Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:55
Date: 2016-02-02
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Second Chamber
Subject matter: Trade marks;Intellectual, industrial and commercial property
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Italy

summary of the pleas in law on which they are based. It is settled case-law that, although specific points in the text of the application can be supported and completed by references to specific passages in the documents annexed to it, a general reference to other documents cannot compensate for the failure to set out the essential elements of the legal argument which must, under those provisions, appear in the application itself (see judgment of 8 July 2010 in Engelhorn v OHIM — The Outdoor Group (peerstorm), T‑30/09, ECR, EU:T:2010:298, paragraph 18 and the case-law citied therein). 19 At the hearing, the applicant stated, in response to a question put by the Court, that the reference it had made at certain points in the application was not to be interpreted as a general reference, but that its arguments were limited solely to the specific points developed in the application. In the light of that further information, the Court concludes that the plea of inadmissibility raised by OHIM must be rejected. The admissibility of the complaints directed against the Cancellation Division’s decision 20 OHIM contends that the applicant’s objections against the findings made by the Cancellation Division must be declared inadmissible. 21 It must be recalled in this connection that, by virtue of Article 65(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, actions may be brought before the European Union judicature only against decisions of the Boards of Appeal so that it is only pleas directed against the decision of the Board of Appeal itself which are admissible in such an action (judgment of 7 June 2005 in Lidl Stiftung v OHIM — REWE-Zentral (Salvita), T‑303/03, ECR, EU:T:2005:200, paragraph 59). 22 At the hearing, the applicant stated, in reply to a question put by the Court, that the application was to be interpreted to the effect that the complaints set out therein were directed solely against the contested decision. Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility raised by OHIM in this regard must be rejected. Admissibility of the new evidence submitted by the applicant before the Court 23 The applicant has attached to the application before the Court new evidence consisting of an affidavit by the Mayor of the municipality of Pesaro (Italy). OHIM contends that the affidavit is inadmissible. 24 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of an action before the Court is to review the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM as provided for in Article 65 of Regulation No 207/2009. It is therefore not the Court’s function to re-evaluate the factual circumstances in the light of evidence which has been adduced for the first time before it (judgments of 19 November 2008 in Rautaruukki v OHIM (RAUTARUUKKI), T‑269/06, EU:T:2008:512, paragraph 20, and of 25 June 2010 in MIP Metro v OHIM — CBT Comunicación Multimedia (Metromeet), T‑407/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:256, paragraph 16). It follows that facts not submitted by the parties before the departments of OHIM cannot be submitted at the stage of the appeal brought before the Court (see judgment of 13 March 2007 in OHIM v Kaul, C‑29/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited therein). 25 Moreover, it must be stated that the applicant, replying to a question put by the Court, did not deny that the Mayor of Pesaro, who held that position from 2004 onwards, could have had drawn up at the applicant’s request during the administrative proceedings an affidavit which, although different on account of the dates referred to therein, which are subsequent to the date of the administrative proceedings, would nevertheless have been similar to that drawn up in the context of the present action. 26 In those circumstances, as OHIM contends, the annex referred to in paragraph 23 above, which was not produced by the applicant during the administrative proceedings, must be declared inadmissible. Substance 27 The applicant submits, in essence, two pleas in law against the contested decision, alleging (i) infringement of Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and (ii) infringement of Rule 50(1), third subparagraph, of Regulation No 2868/95. 28 The plea in law alleging infringement of Rule 50(1), third subparagraph, of Regulation No 2868/95 should be examined first. Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Rule 50(1), third subparagraph, of Regulation No 2868/95 29 The applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal failed to take into consideration the evidence submitted, on the ground that the Board of Appeal stated, in point 54 of the contested decision, that the circumstances did not speak in favour of accepting the supplementary documents. 30 It is sufficient to observe in this connection that notwithstanding the Board of Appeal’s statement reproduced in paragraph 29 above, the Board of Appeal nevertheless found, in point 53 of the contested decision, that since the evidence submitted out of time was additional evidence, the condition for taking that evidence into consideration had actually been met, and in points 56 to 63 of the contested decision it expressly referred to that evidence, took it into consideration and analysed it before finally stating why the evidence concerned did not give any further adequate information concerning the extent of use of the mark at issue during the relevant period. 31 In addition, at the hearing, in reply to a question put by the Court, the applicant acknowledged that the additional evidence had not been disregarded by the Board of Appeal. It declared, however, that it challenged the assessment made of that evidence. That assessment is examined in connection with the first plea in law. 32 It follows that since the Board of Appeal examined the relevance of the documents, the applicant’s complaint is ineffective. 33 It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the second plea in law must be rejected. First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 34 The applicant, in essence, criticises the Board of Appeal for finding that the evidence submitted by the applicant for assessment was insufficient for the purposes of establishing that the mark at issue had been put to genuine use. 35 It is apparent from recital 10 of Regulation No 207/2009 that the legislature considered that there is no justification for protecting a Community trade mark, except where the trade mark is actually used. In accordance with that recital, Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that the rights of a proprietor of a Community trade mark are to be declared revoked, in particular, on application to OHIM, if, within a continuous period of five years, the trade mark has not been put to genuine use in the European Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and there are no proper reasons for non-use. That provision adds that the commencement or resumption of use within a period of three months preceding the filing of the application for revocation which began at the earliest on expiry of the continuous period of five years of non-use is to be disregarded where preparations for the commencement or resumption occur only after the proprietor becomes aware that the application for revocation may be filed. 36 Rule 22(3) of Regulation No 2868/95, which is applicable to applications for revocation pursuant to Rule 40(5) of that regulation, provides that evidence of use must concern the place, time, extent and nature of use of the mark at issue (judgments of 10 September 2008 in Boston Scientific v OHIM — Terumo (CAPIO), T‑325/06, EU:T:2008:338, paragraph 27, and of 24 May 2012 in TMS Trademark-Schutzrechtsverwertungsgesellschaft v OHIM — Comercial Jacinto Parera (MAD), T‑152/11, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 17). 37 The rationale for the requirement that a mark must have been put to genuine use in order to be protected under EU law is that OHIM’s register cannot be compared to a strategic and static depository granting an inactive proprietor a legal monopoly for an unlimited period. On the contrary, and in accordance with recital 10 of Regulation No 207/2009, that register must faithfully reflect what companies actually use on the market to distinguish their goods and services in economic life (see, to that effect, order of 27 January 2004 in La Mer Technology, C‑259/02, ECR, EU:C:2004:50, paragraphs 18 to 22). 38 In the interpretation of the notion of genuine use, account must be taken of the fact that the rationale for the requirement that the mark at issue must have been put to genuine use is not to assess commercial success or to review the economic strategy of an undertaking, nor is it intended to restrict trade mark protection to the case where large-scale commercial use has been made of the marks (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited therein). 39 As is apparent from paragraph 43 of the judgment of 11 March 2003 in Ansul (C‑40/01, ECR, EU:C:2003:145), there is genuine use of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. Moreover, the condition of genuine use of the mark requires that that mark, as protected on the relevant territory, be used publicly and externally (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited therein; see also, by analogy, judgment in Ansul, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 37). 40 When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial exploitation of the mark is real, particularly whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited therein; see also, by analogy, judgment in Ansul, cited in paragraph 39 above, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 43). 41 As to the extent of the use to which the trade mark at issue has been put, account must be taken, in particular, of the commercial volume of the overall use, as well as of the length of the period during which the mark was used and the frequency of use (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited therein). 42 In order to examine, in a particular case, whether a Community trade mark has been put to genuine use, an overall assessment must be carried out, which takes into account all the relevant factors of the particular case. That assessment entails a degree of interdependence between the factors taken into account. Thus, the fact that commercial volume achieved under the mark was not high may be offset by the fact that use of the mark was extensive or very regular, and vice versa. In addition, the turnover and the volume of sales of the product under the mark at issue cannot be assessed in absolute terms but must be looked at in relation to other relevant factors, such as the volume of business, production or marketing capacity or the degree of diversification of the undertaking using the trade mark and the characteristics of the products or services on the relevant market. As a result, the Court has stated that use of the mark at issue need not always be quantitatively significant in order to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use can therefore be sufficient to be deemed genuine, provided that it is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned in order to maintain or create a market share for the goods or services protected by the mark (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited therein). 43 The Court of Justice also added, in paragraph 72 of the judgment of 11 May 2006 in Sunrider v OHIM (C‑416/04 P, ECR, EU:C:2006:310) that it was not possible to determine a priori and in the abstract what quantitative threshold should be chosen in order to determine whether use is genuine or not, which means that a de minimis rule, which would not allow OHIM or, on appeal, the General Court, to appraise all the circumstances of the dispute before it, cannot therefore be laid down. Thus, the Court of Justice has held that, when it serves a real commercial purpose, even minimal use of the trade mark can be sufficient to establish genuine use (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited therein). 44 However, the smaller the commercial volume of the exploitation of the mark, the more necessary it is for the proprietor of the mark to produce additional evidence to dispel possible doubts as to its genuineness (judgment of 18 January 2011 in Advance Magazine Publishers v OHIM — Capela & Irmãos (VOGUE), T‑382/08, EU:T:2011:9, paragraph 31). 45 Furthermore, the General Court has specified that genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or suppositions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of effective and sufficient use of the trade mark on the market concerned (see judgment in MAD, cited in paragraph 36 above, EU:T:2012:263, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited therein). 46 It is necessary to examine, in the light of those considerations, whether the Board of Appeal was correct in concluding that the mark at issue had not been put to genuine use in the five years preceding the date of the application for revocation of that mark, thus endorsing the Cancellation Division’s decision. 47 Since the application for revocation of the mark at issue was lodged on 22 December 2009, the five-year period referred to in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, which was mentioned in paragraph 14 above, extends, as the Board of Appeal correctly observed in point 32 of the contested decision, from 22 December 2004 to 21 December 2009. 48 The following evidence was provided by the applicant in the administrative proceedings before the Cancellation Division concerning the use of the mark at issue: – ‘participation [in the] EICMA [Exhibition] (2003): – [an] extract from the [website] www.cyberscooter.it with a reference to MOTOBI motorcycles at the EICMA 2003 [Exhibition]; – [an] extract from [the website] www.eicma.it containing information regarding [the] EICMA 2010 [Exhibition]. [The] EICMA [Exhibition] is a motorcycle exhibition [show] in Milan. There is no reference to MOTOBI. – ... extracts [from websites] on MOTOBI motorcycles (2004): – [an extract] from [the website] www.pakautocar.com including two pictures of motorcycles. According to the title of the website, these are “Motobi motorcycle... wallpaper... images”; – [an extract] from [the website] www.motorcyclespecifications.info/Motobi_Velvet400.html including technical information on a MOTOBI scooter (2004); and – [an extract] from [the website] www.bikez.com including technical information on a “Motobi Adiva 150” (2004) scooter and a “Motobi Adiva 125” (2004) scooter. – buying order (15 October 2009): – [a] buying order from Keeway France SAS placing an order with Benelli Q.J. Srl for 26 units of Pepe 50 scooters with the MOTOBI [trade mark] for the French market. The order is signed by the “director general”. The document is dated 15 October 2009. A letter from Mr PAN of Keeway France SAS in which it is indicated that the Keeway buying order was signed by him; – [a] letter of 25 November 2009 from Benelli Q.J. Srl (signed by the Legal Representative and Director General of Benelli) in reply to the buying order indicating that [the company] will be able to supply the scooters by the end of July 2010. – invoices (2010): – one invoice from Benelli Q.J. Srl to Keeway France dated 20 July 2010 for the sale of one “Velvet 125 cc black Motobi” for the amount of EUR 680 and a transport document; – one invoice from Benelli Q.J. Srl to Motor Show Center Sport Srl. in Milan dated 30 June 2010, for the sale of three motorcycles for the amount of EUR 3 448 and two transport documents[,] dated 2 July 2010 for two “Velvet 125 nero Motobi” and 30 June 2010 for three “49x on road nero — Motobi” [respectively]. – pictures (undated): – four pictures of motorcycles [bearing] the trade mark “MOTOBI”: – internet print-outs from Google ... of “Velvet Motobi” images. – resale of “MOTOBI” spare parts (undated): – [an] extract from [the website] webcache.googleusercontent.com with information on MOTOBI spare parts. It is indicated that “Motobi was founded by one of six Benelli brothers in 1950[,] who made motorcycles for a little over twenty years before the factory doors closed”; – other ... extracts [from websites] (eBay, motorcycles.shop, webcache.googleusercontent.com, justgastanks.com) involving third parties selling vintage MOTOBI spare parts or old MOTOBI motorcycles. The pages were printed out on 29 October 2010. – catalogues: – Benelli motorcycle catalogues showing pictures of goods that are referred to as Velvet and Adiva. According to the [Community trade mark] proprietor, the catalogues are dated 2004. However[,] this date is not visible on the catalogues. It is also claimed that [the catalogues] show the cobranding of MOTOBI with Velvet and Adiva. The following sign appears on the first page: – Benelli accessories & apparel catalogue 2008/2009 listing spare parts and clothing. There is no reference to MOTOBI. – on the company: – ... extracts from [the website] webcache.googleusercontent.com with information on “Benelli Adiva 150” and on the history of Benelli, and, in particular, “the 2005 Benelli Motorcycle range”. The extracts contain some pictures but there is no information on the MOTOBI trade mark — only a reference to MOTOBI and Benelli having produced around 300 motorcycles per day in 1962. According to the [Community trade mark] proprietor, [those extracts] show that Benelli produces Adiva motorcycles, which are also cobranded with MOTOBI; – [an] internet press-release dated 15 September 2005 which indicates that Benelli has been bought by a Chinese firm, and an ... extract from [the website] www.twowheelsblog.com containing the article “Benelli in crisis: production cut as possible move to China considered” (illegible date); – [an] extract from [the website] www.benelliclubgb.net containing information on the Benelli Motobi Club GB, printed on 29 October 2010; – ... extracts from websites regarding the Benelli museum, which [contains] MOTOBI motorcycles, printed on 29 October 2010.’ 49 Furthermore, other evidence was produced by the applicant before the Board of Appeal, which was examined by the Board in points 56 to 63 of the contested decision. The Board made the following observations concerning that evidence. 50 It found that the invoice, which was filed as Annex 1 to the statement of grounds of appeal, was dated 2 August 2010, that is to say outside the relevant period, and showed the sale of three scooters — thus a very small quantity — at a unit price of EUR 680. It next found that the statements filed as Annex 2 to that statement were vague and did not mention whether the products had been sold but merely that they had been produced. It found that Annex 3 to that statement did not relate to MOTOBI goods. It found that Annex 4 to that pleading referred to the right to use the ‘Benelli’ and MotoBi’ logos in the exhibitions planned for 2005, without proving that those logos were used. It found that Annexes 5 to 7 to that statement showed pictures of MOTOBI motorcycles which were undated. Annex 8 to that statement showed the specifications of two 2004 MOTOBI models. Annex 9 to that statement was an article on the history of the MOTOBI trade mark, in which the latest date mentioned was 1972. Lastly, Annexes 10 and 11 to the abovementioned statement were news articles and photographs of ‘benelli’ motorcycles, but did not mention the MOTOBI trade mark. 51 It must be stated that, both for the reasons given by the Cancellation Division, which are reproduced in point 16 of the contested decision, and for those given by the Board of Appeal, which are set out in points 56 to 64 of that decision, the evidence produced by the applicant in the administrative proceedings is, taken as a whole, clearly insufficient for the purposes of establishing genuine use of the mark at issue. 52 As OHIM has correctly observed, most of the documents produced by the applicant for the purposes of establishing genuine use of the mark at issue are devoid of evidential value in so far as they are undated or bear a date before or after the relevant period, or do not refer to the mark at issue, or are undated photographs which cannot be cross-referenced with other documents such as product catalogues or lists of references. None of the documents contain data regarding the turnover or the number of sales of the goods bearing the trade mark during the relevant period. 53 The only evidence submitted by the applicant to the Board of Appeal which contains a date falling within the relevant period referred to in paragraph 47 above is a buying order dated 15 October 2009 for 26 MOTOBI scooters, with a reply dated 25 November 2009. That order which gave rise to a single invoice, dated 20 July 2010 and so after the relevant period, which concerns a single scooter, not 26 scooters. 54 It must be noted in this connection that, although the buying order of 15 October 2009 for 26 MOTOBI scooters falls within the relevant period for the purposes of proof of genuine use of the trade mark, the applicant’s reply to that order nevertheless bears a date at which the applicant had just been informed that the intervener was about to bring proceedings for revocation (see paragraph 4 above) and that, as provided for under the last sentence of Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, that evidence falls within a period of three months preceding the filing of the application for revocation. 55 Furthermore, as regards, first, the applicant’s argument that it provided numerous pieces of evidence, it must be stated that the mere fact that the applicant produced ‘numerous pieces of evidence’ in the administrative proceedings, as it itself asserts, is of no account for the purposes of establishing that the mark at issue was put to genuine use, in so far as proving that fact depends not on the volume of the annexed documents, especially where those documents do not refer to the figurative mark at issue or, in almost all cases, are dated before or after the relevant period, but on the quality and the relevance of the documents, which must enable the applicant to prove the genuine use claimed, since genuine use cannot simply be assumed on the basis of fragmentary and insufficient evidence. 56 Moreover, in relying on documents dated before or after the relevant period and in stating that ‘it shall be assumed that these documents also have an effect on the relevant time period’, the applicant has clearly committed two errors: (i) claiming that documents which do not relate to the relevant period must be taken into consideration for the purposes of proving the genuine nature of the use of the mark at issue and (ii) proceeding on the basis that genuine use can be proved by mere probabilities or suppositions, contrary to the case-law cited in paragraph 45 above. 57 Admittedly, the Court of Justice has held, in paragraph 31 of the order in La Mer Technology, cited in paragraph 37 above (EU:C:2004:50), that circumstances subsequent to the filing of the application for revocation may be taken into account. However, it further stated that such circumstances may make it possible to confirm or better assess the extent to which the trade mark was used during the relevant period and the real intentions of the proprietor during that time. 58 The genuine nature of the use of the mark at issue may furthermore not be proved by evidence which does not relate to the relevant period. 59 It must be stated that, in the present case, the later documents submitted by the applicant both before the Cancellation Division and before the Board of Appeal do not enable the extent to which the trade mark was used during the relevant period to be better assessed, since they do not confirm any information in relation to that period. 60 As regards, secondly, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal failed to take account of ‘the significance of [its] participation at the ... world famous EICMA ... exhibition’, which takes place, according to the applicant itself, in November every year, and at which the applicant claimed to be present in 2003 and 2004, it must be recalled that the relevant period starts on 22 December 2004 so that, even if the applicant did participate in that exhibition, its participation would have been prior to the period in which the genuine use of the mark at issue had to be proved. 61 The applicant’s contention that, on account of its participation in 2003 and 2004 in that exhibition, the mark at issue would have been present on the market in subsequent years, is in no way substantiated and it cannot be inferred solely from that participation that the applicant has established that it put that mark to genuine use, a fortiori since, as it has been noted, genuine use cannot be proved by mere probabilities or suppositions, pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraph 45 above. 62 As regards, third, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not give proper consideration to the fact that goods bearing the MOTOBI sub-brands Adiva and Velvet had been manufactured, inter alia, in 2004, it must be stated that, in any event, the evidence concerning those sub-brands is insufficient to establish genuine use of the word mark MOTOBI. 63 In reply to a question put by the Court at the hearing, the applicant referred, in particular, to Annexes 1 and 8 to its statement of grounds of appeal for the purposes of establishing that those documents highlighted the genuine use of the mark at issue. 64 Annex 1 to the statement of grounds of appeal, which is an invoice dated 2 August 2010 to Keeway France SAS and which was therefore drawn up after the filing date of the application for revocation, relates to the sale of two ‘velvet 125 c. nero — motobi’ models and one ‘velvet 125 c. grigio — motobi’ model. Annex 8 to that statement contains the technical specifications of two ‘motobi velvet’ models. 65 It must be stated, as OHIM contended at the hearing, that the evidence in question, even assessed as a whole with the evidence lodged by the applicant before the Cancellation Division, is also insufficient for the purposes of proving genuine use of the mark at issue on account of (i) the date of the invoice drawn up after the filing date of the application for revocation and, even if that evidence dated after the application for revocation could be taken into account, (ii) the token nature of the sales made. 66 As regards, fourthly, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the fact that the goods falling within Class 12, namely scooters, are not everyday articles sold in large quantities, it is sufficient to observe that the documents produced by the applicant which relate to the relevant period do not mention any scooter sales. The only sale which appears in the documents included in the case file, and which is mentioned in point 37 of the contested decision, is dated after that period. 67 Therefore, even assuming that, as the applicant claims, the scooter market is not characterised by a high number of sales, the applicant has shown no sale during the relevant period, but an order for 26 scooters resulting in a single sale, so that, even if that sole sale had been taken into account for the purposes of proving genuine use of the mark at issue, the fact would have remained that the sale in question was clearly insufficient for the purposes of proving genuine use. Moreover, the additional invoice drawn up on 30 June 2010 at the request of Motor Show Center Sport Srl in Pesaro for the sale of three scooters for EUR 3 448.14 is also dated after that period and — even if it were to be necessary to take it into consideration — shows merely token use of the mark at issue. 68 As the Court of Justice has held, ‘genuine use’ must therefore be understood to denote use that is not merely token, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the mark (judgment in Ansul, cited in paragraph 39 above, EU:C:2003:145, paragraph 36). 69 As regards, fifth, the statements from the applicant’s employees lodged before the Board of Appeal (see point 57 of the contested decision), being documents which come from the company itself, the Court has ruled that, in order to assess their evidential value, regard should be had first and foremost to the credibility of the account they contain. It added that it is then necessary to take account, in particular, of the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears sound and reliable (judgments in Salvita, cited in paragraph 21 above, EU:T:2005:200, paragraph 42, and of 16 November 2011 in Dorma v OHIM — Puertas Doorsa (doorsa FÁBRICA DE PUERTAS AUTOMÁTICAS), T‑500/10, EU:T:2011:679, paragraph 49). 70 In the present case it must be concluded that, given their provenance, the various statements, which come from the applicant itself and are all drafted identically, stating that the vehicles bearing the MOTOBI trade mark shown in the annexed photographs were developed, prepared and promoted by the applicant in 2004 and 2005, cannot therefore constitute, by themselves, adequate proof of the genuine use of the mark at issue. The information contained therein is only indicative and needs to be corroborated by other proof (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 December 2005 in BIC v OHIM (Shape of a lighter), T‑262/04, ECR, EU:T:2005:463, paragraph 79). 71 Thus, in the absence of any other document substantiating the information contained in those statements which could corroborate the production and the sale of the goods bearing the mark at issue, those statements, considered in the light of all the other evidence submitted by the applicant in the administrative proceedings, cannot establish that the mark in question was put to genuine use during the relevant period. 72 As regards, lastly, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not assess the evidence as a whole but separated the various pieces of evidence before it, admittedly, it cannot be ruled out that an accumulation of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those pieces of evidence, taken individually, would be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts (judgment of 17 April 2008 in Ferrero Deutschland v OHIM, C‑108/07 P, EU:C:2008:234, paragraph 36). 73 However, it must be concluded in the present case that, even after assessing as a whole all of the evidence submitted by the applicant, it still cannot be inferred that genuine scooter sales were made during the relevant period, so that it is impossible to ascertain the applicant’s market share or its actual economic activity. 74 It follows from the foregoing that the first plea must be rejected and the action dismissed in its entirety. Costs 75 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by OHIM and the intervener. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Benelli Q.J. Srl to pay the costs. Martins Ribeiro Gervasoni Madise Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 February 2016. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.