Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2014:156
Date: 2014-03-13
Language of the case: Italian
Subject matter: Energy;Environment;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Italy

summary report on the implementation of Directive 2001/77, no later than 31 December 2005, together with any additional proposals addressed to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union. (51) The transitional nature of that directive demands a dynamic interpretation of its provisions that takes into account the long-term objectives of the legislation on green energy promotion and developments that have occurred since its adoption. It is therefore essential to view the area covered by the common rules in the light of Directive 2009/28. b) Directive 2009/28 59. Directive 2001/77 was repealed in its entirety, from 1 January 2012, by Directive 2009/28 which, as is made clear in recital 13 in the preamble to and in Article 3 of the latter, fixes mandatory national targets concerning the share of green energy in total energy consumption. 60. In that connection, Article 3 cites the objective of a minimum 20% share of green energy in gross final consumption of energy by 2020. 61. That is the context in which Article 3(3)(b) of Directive 2009/28 mentions, among the measures that Member States may apply in order to achieve their targets, measures of cooperation with third countries. Unlike Directive 2001/77, Directive 2009/28 includes, therefore, an additional element relating to international relations by authorising the Member States to cooperate with third countries on all types of common projects concerning the generation of green electricity and providing, on the conditions set out in Articles 9 and 10 thereof, that electricity imported from a third country may be taken into account in appraising compliance with overall national targets. Rather surprisingly, that directive even provides, after authorisation by the Commission, for electricity to be taken into consideration that is generated and consumed in a third country in the specific context of the construction, with very long completion dates, of an interconnection to be used to export electricity to the Union. According to Article 39 of that directive, that provision is justified by the high European interest in projects being carried out in third countries, such as the Mediterranean solar plan. 62. In addition, Directive 2009/28 made certain amendments to the guarantee of origin scheme, in particular by adding further details as to its form and content. Nevertheless, it is still intended to be exclusively a means of proof. c) Foreseeable changes in EU law 63. As regards the objective of developing the share of green energies, it is to be observed that the promotion of green energy production in the Union is considered to be an essential objective recognised at Union level. Thus, in the Commission’s communication of 22 January 2014, (52) the increase in the minimum share of green energies to 27 % in 2030 is cited as one of the principal objectives agreed at Union level, the attainment of which is to be guaranteed by a new system of governance based on the implementation of national energy plans. It is interesting to note that the setting of a mandatory target at Union level indicates a new more collective, coherent and coordinated approach to the promotion of green energy. 64. In short, analysis both of Directive 2001/77 and of Directive 2009/28 and foreseeable developments in EU law supports the finding that the sphere of guarantees of origin, considered as a whole to be one of the key instruments for the promotion of green energy in the Union, is already amply regulated in EU law. 65. It remains to be determined whether the common rules existing in this field are affected by the unilateral action of the Italian Republic. 3. The effect of State action on the common rules 66. It is undeniable that, by making the exemption from the obligation to purchase green certificates for electricity imported from a non-member State dependent on the conclusion with that State of an agreement, the purpose of which is to guarantee the origin of the ‘green electricity imported for the purposes of Article 5 of directive 2001/77’, Article 20(3) of Legislative Decree No 387 gives that agreement a scope ratione materiae that coincides exactly with the scope of that directive. Clearly, moreover, the overlapping of the respective areas of the agreement concerned and that directive is evidenced by the express reference made by the provisions of national law to the provisions of Article 5 of that directive. 67. It is true that, by referring purely and simply to the guarantee of origin as provided for under EU law, that legislation does not apparently give rise to any incompatibility between Directive 2001/77 and the proposed agreements, so that the Italian Republic, bound by both acts, could observe the provisions of one without breach of the obligations under the other. However, when, as in the present case, the international agreements concerned fall within the ambit of the common rules or, at all events, within an area already to a large extent covered by such rules, the Member States lose their external competence even if there is no contradiction between those rules and those agreements. (53) That neutrality of the effect on the common rules for the purposes of the judgment in ERTA is attributable to the necessity of ensuring the unity and efficacy of EU law, which could be compromised by measures adopted piecemeal by the Member States. (54) 68. What is more, the renvoi made by the Italian legislation to Article 5 of Directive 2001/77 does not appear to me to preclude all risk that the obligations entered into by the Italian Republic with regard to third countries might be incompatible with EU legislation. In particular, there is nothing to ensure that the agreement would authorise the issue of guarantees of origin only for green electricity meeting the definition in Article 2 of that directive. (55) 69. Moreover, in my view, the conclusion by a Member State of an agreement with a third country concerning the recognition of guarantees of origin is inconsistent with the objectives of EU policy with regard to the development of green energies and is liable to compromise the effectiveness of EU legislation. In that connection, it is to be stressed that the purpose of introducing guarantees of origin intended to establish the green origin of the electricity generated was to facilitate trade in green energy within the internal market in electricity and to promote competition between producers, in particular by enabling final customers to be informed about the origin of the electricity they purchase. 70. Attainment of the objectives underpinning the environmental and energy policies of the Union, such as correcting, in priority at source, damage to the environment, reducing greenhouse gases, increasing green energy production throughout the Union, enhancing prospects of growth and employment in the Member States and also promoting security of supplies and reducing dependency on energy imports, is inextricably linked to how imports of green energy originating in third countries are to be treated. 71. The conclusion by the Member States of international agreements with third countries is liable to imperil the attainment of those objectives, because the action of the Union in favour of environmental protection would manifestly lose its practical effect if every Member State could freely determine whether, and if so to what extent, it intended to support imports of green electricity from third countries. As the Commission emphasised in its written and oral observations, by providing for the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of the recognition of advantages linked to importing green electricity from third countries, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings is liable to favour imports of green energy from those States to the detriment of green energy produced in the Member States. In addition, although the GSE asserted at the hearing that green energy imported from Switzerland had not been taken into account in respect of the attainment of national targets, the conclusion of an international agreement between a Member State and a third country affords no guarantee in this respect. Moreover, Article 20(4) of Legislative Decree No 387, which appears in the national file lodged at the Court Registry, appears to authorise, for the purpose of attaining the national target, taking into account of imported green energy, even if imported from a third country, subject to the conclusion of an agreement between the competent ministries of the Italian Republic and of the third country concerned. Finally, Directive 2009/28 governs this matter henceforth, coordinating the action of the Member States with regard to third countries. (56) 72. In short, the necessary effect, in accordance with the judgment in ERTA, of the common rules adopted by the Union in the sphere of guarantees of origin overlaps with the effectiveness of the provisions of the Treaties relating to environmental protection conferring on the Union exclusive competence to conclude with third countries any agreements relating to the subject-matter governed by Directive 2001/77 and, consequently, withdraws from Member States any right to enter into obligations relating to recognition of guarantees of origin, inasmuch as they are liable to affect the provisions of that directive or to alter its scope. 73. None the less, I see that three objections can be raised to that solution. 74. The first, set out by the Italian Government, has to do with the role conferred by Directive 2001/77 on the Member States in the organisation of the guarantee of origin system. By conferring on them the tasks of defining objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria in order to guarantee the origin of green electricity, of designating the bodies responsible for supervising the issue of guarantees of origin and of putting in place the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the guarantees, that directive may be said to uphold the ‘regulatory contribution’ of the Member States, that is to say, their parallel competence. 75. That first objection can easily be set aside. As the Court has repeatedly held, a directive can be regarded as a common rule from which recognition of an exclusive external competence may stem. (57) In that situation, the degree to which the Member States lose competence varies depending on the normative force of the directive and the leeway left them for determining the procedure for transposition in the context of a circumscribed implementing power. (58) The fact that the EU legislature left to the Member States certain tasks relating to the issue of guarantees of origin does not prevent recognition that the area of those guarantees has already to a large extent been harmonised by EU law. 76. The second objection, which is perhaps the strongest, is based on the distinction drawn by Directive 2001/77 between guarantees of origin and green certificates and on the power left to the Member States to determine whether electricity whose green origin is established by a guarantee of origin may or may not benefit from support mechanisms. According to the Italian Government and the GSE, the system at issue in the main proceedings, which is an aid scheme within the meaning of that directive, comes within the terms of the particular rights conferred on the Member States by that directive. 77. I find that objection unpersuasive for the three following reasons. 78. First, on a reading of the order for reference it is apparent that the scope of the international agreements whose conclusion is envisaged under Legislative Decree No 387 goes further than mere support schemes, for those agreements are intended to cover, more generally, the recognition of guarantees of origin, whether or not the latter are used in the context of an aid scheme. 79. Secondly, under the overall system, by nature transitional, of measures to support green energies under Directive 2001/77 in order to meet objectives for 2010 before a truly Community framework is established as provided for, it seems to me that the residual competence conferred on the Member States to take action by way of national provisions in a particular situation that the Union has temporarily renounced regulating by laying down common rules must be interpreted as constituting, not a reservation of competence in their favour, but a precarious authorisation conferred on them by the EU legislature in connection with the implementation of EU law. In my view, the Union manifestly intended to exercise its competence over the whole sphere concerned, which includes the determination of the operation of the guarantees of origin under the national aid schemes even if, provisionally, it had delegated that issue to them. 80. In that connection, it may be pointed out by analogy that, in its Opinion 1/03, the Court, on the basis of the ‘uniform and coherent’ (59) system of rules on conflicts of jurisdiction in Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (60) interpreted a provision of that regulation which made a renvoi to the legislation of the Member States (61) as implementing EU law. 81. Thirdly, the power conferred on the Member States is limited solely to determining the support afforded to green energy originating from another Member State and does not, therefore, seem to me to be grounds for competence to enter into an international agreement with a third country. I set out in my Opinions in Joined Cases C‑204/12 to C‑208/12 Essent Belgium and Case C‑573/12 Ålands Vindkraft, currently pending before the Court, the reasons why I consider that such a power is not compatible with primary law. 82. The third objection consists of calling in question whether the effect on common rules is real and actual, having regard to the circumstance that, at the time of the facts giving rise to the case in the main proceedings, the Italian Republic and the Swiss Confederation had not yet entered into an agreement on recognition of guarantees of origin. In other words, can a national provision that does no more than envisage the conclusion of an international agreement be capable of affecting common rules? 83. To my mind, the answer to that question must be affirmative. On the one hand, the adoption of a national provision envisaging the conclusion of an international agreement immediately entails a theoretical effect on common rules, counteracting the loss of competence by the Member States as a result of the exercise, by the Union, of its internal competence. On the other hand, a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings creates the risk of a potential affecting the common rules if the agreement should actually be concluded, which is enough to justify the application of the ERTA decision. 84. This extensive view of the concept of the effect on common rules seems to me to be borne out in the case-law. Thus, in Commission v Greece, (62) the Court considered, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the Commission against the Hellenic Republic, that a mere initiative taken within an international organisation by a Member State might be ‘likely’ (63) to affect Union legislation when that initiative set in motion a process that could lead to the adoption of new rules having an effect on that legislation. (64) 85. That reasoning may be extended, by analogy, to any action taken by a Member State liable to lead to the adoption of international norms capable of affecting the common rules adopted by the Union. (65) 86. Such is the case of the provision at issue in the main proceedings. 87. Having dismissed those various objections, I propose that the Court should reply to the first question by declaring that, because guarantees of origin fall within an area already largely covered by the common rules, adopted step by step since Directive 2001/77 with a view to a yet more complete harmonisation, the exercise by the Union of its internal competence has given rise to an exclusive external competence which precludes a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the Member State concerned to conclude international agreements with third countries relating to recognition of guarantees of origin. C – The second question 88. By its second question, the national court asks, essentially, whether the exercise by the Union of its internal competence, in consequence of the adoption of Directive 2001/77, deprives the Member States of their competence to enter into agreements with third countries, this including the case in which the third country concerned in the Swiss Confederation, which is bound to the Union by a free trade agreement. 89. If I abide by the terms in which the question is couched, a relevant reply can easily be found. The fact that the Swiss Confederation entered into the free trade agreement has no effect on the rules governing the division of powers between the Union and its Member States. Consequently, so construed, the question calls for a negative reply. 90. It is true that the question could be construed more widely, as asking whether a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings under which, in the absence of an agreement between the Italian Republic and the Swiss Confederation, an importer of green electricity from Switzerland is obliged to purchase green certificates corresponding to a certain quota of imported green electricity if it is not to incur a penalty, is compatible with the principle of the free movement of goods and the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions of imports. 91. However, as is clear from the wording of the various questions, the national court sought only to obtain clarification in regard to the exclusivity of the external competence of the Union. 92. Accordingly, I doubt that the information provided by the national court was sufficient to enable the interested parties referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice to submit their observations on the question as reformulated above. 93. None the less, in order to provide a useful reply to the national Court, I shall give certain indications as to the parameters to be taken into consideration. 94. I have mentioned in other contexts (66) the reasons that led me to state that national restrictions of imports of green electricity from another Member State constitute discriminatory obstacles to trade between the Member States that cannot be justified on the grounds of overriding requirements relating to environmental protection. 95. Conversely, I consider that those requirements fully justify the restrictions of imports of green electricity from a third country, such as the Swiss Confederation, and in particular that every single justification in PreussenElektra (67) is fully applicable. 96. In that connection it should be pointed out that, when there is no system of mutual recognition of guarantees of origin, the green origin of electricity produced in a third country cannot be guaranteed, as in the case of electricity produced in another Member State and that the Swiss Confederation, which has for several years been negotiating a bilateral agreement on electricity with the Union, (68) participates neither in Union policy in the field of the environment (69) nor in attaining the internal market on energy. 97. Thus, the barrier to trade liable to be caused by the obligation to purchase green certificates seems to me to be justified under Article 20 of the free-trade agreement. D – The third question 98. By its third question, the national court essentially asks whether recognition in favour of the Union of an exclusive external competence precludes a national provision which makes recognition of guarantees of origin issued by third countries subject to the conclusion of an agreement, not between the Member State and the third state concerned, but between the national grid manager of the Member State and the analogous authority of the third country. 99. I have already stated the reasons why I consider these questions to be inadmissible. (70) I shall therefore examine them only in the alternative. 100. Article 4(6) of the Ministerial Decree of 11 November 1999 refers to the conclusion of an agreement between the manager of the Italian grid and the analogous authority of a third country determining the detailed arrangements for the necessary checks. 101. The agreement whose conclusion is envisaged is therefore not an international agreement for the purpose of public international law but a contract, whether under public law or private law, entered into between electricity grid managers. 102. The chief consequence of the gradual loss of competence by the Member States in the international order in step with the exercise by the Union of its internal competence is to deprive those States of their competence to enter into international agreements relating to the subject-matter covered by EU legislation. 103. More generally, however, the Member States are bound to observe the principle of sincere cooperation in the exercise of competences and the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Union which constitutes the expression of that principle. They may not, therefore, circumvent the exclusivity of Union competence by delegating authority to public or private bodies under their control to conclude an agreement with a comparable body of a third country. 104. I take the view, therefore, like the Commission, that the reasoning set out in reply to the first question may be applied to the national legislation at issue. 105. In consequence, the reply to the third question must be that exclusive external competence arising from the exercise by the Union of its internal competence likewise precludes, in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, a national provision which makes reference to the conclusion of an agreement, not between the Member State and the third country concerned, but between the national grid managers of those two States, when it is the object or effect of that provision to evade the Member States’ lack of authority to enter into international obligations with third countries. V – Conclusion 106. For the foregoing reasons, I propose that the Court should answer the questions submitted by the Consiglio di Stato as follows: (1) Because guarantees of origin fall within an area already largely covered by the common rules, adopted step by step since Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market with a view to a yet more complete harmonisation, the exercise by the Union of its internal competence has given rise to an exclusive external competence which precludes a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the Member State concerned to conclude international agreements with third countries relating to recognition of guarantees of origin. (2) The fact that the third country concerned is the Swiss Confederation, with which the European Community concluded a free trade agreement on 22 July 1972, an agreement concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2840/72 of 19 December 1972 as amended by Decision No 1/2000 of the EC-Switzerland Joint Committee of 25 October 2000, has no effect on that reply. (3) The exclusive external competence arising from the exercise by the European Union of its internal competence likewise precludes, in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, a national provision which makes reference to the conclusion of an agreement, not between the Member State and the third country concerned, but between the national grid managers of those two States, when it is the object or effect of that provision to evade the Member States’ lack of authority to enter into international obligations with third countries. 1 – Original language: French. 2 – Case 22/70 [1971] ECR 263. 3 – For ease of reference I shall refer to such energy as ‘green energy’. 4 – OJ 2010 L 283, p. 33. 5 – Agreement entered into, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Regulation (EEC) No 2840/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972 (OJ 1972 L 300, p. 188), as amended by Decision No 1/2000 of the EC‑Switzerland Joint Committee of 25 October 2000 (OJ 2000 L 51, p. 1, hereinafter ‘the Free Trade Agreement’). 6 – Under that Article ‘the agreement shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, law and order or public security, the protection of life and humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures of historic or archaeological value, the protection of industrial and commercial property, or rule relating to gold or silver. Such prohibitions or restrictions must not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties’. 7 – ‘Green Network’. 8 – ‘Green electricity’. 9 – GURI No 75, of 31 March 1999, ‘Legislative Decree No 79’. 10 – ‘GSE’. 11 – Ordinary supplement to GURI No 25, of 31 January 2004, ‘Legislative Decree No 387’. 12 – OJ 1997 L 27, p. 20. 13 – See, inter alia, Case C‑19/12 Efir [2013] ECR, paragraphs 26 and 27 and case-law cited, and C‑212/11 Jyske Bank Gibraltar [2013] ECR, paragraph 38 and case-law cited. 14 – Case C‑157/10 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria [2011] ECR I‑13023, paragraphs 17 to 21. 15 – See Case C‑370/07 Commission v Council [2009] ECR I‑8917, paragraph 49; Case C‑378/08 ERG and Others [2010] ECR I‑1919, paragraph 55; Case C‑240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie [2011] ECR I‑1255, paragraph 31; Case C‑504/09 P Commission v Poland [2012] ECR, paragraph 79; and Case C‑505/09 P Commission v Estonia [2012], paragraph 81. 16 – See Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, paragraph 35. 17 – ERTA, paragraph 16. 18 – Ibid., paragraph 17. Emphasis added. 19 – Ibid., paragraph 18. 20 – See Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I‑1061, paragraph 11. 21 – See Case C‑433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I‑6985, paragraph 45 and case-law therein cited. 22 – Regulation No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ, English Special Edition 1969(I), p. 170). 23 – Paragraph 30. Emphasis added. 24 – Paragraph 31. Emphasis added. 25 – Paragraph 25. Emphasis added. The expression ‘area already covered to a large extent by Community or common rules’ has since been used on several occasions by the Court (see Opinion 1/03 [2006] ECR I‑1145, paragraph 126, and judgments in Case C‑475/98 Commission v Austria [2002] ECR I‑9797, paragraph 97; Case C‑266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I‑4805, paragraph 43, and Commission v Germany, paragraph 45. 26 – ECR I‑5267. 27 – Paragraph 77. 28 – Ibid. 29 – Ibid. Emphasis added. 30 – Paragraph 95. 31 – Paragraph 96. Emphasis added. 32 – Case C‑466/98 Commission v United Kingdom [2002] ECR I‑9427; Case C‑467/98 Commission v Denmark [2002] ECR I‑9519; Case C‑468/98 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I‑9575; Case C‑469/98 Commission v Finland [2002] ECR I‑9627; Case C‑471/98 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I‑9681; Case C‑472/98 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I‑9741; Commission v Austria; and Case C‑476/98 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I‑9855. 33 – Convention signed on 30 October 2007, approved on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 2009/430/EC of 27 November 2008 (OJ 2009 L 147, p. 1). 34 – Opinion 1/03 (paragraph 121). 35 – Ibid. (paragraph 122). 36 – Ibid. 37 – Ibid, paragraph 126. 38 – Ibid. 39 – Ibid., paragraph 128. 40 – Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16). 41 – Article 5 of Directive 2001/77. 42 – Article 5(3), second indent and 5(4) of that directive. 43 – Article 5(3), first indent, of Directive 2001/77. The guarantee of origin shall mention the energy source from which the electricity was produced specifying the dates and places of production and in the case of hydroelectric installations indicate the capacity. 44 – Under Article 2(a), read with Article 5(1), of that directive, the renewable sources of energy for which the guarantee of origin must be issued are wind energy, solar energy, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower energy, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases. 45 – Article 5(1), first sentence, of Directive 2001/77. 46 – Article 5(2) of Directive 2001/77. 47 – Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/77. 48 – Article 5(4) of Directive 2001/77. 49 – Emphasis added. 50 – Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/77. 51 – Article 8 of that directive. 52 – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A policy framework for climate and energy for the period from 2020 to 2030 (COM(2014) 15 final). 53 – See point 41 of this Opinion 54 – See in that connection point 71 of the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies cases. 55 – See footnote 44. 56 – See point 64 of this Opinion. 57 – See, in that connection, ERTA, according to which common rules may be adopted ‘under whatever form they may take’. See also Opinions 1/94 and 2/91 58 – See to that effect, Neframi, E., ‘Les accords mixtes de la Communauté européenne: aspects communautaires et internationaux’, Bruylant, 2007, who observes that ‘by applying a directive the member states do not reserve an autonomous residual competence but a linked competence. They lose the power to decide on the principle of their action whilst remaining masters of its modalities’ (p. 50). A parallel may be drawn with the loss of competence following the adoption of harmonising directives in the internal order. After exercise by the Union of its internal competence the Member States are no longer competent unilaterally to modify the content of harmonised national rules (see in that connection Case 28/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 3097, paragraph 28, and Case 29/87 Dansk Denkavit [1988] ECR 2965, paragraph 16. 59 – Point 148. 60 – OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1. 61 – Under Article 4(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, ‘if the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall … be determined by the law of that Member State’. 62 – C‑45/07 [2009] ECR I ‑701. 63 – Paragraphs 19 and 23. 64 – Paragraph 21. 65 – See on this, Neframi, E., ‘Renforcement des obligations des États membres dans le domaine des relations extérieures’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2009, p. 601. 66 – See my Opinion in Essent Belgium and Ålands Vindkraft. 67 – C‑379/98 [2001] ECR I‑2099. 68 – As far as it is possible to tell, according to European Agency No 11016 of 12 February 2014, the pursuit of negotiations between the Union and the Swiss Confederation could be compromised by the referendum of 9 February 2014 on the initiative entitled ‘Against mass immigration’. 69 – With the exception of its participation in the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network. See, on this matter, the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the participation of Switzerland in the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network (OJ 2006 L 90, p. 37). Agreement concluded and approved on behalf of the Community by Decision 2006/235/EC of the Council of 27 February 2006 (OJ 2006 L 90, p. 36). 70 – In this regard, see above, points 24 to 27 of this Opinion.