Judgment;Information — ECLI:EU:T:2025:47
Date: 2025-01-22
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119). 27 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 28 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the EU Courts a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing his, her or its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 124 and the case-law cited). 29 In that regard, it must be noted that the context of the measures at issue must be taken into account and the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty of obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited). 30 In addition, it is important to bear in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59). 31 Finally, it should also be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the legality of the contested act must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing on the date when the act was adopted (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). 32 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be determined whether the Council committed an error of assessment in deciding to include, and subsequently to maintain, the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. The evidence produced by the Council 33 In the present case, the Council provided the first WK file containing six items of evidence in order to justify including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. Those items are publicly available information, namely: – an extract from a journalist’s Twitter account dated February 2022 (Exhibit 1 of the first WK file); – articles from Corriere della Sera (Exhibit 2 of the first WK file), Kommersant (Exhibit 5 of the first WK file) and RCB (Exhibit 6 of the first WK file); – extracts from the official websites of SUEK and of EuroChem Group accessed in February 2022 (Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4 of the first WK file, respectively). 34 As regards the second set of maintaining acts, the Council also relied on the additional evidence in the second WK file, namely: – articles from Switzerland Times (Exhibit 1 of the second WK file) and Cyprus Mail (Exhibit 2 of the second WK file); – an extract from the official website of SUEK accessed in November 2022 (Exhibit 3 of the second WK file); – extracts from the specialised websites of Cbonds (Exhibits 4 and 6 of the second WK file), GlobeNewswire (Exhibit 5 of the second WK file), Tadviser (Exhibits 7 and 8 of the second WK file), Rusprofile (Exhibits 9 and 12 of the second WK file) and Audit-it.ru (Exhibits 10 and 11 of the second WK file); – an extract from the website of the United States Department of State (Exhibit 13 of the second WK file). The reliability of the evidence 35 The applicant submits essentially that the Council has not provided specific, precise and consistent evidence to constitute a sufficient factual basis on which to justify the inclusion of his name on lists at issue. 36 According to the applicant, the evidence in the first and second WK files on which the Council relied is an ‘insubstantial compilation’ drawn from social media and press articles which relate very little to him, if at all. The press articles may be used only in order to corroborate facts. Thus, none of the evidence meets the burden of proof borne by the Council. 37 In particular, in the second statement of modification, the applicant submits that Exhibit 1 of the second WK file, which is an article from Switzerland Times, is inspired by an article from Tages-Anzeiger which he claims is a ‘tabloid’. 38 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 39 It should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the EU Courts is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In that regard, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited). 40 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59). 41 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information from being provided (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116). 42 In the first place, it must first of all be recalled that, as is apparent from paragraph 28 above, the assessment as to whether the grounds for listing are well founded must be carried out by examining whether the evidence and information produced by the Council constitute a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence. Therefore, the applicant’s challenge of the relevance of the items of evidence, taken separately, must be rejected. 43 In the second place, the applicant’s assertion that the Council relied on a mere compilation of press articles and social media messages in order to include his name on the list must be rejected. It should be noted that the Council produced screenshots from SUEK’s website (Exhibit 3 of the first WK file and Exhibit 3 of the second WK file) and from EuroChem’s website (Exhibit 4 of the first WK file). In addition, the press articles stem from digital information sources of various origins, including Russian, such as Kommersant or RCB, but also foreign, such as Corriere della Sera, Switzerland Times and Cyprus Mail. So far as concerns the reliability of the evidence submitted by the Council, it should be recalled, as is apparent from paragraph 40 above, that, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press or other similar sources of information. 44 As regards, in particular, Exhibit 1 of the second WK file, the probative value of which is called into question by the applicant, it should be noted that the applicant merely disputes the reliability of the article of Switzerland Times without adducing evidence capable of substantiating his claims that it drew inspiration from another publication specialised in the private lives of public persons. In any event, the mere fact that that article of Switzerland Times essentially reproduces the content of another publication is not sufficient to prevent that item of evidence from having probative value. 45 In the third place, the applicant’s unsubstantiated assertion that the evidence in the first and second WK files relate very little to him, if at all, must be rejected. Suffice it to note that most of that evidence refers directly to the applicant. As for the rest of the evidence, it concerns SUEK and EuroChem, in relation to which the applicant does not deny having been, at least until 9 March 2022, a member of the board of directors. 46 Thus, in the light of the foregoing, and in the absence of any argument capable of affecting the reliability of the sources used by the Council, those sources must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 39 above. 47 Consequently, it is necessary to examine, in the light of the evidence concerned, whether the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were well founded. The alleged discrepancies between the grounds set out in the contested acts and those in the first WK file 48 The applicant submits that the grounds for listing contained in the contested acts are materially inaccurate and differ from those set out in the first WK file. 49 In his view, the grounds for listing in the contested acts can be interpreted as referring to the two listing criteria, namely the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145, as amended (‘criterion (a)’), and the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of that decision (‘criterion (g)’). Furthermore, the second set of maintaining acts also refers to the ‘association’ criterion. 50 However, the first WK file expressly refers to the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended (‘criterion (d)’), Article 2(1)(f) of that decision (‘criterion (f)’) and criterion (g); the second WK file does not refer to any criterion. Since the contested acts do not sufficiently reflect criteria (d) and (f), those criteria cannot be taken into consideration. 51 The Council contests the applicant’s arguments. 52 In the present case, it is not disputed that, in the first WK file, the European External Action Service (EEAS) proposed to the Council, in a document expressly described as a draft (‘draft statement of reasons for listing’), that the applicant’s name be included on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d), (f) and (g). 53 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, first, the inclusion of the names of persons, entities and bodies on the relevant lists is generally preceded by the EEAS drawing up working documents, such as the first evidence file, by means of which it proposes to the Council the names of persons, entities and bodies to be included on the relevant lists, a statement of reasons for that purpose and the evidence capable of justifying such inclusion. Such documents are preparatory in nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council, T‑361/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:502, paragraphs 42 and 43). 54 Second, the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures in question are based are met (see judgment of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 55 In the present case, it must be stated that the statements of reasons for the initial acts and the first and second sets of maintaining acts do not contain any reference to suggest that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue under criteria (d) or (f). 56 By contrast, the grounds for the contested acts refer clearly and unambiguously to criterion (g). The fact that the grounds of the contested acts may be understood as also referring to criterion (a) is not such as to demonstrate the lack of clear grounds with regard to criterion (g). The present complaint must therefore be rejected. The application of criterion (g) to the applicant 57 In the first place, the applicant claims that, while he can be considered a businessperson, the Council has not shown that he had close links to the Russian regime and that he was therefore a leading businessperson within the meaning of criterion (g). The Council made a manifest error of assessment by taking the view that, owing to his attendance at the meeting of 24 February 2022, he was a member of President Putin’s inner circle, or that he was a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. The applicant claims that his attendance at that meeting as a member of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) cannot be indicative of a personal relationship with President Putin, or that he is part of the latter’s closest circle. 58 In second place, the applicant argues that the Council has not established that, on the date of the contested acts, he owned or controlled EuroChem and SUEK. He ceased to be the owner of EuroChem and SUEK as from 2006, as he transferred his shares to a trust which holds and controls those companies since that date. Furthermore, on 8 March 2022, he stood down definitively as a beneficiary of the trust and, on 9 March 2022, resigned from his post as non-executive director of the two companies’ board of directors. In any event, as a beneficiary of the trust, he did not enjoy any right of property over EuroChem and SUEK and did not exercise any control over them. 59 In the third place, the applicant claims that, even if he were regarded as owning EuroChem and SUEK and as belonging to President Putin’s inner circle on the date on which the contested acts were adopted, that does not however allow the conclusion to be drawn that he is involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. He submits that it cannot be shown on the basis of the evidence produced by the Council how EuroChem and SUEK provided a ‘substantial’ source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. In the reply, he adds, in essence, that criterion (g) must be interpreted as being directed at the revenue generated by the listed persons from their activities, and not the revenue generated by the economic sectors. In his opinion, the Russian Government must therefore materially benefit from the revenue provided by the person whose name is listed. 60 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 61 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that criterion (g) employs the notion of ‘leading businesspersons’ in conjunction with involvement ‘in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the [Russian] Government’, without any other condition relating to a link, whether direct or indirect, with that government. The aim pursued by that criterion is to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 138). 62 In that regard, there is a rational connection between the targeting of leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government and the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 139 and the case-law cited). 63 However, there is nothing in the recitals or the provisions of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, to indicate that it is for the Council to demonstrate the existence of a close link or interdependence between, on the one hand, the person whose name is included on the lists at issue and, on the other, the Russian Government or its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 140). 64 Thus, in the light of the wording of criterion (g), the persons referred to must be considered to be influential on account of their importance in the sector in which they are involved and the importance of that sector for the Russian economy. In that regard, the notion of ‘leading businessperson’ must therefore be understood as referring to their importance in the light, in particular, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 143 and the case-law cited). 65 The objective of the restrictive measures at issue is not to penalise certain persons or entities because of their links with the situation in Ukraine or their links with the Russian Government, but to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation in order to increase pressure on it and the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to put an end, as quickly as possible, to the aggression suffered by Ukraine (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited). 66 It is in the light of those considerations that it must be assessed whether the Council committed an error of assessment in taking the view that the applicant is a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors constituting a substantial source of revenue for the Russian Government. – The initial acts 67 The reasons given in respect of the applicant relate to the fact that he was the owner of a major fertiliser producer, EuroChem Group, and a coal company, SUEK, and that he attended, on 24 February 2022, a meeting with President Putin, which, it is claimed, demonstrates that he is part of the inner circle of President Putin. 68 In the first place, as regards the status of leading businessperson ascribed to the applicant, it should be noted that it is apparent from Exhibits 3 and 4 of the first WK file that he is the founder of the EuroChem Group, a major fertiliser producer, and of a coal company, SUEK, which the applicant himself acknowledges. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the applicant was, at the very least until 9 March 2022 – that is to say, until the day the initial acts were adopted – the non-executive director of EuroChem’s and SUEK’s boards of directors. 69 However, the applicant claims, in essence, that he is not the ‘owner’ of EuroChem and SUEK, since, first, in 2006, he transferred all his shares in EuroChem and SUEK to the trustees of a trust named Firstline Trust and, second, on 8 March 2022, he irreversibly stood down as a beneficiary of that trust. 70 In the present case, it should be noted that the trust FirstLine Trust was created, as the applicant acknowledges, in order to protect and safeguard his substantial wealth. It is common ground that, in 2006, the applicant transferred to the trustees of that trust all his shares in SUEK and EuroChem which enabled him to control those two companies, and that he became the first beneficiary of the trust. Thus, between 2006 and 8 March 2022, the applicant was both the settlor and the first beneficiary of FirstLine Trust which is, according to Annex A.10 produced by the applicant, the owner, through two companies established in Cyprus, of a portfolio of majority shareholdings in EuroChem and SUEK. 71 Therefore, by setting up the trust and designating himself as its beneficiary, the applicant retained, through the companies and intermediate structures referred to in paragraph 70 above, economic interests in EuroChem and SUEK. The fact that the appellant used an intermediate legal structure, such as a trust, is not such as to prevent it from being regarded as the holder of the shareholdings managed by that trust for the purposes of the application of criterion (g). It follows that it may be considered that the applicant, in his capacity as settlor and beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, continued to hold, from an economic point of view, shareholdings in EuroChem and SUEK. 72 The applicant’s argument that he does not exercise any de jure or de facto control over EuroChem and SUEK must be rejected as ineffective, since, according to criterion (g), control over economic resources is not a necessary condition for that criterion to apply. 73 Therefore, since the applicant was the settlor and beneficiary of the trust which manages his shareholdings in EuroChem and SUEK, the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering, in the grounds for the initial acts, that he was the owner of those two companies. 74 In that regard, it is true that the applicant produces a document indicating that he had irreversibly stood down, on 8 March 2022, as beneficiary of FirstLine Trust which owns and controls EuroChem and SUEK. However, that statement was made unilaterally and in tempore suspecto, namely the day before the initial acts were adopted. In addition, that alleged change in situation which occurred the day before the initial acts were adopted, assuming it to be true, does not enable the applicant’s status as a leading businessperson to be dismissed and for it to be found that the Council made an error of assessment in that connection (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 153). 75 In any event, in view of criterion (g), the notion of ‘leading businesspersons’ refers to factual matters occurring both in the past and over time. Therefore, even assuming that the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue refer to a factual situation which existed before the adoption of the initial acts and which was modified shortly before that date, that fact would not necessarily mean that the restrictive measures adopted against him by those acts are obsolete (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 154). 76 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the applicant was present at the meeting of 24 February 2022 which was organised by President Putin and was attended by a number of Russian businesspersons. While that piece of information is not in itself decisive, it supports the assertion that the applicant is a leading businessperson. Indeed, among all of the businesspersons active in Russia, only 37 were invited to that meeting. 77 It follows that the Council was right to consider that the applicant was a leading businessperson. That classification as a leading businessperson is, moreover, also supported by the nature and scale of the activities of EuroChem, a company producing fertilisers which are, as the applicant accepts, products of global importance. It is apparent from the first WK file (Exhibits 3 and 4) that Eurochem is one of the world’s largest producers and distributors of fertilisers, whose sales figures amounted to 10.2 billion US dollars (USD) in 2021, while the applicant accepts that SUEK is one of the largest integrated energy companies in the world, producing more than 100 million tonnes of coal per year and employing 73 000 persons in Russia. 78 In the second place, it must be examined whether the Council was entitled to, without making an error of assessment, consider that the economic sectors in which the applicant was active constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation. 79 In that regard, the applicant’s argument that there is no evidence in the first WK file confirming that EuroChem or SUEK provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation must be rejected as ineffective. While EuroChem’s or SUEK’s own contribution may be useful in determining their economic significance in the sector concerned or whether the applicant is a leading businessperson, it is not decisive, since, as is clear from criterion (g), it is the economic sector or sectors, and not the natural or legal person whose name is included on the lists at issue, that must constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 156). 80 As regards the economic sectors at issue in the present case, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is clear from the grounds of the contested acts concerning EuroChem’s and SUEK’s activities that the economic sectors concerned are the production and distribution of fertilisers and the energy sector, respectively. Admittedly, SUEK is described in the grounds for the contested acts as a coal company. However, the coal industry is part of the energy sector since coal is a fossil fuel used for energy production. 81 So far as concerns the fertiliser production and distribution sector, it should be noted that the applicant himself concedes that the fertiliser sector, in which EuroChem operates, is highly strategic, as is shown by Annex A.33 to the application. The applicant himself states that fertilisers are of crucial importance to avoid a global food crisis. 82 As regards SUEK, it must be noted that it is active in the energy sector. First, the applicant does not dispute that the energy sector is a sector which provides a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Second, the tax revenue from the energy sector may prove to be substantial within the meaning of criterion (g) (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council, T‑333/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2023:758, paragraph 108). 83 In the light of those considerations, it must be held that the Council provided a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that, at the time the initial acts were adopted, the applicant was a leading businessperson involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. 84 According to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the EU Courts consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). 85 Accordingly, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded as regards the initial acts, without there being any need to examine the other complaints raised by the applicant, seeking to call into question the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue under criterion (a). – The first set of maintaining acts 86 It is important to bear in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgments of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 168). 87 In order to justify retaining a person’s name on the list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on the list in question, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). 88 That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). 89 Similarly, the maintenance of the name of a person or entity on a list remains justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, in the light of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures at issue have not been met (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 83 and 84). 90 It follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, that that decision is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provides, for its part, for the list in its annex to be reviewed at regular intervals, and at least every 12 months. 91 In the present case, it should be borne in mind that the grounds on which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue by the first set of maintaining acts remained the same as those of the initial acts. In order to justify maintaining his name of the lists, the Council relied on the same evidence as that contained in the first WK file. 92 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the context, objectives and individual situation of the applicant on the date of adoption of the first set of maintaining acts allowed the Council to maintain the listing of his name under criterion (g) on the basis of the same evidence. 93 As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be stated that, at the date of the first set of maintaining acts, the gravity of the situation in Ukraine persisted. 94 Consequently, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to the military aggression against Ukraine, and to increase the costs of the actions of the Russian Federation undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. 95 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 86 and 87 above, the Council took due account of the evolution of the applicant’s situation for the purposes of deciding to maintain his name on the lists at issue and, in particular, whether his specific situation has changed in such a way that the evidence has become obsolete. To that end, it is therefore necessary to examine whether the applicant could be classified, on the date on which the first set of maintaining acts was adopted, as a leading businessperson within the meaning of criterion (g) or, at the very least, whether the evidence in the file can constitute a body of evidence within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above. 96 As regards the applicant’s individual situation, it should be noted that the applicant denies having owned EuroChem and SUEK and, in particular, states that he stood down as a beneficiary of FirstLine Trust on 8 March 2022. In addition, he states that the Council was informed, at least in the context of the application, lodged on 17 May 2022, of his relinquishment of his status as a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, the applicant criticises the fact that, in the first set of maintaining acts, the grounds for listing remained the same as those set out in the initial acts and that he continued to be identified as the owner of EuroChem and SUEK. 97 In that connection, it must be borne in mind, first, that, as stated in paragraph 71 above, the fact that the applicant used an intermediate legal structure, such as a trust, is not such as to prevent him from being regarded as the holder of the shareholdings managed by that trust for the purposes of the application of criterion (g). 98 Second, it is common ground that, at the same time as the applicant relinquished his status as a beneficiary, that status was conferred on Ms Aleksandra Melnichenko, who was his wife at the time the first set of maintaining acts was adopted. Since Ms Melnichenko is not a third party with no link to the applicant, the fact that the applicant relinquished his status as a beneficiary in favour of her cannot constitute a relevant change in his individual situation (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 101, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 183). 99 It follows that the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering that the applicant’s individual situation had not changed in a relevant manner and that he still satisfied the conditions of criterion (g) on the day the first set of maintaining acts was adopted. 100 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 84 above, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded as regards the first set of maintaining acts, without there being any need to examine the other complaints raised by the applicant, seeking to call into question his name being maintained on the lists at issue under criterion (a). – The second set of maintaining acts 101 In the grounds relied on in the second set of maintaining acts, the applicant is identified as being the ‘former owner’ of EuroChem and SUEK, who, ‘since 9 March 2022, … transferred his shares in [those companies] to his spouse’ and ‘continues to benefit’ from that wealth. Thus, he is allegedly ‘a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the [Russian] Government’. 102 In that regard, it is apparent from Exhibits 1 and 2 of the second WK file, the content of which is not challenged by the applicant, that, in March 2022, the applicant’s wife, Ms Melnichenko, became the beneficiary of FirstLine Trust, which owns, through two companies established in Cyprus, a portfolio of majority shareholdings in EuroChem and SUEK. As stated in paragraph 98 above, that change of beneficiary cannot be regarded as a change in the applicant’s individual situation since his wife cannot be considered a third party. Furthermore, it is apparent, in essence, from Exhibit 1 of the second WK file that, following the transfer of those companies to his wife via the trust, the applicant did not forego the payment of dividends, but that such a payment was merely deferred. 103 It must therefore be concluded that, having regard, first, to the fact that the applicant could be regarded as the holder of the shareholdings managed by FirstLine Trust, within the meaning of criterion (g) (see paragraph 71 above) and, second, to the transfer of the status of beneficiary of the trust to his wife, it may be considered that the applicant had retained economic interests in both those companies and continued to benefit from those assets. 104 Consequently, in view of the enduring gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been met and of the absence of conclusive evidence to show that the applicant’s individual situation had changed, the Council did not make an error of assessment in maintaining the restrictive measures at issue. 105 That finding cannot be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicant. 106 First, as regards the legal opinion of 11 November 2022 concerning FirstLine Trust produced by the applicant in order to support his assertion that the beneficiaries do not own, nor do they control, the assets held in trust, it should be borne in mind that, in order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the information and regard should also be had in particular to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears sound and reliable. In the present case, that legal opinion was produced at the applicant’s request for the purposes of his defence in the present action. Therefore, it is only of limited probative value (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 February 2018, Klyuyev v Council, T‑731/15, EU:T:2018:90, paragraph 124). 107 Moreover, it is apparent from the analysis set out in that document that the concept of ownership in a formal sense is discussed, without considering whether the fact that the applicant was designated as the first beneficiary of the trust may indicate that his economic interests in the companies concerned remain. 108 Second, so far as concerns the applicant’s argument that the Council has not established a sufficient link between the applicant and the Government of the Russian Federation, it must be borne in mind that the objective of the restrictive measures at issue is not to penalise certain persons or entities because of their links with the situation in Ukraine or their links with the Russian Government, but to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation, in order to increase pressure on it and to increase the costs of its actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to put an end, as quickly as possible, to the aggression suffered by Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2018, Rosneft and Others v Council, T‑715/14, not published, EU:T:2018:544, paragraph 160). 109 In any event, as is apparent from paragraph 63 above, there is nothing in the recitals or the provisions of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, to indicate that it is for the Council to demonstrate the existence of a close link or interdependence between, on the one hand, the person whose name is included on the lists at issue and, on the other, the Russian Government or its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 140). 110 Third, as regards the applicant’s argument that EuroChem and SUEK do not provide a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, since the tax revenue from the sectors in which those companies operate is mainly allocated to the budgets of local federal entities and not to the federal budget of the Russian Federation, it should be noted that the fact, assuming it to be true, that the tax revenue from the mining and fertiliser production sectors and from the energy sector is mainly allocated to the budgets of local federal entities is irrelevant. Having regard to the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, recalled in paragraph 62 above, the concept of ‘revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ cannot be given a narrow interpretation, which would merely cover tax revenue allocated to the federal budget of that State. 111 It follows that the Council did not make an error of assessment in considering, in the second set of maintaining acts, that the applicant satisfied the conditions for his name to be maintained on the lists at issue under criterion (g). 112 Therefore, pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraph 84 above, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded so far as concerns the second set of maintaining acts, without there being any need to examine the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question his name being maintained on the lists at issue. 113 In the light of all of the foregoing, the ground for inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, based on his status as a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation and corresponding to criterion (g), must be found to be sufficiently substantiated such that, in the light of that criterion, the inclusion and the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue stemming from the initial acts and the first and second sets of maintaining acts are well founded. First plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights 114 The applicant claims, in essence, that the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue constitutes an unjustified, arbitrary and disproportionate limitation of his fundamental rights, which include, inter alia, the right to respect for private and family life and the home, as well as the right to property. Thus, he can no longer travel to the Member States or make use of his possessions in the European Union and in Switzerland, where he has his primary residence. The applicant submits that none of the interferences mentioned are lawful for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter. He adds that, since there is no link between him and the Kremlin, the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue in no way contributes to attaining the objectives of Regulation No 269/2014, which consist in applying pressure on the Russian authorities, and is harmful to EuroChem. In addition, the restrictive measures run counter to the European Union’s policy of guaranteeing global food security. Accordingly, the maintenance of the restrictive measures adopted against him is unnecessary and disproportionate. 115 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 116 It must be borne in mind that, as regards the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter, according to settled case-law, those fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). 117 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 118 Thus, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Second, it must respect the essence of those rights. Third, it must effectively meet an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourth, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 27 July 2022, RT France v Council, T‑125/22, EU:T:2022:483, paragraphs 145 and 222 of the case-law cited). 119 It has been held that the restrictive measures prescribed by Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 imposed on natural and legal persons, entities and bodies on the lists annexed to those acts satisfied, in principle, those four conditions (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraphs 195 to 200, and of 6 December 2023, Zubitskiy v Council, T‑359/22, not published, EU:T:2023:779, paragraphs 98 to 105). 120 In the present case, so far as concerns, in particular, the fourth condition referred to in paragraph 118 above, it should be noted, as regards the appropriateness of the restrictive measures at issue, that, with reference to an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as those mentioned in paragraph 62 above, those measures cannot, as such, be regarded as inappropriate (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 199). 121 In addition, with regard to their necessity, other alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation, are not as effective in achieving the objective pursued, having regard in particular to the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 200). 122 Last, a balancing of the interests at stake demonstrates that the disadvantages for the applicant of the temporary freezing of funds and the ban on entering the territory of the Member States for a limited period are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued. In that regard, the importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, which form part of the broader objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any negative consequences, even considerable ones, for certain operators. It should be noted that specific derogations from the measures may be granted by the authorities of the Member States in accordance with Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, in particular to meet the basic or essential needs of the persons concerned or to meet certain necessary expenditure. 123 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue has serious repercussions on his right to respect for family life and the home and on that of his wife and of his children, in particular because the travel ban imposed by the European Union has the indirect effect of cutting his family off from their main residence in Switzerland, it must be held that any measures taken against him by third States cannot be attributed to the contested acts. 124 In addition, as regards the alleged breach of the right to respect for private and family life resulting from the fact that the applicant can no longer visit certain members of his family in the territory of the European Union, it is sufficient to note that the applicant merely claimed that the prohibition on entering or transiting through the territory of the European Union prevents him from maintaining ties with his relatives and friends who reside in the Member States without substantiating that claim with specific evidence. 125 In addition, as regards the argument that the restrictive measures at issue are disproportionate on account of the dangers to which they give rise for global food security, it is sufficient to note that the subject matter of the contested acts is not trade in agricultural products and that no causal link has been shown between the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and risks for global food security. 126 In addition, as regards the second set of maintaining acts, on 16 December 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2479 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 687) and Regulation (EU) 2022/2475 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 322I, p. 315), which provide for a derogation from the freezing of funds and economic resources where transactions are necessary for the sale, supply, transfer or export of agricultural and food products. 127 Last, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging difficulties for EuroChem in carrying out day-to-day activities, it is sufficient to note that the review of the legality of the contested acts is limited to reviewing the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue and that EuroChem is not covered by the restrictive measures at issue. 128 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first plea in law, alleging breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality, must be rejected. The application for a measure of inquiry 129 By letter of 11 June 2024, the applicant applied to the General Court to request that it adopt a measure of inquiry, pursuant to Article 88(1) of the Rules of Procedure, seeking an order that he appear in person at the hearing. He claims that his personal testimony is necessary in order to clarify matters of fact concerning his links with Firstline Trust. 130 The Council, supported by the Commission, contends that that application should not be granted. 131 As regards applications made by a party for measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry, it must be recalled that the General Court is the sole judge of any need to supplement the information available to it in respect of the cases before it (see judgments of 4 March 2021, Liaño Reig v SRB, C‑947/19 P, EU:C:2021:172, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited, and of 1 June 2022, Algebris (UK) and Anchorage Capital Group v Commission, T‑570/17, EU:T:2022:314, paragraph 435 and the case-law cited). 132 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, even where a request for the examination of witnesses states precisely about what facts and for what reasons the witness or witnesses should be examined, it falls to the General Court to assess the relevance of the application to the subject matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named (see judgment of 26 January 2017, Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission, C‑619/13 P, EU:C:2017:50, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited; judgment of 22 October 2020, Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission, C‑702/19 P, EU:C:2020:857, paragraph 29). In general, the witness statement of the applicant him- or herself is only of little probative value (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 259, and of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 116). 133 In the present case, it must be noted that the information contained in the file is sufficient to enable the Court to give judgment, since it has been able to give a proper ruling on the basis of the form of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties, without it being necessary to order the applicant to appear in person or that he be heard as a witness. 134 Accordingly, the application for a measure of inquiry must be rejected. 135 It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 136 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those of the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. According to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Commission must therefore bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Mr Andrey Melnichenko to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to pay its own costs. Brkan Gâlea Kalėda Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 January 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.