Judgment;Information — ECLI:EU:T:2020:318
Date: 2020-07-08
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - successful

summary of reasons, the competent EU authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence provided with those comments (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 114). 76 Last, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the individual concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU means in all circumstances that the institution concerned must identify the individual, specific and concrete reasons why it is considered that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 116). 77 It is in the light of that case-law that the Court must examine the applicant’s arguments as recalled in paragraph 69 above. 78 In that regard, in order to assess compliance with the obligation to state reasons and the obligation to notify the entity concerned of the evidence against it, it is necessary to take into account not only the reasons given in the 2018 acts but also the context of those acts (see paragraph 73 above). 79 In the present case it is necessary to ascertain, first, whether, having regard to the factual and legal context in which the 2018 acts were adopted, the applicant was in a position to understand the reasons for the retention of its name on the lists at issue and the criterion applied by the Council to justify that retention. Second, the Court must assess whether the applicant was put in a position to verify whether the statement of reasons for the decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue was well founded and to defend itself before the Court, and whether the Court is able to exercise its power of review. 80 First, it must be borne in mind that the 2018 acts were adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 26(3) of Decision 2010/413 and the provisions of Article 46(7) of Regulation No 267/2012, according to which the Council is required to review the lists at issue at regular intervals and at least every 12 months (see paragraph 25 above). Those provisions therefore establish the principle that the Council is required to carry out a review and to periodically update the lists of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures. 81 The review of the situation of persons or entities included on the lists at issue may be completed otherwise than by the adoption of a formal act containing an express decision to maintain the name of the person or entity concerned on the lists in question. Thus, as is recalled in paragraph 52 above, the Courts of the European Union have made clear that even in a case in which the person concerned is not mentioned by name by a subsequent act amending the list on which that person’s name has been entered, and even if that subsequent act does not alter the ground on which that person’s name was initially entered on the list, such an act must be understood as evidence of the Council’s intention to maintain the applicant’s name on the list, which has the consequence that its funds remain frozen, given that the Council has a duty to examine that list at regular intervals (see judgment of 9 July 2014, Al-Tabbaa v Council, T‑329/12 and T‑74/13, not published, EU:T:2014:622, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). 82 Second, it must be noted that, in its letter of 6 June 2018, the Council not only stated that the applicant’s observations in the letter of 13 October 2017 had not altered the Council’s view and that the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was in accordance with the JCPOA (see paragraph 23 above), but it also communicated to the applicant the 2018 acts (see paragraph 24 above), which were adopted in accordance with the provisions mentioned in paragraph 80 above. 83 Thus, it is possible to establish from the Council’s letter of 6 June 2018, informing the applicant of the adoption of the 2018 acts, that the wording of the reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was not amended or updated by the Council when it adopted those acts. 84 In this respect, it must be pointed out that the Council had informed the applicant, by the letters of 24 May 2011 and 11 December 2012, that, pursuant to Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 267/2012, the applicant’s name had been entered on the lists at issue. Those provisions prescribe, in particular, the freezing of the funds of ‘persons and entities … that are engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for [nuclear proliferation]’. 85 In addition, it must be recalled that the ground relied on by the Council to justify freezing the applicant’s funds remained as follows in the 2018 acts: ‘Industrial automation company that has worked for the [United Nations]-sanctioned Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) at the uranium fuel enrichment plant at Natanz.’ 86 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s name was included and maintained on the lists at issue on a legal basis that relates to the listing criteria referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 above. Moreover, that listing states the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that the applicant should continue to be subject to restrictive measures. Last, the context in which the 2018 acts were adopted, namely the annual review of restrictive measures adopted to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran and the existence of the JCPOA, was also known to the applicant, since the applicant itself makes reference to it in its letter of 13 October 2017. 87 Having regard to the provisions recalled in paragraph 80 above and to the case-law cited in paragraphs 52 and 81 above, the applicant was in a position to understand, first, that the absence of a reference to its name in the 2018 acts led to its retention on the lists at issue and, second, that the reasons for its listing remained unaltered. The 2018 acts lay down, in the context of the annual review of restrictive measures which the Council is required to undertake, the changes to be made to the lists at issue without mentioning the applicant’s name and without altering the reasons for its listing. 88 In the light of the — unchanged — wording of the reasons for the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue, the legal basis of the 2018 acts which relates to the listing criteria recalled in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, and the factual and legal context in which the restrictive measures against the applicant were maintained, the applicant was therefore in a position to challenge effectively the justification for maintaining the restrictive measures adopted in its case. That is, moreover, what the applicant did when it claimed that the entry of its name was vitiated by errors of law and of fact. 89 Consequently, it must be concluded that, in the light of the context in which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue, the — unchanged — wording of the reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on those lists, and the body of relevant legal rules and the case-law set out in paragraphs 71 to 76 above, the 2018 acts are sufficiently reasoned to enable the applicant to challenge the validity, and the Court to review the lawfulness, of those acts. 90 Accordingly, the arguments relating to infringement of the obligation to state reasons referred to in paragraph 69 above must be rejected. Errors of law 91 The applicant submits, by the first part of the first plea, that the Council included it on the lists at issue without complying with the conditions established by case-law for considering the criterion at issue, alleging support for nuclear proliferation in Iran, to be satisfied. In that respect, the applicant refers to paragraphs 80, 81 and 83 of the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776), and to paragraph 85 of the judgment of 14 September 2016, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council (T‑207/15, not published, EU:T:2016:471), in order to argue that, according to the case-law, the application of that criterion requires that the Council demonstrate the ‘quantitative or qualitative’ significance of the support for nuclear proliferation in Iran. In addition, the applicant refers to paragraphs 81and 83 of the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776) in order to argue that the criterion at issue requires that the Council demonstrate the existence of ‘intentional support’ that is ‘capable, by its quantitative or qualitative significance’, of encouraging the development of nuclear proliferation in Iran. Last, it refers to paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council (T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667) in order to argue that the criterion at issue requires, according to the case-law, that the Council demonstrate that the activities carried out by the person or entity targeted by the restrictive measures are intended for the nuclear industry sector. 92 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 93 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the applicant’s name was initially entered and maintained on the lists at issue on the basis of Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413 and, in virtually identical terms, on the basis of Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 267/2012. 94 Article 20(1)(b) of Decision 2010/413 provides that the funds and economic resources of persons and entities that are ‘engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means’, are to be frozen. 95 The Council stated that the criterion on the basis of which the applicant’s name was included and then maintained on the lists at issue is that of the provision of support for the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 96 In the first place, it should be noted that, as the Council correctly contends, paragraph 85 of the judgment of 14 September 2016, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council (T‑207/15, not published, EU:T:2016:471) concerns the application of a different criterion laid down in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012. That criterion is to be construed as being aimed at any support which, although having no direct or indirect connection with the development of nuclear proliferation, is nonetheless capable, by its quantitative or qualitative significance, of encouraging such development, by providing the Government of Iran with resources or facilities of a material, financial or logistical nature which allow it to pursue nuclear proliferation activities. It is in the light of the latter criterion that the Courts of the European Union specified that it does not cover all forms of support to the Government of Iran but only those forms of support which, by reason of their quantitative or qualitative significance, could contribute to the pursuit of Iran’s nuclear activities. 97 In addition, the Court of Justice, in paragraph 80 of the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776), cited by the applicant, held that the concept of ‘support’ implied a lesser degree of connection to Iran’s nuclear activities than ‘engagement’ or ‘direct association’, and that that concept was capable of covering the procurement of or trade in goods and technology linked to the gas and oil industry. In that judgment, the Court considered that trading in equipment for the gas and oil sector that could be used for Iran’s nuclear programme justified the entry of the entity concerned on the lists at issue, on the basis of the criterion of ‘support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities’, without there being a need to demonstrate that such equipment had actually been sold to an Iranian nuclear facility (judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 85; see also, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2017, Neka Novin v Council, T‑436/14, not published, EU:T:2017:142, paragraphs 29 to 31). 98 As the Council, in essence, contends, the situation examined by the Court of Justice in paragraph 80 of the judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776) differed from that of the present case. In the abovementioned case, the Court examined the extent to which gas, oil and petrochemical activities, that is to say, activities outwith the nuclear sector, could be regarded as meeting the criterion relating to the provision of support for nuclear activities. By contrast, in the present case, since the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was based on the services it had provided to the uranium fuel enrichment plant at Natanz, that is to say, directly to the nuclear sector, the criterion relating to the provision of support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities was a fortiori satisfied. In those circumstances, the Council was not required to prove the qualitative or quantitative significance of that support. 99 It follows from the foregoing that the Council cannot be criticised for having made an error of law because it failed to demonstrate the qualitative or quantitative significance of the applicant’s support for nuclear proliferation. 100 In the second place, the applicant submits, in essence, that the application of the criterion at issue requires that it be demonstrated that the person or entity subject to the restrictive measures provides ‘intentional support’ to the Iranian nuclear programme. 101 That line of argument is founded on a misinterpretation of the criterion at issue. 102 It is sufficient to note that it has been held that the criterion at issue is an objective criterion that is linked to the activities of the person targeted by the restrictive measures and does not include an element of intention (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2017, Neka Novin v Council, T‑436/14, not published, EU:T:2017:142, paragraph 31). 103 It follows that the criterion at issue does not, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, require that it be demonstrated that the person or entity targeted by the restrictive measures intends to be engaged in the Iranian nuclear programme. 104 Accordingly, it must be held that the Council did not err in law in finding that the criterion at issue did not require that, in order for the restrictive measures to be maintained, it had to be demonstrated that the person or entity targeted by those measures was providing intentional support to the Iranian nuclear programme. 105 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments alleging errors of law must be rejected. Errors of assessment 106 In the second part of the first plea, the applicant refers to paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council (T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667), in order to argue that the Council’s decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was not taken, as the case-law requires, on a sufficiently solid factual basis, one that existed at the time the decision was adopted. It adds that the listing grounds are not supported by any demonstration or supporting evidence. 107 In addition, the applicant argues, by its second plea, that the reasons given to justify the retention of its name on the lists at issue are founded on errors of fact. 108 In that regard, first, it observes that, at the time when it provided services to KEC, that company had not yet been sanctioned by the United Nations. Thus, the ground for listing, indicating that the applicant worked for a sanctioned entity, was incorrect and invalidated the Council’s decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue. The applicant adds that it could not have anticipated, six months earlier, that KEC would be sanctioned by the United Nations. 109 Second, the applicant highlights the fact that the Council did not establish the ‘quantitative or qualitative’ significance of the support that the applicant had provided to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Moreover, the value of the services provided by the applicant to KEC clearly excluded the possibility that those services could have had any kind of significance. 110 Third, the applicant maintains that it is not related either to sanctioned entities or to nuclear activities, as is clear from the nature of the services which it currently provides, which are primarily focused on industrial automation (see paragraph 1 above), the main projects which it has implemented and the identities of its main clients, namely oil, gas and electrical power companies of domestic and international reputation. 111 Fourth, the applicant submits that, since the JCPOA permitted the continuation of activities at the Natanz plant, the main concern, which was about the location of the activities which it had carried out in 2006, has been removed. There are therefore no longer any grounds to justify the Council’s decision to maintain its name on the lists at issue. The Council could not, therefore, justify the applicant’s continued listing by reference to a single operation consisting in the provision of services to KEC in Natanz in June 2006, that is to say, 1 year before the sanctions regime against Iran was first established by the European Union, 5 years before the Council decided to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and 12 years before the Council’s decision to maintain its name on those lists. According to the applicant, it is clear from the case-law that restrictive measures should be based on an appraisal of a present or future threat rather than on the evaluation of past conduct. A mere risk that the entity concerned might engage in, be associated with or provide support for prohibited activities in the future is not sufficient. 112 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments. 113 The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires in particular that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 114 Furthermore, it must be noted that, when adopting subsequent acts affecting the same entity, the Council is required, in accordance with Article 24(4) and Article 26(3) of Decision 2010/413, to review at regular intervals and at least every 12 months the need to maintain those measures, in particular, in the light of observations submitted by that entity (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2013, Bank Saderat Iran v Council, T‑494/10, EU:T:2013:59, paragraph 94). 115 In the present case, first, it must be observed that the applicant does not dispute having provided services to KEC in June 2006, or the fact that the provision of those services took place at Natanz. Accordingly, as the Council contends, the Council is not required to produce evidence of those facts which have been admitted by the applicant itself. 116 Second, the Court must assess whether the facts in question permit the inference that the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue has a sufficiently solid factual basis and is therefore justified. 117 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument as set out in paragraph 108 above, it must be noted, as did the Council, that the point in time at which KEC was sanctioned by the United Nations and its name entered on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures would have been relevant only if the applicant’s name had been included on the lists at issue on the basis of the criterion covering persons and entities who had assisted a designated person or entity in violating the restrictive measures of the European Union or the United Nations. Since the applicant’s name was not included on the lists at issue on the basis of that criterion but as a result of support for Iran’s nuclear activities, the fact that KEC was sanctioned by the United Nations after the applicant had provided services to the nuclear fuel enrichment plant at Natanz is not relevant to the assessment as to whether the applicant provided or is capable of providing support for nuclear proliferation. 118 Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that it provided services to KEC at a time when KEC had not yet been sanctioned by the United Nations does not support the conclusion that the applicant’s continued listing is vitiated by an error of assessment and must be rejected. 119 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s arguments as set out in paragraph 109 above, they are, as has been established in paragraphs 96 to 105 above, based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of the case-law. They are, therefore, unfounded. In other words, the Council did not make an error of assessment by failing to ascertain the ‘quantitative or qualitative’ significance of the applicant’s support for nuclear activities. 120 In the third place, the following observations must be made in respect of the applicant’s arguments as set out in paragraphs 110 and 111 above. 121 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the Council contests the applicant’s arguments and contends that, while the activities at the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment plant were not forbidden by the JCPOA or Annex 1 thereto, they were made subject to very strict conditions and were continuously monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which attests to the fact that there continues to be a risk that Iran will engage, at that site, in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. In addition, the work carried out by the applicant at the uranium fuel enrichment plant at Natanz was done at a time when Iran’s nuclear activities were causing great concern to the international community. Moreover, the JCPOA distinguishes between restrictive measures to be lifted on Adoption Day (18 October 2015), on Implementation Day (16 January 2016), on Transition Day (in 2023) and on Termination Day (in 2025). Furthermore, the JCPOA establishes that the applicant’s name is not on the list of persons and entities which were delisted on Implementation Day, 16 January 2016. Accordingly, the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by the 2018 acts was consistent with the JCPOA and supported by a valid legal ground. 122 It must also be stated that, under Article 24(4) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 46(5) of Regulation No 267/2012, where new evidence or observations are submitted by the persons concerned, the Council is required to carry out a review of the restrictive measures and to notify the persons concerned of the reasons for its decision. 123 Principally, first of all, it must be noted that, for the purpose of entering the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council relied on the operation which the applicant carried out for KEC, in June 2006, at the uranium fuel enrichment plant at Natanz. 124 Next, it must be observed that the decision to maintain the restrictive measures against the applicant was taken in 2018, that is to say, as the applicant emphasises, 12 years after the provision of services for the benefit of KEC at Natanz in 2006. As regards the years that elapsed between the listing of its name and the adoption of the 2018 acts, the applicant submits, without being challenged by the Council in that respect, that it is apparent from the nature of the services which it currently provides, the main projects which it has implemented and the identities of its main clients for the years 2014-2015, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017, that it does not provide services in the nuclear sector. 125 It is, moreover, common ground that the activities at the Natanz plant were not prohibited by the JCPOA or Annex I thereto. Those activities were subject to very strict conditions and to continuous monitoring by the IAEA. In that regard, paragraph 48.2 of Annex I to the JCPOA states that ‘[Iran will remove] … electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks’ and that ‘these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of [the Fuel Enrichment Plant] under IAEA continuous monitoring’. In addition, paragraph 71 of Annex I states that ‘Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the [Fuel Enrichment Plant] and [Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant], for 15 years’. 126 Last, it should be noted that the applicant asserts, without being contradicted in that respect by the Council, that the reports issued by the IAEA since 16 January 2016 confirm that, at the date of the adoption of the 2018 acts, Iran was abiding by its enhanced commitments under the JCPOA and that its nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful. 127 The circumstances referred to in paragraphs 123 to 126 above were such that the Council was obliged to examine, in accordance with the provisions mentioned in paragraph 122 above, whether the grounds that had justified the entry of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue remained valid and justified maintaining that listing, having regard to the risk that the applicant was then providing, and would in the future provide, support for nuclear proliferation in Iran. 128 First, to justify maintaining the applicant on the lists at issue, the Council merely recalled the operation carried out by the applicant at the uranium fuel enrichment plant at Natanz in 2006. Moreover, in its letter of 6 June 2018, the Council replied to the observations of the applicant contained in the letter of 13 October 2017 by stating that the retention of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue was in accordance with the JCPOA. In that regard, the Council made clear, in the written pleadings which it put before the Court, that it was apparent from paragraph 16.3 of Annex V to the JCPOA that the persons and entities whose names had been removed from the lists at issue on Implementation Day, that is 16 January 2016, were mentioned in Attachment 1 to Annex II to the JCPOA. Since the applicant was not among them, its name would therefore have been maintained on the lists at issue in accordance with the JCPOA. 129 Second, it must be noted that, in the 2018 acts and in the letter of 6 June 2018, the Council merely referred to the JCPOA and did not respond to the applicant’s arguments relating to the passage of time and, in particular, the long period of time between the single provision of services which it is accused of having provided to KEC in June 2006 and the retention of its name by the 2018 acts. The Council did not, moreover, take into consideration the fact that it would be apparent from the nature of the services now provided by the applicant, focused on industrial automation (see paragraph 1 above), the main projects which it implemented and the identities of its main clients, namely oil, gas and electrical power companies of national and international reputation, that it is no longer related to the sanctioned entities, nor does it provide services in the nuclear sector. Thus, in the absence of an express view of the Council on the arguments advanced by the applicant, and given that it merely noted that the applicant’s name did not appear on the list of persons and entities which, according to the JCPOA, were to be removed from the lists at issue on 16 January 2016, it must be held that the Council did not properly verify the need to maintain the restrictive measures against the applicant. 130 Admittedly, Resolution 2231 (2015) called for the immediate implementation of the JCPOA on the timetable established in the JCPOA. However, the requirement to adhere to the timetable in question did not relieve the Council of its obligation, when reviewing the lists at issue, to examine, in concreto, whether the grounds that had justified the inclusion of a person’s or entity’s name on the lists at issue remained valid and justified maintaining that listing, by providing specific information in that respect in the acts adopted in accordance with the provisions referred to in paragraph 122 above. 131 Third, as has been stated in paragraph 126 above, the Council did not dispute that, according to the reports issued by the IAEA since 16 January 2016, at the time when the 2018 acts were adopted, the Islamic Republic of Iran was abiding by its enhanced commitments under the JCPOA and its nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful. In that context, the Council could not simply claim that the absence of complete confidence in the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran being exclusively peaceful and the decision that the IAEA should closely monitor that country’s nuclear activities justified the continuation of the measures taken against the applicant until 2023, provided that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA. The Council should have assessed and specified in particular the evidence from which it could be inferred that there was, at the time when the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue, a reasonable risk of the applicant providing support for nuclear proliferation in Iran, in order to justify maintaining restrictive measures against the applicant. 132 In those circumstances, the Court must uphold the second part of the first plea in law and the second plea in law, by which it is alleged that the Council did not proceed on a sufficiently solid basis when it adopted the 2018 acts. It must be held that the Council did not properly examine whether, at the time when the 2018 acts were adopted, there was any direct or indirect link between the applicant’s activities and nuclear proliferation (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2017, Neka Novin v Council, T‑436/14, not published, EU:T:2017:142, paragraph 30) or whether such a link could be presumed. The mere fact established by the Council that the applicant had, in 2006, provided services at Natanz — the substance of those services being, moreover, unspecified — is not sufficient to support a finding that, in 2018, that is to say, 12 years after the provision of those services, there was still a link between the applicant’s activities and nuclear proliferation. Thus, the Council has not demonstrated that the continued application of the restrictive measures to the applicant had a sufficiently solid factual basis and was thus justified. The decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, arising from the adoption of the 2018 acts, is therefore vitiated by errors of assessment. 133 In so far as the decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is implicit in the 2018 acts, those acts must be annulled to the extent to which they concern the applicant, and there is no need to analyse the applicant’s arguments concerning breach of the principle of effective judicial protection and the third plea in law in the case. Effects of the annulling judgment 134 As regards Implementing Regulation 2018/827, it must be recalled that, under the second paragraph of Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by way of derogation from Article 280 TFEU, decisions of the General Court declaring a regulation to be void are to take effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal (see judgment of 5 February 2013, Bank Saderat Iran v Council, T‑494/10, EU:T:2013:59, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited). 135 In those circumstances, in the absence of an appeal, the Council has a period of two months, extended on account of distance by a period of 10 days, as from the notification of the present judgment, to remedy the infringements established by adopting, if appropriate, new restrictive measures with respect to the applicant. 136 With regard to the temporal effects of the partial annulment of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Decision 2018/833, it must be recalled that, under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, the General Court may, if it considers it necessary, state which of the effects of the act which it has declared void are to be considered definitive. 137 When questioned at the hearing as to whether the applicant had been retained on the lists at issue by the adoption of acts subsequent to the 2018 acts, the Council did not give a clear answer. It did, however, ask the Court, in the event of annulment, to maintain the effects of Decision 2018/833 as regards the applicant, until the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2018/827 takes effect. 138 In the present case, if the dates when the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2018/827 and that of Decision 2018/833 take effect were to differ, that would be likely seriously to jeopardise legal certainty, since those two acts impose on the applicant measures which are identical. The effects of Decision 2018/833 must therefore be maintained, as regards the applicant, until the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2018/827 takes effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2011, Kadio Morokro v Council, T‑316/11, not published, EU:T:2011:484, paragraph 39). Costs 139 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has been largely unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/833 of 4 June 2018 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/827 of 4 June 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, in so far as they concern Neda Industrial Group; 2. Orders that the effects of Decision 2018/833 be maintained as regards Neda Industrial Group until the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2018/827 takes effect; 3. Dismisses the action as to the remainder; 4. Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. Gervasoni Madise Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 8 July 2020. E. Coulon S. Papasavvas Registrar President Table of contents Background to the dispute Context Basic acts and subsequent amendments establishing the system of restrictive measures Criterion applied on the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant Inclusion of the applicant’s name by acts subsequent to the basic acts Reasons justifying the restrictive measures against the applicant Notification and review of the restrictive measures Decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue Procedure and forms of order sought Law Preliminary observations on the subject matter of the proceedings Substance Infringement of the obligation to state reasons Errors of law Errors of assessment Effects of the annulling judgment Costs * Language of the case: English.