Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2014:304
Date: 2014-05-08
Language of the case: Dutch
Court formation: First Chamber
Subject matter: Citizenship of the Union;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Freedom to provide services;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - inadmissible
Origin: Belgium

summary of the relevant findings of fact required under Article 94(a) of those Rules, must be of such a kind as to enable the Court to ascertain, not only whether the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible, but also whether it has jurisdiction to answer the question referred. 17 It should also be remembered that the Charter’s field of application so far as concerns action of the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law (Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17). 18 That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, according to which the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (see Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). 19 That definition of the field of application of the fundamental rights of the European Union is borne out by the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting it. According to those explanations, ‘the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law’ (Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 20). 20 It follows that, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to that effect, the order in Case C‑466/11 Currà and Others EU:C:2012:465, paragraph 26, and Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22). 21 These considerations correspond to those underlying Article 6(1) TEU, according to which the provisions of the Charter are not to extend in any way the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties. Likewise, the Charter, pursuant to Article 51(2) thereof, does not extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the European Union or establish any new power or task for the European Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties (see Case C‑400/10 PPU McB. EU:C:2010:582, paragraph 51; Case C‑256/11 Dereci and Others EU:C:2011:734, paragraph 71; and Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 23). 22 There is nothing specific in the order for reference demonstrating that the legal situation at issue in the main proceedings comes within the scope of EU law. 23 Like the written observations submitted to the Court, that order contains nothing which establishes a connection between the facts of those proceedings and the Treaty provisions referred to by the referring court. 24 In any event, as regards the application of Articles 34 TFEU to 36 TFEU governing the free movement of goods, referred to by that court, it must be borne in mind, as this Court has observed on a number of occasions, that those provisions do not apply to national rules concerning the closure of shops that are enforceable against all economic operators pursuing activities within the national territory and that affect, in the same way, in law and in fact, the sale of domestic products and of products from other Member States (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑69/93 and C‑258/93 Punto Casa and PPV EU:C:1994:226, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C‑418/93 to C‑421/93, C‑460/93 to C‑462/93, C‑464/93, C‑9/94 to C‑11/94, C‑14/94, C‑15/94, C‑23/94, C‑24/94 and C‑332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno and Others EU:C:1996:242, paragraph 28). 25 Similarly, as regards Articles 56 TFEU and 57 TFEU governing the freedom to provide series, also referred to by the referring court, suffice it to state that the legislation in question is applicable to all traders exercising their activity on national territory; that its purpose is not to regulate the conditions concerning the establishment of the undertakings concerned; and that any restrictive effects which it might have on freedom of establishment are too uncertain and indirect for the obligation laid down to be regarded as being capable of hindering that freedom (see, by analogy, Semeraro Casa Uno and Others EU:C:1996:242, paragraph 32). 26 It follows from all the foregoing that it has not been established that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the Charter referred to by the referring court. 27 In those circumstances, the Court has no jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the Grondwettelijk Hof. Costs 28 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules: The Court of Justice of the European Union has no jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the Grondwettelijk Hof (Belgium). [Signatures] * Language of the case: Dutch.