Kolassa. I do not share that view for the following reasons. 2. The scope of the judgment in Kolassa 86. In that judgment, which concerns the purchase of securities on the secondary market involving several intermediaries, as in the circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings, the Court held inter alia that Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an applicant who has acquired a bearer bond from a third party, without the issuer thereof having freely assumed an obligation towards that applicant, which it is for the referring court to verify, may not invoke jurisdiction under that provision for the purposes of an action brought against the issuer and based on the bond conditions, breach of the information and control obligations and prospectus liability. (94) 87. The Court took the view that it was clear from the summary of the facts set out by the referring court that a legal obligation freely consented to by the bank that issued the bond with respect to the applicant who had acquired a bearer bond from a third party was lacking. (95) 88. I consider that the dispute in the main proceedings is different from the situation which gave rise to that judgment for a number of reasons. First, the bonds on which the investor’s action was based were pre-contractual in nature. He relied on the liability of the issuer of the bonds that he had acquired on the basis of the prospectus and the infringement of other legal information obligations incumbent on the issuer in order to demonstrate that he would not have made an investment of that kind had he been better informed. 89. Secondly, the issue of government bonds, as described by the referring court, which corresponds to the usual form of intermediation in respect of State debts, is subject to conditions which are fundamentally different from the conditions for certificates such as those in which Harald Kolassa invested. The certificates at issue in those proceedings had been issued by a private bank and took the form of bearer bonds, the value of which was to be determined by an index made up of a portfolio managed by a company. (96) 90. Thirdly, the Court held that the applicant was not the bearer of those bonds, (97) after having found that they had been ordered and acquired by the bank with which the applicant was in a direct relationship, from its parent company, as those companies had carried out the order in their name, and that those bonds had been held as covering assets by the intermediary bank in its own name and on behalf of the applicant. (98) 91. That is not the case in the main proceedings. According to the referring court, the applicant is the holder of securities which were purchased in his name by the custodian bank, that bank having acted as a commission agent. 92. Accordingly, the question arises as to the specific classification to be given to those relationships. As regards the choice of the independent concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, (99) it is for the Court to make a decision in this regard. 3. The specific classification with regard to the issue of government bonds 93. In matters relating to the issue of government bonds, the question of classification is new and complex because it has a dual purpose, namely the specific nature of the government bond and the transfer of rights or the assignment of the claim attached to it. 94. It must also be borne in mind that ‘[t]he rights in respect of securities are now mostly held, transferred or pledged in book entry form in securities accounts’. (100) 95. Although various authors maintain that there is no contractual relationship between the issuer and the investor on the secondary market, others consider that that approach could be tempered. (101) Like the latter group, I consider that, in that regard, although it may be conceded that there is no longer a direct contractual relationship, as the security has not been signed by the issuer and the holder, (102) ‘it cannot be determined as a general rule that the legal relationships between the issuer of a financial security and the investor who acquires those instruments (albeit on the secondary market) are not contractual. That question may be assessed on a case-by-case basis only, according to the exact nature of the financial instruments, the documents governing those instruments and the rights and obligations which derive from them on the part of the issuer and the investor’. (103) 96. I consider that paragraph 41 of the judgment in Kolassa, which does not rule out the possibility of the dispute falling within the scope of matters relating to a contract, must be viewed as encouragement to proceed along these lines. 97. Therefore, the terms under which the bonds are offered for subscription by a State, as described by the referring court, cannot, in my view, be classified as a ‘chain of contracts’, within the meaning of the case-law of the Court. (104) 98. It is clear from the documents in the case-file, in particular the subscription agreement, that the Greek State entered into a contract with the ‘managers’ or participants in the primary market system who, as the first holders of the securities, may liquidate them on the secondary market. In other words, their role may be classified as a ‘distributor’ to investors in the secondary market on which the transactions concerning those bonds take place. 99. The Greek State, like any State issuing securities, also produced a document (offering circular) which sets out the key borrowing terms and legally constitutes the contract concluded with its creditors. (105) Therefore, in that legal relationship, the State undertakes to pay coupons and to repay the borrowing on maturity to all holders of securities, admittedly, not directly, but through the intermediaries which acquired the securities on behalf of the holder. In that relationship, it may also be considered that ‘the transfer of the security to the holder brings about an assignment of the rights incorporated in the security: as the subscriber is committed to every security holder ab initio, the holder has a personal right with respect to the issuer’. (106) A consistent approach is adopted in paragraph 91 of the judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB. (107) It states that, ‘under the applicable private law, when purchasing State bonds … central banks, like the private investors, acquired the status of creditors of the issuing and debtor State’. (108) 100. Two additional arguments may be derived from the legislating State’s intervention for the purpose of amending the borrowing terms of the contracting State. First, the aim of the law at issue was to have a direct and immediate effect on the securities held by private institutional investors or natural persons, irrespective of the intermediation by financial bodies. 101. Secondly, that legislative initiative reveals that the State is perfectly aware of the scope of its commitments as the contracting State (109) vis-à-vis the holders of securities, (110) since it altered the content of those commitments before it defaulted and, therefore, the need to meet requests for the early repayment of the debt which would be addressed to it directly. 102. I conclude from all of these factors that ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012, covers the action by which the purchaser of bonds issued in a Member State seeks to assert claims arising from those securities against that State, in particular following the unilateral and retroactive adjustment of the borrowing terms by that State. 103. Consequently, it should be clarified the answers that may be given to the referring court with a view to determining the place of performance of that obligation underlying the claim. C. Determination of the place of performance of the disputed obligation 104. The question arises as to whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the ‘place of performance of the obligation in question’, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012, is that set out in the borrowing terms relating to the bonds in question or whether that place may change according to the transfer of claims attaching to those bonds, or even whether it is the place where the creditor collects the interest. 105. According to settled case-law, (111) where the parties do not designate the place of performance of the obligation at issue, this must be determined in accordance with the law which governs that obligation according to the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought. 106. As I have already set out, the issue of the bonds, which are subject to Greek law, is circumscribed by the provisions in the offering circular. In that document, the Greek Central Bank is designated as the ‘paying agent’, in accordance with Article 8(6) of Law No 2198/1994 which applies to State debt, the applicable law chosen is Greek law and the ‘bondholders’ are the ‘relevant participants of the Bank of Greece Book entry system’. I infer from this that the place of performance of the obligation, of the payment of coupons and the repayment of capital, which forms the basis of the claim is in Greece, in accordance with Law No 2198/1994. The transaction to convert the securities governed by Greek law, laid down in Law No 4050/2012, also demonstrates that this is the place where the decisions regarding the arrangements for the investments and their performance were taken. 107. In those circumstances, and in the light of my analysis concerning the classification of the transfer of the security to the holder in so far as it brings about an assignment of the rights incorporated in the security, I take the view that previous transfers are not capable of changing the determination of the place of performance within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012. (112) 108. This interpretation is consistent with the requirement of predictability and legal certainty, contained in recital 15 of Regulation No 1215/2012, (113) since it has the effect of avoiding the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not reasonably have foreseen if its determination were to depend on the choice of the place where the security is deposited and contribute to the sound administration of justice set out in recital 16 of that regulation. 109. Those objectives could no longer be attained if the place of performance had to be determined on the basis of the place where the interest due to the holder of a government bond is collected. (114) 110. Accordingly, I propose that the Court rule that Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the place of performance of a government bond is determined by the borrowing terms when that bond was issued, notwithstanding subsequent transfers of that bond or the actual performance in a different place of the borrowing terms relating to the payment of interest or the repayment of capital. V. Conclusion 111. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) as follows: Principally: – An action brought by a natural person who has purchased bonds issued by a Member State, against that Member State, seeking to enforce the initial borrowing terms or seeking damages for the non-fulfilment of those terms, on account of those bonds having been exchanged for bonds of a lesser value, that exchange having been imposed on that natural person by a law, adopted by the national legislature in exceptional circumstances, unilaterally and retrospectively amending the conditions applicable to the bonds by inserting a collective action clause enabling the majority of the bondholders to impose such an exchange on the minority, does not fall within the scope of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Alternatively, if the Court finds that the dispute is a ‘civil or commercial matter’ for the purposes of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012: – ‘Matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012, covers the action by which the purchaser of bonds issued in a Member State seeks to assert claims arising from those securities against that State, in particular following the unilateral and retroactive adjustment of the borrowing terms by that State. – Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the place of performance of a government bond is determined by the borrowing terms when that bond was issued, notwithstanding subsequent transfers of that bond or the actual performance in a different place of the borrowing terms relating to the payment of interest or the repayment of capital. 1 Original language: French. 2 OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1. 3 ‘PSI’. See, for a summary of a number of subsequent German proceedings, S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Sage Publishing, New York, 2017, vol. 24, No 3, pp. 399 to 423, in particular pp. 408 to 413. 4 This development occurred in the 1980s. Previously, debts were essentially bank debts. 5 Disputes are arising from several perspectives. Some holders are ensuring that they are not treated less favourably than those who, having not accepted the haircut, are seeking to enforce the claim that the State is no longer able to honour before the courts. Others are seeking to take advantage of this situation to make speculative investments. 6 The Argentinian debt example has demonstrated the economic consequences of the borrower State being exposed to the judicial strategy of investors. It cannot be ignored that this has a financial cost, that that financial cost is assessed, that it influences the choice of the applicable law and that it defines the future ability of the State to borrow again. 7 That is to say EUR 205 billion in claims made by private creditors, compared with Argentinian debt in the order of USD 90 billion (around EUR 76.22 billion). 8 That risk was exacerbated by the banks holding a significant proportion of government bonds. 9 T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756. 10 OJ 2012 L 77, p. 19. 11 T‑749/15, not published, EU:T:2017:21. 12 European Court of Human Rights, 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, ‘the judgment in Mamatas’ (CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614). 13 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ‘the ECHR’. In his press release, the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights stated that ‘[t]he Court therefore held that the applicants had not suffered any special or excessive burden, in view, particularly, of the States’ wide margin of appreciation in that sphere and of the reduction of the commercial value of the bonds, which had already been affected by the reduced solvency of the State, which would probably have been unable to honour its obligations under the clauses included in the old bonds before the entry into force of the new Law. The Court also considered that the collective action clauses and the restructuring of the public debt had represented an appropriate and necessary means of reducing the public debt and saving the State from bankruptcy, that investing in bonds was never risk-free and that the applicants should have been aware of the vagaries of the financial market and the risk of a possible drop in the value of their bonds, considering the Greek deficit and the country’s large debt, even before the 2009 crisis’. 14 In his press release, the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights added that ‘[t]he Court also found that the bond exchange procedure had not been discriminatory, in particular because of the difficulty of locating bondholders on such a volatile market, the difficulty of establishing precise criteria for differentiating between bondholders, the risk of jeopardising the whole operation, with disastrous consequences for the economy, and the need to act rapidly in order to restructure the debt’. 15 Applicable, in accordance with Article 66 of that regulation, to legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015. 16 The German language version of the regulation identifies two alternatives by referring literally to the ‘place where the obligation was performed’ and ‘[the place where the obligation] should have been performed’. The Greek language version reads as follows: ‘os pros diaforés ek symváseos, enópion tou dikastiríou tou tópou ópou ekpliróthike í ofeílei na ekplirotheí i parochí’, which means: ‘in matters relating to a contract, before the court of the place where the service was or must be carried out’. 17 As the referring court summarised the applicable provisions, the following citations of the provisions of Greek law are taken from the written observations of the Greek Government. 18 In accordance with Article 5(2) of the Nómos 2198/1994 — Áfxisi apodochón dimosíon ypallílon en génei, sýnapsi daneíon ypó tou Ellinikoú Dimosíou kai dimiourgía stin Trápeza tis Elládos Systímatos Parakoloúthisis Synallagón epí Títlon me Logistikí Morfí (‘Ávloi Títloi) kai álles diatáxeis (Law No 2198/1994 concerning the increase in the salaries of all officials; the reduction in borrowing by the Greek State, the creation within the Bank of Greece of a system for monitoring transactions in securities credited to a securities account (book-entry securities); and other provisions), of 22 March 1994 (FEK Α’ 43/22.03.1994, ‘Law No 2198/1994’), ‘loans and their subdivisions (bonds) shall be monitored via accounting entries in the securities settlement system … managed by the Greek Central Bank. Interest from securities shall also be monitored via accounting entries, where they are the subject of a standalone transaction, by applying mutatis mutandis the other provisions of this chapter. The Greek Central Bank shall make the entries regarding maturity, service and the repayment of loans on behalf of the Hellenic Republic’. 19 In accordance with Article 6(1) of that law, ‘participants in the system, in addition to the Greek State and the Greek Central Bank, as administrator, shall be natural or legal persons (“participants”) who are designated either by category or by name by decision of the Governor of the Greek Central Bank. …’. 20 It follows from the wording of that article, cited in the observations of the Greek Government or the Hellenic Republic, the defendant, that this is the sale or the transfer of the property right attached to the bond. 21 FEK A’ 36/23.2.2012, ‘Law No 4050/2012’. 22 Term used by the referring court, which is also contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 23 As was clarified by the Portuguese Government in its written observations, that term means that, ‘as the financial intermediary, the bank received, transmitted and executed the subscription order given by the applicant, by performing an operation on behalf of a third party’. 24 This is the subscription amount according to the document submitted as Annex 1 to the written observations of the Hellenic Republic. That document also contains the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of the bonds corresponding to the security listed in the offering circular dated 16 February 2009. In accordance with that document, the maturity date, thus the date on which the bonds must be repaid to the holder, at their nominal value, was set as 20 March 2012. Before the maturity date, the holder must receive interest or a coupon in exchange for his capital loaned. In the present case, the interest rate was set at 4.3% per annum and Mr Kuhn claims to have received that interest. 25 According to the referring court, ‘[t]he applicant describes himself as the holder of a domestic securities portfolio managed by the custodian bank and as the owner of the government bonds credited to that securities portfolio’. 26 That is to say the payment of interest. 27 At the hearing, Mr Kuhn’s representative confirmed that the bonds had been sold. 28 This date, which appears in the order for reference, does not correspond to the date in the case documents, which state that the maturity date of the bonds purchased by Mr Kuhn was set as 20 March 2012, or the date of Law No 4050/2012, or the clarification that Mr Kuhn had sold the converted bonds. 29 It is established that the action was brought after 9 January 2015. 30 Identical wording is used in the request for a preliminary ruling. 31 Identical wording is used in the request for a preliminary ruling. 32 Or, in other words, a security-holder’s account. 33 See, by way of illustration of the cases in which the issue had not been raised by the referring court, judgments of 1 October 2002, Henkel (C‑167/00, EU:C:2002:555 paragraph 25); of 28 April 2009, Apostolides (C‑420/07, EU:C:2009:271 paragraph 40); and of 28 July 2016, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich (C‑102/15, EU:C:2016:607, paragraph 27). 34 See S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular p. 413, explaining why the applicants chose that basis following the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others (paragraph 57). 35 Unlike the applicants in the previous cases, Mr Kuhn sold the converted bonds which he claims had reduced in value in relation to the value determined in the initial borrowing terms, as a result of the application of Law No 4050/2012. 36 It is therefore not a dispute which seeks to review lawfulness. In that regard, Law No 4050/2012 was the subject of a review of constitutionality (see judgment of the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Council of State, Greece), full court, of 21 March 2014, Nos 1116/2014 and 1117/2014) and a review of compatibility with the Convention (see judgment in Mamatas). 37 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79). 38 That clarification was not provided in the equivalent earlier provisions, namely the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1998 C 27, p. 1), as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention (‘the Brussels Convention’) and the first sentence of Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1). The EU legislature has therefore codified the case-law of the Court, established in the judgments of 14 October 1976, LTU (29/76, EU:C:1976:137), and of 16 December 1980, Rüffer (814/79, EU:C:1980:291), which used as the criterion for distinguishing between private law cases and those falling within the scope of public law the intervention of a public authority acting in the exercise of State authority. For a detailed review of the case-law relating to the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, see my Opinion in Fahnenbrock and Others (C‑226/13, C‑245/13, C‑247/13 and C‑578/13, EU:C:2014:2424, points 52 to 60 and the case-law cited). The Court has very recently given a ruling on the interpretation of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 in the judgment of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking (C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 39), in which it held that ‘enforcement proceedings brought by a company owned by a local authority against a natural person domiciled in another Member State, for the purposes of recovering an unpaid debt for parking in a public car park the operation of which has been delegated to that company by that authority, which are not in any way punitive but merely constitute consideration for a service provided, fall within the scope of that regulation’. 39 See the operative part of that judgment. 40 See paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. That solution has been welcomed in German legal literature, in particular P. Mankowski, ‘Zustellung der von Privatpersonen erhobenen Klagen wegen des Zwangsumtauschs von griechischen Staatsanleihen an Griechenland nach EuZustVO (“Fahnenbrock”)’, Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht, RWS Verlag, Cologne, 2015, pp. 495 and 496, and O. L. Knöfel, ‘Griechischer Schuldenschnitt — Zustellung deutscher Klagen gegen den griechischen Staat’, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft, Deutscher Fachverlag, Frankfurt am Main, No 8, pp. 499 to 504, in particular pp. 503 and 504, and in French legal literature, in particular M. Laazouzi, ‘Cour de justice, 1ère ch., 11 juin 2015, Stefan Fahnenbrock, joint cases C‑226/13, C‑245/13, C‑247/13 et C‑578/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:383’, Jurisprudence de la CJUE, Brussels, Bruylant, 2016, pp. 858 to 869, in particular p. 869, and L. d’Avout, P. Kinsch, J.-S. Quéguiner, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, M.-P. Weller, M. Wilderspin, ‘Le droit international privé de l’Union européenne en 2015’, Journal du droit international (Clunet), LexisNexis, Paris, October 2016, Chronicle No 4, pp. 1441 to 1517, in particular pp. 1449 and 1450. 41 See paragraphs 39 to 48 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 42 As the Greek Government pointed out at the hearing, in the proceedings pending before the German courts concerning international service, the defendant is neither present nor represented. With regard to the particular characteristics of that procedure and the divergences in classification, see L. d’Avout, P. Kinsch, J.-S. Quéguiner, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, M.-P. Weller, M. Wilderspin, op. cit., in particular pp. 1446 and 1447. 43 See paragraph 46 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others, cf. paragraph 43 thereof. 44 See paragraphs 48 and 49 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 45 Paragraph 53 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. A consensus has been reached in the legal literature on this point, see, inter alia, L. d’Avout, P. Kinsch, J.-S. Quéguiner, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, M.-P. Weller, M. Wilderspin, op. cit., in particular p. 1449, and M. Laazouzi, op. cit., in particular p. 869; those authors refer to the works of Professor Pierre Mayer, and to O.L. Knöfel, op. cit., and S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular p. 419 and the case-law cited in footnote 148. For a more general presentation of the evolution of the concept of State sovereignty in that regard and the links with what is actually happening in the financial systems, see M. Audit, ‘La dette souveraine : la dette souveraine appelle-t-elle un statut juridique particulier ?’, Insolvabilité des États et dettes souveraines, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, collection ‘Droit des affaires’, Paris, 2011, pp. 67 to 88, in particular pp. 82 to 84. With regard to the resulting difficulties in the treatment of debt, see M. Forteau, ‘Le défaut souverain en droit international public : les instruments de droit international public pour remédier à l’insolvabilité des états’, Insolvabilité des États et dettes souveraines, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, collection ‘Droit des affaires’, Paris, 2011, pp. 209 to 232, in particular p. 215. 46 Paragraph 54 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 47 Paragraph 57 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 48 See paragraph 42 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 49 Paragraph 58 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. 50 See paragraph 46 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others. See, to the same effect, contrary to the view expressed by the Commission at the hearing, inter alia, J.-P. Beraudo and M.‑J. Beraudo, ‘Convention de Bruxelles, conventions de Lugano, règlement (CE) No 44/2001, règlement (UE) No 2015/2012, Généralités et champ d’application’, JurisClasseur Europe, LexisNexis, Paris, 2016, fascicule 3000, M. Laazouzi, op. cit., in particular p. 869, and L. d’Avout, P. Kinsch, J.-S. Quéguiner, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, M.-P. Weller, M. Wilderspin, op. cit., in particular p. 1451. 51 See judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others (paragraphs 34 and 35 and the case-law cited). 52 See judgment of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking (C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraphs 31 to 33 and the case-law cited). 53 See judgment of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others (C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 54 See judgments of 15 February 2007, Lechouritou and Others (C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited), and of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking (C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 34). 55 Cf. judgment of 15 March 2003, Préservatrice foncière TIARD (C‑266/01, EU:C:2003:282, paragraph 30). 56 In that regard, see R. Bismuth ‘L’émergence d’un “ordre public de la dette souveraine” pour et par le contrat d’emprunt souverain ? Quelques réflexions inspirées par une actualité très mouvementée’, Annuaire français de droit international, Volume 58, Persée, Paris, 2012, pp. 489 to 513, in particular p. 510, which uses the terms ‘rewrite the original contracts’. 57 Judgment in Mamatas (§ 110). This figure rises to 59% according to S. Grund, ‘Restructuring Government Debt Under Local Law: the Greek Case and Implications for Investor Protection’, Capital Markets Law journal, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, Vol. 12, No 2, pp. 253 to 273, in particular p. 254. 58 Details of those adjustments are contained in the judgment in Mamatas, § 16 and 17 as well as in the following paragraphs: ‘49. The Council of Ministers act of 24 February 2012 set the start date of the procedure at 24 February 2012. It was listed in the annex which securities had been selected by the act. The act stated that those securities would be adjusted by exchanging them for new securities issued by the State, but also by the European Financial Stability Facility. The new securities issued by the State were composed of both new State bonds and securities with returns linked to GDP (gross domestic product). 50. The new State bonds had an annual rate of 2% for the payment of coupons from 2013 to 2015; of 3% for the payment of coupons from 2016 to 2020; of 3.65% for the payment of coupons in 2021; and of 4.3% for the payment of coupons from 2022 to 2042. They were governed by United Kingdom law. 51. The securities with returns linked to GDP matured in 2042, were governed by United Kingdom law and had a return rate which was calculated according to the nominal capital value of the bonds which depreciated from 2024 to 2042.’ 59 See M. Audit, op. cit., in particular p. 73. 60 See, inter alia, judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB (T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 76 and, with regard to market volatility, paragraph 121). See, also, D. Carreau, ‘Dettes d’État’ Répertoire de droit international, Encyclopédie juridique Dalloz, Dalloz, Paris, 1998, as edited in September 2014, volume 1, in which he mentions ‘sovereign risk’ (paragraph 17), and S. Lemaire, ‘La rétroactivité en droit des investissements internationaux’, La Semaine Juridique — Entreprise et Affaires, 2013, No 38, pp. 47 to 50. 61 Cf. paragraph 57 of the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others, requesting an in-depth assessment. 62 See H. De Vauplane, ‘Le rôle du juge pendant la crise : entre ombre et lumière’, Revue des affaires européennes — Law & European Affairs, Larcier, Brussels, 2012, No 4, pp. 773 to 778, in particular p. 775, et S. Grund, ‘Restructuring Government Debt Under Local Law: the Greek Case and Implications for Investor Protection’, op. cit., in particular p. 255. 63 Judgment in Mamatas (§ 93). The European Court of Human Rights held that ‘the forced participation of the applicants in that process constitutes interference in their right to respect for their property[, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR]’. 64 Noted in the judgment in Fahnenbrock and Others in the following terms: ‘Those changes were to give effect to a decision of a majority of the bondholders on the basis of the exchange clause incorporated by that law into the contract of issue, which, furthermore, confirms the intention of the Hellenische Republik (Greek State) to keep the management of the bonds within a regulatory framework of a civil nature’ (paragraph 57). 65 Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 26 October 2011 (paragraph 12, cf. paragraph 15), available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf. This is a key element of the second support plan for Greece, see judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB (T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 19), and judgment in Mamatas (§ 10 and 11). 66 See judgment in Mamatas (§ 12). 67 Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 26 October 2011 (paragraph 15). 68 See judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB (T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 5). In the judgment in Mamatas, the European Court of Human Rights held that ‘[t]he interference at issue pursued … a public-interest aim’ (§ 105). 69 See R. Bismuth, op. cit., in particular footnote 126 (p. 510), which cites certain authors who have described that law as the ‘mopping up law’, and S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular p. 420, summarising the opinion of A. Witte (footnote 153): ‘He put forward that the Greek haircut — in contrast to other (domestic) mechanisms for debt restructuring — was imposed retroactively, tailor-made for one particular case and which lacked the sufficient safeguards for creditors’, and S. Grund, ‘Restructuring Government Debt Under Local Law: the Greek Case and Implications for Investor Protection’, op. cit., in particular p. 254: ‘To implement a haircut, the Greek Government modified the bulk of its local law debt by resorting to an unconventional, yet practical and politically expedient technique’, and p. 256. 70 See, in this regard, the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment in Mamatas (§ 115 in fine) and the explanations given in R. Bismuth, op.cit., in particular p. 510. 71 For the reasons as to why practice differed on the international capital markets, see R. Bismuth, op.cit., in particular p. 509, and, with regard to the contribution of CACs in controlling solvency crises, p. 506. See, also D. Carreau, op.cit., paragraph 101 et seq. 72 R. Bismuth, op. cit., in particular p. 510. 73 See R. Bismuth, op. cit., in particular pp. 511 and 512), S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular p. 422. 74 S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular p. 422, and footnotes 173 and 175. 75 EUCO 10/11. 76 In accordance with paragraph 96 of the judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle (C‑370/12, EU:C:2012:756), that mechanism ‘[aims] to meet the financing requirements of [the] Members [of that mechanism], namely Member States whose currency is the euro, who are experiencing or are threatened by severe financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States’. 77 See R. Bismuth, op. cit., in particular p. 512. 78 In the words of R. Bismuth, op. cit., in particular p. 508. 79 Cf. judgment No 11260/05 of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy), joined civil chambers, of 27 May 2005, cited by R. O’Keefe, C.J. Tams and A. Tzanakopoulos, The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, footnote 87 (p. 65), and by S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular footnotes 142 (p. 418) and 149 (p. 419). 80 In the words of S. Grund, ‘The legal consequences of sovereign insolvency — a review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt restructuring’, op. cit., in particular pp. 411 and 418. 81 Judgment of 1 October 2002, Henkel (C‑167/00, EU:C:2002:555, paragraph 30). 82 See judgment of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking (C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraph 31). 83 See judgment of 15 June 2017, Kareda (C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraph 8), which may be supplemented with the observation according to which the difference in wording in the French language version, in my view, has no bearing on the finding that the provisions are equivalent. Although the French version of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 conferred jurisdiction on the ‘tribunal du lieu où l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande a été ou doit être exécutée’ (literal translation: court for the place where the obligation underlying the claim was or must be performed), the French version of Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that the applicant may bring an action ‘devant la juridiction du lieu d’exécution de l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande’ (literal translation: before the court for the place of performance of the obligation underlying the claim). Therefore, no conclusion as to the substance is to be drawn from this. 84 See judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo (C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 18). 85 Wording taken from the Report by P. Jenard on the [Brussels] Convention (OJ 1979 C 59, p. 1, at p. 22), cited by the judgment of 19 February 2002, Besix (C‑256/00, EU:C:2002:99, paragraph 30). 86 See judgment of 19 February 2002, Besix (C‑256/00, EU:C:2002:99, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 87 See, in this regard, M.-E. Ancel, P. Deumier, M. Laazouzi, Droit des contrats internationaux, Sirey, Paris, 2016, p. 105. 88 See judgment of 15 June 2017, Kareda (C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraphs 27 to 29 and the case-law cited). 89 See, inter alia, judgment of 22 March 1983, Peters Bauunternehmung (34/82, EU:C:1983:87, paragraph 9). See, also to that effect, judgment in Kolassa (paragraph 37 and the case-law cited), cf. judgment of 15 June 2017, Kareda (C‑249/16, EU:C:2017:472, paragraph 28). 90 See, inter alia, judgment in Kolassa (paragraph 39 and case-law cited). 91 See judgment in Kolassa (paragraph 40), cf. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Kolassa, (C‑375/13, EU:C:2014:2135, footnote 10). 92 Judgment of 13 March 2014, Brogsitter (C‑548/12, EU:C:2014:148, paragraphs 24 and 25). 93 See judgments of 27 September 1988, Kalfelis (189/87, EU:C:1988:459, paragraph 18); of 17 October 2013, OTP Bank (C‑519/12, not published, EU:C:2013:674, paragraph 26); and in Kolassa (paragraph 44). 94 See paragraph 41 of the judgment in Kolassa. 95 See paragraph 40 of the judgment in Kolassa. 96 See detailed explanations regarding the specific legal regime for that product, based on the Court’s findings, A. de Cotiga, ‘I.A. Régulation européenne. C.J.U.E., 28 janvier 2015, Harald Kolassa c. Barclays Bank PLC, Aff. C‑375/13’, Revue internationale des services financiers, Larcier, Brussels, 2015, No 2, pp. 40 to 49, in particular p. 41, which state that at issue is ‘a secured credit derivative’ or ‘a form of derivative concerning a credit event incorporated into a negotiable instrument’. 97 See paragraph 26 of the judgment in Kolassa. 98 See paragraph 15 of the judgment in Kolassa. 99 I therefore propose that the Court departs from the approach recently taken in the judgment of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM (C‑366/13, EU:C:2016:282, paragraph 56), in the specific circumstances of this case, on account of the principle referred to in point 83 of this Opinion (and the case-law cited) and the distinction that can be made between the classification determining jurisdiction on the one hand and locus standi based on national law on the other. 100 A. Cotiga, op. cit., in particular p. 42, second paragraph and footnote 9, which refers to the Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an intermediary. 101 A. Cotiga, op. cit., in particular footnote 27 (p. 44), and M. Fyon, ‘Regards croisés sur l’arrêt Kolassa et sur diverses questions liées aux actions en responsabilité à l’encontre des émetteurs d’instruments financiers’, Revue pratique des sociétés — Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2016, No 4, pp. 405 to 429, in particular paragraph 15, which states that ‘Mr Lehman, however, rightly points out that that conclusion [that no contractual relationships exist] is linked to the legal classification [of those] relationships … as well as the nature of the complaints (which are often of a criminal nature) invoked by [the individual]’. 102 See, with regard to the diversification in the methods for holding securities, A. Cotiga, op. cit., in particular p. 42. 103 I shall refer to the opinion of M. Fyon, op. cit., in particular paragraph 34, which I share. See, to the same effect, A. Azi, ‘La solidarité financière dans la zone euro’, Revue Droit administratif, LexisNexis, Paris, No 8-9, 2012, in particular pp. 9 to 18, paragraphs 5 and 6. 104 See judgment of 17 June 1992, Handte (C‑26/91, EU:C:1992:268). 105 See, to that effect, H. De Vauplane, op. cit., in particular p. 775. 106 B. Haftel, ‘Circulation internationale des titres financiers, action en responsabilité et compétence juridictionnelle : questions de qualification’, Revue des contrats, Lextenso éditions, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 2015, No 3, pp. 547 to 551, in particular p. 548, and, to the same effect, M. Fyon, op. cit., in particular paragraph 36. 107 T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756. It should be noted that that judgment is also cited in the judgment in Mamatas (§ 54). 108 It may also be noted that, in my view, Articles 6 and 8 of Law No 2198/1994 appear to support that general analysis. 109 Which allows the case in the main proceedings to be distinguished from the case giving rise to the judgment of 17 June 1992, Handte (C‑26/91, EU:C:1992:268). 110 Which allows the case in the main proceedings to be distinguished from the case giving rise to the judgment in Kolassa. 111 See, inter alia, judgment of 6 October 1976, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como (12/76, EU:C:1976:133). 112 See, by analogy, with regard to disputes concerning claims relating to ‘tort, delict or quasi-delict’, judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide (C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 113 See, in particular, judgment of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe (C-106/17, EU:C:2018:50, paragraph 45). 114 See, by analogy, judgment of 18 July 2013, ÖFAB (C-147/12, EU:C:2013:490, paragraph 41).