Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2006:329
Date: 2006-05-18
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Second Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Environment
Concepts: General;Environment
Procedure: Action for failure to fulfil obligations - unfounded;Action for failure to fulfil obligations - inadmissible
Origin: Spain

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. (13) That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the basic legal and factual particulars on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. (14) 26. The application in this case meets those requirements. The Commission takes issue with three precisely identified permits because, in its opinion, they are in breach of Article 12(1) of and Annex VI to the Habitats Directive because the otter is jeopardised. 27. Lastly, the Spanish Government argues that the claim is inadmissible for lack of substance. That objection would be justified if the Commission were not alleging any breach of Community law. Here, however, the Commission is claiming that Spain is in breach of Article 12(1) of and Annex VI to the Habitats Directive – that is to say, provisions of Community law. The Spanish Government is actually taking issue with the substance of the claim. However, this does not go to any issue of admissibility but to the substance of the case. This objection must therefore also be dismissed. 28. To sum up, it must be concluded that the application is inadmissible in so far as it takes issue with the permit of 24 May 2001 for hunting ground AV-10.198 at Mediana de la Voltoya in the province of Avila. The rest of it is admissible. B – Substance of the case 29. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the permit for fox hunting with snares in the SA-10.328 hunting area in Aldeanueva de la Sierra in the province of Salamanca is in breach of Article 12(1) of and Annex VI to the Habitats Directive. 1. Annex VI to the Habitats Directive 30. Annex VI to the Habitats Directive contains a list of prohibited methods and means of capture and killing and modes of transport. For mammals, the 10th indent of subparagraph (a) stipulates traps which are non-selective according to their principle or their conditions of use. 31. The methods and means listed are nevertheless not necessarily prohibited in all cases but only in accordance with Article 15 of the Habitats Directive. This is the only provision in the Habitats Directive that refers to Annex VI. It prohibits the use of all indiscriminate means (particularly those stated in Annex VI) in respect of the capture or killing of species of wild fauna listed in Annex V(a) and in cases where, in accordance with Article 16, derogations are applied to the taking, capture or killing of species listed in Annex IV(a). Even in those cases non-selective means are only prohibited if they are capable of causing local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of such species. 32. The permit at issue relates to the fox, which is not included in either Annex IV(a) or Annex V to the Habitats Directive. The prohibition on non-selective means does not therefore apply. No infringement of Annex VI to the Habitats Directive can therefore be established. 2. Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive 33. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the permit infringes Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. Under that provision Member States are obliged to take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict protection for the species of fauna listed in Annex IV(a) in their natural range. Under Article 12(1)(a) this should prohibit all forms of deliberate capture or killing of specimens of these species in the wild and, under subparagraph (b), the deliberate disturbance of these species, particularly during the period of breeding, rearing, hibernation and migration. 34. It should be made clear, with regard to the scope of the prohibition in Article 12(1)(a), that the word ‘deliberate’ used there refers both to the capture and the killing of protected animals. This does admittedly conflict with the French version, in which the term ‘intentionnelle’ is used in the singular and only relates to killing, but it is consistent with the other language versions in which the Directive has been adopted. In Spanish, German, Greek and Portuguese the word ‘deliberate’ undoubtedly refers to both actions. In the English, Dutch and Danish the word ‘deliberate’ could be taken to refer either only to capture or to both actions. It is only the Italian version that could be construed in the same way as the French version, although it is also possible in the Italian to relate the word ‘deliberate’ to both actions. Furthermore, it is also in accordance with the Berne Convention, which has been transposed by the Habitats Directive and the Birds Directive (15) within the Community, (16) to relate the word ‘deliberate’, grammatically speaking, to both actions. 35. It is for that reason necessary to verify whether the permit is compatible with the system of strict protection required by Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive, which is supposed to prohibit the deliberate capture and the deliberate killing of otters. a) The ‘deliberate’ harm to otters 36. The permit would be immediately incompatible with Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive if any deliberate (17) harm to otters were to occur in the exercise of the permit. 37. In German criminal law deliberateness would require that the killing or capture of a protected species of animal be the aim of the action. The French intentionelle and the English deliberate have a similar tendency. These two language versions are particularly relevant for the purposes of interpretation here, as the Berne Convention coincides with the directive in that respect. The French intentionelle corresponds to intention, the equivalent of deliberateness in French criminal law. (18) Under French law deliberateness requires both the knowledge and the desire to carry out a deed. Conditional intent, on the other hand – dolus eventualis or dol éventuel, awareness of the commission of the deed and the favourable acceptance of its consequences – is not to be equated with deliberateness in the absence of an express legislative provision. (19) The English word deliberate does not occupy a comparable position in legal terminology. The English term that corresponds to the German word ‘Vorsatz’ is intention. Nevertheless the word deliberate also implies elements of awareness and desire. 38. According to this linguistic interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of the Habitats Directive – which is principally based on how the term is applied in criminal law – actions should only be banned if they are committed in the knowledge of and with the desire to cause harm to a protected species. In practice, those bans would prevent only a few actions directly aimed at protected species of fauna, e.g. hunting, culling of animals as pests or cruelty to animals. 39. On the other hand, Resolution 1/89 of 9 July 1989 (20) adopted by the Standing Committee of the Berne Convention advocates, in certain circumstances, the wider interpretation of at least the terms intentionelle/deliberate in that Convention. As far as the breeding or resting sites under Article 6(b) of the Convention are concerned, those terms are to be interpreted in such a way that they also encompass actions that are not carried out with the aim of damaging breeding or resting sites but simply in the knowledge that they will probably lead to such damage. 40. Systematically speaking, account should be taken of the fact that the system of strict protection under Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive is supplemented by Article 12(4) of the Habitats Directive and by Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (21) – particularly Article 5. 41. Article 12(4) of the Habitats Directive provides that Member States are to monitor the incidental capture and the incidental killing of specimens of the protected species of fauna and, where appropriate, are to take special protective measures. (22) 42. Under Article 5 of Directive 2004/35 foreseeable damage to protected species must be prevented if it has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining their favourable conservation status. Consequently, these must generally be incidents that relate to a large number of individual specimens. This obligation applies, in principle, to occupational activities where there is intent or negligence or, in the case of certain – mostly industrial – activities, even irrespective of the same. 43. The Court has concerned itself with the concept of deliberateness in the context of Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive in proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations under the Treaty in relation to the protected sea turtle Caretta caretta. (23) This species, which has to be afforded strict protection, uses only a very few beaches in the Mediterranean in order to breed. The most important beaches are to be found in Laganas Bay on the Greek island of Zakynthos. The use of those beaches as a breeding site for turtles is adversely affected if mopeds are used on the beach, if sunbeds and umbrellas are to be found on the beach, if illegal buildings are constructed and if pedalos and other small boats are present in the sea around that area. All of these activities were therefore prohibited by way of warning signs. 44. When the Commission established, on visiting the island, that major disturbance of this kind was taking place it brought an action for a declaration that Greece had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. 45. In his Opinion in that case Advocate General Léger took into account the fact that the use of mopeds, sunbeds and umbrellas and the construction of illegal buildings were deliberate acts such as might disturb the species during a period when, in accordance with Community law, it must especially be protected. (24) He therefore primarily related the deliberateness of the perpetrators concerned to their particular conduct and not to the harm caused to the animals. 46. However, this approach is not convincing. The concept of deliberateness in Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Habitats Directive relates to the harm to protected species that is to be prohibited. It would serve very little purpose if it were to be sufficient for harm to only occur in the course of an act committed with an intention of a different nature. Furthermore, the additional protective provisions in Article 12(4) of the Habitats Directive and Article 5 of Directive 2004/35 would also be robbed of almost all their practical effect if every harm covered by Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Habitats Directive were to be prohibited only if it were caused by deliberate conduct. 47. That judgment was based on a different concept of deliberateness. As mopeds and sunbeds were used on the beach despite the warning signs the Court considered this to be deliberate disturbance of the sea turtles during their breeding period within the meaning of Article 12(1)(b) of the Habitats Directive. (25) 48. This conclusion could be understood to mean that deliberateness exists if, in the circumstances of a particular case, the perpetrator should have known that his conduct was jeopardising a protected species. This means that mere negligence would constitute deliberateness within the meaning of Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. 49. However, it cannot be assumed that the Court of Justice was intending to expand the concept of deliberateness to such an extent that deliberateness may exist irrespective of the will of the perpetrator. In all three language versions examined the concept of deliberateness includes a very strong element of will. Hence, the presentation of the facts must be understood to mean that the moped and boat users’ knowledge of the risk to the turtles was to be assumed from the existence of warning signs. It also had to be inferred from that knowledge that they did at least accept the possibility of harm being caused to the protected turtles. The criterion for deliberateness is therefore whether the risk to the protected species was realised and nevertheless accepted. 50. A further restriction of the concept of deliberateness to its meaning in criminal law would conflict with the concept of a ‘system of strict protection’ that is to be established as a result of the prohibitions stated in Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. A system of protection that prohibits the killing, capture or disturbance of species of Community interest only in the case of a few actions directly aimed at those species but permits the risk of harm to those species being consciously accepted in the case of many other actions cannot be termed ‘strict’. 51. In contrast to the interpretation proposed by Advocate General Léger, the interpretation favoured by the Court of Justice does not supplant Article 12(4) of the Habitats Directive or Directive 2004/35. 52. On this interpretation of the concept of deliberateness Article 12(4) of the Habitats Directive covers those cases in which danger to a protected species is not accepted. The necessary protective measures might consist, in particular, of the creation of consciousness of such danger by way of warnings or explanations. 53. As far as Directive 2004/35 is concerned, the protection in Article 5 against damage that is to be prevented is couched in narrower terms, with the necessary subjective elements being further clarified. It is only significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining favourable conservation status that are to be prevented, whereas the prohibitions in Article 12(1) also extend to harm that has less intensive effects because they only relate to individual specimens. The duty to take preventive measures in Directive 2004/35 nevertheless also applies in principle to negligent conduct and, in the case of certain – particularly industrial – activities, even irrespective of intent or negligence. The Court’s interpretation of the concept of deliberateness therefore prevents any gap between the protection afforded to individual specimens under Article 12 of the Habitats Directive and the protection of populations under Directive 2004/35, but still allows Directive 2004/35 its own scope of application. 54. Deliberate harm to protected species of fauna is therefore to be assumed if the harm is the result of an act whereby the perpetrator was aware of the risk to the protected species and also accepted that risk. 55. The Commission’s arguments also fall within this concept of deliberateness. It considers that hunting using non-selective means in an area where the otter is proven to exist cannot be considered non-deliberate hunting of a protected species. The reference to the fox was a mere formality. 56. The Commission is therefore basing its case on the objective risk associated with the use of non-selective hunting methods. It infers from this that the possibility of a danger to protected species of fauna is impliedly accepted. However, this conclusion is only permissible if the hunters knew that specimens of that species existed in the area affected by that particular method of hunting. 57. In the present case, however, there is insufficient indication that the hunters knew, when they were setting up snares, that there was a risk to otters. Whereas it is common knowledge that the beaches in Zakynthos are one of the few breeding sites in the Mediterranean for the sea turtle Caretta caretta, it is still a matter of dispute between the parties here as to whether otters are present at all in the hunting region concerned. During the administrative procedure the Commission only mentioned the otter as one other species affected and laid particular emphasis on the Iberian lynx (Lynx pardinus). In the absence of evidence, therefore, it cannot be assumed that the hunters were aware of the existence of otters in their hunting grounds and therefore of the risk to them. 58. What is more, there were warning signs on the beach in Zakynthos specifically prohibiting the conduct in question. The setting of snares, however, was even the subject of a permit in this case. The hunters were therefore entitled to assume that no breach of the law was to be expected. 59. Consequently, harm to otters as a result of hunting with snares could not be categorised as deliberate. b) Permit requirements 60. What is also questionable, however, is whether a state permit is compatible with the system of strict protection under Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive if the acts permitted do not necessarily conflict with the express prohibitions in subparagraphs (a) to (d). 61. The judgment on sea turtles Caretta caretta also provides valuable pointers in this context. According to that judgment Greece was also in breach of Article 12 of the Habitats Directive because the protective provisions in place in Zakynthos were not adequate to guarantee the effective protection of turtles when breeding. (26) The Court also found against Greece because it had not effectively implemented existing legislation protecting turtles when faced with constant infringements. (27) 62. Consequently, the Member States cannot confine themselves to bringing in general prohibitions along the lines of the wording of Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. In certain circumstances they must even adopt and enforce specific regulations affording protection to a protected species in particular sites if these sites are of outstanding significance for the conservation of the species and the species is exposed to a particular risk. (28) 63. Admittedly, the Commission is not demanding in this case that site-related protective provisions of this kind should be brought in or enforced for the protection of the otter; it is objecting to the authorisation of hunting with snares. 64. However, if Member States can even be obliged to actively adopt and implement specific site-related protective provisions for protected species of fauna they must first take into account, in the course of their authorisation procedure, whether the approved measures harm the protected species of fauna. 65. When applying Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive in such a preventive context it cannot be relevant whether the particular individuals concerned deliberately harm the protected fauna. Indeed, the criterion is whether the competent authorities have to assume that the authorised conduct will cause the damage that is to be prohibited under Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. If that should be the case the permit concerned may then only be granted in accordance with the derogations provided for in Article 16 of the Habitats Directive. Otherwise the competent authorities would be in indirect breach of the prohibitions in Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive. 66. That obligation on the competent authorities does not require deliberateness in the criminal-law sense. The subjective element of deliberateness does not apply to a public authority. Those authorities must use the best scientific knowledge available. (29) In certain circumstances it may be necessary to obtain further information in order to apply the general level of awareness to a particular case. 67. It is therefore necessary to examine whether, when authorising hunting using snares, the Spanish authorities were entitled to assume without further measures of enquiry that otters would not be harmed. 68. When determining this issue the whole of the material produced to the Court of Justice has to be taken into account. The Spanish Government expressly argues for the first time in the rejoinder that the streams shown on the map inside the SA-10.328 hunting ground in Aldeanueva de la Sierra often contained no water, but that assertion does not constitute new evidence the delay in producing which requires justification under Article 42(1) of the Rules of Procedure. Indeed, the Spanish Government had already said in its answer to the first letter of formal notice that the existence of otters was unlikely because of the nature of the site. The reference to the waters drying up supports this assertion. The Commission also mentioned the streams in question for the first time in the reply. 69. The publications that the Spanish Government produced with the rejoinder and that the Commission produced after the written procedure had come to a close do not constitute evidence in the true sense. They are just references to publicly known facts, which are intended to support the views of the parties. 70. Any doubts that might linger after this evidence has been examined must be to the detriment of the Commission as it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of Community law in infringement proceedings. (30) 71. The parties are in dispute as to whether there are otters in hunting ground SA-10.328. The Commission bases its argument on a standard data sheet drawn up by Spanish authorities for a Spanish site proposal for the Natura 2000 network, the ‘Quilamas’ area. According to that, the otter is supposed to exist in the proposed area. ‘Quilamas’ measures an area of over 10 000 hectares. The hunting ground is admittedly situated directly adjacent to the north west of the area but most of the running water within ‘Quilamas’ e.g. the ‘Arroyo de las Quilamas’ appears to drain to the south east. Between that running water and the hunting ground there are mountain ranges with differences in height of several hundred metres. (31) It is therefore unlikely that otters from the population in those water systems will visit the hunting ground. 72. The Commission nevertheless also refers to the fact that the river Mina crosses the hunting ground and that the Zarzosa and Media streams run near the hunting ground. These streams appear to belong to water systems to the west of Quilamas, where otters are also proven to exist. (32) The Spanish Government nevertheless counters the Commission’s argument with the undisputed assertion that those streams regularly dry up. It is apparent from the studies produced in this context that although otters might occasionally use streams that only periodically contain water, in principle they scarcely use them. (33) 73. Hence, from the information available, the existence of otters in the hunting ground, whilst it cannot be excluded, is rather unlikely. 74. When determining the risks associated with authorising hunting with snares account also had to be taken, in addition to the probability of the existence of otters, of the objective risk of the hunting method and the seriousness of any damage. 75. Contrary to the assertion of the Spanish Government, there is indeed a risk of otters being caught in snares and being critically injured. (34) The Spanish Government, however, has made reference to a publication which permits the conclusion that the capture of otters in traps on land is relatively unlikely. (35) Otters would appear to be much more often run over, or drowned in fish-traps or similar fishing equipment. (36) The setting of snares using expert personnel and the prohibition on setting snares in riverbank regions reduce the risk resulting from snares still further. 76. It would also seem to be accepted that the numbers of otters in Salamanca – as in most other regions of Spain and other parts of Europe – following a sharp drop in the past, are now increasing again or are at least stabilising. (37) 77. In brief, it must therefore be concluded that the existence of otters in hunting ground SA-10.328 is unlikely. What is more, the risk to any otter that might visit the hunting ground must be categorised as slim. If otters should ultimately be captured this would admittedly be regrettable but in view of the conservation status of the population of otters in Salamanca it would not represent significant damage. (38) Consequently, according to the information available to the Court, it must be concluded that the hunting authorities were entitled to assume, without further measures of enquiry, that the authorisation of hunting using snares would not endanger the otter. c) Conclusion 78. No infringement of Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive by Spain can thus be established. It follows that the action must be dismissed. V – Costs 79. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the application made by the Spanish Government. VI – Conclusion 80. I therefore propose that the Court should: (1) dismiss the application; (2) order the Commission to pay the costs. 1 – Original language: German. 2 – OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7. 3 – Opened for signature on 19 September 1979, ETS No 104, ratified by the Community by Council Decision of 3 December 1981 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats, OJ 1982 L 38, p. 3. 4 – The Convention is only binding in the English and French languages. The English version uses the word ‘deliberate’ for both ‘absichtlich’ and ‘mutwillig’, whilst the French version uses the term ‘intentionnelle’. 5 – He would appear to be a civil servant. 6 – Hunting wardens would seem to be private individuals who provide security services and are specifically qualified with regard to hunting. 7 – See the judgment in Case C-525/03 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-9405, paragraph 12 et seq. In that case the Court did not follow the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 2 June 2005 see paragraph 28 et seq. and the references stated in footnote 24, who had considered the claim to be admissible on the basis, in particular, of the judgment in Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, paragraph 7 et seq. In the latter judgment the Court had ruled, exceptionally, that despite the infringement having been remedied the application was admissible because the Member State concerned had persisted in its view of the law. Cases of this kind are certainly better appreciated by reference to evidence of practice in a Member State, which the Commission can also base on the infringements remedied see the judgment in Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I‑3331, paragraph 32. The Commission made a few remarks in this respect at the hearing but does not formally allege that there was such a practice. 8 – Judgments in Case 42/82 Commission v France [1983] ECR 1013, paragraph 20, and in Case 113/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 607, paragraph 11. See also regarding statutory measures the judgments in Case C-105/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-5871, paragraph 13, and in Case 45/64 Commission v Italy [1965] ECR 857, at 865 et seq. 9 – Judgment in Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, ‘San Rocco’, paragraph 60. 10 – Judgments in Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 25, in Case C‑139/00 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-6407, paragraph 19, and in Case C‑433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I‑6985, paragraph 28. 11 – Judgment in Case C-230/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1169, paragraph 31. 12 – Judgment in Case C-350/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-6213, paragraph 21. 13 – The same rule is to be found in Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance and the Spanish Government cites its case-law in this context. 14 – Judgment in Case C-178/00 Italy v Commission [2003] ECR I-303, paragraph 6. 15 – Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ 1979 L 103, p. 1. 16 – Report on the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (1997-1998) (Article 9(2)) (presented by the European Commission), SEC (2001) 515 final. See also the Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 on the continuation and implementation of the European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1987-1992), OJ 1987 C 328, paragraph 5.1.6. The judgment in Case C‑75/01 Commission v Luxembourg [2003] ECR I‑1585, paragraph 57, does not preclude reference being made to this Convention, as the Court only held there that implementation of the Convention did not constitute implementation of the Habitats Directive, in so far as the Convention does not go as far as the Directive. 17 – The word ‘deliberate’ is not only significant in the context of actions in relation to fauna protected under Annex IV(a), which are prohibited under Article 12(1)(a) to (c) of the Habitats Directive. Article V of the Birds Directive also requires, in relation to birds naturally occurring in Europe, the prohibition of deliberate killing or capture (subparagraph (a)) or the deliberate disturbance of these birds particularly during the period of breeding and rearing, in so far as disturbance would be significant having regard to the objectives of the Birds Directive (subparagraph (d)) and the deliberate destruction of, or damage to, their nests and eggs or removal of their nests (subparagraph (b)). 18 – See the first paragraph of Article 121-3 of the French Code pénal (Criminal Code). 19 – See paragraph 2 of Article 121-3 of the French Code pénal. The conscious jeopardisation of other persons legislated for there is deemed codification of the principle of conditional intent. 20 – Accessible via the European Council website at http://www.coe.int. 21 – OJ 2004 L 143, p. 56. 22 – One example of such protective measures attributable exceptionally to the Community is Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 of 26 April 2004 laying down measures concerning incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98, OJ 2004 L 150, p. 12 (amended version: OJ 2004 L 185, p. 4). The Community had to bring in this rule as it has exclusive jurisdiction in the fisheries field. 23 – Judgment in Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147 (Caretta caretta). See also the judgment in Case 412/85 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 3503, at paragraph 14 et seq.: the intentional use of the land, e.g. in agriculture, does not rule out the deliberate killing or capture of birds, the deliberate damage to or destruction of their nests and eggs and their deliberate disturbance within the meaning of Article 5 of the Birds Directive. 24 – Opinion in Caretta caretta, cited in footnote 23, paragraph 57. 25 – Caretta caretta judgment, cited in footnote 23, paragraph 36. 26 – Caretta caretta judgment, cited in footnote 23, paragraph 27 et seq.. 27 – Caretta caretta judgment, cited in footnote 23, paragraph 39. 28 – The Court of Justice will have to deal with this interpretation of the Caretta caretta judgment cited in footnote 23 in Case C-518/04 Commission v Greece (‘Vipera schweizeri’), notice in OJ 2005 C 57, p. 15. 29 – See judgments in Case C-157/89 Commission v Italy (hunting periods) [1991] ECR I-57, paragraph 15, in Case C-3/96 Commission v Netherlands (IBA list) [1998] ECR I-3031, paragraph 69 et seq., and in Case C-79/03 Commission v Spain (numbers hunted) [2004] ECR I‑11619, paragraph 41. 30 – Cf. the judgment in Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited there. 31 – See the map at http://www.dipsanet.es/provin/MapaSalamanca2003.pdf. 32 – Lizana inter alia, in: Ruiz-Olmo and Delibes, La nutria en España, 1998, p. 118. 33 – Lizana inter alia, in: Ruiz-Olmo and Delibes, La nutria en España, 1998, p. 118. Ruiz-Olmo and Delibes, ebenda, p 215, stress, however, that the use by otters of waters that dry up is increasingly to be found in many parts of Spain. 34 – See the BBC report of 3 May 2005 on the death of an otter in a snare, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cornwall/4511053.stm, and the report by the International Otter Survival Fund of 3 May 2003, http://www.otter.org/Update.html, on the death of an otter due to cardiac enlargement after hours of struggling in a snare. 35 – Palazón and Ruiz-Olmo, in: II Jornadas SECEM 1995, p. 67. 36 – See Saavedra inter alia, in: V Jornadas SECEM 2001, p. 125. 37 – Ruiz-Olmo and Delibes, in: Ruiz-Olmo and Delibes, La nutria en España, 1998, p. 212 et seq. 38 – The case of the otter is therefore different from that of the sea turtle Caretta caretta, which only uses a very few beaches in the Mediterranean in order to breed, and from the extremely rare Iberian lynx, which only exists in Spain.