Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:608
Date: 2025-06-18
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: Economic and monetary policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment
Origin: Austria

summary of the contested decision on its website. 14 Also on that day, the FMA, acting on the instructions of the ECB and in accordance with the Bundesgesetz über das Bankwesen (Bankwesengesetz) (Federal Law on the banking sector) of 30 July 1993 (BGBl. 532/1993), appointed a government commissioner for Sberbank Europe and prohibited it from pursuing any business activity with immediate effect. 15 On 6 May 2022, the SRB consulted Sberbank Europe on a non-confidential version of the contested decision intended for publication. On 19 May 2022, Sberbank Europe submitted its observations. 16 On 10 June 2022, the SRB published a non-confidential version of the contested decision on its website. 17 On 15 June 2022, a summary of the contested decision was published in the Official Journal (OJ 2022 C 231, p. 17). 18 On 15 December 2022, Sberbank Europe’s licence as a credit institution lapsed. 19 On 21 December 2023, the SRB published on its website a new non-confidential version of the contested decision, containing fewer redactions than the version published on 10 June 2022. Forms of order sought 20 The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested decision; – order the SRB to pay the costs. 21 The SRB contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded; – order the applicant to pay the costs. 22 The ECB contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action as unfounded; – order the applicant to pay the costs. Law Admissibility of the action 23 The SRB raises a plea of inadmissibility alleging that the applicant has no interest in bringing proceedings. It submits that the applicant does not explain – and that it is not clear from the application – how the annulment of the contested decision may procure it an advantage. 24 The SRB notes that the applicant, rather, appears to take issue with the alleged decision it adopted with a view to order its liquidation under Austrian insolvency law. However, the SRB took no such decision, nor does it have any decision-making powers to open such proceedings under national law. Since it did not order any liquidation of the applicant in the contested decision, the annulment of that decision cannot alter the applicant’s legal position in that regard. 25 The applicant disputes the plea of inadmissibility raised by the SRB. It submits, in essence, that the adoption of the contested decision caused its banking activity to cease and damaged its reputation. Its action seeks a declaration that that decision is unlawful and to protect any right which it may have to compensation. 26 It must be noted that, according to the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). 27 An applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must be vested and current and may not concern a future and hypothetical situation (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). 28 That interest must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible, and continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 29 The interest in bringing proceedings is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 30 It is for the applicant to prove that it has an interest in bringing proceedings, which means that it must justify in a relevant manner its interest in the annulment of the contested act (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Binca Seafoods v Commission, C‑268/16 P, EU:C:2017:1001, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). 31 In the present case, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, in the first place, the SRB took the view that Sberbank Europe was in a FOLTF situation within the meaning of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, since there were objective elements to support a determination that it would, in the near future, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due, within the meaning of Article 18(4)(c) of that regulation. In the second place, the SRB took the view that there was no reasonable prospect that alternative private sector measures or supervisory action, taken in respect of Sberbank Europe, would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. In the third place, the SRB took the view that resolution action adopted in respect of Sberbank Europe was not necessary in the public interest, within the meaning of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation. 32 Since the condition laid down in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 was not satisfied, the SRB concluded that a resolution scheme would not be adopted in respect of Sberbank Europe, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, read in conjunction with Article 18(6) of that regulation. Thus, Article 1 of the contested decision provides that that credit institution is not to be placed under resolution. 33 The SRB’s failure to adopt a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank Europe meant, in essence, that the FOLTF situation of that credit institution, caused by its insufficient liquidity to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fell due, would not be dealt with at EU level and that that institution would have to be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable Austrian law, as follows from Article 18(5) and (8) of Regulation No 806/2014. If the SRB concludes that (i) the credit institution at issue is in a FOLTF situation, within the meaning of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014; (ii) there are no alternative measures within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation, and (iii) resolution is not in the public interest within the meaning of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation, the only possible alternative to resolution is the opening of winding up proceedings in respect of the credit institution under the applicable national law. 34 Furthermore, the SRB, in reaching the conclusion, in the contested decision, that there were no alternative measures within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, ultimately took the view that there was no alternative to the resolution and the opening of winding up proceedings in respect of Sberbank Europe under the applicable national law. 35 It is thus apparent from paragraphs 33 and 34 above that the direct consequence of the adoption of the contested decision was the opening of winding up proceedings in respect of Sberbank Europe under Austrian law, within the meaning of Article 18(8) of Regulation No 806/2014. In that context, immediately after the adoption of the contested decision, the FMA, on the instructions of the ECB and in accordance with Article 70(2) of the Federal Law on the banking sector, appointed a government commissioner for the applicant and prohibited it from pursuing any business activity, with immediate effect. 36 In the context of the present action, the applicant disputes, inter alia, first, the SRB’s competence to take a formal decision not to adopt a resolution scheme (first plea in law) and, second, the merits of its conclusion that there were no alternative measures to avoid the applicant’s failure within a reasonable timeframe, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 (see, in particular, fourth and fifth pleas). 37 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the contested decision adversely affected the applicant’s legal and factual situation, since it resulted in its business activities ceasing and its supervision by a government commissioner, with the result that the applicant has an interest in obtaining its annulment. Moreover, as the applicant rightly submits, a declaration by the Court that the contested decision is unlawful could serve as the basis for any action for damages aimed at properly restoring the damage caused by that decision (judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T‑231/99, EU:T:2002:84, paragraphs 23 to 25; see also, to that effect, judgments of 29 April 2004, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta, C‑496/99 P, EU:C:2004:236, paragraph 83, and of 27 June 2013, Xeda International and Pace International v Commission, C‑149/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:433, paragraphs 32 and 33). 38 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the SRB must be rejected. Substance 39 The applicant raises nine pleas in law in support of its action alleging (i) that the SRB exceeded its powers; (ii) infringement of the right to be heard; (iii) failure to state reasons; (iv) and (v), examined together, failure to carry out a proper examination of the condition laid down in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014; (vi) infringement of the principle of proportionality and a manifest error of assessment concerning the examination of possible alternative solutions; (vii) error of law and a failure to state reasons concerning the fact that the contested decision departs from the resolution plan for the Sberbank Europe group, adopted by the SRB on 3 May 2021 pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 806/2014 (‘the resolution plan’); (viii) lack of access to the file; and (ix) failure to notify the contested decision. The first plea in law, alleging that the SRB exceeded its powers 40 In the context of the present plea in law, first, the applicant submits that the SRB does not have the competence to take a formal decision not to adopt a resolution scheme in respect of a credit institution. By adopting such a decision in its regard, it exceeded the powers conferred on it by Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014. The applicant stated at the hearing that, where the SRB finds, as in the present case, that the conditions for adopting a resolution scheme laid down in that provision are not met, it must ‘close the file’ and do nothing more. 41 Second, the applicant submits that the SRB exceeded the powers conferred on it by Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 through ‘any interference’ in matters of insolvency and by ultimately deciding that it should be subject to insolvency proceedings. In that regard, the applicant notes that, in the contested decision, insolvency proceedings were referred to as an alternative to resolution action and as the necessary and inevitable consequence of that decision. 42 The SRB submits that the present plea is inadmissible on account of the lack of clarity in relation to the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. In the alternative, it submits that it is unfounded. 43 The ECB also contends that the present plea is unfounded. 44 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the SRB and the ECB were in a position to respond meaningfully to the plea raised by the applicant and that the Court is in a position to examine the substance of that plea. Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the SRB is rejected. 45 So far as concerns the substance, as regards the applicant’s complaint set out in paragraph 40 above, the following should be noted. 46 As is apparent from paragraph 70 of the judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB (C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369), where the ECB comes to the conclusion that the entity concerned is in a FOLTF situation, its assessment is sent to the SRB and the resolution procedure is initiated. It is then for the SRB to verify whether the conditions referred to in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 are met in order to decide whether to adopt a resolution scheme. 47 In paragraph 56 of the judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB (C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369), the Court of Justice also found that, since that assessment carried out by the ECB was an intermediate act and not a challengeable act, it could be subject to judicial review in the context of an action before the Courts of the European Union against the adoption by the SRB of a resolution scheme or against the decision not to adopt such a scheme. It follows that the SRB is required to take a positive or negative decision once it has examined the three conditions laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, if only to prevent a lacuna in the judicial protection of an entity, especially with regard to the ECB’s FOLTF assessment of that entity. 48 Moreover, that finding is supported by the broader regulatory context of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014. Thus, it is apparent from Article 82(2) of Directive 2014/59 that ‘a decision whether or not to take resolution action in relation to an institution or an entity … shall contain the following information’. That provision thus expressly provides for the possibility of adopting a decision not to take resolution action. It may be regarded as the equivalent of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, which applies to smaller credit institutions which are not subject to direct supervision by the ECB but which are subject to supervision by NRAs. 49 Moreover, once the ECB has found that a credit institution is in a FOLTF situation, it is for the SRB to decide whether that assessment is correct and, if so, whether or not the credit institution at issue will be placed under resolution. Moreover, the alleged lack of competence of the SRB to adopt a decision not to put in place a resolution scheme could jeopardise the stability of the institution concerned and potentially that of the financial markets, by giving rise to doubts as to the follow-up action to be taken in respect of that institution in the light of the ECB’s assessment. 50 It follows that, following the launch of the procedure by the ECB, the SRB was required to examine the criteria set out in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 and to take a decision at the end of that examination. 51 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s complaint set out in paragraph 40 above must be rejected. 52 As regards the applicant’s complaint referred to in paragraph 41 above, it should be recalled that the contested decision merely provides, in Article 1 thereof, that Sberbank Europe will not be placed under resolution and, in Article 2 thereof, that that decision is addressed to the Austrian NRA. 53 Furthermore, in recital 21 of the contested decision, the SRB states, in essence, that it follows from Regulation No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/59 that where, at EU level, an institution may not be placed under resolution on the ground that the public interest test is not met, that institution is subject, at national level, to winding up proceedings in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. The SRB thus concludes, in the same recital, that, as regards Sberbank Europe, the measures necessary to comply with the contested decision entail the application of bankruptcy proceedings governed by Austrian law. 54 In recital 22 of the contested decision, the SRB also states that its analysis is without prejudice to the rights and powers of the Austrian NRA to exercise its responsibilities in accordance with the applicable national law. 55 The SRB’s assessment, in recitals 21 and 22 of the contested decision, does not demonstrate that the SRB unlawfully exercised power, since, as has already been noted, it is apparent from Article 18(5) and (8) of Regulation No 806/2014 that, where the SRB concludes, first, that the conditions laid down in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, according to which the credit institution in question is in a FOLTF situation and no alternative measures exist, are satisfied and, second, that the condition laid down in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation, according to which resolution must be necessary in the public interest, is not satisfied, the institution in question is subject to winding up proceedings in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law (see paragraph 33 above). 56 It follows from the examination of the grounds and the operative part of the contested decision that the SRB did not unlawfully exercise power in relation to the liquidation of Sberbank Europe and, therefore, the complaint set out in paragraph 41 above must be rejected. 57 In view of the foregoing considerations, the first plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard 58 The applicant submits that the contested decision is unlawful in that it was not granted the right to be heard. 59 The SRB contends that the present plea is not sufficiently substantiated and that it is therefore inadmissible since it does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. In any event, it is unfounded. 60 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, even if the present plea is presented succinctly, its scope may be understood without the need for further elaboration. Moreover, the SRB was able effectively to defend itself as regards the substance. Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the SRB is rejected and the substance of the present plea must be examined. 61 In that regard, it must be recalled that Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that the right to good administration includes the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken. 62 The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely. In addition, it should be stated that the right to be heard pursues a dual objective. First, to enable the case to be examined and the facts to be established in as precise and correct a manner as possible, and, second, to ensure that the person concerned is in fact protected. The right to be heard is intended in particular to guarantee that any decision adversely affecting a person is adopted in full knowledge of the facts, and its purpose is, inter alia, to enable the competent authority to correct an error or to enable the person concerned to submit such information relating to his or her personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (see judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker, C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited). 63 It should be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has previously affirmed the importance of the right to be heard and its very broad scope in the EU legal order, considering that that right had to apply in all proceedings which are liable to culminate in an act adversely affecting a person. Observance of the right to be heard is required even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see judgments of 22 November 2012, M., C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraphs 85 and 86 and the case-law cited; of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited; and of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). 64 It must be stated that Regulation No 806/2014 has the objective of establishing, in accordance with recital 8 thereof, more efficient resolution mechanisms, which must be an essential instrument to avoid damages that have resulted from failures of banks in the past. As regards the procedure provided for in Article 18 of that regulation, that objective presupposes a speedy decision-making process, which often occurs in emergency circumstances – as the short time limits laid down in that provision illustrate – so that financial stability is not jeopardised (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 55). 65 However, although it is necessary to take into account the need for speed in the procedure provided for in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, it must also be reconciled with the right to be heard. 66 Recital 26 of Regulation No 806/2014, moreover, confirms both the shared power of the ECB, as the supervisor within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and the SRB, as resolution authority, to assess whether a credit institution is failing or is likely to fail, and the exclusive power of the SRB to assess whether the other requirements for the adoption of a resolution scheme are met (judgment of 6 May 2021, ABLV Bank and Others v ECB, C‑551/19 P and C‑552/19 P, EU:C:2021:369, paragraph 64). 67 Having regard to the nature of that complex administrative procedure referred to in Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 and conducted by the ECB and the SRB jointly and successively, neither Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights nor the provisions of that regulation require that the entity concerned by the decision to adopt or not adopt a resolution scheme be heard at each stage of the procedure by each of those two bodies separately. 68 In the present case, it should be borne in mind that, in the email of 26 February 2022 (see paragraph 5 above), the applicant informed the ECB and the FMA, with the SRB in copy, that it could reasonably be expected that it would likely be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due in the near future and that there were circumstances indicating that its ability to meet its obligations was at risk. In that email, the applicant explained that its liquidity situation was becoming critical due to substantial deposit outflows and that it had serious doubts as to whether the measures adopted in accordance with its recovery plan could stabilise its situation. The applicant also stated that it had requested emergency liquidity assistance from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank) and that it was awaiting its response. 69 In the contested decision, the SRB took into account the notification made by the applicant in the email of 26 February 2022, in particular in recital 35 of that decision in the description of the procedure, in recital 61 and in recital 63(c) and (g) of that decision in the assessment of the applicant’s FOLTF situation within the meaning of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, and in recital 66 of that decision in the assessment of the existence of alternative measures to avoid the entity’s failure within a reasonable timeframe, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation. In particular, in recital 66 of the contested decision, the SRB noted that the applicant had not mentioned any prospect of a private solution that would prevent a failure and referred to the email of 26 February 2022. 70 It follows from the elements set out in paragraphs 68 and 69 above that, so far as concerns the matters it disputes before the General Court, inter alia the question whether there are alternative measures within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the applicant was heard in the context of the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 July 2022, ABLV Bank v SRB, T‑280/18, under appeal, EU:T:2022:429, paragraph 166). 71 In those circumstances, the applicant’s right to be heard was not infringed. 72 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The third plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons 73 In this plea in law, the applicant raises three complaints. 74 In the first place, the applicant submits that, on the date of adoption of the contested decision, namely 1 March 2022, no statement of reasons was provided with that decision. In its view, reasons which are not shared with the entity concerned, but are ‘recorded internally’ or communicated to another authority, are not sufficient and do not enable those who are affected by the decision to determine whether or not to bring an action against that decision. 75 In the second place, the applicant claims that the non-confidential version of the contested decision sent to it on 6 May 2022 did not contain a sufficient statement of reasons on account of the redactions which it contained. 76 In the third place, the applicant complains that the SRB failed to explain why it had departed from the preferred resolution strategy envisaged in the resolution plan and why it had concluded that the alternatives to a liquidation under national insolvency law were not available. 77 The ECB disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 78 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the contested act in the present case constitutes the decision of the SRB adopted on 1 March 2022, a first non-confidential version of which was published on 10 June 2022 on the SRB’s website. It is that act which is annexed to the application, as provided for in the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 78(1) of the Rules of Procedure. Moreover, a second non-confidential version of the contested decision was published on 21 December 2023 (see paragraph 19 above), in relation to which the applicant had had the opportunity to submit observations following an invitation from the General Court. 79 It is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraph 78 above that the applicant’s complaint set out in paragraph 74 above is ineffective, in that it does not relate to the contested decision as published, which is subject to the review of legality carried out by the Court and in the light of which the adequacy of the statement of reasons must be assessed. 80 It is also apparent from the considerations set out in paragraph 78 above that the applicant’s complaint referred to in paragraph 75 above is also ineffective. In that regard, it is apparent from the explanations of both the applicant and the SRB that the ‘non-confidential version of the contested decision’ sent to the applicant on 6 May 2022 was merely a draft non-confidential version of the contested decision, communicated by the SRB to the applicant in order to obtain its opinion on the confidential information to be redacted in the final version to be published. Moreover, that draft to which the applicant’s present complaint relates is not in the file. 81 In so far as, by its complaint set out in paragraph 75 above, the applicant seeks to claim that, as a result of the redactions of the confidential information, the statement of reasons for the contested decision is insufficient, the following should be noted. 82 It is apparent from the case-law that the non-confidential version of a contested decision, where it sets out the facts and legal considerations which are of decisive importance in the context of that decision, in such a way as to enable the applicant to exercise its right to effective judicial protection and the Court to exercise its power of review, must be regarded as being sufficiently reasoned (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2022, Del Valle Ruíz and Others v Commission and SRB, T‑510/17, EU:T:2022:312, point 452 and the case-law cited). 83 In the present case, the applicant does not identify the information redacted in the published version of the contested decision which its complaint concerns and does not explain how that redacted information prevents it from understanding the content of that decision and from exercising its right to an effective judicial remedy, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 82 above. 84 Consequently, the applicant’s line of argument, in so far as it is concerns an insufficient statement of reasons for the contested decision on account of the redactions of the confidential information, must also be rejected. 85 As regards the applicant’s two specific complaints set out in paragraph 76 above, they must be rejected as unfounded. 86 First, in recitals 75 to 79 of the contested decision, in the context of Section 4.3.2 relating to the assessment of the public interest, the SRB set out the reasons, which relate in particular to the significant change in circumstances, why it considered it appropriate to depart from the assessment set out in the resolution plan. The contested decision is not vitiated by a failure to state reasons in relation to those considerations, which are the subject of a substantive review by the Court in the context of the seventh plea. 87 Second, in recitals 65 to 70 of the contested decision, the SRB explained the reasons why it found that there was no reasonable prospect that other measures could prevent the applicant’s failure within a reasonable timeframe, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. That part of the contested decision, which is the subject of a substantive review by the Court in the context of the fourth and fifth pleas, is also not vitiated by a failure to state reasons. 88 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third plea in law must be rejected. The fourth and fifth pleas, alleging failure to examine properly the condition laid down in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 89 In the context of the fourth and fifth pleas in law, which it is appropriate to examine together, the applicant complains that the SRB did not properly examine whether there were alternative measures to avoid the failure of Sberbank Europe within a reasonable timeframe, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. 90 The SRB and the ECB contend that the present pleas must be rejected as inadmissible in so far as they are not clear or sufficiently substantiated and thus do not satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. In the alternative, they submit that those pleas must be rejected as unfounded. 91 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the SRB and the ECB were in a position to respond effectively to the pleas raised by the applicant and that the Court is in a position to examine the substance of those pleas. Accordingly, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the SRB and the ECB must be rejected. 92 As to the substance, it should be noted that the SRB examined the condition laid down in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 in Section 4.3.1 of the contested decision. In the first place, it examined whether there were private sector measures that could prevent the failure of Sberbank Europe in the near future. Relying in particular on the ECB’s findings and on the information provided by the credit institution itself, it came to the conclusion that that was not the case (recitals 65 and 66 of the contested decision). In the second place, the SRB found that there were no other supervisory or early intervention measures that could immediately restore the applicant’s liquidity position and allow it sufficient time to implement measures (recital 68 of the contested decision). In the third place, the SRB also found that the exercise of the power to write down or convert Sberbank Europe’s capital instruments and eligible liabilities would also not be sufficient to prevent the failure of the entity (recital 69 of the contested decision). It thus concluded that the condition laid down in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 was satisfied. 93 It must be stated that the applicant does not explain, let alone demonstrate, how the SRB’s findings set out in paragraph 92 above are incorrect. 94 The applicant merely submits that the suspension of Sberbank Europe’s liabilities constitutes an alternative measure, within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the application of which the ECB and the SRB should have considered. It notes that such a suspension was put in place by the moratorium on the performance of Sberbank Europe’s payment and delivery obligations, imposed before the adoption of the contested decision (see paragraph 8 above) and by the prohibition on any business activity imposed following the adoption of the contested decision (see paragraph 14 above). 95 The applicant also submits that the ECB could have instructed the FMA to apply for business supervision (Geschäftsaufsicht) under Austrian banking law. That measure would also have allowed its liabilities to be suspended. 96 The applicant adds that the SRB did not explore whether private sector measures with the same effect as a suspension of liabilities could apply in the present case. 97 Furthermore, in its observations on the ECB’s statement in intervention, the applicant submits that the ECB considered that its restructuring carried out in the context of the ‘Adria’ transaction would have made it possible to avoid its FOLTF situation. 98 In that regard, it must be stated that the applicant does not specify the legal grounds which could form the basis for the suspension of Sberbank Europe’s liabilities and does not provide any other detail regarding that measure, in particular its duration. Its claim that the supervision of Sberbank Europe’s business, under the Federal Law on the banking sector, would have allowed such a suspension is too imprecise to satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. In particular, the applicant does not provide any information regarding the conditions for the application of that measure and whether Sberbank Europe fulfilled those conditions. The same is true of the applicant’s claim relating to the existence of private sector measures which have the same effect as a suspension of obligations. 99 Furthermore, in so far as, by its line of argument, the applicant maintains that the moratorium on Sberbank Europe’s payment and delivery obligations, imposed before the adoption of the contested decision, and the prohibition on pursuing any business activity, imposed on Sberbank Europe following the adoption of the contested decision, could constitute alternative measures within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, that line of argument must be rejected as unfounded. 100 First, as regards the moratorium on Sberbank Europe’s payment and delivery obligations, it should be noted that the SRB ordered it to be imposed on the basis of Article 33a of Directive 2014/59 (see paragraph 8 above). That provision governs the power of NRAs to suspend any payment or delivery obligation of the credit institutions in question where, inter alia, it has been determined that those institutions are failing or likely to fail and there is no immediately available private sector measure that would prevent that failure (Article 33a(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2014/59). 101 The first subparagraph of Article 33a(4) of Directive 2014/59 provides that the period of suspension must be as short as possible and that it cannot, in any event, last longer than the period from the publication of a notice of suspension to midnight at the end of the business day following the day of that publication. It was pursuant to that provision that the moratorium in the present case took effect as from 28 February 2022 at 00:01 until 1 March 2022 at 23:59. 102 It is thus apparent that the abovementioned moratorium, imposed on the basis of Article 33a of Directive 2014/59, constitutes a short-term measure the purpose of which is to manage the consequences of the failure of the credit institution in question and cannot, by definition, be perceived as an alternative measure preventing failure within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. 103 Second, as regards the prohibition on pursuing any business activity, imposed on Sberbank Europe, to which the applicant also refers, it should be recalled that that measure was adopted by the FMA pursuant to Article 70(2) of the Federal Law on the banking sector, following the adoption of the contested decision (see paragraph 14 above). As is apparent from that provision, the abovementioned prohibition, which could not exceed 18 months, was adopted as a consequence of the failure or likely failure of Sberbank Europe and was intended to stabilise and mitigate the effects of that failure. It is thus apparent that the adoption of such a measure presupposed that there were no alternative measures preventing the failure of the institution in question within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. Furthermore, in the light of the fact that that measure was adopted following the contested decision on the basis of Austrian law, it must also be noted that the applicant does not explain, let alone demonstrate, that the SRB is competent to adopt such a measure. 104 Moreover, the applicant’s argument set out in paragraph 97 above lacks a factual basis in that, as is apparent from paragraph 17 of the ECB’s assessment of the applicant’s FOLTF situation, the ECB was not of the opinion that the Adria transaction would prevent that situation from arising. In fact, the ECB considered that that transaction was not a realistic option owing to the time needed for its implementation and the applicant’s immediate need for liquidity. 105 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the applicant has not shown that the SRB erred in its examination of the condition laid down in point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014. It follows that the fourth and fifth pleas in law must be rejected. The sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and manifest error of assessment concerning the examination of possible alternative solutions 106 The applicant submits that the SRB infringed the principle of proportionality and committed a manifest error of assessment in that it failed to take into account a number of alternative and less burdensome solutions than the winding up carried out under national law. In so far as the problems identified by the SRB were linked to the applicant’s shareholder, an obvious alternative to liquidation would be ‘a transfer of the applicant to an alternative shareholder’ as it had been decided in the case of Sberbank Croatia and Sberbank Slovenia. 107 The applicant also identifies the sale of business and bail-in as alternative measures to liquidation. It complains that the SRB did not explain, in the contested decision, why it is not possible to have recourse in the present case to those two measures, especially since they are referred to in that decision as being components of the preferred resolution strategy under the resolution plan. 108 The ECB disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 109 It should be borne in mind that, where the SRB concludes, first, that the credit institution in question is in a FOLTF situation, within the meaning of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, second, that there are no alternative measures within the meaning of point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation and, third, that resolution is not necessary in the public interest within the meaning of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of that regulation, the only possible alternative to resolution is the opening of winding up proceedings in respect of the credit institution under the applicable national law (see paragraph 33 above). It follows that, in the present case, the winding up of Sberbank Europe under Austrian law was the only possible solution to the FOLTF situation of that credit institution and to the fact that there was no alternative measure, since its resolution was not considered necessary in the public interest. 110 Furthermore, the sale of business and bail-in, to which the applicant refers as ‘alternative solutions’ to winding up, are resolution tools applicable to an institution under resolution (see Article 18(6)(b) of Regulation No 806/2014, read in conjunction with Article 22(2) of that regulation). In the present case, it was found in the contested decision that the applicant would not be subject to a resolution procedure and, as has been noted (see paragraphs 33 and 55 above), Regulation No 806/2014 does not lay down an obligation for the SRB to examine whether there are alternative solutions to liquidation where the conditions for resolution (and, more specifically, the public interest condition) are not satisfied. 111 It follows that, in the present case, the SRB, since it concluded that the applicant’s resolution was not necessary in the public interest, was not obliged to examine whether the sale of the applicant’s business or the bail-in of the applicant were possible alternatives to its liquidation. 112 For the sake of completeness, it must be stated that, in the email of 26 February 2022 (see paragraph 5 above), Sberbank Europe did not mention the possibility that measures such as the sale of its business or its bail-in could be applied, so that the SRB could take that information into account in its assessment. 113 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the sixth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The seventh plea in law, alleging an error of law and a failure to state reasons concerning the fact that the contested decision departs from the resolution plan 114 The applicant submits that the contested decision contains no justification for departing from the resolution plan. That plan rejects the application of national insolvency proceedings and provides for the resolution of Sberbank Europe and certain of its subsidiaries in the event of the failure of those institutions. According to that plan, the preferred resolution strategy consists in maintaining the structure of the Sberbank Europe group and the bail-in applied at the level of the entity Sberbank Europe, which is the point of entry. According to the applicant, the SRB’s radical departure from the resolution plan without any plausible justification is one of the reasons why the contested decision lacks a sufficient statement of reason. 115 The applicant also claims that the contested decision, by departing from the resolution plan, infringes the third paragraph of Article 23 of Regulation No 806/2014, read in the light of recital 54 of Directive 2014/59, laying down the rule that resolution plans must in principle be followed subject to the existence of a legitimate reason justifying a different approach from that put forward in those plans. 116 Furthermore, the applicant complains that the SRB failed to take account of the fact that recital 44 of Regulation No 806/2014 reveals a clear preference on the part of the legislature for resolution at group level. 117 The ECB disputes the applicant’s line of argument. 118 Under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 806/2014, the SRB is to draw up and adopt resolution plans for the entities and groups that fall within its competence as resolution body. 119 The first subparagraph of Article 8(6) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that the resolution plan must provide for the resolution actions which the SRB may take where an entity referred to in paragraph 1 of that article meets the conditions for resolution. 120 The first subparagraph of Article 8(10) of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that group resolution plans are to contain a plan for the resolution of the group referred to in paragraph 1 of that article, headed by the Union parent undertaking established in a participating Member State, and must identify measures to be taken in respect of, inter alia, the Union parent undertaking and subsidiaries that are part of the group and that are established in the European Union. 121 The third paragraph of Article 23 of Regulation No 806/2014 provides that, when adopting a resolution scheme, the SRB, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission are to take into account and follow the resolution plan as referred to in Article 8 of that regulation, unless the SRB assesses, taking into account the circumstances of the case, that the resolution objectives will be achieved more effectively by taking actions which are not provided for in the resolution plan. 122 Recital 54 of Directive 2014/59 sets out the same principles as those contained in the third paragraph of Article 23 of Regulation No 806/2014. 123 In the present case, it is apparent from the file that, on 3 May 2021, the SRB adopted the resolution plan for the Sberbank Europe group. 124 In the first place, that resolution plan stated that, in the event of failure, the application of a resolution procedure would be justified for Sberbank Europe in view of the financial and operational interdependencies between that entity and the other entities of the Sberbank Europe group established in Europe. In particular, that plan explained that Sberbank Europe was responsible for the transfer of funds from Sberbank of Russia to its subsidiaries and provided support services that were important to those subsidiaries. It was noted in the resolution plan that the liquidation of Sberbank Europe under national insolvency proceedings could have a disruptive effect on the subsidiaries’ business. The resolution plan also provided for the resolution of certain subsidiaries of Sberbank Europe, including Sberbank Slovenia and Sberbank Croatia. 125 In the second place, the resolution plan specified that the preferred resolution strategy was not based on separating the entities of the Sberbank Europe group since its structure should remain unchanged. It provided for bail-in to be applied at the level of Sberbank Europe, which is considered the point of entry. 126 In recitals 75 to 79 of the contested decision, the SRB explained that the reasons underlying the conclusion, in the resolution plan, that resolution should apply to Sberbank Europe in the event of its failure (see paragraph 124 above) no longer existed. 127 First, the SRB stated, in recital 76 of the contested decision, that geopolitical tensions and the imposition of sanctions by the United States of America and the European Union against Russia had an impact on Sberbank Europe’s ability to ensure a sufficient level of liquidity for itself and its subsidiaries. That ability was affected in particular by the decision of the Central Bank of Russia to prohibit the transfer of foreign currency denominated funds in favour of Sberbank of Russia’s subsidiaries located in foreign jurisdictions whose national authorities had imposed sanctions against Russian citizens and assets. 128 Second, the SRB stated, in recital 77 of the contested decision, that the provision of support services by Sberbank Europe to Sberbank Slovenia was no longer deemed to be critical in the current context of the latter’s FOLTF situation. 129 The SRB thus concluded, in recital 78 of the contested decision, that, for the two reasons set out above, the winding up of Sberbank Europe under normal insolvency proceedings did not put resolution objectives at risk and hence resolution action in respect of that credit institution was not considered to be in the public interest, within the meaning of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) and Article 18(5) of Regulation No 806/2014. 130 Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, the SRB explained, to the requisite legal standard, the reason why the contested decision departed from the resolution plan in so far as it concluded that the resolution of Sberbank Europe was not necessary in the public interest. 131 As regards the substance of the applicant’s line of argument, it is apparent from the very wording of the third paragraph of Article 23 of Regulation No 806/2014, read in the light of recital 54 of Directive 2014/59, that the SRB, the Council and the Commission, when adopting a resolution scheme, may depart from the resolution plan and adopt measures which are not provided for in that plan if the circumstances of the case so warrant. Thus, while the relevant regulatory framework allows the competent resolution authorities, when they decide to place an entity under resolution, to adopt resolution actions which differ from those provided for in the resolution plan if the circumstances so warrant, it must be concluded that the SRB must be able to depart from the resolution plan by taking the view that, on account of the circumstances of the case, it is no longer in the public interest for the entity in question to be placed under resolution. 132 When the SRB assesses whether the conditions for the entity in question to be placed under resolution are met, it must, clearly, take into account the actual and current situation of that entity, without it being obliged, as a matter of principle, to follow the resolution plan drawn up previously and, possibly, in different circumstances. In particular, it must assess whether the public interest justifies the application of resolution action in accordance with point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Regulation No 806/2014 and in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 18(5) of that regulation. 133 Similarly, as the SRB rightly points out, the relevant legal framework does not provide for nor mean that a resolution plan at group level will necessarily lead to a positive public interest assessment for each group entity and to the adoption of a resolution scheme covering all the entities comprised in that group. It may be that the circumstances in which the SRB is called upon to assess the public interest condition differ greatly from the circumstances in which the resolution plan was drawn up. That is the case here, since the resolution plan was drawn up without taking account of the geopolitical situation created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which occurred after that plan was drawn up. 134 The analysis set out in paragraph 133 above is not called into question by recital 44 of Regulation No 806/2014, relied on by the applicant, which refers to the content of resolution plans and does not concern the issue relating to the possibility of departing, in a resolution decision, from a resolution plan. 135 In the present case, the SRB took the view that the circumstances did not justify Sberbank Europe being placed under resolution. The applicant has not put forward any evidence capable of calling into question the SRB’s assessment. In particular, it seems to argue that, as a matter of principle, competent resolution authorities must follow the resolution plan. That argument is, however, manifestly incorrect, as is apparent from paragraphs 131 to 133 above. 136 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the seventh plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. The eighth and ninth pleas in law, alleging lack of access to the file of the procedure and failure to notify the contested decision, respectively 137 The applicant submits, for the first time in its request for the stay of the proceedings of 20 January 2023 and without further elaboration, that it did not have access to the file relating to the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested decision (eighth plea in law) and that that decision was not notified to it (ninth plea in law). 138 In its observations on the ECB’s statement in intervention, the applicant submits that that failure to notify amounts to an infringement of an essential procedural requirement which must be assessed by the Court of its own motion. That infringement renders the contested decision non-existent or results in its annulment. 139 The SRB contends that the eighth and ninth pleas are inadmissible, since they were raised out of time. 140 As regards the eighth plea, alleging lack of access to the file, since it has not been raised in the application and is not based on matters of law and of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure, it must be regarded as inadmissible because it is out of time, as provided for in Article 76(d) in conjunction with Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2015, Petro Suisse Intertrade v Council, T‑156/13 and T‑373/14, not published, EU:T:2015:646, paragraphs 113 to 115). 141 So far as concerns the ninth plea, alleging failure to notify the contested decision, it must be rejected as, in any event, unfounded. The contested decision is not addressed to the applicant and, consequently, the SRB was not obliged to notify it thereof, having regard to the third subparagraph of Article 297(2) TFEU. That provision sets out, inter alia, that decisions which specify to whom they are addressed must be notified to those to whom they are addressed and take effect upon such notification. 142 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the eighth and ninth pleas in law must be rejected. The application for the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry 143 In its observations on the ECB’s statement in intervention, the applicant requested that the Court adopt measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry. 144 In the first place, the applicant requested that the Court order the SRB, the Commission and the ECB to produce the full and unredacted version of the following documents: – the ECB’s FOLTF assessments concerning Sberbank Croatia and Sberbank Slovenia; – the FOLTF assessments by the SRB, – the text of the SRB’s submissions to the Commission, – all other relevant documents. 145 In the second place, the applicant requested the Court to order the ECB to produce the decision of its governing council of 26 February 2022 and any other document setting out the background and reasoning of that decision and to explain why the reference to that decision was redacted in the non-confidential version of the ECB’s assessment of the applicant’s FOLTF situation, annexed to the application. 146 As regards the applicant’s request set out in the first indent of paragraph 144 above, it should be noted that the documents referred to are not relevant to the outcome of the present dispute, which concerns Sberbank Europe and not its Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries, which are separate entities. Moreover, the applicant does not explain the relevance of those documents. 147 Concerning the applicant’s requests referred to in the second, third and fourth indents of paragraph 144 above, they are not sufficiently precise as regards their purpose. 148 So far as concerns the requests referred to in paragraph 145 above, it must be stated that the applicant does not explain how the disclosure of the decision of the governing council of the ECB of 26 February 2022 or of any related documents is necessary to support the pleas and arguments relied on. Moreover, that decision relates to the causes of the applicant’s FOLTF situation, that situation having not been challenged before the General Court. Further, the causes of the applicant’s FOLTF situation are not relevant, in the present case, to the assessment of the legality of the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 July 2022, ABLV Bank v SRB, T‑280/18, under appeal, EU:T:2022:429, paragraph 101 (not published)). 149 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applications for measures of organisation of procedure or of inquiry are dismissed. 150 It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 151 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the SRB, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the latter. 152 In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the ECB must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sber Vermögensverwaltungs AG, initially Sberbank Europe AG to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the Single Resolution Board (SRB); 3. Orders the European Central Bank (ECB) to bear its own costs. Kowalik-Bańczyk Buttigieg Hesse Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 18 June 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.