Order;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2022:413
Date: 2022-05-24
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Vice-President
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Privileges and immunities
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal;Application for interim measures - successful
Origin: Belgium;Spain

summary examination of the admissibility of the action, which falls within the jurisdiction of the court hearing the application for interim measures, to consider that the action is probably inadmissible in its entirety. 180 It follows that the application for interim measures cannot be dismissed on the ground that the main action is inadmissible. The requirement to establish a prima facie case Arguments 181 In order to establish a prima facie case, the appellants rely on eight grounds of appeal submitted in support of the main action. 182 In their arguments relating to the third of those grounds of appeal, which should be examined first of all, the appellants submit, inter alia, that the procedure followed in order to adopt the decisions at issue infringed the principle of impartiality arising from Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 39(2) thereof. 183 Point 8 of the Notice to the Members of the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs of 19 November 2019 laying down the principles for immunity cases provides that the position of rapporteur will be rotated on an equal basis between the political groups, but rules out the possibility that the rapporteur may be a member of the same political group or be elected in the same Member State as the Member whose immunity is under discussion. 184 However, the rapporteur for the decisions at issue was a member of the same political group as the VOX political party, which is acting as ‘popular prosecution’ in the criminal proceedings against the appellants. That rapporteur also presided over a meeting of that political party in which he supported the slogan ‘Puigdemont to jail’. 185 In addition, the Chair of the JURI Committee and the political party to which he belongs displayed fierce hostility towards the appellants and pursued a strategy to prevent them from sitting in the Parliament after their election. 186 The Parliament contends that proceedings relating to the waiver of the immunity of a Member of that institution are political in nature and that they cannot therefore be governed by the same rules as disciplinary or judicial proceedings. Consequently, the fact that the rapporteur and the Chair of the JURI Committee belong to a political group other than that of the Member of Parliament concerned does not in itself constitute an infringement of the principle of impartiality. 187 For the same reasons, the fact that the rapporteur and the Chair of the JURI Committee allegedly made political statements which differed from the political program advocated by the appellants is irrelevant. In addition, the appellants’ claims in that regard are not substantiated by tangible evidence. Assessment 188 According to settled case-law of the Court, the fumus boni juris requirement is met where at least one of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded. That is the case, inter alia, where one of the pleas relied on reveals the existence of complex issues of law the solution to which is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the court hearing the application for interim relief but must be the subject of the main proceedings, or where the discussion of issues by the parties reveals that there is a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious (order of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 189 The parties disagree, in the first place, as to the applicability of the principle of impartiality to the rapporteur and the Chair of the JURI Committee, in the context of proceedings relating to a request for waiver of the immunity of a Member of Parliament. 190 In that regard, it should be noted that that point of law has not yet been settled by the Court. 191 Furthermore, the application to such proceedings of all the procedural requirements generally governing administrative procedures cannot, in the light of the eminently political nature of parliamentary procedures, be regarded as being prima facie obvious. 192 However, where the decision to waive the immunity of a Member of the Parliament deprives him or her of an essential element of the status of Member of the European Parliament which is enjoyed by Members of that institution equally during the entire duration of the sessions of a term (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraph 78), the procedure which may lead to the adoption of such a decision must necessarily ensure that the Member of the European Parliament concerned has sufficient individual guarantees. 193 In addition, Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, without making a distinction between the institutions concerned or on the basis of the procedure in which those cases are dealt with. 194 Although the application of that provision to a procedure relating to the vacancy of a seat in the Parliament on account of the disqualification from holding office of a Member of that institution has indeed been ruled out, that solution was based not on the political nature of that procedure, but on the Parliament’s complete lack of discretion in the context of that procedure (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 8 October 2020, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament, C‑201/20 P(R), not published, EU:C:2020:818, paragraphs 93 and 94). 195 Given that neither the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Union nor the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament precisely define the cases in which the immunity of a Member of that institution must be waived, the Parliament enjoys a priori broad discretion when deciding on a request for waiver of the immunity of one of those Members. 196 The principle set out in point 8 of the Notice to the Members of the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, referred to in paragraph 183 of this order, according to which the rapporteur must not belong to the same political group or have been elected in the same Member State as the Member whose immunity is at issue tends moreover to confirm that the Parliament’s practices are intended to ensure, at the very least, a certain degree of impartiality for the rapporteur. 197 In the light of those factors, it must be held that the applicability of the principle of impartiality to the rapporteur and to the Chair of the JURI Committee in the context of a procedure relating to a request for waiver of the immunity of a Member of Parliament constitutes a question on which there is a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not obvious. 198 In the second place, if such applicability were established, examination of the third plea in the main proceedings would involve determining whether the evidence put forward by the appellants is sufficient to establish an infringement of the principle of impartiality. 199 In accordance with that principle, it is incumbent upon the institutions, bodies and agencies of the European Union to comply with both components of the requirement of impartiality, which are, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, by virtue of which no member of the institution concerned may show bias or personal prejudice and, on the other, objective impartiality, under which there must be sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2021, Dalli v Commission, C‑615/19 P, EU:C:2021:133, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). 200 In the present case, the conduct of the rapporteur and of the Chair of the JURI Committee referred to by the appellants is, prima facie, such as to demonstrate bias or personal prejudice towards them. 201 Nevertheless, it will be for the court adjudicating on the substance to assess whether that conduct is actually established, in so far as the Parliament contends that the documents produced by the appellants do not establish it, without, however, denying that that conduct existed. 202 Moreover, it is not disputed that the VOX political party has been placed in a very special situation, since it is directly involved in the criminal proceedings brought against the appellants and it participates directly, on that basis, in the preliminary ruling proceedings in Case C‑158/21. 203 Similarly, as is indicated in the annexes to the application for interim measures, it is apparent from the order of 19 November 2020, Buxadé Villalba and Others v Parliament (T‑32/20, not published, EU:T:2020:552), that Members of Parliament belonging to that party brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Parliament’s acknowledgement of the election of two of the appellants as Members of the European Parliament. 204 In those circumstances, it cannot be ruled out, following the summary examination which it is for the judge hearing the application for interim measures to carry out, that the fact that the rapporteur belongs to a political group in which the Members of the European Parliament of the VOX political party sit is such as to create a legitimate doubt as to a possible bias against the appellants. 205 Consequently, without ruling at this stage on the merits of the third ground of appeal, which is a matter solely for the court adjudicating on the substance, it is apparent that that ground cannot be regarded as lacking in seriousness. 206 Given that this ground of appeal is capable, if upheld by the court adjudicating on the substance of the case, of leading to the annulment of the decisions at issue, it must be held that the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied. Urgency Arguments 207 In order to establish that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied, the appellants submit that their probable arrest, followed, as the case may be, by their surrender to the Spanish authorities, would cause them serious and irreparable damage, by undermining their right to perform their duties as Members of the European Parliament. 208 The combination of the decisions at issue, on the one hand, and the European arrest warrants and the alerts in the SIS II issued against them, on the other hand, expose the appellants to a high risk of arrest and surrender to the Spanish authorities on account of the obligations which those European arrest warrants and those alerts impose on the authorities of all the Member States. That risk could materialise during a trip to Strasbourg in order to participate in parliamentary sessions, but also during the numerous activities in which the appellants are required to engage throughout the European Union as Members of the European Parliament. 209 Although Mr Puigdemont i Casamajó was able, in the past, to travel to several Member States without being arrested, that situation is explained by the fact that he was not covered by a European arrest warrant between October 2017 and his election to the European Parliament. He did not travel in a Member State other than the Kingdom of Belgium while he was the subject of such a European arrest warrant until March 2018, which explains why he was then arrested by the German authorities. 210 The Kingdom of Spain’s argument that the execution of the European arrest warrants is suspended because the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) has submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court must, moreover, be rejected. Such suspension does not follow from the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Spanish authorities have decided to maintain the alerts in SIS II, thus demonstrating that they still seek to obtain the execution of the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants. 211 Lastly, the appellants submit that any annulment of the decisions at issue would occur too late to protect them against the risk on which they rely and would not therefore be sufficient to enable them to exercise their mandates as Members of the European Parliament. 212 The Parliament contends, in the first place, that the decisions at issue are not the decisive cause of the damage alleged by the appellants. That damage stems from the decisions adopted by the Spanish authorities, since the decisions at issue merely eliminate one of the procedural obstacles to the execution of those decisions. 213 In the second place, the Parliament maintains that the situation in Belgium is of specific relevance, since (i) at least two of the appellants seem to reside there and (ii) Members of the European Parliament partly work there. However, the Belgian judicial authorities have consistently rejected the definitive execution of the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants, even before they were granted parliamentary immunity, and against other persons sought for related offences. A change in the position of those judicial authorities is very unlikely pending the Court’s decision in Case C‑158/21. 214 In the third place, while the decisions at issue have no effect in Spain, the appellants do not show that they are in fact likely to be arrested and surrendered to the Spanish authorities by Member States other than the Kingdom of Belgium, whereas they travel regularly within the European Union. The link between possible trips to Member States other than the Kingdom of Belgium and their duties as Members of the European Parliament is also not established. In particular, since the immunity provided for in the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Union has not been waived, they may freely travel to Strasbourg to take part in parliamentary sessions. 215 In the fourth place, the proper conduct of judicial proceedings in a Member State cannot, in any event, constitute a form of serious and irreparable damage. 216 The Kingdom of Spain contends that the decisions at issue do not constitute the decisive cause of the damage alleged by the appellants. Furthermore, since the appellants reside in Belgium and are required to travel to Brussels (Belgium) and Strasbourg in order to exercise their mandates, it is not apparent that the exercise of their mandates as Members of the European Parliament could be impeded by any detention in Spain. 217 Furthermore, no Member State appears to have initiated any procedure for executing the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants. It is highly unlikely that a Member State will execute those European arrest warrants while the preliminary ruling proceedings in Case C‑158/21 are pending. The submission of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU leads to the suspension of the national proceedings, including the proceedings for ruling on those European arrest warrants. Assessment 218 As was pointed out in paragraph 75 of this order, urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage. While it is true that, in order to establish the existence of serious and irreparable damage, it is not necessary for the occurrence and imminence of the damage to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it being sufficient to show that damage is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, the party seeking interim measures is nevertheless required to prove the facts forming the basis of its claim that serious and irreparable damage is likely. 219 In the present case, it is not disputed that the appellants are each the subject of a European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish judicial authorities and that they are covered by alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes. 220 It follows from paragraphs 88 to 92 of the present order that the issuing of a European arrest warrant by a judicial authority of a Member State requires, inter alia, the other Member States to arrest the requested person and to decide on whether he or she should remain in detention pending a surrender decision. 221 Similarly, it follows from paragraphs 121 to 125 of the present order that the existence, in SIS II, of an alert on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes generally entails, by itself, an obligation to arrest persons who are the subject of such alerts, unless those persons have been flagged. 222 In addition, a European arrest warrant entails not only the obligation to arrest the requested person but also the obligation to surrender that person to the issuing judicial authority. 223 It thus follows from settled case-law of the Court that Framework Decision 2002/584 seeks, by the establishment of a simplified and effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgment of 29 April 2021, X (European arrest warrant – Ne bis in idem), C‑665/20 PPU, EU:C:2021:339, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 224 In the field governed by Framework Decision 2002/584, the principle of mutual recognition, which, as is apparent, in particular, from recital 6 thereof, constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is put into practice in Article 1(2) of that framework decision, which lays down the rule that Member States are to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of that framework decision (judgment of 29 April 2021, X (European arrest warrant – Ne bis in idem), C‑665/20 PPU, EU:C:2021:339, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 225 It follows that executing judicial authorities may therefore, in principle, refuse to execute such a warrant only on the grounds for non-execution exhaustively listed by Framework Decision 2002/584 and that execution of the warrant may be made subject only to one of the conditions exhaustively laid down in Article 5 thereof. Accordingly, while execution of the European arrest warrant constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception which must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 17 December 2020, Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 226 Neither the Parliament nor the Kingdom of Spain argues that the execution of the European arrest warrants at issue should be refused pursuant to the grounds for non-execution listed in Framework Decision 2002/584 or that the alerts in SIS II have been flagged. 227 Nor is it alleged, or, a fortiori, shown that Framework Decision 2002/584 and Decision 2007/533 are not generally applied by the Member States. 228 Although the Parliament nevertheless claims that the Member States are clearly reluctant to act on the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants, relying on the fact that Mr Puigdemont i Casamajó travelled to several Member States without being arrested when he did not enjoy parliamentary immunity, it must be held that that claim is not supported by any evidence and is formally disputed by the appellants. 229 Similarly, the fact that the Belgian authorities have not surrendered the appellants to the Spanish authorities cannot be used to rule out the high probability of their arrest, for the reasons set out in paragraph 131 of the present order. 230 The argument put forward by the Kingdom of Spain that the damage alleged by the appellants cannot occur on account of the suspension of the execution of the European arrest warrants issued against them, which results from the submission of a request for a preliminary ruling in Case C‑158/21, must also be rejected. 231 It follows from Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the national court which submits a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court suspends the main proceedings. 232 Nevertheless, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C‑158/21 that that request seeks to determine whether the European arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in respect of a number of requested persons, including the appellants, must be maintained or withdrawn and, more specifically in the case of the appellants, to identify the additional information that should be transmitted to the executing judicial authorities in order to facilitate their surrender. 233 It follows that the decision to stay the main proceedings in Case C‑158/21 implies that the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) does not intend to take a decision, before the Court’s answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, on whether the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants will be maintained or withdrawn. 234 However, in the absence of a formal decision of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in that regard, it cannot be considered that that court intended to call into question the European arrest warrants already issued or to suspend their execution. Such a suspension, which is moreover not provided for in Framework Decision 2002/584, cannot follow directly from Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which does not in any way provide that the operation of the measures adopted by the referring court in the main proceedings before the preliminary ruling is made is necessarily suspended pending that ruling. 235 Accordingly, it must be held that the appellants have demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that their arrest and surrender to the Spanish authorities are foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability if the operation of the decisions at issue is not suspended. 236 It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 149 to 155 of the present order that any arrest of the appellants pursuant to a European arrest warrant or to an alert on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes would be liable to cause them serious and irreparable damage. The same would apply, a fortiori, to a surrender of the appellants to the Spanish authorities, which could result in a long-term deprivation of liberty. 237 It should also be added that the argument put forward by the Parliament and the Kingdom of Spain that the condition relating to urgency is not satisfied on the ground that the decisions at issue are not the decisive cause of the damage which the appellants may suffer must be rejected. 238 It is true that, when suspension of the operation of an act is sought, the grant of the interim measure requested is justified only where the act at issue constitutes the decisive cause of the alleged serious and irreparable damage (order of the Vice-President of the Court of 17 December 2020, Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB, C‑114/20 P(R), not published, EU:C:2020:1059, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 239 It follows from that case-law that suspension of operation of an act must not be ordered where the alleged harm is essentially caused by factors independent of that act and the decisive contribution of the act to the occurrence of that harm has not been established. In such a case, that suspension of operation cannot be regarded as appropriate for preventing serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking it. 240 In the present case, the parliamentary immunity enjoyed by the appellants before the decisions at issue were adopted formed an insurmountable obstacle to their arrest and surrender pursuant to the European arrest warrants issued against them and to the alerts in SIS II. It follows that the decisions at issue are an indispensable condition for the occurrence of the damage on which the appellants rely and that, in the event that the operation of those decisions is suspended, the occurrence of that damage can be avoided. 241 Consequently, it must be held that the appellants have established that the condition relating to urgency has been satisfied. The balance of interests Arguments 242 The appellants claim that it is in the public interest (i) that the composition of the Parliament reflects the free expression of the choices made by the citizens of the European Union as to the persons by whom they wish to be represented and (ii) that its members may carry out their duties throughout their term of office. It follows that the public interest and the interest of the appellants, relating in particular to their individual freedom and freedom of movement, coincide. 243 Furthermore, the annulment of the decisions at issue would not make it possible to reverse the situation resulting from their application, since, if the appellants were surrendered to the Spanish authorities, they would no longer be protected by the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Union. 244 Moreover, the only effect of granting the provisional measure sought would be to delay the further execution of the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants which had already been delayed on account of the withdrawal on two occasions of European arrest warrants previously issued against them and of the long period which elapsed before new European arrest warrants were issued. 245 The Parliament contends that the purpose of parliamentary immunities is not to delay national judicial proceedings or to offer Members of the European Parliament a means of avoiding justice, but to ensure the independence of the Parliament. 246 It is necessary, in accordance with Article 4(2) and (3) TEU, to take into consideration the constitutional interests of the Kingdom of Spain. Since the Parliament has unequivocally decided in favour of waiving the appellants’ immunity, the criminal proceedings brought in that Member State would not interfere with the institutional rights of the Parliament. 247 The Kingdom of Spain contends that granting the interim measure sought would call into question the balancing of interests established in the judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies (C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115). It follows from paragraphs 91 to 94 of that judgment that the competent national court may decide to maintain the detention measures already adopted and to request waiver of the immunity of the Members of the European Parliament concerned. In that context, once the Parliament has granted the waiver of that immunity, suspension of the operation of its decision would entail an excessive sacrifice of the interests of justice and respect for the rule of law, for actions which clearly predate and are unrelated to the election of the appellants to the Parliament. Assessment 248 It is clear that, in most interim proceedings, the decision to grant or to refuse the suspension of application sought is likely to produce, to a certain extent, certain definitive effects and it is for the court hearing the application for interim relief to weigh up the risks attaching to each of the possible solutions. In practical terms, this involves, in particular, examining whether or not the interest of the applicant for interim measures in obtaining suspension of the application of the contested act outweighs the interest in that act’s immediate implementation. In that examination, it must be determined whether the possible annulment of that act by the judgment on the substance would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about by its immediate implementation and conversely whether suspension of its operation would be such as to impede the objectives pursued by the contested act in the event of the action in the main proceedings being dismissed (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of 10 January 2018, Commission v RW, C‑442/17 P(R), not published, EU:C:2018:6, paragraph 60, and order of 8 April 2020, Commission v Poland, C‑791/19 R, EU:C:2020:277, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). 249 As regards, in the first place, the interest in having the interim measures sought granted, it is apparent from the examination of the condition relating to urgency that, if operation of the decisions at issue is not suspended, the appellants may no longer be able to exercise effectively their functions as Members of the European Parliament. 250 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 10(1) TEU provides that the functioning of the European Union is to be founded on the principle of representative democracy, which gives concrete form to the value of democracy referred to in Article 2 TEU. Implementing that principle, Article 14(3) TEU provides that the Members of the Parliament are to be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot (judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraphs 63 and 64). 251 In that context, the immunities granted equally to Members of the Parliament during the entire duration of the sessions of a given term are intended in particular to enable them to perform their tasks (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraphs 76 and 78). 252 Those immunities are also intended, in accordance with the principle of representative democracy, to ensure that the composition of the Parliament reflects faithfully and completely the free expression of choices made by the citizens of the European Union, by direct universal suffrage, as regards the persons by whom they wish to be represented during a given term (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies, C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraphs 82 and 83). 253 It follows that the waiver of the immunity of a Member of Parliament, if carried out improperly and leading to his or her arrest or detention, would be liable to undermine the proper functioning of representative democracy within the European Union. 254 The fact that the Parliament considered, by the decisions at issue, that the appellants’ immunity could be waived is not capable of establishing that the immediate application of those decisions would not hinder the proper functioning of that institution, given (i) that the purpose of the main action is to assess the legality of those decisions and (ii) that that action is based on at least one plea which, prima facie, is not devoid of serious foundation. 255 On the other hand, it is not necessary to take into consideration, when weighing up the relevant interests, the interest in preserving the appellants’ individual freedom and freedom of movement, since, as was pointed out in paragraph 149 of the present order, a Member of Parliament, faced with a decision waiving his or her immunity, can usefully rely only on the adverse effect that that decision would have not solely on his or her right freely to exercise his or her mandate, but also the proper functioning of the Parliament. 256 In the second place, as regards the interest attaching to the immediate application of the decisions at issue, it must be pointed out that the suspension of the operation of those decisions may impede the conduct of the legal proceedings brought by the Spanish authorities against the appellants, by preventing them from being surrendered to those authorities. 257 Contrary to the Parliament’s submissions, that immediate application is not, however, required in order to ensure compliance with Article 4(2) TEU, since parliamentary immunity does not in any way call into question the Member States’ entitlement to bring criminal proceedings within the framework defined by their legal system, but merely ensures a balance between that option and the principle of representative democracy laid down in Article 10(1) TEU. 258 As regards, in the third place, the situation which will result from examination of the main action, it should be noted that any annulment of the decisions at issue would not be such as to reverse the situation which would be brought about by their immediate execution, since such annulment would occur too late to prevent the Members of Parliament concerned from having been prevented from fully exercising their functions during a substantial part of their term of office. 259 Furthermore, if the appellants had been surrendered to the Spanish authorities, the subsequent reinstatement of their immunity under point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Union would have no practical effect, since that immunity is not enjoyed by the appellants on Spanish territory. 260 Conversely, in the event that the action in the main proceedings is ultimately dismissed, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that the delay in the conduct of the criminal proceedings brought against the appellants resulting from suspension of the operation of the decisions at issue would be such as to prevent the completion of those proceedings. 261 It should also be noted that those proceedings have been in progress since 2017 and that the Kingdom of Spain has not disputed the appellants’ claim that the duration of those proceedings is partly due to the fact that European arrest warrants previously issued against them were withdrawn on two occasions and that a long period of time elapsed before new European arrest warrants were issued. 262 Moreover, since the grant of the interim measures sought would entail only temporary re-establishment of the appellants’ parliamentary immunity, it would ultimately do no more than maintain, for a limited period, the status quo which has existed for several years (see, by analogy, order of the Vice-President of the Court of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 114). 263 In the light of all those factors, the balance of interests leans in favour of granting the interim measures sought by the appellants. 264 In those circumstances, the operation of the decisions at issue must be suspended. Costs 265 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. 266 As regards the costs relating to the appeal proceedings, under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeals by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, although the Parliament and the Kingdom of Spain have been unsuccessful, the appellants have not applied for costs. Accordingly, each of the parties is to bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings. 267 As regards the costs relating to the cross-appeal brought by the Kingdom of Spain, pursuant to Article 142 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184 of those rules, where a case does not proceed to judgment, the costs are to be in the discretion of the Court. In the present case, since there is no need to adjudicate on the cross-appeal as a result of the setting aside of the order under appeal following the appeal brought by the appellants, it is appropriate to decide that each party is to bear its own costs relating to the cross-appeal. 268 As regards the costs relating to the proceedings at first instance, it is appropriate to decide, first, in accordance with Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, that the costs of the Parliament and of the appellants are to be reserved. 269 Second, under Article 140(1) of those rules of procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Kingdom of Spain, as intervener at first instance, must bear its own costs relating to the proceedings at first instance. On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby: 1. Sets aside the order of the Vice-President of the General Court of the European Union of 30 July 2021, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament (T‑272/21 R, not published, EU:T:2021:497); 2. Suspends the operation of Decisions P9_TA(2021)0059, P9_TA(2021)0060 and P9_TA(2021)0061 of the European Parliament of 9 March 2021 on the requests for waiver of the immunity of Mr Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó, Mr Antoni Comín i Oliveres and Ms Clara Ponsatí i Obiols. 3. Orders Mr Puigdemont i Casamajó, Mr Comín i Oliveres, Ms Ponsatí i Obiols and the European Parliament to bear their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings. 4. Reserves the costs of Mr Puigdemont i Casamajó, of Mr Comín i Oliveres, of Ms Ponsatí i Obiols and of the European Parliament relating to the proceedings at first instance. 5. Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs relating to both the proceedings at first instance and those on appeal. Luxembourg, 24 May 2022. A. Calot Escobar L. Bay Larsen Registrar Vice-president * Language of the procedure: English.