Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:121
Date: 2026-02-26
Language of the case: Spanish

Translation C-876/24 – 1 
Case C-876/24 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
18 December 2024 
Referring court: 
Juzgado de Primera Instancia n.º 1 de Fuenlabrada (Spain) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
16 December 2024 
Applicant: 
I.G.V. 
Defendant: 
Vueling Airlines, S.A. 
  
JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA 
N.º 1 DE FUENLABRADA  
(Court of First Instance No 1, Fuenlabrada, Spain) 
… 
ORDER 
In Fuenlabrada, on 18 December 2024. 
Subject matter of the main proceedings and relevant facts 
1 I. Subject matter of the request. The request for a preliminary ruling 
concerns the interpretation of Article 33 of the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, done at Montreal on 28 May 1999 
and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 
2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 (OJ 2001 L 194, p. 38; ‘the Montreal 
Convention’); and also the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 2027/97 of the Council of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in respect of 
the carriage of passengers and their baggage (OJ 1997 L 285, p. 1), as amended by 
EN 
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Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 May 2002 (OJ 2002 L 140, p. 2) (‘Regulation No 2027/97’). 
2 The request is made in the context of a dispute between Mrs I.G.V., on the one 
hand, and the carrier Vueling Airlines, S.A. (‘Vueling’), on the other; the dispute 
relates to a claim for compensation for the damage caused by the loss of baggage 
during carriage by air. 
3 II. Relevant facts. The claimant in the main proceedings [now the applicant] 
entered into an air transport contract with Vueling – an air carrier having its 
registered office in Viladecans (Barcelona) – for a flight from Madrid airport 
(MAD) to Barcelona airport (BCN), on 8 November 2023. The baggage was lost 
during that first leg of her journey. 
4 The applicant discovered that the baggage had been lost at Barcelona airport, 
where it could not be collected and checked in for the next leg. Then, unable to 
afford to wait any longer, Mrs I.G.V. took a second, connecting flight to Rome 
(FCO), providing documentary evidence of the expenses she had incurred there to 
replace the contents of her baggage. The applicant has not provided 
documentation, nor added any other information, regarding the contract for the 
second flight, from BCN to FCO (or regarding the return flights to Madrid), and 
therefore, in principle, we must assume that there was no ‘international carriage’, 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, and that the relevant 
carriage is national. 
5 The applicant entered into the air transport contract online, from her home in 
Fuenlabrada (Spain). Moreover, as a service in addition to the flight, the 
applicant paid, in person and at the airport (MAD) itself, to check in the baggage 
that was later lost. 
6 III. Procedure. In accordance with Article 4bis(2) of Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 
de julio, del Poder Judicial (Organic Law 6/1985 of 1 July 1985 on the judiciary), 
it was decided that a hearing should be held within ten days to consider the 
appropriateness of requesting a preliminary ruling (Article 267 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union), given that the jurisdiction of this court 
depends decisively on the interpretation to be given to certain provisions of EU 
law. 
7 The applicant bases her claim on the Montreal Convention and appeared at the 
judicial office to reaffirm having contracted for the carriage online. Vueling did 
not submit any written arguments. 
LAW 
I 
Legal framework 
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3 
8 (A) International law. In accordance with Article 33(1) of the Montreal 
Convention: ‘An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the 
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before the court of the 
domicile of the carrier or of its principal place of business, or where it has a place 
of business through which the contract has been made or before the court at the 
place of destination.’ 
9 (B) European Union law. The second sentence of Article 1 of Regulation 
No 2027/97 extends the application of the relevant provisions of the Montreal 
Convention ‘to carriage by air within a single Member State’. 
10 In accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2027/97, ‘the liability of a 
Community air carrier in respect of passengers and their baggage shall be 
governed by all provisions of the Montreal Convention relevant to such liability.’ 
II 
Territorial jurisdiction in national transport matters 
11 Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention must be interpreted, as regards actions 
for damages falling within the scope of that convention, as governing not only the 
allocation of jurisdiction as between the States Parties to the convention, but also 
the allocation of territorial jurisdiction as between the courts of each of those 
States (judgment [of the Court of Justice] of 7 November 2019, Guaitoli and 
Others, C-213/18, EU:C:2019:927, paragraph 55). 
12 The first question that we are referring is whether Article 33 of the Montreal 
Convention is equally applicable to carriage by air within a Member State. 
13 In the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Prüller-Frey, C-240/14, 
paragraphs 55 to 62, delivered on 20 May 2015, Mr Szpunar argued in favour of 
such application, although, ultimately, it was not necessary for the Court to 
adjudicate on the question. 
14 Indeed, according to that Opinion, the Austrian Government submitted in that 
regard that Regulation No 2027/97 does not extend the scope of the rules on 
jurisdiction laid down in Article 33 of that convention but only the scope of the 
substantive provisions. 
15 Against that position, the Advocate General observed that, pursuant to Article 3(1) 
of Regulation No 2027/97, the liability of an air carrier is governed by ‘all 
provisions of the Montreal Convention relevant to such liability’. 
16 To his mind, that reference covers all of the provisions of Chapter III of the 
Montreal Convention relating to the liability of air carriers, including the 
provisions concerning the rules on jurisdiction set out in Article 33 thereof. 
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17 Indeed, ‘in the internal aviation market, the distinction between national and 
international transport has been eliminated’ (beginning of recital 8 of Regulation 
No 889/2002). The aim of Regulation No 2027/97 is to make the liability of air 
carriers subject to a single set of rules, both for international and national carriage 
within the European Union. That objective militates in favour of a broad 
interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2027/97. 
18 Thus, the rules on jurisdiction form part of the overall approach taken by the 
Montreal Convention to eradicate conflicts of laws and jurisdiction and to 
establish a foreseeable set of rules on liability, protecting passengers and enabling 
air carriers to manage risk more effectively. In the broad scheme of the Montreal 
Convention, those rules on jurisdiction appear alongside the substantive rules in 
Chapter III, concerning the ‘liability of air carriers and the extent of compensation 
for damage’. 
19 Moreover, the Advocate General noted that the close interconnection of economic 
relations within the internal market means that a dispute may easily take on a 
cross-border dimension even if it arises as a result of an accident that occurred 
during a national flight. That consideration justifies the application of uniform 
rules on jurisdiction as regards the liability associated with national and 
international flights within the European Union. 
20 The question referred is of particular relevance, because, if the rules of Spanish 
law on territorial jurisdiction were to apply, the applicant is a consumer and could, 
unquestionably, opt for the jurisdiction of her place of residence, pursuant to 
Article 52(3) of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law on civil procedure). 
21 On the other hand, if, as we believe, the rule applicable is that laid down in 
Article 33 of the Montreal Convention, the jurisdiction of this court in 
Fuenlabrada is conditional on the following two questions referred being 
answered in the affirmative. 
III 
Jurisdiction of the place where the online contracting took place 
22 In accordance with the rules on jurisdiction laid down in Article 33(1) of the 
Montreal Convention, the courts of the province of Barcelona would be 
competent to hear the present case as ‘the court of the domicile of the carrier or of 
its principal place of business’ or as ‘the court at the place of destination’. 
23 However, whether on account of being incorrectly advised or, rather, because the 
cost of litigating in Barcelona would potentially exceed the value of the lost 
baggage, the claim has been brought before the courts of Fuenlabrada, the 
applicant’s place of residence. 
24 The question is whether, in the case of contracting for an airline ticket online – 
something which is very usual – can the court of the place where the passenger 
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has his or her home and permanent residence, or can it not, have jurisdiction 
within the meaning of ‘where [the carrier] has a place of business through which 
the contract has been made’. 
25 The Montreal Convention, which entered into force, so far as the European 
Union is concerned, on 28 June 2004, has, as from that date, been an integral part 
of the European Union legal order and, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to 
give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation (judgments of 12 April 
2018, Finnair, C-258/16, EU:C:2018:252, paragraphs 19 and 20, and of 
19 December 2019, Niki Luftfahrt, C-532/18, EU:C:2019:1127, paragraph 30). 
26 In that regard, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law 
of Treaties (United Nations Treaties Collection, vol. 1155, p. 331), which codifies 
general international law binding on the European Union, states that a treaty must 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (the 
judgments in Finnair, paragraph 21, and in Niki Luftfahrt, paragraph 31). 
27 Furthermore, the Court has already stated that the concepts contained in the 
Montreal Convention must be interpreted uniformly and autonomously, not 
according to the various meanings that may have been given to them in the 
internal laws of the Member States of the European Union, but according to the 
rules of interpretation of general international law, which are binding on it (the 
judgments in Guaitoli and Others, paragraph 47, and in Niki Luftfahrt, 
paragraph 32). 
28 However, in Article 33(2) [of that convention], the jurisdiction of the place where 
‘the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence’ is only 
provided for, literally, with additional requirements, ‘in respect of damage 
resulting from the death or injury of a passenger’. 
29 ‘The provisions of Article 33(2) are often referred to as the “fifth jurisdiction”, 
being an additional basis of jurisdiction beyond the four identified in 
Article 33(1), those four having been the potential bases for jurisdiction under 
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention’ (Akulinina & Anor v Ifly SA [2022] EWHC 
166 (QB)). 
30 In that regard, in the preparatory work that led to the adoption of the Montreal 
Convention, on various occasions, the addition of the place where the passenger 
has his or her home or permanent residence as a ‘fifth’ or additional jurisdiction 
was debated (see the Report on Modernization of the ‘Warsaw System’, C-
WP/10381, [6-27] to [6-31]). That basis for jurisdiction was already provided for, 
with different wording, in Additional Protocol No 3 to the Warsaw Convention 
(Article XII of the 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City, amending Article 28 of the 
Warsaw Convention), provided that the carrier had an establishment there, but that 
protocol never entered into force. The fifth jurisdiction is defended as an 
appropriate and fair jurisdiction for the passenger, as well as being the nearest for 
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the purposes of determining an appropriate amount of compensation, without the 
risk of a significant increase resulting from ‘forum shopping’, and, above all, the 
most consistent with a system of limited liability. However, that additional 
jurisdiction created an additional burden for foreign airlines and, moreover, it was 
suggested that it would cause insurance premiums to rise; it was also not, a priori, 
a jurisdiction that was closely linked to the contractual relationship. As a 
compromise solution and in keeping with the majority opinion, the Report of the 
Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the Warsaw System, C-
WP/10576, proposed adding that jurisdiction only for cases of the death or injury 
of the passenger and conditional on the carrier having a genuine operating 
presence. That transnational solution was included in the final version, in 
Article 33(2) and (3) of the Montreal Convention. 
31 Furthermore, while the provisions under Section 4 of Chapter II of [Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters], on ‘Jurisdiction over consumer 
contracts’, also establish a rule of special jurisdiction for consumers, and 
although an airline passenger may be considered to be a consumer, it should be 
noted that Article 17(3) of that regulation states that Section 4 ‘shall not apply to a 
contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides 
for a combination of travel and accommodation’ (judgment of 11 April 2019, 
Ryanair, C-464/18, EU:C:2019:311, paragraph 28, and the judgment in Guaitoli 
and Others, paragraph 41). 
32 In a literalist interpretation of the Montreal Convention, one court held as 
follows: ‘[13] It might be logical to consider that since Scoot Airlines earns 
revenues through a sale made from an internet access in Québec, it should also be 
liable for its fault or negligence in the Province of Québec. However, this is not 
what the Montreal International Convention says. [14] The Court cannot interpret 
“place of business” as being the computer of the Plaintiffs which was used to 
purchase the tickets. This would be going too far by changing the meaning of the 
words used by the Convention. [15] The courts cannot rewrite the law. It is the 
legislator of the Montreal International Convention that should make the 
appropriate changes to the Convention, which changes would later be adopted by 
the legislature of the State Parties.’ [Charbonneau c. Scoot Pte Ltd. (Scoot 
Airlines), 2018 QCCQ 1645]. 
33 Nevertheless, in the case of online contracting, other courts have taken the view 
that the place ‘where [the carrier] has a place of business through which the 
contract has been made’ could well be the principal and permanent residence from 
which the passenger contracted for the ticket online. 
34 That view has been accepted, succinctly, in some Spanish courts (such as the 
order of Section 4 of the Audiencia Provincial de Bizkaia (Provincial Court, 
Bizkaia, Spain), No 2132/2020, of 6 November, ES:APBI:2020:1742A, or the 
judgment of Juzgado Mercantil n.º 4 de Barcelona (Commercial Court No 4, 
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Barcelona, Spain), No 286/2019, of 11 November, ES:JMB:2019:10412). 
However, most decisions have not gone as far as taking into consideration the 
possibility of special circumstances on account of online contracting, resulting, 
frequently, in Spanish courts being declared to lack international jurisdiction over 
international carriage by non-Spanish airlines. 
35 Notable in that regard is the order of Italy’s Corte di cassazione (Supreme Court 
of Cassation, Italy), Sezioni Unite, of 8 July 2019, No 18257 (also the order of 
13 February 2020, No 3561), which recognises the jurisdiction of the Italian 
courts over the direct purchase online of tickets for international carriage by air, 
on the basis that the home of the purchasers is the place where they learnt that the 
offer made had been accepted, the order being sent electronically and the 
consideration being paid [in that place]. 
36 In short, that case-law is based, first of all, on the adaptation and interpretation 
necessary to take account of the indisputable contractual asymmetry between the 
parties, with the passenger being the weaker party to the contract. 
37 Furthermore, as an intermediate option between the domicile of the air carrier and 
the place of destination, and concurrent with them, Article 33(2) of the Montreal 
Convention provides for a situation in which the air carrier in question is the 
owner of an establishment at which the contract was made, thereby also including 
the place where the purchase of the airline ticket was completed among the 
options available to the claimant. The interpretation has to be adapted to [take 
account of] the radical change in the methods of commercial exchange which has 
taken place on account of online sales and transactions. In that regard, the 
electronic space is a ‘non-place’, and there is, consequently, a need to adapt how 
the jurisdiction of the place where the contract was made is interpreted. 
38 We also note that air carriers offer tickets and other transport-related services for 
sale electronically, either through the official website of the air carrier, accessed 
by the purchasers directly, or through other sites which make it possible to search 
for tickets for the requested dates and are able offer the most advantages financial 
terms on a comparative basis. Air carriers, therefore, appear in the market as 
commercial operators that target internet users, irrespective of the country from 
which they are connected to the internet electronically. The carrier’s liability in 
respect of its potentially universal internet activity would be balanced by the 
enormous facilitation and multiplication of the purchase of travel tickets by a 
global pool of customers. 
39 It is on that basis that the Italian court concludes that, in the case of ‘direct’ 
electronic purchasing, that is, [purchasing] characterised by the fact that the 
contract is both agreed and executed by electronic means, the jurisdiction relating 
to the ‘establishment through which the contract was made’ is dissociated from 
any geographical reference to the agencies or branches of the air carrier, since no 
physical intermediation takes place. 
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40 Moreover, the Italian case-law rules out the criterion of the location of the server. 
The consumer or customer cannot be given the responsibility of searching for the 
location of the server, something which is both difficult to do and difficult to 
verify using the internet, since it is a search the uncertainty of which cannot be 
reconciled with predictability of jurisdiction. 
41 On the other hand, the criterion of the home of the online purchaser would provide 
an appropriate degree of both predictability and proximity to the purchaser. 
Moreover, the criterion of the [purchaser’s] home would also protect the air 
carrier, which would otherwise by exposed to the risk of forum shopping, thereby 
avoiding the possibility of the passenger indicating any place from which, using 
whatever electronic devices he or she is able to use, the passenger is able to learn 
of the acceptance of the offer to purchase. 
42 In our opinion, the rules of treaty interpretation do not in any way exclude the 
Italian view. 
43 The Montreal Convention was drafted in the English, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, 
French and Russian languages, with the six language versions being equally 
authentic. If we consider the ordinary meaning of the text, in the context of the 
treaty (beginning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (‘the Vienna Convention’), while the Spanish term ‘oficina’ or the French 
term ‘établissement’ denote a physical location, the English term ‘place of 
business’ is broader and effortlessly includes any place, geographical or 
otherwise, such as a website through which online contracting takes place – 
English, moreover, being the lingua franca of the aviation industry. 
44 Furthermore, the preparatory work for the treaty is only a supplementary means 
of interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention). In any event, the 
preparatory work does not, in fact, contradict the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘place of business’ in the case of online contracting. It is not necessary to add an 
additional jurisdiction, but rather to recognise, as a reasonable assumption in 
keeping with a principle of normality, that, in the case of online contracting, the 
place of business of the air carrier through which the contract is made is the same 
as the home of the purchaser. Moreover, the interpretation extensively set out by 
the Italian case-law is not in any way manifestly absurd or unreasonable, and, 
therefore, it cannot be said to conflict with the preparatory work for the Montreal 
Convention. 
45 With regard to the teleological interpretation, that is, ‘in the light of its object and 
purpose’ (Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), the preamble to the Montreal 
Convention states the importance of ‘ensuring protection of the interests of 
consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation 
based on the principle of restitution’ (third paragraph) and of ‘achieving an 
equitable balance of interests’ (fifth paragraph). We do not believe, in practice – 
and especially in the case of small claims – that the alternative bases for 
jurisdiction of the domicile of the carrier or the place of destination ensure the 
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protection of the interests of the consumer, nor restitution in respect of those 
interests. It is also equitable if the commercial advantages of selling online are 
offset by the inconvenience of liability in the jurisdiction nearest to the home of 
the purchaser. 
46 Finally, the effectiveness rule of interpretation has been held to be included, 
tacitly, within the overarching principle of ‘good faith’, referred to in Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention. The provisions of a treaty must fulfil a practical 
function, and so must the jurisdiction of the place where the contract is made 
when the contracted is entered into online. ‘It would indeed be incompatible with 
the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort 
occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or effect’ (judgment 
of the International Court of Justice of 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel, [p. 24, first 
paragraph] and the case-law cited). 
47 Given that different interpretations may be argued, we consider it appropriate to 
refer the second question. Should it be answered in the affirmative, it would allow 
our territorial jurisdiction to be maintained; while, should it be answered in the 
negative, that jurisdiction would be ruled out and we would have to disqualify 
ourselves, at the option of the applicant, in favour of the courts of the place where 
Vueling has its registered office (those of Gavá, province of Barcelona) or those 
for Barcelona Airport (those of El Prat de Llobregat, province of Barcelona). 
IV 
Jurisdiction relating to the principal obligation  
48 In the present case, the applicant contracted for the airline ticket from her home. 
However, she has provided proof of payment showing that she contracted for the 
additional service of checking in the baggage in person, at Madrid-Barajas (MAD) 
airport itself, paying EUR 60 using her bank card. 
49 Article 33 of the Montreal Convention does not provide for the possibility of 
more than one place of business and refers, literally, to the ‘place of business 
through which the contract has been made’. 
50 We interpret that provision as designating the place of business for the main 
contract or for the principal obligation – of carriage by air – to be performed. 
Contracting for ancillary services (changing seat, changes to the ticket, checking 
in suitcases, special check-in options, declarations of value, etc.) would not alter 
the jurisdiction. 
51 Indeed, the rules of jurisdiction have to be highly predictable and thus pursue an 
objective of legal certainty which consists in strengthening the legal protection of 
persons established in the European Union, by enabling both the applicant to 
identify easily the court before which he or she may bring proceedings, and the 
defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he or she may be sued 
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(see, by analogy, the judgment of 28 November 2024, VariusSystems, C-526/23, 
EU:C:2024:985, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). 
52 The court having jurisdiction to hear claims based on a contract for the provision 
of services is that of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows 
from the provisions of that contract and, in the absence of such provision, of the 
actual performance of that contract. If there are several contractual obligations, it 
is necessary to establish the obligation which characterises the contract 
concerned (see, by analogy, the judgment in VariusSystems, paragraphs 19 and 20 
and the case-law cited). 
53 In a contract for carriage by air, the carrier’s principal obligation is to carry a 
passenger from a point A to a point C (judgment of 7 March 2018, flightright, 
C-274/16, EU:C:2018:160, paragraph 71). The Court of Justice has held that the 
place of arrival and the place of departure of the aircraft must be considered, in the 
same respect, as the place of provision of the services which are the subject of an 
air transport contract (judgment of 3 February 2022, LOT Polish Airlines, 
C-20/21, EU:C:2022:71, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). 
54 Nevertheless, the solution is not that obvious, as the damage claimed for in this 
case occurred, precisely, on account of the defective provision of the ancillary 
service of transporting luggage. Moreover, in this case and with regard to the 
defective provision of the ancillary service, the place of business of the airport 
would also satisfy the abovementioned rules of treaty interpretation, as well as the 
principles of predictability and proximity of jurisdiction. 
55 Although it does not make its reasons explicit, the abovementioned judgment of 
Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation of 8 July 2019, No 18257, accepts the 
jurisdiction of the home of the purchaser only in cases where ‘the bargaining and 
the purchase have been done entirely online’ (‘ove la contrattazione e l’acquisto 
siano avvenuti interamente on line’). 
56 The different possibilities set out above lead us to refer the third question. Should 
it be answered in the affirmative, it would allow our territorial jurisdiction to be 
maintained; while, should it be answered in the negative, it would imply our 
disqualification in favour of the courts for Madrid Airport (which are those of the 
city of Madrid), except in the (unlikely) event that the applicant opted for those of 
the province of Barcelona. 
Having regard to the provisions of law cited and any others of general and 
relevant application, 
OPERATIVE PART 
One. This court decides to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union for a preliminary ruling: 
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First. Must Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 be interpreted as meaning 
that the liability of a Community air carrier in respect of the carriage of passengers 
and their baggage is also to be governed by Article 33 of the Montreal Convention 
in the case of carriage within a Member State of the European Union? 
Second. May Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention be interpreted as meaning 
that the place where the carrier has a place of business through which the air 
transport contract has been entered into could be the principal and permanent 
residence of the passenger, if the contract was entered into online? 
Third. Must Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention be interpreted as meaning 
that the place where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract 
has been entered into refers to the place in which the principal obligation of 
carriage by air was contracted for and not the place in which the ancillary service, 
from which the carrier’s liability arises, was contracted for, if the latter place 
differs from the former? 
… 
… [Stay of proceedings and closing procedural formulae]