Order — ECLI:EU:C:2026:374
Date: 2026-05-04
Language of the case: English

ORDER OF THE COURT (Eighth Chamber) 4 May 2026 (*) ( Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Representation of non-privileged parties in an action before the Courts of the European Union – Third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Requirement to be represented by a lawyer – Appeal manifestly inadmissible ) In Case C‑582/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 26 August 2025, Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh, residing in Partille (Sweden), represented by himself, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: European Commission, defendant at first instance, THE COURT (Eighth Chamber), composed of O. Spineanu-Matei, President of the Chamber, N. Piçarra (Rapporteur) and N. Fenger, Judges, Advocate General: R. Norkus, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, makes the following Order 1 By his appeal, Mr Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh asks the Court of Justice to set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:800), by which the General Court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible his action seeking compensation for the damage allegedly caused to him by the European Commission by failing to initiate infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden. He also asks the Court to set aside the order of the President of the General Court of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25 R, EU:T:2025:799), by which the latter dismissed his application requesting that the Commission be ordered to adopt provisional steps towards initiating infringement proceedings against that Member State or, in the alternative, formally to reconsider his complaint under Article 258 TFEU within a set time limit. Legal context 2 Under Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union: ‘The Member States and the institutions of the [European] Union shall be represented before the Court of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer. The States, other than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and also the EFTA Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in [the] same manner. Other parties must be represented by a lawyer. Only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area may represent or assist a party before the Court. …’ The procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal 3 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 2 July 2025, the appellant brought an action under, in essence, Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, seeking compensation for the damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the Commission’s failure to initiate infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden. 4 By the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed that action as manifestly inadmissible, on the ground that it had been brought by the appellant under his signature alone and, therefore, without him being represented by a lawyer, contrary to the requirements of the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 5 In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the order under appeal, the General Court recalled the settled case-law according to which it is apparent from those provisions, in particular from the use of the word ‘represented’ in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that, for the purposes of bringing an action before the Courts of the European Union, a ‘party’ as referred to in that article, whatever that party’s standing, is not authorised to act on his or her own behalf, but must use the services of a third party authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of a State which is a party to the EEA Agreement, and that party and his or her legal representative cannot therefore be one and the same person. 6 For the sake of completeness, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal, the cumulative conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability under Article 268 and the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. In paragraph 10 of that order, it stated that, when examining whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law, the Commission has a discretion which excludes the right for individuals to require it to adopt a specific position. 7 The General Court also recalled, in paragraph 11 of that order, that, since the Commission is under no obligation to initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, its decision not to initiate such proceedings is not unlawful, so that it cannot give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. 8 The General Court concluded, in paragraph 12 of that order, that the appellant’s action for damages based on the Commission’s decision not to commence infringement proceedings against the Kingdom of Sweden was manifestly inadmissible. The form of order sought by the appellant before the Court of Justice 9 By his appeal, which is directed simultaneously against the order under appeal and the order of the President of the General Court of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25 R, EU:T:2025:799), the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should: – set aside those orders; – refer the case back to the General Court for it to examine the action; – in the alternative, rule itself on admissibility; – order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the appellant in relation to the proceedings at first instance and the proceedings on appeal. 10 It should be noted at the outset that, by the order of the Vice-President of the Court of 30 October 2025, Arasteh v Commission (C‑590/25 P(R), EU:C:2025:861), the appeal brought by the appellant against the order of the President of the General Court of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25 R, EU:T:2025:799), was dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Accordingly, the present appeal must be examined only in so far as it is directed against the order under appeal. The appeal 11 Under Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 12 It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case. Arguments of the appellant 13 In support of his appeal, the appellant raises nine grounds of appeal. 14 By his first ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court declared his action inadmissible on the sole ground that he had signed it and lodged it in his own name, without being represented by a lawyer. According to the appellant, such an assessment deprives him of any access to justice solely on the basis of a ‘procedural requirement’ and disproportionately restricts his right to be heard, guaranteed in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and his right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 47 thereof. 15 By his second ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court failed to interpret the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, thereby rendering meaningless the right to an effective remedy enshrined in that article. According to the appellant, the General Court erred in law in treating the requirement of being represented by a lawyer as an absolute and inflexible bar, whereas that requirement is instead more of a ‘procedural safeguard’ subject to proportionality. 16 By his third ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court breached the principle that procedural rules, such as those set out in Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, may not prevail over fundamental rights or contravene them, thus depriving the appellant of any examination of the merits of his action and making the rights enshrined in the Charter subordinate to a procedural formality. 17 By his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court, by dismissing the action as manifestly inadmissible, ‘automatically’ and ‘on a purely formal basis’ did not consider the merits of his application for interim relief, thereby depriving him of ‘judicial protection under Articles 278 [and] 279 TFEU, despite the fact that interim measures are designed precisely to secure protection pending [the] resolution of admissibility and merits’. 18 By his fifth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law by proceeding with an improper and selective consideration of the merits, even though it had declared the action to be manifestly inadmissible. By failing to assess ‘essential pleas’, the General Court infringed its obligation to state reasons and deprived the appellant of his right to be heard, in breach of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter. The appellant submits that, once an action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, the General Court should refrain from engaging with substantive issues, since doing so would undermine the very basis of the dismissal. 19 By his sixth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in so far as, in rejecting his arguments, it relied on case-law precedents in which the factual circumstances and the legal issues raised are fundamentally different from those of the present case. In doing so, the General Court also failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons imposed by Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 20 By his seventh ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, by granting him an e‑Curia account, the Registrar of the General Court implicitly recognised his right of access to judicial proceedings in his own name and that ‘this administrative act cannot be reconciled with the subsequent judicial finding of manifest inadmissibility based solely on the absence of legal representation.’ According to the appellant, such an inconsistency breaches the principle of legitimate expectations and the principle of legal certainty and infringes his fundamental right of access to a court, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. 21 By his eighth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court disregarded the principle that every person has the right, in his or her own capacity, to present himself or herself before a court or tribunal, which is enshrined in Articles 6 to 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, and confirmed by the settled case-law of the Supreme Court of Iran. In doing so, the General Court infringed Article 6(3) TEU and Article 52(3) and Article 53 of the Charter. 22 By his ninth and last ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court breached the fundamental principle of freedom of contract, enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter, by requiring him, de facto, to enter into a contract for the provision of services with a lawyer in order to exercise his right of access to a court. Such a requirement constitutes an unnecessary restriction on a natural person acting in his or her own name, like the appellant, which is not justified by any overriding reason of public interest and is disproportionate to the objective of ensuring the proper administration of justice. Findings of the Court 23 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the appellant brought the present appeal, like the action at first instance, under his signature alone and without being represented by a lawyer. 24 Under the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, parties not covered by the first and second paragraphs of that article, known as ‘non-privileged’ parties, must, in an action before the Courts of the European Union, be represented by a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 49). 25 That obligation means that non-privileged parties may not represent themselves before the Courts of the European Union in such an action, but must use the services of a third party (see, to that effect, order of 15 February 2023, Fundacja Instytut na rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris v Parliament, C‑546/21 P, EU:C:2023:123, paragraph 30). 26 Given that no derogation from, or exception to, the prohibition on representing oneself is provided for by the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or by the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the submission of an application signed by the applicant himself or herself cannot in any circumstances be sufficient for the purpose of bringing an action before the Courts of the European Union, even if the applicant is a lawyer authorised to plead before a national court (judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). 27 Accordingly, it must be held that the appeal brought in the present case, in so far as it was signed solely by the appellant himself, does not satisfy the condition laid down in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 28 The arguments put forward by the appellant for the purpose of contesting the order under appeal, in relation to his alleged right to represent himself before the General Court, cannot lead to a different conclusion with regard to the possibility of the appellant representing himself before the Court of Justice and, accordingly, with regard to the admissibility of his appeal before that court. 29 It follows from the foregoing that the appeal, in so far as it relates to the order under appeal, is manifestly inadmissible. Costs 30 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 31 In the present case, since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before that party could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear his own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, in so far as it relates to the order of the General Court of the European Union of 21 August 2025, Arasteh v Commission (T‑421/25, EU:T:2025:800). 2. Mr Alireza Malekzadeh Arasteh shall bear his own costs. Luxembourg, 4 May 2026. A. Calot Escobar O. Spineanu-Matei Registrar President of the Chamber * Language of the case: English.