Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:331
Date: 2016-06-02
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of the circumstances in which the applicant had provided financial services to Novin, set out in paragraphs 125 to 128 above, the existence of such persons and entities is not hypothetical but has, on the contrary, been established in proceedings before the General Court. 162 Secondly, it is certainly true that at the time of the adoption of the regime at issue, general restrictive measures regulating transfers of funds involving an Iranian person or entity were already laid down in Article 30 of Regulation No 267/2012 (‘the earlier regime’). The earlier regime laid down, in particular, an obligation of prior notification above a threshold of EUR 10 000 and an obligation of prior authorisation for transfers of or above EUR 40 000 other than humanitarian transfers. Authorisation could be refused if the competent authority had reasonable grounds to determine that the transfer of funds in question could breach one of the prohibitions or obligations laid down in Regulation No 267/2012. 163 In that regard, it is evident from a comparison of the earlier regime with the regime at issue that the latter is not a qualitatively new regime, as the applicant suggests, but is based on partial adjustments intended to reinforce the earlier regime. 164 So far as concerns Iranian financial institutions, including the applicant, the adoption of the regime at issue reinforced the existing restrictions provided for by the earlier regime only in three respects: first, by providing an exhaustive list of the categories of transfer that could be made; secondly, by introducing a threshold for authorisation of humanitarian transfers; and, lastly, by lowering the threshold for authorisation of certain categories of transfers. In addition, the effect of the first amendment is mitigated by the fact that the list of permissible purposes is broad, notably in that it includes transfers in connection with a specific trade contract. 165 This comparative analysis tends to undermine the applicant’s claim regarding the excessively general, and thus unnecessary, nature of the regime at issue. In so far as the applicant does not explicitly challenge the necessity of the earlier regime and even states that it was capable, along with other measures, of achieving the aim pursued by the Council, the applicant cannot legitimately claim that the regime at issue — which is indistinguishable in its essential characteristics from the earlier regime — is not necessary. 166 Thirdly, inasmuch as the applicant’s arguments must be interpreted as challenging the necessity both of the regime at issue and, implicitly, of the earlier regime, in that both subject transfers between Iranian financial institutions and EU financial institutions to systematic scrutiny by the competent authorities of the Member States, rather than to internal scrutiny by those institutions, also envisaged by Regulation No 267/2012, the Council relies on two circumstances to justify this choice. 167 It submits, first, that it cannot rely on Iranian banks to carry out prior checks, given the deficiencies in the Iranian system for combating money laundering and terrorism financing identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organisation responsible for setting standards and promoting the effective application of legislative, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other related threats which pose a risk to the integrity of the international finance system. 168 Secondly, according to the Council, notwithstanding the scrutiny obligation to which EU financial institutions are subject, those institutions cannot be in a position to identify and deal with suspicious transfers, particularly as the entities involved in nuclear proliferation tend to conceal the identities of the parties to the transactions concerned. 169 With regard to the Council’s first argument, the applicant does not dispute the FATF’s conclusions. It maintains, however, that they are not relevant, in so far as the regime at issue targets nuclear proliferation, not money laundering or the financing of terrorism. 170 That argument cannot be accepted. While these are certainly separate fields, they are nevertheless closely related, in that all three involve the use of financing to achieve clandestine aims. That is, moreover, reflected in the definition of the FATF’s tasks and in the fact that discussions held within that organisation also concern the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 171 In those circumstances, it must be held that the FATF’s conclusions can be applied to the present case and thus support the conclusion that, in view of the deficiencies in the Iranian system for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Iranian entities, and in particular financial institutions, also run the increased risk of being induced to participate, intentionally or unwittingly, in transfers that could contribute to nuclear proliferation. That is a fortiori so given that, in so far as nuclear proliferation activities are managed by the Iranian Government, it is not realistic to expect that government to take legislative or administrative steps to prevent it. 172 As to the Council’s second argument, it must be noted that the extract from the FATF report it put forward notably not only invites enhanced scrutiny by financial institutions, but also urges member jurisdictions of the FATF to apply effective countermeasures to protect their financial sectors from the risks emanating from Iran. That statement implies that, in the opinion of the FATF, the financial institutions are not capable by themselves of dealing adequately with the risk in question. 173 In that context, it has been pointed out in paragraph 161 above that the applicant itself was unwittingly induced to provide account management services to an Iranian entity involved in nuclear proliferation, notwithstanding its internal control systems. In those circumstances, it is not inconceivable that an EU financial institution might, equally involuntarily, be induced to participate in a transfer of funds that could contribute to nuclear proliferation. 174 Consequently, the circumstances put forward by the Council establish that a regime such as the regime at issue was necessary, notwithstanding the parallel internal scrutiny obligations imposed on EU financial institutions. 175 Lastly, the applicant’s arguments summarised in paragraph 160 above, that the effectiveness of the restrictive measures implemented before the adoption of the regime at issue had never been questioned and was confirmed by the Guidelines, cannot be accepted. 176 Thus, first of all, while the Council did not put forward anything specific to show that the effectiveness of the restrictive measures had been challenged or qualified, the fact remains that, since the adoption of Regulation No 423/2007, which was the first regulation relating to nuclear proliferation, the same measures have been progressively expanded, strengthened and clarified, which suggests that the Council was constantly seeking to improve their effectiveness. 177 Next, as is apparent from paragraph 161 above, the judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 92 above (EU:T:2009:401), only confirmed the effectiveness of individual restrictive measures in relation to the funds of the persons and entities subject to those measures. By contrast, it does not enable valid conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness in general of the regime of restrictive measures targeting nuclear proliferation. 178 Lastly, the statement in the Guidelines according to which, in essence, individual restrictive measures are generally more effective and have less harmful effects for legitimate commerce than indiscriminate restrictive measures does not in any way mean that general restrictive measures are not necessary in order to achieve the aim pursued by the Council, in particular when individual restrictive measures prove by themselves to be insufficient for that purpose, as is the case here. Moreover, in any event, as is apparent from the examination of the arguments concerning the scope of the regime at issue in paragraphs 187 to 199 below, the applicant wrongly describes the regime at issue as an ‘indiscriminate’ measure. 179 In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant’s arguments do not establish that the adoption of the regime at issue or, more generally, of a regime which subjects transfers between Iranian financial institutions and EU financial institutions to systematic scrutiny by the competent authorities of the Member States is not necessary owing to the existence of the other restrictive measures implemented under Regulation No 267/2012. 180 Consequently, the present complaint must be rejected. – The scope of the regime at issue 181 The applicant maintains that the regime at issue does not target transfers of funds which contribute to nuclear proliferation but in reality constitutes a general embargo which stops all economic activity and all transfers of funds between EU financial institutions and Iran. In so far as the regime at issue targets the entire Iranian financial sector, the Council wrongly imposed blanket bans on the basis of generalisations concerning all of a country’s banks. Thus the regime at issue unjustifiably places virtually all Iranian banks under suspicion of involvement in nuclear proliferation and money laundering. 182 In that context, the Council’s assertion that persons other than those identified in the individual restrictive measures are involved in nuclear proliferation cannot justify the scope of the regime at issue, according to the applicant. That assertion does not relate specifically to banks, which, nonetheless, are most affected by the regime at issue, but to persons or entities in general. Accordingly, the regime at issue is not appropriate to the aim pursued, since it is designed certainly to affect numerous entities not involved in nuclear proliferation and transfers not connected thereto in order possibly to affect some that are. 183 The applicant submits in that regard that the criterion laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 30b(3) of Regulation No 267/2012, introduced by the contested regulation, according to which any transfer of funds may be prohibited that ‘could be in breach’ of any of the prohibitions or obligations in Regulation No 267/2012 is speculative and too general. In the applicant’s opinion, in order to be compatible with the principle of proportionality, the ban in question should target only transfers of funds that ‘would be in breach’ of the prohibitions or obligations in question. 184 The applicant adds that its case serves to show the excessive scope of the regime at issue. Even on the assumption that it was in fact involved in nuclear proliferation, as the Council claimed, the individual restrictive measures imposed on it would have been both appropriate and sufficient to avoid the risk associated with the transfers of funds which it carried out, and no additional measures were necessary. Since it is apparent from the judgment in Bank Mellat v Council, cited in paragraph 16 above (EU:T:2013:39) that the applicant was not involved in nuclear proliferation, there is even less need to limit its lawful activities by means of the regime at issue. That is particularly the case since, as is apparent from the judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court concerning the United Kingdom restrictive measures imposed on the applicant, the latter has put in place a mechanism which makes it possible to avoid any breach of the restrictive measures put in place by the Security Council. 185 In that context, the applicant claims, in the alternative, that the Council should at least have excluded the application of the regime at issue, in so far as it is a bank which, according to the findings of the General Court and the United Kingdom courts, is not involved in nuclear proliferation and takes due care to ensure that it does not become so involved. 186 The applicant submits, lastly, that it is manifestly disproportionate for the regime at issue to prevent legitimate investment or payments into the European Union. 187 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the applicant’s arguments in relation to the interpretation of the criterion laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 30b(3) of Regulation No 267/2012, put forward at the hearing and summarised in paragraph 183 above, are inadmissible for the reasons set out in paragraphs 60 and 61 above. 188 With regard to the other arguments, in the first place, the applicant wrongly claims, by the argument referred to in paragraph 181 above, that the regime at issue is a ‘general embargo’ which stops all economic activity and all transfers of funds between EU financial institutions and Iran. As is apparent from Article 30 of Regulation No 267/2012, as amended by the contested regulation, the regime at issue expressly permits transfers that are made for the purposes it defines, which include, in particular, transfers regarding personal remittances and transfers in connection with a specific trade contract. 189 Moreover, while the regime at issue is intended to prevent transfers made by Iranian financial institutions that could contribute to nuclear proliferation, its adoption does not mean that the Council has any suspicion as regards the intentional or deliberate involvement of those institutions in nuclear proliferation. 190 In the second place, as regards procedural obligations, it is true that the notification obligation applies to all transfers defined in Article 30(3)(a) of Regulation No 267/2012. Similarly, the obligation to seek prior authorisation applies to all transfers referred to in Article 30(3)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 267/2012. Thus, those two obligations apply both to transfers that could contribute to nuclear proliferation and to those that could not. 191 However, that is inevitable given the purpose of the obligations in question, which are intended to provide the competent national authorities with the information necessary in order to identify in advance those transfers which could contribute to nuclear proliferation and to prohibit them. If they do not have either prior notification of a transfer or a request for its prior authorisation, those authorities cannot assess it in order to determine whether or not it may proceed. 192 In those circumstances, the fact that the notification obligation and the obligation to request authorisation cover transfers which are not capable of contributing to nuclear proliferation does not mean that those obligations are not necessary. Furthermore, in so far as the provisions laying down those obligations do not themselves prohibit the transfers from being carried out, they also do not establish any kind of ‘general embargo’. 193 In the third place, inasmuch as the applicant submits, in paragraph 182 above, that the Council is relying on claims which do not specifically concern the banks, but persons or entities in general, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 13 above, Article 30a of Regulation No 267/2012, introduced by the contested regulation, provides for similar restrictions concerning Iranian persons, entities or bodies which do not fall within the scope of the regime at issue. 194 Furthermore, the Council’s choice, to provide that the regime at issue must apply to transfers involving Iranian financial institutions, while other transfers are subject to a restrictive regime that differs in certain respects, falls within the scope of the power which the Council must be acknowledged to have in that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 102 above. Moreover, that choice is justified by the particular danger posed by Iranian financial institutions, as noted in paragraph 171 above. 195 In the fourth place, the particular circumstances of the applicant, invoked by the applicant in paragraph 184 above, tend to corroborate the necessity of the regime at issue rather than to cast doubt on it. As noted in paragraphs 125 to 127 above, the applicant provided financial account management services, which include the execution of instructions to transfer funds, to an entity involved in nuclear proliferation before that involvement was known publicly. As a result, the applicant was unwittingly induced to carry out transfers which were capable of contributing to nuclear proliferation, notwithstanding its internal control systems. 196 In those circumstances, making transfers of funds between the applicant and EU financial institutions subject to the regime at issue does not go beyond what is necessary in order to prevent transfers of funds that could contribute to nuclear proliferation, notwithstanding the fact that the Council has not established the applicant’s involvement in nuclear proliferation, as both the General Court and the courts of the United Kingdom have held. 197 Consequently, the applicant wrongly maintains that the Council was obliged to exclude it specifically from the scope of the regime at issue. 198 In the fifth place, as regards the argument concerning investment and payments into the European Union, referred to in paragraph 186 above, it is sufficient to observe that it is apparent from paragraphs 141 and 142 above that the regime at issue is not intended to stop legitimate commerce or, therefore, to prohibit legitimate transfers. 199 In the light of the foregoing, the present complaint must be rejected, as, therefore, must the second plea in law in its entirety. The fourth plea in law, concerning the disadvantages caused by the regime at issue 200 In the first place, as regards the disadvantages caused by the regime at issue in general, the applicant submits that that regime is general, indiscriminate and non-targeted, in so far as it targets the Iranian financial sector in its entirety. Thus, the regime at issue is designed to weaken significantly the Iranian economy and thereby inevitably to harm Iranians who are neither linked to nuclear proliferation nor capable of influencing the policy pursued by the Iranian regime. Such a harmful effect, which is capable of extending beyond the economic sector to the humanitarian sphere, for example as regards the availability of life-saving medicinal products, is manifestly disproportionate and contrary to the need to avoid such consequences, consistently referred to by the European Union. 201 The applicant adds, in that context, that the exceptions provided for by the regime at issue are not sufficient to render it proportionate, since they are extremely narrow, are granted entirely at the discretion of the competent authorities and, as is apparent from the third plea, are contrary to the requirements of legal certainty and non-arbitrariness. 202 In the second place, as regards the disadvantages caused to the applicant itself, the applicant submits that there can be no doubt that the exercise of its rights and freedoms has been significantly restricted, since the regime at issue prohibits all transfers of funds between the applicant and the European Union. In so far as the regime at issue is not necessary in order to prevent nuclear proliferation or its funding, it is neither the least onerous measure, nor does it constitute the minimum impairment of the applicant’s rights, particularly as the applicant has never supported nuclear proliferation, as is apparent from the judgment in Bank Mellat v Council, cited in paragraph 16 above (EU:T:2013:39). 203 The other parties dispute the merits of the applicant’s arguments. 204 According to the case-law, any restrictive economic or financial measure entails, ex hypothesi, consequences which could cause harm to parties who have not been found to be responsible for the situation giving rise to the measures in question. The importance of the aims pursued by the legislation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2009 in Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, ECR, EU:T:2009:266, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited). 205 As regards the disadvantages caused by the regime at issue to the Iranian economy in general, it is true that the regime at issue could have a certain impact on the Iranian economy, in that it subjects the transfers of funds concerned to additional requirements and its implementation may take the form of a ban on certain transfers. However, that impact is limited in two respects. 206 First, as noted in paragraph 164 above, the list of permissible purposes under the regime at issue is broad, including as it does humanitarian transfers, transfers regarding personal remittances and transfers in connection with a specific trade contract. 207 It must be emphasised in that context that humanitarian transfers, which constitute a permissible purpose, specifically include transfers regarding healthcare or medical equipment. Thus, the shortage of essential medicines in Iran, invoked by the applicant, cannot be attributed to the regime at issue as such. 208 Secondly, as is apparent from paragraphs 187 to 199 above, the regime at issue is not a general, indiscriminate and non-targeted embargo, notably since it does not seek to prevent legitimate commerce, as is required by recital 12 of Decision 2012/65, which it implements. 209 Furthermore, it is apparent from the examination of the third plea below that the regime at issue is not contrary to the requirements of legal certainty and non-arbitrariness in that its implementation is left entirely to the discretion of the competent authorities. 210 As regards the disadvantages allegedly caused to the applicant itself, it must be accepted that the applicant’s economic activities, as a financial institution, may be rendered more difficult by the implementation of the regime at issue, which imposes additional requirements on it. 211 That said, the applicant does not put forward any specific evidence that might establish the extent of the disadvantages it could suffer as a result of the regime at issue. 212 Moreover, those difficulties could be offset by the matters referred to in paragraphs 206 to 208 above. 213 In those circumstances, given the prime importance of the preservation of international peace and security, which are the underlying ultimate objectives of the measures seeking to prevent nuclear proliferation and its funding, the disadvantages caused both to the Iranian economy in general and to the applicant are not disproportionate to the ends sought. 214 Consequently, the fourth plea in law must be rejected. The third plea in law 215 The applicant maintains that the regime at issue breaches the principles of proportionality and legal certainty, the principle of non-arbitrariness, the obligation to state reasons, the requirement that every sanction must contain the necessary legal safeguards, and the principle of equal treatment. 216 First, the applicant submits that the Council did not state the reasons why the adoption of general restrictive measures was necessary or appropriate for the achievement of the aim pursued. 217 Secondly, it argues that the regime at issue does not, by its nature, contain the attendant procedural and substantive safeguards enshrined in Article 215(3) TFEU that the Court has deemed essential in order to protect the persons and entities targeted by restrictive measures. In particular, according to the applicant, in so far as that regime dispenses with the Council’s obligation to determine whether the imposition of a measure against a specific bank is justified, necessary and proportionate, it reverses the burden of proof. Likewise, the regime at issue provides only for excessively limited exceptions to the prohibition it lays down. 218 The applicant adds in that context that the individual restrictive measures targeting Iranian banks, including, in particular, the applicant itself, were annulled by the General Court on the ground of the legal rights and safeguards which those banks enjoyed and which were enshrined in Article 215(3) TFEU. By replacing the individual restrictive measures with the regime at issue, the Council did not take further measures to remedy the failures of which the General Court complained, notwithstanding the fact that the regime at issue has, overall, harmful effects similar to those of the individual restrictive measures. 219 In those circumstances, the applicant submits that, in so far as the Council’s competence to adopt general restrictive measures is not greater than its competence to adopt individual measures, the unlawfulness of the individual restrictive measures to which it is subject, established in the judgment in Bank Mellat v Council, cited in paragraph 16 above (EU:T:2013:39), implies that the regime at issue is unlawful as far as concerns the applicant. 220 Thirdly, according to the applicant, the regime at issue does not satisfy the requirements of clarity, legal certainty and non-arbitrariness laid down in the case-law. 221 In fact, there is no provision that limits the national authorities’ discretion to refuse a particular transfer, since the relevant provisions merely refer to funds that ‘could contribute’ to nuclear proliferation and to the fact that the competent national authorities have ‘reasonable grounds to determine’ that a transfer ‘could be in breach of any of the prohibitions or obligations’ laid down. The criteria thus defined are, according to the applicant, arbitrary and capricious. 222 Fourthly, the applicant maintains that the regime at issue breaches the principle of equal treatment in two respects. 223 First, the applicant claims that the regime at issue is discriminatory in that it is aimed only at Iranian banks, although banks established in other States run the same risk of being induced to support nuclear proliferation. In the absence of justification by the Council, the applicant submits that that difference in treatment constitutes discrimination on the ground of nationality. 224 Secondly, in the absence of sufficiently clear and precise criteria, the obligation of prior authorisation provided for by the regime at issue is discriminatory, as is apparent from the judgment of 1 June 1999 in Konle (C‑302/97, ECR, EU:C:1999:271, paragraph 49). 225 The other parties dispute the merits of the applicant’s arguments. 226 In the first place, as regards the obligation to state the reasons for the adoption of the regime at issue, according to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 15 November 2012 in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, ECR, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 227 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment in Council v Bamba, cited in paragraph 226 above, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 228 In the present case, it is apparent from recital 12 of Decision 2012/635, to which recital 7 of the contested regulation refers, that, ‘in order to prevent the transfer of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, transactions between Union and Iranian banks and financial institutions should be prohibited, unless authorised in advance by the relevant Member State’. 229 That statement of reasons is sufficient as regards the adoption of an act of general application such as the regime at issue. It was in fact understood by the applicant, who has been able to challenge, in detail, the legality of the regime at issue, and notably its alleged incompatibility with the principle of proportionality. Likewise, the General Court is in a position to review the legality of the regime at issue. 230 In those circumstances, the applicant’s first complaint must be rejected. 231 In the second place, as regards the legal safeguards required by Article 215(3) TFEU, the applicant’s arguments in relation to the alleged link between the unlawfulness of the individual restrictive measures and the regime at issue cannot be accepted. 232 Both in the judgment in Bank Mellat v Council, cited in paragraph 16 above (EU:T:2013:39), and in the other judgments annulling individual restrictive measures targeting Iranian banks, relied on by the applicant, the annulment was based on the lack of proof that the entity concerned did in fact fulfil the criterion applied to it by the Council, and on certain infringements of the procedural rights of that entity in the context thereof. As is evident from paragraphs 36 and 105 above, as a measure of general application, the regime at issue provided for by Article 1(15) of the contested regulation is not based on the application of a criterion to the applicant’s specific case or to that of another entity, which means that it is not implemented in the same way as individual restrictive measures. 233 In those circumstances, the annulment of individual restrictive measures relating to the applicant or other Iranian banks does not, as such, have an impact on the legality of the regime at issue, particularly given that, as noted in paragraph 108 above, the effects of the regime at issue are considerably less extensive than the effects of freezing funds. 234 As to the safeguards which allegedly apply to the regime at issue itself, it is apparent from paragraphs 98 to 109 above that it is not necessary to apply the case-law relating to individual restrictive measures to the present case by analogy, which means that there is no need, in particular, to require the Council to establish that the entities affected by the regime at issue are in fact involved in nuclear proliferation. For the same reasons, the Council was not obliged to assess that circumstance at the time of the adoption of the regime at issue. 235 Instead, it was for the Council, at the stage of the adoption of the regime at issue, to determine the proportionality of the regime at issue and accordingly to examine whether its adoption was appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and its funding, and that it was not causing disproportionate disadvantages to the persons and entities affected, including the applicant. 236 The examination carried out in respect of the first, second and fourth pleas above, which also related to the scope of the permissible purposes of transfers, has not revealed that the regime at issue is incompatible with the principle of proportionality. 237 Moreover, the applicant does not put forward specific arguments regarding the procedural safeguards that should apply to the regime at issue. In any event, as observed in paragraph 232 above, as a measure of general application, the regime at issue is not based on the individual application of a given criterion to the applicant’s or another entity’s specific case. In those circumstances, unlike the procedure for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, the legal safeguards required by Article 215(3) TFEU do not include an obligation for the Council to give the actual and specific reasons in respect of each person or entity affected, an obligation to grant access to the file or an opportunity for persons and entities affected to submit observations, or an obligation for the Council to take such observations into consideration. 238 As regards an act of general application such as the regime at issue, the essential legal procedural safeguard consists in the effective judicial review of the legality of the act in question. 239 That safeguard is provided, on the one hand, by the present action and, on the other, by the possibility of challenging, before the national court having jurisdiction, any refusals by the authorities of Member States to authorise individual transfers, the national court being able, if necessary, to refer a question on the validity or interpretation of the relevant provisions of Regulation No 267/2012 to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 240 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the regime at issue is not contrary to Article 215(3) TFEU, which means that the applicant’s second complaint must be rejected. 241 In the third place, in so far as the applicant’s arguments relating to the requirements of clarity, legal certainty and non-arbitrariness concern the criterion laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 30b(3) of Regulation No 267/2012, they are inadmissible for the reasons set out in paragraphs 60 and 61 above. 242 As regards the other aspects of the regime at issue, it must be noted that the principle of legal certainty, which is a general principle of EU law and which requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings (judgment of 18 November 2008 in Förster, C‑158/07, ECR, EU:C:2008:630, paragraph 67), is, it is true, applicable with regard to restrictive measures such as those provided for by that regime. 243 In the present case, Article 30(2) of Regulation No 267/2012, as amended by the contested regulation, contains an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which a transfer may be authorised, while Article 30(3) and (4) prescribes the thresholds below which prior notification or authorisation is not required. Thus, those provisions define, in a sufficiently clear and precise manner, the scope of the restrictions and obligations they lay down. 244 In those circumstances, the applicant’s third complaint must be rejected. 245 In the fourth place, as regards the complaint alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, that principle constitutes a fundamental principle of law and prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 92 above, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 56). 246 First, as regards alleged discrimination on the ground of nationality, it has been held in paragraph 171 above that Iranian entities, and in particular financial institutions, run the increased risk of being induced to participate, intentionally or unwittingly, in transfers that could contribute to nuclear proliferation. That circumstance justifies the unequal treatment of Iranian financial institutions envisaged by the regime at issue. 247 Secondly, the prior authorisation obligation provided for under the regime at issue applies to all transfers between any financial institution established in Iran and any financial institution established in the European Union that exceed defined thresholds, irrespective of the identity of those entities. In those circumstances, the applicant wrongly claims that that obligation is discriminatory, particularly as the provisions which provide for it are sufficiently clear and precise, as found in paragraph 243 above. 248 That finding is not, moreover, capable of being called into question by the judgment in Konle, cited in paragraph 224 above (EU:C:1999:271), and cited by the applicant. That judgment concerns a system of prior authorisation for the acquisition of land and was therefore delivered in factual circumstances that differ substantially from those at issue in the present case, which means that it is not relevant. 249 In those circumstances, the fourth complaint must be rejected, as, therefore, must the third plea in law in its entirety. 250 Since all the pleas have been rejected, the action must be dismissed. Costs 251 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 252 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Accordingly, the United Kingdom and the Commission must be ordered to bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Bank Mellat to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Commission to bear their own costs. Kanninen Pelikánová Buttigieg Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 June 2016. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.