Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2020:337
Date: 2020-07-10
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Action for damages - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible;Action for damages - inadmissible

summary of those pleas in law. Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the essential matters of law and fact relied on are stated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see, to that effect, order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 53 Accordingly, an application for compensation for harm allegedly caused by an institution must indicate with sufficient precision how all the conditions for compensation for the harm allegedly suffered are met (see order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). Such an application must contain the evidence making possible identification of, first, the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution, second, the reasons for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between that conduct and the harm which he or she claims to have suffered, and, third, the nature and extent of that harm (judgments of 10 July 1990, Automec v Commission, T‑64/89, EU:T:1990:42, paragraph 73; of 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T‑444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 33; and order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 56). 54 In particular, with regard to the condition that the applicant must place the Court in a position to assess the nature and extent of the harm that he or she has suffered, it is for the applicant to specify, inter alia, the nature of the alleged harm, in the light of the conduct alleged against the institution concerned, then to quantify the whole of that injury, even if approximately (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 June 1999, Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors, T‑277/97, EU:T:1999:124, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited; of 7 February 2007, Gordon v Commission, T‑175/04, EU:T:2007:38, paragraph 45, and order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 61). However, a claim for any unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as inadmissible (see orders of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited, and of 28 February 2019, Gollnisch v Parliament, T‑375/18, not published, EU:T:2019:131, paragraph 46). 55 In the present case, it must be noted that, first, the second head of claim, the terms of which are set out in paragraph 51 above, seeks payment of ‘full and fair’ compensation for material harm suffered by the applicant, in compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718). Second, the second head of claim is not set out any more specifically or in more detail in the parts of the application which contain the legal argument. It is only in paragraphs 163 and 186 of the application that the applicant refers, without giving further details, to the existence of material harm for which compensation was ‘ordered’ by the General Court in that judgment. 56 Thus, on the one hand, it must be noted that the applicant relies on the Court to determine the amount of ‘full and fair’ compensation, without specifying to what that compensation corresponds or providing any information enabling its amount to be determined. At most, the applicant states that such an amount ‘could correspond’, ‘for example’, to the amount of her salary, emoluments and entitlements from the time of her dismissal until the end of her employment contract. 57 On the other hand, the applicant’s position appears contradictory in that she seeks compensation for material harm which, in her view, has already been ruled upon earlier by the General Court in its judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718). 58 In those circumstances, the second head of claim does not satisfy the requirements of clarity laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 59 In any event, in so far as the applicant submits that compliance with the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) meant that SatCen should compensate her for material harm, the amount of which remains to be determined, such a premiss is based on a manifestly incorrect reading of that judgment. 60 In that regard, in paragraphs 250 to 254 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), the General Court rejected as premature the form of order sought by the applicant seeking compensation for material harm corresponding to the amount of the remuneration which she would have received had she remained in service with SatCen between the effective date of the dismissal decision and the date of the end of her contract, on the ground that it was not in a position to conclude, without knowing the measures taken to implement that judgment, that the annulment of the dismissal decision necessarily entailed the applicant’s right to receive such a sum. 61 Although the General Court stated, in paragraph 253 of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), that, when compliance with a judgment annulling a measure poses special difficulties, the institution concerned may establish a dialogue with that person with a view to seeking to reach an agreement offering him or her fair compensation for the illegality of which he or she was a victim, it did not recognise that that was the case here. 62 Consequently, the second head of claim is also manifestly devoid of any basis in law. Fourth head of claim 63 By her fourth head of claim, the applicant seeks the payment of interest on the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her by the General Court in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) as compensation for the non-material harm which she suffered. 64 In that regard, as in the case of the second head of claim, the fourth head of claim is not set out in any specific and detailed manner in the application. Nor is the legal basis thereof indicated. Although it appears to be of a compensatory nature, the only arguments put forward by the applicant in support of that claim fall within the scope of the second plea in law for annulment of the decision to launch investigations, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU, of the right to sound administration and of the duty of care. 65 Indeed, it is only in the part of the application relating to the alleged unlawfulness of that decision that the applicant, first, deplores the fact that SatCen paid, out of time, the sum of EUR 10 000 7 months after delivery of the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718); second, points out that SatCen made payment of that sum subject to an agreement on costs, which was ‘inappropriate and unlawful’ and, third, seeks payment of ‘interest’ on that sum for the period by which its payment was late. 66 Even were it possible for the fourth head of claim to be interpreted as a claim for damages based on Article 268 TFEU, the information provided in the application does not enable the General Court to rule on whether the conditions governing the non-contractual liability of the European Union have been satisfied. 67 First, the applicant does not specify on what basis or from which date she regards the payment of the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), made on 18 May 2019, as late. 68 Second, as regards the alleged harm, the applicant merely states that that harm consists of ‘interest’ on the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718), without giving further details. In particular, the application does not quantify the amount to which that interest corresponds, nor does the applicant state the facts which would make it possible to assess the extent of that interest, such as the rate and the period over which it should be applied. 69 Admittedly, it is clear from the case-law that, in certain cases, particularly where it is difficult to express the alleged loss in figures, it is not absolutely necessary to particularise its exact extent in the application or to calculate the amount of the compensation claimed (see judgment of 14 December 2018, East West Consulting v Commission, T‑298/16, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). However, it was also held that the applicant must establish, or at least indicate, the existence of special circumstances in the application (orders of 5 February 2007, Sinara Handel v Council and Commission, T‑91/05, EU:T:2007:31, paragraph 110, and of 9 July 2019, Scaloni and Figini v Commission, T‑158/18, not published, EU:T:2019:491, paragraph 34). 70 In the present case, the applicant does not set out the reasons which justify the failure to quantify the harm allegedly suffered. In addition, it must be pointed out that, at the time when the applicant brought the present action, the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in the judgment of 25 October 2018, KF v SatCen (T‑286/15, EU:T:2018:718) had already been paid by SatCen and was therefore no longer producing interest. Accordingly, the applicant was in a position to propose a calculation corresponding to the application, to the sum of EUR 10 000 awarded to her in that judgment, of an interest rate for the period between the time when, in her view, that sum should have been paid and the date on which such payment actually took place. In those circumstances, the absence of quantification of the alleged harm cannot be justified by the existence of special circumstances. 71 Third, it must be noted that the application does not contain any indication whatsoever as to the causal link between the conduct complained of and the harm alleged. In the absence of any indication from the applicant, it is not for the Court to make assumptions and ascertain whether there is a causal link between the conduct complained of and the injury alleged (see judgment of 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T‑444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 72 Consequently, the General Court is not in a position to rule on the fourth head of claim submitted by the applicant, which does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, as interpreted in the case-law as recalled in paragraphs 52 to 54 above. The fourth head of claim must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 73 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the action must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, as regards the second head of claim, manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Moreover, pursuant to Article 142(2) of the Rules of Procedure, there is no need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene made by the Council. Costs 74 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings, in accordance with the form of order sought by SatCen. 75 Furthermore, under Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, where the main proceedings are brought to an end before a ruling is given on the application for leave to intervene, the Council, the applicant and SatCen must each be ordered to bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed. 2. KF shall pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings. 3. There is no need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene made by the Council of the European Union. 4. Each party shall bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene. Luxembourg, 10 July 2020. E. Coulon R. da Silva Passos Registrar President * Language of the case: English.