Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2018:475
Date: 2018-07-13
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Second Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: European Central Bank (ECB);Economic and monetary policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - successful
Origin: France

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition), 13 July 2018 1. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector — Single supervisory mechanism — Competences of the European Central Bank — Decentralised implementation by the national authorities — Assessment of the significance of an institution — Exclusive competence of the ECB (Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Arts 4(1)(d) and 6(4)) 2. EU law — Interpretation — Methods — Interpretation of secondary legislation consistent with the FEU Treaty and the general principles of EU law (Art. 277 TFEU) 3. EU law — Interpretation — Methods — Literal, systematic and teleological interpretation 4. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector — Prudential requirements applicable to credit institutions and investment firms — Liquidity requirements — Leverage ratio — Calculation — Possibility of excluding certain exposures to public sector entities — Competent authorities’ discretion (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, as amended by Regulation No 2015/62, Art. 429(14)) 5. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector — Prudential requirements applicable to credit institutions and investment firms — Liquidity requirements — Leverage ratio — Calculation — Possibility of excluding certain exposures to public sector entities — European Central Bank decision refusing to grant the derogation — Judicial review — Limits (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, as amended by Regulation No 2015/62, Art. 429(14)) 6. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector — Prudential requirements applicable to credit institutions and investment firms — Liquidity requirements — Leverage ratio — Calculation — Possibility of excluding certain exposures to public sector entities — European Central Bank decision refusing to grant the derogation — Refusal based on considerations inherent to the exposures concerned by the derogation and the payment default situation of the State concerned without examining the likelihood of the risk — Not permissible (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, as amended by Regulation No 2015/62, Art. 429(14)) 7. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector — Prudential requirements applicable to credit institutions and investment firms — Liquidity requirements — Leverage ratio — Relevance of the period for the adjustment of the credit institution’s positions with those of a public financial institution — Limits (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, as amended by Regulation No 2015/62, Recital 90 and Arts 4(1)(94) and 412(1); Council Regulation No 1024/2013, Art. 4(1)(d); Commission Regulation No 2015/61, Art. 26) 8. Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Supervision of the EU financial sector –Prudential requirements applicable to credit institutions and investment firms — Liquidity requirements — Leverage ratio — Calculation — Possibility of excluding certain exposures to public sector entities — European Central Bank decision refusing to grant the derogation — Refusal based on the risk posed by the period for the adjustment of the credit institution’s positions with those of a public financial institution — Failure to examine the characteristics of regulated savings — Not permissible (European Parliament and Council Regulation No 575/2013, as amended by Regulation No 2015/62, Arts 4(1)(94) 412(1) and 429(14)) 1. See the text of the decision. (see para. 28) 2. A provision of secondary European Union law must be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner consistent with the Treaty and the general principles of EU law. However, as shown by the use of the expression ‘as far as possible’, such an interpretation cannot be applied in the case of a provision whose meaning is clear and unambiguous and which therefore requires no interpretation. With regard to such a provision, it is for the EU Courts alone, where a plea of illegality within the meaning of Article 277 TFEU is raised, to review its consistency with the provisions of the Treaty and the general principles of EU law. (see paras 33, 34) 3. See the text of the decision. (see para. 37) 4. Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, as amended by Regulation 2015/62, must be interpreted as conferring on the competent authorities a discretion to refuse to grant the derogation which it establishes, even when the conditions set out in that provision are met. By that derogation, the Commission, with the prior authorisation of the legislature, envisaged the possibility that a credit institution’s exposures to public-sector entities which, because of a State guarantee, present the same low risk level as exposures to that State and which do not correspond to an investment choice by the credit institution — in that the credit institution is under an obligation to transfer the sums concerned — are not relevant for the calculation of the leverage ratio and may therefore be excluded. The only exposures affected by Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 are those which, in application of the standard approach to the calculation of minimum own funds requirements, would be assigned a risk weight of 0%. Consequently, the implementation of Article 429(14) of that regulation entails the reconciliation of two objectives: first, compliance with the logic of the leverage ratio, which requires that the calculation of that ratio include the overall exposure measure of a credit institution, without weighting by reference to the risk, and, second, consideration of the objective of the Commission, authorised in advance by the legislature, that, if necessary, certain exposures with a particularly low risk profile which are not the result of an investment choice made by the credit institutions are not relevant for the calculation of the leverage ratio and may therefore be excluded. It must be stated that the recognition in favour of the competent authorities of a discretion when they implement Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 allows them to decide between those two objectives in the light of the particular characteristics of each individual case. (see paras 53-57) 5. In so far as the European Central Bank has a discretion and, consequently, a wide power of assessment in choosing whether or not to grant the benefit of Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, as amended by Regulation 2015/62, the judicial review which the EU Court must carry out of the merits of the grounds of the contested decision must not lead it to substitute its own assessment for that of the ECB, but focuses on whether the contested decision is based on materially incorrect facts, or is vitiated by an error of law, manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. (see para. 71) 6. Although the European Central Bank is free within the framework of the exercise of the discretion recognised to it under Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, as amended by Regulation 2015/62, to grant or not to grant the derogation envisaged in that provision, the exercise of that freedom must not disregard the objectives pursued by that derogation and must not deprive it of its practical effect. It necessarily follows that the ECB cannot rely on grounds that would make the possibility offered by Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 virtually inapplicable in practice, without depriving that provision of practical effect and disregarding the objectives that led to its introduction. Accordingly, the European Central Bank cannot exclude a credit institution’s exposures to a public financial institution from the benefit of Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 on the basis of considerations which are inherent in the exposures concerned by that provision. That is the case of the consideration based on the fact that that credit institution’s exposures to that public financial institution appear on the assets side of its balance sheet. In so far as the exposures in respect of which that provision envisages the possibility that they will not be taken into account in the calculation of the leverage ratio of a credit institution must by their nature appear on the assets side of that institution’s balance sheet, the consideration based on the fact that the exposures to a public financial institution shown on the assets side of the applicant’s balance sheet cannot validly justify the refusal to grant the requested derogation. The same applies, in the second place, and for similar reasons, to the consideration based on the fact that those exposures constitute a proportion of the sums deposited with the applicant as regulated savings, which remain on the liabilities side of its balance sheet. Similarly, since Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 concerns only exposures to public service entities having a State guarantee, a refusal given on the theoretical ground that a State may be in a payment default situation, without consideration of the likelihood of such a possibility in the case of the State concerned, would amount to rendering the possibility envisaged by that provision virtually inapplicable in practice. Nor, consequently, in so far as the European Central Bank does not examine the likelihood of a payment default, can the reference in the decision to refuse to grant the benefit of Article 429(14) of Regulation No 575/2013 to the volume of a credit institution’s exposures to a financial institution justify in itself those exposures being taken into account in the calculation of the leverage ratio. That volume might be relevant only if, as a result of a payment default by the State concerned, that credit institution could not obtain from that financial institution the sums transferred as regulated savings and would have to have recourse to forced sales of assets. (see paras 79, 81-83, 86, 87, 91, 92) 7. It follows from the definition of excessive leverage set out in Article 4(1)(94) of Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, as amended by Regulation 2015/62, that the risks envisaged in respect of excessive leverage materialise in a situation of insufficient liquidity. It is in order to obtain liquidity that a credit institution may find it necessary to take unintended measures to its business plan, including distressed selling of assets having the consequences explained in that provision, as stated in recital 90 of Regulation No 575/2013. Since the negative consequences of excessive leverage are revealed in the case of insufficient liquidity, the fact that the period for the adjustment of the credit institution’s positions with those of a public financial institution is concerned with liquidity does not deprive that period of relevance to the assessment of the risk associated with its leverage ratio. However, that adjustment period is not at the origin of a liquidity risk for the purposes of the assessment of the liquidity coverage requirements set out in Article 412 of Regulation No 575/2013 and in Regulation 2015/61 supplementing Regulation No 575/2013 with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for credit institutions. The grant of the benefit of Article 26 of Regulation 2015/61 — which allows the competent authorities and thus the ECB to offset interdependent outflows and inflows if, owing to the existence of a guarantee by the central government of a Member State and the short duration of the period between the outflows and inflows, it considers that the period does not give rise to a liquidity risk — by the European Central Bank to inflows and outflows linked with exposures to a financial institution is tantamount to recognition by the ECB that the period that may separate those inflows and outflows does not give rise to a liquidity risk. (see paras 101-104, 108, 109) 8. The adjustment period in question could be relevant for the leverage risk, within the meaning of Article 4(1)(94) of Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, as amended by Regulation 2015/62, even though it is not relevant for the liquidity risk, only where withdrawals of deposits linked with regulated savings were sufficiently large for those savings to exceed the ‘gravely stressed conditions’ envisaged in the context of the calculation of the liquidity ratio under Article 412(1) of Regulation No 575/2013. In that connection, such a possibility could not be taken into account for the purposes of rejecting a credit institution’s request to benefit from Article 429(14) of that regulation without a thorough examination of the characteristics of the regulated savings being carried out by the European Central Bank. That examination ought, in particular, to lead the ECB to consider whether, in the light of their characteristics — and in particular the State guarantee associated with regulated savings — it may be envisaged that withdrawals of regulated savings would be sufficiently large and sudden for the credit institution concerned to find it necessary to have recourse to the measures envisaged in Article 4(1)(94) of Regulation No 575/2013 without being able to await the transfers of funds from the public financial institution on the basis of the adjustment of the positions. In fact, it is by reference to the particular characteristics of each individual case that the European Central Bank, when implementing Article 429(14) of that regulation, is required to arbitrate between the objectives of the leverage ratio and the possibility that certain exposures that meet the conditions laid down in that provision might be excluded from the calculation of the leverage ratio. In those circumstances, if the European Central Bank does not carry out a detailed examination of the characteristics of regulated savings, but merely draws attention in the abstract to the risks entailed in the adjustment period of the positions between the credit institution’s positions and the public financial institution’s positions, it fails to fulfil its obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant aspects of the individual case. (see paras 111-115)