Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1052
Date: 2025-11-19
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Second Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Germany

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. That summary – albeit concise – must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without any further information. Thus, the essential facts and points of law on which an action is based and the pleas in law relied on in support of the action must be apparent, at the very least in summary form, but coherently and intelligibly, from the text of the application itself (see judgment of 29 May 2024, Angelidis v Parliament, T‑49/23, not published, EU:T:2024:335, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 45 In particular, the applicant is required to set out in a sufficiently systematic manner the arguments relating to each plea which he or she puts forward, and the Court cannot be obliged, as a result of a lack of structure in the application or a lack of rigour on the part of the applicant, to reconstruct the legal structure intended to support a plea by bringing together various diffuse elements of the application, at the risk of reconstructing that plea by giving it a scope which it did not have in the mind of that party. To decide otherwise would be contrary to the principle of the sound administration of justice, to the principle that the subject matter of proceedings is defined by the parties and to the defendant’s rights of defence (judgments of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS, C‑446/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 61, and of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 85 (not published)). 46 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the application, the applicant has merely claimed breach of the duty of care in the heading to the present plea, without developing any argument in that regard. In the context of that plea, the applicant has put forward, in the application, only arguments relating to the disclosure of personal information to other members of staff in her unit who should not have had access to it under data protection rules. However, whilst those arguments may concern a failure to protect personal data, which is also referred to in the heading to the fifth plea, it must be stated that the applicant does not establish any link between such arguments and the alleged breach of the duty of care. 47 It follows that, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the application initiating proceedings itself must state clearly and precisely the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas, are not met. Accordingly, the present claim, based on an alleged breach of the duty of care, must be rejected as inadmissible. – Breach of the right to protection of personal data 48 The applicant claims that, by sharing the content of the draft staff report with other members of staff in her unit following the second interview with her immediate superior, held on 28 March 2023, the latter infringed the applicable obligations as regards compliance with the principles of necessity, proportionality, transparency and purpose limitation. 49 It appears from the draft staff report that it was read and commented on by an internal group of other team leaders reporting to the applicant’s immediate superior, who, the applicant submits, should not have had access to it, given the personal nature of the draft. 50 In the reply, the applicant states that she is referring, in that regard, to the obligations laid down by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39). 51 In addition, in so far as the impartiality of her immediate superior had been called into question, the applicant expresses doubts as to that superior’s ability to conduct consultations in relation to the applicant’s self-assessment, particularly with regard to allegedly inaccurate information of which that superior had no direct knowledge. Thus, according to the applicant, selective consultations conducted in her absence led to a subjective and unsubstantiated assessment. 52 The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. 53 In that regard, in the present case, the processing of personal data is covered by the justification in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725, which concerns the case where that processing is necessary for the performance of a task covered by the legitimate exercise of official authority vested in the EU institution to which the data are disclosed. Since it was carried out in the general context of an appraisal procedure, the processing in question necessarily falls within the legitimate exercise of the mission entrusted to the administration (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 June 2022, Cristescu v Commission, T‑754/20, not published, EU:T:2022:316, paragraph 73, and of 7 September 2022, DD v FRA, T‑470/20, not published, EU:T:2022:511, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited). 54 In addition, Article 5(1) of the internal rules on staff reports provides for the possibility of seeking the opinion of work coordinators when drawing up a draft staff report. 55 Furthermore, as regards the arguments concerning lack of impartiality on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior, it should be noted that those were rejected in the context of the fourth plea. 56 The present claim must therefore be rejected as unfounded, and there is no need to rule on its admissibility. 57 Accordingly, the fifth plea must be dismissed in its entirety. First plea: infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and Article 5(8) and Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports as regards a lack of any constructive dialogue 58 The applicant submits that she did not benefit from the safeguards provided for in the applicable rules that would have enabled her to express, under the best possible conditions, her views on the appraisal report. – Admissibility of the first plea in so far as it relates to Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports 59 The Parliament submits that the argument alleging an infringement of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports is inadmissible in so far as the applicant provides no explanation as to why she considers that provision to have been infringed. Consequently, it does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure. 60 In the reply, the applicant states that, given the conduct of the interviews between her and her hierarchical superiors, it is clear that disparaging remarks were made about her which go beyond the scope of the draft staff report, and that the interviews were not conducted solely on the basis of the draft report. 61 In the present case, it should be observed that, in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the application, first, the applicant submits that the conduct of the interviews of 10 and 28 March 2023 with her immediate superior, as reported by her and confirmed by the two witnesses, was contrary, in particular, to the requirements of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports. Secondly, she considers that that provision was infringed by reason of the fact that it was not possible to engage in a genuine dialogue at those interviews and to make comments on the draft staff report. 62 In that regard, Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports provides that: ‘Each staff member being assessed shall be forwarded his or her draft staff report for year N-1 electronically at least five days before the date of his or her interview … The interview shall be conducted on the basis of the draft report’. 63 In that context, it is impossible to determine from the application why the applicant considers that, having regard to the arguments set out in paragraph 61 above, Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports has been infringed in the present case. 64 Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 44 and 45 above, the first plea must be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it relates to infringement of Article 5(8) of the internal rules on staff reports. – Substance 65 The applicant submits that, during her first interview, which took place on 10 March 2023, she did not have the opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue with her immediate superior, who subjected her to verbal attacks and personal accusations, which prevented her from presenting the information she had prepared. In that regard, the applicant provides a statement from the member of the Staff Committee who was present at that interview. The applicant states that those events prompted her to contact the Parliament’s DG for Personnel and the head of the medical service, and to submit a formal request for assistance. 66 According to the applicant, because of the conduct of her immediate superior, it became necessary to organise a second interview on 28 March 2023, at which proper discussion again proved impossible, as stated by the member of the Staff Committee who was present at that interview. However, preventive measures intended to ensure that there was no further hostile and inappropriate behaviour on the part of the applicant’s immediate superior were put in place. The applicant adds that, during that interview, the Staff Committee member accompanying her requested that the interview be brought to an end and that further discussions take place in writing regarding all parts of the staff report that had not been addressed in the course of the two interviews. 67 Furthermore, the applicant submits that the conduct of the two interviews on 10 and 28 March 2023, as reported by the applicant and confirmed by the two witnesses, was contrary to the rules set out in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and in Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports, in particular in that she was not given the opportunity to comment on the draft staff report. 68 The applicant also challenges the credibility of the statements made by her immediate superior and the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication concerning the conduct of the two interviews in question. 69 The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. 70 In that regard, it should be recalled that, under the third paragraph of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations, the staff report is to be communicated to the official, who is entitled to make any comments thereon which he or she considers relevant. 71 Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports provides that ‘the interviews shall be conducted by the first assessor, who shall make sure that they are held in a calm environment in which confidentiality is guaranteed and that no external factors are allowed to disrupt the discussions’. 72 According to the case-law, proper dialogue is imperative during the appraisal procedure since it constitutes a key element to that procedure and requires direct contact between the reporting officer and the official under appraisal, which alone is capable of encouraging a frank and detailed discussion enabling the persons concerned, first, to gauge accurately the nature, reasons for and degree of any differences in opinion between them and, second, to arrive at a better mutual understanding. Without a direct exchange between the reporting officer and the official under appraisal, the staff report cannot entirely fulfil its function as a human resources management tool and as an instrument to accompany the professional development of the official concerned (see judgment of 18 December 2024, TT v Frontex, T‑787/22, not published, EU:T:2024:909, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited). 73 In the present case, it is undisputed that the applicant, accompanied by members of the Staff Committee, attended two interviews, on 10 and 28 March 2023, with her immediate superior, who was herself accompanied by the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, in the context of individual appraisal interviews. 74 According to the applicant, during the interview of 10 March 2023, her immediate superior did not provide any evidence to justify the staff report. In addition, she behaved in a hostile fashion. The applicant adds that she was not given the opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue. In that regard, she provides a statement from the Staff Committee member who accompanied her to that meeting, which refers to hostile statements made by the immediate superior and to the applicant’s inability to present her observations. 75 As regards the interview of 28 March 2023, the applicant maintains once again, producing in support a statement from another member of the Staff Committee who accompanied her to that interview, that it was not possible to hold a proper discussion at that interview. 76 The Parliament, for its part, produces statements from the applicant’s immediate superior and from the head of the human resources unit of the Parliament’s DG for Communication, who accompanied the latter at the interviews of 10 and 28 March 2023, which contradict the statements produced by the applicant, with a view to demonstrating that those interviews did enable a constructive dialogue to take place in a respectful and professional way. 77 In that regard, it should be noted that the statement from the member of the Staff Committee who accompanied the applicant at the interview of 28 March 2023 observes neither that the atmosphere at that interview was hostile towards the applicant nor that the applicant was unable to comment on the staff report. Furthermore, the contact made with the Parliament’s DG for Personnel and the head of the medical service, and the alleged submission of a formal request for assistance, relied on by the applicant and referred to in paragraph 65 above, do not call that observation into question, in so far as they relate to the interview of 10 March 2023 and not that of 28 March 2023. In addition, according to the applicant, the Staff Committee member who accompanied her at that interview requested that the interview be brought to an end and that all further discussions take place in writing as regards all parts of the staff report that had not been addressed in the course of the two interviews. 78 It follows that, first, at the very least, at the interview of 28 March 2023, discussion of the assessments contained in the staff report was possible in so far as some parts were addressed. Secondly, as requested by the person accompanying the applicant, it was possible for the discussion to continue in writing. 79 In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, on 28 March 2023, following the interview held on that day, the applicant submitted detailed comments on the staff report, to which her immediate superior responded on 17 April 2023. As the Parliament maintains, and as the applicant does not dispute, the staff report was amended to take account of her comments. 80 Furthermore, the applicant submitted her self-assessment. 81 It follows that, first, the applicant attended two interviews with her immediate superior. Even on the assumption that a proper discussion of the draft staff report were not possible at the interview of 10 March 2023, which the Parliament disputes, the fact remains that a second interview took place on 28 March 2023. In relation to that interview, the applicant has not shown that she did not have the opportunity to take a position on the assessments contained in the staff report, in accordance with Article 6(2) of the internal rules on staff reports. Secondly, the applicant was able to make her comments, as provided for in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations. 82 In the light of the foregoing, the first plea must be rejected. Second plea: infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations as regards a lack of set objectives 83 The applicant alleges an infringement of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations on the basis that no proper objectives were set for the reference period, including in the 2021 staff report, arguing that that prevented assessment of her ability, efficiency and conduct in the service. – Admissibility 84 The Parliament contends that the present plea was first raised in the application and is therefore inadmissible for breach of the rule that the application must correspond to the complaint. Neither in her complaint nor in the challenge she submitted to the Reports Committee did the applicant put forward any argument relating to a failure to set objectives in the staff report. On the contrary, in the complaint, she stated that her immediate superior had set her objectives with which she did not agree. 85 The applicant disputes the Parliament’s arguments. 86 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, there must be correspondence of complaints in respect of the administrative complaint and the application in order inter alia to prevent the official or other staff member from making some, or all, of his or her pleas only at the litigation stage of the proceedings, thereby significantly reducing any possibility of an extra-judicial settlement of the dispute (see judgment of 2 October 2024, IP v Commission, T‑669/22, EU:T:2024:669, paragraph 149 (not published and the case-law cited)). 87 That stated, although an administrative complaint is an indispensable preliminary to bringing an action against an act adversely affecting a person to whom the Staff Regulations apply, it is not the function of that complaint to bind strictly and absolutely the judicial stage of the proceedings, provided that the claims submitted at the latter stage change neither the cause nor the object of the complaint. In addition, since the pre-litigation procedure is an informal procedure and those involved at that stage are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer, the administration must not interpret complaints restrictively but should, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind (see judgment of 2 October 2024, IP v Commission, T‑669/22, EU:T:2024:669, paragraph 150 (not published and the case-law cited)). 88 However, according to settled case-law, if the pre-litigation procedure provided for in Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations is to achieve its purpose, the administration must be in a position to know with sufficient precision the criticisms made by those involved of the contested decision (see judgment of 13 November 2024, WS v EUIPO, T‑221/23, not published, EU:T:2024:820, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 89 In the present case, it must be stated that, in her complaint, the applicant did not rely on a failure to set objectives. However, she did state that, following the change in her duties, the tasks assigned to her were unrelated to her area of expertise. She added that the targets set for her were impossible to achieve. 90 Accordingly, a claim regarding the objectives set for the applicant was indeed raised in the complaint, as the Parliament acknowledges. 91 Thus, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 87 above, the Parliament’s arguments concerning the breach of the rule of correspondence must be rejected and the present plea must be held to be admissible. – Substance 92 In support of her claim that Article 43 of the Staff Regulations was infringed, the applicant submits that, despite several requests on her part, her professional objectives were never set or agreed upon bilaterally, and that that is aggravated by the fact that, following her recruitment, she was assigned to a post different from that to which she had been recruited. 93 The applicant adds that, despite the fact that two meetings were held, on 2 and 12 May 2022, with her immediate superior, no agenda or formal minutes were drawn up. There was no discussion, only a series of ultimatums about the tasks to be performed by the applicant, which were not fully defined or clearly formulated. Furthermore, she never agreed to the change in her post. 94 The applicant states that the tasks communicated by her immediate superior on 28 March 2022 did not correspond to her official job description and had been defined without any discussion or regard for the appropriate procedure. 95 The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. 96 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, as regards the failure to set objectives for the coming year in the staff report, Article 43 of the Staff Regulations does not require the administration to set each year formal objectives for the purpose of drawing up the annual report on an official’s performance or to appraise that performance on the basis of predetermined objectives. In the absence of such rules, the fact that objectives were not set does not constitute an irregularity of a substantial nature justifying a declaration that the staff report is unlawful (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2025, US v Commission, T‑18/24, not published, EU:T:2025:132, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 97 Furthermore, as regards the internal rules on staff reports relied on by the applicant in the context of the first plea, namely Article 5(8) and Article 6(2), cited in paragraphs 62 and 71 above, it must be stated that those provisions do not lay down any obligation to set objectives either. 98 The applicant’s argument therefore has no basis in law. 99 In addition, the applicant’s argument has no basis in fact. 100 Indeed, it should be observed that, in an email of 16 May 2022, following a meeting held on 12 May 2022 with her immediate superior, the applicant proposed amendments to the objectives which had been proposed by her immediate superior, which the superior accepted by email of 17 May 2022. It follows that, as the Parliament maintains, the applicant’s objectives were in fact communicated to her in writing and she was able to comment on them by submitting her amendments, which her superiors accepted. 101 It is true that the applicant maintains that the meeting which took place on 12 May 2022 was not a formal meeting with her hierarchical superiors, that neither an agenda nor formal minutes were drawn up and that the interview was not recorded in writing. She adds that no agreement on the change to her duties was ever reached and that she never agreed to a change in her duties or her post. 102 However, those arguments do not call into question the conclusion reached in paragraph 100 above. In particular, the alleged lack of minutes or written records of the meeting of 12 May 2022 and the lack of agreement on the change in her duties have no bearing on the fact that her objectives for 2022 were communicated to her, were commented on by her and were accepted by the parties. Furthermore, as the Parliament points out, the objectives in question could not have been set at the time of the 2021 staff report because the applicant’s duties were changing with effect from March 2022. 103 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that she never agreed to the change in her post, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the reassignment of an official to another post is not conditional on his or her consent, as that would restrict the institutions’ freedom to organise their departments and to adapt them to changing needs (see judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 104 Having regard to the foregoing, the second plea must be rejected. Third plea: manifest error of assessment 105 The applicant submits that the contested acts contain several manifestly erroneous statements relating both to the quality of her work and to her conduct. 106 First of all, contrary to the information contained in the staff report, the applicant claims to have received several emails confirming that there were no issues with the quality of her work and that she was responsive, while meeting deadlines. 107 The applicant also states that her immediate superior failed to take into account the fact that the last three months of 2022 had been an extremely stressful period for her, due to a hostile working environment and a difficult personal situation. In particular, her immediate superior contacted her on the very day she returned to Brussels (Belgium), following a period of special leave which she had requested be extended. 108 Furthermore, as regards her conduct at work, the applicant states that she never received formal notification from the Secretary-General or the Director-General of the Parliament’s DG for Communication concerning her removal from her post. Similarly, the applicant states that she complied with the rules on requests for teleworking applicable to the Parliament’s permanent staff and regularly recorded her telework both in the internal file created by her immediate superior and on the human resources portal. 109 Lastly, with regard to the award decision, the applicant claims that she was deprived of certain opportunities, such as the opportunity to attend meetings, in contrast to colleagues who had been awarded two merit points, which meant that she was not in a comparable situation. 110 The Parliament disputes the applicant’s arguments. 111 In that regard, in the first place, concerning the staff report, it should be noted that, according to the case-law on the appraisal of officials, reporting officers have the broadest discretion when appraising the work of persons upon whom they must report and it is not for the Courts to interfere with their assessments or review the validity thereof, save in the case of error or manifest exaggeration. Indeed, review by the Courts of the content of staff reports is limited to ensuring that the procedure has been conducted in a lawful manner, the facts are materially correct and there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers (see judgment of 18 October 2023, Gómez Calavia v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑336/22, not published, EU:T:2023:652, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 112 Similarly, an error may only be said to be manifest where it may easily be detected in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the exercise of decision-making powers to be subject. Consequently, in order to establish that the administration committed a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of a staff report, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the administration implausible. In other words, a plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the contested assessment may still be accepted as true or valid (see judgment of 14 September 2022, QN v Commission, T‑179/21, not published, EU:T:2022:557, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited). 113 In the present case, the applicant relies on several emails attesting to the quality of her work and stating that there were no issues with it. Thus, in an email of 5 September 2022, she was thanked and specifically told that ‘[her] instructions [made] the guided tour much more transparent for the visitors’. Similarly, she received thanks on 14 July and 7 November 2022. She was also thanked for her contribution to a permanent exhibition. In addition, the applicant states that she received no indication that her contribution to a travelling exhibition was unsatisfactory. 114 In that regard, however, it must be stated that, first, the emails submitted by the applicant, with the exception of the first one, contain no assessment of the quality of her work, but merely acknowledge receipt of her contributions with a simple expression of thanks. 115 Secondly, the applicant has not produced any additional evidence that might call into question the plausibility of the criticisms and negative remarks made by the reporting officers in relation to her performance at work in 2022. Indeed, it is apparent from the three sections of the staff report containing the detailed assessment, headed ‘Ability’, ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Conduct’, that, first, ‘[the applicant avoids fixing] commitments and deadlines, in spite of numerous attempts of her hierarchy’, secondly, ‘not answering emails and not reacting to reminders led to a lot of frustration in [her various] teams’, thirdly, the applicant adopted an ‘attitude…of obstruction’, fourthly, ‘in 2022, [the applicant] generally displayed a distance and disinterest …, at least in her own contribution’, fifthly, she had shown less availability, reliability and adaptability, and sixthly, the issues identified in the applicant’s 2021 staff report had not been resolved. 116 Those assessments are also corroborated by several exchanges between the applicant and her immediate superior, produced by the Parliament, according to which the applicant had difficulty meeting deadlines and her immediate superior had to follow up with her on several occasions. 117 Furthermore, as the Parliament points out, it appears that the issues identified – namely the applicant’s lack of responsiveness to emails from her immediate superior, her difficulties in meeting deadlines and the need to follow up with her to ensure her work was completed on time – predated the personal difficulties which the applicant says she experienced in the last three months of 2022. 118 In view of the foregoing and in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 111 and 112 above, it must be held that the applicant has not demonstrated that the staff report was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 119 In the second place, as regards the award decision, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in assessing the merits to be taken into consideration in a decision on promotion under Article 45 of the Staff Regulations, the appointing authority has a wide discretion. Review by the EU Courts must accordingly be confined to determining whether, regard being had to the various considerations which have influenced the administration in making its assessment, it has not exceeded the proper bounds and has not used its power in a manifestly incorrect way. The EU Courts cannot therefore substitute their assessment of the qualifications and merits of officials for that of the appointing authority. They must confine themselves to verifying that the consideration of comparative merits provided for in Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations was conducted objectively and correctly in the light of the details provided by the appointing authority on the promotion procedure prior to that consideration. Consequently, it is not for the EU Courts to review the merits of the administration’s appraisal of the professional abilities of an official where it involves complex value judgments which, by their very nature, are not amenable to objective verification (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 120 However, the wide discretion thereby conferred on the appointing authority is circumscribed by the need to undertake a consideration of the candidates’ comparative merits with care and impartiality, in the interests of the service and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. In practice it must be undertaken on a basis of equality, using comparable sources of information (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 121 In the present case, in the light of the conclusion reached in paragraph 118 above, it must be stated that the staff report, on which the award decision is based, contains numerous negative comments. In that context, as is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint, after a detailed comparative examination of the staff report with those of the other colleagues in the same grade of the Parliament’s DG for Communication to whom two merit points were awarded, it appears that, unlike the applicant’s staff report, the staff reports of the other colleagues did not contain similar negative comments and that those officials had demonstrated a higher level of professional experience. 122 In that regard, it should be recalled that the appointing authority has the power to undertake a consideration of comparative merits according to the procedure or method which it considers most appropriate. As is recognised in the case-law, there is no obligation on the institution concerned to adopt a particular appraisal and promotion system, given the wide discretion which it has to implement the objectives of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations in accordance with its own needs for the organisation and management of its staff (see judgment of 6 November 2024, AL v Council, T‑315/23, not published, EU:T:2024:771, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 123 The applicant does not challenge the comparison made by the administration. 124 As regards the allegations that the applicant was often not invited to meetings at which her presence was necessary, it must be stated that she has produced no evidence to support those allegations. The applicant has not established that her presence was necessary at the meetings in question. In any event, having regard to the negative content of the staff report, those arguments cannot establish that the award decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 125 It follows that the applicant has not shown that the award decision was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 126 In the light of the foregoing, the third plea must be rejected as unfounded, and there is no need to rule on its admissibility, which is challenged by the Parliament. 127 Since all the pleas in law have been rejected, the action must be dismissed as unfounded. Costs 128 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 129 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Parliament. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders HI to pay the costs. Kowalik-Bańczyk Reine Cassagnabère Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 29 April 2026. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.