Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2019:93
Date: 2019-02-14
Language of the case: English
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded;Staff cases - inadmissible;Action for damages - inadmissible

summary statement of those pleas. However, it is clear that that argument, alleging infringement of the first paragraph of Article 60 of the Staff Regulations, is not included in the application, but is put forward for the first time at the reply stage. In any event, as described in paragraphs 2, 33 and 37 above, it is not disputed that the applicant obtained a medical certificate, issued in Brussels, his place of employment, stating that the sick leave in question covered the period from 30 July to 7 August 2016 and that he left his place of employment on 7 August 2016, whereas, under the second paragraph of Article 60 of the Staff Regulations, he should have requested prior permission from the appointing authority to leave his place of employment to spend sick leave elsewhere than at his place of employment. In that regard, the argument that, as he was in [confidential] on 7 August 2016, he was authorised to visit a doctor in [confidential] on 8 August 2016 does not preclude that he should have requested the prior permission referred to above. Consequently, the argument must be dismissed, primarily, as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as ineffective. 62 The plea alleging breach of the duty of care and of the principle of good administration and, consequently, the claim for annulment in its entirety, must therefore be rejected. The claim for damages 63 In the reply, the applicant requests the award of damages assessed ex aequo et bono in the sum of EUR 100 000 to compensate for the non-material damage caused by the Parliament’s wrongful conduct. In particular, the applicant stresses that the infringements of EU law committed by the Parliament gave rise to psychological suffering. 64 In addition, the applicant refers to his dismissal and claims that it damaged his reputation and that all his attempts to find new employment in the EU institutions were unsuccessful. In particular, the applicant argues that the note concerning his dismissal and all the relevant circumstances are included in his personal file, which makes him unemployable. 65 The Parliament disputes that argument. 66 Since all the pleas in law relied on in support of the claim for annulment have been rejected, the claim for damages should therefore be rejected, in so far as the alleged damage results from the contested decision (see judgment of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament, T‑214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 67 It should be pointed out that the present case is not one in which the Court, while noting the existence of maladministration, does not annul the contested decision, but rather, on the basis of its unlimited jurisdiction in disputes of a financial character in civil service matters, nevertheless of its own motion orders the defendant to pay compensation for the damage caused by the defendant’s wrongful act (judgment of 5 June 1980 in Oberthür v Commission, 24/79, EU:C:1980:145, paragraphs 11 to 14; see, also, judgment of 20 May 2010, Gogos v Commission, C‑583/08 P, EU:C:2010:287, paragraphs 44 and 51 and the case-law cited). 68 As regards any harm that does not arise from the contested decision, but from faults and omissions allegedly committed by the administration, the applicant does not indicate that he has made a request in that regard under Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations. His claim must therefore be rejected as inadmissible (judgment of 31 May 2005, Dionyssopoulou v Council, T‑284/02, EU:T:2005:188, paragraph 72). 69 Finally, as regards any harm that does not arise from the contested decision, but from other decisions in respect of which the applicant has not sought annulment in his application, including the decision to dismiss him, to which he refers in his reply, it should be noted that, under Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant is required to state in the application the subject matter of the proceedings and the form of order sought. While Article 84(2) of those rules authorises, in certain circumstances, new pleas in law to be introduced in the course of proceedings, that provision cannot in any circumstances be interpreted as authorising the applicant to bring new claims before the General Court and thereby to modify the subject matter of the proceedings (see judgment of 13 July 2018, PS v EIB, T‑612/16, not published, EU:T:2018:483, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). Given that the claim for damages was introduced at the reply stage and not at the stage of the application and that it goes beyond the subject matter of the dispute, as defined therein, it must, in the absence of matters of law and fact which came to light in the course of the written procedure that justify an amendment of that subject matter, be rejected as inadmissible. 70 The action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 71 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, as applied for by the Parliament. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders L to pay the costs. Gervasoni Kowalik-Bańczyk Mac Eochaidh Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 February 2019. E. Coulon S. Gervasoni Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 Confidential data omitted.