Judgment;Information — ECLI:EU:T:2026:31
Date: 2026-01-21
Language of the case: English
Court formation: First Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Germany

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) 21 January 2026 (*) ( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for an EU figurative mark representing a curved stripe and an irregular triangle inside a black rectangle – Earlier EU figurative marks representing one or more white curved stripes ascending to the right – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 ) In Case T‑43/25, Puma SE, established in Herzogenaurach (Germany), represented by M. Schunke and P. Trieb, lawyers, applicant, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents, defendant, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being Ningbo Gongfang Commercial Management Co. Ltd, established in Ningbo (China), THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber), composed, at the time of the deliberations, of I. Gâlea, acting as President, T. Tóth and S.L. Kalėda (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator, having regard to the written part of the procedure, inter alia, the applicant’s offer of evidence lodged at the Court Registry on 6 October 2025, further to the hearing on 29 October 2025, gives the following Judgment 1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Puma SE, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 November 2024 (Case R 275/2024-4) (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2 On 23 September 2022, the intervener, Ningbo Gongfang Commercial Management Co. Ltd, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign: 3 The mark applied for covered goods in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding to the following description: ‘Down jackets; sweat shirts; hooded pullovers; pants; yoga pants; bathing suits; casual jackets; coats; coats for men; sweaters; short-sleeve shirts; short-sleeved T-shirts; menswear; Tee-shirts; footwear for men and women; socks and stockings’. 4 On 20 December 2020, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above. 5 The opposition was based on the following earlier marks: – the EU figurative mark reproduced below, registered on 10 June 2020 under number 18 200 424 (‘earlier mark No 1’), for goods in Class 25 (‘Clothing, footwear, headgear’): – the EU figurative mark reproduced below, registered on 31 January 2010 under number 8 461 469 (‘earlier mark No 2’), for goods in, inter alia, Class 25 (‘Clothing; footwear; boot uppers; footwear uppers; inner soles; non-slipping devices for boots and shoes; soles for footwear; studs for football boots [shoes]; headgear’): – the EU figurative mark reproduced below, registered on 29 September 2020 under number 13 199 666 (‘earlier mark No 3’), for goods in, inter alia, Class 25 (‘Clothing; footwear; headgear’): 6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1). 7 On 11 December 2023, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition. 8 On 5 February 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division. 9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In the first place, it found that the goods in question were directed at the general public, whose level of attention was average, and that the relevant territory included all the Member States of the European Union. In the second place, it found that the goods in question were identical. In the third place, it considered that, given the substantial differences between the earlier signs and the sign applied for, including the presence of a black background in the sign applied for and the respective geometric configurations of the signs in question, those signs were visually dissimilar overall. In addition, as the signs in question were purely figurative, they could not be subject to a phonetic assessment. Lastly, conceptually, it was not apparent that the public would attach any particular meaning to them. Thus, the Board of Appeal found that the signs were dissimilar overall. Forms of order sought 10 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested decision; – order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal. 11 EUIPO contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action; – order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is held. Law 12 The applicant raises a single plea in law in support of its action, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 13 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. 14 The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited). 15 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 16 The single plea in law should be examined in the light of those considerations. 17 In the present case, it should be noted that none of the parties challenges the Board of Appeal’s analysis that the goods in question are identical and intended for the general public, whose level of attention is average. 18 In the context of the present action, it is therefore necessary to examine the assessment made by the Board of Appeal as regards the comparison of the signs at issue and the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. Comparison of the signs at issue 19 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 20 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue had an average degree of distinctiveness and did not contain any dominant element (paragraphs 38 and 39 of the contested decision). Visual similarity 21 In paragraphs 40 to 44 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that there are clear differences between the signs at issue. The two converging stripes of earlier mark No 1 form a triangular configuration, while the sign applied for features a combination of a curved stripe and an inverted irregular triangle. The continuous, curvilinear stripe of earlier mark No 2 contrasts with the more complex design of the sign applied for. Earlier mark No 3 contains three distinct curved stripes which converge and slope upwards and to the right, while the sign applied for has a different geometric configuration. In addition, the presence of a black background in the sign applied for contributes to the visual contrast with the three earlier signs. Moreover, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal recalled the case-law according to which the comparison between the signs can be carried out only on the basis of the shapes and orientations in which those signs are registered or applied for. 22 The applicant claims, in essence, that the stripes in the signs in question differ only in details which are of very minor importance, to which the relevant public, which is used to encountering various abstract figurative marks – especially in the field of sports and sports lifestyle – such as the marks at issue, which consist of one or more stripes, will not pay attention. Aside from the black rectangle, present only in the sign applied for, which will not be perceived as distinctive and could even ‘disappear’ when the sign is applied to black or dark-coloured goods, the main difference is the orientation of the signs, as the sign applied for is ‘upside down’ in comparison to the earlier signs. 23 The applicant submits that, in addition, it follows from the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339), that the forms of use that can normally be expected must be taken into account. The positioning of the sign changes in the wearing position or by the movement of the wearer, and the perception of the signs can vary depending on their orientation. Since the signs in question do not have a ‘natural’ orientation, such as, for example, the representation of an animal, where consumers know which way is up and which way is down, the signs can be placed freely on the goods. Thus, there is a concrete risk of the contested sign being used in rotated form or of that sign being perceived by consumers in different orientations, depending on the position of the goods on which the sign is applied. 24 Furthermore, even if the signs are compared without being rotated, there are sufficient visual similarities since, according to settled case-law, it is necessary to focus on the overall impression given by the respective stripe elements and not on small details which the consumer does not notice on the basis of his or her imperfect memory. 25 Thus, according to the applicant, there is a visual similarity between the signs, at least to an average degree. In addition, the similarity of the signs must be regarded as being correspondingly higher if account is taken of the mark applied for in rotated form, in accordance with the Court of Justice’s case-law cited in paragraph 23 above. 26 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 27 In that regard, it should be noted that the two converging white stripes in the earlier mark No 1, which curve and ascend towards the right, form, as the Board of Appeal found, a triangular configuration, whereas the sign applied for features a combination of a white stripe, which is also curved and ascends towards the right, and an inverted irregular white triangle. Thus, although the two signs do include curved elements that ascend towards the right, their structures vary significantly. 28 With regard to the white stripe in earlier mark No 2, which is curved and ascends towards the right, it contrasts with the more complex design of the sign applied for, as described in paragraph 27 above. 29 As for the three white stripes in earlier mark No 3, which are curved and ascend towards the right, they also differ markedly from the sign applied for, as described in paragraph 27 above. As the Board of Appeal observed, those stripes create a flowing motion, whereas the sign applied for has an angular and segmented appearance, containing shapes which vary in thickness and incorporate sharp points. 30 In addition, the sign applied for differs from the signs of the three earlier marks as regards their orientation, since the sign applied for traces an ascending motion towards the right which widens, while the three earlier marks trace a motion which, although ascending towards the right, is narrowing. The direction of the curve is thus inverted. 31 Finally, the black rectangular background, upon which the white stripe and white triangles of the sign applied for are applied, add to the visual difference between that sign and the earlier signs. 32 It must therefore be held that the signs at issue are not visually similar. 33 The applicant does, however, claim that the black rectangle of the sign applied for could ‘disappear’ if the sign is applied on black or dark-coloured goods, and that the sign applied for is ‘upside down’ in comparison to the earlier signs. 34 In that regard, it should be noted, as stated in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, that, according to settled case-law, when assessing whether they are identical or similar, the signs must be compared in the form in which they are protected, that is to say, as they were registered or as they appear in the application for registration. The actual or potential use of registered marks in another form is irrelevant when comparing the signs (judgments of 21 April 2021, Chanel v EUIPO – Huawei Technologies (Representation of a circle containing two interlaced curves), T‑44/20, not published, EU:T:2021:207, paragraph 25; of 29 November 2023, Beauty Boutique v EUIPO – Lightningbolt Europe (Representation of a lightning bolt), T‑12/23, not published, EU:T:2023:768, paragraph 43; and of 20 November 2024, Laboratorio SYS v EUIPO – Dr. Babor (sYs), T‑39/24, not published, EU:T:2024:853, paragraph 41). 35 The orientation of the signs, as set out in the application for registration, may have an impact on the scope of their protection and, consequently, in order to avoid any uncertainty and doubt, the comparison between the signs can be carried out only on the basis of the shapes and orientations in which those signs are registered or applied for (judgments of 21 April 2021, Representation of a circle containing two interlaced curves, T‑44/20, not published, EU:T:2021:207, paragraph 26; of 1 June 2022, Krasnyj Octyabr v EUIPO – Pokój (KRÓWKA MLECZNA Milk FUDGE), T‑363/20, not published, EU:T:2022:321, paragraph 61; and of 5 October 2022, Puma v EUIPO – CMS (CMS Italy), T‑711/20, not published, EU:T:2022:604, paragraph 56). 36 Thus, the General Court has already had occasion to point out that the comparison of the signs at issue cannot be made as they might appear on sports footwear (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 October 2018, Asics v EUIPO – Van Lieshout Textielagenturen (Representation of four crossed lines), T‑581/17, not published, EU:T:2018:685, paragraph 43). 37 However, the applicant argues that the case-law of the General Court is at odds with that of the Court of Justice, which may be inferred from the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339). 38 In paragraph 66 of the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339), the Court of Justice stated that, once a mark has been registered, its proprietor had the right to use it as he or she saw fit so that, for the purposes of assessing whether the application for registration fell within the ground for refusal laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), it was necessary to ascertain whether there was a likelihood of confusion with the opponent’s earlier mark in all the circumstances in which the mark applied for might be used if it were to be registered. 39 However, first, as EUIPO contends, the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339), did not concern whether the signs could be compared on the basis of shapes and orientations other than those in which the signs had been registered or applied for, but rather, in particular, whether the proprietor of a registered trade mark was entitled to prevent the use, by a third party, in a comparative advertisement within the meaning of Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17), as amended by Directive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 (OJ 1997 L 290, p. 18), of a sign similar to that mark in relation to goods or services identical with, or similar to, those for which that mark had been registered where such use did not give rise to a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. 40 Second, the reference made by the Court of Justice in paragraph 66 of the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339), to the circumstances in which the mark applied for might be used if it were to be registered does not mean that the comparison between the signs must be carried out on the basis of shapes and orientations other than those in which those signs are registered or applied for. The ‘upside down’ use of a sign that has been registered or applied for, a point raised by the applicant in the present case, is not a circumstance in which the sign is used within the meaning of paragraph 66 of the judgment referred to above. 41 The reference made by the applicant to the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339), is thus irrelevant, and the applicant’s arguments that the black rectangle of the sign applied for could ‘disappear’ if the sign is applied on black or dark-coloured goods and that the sign applied for is ‘upside down’ in comparison to the earlier signs must be rejected. 42 The Board of Appeal was therefore right to find, in paragraph 52 of the contested decision, that, given the substantial differences between the earlier signs and the sign applied for, including the presence of a black background in the sign applied for and the respective geometric configurations of the signs in question, the earlier signs and the sign applied for were visually dissimilar overall. Phonetic similarity 43 It is common ground between the parties that, as the Board of Appeal observed in paragraph 53 of the contested decision, since the signs at issue are purely figurative, they cannot be subject to a phonetic assessment, as there is no element that might be pronounced by the relevant public. Conceptual similarity 44 In paragraphs 55 and 56 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal agreed with the Opposition Division’s assessment that it was not apparent that the public would attach any particular meaning to the signs in question. The signs do not even represent a specific geometric figure that might convey a particular meaning. It is therefore impossible to carry out a conceptual comparison of the signs. 45 The applicant claims that the signs at issue are conceptually highly similar as they convey the concept of a stripe with a bent curve that narrows towards the end. In support of that claim, it refers to the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO of 29 June 2010 in Case B 1 491 086. 46 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 47 In that regard, the General Court states that the marks at issue are figurative marks without any word elements and that none of the geographic shapes has any conceptual content. 48 In addition, as EUIPO contends, the Court has already had occasion to observe, with regard to signs representing a monochromatic stripe which curves and ascends towards the right, that such a stripe did not convey any particular concept and that a conceptual comparison was not possible (judgment of 6 November 2024, Puma v EUIPO – Zheng (Representation of an emblem), T‑544/23, not published, EU:T:2024:787, paragraph 48). 49 Similarly, in the present case, it must be stated that the signs at issue, whether they have one, two or three stripes, do not convey any concept and, consequently, a conceptual comparison is not possible. 50 As regards the reference made by the applicant to a decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO, it is sufficient to state in any case that, according to case-law, the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal, which are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion, must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice, which, in any event, cannot bind the Courts of the European Union (judgments of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM, C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47, and of 10 September 2015, Laverana v OHIM (BIO PROTEINREICHER PFLANZENKOMPLEX AUS EIGENER HERSTELLUNG), T‑571/14, not published, EU:T:2015:626, paragraph 22). 51 The Board of Appeal was therefore right to conclude that it was impossible to carry out a conceptual comparison of the signs. Global assessment of the likelihood of confusion 52 In paragraphs 57 and 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, as the Opposition Division had concluded, the signs at issue were dissimilar overall and that the opposition under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 therefore had to be rejected. 53 The applicant submits that, although the Board of Appeal found the earlier marks to be distinctive to an average degree, it demonstrated extensively before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal that those marks enjoy a maximum degree of distinctiveness acquired through use. The marks have been used extensively throughout the European Union for ‘clothing, footwear, headgear’ for several decades. Taking into account such distinctive character together with the fact that the goods at issue are identical, a low degree of visual similarity is sufficient to lead to a likelihood of confusion. 54 The applicant also submits that famous manufacturers, such as the applicant, use marks consisting of one or more stripes with which the relevant public is familiar. Those marks thus appeal to competitors like the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. 55 Moreover, since the earlier marks, like the mark applied for, are part of the family of marks consisting of one or more stripes, there is in any event a likelihood of association within the meaning of the second alternative laid down in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 56 Lastly, by a letter of 6 October 2025 and the annexes thereto, the applicant produced an order of the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) of 22 September 2025 and a judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, Germany) of 19 August 2025, from which it infers that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks in question in the cases which gave rise to those decisions and the mark Puma, given the presence of curved stripes in all those marks. 57 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. 58 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74). 59 In the present case, with regard to the distinctiveness of the earlier marks, the applicant claims that it ‘extensively demonstrated before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal’ that the earlier marks enjoyed a maximum degree of distinctiveness acquired through use and that, given that the goods at issue are identical, a low degree of visual similarity led to a likelihood of confusion. 60 In that regard, in any event, it should be noted that it is not for the Court to research and identify which documents within EUIPO’s administrative case file could serve as the basis of the applicant’s arguments (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 May 2015, Skype v OHIM – Sky and Sky IP International (skype), T‑423/12, not published, EU:T:2015:260, paragraph 60). 61 It is clear that the applicant is merely asserting that it demonstrated the use of the earlier marks before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal, without providing any clarification. Accordingly, it must be held that the applicant has not called into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the earlier marks have an average degree of distinctiveness (paragraph 39 of the contested decision). 62 Next, it follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal was right to find that, first, the goods concerned were identical and, second, the earlier signs and the sign applied for were visually dissimilar overall, that the signs at issue cannot be subject to a phonetic assessment and that it was impossible to carry out a conceptual comparison of the signs. 63 Therefore, the Court observes that, having carried out a global assessment and in the light of all the factors mentioned above, the Board of Appeal was right to conclude, in paragraph 63 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue were dissimilar and that, therefore, one of the necessary conditions for applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 was not fulfilled. 64 That assessment cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments. 65 In the first place, regarding the applicant’s argument that it is common for manufacturers of sporting goods to use marks consisting of one or more stripes; assuming this to be the case, the applicant cannot therefore, logically, criticise the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal for having applied to register such a mark for such goods. In any event, the applicant does not explain how such an argument would support the existence, in the present case, of an infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. 66 In the second place, as far as concerns the applicant’s argument that a likelihood of association exists because the marks at issue are part of the family of marks consisting of one or more stripes, it is clear that the applicant does not put forward any argument in support of that claim other than those already rejected above. 67 In the third place, with regard to the applicant’s offer of evidence relating to two decisions of national courts, it must be held, without there being any need to rule on their admissibility, that those decisions are irrelevant. 68 First, the signs in question in the cases which gave rise to those decisions are not the same as those at issue in the present case. 69 Second, it must be stated that those decisions concern proceedings for infringement. The present case does not, however, involve determining whether the use, for identical goods, of an allegedly identical mark can constitute prohibited use, but rather carrying out a prospective analysis of any likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 July 2019, MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO – Halla Holdings (MANDO), T‑698/17, not published, EU:T:2019:524, paragraph 44). In addition, there is no need to take into account the manner in which the sign is used, since that element is not one of the factors which are relevant to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (order of 24 April 2007, Castellblanch v OHIM, C‑131/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:246, paragraph 56). 70 In that regard, in so far as the applicant claims that the registration of the sign applied for could jeopardise the protection of the exclusive rights arising from the earlier marks, it must also be borne in mind that it is for the applicant to use, if necessary, other legal remedies for the purpose of protecting its earlier mark, inter alia, an action for infringement (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2015, Compagnie des montres Longines, Francillon v OHIM – Staccata (QUARTODIMIGLIO QM), T‑76/13, not published, EU:T:2015:94, paragraph 58). 71 Third, in any event, while it is true that neither the parties nor the Court can be precluded from drawing on national or international case-law or decision-making practices for the purposes of interpreting EU law, the Courts of the European Union are not bound by a decision given in a Member State or in a third country (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 November 2008, Lego Juris v OHIM – Mega Brands (Red Lego brick), T‑270/06, EU:T:2008:483, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited, and of 17 January 2019, Equity Cheque Capital Corporation v EUIPO (DIAMOND CARD), T‑91/18, not published, EU:T:2019:17, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 72 It follows from all of the foregoing that all the applicant’s arguments are unfounded and that, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 73 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 74 As a hearing took place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by EUIPO, in accordance with the form of order sought by EUIPO. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Puma SE to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). Tóth Kalėda Gâlea Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 January 2026. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.