Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:1014
Date: 2024-12-12
Language of the case: Swedish
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Free movement of goods;Commercial policy;Approximation of laws;Customs Cooperation
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Sweden

Translation C-781/23 – 1 
Case C-781/23 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged:  
18 December 2023 
Referring court:  
Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Sweden) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
12 December 2023 
Appellant:  
Malmö Motorrenovering AB 
Respondent:  
Allmänna ombudet hos Tullverket 
  
HÖGSTA   RECORD  … 
FÖRVALTNINGS-  12. 12. 23   … 
DOMSTOLEN  … 
… 
APPELLANT 
Malmö Motorrenovering AB … 
… 
RESPONDENT 
Allmänna ombudet hos Tullverket (General Representative of the Customs 
Authority, Sweden) 
… 
ORDER 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 12. 12. 2023 – CASE C-781/23 
 
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A preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU must be obtained from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in accordance with the attached request for such a 
ruling (Annex to the record). 
… 
ANNEX 
Request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU seeking 
interpretation of Article 251 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 laying down the 
Union Customs Code (Union Customs Code). 
Introduction 
1 By its reference for a preliminary ruling, the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen 
(Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden) seeks clarity as to how Article 251 of 
the Union Customs Code is to be interpreted with regard to the conditions for 
extending a predetermined period during which goods may remain under the 
temporary admission procedure. The question for a preliminary ruling has arisen 
in the context of proceedings concerning the extinction of a customs debt under 
Article 124(1)(h) of the Union Customs Code. 
Applicable provisions of EU law 
2 Under Article 28(1)(b) of the Union Customs Code, favourable decisions are to be 
revoked or amended upon application by the holder of the decision. 
3 Article 79(1)(a) provides that, for goods liable to import duty, a customs debt on 
import is to be incurred through non-compliance with an obligation under the 
customs legislation relating, inter alia, to the temporary admission of such goods 
within the customs territory of the Union. 
4 A customs debt incurred pursuant to Article 79(1)(a) is to be extinguished under 
Article 124(1)(h) where (i) the failure which led to the incurrence of a customs 
debt had no significant effect on the correct operation of the customs procedure 
concerned and did not constitute an attempt at deception and (ii) all of the 
formalities necessary to regularise the situation of the goods are subsequently 
carried out. 
5 Article 250(1) states that under the temporary admission procedure non-Union 
goods intended for re-export may be subject to specific use in the customs 
territory of the Union, with total or partial relief from import duty. 
6 Article 251 lays down the period during which goods may remain under the 
temporary admission procedure. 
MALMÖ MOTORRENOVERING 
 
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7 Paragraph 1 of that article states that the customs authorities are to determine the 
period within which goods placed under the temporary admission procedure must 
be re-exported or placed under a subsequent customs procedure. It further states 
that such period is to be long enough for the objective of authorised use to be 
achieved. 
8 Paragraph 2 states that, except where otherwise provided, the maximum period 
during which goods may remain under the temporary admission procedure for the 
same purpose and under the responsibility of the same authorisation holder is to 
be 24 months, even where the procedure was discharged by placing the goods 
under another special procedure and subsequently placing them under the 
temporary admission procedure again. 
9 Under Paragraph 3, where, in exceptional circumstances, the authorised use 
cannot be achieved within the period referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
customs authorities may grant an extension, of reasonable duration of that period, 
upon justified application by the holder of the authorisation. 
10 Lastly, paragraph 4 provides that the overall period during which goods may 
remain under the temporary admission procedure is not to exceed 10 years, except 
in the case of an unforeseeable event. 
11 Under Article 103(a) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 
28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain 
provisions of the Union Customs Code – for the purposes of the application of 
Article 124(1)(h)(i) of the Code – exceeding a time limit by a period of time 
which is not longer than the extension of the time limit that would have been 
granted had that extension been applied for is to be considered a failure with no 
significant effect on the correct operation of the customs procedure. 
Facts in the proceedings 
12 The case concerns the company Malmö Motorrenovering AB and a temporary 
importation of a racing car from the United States to Sweden. The intention of the 
company’s importation was to use the car in racing activities within the EU and 
subsequently to re-export it. The racing activities were to last until 8 September 
2019. The company applied for and was granted authorisation for the use of the 
temporary admission procedure and on 30 April 2019 the company brought the 
car into the country. However, according to the conditions for the authorisation, 
the car had to be re-exported by 30 July 2019, that is to say before the end of the 
racing activities. Why that date, and not a later date, was decided upon is a matter 
of dispute between the company and the Tullverket (Customs Authority, Sweden). 
13 It is common ground that the car was not re-exported until 19 September 2019 – 
that is to say, after the date laid down in the authorisation – and that that did not 
constitute an attempt at deception. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 12. 12. 2023 – CASE C-781/23 
 
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14 As the car was re-exported after the expiry date laid down in the authorisation, the 
Customs Authority decided to charge the company customs duty of SEK 101 959 
and VAT of SEK 280 387. 
15 The company lodged an action against the decision with the Förvaltningsrätten i 
Linköping (Administrative Court, Linköping, Sweden), which upheld the 
company’s action and decided that the customs debt, including VAT, should be 
extinguished. The Förvaltningsrätten noted that the company had not stated a final 
date for re-exportation in its customs declaration, but that the intention had been to 
export the car only when the racing season had ended. In the view of the 
Förvaltningsrätten, there is nothing to indicate that the intention of the procedure 
had been deceptive, rather, it appeared to have been a matter of mere oversight. 
Against that background, and in view of the fact that the Customs Authority had 
not argued that there were reasons for not granting the company a period up to the 
date of the actual re-exportation of the car if that date had already been stated in 
the application, the Förvaltningsrätten found that there were grounds for allowing 
the customs debt to be extinguished under Article 124(1)(h) of the Union Customs 
Code. 
16 The Customs Authority lodged an appeal with the Kammarrätten i Jönköping 
(Administrative Court of Appeal, Jönköping, Sweden), which upheld the appeal 
and confirmed the decision of the Customs Authority. The Kammarrätten held 
that, in order for relief to be granted under Article 124(1)(h) of the Union Customs 
Code and Article 103(a) of the Supplementing Regulation, it is necessary to 
examine whether and to what extent the company would have been granted an 
extension of the time limit for re-exporting the car if an application for an 
extension had been submitted to the Customs Authority. The company was not 
deemed to have demonstrated that the circumstances were such that it could be 
considered likely that it would have been granted an extension if such an 
application had been submitted. This was particularly true in view of the fact that 
an extension in this case would have required that the company be able to rely on 
exceptional circumstances as a reason for granting such an application. 
Consequently, there were no grounds for extinguishing the customs debt under 
Article 124(1)(h) of the Union Customs Code. 
17 The company lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Kammarrätten with 
the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen. The Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen may limit 
leave to appeal to a specific aspect of the case where review of that aspect is of 
particular importance for the uniform application of the law (referred to as a 
question of precedent). The Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen granted leave to appeal 
in respect of the question of precedent concerning the conditions for determining 
and subsequently extending the period during which goods may remain under the 
temporary admission procedure pursuant to Article 251 of the Union Customs 
Code. The issue of granting leave to appeal in respect of the remainder of the case 
was reserved. 
MALMÖ MOTORRENOVERING 
 
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18 In cases of this kind, the public action before the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen is 
brought by the General Representative of the Customs Authority. The General 
Representative – rather than the Customs Authority – is thus a separate party 
before the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen. However, the Customs Authority has 
nevertheless been given the opportunity to comment in the case. 
Positions of the parties and the Customs Authority 
Malmö Motorrenovering AB 
19 Malmö Motorrenovering AB claims that the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen should 
rule that there are grounds for allowing the customs debt imposed on the company 
to be extinguished. The company submits as follows. 
20 The Customs Authority’s view that exceptional circumstances are required for the 
application of the grounds for relief is incorrect in the light of both the wording 
and the purpose of Article 251 of the Union Customs Code. The exceptional 
circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 of the article relate to the 24-month time 
limit referred to in paragraph 2. Paragraph 3 also refers to paragraph 1 because 
that time limit may have been set from the outset at 24 months or more. The 
provision in paragraph 3 should therefore be read as meaning that the temporary 
admission procedure can last for up to 24 months and that a longer period requires 
exceptional reasons. 
The General Representative of the Customs Authority 
21 The General Representative of the Customs Authority submits that the case should 
be referred back to the Kammarrätten for re-examination on the basis that 
Article 251(3) of the Union Customs Code is not applicable and submits as 
follows. 
22 The general rule laid down by Article 251(1) of the Union Customs Code is that 
the period determined by the customs authority is to be long enough for the 
objective of authorised use to be achieved. If the determined period for which 
goods may remain under the temporary admission procedure proves to be 
insufficient, the holder of the authorisation may, under Article 28(1)(b), apply for 
the decision to be amended so as to extend that period. A reasonable interpretation 
of the latter provision is that it may be limited by other rules, in so far as they are 
applicable. The question is whether Article 251(3) includes such a limitation in 
the present situation. 
23 As regards extension of the period laid down in Article 251, it seems reasonable 
and appropriate that such an extension may be decided upon where the holder of 
the authorisation can demonstrate that the period determined is not sufficient to 
achieve the objective. A requirement that such an extension may be granted only 
in exceptional circumstances would undermine the purpose of the rules. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 12. 12. 2023 – CASE C-781/23 
 
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24 It is clear from the introductory part of Article 251(3) of the Union Customs Code 
that that provision is intended to apply in the event that the authorised use cannot 
be achieved within the period referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. In the light of the 
purpose of those provisions, the reference to paragraphs 1 and 2 must be 
interpreted as meaning that paragraph 3 refers to an extension of the period laid 
down in paragraph 1, which exceeds the maximum period of 24 months laid down 
in paragraph 2. 
25 Such an interpretation means that the limitation to exceptional circumstances in 
Article 251(3) applies only where an extension of the period during which the 
goods may remain under the temporary admission procedure (for the same 
purpose and under the responsibility of the same holder of the authorisation) 
would result in the period exceeding 24 months. 
The Customs Authority 
26 The Customs Authority argues that the appeal should be dismissed and states that 
Article 251(3) of the Union Customs Code is applicable in the present case. That 
provision refers to both paragraphs 1 and 2. If paragraph 3 were intended to apply 
only where a period exceeded the maximum period of 24 months applicable under 
paragraph 2, paragraph 3 would refer only to paragraph 2. 
The need for a preliminary ruling 
27 It is common ground that the period for re-exportation decided upon by the 
Customs Authority was not sufficient for the objective of the authorised use – that 
is to say use of the car to take part in races within the EU until the beginning of 
September 2019 – to be achieved. It is further common ground that the overall 
period needed for the company to achieve that objective was less than 24 months 
and that there was no attempt at deception. 
28 The question in the case before the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen is what 
conditions apply, in a situation such as that described above, for determining and 
subsequently extending the period during which goods may remain under the 
temporary admission procedure pursuant to Article 251 of the Union Customs 
Code. 
29 Article 251(3) states that where, in exceptional circumstances, the authorised use 
cannot be achieved within the period referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
customs authorities may grant an extension, of reasonable duration of that period, 
upon justified application by the holder of the authorisation. The company and the 
General Representative interpret the provision differently from the Customs 
Authority. 
30 Article 251(3) of the Union Customs Code can, as the company and the General 
Representative argue, be understood as meaning that it is applicable only if an 
application for an extension of the period means that the period already granted, 
MALMÖ MOTORRENOVERING 
 
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together with the extension applied, will exceed the time limit of 24 months 
referred to in paragraph 2. If that meaning is placed on paragraph 3, the 
requirement of exceptional circumstances is not applicable where, as in the 
present case, the period already granted, together with the extension applied for, is 
less than 24 months. 
31 However, the Customs Authority interprets paragraph 3 differently and argues that 
the reference to paragraphs 1 and 2 means that paragraph 3 is always applicable 
when the authorised use cannot be achieved within the period already granted. If 
that meaning is placed on the provision, the requirement of exceptional 
circumstances also applies where a period already granted, together with an 
extension applied for, is less than 24 months. 
32 The Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen finds that the wording of the article does not 
rule out either interpretation. The Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen takes the view 
that what the General Representative has stated regarding the purpose of the 
provisions is not sufficient to determine its meaning. The Court of Justice does not 
appear to have examined the matter and, in the view of the Högsta 
förvaltningsdomstolen, there is not therefore sufficient guidance for determining 
the matter in this case. It is therefore necessary to obtain a preliminary ruling from 
the Court of Justice. 
Question 
33 In the light of the foregoing, the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen requests an answer 
to the following question. 
34 Must Article 251 of the Union Customs Code be interpreted as meaning that the 
reference in paragraph 3 to paragraphs 1 and 2 means that the requirement for 
exceptional circumstances in paragraph 3 applies only where a period already 
granted, together with an extension applied for, would mean that the overall 
period during which the goods may remain under the procedure in question 
exceeds 24 months? Or must the article be interpreted as meaning that the 
requirement for exceptional circumstances in paragraph 3 is applicable to all 
applications for an extension, that is to say, even if the period already granted, 
together with the extension applied for, does not exceed the 24-month period laid 
down in paragraph 2?