Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:1999:239
Date: 1999-05-11
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: State aids;Competition
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Germany

summary statement of reasons concerns only those facts that are covered by the presumption, that is to say, distortion of competition and effect on intra-Community trade, and does not concern other issues, such as the existence of aid and particularly the existence of operating aid, in respect of which the Commission is required to give a comprehensive and sufficient statement of reasons for its decision. 164. It follows that, in cases of operating aid, the Commission can confine itself to providing a summary statement of reasons, without entering into detail, for a decision adopted in the procedure under Article 93(2) of the Treaty, as regards distortion of competition and effect on intra-Community trade. 165. As a consequence, I would propose that the third plea in law be rejected in its entirety. D - Fourth plea in law: Misapplication of Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty 166. In its fourth and last plea in law, the applicant maintains that, even if the conditions set out in Article 92(1) of the Treaty were fulfilled, the Commission should have considered the contested aid to be compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty. The statement of reasons on that point does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 190 of the Treaty that it be both comprehensive and sufficient. 167. The applicant divides this plea in law into two parts. It first claims that the Commission failed to recognise the importance of the Guidelines in the fisheries sector in exercising its powers of assessment. Correct application would have led to a different result. Secondly it claims that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the conditions set out in Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty were not fulfilled. (94) 168. As has already been pointed out, the Guidelines are binding on the Commission and the Member States and, by its nature, operating aid is, in principle, incompatible with the common market. It should further be noted that Article 92(3)(c), as an exception to the general prohibition contained in Article 92(1), must be interpreted narrowly and applied in the same spirit. Lastly, as the Court pointed out in Case 730/79 Philip Morris, (95) the Commission enjoys a wide discretion under Article 92(3), because it involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context. 169. It can be seen from section V of the contested decision that the Commission examined, in a proper manner, whether the contested aid could be allowed on the basis of Article 92(3)(c). Since the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the assessment which it made is not, in my view, manifestly wrong. I have reached that conclusion after examining the various steps in the Commission's reasoning. 170. In particular, I consider that a distinction must be made as to whether Jadekost could benefit from aid, on the one hand, on account of the area in which it operated, or, on the other hand, on account of the sector in which it operated, as the Commission maintains moreover. 171. Even if Jadekost operated in an area in which aid to facilitate development could be obtained, the second sentence of point 1.6 of the Guidelines provides that the components of regional aid schemes relating to the fisheries sector will be examined on the basis of the Guidelines. In other words, the Guidelines contain the principles of coordination which the Commission will apply to regional aid schemes in force or to be established in the regions of the Community. That means that the Commission's discretion is exercised in accordance with the principles which it laid down itself, in cooperation with the Member States, in the Guidelines. The applicant's arguments to the contrary must therefore be rejected as unfounded. 172. In regard to the area of activity for which the aid was granted, as the Commission has pointed out, the aid in question does not fulfil the conditions laid down in the Guidelines in the fisheries sector and it does not appear that the Commission exercised its discretion wrongly, that is to say, that its assessment is manifestly incorrect. 173. Since what is involved is operating aid, I would point out that such aid cannot in any circumstances, according to the settled case-law of the Court, (96) be considered compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 92(3)(c), inasmuch as, by its very nature, it threatens adversely to affect trading conditions to a degree contrary to the common interest. In addition, operating aid is incompatible with the common market pursuant to point 1.3 of the Guidelines. 174. The applicant further claims that, although the Commission referred to the 1992 Guidelines, it nevertheless applied those of 1994, (97) as is apparent from the text of the contested decision. It submits that, in the German text, when the question was examined as to whether there was operating aid, the conditions mentioned there (in point 1.3) were not listed as alternatives but rather had to be cumulatively fulfilled. In the German version, the disjunctive 'or' is missing, a synonym (98) of which is contained only in the 1994 version. 175. I consider that it is more likely that the conditions set out in point 1.3, as follows from the objective of that text, (99) need only be fulfilled alternatively. Apart from the fact that other language versions (100) require only that the conditions laid down be fulfilled alternatively, that conclusion follows from a teleological interpretation of the contested provision. Otherwise it would be very rare for all the alternative conditions provided for to be fulfilled and the result would be that only in a few instances could it be considered that such aid was incompatible with the common market because it distorted (or threatened to distort) competition. That would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the common fisheries policy and, more generally, the proper functioning of the common market and maintenance of the system of free and undistorted competition in the fisheries sector. 176. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that, despite the fact that the contested decision referred to the text (point 1.3) of the 1994 Guidelines rather than, as should have been the case, the 1992 version, nevertheless this does not entail the nullity of the decision because the content of both versions is essentially the same. 177. The last point which I would like to stress is the fact that the granting of a security, in other words, the granting of aid to Jadekost, was not accompanied by any specific obligations as to its use, in accordance with the criteria on the basis of which different categories of aid are considered compatible with the commonmarket. Those criteria are set out in point 2.3 of the Guidelines, concerning aid to processing and marketing in the fisheries sector. 178. In particular, as can be seen from the documents before the Court, the aid granted to Jadekost was not aid to investment (point 2.3.3 of the Guidelines) or aid relating to product quality (point 2.3.4 of the Guidelines). Although a financing plan existed in order to demonstrate that the loan for which the security was granted was to be used for the operation of the undertaking, that cannot be regarded as an undertaking on the part of the recipient to use the aid, within the meaning of point 1.3, in conjunction with point 2.3, of the Guidelines. That is because, as I have already pointed out, the loan for which the security was granted was used to cover general operating costs which Jadekost had to bear in the course of its normal activities. Consequently the Commission's finding that the contested aid was not compatible with the common market is not manifestly wrong. 179. As a consequence, I would propose that the fourth plea in law be rejected in its entirety. IV - Conclusion 180. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should: (1) dismiss the application of the Federal Republic of Germany; (2) order the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs. 1: - Original language: Greek. 2: - OJ 1996 L 246, p. 43. 3: - Case C-225/91 [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraph 24. 4: - See also similar judgments (on the extent of the Commission's powers deriving from Article 92(3)) in the earlier judgments in Case 301/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, paragraph 18; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 49; Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 56; and Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 34. 5: - See also section A, in fine, of the Opinion of Advocate General Gand in Case 8/65 Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi v High Authority [1966] ECR 1. 6: - OJ 1992 C 152, p. 2. 7: - OJ 1995 C 201, p. 6. 8: - The Commission stated (paragraph 7) that the aid deriving from such a loan guarantee is generally equal to the difference between the rate of interest on a loan raised on normal market terms and the actual rate secured by virtue of the guarantee. 9: - According to the report of C & L Treuarbeit of 29 March 1994. 10: - As is clear from the report of C & L Treuarbeit of 29 March 1994. 11: - See, for instance, Case C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21. 12: - See, for instance, Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] 2321, paragraph 28. 13: - See, for instance, Case C-301/87 France v Commission (Boussac) (cited in footnote 3), paragraph 30. 14: - Ibid., paragraph 31. See also Case 259/85 France v Commission [1987] 4393, paragraph 13. 15: - In that case, France had applied for the annulment of a Commission decision regarding aid granted by the French Government to a producer of textiles, clothing and paper products, Boussac Saint Frères. 16: - This is clear from the Commission's facsimile of 1 September 1994 to the German Government, which has been submitted as annex B3 to the Commission's defence. In that facsimile, the applicant was requested to provide various information regarding the competitive practices of Jadekost in the area of pricing and in regard to its production costs. 17: - The Commission contends that the details contained in the letters of the competing companies were discussed with the applicant during meetings held on 31 August 1994 and 28 November 1995. 18: - See also the letters of 30 June 1994 and 20 February 1995 which have been submitted as annexes B1 and B6 to the Commission's defence. 19: - Letters of 2 November 1994 and 13 April 1995 submitted as annexes B5 and B7 to the Commission's defence. 20: - The Notice referred to the 1994 Guidelines rather than to those of 1992, but that does not mean that the interested parties did not know which rules formed the basis for the infringement of Community law. 21: - Certain information contained in those letters is set out at the end of section II of the contested decision. 22: - This letter is submitted as annex B14 to the Commission's defence. 23: - This letter is submitted as annex B15 to the Commission's defence. 24: - This letter is submitted as annex B16 to the Commission's defence. 25: - The company in question points out, in the same letter, that in its letter of 2 March 1994 addressed to the Land Government, it had also expressed its reservations as to the amount of the security which could be justified by Jadekost's maximum expected turnover, and which should not have exceeded DEM 4 or 5 million. 26: - Insolvency proceedings were initiated against Jadekost on 31 March 1995. 27: - See point 24 of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-301/87, France v Commission (cited in footnote 3). 28: - Case C-241/94 France v Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, paragraph 33; Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16; and Case 84/82 Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 1451. 29: - Point 8, in fine, of the Opinion in Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013. 30: - See, for instance, Case C-241/94 France v Commission (cited above in footnote 27), paragraphs 36 and 37. 31: - In particular - in section III, paragraph 6, fourth sentence of its Decision, the Commission states that 'Since only very limited securities were available in the start-up phase, Jadekost took steps to obtain a security from the Land for the operating loans granted to it by its bank, the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG.' 32: - As the Commission also notes, the applicant stated, in its letter of 19 July 1994 (annex B2 to the Commission's defence), that 'to guarantee operational funding the banks required an 80% security to be provided by the Land of Lower Saxony for a credit of DEM 35 000 000.' 33: - The Commission submitted this letter as annex B 9 to its defence. 34: - According to section 1.3 of the aforementioned General Directives on Securities, referred to by the Commission in point 46 of its defence, an application for a security requires the approval of the Budget Committee of the (Lower Saxony) Landtag if there is any departure from the Guidelines. 35: - The point was repeated at the hearing, in reliance on the relevant Commission Notice (Commission Notice on the de minimis rule for State aid (96/C 68/06) OJ 1996 C 68, p. 9), that, where significant sureties exist, the aid cannot be equal to 100% of the amount for which the aid was granted. 36: - Case C-301/87 France v Commission (cited in footnote 3), paragraph 39. 37: - Capital contributions, loans at reduced rates of interest and reductions in social security charges. 38: - The Commission Notice (96/C 68/06), relied upon by the applicant, takes merely the form of guidelines whose essential characteristic consists in clarifying the Commission's policy in different sectors (in regard to the meaning of guidelines, particularly under French law, see Prokopios Pavlopoulos, 'La directive en droit administratif', Paris LGDJ, 1978 (in the 'Bibliothèque de Droit Public' series, volume 128, XX, 268 pages), passim, Jean Boulouis, 'Sur une catégorie nouvelle d'actes juridiques: les directives in Recueil d'Études en hommage à Charles Eisenmann, Paris, Cujas publishers, 1977, p. 191; and Pierre Delvolé, La notion de directive in AJDA 1974, p. 459)'. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that one cannot infer from the Notice that the Commission's findings and assessment are manifestly wrong inasmuch as the risk to the guarantor was, as I have already pointed out, considered to be very high due to the financial situation of Jadekost. I would point out that, according to the Notice in question, the cash grant equivalent for loan guarantees in a given year can be either (1) calculated in the same way, as the cash grant equivalent of a soft loan, once the premiums paid have been deducted, the interest subsidy representing the difference between the reference interest rate and the rate obtained owing to the State guarantee, or (2) taken to be the difference between (a) theoutstanding sum guaranteed, multiplied by the risk factor (the probability of default) and (b) any premium paid, i.e. (guaranteed sum . risk) - premium. In the present case, the security granted corresponded to 80% of the DEM 35 000 000 loan accorded to Jadekost. After deduction of application and surety fees, the net subsidy equivalent corresponds to 98.7% of DEM 25 600 000, which was the amount of the security. If one applies the net subsidy equivalent of 98.7%, one obtains the sum of DEM 25 267 200 to which the securities correspond. Of that amount, DEM 10 688 025 (equivalent to 42.3%) represented fish products. 39: - The Commission submits a letter dated 22 July 1994 addressed to it (annex B2 to its defence). 40: - In that application, submitted as annex B19 to the Commission's defence, the proposed use of the loan is described as 'Betriebsmittelkredit für das Umlaufvermögen'. 41: - Reproduced verbatim in section III, paragraph 6, in fine, of the contested decision. 42: - That decision has been submitted as annex B2 to the Commission's defence. The Commission contends that this can also be inferred from the decision of 2 May 1994 to approve the security. 43: - Sections III, paragraph 8, and IV, paragraph 9, of the contested decision. 44: - I would point out that the Court stated in Case 32/82 Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 32: '... the granting of aid ... cannot be regarded as being automatically contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. Thus, irrespective of the form in which aid is granted ... it is the Commission's task to examine whether it is contrary to Article 92(1) and, if so, to assess whether there is any possibility of its being exempt under Article 92(3), giving the grounds on which its decision is based accordingly.' 45: - See Christian Gavalda and Gilbert Parléani, Droit des affaires de l'Union Européenne, Paris, Litec, 2nd edition, 988, p 394 ff., paragraph 737. 46: - See Bellamy and Child, Common Market Law of Competition, 4th edition, 1993, p. 911, No 18-004. 47: - Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709; and Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland v Commission [1980] ECR 2671. 48: - Paragraph 11 of Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland v Commission (cited in footnote 46). 49: - Case 259/85 France v Commission, cited in footnote 13, paragraph 24. 50: - Thus, according to Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19, aid to an undertaking may be such as to affect trade between the Member States and distort competition where that undertaking competes with products coming from other Member States, even if it does not itself export its products. Such a situation may exist even if there is no overcapacity in the sector at issue. 51: - Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 35. 52: - Point 49 of my Opinion in those cases, in which judgment was delivered on 24 October 1996 [1996] ECR I-5151. 53: - Cited in footnote 46. 54: - Paragraph 11 of Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland, cited in footnote 46. 55: - Paragraph 43 of the judgment, cited above in footnote 3. 56: - Judgment cited above in footnote 3 (paragraph 27). 57: - See also point 19 of the Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 1 October 1990 in Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission, in which judgment was delivered on 2 March 1991 (cited above in footnote 3). 58: - Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet Combinatie v Minister van Economische Zaken [1996] ECR I-5023, paragraphs 36 to 44, see also points 34 to 52 of the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz. 59: - These are the Guidelines for the examination of State aids in the fisheries sector (88/C 313/09) (OJ 1988 C 313, p. 21). 60: - See also Case C-135/93 Spain v Commission, paragraph 24. In the IJssel-Vliet judgment the Court stated (paragraph 37) that: '[t]he Guidelines are based on Article 93(1) of the Treaty and are thus one element of that obligation of regular, periodic cooperation from which neither the Commission nor a Member State can release itself. They also - at least as regards relations between the Commission and the Netherlands - conform strictly to the spirit of regular, periodic cooperation envisaged by the said Treaty article between the Commission and the Member States.' 61: - In the case of the Netherlands Government, by letters of 30 March and 6 May 1988. 62: - By letter of 30 November 1988. 63: - In paragraph 40 the Court elaborated on this point in the following terms: 'In that letter, the Commission asked the Netherlands Government to assure it that the criteria laid down by the Guidelines would be observed in respect of all aids in the sector. In response, the Netherlands Government confirmed, by letter of 31 January 1989, that aids granted to the fisheries sector were in conformity with the Guidelines. ... When it did so, the Netherlands Government was applying the national aid scheme, which must therefore be deemed to have been covered by that confirmation.' 64: - Furthermore, in Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, paragraph 35, the Court recognised as binding a 'discipline' which was of the same legal nature as the Guidelines and whose rules had been approved by the Member States. The said 'discipline' constituted rules for the Member States in regard to granting aid in a certain sector (the synthetic fibre industry), which the Commission had presented in a Notice on its policy in this area and which the Member States had agreed to; see also paragraph 42 of the judgment in IJssel-Vliet, cited in footnote 58. 65: - The applicant disagrees with the Commission's view that Jadekost could not have obtained any loan without the security. It considers that the Commission pursued two separate approaches in a manner which was confused (lacking in clarity) and contradictory. First, the Commission evaluates the undertaking's price advantage and then it determines whether and to what extent the undertaking could have obtained alternative financing with its existing sureties. 66: - The applicant draws a distinction between the question of principle, that is to say whether the existence of sureties is of relevance for determining the amount of aid on the one hand and, on the other, the question of the value of the existing sureties in the present case. That is because ultimately, the advantage obtained by the debtor whereon security is given is less than that obtained by the beneficiary of a subsidy. 67: - Case T-459/93 [1995] ECR II-1675. 68: - The applicant further maintains that: (c) the Commission's argument that the security resulted in a 100% reduction in production costs is incorrect; (d) the Commission wrongly considered that the granting of the security by the Land of Lower Saxony distorted competition in so far as Jadekost was able to sell its products at prices that were artificially lower than the usual market prices. With its small production quantities, Jadekost's entry onto the market had not had any effect on the constant downward trend in prices for deep-frozen fish products which had begun long before. Moreover, because Jadekost's production represent a minimal share of the European market, no distortion of competition could have been perceptible. Germany's share of overall production in the Member States is, according to the applicant, less than 24% and Jadekost has only a 1.5% share of the European market. 69: - Those matters are regulated by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92 of 17 December 1992 on the common organisation of the market in fishery and aquaculture products (OJ 1992 L 388, p. 1). 70: - The Commission submits that that can also be inferred from the fact that the contested decision mentions information that was provided by a number of competitors and associations in Member States. 71: - Case 173/73 Italy v Commission and Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission (both cited in footnote 46). 72: - Section IV, paragraphs 11 and 13, of the contested decision in the English text; section IV, paragraphs 12, 13 and 14, of the contested decision in the German text, which is the only authentic version. 73: - Case C-278/95 P Siemens v Commission [1997] ECR I-2507, paragraph 18. 74: - The Court of Justice therefore upheld the Court of First Instance's reasoning on this point; it had ruled in paragraph 77 of its judgment in Case T-459/93 Siemens v Commission [1995] ECR II-1675, that the purpose of both the aid towards the advertising campaigns and the market surveys and the aid for the purchase of equipment to be leased 'was the marketing of Siemens' products'. It then went on to state: 'Since marketing is a normal, everyday commercial activity, those aids constitute operating aids which, first, do not promote the development of any economic sector and, second, provide the applicant with artificial financial support such as to distort competition in the long term and to affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest'. 75: - See also Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission [1990] ECR I-3891, paragraph 18, and Case C-301/87 Boussac, cited in footnote 3, paragraph 49. 76: - In the Boussac judgment, cited in footnote 3 (paragraph 54), the Court accepted that the financial assistance given by the French Government to Boussac was designed to prolong artificially the activity of the undertaking despite the fact that it was in a state of insolvency and that it could not be expected that the undertaking would be in a position to survive on its own in the immediate future. Nor had the measures in question been intended to modernise the undertaking in order to restore the competitiveness enjoyed years previously. For those reasons the Court came to the conclusion (paragraph 57) that the aid in question could not qualify under the exemptions set out in Article 92(3) of the Treaty. 77: - The provision furthermore provides that such aid is compatible with the common market in so far as it is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division. Following the reunification of the two Germanys, that latter provision is of only historical significance. 78: - Point 67 of the Opinion in the case cited in footnote 3. 79: - See paragraph 18 of Case C-278/95 P Siemens v Commission, cited in footnote 72. 80: - See, for instance Case C-353/92 Greece v Council [1994] ECR I-3411, paragraph 19; Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 Portugal and Spain v Council [1992] ECR I-5073, paragraph 16; and Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3799, paragraph 16. 81: - Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19. 82: - The case-law cited in the examination of submissions concerning distortion of competition and the effect on Community trade, leads to the conclusion that aid must be presumed to be capable of distorting competition and to affect intra-Community trade (in this context see Jacques Biancarelli, Le contrôle de la Cour de Justice des Communautés en matière d'aides publiques, L'actualité juridique - Droit administratif, 1993 (p. 412 to 436) p. 412 particularly p. 422, and Claude Blumann, 'Régime des aides d'État: jurisprudence récente de la Cour de Justice' 1989 to 1992, Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européene, No. 361, 1992 (p. 721 to 739), p. 721, 726. However, that does not mean that a finding as to whether those two conditions are met is not required to be reasoned in accordance with Article 190 of the Treaty. Thus in the above-cited (footnote 43) Case 23/87 Intermills, the Court held that a Commission decision should be annulled since, as regards the damage to competition in the common market (paragraph 38): 'the relevant paragraphs of the preamble to the decision merely note the objections raised by the Governments of three Member States, two trade associations and an undertaking in the paper industry. Apartfrom that reference, the decision gives no concrete indication of the way the aid in question damages competition'. In its judgment in Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek, cited in footnote 80, the Court annulled a Commission Decision which contained no statement of reasons with regard to its assessment that the aid at issue affected trade between Member States and distorted or threatened to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or products. As the Court observed 'The preamble recalls the concern expressed by the Governments of two Member States and by two trade associations in the relevant industry with regard to the distortion of competition resulting from the measure taken by the Netherlands Government ... and then merely repeats the wording of Article 92(1) ... without any indications of fact' (paragraph 23 of the judgment in Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek). In the same judgment the Court accepts that in certain cases the very circumstances in which aid is granted are sufficient to show that the aid is capable of affecting trade between Member States and of distorting or threatening to distort competition; however, the Court continues: 'the Commission must at least set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision. In this case it has failed to do so since the contested decision does not contain the slightest information concerning the situation of the relevant market, the place of Leeuwarder (the recipient of aid) in that market, the pattern of trade between Member States in the products in question or the undertaking's exports' (paragraph 24 of the judgment in Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek). 83: - See Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek, cited in footnote 80, paragraph 19 ff., and Germany and Others v Commission, cited in footnote 51, paragraph 52. 84: - Joined Cases 62/87 and 72/87 Exécutif Régional Wallon and Glaverbel v Commission [1988] ECR 1573, paragraph 18. 85: - See Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 Germany and Others v Commission, cited in footnote 51, paragraph 53. 86: - Joined Cases C-356/90 and C-180/91 [1993] ECR I-2323. 87: - Commission Decision 90/627/EEC of 4 July 1990 on loans granted by the Belgian authorities to two shipowners for the purchase of a 34 000 m3 LPG ship and two refrigerator ships (OJ 1990 L 338, p. 21) and Commission Decision 91/375/EEC of 13 March 1991 concerning credits granted by the Belgian authorities to various shipowners for the building of nine vessels (OJ 1991 L 203, p. 105). 88: - Council Directive 87/167/EEC of 26 January 1987 on aid to shipbuilding (OJ 1987 L 69, p. 55). 89: - The Court first stated (paragraph 30): 'the Council, in accordance with the rationale of Article 92(3), first noted that aid to shipbuilding was incompatible with the common market and then took into account a series of economic and social requirements which caused it to make use of its power under the Treaty to consider such aid nevertheless compatible with the common market, provided that it complied with the criteria for derogation contained in the Directive (87/167)'. 90: - The Court also explained, in paragraph 31, that that ceiling constituted what the Council regarded as the balance between the conflicting requirements of respect for the rules of the common market and the maintenance of a sufficient level of activity in European shipyards and also the survival of an efficient and competitive European shipbuilding industry. 91: - In particular, it maintains that the contested decision failed to make findings in regard to (a) the amount of a premium adjusted in accordance with the risk accepted and its effects on the amount of aid; (b) the sureties established in view of the loan which were decisive for determining the amount of the aid in question; (c) the possibilities of obtaining alternative financing despite the fact the Commission had acknowledged the possibility of a risk-adjusted premium. 92: - It should be noted that, according to the Court's case-law developed in connection with the special conditions applicable when decisions on the clearance of accounts are adopted, where the Member State has been involved in all stages of the administrative procedure which resulted in the adoption of the decision against it, it suffices, precisely because of the nature and extent of that involvement, for the statement of reasons to be brief, that is to say, not very detailed; see, for instance, Case 819/79 Germany v Commission [1981] ECR 21, paragraphs 20 and 21, which concerned a decision on the clearance of accounts for expenditure submitted by the German Government for financing by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), Guarantee Section. See also Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 Germany and Others v Commission, cited above in footnote 51, paragraph 31. 93: - I would point out that the absence of information on those points led the Court, in Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 Germany and Others v Commission (cited above in footnote 51) to conclude that the Commission's statement of reasons in that case was insufficient (paragraphs 53 and 54). 94: - In support of its submissions, the applicant states as follows: (a) Jadekost carried on its business in an area that could have benefited from aid to facilitate development as it is an area with a low per capita income and high unemployment; (b) in the light of the applicant's view in respect of an overall approach to/assessment of the aid granted, the conditions for facilitating the development of certain economic areas as set out in Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty were satisfied in the case of Jadekost. The security was intended to provide financing for a new undertaking, rather than to maintain a company that had been in operation for a long time; (c) the granting of the security in favour of Jadekost did not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. 95: - Cited above in footnote 46. See also paragraph 49 of Case C-301/87 Boussac, cited above in footnote 3. 96: - See, for instance, the above-cited (footnotes 74 and 3 respectively) judgments in Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission and Case C-301/87 Boussac. 97: - OJ 1994 C 368, p. 12. 98: - The 1994 German text contains the abbreviation 'bzw.', i.e. 'beziehungsweise' which corresponds to the disjunctive 'or'. 99: - The Court has pointed out that in the case of divergence between the language versions, 'the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part'; see, for instance Case 100/84 Commission v United Kingdom [1985] ECR 1169, paragraph 17; Case C-100/90 Commission v Denmark [1991] ECR I-5089, paragraph 8; and Case C-449/93 Rockfon v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark [1995] I-4291, paragraph 28. 100: - The differentiation in the German text can also be found, for example, in the English version, but not in the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese or Greek texts. The Court has already had occasion to address the issue of linguistic divergence in the rendering of conditions or the phrasing of legislation of the Community institutions. In Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, for instance, it stated: 'When a single decision is addressed to all the Member States the necessity for uniform application and accordingly for the uniform interpretation makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, in light in particular of the versions in all four languages' (paragraph 3). See Case 19/67 Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v van der Vecht [1967] ECR 345. In its judgment in Stauder, the Court went on to state 'It cannot, moreover, be accepted that the authors of the decision intended to impose stricter obligations in some Member States than in others' (paragraph 4). In addition, in Case C-372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v Cricket St. Thomas Estate [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 18, the Court stated that the text in one Community language (in that case, English) 'cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in this regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement for the uniform application of Community law'.