Order;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:585
Date: 2024-07-04
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Acts of the institutions
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Germany

Translation C-288/24 – 1 
Case C-288/24 [Stegmon] i 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
24 April 2024 
Referring court: 
Landgericht Berlin (Germany) 
Date of the order for reference: 
23 April 2024 
Law enforcement agency: 
Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin 
Accused: 
M.R. 
  
[…] 
 
Landgericht Berlin I 
(Berlin Regional Court I, Germany) 
 
Order 
[…] 
 
In the criminal matter 
a g a i n s t 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings. 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 23. 4. 2024 – CASE C-288/24 
 
2  
M.R.[…] 
[…] 
Prosecution authority: Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Public Prosecutor’s Office), […] 
Berlin 
on account of infringements of the Betäubungsmittelgesetz (Narcotics Law), 
the 25th General Grand Criminal Chamber of the Landgericht Berlin I (Berlin 
Regional Court I, Germany) ordered as follows on 23 April 2024: 
I. The following questions are to be referred to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘the Court’) pursuant to Article 267 TFEU: 
1. Is Article 267 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that it authorises the 
referring court, or even requires it to refrain, until the Court issues its 
decision in relation to the main proceedings, from taking any procedural 
measures that have a connection with the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling? 
2. Does Article 267 TFEU prohibit basing a finding of an apparent 
conflict of interests solely on the fact that a judge is awaiting the Court’s 
decision on his or her reference for a preliminary ruling? 
3. Do the answers to the first and second questions referred apply 
respectively also to a criminal case involving detention, in respect of which 
there is a special duty to proceed expeditiously? 
II. It is requested that the reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with 
under an expedited procedure, or, in the alternative, that it be given priority. 
Grounds: 
1 The request for a preliminary ruling relates to the same main proceedings as those 
for which the request for a preliminary ruling that was lodged by the Kammer 
(Chamber) on 13 November 2023 is currently pending before the Court under 
Case number C-675/23. That request for a preliminary ruling supplements the 
request for a preliminary ruling lodged by the Chamber on 19 October 2022 
(C-670/22) pertaining to various questions relating to Directive 2014/42 (‘the EIO 
Directive’). Case C-675/23 has been stayed pending the decision – now scheduled 
for 30 April 2024 – of the Grand Chamber of the Court in Case C-670/22. Both 
main proceedings relate to alleged acts of trafficking in narcotic drugs that pertain 
exclusively to the evaluation of EncroChat data. 
2 The present request for a preliminary ruling comprises questions as to the effects 
of a pending request for a preliminary ruling on the main proceedings and their 
arrangements. Those questions arise in connection with a request for recusal 
STEGMON 
 
3 
(Ablehnungsgesuch) that the Chamber is required to rule upon. The 
Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Public Prosecutor’s Office, Berlin) brought a request 
for recusal against the presiding judge of the Chamber on the grounds of an 
apparent conflict of interests (Besorgnis der Befangenheit), basing that request 
primarily on the fact that the presiding judge had still not scheduled any dates for 
inter partes proceedings, but was instead awaiting the decision of the Court on the 
requests for preliminary rulings in Cases C-675/23 and C-670/22. 
A. Factual background 
3 Due to the criminal charges brought against him in the main proceedings, the 
accused person was remanded in pre-trial detention for the first time as of 4 May 
2023. 
4 By order of 29 June 2023, the Chamber allowed the charges, ordering the 
commencement of the inter partes criminal proceedings. At the same time, it 
stayed the proceedings in order to refer questions on the interpretation of the EIO 
Directive to the Court for a preliminary ruling –as requested by the defence – and 
to await the Court’s decision. In view of the uncertainty as to the date of the 
Court’s decision, it also suspended the arrest warrant. 
5 The Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal against that suspension of 
the arrest warrant on 30 June 2023, asserting that ‘a significant delay in the 
proceedings that would constitute an infringement of the duty to conduct the 
proceedings expeditiously’ was still not apparent. At the same time, it remarked 
that the stay of proceedings was ‘certainly not open to challenge on formal 
grounds’. Nor, in the light of the admitted request for a preliminary ruling in Case 
C-670/22, could the Chamber be accused of seeking to groundlessly delay the 
proceedings, with the result that there was no apparent conflict of interests. 
6 The Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office) 
joined the appeal on 10 July 2023. According to its submissions, continuation of 
the pre-trial detention remained proportionate because the main trial had 
commenced before expiry of the six-month time limit and, consequently, the duty 
to proceed expeditiously in custody cases was to be regarded as fulfilled. When 
considered in isolation, the request for a preliminary ruling was ‘not an 
objectively unjustified and avoidable significant delay in the proceedings that 
precluded continuance of the pre-trial detention’. 
7 By order of 24 July 2023, the Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court, Berlin) set 
aside the Chamber’s order of 29 June 2023, in so far as it related to the suspension 
of the arrest warrant, and declared the arrest warrant to be executable again. In the 
grounds for the order, it was explained, in particular, that the Chamber’s decision 
to stay proceedings did not preclude execution of the arrest warrant. On the 
contrary, the Chamber was being given an ‘opportunity’ to ‘reconsider whether it 
wished to adhere to its decision to stay proceedings in the light of the duty to 
proceed expeditiously that it is required to observe in custody cases’. Even if 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 23. 4. 2024 – CASE C-288/24 
 
4  
‘domestic legal remedies’ could ‘not limit the referring court’s discretion to refer’ 
it was pointed out ‘as a precaution’ that the decision to stay proceedings was 
subject to appeal. 
8 On 26 July 2023, the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office then lodged an appeal that 
additionally contested the stay of proceedings on the ground that that stay of 
proceedings and the failure to advance the proceedings would constitute an 
infringement of the duty to proceed expeditiously in cases involving detention. 
9 On 9 August 2023, the Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office also joined that 
appeal, asserting, in the process, that awaiting the decision of the Court would run 
contrary to the duty to proceed expeditiously in cases involving detention. 
10 By order of 13 September 2023, the Berlin Higher Regional Court then lifted the 
stay of proceedings also. It also stated that a stay of proceedings for the purposes 
of clarifying legal questions was generally prohibited. Although a stay of 
proceedings for a ‘test case’ before the Court appeared ‘justified, exceptionally’, 
the duty to proceed expeditiously meant, however, that that was true only if the 
decision in the ‘test case’ was imminent and the delay did not entail any 
unacceptable burdens for the accused person. In the light of the special duty to 
conduct the proceedings expeditiously in cases involving detention, the 
Chamber’s decision to stay proceedings was ‘vitiated by a manifest error of 
assessment’, since the date on which the Court could be expected to issue its 
decision was unknown. According to the Berlin Higher Regional Court, that was 
all the more true in view of the fact that the particularities of the present case 
might necessitate a further request for a preliminary ruling. 
11 On 20 October 2023, the Chamber, citing the special duty to conduct the 
proceedings expeditiously in cases involving detention, suspended the arrest 
warrant once again. It did so because the Public Prosecutor’s Office had failed to 
provide, or had only partially provided, the information that the Chamber had 
requested for the purposes of, inter alia, preparing the request for a preliminary 
ruling. 
12 In its appeal of 23 October 2023, the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office challenged 
that suspension order, submitting that, on the contrary, a significant delay that 
would constitute an infringement of the duty to conduct the proceedings 
expeditiously had not yet occurred. 
13 On 15 November 2023, the Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office also joined 
that appeal. In its submissions, it asserted that the Chamber itself had not given 
extensive consideration to the duty to conduct the proceedings expeditiously, as 
was evidenced, according to the Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office, by the 
alleged fact that it had been in a position to schedule dates for inter partes 
proceedings for a long time. However, the duty to conduct the proceedings 
expeditiously could nevertheless still be adequately observed ‘by conducting the 
proceedings in the expeditious manner that was now due’. If, in the event of a 
STEGMON 
 
5 
renewed order for execution of the arrest warrant, the Chamber should fail to 
schedule dates for the inter partes proceedings forthwith, it would then be 
necessary to examine whether that constituted grounds for a request for recusal. 
14 By memorandum of 29 November 2023, the presiding judge then set out the 
reasons for why the scheduling had not hitherto taken place. She explained that 
according to her understanding of the Court’s case-law, the Chamber had an 
absolute right, even in cases involving detention, to refer questions to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling and await the decision of the Court. In the light of the 
request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-675/23 of 14 November 2023, which 
had since been referred, the Chamber was even – according to the presiding 
judge’s statements – required to wait. 
15 By order of 6 December 2023, the Berlin Higher Regional Court set aside the 
Chamber’s order of 20 October 2023 also, declaring the arrest warrant executable 
again. In the grounds for the order of 6 December 2023, it was stated that the 
request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-675/23 and the request for a 
preliminary ruling in Case C-670/22 (both concerning the interpretation of the 
EIO Directive) involved only the legal question under non-constitutional law – 
more specifically, under criminal law – as to the possibility to use the data. The 
Berlin Higher Regional Court had already pointed out itself that a stay of 
proceedings for the sole purpose of awaiting ‘clarification at the highest judicial 
level’ of such a question would not be permissible. There was nothing to prevent 
the immediate further planning and scheduling of the inter partes proceedings. On 
the contrary, in view of the fact that the arrest warrant had been declared 
executable again, the Chamber would ‘have another opportunity to reconsider the 
further scheduling arrangements for the proceedings’ and, in that regard, to 
consider and prioritise the duty to proceed expeditiously in particular. 
16 Referring to that order, the Public Prosecutor’s Office called upon the Chamber to 
conduct the inter partes proceedings ‘as soon as possible and as quickly as 
possible’. 
17 On 18 December 2023, the accused person was remanded in pre-trial detention 
once again. Since 2 January 2024, he has been serving a multi-year custodial 
sentence in connection with another case. The end date for that fixed-term 
custodial sentence is listed as 28 May 2026. Consideration for early release after 
serving two thirds of the sentence is at least theoretically possible as of 27 July 
2024. 
18 By order of 20 February 2024, the Chamber refused to allow the accused person’s 
fresh appeal against his detention in view of the decisions of the Berlin Higher 
Regional Court, which, in the Chamber’s opinion, remained binding. 
19 In that regard, the Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office also expressed the 
opinion, on 26 February 2024, that awaiting clarification from the Court on a 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 23. 4. 2024 – CASE C-288/24 
 
6  
‘question of law not involving constitutional law’ did not justify forbearance from 
scheduling and commencing the inter partes proceedings. 
20 By order of 12 March 2024, the Berlin Higher Regional Court ultimately lifted the 
arrest warrant, stating that, despite the ‘clearly and unambiguously explained legal 
situation’, the Chamber had failed to adequately observe the special duty to 
proceed expeditiously in cases involving detention, as was clear from the fact that 
it had, thus far, neither commenced nor terminated the inter partes proceedings. In 
the light of that ‘serious breach of the strict requirements of constitutional law’, 
for which the Chamber had been solely responsible, the duty to proceed 
expeditiously in cases involving detention had been breached in such manner that 
further continuation of the arrest warrant would no longer be proportionate. 
21 By letter of 28 March 2024, the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office – acting through 
the head of the competent main department responsible for combating organised 
crime – thereupon filed a request for recusal against the presiding judge of the 
Chamber on the grounds of an apparent conflict of interests. By way of 
justification it explained in particular that, despite the detention measures that had 
been in place in the main proceedings until 12 March 2024, and despite the fact 
that the Berlin Higher Regional Court had pointed out the urgent need for 
scheduling to be carried out, the presiding judge had failed to schedule a date for 
the inter partes proceedings. According to the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
the alleged fact that the presiding judge had wilfully ignored that advice, and was 
thus responsible for the withdrawal of the arrest warrant, constituted grounds for 
assuming that she was no longer aligning her decisions to the requirements of the 
higher courts but was instead pursuing only her own interests, which related to the 
question she had raised as to the admissibility of the evidence, which, in her 
opinion, was material to the decision. In that respect, the course of the proceedings 
up to that point suggested that she had been ignoring considerations of procedural 
safeguarding and the duty to proceed expeditiously because she was orientating 
her conduct of the proceedings exclusively so as to schedule a date for the inter 
partes proceedings only after the Court had issued its decision. That appeared, 
according to the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, to be arbitrary and 
constituted – in that respect it cited a decision of the Bayerisches Oberstes 
Landesgericht (Bavarian Highest Regional Court, Germany) (BayObLG, decision 
of 24 September 2001 – 5St RR 248/01 –, Juris) – a gross error of law that 
infringed fundamental procedural rules aimed at protecting constitutional rights, 
that is to say the duty to proceed expeditiously in cases involving detention. 
22 In her official statement of 12 April 2024 concerning the grounds for recusal, the 
presiding judge referred once again to the case-law of the Court. 
23 In his opinion of 21 April 2024, the counsel for the defence asserted that the 
request for recusal for conflict of interest served the non-procedural purpose of 
removing the lawful judge from the proceedings on a pretext. 
STEGMON 
 
7 
B. Explanation of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
I. National law 
1. Apparent conflict of interests 
24 Paragraph 24(1) of the Strafprozessordnung (German Code of Criminal 
Procedure, ‘the StPO’), provides that judges may be recused for an apparent 
conflict of interests. According to Paragraph 24(2) of the StPO, a request for 
recusal may be brought where there is reason to doubt the impartiality of a judge. 
25 According to the case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, 
Germany), doubt as to the impartiality of a judge is justified if the party seeking 
recusal has – following a reasonable assessment of the facts that are known to him 
or her – grounds for assuming that the judge whose recusal is sought has adopted 
a personal attitude towards him or her that could interfere with the judge’s 
impartiality or objectivity (see, for example, BGH, decision of 23 January 2018 – 
1 StR 36/17 – paragraph 6, juris). In that respect, although procedural 
infringements that are based on an error or an incorrect, or even untenable, legal 
view, do not generally constitute grounds for recusal, the case is different, 
however, if the decisions are absurd or even give rise to an appearance of 
arbitrariness (BGH, decision of 10 September 2002 – 1 StR 169/02 –, 
paragraph 12, juris). 
26 According to the case-law of the Bavarian Highest Regional Court cited by the 
Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office in support of its request for recusal, that could 
be the case if, for example, a judge’s approach to conducting the proceedings 
lacks a sufficient legal basis, such that the limitations placed on the judicial 
function are disregarded and fundamental rules enshrined in the constitution for 
the protection of constitutional rights are infringed (BayObLG loc. cit., 
paragraph 8, juris). 
27 According to Paragraph 27(1) of the StPO, the Chamber is required to rule on the 
request for recusal without the participation of the presiding judge and, in lieu 
thereof, with the participation of the replacement judge specified in the 
organisational chart. According to Paragraph 28(2) of the StPO, that decision is 
not subject to appeal by means of an immediate complaint (sofortige Beschwerde), 
but it may be contested together with the subsequent judgment by means of an 
appeal on a point of law (Revision). Paragraph 338(3) of the StPO provides that, if 
the presiding judge participated in reaching the judgment and the Federal Court of 
Justice finds that the request for recusal brought against her was erroneously 
rejected, that will constitute an absolute ground for an appeal on a point of law 
and will result in the judgment being set aside. Conversely, an erroneous 
exclusion of the presiding judge could, at least in cases where there has been an 
assumption or arbitrariness, justify a claim under the rules governing appeals on 
points of law as laid down in Paragraph 338(1) of the StPO, that the court of 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 23. 4. 2024 – CASE C-288/24 
 
8  
decision was not composed in the prescribed form (see Siolek in: Löwe-
Rosenberg, StPO, 27th Edition, § 28, paragraph 1). 
2. Duty to proceed expeditiously 
28 The general duty to proceed expeditiously in criminal cases is not expressly 
regulated under German law, but is derived from the rule-of-law principle 
provided for under the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) as well as from the first sentence 
of Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (see 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany), decision of 
24 November 1983 – 2 BvR 121/83 –, paragraphs 3 and 7, juris). 
29 In cases involving detention, a special duty to conduct the proceedings 
expeditiously that is enshrined in constitutional law applies, which also finds 
expression in the first sentence of Article 5(3) ECHR. Accordingly, law 
enforcement agencies and criminal courts must, in those cases, take all possible 
and reasonable measures to complete the necessary investigations with due speed 
and obtain a judicial decision on the offences alleged against an accused person. 
In that respect, delays for which the accused person is not responsible and which 
are not objectively justified are to be avoided and the longer the pre-trial detention 
continues, the stricter will be the requirements that must be imposed in order to 
ensure the expeditious advancement of the proceedings (see BVerfG, decision 
of13 May 2009 – 2 BvR 388/09 –, paragraph 21, juris). In that respect, the special 
duty to proceed expeditiously applies also, in principle, to cases involving bail or 
a subsidiary title of detention (Überhaft) (see BVerfG, decision of 30 August 
2008– 2 BvR 671/08 –, paragraph 21, juris). 
30 Against that backdrop, Paragraph 121(1) of the StPO provides that, until issuance 
of a judgment, execution of pre-trial detention for one and the same offence 
exceeding a period of six months may be enforced only if the particular difficulty 
or the unusual extent of the investigations or some other important reason does not 
yet admit pronouncement of judgment and justify continuation of the detention. 
However, according to Paragraph 121(3) of the StPO, the running of the time limit 
is suspended if the inter partes proceedings commenced within the six-month time 
limit. 
3. Request for a preliminary ruling 
31 The request to the Court for a preliminary ruling and the associated effects on the 
main proceedings are not explicitly governed by German law. However, it is 
generally accepted that a request for a preliminary ruling results in a stay of the 
main proceedings (see Esser in: Hilgendorf/Kudlich/Valerius, Handbuch des 
Strafrechts Band 6, 1st Ed. 2022, Europäisierung des Strafrechts, paragraph 257). 
The Chamber based the stay of the recusal proceedings on a mutatis mutandis 
application of Paragraph 262(2) of the StPO, which provides that, where criminal 
liability for an act is dependent on the evaluation of a legal relationship under civil 
law, the court is entitled to suspend the investigation and await the judgment of 
STEGMON 
 
9 
the civil court (see Stuckenberg in: Löwe-Rosenberg, StPO, 27th Edition, § 262, 
paragraphs 13 and 45). 
II. Explanation of the questions and relevance 
32 1. The presiding judge has cited the case-law of the Court as justification for her 
approach to the conduct of the proceedings. She has summarised that case-law to 
the effect that the referring judge should not, prior to the conclusion of the 
proceedings before the Court, be instructed – or compelled by means of 
‘disciplinary sanctions’ – by an appellate court to continue the main proceedings 
and that the referring court is required to await the decision of the Court and, 
pending that decision, may take only those procedural measures that are unrelated 
to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, and that that the foregoing 
applies also in cases involving detention. 
33 2. The Chamber in its entirety has so far assumed that she was not only entitled to 
obtain from the Court – which has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on questions of 
EU law – an answer on questions of EU law that are material to the decision, but 
was also required, in the present case, to await the Court’s decision, and, 
furthermore, that she had the right to do so without having to fear any negative 
consequences in that respect. Thus far, the Chamber had understood the case-law 
of the Court to that effect. 
34 For example, as early as its judgment of 16 December 2008 (C-210/06 Cartesio, 
paragraph 98) concerning Article 234(2) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, the Court has stated that ‘the jurisdiction conferred by that provision 
of the Treaty on any national court or tribunal to make a reference to the Court for 
a preliminary ruling cannot be called into question by the application of those 
rules [of national law], where they permit the appellate court to vary the order for 
reference, to set aside the reference and to order the referring court to resume the 
domestic law proceedings’. 
35 In the Court’s order of 12 February 2019 RH (C-8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110) the 
same statements can be found in paragraph 40 concerning Article 267 TFEU. In 
paragraph 47, it then states: ‘Not being exposed to disciplinary sanctions for 
exercising a choice, such as sending a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court 
or choosing to wait for the reply to such a request before adjudicating on the 
substance of a dispute before them, which is exclusively within their jurisdiction, 
constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence’. 
36 The assumption that the Chamber is also required to refrain, until the Court has 
issued its decision, from taking procedural measures relating to the questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling is based, according to the Chamber’s present 
understanding, on the Court’s judgment of 17 May 2023 (C-176/22, 
EU:C:2023:416) in particular, since, in paragraph 30 of that judgment in states: 
‘Accordingly, because a request for a preliminary ruling may be made to the Court 
even at an early stage of the main proceedings, it must be open to the referring 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 23. 4. 2024 – CASE C-288/24 
 
10  
court, pending the Court’s response to that request, to continue those proceedings 
for procedural steps which it considers necessary and which are unrelated to the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling.’ 
37 According to the Chamber’s present understanding, that applies a fortiori in the 
light of the rule laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 267 TFEU and the 
possibilities available under procedural law – even in criminal cases or cases 
involving detention – for an expedited or accelerated procedure, or an urgent 
preliminary ruling procedure, as provided for under Article 23a of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 105 
or 107 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
38 3. By contrast, the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, and in fact not just the head 
of department with responsibility for the main proceedings but also, at least, the 
responsible division manager, the Berlin Public Prosecutor General’s Office, 
which is superordinate to the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, and, in particular, 
the Berlin Higher Regional Court as the highest court of Berlin, clearly take a very 
different view. Over a period now spanning more than half a year, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Prosecutor General’s Office and the Berlin Higher 
Regional Court have repeatedly and with increasing intensity attempted (by means 
of appeal and setting aside of the order staying the proceedings; requests for 
prompt scheduling; and threat of a request for recusal for conflict of interests 
(Befangenheitsantrag)) to impel the presiding judge to advance the proceedings 
without waiting for the Court’s response to the questions on EU law that the 
Chamber considers material to its decision. 
39 4. Through the request for recusal filed by the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
the presiding judge’s understanding of the EU law is now being used as a basis for 
alleging a serious infringement of her official duties. That affects not only the area 
of judicial independence, which is enshrined in constitutional law (Article 97(1) of 
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), but also the right to the lawful judge (second 
sentence of Article 101(1) of the Basic Law). That significantly affects the further 
course of the proceedings, and particularly on the question as to the composition 
of the Chamber for the purposes of conducting the inter partes proceedings. The 
uncertainty as to whether the Federal Court of Justice would share the Chamber’s 
present understanding of EU law, or would instead regard a decision on the 
request for recusal that was based on that understanding as erring in law, would 
affect the entire trial procedure. If the Chamber were to err in its decision on the 
request for recusal, that could result in the judgment being set aside in an appeal 
on points of law (Revision). In the light of the foregoing, the Chamber is anxious 
to obtain clarification from the Court on the questions of EU law, with binding 
effect for the present main proceedings. 
STEGMON 
 
11 
C. Need for urgency 
40 The Court is requested to determine the case pursuant to an expedited procedure, 
or to give the case priority over others, because the accused person is in custody. 
Even if that custody is due to a penal sentence relating to another case and the 
arrest warrant issued in connection with the main proceedings has been 
suspended, the ongoing main proceedings impact on the execution of the penal 
sentence and, in particular, the question of a potential early release, which is at 
least theoretically possible as of 27 July 2024, pursuant to Paragraph 57(1) of the 
Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code). However, until the Court issues its decision, the 
Chamber cannot rule on the request for recusal and nor can it conduct any inter 
partes proceedings. 
[…] 
[Information on the composition of the bench] 
Issued at 
Berlin, 24.4.2024 
Warlich 
Justizbeschäftigter (judicial employee)