Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2017:527
Date: 2017-07-06
Language of the case: English
Subject matter: Environment;Approximation of laws;Research and technological development;Public health;REACH
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Judgment delivered after back reference
Origin: Belgium;France

Summary of the relevant passages of the judgment under appeal 43. The General Court ruled that the fact that a substance may have an intermediate status does not mean that it is exempt from identification as being of very high concern in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 59 of the REACH Regulation. (23) 44. The General Court examined the uses of acrylamide as a grouting agent through polymerisation and for the preparation of polyacrylamide electrophoresis gels. As regards grouting, it found that the use of acrylamide is not an intermediate use but rather an end-use of the substance. (24) Sections 2 and 4 of the ‘Definition of intermediates as agreed by Commission, Member States and ECHA on 4 May 2010’ (25) support that conclusion. (26) As regards the preparation of polyacrylamide electrophoresis gels, the intention behind the handcast preparation, which is one of the steps in the electrophoresis protocol, is not the manufacturing of polyacrylamide as such but the analytical separation of molecules by electrophoresis. (27) In any case, the fact that the three registration dossiers for acrylamide on the ECHA database all identify acrylamide as an intermediate does not mean that that substance was used exclusively as an intermediate. (28) 45. The General Court pointed out that, under the REACH Regulation, a substance is defined by its intrinsic properties, whereas the concept of an intermediate is defined according to the intended purpose of the manufacture and use of the substance. (29) The fact that a substance may have an intermediate status therefore does not mean that it is exempt from identification as being of very high concern in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 59 of the REACH Regulation. (30) The parties’ submissions 46. By their first ground of appeal, PPG and SNF submit that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the definition of ‘intermediate’, as set out in Article 3(15) of the REACH Regulation. That ground of appeal is divided into three parts. 47. First, PPG and SNF argue that the General Court’s interpretation of intermediates is contrary to the clear wording of the provisions on intermediates set out in the REACH Regulation. Acrylamide satisfies the definition of intermediates since it is manufactured for and consumed in a chemical reaction with the intention of being transformed into polyacrylamide. Therefore, its use in order to form polyacrylamide subsequently used as a grouting agent or for the preparation of electrophoresis gels should not be excluded from that definition. The end use of the synthesised substance or the chemical process subsequent to synthesis is not relevant for the definition of intermediates. 48. Second, the interpretation of intermediates by the General Court is contrary to the purpose of the provisions on intermediates of the REACH Regulation. Intermediates are a specific category of substances that are covered by the exemptions provided for in Article 2(8) of the REACH Regulation because they do not represent the same level of risk as substances to which there is significant exposure. 49. Third, PPG and SNF contend that the General Court erred in law when it relied on Appendix 4 of the ECHA Guidance on intermediates to support its interpretation of the definition of ‘intermediate’. 50. The ECHA responds that the definition of ‘intermediate’ must be interpreted strictly since it is the starting point for exempting those substances from the scope of certain provisions of the REACH Regulation. For a substance to qualify as an intermediate within the meaning of Article 3(15), the main aim of transforming that substance must be to contribute to the structure of a different substance whose manufacture is intended. Furthermore, intermediates are subject to lighter registration requirements when used under strictly controlled conditions on a ‘site’ as defined by Article 3(16). Therefore, where a substance is used for a specific end-use, in the place where that end-use is supposed to occur (for instance, the use of acrylamide in grouting), that use is not intermediate. Furthermore, the ECHA Guidance on intermediates was merely used by the General Court to buttress its conclusions. 51. For the Commission, the mere fact that one substance is transformed into another does not suffice to classify it as an intermediate. Without implying that there is a subjective criterion, the Commission argues that the purpose of the manufacturing and use of the substance and the aim of the chemical process should be taken into consideration when assessing whether that substance qualifies as an intermediate. It adds that the use of a substance as intermediate is irrelevant in relation to its identification as an SVHC under Article 59 of the REACH Regulation. Furthermore, PPG’s and SNF’s assertions regarding the General Court’s use of the ECHA Guidance are incorrect. Assessment 52. In essence, the first ground of appeal raises the question of the definition of ‘intermediates’ under the REACH Regulation and the relationship of that term to ‘substances’. 53. ‘Substance’ is the main concept used to define the scope of the REACH Regulation. Recital 1 states that the regulation’s objectives are to ensure ‘a high level of protection of human health and the environment as well as the free movement of substances … while enhancing competitiveness and innovation’. Both the high level of protection of human health and the efficient functioning of the internal market for substances are to be achieved by the approximation of legislation on substances. (31) The core of the definition of ‘substance’ under Article 3(1) (‘a chemical element and its compounds in the natural state or obtained by any manufacturing process’), has remained unaltered since the earlier texts that were amended or repealed by that regulation (32) and the first directive on dangerous substances. (33) That definition is the ‘cornerstone of REACH, as substances are the main subject of REACH provisions’. (34) Furthermore, the definitions of most of the terms of the REACH Regulation, such as ‘polymer’, ‘monomer’ and ‘intermediate’, are directly based on the concept of ‘substance’. 54. When a substance is considered to be of very high concern, which means that it is particularly dangerous because of its intrinsic properties, it can be included in Annex XIV of the REACH Regulation, ‘List of substances subject to authorisation’, under the procedure described in points 33 to 38 above. The identification of SVHCs in terms of Article 57 does not address the intended uses of substances, but only their intrinsic properties. 55. ‘Intermediate’ is defined in Article 3(15). It is clear from the wording of that provision that an intermediate is (i) a substance; (ii) that is manufactured for chemical processing; (iii) that is consumed in or used for that processing; (iv) in order to be transformed into another substance. When it comes to isolated intermediates, such as acrylamide in the present case, a further condition applies before the substance will qualify as an intermediate under the REACH Regulation: the procedure must take place at a ‘site’, as defined by Article 3(16), or the substance must be transported between or supplied to other ‘sites’. The ratio legis here is to avoid risks for human health and the environment by ensuring that intermediates are only used under controlled conditions. 56. The difference between the concept of substance and the concept of intermediate is that the latter are manufactured for chemical processing and are used in order to create another substance. The latter definition thus encompasses both (i) the purpose of manufacturing intermediate substances as well as of their consumption or use, namely chemical processing, and (ii) the purpose of the chemical processing itself, which is the creation of another substance. For isolated intermediates, the definition also includes the concept of ‘site’. 57. The examination that requires to be conducted here is twofold: (i) whether or not there is a substance and (ii) whether or not the purpose and conditions of the manufacture, use and chemical processing of that substance correspond to those of the definition of an intermediate under the REACH Regulation. As PPG and SNF accepted at the hearing, the starting point for the analysis must be the concept of ‘substance’; first, the substance should be identified and then one should look at the ways it is used in order to verify if it corresponds to the definition of ‘intermediate’. I shall use a syllogism here: all intermediates are uses of substances, but only some substances’ uses are intermediate; therefore, a substance may have both intermediate and non-intermediate uses. 58. It follows from the above that the definition of intermediates adopted by the REACH Regulation is based on the purpose of the manufacture and use of the substance concerned. That is reflected both in the text of the regulation and in its purpose. 59. Thus, the text of Article 3(15) defines an ‘intermediate’ using the expressions ‘manufactured for’ and ‘in order to’. The purpose of the provisions on intermediates within the context of the authorisation procedure is to exempt certain uses of substances from the authorisation requirement in order to concentrate on the uses that pose the greatest risk. (35) That purpose should be interpreted according to the overall aim of the REACH Regulation and of the authorisation procedure, that is to say, the control of risks from SVHCs in the context of assuring a high level of protection of human health and the environment. (36) 60. I therefore consider that the General Court correctly found, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that the REACH Regulation defines an intermediate ‘according to the intended purpose of the manufacture and use of a substance’. That approach is in line both with the wording and the purpose of that regulation. 61. PPG and SNF also contend that the General Court erred in law when it categorised the use of acrylamide in grouting and for the preparation of electrophoresis gels as end uses and not intermediate uses of acrylamide. 62. The General Court’s reasoning regarding grouting applications and preparation of electrophoresis gels (paragraphs 54 to 58 of the judgment under appeal) rejects the intermediate nature of those uses. That reasoning is based on the argument that the main purpose of the chemical process is not the creation of polyacrylamide but the sealing function or the analytical separation of molecules by electrophoresis. 63. As I read the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not extend the scope of the definition in Article 3(15) nor did it introduce the absence of an end-use of the synthesised substance as an additional criterion into the definition of intermediates, as PPG and SNF maintain. On the contrary, the General Court applied the definition of intermediates, having regard to the intended purpose of the manufacture and use of a substance, to the letter. Indeed, as the General Court correctly pointed out, the purpose of using acrylamide in those two instances is not manufacturing polyacrylamide, but grouting or electrophoresis. The General Court therefore found as a fact that those two uses were not intermediate uses but end-uses. 64. It is true that some terminological variations in the judgment under appeal, such as the use of the words ‘intention’, ‘intended purpose’ or ‘intended objective’, could lead one to think that the General Court sought to introduce a subjective element of evaluation of intent in the definition of ‘intermediates’. However, in my view, an overall reading of the disputed passages shows that not to be the case. The occasional presence of those words does not therefore invalidate that Court’s reasoning. 65. Whether or not grouting applications and preparation of electrophoresis gels are uses of acrylamide, and if so what kind of uses, is a question of fact. On one view, the appellants are here asking this Court to reach different findings of fact. However, absent a distortion of facts (which is not alleged) the General Court’s findings of fact cannot be challenged on appeal. Even if one takes the view — more favourable to the appellants — that they are, rather, seeking to challenge the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them, it follows from the analysis that I have just set out that I consider that the General Court made a correct application of the law. (37) 66. I therefore reject PPG’s and SNF’s arguments. 67. Regarding the reference at paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal to Appendix 4 of the ECHA Guidance on intermediates, PPG and SNF maintain that the General Court should have assessed independently the legal soundness of that document and that it relies on sections that are irrelevant to the present case. 68. I consider that this argument should be rejected. In my view, the General Court’s interpretation of intermediates is correct and the fact that it invokes an extract of the ECHA Guidance on intermediates to support its conclusions concerning the use of acrylamide for grouting has no consequence as regards the operative part of the judgment under appeal. It cannot therefore justify its being set aside. (38) 69. I therefore reject that argument and the first ground of appeal. Third ground of appeal: error in law in the interpretation of the exemption of intermediates from Article 59 of the REACH Regulation Summary of the relevant passages of the judgment under appeal 70. The General Court ruled that acrylamide, as a ‘substance’ under Article 3(1) of the REACH Regulation, can be subjected to the identification procedure provided for by Article 59. (39) Even though Article 2(8)(b) of that regulation exempts on-site isolated and transported isolated intermediates from Title VII, the fact that a substance may have the status of an intermediate does not mean that it is exempted from the identification procedure. (40) The fact that the dossier submitted by the Netherlands concerning the identification of acrylamide as a carcinogenic and mutagenic substance refers only to examples using that substance as an intermediate is not relevant for the purposes of identifying that substance as an SVHC meeting the criteria referred to in Article 57. That fact might, however, become relevant later in the authorisation procedure. (41) The parties’ submissions 71. By their third ground of appeal, PPG and SNF submit that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the exemption of intermediates from Title VII of the REACH Regulation on authorisation. That ground of appeal is composed of three parts. 72. First, PPG and SNF submit that the General Court’s finding that intermediates are not exempted from Article 59 is contrary to the clear intention of the legislature and the express wording of Article 2(8)(b) that excludes intermediates from Title VII in its entirety. 73. Second, they argue that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 59, since the general reference to ‘substances’ in that article cannot preclude the application of the specific exemptions for intermediates. Since the General Court acknowledged that intermediates are not subject to authorisation, it erred in law by not then concluding that intermediate uses are also not subject to Article 59. Furthermore, whether a substance benefits from an exemption from certain provisions must be verified before, not after, those provisions are applied to it. The appellants also argue that the procedure set out in Article 59 is not intended merely to identify substances having the properties listed in Article 57, but also establishes a list of substances that will eventually be included in Annex XIV. 74. Third, PPG and SNF contend that the General Court erred in law by ruling that intermediates are not exempted from Article 57. The fact that a substance has intrinsic properties of concern listed in Article 57 does not mean that the express exemption set out in Article 2(8)(b) can be ignored. Furthermore, the purpose of identifying substances having the intrinsic properties listed in Article 57 is not to identify all such substances but only those subject to inclusion in Annex XIV. 75. The ECHA argues that the General Court was correct in finding that Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation cannot prevent it from identifying acrylamide as an SVHC. The legislative background, the meaning and the application of that article in practice support this view. Moreover, Article 2(8)(b) is an exception to the requirement to apply for authorisation and should therefore be interpreted strictly. 76. Concerning Articles 57 and 59, the ECHA submits that the General Court was right to conclude that acrylamide constitutes a substance that can be subject to the identification procedure, irrespective of whether it is used only as an intermediate. Furthermore, the wording of those articles indicates that identifying and including a substance in the candidate list does not necessarily result in its inclusion in Annex XIV. 77. The Commission submits that the exemption in Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation must be understood as an exemption from all the provisions in Title VII which refer to the use of a substance as an intermediate. It adds that other uses, such as in medicinal products and in food and feedstuffs, are exempted from Title VII by virtue of Article 2(5) but do not prevent a substance from being identified and included in the candidate list. According to the Commission, PPG and SNF have not explained how a substance which is used as both an intermediate and a non-intermediate should be treated if their interpretation of Article 2(8)(b) were to be upheld. Assessment 78. The third ground of appeal concerns the scope and effect of the exemption laid down in Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. The three branches of the third ground of appeal all essentially concern that issue and I shall therefore consider them together. 79. First, it is necessary to bear in mind that exceptions to a principle must, according to settled case-law, be interpreted strictly. (42) That conclusion is valid a fortiori, when the principle is of a protective nature. Here, the authorisation procedure aims to control risks from SVHCs to human health and the environment. In that context, the precautionary principle which underpins the REACH Regulation is particularly relevant. 80. Second, the exemption set out in Article 2(8) is a partial exemption. It merely exempts on-site and transported isolated intermediates from Chapter 1 of Title II (except for Articles 8 and 9) and Title VII of the REACH Regulation. It therefore differs from the general exemptions from the scope of that regulation for radioactive substances, substances, mixtures and articles under customs supervision, non-isolated intermediates, the carriage of dangerous substances and waste contained in Article 2(1) and (2). 81. Third, in my view the exemption in Article 2(8)(a) and (b) concerns particular uses of substances, for the following reasons. 82. As I have already explained, the definition of intermediates adopted by the REACH Regulation must be construed having regard to the purpose of the manufacture and use of the substance in question. (43) It follows that the exemption from Title VII (on-site and transported isolated) for intermediates must be construed in the same way. It is use related and should be read as concerning intermediate uses of substances. 83. The legislative history of that exemption points in that direction. Thus, the White Paper that preceded the procedure promulgating the REACH Regulation states, in section 2.3 entitled ‘key elements of the proposed strategy’, that uses of substances which do not give rise to concern may be subject to general exemptions from the authorisation procedure for SVHCs. (44) The Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation repeats that principle and states that ‘certain uses may be exempted from the requirement to be authorised’ in order to ‘allow the authorisation process to concentrate on the uses of substances that are likely to pose the greatest risk’. (45) Both documents clearly indicate that the exemptions from authorisation concern uses of substances. 84. Furthermore, the initial draft of the REACH Regulation placed the exemption of intermediates from authorisation within Title VII. Article 53(5)(g) of the proposed regulation provided that (only) the first two paragraphs of that article, concerning authorisation, did not apply to ‘uses as an on-site isolated intermediate or as a transported isolated intermediate’. (46) It was the European Parliament which, with the stated intention of grouping all the exemptions affecting the scope of the REACH Regulation in one article at the beginning of the document for the sake of clarity, moved the exemption concerning intermediates to join the other exemptions from the scope of that regulation in Article 2. (47) On the other hand, Articles 57 and 59 have remained unaltered since the initial drafting of the proposed regulation. (48) They concern substances, as defined in Article 3(1). 85. It follows that a combined reading of Articles 2(8)(b), 3(1), 3(15)(b) and (c) and Title VII of the REACH Regulation leads to the conclusion that the exemption of on-site and transported isolated intermediates from Title VII is a use related exemption, that covers a substance’s specific intended use. 86. When it comes to applying the exemption in Article 2(8)(b) the line of reasoning should therefore be as follows: (i) the authorisation procedure concerns substances; (ii) the application of that procedure presupposes that the criteria for identification as an SVHC set out in Article 57 have already been fulfilled; (49) (iii) that identification depends only on the intrinsic properties of substances and not on their intended use; (iv) once a substance has been identified as an SVHC, it falls within the scope of the authorisation procedure, although its formal inclusion in the list of substances subject to authorisation may be deferred depending on the degree of priority granted by the ECHA; (50) however (v) when the identified SVHCs have intermediate uses, those uses are exempted from the scope of Title VII of that regulation; and finally (vi) if a substance has multiple uses, only one of which is exempt, the exemption will apply only to the quantity that is intended for the exempted use. (51) 87. It follows from all the above considerations that Articles 57 and 59 of the REACH Regulation concern substances with certain intrinsic properties and not uses of substances. In contrast, Article 2(8)(b) merely exempts specific uses of substances (as an isolated intermediate) from Title VII. The effect of that exemption cannot be larger than its scope. Thus Article 2(8)(b) can only exempt intermediates from the articles of that title that concern uses of substances, not from the articles that concern intrinsic properties of substances. 88. I therefore conclude that the General Court did not err in law when it held that the fact that a substance may have intermediate status for certain uses does not mean that it is exempt from identification as an SVHC in accordance with the procedure in Article 59. (52) 89. I consider therefore that the third ground of appeal should be dismissed. Second ground of appeal: breach of the duty to state reasons Summary of the relevant passages of the judgment under appeal 90. In paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recalled that, under Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation, on-site isolated intermediates and transported isolated intermediates are exempted from Title VII. It therefore proceeded to examine whether, as a result of that exemption, the decision at issue was lawful insofar as it identified acrylamide as an SVHC. (53) 91. The General Court held that the fact that a substance has, in a specific case, the status of an intermediate cannot exempt it from the identification procedure laid down in Article 59. (54) The parties’ submissions 92. In support of their second ground of appeal, PPG and SNF argue that the General Court breached the duty to state reasons by failing to address their arguments concerning Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. They contend that the judgment under appeal failed to state why the clear and unambiguous exemption of on-site isolated intermediates and transported isolated intermediates from Title VII did not thereby also exclude the application of Article 59. 93. The ECHA submits that the reasoning of the General Court is straightforward and enables the appellants to know why their arguments were rejected. In this respect, it refers to paragraphs 65 to 70 of the judgment under appeal. 94. The Commission considers that the General Court sufficiently explained why a substance that is used as an intermediate may nevertheless be identified under Article 59 of the REACH Regulation. Assessment 95. The obligation to state the reasons on which a judgment is based arises under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, which applies to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof. It has consistently been held that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment of the General Court is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose that court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. (55) 96. As I read the judgment under appeal, the General Court directly addressed the scope of the exemption laid down by Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. 97. The General Court clearly explained its reasoning in paragraphs 65 to 70 of the judgment under appeal. It found that acrylamide is a substance under Article 3(1) of the REACH Regulation and that the fact that it has, in a specific case, the status of an intermediate cannot exempt it from the identification procedure. 98. In my view, the General Court’s reasoning is clear and expressed with sufficient detail to enable PPG and SNF to lodge their appeal and for the Court to make a ruling on appeal. 99. I therefore conclude that the General Court gave sufficient reasons for its decision and that the second ground of appeal is unfounded. Fourth ground of appeal: error in law in the assessment of the obligation of the ECHA to consider the information in the Annex XV dossier Summary of the relevant passages of the judgment under appeal 100. The fourth ground of appeal is aimed at the General Court’s rejection of the appellants’ claim that under Article 59, the identification of acrylamide should have been based on all the information contained in the Annex XV dossier prepared by the Netherlands, including the information concerning uses and exposure. The General Court held that even if that dossier referred only to examples of the use of acrylamide as an intermediate, that was not relevant for the purposes of identifying acrylamide as an SVHC, given that that information did not concern the intrinsic properties of acrylamide. The information on the uses of acrylamide could become relevant in the later stages of the procedure, namely the procedure for granting authorisations for specific uses. In any event, it cannot be concluded that all uses of acrylamide referred in that dossier are intermediate in nature. The parties’ submissions 101. PPG and SNF argue that the General Court’s conclusion is based on an error in law. The information on the uses of a substance is a regulatory requirement for the Annex XV dossier and the ECHA is required to take that information into account. In the case of acrylamide, the information showed that that substance was only used as an intermediate, a fact relevant for the application of the exemption laid down in Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. 102. The ECHA submits that the General Court was right to conclude that during the first stage of the authorisation process, which concerns the identification of a substance, it is not required to consider information about the use of a substance. In any event, the Annex XV dossier noted that there were two uses of acrylamide that were not intermediate. Assessment 103. The preparation of an Annex XV dossier is a formal requirement of the procedure under Article 59 of the REACH Regulation. The purpose of that procedure is to identify substances that have the intrinsic properties referred to in Article 57 and that may, therefore, be subject to authorisation. 104. The obligatory content of an Annex XV dossier is laid down by the REACH Regulation itself. It comprises three parts: (i) the proposal; (ii) the justification and (iii) the information on use, exposure, alternative substances, and risks. The proposal is the essential part of the dossier, since it includes the identity of the substance concerned and its proposed identification according to the criteria laid down in Article 57. The justification is also fundamental, since it gives the reasons for the identification of substances. 105. The information on use, exposure, alternative substances and risks is also obligatory but it seems to me that its role is complementary. First, only the ‘available’ use and exposure information is required to be provided. (56) There is no duty to conduct research going beyond the information that is available in order to prepare an Annex XV dossier. Second, the term ‘use and exposure category’, defined in Article 3(38), (57) is used several times by that regulation. For instance, it is relevant to Title II, concerning the registration of substances, when it comes to the information to be submitted for general registration purposes (Article 10; see also Annex VI) and to Annex I, laying down general provisions for assessing substances and preparing chemical safety reports. In my view, it follows from the complementary nature of that information and from the fact that it is not supposed to be exhaustive that its role in Annex XV is only at the stage when exemptions of certain uses are being considered. It plays no part in the (prior) assessment of whether a particular substance should be identified as an SVHC. 106. I therefore consider that the General Court did not err in law when it found that even if the Annex XV dossier ‘refers only to examples of the use of that substance as an intermediate, that is not relevant for the purposes of identifying acrylamide as an [SVHC] …, given that that information does not concern the intrinsic properties of acrylamide’. (58) Indeed, both Article 57 and Annex XV are clear on this point: substances are identified as of very high concern when they have the properties listed in Article 57. (59) That provision makes no reference to the uses of substances for the purposes of identification. On the contrary, uses of substances are considered elsewhere, namely by Article 56, which lays down the general principle that substances included in Annex XIV cannot be placed on the market or used, and exceptions to that principle. That stage concerns the inclusion of substances in Annex XIV (Article 58), or in Chapter 2 of Title VII, which concerns the granting of authorisations. 107. I therefore consider that the fourth ground of appeal should be rejected. Fifth and sixth grounds of appeal: error in law and breach of duty to state reasons in the assessment of the proportionality of the contested decision Summary of the relevant passages of the judgment under appeal 108. The General Court rejected PPG’s and SNF’s arguments that the decision at issue breached the principle of proportionality. First, it found that the identification of acrylamide as an SVHC was not manifestly inappropriate in relation to the aim of protecting human health and the environment. Second, it found that the contested decision did not exceed the limits of what was necessary to achieve those objectives. In particular, the exemption of intermediate uses from identification is not a less onerous measure suitable to achieve the same aims. Rather, the legislature had introduced specific rules governing intermediates in Article 2(1)(c) and Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. The parties’ submissions 109. In support of their fifth ground of appeal, which is pleaded in the alternative, PPG and SNF argue that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the principle of proportionality. A less onerous measure would have been to state expressly in the contested act that ‘identification and inclusion on the candidate list has no impact whatsoever on the use of intermediates’, since that solution has the advantage of reconciling the exemption of intermediates under Article 2(8)(b) with the identification procedure under Article 59. 110. PPG and SNF also submit, by their sixth ground of appeal, that the General Court’s assessment, set out in the second sentence of paragraph 93, does not enable them to understand why that measure is not a less onerous measure which the ECHA should therefore have adopted. 111. The ECHA submits that the General Court did not err in law applying the principle of proportionality. It must be allowed a broad discretion in a field which entails political, economic and social choices on its part and which requires it to undertake complex assessments. Furthermore, the General Court complied with its duty to state reasons in that regard. The reference in paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal to the specific rules relating to intermediates introduced by the EU legislature, namely Article 2(1)(c) and Article 2(8)(b), and the cross reference to paragraph 48 were sufficient. 112. The Commission argues that the General Court fully addressed the ECHA’s alleged breach of the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, the alternative put forward by PPG and SNF is redundant because the consequence that it spells out stems directly from Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation itself. The restatement in different words of what is already laid down in legislation is not a ‘measure’ nor is it a ‘less onerous’ one given that the suggested addition has no legal or practical effect. Assessment 113. In paragraphs 81 to 94 of the judgment under appeal the General Court examined PPG’s and SNF’s plea alleging a breach of the principle of proportionality. 114. First the General Court correctly defined that principle and the limitations on judicial review arising from the broad discretion enjoyed by the ECHA in that matter. (60) The General Court then addressed the arguments that the decision at issue was not appropriate to achieve the objectives of the REACH Regulation. (61) Finally, it considered whether the contested decision exceeded the limits of what was necessary to achieve the objectives pursued and the less onerous alternative measures presented by PPG and SNF. (62) It concluded that the decision at issue did not breach the principle of proportionality. 115. PPG’s and SNF’s fifth ground of appeal concerns the assessment by the General Court of one of the allegedly less onerous measures that would nevertheless, they argue, have permitted the achievement of the objectives pursued by the REACH Regulation. 116. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected that argument on the grounds that the exemption of intermediates is expressly addressed by Article 2(8)(b) of the REACH Regulation. I agree with both the General Court and the Commission that, since that is indeed the legal position, the supposedly ‘alternative measure’ would have had no practical or legal effect. It would therefore have been meaningless in terms of the proportionality test. It would, in short, have been entirely pointless. 117. It follows that the fifth ground of appeal is unfounded. 118. By the sixth ground of appeal, PPG and SNF contend that the General Court breached its duty to state reasons. They submit, in particular, that the second sentence of paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal does not enable them to understand why the measure they propose is not a less onerous measure that the ECHA should have had recourse to. 119. I do not accept that submission. 120. As I have already indicated, the General Court did state its reasons for rejecting PPG’s and SNF’s plea. It is true that that reasoning is limited to one sentence. I note, however, that the argument to which the General Court was responding was also formulated in one sentence in point 92 of the application for annulment. It is settled case-law that ‘the requirement for the [General Court] to give reasons for its decisions cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by the appellant’. (63) The approach of the General Court enabled the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken, thereby allowing the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review, as required by this Court’s case-law. (64) 121. The sixth ground of appeal should therefore be rejected. 122. I thus conclude that the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 123. In accordance with Articles 137, 138, 140 and 184 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, read together, PPG and SNF as the unsuccessful parties on all grounds of appeal should be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Conclusion 124. In the light of all the above considerations, I am of the opinion that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; – order Polyelectrolyte Producers Group GEIE and SNF SAS to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Chemicals Agency; – order the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Commission to bear their own costs. 1 – Original language: English 2 – T‑268/10 RENV, EU:T:2015:698. 3 – Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006 L 396, p. 1). The version of the REACH Regulation relevant to the facts in the main proceedings is that last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 552/2009 of 22 June 2009 (OJ 2009 L 164, p. 7) and it is that version that I shall reproduce below. 4 – Recital 1 and Article 1. 5 – Council Directive of 27 June 1967 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances (OJ, English Special Edition, 1967(I), p. 324). This directive has since been repealed by Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008 L 353, p. 1). 6 – According to the ECHA’s Multilingual Chemical Terminology Database, polymerisation is the formation of polymers from simpler (monomer) molecules by addition. 7 – T‑268/10, EU:T:2011:508. 8 – C‑625/11 P, EU:C:2013:594. 9 – The General Court’s analysis of the admissibility issue is set out at paragraphs 29 to 61 of the judgment under appeal. 10 – Judgment of 10 September 2015, FCD and FMB, C‑106/14, EU:C:2015:576, paragraph 32. 11 – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) [on Persistent Organic Pollutants], COM(2003) 644 final, p. 12 (‘the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation’). 12 – Article 1(3) of the REACH Regulation. 13 – Recital 69 of the REACH Regulation. 14 – Judgment of 10 September 2015, FCD and FMB, C‑106/14, EU:C:2015:576, paragraph 35. 15 – Article 59(2) and (3) and Annex XV of the REACH Regulation. Within 60 days of the circulation of the dossier, the other Member States or the ECHA may comment on the identification of the substance (Article 59(5)). 16 – Article 59(4) of the REACH Regulation. 17 – Article 59(7) to (9) of the REACH Regulation. 18 – Article 58(3) of the REACH Regulation. 19 – Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (OJ 1999 L 184, p. 23). See Articles 58(1) and 133(4) of the REACH Regulation. Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC was inserted by Council Decision 2006/512 of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (OJ 2006 L 200, p. 11). 20 – Article 58(1) and (2) of the REACH Regulation. 21 – Article 62 of the REACH Regulation. 22 – See Article 56(1)(b) to (e) and Article 56(2) to (5) of the REACH Regulation. 23 – Paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal. 24 – Paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal. 25 – Appendix 4 of the ECHA Guidance on intermediates, 2010, ECHA-2010-G-17-EN (‘the ECHA Guidance on intermediates’). 26 – Paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal. 27 – Paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal. 28 – Paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal. 29 – Paragraphs 66 and 67 of the judgment under appeal. 30 – Paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal. 31 – Recitals 2 and 3. 32 – Article 1(3)(a) of Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations (OJ 1976 L 262, p. 201); Article 2(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 of 23 March 1993 on the evaluation and control of the risks of existing substances (OJ 1993 L 84, p. 1); Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 1999/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (OJ 1999 L 200, p. 1). 33 – Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 67/548. 34 – Commission staff working document, General Report on REACH, SWD(2013) 25 final, p. 17. 35 – See to that effect the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation, p. 33. 36 – Articles 1 and 55 of the REACH Regulation. 37 – The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts. When the General Court has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see judgments of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraphs 48 and 49, and of 19 July 2012, Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others, C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P, EU:C:2012:479, paragraph 84). 38 – See, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C‑496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited. 39 – Paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal. 40 – Paragraphs 66 and 67 of the judgment under appeal. 41 – Paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal. 42 – Judgments of 10 November 2016, Baštová, C‑432/15, EU:C:2016:855, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited, and of 29 March 2012, Commission v Poland, C‑185/10, EU:C:2012:181, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited. 43 – See points 55 and 58 above. 44 – Commission of the European Communities, Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy, COM(2001) 88 final, pp. 8 and 19. 45 – See the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation, p. 33. 46 – See the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation, p. 108. 47 – See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restrictions of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2003/0256(COD)), A6-0315/2005, pp. 523 and 524. 48 – See Articles 54 and 56 of the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation. 49 – Judgment of 15 March 2017, Hitachi Chemical Europe and Polynt v ECHA, C‑324/15 P, EU:C:2017:208, paragraph 35. 50 – Judgment of 15 March 2017, Hitachi Chemical Europe and Polynt v ECHA, C‑324/15 P, EU:C:2017:208, paragraph 35. 51 – See Bergkamp, L., ‘Key concepts and scope’, The European Union REACH Regulation for chemicals, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 59. Indeed, PPG and SNF accepted at the hearing that when a substance has both intermediate and non-intermediate uses ‘for example 50% intermediate uses and 50% other uses’ only the intermediate uses are exempted under Article 2(8)(b). 52 – Paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal. 53 – Paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal. 54 – Paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal. 55 – See, inter alia, judgment of 11 April 2013, Mindo v Commission, C‑652/11 P, EU:C:2013:229, paragraph 29. 56 – See to that effect, the order of 4 September 2014, Cindu Chemicals and Others v ECHA, C‑289/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2175, paragraph 51. 57 – Article 3(24) provides a separate definition of the term ‘use’ and Article 3(37) of the term ‘exposure scenario’. 58 – Paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal. 59 – See point 34 above. 60 – Paragraphs 81 and 82 of the judgment under appeal. See also judgment of 21 July 2011, Etimine, C‑15/10, EU:C:2011:504, paragraphs 60, 124 and 125. 61 – Paragraphs 84 to 87 of the judgment under appeal. 62 – Paragraphs 88 to 93 of the judgment under appeal. 63 – Judgment of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited. 64 – Judgment of 11 April 2013, Mindo v Commission, C‑652/11 P, EU:C:2013:229, paragraph 29.