Information;Order — ECLI:EU:C:2024:712
Date: 2024-09-03
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC;Procedural provisions
Procedure: Staff cases;Action for damages;Application as to costs

summary of the pleas and complaints must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action. 46 It is thus clear from reading Article 12(6)(i) in conjunction with Article 24(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 L 53, p. 1) that it is FRA’s Management Board that is empowered to adopt the implementing measures for the Staff Regulations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 110 of those regulations. 47 Therefore, in so far as Decision 2009/13 must be considered to be an implementing rule for the Staff Regulations, within the meaning of Article 110(2) of those regulations, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the General Court must raise of its own motion any plea as to the lack of competence of the author of the contested measure (see, inter alia, judgment of 14 December 2016, SV Capital v ABE, C‑577/15 P, EU:C:2016:947, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 48 It follows that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 306 of the judgment under appeal that, as the appellant had not sufficiently substantiated her argument alleging that the author of Decision 2009/13 lacked competence, that argument had to be rejected. 49 However, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that an error of law committed by the General Court does not invalidate a judgment under appeal if its operative part is well founded on other legal grounds (judgment of 20 September 2018, Spain v Commission, C‑114/17 P, EU:C:2018:753, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 50 In the present case, Decision 2009/13 could not be classified as a general provision implementing the Staff Regulations adopted on the basis of Article 110 of those regulations, but was, as FRA submitted in its written pleadings, an internal decision intended to guide the body responsible for staff matters. In that regard, Article 15(4)(c) of Regulation No 168/2007 provides that the FRA Director shall be responsible for ‘all staff matters, and in particular the exercise in respect of staff of the powers laid down in Article 24(2)’. 51 Therefore, although the General Court could not, in the present case, merely state that the complaint alleging lack of competence had to be rejected on the ground that it was not sufficiently substantiated, that complaint could not in any event succeed given that Decision 2009/13, even if it were applicable directly or indirectly to the present case, is not a general implementing measure adopted under Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, the adoption of which is, as provided for in Article 24(3) of Regulation No 168/2007, the sole preserve of FRA’s Management Board in agreement with the Commission, but an internal management provision which the Director is empowered to adopt. 52 It is clear from all of those considerations that the first ground of appeal must be rejected. The second ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 53 The appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court, first, did not examine the third head of her claim, seeking compensation for the harm resulting from FRA’s failure to adopt lawful rules concerning the appraisal and reclassification of its members of staff and the renewal of their contracts, which constituted a failure to act within the meaning of Article 265 TFEU and, secondly, failed to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction, as requested under her fifth head of claim, thereby disregarding the requirements stemming from its obligation to ensure that the law is observed, in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 268 TFEU. 54 Thus, as a preliminary point, the appellant notes that the EU courts are required to examine of their own motion any plea alleging lack of competence and infringement of essential procedural requirements in the adoption of an act. On the basis of the findings in paragraph 230 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 231 of that judgment, that the procedure for adopting the contested decision was governed not only by Decision 2009/13, but also and above all by the obligations incumbent on the administration under Article 266 TFEU. She infers from this that FRA relied on Article 266 TFEU because the rules governing the renewal of contracts were unlawful at the time of the adoption of the initial non-renewal decision and remained so at the time of the adoption of the second non-renewal decision, which the General Court had, in essence, validated in paragraph 230 of the judgment under appeal. 55 The appellant takes the view that the General Court was obliged to examine the facts at issue, which it had not done. It follows that the findings set out in paragraphs 230, 308 and 309 of the judgment under appeal were not based on the facts on which her application, which criticised the failure to consult the Staff Committee and the lack of competence of the author of Decision 2009/13, was based. That examination is particularly important as the decisions of the EU courts affect, beyond the individual interest of the appellant, the public interest. The appellant also criticises the General Court for having failed to take into account the overall context of the case, in particular the judgment of 11 July 2019, BP v FRA (T‑838/16, not published, EU:T:2019:494), ordering FRA to compensate her for the harm she had suffered because of the disclosure of her personal data. She concludes from this that the General Court failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure that the law is observed guaranteed in Article 19(1) TEU, committed a manifest error of assessment, distorted the evidence, breached its duty to give reasons and infringed the right to a fair trial. 56 More specifically, the appellant disputes the findings made by the General Court in paragraphs 311 and 333 of the judgment under appeal. 57 The General Court erred, according to her, in finding, in paragraph 311 of that judgment, that the appellant claimed compensation, first, for the damage suffered as a result of the contested decision and the unlawful implementation of the judgment on appeal and, secondly, for the damage resulting from the adoption by FRA of unlawful rules on appraisal, reclassification and renewal. The appellant submits that she did not dispute the fact that FRA had adopted unlawful rules, but the fact that it had failed to adopt lawful rules, which is different. The error made in paragraph 311 of the judgment under appeal is established, first, by the misreading by the General Court of her third head of claim, secondly, by the distortion of the sense of the words used in the third head of claim and thirdly, by the distortion of the legal basis applicable to the two texts, namely, the text of the head of claim and the text of paragraph 311 of the judgment under appeal. She submits that in order to address her claim for compensation the General Court had the duty to assess the part of her claim relating to FRA’s failure to act and thus the evidence she had submitted in that regard for the purpose of establishing whether FRA had failed to fulfil its obligation to adopt lawful rules. 58 The appellant also submits that the General Court erred in finding, in paragraph 333 of the judgment under appeal, in relation to her fifth head of claim, that the examination of the pleas in the action had not disclosed any factors justifying, in the circumstances, the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations. She submits, in essence, that the General Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 19(1) TEU, and that a diligent exercise of that jurisdiction should have led it to conclude that FRA had failed to adopt lawful rules and to draw inferences from that failure, in accordance with the relevant case-law concerning pecuniary disputes, in the context of its unlimited jurisdiction. 59 FRA contends that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. Findings of the Court 60 By her second ground of appeal, referring essentially to paragraphs 230, 308 to 311 and 333 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court, in essence, ruled infra petita, by not ruling on all of the heads of claim that she had put forward. By the first part of that ground of appeal, she criticises the General Court for not having ruled on her third head of claim, seeking compensation for the damage suffered by her as a result of FRA’s failure to adopt lawful rules for the appraisal and reclassification of its members of staff and for the renewal of their contracts, which constituted a failure to act, within the meaning of Article 265 TFEU. By the second part of that ground, she criticises the General Court for not having ruled on her fifth head of claim, inviting that court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction. 61 As regards the first part of that second ground of appeal, it is apparent from the application initiating proceedings submitted by the appellant before the General Court that she sought compensation for harm which she considered that she had suffered on account, inter alia, of the absence of lawful implementing rules, as she pleaded loss of salary, loss of opportunity to be reclassified and loss of income. As is apparent from paragraphs 318 to 333 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not expressly rule on that application. 62 The General Court, in effect, in paragraph 319 of the judgment under appeal, analysed the application before it as asking the Court to declare FRA’s appraisal rules unlawful at the time of the appellant’s appraisal for the years 2009 and 2010. In the circumstances of the case, it held, first, in paragraphs 322 to 324 of the judgment under appeal, that, in invoking the unlawfulness of the rules on appraisal, the appellant sought indirectly to challenge the lawfulness of the 2009 and 2010 CDRs and it consequently dismissed the claim relating to that paragraph as inadmissible. Secondly, the General Court noted, in paragraphs 331 and 332 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant submitted that Decision 2009/13 was unlawful in that it was, inter alia, adopted by an authority without competence to do so and without consultation of the Staff Committee, and it rejected the claim on that point, referring in that regard to its analysis, in paragraphs 302 to 309 of the judgment under appeal, of the third part of the second plea in law, pleading the unlawfulness of that decision. 63 However, even if one accepts that the failure of an institution or agency to adopt lawful rules on appraisal and reclassification is, if established, comparable to a failure to act, within the meaning of Article 265 TFEU, which, in turn, would confer entitlement to compensation, it is apparent from paragraphs 302 and 308 of the judgment under appeal, first, that the appellant is wrong to maintain that the General Court took the view that Decision 2009/13, which was applicable in the present case, was unlawful and, secondly, that FRA was required to act in the manner suggested by the appellant. 64 As regards the second part of the second ground of appeal, alleging the failure by the General Court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction, it must be rejected as unfounded in that it is based on an incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal. It is clear from paragraph 333 of that judgment that the General Court did not fail to rule on that head of claim but held that there was no need for it to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction since the examination of the pleas in law had not disclosed any factor justifying its exercise in the present case. 65 In the light of those considerations, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. The third ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 66 The third ground of appeal alleges infringement, by the General Court, of Articles 35, 36, 64 and 65 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, infringement of the principle of audi alteram partem, disregard for the rules of evidence, infringement of the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial and infringement of Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 67 The appellant notes generally that the General Court did not refer to the evidence set out in Annexes A.20 and A.28 to her application at first instance, except in paragraph 327 of the judgment under appeal, in which it found that her application was not sufficiently substantiated regarding her having been denied the benefit of a reclassification procedure on account of the absence of lawful rules on reclassification, together with the delays in drawing up her CDRs, and that she confined herself ‘to referring to the audit report of the European Commission’s Internal Audit Service, with no indication as to the relevant annex’. She submits, however, in that regard, that she became aware, after she received FRA’s defence, that there was a possibility that FRA had not received all the evidence submitted, which is why, on 25 September 2017, she sent the General Court a letter containing the evidence in question, requesting it to ascertain whether FRA had received all the evidence. She notes, however, that that letter was apparently not notified to FRA and that she was not informed of the outcome of her request, which was an infringement of Articles 35, 36, 64 and 65 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and of the principle of audi alteram partem, the principle of transparency and of the right to be heard. 68 The appellant argues, moreover, that, contrary to what is stated by the General Court in paragraph 101 of the judgment under appeal, the ‘first’ offer of evidence that she submitted was on 21 July 2017 (Annexes F.1 to F.9) and not on 11 September 2017. She notes, however, that the judgment under appeal did not reject any of the nine items of evidence submitted, annexed under numbers F.1 to F.9 to her reply, that it did not refer to them and that it did not state the reasons why they were not taken into consideration, even though they were relevant in the light of her heads of claim and her pleas in law. She infers from this that the General Court did not examine her application, that it could not therefore reach the conclusions set out in paragraphs 305, 306 and 309 of the judgment under appeal, that it therefore distorted the evidence and facts submitted and, as a result, infringed the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial. 69 FRA disputes the appellant’s line of argument in its entirety. It contends that the third ground of appeal is in part manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded. Findings of the Court 70 It is clear that under the guise of a ground of appeal expressed in very general terms, alleging, in essence, infringement by the General Court of its duty of care in the taking and assessment of the evidence adduced before it, the appellant reiterates, to a large extent, the arguments put forward in support of her first two grounds of appeal, in particular, those in which she criticises the assessment of the plea of illegality which she invoked and the consequences of that assessment on her claim for compensation, and, in short, invites the Court of Justice to re-examine the various items and offers of evidence that she adduced before the General Court. 71 Therefore, the ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety, since the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence that the General Court accepted in support of those facts. Provided that that evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the General Court alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced before it. That assessment does not, therefore, constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgments of 16 June 2016, Evonik Degussa and AlzChem v Commission, C‑155/14 P, EU:C:2016:446, paragraph 23, and of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 72 It follows from those considerations that the third ground of appeal must also be rejected. The fourth ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 73 The fourth ground of appeal alleges infringement by the General Court of the rights of the defence, the right to be heard and the right of access to relevant information, guaranteed under Article 41 of the Charter, distortion of the evidence, infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial, guaranteed under Article 47 of the Charter, and a failure to state reasons. 74 The appellant submits, by a first part of that ground of appeal, that the conclusion, which the General Court reached in paragraph 161 of the judgment under appeal, that the right to be heard had not been infringed is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and a distortion of the evidence. She notes that her hearing before the new FRA Director on 18 December 2015, referred to by the General Court in paragraph 154 of the judgment under appeal, took place two days after his nomination. If the General Court had examined the facts, it would have found that that hearing was ineffective, because the FRA Director was not familiar with the file, and unlawful because the appellant was not informed of the decision that the Director intended to take. She points out that she did not have the opportunity to make her views known either on the negative factors identified in respect of her, the first reason for the non-renewal of her contract, or on the limited budget available, the second reason for the non-renewal, as FRA did not notify her of that information. She submits, more specifically, that FRA was untruthful in relation to the limited budget available, that the General Court neither examined the evidence annexed under numbers A.20 and A.28, proving that untruthfulness, nor responded to her request of 25 September 2017 asking it to ensure that FRA had received that evidence and that, lastly, it did not state the reasons for not taking that evidence into consideration. 75 In the second part of the fourth ground of appeal, which refers to paragraphs 171 to 181 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court was not entitled to find that she had access to both incriminating and exculpatory evidence and, therefore, that there was no infringement of the right of access to the file. She points out, in that regard, that she was not given a fair hearing before the FRA Director adopted the contested decision, as she was not in fact in a position to make known her point of view on the evidence that could be adduced against her, and that she was not given disclosure of the documents on which the Director based that decision, in particular the incriminatory evidence. She notes, moreover, that she demonstrated that the ground alleging limited budgetary resources was unfounded. 76 In the third part of the fourth ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the appellant submits, in the first place, that the manner in which the General Court described her seventh plea in law in paragraph 137 of the judgment under appeal is inaccurate. She submitted, in her application, that FRA had given her the opportunity to comment on the opinion of 24 February 2012 but did not take into consideration her ‘list of objections’ or state the reasons for not taking it into consideration. She takes the view that that material inaccuracy and error in the classification of the documents in the file, her list of objections being classified as ‘comments’, together with the fact that the General Court did not correctly take into account any of her arguments, constitutes an error of law. The appellant submits, in the second place, that the conclusion that the General Court reached in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, that FRA provided sufficient reasons for its decision and that it was not required to answer all the arguments that she had put forward, is also vitiated by an insufficient and defective statement of reasons. She notes, in that regard, that the contested decision was based on two factors, insufficient budgetary resources and below average CDRs. However, she proved that the claim that there was an insufficient budget was inaccurate and demonstrated that the CDRs were adopted unlawfully, which were essential and decisive factors in the light of the requirement to state reasons referred to by the General Court in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal. In referring only to the first reason, without considering the second, the General Court therefore failed to clarify the facts and to state reasons for its judgment, infringed the right to be heard, committed a manifest error of assessment, infringed the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial. 77 FRA disputes all the arguments put forward in support of the fourth ground of appeal. It submits that that ground of appeal must be rejected as in part manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, as manifestly unfounded. Findings of the Court 78 In her fourth ground of appeal, the appellant argues, in essence, that in rejecting her first plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, and the two parts of her seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to access to the file, the General Court either distorted the facts and evidence which she had submitted to it or made manifest errors of assessment. 79 By the first part of her fourth ground of appeal, the appellant essentially puts forward two arguments. 80 The appellant disputes, first, having been given a fair hearing by the new FRA Director, as she was not informed in advance of the content of the decision that he intended to adopt and the incriminatory evidence that he intended to accept for that purpose was not made available to her. However, it is clear from paragraphs 154 to 157 of the judgment under appeal that she had an ample opportunity to express her point of view both before and after her hearing before the new FRA Director and that she had, inter alia, made written comments on the draft decision. That argument must therefore be rejected as unfounded. 81 Secondly, she submits that the General Court distorted the evidence by which she sought to demonstrate that FRA had been untruthful concerning the second reason for the non-renewal of her contract, relating to the insufficiency of budgetary resources. It is clear, however, that that argument was not made at first instance before the General Court and that, consequently, no ruling was made in the judgment under appeal on that point, even though paragraph 153 of that judgment refers to the Multi-annual Staff Policy Plan 2012-2014. That argument must, therefore, be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 82 Consequently, it being understood that the appellant did not challenge the assessment made by the General Court in paragraph 158 of the judgment under appeal that the new FRA Director had no need whatsoever to reopen the discussion on the subject of the 2009 and 2010 CDRs, since they had become final, the first part of the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part inadmissible. 83 The second part of the fourth ground of appeal, as it is based overall on the same arguments, in terms of the infringement of the right of access to the file, must be rejected for the same reasons. 84 By the third part of her fourth ground of appeal, the appellant also puts forward, in essence, two separate arguments: the first alleging an error in the classification of the comments she had made in respect of the opinion of 24 February 2012, and the second, based on the General Court wrongly finding, in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, that FRA had not answered her complaints concerning irregularities vitiating the acts preparatory to the contested decision. 85 As regards the first of those arguments, it must be rejected as unfounded. The fact that the General Court classified her objections as mere ‘comments’ does not in itself mean that it misconstrued the scope of FRA’s obligation to state reasons. 86 As to the second of those arguments, which must be compared with the arguments put forward in the context of the second plea in law at first instance, alleging that FRA disregarded its own general rules governing the appraisal of its contract staff and the renewal of their contracts, the appellant submits that the agency did not state the reasons for not taking those irregularities into account. 87 As is apparent from the analysis of the first ground of appeal, the appellant relies, in that regard, inter alia, on a submission alleging the lack of competence of the author of the 2009/13 Decision, pursuant to which the contested decision was adopted. From that point of view, the question of whether, contrary to what the General Court appears to state in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal, that argument required a reasoned response on the part of FRA, subject to review by the Court, cannot at the outset be rejected as inadmissible. 88 It appears, however, that that paragraph refers to paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, which was not challenged by the appellant, in the words of which ‘the new FRA Director justified the non-renewal of the applicant’s contract by weighing up, on the one hand, the interests of the service, in the light of the negative opinion given by her head of department on 24 February 2012, her relative performance over a period of 3 years preceding the initial decision not to renew and budgetary aspects requiring, within FRA, the temporary engagement of an archivist and, on the other hand, the interests of the applicant’. 89 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. The ground of appeal relating to irregularity in the composition of the Chamber hearing the case, put forward in the reply 90 Referring to the arguments which she put forward in the two other appeals, namely, the appeals giving rise to the order of 19 March 2020, BP v FRA (C‑682/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:214), and the judgment of 16 September 2020, BP v FRA (C‑669/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:713), respectively, the appellant requests, in her reply, that the Court ‘take into consideration’ the fact that the Fifth Chamber was composed in a way which did not allow, first, an effective vote, as the judge acting as President also cumulated the function of Judge-Rapporteur in breach of Article 21(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, and, secondly, the referral of a case to a Chamber sitting in extended composition, in breach of Article 28(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 91 That line of argument which concerns a matter of public policy, although not related to any of the grounds initially put forward in support of the appeal, must be declared admissible, even though it was raised at the stage of the reply and the appellant refers to other cases that she had against FRA. 92 That argument cannot, however, succeed. 93 In the first place, the argument that the Judge-Rapporteur had two votes on account of her role as acting President of the relevant Chamber must be rejected, since the appellant has not put forward anything to support that assertion. While Article 21(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which concerns the procedures for voting during deliberations, states that ‘the Judge-Rapporteur … shall vote first and the President … shall vote last’, that clarification, which merely states the order in which the members of the Chamber hearing the case are to cast their votes cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Judge-Rapporteur who is also President of the Chamber is required to vote twice, and thus to have two votes, under that provision. 94 In the second place, as regards the argument indirectly calling into question the formation of the Chamber which heard the case, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, ‘whenever the legal difficulty or the importance of the case or special circumstances so justify, a case may be referred to the Grand Chamber or to a Chamber sitting with a different number of Judges’. 95 The referral of a case to a Chamber sitting in extended composition is an option, not an obligation, recourse to which is subject to the criteria defined in those rules of procedure. 96 In the present case, the appellant has not put forward any objective reason why it should be held that the case that was brought before the General Court entailed a difficulty, an importance or a particular circumstance that required a referral to a Chamber sitting in extended composition. 97 It follows from those considerations that the arguments put forward in the reply which challenge the lawfulness of the composition of the Chamber that heard the case must be rejected as unfounded. The fifth ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 98 By her fifth ground of appeal, which refers to paragraphs 335 and 336 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that, in ordering her to pay the costs in their entirety, the General Court infringed Articles 134 and 135 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. She argues, in that regard, that the General Court, first, did not state the reasons why the case did not lend itself to the application of Article 135(1) of the Rules of Procedure concerning the division of costs on an equitable basis and, secondly, did not examine the possibility of applying Article 135(2) of the Rules of Procedure, concerning unreasonable or vexatious costs. She notes that she pleaded that FRA should bear all the costs in the light of its attitude which caused ‘the escalation of the dispute’ and the lodging of her appeal. She requests, therefore, that the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and of the appeal in their entirety. 99 FRA contends that that ground is manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded. Findings of the Court 100 The fifth ground of appeal, which refers to paragraphs 335 and 336 of the judgment under appeal ordering the appellant to bear the costs in their entirety, alleges an infringement by the General Court of Articles 134 and 135 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and of the obligation to state reasons. 101 In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, where all the other grounds put forward in an appeal have been rejected, any ground challenging the decision of the General Court on costs must be rejected as inadmissible by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, under which no appeal is to lie regarding only the amount of the costs or the party ordered to pay them (judgments of 12 July 2001, Commission and France v TF1, C‑302/99 P and C‑308/99 P, EU:C:2001:408, paragraph 31, and of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v Commission, C‑608/13 P, EU:C:2016:414, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 102 Since the appellant has been unsuccessful in all of her grounds and arguments relied on in support of the appeal, the present ground of appeal, relating to the allocation of costs, must, therefore, be declared inadmissible. 103 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 104 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. In the present case, since the appellant has been unsuccessful and FRA has applied for her to be ordered to pay the costs, the appellant must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by FRA. On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders BP to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Wahl Biltgen Rossi Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 December 2020. A. Calot Escobar N. Wahl Registrar President of the Eighth Chamber * Language of the case: English.