Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2026:14
Date: 2026-01-15
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Tenth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Italy

Summary C-588/24 – 1 
Case C-588/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
10 September 2024 
Referring court: 
Consiglio di Stato (Italy) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
26 August 2024 
Applicant and appellant: 
Imballaggi Piemontesi Srl 
Defendant and respondent: 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
By an action brought before the TAR Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, 
Lazio), the limited liability company, Imballaggi Piemontesi Srl (‘IP’), challenged 
a decision taken on 17 July 2019 by the Autorità garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato (the Italian Competition Authority; ‘the AGCM’), by which it imposed a 
penalty on that company for having participated in an agreement restricting 
competition on the market for the production and sale of cardboard sheets. After 
the action was dismissed, IP brought an appeal before the Consiglio di Stato 
(Italian Council of State), the referring court. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The reference for a preliminary ruling, made by the Italian Council of State, 
pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, concerns the interpretation of Articles 41 and 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) and 
seeks to determine whether they preclude national legislation which does not 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-588/24 
 
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expressly provide that the time period for the conclusion of the penalty 
proceedings before the AGCM is mandatory 
Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
Do Articles 41 and 47 of the [Charter] and Article 46 of the [European 
Convention on Human Rights] preclude rules such as national rules which, in the 
area of the monitoring of agreements restricting competition, for the purposes of 
the exercise of powers to impose penalties and without prejudice to the exercise of 
the enforcement powers, do not expressly provide that the time period for 
concluding proceedings set by the Italian Competition Authority in the statement 
of objections is mandatory, allowing that authority to extend that time period 
unilaterally, by justified extension measures, when circumstances arise that call 
for an objective or subjective extension of the assessment? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Directive 2014/104/EU 
Communication from the European Commission 2004/C 191/08 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Article 6(3) of decreto del Presidente della Repubblica (d.P.R.) n. 217 del 1998, 
regolamento in materia di procedure istruttorie di competenza dell’Autorità 
garante della concorrenza e del mercato (Presidential Decree No 217 of 1998 on 
the regulation of investigation procedures falling within the competence of the 
Italian Competition Authority) provides that the measure to initiate the 
investigation shall indicate, inter alia, the essential elements relative to the alleged 
infringements and the time period for the conclusion of the proceedings. 
Article 2(5) of legge n. 241 del 1990 (Law No 241 of 1990) provides that, save as 
provided for by specific legislative provisions, assurance and supervisory 
authorities shall govern the time periods for the conclusion of the proceedings 
falling within their respective competences in accordance with their own internal 
rules. 
Article 1(4) of Legge n. 287 del 1990, norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del 
mercato (Law No 287 of 1990 on the protection of competition and the market), 
which provides that ‘the provisions in this Title shall be interpreted in accordance 
with the principles laid down in the competition law of the European 
Communities’; Article 12(1) quater, which provides that proceedings relating to 
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infringements of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU shall comply with the general 
principles of EU law or Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 By a resolution adopted on 22 March 2017, the AGCM initiated an investigation 
against 19 companies, including IP, with a view to establishing possible 
infringements of Article 101 TFEU on account of participation in an agreement 
restricting competition in the cardboard market, and set 31 May 2018 as the time 
period for the conclusion of the proceedings. By four successive resolutions, the 
proceedings were extended to other companies. By a resolution of 31 January 
2018, the time period for the conclusion of the proceedings was extended until 
31 December 2018; lastly, by a resolution of 31 October 2018, the subject matter 
of the investigation was extended to cover the assessment of actions taken in 
monitoring the production of cardboard sheets, price-fixing and customer-sharing, 
and the time period for the conclusion of the proceedings was extended until 
19 July 2019. 
2 On 17 July 2019, the AGCM imposed a penalty on IP for its involvement in an 
agreement restricting competition. IP brought an action against that decision 
before the Tribunale amministrativo per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, 
Lazio), which, by judgment No 6052 of 24 May 2021, dismissed that action. IP 
appealed against that judgment to the Italian Council of State, arguing that the 
penalty for failure to comply with the time period for the conclusion of the penalty 
proceedings was out of time. By judgment No 2118 of 1 March 2023, the Italian 
Council of State varied the judgment under appeal by upholding the action at first 
instance solely in respect of the determination of the penalty. IP brought an action 
for revision against the judgment of the Italian Council of State before the same 
court, requesting revision of the ruling. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
3 IP requested that a question for a preliminary ruling be referred to the Court of 
Justice in order to ascertain the exact scope of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter. It 
considers that the time periods for the conclusion of the proceedings before the 
AGCM are intended to protect the accused; however, in its view, the failure to 
provide for the mandatory nature of those time periods allows the AGCM to 
extend them unilaterally, including in cases other than those defined in its 
regulations or in ordinary legislation. 
4 The AGCM recalls supranational case-law, which considers that the time period 
initially set by the competent administrative authority is not mandatory. It also 
considers that it would be appropriate to stay the proceedings in the present case 
pending the decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-511/23 dealing with the 
same matter. 
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Previous national case-law in the present field  
5 The referring court refers to its judgment No 3977 of 2023, in a similar dispute 
concerning the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and 
Environment (‘ARERA’). In that judgment, the Italian Council of State ruled on 
the mandatory or indicative nature of the time period for the conclusion of the 
proceedings, summarising the existing guidelines on the matter: 
– according to one interpretation, prevailing in the case-law of the Italian Council 
of State, the time period for the conclusion of the penalty proceedings conducted 
by ARERA– and, more generally, by independent administrative authorities – 
must be regarded as mandatory. Failure to respect the time period renders the 
penalty imposed unlawful, on the grounds of the need for certainty in legal 
relations and the fact that there is a close link between compliance with that time 
period and the effectiveness of the defendant’s rights of defence; 
– according to a second interpretation, the time period for the conclusion of the 
penalty proceedings is indicative, in so far as the mandatory nature is not provided 
for by law and in view of the fact that the protection of the individual rights is 
satisfied by the presence of the five-year limitation period and by the possibility of 
bringing an action against the administration; 
– according to a third interpretation, the time period for the conclusion of the 
penalty proceedings is, as a general rule, indicative and the court is recognised as 
having the power to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the length of time 
taken by the authority to impose the penalty was reasonable, specifically, as 
regards the time it had originally planned to take. 
6 In that judgment, the Italian Council of State reiterated the argument that the time 
period was mandatory, on the basis of an interpretation of the national legislation 
in conformity with the Italian Constitution, having regard to the rights of the 
defence and the principles of equality, legality, impartiality and good 
administration. It also stated that the argument that it is legitimate to set a time 
period for the conclusion on a case-by-case basis cannot be accepted, in so far as it 
is contrary to those principles and in view of the fact that regulatory uncertainty is 
liable to discourage investment by economic operators, including those of foreign 
origin. 
7 In that judgment, the Italian Council of State concluded that: 
– ARERA could independently regulate its penalty proceedings and, in doing so, 
it was required to set, in advance, a general time period for its conclusion; 
– the time period for the conclusion of the penalty proceedings must be regarded 
as mandatory; in any event, where ARERA indicated a time period for the 
conclusion of the proceedings in the formal notice of the initiation of the 
procedure, that implies the adoption of a constraint which the authority imposes 
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upon itself and with which it is obliged to comply, with the result that if that time 
period is exceeded, the penalty is rendered unlawful. 
8 The referring court also mentions judgment No 8155 of 2021, which it delivered 
in the context of a dispute relating to the assessment of unfair commercial 
practices concerning the AGCM. In that judgment, the Italian Council of State 
reiterated that the mandatory nature of the time periods governing the application 
of financial administrative penalties, even though not expressly set out in the 
relevant provisions, may nevertheless be established on account of the punitive 
nature of the penalty measures: the procedure relating to those measures must 
ensure compliance with the guarantees recognised in Articles 6 and 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), as well as the Protocol 7 
(Articles 2 and 4). 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
9 The referring court notes that the purpose of the obligation to make a reference for 
a preliminary ruling is to ensure the uniform application of EU law, which would 
be undermined if divergent approaches were to be established within the various 
national legal systems. The national court of last instance is obliged to refer the 
question for a preliminary ruling, with the only exceptions identified by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in the judgments in Case C-283/81 Cilfit of 
6 October 1982 and, more recently, in Case C-561/19 of 6 October 2021, and in 
the order in Case C-597/21 of 15 December 2022. It points out that, in the present 
case, the obligation to refer exists in so far as there is no ‘acte clair’, which does 
not necessitate further interpretations, and the question referred is relevant. 
10 The referring court observes that there is no rule, whether at European or national 
level, which lays down a mandatory time period for the conclusion of proceedings 
to establish the existence of agreements restricting competition. In particular, it 
points out that Article 6(3) of Presidential Decree No 217 of 1998 confers on the 
AGCM a discretion to impose constraints on its activity. 
11 It also notes the differences between the AGCM and the ARERA, stating that the 
regulation governing ARERA’s penalty proceedings provides that the time period 
for the conclusion of the proceedings is 220 days from the notification of the 
commencement of the procedure, unless there are justified procedural grounds; a 
time period, in the absence of a justified extension, is therefore already set at a 
regulatory level, unlike the procedures conducted by the AGCM to protect 
freedom of competition. Decree No 217 of the President of the Republic of 
30 April 1998 on agreements restricting competition did not in fact introduce a 
general time period for the conclusion of the proceedings, leaving it to the 
discretion of the procedural body to set the deadline, on a case-by-case basis, 
according to the characteristics and complexity of the case before it. 
12 The referring court observes that, in the present case, the question raised by IP 
relates to the mandatory nature of the time period of 31 May 2018, set out in the 
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document initiating the AGCM proceedings of 22 March 2017. According to the 
referring court, the mandatory nature of that time period should be ruled out for 
several reasons: – Article 6(3) of Presidential Decree No 217 of 1998 does not 
describe the time period for the conclusion of the proceedings as mandatory; – 
Article 152(2) of the codice del processo amministrativo (Code of Administrative 
Procedure) provides that the time periods laid down by law are indicative, unless 
the law expressly declares them to be mandatory; – logically, just as the AGCM 
has the power to determine on a case-by-case basis the period necessary for the 
conclusion of the proceedings, it also has the power to redetermine the duration of 
the proceedings, provided that it does so prior to the end of the time period and by 
reasoned decision. While the investigation is being conducted, the assessment may 
prove much more complex, from an objective and subjective point of view, than 
that envisaged when the initiation of the proceedings was notified and the initial 
time period was set. 
13 In that regard, the referring court points out that the present case was extremely 
complex from the outset and that it has become increasingly complex over time, 
due to both the gradual involvement of new undertakings and the extension of the 
investigations to other aspects of the unlawful cartel. As a result of that gradual, 
subjective and objective extension of the initial proceedings, the time period for 
the conclusion of the procedure was therefore extended twice, bringing the time 
period forward by more than one year with respect to that initially envisaged. 
Those extensions made it necessary to ensure, first, that AGCM effectively carried 
out its activities to ensure competition is not restricted, under of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU and, second, that the right to an adversarial procedure could be fully 
exercised by both the new companies to which the administrative action was 
directed and the original companies, including IP, as regards the relationship with 
the new companies involved and the extension of the scope of the assessment. 
14 The referring court therefore takes the view that, in the present case, relating to an 
agreement restricting competition, the time period for the conclusion of the 
proceedings may be regarded as mandatory, not in the sense that the time period 
initially indicated must necessarily be observed, but only in as much as the initial 
time period cannot be disregarded again, once it has been reasonably extended on 
justified grounds. In essence, the time period of 31 May 2018 initially set by the 
AGCM in the act initiating the proceedings cannot be regarded as mandatory, but 
only that of 19 July 2019, fixed in the second act extending the time period for the 
conclusion of the proceedings, which, as regards the date on which the measure 
was adopted, was complied with by that authority. 
15 According to the referring court, supranational case-law appears to suggest that 
the time period initially set by the sectoral administrative authority is not 
mandatory. As regards the general principle of a fair hearing laid down in 
Article 6 of the ECHR and Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, the referring court 
observes that, in a dispute between the EIB and its staff members concerning the 
time period for bringing proceedings, the Court of Justice stated that the 
‘reasonableness’ of the duration of the administrative procedure cannot be 
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examined by reference to a precise maximum time period determined in an 
abstract manner, but must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case 
(Case C-334/12 RX-II, paragraph 28, and Case C-238/99 P, paragraph 192). 
16 Furthermore, given that the ‘reasonable time’ principle is a general principle of 
EU law and is reproduced in Article 47(2) of the Charter, the case-law of the 
Court of Justice has emphasised that the fact of exceeding a reasonable time, 
where identified, can constitute a ground for annulment only where it has been 
established that the breach of that principle adversely affected the rights of 
defence of the undertakings concerned (Case T-372/10, paragraphs 105 and 
C-611/16, paragraph 141). 
17 The referring court notes that IP has not shown how extending the time period for 
the conclusion of the proceedings affected the exercise of its rights of defence and 
points out, on the contrary, that the extension was also decided to enable an 
adversarial procedure to be established with the parties concerned in a proper 
manner and, therefore, to ensure that they could fully exercise their rights of 
defence in relation to the new circumstances which arose during the investigation. 
18 Furthermore, in cases of such complexity, the automatic unlawfulness of the 
measure concluding the proceedings where the time period originally set is 
exceeded would, would entail the risk that conduct constituting infringements of 
EU competition law would remain unpunished, thereby undermining the principle 
of effectiveness of in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
19 The referring court points out that the objective of the EU competition rules, as set 
out in the communications from the European Commission, is to protect 
competition on the market as a means of improving consumer welfare and 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources (Communication 2004/C 191/08, 
paragraph 33). As is apparent from the recitals (in particular recitals 5 and 6°) and 
the provisions of Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, the 
substantive addressee of the rules on the protection against distorted competition 
is also, and above all, the consumer, whose protection must not be jeopardised in 
any circumstance, as it is necessary to strike a fair balance between competing 
needs. 
20 Indeed, it may be considered that there is a process of convergence between the 
rules ensuring that competition is not restricted and consumer protection, which is 
even more evident in legal systems, such as the Italian system, where both areas of 
protection are entrusted to the same administrative authority, which is responsible 
for applying both sets of rules. 
21 The referring court goes on to point out that, even if the initial time period set by 
the AGCM for the conclusion of the proceedings were to be regarded as 
mandatory, it would only be deprived of its power to impose penalties, but not of 
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enforcement powers, that is, the power to establish the existence of an agreement 
restricting competition and to make an order to desist, in the future, from conduct 
similar to that resulting in the infringements established. Since the actual 
addressee of the rules ensuring that competition is not restricted is the consumer, 
that protection would inevitably be frustrated if, in addition to the possible loss of 
the power to impose penalties, the authority were also deprived of its enforcement 
powers. 
22 Lastly, as regards the AGCM’s request to stay the proceedings pending the 
decision of the Court of Justice, the referring court notes that the question referred 
in Case C-511/23 is not relevant in the present case. It adds that Case C-511/23, 
like Cases C-510/23 and C-491/24, concerns the interpretation of EU law with 
regard to the duration of the preliminary investigation phase of antitrust 
proceedings, and not the duration of the subsequent investigation phase, that is to 
say, the total length of the procedure.