Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2010:283
Date: 2010-05-20
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: Agriculture and Fisheries;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Sugar
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Austria

summary of the financial consequences of the reform of the sugar sector, provided by the applicant as an annex, that the Council also expected expenditure between EUR 1 550 and EUR 1 600 million as from the 2007/08 marketing year, whilst the costs of direct income support were also estimated at EUR 1 542 million per marketing year. 83. Comparing that estimated expenditure with the financial consequences of the production charge under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006, it becomes immediately clear that the total amount of that charge is far below the Community’s estimated annual expenditure in the sugar sector. (32) Against this background, reliance on the judgment in Zuckerfabrik Jülich and Others (33) also appears to be inappropriate. In that judgment, the Court decided against an interpretation of the production charge – applicable at that time – which would entail the risk that the charges due to the Community might exceed the expenditure to be covered. 84. In this connection, the applicant’s argument that the production charge does not serve to finance the direct income support scheme and therefore exceeds the Community’s remaining expenditure occurring under the CMO in the sugar sector must be firmly rejected. Irrespective of whether the Community’s expenditure for the direct decoupled payments to producers in the sugar sector are to be classified in budgetary terms as ‘expenditure occurring under the CMO in the sugar sector’, it is clear from the drafting history of Regulation No 318/2006 that Community expenditure in the sugar sector was now intended to be concentrated primarily on those direct payments. The objective of the production charge, as set out in recital 19 in the preamble to Regulation No 318/2006, is therefore to be understood to the effect that that charge was also conceived, in terms of its amount, as a contribution to the financing of expenditure for the direct decoupled payments. 85. In the light of these considerations, I consider that the levying of the production charge and the calculation of that charge on the basis of the allocated sugar quota are not manifestly unnecessary for attaining the aim pursued by the Community legislature of requiring the sugar-producing undertakings to contribute to the financing of the Community’s expenditure in the sugar sector. 86. Lastly, there is also not a manifestly unreasonable relationship between the objectives pursued and the disadvantages caused. 87. In this connection, the main objection raised is that calculating the production charge on the basis of the allocated sugar quota would mean that the charge is levied, to some extent, on sugar which does not actually exist, if – as in the main proceedings – production does not exceed the production threshold. If, by contrast, quota sugar were produced in excess of the production threshold, the same charge would be imposed twice where quota sugar is carried over to the next marketing year. In the case of reclassification as industrial sugar, the production charge, which remains at the same level, is disproportionately high. 88. I do not find these arguments persuasive. 89. A common feature of the arguments is that they stress the consequences of levying the charge exclusively in relation to the quota sugar withdrawn from the market. However, they overlook the fact that the production charge was conceived by the Community legislature in the exercise of its wide discretion as a quota charge independent of production. The reasonableness of that charge cannot be called into question by referring to the consequences of that charge in relation to a relatively small subcategory of quota sugar, namely that withdrawn from the market. Rather, the examination of reasonableness must take account of all the advantages and disadvantages of the quota charge independent of production in the context of the overall scheme of that regime. 90. Because the Community legislature used the allocated sugar quota as the basis for assessment of the production charge, it introduced a charge system in which the charges are levied on the basis of the total sugar quota even if the sugar quota is not fully utilised. The causes of such incomplete utilisation of the sugar quota can be not only a crop failure, other problems or a free economic decision by the sugar-producing undertaking, but also a Commission decision ordering a withdrawal of sugar from the market for a certain marketing year. 91. If a sugar-producing undertaking is not able or is not permitted to utilise its sugar quota fully, it will be able to sell less sugar at the relevant market price or dispose of it by selling it to the national intervention agencies. (34) Because the charge is based on the quota and not on the quantities of sugar actually sold, it remains constant even if the sugar-producing undertakings’ income from the sale of their sugar falls. 92. Even though this fact may certainly represent a financial disadvantage for the sugar-producing undertakings, it is not manifestly unreasonable in relation to the aims pursued by the Community legislature to require the sugar-producing undertakings to help to finance the CMO in the sugar sector by means of a contribution which is payable in advance and is as constant as possible. 93. In weighing those interests, it must be borne in mind in particular that by the reform of the CMO in the sugar sector, decoupled agricultural income support was also increased. (35) In the overall context of the CMO in the sugar sector, the decoupled charge under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 is therefore clearly the basic approach adopted by the reform of the CMO in the sugar sector. 94. Furthermore, a numerical analysis of the consequences of the non-utilisation of the sugar quota on the relationship between the charge payable by the sugar-producing undertakings and their income from the sale of quota sugar clearly shows that the unchanging nature of the charge does not result in an unreasonably high burden on those undertakings. For example, the applicant’s own calculations show that even in a case like the present one, where the Commission has set a drastic withdrawal percentage of 13.5%, the charge increases, arithmetically, only from EUR 12 per tonne to EUR 13.87 per tonne in the case of full utilisation of the production threshold in relation to the quota sugar placed on the market. Having regard to the reference price of EUR 631.90 per tonne in the 2007/08 marketing year – which had to be secured precisely by means of that withdrawal from the market – the increase in the charge per tonne of quota sugar placed on the market, based on that estimate, does not entail an unreasonable burden on the sugar-producing undertakings, especially since under Article 16(4) of Regulation No 318/2006 they may require sugar-beet or sugar-cane growers or chicory suppliers to bear up to 50% of the production charge concerned. (36) 95. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude that neither the levying nor the calculation of the production charge under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 on the basis of the abstractly allocated sugar quota appears to be manifestly inappropriate, manifestly unnecessary or manifestly unreasonable having regard to the aim pursued by that charge and in the light of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature in matters concerning the CAP. Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 is therefore compatible with the principle of proportionality. 2. Alleged infringement of the principle of non-discrimination a) Insufficient express clarification of the alleged infringement in the order for reference 96. Even though by its second question the referring court expressly seeks clarification from the Court as to the compatibility of Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 with the principle of non-discrimination derived from Article 34 EC, the order for reference does not contain any express analysis or description of the facts or doubts which led the referring court to ask that question. Against that background, neither the Council nor the Commission examined the question whether the decoupled calculation and levying of the production charge under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 might infringe the principle of equal treatment. 97. Nevertheless, in my opinion, this question must not be ignored in the present proceedings. 98. It should be stated, first of all, that the description of the defendant’s views and arguments in the order for reference contains an important reference to the referring court’s doubts regarding a possible infringement of the principle of equal treatment. The referring court states in particular that, in the defendant’s opinion, ‘it is unsatisfactory for an undertaking to be able to produce quota sugar only up to a production threshold, which depends on the Member State in which it is established, but for it still to have to pay the production charge on the total quota allocated to it’. It is immediately clear from this statement that even the defendant in the main proceedings has considered the existence of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment stemming from the fact that the production thresholds have regional differences, but the production charges were calculated on the basis of the total sugar quota allocated without reference to the production thresholds. 99. On a sound appraisal of the information contained in the order for reference, an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination could, in the view of the referring court, stem in particular from the fact that the production thresholds are set on a regionally differentiated basis under Article 1(2) of Regulation No 290/2007, whilst the production charges under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 are determined on the basis of the sugar quota and therefore independently of production, with the result that the burden of the production charges could be different from one undertaking to the next depending on nationality. The applicant and the Republic of Lithuania expressed the same doubts in their written observations. (37) 100. In view of the above considerations, I consider it appropriate, despite the insufficient clarification given in the order for reference, also to examine the question of a possible infringement of the principle of non-discrimination in the present preliminary ruling proceedings. I will first consider the criterion for analysis to be applied in examining an alleged infringement of the principle of non-discrimination in matters concerning the CAP. I will then examine whether the decoupling of the charge from production under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 in combination with the regional differentiation of the production thresholds under Article 1(2) of Regulation No 290/2007 is to be regarded as an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination. b) Criterion for analysis 101. According to settled case-law, under the prohibition of discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. (38) 102. A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment. (39) 103. I have already considered above the fact that, in matters concerning the CAP, it is settled case-law that the Community legislature has a wide discretion. (40) That discretion is also to be taken into consideration in the context of the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC. (41) 104. If it were found that a Community measure in the sphere of the CAP results in unequal treatment of producers of the same product in different Member States, the judicial review of observance of the principle of equality must therefore essentially be limited to examining whether the difference in treatment relates sufficiently to a legally permitted aim and is not manifestly inappropriate in relation to that aim. c) Examination of the alleged infringement of the principle of non-discrimination 105. Under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006, the production charge is levied at a level of EUR 12 per tonne on the total sugar quota allocated to a sugar-producing undertaking. Consequently, the part of a sugar quota which cannot be utilised as a consequence of a withdrawal in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation No 318/2006 in conjunction with Article 1 of Regulation No 290/2007 must be included in the basis for assessment of the production charge. (42) 106. In Article 1(1) of Regulation No 290/2007, the withdrawal percentage is set at 13.5% for the 2007/08 marketing year. In Article 1(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 290/2007, that withdrawal percentage is remodelled as a production threshold. (43) In Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation No 290/2007, that production threshold is then regionally differentiated, as the sugar-producing undertakings in the Member States in which at least 50% of the national sugar quota has been released from 1 July 2006 as a result of quotas being renounced under Regulation No 320/2006 are exempted from withdrawal. For the Member States in which less than 50% of the national sugar quota has been released from 1 July 2006 as a result of quotas being renounced, the withdrawal percentage provided for in the first paragraph is reduced in proportion to the quotas released. 107. On the basis of this regional differentiation, the withdrawal percentage for the 2007/08 marketing year was reduced for Spain to 10.53%, for Sweden to 10.26%, for the Czech Republic to 7.29%, for Hungary to 6.21%, for Slovakia to 4.32% and for Finland to 3.24%, whilst it ceased to apply to Greece, Italy and Portugal. (44) This reduction of the withdrawal percentage resulted in a corresponding increase in the production thresholds applicable in those Member States. 108. In view of these figures, it is clear that the regional differentiation of the withdrawal percentage has meant that the degree to which the sugar-producing undertakings could utilise their sugar quotas in the 2007/08 marketing year was dependent inter alia on the Member State in which they were established. In contrast, the production charge under Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 was levied uniformly throughout the Community on the basis of the allocated sugar quota, irrespective of the relevant withdrawal percentage and the corresponding production threshold. 109. It follows directly from these findings that the part of the production charge payable by the undertakings, which corresponded to the part of their quota which was subject to a preventive withdrawal, varied in the 2007/08 marketing year depending on the Member State in which the undertakings were established. (45) To that extent, the fixing of the production charge provided for in Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 resulted in different treatment for undertakings which could be in a similar situation but were established in different Member States. 110. However, it must still be examined whether that difference in treatment is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if it pursues a legally permitted aim and whether it is appropriate having regard to that aim. 111. With regard to responsibility for the regional differentiation of the withdrawal percentage and the corresponding production thresholds, recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 290/2007 stresses, first of all, that the constraints associated with the withdrawal could have serious economic consequences for undertakings in Member States which have made particular efforts under the restructuring scheme established by Regulation No 320/2006. It is then explained that such an effect would be contrary to the very objective of this scheme and of the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, which is to guarantee the viability and competitiveness of this sector. 112. On a sound appraisal of statements contained in recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 290/2007, account is to be taken of the efforts made by the Member States with regard to the definitive renunciation of quotas by reducing the withdrawal percentage and making a corresponding increase in the production thresholds in individual Member States. Because, in the view of the Commission – which is evident from recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 290/2007 – this renunciation of national quotas and the ensuing restructuring result in a national economic environment in which an unrestricted application of the withdrawal mechanism and the corresponding production thresholds would threaten the viability and competitiveness of the remaining sugar-producing undertakings – and therefore also of sugar-beet producers (46) – the withdrawal percentage in Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation No 290/2007 for the Member States concerned – and therefore for the sugar-producing undertakings established there – was reduced and the production thresholds were thereby increased. 113. In view of the structural adjustment problems in connection with the reform of the sugar sector which are faced by sugar-producing undertakings in individual Member States, by setting the withdrawal percentage for the 2007/08 marketing year on a regionally differentiated basis, the Commission therefore complies with the primary law requirement under Article 33(2)(a) EC that, in working out the CAP, account must be taken of the particular nature of agricultural activity, resulting in part from natural and structural disparities between the various agricultural regions. 114. In the light of these considerations, I conclude that a legally permitted aim was pursued with the regional differentiation of the withdrawal percentage and the corresponding production thresholds and the resulting difference in treatment of sugar-producing undertakings which may be in a similar situation but are established in different Member States. 115. In my opinion, the unequal treatment is also not manifestly inappropriate in relation to the aim pursued. 116. In this respect, it must be stressed in particular that the withdrawal percentage pursuant to Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation No 290/2007 was reduced in proportion to the quotas released, whilst the withdrawal from the market ceased to apply completely only in the Member States in which at least 50% of the national sugar quota was released. This variable form of regional graduation of the withdrawal percentage and the corresponding production thresholds is a clear indication of the balanced character of this regime, where only the sugar-producing undertakings in the Member States where the reduction of sugar production capacities was particularly marked, at more than 50%, and the sugar sector was therefore undergoing radical changes were fully exempted from the withdrawal from the market. 117. In view of the discretion which the Commission is to be granted in connection with the organisation of the withdrawal mechanism in the light of the specific characteristics of the individual marketing years, I cannot therefore see anything to suggest a possible infringement of the principle of non-discrimination. 118. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude that the setting of the production charge in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006 on the basis of the allocated sugar quota, despite the regional differentiation of the withdrawal mechanism and the resulting difference in treatment of undertakings which could be in a similar situation but were established in different Member States, does not give grounds for the existence of an infringement of the principle of equality. 119. It follows from all those considerations that an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination derived from the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC cannot be considered to arise. VII – Conclusion 120. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should give the following answers to the questions referred to it by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof: (1) Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector is to be interpreted as meaning that even the part of a sugar quota which cannot be utilised as a consequence of a preventive withdrawal in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation No 318/2006 in conjunction with Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 290/2007 of 16 March 2007 establishing, for the 2007/08 marketing year, the percentage provided for in Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 must be included in the assessment of the production charge. (2) The examination of the second question has not revealed anything which might affect the validity of Article 16 of Regulation No 318/2006. 1 – Original language: German. 2 – OJ 2006 L 58, p. 1 3 – OJ 2007 L 78, p. 20. 4 – OJ 2001 L 178, p. 1. 5 – OJ 2006 L 58, p. 32. 6 – OJ 2006 L 58, p. 42. 7 – The common organisations of the markets in the sugar sector were previously distinguished by their price support arrangements and the allocation of quotas. The quota regime created in 1967 along with the CMO in the sugar sector also made it possible to maintain relatively high prices without producing surpluses. The quota regime was intended originally to be of a temporary nature only and to expire in 1975, but it was extended on a number of occasions. It was subsequently made more flexible in its structure in order to enable quotas to be increased for the benefit of the more efficient sugar producers. See Olmi, G., Politique agricole commune, Brussels, 1991, p. 173, and Priebe, R., in Grabitz, E. and Hilf, M., Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Volume I, Article 34 EC, paragraph 57 (39th supplement, July 2009). 8 – For the background to that reform of the CMO in the sugar sector, see Swinbank, A., ‘EU Sugar Policy: An Extraordinary Story of Continuity, But Then Change’, Journal of World Trade 2009, pp. 603 to 620. For an analysis of the broad outline of the reform in comparison with the previous organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, see Michel, J. and Merten-Lentz, K., ‘La réforme du marché du sucre communautaire’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 2005, pp. 671 to 676, and Barents, R., ‘De zure smaak van Europese suiker’, NTER 2005, pp. 228 to 235. 9 – The English heading ‘Production charge’ is rendered in French as ‘Taxe à la production’, in Slovenian as ‘Proizvodna dajatev’, in German as ‘Produktionsabgabe’, in Danish as ‘Produktionsafgift’, in Spanish as ‘Canon de producción’ and in Portuguese as ‘Encargo de produção’. In those language versions, Article 16(2) refers to ‘sucre sous quota’, ‘kvotnega sladkorja’, ‘quota sugar’, ‘kvotesukker’, ‘azúcar de cuota’ and ‘açúcar de quota’, whilst Article 16(1) and (3) mention ‘quota de sucre’, ‘kvote za sladkor’, ‘sugar quota’, ‘sukkerkvote’, ‘cuotas de azúcar’ and ‘quotas de açúcar’. In the Dutch version, the heading is ‘Productieheffing’, but then the term ‘suikerquotum’, rather than ‘quotumsuiker’, is used in Article 16(2), as well as in Article 16(1) and (3). 10 – See also Riesenhuber, K., Europäische Methodenlehre, Berlin, 2006, p. 266, paragraph 51. 11 – See points 39 and 40 of this Opinion. 12 – Regulation No 1260/2001 and Council Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999 of 13 September 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (OJ 1999 L 252, p. 1). 13 – Article 1(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 290/2007 essentially provides that the withdrawal obligation only applies to sugar produced in excess of a production threshold. That production threshold is calculated by deducting the withdrawal percentage from the allocated sugar quota which, for the 2007/08 marketing year, normally gave a production threshold of 86.5% of the allocated sugar quota. 14 – My Opinion in Case C-33/08 [2009] ECR I-0000, point 40 et seq. 15 – Case C-33/08 [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21 et seq. 16 – Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 31; Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, paragraph 97; Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I‑5689, paragraph 81; Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 41; and Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 13. 17 – With regard to this three-stage scheme of analysis, see Simon, D., ‘Le contrôle de proportionnalité exercé par la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes’, Petites affiches 2009, No 46, p. 17, at p. 20 et seq. According to the author, however, the review of the lawfulness of the aims pursued and the subjective reasons for the adoption of the measure in question represent two additional stages of analysis in many judgments. 18 – In many judgments, the Court has admittedly simply found that the principle of proportionality requires that measures implemented through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. In so far as in those judgments the reasonableness of the measures to be examined is typically not important, they do not allow the conclusion to be drawn that the proportionality test must follow a two-stage scheme of analysis without consideration of the reasonableness of the measure in question. 19 – Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 32; Case C-34/08 Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 76; Spain v Council, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 98; Case C-535/03 Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation [2006] ECR I-2689, paragraph 57; Case C-94/05 Emsland-Stärke [2006] ECR I-2619, paragraph 54; Jippes and Others, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 82; Crispoltoni and Others, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 42; Fedesa and Others, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 14; and Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 22. 20 – Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 33; Spain v Council, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 99; and Jippes and Others, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 83. 21 – See Case C-558/07 S.P.C.M. and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 42; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I-6451, paragraph 52; Case C‑434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, paragraph 46; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 48; and Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 123. See also Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-675, paragraph 53. 22 – See my Opinion in Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others, cited in footnote 19, point 61 et seq. 23 – See my Opinions in Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others, cited in footnote 19, point 61, and Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, point 51. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases C-5/06 and C-23/06 to C-36/06 Zuckerfabrik JülichandOthers [2008] ECR I‑3231, point 65, and the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in S.P.C.M. and Others, cited in footnote 21, point 69 et seq., which rightly state that even in matters in which complex technical and/or political choices must be made and the Community legislature therefore enjoys a wide margin of assessment and action, it must be reviewed if there are clearly less oppressive measures available which are equally effective, or if the measures adopted are obviously out of proportion to the aims pursued. Otherwise the principle of proportionality, which is part of primary law, would be deprived of its practical effect. 24 – See my Opinion in Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others, cited in footnote 19, point 63. See also von Danwitz, T., ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im Gemeinschaftsrecht’, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht, 2003, p. 391, at p. 396, who points out that such an approach reduces the principle of proportionality to a discretionary review. 25 – See Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 42; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, cited in footnote 21, paragraph 126 et seq.; and Emesa Sugar, cited in footnote 21, paragraph 54 et seq. See also Koch, O., Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Berlin, 2003, p. 212, who stresses that nearly all the judgments in which the Court seemingly reduced the review to ‘inappropropriateness’ included an analysis of possible alternative measures and, in some cases, detailed reasons why those measures were not preferable. The notion of ‘manifest inappropriateness’ must therefore be understood merely as a synonym for a reduced level of scrutiny as part of the multi-stage proportionality test. See also Kischel, U., ‘Die Kontrolle der Verhältnismäßigkeit durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof’, EuR 2000, p. 380, at p. 398 et seq., who says that the Court does not give its own wording, according to which the review of proportionality is to be limited to an examination of manifest inappropriateness in the relevant areas, the purport which it appears to have at first sight. In contrast, it is clear from the relevant rulings that the discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature does not restrict proportionality to manifest inappropriateness, but limits the review of proportionality in general to manifest errors. 26 – See my Opinion in Azienda Agricola Disarò Antonio and Others, cited in footnote 19, point 62 et seq. 27 – See points 67 and 68 of this Opinion. 28 – Schräder, cited in footnote 19, paragraph 21. 29 – See Spain v Council, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 121; Case C-120/99 Italy v Council [2001] ECR I-7997, paragraph 44; Case C-179/95 Spain v Council [1999] ECR I-6475, paragraph 29; Case C-4/96 NIFPO and Northern Ireland Fishermen’s Federation [1998] ECR I-681, paragraphs 41 and 42; Case C-122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-881, paragraph 18; and Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 25. 30 – Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: ‘Accomplishing a sustainable agricultural model for Europe through the reformed CAP – sugar sector reform’ (COM(2004) 499 final, p. 11). 31 – COM(2005) 263 final, point 5 of the explanatory memorandum. 32 – Under Article 16(2) of Regulation No 318/2006, the production charge is set at EUR 12 per tonne of the sugar and inulin syrup quota and at EUR 6 per tonne for the isoglucose quota. In Annex III to that regulation, the national and regional quotas are set at up to 17 440 537 tonnes for sugar, 507 680 tonnes for isoglucose and 320 718 tonnes for inulin syrup. In Annex IV the additional quotas for sugar are set at up to 1 100 000 tonnes for sugar and 103 000 tonnes for isoglucose. The maximum production charge to be paid by all sugar-producing undertakings is mathematically therefore around EUR 230 million, without taking into account the renunciations of quotas which have since taken place. 33 – Joined Cases C-5/06 and C-23/06 to C-36/06 [2008] ECR I-3231. 34 – Under Article 18(2) of Regulation No 318/2006, the intervention price for quota sugar amounts to 80% of the reference price applicable for the following marketing year. That intervention possibility is limited both in time, to the 2006/07 to 2009/10 marketing years, and in volume, to a total quantity of 600 000 tonnes per marketing year for the Community. 35 – See point 40 of this Opinion. 36 – At the hearing the applicant confirmed, moreover, that it had taken this option of requiring the farmers to contribute to the financing of the production charge. 37 – See point 33 of this Opinion. 38 – The Court has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination laid down by Community law in Article 34(2) EC is a specific enunciation of the general principle of equal treatment, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law; see Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 46, and Case C-313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33. 39 – Case C-127/07 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraineand Others [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47, and the case-law cited. 40 – See point 61 et seq. of this Opinion. 41 – See Unitymark and North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation, cited in footnote 19, paragraph 57. See also Groussot, X., General Principles of Community Law, Groningen, 2006, p. 167 et seq.; Thiele, G., in Calliess, C. and Ruffert, R. (eds), Kommentar zu EUV/EGV, 3rd edition, Munich, 2007, Article 34 EC, paragraph 57; and Barents, R, ‘Recent developments in Community case law in the field of agriculture’, CML Rev. 1997, p. 811, at p. 840 et seq. 42 – See point 57 of this Opinion. 43 – See footnote 13 to this Opinion. 44 – Annex to Regulation No 290/2007. 45 – With regard to this finding of unequal treatment with regard to the part of the sugar quota affected by the withdrawal which is subject to a charge, see Agrana Zucker, cited in footnote 15, paragraph 49. 46 – In this connection, recital 35 in the preamble to Regulation No 318/2006 also states that in Member States with a significant reduction of sugar quota sugar-beet producers will face particularly severe adaptation problems and in such cases the transitional Community aid to sugar-beet growers will not suffice to fully address the beet growers’ difficulties. Against that background, Member States having reduced their quota by more than 50% should be authorised to grant State aid to sugar-beet growers during the application period of the transitional Community aid.