Judgment;Judgment (extracts);Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2023:334
Date: 2023-06-14
Language of the case: English
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Ireland

summary of the decisions of the APFTE’s finance committee, the APFTE’s website initially had no real marketing function, but formed part of the APFTE’s strategy to justify the payments made to the airlines. It added that the documents on the workings of the APFTE submitted by the French authorities for the years 2017 and 2018 showed that, when the APFTE stopped operating in 2018, the CCIM and the local authorities had designed, and indeed implemented, a new legal structure, which involved the purchase of marketing services being taken over by ‘a purchasing group, consisting of the local authorities and the [CCIM], which [picked up] the baton by no longer purchasing marketing services but rather flight routes’. 204 The applicants’ arguments cannot render the Commission’s assessment implausible. 205 First, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the Commission took account, in particular in recital 198 of the contested decision, of the functioning of the APFTE during operation when it considered that the documents on the workings of the APFTE submitted by the French authorities for the years 2017 and 2018 showed that the CCIM and the local authorities had designed, and indeed implemented, a new legal structure. In addition, it also took into account, in recital 202 of that decision, which refers to footnote 121 thereto, the minutes of the APFTE’s general meeting of 19 October 2011 and a record of the APFTE’s executive committee meeting of 4 July 2013, in order to find, in essence, that the APFTE had decided to conclude the agreements at issue in order to maintain Ryanair’s presence at Montpellier airport. 206 Secondly, in so far as the applicants claim that, after March 2011, several of the public members of the APFTE made their participation in the APFTE’s budget conditional on there being a proper strategy for the tourist and economic development of their area, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 230 to 237 of the contested decision, the APFTE, and therefore its public members, did not assess the potential impact of its budget. This is not disputed by the applicants. Thus, if the public members of the APFTE had in fact made their participation in the APFTE’s budget conditional on there being a proper strategy, they would have assessed the impact of that budget on the tourist and economic development of their area. 207 Thirdly, the applicants argue that the improvement of the APFTE’s website is evidence of an intention to carry out marketing efficiently. In that regard, it should be noted that, although, as the applicants maintain, it is apparent from recital 197 of the contested decision that the President of the APFTE suggested that the APFTE’s website be improved, the applicants fail to mention that, in accordance with that recital, he also specified that that website was ‘needed in order to justify the communication expenditure incurred in order to bring significant numbers of European customers to the greater Montpellier area’. 208 Fourthly, regarding the applicants’ argument that the fact that the APFTE was pursuing the objective of maintaining Ryanair’s presence at Montpellier airport and of subsidising the marketing of its routes to and from that airport does not mean that the APFTE did not also have a real need to purchase marketing services from the applicants in order to promote the region, that argument is not capable of demonstrating that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in finding that, in the present case, the APFTE’s real need had not been objectively established. 209 Accordingly, the first complaint must be rejected as unfounded. (2) The second complaint, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that the APFTE focused on Ryanair’s routes rather than on marketing services 210 The applicants claim that the allegation that the agreements at issue targeted Ryanair, or regions where Ryanair was present, does not demonstrate that the APFTE did not have a real need. They add that, although the Commission argues that the agreements at issue did not target broader regions, first, it fails to demonstrate that broader marketing would have been more efficient and, secondly, that fact does not mean that there was not a real need to promote Montpellier and its surroundings in the regions that were targeted by the agreements at issue. In addition, the applicants assert that the reference to routes or regions connected by routes is justified by the fact that it is necessary that a route operates for the region or the airport to be able to influence the proportion of inbound passengers through marketing. The Commission failed to take that fact into account in the contested decision. In addition, the applicants maintain that the marketing services are described in each of the agreements at issue. Moreover, the marketing content published on Ryanair’s website shows that the subject matter is not Ryanair’s offer of routes, or the frequencies and low prices of those routes, but the Montpellier region and its tourism and business opportunities. According to the applicants, the Commission simply asserted that the APFTE had focused on Ryanair’s routes instead of providing marketing for the region, but did not provide any analysis of the content of the marketing services to support its assertion, with the result that the Commission’s assessment of the facts is manifestly incorrect. 211 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 212 In recitals 202 to 212 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that the APFTE had decided to conclude the agreements at issue in order to maintain Ryanair’s presence at Montpellier airport. According to the Commission, an analysis of the agreements at issue and of the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders supports the conclusion that they specifically targeted the air routes operated by Ryanair. The 2010 agreement and the 2013 agreements, as well as the successive amendments thereto and renewals thereof, are based on specific commitments by Ryanair to operate air routes to Montpellier airport and impose clear obligations in that regard. Although the 2017 agreements do not mention the airports served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport and do not contain any explicit obligation with regard to air transport to that airport, they clearly identify as a target the inhabitants of the regions where the airports served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport are located. In the general context of the contractual relations between the APFTE and Ryanair from 2010 onwards, it is clear that the 2017 agreements had the objective and intended effect of supporting the existing air transport activities of Ryanair at Montpellier airport. The Commission considered that the inclusion in the agreements at issue of obligations to operate flights was important evidence of the real object of those agreements, namely the remuneration of Ryanair for continuing to operate at Montpellier airport. 213 In the present case, it should be noted, first of all, that the 2010 agreement expressly refers to Ryanair’s commitments to operate the air routes to Montpellier airport. Next, it should be noted that the specifications of the 2013 call for tenders contain very specific air transport requirements, in respect of five lots in particular, such as annual routes, the number of flights per week and per year, the minimum annual volume of incoming units, the minimum annual offer of seats and the start date. However, as regards the marketing obligations, they merely state that each tenderer must offer ‘to promote tourist and economic flows to Montpellier through all available media on the market’ and must ‘provide a link to the APFTE’s website’. The same is true of the 2013 agreements, which remunerate the provision of marketing services per lot. Lastly, although the 2017 agreements do not specifically mention the airports served from Montpellier airport and do not contain any explicit obligation with regard to air transport to that airport, they identify as a target of the marketing activities, in particular, the inhabitants of the regions where the airports served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport are located, namely Wallonia (Brussels-Charleroi airport), Rhineland-Palatinate (Frankfurt-Hahn airport), and Yorkshire (Leeds-Bradford airport). 214 In that context, it should be noted that the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding that the agreements at issue targeted Ryanair flight operations. 215 The applicants’ other arguments cannot call that conclusion into question. 216 First, regarding the applicants’ argument that the fact that the marketing agreements targeted Ryanair, or regions where Ryanair was present, does not demonstrate that there was not a real need, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from recital 188 of the contested decision, the Commission’s finding that the APFTE had no real need to purchase marketing services from the applicants is based on a range of indicators. The fact that the marketing agreements targeted Ryanair flight operations rather than marketing services is only one factor among others taken into account by the Commission. Accordingly, the question whether the Commission has sufficiently proved that there was no real need for the APFTE to purchase the marketing services from the applicants cannot be assessed solely by taking into consideration each of those indicators in isolation, but must be decided by considering all of them together. 217 Secondly, the applicants’ argument that the Commission fails to demonstrate that broader marketing would have been more efficient is not capable of revealing that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in finding that the agreements at issue targeted Ryanair routes. In recital 209 of the contested decision, the Commission indicated that it had not identified any particular reason for the APFTE to choose Rhineland-Palatinate, Wallonia and Yorkshire as the target of marketing services, other than the fact that they were the only three regions served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport. That assessment cannot be vitiated by a manifest error of assessment on account of a failure to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of geographically broader marketing. 218 Thirdly, in so far as the applicants assert that the reference to routes or regions connected by routes is justified by the fact that it is necessary that a route operates for the region or the airport to be able to influence the proportion of inbound passengers through marketing, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from recital 209 of the contested decision, as regards, in particular, the 2017 call for tenders, regions other than Rhineland-Palatinate, Wallonia and Yorkshire were connected by direct flights operated by other airlines, but those regions were nevertheless not targeted by that call for tenders. This is not disputed by the applicants. 219 Fourthly, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the Commission analysed the level of detail of the marketing services to be provided, in particular in the context of examining the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders. In particular, in recital 207 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the specifications of the 2013 call for tenders were ‘very general, not to say vague’ on the nature of the marketing services to be provided. 220 Fifthly, the applicants claim that the content published on Ryanair’s website shows that the subject matter is not Ryanair’s offer of routes, or the frequencies and low prices of those routes, but the Montpellier region and its tourism and business opportunities. That argument is not such as to call into question the Commission’s assessment that the APFTE had decided to conclude the agreements at issue with the applicants. 221 Sixthly, according to the applicants, the Commission simply asserted that the APFTE had focused on Ryanair’s routes instead of providing marketing for the region, but did not provide any analysis of the content of the marketing services to support its assertion, with the result that the Commission’s assessment of the facts is manifestly incorrect. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the assessments set out in recitals 202 to 212 of the contested decision are intended to demonstrate that the agreements at issue and the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders targeted Ryanair’s air routes rather than marketing services, with the result that the evidence derived from the content of the marketing services is not capable of invalidating the Commission’s analysis in that regard. 222 Accordingly, the second complaint must be rejected as unfounded. (3) The third complaint, alleging, in essence, that the Commission erred in finding that the APFTE was targeting the applicants instead of traditional marketing services providers 223 The applicants claim that the choice to make use of the marketing services of an airline is justified by the fact that customers living in regions served by an airline and using its website are precisely the persons most likely to decide to travel to the targeted region in the first place. They add that they have provided ample quantitative data to prove that Ryanair’s website was the most popular travel and airline website in the world, as well as a qualitative analysis demonstrating that advertising by an airport on Ryanair’s website targets uniquely potential passengers to or from that airport. Furthermore, it is logical to increase the region’s exposure by promoting that region on Ryanair’s website, even if not all the persons who view that website fly with Ryanair. Accordingly, Ryanair’s website is uniquely tailored to the marketing needs of regional airports. 224 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 225 In recitals 213 to 229 of the contested decision, the Commission explained, in essence, that an analysis of the agreements at issue and the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders showed that the decisive criteria defined by the APFTE and selected in the calls for tenders favoured AMS over conventional marketing service providers, in particular by introducing the criterion of serving flight routes and needing to offer a website specific to the marketing service provider with enough traffic to offer online advertising on that site. 226 In the present case, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 63 to 73 of the contested decision, the specifications for the 2013 call for tenders provided for five different lots, including the lots entitled ‘Brussels-Charleroi’, ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’, ‘Leeds’ and ‘Birmingham’, and indicated minimum frequencies therein. This is not disputed by the applicants. Those lots corresponded precisely to the air transport services operated by Ryanair between Montpellier airport, on the one hand, and Brussels-Charleroi airport, Frankfurt-Hahn airport, Leeds-Bradford airport and Birmingham airport, on the other, at the time when the call for tenders was launched. In addition, it is clear from that call for tenders that the only marketing service that imperatively had to be provided was the provision, by the marketing service provider, of a link to the APFTE’s website on its own website. The applicants do not dispute that that model precisely corresponds to the commercial model used by AMS, which offers advertising space on Ryanair’s website. Furthermore, as regards the 2017 agreements, it should also be noted that Ryanair was the only airline to serve the three regions covered by the first three lots of the 2017 call for tenders. 227 Therefore, it must be held that the Commission was entitled to conclude, without committing a manifest error of assessment, that the APFTE was targeting the applicants instead of traditional marketing service providers. 228 Contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the Commission did not state, in recital 229 of the contested decision, that Ryanair had not provided qualitative or quantitative data to justify the superiority of its marketing, but found that there was ‘[a lack of] quantitative or qualitative evidence justifying the choice of Ryanair routes as the most appropriate marketing tool by comparison not only with other forms of advertising but also with other flight routes to Montpellier airport’. 229 As regards, first, the quantitative data, and in particular the number of potential tourists targeted by the marketing campaign conducted by the applicants, it should be noted that the Commission demonstrated, in the contested decision, that those visitor numbers contributed only very little to the development of the Montpellier region. As is apparent from recitals 18 and 19 of the contested decision, which refer to Table 2 of that decision, since 2010, the total number of Ryanair passengers to and from Montpellier airport accounted for only a relatively small proportion of the passenger traffic at that airport and the number of Ryanair passengers had decreased continuously from 2012 onwards. 230 As regards, secondly, the applicants’ argument relating to the qualitative analysis demonstrating that advertising by an airport on Ryanair’s website targets uniquely potential passengers to or from that airport, it must be held that it does not demonstrate the qualitative value of the services offered under the agreements at issue. 231 Furthermore, in so far as the applicants maintain that services to the destination are justified by the fact that customers living in regions served by an airline and using its website are precisely the persons most likely to decide to travel to the targeted region in the first place, it should be noted that, even if it were established, that finding does not show that the agreements at issue represented the best choice for allocating a substantial part of the APFTE’s budget, as is apparent from recital 246 of the contested decision. This is not disputed by the applicants. 232 Accordingly, the third complaint must be rejected as unfounded. (4) The fourth complaint, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that the APFTE was not interested in the success of the marketing campaigns 233 The applicants maintain that the Commission’s assessment that the APFTE did not wish to measure the impact of the marketing campaigns is at odds with other findings set out in that decision, which establish that there was considerable pressure from the members of the APFTE to control marketing campaigns. Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law that the existence of State aid should be assessed ex ante. The Commission’s failure to find evidence of reporting would thus at worst constitute ex post evidence of non-compliance with the internal conditions and procedures of the APFTE, but it would in no way affect the finding of the existence of State aid. 234 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 235 In the present case, the Commission stated, in recitals 230 to 237 of the contested decision, that it had found no evidence to show that the APFTE had assessed, either ex ante or ex post, the potential impact of its budget by evaluating different service providers, by evaluating the impact of various marketing services, by assessing the impact of marketing campaigns targeting different regions of northern Europe, or by analysing the costs and benefits of the marketing agreements concluded with the applicants. 236 The applicants’ arguments cannot render the Commission’s assessment implausible. 237 The payment of subsidies by the public members of the APFTE, which was subject to compliance with the obligation on the APFTE to implement the agreed marketing programmes and to submit reports in that regard, does not support the finding of a contradiction with the Commission’s assessment that the APFTE had no interest in the actual impact of the marketing campaigns carried out on its behalf by the applicants. The monitoring of the applicants’ implementation of the marketing obligations must not be confused with the verification of the actual impact of the marketing campaigns. 238 Nor, moreover, can the applicants claim, in essence, that the Commission erred in seeking evidence of the potential impact of the APFTE’s budget, since the existence of State aid must be assessed ex ante. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the Commission stated, in recital 230 of the contested decision, that it had found no evidence to show that the APFTE had assessed, either ex ante or ex post, the potential impact of its budget. 239 Accordingly, the fourth complaint must be rejected as unfounded. (5) The fifth complaint, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that the marketing payments coincided with the duration of Ryanair’s flight operations 240 The applicants maintain that, contrary to the findings in the contested decision that the marketing payments coincided with the duration of Ryanair’s flight operations, the APFTE ceased payments to the applicants on account of the formal investigation procedure. 241 The Commission disputes that line of argument. 242 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicants do not dispute the findings in recitals 238 and 239 of the contested decision that the last payment to the applicants was made in February 2019 and Ryanair has not operated at Montpellier airport since the summer of 2019. In that context, the Commission cannot be criticised for having found that the end of the marketing payments coincided with the cessation of Ryanair’s operations at Montpellier airport. 243 Although the applicants claim that the APFTE ceased payments on account of the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from recital 84 of the contested decision, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure on 4 July 2018, whereas the last payment made by the APFTE to the applicants dates from February 2019. This is not disputed by the applicants. 244 Accordingly, that complaint must be rejected as unfounded, as must the first part in its entirety. (b) The second part, alleging that the Commission incorrectly considered that the services provided by the applicants were not capable of promoting the region effectively 245 The present part of the plea is divided into two complaints, alleging, first, that the Commission incorrectly found that the choice of the applicants as marketing services providers was not sufficiently justified in economic terms and, secondly, that the Commission erred in finding that the marketing campaigns did not have the effect alleged by Ryanair. (1) The first complaint, alleging that the Commission incorrectly found that the choice of the applicants as marketing services providers was not sufficiently justified in economic terms 246 The applicants claim that the focus on Ryanair’s website can be explained by the popularity of that website. In addition, part of the APFTE’s budget was assigned to the purchase of marketing services from other airlines, but the Commission did not investigate the possible grant of State aid to those airlines. They add that the Commission’s assessment that there are tourists other than Ryanair passengers generating more revenue for the region does not weaken the economic justification for focusing on Ryanair’s passengers, which would make it possible to rebalance the origin of visitors to the region and to strengthen less developed flows for the sake of diversifying sources of income. The applicants submit that advertising on the home page, which is the most costly, targets passengers who have not yet decided on their destination and that the split between the home page, for undecided passengers, and the destination page, for decided passengers, reflects the fact that a large proportion of passengers are undecided. They add that the choice to advertise only on certain language versions of Ryanair’s website is due to the APFTE’s limited budget. They explain that while Ryanair’s website did not advertise the services of Ryanair’s competitors in the field of aviation or rail transport, Ryanair cannot sell services that harm its own commercial interests. 247 The Commission disputes those arguments. 248 In the present case, it should be noted that the Commission identified, in recitals 248 to 271 of the contested decision, evidence supporting the assessment that the choice of the applicants as marketing services providers was not sufficiently justified in economic terms. 249 First, the Commission found that the marketing campaigns were limited to Ryanair’s website and customers. Secondly, it explained that Ryanair’s customers were not the most attractive market segment in terms of economic revenue for the region. The maximum potential number of tourists travelling with Ryanair was very low, Ryanair’s passengers did not have the greatest leverage effect in terms of spending in the region and, in terms of tourism and business travel, most of the customers of Montpellier and its surroundings are domestic and not international. Thirdly, the Commission stated that Ryanair’s marketing services had very little impact for the APFTE. The online marketing services provided by the applicants consisted essentially in inserting messages and links on the Montpellier destination page of Ryanair’s website, and inserting a link to the website designated by the APFTE on the English, German, Dutch and Belgian (French and Dutch) homepages of that same website. However, in the Commission’s view, the information provided about Montpellier was unlikely to attract new customers. Thus, Ryanair’s marketing value is targeted at Ryanair customers who have already chosen their destination airport or whose visit to Ryanair’s website indicates that they are likely to choose a specific destination airport. Fourthly, the Commission noted that the marketing services chosen by the APFTE from among Ryanair’s potential services had even less impact. Only the English, German, Dutch and Belgian (French and Dutch) homepages of Ryanair’s website were covered by the agreements at issue. Fifthly, the Commission found that the contribution made by AMS’s marketing services mainly attracted potential Ryanair customers without reaching other potential tourists, in terms of their origin, their choice of means of transport or their consumption behaviour. 250 In the light of the evidence identified, it must be held that the Commission has demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the choice of the marketing services provided by the applicants was not sufficiently justified in economic terms. 251 None of the arguments put forward by the applicants is of such a kind as to disprove that conclusion. 252 First, the applicants allege that the focus on Ryanair’s website can be explained by the popularity of that website. However, the mere fact that the website is popular is not capable of calling into question the Commission’s assessment in recitals 268 to 271 of the contested decision that the marketing campaigns at issue are not such as to attract tourists who are not targeted by Ryanair’s flight operations. 253 Secondly, the applicants claim that the Commission’s assessment that there are tourists other than Ryanair passengers generating more revenue for the region does not weaken the economic justification for focusing on Ryanair’s passengers, which would make it possible to rebalance the origin of visitors to the region and to strengthen less developed flows for the sake of diversifying sources of income. However, that argument does not demonstrate that the Commission manifestly erred in its assessment. Even if it were established, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from recital 252 of the contested decision, the maximum potential number of tourists travelling with Ryanair is low. It never exceeded a percentage of, at most, 20% of passengers at Montpellier airport and steadily declined after 2012. This is not disputed by the applicants. 254 Thirdly, the applicants submit that advertising on the home page of Ryanair’s website, which is the most costly, targets passengers who have not yet decided on their destination and that the split between the home page, for undecided passengers, and the destination page, for decided passengers, reflects the fact that a large proportion of passengers are undecided. In that regard, it should be noted that, as the applicants acknowledge in paragraph 175 of the application, those undecided customers are primarily motivated by the ticket price, a factor which is determined by Ryanair. Moreover, as is apparent from recital 257 of the contested decision, the online marketing services provided by the applicants consisted essentially in inserting messages and links on the Montpellier destination page of Ryanair’s website, and inserting a link to the website designated by the APFTE on the English, German, Dutch and Belgian (French and Dutch) homepages of that same website. This is not disputed by the applicants. Accordingly, the Commission was fully entitled to conclude that, irrespective of the proportion of passengers who were undecided, the services at issue were targeted essentially at passengers who had already decided to use or were likely to consider using Ryanair’s transport services. 255 Fourthly, the applicants add that the choice to advertise only on certain language versions of Ryanair’s website is due to the APFTE’s limited budget. However, that argument cannot render implausible the Commission’s assessment in recital 261 of the contested decision that the marketing services were designed essentially to promote Ryanair’s services between Montpellier and the destinations that Ryanair undertook to serve. 256 Fifthly, the applicants explain that while Ryanair’s website did not advertise the services of Ryanair’s competitors in the field of aviation or rail transport, Ryanair cannot sell services that harm its own commercial interests. That argument supports the Commission’s conclusion that the APFTE’s choice of Ryanair was not sufficiently justified in economic terms. Since it was not economically attractive for Ryanair to focus its marketing campaigns on tourists not targeted by its flight operations, it was not rational for the APFTE to choose AMS as a marketing services provider. 257 Consequently, the first complaint must be rejected as unfounded. (2) The second complaint, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that the marketing campaigns did not have the effect alleged by Ryanair 258 The applicants dispute the Commission’s analysis that the marketing campaigns did not have the effect alleged by Ryanair of promoting the region. They argue that effectiveness should not be taken into account as a factor for the ‘real need’ test. They add that the Commission’s assessment that inbound traffic to Montpellier airport is explained by the favourable climate in that region is not sufficient to conclude that the applicants’ marketing campaigns had no effect. Furthermore, the Commission failed to take account of the objective of stimulating inbound traffic and improving the recognition of the Montpellier brand. Moreover, the Commission does not provide any analysis as regards the supposed technical inadequacy of the applicants’ services. 259 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 260 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in recital 277 of the contested decision, the Commission considered that the evidence which had led it to conclude (i) that the purpose of the agreements at issue was not to promote Montpellier as a destination but to keep Ryanair at Montpellier airport and (ii) that the APFTE’s choice of the applicants was not sufficiently justified in economic terms was sufficient to find that neither the APFTE and nor the public members of the APFTE had any real need as regards the applicants’ marketing services. However, the Commission explained that it was referring to the evidence uncovered by the formal investigation procedure as regards the specific effects of the agreements at issue in so far as Ryanair had commented on that issue. 261 In that context, the applicants cannot criticise the Commission for having reversed the burden of proof by establishing a presumption that their marketing services were ineffective or for having introduced a new efficiency test. 262 Next, it should be noted that the Commission specified, in recitals 279 to 290 of the contested decision, that the formal investigation procedure had found evidence that the actual advertising effect of the marketing campaigns was small. It added that (i) there was no quantitative evidence as regards the tangible contribution made by the marketing campaigns and (ii) the formal investigation procedure had revealed prima facie evidence that the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE had no impact on the proportion of visiting tourists or on the development of the Montpellier brand. 263 The applicants have not put forward any evidence to show that the Commission’s conclusion is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 264 In so far as the applicants maintain that the Commission’s assertion, in recital 289 of the contested decision, that there is a natural inbound flow of traffic towards the Montpellier region due, in particular, to its climate, is not sufficient, it should be noted that the Commission’s reasoning in that recital is based on the fact that the tourist assets of the Montpellier region, which explain why the flow of passengers is by nature more towards Montpellier than from Montpellier to the other regions, existed before the agreements at issue. The reference to various other tourist destinations is not capable of calling that reasoning into question. 265 As regards the arguments relating to the advantages which the marketing services brought for Montpellier airport and the Montpellier region in terms, first, of improving the recognition of the Montpellier brand and, secondly, of stimulating inbound traffic, it should be noted that the Commission took them into account in recital 290 of the contested decision when it considered that the arguments put forward by Ryanair in that context related solely to the effects of Ryanair’s presence at a given airport, but were not, however, relevant as regards the tangible contribution made by the marketing campaigns to the region. 266 As regards the applicants’ argument that the Commission does not provide any analysis as regards the alleged technical inadequacy of their services, it is sufficient to note that, in recitals 282 and 286 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that neither Ryanair nor the French authorities had adduced any evidence capable of demonstrating quantitatively the alleged effect of the agreements at issue, such as statistics or performance indicators. The popularity of Ryanair’s website does not in itself enable the effect of the agreements at issue to be measured. 267 Therefore, the present complaint must be rejected, as must the second part in its entirety. (c) The third part, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that Ryanair benefited from the marketing services at issue 268 The applicants dispute the Commission’s conclusion that, if the marketing agreements did have an effect, it primarily benefited Ryanair. They maintain that the Commission distorted the facts by stating that, even in the absence of a marketing agreement, Ryanair would have an interest in carrying a high proportion of tourists wishing to visit the region and that stimulating inbound traffic is a goal which is specific to the region. They add that the content of the marketing campaigns focused on the region’s tourist attractions and business opportunities, so that Ryanair was not in a position to promote its transport services. Furthermore, the marketing services provided under the agreements at issue are different to marketing for flights. Moreover, there is a contradiction between the claim that the marketing services provide a benefit for Ryanair by increasing load factors, and the claim that the APFTE and Montpellier airport derive no benefit at all from those services. 269 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 270 In the present case, the Commission noted, in recitals 291 to 304 of the contested decision, that, even if the agreements at issue did have the effect of encouraging tourists to purchase flight tickets to Montpellier, that effect primarily benefited Ryanair. According to the Commission, a marketing campaign might increase the load factor of aircrafts and, moreover, might help to alter the balance between passengers visiting Montpellier, who are prepared to pay a high-season price, and passengers living in the Montpellier region. 271 None of the arguments put forward by the applicants is capable of undermining that approach taken by the Commission. 272 As regards the applicants’ argument that the Commission distorted the facts by stating that, even in the absence of a marketing agreement, Ryanair would have an interest in carrying a high proportion of tourists wishing to visit Montpellier and its surroundings and that stimulating inbound traffic is a goal which is specific to the region, it must be held that, in the absence of any figures as to the impact of marketing campaigns on the allocation of seats between inbound and outbound passengers, it cannot be held that the Commission distorted the facts. In addition, it should be noted that the applicants merely put forward an assessment which is contrary to that set out in the contested decision without adducing the slightest evidence. Such an allegation is not capable of demonstrating that the Commission in any way manifestly erred in its assessment. 273 As regards the argument whereby the applicants criticise the Commission for having considered that the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders had enabled the applicants to choose the marketing services offered in such a way that they primarily promoted their own air transport services to Montpellier on Ryanair’s website, whereas it was the APFTE which chose the content and time of the publication, it must be observed that that fact is not such as to call into question the conclusion that Ryanair was the main beneficiary of the agreements at issue. 274 As regards the applicants’ argument based on the difference between the marketing campaigns carried out under the agreements at issue and the marketing campaigns carried out by Ryanair in respect of its flights, it must be held that that argument is not capable of demonstrating that the marketing campaigns resulting from the agreements at issue were not primarily of interest to Ryanair. 275 As regards the argument put forward by the applicants in their reply that there is a contradiction between the claim, in recital 304 of the contested decision, that the marketing services provide a benefit for Ryanair by increasing load factors and the claim that the APFTE and Montpellier airport derive no benefit at all from those services, it is sufficient to point out that the Commission merely stated that the applicants were not in a position to promote the City of Montpellier and its surroundings effectively and that the tangible contribution made by the marketing campaigns for the purposes of that promotion had not been demonstrated. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in the Commission’s arguments. 276 Consequently, the third part must be rejected as unfounded. (d) The fourth part, alleging that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the price paid by the APFTE was not in line with the market price 277 First, the applicants submit that the contested decision does not sufficiently explain why the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders did not guarantee a market price. 278 Secondly, the applicants claim that the Commission’s assessments in that regard are incorrect. As regards the 2013 call for tenders, they claim that the Commission incorrectly considered that the procedure relating thereto was not unconditional. In particular, advertising on airlines’ websites is more effective and the division of the call for tenders into five lots was linked to the scope of the call for tenders. In addition, the Commission has not shown that the inclusion of obligations relating to the operation of air transport services is likely to increase the price of the marketing services and that the outcome would have been different if the APFTE had not restricted the call for tenders to airlines. Furthermore, the call for tenders was sufficiently well-publicised and transparent. As regards the 2017 call for tenders, the applicants claim that its terms were not specifically designed to favour Ryanair. The selection criteria were sufficiently broad, the tendering specifications did not refer to air transport activities or to a specific airport and a competing bid had been proposed. Moreover, the Commission has not shown that that call for tenders was discriminatory. 279 Thirdly, the applicants criticise the Commission for having considered that the APFTE had no interest in minimising costs. 280 Fourthly, the applicants claim that they provided several expert reports during the investigation establishing that the prices charged for the marketing services sold through the marketing agreements were in line with the market price. However, the Commission did not put forward any valid argument to explain to what extent those reports were not relevant. 281 The Commission disputes those arguments. 282 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 184, 306 and 307 of the contested decision, the Commission considered that the finding that there was no real need for the APFTE to conclude the agreements at issue was sufficient to determine that there was an economic advantage. However, given that Ryanair had raised arguments relating to the price paid in its comments on the opening decision, it also analysed whether the prices paid by the APFTE were in line with market prices. 283 Accordingly, the applicants’ arguments relating to the Commission’s conclusions concerning the establishment of marketing service prices must be rejected as ineffective in as much as they are directed against grounds of the contested decision which must be regarded as having been included for the sake of completeness. 284 In any event, in the first place, it should be borne in mind that the market price is the highest price which a private investor acting under normal competitive conditions is ready to pay for a service (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 2013, Land Burgenland and Others v Commission, C‑214/12 P, C‑215/12 P and C‑223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). 285 For the purpose of checking the market price, account may be taken of, in particular, the manner in which the service was acquired, for example, by means of public tendering which was designed to ensure that the sale took place under market conditions. It follows that where a public authority uses an open, transparent and unconditional tendering procedure, it can be presumed that the market price corresponds to the highest bid, provided that it is established, first, that that bid is binding and credible and, secondly, that the consideration of economic factors other than the price is not justified (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 October 2013, Land Burgenland and Others v Commission, C‑214/12 P, C‑215/12 P and C‑223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682, paragraphs 93 and 94, and of 16 July 2015, BVVG, C‑39/14, EU:C:2015:470, paragraph 32). 286 According to the case-law, the question whether a tendering procedure has been open and transparent is determined on the basis of a range of indicators specific to the circumstances of each case (see judgment of 7 March 2018, SNCF Mobilités v Commission, C‑127/16 P, EU:C:2018:165, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). 287 It is in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 284 to 286 above that it is appropriate to examine the applicants’ complaints regarding the calls for tenders, while bearing in mind that, in that context, the Court cannot rule directly on the very lawfulness of the tendering procedure. 288 In the present case, the Commission considered, in recitals 312 to 316 of the contested decision, that the issuing of the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders did not guarantee a market price. It found, in essence, that that issuing could not exclude an advantage and that the calls for tenders were designed in such a way that the applicants could prevail over other candidates. 289 In the light of the material in the file, there is no need to call into question that finding. It should be noted that, as regards the 2010 agreement, it is apparent from recitals 53 and 310 of the contested decision that it was signed without a prior tendering procedure. In those circumstances, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 285 above, it cannot be presumed that it was signed at the market price. 290 As regards the 2013 call for tenders, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 63 to 73 of the contested decision, the only requirement that the marketing service provider needed to fulfil in relation to the marketing itself was to include a link on its website to the APFTE’s website. However, that call for tenders divided the contract into five lots, four of which corresponded to the routes operated by Ryanair when the call for tenders was launched. Furthermore, it is common ground between the parties that Ryanair was the only tenderer to submit a bid for those four lots. Furthermore, it is apparent from recital 244 of the contested decision that no agreement was concluded for the fifth lot, which concerned a route that Ryanair had operated since 2011 but had stopped operating between the publication of the specifications of that call for tenders and the conclusion of the agreements at issue. 291 In that context, even if, as the applicants maintain, the 2013 call for tenders was sufficiently well-publicised and transparent, the Commission cannot be criticised for having considered that the issuing of that call for tenders did not guarantee a market price. 292 In so far as the applicants claim that advertising on airlines’ websites is more effective and that the division of the 2013 call for tenders into five lots was linked to the scope of that call for tenders, it is sufficient to note that those circumstances do not call into question the finding in recital 70 of the contested decision – a finding which is not disputed by the applicants – that Ryanair was the only company to submit a bid following the 2013 call for tenders. In the absence of other bids, it is impossible to determine whether the bid submitted by the applicants was in line with the market price. 293 In addition, although the applicants claim that the Commission has not shown that the inclusion of obligations relating to the operation of air transport services is likely to increase the price of the marketing services and that the outcome would have been different if the APFTE had not restricted the call for tenders to airlines, it should be noted that the Commission clarified that an entity wishing only to purchase marketing services to promote a given area would have no interest in including obligations relating to the operation of air transport services in the agreements concluded with the provider of those marketing services; nor would it have any interest in including such obligations in the calls for tenders organised for the purchase of marketing services, in order to demonstrate that such obligations in agreements and calls for tenders limit the number of undertakings able to provide the marketing services requested. Consequently, the applicants cannot criticise the Commission for failing to show that the inclusion of such obligations in marketing services agreements was likely to increase the price of the marketing services or that the outcome would have been different if the APFTE had not restricted the call for tenders to airlines. 294 As regards the 2017 call for tenders, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 74 to 81 of the contested decision, that call for tenders referred to seven lots corresponding, in particular, to the regions in which the three airports served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport were located when the call for tenders was launched and that those three lots were awarded to Ryanair, despite the existence of a competing bid. In addition, in accordance with the tendering specifications, the agreements concerned were agreements under which the marketing services would be provided and paid for only on the issue of purchase orders by the APFTE, for which payment corresponded to the two seasons of the civil aviation calendar. Furthermore, the agreements concluded with Ryanair were the only agreements that the APFTE implemented as a result of that call for tenders. 295 The applicants submit that the conditions of the 2017 call for tenders were not specifically designed to favour Ryanair, since the selection criteria were sufficiently broad, the tendering specifications did not refer to air transport activities or to a specific airport and a competing bid had been proposed. In that regard, it is sufficient to point out that, as is apparent from paragraph 294 above, that call for tenders referred to seven lots corresponding, in particular, to the regions in which the three airports served by Ryanair were located and that those three lots were awarded to Ryanair, despite the existence of a competing bid. Furthermore, the 2017 agreements were the only agreements that the APFTE implemented as a result of that call for tenders. 296 Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ argument that the Commission has not shown that the call for tenders was discriminatory, it is sufficient to observe that the Commission demonstrated, on the basis of a range of indicators set out in recitals 74 to 81, 208 to 212 and 314 of the contested decision, that the tendering criteria were defined in such a way as to favour Ryanair’s bids, in particular in so far as the APFTE had not identified any particular reason for choosing the three regions concerned (Rhineland-Palatinate, Wallonia and Yorkshire) as targets for marketing services, other than the fact that they were the only three regions already served by direct flights operated by Ryanair from Montpellier airport. 297 The applicants’ complaints relating to the calls for tenders must therefore be rejected. 298 In the second place, it is necessary to analyse the applicants’ arguments relating to the Commission’s assessment of the benchmarking provided by Ryanair. 299 In the present case, first, the Commission stated, in recitals 317 to 324 of the contested decision, that the study carried out by an economic analysis firm, which concluded that AMS’s marketing agreements provided for prices which were in line with market prices by comparing them with the prices charged by other online marketing services providers, was not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the payments made by the APFTE to the applicants were in line with the market price. That study compares only the gross prices indicated on the rate cards of several marketing services providers, without taking account of discounts applied in order to determine the actual prices. The discounts applied to marketing agreements can vary from one agreement to another. Furthermore, the study suggests that there is no direct correlation between the number of visitors to a website and the price of an advertisement in terms of the cost per thousand displays on that website. However, the price that a customer is prepared to pay for a marketing service depends on the expected return on investment. Moreover, that study does not take into account the purchasing posture of the visitor to the site. It compares websites with very different numbers and traffic that target very different customers, whose readiness to purchase and intention to purchase vary to a greater or lesser extent. 300 Secondly, the Commission found that the various bilateral marketing agreements provided by Ryanair at its request had very different durations, scopes and amounts, so that there was no price transparency in that market. 301 Thirdly, the Commission noted that an analysis of the bids submitted for lots 4 and 5 of the 2017 call for tenders showed that advertising for the region on websites which were comparable in terms of services could have been obtained at a lower price. 302 None of the evidence put forward by the applicants is capable of establishing a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission. 303 First, as regards the comparability of the agreements at issue with other agreements, it should be noted that the applicants merely state that they had submitted such agreements. That fact is not such as to demonstrate that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment when it found, in recital 322 of the contested decision, that there was no price transparency since the agreements submitted by the applicants had very different durations, scopes and amounts. 304 Secondly, as regards the relevance of the other expert reports, in so far as the applicants complain that the Commission failed to explain to what extent the evidence which the applicants had submitted in order to prove that the agreements at issue were in line with the market price was unconvincing, it should be borne in mind that the Commission cannot be required to mention or to express a position in the contested decision on each of the documents sent to it by the applicants, the relevance of which they have failed to prove as regards the examination which the Commission was required to carry out (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 January 2018, EDF v Commission, T‑747/15, EU:T:2018:6, paragraph 148). 305 Moreover, as regards the relevance of the study referred to in paragraph 299 above, as is apparent from that study (Annex A.4.1.4 to the application), the prices actually paid for advertising services might differ owing to, for example, discretionary discounts and special offers and this is an important limitation. The applicants’ argument that it is impossible to obtain prices after deduction is not such as to establish a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission in that regard. 306 In addition, in so far as the applicants merely maintain that the Commission’s assessment that there is no correlation between the number of visitors to a website offering marketing services and the price of the marketing services does not take account of the fact that pricing takes into consideration the number of visitors to a website, it is sufficient to note that that finding alone is not sufficient to render implausible the assessment of the facts made in the contested decision. 307 Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ argument that the consideration of the ‘purchasing posture’ of the visitor to the website fails to take account of the value of Ryanair’s website, it is sufficient to observe that the assessment in recital 321 of the contested decision concerns the comparability of the study of Ryanair’s website with that of other sites. In that context, it is irrelevant, in that regard, that Ryanair has a favourable ‘purchasing posture’. 308 Thirdly, the applicants’ arguments relating to the Commission’s assessment of the lack of cost-minimisation measures by the APFTE are not such as to prove a manifest error of assessment in the contested decision. Although the applicants criticise the Commission for having found that the 2010 agreement had not been concluded following a call for tenders, so that the APFTE did not seek to minimise prices, and for not having noted that the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders were such as to minimise prices, it must be observed that the Commission considered that even the issuing of calls for tenders did not guarantee market prices. Moreover, the fact that the APFTE was seeking to ensure that Ryanair would bring a constant flow of passengers by air is irrelevant since the Commission’s analysis consists in examining whether the price of the marketing services is in line with the market price. 309 Accordingly, the fourth part of the fourth plea must be rejected, as must the fourth plea in law in its entirety. 310 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the error found in paragraph 155 above is not such as to lead to the annulment of the contested decision. 5. The fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU, inasmuch as the Commission failed to identify AMM as a beneficiary of the aid 311 The applicants complain, in essence, that the Commission did not include AMM among the beneficiaries of the aid. According to the applicants, that company is an indirect beneficiary and not merely a secondary beneficiary since it benefited from the marketing services because of the increase in traffic. In addition, it exercised influence in decision-making regarding the APFTE’s purchases of marketing services. Furthermore, in a recent decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the Commission analysed whether the operator of the airport concerned could be regarded as an indirect beneficiary. The applicants put forward that argument in their comments, but the Commission failed to take it into account. By failing to carry out such an examination in the present case, the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons and erred in law. 312 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 313 In that regard, it must be pointed out that Article 107 TFEU prohibits aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, without drawing a distinction as to whether the aid-related advantages are directly or indirectly conferred (judgment of 4 March 2009, Italy v Commission, T‑424/05, not published, EU:T:2009:49, paragraph 108). 314 In the present case, it should be noted that, in recitals 325 and 341 of the contested decision, the Commission stated, in essence, that the agreements at issue conferred a selective economic advantage on the applicants. It found, in recital 345 of that decision, that those agreements constituted State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, to the applicants’ benefit. Accordingly, it concluded that the applicants had to be regarded as beneficiaries of the aid. 315 The applicants claim, in essence, that AMM also benefited from the agreements at issue because of the increase in traffic, with the result that the Commission incorrectly failed to identify it as an indirect beneficiary of the aid. In that regard, it should be noted that the fact, even if it were established, that AMM also benefited from the agreements at issue has no bearing, as such, on the finding that the applicants benefited from those agreements, with the result that that argument of the applicants must be regarded as ineffective (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2020, Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission, T‑901/16, EU:T:2020:97, paragraph 42). 316 In any event, it must be held that, as is apparent from recital 285 of the contested decision, nothing in the file permitted a finding by the Commission that the agreements at issue had actually had the effect of increasing the number of international tourists on the routes which Ryanair operated to Montpellier airport. This is not disputed by the applicants. On the contrary, it is apparent from recital 237 of that decision that Ryanair’s passenger numbers at that airport had been decreasing since 2012. In the absence of evidence to support the applicants’ assertion that AMM benefited from the agreements at issue because of the increase in traffic, the Commission cannot be accused of any error of law or manifest error of assessment. 317 The applicants’ argument that AMM exercised influence in decision-making regarding the APFTE’s purchases of marketing services should also be rejected. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 132 above, before March 2011, the APFTE’s strategic choices, namely the choice of specific marketing agreements, were ultimately predetermined by the CCIM and the other public members of the APFTE and, after that date, the choice of geographical areas to be targeted by marketing services was actually made by the local authorities and the CCIM, thus excluding AMM. 318 The applicants’ argument that, in a subsequent decision, the Commission analysed whether the operator of an airport was an indirect beneficiary, cannot succeed either. The Commission’s later decision-making practice has no bearing on the assessment of the lawfulness of the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 May 2010, Todaro Nunziatina & C., C‑138/09, EU:C:2010:291, paragraph 21, and of 15 June 2005, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, T‑171/02, EU:T:2005:219, paragraph 177). 319 In so far as the applicants claim that the Commission should have examined whether indirect aid had been granted to Montpellier airport as they had raised that issue in their comments submitted during the formal investigation procedure, it is sufficient to note that, according to settled case-law, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the parties concerned, but it is sufficient if it sets out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 6 March 2003, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission, T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraphs 278 to 280 and the case-law cited). 320 It follows from the foregoing that this plea must be rejected as ineffective, without it being necessary to rule on its admissibility, which is disputed by the Commission. 6. The sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU, inasmuch as the Commission failed to establish the selectivity of the agreements at issue 321 The applicants complain that the Commission established the selectivity of the agreements at issue on the basis of the consideration that they were individual measures which had not been granted on the basis of an aid scheme. They submit that, in the judgment of 13 December 2018, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission (T‑77/16, not published, EU:T:2018:947), the General Court held that, in such a situation, it was for the Commission to establish that the terms granted to the applicants were more favourable than those applicable to other airlines using the airport and that those terms were, accordingly, selective. They claim that, contrary to what is stated by the Commission, that consideration does not concern only the situation in which airport charges are collected pursuant to a schedule of charges, but also applies where individual agreements are concluded between airlines and airports. In paragraph 56 of the judgment of 9 September 2014, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission (T‑461/12, EU:T:2014:758), the General Court held that the requirement as to selectivity was not assessed on the basis of a distinction between general measures and individual measures, but by means of a substantive analysis of whether all the customers of a public body could benefit from privileged tariffs or similar measures. That approach was confirmed by the Court of Justice (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, C‑524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971). Furthermore, in the judgment of 20 December 2017, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission (C‑70/16 P, EU:C:2017:1002), the Court of Justice held, in essence, that the requirement as to selectivity was not automatically met if a measure applied exclusively to a specific economic sector or to undertakings in a given geographical area. 322 The applicants add that the Commission incorrectly found, without any supporting evidence, that the agreements at issue were one-off measures. The Commission also stated that the APFTE had used 30 to 40% of its budget to purchase marketing services from other providers, which could be airlines with sufficiently popular websites that could be used to promote the region. That fact proves that there is a ‘template’ for contractual relationships between the APFTE and the airlines present at Montpellier airport. Moreover, the Commission did not analyse the extent to which those airlines were in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of the applicants. In the judgment of 20 December 2017, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission (C‑70/16 P, EU:C:2017:1002), the Court of Justice held that such a failure to state reasons constituted an infringement of essential procedural requirements and impeded judicial review by the EU judicature. 323 The Commission disputes those arguments. 324 In that regard, it should be noted that the selective application of a State measure constitutes one of the characteristics of ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (see judgment of 9 September 2014, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, T‑461/12, EU:T:2014:758, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). That article prohibits aid ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’, that is to say, selective aid (judgment of 14 January 2015, Eventech, C‑518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 54). 325 It should next be recalled that the requirement as to selectivity under Article 107(1) TFEU must be clearly distinguished from the concomitant detection of an economic advantage in that, where the Commission has identified an advantage, understood in a broad sense, as arising directly or indirectly from a particular measure, it is also required to establish that that advantage specifically benefits one or more undertakings. It falls to the Commission to show, in particular, that the measure at issue creates differences between undertakings which, with regard to the objective of the measure, are in a comparable situation. It is necessary therefore that the advantage be granted selectively and that it be liable to place certain undertakings in a more favourable situation than that of others (judgments of 4 June 2015, Commission v MOL, C‑15/14 P, EU:C:2015:362, paragraph 59, and of 30 June 2016, Belgium v Commission, C‑270/15 P, EU:C:2016:489, paragraph 48). 326 It must, however, be observed that the requirement as to selectivity differs depending on whether the measure at issue is envisaged as a general aid scheme or as an individual aid measure. In the latter case, the identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to support the presumption that it is selective. By contrast, when examining a general aid scheme, it is necessary to identify whether the measure at issue, notwithstanding the finding that it confers an advantage of general application, does so to the exclusive benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 June 2015, Commission v MOL, C‑15/14 P, EU:C:2015:362, paragraph 60, and of 30 June 2016, Belgium v Commission, C‑270/15 P, EU:C:2016:489, paragraph 49). 327 In recitals 326 to 341 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that, since the agreements at issue had not been signed on the basis of an aid scheme within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589, they had to be regarded as individual measures. As regards the 2010 agreement, it found that it had been concluded directly with AMS without a prior call for tenders and without having been based on an act meeting the requirements of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. As regards the 2013 agreements and the 2017 agreements, the Commission considered, in essence, that the issuing of the calls for tenders organised by the APFTE, which was designed in such a way as to favour the services offered by the applicants, had not been sufficient to open the procurement to other service providers effectively. Thus, it concluded that the agreements at issue were one-off measures, concluded individually between the parties, containing specific contractual obligations and not applying public or otherwise predetermined prices applied by the APFTE, with the result that the economic advantage conferred on the applicants had to be regarded as selective. 328 That analysis must be upheld. First, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 326 above, when assessing the selective nature of an individual measure, the identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to support the presumption that it is selective. In the present case, the agreements at issue contain terms individually agreed between the APFTE and the applicants. As is apparent from recitals 53 to 57 of the contested decision, the 2010 agreement states that AMS undertakes to provide the APFTE with a range of marketing services on Ryanair’s website, and that Ryanair undertakes to operate air routes between Montpellier airport, on the one hand, and Frankfurt-Hahn airport, Brussels-Charleroi airport and Leeds-Bradford airport, on the other. It also states that the amounts of marketing services offered by AMS are linked to Ryanair’s commitment to operate those air routes and that, in the event of a failure to honour those commitments, payment of the price will be refused or will be the subject of an amendment. As regards the 2013 agreements, it is apparent from recitals 63 to 73 of the contested decision that they provide for the lots awarded to Ryanair and their price. The same is true of the 2017 agreements which, in accordance with recitals 74 to 81 of that decision, indicate the lots designating the European regions served by Ryanair and the amount of the services on the basis of a purchase order. 329 Secondly, it should be noted that it is apparent from the file that the APFTE sought to conclude the agreements at issue with the applicants. 330 As regards the 2010 agreement, by which Ryanair undertook, inter alia, to operate air routes between Montpellier airport, on the one hand, and Frankfurt-Hahn airport, Brussels-Charleroi airport and Leeds-Bradford airport, on the other, it is apparent from recital 16 of the contested decision that those routes were already established when the APFTE was created, namely on 24 June 2010. This is not disputed by the applicants. In the absence of a call for tenders with a view to the signing of that agreement, it is not inconceivable that the APFTE did not seek another provider for those destinations and that budget, as the Commission found in recital 331 of the contested decision. 331 As regards the 2013 agreements, it should be observed that it is apparent from recital 334 of the contested decision, as well as footnote 168 thereto, that, as the 2010 agreement was due to expire, the APFTE was obliged to organise a call for tenders and that only the flows covered by that agreement would be put out to tender, destination by destination. In addition, the applicants do not dispute that, as is apparent from recitals 68, 70 and 336 of that decision, the lots ‘Brussels-Charleroi’, ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’, ‘Leeds’ and ‘Birmingham’ and the minimum frequencies indicated in the call for tenders of 2 October 2013 in relation to those lots corresponded exactly to the air transport services operated by Ryanair when the call for tenders was launched and that Ryanair had been the only airline to submit a bid for those four lots. It follows that the applicants were favoured as a result of the conditions referred to in that call for tenders. 332 As regards the 2017 agreements, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recitals 75 and 78 of the contested decision, the specifications of the call for tenders of 13 March 2017 designated, among the seven lots covering the European regions whose inhabitants were to be targeted by the marketing services, three lots corresponding to the regions in which the three airports served by Ryanair from Montpellier airport were located when the call for tenders was launched, namely ‘Wallonia’, ‘Rhineland-Palatinate’ and ‘Yorkshire’, and those three lots were awarded to Ryanair despite the existence of a competing bid. In addition, it is apparent from recital 81 of that decision that the agreements concluded with Ryanair were the only agreements that the APFTE implemented as a result of that call for tenders. It follows that the specifications of that call for tenders guided the choice of service provider towards the applicants. 333 In those circumstances, it must be held that the agreements at issue are selective in nature. 334 The applicants’ other arguments are not such as to call into question that assessment. 335 First, the applicants complain that the Commission established the selectivity of the agreements at issue on the grounds that they were individual measures which had not been granted on the basis of an aid scheme. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, in the case of individual measures, such as those at issue in the present case, the selectivity of the economic advantage is presumed (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, Commission v MOL, C‑15/14 P, EU:C:2015:362, paragraph 60). In any event, it should be observed that, as is apparent from recitals 331 and 334 to 339 of the contested decision, the Commission also took into account the minutes of the APFTE’s inaugural general meeting on 24 June 2010, reflecting a desire to continue the previous agreements with the applicants without seeking other suppliers, and the terms of the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders, which were designed in such a way as to favour the applicants. 336 Secondly, it is necessary to reject the applicants’ argument based on the judgment of 13 December 2018, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission (T‑77/16, not published, EU:T:2018:947). In that regard, it should be noted that the case that gave rise to that judgment concerned the application of discounts on schedules of airport charges on the basis of individual agreements and that the discounts on the charges were offered to all airlines wishing to operate out of the airport concerned. Accordingly, it was on the basis of the judgments of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck (C‑524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971), and of 9 September 2014, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission (T‑461/12, EU:T:2014:758), that the Court held that it was for the Commission to establish that the terms granted to the applicants were more favourable than those applicable to other airlines using the airport and that those terms were, as a result, selective. In the present case, the applicants do not dispute that, as is apparent from recital 340 of the contested decision, the agreements at issue do not set out public prices, which are also applicable to their competitors. 337 Thirdly, the applicants are incorrect to rely on the judgment of 9 September 2014, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission (T‑461/12, EU:T:2014:758), in which the General Court held that the requirement as to selectivity was not assessed on the basis of a distinction between general measures and individual measures, but by means of a substantive analysis of whether all the customers of a public body could benefit from privileged tariffs or similar measures. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the case which gave rise to that judgment concerned a generally applicable measure (see judgment of 9 September 2014, Hansestadt Lübeck v Commission, T‑461/12, EU:T:2014:758, paragraphs 4 to 8), and that, in paragraph 54 of the judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck (C‑524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971), the Court of Justice stated, in essence, that the examination of the selectivity at issue had to be carried out ‘within the context of a particular legal regime’. 338 Fourthly, the same is true of the applicants’ argument based on the judgment of 20 December 2017, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission (C‑70/16 P, EU:C:2017:1002), in which the Court of Justice held, in essence, that the requirement as to selectivity was not automatically met if a measure applied exclusively to a specific economic sector or to undertakings in a given geographical area. In that regard, it is sufficient to point out that the Court of Justice also explained that a measure is selective only if, within the context of a particular legal regime, it has the effect of conferring an advantage on certain undertakings over others, in a different sector or the same sector, which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, in a comparable factual and legal situation (judgment of 20 December 2017, Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission, C‑70/16 P, EU:C:2017:1002, paragraph 61). 339 Fifthly, the applicants claim that the Commission incorrectly considered, without any supporting evidence, that the agreements at issue were one-off measures, since the APFTE had used 30 to 40% of its budget to purchase marketing services from other providers. It should be noted that, although the Commission stated, in recital 340 of the contested decision, that the agreements at issue and their amendments and renewals were ‘one-off measures’, it is apparent from recitals 326 to 341 of that decision that the Commission based its analysis of selectivity on (i) the fact that those agreements were concluded individually and did not apply public or otherwise predetermined prices applied by the APFTE and (ii) the fact that the terms of the 2013 and 2017 calls for tenders were designed in such a way as to favour the applicants. 340 Sixthly, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the Commission was not required to examine, in the present case, whether there was a template for contractual relations between the APFTE and all the airlines operating at Montpellier airport requiring it to analyse whether the other airlines were in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of the applicants. As has been recalled in paragraphs 329 to 333 above, it is apparent from the file that the APFTE sought to conclude the agreements at issue with the applicants. Moreover, as the Commission contends without being challenged by the applicants, the latter received the largest part of the APFTE’s budget without ever having carried more than 15% of the passengers at Montpellier airport, whereas more than 10 airlines were present at that airport (recitals 233, 246 and 250 and Table 2 of the contested decision, as well as footnote 4 thereto). Those circumstances were sufficient for the Commission to establish selectivity, without having to examine whether the other airlines were in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of the applicants. 341 It follows from all of the foregoing that the sixth plea in law must be rejected. B. The application for a measure of organisation of procedure 342 By letter of 19 February 2021, the applicants requested the Court to adopt a measure of organisation of procedure asking the Commission to produce certain material from the file relating to the administrative procedure which led to the contested decision. According to the applicants, access to those documents is necessary to enable them fully to exercise their rights of defence and to enable the Court to review the contested decision. 343 The Commission contends that the request for production of documents should be refused. 344 In that regard, it should be recalled that it is for the Court to appraise the usefulness of measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry (judgment of 19 June 2018, Le Pen v Parliament, T‑86/17, not published, EU:T:2018:357, paragraph 206). 345 In the present case, it must be stated, first, that the document showing that the corrigendum was adopted by the College of Commissioners was provided by the Commission in Annex B1 to its defence. 346 Secondly, as regards the minutes of the meetings of the APFTE and the documents intended to show that the purchase of the marketing services was not in line with the market price, it must be observed that the applicants do not state precisely the reasons for that request, as required by Article 88(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 347 In any event, it should be noted that the material in the file and the explanations given at the hearing are sufficient to enable the applicants to exercise their rights of defence and to enable the Court to give a ruling, since the Court has been able to rule on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. 348 Thirdly, as regards the documents submitted to the Commission by third parties, it should be recalled that the parties concerned, except for the Member State responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing State aid to consult the documents on the Commission’s administrative file (judgment of 29 June 2010, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 58). 349 It follows that the applicants’ application for measures of organisation of procedure must be refused. 350 It must be concluded that the action must be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 351 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. 352 The Council is to bear its own costs, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Ryanair DAC and Airport Marketing Services Ltd to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 3. Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs. Costeira Kancheva Zilgalvis Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 June 2023. V. Di Bucci D. Spielmann Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.