Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:1998:99
Date: 1998-05-14
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Third Chamber, Extended Composition
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Competition;Agreements, decisions and concerted practices;Concerted practices
Concepts: Statement of reasons;Determining the amount of the fine;Commission;Hearing of persons concerned and of third parties / Access to the file;Termination of infringements: powers of the Commission;Notification
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - successful;Appeal against penalty - unfounded
Origin: Finland

summary publication, and T-151/89 Société des Treillis et Panneaux Soudés v Commission [1995] ECR II-1191, summary publication), that this Court stressed for the first time that it is desirable for undertakings to be able to ascertain in detail the method used for calculating the fine imposed without having to bring court proceedings against the Commission's decision in order to do so. 311. It follows that, when it finds in a decision that there has been an infringement of the competition rules and imposes fines on the undertakings participating in it, the Commission must, if it systematically took into account certain basic factors in order to fix the amount of fines, set out those factors in the body of the decision in order to enable the addressees of the decision to verify that the level of the fine is correct and to assess whether there has been any discrimination. 312. In the specific circumstances set out in paragraph 310 above, and having regard to the fact that in the procedure before the Court the Commission showed itself to be willing to supply any relevant information relating to the method of calculating the fines, the absence of specific grounds in the Decision regarding the method of calculation of the fines should not, in the present case, be regarded as constituting an infringement of the duty to state reasons such as would justify annulment in whole or in part of the fines imposed. - The effects of the infringement 313. According to the seventh indent of point 168 of the Decision, the Commission determined the general level of fines by taking into account, inter alia, the fact that the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives. It is common ground that this consideration refers to the effects on the market of the infringement found in Article 1 of the Decision. 314. In order to review the Commission's appraisal of the effects of the infringement, the Court considers that it suffices to consider the appraisal of the effects of the collusion on prices. Consideration of the effects of the collusion on prices, the only effects disputed by the applicant, makes it possible to assess, in general, whether the cartel was successful, because the purpose of the collusion on downtime and on market shares was to ensure the success of the concerted price initiatives. 315. As regards collusion on prices, the Commission appraised the general effects of this collusion. Consequently, even assuming that the individual data supplied by the applicant show, as it claims, that the effects of collusion on prices were, in its case, less significant than those found on the European cartonboard market taken as a whole, such individual data cannot in themselves suffice to call into question the Commission's assessment. Furthermore, the applicant's assertion that, in point 16 of the Decision, the Commission based its argument on an erroneous definition of the cartonboard producers' average operating margin is also irrelevant. There are no grounds for considering that the Commission took that definition of the operating margin into account when it assessed the effects on the market of the collusion on prices, nor that the operating margin earned should have been taken into account for the purpose of that assessment. 316. It is apparent from the Decision, as the Commission confirmed at the hearing, that a distinction was drawn between three types of effects. Moreover, the Commission relied on the fact that the price initiatives were considered by the producers themselves to have been an overall success. 317. The first type of effect taken into account by the Commission, and not contested by the applicant, consisted in the fact that the agreed price increases were actually announced to customers. The new prices thus served as a reference point in individual negotiations on transaction prices with customers (see, inter alia, points 100 and 101, fifth and sixth paragraphs, of the Decision). 318. The second type of effect consisted in the fact that changes in transaction prices followed those in announced prices. The Commission states that the producers not only announced the agreed price increases but also with few exceptions took firm steps to ensure that they were imposed on the customers (point 101, first paragraph, of the Decision). It accepts that customers sometimes obtained concessions in regard to the date of entry into force of the increases or rebates or individual reductions, particularly on large orders, and that the average net increase achieved after all discounts, rebates and other concessions would always be less than the full amount of the announced increase (point 102, last paragraph, of the Decision). However, referring to graphs in the LE report, an economic study produced on behalf of several addressee undertakings of the Decision for the purposes of the procedure before the Commission, the Commission claims that during the period covered by the Decision there was a close linear relationship between changes in announced prices and those in transaction prices expressed in national currencies or converted to ecus. It concludes from this that: the net price increases achieved closely tracked the price announcements albeit with some time lag. The author of the report himself acknowledged during the oral hearing that this was the case for 1988 and 1989 (point 115, second paragraph, of the Decision). 319. When appraising this second type of effect the Commission could properly take the view that the existence of a linear relationship between changes in announced prices and changes in transaction prices was proof of an effect by the price initiatives on transaction prices in accordance with the objective pursued by the producers. There is, in fact, no dispute that on the relevant market the practice of holding individual negotiations with customers means that, in general, transaction prices are not identical to announced prices. It cannot therefore be expected that increases in transaction prices will be identical to announced price increases. 320. As regards the very existence of a relationship between announced price increases and transaction price increases, the Commission was right in referring to the LE report, which consists of an analysis of changes in the price of cartonboard during the period to which the Decision relates, based on information supplied by several producers, including the applicant itself. 321. However, that report only partially confirms, in temporal terms, the existence of a close linear relationship. Examination of the period 1987 to 1991 reveals three distinct sub-periods. At the oral hearing before the Commission the author of the LE report summarised his conclusion as follows: There is no close relationship, even with a lag, between announced price increase and market prices in the early part of the period, in 1987 through 1988. There is such a relationship in 1988/1989, and then the relationship breaks down and behaves rather oddly over the period 1990/1991 (transcript of the oral hearing, p. 28). He also observed that those temporal variations were closely linked to variations in demand (see, in particular, transcript of the oral hearing, p. 20). 322. Those conclusions expressed by the author at the hearing are in accordance with the analysis set out in his report, and in particular with the graphs comparing changes in announced prices and changes in transaction prices (LE report, graphs 10 and 11, p. 29). The Commission has therefore only partially proved the existence of the close linear relationship on which it relies. 323. At the hearing the Commission stated that it had also taken into account a third type of effect of the price collusion, namely the fact that the level of transaction prices was higher than that which would have been achieved in the absence of any collusion. Pointing out that the dates and order of the price increase announcements had been planned by the PWG, the Commission takes the view in the Decision that it is inconceivable in such circumstances that the concerted price announcements had no effect upon actual price levels (point 136, third paragraph, of the Decision). However, the LE report (section 3) drew up a model which enabled a forecast to be made of the price level resulting from objective market conditions. According to that report, the level of prices determined by objective economic factors in the period 1975 to 1991 would have evolved, with minor variations, in an identical manner to the level of transaction prices applied, including those during the period covered by the Decision. 324. Despite those conclusions, the analysis in the report does not justify a finding that the concerted price initiatives did not enable the producers to achieve a level of transaction prices above that which would have resulted from the free play of competition. As the Commission pointed out at the hearing, it is possible that the factors taken into account in that analysis were influenced by the existence of collusion. So, the Commission rightly argued that the collusive conduct might, for example, have limited the incentive for undertakings to reduce their costs. However, the Commission has not argued that there is a direct error in the analysis in the LE report nor submitted its own economic analysis of the hypothetical changes in transaction prices had there been no collusion. In those circumstances, its assertion that the level of transaction prices would have been lower if there had been no collusion between the producers cannot be upheld. 325. It follows that the existence of that third type of effect of collusion on prices has not been proved. 326. The above findings are in no way altered by the producers' subjective appraisal, on which the Commission relied in reaching the view that the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives. In that regard, the Commission referred to a list of documents which it produced at the hearing. However, even supposing that it could base its appraisal of the success of the price initiatives on documents showing the subjective opinions of certain producers, it must be observed that several undertakings, including the applicant, rightly referred at the hearing to a number of other documents in the file showing the problems encountered by the producers in implementing the agreed price increases. In those circumstances, the Commission's reference to the statements of the producers themselves is insufficient for a conclusion that the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives. 327. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the effects of the infringement described by the Commission are only partially proved. The Court will consider the implications of that conclusion as part of the exercise of its unlimited powers in regard to fines, when it assesses the general level of the fines imposed in the present case (see paragraph 342 below). - The alleged unlawfulness of some of the criteria taken into account to determine the amount of the fines 328. First, the Court rejects the applicant's argument that the fact that the amount of the fines was determined on the basis of the turnover of each undertaking means that the Commission was not entitled to take account of the territory within which the infringement took place (point 168, second indent, of the Decision), the overall value of the economic sector in question (point 168, third indent, of the Decision) and the respective importance of each undertaking in the sector (point 169, first paragraph, third indent, of the Decision). 329. Those criteria are relevant in assessing the seriousness of the infringement found and, as a result, in determining the amount of the fines in accordance with Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17. Whilst the amount of the fines was, admittedly, determined on the basis of the turnover of each undertaking, consideration of the criteria in question enabled the Commission to determine which part of the turnover should be taken into account in the case of each of the undertakings concerned and the percentage rate to be applied in order to determine the amount of the individual fines. 330. Second, as regards the applicant's argument that the Commission should have taken account of the fact that the agreement did not cover certain Member States which accounted for a large part of its turnover (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Denmark), it is apparent from Article 1 of the Decision that simultaneous and uniform price increase were planned and implemented throughout the European Community. Moreover, the applicant puts forward no argument to clarify the basis on which it, apparently, disputes that finding. In those circumstances, the applicant's argument must be rejected. 331. Thirdly, and finally, the applicant's argument that the Commission should not have taken account of the steps taken to conceal the infringement must be rejected. 332. It should be borne in mind, in that connection, that according to the third paragraph of point 167 of the Decision, a particularly grave aspect of the infringement is that in an attempt to disguise the existence of the cartel the undertakings went so far as to orchestrate in advance the date and sequence of the announcement of each major producer of the new price increases. The Decision also states as follows: the producers could as a result of this elaborate scheme of deception have attributed the series of uniform, regular and industry-wide price increases in the cartonboard sector to the phenomenon of “oligopoly behaviour“ (point 73, third paragraph). Finally, according to the sixth indent of point 168, the Commission, in determining the general level of fines, took into account the fact that elaborate steps were taken to conceal the true nature and extent of the collusion (absence of any official minutes or documentation for the PWG and JMC; discouraging the taking of notes; stage-managing the timing and order in which price increases were announced so as to be able to claim they were “following“, etc.). 333. The applicant does not contest the Commission's assertion that the undertakings planned the dates and order of dispatch of letters announcing the price increases in order to disguise the existence of price collusion. 334. The absence of official minutes and the almost total absence of internal notes relating to the meetings of the PWG and of the JMC constitute, having regard to the number of such meetings, to the length of time for which they continued and to the nature of the discussions in question, sufficient proof of the Commission's allegation that the participants were discouraged from taking notes. 335. It follows from the foregoing that the undertakings which participated in the meetings of those bodies were not only aware of the unlawfulness of their conduct but also took steps to conceal the collusion. Accordingly, the Commission was fully entitled to hold those steps to be aggravating circumstances when assessing the gravity of the infringement. - The general level of fines 336. Under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines ranging from ECU 1 000 to 1 000 000, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. As is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice, the gravity of infringements falls to be determined by reference to numerous factors including, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case, and the deterrent character of the fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (order in SPO and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 54). 337. In the present case, the Commission determined the general level of fines by taking into account the duration of the infringement (point 167 of the Decision) and the following considerations (point 168): - collusion on pricing and market sharing are by their very nature serious restrictions on competition, - the cartel covered virtually the whole territory of the Community, - the Community market for cartonboard is an important industrial sector worth some ECU 2 500 million each year, - the undertakings participating in the infringement account for virtually the whole of the market, - the cartel was operated in the form of a system of regular institutionalised meetings which set out to regulate in explicit detail the market for cartonboard in the Community, - elaborate steps were taken to conceal the true nature and extent of the collusion (absence of any official minutes or documentation for the PWG and JMC; discouraging the taking of notes; stage-managing the timing and order in which price increases were announced so as to be able to claim they were “following“, etc.), - the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives. 338. Furthermore, it is common ground that fines of a basic level of 9 or 7.5% of the turnover on the Community cartonboard market in 1990 of each undertaking addressed by the Decision were imposed on the undertakings regarded as the ringleaders of the cartel and on the other undertakings respectively. 339. It should be pointed out, first, that when assessing the general level of fines the Commission is entitled to take account of the fact that clear infringements of the Community competition rules are still relatively frequent and that, accordingly, it may raise the level of fines in order to strengthen their deterrent effect. Consequently, the fact that in the past the Commission applied fines of a certain level to certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level, within the limits set out in Regulation No 17, if that is necessary in order to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy (see, inter alia, Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 105 to 108, and ICI v Commission, cited above, paragraph 385). 340. Second, the Commission rightly argues that, on account of the specific circumstances of the present case, no direct comparison could be made between the general level of fines adopted in the present decision and those adopted in the Commission's previous decisions, in particular in Commission Decision 86/398/EEC of 23 April 1986 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.149 - Polypropylene) (OJ 1986 L 230, p. 1, hereinafter the Polypropylene decision), which the Commission itself considered to be the most similar to the decision in the present case. Unlike in the Polypropylene case, no general mitigating circumstance was taken into account in the present case when determining the general level of fines. Moreover, as the Court has already held, the intricate steps taken by the undertakings to conceal the existence of the infringement constitute a particularly serious aspect of it which differentiates it from the infringements previously found by the Commission. 341. Third, the Court notes the lengthy duration and obviousness of the infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty which was committed despite the warning which the Commission's previous decisions, in particular the Polypropylene decision, should have provided. 342. On the basis of those factors, the criteria set out in point 168 of the Decision justify the general level of fines set by the Commission. Admittedly, the Court has already held that the effects of the collusion on prices, which the Commission took into account when determining the general level of fines, are proved only in part. However, in the light of the foregoing considerations, that conclusion cannot materially affect the assessment of the gravity of the infringement found. The fact that the undertakings actually announced the agreed price increases and that the prices so announced served as a basis for fixing individual transaction prices suffices in itself for a finding that the collusion on prices had both as its object and effect a serious restriction of competition. Accordingly, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court considers that the findings relating to the effects of the infringement do not justify any reduction in the general level of fines set by the Commission. 343. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the procedural and substantive pleas relating to the determination of the amount of the fines must be rejected. The plea alleging misassessment of the role played by the applicant Arguments of the parties 344. The applicant disputes that it was one of the ringleaders of the agreement: even if the conduct of the representatives of the NPI could be imputed to the applicant, those representatives only participated in half the meetings of the PWG. 345. The applicant was subjected to constant pressure from the other producers, as several appendices to the statement of objections show (see point 76 of the Decision). 346. Finally, the agreement was rooted in the desire of Community producers to protect their market from exports, inter alia, by producers from the EFTA countries. It was only following the acquisition by the latter producers of production facilities in the Community that it became a matter of maintaining a balance between the major groups of European producers so as not to jeopardise the price initiatives (point 56 of the Decision). As it had not acquired any production facilities in the Community, the applicant could not be considered to be one of the ringleaders of the agreement. 347. The Commission takes the view that it was fully entitled to consider the applicant to be one of the ringleaders of the agreement. It points out, in particular, that for two years the applicant presided over the PWG, the central decision-making body of the cartel, and the President Conference. Furthermore, the applicant participated in all the price increases and even led three of those increases itself. 348. The minutes of a meeting held by Iggesund Board Sales Ltd on 28 and 29 January 1988 (appendix 72 to the statement of objections, quoted at point 76 of the Decision) confirmed the central role played by the applicant, since they make it clear that the other producers waited for the applicant to act before implementing their own price increases. 349. The applicant's comments concerning the objective pursued by the participants in the cartel merely serve to confirm the anti-competitive nature of that objective. Findings of the Court 350. It follows from the Court's findings relating to the applicant's pleas in support of its application for annulment in whole or in part of Article 1 of the Decision that the nature of the PWG's functions, as set out in the Decision, has been demonstrated by the Commission. 351. In those circumstances, the Commission was fully entitled to conclude that the undertakings, including the applicant, which participated in the meetings of that body had to be regarded as ringleaders of the infringement found and that accordingly they had to bear special responsibility (see point 170, first paragraph, of the Decision). 352. It is admitted that the applicant's managers participated in approximately half of the meetings of the PWG. Accordingly, the applicant cannot plausibly assert that it played a less important role in the shaping of the cartel than the other undertakings which took part in those meetings, particularly as its representatives held key positions in the PWG for almost the whole of the period covered by the Decision (see above, paragraph 125 et seq). 353. The applicant's assertion that it was subject to constant pressure from the other producers cannot alter that finding. In the first place, the applicant has not adduced any evidence to prove that it was forced to participate in the infringement. Furthermore, the applicant's reference to point 76 of the Decision does not call into question its role as a ringleader of the agreement. 354. The document cited in that point (appendix 72 to the statement of objections) states: Pressure has been put on the Finns from all over Europe to increase prices. Finnboard have been told we will not move on prices until they have published an increase price (sic). 355. That passage merely indicates that the other undertakings were waiting for the applicant to announce an increase in its prices before proceeding to increase their own prices. Accordingly, it only serves to confirm the role played by the applicant as ringleader of the cartel, in that the other undertakings attached particular importance to its participation in the concerted price increases. 356. Finally, the applicant's argument grounded upon the objective pursued by the basic agreement between the major producers cannot be upheld either. Whilst it is true that Stora explained that the initial concern of the PWG was to contain the growth of the market shares of EFTA producers, the fact remains that that concern was due to the fact that such growth might hamper their efforts to increase prices (see point 56, second paragraph, of the Decision, referring to the statement by Stora appearing in appendix 43 to the statement of objections). The pursuit of such an objective in fact merely serves to confirm the manifest nature of the infringement found. 357. In the light of those considerations, the plea must be rejected. The plea alleging errors by the Commission in reducing the fines Arguments of the parties 358. The applicant submits that it should have had its fine reduced, as it did not dispute the main factual allegations on which the Commission based the complaints against it. In its reply to the statement of objections, it confined itself to pointing out breaches of procedural rules and arguing that the facts adduced by the Commission had no probative value. 359. Moreover, it argues that the reduction of Stora's fine was unjustified and led to distortions of competition because of the high level of fines. Without Stora's statements, the Commission would not have had sufficient evidence to prove any agreement. There are indications that Stora's revelations were intended to weaken its main rivals. For that reason, the applicant requests the Court to ask the Commission whether any discussions were held with Stora on the subject of the level of the fine and/or possible reductions of fines. 360. The Commission considers that the applicant has no right to any reduction of the fine. The application clearly shows that it disputes the principal factual allegations put forward by the Commission. 361. Furthermore, the breach, if any, of the principle of proportionality when the amount of Stora's fine was fixed in no way affects the legality of the fine imposed on the applicant. Findings of the Court 362. In its reply to the statement of objections the applicant disputed, as it did before the Court, that it participated in any infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 363. Accordingly, the Commission correctly considered that the applicant, by replying in that way, did not conduct itself in a manner which justified a reduction in the fine on grounds of cooperation during the administrative procedure. A reduction on that ground is justified only if the conduct enabled the Commission to establish an infringement more easily and, where relevant, to bring it to an end (see ICI v Commission, cited above, paragraph 393). 364. Insofar as the applicant argues that the reduction of Stora's fine is excessive, the Court points out that Stora supplied the Commission with statements containing a highly detailed description of the nature and object of the infringement, the operation of the various bodies of the PG Paperboard, and the participation of the various producers in the infringement. Through those statements, Stora supplied information well in excess of that which the Commission may require to be supplied under Article 11 of Regulation No 17. Although the Commission states in the Decision that it obtained evidence corroborating the information contained in Stora's statements (points 112 and 113 of the Decision), it is clear that Stora's statements constituted the principal evidence of the existence of the infringement. Without those statements, it would therefore have been, at the very least, much more difficult for the Commission to establish or put an end to the infringement with which the Decision is concerned. 365. In those circumstances, the Commission, by reducing by two-thirds the fine imposed on Stora, did not overstep the limits of its discretion when determining the amount of fines. The applicant cannot therefore validly claim that the fine imposed on it is excessive in relation to that imposed on Stora. 366. There is thus no need to ask the Commission to indicate whether discussions were held with Stora on the subject of the level of the fine and/or possible reductions in fines. 367. That plea must, therefore, also be rejected. 368. It follows from all the above that Article 2 of the Decision must be partially annulled. For the rest, the application must be dismissed. Costs 369. Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. As the applicant has been largely unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, as sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber, Extended Composition), hereby: 1. Annuls, as regards the applicant, the first to fourth paragraphs of Article 2 of Commission Decision 94/601/EC of 13 July 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard) save and except the following passages: The undertakings named in Article 1 shall forthwith bring the said infringement to an end, if they have not already done so. They shall henceforth refrain in relation to their cartonboard activities from any agreement or concerted practice which may have the same or a similar object or effect, including any exchange of commercial information: (a) by which the participants are directly or indirectly informed of the production, sales, order backlog, machine utilisation rates, selling prices, costs or marketing plans of other individual producers. Any scheme for the exchange of general information to which they subscribe, such as the Fides system or its successor, shall be so conducted as to exclude any information from which the behaviour of individual producers can be identified.; 2. Dismisses the application as regards the remaining claims; 3. Orders the applicant to pay the costs. Vesterdorf Briët Lindh Potocki Cooke Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 May 1998. H. Jung B. Vesterdorf Registrar President Summary Facts II - 2 Procedure II - 6 Forms of order sought II - 7 The application for annulment of the Decision II - 8 The plea alleging breach of the rules concerning use of languages II - 8 Arguments of the parties II - 8 Findings of the Court II - 10 The plea alleging irregularities in the procedure for the adoption, authentication and notification of Commission decisions II - 11 Arguments of the parties II - 11 Findings of the Court II - 12 The plea grounded upon infringement of the rights of the defence and infringement of the procedural rules relating to the statement of objections II - 13 Arguments of the parties II - 13 Findings of the Court II - 14 The plea grounded upon infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty II - 15 Arguments of the parties II - 15 Findings of the Court II - 17 The plea grounded on infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty in that the Commission did not prove that the applicant participated in any agreement II - 18 The first part of the plea: no proof that the applicant participated in any agreement II - 18 - Arguments of the parties II - 18 - Findings of the Court II - 20 The second part of the plea: lack of evidence of the applicant's participation in price initiatives II - 22 - Arguments of the parties II - 22 - Findings of the Court II - 24 The third part of the plea: lack of evidence of the applicant's participation in volume control II - 28 - Arguments of the parties II - 28 - Findings of the Court II - 29 The plea of infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty in that the Commission did not take due account of the competitive conditions and the market situation II - 35 Arguments of the parties II - 35 Findings of the Court II - 36 Application for annulment of Article 2 of the Decision II - 37 Arguments of the parties II - 37 Findings of the Court II - 38 The claim for annulment or reduction of the amount of the fine II - 42 The plea that the fine was calculated on the basis of irrelevant turnover figures II - 42 Arguments of the parties II - 42 Findings of the Court II - 44 Procedural and substantive pleas relating to the determination of the amount of fines II - 47 Arguments of the parties II - 47 Findings of the Court II - 49 - The statement of reasons concerning the amount of the fines II - 49 - The effects of the infringement II - 52 - The alleged unlawfulness of some of the criteria taken into account to determine the amount of the fines II - 55 - The general level of fines II - 56 The plea alleging misassessment of the role played by the applicant II - 58 Arguments of the parties II - 58 Findings of the Court II - 59 The plea alleging errors by the Commission in reducing the fines II - 60 Arguments of the parties II - 60 Findings of the Court II - 61 Costs II - 62 1: Language of the case: German.