Information;Order — ECLI:EU:C:2024:481
Date: 2024-06-04
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible;Staff cases;Action for damages

summary form to a complaint alleging infringement of “fundamental legal principles and especially the [appellant]’s right to [an] effective legal remedy”, and does not contain legal arguments sufficient to enable the Court to exercise its powers of judicial review. 15. That complaint must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 16. It follows that the first part of the single ground of appeal must be rejected as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded. The second part, alleging distortion of the letter of 8 August 2021 Arguments of the appellant 17. In support of the second part of the single ground of appeal, the appellant claims, summarily, that in paragraphs 37 to 44 of the order under appeal the General Court distorted the facts and committed a “fundamental error … in the application of the law and in the assessment of the facts”, by failing to distinguish, for the purposes of the legal classification of the letter of 8 August 2021, between the elements constituting a complaint, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and those constituting a request, within the meaning of Article 90(1) thereof. 18. The appellant complains, in essence, that the General Court adopted a “blanket categorisation” of the letter of 8 August 2021, even though certain elements thereof called on EUIPO to take a decision on the basis of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations for the first time, and in particular to take measures with regard to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. According to the appellant, that is evidenced by the wording used by the General Court in the last sentence of paragraph 44 of the order under appeal and in particular the use of the word “requesting” in the expression “requesting EUIPO to reconsider [its position] and bring it to the attention of the Spanish authorities”. She argues that that “blanket categorisation” of the letter of 8 August 2021 and of all its constituent elements is clearly unlawful since both EUIPO – as appointing authority – and the General Court are required to assess in detail the submissions made by officials, taking into account, moreover, that the applicant acted here without legal advice. Assessment 19. At the outset, it should be noted that the appellant does not dispute the considerations set out by the General Court in paragraphs 37 to 43 of the order under appeal as regards the factors on the basis of which the letter of 8 August 2021 could be classified as a “complaint” within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. In reality, the appellant’s complaint seeks to call into question the assessment made by the General Court in paragraph 44 of that order. In that paragraph, the General Court held that the classification of that letter as a “complaint” within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, “[was] not called into question by the applicant’s argument that EUIPO was requested for the first time, by that letter and the supplement of 12 November 2021, to take measures vis-à-vis the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, that is to say, in particular, ‘to issue amended information [to that ministry] in order that the matter can be rectified as soon as possible.’” In that paragraph, the General Court went on to give reasons for that assessment. 20. Consequently, it must be held that the appellant merely reiterates the argument which she had put forward before the General Court in her action at first instance and is in fact attempting to obtain from the Court of Justice a fresh assessment of a question of fact, namely, in the present case, whether, by the letter of 8 August 2021, EUIPO was requested for the first time to correct its erroneous measures and to inform the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation thereof, without however alleging any distortion in that regard. 21. Therefore, the second part of the single ground of appeal is, in accordance with the case-law cited above, manifestly inadmissible. 22. Consequently, the single ground of appeal relied on by the appellant and, therefore, the appeal brought by the appellant, must be rejected as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded, and the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings, in accordance with Article 137 and Article 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure.’ 5 For the same reasons as those given by the Advocate General in points 12 to 15 and 19 to 21 of his view, the second complaint in the first part, and the second part of the single ground of appeal, must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 6 As regards the first complaint in the first part, it should be noted, for the same reasons as those given by the Advocate General in points 6 to 10 of his view, that the General Court did not distort the letter of 26 July 2021 when it found, in paragraph 35 of the order under appeal, that it necessarily implied that EUIPO did not intend to reconsider its position and thus definitively established that position with regard to the appellant’s individual situation. Therefore, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 34 of that order, which the appellant does not dispute, it must be held that the General Court clearly did not err in law, in paragraph 36 of that order, in classifying the letter of 26 July 2021 as a ‘decision’ within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations. 7 In those circumstances, the first complaint in the first part of the single ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 8 In the light of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded. Costs 9 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. In the present case, since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was served on EUIPO and therefore before it could have incurred costs, LD must be ordered to bear her own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded. 2. LD shall bear her own costs. Luxembourg, 4 June 2024. A. Calot Escobar O. Spineanu-Matei Registrar President of the Chamber * Language of the case: English.