Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2021:500
Date: 2021-06-17
Language of the case: Polish
Subject matter: Right of establishment;Internal market - Principles;Freedom to provide services;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Summary C-55/20 — 1 
Case C-55/20 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
31 January 2020 
Referring court: 
Sąd Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary 
Court of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
24 January 2020 
Appellant: 
Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości (Ministry of Justice, Poland) 
Other party to the proceedings: 
R.G. 
Subject matter of the proceedings before the referring court 
Appeal by the Minister Sprawiedliwości (Minister for Justice) against the decision 
of 8 August 2019 to discontinue disciplinary proceedings against the adwokat 
(advocate) R.G. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the questions referred 
– The application of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market, including Article 10(6) thereof, to disciplinary proceedings against Polish 
advocates and foreign lawyers registered with a Bar Association; 
– An appeal on a point of law being heard by a court which has been found not to 
be an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of Article 47 of the 
Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]; 
– The right of the Prokurator Generalny (Polish Public Prosecutor General) and 
the Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Polish Ombudsman) to lodge an appeal on a 
point of law against the rulings of a Bar Association disciplinary court. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C-55/20 
 
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Questions referred 
(1) Are the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market (‘the Services Directive’), including 
Article 10(6) of the Services Directive, applicable to proceedings 
concerning the disciplinary liability of Polish advocates and foreign 
lawyers registered with a Bar Association, in connection with which 
liability an advocate may, inter alia, be fined, suspended, or expelled 
from the bar, and a foreign lawyer may, inter alia, be fined, have his 
right to provide legal assistance in the Republic of Poland suspended, 
or be prohibited from providing legal assistance in the Republic of 
Poland? If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, do the 
provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (‘the Charter’), including Article 47 thereof, apply to the 
above proceedings before Bar Association courts in cases where there 
is no right of appeal against the rulings of those courts to national 
courts or where such rulings are subject only to an extraordinary 
appeal, such as an appeal on a point of law to the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court), also in cases where all the essential elements are 
present within a single Member State? 
(2) In a case where, in the proceedings referred to in Question 1, under the 
national legislation in force the body competent to hear an appeal on a 
point of law against a ruling or decision of a Bar Association 
disciplinary court or an objection to an order refusing such an appeal 
on a point of law is a body that, in the view of that court, which is 
consistent with the view expressed by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) in its judgment of 5 December 2019, case reference III PO 7/18, 
is not an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 47 of the Charter, is it necessary to disregard the national 
provisions establishing the jurisdiction of that body and is it the duty of 
the Bar Association disciplinary court to refer such an appeal on a 
point of law or objection to a judicial body which would have 
jurisdiction if those national provisions had not precluded it? 
(3) In a case where — in the proceedings referred to in Question 1 — no 
appeal on a point of law can be lodged against a ruling or decision of a 
Bar Association disciplinary court, according to the position of that 
court, either by the Public Prosecutor General or the Ombudsman, and 
that position is: 
(a) contrary to the position expressed in the resolution of 
27 November 2019, case reference II DSI 67/18, adopted by a 
seven-judge panel of the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego 
(Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), that is, the body 
which, under the national legislation in force, is competent to 
MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) 
 
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hear an objection to an order refusing an appeal on a point of 
law, but which, in the view of the Bar Association disciplinary 
court, which is consistent with the view expressed by the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court) in its judgment of 5 December 
2019, case reference III PO 7/18, is not an independent and 
impartial tribunal for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter; 
(b) consistent with the position previously expressed by the Izba 
Karna Sądu Najwyższego (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme 
Court), that is, the judicial body that would have jurisdiction to 
hear such an objection if those national provisions had not 
precluded it; 
may (or should) the Bar Association disciplinary court disregard the 
position expressed by the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego 
(Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court)? 
(4) If in the case referred to in Question 3, an appeal by the Minister for 
Justice has been lodged with a Bar Association disciplinary court, and: 
(a) one of the factors which in the view of the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court) as expressed in its judgment of 5 December 
2019, case reference III PO 7/18, as well as in the view of the 
Bar Association disciplinary court, justify the assumption that the 
Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of 
the Supreme Court), that is, the body referred to in Question 3(a), 
is not an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 47 of the Charter, is the influence of the executive, 
including the Minister for Justice, on its composition; 
(b) the function of Public Prosecutor General, who — according to 
the position expressed by the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu 
Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), that 
is, the body referred to in Question 3(a), would be entitled to 
lodge an appeal on a point of law against the decision made on 
appeal, and according to the position of the Izba Karna Sądu 
Najwyższego (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court), that is, 
the judicial body referred to in Question 3(b), and also according 
to the position of the Bar Association disciplinary court, is not 
entitled to lodge such an appeal, is by operation of law actually 
performed by the Minister for Justice, 
should the Bar Association disciplinary court ignore that appeal if it is 
the only way in which it can ensure that the proceedings are 
compatible with Article 47 of the Charter and, in particular, prevent 
interference in those proceedings by a body which is not an 
independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of that provision? 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C-55/20 
 
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Provisions of EU law relied on 
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, Article 10(6) 
Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union], Article 47 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Ustawa z dnia 26 maja 1982 r. — Prawo o adwokaturze (Law on Advocates of 
26 May 1982) (‘the LA’): Article 11(2), Article 39(1), Article 40(1) and (2), 
Article 51, Article 54(1), Article 56(1) and (3), Article 63, Article 80, 
Article 81(1), Article 82(2), Article 86, Article 88a(1) and (4), Article 89, 
Article 91, Article 91a(1), Article 91b, Article 91c, Article 95n; 
Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu przez prawników zagranicznych 
pomocy prawnej w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Law of 5 July 2002 on the 
Provision of Legal Assistance by Foreign Lawyers in the Republic of Poland) …: 
Article 4(1), Article 10(1) and (2); 
Kodeks postępowania karnego (Code of Criminal Procedure) (‘the CCP’): 
Article 100 § 8, Article 521; 
Ustawa z dnia 28 stycznia 2016 r. — Prawo o prokuraturze (Law of 28 January 
2016 on the Public Prosecutor’s Office) (‘the LPPO’): Article 1 § 2; 
Ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law of 8 December 2017 
on the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court)) (‘the LSC’): Article 24, first indent of 
Article 27 § 1(1)(b). 
Brief outline of the facts and procedure 
1 On 8 August 2017, the Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie 
(Disciplinary Spokesperson of the Bar Association in Warsaw) received a letter 
from the Prokurator Krajowy — Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego 
(National Public Prosecutor — First Deputy of the Public Prosecutor General) 
(‘the National Public Prosecutor’) dated 20 July 2017, requesting that disciplinary 
proceedings be instituted against the advocate R.G. In the opinion of the National 
Public Prosecutor, statements by R.G. issued on 10 and 11 October 2016, in which 
he commented on the hypothetical possibility of his client, D.T., President of the 
European Council, being charged with a criminal offence, went beyond the limits 
of an advocate’s freedom of expression, could be construed as unlawful threats, 
that is, as a criminal offence, and constituted disciplinary misconduct. 
2 In his decision of 7 November 2017, the Disciplinary Spokesperson of the Bar 
Association in Warsaw refused to launch a disciplinary inquiry. That decision, 
following an appeal by the National Public Prosecutor, was overturned on 23 May 
MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) 
 
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2018 by a decision of the Sąd Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie 
(Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association in Warsaw) (‘the Disciplinary Court’) 
and the case was referred to the Disciplinary Spokesperson. In his decision of 
18 June 2018, the Disciplinary Spokesperson launched a disciplinary inquiry in 
regard to the advocate R.G. having exceeded the limits of freedom of speech on 
10 and 11 October 2016. In his decision of 28 November 2018, the Disciplinary 
Spokesperson discontinued the inquiry when he found that R.G.’s actions did not 
amount to disciplinary misconduct. As a result of an appeal by the National Public 
Prosecutor and an appeal by the Minister for Justice, that decision was overturned 
by the Disciplinary Court on 13 June 2019 and the case was referred to the 
Disciplinary Spokesperson for reconsideration. In his decision of 8 August 2019, 
the Disciplinary Spokesperson once again discontinued the disciplinary inquiry 
into R.G. Both the National Public Prosecutor and the Minister for Justice 
appealed against that decision. 
3 Currently, the subject of the Disciplinary Court’s consideration is (potentially) the 
appeal by the Minister for Justice; as regards the appeal by the National Public 
Prosecutor, the Disciplinary Spokesperson refused to accept it by order of 
30 August 2019, but that order was repealed on 10 December 2019 by the 
Disciplinary Court; to date, the [Disciplinary] Spokesperson has not referred the 
appeal to the Disciplinary Court. 
Succinct presentation of the reasons for the reference 
4 In its view, the Disciplinary Court ruling in the present case is entitled to refer 
[questions] to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 
Since (i) it is a body established by law, (ii) it is permanent in nature and 
independent in its judgments (Article 89(1) of the LA), (iii) it resolves disputes, 
ruling on motions by the Disciplinary Spokesperson concerning punishments for 
advocates and on appeals against the Disciplinary Spokesperson’s decisions 
refusing to launch, or discontinuing, a disciplinary inquiry, (iv) it applies the 
procedural provisions of the Law on Advocates and of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, (v) its decisions are binding and enforceable by coercion, (vi) it acts at 
the request of the parties rather than ex officio and (vii) it is obliged to apply the 
law, it is, as such, a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU. 
Furthermore, as a court or tribunal of last instance for the purposes of Article 267 
TFEU, it is in fact obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. 
Question 1 — Services Directive 
5 The Disciplinary Court has doubts as to the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Services Directive — more specifically, whether the provisions of Chapter III of 
that directive apply to proceedings concerning the disciplinary liability of Polish 
advocates and foreign lawyers registered with a Bar Association, even if all the 
essential elements are present within only one State. This question is crucial for 
the outcome of the present case. If the provisions of Chapter III of the Services 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C-55/20 
 
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Directive apply to proceedings concerning the disciplinary liability of Polish 
advocates and foreign lawyers registered with a Bar Association, those 
proceedings fall within EU law and are subject to the application of the Charter, in 
particular Article 47 thereof, both in so far as they are pending before Bar 
Association disciplinary courts and in so far as they are pending or may be 
pending before national courts or other national bodies as a result of appeals 
against the rulings of Bar Association disciplinary courts. In that case, the 
Disciplinary Court will have an obligation under EU law to ensure that the 
proceedings pending before it meet the standard of a fair trial laid down in that 
provision. 
6 The Disciplinary Court inclines towards the view that that question should be 
answered in the affirmative. The provision of legal assistance by lawyers 
established in the European Union undoubtedly falls within the scope of 
Article 2(1) of the Services Directive, since such assistance constitutes a service 
supplied by a provider established in a Member State, particularly as under Polish 
law advocates are entrepreneurs and engage in business activity. Furthermore, 
legal assistance provided by lawyers is not covered by any of the exclusions listed 
in Article 2(2)(a) to (l) of that directive. In the view of the Disciplinary Court, the 
Bar Association registration and deregistration scheme amounts to an 
‘authorisation scheme’ within the meaning of Article 4(6) of the Services 
Directive. Bar disciplinary proceedings are also part of that scheme, since as a 
result of such proceedings Bar Association disciplinary courts can in fact suspend 
a decision authorising a lawyer to pursue advocacy work (by suspending his right 
to engage in professional activity or by suspending his right to provide legal 
assistance in the territory of the Republic of Poland) or revoke such a decision, 
with effect for at least 10 years (by expelling him from the Bar or by prohibiting 
him from providing legal assistance in the territory of the Republic of Poland). 
Once the disciplinary court’s ruling becomes final, a Polish advocate or a foreign 
lawyer loses, temporarily or permanently, the right to provide services. In fact, 
this constitutes a withdrawal of authorisation for the purposes of Article 10(6) of 
the [Services] Directive. 
7 In the view of the Disciplinary Court, Article 3(1) of the Services Directive also 
does not preclude the application of the provisions of Chapter III thereof to the 
disciplinary proceedings at issue, since the provisions of other directives 
governing specific aspects of the taking up and pursuit of activity consisting in the 
provision of legal services under the freedom to provide services or the freedom 
of establishment do not conflict with the provisions of that chapter. In any event, 
such a conflict, even if it were to occur with regard to an aspect covered by 
Chapter III of the [Services] Directive, would not affect that directive as a whole. 
Those separate directives govern the provision of legal assistance services only in 
so far as those services include a foreign element and as such are covered by the 
freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment enshrined in the 
Treaty. Meanwhile, the scope of Chapter III of the Services Directive is broader, 
because it also covers purely internal situations (judgment of the Court of Justice 
of 30 January 2018, College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van de gemeente 
MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) 
 
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Amersfoort and Visser Vastgoed Beleggingen BV, C-360/15 and C-31/16). Thus, 
at least with respect to purely internal situations, the application of the provisions 
of Chapter III of the Services Directive should not be affected by Article 3(1) 
thereof. 
8 Nor does Article 1(5) of the Services Directive preclude the application of the 
provisions of Chapter III thereof to proceedings before Bar Association 
disciplinary courts. Pursuant to Article 86 of the LA, disciplinary proceedings are 
conducted independently of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the purpose of 
disciplinary proceedings is different to that of criminal proceedings. In a way, 
disciplinary proceedings serve to ensure the effectiveness of the system of 
controlling access to the provision of legal services. In that sense, they are part of 
the ‘authorisation scheme’ without which such proceedings would lose their 
raison d’être. 
Question 2 — jurisdiction to hear an appeal on a point of law or an objection to a 
refusal to accept an appeal on a point of law 
9 Question 2 concerns the body competent to hear an appeal on a point of law 
against a ruling of a Bar Association disciplinary court or an objection to a refusal 
to accept such an appeal on a point of law. Pursuant to the first indent of 
Article 27 § 1(1)(b) of the LSC, cases heard by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) in connection with disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Law on 
Advocates fall within the jurisdiction of the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu 
Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (‘the SC Disciplinary 
Chamber’). The question whether the SC Disciplinary Chamber is an independent 
and impartial tribunal for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter has already 
been considered by the Court of Justice and by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court). Further to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019, 
A.K., C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 (independence of the SC Disciplinary 
Chamber), the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), in its judgment of 5 December 
2019, case reference III PO 7/18, ruled that the SC Disciplinary Chamber is not an 
independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter. 
One of the factors that led the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) to that conclusion 
was the influence of the executive, and especially the Minister for Justice, on the 
composition of that body. 
10 In this situation, it appears that it is possible and even necessary to disregard the 
national provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the [SC] Disciplinary Chamber, 
that is, the first indent of Article 27 § 1(1)(b) of the LSC. In this instance, pursuant 
to Article 24 of the LSC, the Izba Karna Sądu Najwyższego (Criminal Chamber of 
the Supreme Court) (‘the SC Criminal Chamber’) would be competent to hear the 
appeals on points of law and objections in question, since the provisions of the 
CCP apply to disciplinary cases against advocates. However, clarification by the 
Court of Justice is needed as regards whether the above conclusion is also valid in 
so far as the decision to disregard those provisions would not be made by the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court), but by a Bar Association disciplinary court. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING — CASE C-55/20 
 
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11 Since, under national law, after pronouncing or delivering its ruling a Bar 
Association disciplinary court is obliged to instruct the parties to the proceedings 
(and in some cases also the Minister for Justice) regarding the time limit for, and 
manner of, lodging an appeal or that there is no right of appeal, the Disciplinary 
Court seeks to determine whether in formulating that instruction it should, taking 
into account the judgment of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) of 5 December 
2019, disregard the first indent of Article 27 § 1(1)(b) of the LSC and instruct the 
parties that appeals — if the Disciplinary Court finds that such appeals may be 
lodged against its ruling — should be brought before the SC Criminal Chamber. 
12 Question 2 is formulated under the assumption that the proceedings referred to in 
Question 1, including the proceedings at issue, fall within the scope of the Charter, 
in particular Article 47 thereof. That assumption, which determines the 
admissibility of this question, will be met, first of all, if the answer to Question 1 
is in the affirmative. Secondly, in the view of the Disciplinary Court, there may be 
doubts as to the purely internal nature of the present case, given that it concerns 
the actions of the advocate R.G. who is acting as attorney for D.T., the President 
of the European Council. Thirdly, where a case or the laws applicable to it are 
even potentially of a cross-border nature, the Court will find an EU element that 
determines its jurisdiction, since it is sufficient for entrepreneurs from one 
Member State to be interested in carrying out regulated activities in another 
Member State (see judgments of: 11 June 2015, Berlington, C-98/14, and the 
case-law cited; 1 June 2010, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, C-570/07 and 
C-571/07; 19 July 2012, Garkalns, C-470/11; 15 November 2016, Ullens de 
Schooten, C-268/15, paragraph 50). In addition, where the recipients of regulated 
services may potentially include persons from other Member States, that is 
sufficient for a finding that there is an EU element and the Court has jurisdiction 
(judgments of 11 June 2015, Berlington, C-98/14, and of 15 November 2016, 
Ullens de Schooten, C-268/15, paragraph 51). Undoubtedly, clients of lawyers 
registered with the Bar Association in Warsaw, and even clients of R.G., may 
include — and probably do include — persons from other Member States. 
Fourthly, the Court’s jurisdiction to answer a question referred for a preliminary 
ruling in a case confined in all respects within a single Member State may be 
justified by the fact that national law requires the referring court to grant the same 
rights to a national of its own Member State as those which a national of another 
Member State in the same situation would derive from EU law (judgment of 
15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C-268/15, paragraph 52 and the case-law 
cited). An assumption that other (higher) standards would have to be applied in 
hearing disciplinary cases of foreign lawyers from Member States of the European 
Union who are registered with the Bar as well as advocates who are citizens of 
such Member States or advocates who are involved in the provision of services to 
persons from other Member States, while other (lower) standards would be 
applied to the remaining advocates, namely those with Polish citizenship and 
providing services to Polish clients, would be difficult to accept under Polish law. 
Such reverse discrimination would not be acceptable under Polish law. 
MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) 
 
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Question 3 — how to decide whether an appeal on a point of law is admissible 
13 For the reasons already set out in the grounds for Question 2, it is necessary to 
clarify not only which body will have jurisdiction to hear a potential appeal on a 
point of law against a ruling of the Disciplinary Court or an objection to a refusal 
to accept such an appeal on a point of law, but also whether such an appeal on a 
point of law is admissible at all. This is important both because of the contents of 
the instruction which a disciplinary court is obliged to give when pronouncing or 
delivering its ruling, but also because of its further obligations in the event of an 
appeal on a point of law being lodged and also the possible need to ensure that the 
standard arising from Article 47 of the Charter is otherwise met in that respect. 
For the reasons set out in paragraph 12 above, this issue falls within EU law and 
its clarification falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 
14 The Disciplinary Court’s uncertainty stems from the fact that, in accordance with 
the position presented to date by the SC Criminal Chamber, and the position 
presented in legal doctrine and by Bar Association disciplinary courts, in cases 
such as the one at issue not only do the parties to the proceedings not have the 
right to lodge an appeal on a point of law but also neither the Public Prosecutor 
General nor the Ombudsman has that right. In particular, in such cases those 
bodies may not avail themselves of the extraordinary appeal on a point of law 
provided for in Article 521 of the CCP. The Disciplinary Court shares that 
position. However, in its resolution of 27 November 2019, case reference II 
DSI 67/18 (which, incidentally, also concerned the advocate R.G.), a 7-judge 
panel of the SC Disciplinary Chamber found that an appeal on a point of law 
under Article 521 of the CCP is admissible in such cases. This would mean that in 
such cases, an appeal on a point of law could be brought by the Public Prosecutor 
General and by the Ombudsman. The Disciplinary Court therefore has doubts as 
to whether the above position of the [SC] Disciplinary Chamber — which, 
moreover, is not formally binding on the Disciplinary Court — should be taken 
into account or whether it is devoid of legal significance, since, as has already 
been stated above, according to the judgment of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) of 5 December 2019, case reference III PO 7/18, the SC Disciplinary 
Chamber is not an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 47 of the Charter. 
Question 4 — how to ensure that the case is heard by an independent and 
impartial tribunal for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter 
15 In the present case, the Disciplinary Court is to hear the appeal of the Minister for 
Justice lodged by him not as a party to the proceedings but as a special body under 
Article 88a(4) of the LA, which status entitles him to lodge an appeal in any case. 
In accordance with the position presented to date by the SC Criminal Chamber, 
and the position presented in legal doctrine and by Bar Association disciplinary 
courts, in cases such as the one at issue an appeal on a point of law against a 
decision by the Disciplinary Court to uphold a decision to discontinue an inquiry 
contested before that court is inadmissible. However, a different position was 
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presented in the resolution of 27 November 2019, case reference II DSI 67/18, of 
a 7-judge panel of the SC Disciplinary Chamber, which indicated that the Public 
Prosecutor General — who is also the Minister for Justice pursuant to Article 1 § 
2 of the LPPO — has the right to lodge an appeal on a point of law against such a 
decision. An important consideration here is that one of the factors which 
prompted the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) to find that the SC Disciplinary 
Chamber is not an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 47 of the Charter was its dependence on the executive, and in particular 
the influence of the Minister for Justice (who is at the same time the Public 
Prosecutor General) on its composition. 
16 In the light of the above circumstances as well as the fact that both the present 
case and Case II DSI 67/18 concerned the same advocate, the present case was 
initiated at the request of the First Deputy of the Public Prosecutor General and 
the charges against the defendant concern his statements regarding the actions of 
the public prosecutor’s office, the Disciplinary Court sees a risk that even if the 
measures referred to in Questions 2 and 3 are applied, that is, even if the 
Disciplinary Court accepts that an appeal on a point of law is inadmissible in the 
present case and any objections to a refusal to hear such an appeal on a point of 
law should be referred to the SC Criminal Chamber, the appeal on a point of law 
brought by the Public Prosecutor General (Minister for Justice) will still be heard 
by the SC Disciplinary Chamber. That possibility raises the question of how the 
Disciplinary Court, if it deems that risk to be real, may (or should) proceed to 
prevent such a situation and thus ensure that the standard arising from Article 47 
of the Charter is maintained in the present case. 
17 The fact that the Minister for Justice acts as a special body justifies consideration 
of whether, in the event of the above risk becoming real, the Disciplinary Court 
should ignore the appeal on a point of law even though it is prima facie admissible 
under the applicable provisions of national legislation. Otherwise, we may be 
faced with a situation in which de facto the same body — acting firstly as the 
Minister for Justice, secondly as the Public Prosecutor General and thirdly as the 
body which actually determines the composition of the SC Disciplinary Chamber, 
which Chamber subsequently grants him the power to lodge an appeal on a point 
of law which is inadmissible under the relevant statute, and will ultimately hear 
his appeal on a point of law — will prevent the case in question from being heard 
by an independent and impartial tribunal as required by Article 47 of the Charter.