Abstract;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:331
Date: 2025-03-26
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible
Origin: Netherlands

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) 26 March 2025 (*) ( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Temporary prohibition of broadcasting and suspension of authorisations for the broadcasting of content by certain media outlets – Temporary prohibition of advertising for products or services in content produced or broadcast by certain media outlets – Competence of the Council – Freedom of expression and of information – Proportionality – Obligation to state reasons ) In Case T‑307/22, A2B Connect BV, established in Purmerend (Netherlands), BIT BV, established in Ede (Netherlands), Freedom Internet BV, established in Amsterdam (Netherlands), represented by L. Oranje, J. Spauwen and J. van den Brink, lawyers, applicants, v Council of the European Union, represented by S. Lejeune, acting as Agent, defendant, supported by Republic of Estonia, represented by M. Kriisa, acting as Agent, by Republic of Latvia, represented by J. Davidoviča, K. Pommere and I. Romanovska, acting as Agents, by Republic of Lithuania, represented by K. Dieninis and V. Kazlauskaitė-Švenčionienė, acting as Agents, by European Commission, represented by J.-F. Brakeland, C. Giolito, L. Malferrari and M. Carpus Carcea, acting as Agents, and by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented by F. Hoffmeister, L. Havas and M. De Almeida Veiga, acting as Agents, interveners, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition), composed of M. van der Woude, President, R. Mastroianni (Rapporteur), M. Brkan, I. Gâlea and T. Tóth, Judges, Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator, having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular; – the application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 24 May 2022, – the statement of modification of the application lodged at the Court Registry on 29 August 2022, – the statements in intervention of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 January 2023, further to the hearing on 10 July 2024, gives the following Judgment 1 By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, A2B Connect BV, BIT BV and Freedom Internet BV, seek (i) annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 5; ‘the first contested decision’) and of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 1; ‘the first contested regulation’) (together, ‘the acts of 1 March 2022’), and (ii) partial annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 128; ‘the second contested decision’) and of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of 3 June 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 53; ‘the second contested regulation’) (together, ‘the acts of 3 June 2022’) in so far as those acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern them. Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action 2 The present case arises in the context of restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 3 The applicants are information society operators established in the Netherlands, which present themselves as providers of internet services to individuals, as regards Freedom Internet, and to businesses, as regards A2B Connect and BIT. 4 In March 2014, the Russian Federation illegally annexed Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) and has, since that time, engaged in ongoing destabilisation actions in eastern Ukraine. In response to that behaviour, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures in the light of the actions of the Russian Federation destabilising the situation in Ukraine, restrictive measures in the light of actions compromising or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation. 5 On 17 March 2014 the Council of the European Union accordingly adopted Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16) and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6). 6 Subsequently, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13) was adopted in order to introduce targeted restrictive measures in the areas of access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies, in particular in the energy sector. The Council considered that the latter measures fell within the scope of the FEU Treaty and that their implementation required regulatory action at EU level, and therefore adopted Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), which contains more detailed provisions to give effect, both at EU level and in the Member States, to the requirements of Decision 2014/512. 7 On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and on the same day Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine at a number of places in the country. 8 On the same date, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) published a declaration on behalf of the European Union condemning the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and stated that the European Union’s response would include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures. In its conclusions adopted at its special meeting on the same day, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms that ‘unprovoked and unjustified … aggression’, being of the view that, by its illegal military actions, to which the European Council had to react, the Russian Federation was grossly violating international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 (‘the United Nations Charter’), and undermining European and global security and stability. 9 Against that background, on 1 March 2022, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the first contested decision and, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the first contested regulation, in order to prohibit continuous and concerted propaganda actions in support of military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, targeted at civil society in the European Union and neighbouring countries, channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation, since such actions constituted a threat to the public order and security of the European Union. 10 Article 1(1) of the first contested decision inserted a new Article 4g into Decision 2014/512, worded as follows: ‘1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast, or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. 2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX shall be suspended.’ 11 Article 1(1) of the first contested regulation inserted a new Article 2f into Regulation No 833/2014, worded as follows: ‘1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. 2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV shall be suspended.’ 12 By the acts of 1 March 2022, a list of the legal persons, entities or bodies subject to the prohibition on broadcasting was added, respectively, as Annex IX to Decision 2014/512 and as Annex XV to Regulation No 833/2014 (‘the list at issue’). The applicants’ names are not on that list. 13 In view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted the acts of 3 June 2022, that is to say, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, the second contested decision and, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, the second contested regulation. 14 Article 1(10) of the second contested decision added a new paragraph 3 in Article 4g of Decision 2014/512, which reads as follows: ‘3. It shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX, including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1.’ 15 Article 1(1) of the second contested regulation added a new paragraph 3 in Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014, which has essentially the same wording. 16 Article 1(14) of the second contested decision and point 4 of the Annex thereto and Article 1(21) of the second contested regulation and Annex VI thereto amended the list at issue by adding to it the names of three further entities, which do not include those of the applicants. Forms of order sought 17 After modification of the application pursuant to Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicants claim that the Court should: – annul the contested acts; – order the Council to pay the costs. 18 In the final form of its pleadings, the Council claims, in essence, that the Court should: – dismiss the action and the statement of modification as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded; – order the applicants to pay the costs. 19 The Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the European Commission and the High Representative claim, in essence, that the action should be dismissed. Law 20 By their action and the modification of the application, the applicants seek annulment (i) of the acts of 1 March 2022, in so far as Article 4g, inserted in Decision 2014/512 by the first contested decision, and Article 2f, inserted in Regulation No 833/2014 by the first contested regulation, prohibit, in almost identical terms, the broadcasting of content from the media outlets named on the list at issue, and (ii) of the acts of 3 June 2022, in so far as Article 4g(3), inserted in Decision 2014/512 by the second contested decision, and Article 2f(3), inserted in Regulation No 833/2014 by the second contested regulation, prohibit, in almost identical terms, the advertising of products or services in content produced or broadcast by the media outlets named on the list at issue. 21 Although it has not formally raised an objection under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Council claims in its written pleadings that the action is inadmissible on the ground that the application for annulment of the acts of 1 March 2022 does not satisfy the criteria laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It also submits that the statement of modification is inadmissible on the grounds, first, that it does not meet the criteria set out in Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure and, second, that the applicants have neither an interest in bringing proceedings against the acts of 3 June 2022 nor locus standi to do so. Jurisdiction of the Court to examine the head of claim seeking annulment of the contested decisions 22 It is appropriate for the Court to examine of its own motion whether the claims seeking annulment of the first and second contested decisions (‘the contested decisions’) have been brought before a court with jurisdiction to examine them. Since the question of its jurisdiction to hear a dispute is a matter of public policy, such a question may be examined by the Court at any stage of the proceedings, even of its own motion (see judgments of 7 February 2024, Usmanov v Council, T‑237/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:56, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 15 May 2024, Russian Direct Investment Fund v Council, T‑235/22, not published, EU:T:2024:311, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). The parties submitted arguments on that point at the hearing, in reply to a written question sent to them before the hearing. 23 In that regard, it should be noted that the contested decisions were adopted under Article 29 TEU, which is a provision concerning the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 24 Although, pursuant to the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not, as a general rule, have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, it should nevertheless be recalled that the Treaties explicitly establish two exceptions to that rule. First, both the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU provide that the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU. Second, the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU confers on the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisdiction to review the legality of certain decisions referred to in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. The latter provision confers on the Courts of the European Union jurisdiction to give rulings on actions brought subject to the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, concerning the review of the legality of Council decisions adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP which provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). 25 As regards measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the CFSP, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited). 26 In that regard, it should be recalled that restrictive measures resemble both measures of general application, in that they require a general and abstract category of addressees to implement prohibitions relating to the activities of certain entities listed in their annexes, and also individual decisions in relation to those entities (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited). 27 In the present case, first, Article 4g(1) of Decision 2014/512, as inserted by Article 1(1) of the first contested decision, establishes that it is prohibited for ‘operators to broadcast, or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to [the broadcasting of], any content by [the media outlets named on the list at issue]’. Second, Article 4g(3) of Decision 2014/512, as inserted by Article 1(10) of the second contested decision, provides that it is prohibited to ‘advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by [the media outlets named on the list at issue], including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1’. 28 Accordingly, it must be found that the contested decisions refer explicitly to the media outlets on the list at issue, whose content is subject to the prohibitions imposed by the provisions referred to above. Those measures therefore target identified media outlets and are, in relation to them, restrictive measures against legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. 29 It is clear from the case-law that a decision providing for restrictive measures may be considered to be an individual measure if the person concerned is identified in the body of the decision or in a list annexed thereto, that is to say, if that person is referred to by name in that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 2024, Russian Direct Investment Fund v Council, T‑235/22, not published, EU:T:2024:311, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 30 Since the applicants’ names do not appear either in the body of Decision 2014/512, as amended, or in Annex IX thereto, as amended, the contested decisions are not restrictive measures against the applicants (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 104, and of 15 May 2024, Russian Direct Investment Fund v Council, T‑235/22, not published, EU:T:2024:311, paragraph 26). The restrictive measures at issue, which are provided for both by the contested decisions and by the first and second contested regulations (‘the contested regulations’), must be understood as being of general application as regards the applicants (see paragraph 27 above), since the latter are among the entities belonging to the general and abstract category of ‘operators’ that are prohibited from broadcasting content from the ‘legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX’ to Decision 2014/512, as amended, and as being of individual application as regards those persons, entities and bodies. 31 The applicants cannot therefore rely on the fact that the restrictive measures at issue are individual measures in relation to the media outlets identified in the body of Decision 2014/512, as amended, as a result of the explicit reference to the list at issue which contains their names, as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction to hear their action for annulment. 32 It follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction to examine the legality of the contested decisions. 33 On the other hand, the Court’s jurisdiction is not subject to any limitations as regards the contested regulations, which were adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU and give effect to the contested decisions, adopted in the context of the CFSP. Such regulations constitute European Union acts, adopted on the basis of the FEU Treaty, and the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the legality of those acts (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 106). 34 In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to rule only on the legality of the contested regulations. The application for annulment of the contested regulations Admissibility 35 The Council, supported by the Commission, claims in particular that the applicants, as internet service providers, are not directly concerned by the first contested regulation, because they have only an indirect obligation to block access to the websites of the media outlets subject to the restrictive measures at issue. The Council also submits that the modification of the application is inadmissible, on the grounds, first, that it does not satisfy the criteria set out in Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure and, second, that the applicants have neither an interest in bringing an action for annulment of the second contested regulation nor locus standi in such an action. The action and the modification of the application are therefore inadmissible. 36 The applicants dispute those arguments. 37 In that regard, it should be recalled that the Courts of the European Union are entitled to assess whether, according to the circumstances of each case, the proper administration of justice justifies the dismissal of an action on the merits without a prior ruling on its admissibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraphs 51 and 52). 38 In the present case, since the action is in any event unfounded, on the grounds set out below, it is necessary in the interests of procedural economy to examine it on the merits without a prior ruling on its admissibility. Substance 39 In support of the action, the applicants put forward three pleas in law, alleging, in essence, (i) that the Council lacked competence to adopt the contested regulations; (ii) infringement of the right to freedom of expression and information enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’); and (iii) infringement of the right to good administration guaranteed in Article 41 of the Charter. 40 It is appropriate to begin by examining the first plea, before examining the third plea and, last, the second plea. – The first plea, alleging that the Council lacked competence to adopt the contested regulations 41 The applicants submit that, when it adopted the contested regulations, the Council exceeded its competences in CFSP matters. Specifically, those regulations do not pursue one of the CFSP objectives identified in the document entitled ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’, adopted by the Council on 4 May 2018 (‘the Guidelines on restrictive measures’). The contested regulations are intended rather to regulate certain media content directly, in order to protect citizens of the European Union from harmful disinformation for an indefinite period and without there being any connection with the war in Ukraine. 42 According to the applicants, the regulation of media content in fact falls within the scope of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1), which, in particular, confers power to take action to penalise an audiovisual media outlet for inappropriate editorial content solely on the national authorities. Long before the adoption of the contested regulations, six Member States had in fact already adopted measures under that directive in relation to harmful media content from Russian media outlets. 43 The Council, supported by the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Commission and the High Representative, dispute the applicants’ arguments. 44 Even though it has been held, in paragraph 34 above, that a ruling is necessary only on the legality of the contested regulations, it should nevertheless be pointed out that, according to Article 215(2) TFEU, the Council may only adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty so provides. It follows that a precondition for ascertaining whether the Council was competent to adopt the contested regulations is that it must have been competent to adopt the contested decisions, which confer on it the power to adopt those regulations. 45 In that regard, it should be recalled that under Article 3(5) TEU the Union, in its relations with the wider world, is to uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It is to contribute to peace, security and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. 46 The contested decisions have their basis in Article 29 TEU. That provision, inserted in Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, on ‘Specific provisions on the [CFSP]’, confers on the Council the power to ‘adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’. In accordance with Article 23 TEU, the Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to that chapter, is to be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1, including, according to Article 21(1) TEU, democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, respect for human dignity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Article 24(1) TEU states that ‘the Union’s competence in matters of [CFSP] shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security’ (judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22 (‘the judgment in RT France’), EU:T:2022:483, paragraph 49). 47 According to the case-law, the combined effects of, on the one hand, Articles 21 and 23, Article 24(1) and Article 25 and the first subparagraph of Article 28(1) TEU and, on the other, Article 29 TEU are that decisions which (i) come within the framework of the CFSP, as defined in Article 24(1) TEU, (ii) relate to ‘a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’ and (iii) are not in the nature of ‘operational action’ within the meaning of Article 28 TEU constitute ‘approaches of the Union’ within the meaning of Article 29 TEU, namely actions entailing any operations, whether civil or military, led by one or more Member States, outside the European Union (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 48 The concept of ‘approach of the Union’ within the meaning of Article 29 TEU lends itself to a broad interpretation, with the effect that, provided that the conditions set out in paragraph 47 above are met, not only acts that are programmatic in nature or mere declarations of intent may be adopted on the basis of that article, but also, in particular, decisions providing for measures capable of directly affecting the legal position of individuals. That is moreover confirmed by the wording of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). 49 Given the vast scope of the aims and objectives of the CFSP, as expressed in Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU and in the specific provisions relating to that policy, in particular Articles 23 and 24 TEU, the Council has broad discretion to determine the persons and entities which will be subject to the restrictive measures that the European Union adopts in the field of the CFSP. The Council, faced with the international crisis caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, cannot therefore be criticised for considering that suitable measures to respond to the serious threat to peace on the borders of the European Union and to the violation of international law could include a prohibition of the broadcasting of the content of certain media outlets funded by the budget of the Russian State, on the ground that they supported that aggression by continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeting civil society in the European Union and neighbouring countries, gravely distorting and manipulating the facts (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 52). Similarly, in that context, the Council was also entitled, on the basis of the provisions relating to the CFSP, to adopt a prohibition on advertising products or services in content produced or broadcast by the media outlets on the list at issue. 50 It is apparent from recitals 8 and 19 respectively of the first and second contested decisions that, in the Council’s considered view, the actions referred to in paragraph 49 above constituted a significant and direct threat to the public order and security of the European Union, thereby justifying its intervention within the framework of the competences conferred on it by the EU Treaty in Chapter 2 of Title V (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 53). 51 Those interventions are therefore directly linked to the aims of the CFSP referred to in Article 21(2)(a) and (c) TEU, since they seek, first, to safeguard the values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity of the European Union and, second, to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 52 As regards the objectives pursued by the Council, recitals 4 to 10 of the first contested decision and recitals 4 and 5 and 17 to 20 of the second contested decision refer to the need to protect the European Union and its Member States against disinformation and destabilisation campaigns conducted by the media outlets under the control of the leadership of the Russian Federation which, in a context marked by military aggression against Ukraine, threaten the public order and security of the European Union. Those objectives therefore relate to public interests aimed at protecting European society and forming part of an overall strategy designed to bring the aggression suffered by Ukraine to an end as quickly as possible (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 55). 53 Since propaganda and disinformation campaigns are capable of undermining the foundations of democratic societies and are an integral part of the arsenal of modern warfare, the restrictive measures at issue are also integral to the pursuit by the European Union of the objectives assigned to it in Article 3(1) and (5) TEU (judgment in RT France, paragraph 56). 54 By adopting the contested decisions, the Council therefore exercised the competence attributed to the European Union by the provisions of the Treaties relating to the CFSP. That conclusion cannot be called into question by the Guidelines on restrictive measures, which, as the Council correctly submits, cannot in any event be interpreted as limiting that competence. 55 Nor can that conclusion be called into question by the line of argument that the Council exceeded the competences conferred on it by the Treaties by adopting measures intended to regulate certain media content directly in order to protect citizens of the European Union from harmful disinformation for an indefinite period and without there being any connection with the war in Ukraine. The contested acts are intended to impose restrictive measures in response to the actions and the policy of the Russian Federation seeking to destabilise Ukraine and to undermine its sovereignty and integrity. The applicants cannot therefore argue that, by adopting those measures, the Council relied on the provisions of the EU Treaty relating to the CFSP in order to regulate the content of the media outlets subject to those acts beyond the context of the actions and policies of the Russian Federation to destabilise Ukraine. 56 The same is also true of the applicants’ claim that the power to penalise an audiovisual media outlet for inappropriate editorial content falls only within the competence of the national regulatory authorities. First, the competences of the European Union, including those relating to the CFSP, cannot be excluded by or predicated on the existence or exercise of powers attributed by national law to an administrative authority. Thus, the fact that a national administrative authority has competence to adopt sanctions does not preclude, in specific circumstances, the competence conferred on the Council to adopt restrictive measures designed to prohibit, provisionally and reversibly, the broadcasting of certain media content (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 57). 57 Second, it should be borne in mind that the competence attributed to the national administrative authorities by domestic law does not pursue the same objectives, is not based on the same premisses or the same values and cannot guarantee the same results as uniform and immediate intervention throughout the territory of the European Union, such as the intervention that can be undertaken under the CFSP. It should also be noted that, in their enacting terms, the contested decisions are addressed to the operators, prohibiting them from broadcasting the content of the entities on the list at issue and from advertising in content produced or broadcast by those entities, by any means, including cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers or internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. Since those prohibitions apply irrespective of the Member State in which those operators are established and of the mode by which the content is broadcast, it follows that the intended results of the contested decisions could not have been achieved via the national regulatory authorities, since their competence is limited to the territory of the Member State to which each belongs and, consequently, any intervention by them could not be as effective as a general measure adopted under the CFSP (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 58). 58 Last, as regards the argument put forward by the applicants concerning, in essence, the division of the internal competences of the European Union, it must be found that the adoption of the contested acts cannot be called into question by the fact that the European Union is able to intervene, in the field of audiovisual services, on the basis of other categories of competences governed by the FEU Treaty, in particular the competences for the regulation of the internal market attributed to the Union under Article 4(2) TFEU (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 59). 59 In that regard, suffice it to recall that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 40 TEU, the implementation of the policies listed in Articles 3 to 6 TFEU is not to affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union’s competences under the CFSP (judgment in RT France, paragraph 60). 60 It follows that the competences of the European Union under the CFSP and under other provisions of the FEU Treaty in the third part of that Treaty, on the Union’s policies and internal actions, are not mutually exclusive but complementary, each having its own scope and aiming to achieve different objectives (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 61 As regards the Council’s competence to adopt the first contested regulation, it must be noted that, according to Article 215(2) TFEU, where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V TEU so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities. 62 In the present case, since, as recalled in paragraph 44 above, in order to ascertain whether the Council was competent to adopt the contested regulations, it is necessary first to ascertain whether it was competent to adopt the contested decisions granting it that power, it must be noted that, since the Council could validly adopt the contested decisions under Article 29 TEU, the adoption of the contested regulations under Article 215(2) TFEU was necessary, as is apparent from recitals 12 and 28 respectively of the first and second contested regulations, in order to ensure the uniform application of the restrictive measures at issue across the territory of the European Union. Since those measures can be implemented only by imposing on operators a temporary prohibition, first, on broadcasting the content of the media outlets on the list at issue and, second, on advertising in content produced or broadcast by those outlets, it is clear that the uniform application of those prohibitions throughout the territory of the European Union can be better achieved at EU level than at national level (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 63). 63 In the light of all the foregoing, the plea in law alleging that the Council lacked competence must be rejected as unfounded. – The third plea, alleging infringement of the right to good administration guaranteed by Article 41 of the Charter 64 By the third plea, the applicants allege infringement of the right to good administration guaranteed by Article 41 of the Charter as a result, in essence, of infringement of the obligation to state reasons enshrined in Article 296 TFEU. 65 According to the applicants, the Council has failed to fulfil its obligation to provide the actual and specific reasons why it found it necessary to adopt the restrictive measures at issue, relating, inter alia, to the context, gravity and particular urgency of the situation. As regards the context, the recitals of the contested regulations confine themselves to providing grounds relating only to the broadcasting activities of the media outlets, without taking account of the neutral role of ‘operators’ such as the applicants. As regards the gravity and urgency of the situation, the Council has not provided a sufficient statement of the reasons why in its view the media outlets named on the list at issue broadcast harmful propaganda justifying the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. 66 Nor has the Council fulfilled its obligation to provide reasons for the particular legal basis chosen in the contested regulations or its obligation to include in those regulations a detailed explanation of how they are necessary and proportionate and of how they comply with fundamental rights. 67 Last, the applicants criticise the Council for failing to document and publicise the decision-making process that led to the adoption of the contested regulations, thereby preventing the applicants from knowing their origin and context. 68 In the reply, the applicants also claim that the considerations in the judgment in RT France cannot be applied in the present case because in that judgment the sufficiency of the statement of reasons was assessed only in relation to RT France. 69 The Council, supported by the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Commission and the High Representative, disputes the applicants’ arguments. 70 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, despite the heading of the present plea in law, in which the applicants refer generically to infringement of the right to good administration guaranteed in Article 41 of the Charter, in reality they are claiming only an infringement of the obligation to state reasons. 71 According to settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an applicant is based is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, second, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited). 72 It should also be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU and by Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter must be appropriate to the nature of the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in receiving explanations. It is in particular not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question of whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited). 73 Thus, first, the reasons given for a decision adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that decision was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her. Second, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a measure must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for taking the measure (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). 74 In the light of that case-law, a distinction should be drawn according to whether the statement of reasons for the acts at issue concerns provisions of general application or concerns provisions which, for the persons to whom they are addressed, amount to restrictive measures of individual application (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 114). 75 In the case of provisions of general application, the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating, first, the overall situation which led to their adoption, and, second, the general objectives which they are intended to achieve (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited, and of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 68). 76 By contrast, in the case of provisions which are, for their addressees, restrictive measures of individual application, it has been made clear in the case-law that the statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposed a restrictive measure had not only to identify the legal basis for that measure but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted in respect of the person concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited). 77 It is in the light of those considerations that it is appropriate to determine whether the Council discharged its obligation to state the reasons for the provisions at issue to the requisite legal standard. 78 In the present case, it should be borne in mind that the contested regulations imposing the restrictive measures at issue are not of individual application in relation to the applicants (see paragraph 30 above). On the contrary, those measures are intended to establish a general prohibition for all operators, first, on broadcasting content from media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation and named on the list at issue and, second, on advertising in content produced or broadcast by those outlets. The question of whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must therefore be determined in the light of, first, the overall situation which led to the adoption of the provisions at issue, and, second, the general objectives which they are intended to achieve (see paragraph 75 above). 79 It must be borne in mind that, in paragraphs 112 and 113 of the judgment in RT France, the Court held that the statement of reasons for the first contested regulation was sufficient in relation to the applicant in that case, in respect of which that act was a measure of individual application. It follows that the first contested regulation necessarily contains a sufficient statement of reasons as regards the applicants in the present case, since, in relation to them, that regulation is an act of general application and the statement of reasons for it may, as is clear from the case-law set out in paragraph 75 above, be limited to indicating the overall situation which led to the adoption of the acts imposing the restrictive measures at issue and the general objectives that they are intended to achieve. 80 In that regard, as the Court has stated in paragraph 107 of the judgment in RT France, the general context that led the Council to adopt the restrictive measures at issue is clearly set out, in particular, in the recitals of the first contested regulation. First, recital 4 of that regulation refers to the European Council’s conclusions of 24 February 2022 (see paragraph 8 above), in which it condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ‘unprovoked and unjustified … aggression’ against Ukraine, called for the urgent preparation and adoption of a further individual and economic sanctions package and demanded, in particular, that the Russian Federation immediately stop its disinformation campaign. Second, recital 5 of that regulation refers to the Council’s conclusions of 10 May 2021, in which the Council underlined the need to further strengthen the Union’s and Member States’ resilience as well as their ability to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, and, inter alia, foreign interference and influence operations. The first contested regulation accordingly indicates the overall situation, which is known to the applicants, and the general objectives that the regulation is intended to achieve. The same is true of the second contested regulation. It must be noted that such justifications are also apparent from recitals 7 to 11 and 13 of the second contested regulation. 81 It must therefore be held that the Council stated sufficient reasons for the contested regulations, for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 75 above, according to which, in relation to acts of general application, it is not necessary to examine whether the Council has provided the ‘actual and specific reasons’ that led to the adoption of those acts. 82 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicants’ arguments. 83 In the first place, the Council cannot be criticised for failing to state sufficient reasons for its assessment of whether the restrictive measures at issue are necessary and proportionate and whether they comply with fundamental rights. In that regard, it should be recalled that, for the purposes of the case-law referred to in paragraph 72 above, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. Furthermore, the question of whether such measures are appropriate and necessary for achievement of their objectives, and that of whether they comply with fundamental rights, concern the examination of those measures on the merits (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Gazprom Neft v Council, T‑735/14 and T‑799/14, EU:T:2018:548, paragraph 126), which will be conducted under the second plea in law. 84 In the second place, the applicants’ arguments cannot succeed in so far as they claim that non-disclosure of the documents relating to the decision-making process is in itself a relevant circumstance for the purposes of determining whether the Council discharged its obligation to state reasons. As the Council correctly emphasises, there is no obligation under EU law to disclose those documents and their non-disclosure is not one of the relevant circumstances, referred to in paragraph 72 above, for assessing the sufficiency of the statement of reasons. 85 After all, the applicants, first, were in a position to understand the prohibitions at issue, and set out the reasons why they were challenging those measures, and, second, fully understood that they were required to act in implementation of those measures, even though they are not broadcasters. 86 In the light of all the foregoing, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. – The second plea, alleging infringement of freedom of expression and information 87 By their second plea, the applicants claim that the contested regulations infringe the freedom of expression and information guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). 88 In particular, according to the applicants, the restrictive measures at issue restrict their freedom to impart information. 89 In that regard, the applicants claim that they are required to conduct comprehensive filtering in order to recognise any content from the media outlets named on the list at issue, irrespective of the platform on which it appears, who published it and the purpose and context of that publication, and that the foregoing constitutes a far-reaching interference with their right to freedom of expression and information. 90 Such a comprehensive prohibition also constitutes a restriction on the right of the users of the applicants’ services to impart and receive information, which is an integral part of the applicants’ right to impart information. 91 According to the applicants, a restriction of that nature on freedom of expression and information does not comply with the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, in particular as regards those requiring that limitations on the exercise of that right must be provided for by law, proportionate and necessary. In that regard, the applicants claim, in the reply, that the reasoning in the judgment in RT France cannot be applied mutatis mutandis in the present case, in particular due to their ‘neutral position’ as internet service providers. 92 Specifically, as regards, in the first place, the requirement that the restrictive measures at issue must be provided for by law, the applicants submit that the measures are insufficiently clear and predictable. 93 In the second place, as regards whether those measures are necessary, the applicants submit, first, that the Council failed to take into account the fact that the present case falls within the field of political speech and matters of public interest, meaning that a high level of protection of freedom of expression should be afforded in respect of the content of the media outlets subject to the prohibition at issue. 94 Second, the applicants criticise the Council for failing to substantiate the assertions made in the contested regulations concerning, in essence, the reasons for establishing a general prohibition on broadcasting content from the media outlets named on the list at issue and on advertising in content produced or broadcast by them and the urgency of doing so; the grounds on which those media outlets are allegedly ‘essential and instrumental’ in the war in Ukraine; the grounds indicating how those media outlets gravely distort and manipulate the facts; and the impact or effect of their activities within the European Union. 95 Third, the contested regulations are founded on an incorrect interpretation of the right to freedom of expression and information, because disinformation and propaganda cannot be regarded as ‘unlawful’ content. 96 Fourth, the Council, moreover, has not strictly targeted the unlawful content of the entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue, but has instead adopted restrictions relating to all the content of those entities completely without distinction. 97 Last, the applicants dispute the effectiveness of the contested regulations, on the ground that it has not been proven that the prohibitions at issue help substantially in stopping the spread of disinformation about the aggression in Ukraine. On the contrary, according to the applicants, it is still possible to access the content covered by that prohibition. 98 In the third place, as regards whether the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate, the applicants claim, in essence, that measures other than a complete prohibition on broadcasting were conceivable and that, in any event, those measures could have been limited to the fields of broadcasting and video-on-demand services, rather than being designed so broadly that a potentially large amount of content is likely to fall under the prohibition. Furthermore, those measures are not clearly limited in time and in fact result, in essence, in a permanent preventive ban. 99 In the reply and in their observations on the statements in intervention, the applicants also argue, in essence, that the contested regulations are not in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 10 ECHR, in particular as regards procedural safeguards and prior restraints. 100 The Council, supported by the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Commission and the High Representative, disputes the applicants’ arguments. 101 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that respect for fundamental rights is required of all actions of the European Union, including in the implementation, through regulations under Article 215 TFEU, of decisions adopted in the field of the CFSP. 102 Under Article 11(1) of the Charter, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of borders. Under Article 11(2) of the Charter, the freedom and pluralism of the media are to be respected. 103 Article 11 of the Charter is an essential foundation of a pluralist, democratic society and, in accordance with Article 2 TEU, is one of the values on which the Union is based (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige and Watson and Others, C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 93, and of 23 April 2020, Associazione Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI, C‑507/18, EU:C:2020:289, paragraph 48). 104 The rights and freedoms enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter are not absolute rights, but must be considered in relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited). 105 As is apparent from the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the rights contained therein have the same meaning and scope as the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, which does not preclude EU law from affording more extensive protection (judgment of 22 June 2023, K.B. and F.S. (Raising ex officio of an infringement in criminal proceedings), C‑660/21, EU:C:2023:498, paragraph 41). 106 In interpreting Article 11 of the Charter, it is therefore necessary to take into account the corresponding rights guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2022, Autorité des marchés financiers, C‑302/20, EU:C:2022:190, paragraph 67, and of 12 January 2023, Migracijos departamentas (Reasons for persecution on the ground of political opinion), C‑280/21, EU:C:2023:13, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 107 It is clear from the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that Article 10 ECHR guarantees freedom of expression and information to everyone and applies not only to the content of information but also to the means of dissemination, since any restriction imposed on those means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information (see ECtHR, 28 September 1999, Öztürk v. Turkey, CE:ECHR:1999:0928JUD002247993, § 49 and the case-law cited). 108 In the present case, it should be noted that the applicants are relying, in essence, first, on an infringement of their right to freedom to impart information and, second, on the right of the users of their services to freedom to receive or to impart information. 109 In the first place, as regards the alleged infringement of the applicants’ freedom to impart information, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, contrary to what they are asserting, the fact that they play a neutral role in the broadcasting of content does not preclude a number of considerations set out by the Court in the judgment in RT France from being transposed to the present case, where those considerations relate to the restrictive measures at issue from an objective perspective. 110 Even assuming that internet service providers, such as the applicants, which after all describe themselves as operators providing internet access to individuals or businesses (see paragraph 3 above), may be regarded as holders of an autonomous right to freedom to impart information, despite relying on their neutral role in the broadcasting of content, the applicants’ arguments cannot succeed. 111 Even if the temporary prohibition on contributing to the broadcasting of content of the media outlets subject to the restrictive measures at issue, imposed by the first contested regulation, and that on advertising products or services in content broadcast by those outlets, imposed by the second contested regulation, could amount to interference with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom to impart information, it should be borne in mind that Article 52(1) of the Charter allows limitations on the exercise of the rights it enshrines. Thus, in order to comply with EU law, an interference with freedom of expression must satisfy four conditions. First, the limitation in question must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s freedom of expression must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, the limitation in question must respect the essence of freedom of expression. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate. Those conditions correspond, in essence, to those provided for by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which, in order to be justified under Article 10(2) ECHR, an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be ‘prescribed by law’, pursue one or more legitimate aims and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve them (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraphs 143 to146). 112 As regards the first condition, that any restriction on freedom of expression and information must be provided for by law, it should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue are provided for by law, since they are contained in legal acts which, inter alia, are of general application and have clear legal bases in EU law. The contested regulations were adopted under Article 215 TFEU in order to implement the contested decisions, which had been adopted under Article 29 TEU. 113 It should be borne in mind that a person or entity must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences to which a given action may give rise. Specifically, those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. A law which confers a discretion is thus not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question of affording the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited). 114 It was therefore foreseeable, for internet service providers which enable the broadcasting of content in support of the Russian Federation’s military aggression in Ukraine, put out during television and internet broadcasts by media outlets entirely funded by the Russian State budget, that they might be the subject of restrictive measures consisting of a prohibition on the broadcasting of propaganda activities in support of that aggression and that, therefore, a prohibition on the broadcasting of content from those media outlets might be imposed on any operator, ‘including through transmission or distribution by any means such as … internet service providers’. The foregoing is especially so in view of the broad discretion available to the Council when adopting restrictive measures and having regard to the important role played by the media, in particular the audiovisual media, in modern society (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 151 and the case-law cited). 115 In those circumstances, it must be held that the condition that limitations on freedom of expression and information must be provided for by law is satisfied in the present case. 116 As regards the second condition, relating to interference with the essential content of the applicants’ freedom to impart information, it should be noted that the prohibition on broadcasting content from certain media outlets, in common with the prohibition on advertising in content produced or broadcast by those outlets, concerns the freedom to receive or impart the content of only a small number of media outlets. This means that those prohibitions cannot interfere with the essential content of the freedom on which the applicants rely. 117 Furthermore, it is clear from the wording of the last part of recital 10 and recital 11 respectively of the first and second contested regulations, read and interpreted in the light of the requirement to limit interference with freedom of expression and information as far as possible, that the measures established by those regulations could be maintained, on the one hand, ‘until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end’ and, on the other, until ‘the Russian Federation, and its associated media outlets, cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union and its Member States’. As those two criteria are cumulative, if one of them ceased to be satisfied, there would be no further need to maintain the restrictive measures at issue (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 155). It cannot therefore be claimed that, as the applicants assert, the contested regulations are intended to apply without a time limit defined in advance by the Council. 118 The fact that the restrictive measures at issue were maintained subsequently, since those conditions were still satisfied, cannot call into question the fact that they are temporary and reversible. In addition, contrary to what the applicants appear to be claiming, that circumstance cannot be taken into account, since the legality of the contested regulations must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when they were adopted (see judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C‑123/18 P, EU:C:2019:694, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 119 Last, as regards the argument that the filtering of content which the applicants are allegedly obliged to carry out generates a large amount of work and high costs for the applicants, even assuming that argument to be based on a correct interpretation of the obligation under Article 2f of Regulation No 833/2014, introduced by the first contested regulation, it is irrelevant in the context of assessing interference with the essence of the right to impart information and may amount, at most, as emphasised by the Council, supported by the Republic of Estonia, the Commission and the High Representative, to potential infringement of the freedom to conduct a business, no such infringement having, however, been invoked by the applicants. 120 As regards the prohibition on advertising, imposed by Article 1(1) of the second contested regulation, contrary to what the applicants are claiming, it is clearly intended, essentially, to prohibit undertakings that operate in the territory of the European Union from purchasing advertising space on the channels and websites of the media outlets named on the list at issue. It follows that, as the Council notes, a prohibition of that kind is not such as to create an obligation on internet service providers, such as the applicants, to prevent their users from broadcasting advertising in content produced or broadcast by the media outlets subject to the restrictive measures or simply from accessing such advertising. Contrary to what the applicants are claiming, it is clear from the wording of Article 1(1) of the second contested regulation that the prohibition it establishes does not concern advertising of the content of those media outlets but instead imposes a requirement not to advertise in content produced or broadcast by them. 121 In those circumstances, it cannot be found that the prohibitions at issue interfere with the essence of the applicants’ freedom to impart information. 122 As regards the third condition, relating to pursuit of an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, it should be noted that the Court has held, as is apparent from recitals 5 to 10 of the first contested regulation and from recitals 7 to 11 of the second contested regulation, that the restrictive measures at issue pursued the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(a) TEU, of safeguarding the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security and integrity; that they formed part of the pursuit by the European Union of the objectives, including the peaceful objectives, assigned to it in Article 3(1) and (5) TEU; that they were consistent with the objective, referred to in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; and, last, that they sought to put an end to the state of war and to the violations of international humanitarian law to which war is liable to lead, which also meets an objective of fundamental general interest for the international community (see the judgment in RT France, paragraphs 161 to 166 and the case-law cited). 123 In those circumstances, it must be found that, in the present case, the condition relating to the pursuit of an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union is satisfied. 124 As regards the fourth condition, that the restrictive measures at issue must be proportionate, it should be noted that the principle of proportionality requires that the limitations which may be imposed by acts of EU law on rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to meet the legitimate objectives pursued or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see the judgment in RT France, paragraph 168 and the case-law cited). 125 The Court has held, in the judgment in RT France, that the Council did not err by considering it necessary to prevent, in compliance with Article 11 of the Charter, forms of expression designed to justify and support an act of military aggression perpetrated in violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, and that, taking account, inter alia, of the extraordinary context of that case, it was appropriate to find that the limitations which were liable to result from the restrictive measures at issue on the freedom of expression of RT France and, by definition, of the other media outlets subject to the prohibition at issue, were proportionate, inasmuch as they were appropriate and necessary for the aims pursued (see the judgment in RT France, paragraphs 192 to 213 and the case-law cited). It must be noted, however, that in the foregoing analysis the proportionality of the contested regulations was examined in relation to RT France, which is one of the entities expressly subject to the restrictive measures at issue. 126 In the present case, by contrast, that analysis must relate to the proportionality of the contested regulations in relation to the applicants, since they are relying on an infringement of their own right to freedom of expression and information and, in particular, to freedom to impart information. 127 First of all, it is necessary to ascertain whether the restrictive measures at issue are appropriate, in relation to the applicants, in order to achieve the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. In that regard, it must be held that the Council could validly consider that those restrictive measures, which were targeted at media outlets controlled by members of the leadership of the Russian Federation engaged in propaganda actions in support of its military invasion of Ukraine, were capable of protecting the public order and security of the European Union and of preserving the integrity of democratic debate within European society, peace and international security (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 193). 128 It must be borne in mind that the prohibitions at issue, inasmuch as they form part of a package of restrictive measures adopted in the aftermath of the military aggression in Ukraine, also constitute appropriate measures for achieving the objective of exerting maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against that country. 129 Given that the restrictive measures at issue are intended to prohibit, first, the broadcasting of content from the media outlets controlled by members of the leadership of the Russian Federation engaged in propaganda actions in support of the military invasion of Ukraine, which are named on the list at issue, and, second, the advertising of products and services in content broadcast by those outlets, it was appropriate for the Council to take internet service providers, such as the applicants, into consideration in the same way as any of the means of content transmission or distribution, as operators that are expected to ensure the application, and therefore the effectiveness, of those prohibitions in the territory of the European Union. In addition, it is necessary to note, as the Council does, that the advertising prohibition is also appropriate in order to increase pressure on the Russian authorities. 130 The fact, claimed by the applicants, that the restrictive measures at issue are not suited to their purpose, because the website of the Russia Today newspaper can still be accessed everywhere in the European Union, cannot call into question the appropriateness of the broadcasting prohibition at issue. Possible difficulties in applying the contested regulations cannot render those measures inappropriate. 131 It follows that the restrictive measures at issue are appropriate for achieving the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union. 132 As regards whether, in relation to the applicants, the limitations are necessary, it is clear that the prohibitions at issue are general measures imposed on the applicants as they are on other internet service providers and other information society operators. In view of the particular nature of those prohibitions, which must be given widespread application throughout the territory of the European Union, they were intrinsically necessary in order effectively to pursue the objectives inherent in the restrictive measures at issue. 133 The prohibitions at issue, in order to be sufficiently effective and to have the effects pursued by the restrictive measures at issue, which are targeted at media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation that has put in place a systematic propaganda campaign in support of the military aggression in Ukraine (the judgment in RT France, paragraphs 161 and 162), necessarily had to relate to all forms of broadcasting, including by ‘internet service providers’, and could not be limited, as the applicants claim they could (see paragraph 98 above), to the fields of broadcasting and video-on-demand services. It should also be noted that the applicants have not invoked any less onerous alternative measure that would have been as effective in achieving the objectives pursued by the measures at issue. 134 Last, on a weighing up of the interests at play, the disadvantages involved in the prohibitions at issue are not disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued. In that regard, the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested regulations, which form part of the wider objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any negative consequences, even considerable ones, for certain operators which bear no responsibility for the situation that led to the adoption of the restrictive measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited). In addition, it should be borne in mind that the applicants are required merely not to contribute to the broadcasting of content from those media outlets, which are moreover very limited in number. Accordingly, the restrictive measures at issue do not prevent the applicants from exercising their fundamental rights and, in particular, their purported freedom to impart information, since the applicants are permitted to provide access to all other content to the internet users under contract with them. The applicants have therefore not established that the contested regulations interfered disproportionately with their freedom to impart information. 135 In the light of all the foregoing, it should be found that, even assuming that the applicants are entitled to rely on any freedom to impart information, the limitations on that freedom that are liable to result from the restrictive measures at issue are proportionate, inasmuch as they are appropriate, necessary and strictly proportionate to the aims sought. 136 In the second place, as regards the alleged infringement of the right to freedom of expression and information of the users of the applicants’ services, users that are supposedly prevented from accessing the content of the media outlets subject to the restrictive measures at issue, it must be noted that the right in question concerns not only the right to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 1 December 2015, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, CE:ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, § 56 and the case-law cited). 137 In the present case, the applicants have not indicated to what extent or, above all, in what capacity, given that they are internet service providers and that their role is therefore that of a ‘mere conduit’ of the information transmitted, they are able to rely on the right to freedom of expression and information of the users of their services. 138 Even assuming that those users, legal or natural persons provided with internet access by the applicants, were able to invoke an infringement of a right to freedom of expression and information, in particular of the right to freedom to receive information, it nevertheless remains true that the applicants cannot adduce in support of their action for annulment a right that they do not hold (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 June 2022, Anglo Austrian AAB and Belegging-Maatschappij ‘Far-East’ v ECB, T‑797/19, EU:T:2022:389, paragraph 285, confirmed on appeal by judgment of 12 September 2024 , Anglo Austrian AAB v ECB and Far East, C‑579/22 P, EU:C:2024:731). It is clear from the case-law that infringement of an individual right may, in principle, be relied on only by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, and not by third parties (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 September 2019, Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry v Commission, T‑228/17, EU:T:2019:619, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 139 In the present case, the applicants have merely indicated, in completely generic terms, that no remedies before the national courts were available to the users of their services in which to claim interference with their right to receive and impart information. The applicants have not, however, explained in what capacity and on what legal basis they are entitled, on behalf of those users, to rely on the alleged infringement of their right in an action for annulment before the General Court. 140 Nor can that conclusion be called into question by the applicants’ arguments to the effect that their right to impart information and the right of the users to receive and impart information, guaranteed in Article 11(1) of the Charter, are inseparable. It should be pointed out that, even if the applicants could rely on a right of their own to impart information, the limitations thereon that are liable to result from the restrictive measures at issue comply with Article 52(1) of the Charter (see paragraph 135 above). In any event, it is clear that if interference with the right to broadcast content that involves support for an act of aggression is justified and proportionate, the same applies a fortiori to a limitation of the public’s right to receive the information conveyed by that content (see, to that effect, the judgment in RT France, paragraph 214). 141 Last, as regards Article 11(2) of the Charter, it is clear that the applicants merely invoked it, for the first time, at the hearing, and did not in fact specify on what basis that provision, which relates specifically to respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media, whether that freedom be that of journalists or of publishers and media organisations, applies to the applicants, which are not media outlets but internet service providers. 142 In the light of all the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, with no requirement to rule on the admissibility of the additional evidence produced by the applicants under Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure. Costs 143 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 144 According to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania and the Commission, which had for its part applied for the applicants to be ordered to pay the costs, must bear their own costs. 145 According to Article 138(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court may order an intervener other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof to bear his or her own costs. In the present case, the High Representative must be ordered to bear her own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders A2B Connect BV, BIT BV and Freedom Internet BV to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to bear their own costs. Van der Woude Mastroianni Brkan Gâlea Tóth Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 March 2025. T. Henze S. Papasavvas Deputy Registrar President * Language of the case: English.