Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1094
Date: 2025-12-10
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Ireland

summary of that recital in paragraph 124 above, that the Commission explained that it had followed a standard methodology in that respect. The applicant has been able to challenge that methodology and the calculation of the WACC set out in that recital of the contested decision, as is shown by its arguments put forward in the third complaint of the present plea. Accordingly, the applicant’s claim cannot establish a failure to state reasons. 128 In the light of the foregoing, the present complaint and, consequently, the third plea in its entirety must be rejected. D. The fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the necessity of the measure at issue or its incentive effect 129 By the fourth plea, the applicant submits that the Commission failed to establish the necessity of the measure at issue or its incentive effect, disregarding the conditions in points 8, 53 and 59 of the Guidelines. 130 First, the applicant claims that the Commission did not demonstrate the necessity of the measure at issue, since it failed to examine TAP’s ability to borrow or raise funds, inter alia by using its aircraft as collateral, and the contested decision makes no mention of any attempt by TAP in that regard. Furthermore, the relevant part of the contested decision is excessively redacted, which constitutes a failure to state adequate reasons. 131 Second, the applicant asserts that the Commission also failed properly to demonstrate the incentive effect of the measure at issue, as required by point 59 of the Guidelines. 132 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 133 Before examining the applicant’s arguments, it should be recalled, at the outset, that point 8 of the Guidelines, set out in the introductory part thereof, states that ‘undertakings should only be eligible for State aid when they have exhausted all market options’. 134 In section 3.2 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Need for State intervention’, point 53 provides as follows: ‘Member States that intend to grant restructuring aid must provide a comparison with a credible alternative scenario not involving State aid, demonstrating how the relevant objective or objectives in section 3.1.1 would not be attained, or would be attained to a lesser degree, in the case of that alternative scenario. Such scenarios may, for example, include debt reorganisation, asset disposal, private capital raising, sale to a competitor or break-up, in each case either through entry into an insolvency or reorganisation procedure or otherwise.’ 135 In section 3.4 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Incentive effect’, point 59 states as follows: ‘Member States that intend to grant restructuring aid must demonstrate that in the absence of the aid, the beneficiary would have been restructured, sold or wound up in a way that would not have achieved the objective of common interest identified in section 3.1.1. This demonstration can form part of the analysis presented in accordance with point 53.’ 136 In the present case, in recital 242 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that the objective of the measure at issue was to prevent the insolvency of TAP SGPS by enabling that undertaking to implement the restructuring plan, which would have the effect of averting a situation of market failure and social hardship. The Commission observed that, in the absence of the measure at issue, TAP SGPS would be unable to fulfil its financial obligations or to have access to capital markets. 137 In that regard, in the first place, it must be noted that, in the contested decision, the Commission presented evidence demonstrating TAP’s very serious financial situation and the real risk of TAP’s exit from the market in the absence of the measure at issue. Thus, a credible scenario without the grant of State aid, of a ‘break-up’ or ‘entry into an insolvency … procedure’, in accordance with the wording of point 53 of the Guidelines, or of a winding up, in accordance with the wording of point 59 of the Guidelines, was indeed examined in the contested decision. 138 First, the Commission explained in the contested decision the extent of the difficulties faced by TAP in 2020, which had been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is apparent, inter alia, from recital 25 of the contested decision that, on 20 March 2020, the rating agency Standard & Poor’s had lowered TAP Air Portugal’s credit rating and had announced that TAP’s recovery prospects in respect of the bonds issued in December 2019, amounting to EUR 375 million, were 45%. In recital 187 of the contested decision, it also noted that TAP SGPS and TAP Air Portugal were in a negative equity position and that the situation of TAP SGPS had worsened since 2019. Furthermore, in recital 201 of the contested decision, the Commission observed that, in view of its financial situation, there was a concrete and imminent risk that, without the measure at issue, TAP Air Portugal would no longer be able to meet its payment obligations and would have to declare insolvency. It reiterated that finding in recital 242 of the contested decision, as is apparent from paragraph 136 above. 139 Second, the Commission explained in the contested decision that access to capital markets was no longer possible for TAP SGPS. In particular, it noted, in recital 148 of the contested decision, that TAP Air Portugal had already made an effort to sell the aircraft which it owned in order to obtain more liquidity. In recitals 149 and 150 of the contested decision, it observed that TAP SGPS had made attempts to raise funds from financial institutions and other stakeholders, but that such financing was not accessible without the strengthening of its equity position through the measure at issue. Similarly, it explained, in recital 244 of the contested decision, that it was impossible to obtain sufficient financing on capital markets and also observed, in recital 245 of that decision, that, in the absence of the measure at issue, TAP would not have sufficient equity to be able to finance itself on the markets. 140 It follows that, although the applicant complains in that regard that the Commission failed to examine TAP’s ability to borrow or raise funds on the markets, it must be stated that the Commission presented a body of evidence in the contested decision demonstrating that access to financing on a sufficient scale on the markets without the grant of State aid was neither possible nor plausible for TAP and that there was no option other than the measure at issue to prevent TAP’s exit from the market. 141 In addition, it must be observed that the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of demonstrating that financing on the markets would have been plausible for TAP at the time when the measure at issue was notified. In that connection, its argument that other airlines had financed themselves on the market or had applied the possibility of raising funds in an innovative way does not call into question the Commission’s conclusion in that regard, given that the applicant has not established that those other airlines were in a financial situation that was comparable to the very specific situation of TAP, as described in paragraphs 138 to 140 above. 142 It follows from the foregoing considerations that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Commission established, to the requisite legal standard, that the measure at issue was necessary in accordance with points 8 and 53 of the Guidelines. 143 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Commission did not examine the incentive effect, for the purposes of point 59 of the Guidelines, of the measure at issue, it must be observed that the Commission, in the contested decision, and in particular in recital 242 thereof, stated that, in the absence of the measure at issue, TAP ran the risk of winding up and exit from the market. That is sufficient to satisfy the condition laid down in point 59 of the Guidelines, according to which it must be demonstrated that, ‘in the absence of the aid, the beneficiary would have been restructured, sold or wound up’. Moreover, the fact that the Commission demonstrated this in the context of its analysis provided in accordance with point 53 of the Guidelines does not in any way constitute an error of law, since such an approach is expressly permitted by the wording of point 59 of the Guidelines (see paragraph 135 above). 144 In the third place, as regards the claim that there was a failure to state reasons in the light of the excessive redaction of the contested decision, it must be stated that only one piece of information is redacted in the relevant part of the contested decision, in recital 242 thereof. Despite that redaction, it is apparent, first, from paragraph 136 above, that the reasoning followed by the Commission was clearly set out and, second, from the examination of the present plea, that the applicant has been able to challenge that reasoning and that the Court has been able to exercise its power of review. Accordingly, the statement of reasons provided in that recital complies with the requirements of the case-law (see paragraphs 20 and 119 above). 145 In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected. E. The fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the appropriateness of the measure at issue 146 By the fifth plea, the applicant submits that the Commission failed properly to establish the appropriateness of the measure at issue within the meaning of point 38(c) and of points 54 and 58 of the Guidelines. 147 First, the applicant claims that the Commission failed to apply points 38(c) and 54 of the Guidelines, since it did not compare the various options available to TAP in order to assess whether the measure at issue was the one which allowed that group to be restructured in the least distortive way. 148 Second, the applicant submits that the Commission did not properly establish that the measure at issue was the right aid instrument in the light of TAP’s specific circumstances, thereby failing to apply point 58 of the Guidelines. It maintains that it is impossible, in particular due to the redaction of certain figures in the contested decision, to verify that TAP was facing both liquidity and solvency difficulties or whether the measure at issue was capable of addressing those difficulties. Moreover, the Commission did not set out in the contested decision any measures other than the measure at issue, such as a credit guarantee. 149 Third, the applicant submits that the Commission was incorrect in concluding that the Portuguese Republic was appropriately remunerated. 150 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 151 Before examining the applicant’s arguments, it should be recalled, at the outset, that, according to point 38 of the Guidelines, the Commission must assess whether notified aid can be declared compatible with the internal market by ensuring that certain criteria are met, including the criterion referred to in point 38(c), which states as follows: ‘appropriateness of the aid measure: an aid measure will not be considered compatible if other, less distortive measures allow the same objective to be achieved (section 3.3). …’ 152 In section 3.3 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Appropriateness’, point 54 states as follows: ‘Member States should ensure that aid is awarded in the form that allows the objective to be achieved in the least distortive way. In the case of undertakings in difficulty, that can be achieved by ensuring that aid is in the appropriate form to address the beneficiary’s difficulties and that it is properly remunerated. This section sets out the requirements that must be complied with in order to demonstrate that an aid measure is appropriate.’ 153 Point 58 of the Guidelines states that Member States are free to choose the form that restructuring aid takes but that they should nonetheless ensure that the instrument chosen is appropriate to the issue that it is intended to address. In particular, Member States should assess whether the beneficiaries’ problems relate to liquidity or solvency and select appropriate instruments to address the problems identified. 154 In the present case, in recitals 243 to 249 of the contested decision, the Commission concluded that the measure at issue was appropriate. First, it considered that TAP SGPS needed measures consisting mainly of equity measures in order to address its solvency and liquidity problems. Second, it found that the remuneration for the Portuguese Republic was sufficient, since, following the grant of the measure at issue, the Portuguese Republic would own all the capital of TAP Air Portugal and, on the basis of two valuation methods, that holding would increase in value in the future, with the result that it could be sold at a profit. 155 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Commission should, by virtue of point 54 of the Guidelines, have examined whether another measure, less distortive to competition, was possible, it must be noted that, according to that point, a restructuring aid measure is considered to be appropriate if it allows the beneficiary’s difficulties to be addressed, while being properly remunerated, and that such a measure must comply with the requirements established in section 3.3 of the Guidelines, namely those set out in point 58 of the Guidelines with regard to restructuring aid, which are intended to ensure that the measure at issue is an appropriate instrument for addressing the liquidity or solvency problems of the beneficiary. Therefore, if the abovementioned requirements are met, the restructuring aid chosen must be regarded as complying with point 54 of the Guidelines. 156 Although the applicant seeks by its line of argument to allege that the Commission failed to examine whether another type of aid measure, such as a credit guarantee, would have been more appropriate and less distortive to competition, it must be observed that the wording of point 54 of the Guidelines does not require such an examination, as is apparent from the analysis carried out in paragraph 155 above, and that point 58 of the Guidelines states that Member States are free to choose the form that restructuring aid takes. 157 In addition, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, it is not for the Commission to make a decision on every other possible alternative aid measure. It is not required to prove, positively, that no other conceivable aid measure, which by definition would be hypothetical, would be more appropriate and less distortive to competition than the aid measure at issue (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 May 2019, Scor v Commission, T‑135/17, not published, EU:T:2019:287, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited). While the Court of Justice has also held that, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited), in the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the Commission had to make a choice between several appropriate measures, within the meaning of that case-law. 158 Furthermore, and in any event, the applicant has not adduced any evidence or indicia capable of demonstrating that the other aid measure which it proposes, namely a credit guarantee, would have allowed both the equity and liquidity problems of TAP to be addressed in the same manner as in the measure at issue. 159 In addition, inasmuch as the applicant also seeks by its line of argument to allege that the Commission failed to examine whether a measure other than State aid would have been possible in order to address TAP’s problems, it must be stated that that argument concerns the necessity of the measure at issue and not its appropriateness, as referred to in points 54 and 58 of the Guidelines. In that regard, reference should be made to the examination of the fourth plea, which rejects the applicant’s arguments disputing the necessity of the measure at issue. 160 Similarly, the claim that, in essence, the Commission should have required a reduction in the size of TAP’s fleet in order to limit distortions of competition is, in the light of the wording of points 54 and 58 of the Guidelines, also irrelevant to the issue of the appropriateness of the measure at issue. 161 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Commission did not properly explain how the measure at issue would be appropriate to address both the objective of restoring a certain level of equity and that of restoring TAP’s liquidity, it must be observed that the Commission explained, in recital 245 of the contested decision, why it considered that the form of the measure at issue, which consisted mainly of amounts increasing TAP SGPS’s equity, was appropriate to address the problems identified. In that regard, first, it stated that TAP SGPS was in a negative equity position in 2019 and that it had to strengthen its position in order to be able to attract significant long-term debt or investment funds in capital markets. Second, TAP SGPS’s liquidity projections showed that, in the absence of the measure at issue, TAP SGPS would have been in a negative cash position during the years 2021 to 2023. Thus, although the applicant criticises the redactions of figures in recital 245 of the contested decision, it is nevertheless apparent from that recital that the Commission explained why the measure at issue was appropriate, thereby meeting the requirements of the case-law in relation to the statement of reasons (see the case-law cited in paragraph 119 above). 162 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s line of argument challenging the assessment of the remuneration of the Portuguese Republic, it must be recalled that, in recitals 246 to 248 of the contested decision, the Commission considered that the Portuguese Republic would be properly remunerated, in accordance with point 54 of the Guidelines, on account of the future value of TAP Air Portugal’s capital in 2025, which would be entirely in its possession. In that regard, the applicant has not put forward any substantiated argument disputing the fact, referred to in recital 247 of the contested decision, that the two valuation methods used by the Commission to calculate TAP Air Portugal’s expected terminal value, namely the Gordon growth method and the multiples method, are commonly used to calculate the terminal value of an undertaking. They were therefore appropriate methods in the present case. 163 In addition, although the applicant also claims in the application that it does not understand where the data of other airlines applied in the multiples method came from, it must be stated that the Commission, in recital 247 of and footnote 67 to the contested decision, explained the origin of those data. 164 In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected. F. The sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the proportionality of the measure at issue 165 By the sixth plea, the applicant submits that the Commission failed to establish the proportionality of the measure at issue for the purposes of points 61 to 69 of the Guidelines. In support of that plea, the applicant raises, in essence, three complaints. By the first complaint, it alleges a lack of precision in the contested decision as regards the amounts of the components of the measure at issue, inter alia on account of the redactions of certain figures. By the second complaint, it claims that the Commission failed to ensure that the amount of the measure at issue was limited to the minimum necessary. By the third complaint, it argues that the Commission did not correctly calculate TAP’s own contribution and the burden sharing. 166 Before examining the applicant’s arguments, it should be noted at the outset that, in section 3.5 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Proportionality of the aid/aid limited to the minimum’, point 61 provides, inter alia, that ‘the amount and intensity of restructuring aid must be limited to the strict minimum necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken, in the light of the existing financial resources of the beneficiary, its shareholders or the business group to which it belongs.’ That point also states that, ‘in particular, a sufficient level of own contribution to the costs of the restructuring and burden sharing must be ensured, as set out in more detail in this section (3.5.2).’ 167 As regards own contribution to the costs of the restructuring, point 62 of the Guidelines states, inter alia, that ‘a significant contribution [to such costs] is required from the own resources of the aid beneficiary, its shareholders or creditors or the business group to which it belongs, or from new investors.’ 168 Moreover, with respect to burden sharing, point 65 of the Guidelines states, inter alia, that ‘aid to cover losses should only be granted on terms which involve adequate burden sharing by existing investors.’ 169 In the present case, in recitals 250 to 269 of the contested decision, the Commission assessed the proportionality of the measure at issue by examining TAP’s own contribution and the burden sharing. 170 First, as regards own contribution to the costs of the restructuring, the Commission verified whether the own contribution measures included in the restructuring plan were free of State aid and would materialise with sufficient certainty. In that regard, the Commission examined the payments of costs relating to the reduction of TAP Air Portugal’s wage bill and to the divestment of an asset, the cost reductions resulting from the renegotiation of contracts with third parties and contributions linked to asset phase-outs, the financing granted by a creditor without a guarantee from the Portuguese Republic and by a financial institution, and the deferrals of payments under bonds and loans. The Commission calculated that the total value of those contributions did not reach the threshold of 50% of the restructuring costs, but considered that, due to the exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, TAP’s own contribution was sufficient. 171 Second, as regards burden sharing, the Commission considered, inter alia, that TAP’s shareholders, including the Portuguese Republic, would adequately share the burden of the restructuring of that group, since the value of their holdings would be reduced to zero in the loss absorption. Moreover, TAP SGPS would divest its holdings in Cateringpor, Groundforce and M&E Brasil. Consequently, it found, the measure at issue granted in the form of equity held by the Portuguese Republic would provide the latter with all future gains in value of TAP. 172 On the basis of those assessments, the Commission concluded, in recital 269 of the contested decision, that the measure at issue was proportionate and that the burden sharing was appropriate. 173 As regards the applicant’s line of argument, it is appropriate to examine, first, the second complaint, then the third complaint, and, lastly, the first complaint. 1. The second complaint of the sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to ensure that the amount of the measure at issue was limited to the minimum necessary 174 The applicant submits that the Commission failed to ensure that the amount of the measure at issue was limited to the minimum necessary. First, it maintains that the Commission failed to have regard to point 61 of the Guidelines in assessing the proportionality of the measure at issue solely from the perspective of own contributions and burden sharing. Second, it argues that the Commission validated revenue forecasts based on conservative traffic forecasts even though there was no need to use such conservative assumptions in the baseline scenario. Third, it submits that the Commission failed to establish that TAP’s fleet had been cut back to the strict minimum. 175 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 176 In that connection, in the first place, concerning the applicant’s allegation of a failure to have regard to point 61 of the Guidelines in that the Commission, in essence, erred in law in its examination of the proportionality of the measure at issue by examining only the conditions relating to own contributions and burden sharing, it is to be noted that that point of the Guidelines states that the amount of aid must be limited to the strict minimum necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken ‘in the light of the existing financial resources of the beneficiary, its shareholders or the business group to which it belongs’, and then requires that ‘a sufficient level of own contribution to the costs of the restructuring and burden sharing must be ensured, as set out in more detail in this section’. Point 61 of the Guidelines therefore expressly states that proportionality is to be assessed in the light of the existing resources of the beneficiary and those of its business group, and specifically sets out two conditions which are closely linked to the issue of the resources of that beneficiary and that group, namely own contribution and burden sharing, the requirements relating to those conditions being laid down in points 62 to 69 of the Guidelines. No further requirements are specified in the relevant section of the Guidelines. 177 It follows that the Commission did not fail to have regard to point 61 of the Guidelines in examining the proportionality of the measure at issue solely in the light of the requirements specifically laid down in the Guidelines relating to own contribution and burden sharing. 178 In the second place, as regards the reduction of TAP’s fleet, it must be held that the Commission was also not required, for the purpose of concluding that the measure at issue was proportionate, to ensure that TAP’s fleet was reduced to the strict minimum. Such a requirement is not apparent from points 61 to 69 of the Guidelines governing the examination of the proportionality of restructuring aid, in accordance with what has been stated in paragraph 176 above. Thus, the proportionality of restructuring aid is not conditional on the assets of the beneficiary of such aid being limited to the strict minimum necessary to be viable on the market, contrary to what the applicant claims. 179 In the third place, as regards the error of assessment which the Commission is purported to have made in the financial projections in recital 151 of the contested decision, it must be observed that the alleged error does not relate to the Commission’s examination of the proportionality of the measure at issue. The financial projections in question were used in the assessment of TAP’s return to viability, which was examined in recitals 228 to 238 of the contested decision, and were not used in the assessment of the proportionality of the measure at issue. Accordingly, that argument is irrelevant to the Commission’s examination of the proportionality of the measure at issue and must be rejected. 180 In the light of the foregoing, the second complaint of the present plea must be rejected. 2. The third complaint of the sixth plea in law, concerning the examination of own contribution and burden sharing 181 The applicant claims that the Commission did not correctly calculate TAP’s own contribution and the burden sharing under points 62 to 69 of the Guidelines. First, it submits that the Commission failed to establish that the own contribution was free of State aid. Second, it maintains that the Commission wrongly accepted a level of own contribution of less than 50%. Third, it argues that the Commission failed to verify whether the burden sharing was adequate as regards the Portuguese Republic and HPGB. 182 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 183 In that regard, in the first place, so far as concerns own contribution, although the applicant submits, first, that the Guidelines require, in points 62 and 63 thereof, that own contribution from a beneficiary of restructuring aid should not contain any State aid, it must be stated that it has not provided any evidence demonstrating the existence of State aid in the present case. Its claims that the renegotiation of contracts with suppliers and the deferrals in respect of bonds and loans, referred to in recitals 255 to 257 and 259 respectively of the contested decision, might have involved State aid are not supported by any strong factual evidence. The mere reference made by the applicant to the fact that certain airports served by TAP might be owned or controlled by public authorities or to the fact that TAP might potentially have financing from State creditors is not sufficient in that respect. Nor does the applicant plausibly indicate how any of the contract renegotiations listed in recital 43(b), (d) and (g) of the contested decision could have contained State aid. 184 Second, the applicant submits that the Commission was not entitled to consider that exceptional circumstances justified a level of own contribution of less than 50%. 185 In that regard, it must be recalled that point 64 of the Guidelines states that ‘own contribution will normally be considered to be adequate if it amounts to at least 50% of the restructuring costs’, but that, ‘in exceptional circumstances and in cases of particular hardship, which must be demonstrated by the Member State, the Commission may accept a contribution that does not reach 50% of the restructuring costs, provided that the amount of that contribution remains significant.’ 186 In the present case, the Commission did not make an error of assessment in finding, in recitals 261 to 263 of the contested decision, that the COVID-19 pandemic had given rise to exceptional circumstances justifying an own contribution below the threshold laid down in point 64 of the Guidelines. As set out in recitals 18 and 24 to 26 of the contested decision, the COVID-19 pandemic and the travel restrictions adopted by governments around the world in order to curb its spread had a considerable impact on the aviation sector, and particularly on TAP by interrupting TAP Air Portugal’s transformation process and by deteriorating the financial situation of TAP Air Portugal and that of TAP SGPS. TAP’s ability to access financing on the markets was therefore significantly affected. 187 The arguments put forward by the applicant are not such as to call that finding into question. 188 First, the argument that the Commission, in essence, applied Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as the legal basis for the measure at issue is based on a misreading of recital 263 of the contested decision. In that recital, the Commission merely stated that the pandemic could be regarded as a serious disturbance in the economy within the meaning of that provision of the FEU Treaty, but it did not in any way state that the measure at issue had to be examined on that basis. 189 Second, while the applicant points out that TAP benefited from aid measures compensating for the damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, that did not preclude the view, as taken by the Commission in the contested decision, that the pandemic had given rise to exceptional circumstances which reduced TAP’s ability to provide an own contribution reaching 50% of the restructuring costs. Moreover, the fact that the Commission may, in previous decisions, have accepted other reasons justifying an own contribution of less than 50% is irrelevant to the examination carried out by the Commission in the present case, which had to be based on TAP’s specific circumstances. 190 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic had already been used by the Commission as a reason to justify a restructuring period longer than the usual period permitted under the Guidelines also does not exclude the possibility of citing that circumstance when examining TAP’s ability to make an own contribution to the restructuring costs. 191 In the second place, as regards burden sharing, the applicant claims that the Commission did not properly verify whether the burden sharing in the present case was adequate under the Guidelines. 192 In that regard, first, it should be recalled that point 66 of the Guidelines provides that ‘adequate burden sharing will normally mean that incumbent shareholders and, where necessary, subordinated creditors must absorb losses in full.’ 193 Although the applicant claims that the Commission did not explain in the contested decision how the market value of the Portuguese Republic’s holdings in TAP SGPS would be reduced to zero in the loss absorption, given that TAP would become viable again at the end of the restructuring, it must be observed that the Commission explained, in recital 266 of the contested decision, without being contradicted by the applicant, that the value of the Portuguese Republic’s holdings in TAP SGPS would be reduced to zero, in accordance with the requirement laid down in point 66 of the Guidelines. That factual finding as to the reduction in the value of the Portuguese Republic’s holdings in TAP SGPS cannot be invalidated by the mere fact that, in the future, namely after the implementation of the restructuring plan, the Portuguese Republic’s holding will increase in value, since TAP will become financially viable again, that being, moreover, a necessary condition for the authorisation of the measure at issue under the Guidelines. 194 In addition, the applicant’s argument that the Commission failed to examine whether HPGB, a minority shareholder of TAP SGPS, participated in the burden sharing must be rejected. The Commission expressly found, in recital 266 of that decision, that ‘existing shareholders’ of the beneficiary participated adequately in the burden sharing, since their holdings would be reduced to zero in the loss absorption. By referring to ‘existing shareholders’, that finding necessarily included HPGB. 195 Second, point 67 of the Guidelines states, in particular, that adequate burden sharing ‘will also mean that any State aid that enhances the beneficiary’s equity position should be granted on terms that afford the State a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary’. The applicant criticises the Commission’s assessment in that regard by claiming that the gradual divestment of three subsidiaries of TAP SGPS, referred to in recital 266 of the contested decision, namely Cateringpor, Groundforce and M&E Brasil, is not sufficiently certain to afford the Portuguese Republic a reasonable share of future gains in value of the beneficiary. 196 However, it must be borne in mind that those subsidiary sales form an integral part of the restructuring plan, as two of them are even listed in Article 2(2) of the contested decision. The divestments in question were therefore mandatory, even though their precise dates and the amounts involved could not have been known at the time when the contested decision was adopted. 197 Furthermore, even assuming, as the applicant submits, that the financial situation of the three subsidiaries of TAP SGPS in question would be strengthened as a result of the measure at issue and therefore that the minority shareholders of those subsidiaries would also benefit indirectly from that measure, such an assumption would not invalidate the Commission’s conclusion in recital 266 of the contested decision that there was adequate burden sharing under point 67 of the Guidelines. Indeed, as the Commission pointed out at the hearing, as the majority shareholder of TAP, the Portuguese Republic would necessarily benefit from future gains in value of the abovementioned subsidiaries, thereby meeting the requirement laid down in that point of the Guidelines. 198 In the light of the foregoing, the third complaint of the present plea must be rejected. 3. The first complaint of the sixth plea in law, concerning the alleged lack of precision as regards the amounts of the components of the measure at issue 199 The applicant submits that, in view of the redactions made in the contested decision, it is impossible to determine the amount of aid granted in the form of the loan guaranteed by the Portuguese Republic and the amount granted through the direct equity injection, and therefore to ascertain whether the measure at issue is proportionate. Moreover, the applicant maintains that the Commission did not explain precisely the difference between the amount of the measure at issue which was notified by the Portuguese Republic and the amount which was authorised in the contested decision. It argues that those omissions also constitute a failure to state reasons. 200 In that regard, first, with respect to the applicant’s criticism concerning the redaction of the amounts of the various components of the measure at issue in the public version of the contested decision, that redaction does not mean that the assessment of the proportionality of the measure at issue under the Guidelines is vitiated by an error of assessment or a failure to state reasons. In accordance with the analysis carried out in paragraphs 176 and 177 above, it is not apparent from points 61 to 69 of the Guidelines that the Commission was required to ensure that the amounts allocated in the form of loans and recapitalisation corresponded exactly to the beneficiary’s financial needs, in terms of liquidity and equity, at the time of the contested decision. By contrast, those points require the Commission to ensure that restructuring aid is accompanied by an own contribution to the costs of the restructuring and adequate burden sharing, which the Commission did in the contested decision. 201 Second, as regards the applicant’s argument that the difference between the notified amount of the measure at issue and the authorised amount of that measure is not explained in the contested decision, it must be stated that the applicant does not make clear why such an explanation would be necessary for the examination of the proportionality of the measure at issue under the Guidelines. In any event, it must be observed, as the Commission contended at the hearing, that an explanation in that regard was provided in recital 40 and in recital 43(e) of the contested decision, in which it was found that an initially envisaged component of the aid at issue, namely a liquidity aid measure, was no longer necessary and was therefore withdrawn from the measure at issue prior to the adoption of the contested decision. 202 In the light of the foregoing, the present complaint and, consequently, the sixth plea in its entirety must be rejected. G. The seventh plea in law, alleging that the Commission did not adequately review the negative effects of the measure at issue 203 By the seventh plea, the applicant submits that the Commission made several errors of law and of assessment in its analysis of the negative effects of the measure at issue. This plea is divided into two complaints. By its first complaint, the applicant claims that the Commission did not correctly apply the ‘one time, last time’ condition. By its second complaint, it maintains that the Commission accepted measures which were too weak to limit distortions of competition. 1. The first complaint of the seventh plea in law, concerning the ‘one time, last time’ condition 204 The applicant submits that the Commission did not correctly apply the ‘one time, last time’ condition laid down in point 74 of the Guidelines, according to which no aid may be passed on to an entity in the beneficiary’s group which has received rescue or restructuring aid during the previous 10 years. It argues that the Commission did not exclude the possibility that the measure at issue might be passed on to an earlier beneficiary of such aid among the undertakings of the group to which TAP belonged, such as HPGB. 205 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 206 Before examining the applicant’s arguments, it should be recalled, at the outset, that, in section 3.6.1 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘“One time, last time” principle’, point 71 provides as follows: ‘… the Member State must specify whether the undertaking concerned has already received rescue aid, restructuring aid or temporary restructuring support in the past … If so, and where less than 10 years have elapsed since the aid was granted or the restructuring period came to an end or implementation of the restructuring plan was halted (whichever occurred the latest), the Commission will not allow further aid pursuant to these guidelines.’ 207 Point 74 of the Guidelines states as follows: ‘Where a business group has received rescue aid, restructuring aid or temporary restructuring support, the Commission will normally not allow further rescue or restructuring aid to the group itself or any of the entities belonging to the group unless 10 years have elapsed since the aid was granted or the restructuring period came to an end or implementation of the restructuring plan was halted, whichever occurred the latest. Where an entity belonging to a business group has received rescue aid, restructuring aid or temporary restructuring support, the group as a whole as well as the other entities of the group remain eligible for rescue or restructuring aid (subject to compliance with the other provisions of these guidelines), with the exception of the earlier beneficiary of the aid. Member States must demonstrate that no aid will be passed on from the group or other group entities to the earlier beneficiary of the aid.’ 208 In the present case, in recitals 271 to 273 of the contested decision, the Commission assessed whether the conditions laid down in the Guidelines relating to the ‘one time, last time’ principle had been complied with. It noted, inter alia, that none of the entities making up the TAP economic unit, namely TAP SGPS, TAP Air Portugal and the entities under their control, had received any rescue aid, restructuring aid or temporary restructuring support during the previous 10 years, other than the rescue measure approved in the decision on the rescue measure. Since the latter measure forms part of the same restructuring operation as the measure at issue, the prior grant of that measure did not entail a breach of the ‘one time, last time’ principle, in accordance with point 72(a) of the Guidelines. 209 In that regard, first, it must be recalled that, as has been explained in the context of the examination of the first plea, HPGB did not belong to the TAP group as at the date of the contested decision. The applicant does not call into question the analysis in the contested decision according to which HPGB did not have controlling rights over TAP SGPS (see paragraph 15 above). Consequently, even if HPGB had received rescue aid, restructuring aid or temporary restructuring support during the previous 10 years, it was not necessary for the Commission, for the purpose of ensuring that the measure at issue complied with point 74 of the Guidelines, to demonstrate in the contested decision that no part of that measure could be passed on to HPGB. 210 Second, the applicant has not put forward any evidence showing that HPGB had received any of the types of aid covered by the ‘one time, last time’ principle during the previous 10 years, or indicating how or why TAP would pass the measure at issue or part of that aid on to HPGB. The applicant’s line of argument therefore remains purely speculative. 211 In the light of the foregoing, the first complaint of the present plea must be rejected. 2. The second complaint of the seventh plea in law, concerning the measures to limit distortions of competition 212 According to the applicant, the Commission imposed measures that were insufficient to limit distortions of competition. More specifically, in the context of the present complaint, it criticises the measures relating, first, to the size of TAP’s fleet, second, to the divestment of slots at Lisbon airport and, third, to the sale of TAP SGPS’s subsidiaries, Groundforce and Cateringpor. 213 Before examining, in order, the different parts of the applicant’s line of argument, it should be recalled, at the outset, that, in section 3.6.2 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Measures to limit distortions of competition’, point 76 provides as follows: ‘When restructuring aid is granted, measures must be taken to limit distortions of competition, so that adverse effects on trading conditions are minimised as much as possible and positive effects outweigh any adverse ones. The Commission will assess the appropriate form and scope of such measures in accordance with this section (3.6.2).’ 214 In section 3.6.2.1 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Nature and form of measures to limit distortions of competition’, point 78 provides, inter alia, as follows: ‘… undertakings benefiting from restructuring aid may be required to divest assets or reduce capacity or market presence. Such measures should take place in particular in the market or markets where the undertaking will have a significant market position after restructuring, in particular those where there is significant excess capacity.’ 215 Point 80 of the Guidelines provides as follows: ‘Measures to limit distortions of competition should not lead to a deterioration in the structure of the market. Structural measures should therefore normally take the form of divestments on a going concern basis of viable stand-alone businesses that, if operated by a suitable purchaser, can compete effectively in the long term. In the event that such an entity is not available, the beneficiary could carve out and subsequently divest an existing and appropriately funded activity, creating a new and viable entity that should be able to compete in the market. Structural measures that take the form of divestment of assets alone and do not involve the creation of a viable entity able to compete in the market are less effective in preserving competition and will therefore only be accepted in exceptional cases where the Member State concerned demonstrates that no other form of structural measures would be feasible or that other structural measures would seriously jeopardise the economic viability of the undertaking.’ 216 In section 3.6.2.2 of the Guidelines, entitled ‘Calibration of measures to limit distortions of competition’, point 92 of the Guidelines provides, inter alia, that ‘measures limiting distortions of competition should not compromise the prospects of the beneficiary’s return to viability’. (a) The applicant’s line of argument relating to the cap on TAP’s fleet 217 The applicant submits that the reduction in TAP’s fleet is insufficient. It maintains that the reduction in the number of TAP’s aircraft is not only marginal and had already begun before the restructuring, but that the Commission also failed to examine whether TAP’s capacity in terms of available seat kilometres had materially decreased. According to the applicant, the Commission also failed to explain why the divestment of assets in the present case, which was in any event necessary to ensure TAP’s viability, would be effective in limiting distortions of competition, rather than the divestment of a viable entity able to compete on the market. 218 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 219 In the present case, in recitals 280 and 281 of the contested decision, the Commission assessed the measure consisting of a cap on the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet at a maximum of 90 to 100 aircraft until 2025. It considered that that cap reduced TAP Air Portugal’s market presence and capacity, since it meant that TAP would not have sufficient aircraft to meet expected demand in 2025. The Commission also found that such a reduction was in line with the measures adopted in previous decisions authorising the restructuring of airlines in order to limit distortions of competition. 220 In that regard, first, with respect to the Commission’s decision to accept the cap on the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet as a measure intended to limit distortions of competition, instead of the divestment of a viable entity able to compete on the market, it must be noted that, under point 78 of the Guidelines (see paragraph 214 above), the divestment of assets and measures reducing the capacity or market presence of a beneficiary of restructuring aid are among the measures envisaged by the Guidelines to limit distortions of competition. The cap on the number of aircraft in TAP Air Portugal’s fleet until 2025 is precisely such a measure, since TAP Air Portugal will have fewer aircraft than before the restructuring period and will not be able to meet the demand expected at the end of that period. 221 Furthermore, although point 80 of the Guidelines (see paragraph 215 above) states that structural measures should ‘normally’ take the form of divestments of viable stand-alone businesses, as the applicant points out, it must be stated that the cap on TAP Air Portugal’s fleet forms part of a set of measures adopted by TAP in order to limit distortions of competition. Those measures included divestments of undertakings, such as the divestment of Groundforce and Cateringpor, and divestments of assets, namely the slots at Lisbon airport, with the aim of reducing TAP’s market presence and enabling the expansion of competitors’ activities, in accordance with points 78 to 80 of the Guidelines. In those circumstances, the fact that the Commission accepted the capping of the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet as a measure limiting distortions of competition does not constitute a failure to have regard to the Guidelines. 222 Second, as regards the scale of that measure, although the applicant maintains that the cap in question represents a marginal reduction, it must be observed that the Guidelines do not impose any quantitative threshold relating to the reduction of the market presence of the beneficiary of a restructuring aid measure for the purpose of limiting distortions of competition. Moreover, it must be recalled that, under point 92 of the Guidelines (see paragraph 216 above), such measures should not compromise the return to viability of the beneficiary of restructuring aid. Therefore, the reduction in the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet did not necessarily have to be greater, as the applicant in essence submits, in order to be accepted as a measure to limit distortions of competition. 223 In addition, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging a failure by the Commission to examine the capacity of the fleet, that argument also does not call into question the validity of the cap on the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet. The applicant does not dispute that that measure would result in TAP Air Portugal being unable to meet demand in 2025 and having a more limited market presence than it had in 2019, which is consistent with the objective set out in point 78 of the Guidelines. 224 Third, as regards the applicant’s claim that the capping of the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet had begun before the restructuring and that such a cap was in fact a measure to ensure TAP’s viability rather than to limit distortions of competition, it must be observed, as the Commission contends, that the applicant confuses two separate measures. The reduction of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet, the lawfulness of which under the Guidelines has been examined in the context of the third plea, was carried out as part of the restructuring plan. By contrast, the cap on the size of that fleet until the end of the restructuring period constituted a mandatory commitment, by virtue of Article 2(2)(b) of the operative part of the contested decision, which formed part of a measure expressly adopted in order to limit distortions of competition, as is apparent from recitals 276, 280 and 281 of the contested decision. 225 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s line of argument relating to the size of TAP’s fleet must be rejected. (b) The applicant’s line of argument relating to the divestment of slots at Lisbon airport 226 The applicant submits that the divestment of a maximum of 18 slots at Lisbon airport is also insufficient and inadequate for various reasons. In that regard, it puts forward arguments criticising the scale of that measure, the procedure for allocating the slots at issue and the conditions attached to that allocation. 227 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 228 In the present case, in recitals 282 to 320 of the contested decision, the Commission examined the measure consisting of the divestment of slots at Lisbon airport. It observed that TAP Air Portugal held – and would continue to hold after the restructuring period – a significant position at that airport and that measures limiting distortions of competition were therefore necessary under point 78 of the Guidelines. In view of the congestion existing at that airport, a significant barrier to the entry or expansion of TAP Air Portugal’s competitors would be removed through the divestment of slots, with the result that such a divestment would be the most effective measure to limit distortions of competition. The Commission considered that the amount of 18 slots per day was sufficient to enable the remedy taker to establish operations at Lisbon airport or to expand such operations, for example, by basing three aircraft there and by operating three rotations per day per aircraft. Those slots would be available to potential remedy takers from the winter 2022/2023 IATA season until the end of 2025. The Commission also considered that the eligibility criteria for the selection of a remedy taker, including the criterion relating to independence from TAP Air Portugal, were appropriate. (1) The applicant’s arguments concerning the scale of the divestment of the slots at issue 229 As regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the allegedly insufficient scale of the divestment of the slots at issue, first, it must be pointed out that it is apparent from the summary of the contested decision in paragraph 228 above that the Commission considered that the divestment of slots at Lisbon airport removed a significant barrier to the entry or expansion of competitors and that the amount of slots at issue would enable a competitor to compete effectively, in accordance with point 80 of the Guidelines. As the Commission observed in recital 292 of the contested decision, without being challenged on that point by the applicant, the amount of 18 slots per day would enable the remedy taker to base three aircraft at Lisbon airport and to operate three rotations per day per aircraft, which, by way of example, would afford the applicant or easyJet the possibility of increasing the size of their fleet based at that highly congested airport by more than 40%. 230 Second, although the applicant claims that the number of slots at issue is too low and therefore does not make it possible to reduce or eliminate TAP’s dominant position at Lisbon airport or for an entrant to reach the same size as the competitors at that airport, it must be stated that no such requirements are apparent from the Guidelines. 231 As regards measures to limit distortions of competition, the Guidelines expressly require, in point 79 thereof, that such measures are intended to ‘strengthen competition’ by favouring ‘the entry of new competitors’ or ‘the expansion of … small competitors’ and, in point 80 of those guidelines, that the divestment of businesses or assets on the basis of those measures should be such as to enable a competitor to compete effectively with the beneficiary of the aid (see paragraph 215 above). Similarly, point 92 of the Guidelines provides that measures must not be on such a scale as to compromise the beneficiary’s return to viability (see paragraph 216 above). Thus, the quantitative thresholds envisaged in the applicant’s line of argument have no basis in the Guidelines. 232 In that regard, although the applicant refers, in its reply, to Commission Decision C(2020) 4372 final of 25 June 2020 on the State aid SA.57153 (2020/N) – Germany – COVID-19 – Aid to Lufthansa, the case which gave rise to that decision must be distinguished from the present case. In that decision, by which the Commission authorised aid under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and its Communication of 19 March 2020 entitled ‘Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak’ (OJ 2020 C 91 I, p. 1), as amended on 3 April 2020 (OJ 2020 C 112 I, p. 1) and 8 May 2020 (OJ 2020 C 164, p. 3), it was found that the slots to be divested by the beneficiary of the aid in question at Frankfurt and Munich airports (both in Germany) would enable the entry of a new competitor of a size comparable to that of the existing competitors at the airports concerned. However, that does not in any way mean that the Commission, in the contested decision, had no choice but to accept a corresponding number of slots at Lisbon airport, as it was required to assess the measures to limit distortions of competition solely in the light of the requirements of the Guidelines and TAP’s specific circumstances in the present case. 233 In any event, as has already been stated, the Commission found in recital 292 of the contested decision that the amount of slots at issue enabled the applicant or easyJet to increase the size of their fleet at Lisbon airport by more than 40%. Such a change cannot be described as marginal, contrary to what the applicant claims. 234 In addition, although the applicant complains that the Commission did not specifically address the question whether the number of slots could encourage new entries into the market, it must be pointed out that the Commission stated on several occasions in the contested decision, for instance in recitals 285, 288 to 290, 292 and 293 thereof, that the divestment of the slots at issue could enable the establishment of operations at Lisbon airport and, therefore, the entry of a new competitor into the market. In any event, it must be observed that, under the Guidelines, effective competition may also be exerted by an existing competitor that strengthens its position by acquiring the slots at issue, with the result that the specific examination referred to by the applicant was not necessary. 235 Third, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission did not sufficiently examine whether TAP Air Portugal could have divested more slots without compromising its return to viability, as no analysis is provided in support of its conclusion in that respect in recital 319 of the contested decision. 236 In that regard, it is apparent from recitals 313 to 319 of the contested decision that the Commission did indeed assess whether or not the divestment of 18 slots by TAP Air Portugal compromised that undertaking’s return to viability and that it found that the transfer of more than 18 slots could compromise its return to viability in the most adverse market circumstances. There was therefore an assessment by the Commission of that possibility. 237 Furthermore, the applicant’s argument that, in essence, the Commission should have required measures reducing TAP’s activities to the point of non-viability is not supported by point 92 of the Guidelines, which merely requires the Commission to ensure that all measures taken to limit distortions of competition do not have negative consequences for the return to viability of the beneficiary of restructuring aid. Indeed, measures on the scale envisaged by the applicant would jeopardise the rationale for authorising restructuring aid, which is precisely to enable an eligible undertaking to become viable again. 238 Lastly, the applicant claims that the divestment of the slots at issue is not sufficient in the light of TAP Air Portugal’s market position at Lisbon airport and the level of TAP’s own contribution. However, it is apparent from the foregoing analysis, first, that the divestment of the slots at issue reduced the beneficiary’s presence at Lisbon airport, as did the cap on the size of TAP Air Portugal’s fleet, and that the number of slots involved would strengthen competition at that airport and, second, that the divestment of a higher number of slots could have compromised TAP’s return to viability. In those circumstances, the Commission did not fail to have regard to the conditions relating to measures to limit distortions of competition laid down in the Guidelines. (2) The applicant’s arguments concerning the procedure for allocating the slots at issue 239 As regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the procedure for allocating the slots at issue, first, the applicant submits that the Commission delayed the divestment of the slots at issue until the winter 2022/2023 IATA season instead of starting implementation in the summer 2022 IATA season and did not justify why those slots had been left vacant during the summer of 2022. 240 In that regard, it must be recalled that point 78 of the Guidelines provides, inter alia, that divestments to limit distortions of competition ‘should take place without undue delay, taking into account the type of asset being divested and any obstacles to its disposal, and in any case within the duration of the restructuring plan.’ 241 In the present case, it is apparent from recital 300 of the contested decision that the call for proposals regarding the divestment of the slots was to be published well in advance of the general slot allocation procedure for each IATA season and that it would begin with the winter 2022/2023 IATA season, the latter being the first IATA season in respect of which the general slot allocation procedure had not yet started as at the date of the contested decision. Thus, on account of the date of adoption of the contested decision, namely 21 December 2021, the winter 2022/2023 IATA season was the next season in respect of which the general slot allocation procedure had not yet started. That timeframe therefore afforded potential remedy takers the opportunity to organise their bids better and, as explained by the Commission in its defence, to plan their networks in line with the next general slot allocation procedure. There was therefore no ‘undue delay’ within the meaning of point 78 of the Guidelines. 242 Although the applicant criticises that timeframe by claiming that it had the consequence that the slots at issue were not available to the potential remedy taker for the summer 2022 IATA season, it must be observed that the Commission was entitled to consider that organising the divestment of the slots in respect of that season would have been very difficult from a practical point of view, inter alia with regard to the submission of bids by potential remedy takers. As the Commission contends in its defence, not only was the period between the adoption of the contested decision and the start of the summer 2022 IATA season, on 27 March 2022, very short, but the call for proposals could not have been adequately coordinated with the general slot allocation procedure for the summer 2022 IATA season, which was to end in January 2022 at the latest. 243 Second, the applicant criticises some of the criteria, examined in recitals 303 to 310 of the contested decision, for evaluating the bids of the potential takers of the slots at issue. 244 It disputes the fact that, if the Commission were to give the same or similar evaluation to several proposals, TAP would have the possibility of deciding which bid won, which would enable it to choose the remedy taker that posed the lesser competitive threat and entail the risk of a conflict of interest. 245 In that regard, it should be noted that, while it is true that, according to the contested decision, the Commission, in the event of tied bids, was to give preference to the bid ranked best by TAP Air Portugal, the risk of a conflict of interest, as alleged by the applicant, or that the remedy taker would not compete with TAP Air Portugal, were purely hypothetical. Indeed, it is apparent from recitals 93, 94 and 309 of the contested decision that it was only in the event of tied bids, after the Commission had taken into account, inter alia, the seat capacity of the aircraft based at Lisbon airport and the number of direct routes to and from that airport, that the choice would fall to TAP Air Portugal. Next, in the event that TAP Air Portugal’s choice might play a role in the selection of the remedy taker, that choice nevertheless had to be circumscribed by transparent criteria, as is apparent from recital 94 of the contested decision. The requirement of transparency thus ensured that the criteria used by TAP Air Portugal would not be arbitrary and would be announced in advance. Lastly, and above all, it is clear from recital 304(b) of the contested decision that, in order to be eligible, the remedy taker had to be ‘independent of’ and ‘unconnected with’ TAP Air Portugal. 246 Moreover, the applicant submits that the evaluation of the bids of potential remedy takers on the basis of the criteria set out in recital 93 of the contested decision wrongly gives priority to the number of departing seats from Lisbon airport rather than the number of destinations served and also disregards the expected load factor on the routes operated by the slot taker. 247 However, the applicant’s line of argument cannot succeed in the light of the objective of the divestment of the slots at issue, namely to limit distortions of competition by enabling the remedy taker to compete effectively in the long term at Lisbon airport. Taken as a whole, the eligibility conditions and the criteria for evaluating bids ensured that the taker of the slots at issue would exert competitive pressure on TAP Air Portugal, as the Commission explained in recitals 303 to 310 of the contested decision. In that connection, it must be noted that the remedy taker had to hold a licence issued by a Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA) in order to be able to operate routes within the EEA without restrictions and had to commit to basing aircraft at Lisbon airport, such that the connectivity of that airport would be guaranteed. The remedy taker also had to be able to compete with TAP Air Portugal in terms of independence and financial soundness. Furthermore, the use of criteria relating to the number of departing seats from Lisbon airport and the number of destinations served meant that the remedy taker was to be chosen according to criteria which, logically, would result in competition with TAP Air Portugal at Lisbon airport. In the light of all those factors, it has in no way been demonstrated that the objective of the divestment of the slots at issue could be undermined by the mere fact that, according to the applicant, the criteria for evaluating bids gave priority to the number of departing seats from Lisbon airport, rather than the number of destinations served, and that those criteria disregarded the load factor expected by the remedy taker. (3) The applicant’s arguments concerning the conditions attached to the slots at issue 248 As regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the conditions attached to the slots at issue, first, the applicant submits that certain time-related conditions attached to the grant of the slots at issue are excessively restrictive, which reduce the effect of the divestment of those slots on competition at Lisbon airport. 249 In that regard, it is apparent from recital 297 of the contested decision that the Commission noted that there were two constraints imposed on the taker of the slots, which were aimed at protecting TAP Air Portugal’s hub-and-spoke operations at Lisbon airport. First, TAP Air Portugal was not obliged to transfer, inter alia, more than one slot before 08:00 per aircraft based at that airport, in accordance with recital 84 of the contested decision. Second, TAP Air Portugal could allocate slots corresponding to the slots requested by the remedy taker within a range of more or less 20 minutes for short-haul flights and of more or less 60 minutes for long-haul flights. The Commission considered that those constraints would not affect the ability of the slot taker to compete with TAP Air Portugal. 250 While the applicant criticises the potential cap on the number of slots transferred before 08:00 per aircraft, such slots being very important to TAP Air Portugal’s competitors, the fact remains that the taker of the slots at issue was to benefit from access to at least one slot per aircraft before 08:00. In view of the fact that the remedy taker was also to have three aircraft based in Lisbon, such a cap would enable it to operate three routes to or from Lisbon airport before 08:00. As the Commission found in recital 297 of the contested decision, without being contradicted by the applicant, the data provided by the Portuguese authorities showed that that cap was compatible with the usual rotations of aircraft based at Lisbon airport and should not therefore restrict the ability of competitors to compete with TAP Air Portugal at Lisbon airport. 251 In addition, the applicant’s criticism relating to the time window within which TAP was to transfer the slots at issue must be rejected, inasmuch as it is alleged that TAP Air Portugal could use that window to impair the operations of the taker of those slots, without it being necessary to rule on its admissibility, which is disputed by the Commission. As was explained in recital 297 of and footnote 85 to the contested decision, the commitment in question prevents TAP Air Portugal from exercising its discretion in order to undermine the reasonable rotation of the remedy taker’s aircraft. 252 Second, the applicant maintains that there is no provision laid down in the contested decision to ensure ex post monitoring of whether the taker of the slots at issue complies with its bid, which risks rendering the measure ineffective. 253 In that regard, it is not disputed that the operation by the taker of the slots at issue was not subject to any monitoring in order to verify whether the remedy taker complied with the plan which it had submitted in its bid. However, it must be observed that the Guidelines do not require such monitoring of a structural measure, as in the present case. Those guidelines simply require, in point 79 thereof, that a structural measure strengthen competition and, in point 80 thereof, that such a measure enable the purchaser to compete in the long term. Moreover, in accordance with recital 296 of the contested decision, the fact that the remedy taker would remain free to use the slots at its discretion would make the divestment at issue even more attractive from a commercial point of view for the potential remedy taker, since it could adapt its services during the operation of the slots, making it easier for it to compete with TAP Air Portugal at Lisbon airport. 254 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s line of argument relating to the divestment of the slots at Lisbon airport must be rejected. (c) The applicant’s line of argument relating to the divestment of the stakes in Cateringpor and Groundforce 255 The applicant submits that, as regards the divestment of TAP SGPS’s stakes in Cateringpor and Groundforce, the Commission failed to take account of the fact that, in accordance with the wording of point 78 of the Guidelines, divestments of loss-making activities which are in any event necessary to restore the long-term viability of a beneficiary of rescue or restructuring aid are generally not considered sufficient to address distortions of competition. In addition, the abovementioned undertakings do not operate in the market where TAP has a significant market position, with the result that the divestment at issue is not such as to limit distortions of competition. 256 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 257 Before examining the applicant’s arguments, it must be recalled, at the outset, that point 78 of the Guidelines states, first, that structural measures to limit distortions of competition ‘should take place in particular in the market or markets where the undertaking will have a significant market position after restructuring’ and, second, that divestments ‘which would at any rate be necessary to restore long-term viability will generally not be considered sufficient … to address distortions of competition.’ 258 In the present case, in recitals 277 to 279 of the contested decision, the Commission explained, first, that Cateringpor and Groundforce had been profit-making until 2019, their financial difficulties having been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and that there was interest on the part of potential investors in acquiring them. According to the Commission, the divestment of those undertakings satisfied the conditions laid down in point 80 of the Guidelines since they could compete in the long term if they were managed by a suitable purchaser. The Commission considered that the divestment of those undertakings constituted a measure limiting distortions of competition, since they were vertically integrated within the TAP SGPS group and were its main suppliers of catering and ground handling services. It found that the divestment of those undertakings to competitors would therefore lead to an increase in competition in the relevant markets. Second, the Commission did not accept the divestment of M&E Brasil as a measure to limit distortions of competition since that undertaking was loss-making prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and, therefore, its sale was regarded rather as a measure that was necessary to restore TAP’s viability. 259 In that connection, in the first place, the Court must reject the applicant’s argument that Cateringpor and Groundforce were engaged in loss-making activities which had to be divested at any rate in order to restore TAP’s long-term viability. While that divestment was also part of the restructuring plan submitted by TAP as a measure enabling it to focus on its core activity, namely aviation, in accordance with recital 29 of the contested decision, it must be stated that the applicant does not call into question the finding in recital 277 of the contested decision that those undertakings were fundamentally viable and therefore of interest to potential purchasers. Therefore, although the divestment of Cateringpor and Groundforce was included by TAP in the restructuring plan, that does not mean that those undertakings were loss-making, unlike M&E Brasil, the divestment of which was not accepted as a measure to limit distortions of competition. 260 In the second place, the fact that Cateringpor and Groundforce were not operating in the market where TAP Air Portugal had a significant market position at the time of the contested decision, namely passenger air transport in Portugal, does not mean that the Commission erred in accepting the divestment of those undertakings as a measure capable of limiting distortions of competition under the Guidelines. In that regard, while it is true that point 78 of the Guidelines states that such a measure is to take place ‘in particular’ in the market or markets where the beneficiary will continue to have a significant market position, the Guidelines do not require that all measures to limit distortions of competition must relate to the market or markets where a significant market position is held. In the present case, measures relating to the passenger air transport market were also adopted by TAP, through the cap on the size of its fleet and the divestment of slots at Lisbon airport. Thus, the divestment of Cateringpor and Groundforce forms part of an additional measure which, as stated, in essence, in recital 278 of the contested decision, reduces TAP’s presence and significance as a group in the market in general, which, moreover, is consistent with point 78 of the Guidelines. 261 In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s line of argument relating to the divestment of the stakes in Cateringpor and Groundforce and, consequently, the second complaint of the present plea and the plea in its entirety, must be rejected. H. The eighth plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of non-discrimination, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment 262 By the eighth plea, the applicant submits that the Commission infringed the principles of non-discrimination, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment. 1. Breach of the principle of non-discrimination 263 The principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (judgment of 15 April 2008, Nuova Agricast, C‑390/06, EU:C:2008:224, paragraph 66; see also, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 2018, Montero Mateos, C‑677/16, EU:C:2018:393, paragraph 49). 264 The elements which characterise different situations, and hence their comparability, must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the EU act which makes the distinction in question. The principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates must also be taken into account (judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 26). 265 In addition, it should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that acts adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question (judgment of 17 May 1984, Denkavit Nederland, 15/83, EU:C:1984:183, paragraph 25); where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgment of 30 April 2019, Italy v Council (Fishing quota for Mediterranean swordfish), C‑611/17, EU:C:2019:332, paragraph 55). 266 In the context of the present plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the contested decision authorises discriminatory treatment which is neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve the objective of the measure at issue. It maintains that at no time did the Commission examine the need and objective justification for granting the aid only to the beneficiary, even though the COVID-19 pandemic had serious repercussions for all the airlines that were operating in Portugal. According to the applicant, the aid goes beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objective since the beneficiary receives 100% of the aid, even though it ensures only 33% of Portugal’s connectivity. It claims that, in that regard, the allocation of aid to all the airlines operating in Portugal according to their market share would have enabled the same objective to be achieved. 267 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 268 In that connection, first of all, it should be recalled that classification of a national measure as ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, requires, inter alia, that that measure confer a selective advantage on the recipient while distorting or threatening to distort competition (judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 101, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 32). In particular, the requirement of selectivity arising from Article 107(1) TFEU presupposes that the Commission will establish that the economic advantage, understood in the broad sense, arising directly or indirectly from a particular measure specifically benefits one or more undertakings. It falls to the Commission to show, in particular, that the measure in question creates differences between undertakings which, with regard to the objective of the measure, are in a comparable situation. It is necessary therefore that the advantage be granted selectively and that it be liable to place certain undertakings in a more favourable situation than that of others (judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 103, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 34). 269 Nonetheless, State aid granted for the purposes of and in accordance with the conditions laid down by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU is compatible with the internal market. It follows that, unless that provision is to be deprived of all practical effect, State aid which is granted for the purposes of an objective recognised therein and within the limits of what is necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that objective, cannot be held to be incompatible with the internal market for effects which are inherent in any State aid, that is to say, inter alia, for reasons relating to whether the aid is selective or distorts competition (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraphs 106 and 107; see also, by analogy, judgment of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraphs 35 and 36). 270 Therefore, aid cannot be considered incompatible with the internal market for reasons that are solely linked to whether the aid is selective or distorts or threatens to distort competition (judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 108, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 37). 271 Admittedly, the procedure provided for in Article 108 TFEU must never produce a result that is contrary to the specific provisions of the FEU Treaty. Accordingly, State aid which, as such or by reason of some modalities thereof, contravenes provisions or general principles of EU law cannot be declared compatible with the internal market (judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 109, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 38). 272 However, as regards Article 18 TFEU specifically, it is settled case-law that that article is intended to apply independently only to situations governed by EU law in respect of which the FEU Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination (judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 110, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 39). 273 Since Article 107(3)(c) TFEU provides for derogations from the principle, referred to in paragraph 1 of that article, that State aid is incompatible with the internal market, and thus allows, in particular, differences in treatment between undertakings, subject to fulfilment of the requirements laid down by those derogations, those derogations must be regarded as ‘special provisions’ provided for in the Treaties, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 111, and of 23 November 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑210/21 P, EU:C:2023:908, paragraph 40). 274 It follows that, in the present case, it is necessary to examine only whether the difference in treatment brought about by the measure at issue is permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. That examination requires, first, that the objective of the measure at issue fulfils the requirements laid down by that provision and, second, that the modalities for granting the measure at issue – namely, in the present case, the fact that it benefits only TAP – are such as to enable that objective to be achieved and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. 275 In that connection, as regards, in the first place, the objective of the measure at issue, it must be recalled, as is apparent inter alia from the examination of the second and fourth pleas above, that the Commission explained in the contested decision that that measure was intended to prevent the insolvency of TAP, which was facing solvency and liquidity difficulties, in particular due to heavy operating losses recorded following the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to avert a situation of market failure and social hardship. Thus, the objective of the measure at issue was to enable TAP to implement the restructuring plan in order to return to viability. That objective was therefore consistent with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, read in conjunction with the Guidelines. 276 As regards, in the second place, the modalities for granting the measure at issue, it has not been established, as is apparent from the analysis of the first seven pleas, that the Commission infringed Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, read in conjunction with the Guidelines. More specifically, the Commission correctly considered that the measure at issue pursued an objective of common interest, in accordance with the analysis set out in the examination of the second plea above. Furthermore, the Commission did not make an error of assessment regarding the appropriateness and proportionality of the measure at issue and the measures to limit distortions of competition generated by that measure, as is apparent from the examination of the fifth, sixth and seventh pleas above. 277 In addition, the applicant has not established that dividing the amount of the aid at issue between all the airlines present in Portugal would have been effective in achieving the objective pursued by the measure at issue, namely to enable TAP to return to viability in order to avert a situation of market failure and social hardship in the event of TAP’s exit from the market. Moreover, only undertakings in difficulty, like TAP, are eligible for restructuring aid. 278 It follows that the measure at issue does not infringe the principle of non-discrimination. 2. Breach of the principles of freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment 279 The applicant submits that the Commission should have determined, when assessing the compatibility of the measure at issue, whether the form of the aid granted in the present case complied with the principles of freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment. It maintains that, by failing to do so, the Commission erred in law. The applicant claims that reserving the aid solely to the beneficiary restricts the rights granted to EU carriers by the EU operating licence system established by Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3), in other words, the right of those carriers freely to provide air transport services within the internal market. It argues that the contested decision entails an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment. 280 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 281 In that regard, as has been pointed out in paragraph 271 above, the procedure provided for in Article 108 TFEU must never produce a result that is contrary to the specific provisions of the Treaty. Accordingly, State aid which, as such or by reason of some modalities thereof, contravenes provisions or general principles of EU law cannot be declared compatible with the internal market (judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 131). 282 However, the Court of Justice has previously held that the restrictive effects which an aid measure has on the freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment still do not constitute a restriction prohibited by the FEU Treaty, since it may be inherent in the very nature of State aid, such as its selective nature (judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 132). 283 Where the modalities of an aid measure are so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them separately, their effect on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid viewed as a whole with the internal market must therefore of necessity be determined by means of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU (see judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 133 and the case-law cited). 284 In the present case, the choice of TAP as the beneficiary of the measure at issue forms part of the objective of that measure, namely preventing TAP’s exit from the market and enabling it to return to viability, and, in any event, even if that choice were to be regarded as a modality of that measure, the applicant does not dispute that such a modality is indissolubly linked to that object. It follows that the effect of the choice of TAP as the beneficiary of the measure at issue on the internal market cannot be examined separately from the effect of the compatibility of that aid measure viewed as a whole with the internal market by means of the procedure prescribed in Article 108 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 134). 285 In any event, while it is true that the measure at issue relates to individual aid, namely restructuring aid, which benefits only TAP, the applicant has not shown how that exclusive character is such as to deter it from providing services to and from Portugal, or from exercising its freedom of establishment in that Member State. In particular, it fails to identify the matters of fact or of law which mean that the measure at issue produces restrictive effects that go beyond those which trigger the prohibition laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, but which are nevertheless necessary and proportionate to cover TAP’s financial needs in order to prevent its exit from the market, in accordance with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, read in the light of the Guidelines. 286 Consequently, the measure at issue cannot constitute an obstacle to the freedom of establishment or to the freedom to provide services. It follows that the applicant is not justified in alleging that the Commission failed to examine the compatibility of that measure with the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. 287 In the light of the foregoing, the eighth plea must be rejected in its entirety. I. The ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU 288 By the ninth plea, the applicant submits that the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons at various points in the contested decision. 289 First, it argues that the Commission failed to provide any justification in support of its conclusions that (i) the Portuguese Republic was unable to deal with TAP’s difficulties on market terms and (ii) that HPGB and Mr Pedrosa were unable to deal with TAP’s difficulties either. 290 Second, as regards the examination of TAP’s return to viability, the level of reduction of TAP’s fleet, including in terms of capacity, is not explained, in particular due to the redactions in the contested decision. 291 Third, the impact of other restructuring measures, such as the reduction in staff costs and the renegotiation of supply contracts, was disregarded, as was the question whether those measures had started prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 292 Fourth, the restructuring costs and sources of financing are overly redacted, making it impossible to verify the assumptions used in the contested decision. 293 Fifth, there is a lack of information regarding TAP’s profitability during the restructuring period, TAP’s future performance in terms of EBIT, ROCE and return on equity, and the assumptions underpinning the adverse scenario. 294 Sixth, the redaction of the level of own contribution makes it impossible to ascertain whether that level is significant. 295 Seventh, the Commission does not justify its conclusion that the divestment of more than 18 slots at Lisbon airport could compromise TAP’s return to viability in the adverse scenario and did not provide any analysis in that regard in relation to the baseline scenario. 296 Eighth, the Commission failed to weigh up the positive and negative effects of the measure at issue. 297 The Commission, supported by the Portuguese Republic, disputes the applicant’s arguments. 298 In that regard, as has already been stated in paragraph 20 above, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 8 September 2011, Commission v Netherlands, C‑279/08 P, EU:C:2011:551, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited). 299 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s first argument relating to the ability of TAP’s shareholders to deal with TAP’s difficulties without recourse to State aid, it must be observed that, as is apparent from the examination of the first plea, the Commission stated to the requisite legal standard the reasons for the conclusion that the beneficiary was eligible for restructuring aid pursuant to the Guidelines. 300 More specifically, it is apparent from paragraph 22 above that the Commission, in recitals 191 and 194 of the contested decision, examined the ability of the Portuguese Republic to deal with TAP’s difficulties on market terms and concluded that it was not capable of doing so. 301 In the second place, the second to seventh arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the present plea concern, in essence, redactions of certain figures by the Commission in the public version of the contested decision in order to comply with its obligation to preserve professional secrecy (see paragraph 118 above). It follows from the examination of the third, sixth and seventh pleas that the Commission sufficiently substantiated its reasoning and methodology in the parts of the contested decision to which the applicant’s line of argument relates. More specifically, it set out the reasons why it had considered that the measures forming part of the restructuring plan were appropriate, that TAP’s return to viability had been demonstrated, that TAP’s own contribution to the costs of the restructuring was in accordance with the Guidelines and that the scale of the slot divestment as a measure to limit distortions of competition was sufficient under the Guidelines. As is apparent from the examination of the third, sixth and seventh pleas, the applicant has been able to challenge those assessments and the Court has been able to exercise its power of review, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 298 above. 302 Lastly, as regards the alleged failure to weigh the beneficial effects of the measure at issue against its adverse effects, it suffices to observe that the Commission did indeed carry out that assessment in the contested decision. In order to ensure that that measure did not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the Commission examined whether the conditions laid down in the Guidelines were satisfied. More specifically, it verified, inter alia, that the measure at issue contributed to an objective of common interest, was necessary, appropriate and proportionate, had an incentive effect, and was accompanied by measures to limit distortions of competition. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument is bound to fail. 303 In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 304 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter. 305 In addition, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Portuguese Republic must bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Ryanair DAC to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 3. Orders the Portuguese Republic to bear its own costs. Kowalik-Bańczyk Hesse Ricziová Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 December 2025. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English.