Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2022:313
Date: 2022-06-01
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Third Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Economic and monetary policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible;Application for measures of inquiry - unfounded
Origin: Spain

summary, the technical standards of the EBA draw attention to the need to distinguish between two types of valuation prior to the resolution, namely, on the one hand, valuation 1, carried out under Article 36(4)(a) of Directive 2014/59, which is the equivalent of Article 20(5)(a) of Regulation No 806/2014, and, on the other hand, valuation 2, carried out under Article 36(4)(b) to (g) of Directive 2014/59, which corresponds to Article 20(5)(b) to (g) of Regulation No 806/2014. 403 Recital 1 of the regulatory technical standards, which is reproduced in recital 1 of Delegated Regulation 2018/345, recalls that distinction between, on the one hand, an initial valuation assessing whether the conditions for the write-down and conversion of capital instruments or the conditions for resolution have been met, and, on the other hand, a subsequent valuation forming the basis for the decision to apply one or more resolution tools. The technical regulatory standards lay down different criteria for carrying out valuation 1 and valuation 2. 404 As regards valuation 1, the regulatory technical standards state that the relevant criterion is whether the entity is failing or likely to fail. 405 Contrary to the applicants’ submissions, the purpose of valuation 2 was not to establish whether Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail and they cannot therefore rely on a contradiction with valuation 1 in that regard. 406 Furthermore, it must be observed that differences between the conclusions reached in valuation 1 and those reached in valuation 2 are due to the fact that, since the valuations pursued different objectives, they were based on different assessment criteria defined in the technical standards of the EBA. Thus, in accordance with the technical standards of the EBA, the main purpose of valuation 1 was to determine whether the total value of the entity’s assets exceeded that of its liabilities, in other words, whether the entity was balance sheet solvent, whereas valuation 2 had to be based on the economic value and not on the book value of the entity. 407 In any event, as regards the applicants’ argument that the conclusions of valuations 1 and 2 were contradictory, it is sufficient to note that that argument is ineffective, since the conclusions of valuation 1 were no longer relevant following the ECB’s assessment of 6 June 2017 for the reason set out in paragraph 294 above. 408 Furthermore, it must be observed that the ECB, in its assessment, did not rely on Banco Popular’s insolvency in order to conclude that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail. The ECB’s conclusion that Banco Popular, because of its liquidity position and its inability to generate further liquidity, would be unable in the near future to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fell due is not at odds with the fact that Banco Popular was solvent from an accounting standpoint. 409 Since valuation 2 had to take account of the economic value and not the book value of Banco Popular, the applicants cannot claim a contradiction between the finding that Banco Popular was solvent, made in valuation 1, in the assessment of the ECB or by the Bank of Spain, and the conclusion in valuation 2. 410 Therefore, their arguments relating to the calculation of the value of Banco Popular’s net assets taking account of the adjustments in respect of non-performing assets, envisaged by the ECB and Banco Popular, are also irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the validity of valuation 2, in so far as they are concerned only with the book value of Banco Popular. 411 It follows from the foregoing that the third complaint must be dismissed, as must, therefore, the fourth part of this plea in law. (e) The fifth part, alleging infringement of Article 20(7) and (9) of Regulation No 806/2014 412 The applicants allege infringement of Article 20(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, which provides that the valuation is to be supplemented by, inter alia, an updated balance sheet and a report on the financial position of the entity. They claim that Deloitte acknowledged that it had not carried out an analysis of the structure of the undertaking and of the balance sheets of the individual entities. In the absence of a balance sheet for each entity in the Banco Popular group, Deloitte conducted its assessment on a consolidated basis, despite stating that an entity-by-entity analysis was of crucial importance. 413 The applicants also claim infringement of Article 20(9) of Regulation No 806/2014, in so far as Deloitte acknowledged that it had been unable to reflect the subdivision of creditors in classes in accordance with the priority of claims. Nonetheless, Deloitte included a creditor hierarchy in valuation 3, using information available on 6 June 2017. 414 It must be recalled that, in the present case, since valuation 2 was a provisional valuation carried out on the basis of Article 20(10) of Regulation No 806/2014, it is clearly apparent from that provision, referred to in paragraph 302 above, that the valuation had to comply with the requirements of Article 20(7) and (9) of that regulation only in so far as reasonably practicable in the circumstances. 415 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicants claim, Article 20(7) of Regulation No 806/2014 does not require the valuation to be supplemented by an updated balance sheet and a report on the financial position of each entity comprising the group placed under resolution. The concept of ‘entity’ mentioned in that article refers to the concept defined in Article 2 of Regulation No 806/2014. Valuation 2 was based on the consolidated balance sheet of the Banco Popular group. 416 The applicants also rely on extracts from valuation 2 which are irrelevant. 417 In one extract from the annex to valuation 2, cited by the applicants, Deloitte stated that, since it had not been provided with the entity’s corporate structure and the balance sheets of the individual entities, its liquidation scenario had been prepared on a consolidated basis for illustrative purposes and that that was contrary to Spanish law. In another extract from that annex, to which the applicants also refer, Deloitte stated that the entity-by-entity analysis was crucial for the liquidation scenario simulation. The applicants also refer to extracts in which Deloitte states that it did not have sufficient data or time to be able to classify the creditors according to their ranking and that the fact that its calculations were performed at the level of the Banco Popular group could have material value implications with creditors of some entities receiving 100% recovery to the detriment of creditors of other entities. 418 Those extracts, which appear in the second part of the annex to valuation 2 relating to the liquidation scenario simulation and not in the first part of that annex relating to the provisional valuation of Banco Popular, are irrelevant. It must be borne in mind that the resolution scheme was adopted taking into account the first part of the annex to valuation 2 containing the provisional valuation of Banco Popular, which was prepared with a view to applying the sale of business tool. 419 As stated in Section 3 of the report on valuation 2, the purpose of the liquidation scenario simulation was to determine whether the shareholders and creditors of Banco Popular would have received better treatment if Banco Popular had been wound up in normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with Spanish law. 420 In the second part of the annex to valuation 2 containing that simulation, Deloitte explained that, with further data concerning the balance sheet of each entity and more time, it would have been able to refine its liquidation assumptions and prepare a liquidation scenario strategy. It thus stated that the liquidation scenario simulation in the annex to valuation 2 was provided for illustrative purposes. 421 Thus, in accordance with Article 20(10) of Regulation No 806/2014, Deloitte made the estimate provided for in Article 20(9) of that regulation only in so far as reasonably practicable in the circumstances. 422 In addition, the question of the treatment of shareholders and creditors in the liquidation scenario falls under valuation 3, the purpose of which is, according Article 20(16) of Regulation No 806/2014, to determine whether the shareholders and creditors would have received better treatment if the institution under resolution had entered into normal insolvency proceedings. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Deloitte forwarded valuation 3 to the SRB on 14 June 2018, after the adoption of the resolution scheme. 423 Furthermore, the applicants’ assertion that Deloitte included a creditor hierarchy in valuation 3 based solely on information available on 6 June 2017 is not relevant for the purposes of assessing the lawfulness of the resolution scheme. In any event, that assertion is incorrect as, although valuation 3 indicates that it is based on the financial information available on 6 June 2017, it also makes clear that it is based on extensive information obtained after the adoption of the resolution scheme and which was therefore not available when valuation 2 was drawn up. 424 Accordingly, the fifth part of this plea in law must be dismissed. 425 It follows from all the foregoing that the SRB did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding that valuation 2 complied with Article 20 of Regulation No 806/2014. The second plea in law must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. 3. Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard and the right of access to the file, enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter 426 The applicants claim that the SRB infringed the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, in so far as they were not heard and did not have access to the file before the adoption of the resolution scheme. In essence, this plea is divided into two parts. (a) The first part, alleging infringement of the right to be heard 427 The applicants argue that the right to be heard, enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, applies to any measure liable to affect a person and, in particular, to the resolution of an institution in which that person owns shares. The contested decisions concern the resolution of a single bank and the persons concerned are its shareholders and creditors. The applicants maintain that the holders of capital instruments in a bank must be heard before they are deprived of their property. 428 The Commission contends that the resolution decision, in so far as it concerns the applicants, is not an individual measure but a measure of general application and that Article 41 of the Charter does not apply. It argues that, even if the applicants had a right to be heard before the adoption of the resolution scheme, that right could be subject to restrictions. 429 The SRB submits that the limitation of the right to be heard, to the extent that it is applicable, is justified by the need to ensure the effectiveness of resolution decisions and the stability of the financial markets. 430 It must be borne in mind that Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter provides that the right to good administration includes the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would adversely affect him or her is adopted. 431 The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. In addition, it must be stated that the right to be heard pursues a dual objective. First, to enable the case to be examined and the facts to be established in as precise and correct a manner as possible, and, second, to ensure that the person concerned is in fact protected. The right to be heard is intended, inter alia, to guarantee that any decision adversely affecting a person is adopted in full knowledge of the facts, and its purpose is to enable the competent authority to correct an error or to enable the person concerned to submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (see judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker, C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited). 432 It must be observed that the Court of Justice has affirmed the importance of the right to be heard and its very broad scope in the EU legal order, considering that that right must apply in all proceedings which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting a person. In accordance with the case‑law of the Court of Justice, observance of the right to be heard is required even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see judgments of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 85 and 86 and the case-law cited; of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited; and of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). 433 Therefore, in the light of its character as a fundamental general principle of EU law, the application of the principle of the rights of the defence, which include the right to be heard, cannot be excluded or restricted by any legislative provision. Respect for that principle must therefore be ensured both where there is no specific legislation and also where legislation exists which does not itself take account of that principle (see judgment of 18 June 2014, Spain v Commission, T‑260/11, EU:T:2014:555, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 434 First of all, it should be noted that the resolution scheme adopted by the SRB has as its purpose the resolution of Banco Popular which must therefore be regarded as the person with regard to whom an individual measure is adopted and to whom the right to be heard is guaranteed by Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter. 435 Thus, it should be borne in mind that the applicants are not addressees of the resolution scheme, which is not an individual decision taken against them, or of Decision 2017/1246 endorsing that resolution scheme. 436 However, it must be observed that, in accordance with Article 21(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the SRB exercised the power to write down or convert Banco Popular’s capital instruments. 437 Therefore, the procedure followed by the SRB to adopt the resolution scheme, even though it does not constitute an individual procedure initiated against the applicants, may lead to the adoption of a measure liable to have an adverse effect on their interests in their capacity as shareholders or holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular. 438 The case-law of the Court of Justice cited in paragraph 432 above adopted a broad interpretation of the right to be heard as being guaranteed to every person during the procedure which may result in a measure adversely affecting that person. 439 In addition, first, according to recital 121 of Regulation No 806/2014, that regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in particular by the Charter, including the right of defence, and should be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles. Second, although Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 does not require the SRB to hear the shareholders or holders of capital instruments in the entity concerned during the resolution procedure, no provision of Regulation No 806/2014 expressly precludes such a hearing. 440 In that regard, it should be noted that the applicants do not raise a plea of illegality against Regulation No 806/2014 in that it does not provide for the shareholders or holders of capital instruments to be given a prior hearing before a resolution scheme is adopted. They submit that they should be recognised as having the right to be heard in the resolution procedure for Banco Popular pursuant to Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, even though the applicable legislation does not provide for such a right. 441 However, if the shareholders and creditors of the entity covered by the resolution action can rely on the right to be heard as part of the resolution procedure, that right may be subject to limitations, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 442 Article 52(1) of the Charter provides as follows: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 443 The Court of Justice has held that fundamental rights, such as observance of the rights of the defence, do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not constitute, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed (see judgments of 10 September 2013, G. and R., C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 20 December 2017, Prequ’Italia, C‑276/16, EU:C:2017:1010, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 444 It follows that the failure to hear the applicants in their capacity as shareholders or holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular, in the context of the resolution procedure, whether that failure was due to the SRB or the Commission, could be justified. 445 It should be recalled that, in Article 4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB took the view that the resolution of Banco Popular was in the public interest in so far as it was necessary for and proportionate to the achievement of two objectives referred to in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 806/2014, namely to avoid significant negative effects on financial stability and to ensure the continuity of Banco Popular’s critical functions. In Decision 2017/1246, the Commission expressly endorsed the reasons put forward by the SRB to justify the need for a resolution action in the public interest. 446 In the present case, the restriction of the applicants’ right to be heard may be justified, first, by the pursuit of the objectives referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014 and, second, by the need to ensure the effectiveness of the resolution of Banco Popular, which had to be carried out speedily. 447 In the first place, it should be noted that several recitals of Regulation No 806/2014, in particular recitals 12, 58 and 61, state that the stability of financial markets is one of the objectives pursued by the resolution mechanisms established by that regulation. 448 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 18(5) of Regulation No 806/2014, a resolution action is to be treated as in the public interest if it is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 of that regulation, and winding up of the entity under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent. The resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014 include, inter alia, the objective of ‘[avoiding] significant adverse effects on financial stability, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline’, and that of ‘[protecting] public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support’. 449 In that regard, the Court of Justice has stated that financial services play a central role in the economy of the European Union. Banks and credit institutions are an essential source of funding for businesses that are active in the various markets. In addition, banks are often interconnected and a number of them operate internationally. That is why the failure of one or more banks is liable to spread rapidly to other banks, either in the Member State concerned or in other Member States. That is likely, in turn, to produce negative spill-over effects in other sectors of the economy (judgments of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 50; of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 72; and of 25 March 2021, Balgarska Narodna Banka, C‑501/18, EU:C:2021:249, paragraph 108). 450 The Court of Justice has held that the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending and minimising distortions of competition constitutes an overriding public interest (judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 69). 451 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) held, in its decision of 1 April 2004, Camberrow MM5 AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2004:0401DEC005035799, § 6), that, in delicate economic areas such as the stability of the banking system, the States enjoyed a wider margin of appreciation and that, therefore, the impossibility for a shareholder to participate in the proceedings leading to the sale of the bank was not disproportionate to the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of creditors and safeguarding the proper administration of the bank’s bankruptcy estate. 452 Reference should also be made to the judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others (C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836), delivered in response to a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Articles 8, 25 and 29 of Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of [the second paragraph of Article 54 TFEU], in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (OJ 1977 L 26, p. 1). That case concerned an exceptional measure by the national authorities aimed at preventing, by means of an increase in capital, the failure of a company which, according to the referring court, threatened the financial stability of the European Union. The Court of Justice held that the protection conferred by Second Directive 77/91 on the shareholders and creditors of a public limited liability company, with respect to its share capital, did not extend to a national measure of that kind that is adopted in a situation where there is a serious disturbance of the economy and financial system of a Member State and that is designed to overcome a systemic threat to the financial stability of the European Union, due to a capital shortfall in the company concerned (judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others, C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836, paragraph 50). The Court of Justice added that the provisions of Second Directive 77/91 did not therefore preclude an exceptional measure affecting the share capital of a public limited liability company taken by the national authorities where there was a serious disturbance of the economy and financial system of a Member State, without the approval of the general meeting of that company, with the objective of preventing a systemic risk and ensuring the financial stability of the European Union (see judgment of 8 November 2016, Dowling and Others, C‑41/15, EU:C:2016:836, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). 453 Those considerations apply, by analogy, to the situation of former shareholders or holders of capital instruments in a bank which has been placed under resolution pursuant to Regulation No 806/2014, such as the applicants. 454 It follows from the foregoing that the resolution procedure established by Regulation No 806/2014 and described in Article 18 of that regulation pursues an objective of general interest, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial markets, capable of justifying a limitation on the right to be heard. 455 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicants do not dispute that the procedure for the resolution of Banco Popular complied with the objective of ensuring financial stability referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014. 456 In that regard, in Article 4.4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB explained that it had concluded that Banco Popular’s situation entailed an increased risk of significant adverse effects on financial stability in Spain, on the basis of various elements. Those elements included, first, the size and relevance of Banco Popular, which was the parent company of the sixth largest banking group in Spain, with total assets of EUR 147 billion, and which was classified by the Bank of Spain in 2017 as a significant institution of a systemic nature. The SRB noted, inter alia, that Banco Popular was one of the main market participants in Spain, with a significant market share in the segment of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and that it had a relatively high market share of deposits (almost 6%) and a large number of retail clients (approximately 1.4 million) throughout Spain. Second, the SRB took into account the nature of Banco Popular’s business, which was structured around commercial banking activities and focused primarily on offering financing, savings management and financial services to individuals, families and companies (particularly SMEs). According to the SRB, the similarity between Banco Popular’s business model and that of other Spanish commercial banks contributed to the potential for indirect contagion to those banks which might have been perceived as facing the same difficulties. 457 Furthermore, it should be noted that the second objective pursued by the resolution scheme, namely to ensure the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular, also contributes to the general interest objective of protecting the stability of the financial markets. 458 Under Article 2(1)(35) of Directive 2014/59, the critical functions of an institution are defined as ‘activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations’. 459 In that regard, Article 6(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/778 of 2 February 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59 with regard to the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions may be partially or entirely deferred, and on the criteria for the determination of the activities, services and operations with regard to critical functions, and for the determination of the business lines and associated services with regard to core business lines (OJ 2016 L 131, p. 41), lays down the criteria for determining critical functions. It is a function provided by an institution to third parties who are not affiliated to the institution or group, the sudden disruption of which would likely have a material negative impact on those third parties, would give rise to contagion or would undermine the general confidence of market participants due to the systemic relevance of the function for third parties and the systemic relevance of the institution or group in providing that function. 460 Thus, the objective of ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of the entity concerned by a resolution action, provided for in Article 14(2)(a) of Regulation No 806/2014, is intended to prevent a break in those functions which could lead to disruption, not only on the market concerned, but also for the overall financial stability of the European Union. 461 Accordingly, since resolution action is intended to preserve or restore the financial situation of a credit institution, in particular in so far as it constitutes an alternative to its liquidation, it must be regarded as effectively meeting an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 March 2021, Balgarska Narodna Banka, C‑501/18, EU:C:2021:249, paragraph 108). 462 In that regard, in Article 4.2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB stated that the resolution of Banco Popular was necessary and proportionate to achieving, inter alia, the objective set out in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 806/2014 of ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular. 463 In Article 4.4 of the resolution scheme, the SRB identified three critical functions of Banco Popular, within the meaning of Article 6 of Delegated Regulation 2016/778, namely deposit taking from households and non-financial corporations, lending to SMEs, and payment and cash services. 464 The applicants have not put forward any argument to dispute those findings. 465 It follows from the foregoing that the resolution procedure for Banco Popular pursued an objective of general interest, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial markets, capable of justifying a limitation on the right to be heard. 466 In the second place, the general interest of the European Union, in particular the pursuit of the objectives of maintaining the stability of the financial markets and ensuring the continuity of the critical functions of Banco Popular, requires that, once the conditions laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 have been fulfilled, a resolution action must be adopted as soon as possible. 467 It should be pointed out that a number of recitals in Regulation No 806/2014 imply that, when a resolution action becomes necessary, it must be adopted quickly. Those are, inter alia, recitals 26, 31 and 53, and especially recital 56 of that regulation which states that, in order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. 468 In that regard, the Court of Justice has held that the objective of Regulation No 806/2014 is to establish, in accordance with recital 8, more efficient resolution mechanisms, which must be an essential instrument to avoid damage that has resulted from failures of banks in the past and that that objective presupposes a speedy decision-making process, as the short time limits laid down in Article 18 of that regulation illustrate, so that financial stability is not jeopardised (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 55). 469 Thus, Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 states, inter alia, that, where the ECB considers that an entity is failing or is likely to fail, it is to communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the SRB. According to paragraph 2 of that article, where the SRB itself carries out an assessment, it is to be communicated to the ECB without delay. If the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are met, the SRB must adopt a resolution scheme which, pursuant to Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, is to be transmitted to the Commission immediately after its adoption. The Commission then has 24 hours in which to endorse a resolution scheme or raise objections. 470 It follows that once the entity satisfies the conditions for the adoption of a resolution action, that is to say, first, that it is failing or is likely to fail, second, that there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable time frame and, third, that its resolution is necessary to achieve one or more of the objectives referred to in Article 14 of Regulation No 806/2014, Article 18 thereof provides that a decision must be adopted within a very short time frame. 471 Thus, in the present case, once the ECB found that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail and once the SRB considered that the conditions laid down in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 had been met, the resolution scheme had to be adopted as quickly as possible. 472 That rapid decision was justified by the need to ensure the continuity of Banco Popular’s critical functions and the need to avoid the significant adverse effects of Banco Popular’s situation on the financial markets, by preventing, inter alia, the risks of contagion. In the present case, as Banco Popular’s failure occurred on a weekday, it was necessary to complete the procedure and to adopt the decision before the opening of the markets on the morning of 7 June 2017. 473 As Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona emphasised in point 80 of his Opinion in Joined Cases ABLV Bank and Others v ECB (C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:16), the speed with which those institutions and agencies of the European Union must take their decisions is in order to ensure that the resolution of the banking institution does not have an adverse impact on the financial markets and that need for speed also requires them, de facto, to have the decision ‘prepared’ before they launch the procedure, in order to take advantage of the financial markets being closed. 474 Speed in taking a decision was therefore a condition of its effectiveness. 475 Thus, the Court of Justice has already ruled that the urgency requiring immediate action by the competent authority justified a limitation of the right to be heard of the persons concerned by measures adopted in the field of environmental liability (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 67) and in the field of agriculture (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2006, Dokter and Others, C‑28/05, EU:C:2006:408, paragraph 76). 476 Moreover, in the field of fund-freezing measures, the Court of Justice has held that the communication of the grounds on which the initial inclusion of the name of a person or entity in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures is based, prior to that inclusion, would be liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of the freezing of funds and economic resources imposed by EU law. In order to attain the objective pursued by the applicable regulation, such measures must, by their very nature, take advantage of a surprise effect and apply with immediate effect (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 338 to 340; of 21 December 2011, France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, C‑27/09 P, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 61; and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 51). 477 Nor are the EU authorities bound to hear the applicants before their names are included for the first time in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, for reasons also connected to the objective pursued by EU law and to the effectiveness of the measures provided by that law (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 341, and of 25 April 2013, Gbagbo v Council, T‑119/11, not published, EU:T:2013:216, paragraph 103). 478 That is all the more true in cases such as the present one where the restriction on the right to be heard concerns not the entity covered by the resolution procedure, namely Banco Popular, but the applicants in their capacity as shareholders or holders of capital instruments in that institution. 479 It must also be observed that, in its decision of 1 April 2004, Camberrow MM5 AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2004:0401DEC005035799), the ECtHR found that the sale of the bankrupt bank as a going concern had been effected in order to achieve the prompt and more certain satisfaction of its creditors, who had been waiting for years to receive their dues, and the quick completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the need for simplicity and speed in the procedure leading to the sale of the bank was of paramount importance. If the law had provided that the bankruptcy court was under an obligation to consult with all shareholders and creditors of the bank, that would have led to a substantial slowing down of the proceedings and, consequently, to a further delay in the payment of the creditors’ dues and in the completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. 480 In the judgment of 24 November 2005, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2005:1124JUD004942999, § 136), the ECtHR held that, in such a sensitive economic area as the stability of the banking system and in certain situations, there may be a paramount need to act expeditiously and without advance notice in order to avoid irreparable harm to the bank, its depositors and other creditors, or the banking and financial system as a whole. 481 Furthermore, the fact that the resolution scheme may lead to an interference with the applicants’ right to property cannot justify an obligation to grant them a right to be heard before it is adopted. 482 In that regard, the General Court has already highlighted in paragraph 282 of the judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others (T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486), that the applicable provisions must offer the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the competent authorities. In order to ensure compliance with that requirement, which constitutes a requirement inherent in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 368 and the case-law cited; of 25 April 2013, Gbagbo v Council, T‑119/11, not published, EU:T:2013:216, paragraph 119; and ECtHR, 20 July 2004, Bäck v. Finland, CE:ECHR:2004:0720JUD003759897, § 56). Therefore, that requirement cannot be interpreted as meaning that the interested person must, in all circumstances, be able to make his or her views known to the competent authorities prior to the adoption of measures infringing his or her right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 19 September 2006, Maupas and Others v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:0919JUD001384402, §§ 20 and 21). 483 The General Court considered that that was the case in particular where, as in the present case, the measures at issue did not constitute a penalty and were implemented in a context of particular urgency. On that last point, the General Court noted that it concerned prevention of an imminent risk of collapse of the banks concerned in order to protect the stability of the financial system of a Member State and, therefore, to prevent contagion to other Member States of the euro area. The establishment of a prior consultation procedure, in the context of which the thousands of depositors and shareholders of the banks concerned could have usefully made their views known prior to the adoption of the harmful provisions, would inevitably have delayed the application of measures seeking to prevent such a collapse. The achievement of the objective consisting in protecting the stability of the financial system of that Member State and, therefore, preventing contagion to other Member States of the euro area would have been exposed to serious risks (see judgment of 13 July 2018, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others, T‑680/13, EU:T:2018:486, paragraph 282 and the case-law cited). 484 That assessment was confirmed by the Court of Justice which held that the General Court had correctly based its reasoning on the judgment of the ECtHR of 21 July 2016, Mamatas and Others v. Greece (CE:ECHR:2016:0721JUD006306614), from which it is clear that the requirement that any restriction on the right to property must be provided for by law cannot be interpreted as meaning that the persons concerned should have been consulted before the adoption of that law, in particular where such prior consultation would inevitably have delayed the application of the measures designed to prevent the collapse of the banks concerned (judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraph 159). 485 Furthermore, it must be concluded that the need to act swiftly without informing the shareholders and creditors of an entity that a resolution procedure concerning that entity is imminent, is intended to avoid the worsening of that entity’s situation which would undermine the effectiveness of the resolution action. Informing the shareholders or bondholders of the bank that it might be under resolution, and therefore that it was considered to be failing or likely to fail, could encourage them to sell their securities on the markets and also lead to a massive withdrawal of deposits, which would have the effect of exacerbating the bank’s financial situation and making it more difficult, or even impossible, to adopt a solution likely to prevent its liquidation. 486 In that regard, as is apparent from recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, any information provided in respect of a decision before it is taken, be it on whether the conditions for resolution are satisfied, on the use of a specific tool or on any action in the course of the proceedings, must be presumed to have effects on the public and private interests concerned by the action. 487 It must therefore be held that hearing the applicants, in their capacity as shareholders and bondholders of Banco Popular, before the adoption of the resolution scheme or before the adoption of Decision 2017/1246 would have entailed a substantial slowdown in the procedure and, therefore, would have compromised both the attainment of the objectives of the action and its effectiveness. 488 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a prior hearing of the applicants, informing them of the existence of a potential resolution action, would have led to a risk of them adopting conduct on the market that exacerbated the financial situation of Banco Popular. Such a hearing could thus have undermined the effectiveness of the planned resolution. 489 Second, in view of the urgent need to adopt the resolution scheme, it was not possible to consult the applicants beforehand in the same way as the other shareholders or holders of capital instruments in Banco Popular, not only because of the difficulties associated with identifying them, but also because it was impossible to analyse effectively their observations before the adoption of the resolution scheme. 490 The applicants submit that if they had been heard before the adoption of the resolution scheme, either Banco Popular would not have been placed under resolution, as they would have explained that the conditions were not satisfied, or the resolution would have taken place on different terms, as they would have been able to invoke the need to wait for emergency liquidity assistance, to propose the application of an alternative measure or to suggest the application of another resolution tool. 491 In that regard, suffice it to note that it is clear from the analysis of the first plea, first, that the applicants have not demonstrated that the conditions laid down in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 were not satisfied. Second, it has been found that, since the Bank of Spain refused to grant additional emergency liquidity assistance, the SRB had no reason to wait for such assistance to be granted and that the alternatives relied on by the applicants were not feasible in the short term. The applicants have therefore not shown that hearing them in the context of the resolution procedure would have altered the content of the resolution scheme. 492 It follows from all the foregoing that hearing the applicants before the adoption of the resolution scheme would have undermined the objectives of protecting the stability of the financial markets and the continuity of the entity’s critical functions, and the requirements of speed and effectiveness of the resolution procedure. 493 Therefore, the failure to hear the applicants in the context of the resolution procedure for Banco Popular constitutes a limitation on the right to be heard which was justified and necessary in order to meet an objective of general interest and respected the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 494 Accordingly, the first part of this plea in law must be dismissed. (b) The second part, alleging infringement of the right of access to the file 495 The applicants claim that, as persons subject to the SRB’s decision, they have a right of access to the file pursuant to Article 90(4) of Regulation No 806/2014 and Article 41(2) of the Charter. 496 In the first place, they submit that, before adopting an act adversely affecting a person, the institution cannot take account of information or documents without first giving the addressee of the act the opportunity to express his or her point of view, which requires access to the administrative file. The applicants maintain that the resolution scheme should be annulled in so far as it was based on a provisional valuation which was not made available to the applicants. 497 The right of access to the file is provided for in Article 90(4) of Regulation No 806/2014, according to which: ‘Persons who are the subject of the [SRB]’s decisions shall be entitled to have access to the [SRB]’s file, subject to the legitimate interest of other persons in the protection of their business secrets. The right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information or internal preparatory documents of the [SRB].’ 498 In that regard, first, it must be observed that access to the file in competition cases is intended in particular to enable the addressees of the statement of objections to acquaint themselves with the evidence in the Commission’s file, so that they can express their views effectively on the conclusions reached by the Commission in its statement of objections, on the basis of that evidence. That right of access to the file means that the Commission must provide the undertaking concerned with the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation file that might be relevant for that undertaking’s defence. Those documents comprise both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, with the exception of business secrets of other undertakings, internal documents of the Commission and other confidential information (see judgment of 14 May 2020, NKT Verwaltung and NKT v Commission, C‑607/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:385, paragraphs 261 and 262 and the case-law cited). 499 Second, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, observance of the rights of the defence in a proceeding before the Commission, the aim of which is to impose a fine on an undertaking for infringement of competition rules, requires that the undertaking concerned must have been afforded the opportunity to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged as well as on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement. Those rights are referred to in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter (see judgment of 28 November 2019, Brugg Kabel and KabelwerkeBrugg v Commission, C‑591/18 P, not published, EU:C:2019:1026, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 500 Third, as regards, more generally, observance of the rights of the defence as enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Charter, that includes the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining confidentiality (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited; judgment of 2 December 2020, Kalai v Council, T‑178/19, not published, EU:T:2020:580, paragraph 73). 501 Fourth, it must be observed that infringement of the right of access to the Commission’s file during the procedure prior to adoption of a decision can, in principle, cause the decision to be annulled if the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned have been infringed (see judgments of 25 October 2011, Solvay v Commission, C‑109/10 P, EU:C:2011:686, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and of 15 July 2015, Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, T‑47/10, EU:T:2015:506, paragraph 349 (not published) and the case-law cited). 502 It follows from the case-law cited in paragraphs 498 to 501 that both the right of access to the file enshrined in Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter and, more specifically, access to the file in competition cases, concern persons or undertakings subject to proceedings opened or decisions taken against them. 503 In the present case, it follows from Article 90(4) of Regulation No 806/2014 that the right of access to the file concerns the entity that is the subject of the resolution scheme, namely Banco Popular, and not its shareholders or creditors. 504 Accordingly, the applicants cannot claim a right of access to the file. 505 Furthermore, both Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter and Article 90(4) of Regulation No 806/2014 provide that certain information may be protected if it is confidential. 506 It follows that the applicants cannot claim that the fact that the SRB did not disclose valuation 2 during the administrative procedure which led to the adoption of the resolution scheme constitutes an infringement of the right of access to the file. 507 In the second place, the applicants submit, in the reply, that there is no duty of confidentiality vis-à-vis shareholders and creditors following a resolution, since a resolution action affects their assets and they must be able to ascertain the grounds of the resolution. Furthermore, Article 88 of Regulation No 806/2014 provides for an exception to professional secrecy where disclosure is necessary for the purpose of legal proceedings. The applicants state that, according to recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, the disclosure of information before the adoption of the resolution scheme could affect the resolution procedure, whereas, after the adoption of the resolution decision, the objective of the resolution would no longer be compromised by that disclosure. 508 It must be held that those arguments are not concerned with the right of access to the file during the administrative procedure, within the meaning of Article 90(4) of Regulation No 806/2014, but with the right of access to the documents on which the SRB relied in order to adopt the resolution scheme, after the scheme’s adoption. 509 Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the SRB is under an obligation to protect the confidential data of all entities, including business secrets, under Article 339 TFEU, Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter and Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014. 510 In that regard, according to Article 34(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, for the purpose of performing its tasks under that regulation, the SRB may, through the national resolution authorities or directly, after informing them, making full use of all of the information available to the ECB or to the national competent authorities, require, inter alia, the entities covered by a resolution action to provide all of the information necessary to perform the tasks conferred on it by that regulation. Paragraph 2 of that article states that the requirements of professional secrecy do not exempt those entities from the duty to supply that information. Article 34(4) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that the SRB is to be able to obtain, including on a continuous basis, any information necessary for the exercise of its functions under that regulation, in particular on capital, liquidity, assets and liabilities concerning any institution subject to its resolution powers. 511 Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides: ‘Before any information is disclosed, the [SRB] shall ensure that it does not contain confidential information, in particular, by assessing the effects that the disclosure could have on the public interest as regards financial, monetary or economic policy, on the commercial interests of natural and legal persons, on the purpose of inspections, on investigations and on audits. The procedure for checking the effects of disclosing information shall include a specific assessment of the effects of any disclosure of the contents and details of resolution plans as referred to in Articles 8 and 9, the result of any assessment carried out under Article 10 or the resolution scheme referred to in Article 18.’ 512 That provision expressly lays down an obligation on the SRB to ensure, prior to the publication or communication of the resolution scheme to a third party, that that scheme does not contain confidential information, which it may have obtained in particular under Article 34 of Regulation No 806/2014. That obligation also applies to valuation 2, which is an annex to the resolution scheme and forms an integral part of it, pursuant to Article 12.2 of that scheme. 513 The applicants submit that, according to recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, professional secrecy applies only during the resolution procedure, before the resolution decision is made public. 514 Recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014 provides: ‘Resolution actions should be properly notified and, subject to the limited exceptions laid down in this Regulation, made public. However, as information obtained by the [SRB], the national resolution authorities and their professional advisers during the resolution process is likely to be sensitive, before the resolution decision is made public, that information should be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy. The fact that information on the contents and details of resolution plans and the result of any assessment of those plans may have far-reaching effects, in particular on the undertakings concerned, must be taken into account. Any information provided in respect of a decision before it is taken, be it on whether the conditions for resolution are satisfied, on the use of a specific tool or of any action during the proceedings, must be presumed to have effects on the public and private interests concerned by the action. However, information that the [SRB] and the national resolution authorities are examining a specific entity could be enough to have negative effects on that entity. It is therefore necessary to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for maintaining the confidentiality of such information, such as the content and details of resolution plans and the result of any assessment carried out in that context.’ 515 First, it is apparent from that recital that some of the information held by the SRB, contained in the resolution scheme, in valuation 2 and in the documents on which it relied, is covered by professional secrecy and is confidential. 516 In that regard, the Court of Justice has held, with regard to Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145, p. 1), that the effective monitoring of the activities of investment firms, through supervision within a Member State and the exchanging of information by the competent authorities of several Member States, requires that both the supervised entities and the competent authorities can have confidence that the confidential information provided will, in principle, remain confidential (see judgment of 19 June 2018, Baumeister, C‑15/16, EU:C:2018:464, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 517 The Court of Justice has considered that the absence of such confidence is liable to compromise the smooth transmission of the confidential information that is necessary for monitoring. Therefore, in order to protect not only the specific interests of the firms directly concerned, but also the public interest in the normal functioning of the markets in financial instruments of the European Union, Article 54(1) of Directive 2004/39 imposes, as a general rule, the obligation to maintain professional secrecy (see judgment of 19 June 2018, Baumeister, C‑15/16, EU:C:2018:464, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited). 518 It must be observed that Article 88(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, on the requirements of professional secrecy of members of the SRB, contains a provision equivalent to that of Article 54(1) of Directive 2004/39. 519 Second, it is true that recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014 mentions the SRB’s obligations of professional secrecy before a resolution decision is adopted. It states that, in so far as certain information held by the SRB is sensitive and is covered by business secrecy, it must not be disclosed to the public prior to the adoption of a resolution action. Indeed, the disclosure of information concerning the fact that an entity is failing or likely to fail and may be the subject of a resolution action could, among other things, encourage shareholders to sell their securities on the markets and also lead to a massive withdrawal of deposits, which would have the effect of exacerbating the bank’s financial situation and, therefore, undermining the effectiveness of action by the SRB and the functioning of the market. 520 However, that recital also expressly states that resolution actions ‘should be properly notified and, subject to the limited exceptions laid down in this Regulation, made public’. It must be recalled that Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014, cited in paragraph 511 above, expressly requires the SRB to ensure, before the resolution scheme is disclosed, that it does not contain confidential information. 521 Accordingly, recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014 cannot be interpreted, in the manner proposed by the applicants, as meaning that the rules on confidentiality and professional secrecy apply only until the resolution decision has been adopted. 522 The applicants also refer to the second subparagraph of Article 88(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, according to which ‘information subject to the requirements of professional secrecy shall not be disclosed to another public or private entity except where such disclosure is due for the purpose of legal proceedings’. 523 That provision does not mean that the SRB is under an obligation to disclose the resolution decision in full as soon as legal proceedings are initiated. That provision refers to the possibility for a court to order the production of documents, including documents containing confidential information. 524 In that regard, the Court has the power to order the SRB to produce any document which the Court considers relevant for the purpose of ruling on the dispute, by way of a measure of inquiry, pursuant to Article 91(b) and Article 92(3) of the Rules of Procedure. However, in accordance with Article 103(1) thereof, the Court may consider that certain information contained in those documents is confidential and thus decide that it is not to be communicated to the other parties, in particular the applicants. 525 It follows that a decision by the Court to order the production of documents does not guarantee the applicants access to all of those documents if the Court considers that they contain confidential information. 526 In addition, in the present proceedings, the Court, on 12 May 2021, by way of a measure of inquiry, ordered the SRB to produce certain documents, including the confidential versions of the resolution scheme, valuation 2 and the ECB’s assessment that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail. In accordance with Article 103 of the Rules of Procedure, after examining their content, the Court considered that the information remaining redacted in the versions of those documents published on the websites of the SRB and ECB was not relevant to the outcome of the present dispute. Accordingly, by order of 9 June 2021, the Court removed the confidential versions of those documents from the file. 527 It follows from the foregoing that the applicants cannot claim that, after the adoption of the resolution scheme, there is no duty of confidentiality with respect to them, or that they have a right to receive the entire file on which the SRB relied. 528 Accordingly, the second part of this plea must be dismissed, as must, therefore, the third plea in its entirety. 4. The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons 529 The applicants argue that the contested decisions do not contain an adequate statement of reasons. 530 According to settled case‑law of the Court of Justice, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue, and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure, and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgments of 8 May 2019, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v ECB, C‑450/17 P, EU:C:2019:372, paragraphs 85 and 87 and the case-law cited, and of 21 October 2020, ECB v Estate of Espírito Santo Financial Group, C‑396/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:845, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 531 Furthermore, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a measure must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for making the decision (see judgments of 6 November 2012, Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission, C‑551/10 P, EU:C:2012:681, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and of 23 May 2019, KPN v Commission, T‑370/17, EU:T:2019:354, paragraph 139 and the case-law cited; judgment of 27 January 2021, KPN v Commission, T‑691/18, not published, EU:T:2021:43, paragraph 162). 532 In the first place, the applicants claim that there are several shortcomings in the statement of reasons for the resolution scheme. 533 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in the present case, on 7 June 2017, the SRB published on its website a notice regarding the adoption of the resolution scheme, together with a document summarising the effects of the resolution in accordance with Article 29(5) of Regulation No 806/2014. On 11 July 2017, the SRB published a non-confidential version of the resolution scheme. The SRB also published on its website, on 2 February 2018 and then on 31 October 2018, in other words before the reply was lodged, less redacted non-confidential versions of the resolution scheme and valuation 2. 534 First, a number of the applicants’ arguments concern the sale process for Banco Popular. The applicants submit that the resolution scheme does not explain why only two potential buyers were invited to sign non-disclosure agreements and why only one of them submitted a bid. They claim that that is important for determining whether Banco Popular was sold in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 806/2014. 535 It must be recalled that the sale process for Banco Popular was handled by the FROB. In the process letter issued on 6 June 2017, in the context of the possible resolution of Banco Popular, the FROB invited potential buyers to participate in the sale process and to submit a bid for the acquisition of 100% of Banco Popular’s capital, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in that letter. 536 In Article 6.6 of the resolution scheme, the SRB took the view that the FROB’s marketing efforts Banco Popular prior to the adoption of that scheme had satisfied the requirements set out in Article 24 of Regulation No 806/2014, read together with Article 39 of Directive 2014/59. The SRB noted that, during the period immediately preceding the resolution, Banco Popular had conducted a private sale process and that, in the week beginning 29 May 2017, it had become clear that that process would be unsuccessful. It stated that the decision to limit the marketing efforts to banks which had already expressed a general interest in the acquisition of Banco Popular in the context of the private sale process complied with the requirements of Article 39 of Directive 2014/59. The SRB stated that, following the implementation of the sale process by the FROB, ultimately, two banks were invited to participate in that process. It mentioned that all potential buyers had been approached on the same date, that they had had access to the same virtual data room and that their bids had been subject to the same conditions and deadline. The SRB also noted that, of the two potential buyers, one valid bid had been received and that, given that the buyer was the only bidder, it was prudent to accept its terms and thus avoid the uncontrolled insolvency of Banco Popular which, among other things, could have undermined its critical functions. 537 Those different factors, set out in the version of the resolution scheme annexed to the reply, are sufficient to ascertain how the marketing process for Banco Popular was conducted. Since it had been handled by the FROB, the SRB could simply note that only one bid had been submitted and take into account the outcome of that process. In addition, the reasons why the other potential buyers did not submit bids are irrelevant. 538 The applicants further submit that no explanation was provided as to why the sale price of Banco Popular was set at EUR 1 or whether that price reflected the market value of Banco Popular. They state that they do not know why BBVA was not given additional time to submit a bid. 539 To the extent that those arguments concern the marketing process conducted by the FROB, the applicants do not explain why that information should appear in the resolution scheme or why it is crucial to understanding that scheme. 540 Furthermore, those arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the facts. It must be recalled that the sale price of EUR 1 was not set by the SRB. In the process letter, the FROB stated that the price offered in the bids had to be equal to or greater than EUR 1. The sale price of EUR 1, referred to in the resolution scheme, stems from the competitive sale process conducted by the FROB and the price offered by Banco Santander. Accordingly, that price reflects, by definition, the market value of Banco Popular. Furthermore, since BBVA informed the FROB on 6 June 2017 that it had decided not to submit a bid, there was no need to give a specific reason in the resolution scheme explaining why the FROB had not granted it extra time. 541 Second, a number of the applicants’ arguments concern the statement of reasons regarding compliance with the conditions for resolution. The applicants claim that no reasons were given for the finding, in Article 2.1 of the resolution scheme, that Banco Popular would not, in the near future, be able to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fell due. In particular, there is no indication whether the origin of that finding lies in the statements made by the Spanish authorities and in the outflows or withdrawals of their deposits, or in the lack of emergency liquidity assistance. According to the applicants, the SRB concluded, in Article 3.1 of the resolution scheme, that there were no alternative measures capable of preventing the failure of Banco Popular within a reasonable time frame, without having examined the alternatives mentioned in the second part of the first plea. The reasons why the sale of business tool was selected from among those other measures were not explained. 542 It must be observed that, in Article 2 of the resolution scheme, the SRB stated that the ECB had found that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail, in accordance with the provisions of Article 18(1)(a) and (4)(c) of Regulation No 806/2014. It pointed out that there were a number of factors indicating that Banco Popular would not be able, in the near future, to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fell due. 543 In recital 23 of the resolution scheme, the SRB stated that, as the ECB had explained in its assessment, Banco Popular’s liquidity situation had deteriorated significantly and, in recital 24, it listed the circumstances that had led to that situation. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the reasons for the ECB’s finding that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail are clearly set out in its assessment, which forms part of the context in which the resolution scheme was adopted. A non-confidential version of the ECB’s assessment was published on its website on 14 August 2017. 544 Accordingly, the applicants cannot claim that the SRB did not provide an adequate statement of the reasons why Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail. 545 Furthermore, it follows from the analysis of the second part of the first plea (see paragraphs 188 to 192 above) that the SRB gave sufficient reasons, in Article 3 of the resolution scheme, for the lack of alternative private sector measures or supervisory action capable of preventing the failure of Banco Popular. In addition, in Article 5 of the resolution scheme, particularly in Article 5.3 thereof, the SRB stated its reasons for choosing the sale of business tool as the resolution tool and explained why the other tools listed in Article 22(2) of Regulation No 806/2014 would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent. 546 The applicants do not claim that those provisions of the resolution scheme are insufficient to enable their scope to be understood; they merely complain that the SRB failed to examine the alternative measures on which they rely in the first plea. 547 In that regard, suffice it to note that the SRB was not required to examine the measures relied on by the applicants which were not viable, as is apparent from paragraphs 193 to 230 above. 548 Third, in the reply, the applicants raise arguments concerning the statement of reasons for valuation 2. They claim not know why valuation 2 was used when that valuation stated that it was purely illustrative and should not be used in order to adopt a decision, why the valuation reports did not carry out the analysis required by Article 20(5)(a) to (c) and (f) of Regulation No 806/2014, why valuations 1 and 2 are inconsistent on the issue of Banco Popular’s solvency, or why the ECB’s valuation of Banco Popular’s non-performing assets was not used even though the SRB had stated that it was the best estimate. 549 It must be held that those arguments merely repeat the arguments raised by the applicants in the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 20 of Regulation No 806/2014. The applicants do not explain why the resolution scheme should include explanations on matters raised solely in their own pleas. Nor do they specify the extent to which those explanations are necessary in order to understand that scheme. 550 Fourth, the applicants criticise the SRB for failing to explain, in the resolution scheme, whether Deloitte satisfied the conditions of independence laid down in Articles 37 to 41 of Delegated Regulation 2016/1075. 551 In that regard, the SRB stated, in recital 41 of the resolution scheme, that it had hired an independent valuer to carry out valuation 2. Suffice it to note that the purpose of the resolution scheme is not to explain the reasons why that valuer satisfied the requirements of Delegated Regulation 2016/1075 and the applicants do not specify the extent to which those explanations are necessary in order to understand the resolution action adopted by the SRB. 552 Fifth, the applicants submit that the SRB did not identify the resolution strategy or the resolution tool contained the 2016 resolution plan and that it did not state the reasons why that plan was not followed. 553 Suffice it to note that, in recitals 44 to 46 of the resolution scheme, which appear in their entirety in the version of the resolution scheme published on the SRB’s website on 2 February 2018 and annexed to the reply, the SRB explained why the resolution tool contemplated in the 2016 resolution plan was not appropriate in view of the circumstances prevailing on the date of the resolution. Thus, it noted that the 2016 resolution plan was based on the assumption that Banco Popular’s failure would be related to a deterioration in its capital position. Since Banco Popular’s failure was the result of the deterioration in its liquidity position, the SRB stated that it could not be guaranteed that the bail-in tool envisaged in that plan would immediately and effectively remedy Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis. 554 Those explanations are sufficient to demonstrate why the 2016 resolution plan was not applied in the resolution scheme. 555 Sixth, the applicants claim that they do not know why the SRB, before placing Banco Popular under resolution, did not wait for the full amount of emergency liquidity assistance already approved by the ECB to be granted. 556 Suffice it recall that it follows from the analysis of the first complaint in the first part of the first plea that the SRB found in the resolution scheme that the Bank of Spain, after providing initial emergency liquidity assistance to Banco Popular on 5 June 2017, was not in a position to provide it with additional emergency liquidity assistance. Since the grant of emergency liquidity assistance falls within the remit of the national central banks, the SRB could only take note of the unavailability of additional emergency liquidity assistance. 557 Thus, since there was no reason for the SRB to wait for the grant of that emergency liquidity assistance, it did not have to provide any justification in that regard in the resolution scheme. 558 As for the argument that numerous passages in the resolution scheme and in the valuations were redacted, preventing the applicants from understanding them, it is sufficient to note that this is merely a general consideration which, in the absence of details on the parts of the resolution scheme or of valuation 2 that the applicants are unable to understand, does not prove that there was a breach of the obligation to state reasons. 559 It follows from the foregoing that none of the applicants’ arguments is capable of establishing that the SRB breached its obligation to state reasons. 560 In the second place, the applicants submit that they received only a partial ‘non-confidential’ copy of the resolution scheme and that they did not have access to the annexes thereto or to the administrative file. They argue that they were therefore not aware of the reasons for the contested decisions. They add, in the reply, that the obligation to state reasons protects any person concerned by the measure, not just its addressee, and that they are therefore entitled to receive a full statement of reasons for the contested decisions. Moreover, in the reply, the applicants state that they are not seeking general publication of the documents, since that appears to be precluded by Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014, but rather the communication of a reasoned decision and authorisation to have confidential access to the file during the present proceedings. 561 It must be stated that, by that argument, the applicants essentially take issue with the SRB for failing to provide them with the full text of the resolution scheme and valuation 2. 562 In that regard, it follows from the examination of the second part of the third plea that, after the adoption of the resolution scheme, the applicants are not entitled to receive the entire file on which the SRB relied, since the SRB is under an obligation to protect the confidential information contained in that file. That reasoning also applies to the resolution scheme and valuation 2, which contain confidential data. 563 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the applicants are not the addressees of the resolution scheme, which is addressed to the FROB. The applicants must be regarded as third parties and therefore do not have the right to be notified of the full text of the resolution scheme. 564 It must be observed that the Court of Justice has already held that a Commission decision finding that there is no State aid alleged by a complainant may, in the light of the obligation to respect business secrecy, be sufficiently reasoned without including all the figures on which that institution’s reasoning is based (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 July 2008, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, C‑341/06 P and C‑342/06 P, EU:C:2008:375, paragraphs 108 to 111). Accordingly, where a non-confidential version of such a decision discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by that institution and the methodology used by it, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain those reasons and the General Court to exercise its power of review in respect of them, that is sufficient to satisfy that institution’s obligation to state reasons (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Club Hotel Loutraki and Others v Commission, C‑131/15 P, EU:C:2016:989, paragraph 55). 565 Moreover, as regards the economic elements used by Deloitte in valuation 2 and taken into account by the SRB in the resolution scheme, they undeniably concern complex technical appraisals. Since the resolution scheme clearly disclosed the SRB’s reasoning, enabling the substance of that scheme to be challenged subsequently before the competent court, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices or each of the figures on which that reasoning is based (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 July 2008, Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, C‑341/06 P and C‑342/06 P, EU:C:2008:375, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited). 566 The applicants accept that Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014 is an impediment to publication of the full text of the resolution scheme. By providing that the SRB must ensure that information does not contain confidential material before disclosing it, that provision, cited in paragraph 511 above, covers not only the publication of that information but also its disclosure to third parties. 567 Furthermore, the applicants have not explained to what extent the data which remained redacted in the non-confidential versions of the resolution scheme and valuation 2 were necessary in order to understand the resolution scheme. 568 The applicants have therefore not established that the SRB breached its obligation to state reasons by redacting the economic data in the non-confidential versions of the resolution scheme and valuation 2. 569 It must therefore be held that the applicants cannot claim that they are entitled to be provided with the full text of the resolution scheme and valuation 2. 570 In the third place, the applicants claim that, in accordance with the judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7), only the Commission can review the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme. They argue that Decision 2017/1246 is a merely tacit decision and contains no reasoning. 571 It should be noted that recital 4 of Decision 2017/1246 states: ‘The Commission agrees with the resolution scheme. In particular, it agrees with the reasons provided by the SRB of why resolution is necessary in the public interest in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.’ 572 In addition, first, in recital 2 of Decision 2017/1246, the Commission referred to the fact that the SRB, in the resolution scheme, had stated that all conditions for resolution set out in the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 had been met with respect to Banco Popular and that the SRB had assessed why resolution action was necessary in the public interest. Second, in recital 3 of Decision 2017/1246 endorsing the resolution scheme, the Commission stated that the resolution scheme, in accordance with Article 18(6) of Regulation No 806/2014, placed Banco Popular under resolution and determined the application of the sale of business tool and that the resolution scheme also provided reasons why all those elements were adequate. 573 It follows that the Commission, in Decision 2017/1246, expressly referred to the grounds on which the SRB had considered that the conditions for the adoption of the resolution scheme had been met and that the sale of business tool should be applied. Thus, the endorsement of the resolution scheme in recital 4 of Decision 2017/1246 must be read in the light of the other recitals of that decision and concerns all of those grounds. In that recital, the Commission expressly stated that it agreed with the reasons set out in the resolution scheme justifying the adoption of a resolution action in respect of Banco Popular, in particular as regards the public interest criterion. 574 Thus, it must be held that the resolution scheme and the statement of reasons for it form part of the context in which Decision 2017/1246 was adopted, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 530 above. 575 In addition, it should be noted that, under Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, the Commission must either endorse the resolution scheme or object to it with regard to its discretionary aspects. 576 It follows that, where, as in the present case, the Commission endorses the resolution scheme, the statement of reasons for its decision may be limited to indicating that it agrees with the reasons contained in the scheme. Any other additional justification for its endorsement may consist only of a repetition of the elements already contained in the resolution scheme. According to Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, the Commission must not repeat the SRB’s analysis in its decision, but only endorse it. 577 Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 531 above, account must be taken of the very short period of time that was available to the Commission, under Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, to adopt its decision once the SRB had transmitted the resolution scheme. 578 It follows that a statement of reasons by which the Commission indicates that it agrees with the content of the resolution scheme and with the reasons put forward by the SRB in the resolution scheme to justify its adoption must be considered sufficient to justify an endorsement. 579 In the reply, the applicants submit that none of the documents which the Commission claims are part of its administrative file supports the Commission’s participation in the procedure, beyond the adoption of its decision. The applicants state that that argument seeks to establish that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 291 TFEU and the judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7). 580 By that argument, the applicants do not claim that the Commission breached its obligation to state reasons, but plead breach of the principles governing the delegation of powers laid down in the judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v High Authority (9/56, EU:C:1958:7). The applicants state, in the reply, that that argument refers to paragraph 153 of the application. However, in that paragraph of the application, the applicants mentioned only that the Commission had not given reasons for its review of the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme and had merely endorsed it. 581 It must therefore be held that that argument was raised for the first time in the reply and must be construed as constituting a new plea in law. 582 Under Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. 583 The applicants do not claim that that new argument is based on factual circumstances which were unknown to them at the time when the action was brought, with the result that the argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 584 It follows from all the foregoing that the fourth plea in law must be dismissed. 585 As all the pleas have been dismissed, the application for annulment of the contested decisions must be dismissed. 586 Therefore, it is also necessary to dismiss the applicants’ request in the first head of claim that the Court should, as a result of the annulment of the contested decisions, ‘order the SRB and the Commission to return their investments in Banco Popular’, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of that request. As regards the alternative request in the first head of claim that the Court should order the SRB and the Commission ‘to pay [the applicants] damages on grounds of non-contractual liability’, it must be considered to be indissociable from the first claim for damages examined below. B. The claims for damages 587 By their second head of claim, the applicants ask the Court to order the SRB and the Commission to pay them damages on grounds of non-contractual liability. The applicants raise two separate claims for damages. The first is based on the annulment of the contested decisions and the second is independent of that annulment. 1. The first claim for damages 588 Concerning the first claim for damages, in the event that the Court annuls the contested decisions, the applicants seek damages on grounds of non-contractual liability and confirmation of the effects of those decisions under Article 264 TFEU. 589 They submit that, under Article 264 TFEU, the Court may state that certain effects of the contested decision, which it has declared void, are to be regarded as definitive, in which case they ask the Court, in the alternative to their application for annulment, to order the SRB and the Commission to pay them damages on account of the non-contractual liability incurred by the SRB and the Commission. As regards compensation for the damage sustained in the event of annulment of the contested decisions, the applicants state that the second paragraph of Article 266 TFEU provides that the obligation to take all necessary measures to restore the applicants to their previous position is not to affect any obligation which may result from the application of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU. 590 According to settled case-law, a claim for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected where it is closely related to a claim for annulment which has itself been rejected as inadmissible or unfounded (see judgment of 29 April 2020, Tilly-Sabco v Council and Commission, T‑707/18, not published, EU:T:2020:160, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited). 591 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the applicants’ first claim for damages is contingent on a finding that the contested decisions are unlawful. Since the application for annulment of the contested decisions has been dismissed, the applicants’ first claim for damages must be dismissed. 2. The second claim for damages 592 The applicants claim damages in respect of the non-contractual liability of the SRB and the Commission under Article 87 of Regulation No 806/2014, which provides for the liability of the SRB in the performance of its resolution functions, and under Articles 266, 268 and 340 TFEU, which apply both to the SRB and the Commission. 593 The applicants claim that, irrespective of whether or not the contested decisions are annulled, the SRB and the Commission should be ordered to pay them damages on grounds of non-contractual liability owing to the SRB and the Commission’s unlawful conduct as described in the pleas for annulment, namely the statements and disclosures by the SRB which led to the resolution of Banco Popular, the indifference of the European institutions to Banco Popular’s collapse, the lack of sound administration and early intervention, and the unlawfulness of the resolution procedure. They submit that if none of those unlawful actions on the part of the SRB had taken place, Banco Popular would not have been placed under resolution or, at least, not under the same terms. 594 It must be recalled that, as provided for in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, in the case of non-contractual liability, the European Union is, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, to make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. 595 It is settled case-law that the European Union may incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the EU institution, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage complained of (see judgments of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited; of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited; and of 25 February 2021, Dalli v Commission, C‑615/19 P, EU:C:2021:133, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 596 If any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the action must be dismissed in its entirety and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. Furthermore, the EU judicature is not required to examine those conditions in any particular order (see judgments of 5 September 2019, European Union v Guardian Europe and Guardian Europe v European Union, C‑447/17 P and C‑479/17 P, EU:C:2019:672, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited, and of 10 March 2021, AM v EIB, T‑134/19, EU:T:2021:119, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). 597 According to settled case-law, as regards the first condition relating to the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct of the institutions, a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals must be established (see judgments of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited, and of 25 February 2021, Dalli v Commission, C‑615/19 P, EU:C:2021:133, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited, and order of 24 October 2019, Liaño Reig v SRB, T‑557/17, not published, EU:T:2019:771, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 598 The requirement of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals seeks, whatever the nature of the unlawful measure in question, to avoid the situation where the risk of having to bear the losses alleged by the persons concerned hinders the ability of the institution concerned to fully exercise its powers in the general interest, both in the context of its activities that are regulatory or involve economic policy choices and in the sphere of its administrative competence, without thereby leaving third parties to bear the consequences of flagrant and inexcusable misconduct (see judgments of 3 March 2010, Artegodan v Commission, T‑429/05, EU:T:2010:60, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; of 23 November 2011, Sison v Council, T‑341/07, EU:T:2011:687, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited; and of 14 December 2018, East West Consulting v Commission, T‑298/16, EU:T:2018:967, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 599 Such a breach is established where it is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU institution (see judgments of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 18 November 2020, H v Council, T‑271/10 RENV II, EU:T:2020:548, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited). It is solely where that institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion that the mere infringement of EU law may suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (see judgments of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C‑301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited, and of 20 September 2019, Dehousse v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑433/17, EU:T:2019:632, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited). (a) The alleged unlawfulness 600 As regards the conduct of the Commission and the SRB, the applicants claim that the statements and disclosures by the SRB on 23 and 31 May 2017 and on subsequent days caused widespread panic which led to a fall in Banco Popular’s share price and a run on its customers’ deposits. The SRB breached its duty of confidentiality. When the information leaked, the SRB and the Commission adopted a passive attitude to the right to good administration and the right to early intervention, instead of taking steps to mitigate the damage. According to the applicants, when the SRB found that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail, it adopted the resolution scheme without considering measures that would be less onerous on them, contrary to Regulation No 806/2014 and of fundamental principles, such as the principle of proportionality, the prohibition of discrimination and arbitrariness, the right to be heard and the right to a statement of reasons for a decision. 601 The applicants submit that the infringement of EU law by the SRB and the Commission is clearly substantiated, which is enough to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach. The SRB committed an inexcusable error giving rise to its non-contractual liability. The applicants assert that the SRB should not have made statements or disclosed information and, since harm was caused to Banco Popular, the SRB and the Commission should have attempted to mitigate that harm and, if Banco Popular’s failure was irreversible, they should have decided on a resolution scheme in accordance with the law and fundamental principles. 602 The applicants’ arguments relating to the conduct of the Commission and the SRB can be divided into two complaints, concerning, first, breach of the duty of confidentiality and, second, the passive attitude of the SRB and the Commission. (1) The first complaint, concerning breach of the duty of confidentiality 603 The applicants submit that it follows from recital 116 and Articles 88 and 90 of Regulation No 806/2014 and from Article 339 TFEU that the required standard of diligence and care is extremely high. They argue that it is incorrect to state that the public would not have inferred from the interview which the Chair of the SRB gave to the television channel Bloomberg on 23 May 2017 that Banco Popular was being examined as provided for in recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014. 604 The applicants submit that the statements and information leaks of 23 and 31 May 2017 are attributable to the SRB or, at least, to EU officials who participated in the resolution procedure. The SRB did not deny that the press article published by Reuters on 31 May 2017 originated from leaks. The Commission and the SRB did not deny the existence of deposit withdrawals by the Spanish authorities, in particular the FROB. The SRB and the Commission did not conduct any internal investigation establishing that they were not the source of the leaks. According to the applicants, the SRB did not implement the procedure for checking the effects of disclosing information referred to in Article 88(5) of Regulation No 806/2014, which constitutes a sufficiently serious breach. 605 Article 339 TFEU states: ‘The members of the institutions of the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.’ 606 According to the case-law, while that provision is mainly aimed at information collected from undertakings, the words ‘in particular’ show that it is a general principle which applies also to other confidential information (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 March 2011, Siemens v Commission, T‑110/07, EU:T:2011:68, paragraph 400 and the case-law cited). 607 Article 88(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides: ‘Members of the [SRB], the Vice-Chair, the members of the [SRB] referred to in Article 43(1)(b), the staff of the [SRB] and staff exchanged with or seconded by participating Member States carrying out resolution duties shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 339 TFEU and the relevant provisions in Union legislation, even after their duties have ceased. They shall in particular be prohibited from disclosing confidential information received during the course of their professional activities or from a competent authority or resolution authority in connection with their functions under this Regulation, to any person or authority, unless it is in the exercise of their functions under this Regulation or in summary or collective form such that entities referred to in Article 2 cannot be identified or with the express and prior consent of the authority or the entity which provided the information.’ 608 Reference should also be made to recital 116 of that regulation, cited in paragraph 514 above, relating to the confidentiality of information held by the SRB prior to the adoption of a resolution decision. 609 In the present case, it must be observed that, in the application, the applicants mention the ‘statements and disclosures by the SRB on 23 and 31 May 2017 and on subsequent days’. In the reply, the applicants refer only to the interview given by the Chair of the SRB on 23 May 2017 and to the article published by Reuters on 31 May 2017. 610 Since the applicants do not identify the other alleged statements by the SRB, the Court will confine itself to examining the content of the remarks made by the Chair of the SRB on 23 May 2017 and the content of the Reuters article of 31 May 2017 on which the applicants rely to claim breach of the duty of confidentiality. 611 In the first place, as regards the interview given by the Chair of the SRB to the television channel Bloomberg on 23 May 2017, the journalist asked: ‘Can I take you to Spain? I want to show our audience something that is very much on our radar screen here at Bloomberg and that is Banco Popular and the CoCos [Contingent Convertibles] which are under a little bit of pressure right now. This is an institution with a CET 1 just north of 7 per cent. Is it on your radar screen as well?’ 612 The Chair of the SRB replied: ‘Well, I am never talking about individual banks. There are more banks than just one on our radar screen and of course, Banco Popular is also a case we are watching but it is not the only one we are watching.’ 613 First, it must be noted, as the SRB points out, that those remarks are general in scope, since the supervision of institutions is one of the SRB’s tasks in cooperation with the ECB. The information that Banco Popular, as a credit institution covered by the single supervisory mechanism, was being ‘watched’ was not confidential. 614 In addition, it is apparent from the article of 15 May 2017 published by elconfidencial.com, referred to in paragraph 41 above, that the information that Banco Popular had been the subject of an inspection by the ECB was already public. 615 Second, during that interview, the Chair of the SRB did not mention the possible resolution of Banco Popular. No conclusion can be drawn from those remarks as regards the imminent resolution of Banco Popular, far less as regards the resolution tool that might be used by the SRB. 616 Furthermore, since those remarks cannot be construed as meaning that Banco Popular would be placed under resolution, they do not fall within the situations contemplated by recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014 concerning the transmission of information in respect of a resolution decision before that decision is adopted. 617 Moreover, as regards another extract from that interview, cited in paragraph 16 of the application, it is sufficient to note that the remarks made by the Chair of the SRB are of a general nature and do not concern the individual situation of Banco Popular. In the extract in question, the Chair of the SRB gave the following answer to a question concerning the future of institutions, like Banco Popular, which had recently raised money on the market and would struggle to do so again: ‘Well, again, I won’t talk about Banco Popular. As you understand, I think dealing with the topic is exactly going back to considering what is the root cause, and it’s an individual and idiosyncratic case-by-case to see, can you offload NPL portfolio in a bad bank? Can you try to sell it? How can you restructure? Merger is always one option. … I think my clear message would be, we have worked hard over the last two years in trying to set up resolution plans which hopefully also offer more private solutions. So before you come to the point of being non-viable … and going into resolution to say, is the bank structured in a way that you can find alternative, private solutions? They are always, I would say, even from our perspective, the preferred solution. And there is no “one size fits all”.’ 618 Accordingly, it must be held that the remarks made by the Chair of the SRB during the interview of 23 May 2017 do not contain confidential information and do not constitute a breach of the principle of confidentiality or the obligation of professional secrecy laid down in Article 88 of Regulation No 806/2014 and Article 339 TFEU. 619 In the second place, as regards the article published by Reuters on 31 May 2017, entitled ‘EU warned of resolution risk for Banco Popular’ (La UE, advertida de riesgo de una resolución ordenada en Banco Popular), that article states that, according to an anonymous high-ranking EU official, one of Europe’s top bank watchdogs had warned EU officials that Banco Popular might need to be placed under resolution if it failed to find a buyer and that the Chair of the SRB had recently issued an ‘early warning’. According to that article, the high-ranking official in question also stated that the Chair of the SRB had declared that the SRB was following the (Banco Popular) procedure with particular attention with a view to a possible intervention, adding that the bank’s merger bid may be fruitless. 620 That Reuters article also states that, according to another source, also anonymous, general preparations were under way, although concrete steps had still not been taken. According to that article, a spokesperson for Banco Popular had stated that the bank was working on several plans, including a merger, a capital increase and asset sales. 621 It must also be observed that that article mentions the SRB’s press release of the same day in which the SRB stated that it was not commenting on the specific difficulties of a bank, that it could not confirm the interpretations regarding alleged quotes made by its Chair and that it never issued warnings about banks. 622 The applicants refer to the extract from that article stating that ‘general preparations were under way’. Suffice it to note that, according to the article, those remarks were made by ‘a second source’, also anonymous, who is not identified as being an EU official. They cannot therefore be attributed to a Commission official or to a member of the SRB’s staff. Moreover, the reference to ‘general preparations’ is very vague in scope and gives no indication as to whether they related to a resolution procedure concerning Banco Popular or whether they referred to the plans envisaged by the bank itself, also mentioned in that article. 623 In addition, it must be observed that the applicants fail to specify which items of information contained in that article are confidential, or to what extent their disclosure would constitute a breach of the requirements of professional secrecy of the SRB or the Commission. In any event, the remarks of that EU official, reported in that article, did not relate to confidential information which could be known only to members of the SRB or the Commission and are not capable of proving the existence of the alleged leaks relied on by the applicants. 624 Thus, first, the official mentioned an ‘early warning’ allegedly issued by the Chair of the SRB. It must be observed that it is not for the SRB to make such a statement, a point which the SRB recalled, moreover, in its press release of 31 May 2017. 625 Second, as regards that official’s assertion that ‘the Chair of the SRB had declared that the SRB was following the (Banco Popular) procedure with particular attention with a view to a possible intervention’, suffice it to observe that those remarks repeat the substance of what the Chair of the SRB had stated publicly during her interview on the television channel Bloomberg on 23 May 2017, that is to say that Banco Popular was being ‘watched’. Moreover, the broad interpretation given to those remarks was contradicted by the SRB in its press release. 626 Furthermore, the fact that that article claims to reproduce the words of the Chair of the SRB is not sufficient to establish their authenticity, particularly since the person who was supposed to have reported them is not identified. 627 Third, as regards that official’s assertion that the bank’s merger offer might be unfruitful, it is apparent from that article that Banco Popular itself had stated that the deadline initially set for 10 June 2017 to submit bids in the private sale process was a flexible one. 628 In that regard, the applicants produced as an annex to the application an article from El País of 31 May 2017, entitled ‘Banco Popular extends the deadline for bids until the end of June’ (El Popular amplía el plazo para presentar ofertas hasta fin de junio), which confirms that the bank postponed the deadline for the submission of bids from 10 June to the last week of that month. 629 Thus, the possibility that the private sale process launched in April 2017 might be unfruitful cannot be regarded as confidential information, but as a simple deduction from the circumstances, that is to say that, on 31 May 2017, Banco Popular still had not found a buyer in that process and that the date for the closure of the process had been postponed. 630 Fourth, as regards the assertion that, according to an anonymous high-ranking EU official, one of Europe’s top bank watchdogs had warned EU officials that Banco Popular might need to be placed under resolution if it failed to find a buyer, it must be observed that several press articles had already reported in May that Banco Popular was in distress and had initiated a private sale process. 631 Consequently, it is apparent from an article of 11 May 2017, published on the website elconfidencial.com, mentioned in paragraph 40 above, that the Chairman of Banco Popular had ordered the urgent sale of the bank because of a risk of insolvency. The reference in the Reuters article of 31 May 2017 to the fact that the EU officials were informed by ‘one of Europe’s top bank watchdogs’ seems to correspond to the information given in the article of 11 May 2017, according to which, as a result of a serious risk of insolvency due, in particular, to the continued outflow of deposits, the Chairman of Banco Popular had been forced to implement the sale process in order to meet the ECB’s requirements. In addition, an article of 15 May 2017, published on the website elconfidencial.com, mentioned in paragraph 41 above, stated that the plan to sell Banco Popular had been implemented by its Chairman after the ECB’s inspection. 632 Thus, the fact that Banco Popular faced a risk of insolvency if it did not find a buyer at the end of the sale process it had initiated had been public knowledge since mid-May 2017. 633 It follows that, contrary to the applicants’ claim, the remarks of the anonymous EU official, reported in that article, do not contain confidential information relating to the implementation of a resolution procedure concerning Banco Popular, such as the information referred to in recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, which could be known only to Commission officials or members of the SRB. 634 Moreover, that Reuters article is based on the comments of an alleged anonymous EU official, whose home EU institution or body is not identified. 635 As the SRB maintains, many people other than members of the SRB or officials of the Commission were likely to make such comments, having regard, in particular, to the possibilities of exchanging information provided for, inter alia, in Article 88(6) of Regulation No 806/2014. 636 According to the case-law, it is for the applicant, in an action for damages, to establish that the conditions on which the Union incurs non-contractual liability under Article 340 TFEU are satisfied. Thus, in so far as the applicants have not established in the present case that the publication of information in the press resulted from the disclosure of information attributable to the Commission or the SRB, they cannot, in principle, be accused of such publication (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited). 637 In that regard, it must be observed that the applicants have adduced no evidence to show that the official referred to in that article is a Commission official or a member of the SRB’s staff. 638 The applicants merely assert that that article proves the existence of leaks and that the SRB did not deny that leaks occurred. They submit that the SRB and the Commission did not provide any report or conduct any internal investigation establishing that they were not the source of the information leaks contained in the Reuters article. They maintain that, since no such internal investigation took place, the SRB and the Commission cannot adduce any evidence enabling them to reverse the presumption arising from recital 116 and Articles 88 and 91 of Regulation No 806/2014. 639 Even if the comments reported in that article came from a leak by an EU official, since it has not been established that the Commission’s departments or the SRB are responsible for the leak of information shown by the press articles to which the applicants refer, it is clear from the case-law that such a source of the leak cannot be presumed (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2006, BASF v Commission, T‑15/02, EU:T:2006:74, paragraph 605). 640 Furthermore, it must be stated that even if it is likely that the Commission or the SRB may have been the source of that leak, that mere possibility is not sufficient, as the applicants claim, to place on them the burden of proving the contrary (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2006, Degussa v Commission, T‑279/02, EU:T:2006:103, paragraph 412). 641 Contrary to the applicants’ submissions, neither recital 116 nor Article 88 of Regulation No 806/2014, prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information to any person or authority, can be interpreted as containing a presumption that any leak concerning the resolution of an entity originates from a member of staff of the SRB, entailing the reversal of the burden of proof. 642 In the present case, since there is no presumption that the Commission or the SRB was the source of the alleged leak of information, the onus is not on them to demonstrate that they were not. 643 Moreover, it cannot in any way be inferred from the absence of an internal investigation that the SRB or the Commission breached their duty of confidentiality. Thus, it must be held that the fact that the SRB and the Commission did not carry out an internal investigation in order to determine the origin of potential leaks of information, after the resolution decision was adopted, is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing whether unlawful conduct is the cause of the damage relied on by the applicants. 644 In that regard, by letter lodged at the Court Registry on 9 October 2020, the applicants offered further evidence pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure. That evidence concerned two internal emails of the SRB of 10 and 18 August 2017 concerning a potential leak of information giving rise to the Reuters article of 31 May 2017. The applicants state that they had access to those documents following the decision of the Appeal Panel of the SRB of 15 April 2020, concerning their request for access to documents made under Article 90 of Regulation No 806/2014, and that the SRB sent them those two emails on 27 August 2020. They submit that those emails show that the SRB did not carry out an internal investigation into the alleged leak of information giving rise to the article of 31 May 2017. 645 Suffice it to state that the applicants have failed to establish that the comments reported in the Reuters article of 31 May 2017 originated from a leak of information from a member of the SRB, and that the fact that the SRB did not conduct an internal investigation is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing whether the SRB breached its duty of confidentiality. Therefore, it must be held that that further evidence seeking to establish that the SRB did not carry out an internal investigation into the alleged leak of information giving rise to the article of 31 May 2017 is irrelevant. 646 It follows from all the foregoing that the applicants have failed to establish that the SRB or the Commission breached the principle of confidentiality and the obligation of professional secrecy. (2) The second complaint, concerning the passive attitude of the SRB and the Commission 647 The applicants submit that, when the leaks of information began, the SRB and the Commission adopted a passive attitude to the right to good administration and the right to early intervention, instead of taking steps to mitigate the damage. When the SRB found that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail, it adopted the resolution scheme without considering measures that would be less onerous on the applicants, contrary to Regulation No 806/2014 and of fundamental principles, such as the principle of proportionality, the prohibition of discrimination and arbitrariness, the right to be heard, and the right to a statement of reasons for a decision. The applicants submit that since the SRB and the Commission created the climate of uncertainty which led to the insolvency of Banco Popular, they were required to act in order to minimise the damage caused. 648 It must be observed that the applicants do not explain the exact nature of their complaints against the Commission and the SRB when they refer to the ‘passive attitude’ of the latter or what measures the Commission and the SRB should have taken to ‘mitigate the damage’. 649 As the Commission points out, it is settled case-law that omissions by the EU institutions give rise to liability on the part of the Union only when the institutions have infringed a legal obligation to act under a provision of EU law (judgment of 15 September 1994, KYDEP v Council and Commission, C‑146/91, EU:C:1994:329, paragraph 58; see also judgments of 14 December 2005, Beamglow v Parliament and Others, T‑383/00, EU:T:2005:453, paragraph 166 and the case-law cited, and of 16 November 2017, Acquafarm v Commission, T‑458/16, not published, EU:T:2017:810, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). The applicants do not identify the provisions which purportedly require the SRB and the Commission to act in order to avoid adopting a resolution decision. 650 In so far as the applicants refer to the arguments already raised in the application for annulment, suffice it to note that those arguments were rejected in the analysis of the first plea. In particular, the arguments relating to the passive attitude of the SRB and the Commission in breach of the principle of good administration were dismissed in the analysis of the third complaint in the first part of the first plea, in paragraphs 173 to 176 above, and the arguments relating to the failure to consider measures that would be less onerous on the applicants were dismissed in the second and third parts of the first plea. 651 It follows from the foregoing that the applicants have failed to establish the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the SRB or the Commission and, therefore, they have failed to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 596 above, since the first condition required for the SRB or the Commission to incur non-contractual liability is not satisfied, the second claim for damages must be dismissed, without there being any need to examine the other conditions. 652 Nonetheless, the Court considers it appropriate, in the interests of the sound administration of justice, also to examine the applicants’ arguments relating to the existence of a causal link between the alleged unlawful conduct of the SRB and the Commission and the damage which they claim to have sustained. (b) The causal link 653 The applicants claim that the causal link relating to disclosures of confidential information is mentioned in recital 116 of Regulation No 806/2014, in that such disclosures could result in a banking institution being placed under resolution. The use of the words ‘must be presumed’ in recital 116 means, according to the applicants, that in the event of breach of the duty of confidentiality, it is for the EU institutions to prove that there is no causal link. 654 The applicants recall that the statement made by the Chair of the SRB on 23 May 2017, according to which the SRB was in the process of examining Banco Popular, and the Reuters article of 31 May 2017, reporting that the SRB was going to initiate a resolution procedure, caused widespread panic which led to a fall in Banco Popular’s share price and a run on its deposits. Following those information leaks, the SRB and the Commission did nothing to remedy the situation and, in consequence, the SRB reached the view that Banco Popular was failing and initiated a resolution procedure. The applicants also claim that the SRB committed several infringements when it adopted the resolution scheme. All those infringements are the cause of the damage sustained by the applicants. The applicants submit that the SRB and the Commission should not have adopted a resolution action in respect of Banco Popular, in which case the applicants would still have their investments, or that the SRB and the Commission should have adopted it on different terms, in which case the applicants might not have sustained economic loss. 655 As regards the condition that there must be a causal link between the conduct alleged and the damage claimed, that damage must be a sufficiently direct consequence of the conduct complained of, which must be the decisive cause of the damage, although there is no obligation to make good every harmful consequence, even a remote one, of an unlawful situation. It is for the applicant to adduce evidence of a causal link between the conduct complained of and the damage pleaded (see judgment of 11 July 2019, BP v FRA, T‑838/16, not published, EU:T:2019:494, paragraph 217 and the case-law cited). 656 The applicants submit that the statement made by the Chair of the SRB on 23 May 2017 and the Reuters article of 31 May 2017 brought about Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis. 657 Those arguments are based on a partial and erroneous presentation of the facts giving rise to Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis and the causes that led to the situation in which it was failing or likely to fail. 658 Thus, it must be borne in mind that, in its assessment that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail, the ECB stated that Banco Popular had attracted attention because of its low profitability, the poor quality of its assets and its low coverage compared with its peers and that, since January 2017, it had been the subject of negative media coverage. The ECB noted that, in February 2017, when it presented its annual accounts for 2016, Banco Popular disclosed the need for extraordinary provisions and the replacement of its Chairman. The ECB found that those announcements had led DBRS to downgrade Banco Popular’s rating and had caused significant concerns to Banco Popular’s customer base, which was reflected by unexpected deposit withdrawals. 659 The ECB also noted that a further wave of deposit outflows had been triggered by the publication by Banco Popular, on 3 April 2017, of an ad hoc disclosure on the outcome of several internal audits and had been fuelled by other events mentioned in paragraph 56 above. 660 In recital 24 of the resolution scheme, the SRB cited several circumstances which had led to the rapid deterioration of Banco Popular’s liquidity situation, namely: – in February 2017, Banco Popular disclosed the need for extraordinary provisions amounting to EUR 5.7 billion, leading to consolidated losses of EUR 3.485 billion, and appointed a new chairman; – on 10 February 2017, DBRS downgraded Banco Popular’s rating; – on 3 April 2017, Banco Popular published an ad hoc disclosure on the outcome of internal audits potentially having a significant impact on its financial statements and confirmed the replacement of its CEO less than one year after he took office; – on 7 April 2017, Standard & Poor’s and, on 21 April, Moody’s, downgraded Banco Popular’s rating; – on 12 May 2017, Banco Popular breached the liquidity coverage requirement of 80% and was unable to re-establish compliance with the regulatory limit thereafter; – continuous negative press coverage of Banco Popular’s financial results and of the alleged imminent risk of bankruptcy or illiquidity resulted in an increase of deposit outflows; – on 6 June 2017, DBRS and Moody’s downgraded Banco Popular’s rating. 661 The SRB stated that all those circumstances had resulted in significant withdrawals of deposits. 662 It must also be observed that the Board of Directors of Banco Popular, in the minutes of the meeting of 6 June 2017 at the end of which it declared that the bank was failing, mentioned the reasons which had led to Banco Popular’s situation, including press articles published over the preceding months on the financial situation of the group in general and of Banco Popular in particular and their effects on the liquidity situation. The Board of Directors stated that the period of extreme financial stress that Banco Popular was experiencing was due to several factors, including its diminished solvency, the quality of its assets and their coverage compared with the peer group, and the continuous and extremely negative media coverage of the group by certain media outlets. It follows that, although the Board of Directors acknowledged that the information relating to the group’s financial difficulties published in the press over several months had contributed to Banco Popular’s situation, it cites them only as one factor among others and does not refer to the statement made by the Chair of the SRB on 23 May 2017 or the Reuters article of 31 May 2017. 663 It is clear from those facts, which are not disputed by the applicants, that Banco Popular’s situation had already deteriorated well before 23 May 2017 and that its liquidity crisis was caused by multiple factors which originated in the bank’s poor results announced in February and April 2017. In particular, the liquidity coverage requirement for Banco Popular had not been in compliance with the legal requirements since 12 May 2017. 664 It must be observed that the applicants cannot ignore all the objective factors that caused Banco Popular’s liquidity problems, particularly since April 2017. They cannot reasonably argue that the statement of 23 May 2017 and the article of 31 May 2017, even if they involved a breach of the principle of confidentiality on the part of the SRB or the Commission, were the cause of Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis and, therefore, of the damage sustained by them. 665 Consequently, it follows that the applicants have failed to establish a causal link between the alleged unlawful acts committed by the SRB and the Commission and Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis, and thus between those acts and the damage claimed. 666 That finding is not called into question by the applicants’ other arguments. 667 The applicants claim that the ECB, in its assessment that Banco Popular was failing or likely to fail, noted that the deposits losses since 31 May 2017 were particularly significant, after the media reported that the bank could face wind-down if the private sale process then under way was not successful within a very short period. 668 It follows from its assessment that, according to the ECB, the announcement of the failure of the private sale process and the risk of insolvency of the undertaking exacerbated Banco Popular’s deposit losses. However, that was only one factor among the many others cited by the ECB which caused those deposit outflows. The applicants cannot assert that the ECB acknowledged that the Reuters article had brought about Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis. 669 The ECB noted that Banco Popular had received significant negative media coverage during that period and even cited examples of articles published on 11 and 15 May 2017, referred to in paragraphs 40 and 41 above. The applicants cannot handpick from all those press articles the only article mentioning an EU official in order to claim that that article alone caused Banco Popular’s liquidity outflow. 670 The applicants also claim that the SRB, in valuation 1, and the ECB, in its assessment of 5 June 2017 concerning Banco Popular’s request for emergency liquidity assistance, stated that 23 and 31 May 2017 were important dates in Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis. 671 In that regard, in its assessment of 5 June 2017 relating to Banco Popular’s request for emergency liquidity assistance, the ECB stated: ‘The bank has been confronted with significant cash outflows across all customer segments between 31 March and 1 June 2017 which have led to severe deterioration of both the deposit base … and the counterbalancing capacity (CBC …). Sparked by a deterioration of the reputation of the institution as a result of media coverage and of the announcement made by the bank on the need to proceed to either a capital increase or an M&A transaction due to the deteriorated financial situation, together with the impact of subsequent rating downgrades, deposit outflows exceeded €500M in a single day repeatedly over the course of the past weeks (12.05, 16.05, 22.05, 23.05, 31.05 and 01.06) in the context of a steady reduction of funding with a limited liquidity buffer.’ 672 The SRB reproduced that same analysis in valuation 1, stating that it had relied on the information provided by the ECB. 673 It follows that the dates of 23 and 31 May 2017 are mentioned by the ECB and the SRB only in the context of other dates on which deposit outflows exceeded EUR 500 million and have no connection with the statement made by the Chair of the SRB and the Reuters article. Contrary to what the applicants claim, the ECB and the SRB did not state that the dates of 23 and 31 May were more important than the other dates mentioned. In addition, they made clear that there were many reasons for the deposit outflows and it cannot be inferred from this, as the applicants do, that the statement of 23 May and the article of 31 May brought about Banco Popular’s liquidity crisis. 674 Furthermore, the evolution in Banco Popular’s share price showed a steady fall between June 2016 and June 2017. Contrary to the applicants’ assertions, that evolution does not disclose any link between, on the one hand, the statement of 23 May and the article of 31 May 2017 and, on the other, the share price of Banco Popular. The fall in Banco Popular’s share price was due to the bank’s poor financial situation and must be viewed in the context of the successive downgrades of its rating by the rating agencies, mentioned in paragraphs 32, 38 and 46 above. 675 It follows from all the foregoing that the applicants’ claims for damages must be dismissed. C. The applications for annulment of valuation 2 and for compensation 676 By their third head of claim, the applicants dispute valuation 2 under Article 20(15) and Articles 86 and 87 of Regulation No 806/2014 and submit that they are entitled to compensation. 677 The Commission maintains that the challenge to valuation 2 is inadmissible. The SRB contends that valuation 2 cannot be challenged separately from the resolution decision. 678 In the first place, the applicants seek the annulment of valuation 2 independently of the annulment of the contested decisions. They expressly state, in the application, that the right to challenge the valuation under Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014 constitutes an application for partial annulment of the resolution decision, specifically the expert report used by the SRB for the purposes of the resolution. They assert that their application for partial annulment of the resolution decision, brought under Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014, is wholly separate from the action for annulment of the contested decisions and from their claims for damages. That application would be admissible even if their other heads of claim were dismissed. 679 Furthermore, in their letter lodged at the Court Registry on 16 April 2019 concerning an application for modification of the measures of inquiry, the applicants themselves framed the application for annulment of the contested decisions, the action for non-contractual liability and the challenge to valuation 2, together with a claim for compensation, as three autonomous actions. 680 In that respect, it must be observed that Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides: ‘The valuation shall be an integral part of the decision on the application of a resolution tool or on the exercise of a resolution power or the decision on the exercise of the write-down or conversion power of capital instruments. The valuation itself shall not be subject to a separate right of appeal but may be subject to an appeal together with the decision of the [SRB].’ 681 In that regard, the applicants rely on a misinterpretation of that provision and of recital 63 of Regulation No 806/2014, according to which ‘such valuation should be subject to a right of appeal only together with the resolution decision’. Contrary to the applicants’ claims, the possibility of bringing a ‘joint’ action against the valuation and the resolution scheme does not mean that it is possible to challenge the valuation in an action which is separate from that seeking annulment of the resolution scheme, even if it is brought at the same time and by means of a single application. 682 It is clear from the wording used in Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014 that valuation 2, as an integral part of the resolution scheme, can be challenged only in the context of an action for annulment of that scheme, but cannot be the subject of a separate appeal. 683 Thus, it must be held that the applicants’ application for annulment only of valuation 2, which is independent of their application for annulment of the contested decisions, must be construed as a separate action from that seeking annulment of the resolution scheme. Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014, on which the applicants base their application for annulment of valuation 2, expressly rules out the possibility of bringing such an action. 684 The application for annulment of valuation 2 must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible. 685 In the second place, the applicants claim a right to compensation flowing directly from Article 17 of the Charter, even though Regulation No 806/2014 does not make provision for compensation. The applicants submit that the shareholders and bondholders of Banco Popular should have received compensation after the resolution equivalent to the net asset value, in accordance with Article 20(12) of Regulation No 806/2014, not the liquidation value. They maintain that that claim is admissible even though they have not specified the exact extent of the damage sustained or the exact amount of the compensation sought. 686 The applicants also state that ‘the action referred to in Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014 is separate from the action for annulment and the action for non-contractual liability’ and that the valuation used for the purposes of that provision is ‘different from the calculation of damage in the event of annulment with confirmation of the effects or the calculation in the event of non-contractual liability’. In the reply, they maintain that they are entitled to compensation equivalent to the net asset value of Banco Popular on the date of the resolution in accordance with Article 20(12) and (16) of Regulation No 806/2014, read in conjunction with Article 20(15) and Articles 86 and 87 thereof. 687 In the reply, the applicants submit that, if valuation 2 had reflected the net asset value of Banco Popular on the date of the resolution, Banco Popular would not have been placed under resolution or it would have been necessary to set a higher minimum price bid, which would have benefited shareholders and holders of capital instruments. They argue that, in view of the estimates of the ECB and Banco Popular, Banco Popular’s net asset value was positive and stood at EUR 7 billion, and that the shareholders and holders of capital instruments should receive an amount of compensation calculated on the basis of that value, namely EUR 1.67 per share. 688 It must also be observed that, by their letter lodged at the Court Registry on 16 April 2019, the applicants withdrew their request, set out in the application, for the appointment of an expert to carry out a fair, prudent and realistic valuation in order to calculate the net asset value of Banco Popular. 689 It must be stated that it is not possible to ascertain from the applicants’ arguments what the legal basis is for that claim for compensation raised in the context of their challenge to valuation 2. 690 First, the references made by the applicants to Article 20(15) of Regulation No 806/2014 as the basis for their claim for compensation are not intelligible. That provision, mentioned in paragraph 680 above, merely states that the valuation on which the SRB relied is an integral part of the resolution scheme and cannot be the subject of a separate appeal. 691 Second, as regards the assertion that the right to compensation flows directly from the infringement of the right to property enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter, it must be observed that, even if the resolution of Banco Popular resulted in an infringement of the applicants’ right to property, that infringement is not a consequence of valuation 2. 692 It must be observed that the purpose of valuation 2, carried out by an independent expert, is to inform the SRB’s decision on the adoption of the resolution scheme and, as the Commission points out, that valuation does not in itself produce binding legal effects such as to affect the applicants’ interests. Only the resolution scheme and Decision 2017/1246 produce binding legal effects. Therefore, the applicants cannot claim compensation on the basis of a challenge to valuation 2 that is wholly separate from the challenge to the contested decisions. 693 Third, as regards the applicants’ reference to Article 20(12) of Regulation No 806/2014, suffice it to note that that provision is not relevant in the present case. 694 Article 20(12) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides: ‘In the event that the ex post definitive valuation’s estimate of the net asset value of an entity referred to in Article 2 is higher than the provisional valuation’s estimate of the net asset value of that entity, the [SRB] may request the national resolution authority to: (a) exercise its power to increase the value of the claims of creditors or owners of relevant capital instruments which have been written down under the bail-in tool; (b) instruct a bridge institution or asset management vehicle to make a further payment of consideration in respect of the assets, rights or liabilities to an institution under resolution, or as the case may be, in respect of the instruments of ownership to the owners of those instruments of ownership.’ 695 Suffice it to note that, in the present case, the SRB did not carry out an ex post definitive valuation on the basis of that provision. In any event, contrary to what the applicants claim, that provision does not give the SRB or the Commission the option to award them compensation. 696 Fourth, the applicants’ reference to Article 20(16) of Regulation No 806/2014, as the basis for their right to compensation equivalent to Banco Popular’s net asset value on the date of the resolution, is not intelligible inasmuch as that provision provides only that the SRB is to ensure that a valuation is carried out after the resolution, in order to determine whether the shareholders and creditors would have received better treatment if the institution under resolution had entered into normal insolvency proceedings. 697 Moreover, in so far as that claim for damages should be construed as seeking to establish the non-contractual liability of the SRB or the Commission on the basis of Article 87(3) of Regulation No 806/2014, suffice it to state that that claim does not address any of the conditions which must be met in order for the institutions to incur liability under Article 340 TFEU, referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 595 above. Indeed, the applicants do not identify the infringement allegedly committed by the SRB or the Commission or the conduct in which they allegedly engaged. 698 In the light of the foregoing, the claim for compensation based on the challenge to valuation 2 must be dismissed. 699 Accordingly, the applicants’ third head of claim must be dismissed. D. The applications for measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry 700 The applicants have requested the Court to order various measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry. 701 In the application, the applicants requested the Court, first, to order the SRB, the Commission, the ECB, the Kingdom of Spain, the Bank of Spain and the FROB to produce various documents. Second, they requested the Court to order the examination of several persons as witnesses and the preparation of expert reports, under Article 91(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure. 702 By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 16 April 2019, the applicants submitted a modification of the measures of inquiry contained in the application and the reply. In that letter, they stated that they withdrew their request for expert reports and confined their request for the examination of witnesses to the Chair of the SRB. 703 As regards applications made by a party for measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry, it must be recalled that the Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission, C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited; judgment of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS, C‑446/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 53). 704 It is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, even where a request for the examination of witnesses, made in the application, states precisely about what facts and for what reasons the witness or witnesses should be examined, it falls to the General Court to assess the relevance of the application to the subject matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission, C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited; judgment of 22 October 2020, Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission, C‑702/19 P, EU:C:2020:857, paragraph 29). 705 It must be recalled that, by its order for a measure of inquiry of 12 May 2021, pursuant to Article 91(b), Article 92(3) and Article 103 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court ordered the SRB to produce certain documents referred to in paragraph 98 above. By order of 9 June 2021, the Court held that the documents produced by the SRB in their confidential version were not relevant to the resolution of the dispute. 706 In the present case, it must be noted that the information contained in the file and the explanations provided during the hearing are sufficient to enable the Court to give judgment, since it has been able to give a proper ruling on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. 707 It follows that the applicants’ applications for measures of organisation of procedure and measures of inquiry must be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of some of those applications. 708 It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety. V. Costs 709 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the Commission, the SRB and Banco Santander, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the latter three parties. 710 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Kingdom of Spain must therefore bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, Extended Composition), hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Eleveté Invest Group, SL and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to bear their own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and Banco Santander, SA; 3. Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs. Van der Woude Jaeger Kreuschitz De Baere Steinfatt Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 June 2022. [Signatures] Table of contents * Language of the case: Spanish. 1 The list of the other applicants is annexed only to the version sent to the parties.