Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2022:79
Date: 2022-02-15
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: Financial provisions
Procedure: Action for annulment - inadmissible

summary of the pleas in law and arguments relied on and the form of order sought by the applicant. 12 It is apparent from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to exercise its review. It follows that it is necessary that the basic legal and factual particulars, on which the action is based, be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, accordingly, specify the nature of the ground on which the action is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (see orders of 27 March 2017, Frank v Commission, T‑603/15, not published, EU:T:2017:228, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and of 18 September 2018, eSlovensko v Commission, T‑664/17, not published, EU:T:2018:559, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 13 Thus, the applicant is required to set out in a sufficiently systematic manner the arguments relating to each plea in law on which it relies, and the General Court is not obliged, because of the lack of structure of the application or lack of rigour on the part of the applicant, to reconstruct the legal structure intended to support a plea by bringing together various diffuse elements of the application. The risk would be to reconstruct that plea by giving it a scope which it did not have in the mind of that party. To decide otherwise would be contrary both to the principle of the sound administration of justice and the principle that the subject matter of an action is delimited by the parties and to the defendant’s rights of defence (see order of 6 September 2009, Romańska v Frontex, T‑212/18, not published, EU:T:2019:581, paragraph 42). 14 In the present case, it must be held that those requirements have not been met. 15 Admittedly, it is clear from the application that this is an action for annulment directed against the contested decision based on Article 263 TFEU. In other words, the requirement under Article 76(e) of the Rules of Procedure that the application must indicate the form of order sought by the applicant is satisfied in that regard. 16 In addition, the application contains a detailed summary of the exchange of messages concerning the prospects, for the applicant, of entering into a grant agreement as coordinator for the ‘Slovak Safer Internet Centre V’ project. 17 Nevertheless, the basic legal and factual particulars, on which the action for annulment is based, are not indicated in any way in the application. The applicant merely refers to certain principles or rules of law, such as the principle of proportionality, the right to good administration, and misuse of powers, and summarises its ‘first plea in law’ by listing in the abstract ‘infringement of an essential procedural requirements, exceeding of power, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers, particularly improper legal evaluation of facts and findings’, without setting out the facts which constitute the basis of the infringement of those principles or rules of law. Conversely, the applicant repeats excerpts from the applicable law and judgments of the General Court or the Court of Justice concerning their general application, without in any way linking them with the facts of the present case. 18 For instance, the applicant, in an imprecise and relatively confused manner, presents, in paragraph 8 of the application, in 3 pages and under 13 indents, a list of exchanges of opinion between it, the Commission and the auditors, without any legal qualification other than that of the fact that ‘the Commission had not taken proper care of the case’. In that regard, there is no substantial explanation or arguments as to how the Commission contributed to the extension of the procedure at issue or to the periods of inactivity attributable to it. In short, that statement lacks structure and rigour to such an extent that it is impossible for the Commission to reconstitute the legal articulation supposed to support it. 19 In addition, the applicant, in the part of the application entitled ‘IV. PLEAS IN LAW IN THE MAIN ARGUMENTS’, merely cites excerpts from judgments delivered by the Court of Justice or the General Court, which are unrelated to the facts at issue. 20 It must be held that that part of the application does not meet the requirements of clarity and precision laid down in Article 76(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure. 21 It follows that the application clearly does not satisfy the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. The pleas in law and the basic legal and factual particulars, on which the action is based, are in no way apparent from the application. The heads of claim seeking to suspend the operation of the contested decision and to refer the case back to the Commission 22 In the first place, in the application, the applicant requests the suspension of the operation of the contested decision on the ground that the immediate enforceability of the sum claimed by the Commission could compromise the survival of the organisation. It states, in its observations on the plea of inadmissibility, that its application seeks annulment of the contested decision and that its application to suspend the operation of the decision supplements the application on its merits. 23 The Commission contends that that claim is inadmissible on the ground that it was not made by separate document. 24 It should be noted that, according to Article 156(5) of the Rules of Procedure, an application to suspend the operation of a measure must be made by separate document. 25 In the present case, the request was made in the application. 26 It follows that it is inadmissible. 27 In the second place, the applicant requests that the case be referred back to the Commission for a decision on the financial implications and the eligibility of the expenditure at issue. It disputes in that regard the ineligibility found by the audit. 28 The Commission contends that that request is inadmissible. 29 It should be noted that, by that request, the applicant requests, in essence, the Court to issue a direction to the Commission. 30 In accordance with settled case-law, however, in an action for annulment, the jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union is limited to reviewing the legality of the contested measure and the Court may not, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, issue directions to institutions of the European Union (see order of 26 October 1995, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, EU:C:1995:360, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 17 June 2010, CEVA v Commission, T‑428/07 and T‑455/07, EU:T:2010:240, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). It is for the institution concerned to take, under Article 266 TFEU, the measures necessary to comply with any judgment ordering annulment (see order of 12 March 2014, PAN Europe v Commission, T‑192/12, not published, EU:T:2014:152, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited). 31 Accordingly, that claim is inadmissible. 32 It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed as inadmissible. Costs 33 Under Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 34 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as inadmissible. 2. eSlovensko Bratislava is ordered to pay the costs. Luxembourg, 15 February 2022. E. Coulon D. Spielmann Registrar President * Language of the case: English.