Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2014:2072
Date: 2014-07-10
Language of the case: Czech
Subject matter: Approximation of laws;Fundamental rights;Data protection
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Czechia

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 11 December 2014 1. Approximation of laws — Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data — Directive 95/46 — Scope — Personal data — Concept — Image of a person recorded by a camera making it possible to identify the person concerned — Included (European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, Arts 2(a) and 3(1)) 2. Approximation of laws — Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data — Directive 95/46 — Scope — Processing of personal data — Concept — Surveillance in the form of a video recording of persons which is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive — Included (European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, recitals 15 and 16 and Arts 2(b), and 3(1)) 3. Approximation of laws — Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data — Directive 95/46 — Scope — Exceptions — Narrow construction in the light of fundamental rights — Processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity — Meaning — Operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, which also monitors a public space — Not included (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 7; European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, recital 10 and Arts 1 and 3(2), second indent) 1. The term ‘personal data’ which appears in Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data covers, according to the definition under Article 2(a) of that directive, ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, an identifiable person being ‘one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference … to one or more factors specific to his physical … identity’. Accordingly, the image of a person recorded by a camera constitutes personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 inasmuch as it makes it possible to identify the person concerned. (see paras 21, 22) 2. Surveillance in the form of a video recording of persons which is stored on a continuous recording device — the hard disk drive — constitutes, pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, the automatic processing of personal data. Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46 defines the ‘processing of personal data’ as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, … such as collection, recording, … storage’. As can be seen, in particular, from recitals 15 and 16 to Directive 95/46, video surveillance falls, in principle, within the scope of that directive in so far as it constitutes automatic processing. (see paras 23-25) 3. The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity. As is clear from Article 1 of that directive and recital 10 thereto, Directive 95/46 is intended to ensure a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data. In that regard, the protection of the fundamental right to private life guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary. Since the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter, the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 3(2) of that directive must be narrowly construed. The fact that Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 falls to be narrowly construed has its basis also in the very wording of that provision, under which the directive does not cover the processing of data where the activity in the course of which that processing is carried out is a ‘purely’ personal or household activity, that is to say, not simply a personal or household activity. Therefore, the processing of personal data comes within the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 only where it is carried out in the purely personal or household setting of the person processing the data. To the extent that video surveillance covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity for the purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46. (see paras 27-31, 33, 35, operative part)