Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:701
Date: 2025-09-11
Language of the case: French

Summary C-376/24 – 1 
Case C-376/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
28 May 2024 
Referring court: 
Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
8 May 2024 
Applicant: 
MT 
Defendant: 
Autorité des services et des marchés financiers (FSMA) 
  
1. Subject matter of the main proceedings: 
1 In the first six months of 2016, Bpost, a public limited liability company, was the 
subject of rumours surrounding possible privatisation sparked, in particular, by 
laws adopted in December 2015 and changes to the statutes adopted following a 
decision of the extraordinary general meeting of Bpost on 11 May 2016. 
2 On 27 May 2016, when interviewed during a radio programme, MT, former 
Minister for Public Enterprise at the time of the floating of Bpost on the stock 
exchange, indicated that Bpost would imminently lose its publicly owned 
establishment status and stated: the ‘State will sell some of its shares … it is really 
a matter of hours’. In the information reported subsequently to two newspapers, 
MT once again referred to the intended sale by the Belgian State of part of its 
shareholding in the capital of Bpost. 
3 The same day, Bpost requested that the Autorité des services et des marchés 
financiers (Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority) (‘the FSMA’) 
suspend the trading of its shares on the stock exchange. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
2 
4 On 28 July 2016, the FSMA launched an investigation into the public statements 
made by MT with regard to the imminent sale by the Belgian State of part of its 
shareholding in the public limited liability company Bpost to Post NL, a company 
governed by Netherlands law, as part of a merger between the two companies, a 
project which had not been made public at that time, and which was aborted 
shortly thereafter. 
5 MT was invited to submit observations, as was SL, Secretary General of the postal 
sector of the Centrale Générale des Services Publics (Belgian General Union of 
Public Services) (CGSP), who was one of the five permanent national union 
representatives employed by Bpost at the material time and who, in that capacity, 
had been informed by the management of the possible merger between Bpost and 
PostNL. 
6 Following the investigation, the FSMA criticised MT for having, in the morning 
of Friday 27 May 2016, communicated: 
‘(a) the existence of an imminent project to privatise Bpost to a radio journalist 
during the “Matin Première” programme broadcast live on RTBF and thus to all 
listeners of that programme; and 
(b) that the State was preparing to sell off approximately 10% of Bpost as part 
of a merger with another European operator to a journalist from the website 
L’Avenir.net and therefore to all readers of that article which reproduced those 
comments’. 
7 After various preliminary decisions, which are the subject of unsuccessful legal 
proceedings brought by MT, the Sanctions Committee of the FSMA ultimately 
decided on 11 May 2023: 
‘… 
2. to declare that MT had infringed Article 25(1)(b) of the Law of 2 August 
2022, by communicating information that he knew or should have known was 
inside information outside the exercise of his employment, profession or duties; 
3. in application of Article 72(3) of the Law of 2 August 2002, to impose a fine 
on MT in the amount of EUR 12 500 …’ 
8 MT brought an action before the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, 
Brussels, Belgium) (‘the Court of Appeal’) against that decision. 
9 The Court of Appeal rejects, in essence, the six grounds of appeal and reserves 
judgment on part of the second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the 
requirement to adjudicate within a reasonable period of time. With regard to the 
seventh ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal stays the proceedings and refers 
two questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
FSMA 
 
3 
2. Legal framework: 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) 
10 Article 10 provides: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) 
11 Article 11 provides: 
‘Freedom of expression and information 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.’ 
12 Article 52 reads as follows: 
‘Scope and interpretation of rights and principles 
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
… 
3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
4 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection. 
…’ 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
13 Recital 44 reads as follows: 
‘This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and in particular by Article 11 thereof and Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In this regard, this Directive does not in any way 
prevent Member States from applying their constitutional rules relating to freedom 
of the press and freedom of expression in the media’. 
14 Article 1 provides: 
‘For the purposes of this Directive: 
1. “Inside information” shall mean information of a precise nature which 
has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of 
financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of 
those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial 
instruments.’ 1 
15 Article 3 provides: 
‘Member States shall prohibit any person subject to the prohibition laid down in 
Article 2 from: 
 
1 Directive 2003/124 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC provides: ‘Article 1 
Inside information 
1. For the purposes of applying point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2003/6/EC, information shall be 
deemed to be of a precise nature if it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably 
be expected to come into existence or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be expected to 
do so and if it is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set 
of circumstances or event on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial 
instruments. 
2. For the purposes of applying point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 2003/6/EC, “information which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of financial 
instruments or related derivative financial instruments” shall mean information a reasonable 
investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his investment decisions.’ 
FSMA 
 
5 
(a) disclosing inside information to any other person unless such disclosure is 
made in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties; 
(b) recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of inside 
information, to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that 
information relates.’ 
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC 
16 Recital 77 states: 
‘This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). 
Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
those rights and principles. In particular, when this Regulation refers to rules 
governing the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other media 
and the rules or codes governing the journalist profession, account should be taken 
of those freedoms as guaranteed in the Union and in the Member States and as 
recognised pursuant to Article 11 of the Charter and to other relevant provisions.’ 
17 Article 7, entitled ‘Inside information’, reproduces, in essence, the definitions set 
out in Directives 2003/6 and 2003/124. 
18 Article 8, entitled ‘Insider dealing’, provides: 
… 
4. This Article applies to any person who possesses inside information as a 
result of: 
… 
This Article also applies to any person who possesses inside information under 
circumstances other than those referred to in the first subparagraph where that 
person knows or ought to know that it is inside information. 
…’ 
19 Article 10 provides: 
‘Unlawful disclosure of inside information 
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, unlawful disclosure of inside 
information arises where a person possesses inside information and discloses that 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
6 
information to any other person, except where the disclosure is made in the 
normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties. 
This paragraph applies to any natural or legal person in the situations or 
circumstances referred to in Article 8(4). 
…’ 
20 Article 21 provides: 
‘Disclosure or dissemination of information in the media 
For the purposes of Article 10 … where information is disclosed or disseminated 
and where recommendations are produced or disseminated for the purpose of 
journalism or other form of expression in the media, such disclosure or 
dissemination of information shall be assessed taking into account the rules 
governing the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media and 
the rules or codes governing the journalist profession, unless: 
(a) the persons concerned, or persons closely associated with them, derive, 
directly or indirectly, an advantage or profits from the disclosure or the 
dissemination of the information in question; or 
(b) the disclosure or the dissemination is made with the intention of misleading 
the market as to the supply of, demand for, or price of financial instruments.’ 
Law of 2 August 2022 on supervision of the financial sector and financial 
services 
21 Article 2 defines, inter alia, the concept of ‘inside information’ in identical terms 
to those of Directives 2003/6 and 2003/124, and therefore Regulation 
No 596/2014. 
22 Article 25 provides: 
‘1. Any person who possesses information which he knows, or ought to have 
known, constitutes inside information is prohibited from: 
… 
(b) communicating such information to another person, if it is not in the normal 
exercise of an employment, a profession or duties;’ 
FSMA 
 
7 
3. Arguments of the parties: 
A. MT 
23 In his seventh ground of appeal, MT argues that there was no infringement of 
Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002. 
24 As a preliminary point, the component elements of the alleged infringement of 
Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002 are not established. 
25 In the first place, the information he communicated was not inside information in 
that it was not of a precise nature (because it related to the future and was not 
precise enough to influence a reasonable investor), it was not likely to have a 
significant effect on Bpost’s share prices, and it had already been made public. 
26 In the second place, MT maintains that he does not have the status of primary 
insider, in so far as he did not receive the information as a result of his proximity 
to Bpost. Furthermore, he notes that the FSMA does not provide any evidence that 
he is a secondary insider, that is to say he received the information from a primary 
insider. 
27 Next, MT points out that the prohibition set out by the law relates to 
communicating information ‘to another person’, except in the normal ‘exercise of 
an employment, a profession or duties’. 
28 MT argues, first, that he did not communicate the alleged inside information to ‘a 
person’ but generally and indiscriminately to the public and that a fortiori the 
information communicated was not intended to mislead investors. 
29 MT maintains, next, that the prohibition to communicate inside information does 
not apply to a person acting in the normal exercise of his duties, as was the case 
here. 
30 Furthermore, even if it were acknowledged that he communicated inside 
information, MT relies, first, on the exception provided for in Article 21 of 
Regulation No 596/2014 in order to guarantee the freedom of expression. 
31 In so far as disclosure or dissemination of information ‘in the media’ is not 
defined, it should be interpreted in accordance with its usual meaning. The 
provision is therefore not limited to the publication of information by journalists. 
It is the medium that matters and not the person behind that publication. Article 21 
contains more lenient provisions than those resulting from Directive 2003/6, so 
that Article 21 is intended to apply retroactively in the present case. 
32 MT claims to have made public interventions in the media within the framework 
of his duties as former Minister of Public Enterprise, member of the cabinet and 
member of the national bureau of the Belgian Socialist Party. He claims not to 
have benefited from it – quite the contrary – and that the interventions were made 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
8 
with no intention of misleading the market. Moreover, his interventions were 
necessary for the accomplishment of his political duties and tasks. In any case, the 
balance must be tilted in favour of his freedom of expression in that his disclosure 
is of major general interest and any negative effects are only hypothetical and not 
demonstrated in practice. 
33 Next, more fundamentally, MT notes that Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2022 
restricts the freedom of expression enshrined by Article 10 ECHR. The 
prohibition provided for by law must be interpreted strictly. This is all the more so 
when it comes to the restriction of political expression. Consideration must also be 
given to the freedom of association enshrined by Article 11 ECHR. 
34 It is inconceivable that information disclosed by a union leader to a leading 
politician and communicated by the latter in order to incite public debate on an 
important issue (the privatisation of Bpost), is capable of being a basis for 
administrative proceedings aimed at punishing those allegedly guilty of insider 
trading. 
35 MT also relies on the protection of whistle-blowers, set out, inter alia, in the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 14 February 2023 (Hallet v. 
Luxembourg, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0214JUD002188418). 
36 MT argues that his interventions on the radio and in the press fell within the 
framework of his duties as former Minister of Public Enterprise and member of 
the national bureau of the Belgian Socialist Party, that is to say the opposition 
party and for which he played a particular role in the shadow cabinet (in which 
members of the political party in opposition are chosen as counterparts of 
members of the government who hold cabinet positions). 
B The FSMA 
37 The FSMA argues that Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 is not applicable to 
MT. Only journalists are concerned by the three sets of rules set out in Article 21. 
38 Even if Article 21 did not apply exclusively to professional journalists, the fact 
remains that Article 21 applies only to disclosures made ‘for the purpose of 
journalism’ and therefore concerns only those who, although not journalists by 
profession, carry on an equivalent activity, profession or function. The Court’s 
interpretation in the judgment of 15 March 2022, Autorité des marchés financiers 
(C-302/20, EU:C:2022:190), in no way justifies extending the words ‘for the 
purpose of journalism’ to cover speeches or statements made by a politician for 
political purposes, moreover distorting them. 
39 The disclosure of the transaction Bpost was preparing to close was neither 
necessary, nor proportionate, for the purposes of expressing ‘political’ opposition 
to a government ‘policy’ of privatisation of public companies. 
FSMA 
 
9 
40 MT was free to express his ‘political’ opposition to the privatisation of a Belgian 
public company in ways other than by disclosing inside information, as such being 
subject to protection for reasons of public policy under European and Belgian law. 
The fact that the information is of ‘major general interest’ does not, in itself, 
justify in all circumstances invariably and unconditionally its disclosure in 
disregard of its (legally) secret or confidential nature. MT’s intention was not to 
inform the public of Bpost’s transaction, rather to try to torpedo it, in particular by 
instigating a strike within Bpost. 
41 The FSMA challenges the broad interpretation of the exception provided for in 
Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002 in the light of freedom of expression. It 
submits that possible involvement in the shadow cabinet of a political party is not 
a duty within the meaning of Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2022. 
42 The alleged duty must relate to an activity likely to involve, due to its specific 
purpose and nature, the holding of inside information and the ‘normal’ exercise of 
the duty in question must include the disclosure of such information to a third 
party. In other words, the communication of inside information to a third party 
cannot fall within the ‘normal’ exercise of a duty unless it is considered to be of 
such a nature that it normally places the person exercising it in the position of 
having to hold inside information relating to an issuer of financial instruments or 
to those financial instruments. 
43 Even assuming that MT was acting in the performance of his duties or political 
role (as leader of a political party or former minister), those duties or that role still 
do not justify his being the normal holder of inside information relating to a public 
company, and even less so that he is authorised to disclose it pursuant to the 
exception referred to above. For a person to be able to communicate inside 
information to a third party under the exception set out in Article 25 of the Law of 
2 August 2002, there must be ‘a close link between the disclosure and the exercise 
of his employment, profession or duties’ in accordance with which that 
communication is made (judgment of 22 November 2005, Grøngaard and Bang, 
C-384/02, EU:C:2005:708). 
44 The FSMA also objects to the protection on the basis of MT’s freedom of 
expression: the disclosure of inside information relating to Bpost’s upcoming loss 
of publicly owned establishment status is not ‘an opinion’. Furthermore, the right 
to freedom of expression is not without limits. 
45 MT cannot claim the status of whistle-blower, which presupposes a working 
relationship with the company about which the statements are made. Furthermore, 
challenging a policy of privatisation of public undertakings has nothing do to with 
issuing an alert against a practice which is to be condemned as illegal, illicit or 
morally reprehensible. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
10 
4. Assessment of the Court of Appeal: 
Inside information 
46 The Court of Appeal notes first of all that in the legal definition, to be classified as 
inside information, information must meet the following four conditions: 
1. it concerns on or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more 
financial instruments; 
2. it is of a precise nature; 
3. it has not been made public; 
4. it could have significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments. 
47 The Court of Appeal held that those four conditions were indeed met in the 
present case. 
48 It examined in greater detail the ‘precise nature’ whereby the information is to 
indicate a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably be expected to 
come into existence or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be 
expected to do so (materiality criterion) and if it is specific enough to enable a 
conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or 
event on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial 
instruments (specificity criterion). 
49 In the present case, the infringement which the applicant is alleged to have 
committed concerns ‘the existence of an imminent project to privatise Bpost in the 
context of which the Belgian State will divest itself of around 10% of its 
shareholding in Bpost’. 
50 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the project in question constituted, 
at the material time, an event which ‘may reasonably be expected to [occur]’. 
51 In the judgment of 28 June 2012, Geltl (C-19/11, EU:C:2012:397), the Court of 
Justice held that ‘in using the terms “may reasonably be expected”, Article 1(1) of 
Directive 2003/124 refers to future circumstances or events from which it appears, 
on the basis of an overall assessment of the factors existing at the relevant time, 
that there is a realistic prospect that they will come into existence or occur’. The 
Court of Justice adds that, on the contrary, ‘precise information is not to be 
considered as including information concerning circumstances and events the 
occurrence of which is implausible’ (judgment of 28 June 2012, Geltl, C-19/11, 
EU:C:2012:397, paragraphs 46 and 48). The Court of Appeal infers from this that 
the level of requirement as to the expectation that they will occur is not very high. 
52 In the present case, the Court of Appeal takes the view that, on 27 May 2016, 
there was a likelihood that the proposed merger with PostNL would take place 
FSMA 
 
11 
imminently (since, according to the negotiators’ timetable, a press release about 
the transaction was planned for 6 June 2016) and to the extent that, as a result of 
that transaction, the involvement of the Belgian State in Bpost would significantly 
decrease with the loss of Bpost’s publicly owned establishment status, even if the 
negotiations could still to break down. 
53 Even if it turns out that the negotiations between Bpost and PostNL were not yet 
finalised and that a set of questions were still to be negotiated, there was a real 
prospect that the project would come to fruition in the coming days. 
54 Furthermore, even though it was not likely that the transaction would be closed ‘in 
the next few hours’, as MT indicated with regard to the ‘sale’ of shares by the 
Belgian State, and even if the transaction did not involve the sale or transfer of 
part of its shareholding by the Belgian State, but dilution thereof following a more 
complex merger operation, the Court of Appeal considers that MT reported an 
imminent loss of publicly owned establishment status by Bpost with a reduction in 
involvement by the Belgian State, which amounted to a real prospect, so that the 
information communicated had the precise nature required of inside information. 
55 So far as concerns the specificity criterion, the Court of Justice held that ‘it is 
enough that the information be sufficiently exact or specific to constitute a basis 
on which to assess whether the set of circumstances or the event in question is 
likely to have a significant effect on the price of the financial instruments to which 
it relates. Consequently, the only information excluded from the concept of 
“inside information” by virtue of that provision is information that is vague or 
general, from which it is impossible to draw a conclusion as regards its possible 
effect on the prices of the financial instruments concerned’ (judgment of 11 March 
2015, Lafonta, C-628/13, EU:C:2015:162, paragraph 31). 
56 In the present case, the information relating to Bpost’s imminent loss of publicly 
owned establishment status (and the reduction in involvement by the Belgian 
State) met that criterion; it was not vague, general information making it 
impossible to conclude that there was an effect on the price of Bpost’s shares. On 
the contrary, that information was likely to have effect on the share price. 
57 The Court of Appeal therefore takes the view that MT’s statement of 27 May 2016 
was based on inside information. 
Insider status 
58 The law prohibits any person from communicating inside information to others if 
the person knows, or ought to have known, that the information constitutes inside 
information. 
59 It is for the FSMA, which criticises MT for having communicated inside 
information, to establish not only that MT possessed inside information, but that 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
12 
he knew, or ought to have known, that that information constituted inside 
information. 
60 In order to establish such awareness, whether actual or implied, the contested 
decision refers, inter alia, to MT’s capacity as former Minister of Public 
Enterprise, in particular at the time of the floating of Bpost on the stock exchange. 
It also refers to the fact that he announced he was revealing a ‘scoop’ about Bpost. 
61 The Court of Appeal considers that statement of reasons to be adequate and 
considers that MT does indeed have insider status. 
Exceptions or derogations from the prohibition 
62 The EU legislation transposed by the provision of Belgian law at issue in the 
present case pursues the objective of ensuring ‘market integrity’ – considered to 
be a prerequisite for economic growth – and ‘the smooth functioning of securities 
markets and public confidence in markets’ (recital 2 of Directive 2003/6). 
63 Given that context, the prohibition on the communication of inside information 
appears, prima facie, to ensure, in essence, fair public communication and to 
prevent such inside information from being used for an acquisition or disposal. 
64 Both Directive 2003/6 (see, inter alia, recital 44 thereof) and Regulation 
No 596/2014 (see, inter alia, recital 77 thereof) state that they respect the 
fundamental rights, first and foremost being the freedom of expression recognised 
by Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter. 
65 Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 aims to strike a balance between the 
objective pursued by financial legislation to prohibit the communication of inside 
information and the right to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the 
press. 
66 The Court of Justice has held that ‘the question whether the provisions of 
Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 are more lenient, in the domain in question, 
than those of Directive 2003/6, with the result that they are indeed applicable to 
the dispute in the main proceedings, depends on the interpretation of that article’ 
(judgment of 15 March 2022, Autorité des marchés financiers, C-302/20, 
EU:C:2022:190, paragraph 59). 
67 As to the meaning of Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014, the Court of Justice 
held in the same judgment that ‘in order to take account of the importance of those 
fundamental freedoms in every democratic society, it is necessary to interpret 
broadly concepts relating to those freedoms, such as that of “the purpose of 
journalism”’ (judgment of 15 March 2022, Autorité des marchés financiers, 
C-302/20, EU:C:2022:190, paragraph 66). 
68 Furthermore, Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 does not constitute an 
independent basis but must be read in conjunction with Article 10 of Regulation 
FSMA 
 
13 
No 596/2014, which presupposes ‘a close link between the disclosure of inside 
information and the exercise of an employment, a profession or duties in order to 
justify that disclosure’ (judgment of 15 March 2022, Autorité des marchés 
financiers, C-302/20, EU:C:2022:190, paragraph 78). 
69 Both Directive 2003/6 (in Article 3 thereof) and Regulation No 596/2014 (in 
Article 10 thereof) provide that the disclosure of inside information is not 
prohibited if it is made ‘in the normal course of the exercise of [the person’s] 
employment, profession or duties’. 
70 It is not disputed that in the present case, MT did not derive any advantage or 
benefit from the disclosure made, nor did he make that disclosure with the 
intention of misleading the market. 
71 The question arises as to whether Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 could 
apply to MT, as a more favourable legal provision and to the extent that he claims 
to have acted within the framework of his duties as a former minister and 
opposition party politician, and with the objective of drawing public attention to 
the proposed privatisation of a leading public undertaking or, more generally, 
whether he could take advantage of the exception relating to disclosure made in 
the course of his duties. Either way, it is necessary to take into account the fact 
that the alleged disclosure concerned the disclosure of information in the media, 
which he says he made for the purpose of inciting political debate. 
72 In order to answer those questions, it is necessary to resolve questions relating to 
the interpretation of Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014. 
73 In the context of its prima facie assessment, the Court of Appeal notes that the 
prohibition on disclosing inside information amounts to a limit on MT’s freedom 
of expression, guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter. 
Although those provisions provide that limitations on freedom of expression may 
be provided for by law, there is still reason to verify, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, whether such limitations are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union (Article 52 of the 
Charter), or are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights 
of others for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence 
(Article 10(2) ECHR). 
74 In that regard, so far as concerns the proportionality test and the objective pursued 
by the prohibition on the disclosure of inside information that MT is accused of 
having infringed by means of his public disclosure, the Court of Appeal notes, 
also prima facie, that perhaps there is reason to believe that the objective pursued 
by that prohibition is less about ensuring market integrity and more about 
protecting the rights of the issuer concerned (in the present case, Bpost). Bpost 
sought, in accordance with the financial rules applicable, to postpone 
communicating the information to the markets in order to facilitate negotiations 
with its partner free from any interference. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-376/24 
 
14 
75 The Court of Appeal thus refers the questions set out below to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling. 
5. The questions referred: 
76 Before a ruling is given, the Court of Appeal refers the following questions to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling: 
1. Must Article 3 of Directive 2003/6, read in the light of Articles 11 and 52 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 10 ECHR and the principle of equality, 
in so far as it concerns the prohibition on ‘disclosing inside information to any 
other person unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of 
his employment, profession or duties’, be interpreted as prohibiting the disclosure 
of inside information in the media (radio and websites of printed media outlets) by 
a person who has the status of politician, former minister and member of an 
opposition party, who intervenes in the media in that capacity, and who seeks, by 
that disclosure, to incite public debate on a question of general interest in such a 
way as to criticise a privatisation project, even though his or her duties do not 
normally involve such a disclosure of inside information in the media? 
2. Must the scope of Article 21 of Regulation No 596/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse, read in the light 
of the same principles as those set out in the preceding question, be interpreted as 
being limited to disclosure or dissemination of inside information by journalists, 
or does it also apply to the disclosure or dissemination of inside information in the 
media by a person, such as a politician, former minister and member of an 
opposition party, who seeks, by that disclosure, to incite public debate on a 
question of general interest in such a way as to criticise a privatisation project?