Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:403
Date: 2026-05-13
Language of the case: Spanish

Provisional text OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL MEDINA delivered on 13 May 2026 (1) Case C‑61/25 P European Commission v Kingdom of Spain ( Appeal – European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) – Expenditure excluded from European Union financing – Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 – Article 93(2) – Cross-compliance – Annex II – Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs), SMR 3 – Biodiversity – Protected species of wild flora – Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43/EEC – Non-specification of farmers’ obligations ) Introduction 1. The present Opinion concerns an appeal brought by the European Commission seeking to have set aside the judgment of 20 November 2024, Spain v Commission (T‑508/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:855). By that judgment, the General Court upheld the action brought by the Kingdom of Spain and annulled, in so far as that Member State was concerned, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/908 of 8 June 2022 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). (2) 2. In that decision, the Commission had rejected financing in the amount of EUR 9 968 215.15 owing to the lack of checks put in place by the Spanish authorities between 2016 and 2017 in order to verify the conservation of the natural habitats of protected species of wild flora in Castilla y León (Spain). Those checks were required, according to the Commission, under the cross-compliance rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, (3) which ties common agricultural policy (4) financing to compliance by farmers with basic standards concerning, inter alia, the environment. In particular, the Commission criticised the Kingdom of Spain for not having carried out on-the-spot checks on compliance by farmers receiving EU aid with statutory management requirements (SMRs), SMR 3, (5) as laid down in Annex II to Regulation No 1306/2013 and, by reference therefrom, by the implementing measures in Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43/EEC. (6) 3. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 establishes that the obligation to carry out cross-compliance checks relates only to compliance with the measures implementing that directive at national level. However, as no plan or any other conservation measure had been adopted in Castilla y León under Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43, the requirements imposed on farmers in respect of SMR 3 were not sufficiently precise to enable the Spanish authorities to check compliance with them. The General Court therefore concluded that the Commission was unjustified in considering the absence of checks as non-compliance and therefore in applying a financial correction. 4. The Court is asking me to examine the second ground of appeal relied on by the Commission in its appeal, which concerns the interpretation of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013. It is a key provision of the cross-compliance system applicable under the CAP on which the Court has not yet ruled. It will be necessary to determine in particular whether, in the light of its wording, legislative context and purpose, Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 prevents the Commission from excluding from European Union financing expenditure incurred under the EAGF and EAFRD (7) where, as the General Court held in the judgment under appeal, the absence of checks on compliance with SMR 3 is the result of the failure, by the national authorities, to specify the obligations to be fulfilled by farmers. Legal framework 5. Regulation No 1306/2013, which contains the main rules to which these proceedings relate, laid down the rules on the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP until it was repealed in January 2023. After it was repealed, it was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2021/2116. (8) Regulation No 1306/2013 provided the framework for the Funds, ensured monitoring of expenditure and imposed control mechanisms for agricultural aid. Detailed rules for applying Regulation No 1306/2013 were laid down by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 (9) and by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014. (10) 6. Recitals 54, 55, 59 and 60 of Regulation No 1306/2013 stated as follows: ‘(54) That cross-compliance system incorporates in the CAP basic standards concerning the environment … Cross-compliance aims to contribute to the development of sustainable agriculture through better awareness on the part of beneficiaries of the need to respect those basic standards. It aims also to contribute to make the CAP more compatible with the expectation of society through improving consistency of that policy with the environment, public health, animal health, plant health and animal welfare policies. The cross-compliance system forms an integral part of the CAP and should therefore be maintained. Its scope, however, which consists so far in separate lists of statutory management requirements and standards of good agricultural and environmental condition of land should be streamlined so that consistency of the cross-compliance system is ensured and made more visible. For this purpose, the requirements and standards should be organised in a single list and grouped by areas and issues. … (55) Statutory management requirements need to be fully implemented by Member States in order to become operational at farm level and ensure the necessary equal treatment of farmers. … (59) Beneficiaries should understand their compliance obligations clearly in relation to the rules on cross-compliance. For that purpose, all requirements and standards forming part of those rules should be communicated by Member States in an exhaustive, understandable and explanatory way, including, where possible, by electronic means. (60) An effective implementation of cross-compliance requires verification that obligations are respected at the level of beneficiaries. …’ 7. Title V of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘Control systems and penalties’, contained a Chapter I, under the heading ‘General rules’. That chapter contained Article 58 of that regulation, entitled ‘Protection of the financial interests of the Union’, which provided: ‘1. Member States shall, within the framework of the CAP, adopt all legislative, regulatory and administrative provisions and take any other measures necessary to ensure effective protection of the financial interests of the Union, in particular to: (a) check the legality and regularity of operations financed by the Funds; … (c) prevent, detect and correct irregularities and fraud; … 2. Member States shall set up efficient management and control systems in order to ensure compliance with the legislation governing Union support schemes aimed at minimising the risk of financial damage to the Union. …’ 8. Title VI of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘Cross-compliance’, contained a Chapter I, entitled ‘Scope’, which comprised Articles 91 to 95 of that regulation, and a Chapter II, entitled ‘Control system and administrative penalties in relation to cross-compliance’, which comprised Articles 96 to 101 of that regulation. 9. According to Article 91 of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘General principle’: ‘1. Where a beneficiary referred to in Article 92 does not comply with the rules on cross-compliance as laid down in Article 93, an administrative penalty shall be imposed on that beneficiary. 2. The administrative penalty referred to in paragraph 1 shall only apply where the non-compliance is the result of an act or omission directly attributable to the beneficiary concerned … … 3. For the purpose of this Title the following definitions shall apply: … (b) "requirement" means each individual statutory management requirement under Union law referred to in Annex II within a given act, differing in substance from any other requirements of the same act.’ 10. Article 93 of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘Rules on cross-compliance’, provided, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof: ‘1. The rules on cross-compliance shall consist of the statutory management requirements under [European] Union law and the standards for good agricultural and environmental condition of land established at national level as listed in Annex II, relating to the following areas: (a) environment, climate change and good agricultural condition of land; (b) public, animal and plant health; (c) animal welfare. 2. The legal acts referred to in Annex II concerning the statutory management requirements shall apply in the version in force and, in the case of Directives, as implemented by the Member States.’ 11. According to Article 95 of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘Information to beneficiaries’: ‘Member States shall provide the beneficiaries concerned, where appropriate by the use of electronic means, with the list of the requirements and standards to be applied at farm level, as well as clear and precise information thereon.’ 12. Article 96 of Regulation No 1306/2013, entitled ‘Checks of cross-compliance’, provided as follows: ‘… 3. Member States shall carry out on-the-spot checks to verify whether a beneficiary complies with the obligations laid down in this Title. …’ Background to the dispute 13. The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 35 of the judgment under appeal and, for the purposes of the present Opinion, may be summarised as follows. 14. Following an investigation carried out in the autonomous community of Castilla y León concerning the rules for implementing the cross-compliance system laid down in Title VI of Regulation No 1306/2013, the Commission established a number of deficiencies in connection with three key controls during 2016 and 2017, relating in particular to the extent and quality of the on-the-spot checks carried out by the Spanish authorities. According to the Commission, those deficiencies were liable to cause a risk to the Funds and, therefore, to lead to the application of a flat-rate financial correction on the total amount of aid paid to the beneficiaries to whom the cross-compliance system applied. 15. Following exchanges between the Spanish authorities and the Commission, in particular regarding the calculation of the risk caused by the deficiencies established by the Funds and also following the Conciliation Body report, adopted under Article 40 of Implementing Regulation No 908/2014, the Commission informed the Spanish authorities of its final position. In that position, it maintained its findings on the deficiencies in respect of the first and second key controls, and on the risk caused by those deficiencies to the Funds. 16. Those findings related, as regards the second of the four infringements falling within the first key control, which is the only control in question in the present proceedings, to SMR 3 and concerned the lack of checks on the conservation of natural habitats of protected species of wild flora during 2016 and 2017. In particular, the Commission found that the Spanish authorities had not carried out cross-compliance checks as required in Article 96(3) of Regulation No 1306/2013 and in Article 24(1) and in Article 65(1) of Implementing Regulation No 809/2014. 17. In the light of all the deficiencies established, the Commission decided, in its final position, to apply, for the claim years 2016 and 2017, a flat-rate financial correction of 5% on 10% of the total amount of aid, and 2% on 10% of the total amount of aid for the claim year 2018. Accordingly, in the decision at issue, the Commission excluded from EU financing the total gross amount of EUR 9 973 274.36, which, in view of the amounts already recovered from previous investigations, resulted in a net final correction of EUR 9 968 215.15. Procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 18. By application of 19 August 2022, the Kingdom of Spain claimed that the General Court should annul the contested decision, in so far as it was concerned. In support of its action, it raised two pleas in law, in which it relied on various errors of fact, law and assessment allegedly committed by the Commission. 19. In particular, the first plea in law contained six parts, the first four of which concerned the lack of evidence of serious and reasonable doubt regarding the various deficiencies established in respect of the first and second key controls. The fifth part of that plea in law concerned an infringement of the principle of sound administration vitiating the rejection of the calculation of the amount to be excluded from EU financing based on an extrapolation proposed by the Kingdom of Spain. The sixth part of that plea in law and the second plea in law concerned infringement of the principle of proportionality vitiating the flat-rate financial correction imposed by the Commission. 20. By the judgment under appeal, the General Court upheld, in its entirety, the second part and, in part, the fourth part of the first plea in law, on the ground that the Commission had improperly based the flat-rate financial correction at issue on two deficiencies: first, the lack of cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3, in breach of Article 96(3) of Regulation No 1306/2013 and, second, the absence of the beneficiaries’ signature in the cross-compliance control reports, in breach of Article 72(1)(b)(ii) of Implementing Regulation No 809/2014. As to the remainder, the General Court rejected the first and third parts of the first plea in law. It did not examine the fifth and sixth parts of the first plea in law or the second plea in law. 21. As regards the second part of the first plea in law, which is the part concerned in the present appeal, the General Court stated, first, that, pursuant to Article 93(1) of Regulation No 1306/2013, the rules on cross-compliance with the SMRs are laid down in Annex II to that regulation. As regards, more particularly, SMR 3, that Annex II refers to Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43, which provides that Member States must establish, in respect of special areas designated for conservation of the habitats of protected species of wild flora, the necessary conservation measures, involving, if need be, appropriate management plans, and take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of those habitats. The General Court also stated that, in Castilla y León, Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43 had been transposed by Decree 63/2007, (11) which contains a list of the protected wild flora species in that autonomous community of Spain. 22. Second, the General Court found that the combination, first, of Decree 63/2007, which recognises the presence of protected species of wild flora in Castilla y León, and second, the lack of cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3 aimed specifically at protecting such species was evidence of serious and reasonable doubt about the checks carried out. It inferred from this, in accordance with the settled case-law applicable in that area, that the Kingdom of Spain had to prove that the Commission’s findings were incorrect. 23. Last, the General Court stated that, in accordance with Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, the obligation to carry out cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3 only concerns compliance with the measures transposing Directive 92/43 at national level. According to that provision, the legal acts referred to in Annex II of that regulation concerning the SMRs apply only in the version in force and, in the case of directives, as implemented by the Member States. However, in the present case, in the absence of any conservation measure previously defined by the Spanish authorities within the meaning of Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43, the requirements imposed on farmers in respect of SMR 3 were not laid down in sufficiently precise terms for compliance with those requirements to be able to be effectively checked by the Spanish authorities. The General Court held that it followed that the Kingdom of Spain was justified in maintaining that the lack of cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3 could not be regarded by the Commission as non-compliance. 24. The decision at issue was annulled by the judgment under appeal in its entirety, in so far as it concerned the Kingdom of Spain. As regards the extent of that annulment, the General Court stated, in essence, that, were it not for the deficiencies contested by the second and fourth parts of the first plea in law, the calculation of the total amount of the flat-rate financial correction would normally have been different and that it was therefore for the Commission to draw the consequences of that annulment. Forms of order sought on appeal 25. By its appeal, the Commission claims that the Court should: – set aside paragraph 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal in so far as it upholds the second part of the first plea in law; – reject the second part of the first plea in law as unfounded; – refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule on the fifth and sixth parts of the first plea in law and the second plea in law; and – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 26. The Kingdom of Spain contends that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; – order the Commission to pay the costs. Legal analysis 27. In support of its appeal, the Commission relies on two grounds of appeal, alleging, first, an error in the application of the rules governing the allocation of the burden of proof in the procedure for clearance of accounts and, second, an error in the interpretation of the obligations on the Member States relating to the application of SMR 3 and the checks on farmers’ compliance with those requirements. 28. As requested by the Court, my analysis will focus on the second of those grounds of appeal, which is concerned in particular with the interpretation of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013. Arguments of the parties 29. By the second ground of appeal relied on in support of its appeal, the Commission claims that the General Court wrongfully held that the Kingdom of Spain could have refuted the evidence of the existence of serious and reasonable doubt regarding the obligation to carry out on-the-spot checks to ensure compliance with SMR 3 by relying on its own failure to specify, in national law, the obligations arising from Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43. More specifically, the Commission submits that the General Court’s conclusion cannot be based on Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013. That provision cannot be interpreted as meaning that a Member State does not have to carry out on-the-spot cross-compliance checks where the requirements for such checks have not been previously laid down by the national authorities. On the contrary, where a Member State does not fulfil its duty to implement the SMRs and where, therefore, no on-the-spot check is carried out, that Member State fails to fulfil its obligation to provide for a system of checks ensuring effective control of compliance with the SMRs, as required in particular under Article 96(3) of Regulation No 1306/2013 and Article 24(1) and Article 65(1) of Implementing Regulation No 809/2014. A different interpretation would be likely both to deprive Regulation No 1306/2013 and Implementing Regulation No 809/2014 of practical effect and to disregard the purpose of the cross-compliance requirements laid down. 30. The Kingdom of Spain disputes those arguments, and contends that the interpretation of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, as stated by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, is correct. In particular, the Kingdom of Spain submits that the Member States define the content of SMR 3 in the course of transposing Directive 92/43. When implementing that directive in Castilla y León, the Spanish authorities considered that it was not necessary to adopt plans for the recovery or conservation of the habitats of protected species of wild flora, or other conservation measures, under Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43, imposing obligations on farmers in connection with their activity. In that context, according to the Kingdom of Spain, the lack of on-the-spot checks was justified, given that, under Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, compliance with SMR 3 must be checked taking into account the manner in which the Member State transposed Directive 92/43. Contrary to what the Commission claims, that does not mean that the Member State does not have a reliable and operational control regime based on the cross-compliance system imposed by Regulation No 1306/2013. Legal assessment 31. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the present case concerns a decision adopted by the Commission in the context of the procedure for clearance of accounts laid down in Article 52 of Regulation No 1306/2013. The purpose of that procedure, which takes place between that institution and each of the Member States which have benefited from CAP financing, is to ascertain whether, as required by Article 58(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, the Member State concerned has an efficient management and control system enabling it to ensure compliance with the legislation governing EU support schemes and minimise the risk of financial damage to the European Union. The procedure for clearance of accounts is also designed to ascertain whether, in the system, the Member State concerned has carried out the necessary checks in order to determine whether the rules laid down in Regulation No 1306/2013, including the rules on cross-compliance, have been respected. As the General Court rightly states in paragraph 75 of the judgment under appeal, where those checks have not been carried out or have been deficient, the Commission is obliged to carry out a financial correction in order to avoid the Fund being burdened with amounts that have not served to finance an objective pursued by EU law. (12) 32. Moreover, it is clear from settled case-law that, in order to prove that there has been infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets, the Commission is required to produce evidence of its serious and reasonable doubt regarding the checks carried out by the national authorities or the irregularity of the figures they have transmitted, without having to show exhaustively the inadequacy of those checks or the irregularity of those figures. The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the Member State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of Fund accounts, consequently, it is for the State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that those checks were actually carried out or that its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission's assertions are incorrect. (13) 33. In the present case, the General Court held, on the one hand, in paragraphs 76 and 77 of the judgment under appeal, that, as no cross-compliance checks had been carried out in respect of SMR 3 by the Spanish authorities in Castilla y Léon, the Commission had succeeded in establishing, in its final position, evidence of serious and reasonable doubt, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph, and that it was therefore for the Kingdom of Spain to prove that the Commission’s findings were incorrect. However, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, on the other hand, that the Kingdom of Spain’s line of argument based on the insufficient precision of the requirements laid down in Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43 for the purpose of enabling farmers to protect species of wild flora in Castilla y Léon had made it possible to refute the Commission’s conclusion of non-compliance with the cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3. 34. In the first place, as regards the General Court’s finding relating to the Commission’s establishment of serious and reasonable doubt, it should be noted that the cross-compliance system established by Regulation No 1306/2013 requires, in fact, that farmers benefiting from the aid referred to in Article 92 of that regulation comply with certain rules aimed at protecting the environment, public health and animal welfare. According to Article 93(1) of Regulation No 1306/2013, those rules include, in particular, the SMRs, which are set out in a single list and grouped by areas and issues in Annex II to that regulation. (14) 35. As regards the specific objective of protecting biodiversity, Annex II of that regulation states, under the heading ‘SMR 3’, that the rules to be complied with by farmers are, in particular, those laid down in Directive 92/43, more specifically in Article 6(1) and (2) thereof. As the General Court stated in paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal, that provision states, first, that, for special areas of conservation of the habitats of protected species of wild flora, Member States must establish the necessary conservation measures involving, if need be, appropriate management plans, and, second, that Member States must take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of those habitats. In Castilla y León, which is the Spanish autonomous community concerned in the present case, Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43 had been transposed by Decree 63/2007. That decree contained a list of the protected wild flora species and provided for the adoption of plans for the recovery and conservation of the habitats of those species. (15) 36. It follows that the General Court was entitled to hold that the Commission had established evidence of serious and reasonable doubt, within the meaning of the case-law cited in point 32 of the present Opinion, in that, although the presence of protected wild flora species in Castilla y León was recognised by the national legislation transposing Directive 92/43, no cross-compliance check in respect of SMR 3 aimed specifically at protecting those species had been carried out. 37. In the second place, as regards the General Court’s finding that the Kingdom of Spain had refuted the existence of such serious and reasonable doubt, it must be stated that that assessment is based on the interpretation of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, as set out by the General Court in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal and applied in the present case in paragraph 79 of that judgment. The General Court held, in essence, that, in accordance with the wording of that provision, the duty to carry out cross-compliance checks only concerns compliance with the measures implementing Directive 92/43 at national level, and therefore, in cases where no conservation plan or other measure has been adopted, the obligations in respect of SMR 3 are not precise enough to require national authorities to check compliance with them. 38. In order to determine whether the General Court’s interpretation and its application to the present case are vitiated by an error, as the Commission claims, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has repeatedly recalled the hermeneutical canons that must be relied on when interpreting a provision of EU law. According to settled case-law, for the purposes of doing so, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. (16) 39. As regards the textual interpretation, Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 provides that the legal acts referred to in Annex II concerning the SMRs apply in the version in force and, ‘in the case of Directives, as implemented by the Member States’. It follows that, where the SMRs are defined in relation to a directive, as in the present case, the cross-compliance checks carried out in order to verify compliance with the SMRs must be made in the light of the rules which give effect to the directive concerned adopted by the national authorities. The aim of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 is therefore to clarify the legislative framework on the basis of which Member States are required to examine whether farmers receiving CAP financing are complying with the cross-compliance rules laid down in that regulation. However, contrary to the interpretation given by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, there is nothing in the wording of that provision to indicate that a Member State is released from its obligation to carry out cross-compliance checks where the SMRs are insufficiently specified. That is a syllogism which, in my view, is unsupported in the text of that provision. 40. It should also be noted that, as regards cases where the SMRs are defined in relation to a directive, Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 uses, in the version in English, the expression ‘implemented’, that is to say, the past participle of a verb, in order to refer to the version under which the national authorities must carry out their cross-compliance checks. (17) Therefore, even the very wording of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 presupposes that the national authorities have previously adopted measures in respect of the SMRs in relation to the directive concerned. It follows that the text of that provision cannot be used to draw any consequence in law where the SMRs have not been precisely clarified. 41. It follows that, from a textual point of view, Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 cannot be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not required to carry out cross-compliance checks where the obligations resulting from the directive referred to in Annex II to that regulation have not been specified by the national authorities. 42. In addition, even assuming that the wording of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 can be considered to be ambiguous, the foregoing finding also appears to me to be supported by contextual and teleological interpretations of that provision, which, however, were not examined by the General Court. 43. As regards the contextual interpretation, it should be noted that Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 is contained in Title VI of that regulation, entitled ‘Cross-compliance’. Article 96 of that regulation, which falls under the same title, lays down the obligation of Member States to carry out checks to verify whether beneficiaries of EU financial aid comply with the SMRs, in particular in the form of on-the-spot checks. That obligation is reiterated, in similar terms, in Article 24(1)(c) and Article 65(1) of Implementing Regulation No 809/2014, which state that checks made by national authorities must be made in such a way as to ensure effective verification of the requirements and standards relevant for cross-compliance. However, since those provisions do not provide for any exception in respect of the checks, Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 cannot be interpreted, for reasons of consistency, as releasing the Member States from their principal obligation under the cross-compliance system. 44. Furthermore, it must be concluded, as the Commission did, that that clearly implies that the requirements resulting from the SMRs for farmers have been defined in a sufficiently precise manner to enable effective verification of farmers’ compliance with them and for those farmers to be aware of them. Apart from the fact that, as stated in point 40 of the present Opinion, that obligation can be inferred from the very wording of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, this becomes even clearer on reading recitals 55, 59 and 60 of that regulation. Those recitals contain, in fact, clarifications of the cross-compliance system established by Regulation No 1306/2013, in that they state, first, that Member States are obliged to fully implement the SMRs in order for them to become operational at farm level and, second, that farmers must understand their obligations clearly in relation to the SMRs. Those statements are reiterated in Article 95 of Regulation No 1306/2013, according to which Member States are bound by the obligation to provide farmers with the list of the requirements and standards to be applied at farm level, as well as clear and precise information thereon. 45. It follows that, from a contextual point of view, the General Court could not interpret Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, in a case where the SMRs are yet to be defined in relation to a directive, as exempting a Member State from its obligation to carry out cross-compliance checks owing to the non-specification of the obligations imposed on farmers. The obligation on Member States to carry out that form of checks presupposes the prior definition by national authorities of the requirements to be fulfilled by farmers, and therefore the lack of such clarification and, consequently, of cross-compliance checks had to result in a finding of non-compliance by the Commission. 46. Last, as regards the teleological interpretation, the General Court’s reasoning also seems to me to be contrary to the purpose of Regulation No 1306/2013 and, in particular, of the rules laid down in that regulation on cross-compliance. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the purpose of those rules is to provide a link between EU financing from the Funds and the fulfilment, by the beneficiaries of that financing, of the objectives pursued by other EU policies such as environmental protection. As the General Court stated in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal, the Funds only finance interventions carried out in accordance with provisions of EU law. However, the purpose pursued by Regulation No 1306/2013 establishing the cross-compliance system, and that of the rules laid down by it, would be called into question if Article 93(2) of that regulation were interpreted as enabling Member States to avoid their obligation to carry out checks by relying on their own failure to provide clarifications of the requirements which farmers must fulfil in respect of the SMRs. 47. It follows from the foregoing that none of the canons established by the Court for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law permits acceptance of the General Court’s interpretation of Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 as set out in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal. 48. The arguments put forward by the Kingdom of Spain in its written pleadings cannot cast doubt on the foregoing conclusion. 49. First, the argument that the application of a financial correction where, as in the present case, the specifications in respect of the SMRs have not been adopted by the national authorities would amount to penalising farmers for a failure which is not attributable to them must be rejected. In that regard, it is sufficient to state that, in accordance with Article 91(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013, farmers can be penalised only for failures to comply with cross-compliance rules that are attributable to them, which precludes the financial correction applied by the Commission in the decision at issue, which is attributable to the Spanish authorities alone, from having any repercussion on them. Moreover, as the Commission rightly states, the procedure for clearance of accounts is a procedure between that institution and the Member State concerned in which the Member State is alone liable in the event of any non-compliance in the form of failure to carry out checks. The damage caused by that Member State’s conduct to farmers may also give rise to compensation for the infringement of EU law committed by that State. 50. Second, even assuming that the Commission cited Article 95 of Regulation No 1306/2013 for the first time in its appeal before the Court of Justice, as the Kingdom of Spain maintains, that citation cannot constitute a new argument likely to be rejected as inadmissible. In fact, the Commission refers to that provision, contained in Title VI of Regulation No 1306/2013, on cross-compliance rules, in order to clarify the contextual interpretation which, in its view, Article 93(2) of that regulation deserves. However, as stated in point 38 of the present Opinion, in order to determine whether the General Court’s interpretation and its application to the present case in the judgment under appeal were vitiated by error, the meaning of that provision should be determined in the light, inter alia, of its legislative context. It should therefore be held that the Commission’s reliance on Article 95 of Regulation No 1306/2013 was relevant and admissible in the context of the legal analysis to be carried out in the present proceedings. 51. Third, as regards the Kingdom of Spain’s argument that the Spanish authorities considered that it was unnecessary to adopt plans for the recovery or conservation of the habitats of protected species of wild flora, or other conservation measures, under Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43, imposing obligations on farmers in connection with their activity, it must be stated that that argument is contradicted by the very content of Decree 63/2007, as described by the General Court in the judgment under appeal. It is clear from paragraph 79 of that judgment that Decree 63/2007 contained not only a list of the protected species of wild flora in Castilla y Léon but also provided for the adoption of plans for the recovery and conservation of the habitats of those species. That highlights the fact that, in the eyes of the Spanish authorities, specific measures were necessary to implement Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 92/43 when the list of protected species of wild flora in Castilla y Léon was adopted. 52. In the light of all the foregoing, it must be stated that the General Court erred in law when interpreting Article 93(2) of Regulation No 1306/2013 by holding, on the basis of that provision, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the Kingdom of Spain had been able to refute the conclusion expressed by the Commission in its final position that the cross-compliance checks in respect of SMR 3 by that Member State were non-compliant. 53. The second ground of appeal should, in my view, be upheld, which necessarily entails the annulment of the judgment under appeal. In addition, since the Court of Justice has the necessary material to give final judgment on the second part of the first plea in law in the action at first instance, it is appropriate, under the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to reject that part. Last, in so far as the General Court has not ruled, at first instance, on the substance of the fifth and sixth parts of the first ground of appeal and the second ground of appeal raised by the Kingdom of Spain, the case should be referred back to it. Conclusion 54. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should: – set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 20 November 2024, Spain v Commission (T‑508/22, EU:T:2024:855); – refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the substance of the fifth and sixth parts of the first ground of appeal and on the second ground of appeal; – order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 1 Original language: French. 2 OJ 2022 L 157, p. 15, ‘the decision at issue’. 3 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549). 4 ‘the CAP’. 5 ‘SMR 3’. 6 Council Directive of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7). 7 ‘the Funds’. 8 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (OJ 2021 L 435, p. 187). 9 Commission Implementing Regulation of 17 July 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system, rural development measures and cross compliance (OJ 2014 L 227, p. 69) (‘Implementing Regulation No 809/2014’). 10 Commission Implementing Regulation of 6 August 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to paying agencies and other bodies, financial management, clearance of accounts, rules on checks, securities and transparency (OJ 2014 L 255, p. 59), as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/56 of 12 January 2018 (OJ 2018 L 10, p. 9) (‘Implementing Regulation No 908/2014’). 11 Decreto 63/2007 por el que se crean el Catálogo de Flora Protegida de Castilla y León y la figura de protección denominada Microrreserva de Flora (Decree 63/2007 establishing the catalogue of protected flora in Castilla y León and the protection system known as the ‘flora micro-reserve’) of 14 June 2007 (BOCYL No 119 of 20 June 2007, p. 13197) (‘Decree 63/2007’). 12 See, inter alia, judgment of 11 January 2001, Greece v Commission (C‑247/98, EU:C:2001:4, paragraph 14), cited in the judgment under appeal. 13 See judgment of 6 November 2014, Netherlands v Commission (C‑610/13 P, EU:C:2014:2349, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 14 See, in that regard, recital 55 of Regulation No 1306/2013. 15 See, in that regard also, paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal. 16 See, inter alia, judgment of 22 February 2024, Landkreis Jerichower Land (C‑85/23, EU:C:2024:161, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 17 See, also, among others, the versions of that provision in Danish (‘gennemført’), Dutch (‘omgezet’), Estonian (‘rakendatutena’), French (‘mise en œuvre), German (‘umgesetzt’), Italian (‘attuate’), Lithuanian (‘įgyvendintos’), Portuguese (‘transpostas’) or Slovak (‘transponovanom’).