Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:360
Date: 2026-04-30
Language of the case: German

summary of that decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 6 April 2017 (OJ 2017 C 108, p. 6). 18 According to that decision, 15 manufacturers of trucks, namely MAN Truck & Bus SE, MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH, MAN Truck & Bus AG, Daimler AG, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV, CNH Industrial NV, Iveco SpA, Iveco Magirus AG, AB Volvo (publ), Volvo Lastvagnar AB, Renault Trucks SAS, Volvo Group Trucks Central Europe GmbH, PACCAR Inc., DAF Trucks Deutschland GmbH and DAF Trucks NV, participated in a cartel, prohibited, in particular, by Article 101 TFEU, consisting in collusive agreements on pricing and gross price increases in the European Economic Area for trucks and on the timing and the passing on of costs for the introduction of emission technologies for those trucks required by the standards in force (‘the cartel concerned’). As concerns MAN Truck & Bus SE, MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH and MAN Truck & Bus AG, that infringement took place between 17 January 1997 and 20 September 2010 and, for the 12 other participating companies, between 17 January 1997 and 18 January 2011. 19 Wenzel Logistics is a transport company established in Austria which, during those periods covered by the cartel concerned, bought trucks from distributors of several participants in that cartel, inter alia, trucks of the Mercedes-Benz brand, which was owned by Daimler AG, now Mercedes-Benz Group. 20 On 13 January 2021, Wenzel Logistics brought an action for damages before the Landgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Graz (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Graz, Austria), seeking that Mercedes-Benz Group be ordered to pay it a sum of EUR 848 357.92 as compensation for the harm that it alleged to have suffered as a result of the cartel concerned. That sum corresponds, according to Wenzel Logistics, to the difference between the purchasing prices for the trucks which were actually paid by it and the prices that it would have paid had the cartel concerned not existed, together with statutory interest and costs. 21 As concerns interest, Wenzel Logistics claimed that it was payable, under Paragraph 37d of the KartG, from the date on which the harm occurred. 22 Mercedes-Benz Group, supported by MAN Truck & Bus SE and MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH, interveners in the main proceedings, submitted that the cartel concerned had not had any impact on the net prices invoiced to Wenzel Logistics and that, in any case, Wenzel Logistics had passed on those prices to its clients. Mercedes-Benz Group also maintained that it is only since 1 March 2013 that the right to compensation for harm resulting from cartels has been governed in Austrian law by the KartG. As the right to compensation for the harm caused by the cartel concerned arose before that date, the interest should be paid, on the basis of the ABGB, from the date on which it became due. That date should be determined not in relation to the time when the harm occurred, but in relation to the moment when the action of Wenzel Logistics was notified. 23 By judgment of 2 April 2024, the Landgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Graz (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Graz) ruled, on the basis of an expert opinion, that Mercedes-Benz Group had to pay Wenzel Logistics a sum of EUR 172 857.42, which included interest at the annual statutory rate of 4%. In accordance with Paragraph 1333 of the ABGB, read in conjunction with other provisions of Austrian civil law, that court took the view that that interest was due from the date on which the right to compensation had been asserted in quantitative terms by way of a formal notice or in the context of an action, that is, in the present case, from 21 January 2021, which is the date on which the action for damages was notified to Mercedes-Benz Group. 24 The appeal brought by Wenzel Logistics against that judgment was dismissed by judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Graz (Higher Regional Court, Graz, Austria) of 10 October 2024. 25 In that judgment, the appeal court pointed out that Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, which concerns the right to full compensation, including interest, for harm caused by an infringement of competition law was transposed into the Austrian legal system by Paragraph 37d of the KartG, in the version published in BGBl. I, 56/2017, which applies, in accordance with Paragraph 86 of that law, only to harm that occurred after 26 December 2016. That provision, therefore, like Paragraph 37a of the KartG, which entered into force on 1 March 2013, is not applicable, ratione temporis, to the action for damages brought by Wenzel Logistics. The court of first instance thus had correctly relied on the general rules of Austrian civil law, without taking into account the specific rules in the KartG. 26 Wenzel Logistics brought an appeal on a point of law (Revision) against that judgment before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), which is the referring court. 27 The referring court notes that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the right to full compensation, including interest, for harm caused by a cartel stems directly from Article 101(1) TFEU and the principle of effectiveness. The Court of Justice further specified that Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2014/104 reflected that case-law on Article 101(1) TFEU, with the result that the national measures implementing Article 3(1) and (2) had, in accordance with Article 22(2) of that directive, to apply with immediate effect to any action for damages falling within the scope of that directive. 28 In the light of that case-law, according to the referring court, it cannot be ruled out that Paragraph 37d of the KartG, in the version published in BGBl. I, 56/2017, must be applicable to the case in the main proceedings. However, that is possible only if Paragraph 86 of the KartG is disapplied in so far as it provides that Paragraph 37d of that law concerns solely compensation for harm that has occurred after 26 December 2016. That court wishes to ask the Court of Justice whether Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, read in conjunction with Article 22(2) of that directive, must in fact be understood as meaning that a national provision such as Paragraph 37d of the KartG applies to an action for damages such as that brought by Wenzel Logistics. 29 The referring court, furthermore, wishes to know which criteria must be taken into consideration in order to determine, pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, the date on which the harm occurred, from which, according to recital 12 of that directive, interest is payable. That court is uncertain whether, in the context of an action for damages such as that brought by Wenzel Logistics, concerning harm caused by a cartel consisting in the sale of goods at inflated prices, interest must be calculated from the date on which those goods were paid for at an inflated price or from another date, such as the date on which the purchasing price of those goods became due for payment or the date on which the contract for sale was concluded. 30 In those circumstances the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Should Article 3(2) of Directive [2014/104], read in conjunction with Article 22(2) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that Article 3(2), relating to the payment of interest for harm caused by a cartel, applies to actions for damages brought before a national court after 26 December 2014? If that question is answered in the negative: what other date should be used for the purpose of applying Article 3(2) of Directive [2014/104]? (2) Should Article 3(2) of Directive [2014/104] be interpreted as meaning that the date on which the harm caused by a cartel [occurred] and from which interest is payable on the harm caused by a cartel is to be regarded as the date on which the [inflated] price resulting from a prohibited price-fixing arrangement was paid by the injured party? If that question is answered in the negative: what other date should be used for the purpose of determining when the harm occurred?’ Consideration of the questions referred Admissibility 31 According to Mercedes-Benz Group, supported by MAN Truck & Bus SE and MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH, the questions referred, which concern the interpretation of Directive 2014/104, are manifestly irrelevant for the solution of the dispute in the main proceedings, as the action for damages of Wenzel Logistics does not fall within the temporal scope of that directive. Article 3(2) of that directive clearly constitutes a ‘substantive provision’ within the meaning of Article 22(1) of that directive. Accordingly, in view of the prohibition of retroactive application laid down in Article 22(1) of the directive, the national provisions implementing Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 cannot apply to the action for damages brought by Wenzel Logistics, which relates to harm that occurred before the entry into force of Directive 2014/104. 32 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the action has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling enabling it to deliver its judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context, which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for this Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 7 September 1999, Beck and Bergdorf, C‑355/97, EU:C:1999:391, paragraph 22, and of 12 February 2026, Valora Effekten Handel, C‑864/24, EU:C:2026:94, paragraph 28). 33 In the present case, as is also apparent from the information provided by the referring court concerning its first question, that court has doubts as to whether Paragraph 37d of the KartG, the provision of Austrian law which implements Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, is subject to the prohibition of retroactive application laid down in Article 22(1) of that directive. 34 That question is neither hypothetical nor one which bears no relation to the actual facts of the dispute in the main proceedings or its purpose. It is undisputed that Wenzel Logistics claims that Paragraph 37d of the KartG is applicable to its action for damages instead of the general rules of Austrian civil law, which were applied to that action by the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Graz (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Graz) and the Oberlandesgericht Graz (Higher Regional Court, Graz). Should Paragraph 37d of that law apply, interest would be calculated from the date on which the harm occurred, while, in the event that the general rules of Austrian civil law were applicable, interest would be payable, according to the information provided in the order for reference, only from the date on which that action was notified to Mercedes-Benz Group. The provisions of Directive 2014/104 referred to in the first question are, consequently, relevant for determining whether Paragraph 37d of the KartG is to apply to the action in the main proceedings, and the Court has before it the factual and legal material necessary to give an answer to that question. 35 It follows that the first question is admissible. 36 The second question is based on the premiss, whose accuracy will be verified in the context of examining the first question, that a national provision implementing Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, such as Paragraph 37d of the KartG, is to apply to an action for damages concerning harm that occurred before the entry into force of that directive. If it emerges that that premiss is accurate, the Court must answer the second question, which concerns the inferences that may be drawn from Article 3(2) of that directive in order to identify, for the purpose of calculating interest, the time when the harm occurred. 37 As the second question therefore is neither hypothetical nor one which bears no relation to the actual facts of the dispute in the main proceedings or its purpose, and the Court has before it the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the referring court, that question is also admissible. Moreover, the argument put forward by Mercedes-Benz Group, supported by MAN Truck & Bus SE and MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland GmbH, claiming that Directive 2014/104 does not contain, contrary to what the referring court suggests by asking that question, any binding rule relating to the date on which the harm occurred, concerns the substance of the case. Substance The first question 38 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3(2) and Article 22(2) of Directive 2014/104 must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision implementing the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law, which provides that the interest payable in the context of that full compensation must be calculated from the date on which the harm occurred, must be applicable with immediate effect to all legal actions seeking such compensation brought on or after 26 December 2014, the date of the entry into force of that directive. 39 As regards the temporal application of the national provisions implementing Directive 2014/104, it is necessary to draw a distinction based on whether the rule of that directive implemented by the national provision at issue codifies the Court’s case-law on Article 101 TFEU, in which case that national provision must apply with immediate effect, or whether that rule stems solely from that directive, which requires an examination of the temporal applicability of that national provision in the light of Article 22 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer, C‑312/21, EU:C:2023:99, paragraph 33). 40 As regards the rule, stated in Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, according to which full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law must comprise compensation for actual loss, loss of profit and the payment of interest, the Court has already stated that that rule codifies, as is clear from recital 12 of that directive, the case-law on Article 101 TFEU, resulting, in particular, from the judgment of 13 July 2006, Manfredi and Others (C‑295/04 to C‑298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 95), so that national measures transposing Article 3(2) must apply with immediate effect to all actions for damages falling within the scope of that directive, as confirmed by Article 22(2) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer, C‑312/21, EU:C:2023:99, paragraphs 34 and 35). 41 Having thus clarified that the provisions of national law implementing Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 must apply with immediate effect to all actions for damages seeking compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law, the Court also stated, in paragraph 35 of the judgment of 16 February 2023, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer (C‑312/21, EU:C:2023:99), that that immediate applicability concerns actions falling within the scope of that directive pursuant to Article 22(2) of that directive. 42 As is clear from Article 22(2) of the directive, actions brought before 26 December 2014, the date on which Directive 2014/104 entered into force, are excluded from the scope of that directive and Member States must ensure that national provisions intended to transpose that directive into their domestic legal systems do not apply to those actions. 43 In that regard, the Court specified that, where a national provision referred to in Article 22(2) of Directive 2014/104 enters into force at a date between 26 December 2014 and 27 December 2016, which is the date on which the period for transposing that directive expired, it is possible for the Member State in question to determine that all actions for damages brought before the date of the entry into force of that national provision, or before 27 December 2016, are excluded from the scope of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications, C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraphs 28 and 29). 44 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that Wenzel Logistics brought its action for damages, seeking compensation for the harm caused by the cartel concerned, on 13 January 2021. It appears also that Paragraph 37a of the KartG, which provides, inter alia, that interest is payable from the date on which the harm occurred, has the purpose of transposing Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 into the Austrian legal system. In those circumstances, whose accuracy is not for the Court of Justice to verify, Paragraph 37d of the KartG must apply to the situation at issue in the main proceedings. 45 There is no need, in that regard, to examine whether Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 constitutes a ‘substantive provision’, within the meaning of Article 22(1) of that directive. As follows from paragraphs 33 and 35 of the judgment of 16 February 2023, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer (C‑312/21, EU:C:2023:99), whose content is reiterated in paragraphs 39 to 41 of the present judgment, the temporal application of the national provisions implementing Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 cannot, if the practical effect of Article 101(1) TFEU, whose interpretation is codified in Article 3(2), is not to be undermined, be subject to the restrictions imposed by Article 22 of that directive, the only exception, deriving from Article 22(2), being that national provisions implementing that directive cannot, in any event, apply to actions brought before the entry into force of that directive. 46 Consequently, a national provision such as Paragraph 86 of the KartG, which limits the applicability of Paragraph 37d of that law to actions seeking compensation for harm occurring after 26 December 2016 and which leads, in the case of an action such as that of Wenzel Logistics, seeking compensation for harm that occurred before 27 December 2016, to payment of interest not from the date on which the harm occurred, but from the date on which the action was notified, must be regarded as undermining the practical effect of Article 101(1) TFEU. 47 It must be noted, in that regard, that when Directive 2014/104 was adopted, the Court had already held, in paragraphs 95 and 97 of the judgment of 13 July 2006, Manfredi and Others (C‑295/04 to C‑298/04, EU:C:2006:461), in essence, that full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law cannot, if it is not to render that compensation ineffective, disregard facts, such as the effluxion of time, which are likely to reduce, in practice, the value of that compensation. In that regard, in paragraph 97 of that judgment, the Court, by analogy, referred to its previous case-law arising from the judgment of 2 August 1993, Marshall (C‑271/91, EU:C:1993:335, paragraph 31). As follows from recital 12 of Directive 2014/104, that directive intends, inter alia, to codify that case-law of the Court, according to which full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law entails the payment of interest from the date on which the harm occurred. 48 In the light of that case-law and that recital of Directive 2014/104, which are relevant for the purpose of interpreting Article 3(2) of that directive, a national provision such as Paragraph 86 of the KartG, whose application would lead, for harm that occurred before 27 December 2016, to a calculation of interest which does not take into account the effluxion of time between the time when the harm occurred and the time when the injured party asserts his or her right to compensation, does not guarantee the full effectiveness of Article 101(1) TFEU. That is all the more so since the specificities of competition law cases require, as a general rule, a complex factual and economic analysis (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2023, Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos, C‑25/21, EU:C:2023:298, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). Those specificities generally have the effect that a long period of time elapses between the time when the harm caused by a cartel occurred and the finding by the competent competition authority that such a cartel existed. Thus, it was only on 19 July 2016 that the Commission established the existence of the cartel concerned, which was in place, as concerns the participation therein of Daimler (now Mercedes-Benz Group), between 17 January 1997 and 18 January 2011. 49 In so far as a national provision such as Paragraph 86 of the KartG must be regarded as undermining the practical effect of Article 101(1) TFEU, it must be borne in mind that that provision of primary EU law produces direct legal effects in relations between individuals and directly creates rights for individuals which national courts must protect (judgments of 30 January 1974, BRT and Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs, 127/73, EU:C:1974:6, paragraph 16, and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia, C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 50). 50 It should also be borne in mind that the national court is required to interpret national law, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the text and purpose of Article 101(1) TFEU, taking into consideration the whole body of national law and applying the interpretative methods recognised by national law, with a view to ensuring that that provision of primary EU law is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective which it pursues. If the national court considers that it is not possible for it to uphold a consistent interpretation, owing to certain restrictions arising from, for example, the prohibition to adopt an interpretation of national law contra legem, that court would be required to disregard that national provision and to apply directly Article 101(1) TFEU to the dispute pending before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Sumal, C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800, paragraphs 71 to 73). 51 In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that Article 3(2) and Article 22(2) of Directive 2014/104, read in conjunction with Article 101(1) TFEU, must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision implementing the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law and providing that the interest payable in the context of that full compensation must be calculated from the date on which the harm occurred, which can, as the case may be, precede the entry into force of that directive, must apply with immediate effect to all legal actions seeking such compensation brought after the entry into force of that national provision or, where that entry into force postdates the expiry of the deadline for the transposition of that directive, to all such actions for damages brought after the expiry of that deadline. The second question 52 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of full compensation for harm caused by a cartel consisting in concluding collusive agreements leading to the sale of goods at inflated prices, the date on which that harm occurred, from which interest is payable, is the date on which those prices were paid by the injured party. 53 As stated in paragraphs 40 and 47 of the present judgment, the EU legislature codified, in Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, the Court’s previous case-law, according to which the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law entails, inter alia, the payment of interest from the date on which that harm occurred. 54 That obligation is reflected in the very definition of the concept of ‘full compensation’ in Article 3(2) of that directive, which states that such compensation ‘shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed’. 55 The occurrence of harm gives rise to a position which is fundamentally different from the position in which the person concerned would have been had the infringement in question not been committed, with the result that all components of the compensation, including interest intended to compensate for the effluxion of time, must be determined on the basis of the date on which the harm occurred. 56 The EU legislature, however, failed to elaborate on the criteria for establishing the circumstance that determines when the harm occurs. As that specific aspect of implementing the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law has not been harmonised, Member States enjoy discretion in that regard. 57 That freedom nevertheless does not affect the obligation, imposed on each Member State, to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 April 1984, von Colson and Kamann, 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, paragraph 15, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 62). 58 The obligation to ensure ‘full compensation’ for harm, within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, which follows from Article 101(1) TFEU, means that any Member State authority must rely on criteria that allow the establishment of the circumstance which primarily marks the time when the injured party began to suffer the harm caused by the infringement of competition law. Where various circumstances, each as relevant as the other, lead to the occurrence of that harm, it is the circumstance which occurred first that must be identified so as to serve as the point of departure for calculating interest. 59 Furthermore, where the harm consists of separate parts, it should be ensured that the assessment, based on the information set out in the preceding paragraph, concerning the time when that harm occurred is done separately for each part of that harm. 60 In the present case, as, first, it is apparent from the order for reference that the harm alleged by Wenzel Logistics resulted from the purchase of trucks at prices that were inflated as a result of the cartel in question, and, second, as is clear from Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, whose content is derived from Article 101(1) TFEU, which, as has been pointed out in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, has direct effect between individuals, the harm referred to by that directive covers not only actual loss, but also loss of profit, it appears, subject to verifications to be carried out by the referring court in the light of all the relevant circumstances, that the time when the funds became unavailable as a result of paying those prices could constitute the time when the harm occurred. 61 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, read in conjunction with Article 101(1) TFEU, must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of full compensation for harm caused by a cartel consisting in concluding collusive agreements leading to the sale of goods at inflated prices, the date on which that harm occurred, from which interest is payable, is the date on which the circumstance occurred which primarily marks the time when the injured party began to suffer actual loss or loss of profit owing to that cartel. Costs 62 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby rules: 1. Article 3(2) and Article 22(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 101(1) TFEU, must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision implementing the right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law and providing that the interest payable in the context of that full compensation must be calculated from the date on which the harm occurred, which can, as the case may be, precede the entry into force of that directive, must apply with immediate effect to all legal actions seeking such compensation brought after the entry into force of that national provision or, where that entry into force postdates the expiry of the deadline for the transposition of that directive, to all such actions for damages brought after the expiry of that deadline. 2. Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/104, read in conjunction with Article 101(1) TFEU, must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of full compensation for harm caused by a cartel consisting in concluding collusive agreements leading to the sale of goods at inflated prices, the date on which that harm occurred, from which interest is payable, is the date on which the circumstance occurred which primarily marks the time when the injured party began to suffer actual loss or loss of profit owing to that cartel. [Signatures] * Language of the case: German.