Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2026:223
Date: 2026-03-19
Language of the case: Hungarian
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Hungary

Summary C-679/24 – 1 
Case C-679/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
15 October 2024 
Referring court: 
Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
9 October 2024 
Appellant: 
HL 
Respondents: 
UniCredit Bank Zrt. 
Momentum Credit Zrt. 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Dispute between a consumer, on the one hand, and a credit institution and a debt 
collection company, on the other, concerning the validity of a loan agreement 
denominated in a foreign currency, and the commencement of the limitation 
period for bringing claims under that agreement and the suspension of that period. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation of Articles 1 and 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
Legal basis: Article 267 TFEU. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-679/24 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Are the objectives laid down in Articles 1 and 7 of Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 achieved where, in the case of a claim made by a 
consumer in proceedings brought by that consumer and based on the unfair 
nature of the main subject matter of a loan agreement concluded with the 
consumer ([concerning] information about the exchange rate risk), the 
financial claim is subject to the limitation period of five years laid down in 
the Hungarian Civil Code, calculated from the point in time at which the 
claim may be brought – also taking into account the provisions of DH1 és 
DH2 törvényeknek (the DH 1 and DH 2 Laws), which provide for the 
possibility that the limitation period can be suspended – notwithstanding the 
fact that the unfair nature of the main subject matter of the agreement means 
that the agreement as a whole is invalid, and that the unilateral termination 
of that agreement cannot therefore result in its termination, with the result 
that the date on which the agreement was concluded determines the starting 
point of the limitation period? 
2. Are the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 
limitation periods for asserting a consumer’s claims, and the decisions of the 
Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary) following those decisions of the Court of 
Justice, relevant for the purposes of achieving the objectives laid down in 
the directive, and are they binding or do they at least have the force of 
precedent for the Hungarian courts, as a result of which the consumer is in a 
position to recognise the unfair nature of the main subject matter of the 
agreement he or she has concluded? If the answer is in the affirmative, can 
[the date of] such decisions be regarded as the starting point of the limitation 
period for asserting the claim for a declaration that an agreement is unfair or 
can the limitation period only be regarded as having been suspended 
between the time when the agreement was concluded and the date on which 
such decisions are given? 
3. In addition to the date on which the decisions referred to in the second 
question were given, should the point in time when the consumer became 
aware of those decisions be taken as the starting point of the limitation 
period or should this be taken as the end of the period – which began with 
the conclusion of the contract – during which the limitation period has been 
suspended? 
4. In the case of a consumer’s claim based on the unfair nature of the main 
subject matter of an agreement, if the limitation period begins to run at the 
time when the agreement is concluded, is it justified to grant the consumer 
the possibility of asserting his or her claim until the end of the term of the 
agreement concluded by that consumer, where the term of the agreement 
exceeds the limitation period of five years currently in force? 
UNICREDIT BANK AND MOMENTUM CREDIT 
 
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Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (‘Directive 93/13’), Article 1 and 7. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai 
(C-26/13). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 September 2017, Andriciuc and Others, 
(C-186/16). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 September 2018, OTP Bank and OTP 
Faktoring (C-51/17). 
Order of the Court of Justice of 8 November 2018, VE (C-227/18). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance 
(C-609/19). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance 
(C-776/19 to C-[782]/19). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 31 March 2022, Lombard Lízing (C-472/20). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2022, D.B.P. and Others 
(Mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency) (C-80/21 to C-82/21). 
Order of the Court of Justice of 14 June 2023, AxFina Hungary (C-705/21). 
Provisions of national law relied on 
A Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 1959. évi IV. törvény (Law IV of 1959 
approving the Civil Code; ‘the Civil Code’) in force at the time when the 
agreement was concluded on 14 February 2008, Article 209(5) transposing 
Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13. 
In accordance with Article 234(1) of the Civil Code, ‘except in the cases provided 
for by law, any person may plead the ineffectiveness of a contract that is null and 
void without any time limit for doing so. A special procedure is not necessary for 
a declaration of invalidity’. 
According to Article 237(1) of the Civil Code, if a contract is invalid, the situation 
existing before the conclusion of that contract is to be restored. Article 237(2) of 
that code establishes that if it is impossible to restore the situation existing before 
the conclusion of a contract, the court will declare that contract applicable during 
the period until it has given its ruling. That provision also establishes that a 
contract that is invalid may be declared to be valid if it is possible to eliminate the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-679/24 
 
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cause of the invalidity. In such cases, restitution of any services for which the 
consideration, if any, has not been paid shall be agreed. 
In accordance with Article 324 of the Civil Code, claims are time-barred after five 
years. Under Article 326(1) of the Civil Code, the limitation period begins to run 
from the point in time when the claim may be brought. Paragraph 2 of that article 
provides that, where the person entitled to bring a claim is prevented from doing 
so for a justifiable reason, the limitation period is ‘suspended’ and the claim may 
be brought within one year – or within three months, if the limitation period is one 
year or less – from the time when the obstacle is removed, even if the limitation 
period has already expired or if there is less than one year or three months 
remaining before the expiry of the limitation period. In accordance with 
Article 327 of the Civil Code, the limitation period will be interrupted when 
fulfilment of the obligation is demanded in writing, when the claim is brought 
before the courts, when the obligation is modified by agreement and when the 
debtor acknowledges the debt. Following the interruption, the limitation period 
starts again. 
Article 1(1) of the a Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói 
kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes 
kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvény (Law No XXXVIII of 
2014 on the resolution of certain issues relating to the decision adopted by the 
Hungarian Supreme Court with a view to ensuring consistent interpretation of the 
provisions of civil law concerning loan contracts concluded by credit 
establishments; ‘the DH 1 Law’) states as follows: ‘… For the purposes of the 
present law, loan contracts concluded with consumers shall cover any foreign 
exchange based … credit or loan agreement, or any financial leasing agreement, 
concluded between a financial institution and a consumer, if it incorporates 
standard contract terms or any contract term which has not been individually 
negotiated …’. Paragraph 7 of that article establishes that the limitation period for 
claims is suspended from the date on which this law enters into force until such 
time as is legally specified. 
In accordance with Article 9 of the a Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói 
kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes 
kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvényben rögzített elszámolás 
szabályairól és egyes egyéb rendelkezésekről szóló 2014. évi XL. törvény (Law 
No XL of 2014 on the provisions governing the settlement of accounts referred to 
in [the DH 1 Law] and on certain other provisions; ‘the DH 2 Law’), the limitation 
period for bringing claims arising from consumer loan agreements is suspended, 
within the meaning of Article 1(7) of the DH 1 Law, until the date on which the 
consumer is notified of the settlement of accounts pursuant to the DH 2 Law itself 
or until 31 December 2015, at the latest. Under Article 37(1) of the DH 2 Law, the 
only possible legal consequence of invalidity in cases similar to that in these 
proceedings is a declaration that the contract is valid or that it has effect until the 
date on which judgment is given. 
UNICREDIT BANK AND MOMENTUM CREDIT 
 
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According to Judgment 2/2014 of the Hungarian Supreme Court on the consistent 
interpretation of the provisions of civil law of 16 June 2014, which aims to ensure 
the uniform interpretation of national law and the consequent unification of case-
law, individually negotiated contractual terms cannot be considered unfair. The 
legal provisions on unfair contract terms do not apply to terms defining the main 
subject matter of the contract – and, consequently, neither do they apply to terms 
that place the exchange rate risk on the consumer – which determine the 
characteristic performance under the contract, provided that they are clear and 
comprehensible. However, the fact that the provisions identifying who bears the 
exchange rate risk form part of the main subject matter of the contract does not in 
itself preclude an examination of the unfair nature of those contractual provisions 
where they are not clear or comprehensible, taking into account also the 
information received from the financial institution. The consumer must prove that 
the information was inadequate and that, as a result, the contractual provision 
concerning the exchange rate risk was not clear and comprehensible. 
According to the reasoning stated in point III of that judgment on the consistent 
interpretation of the provisions of civil law, ‘it is possible to examine whether a 
provision of a given contract relating to exchange rate risk is clear and 
comprehensible despite the fact that the vast majority of foreign currency loan 
contracts concluded with consumers were concluded before the amendment of the 
Civil Code … in 2009. … The provisions of Directive [93/13], which was already 
binding in Hungary too at the time when the contracts were concluded following 
the Association Agreement, have been transposed … The amended legislation, 
specifically taking into account the provisions of Directive [93/13], had 
introduced into Article 209(4) of the Civil Code a provision stating that “a 
standard contractual term, or a term not individually negotiated in a consumer 
contract, shall also be regarded as unfair simply on the ground that it is not in 
plain intelligible language”. As is clear from the considerations set out by the 
Court of Justice in its judgment [of 30 April 2014 in Case C-26/13, Kásler and 
Káslerné Rábai], a national court is required, when applying the provisions of 
domestic law, to consider the whole body of rules of national law and to interpret 
them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of [Directive 
93/13] in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the 
directive, unless that entails an interpretation contra legem of [national] law 
(paragraphs 64 and 65). Since it also cannot be deduced from the only provision 
of Hungarian law prior to 22 May 2009 that the rules of the incorrectly transposed 
Directive [93/13] relating to comprehensibility and clarity do not apply, the 
relevant legislation must be interpreted on the basis of Directive [93/13].’ 
Other provisions of national law relied on: 
A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény (Law CXXX of 2016 
on civil procedure), Article 346. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-679/24 
 
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A bíróságok szervezetéről és igazgatásáról szóló 2011. évi CLXI. törvény (Law 
CLXI of 2011 on the organisation and administration of the courts), Articles 27, 
27, 41, 41/D and 42. 
Judgment Jpe.I.60.015/2021/15 of 22 November 2021 of the Appeal Chamber for 
the Unification of Precedent of the Hungarian Supreme Court, with effects for 
unification of precedent, which held that there was a deviation on a point of law 
from a previously published judgment of the Hungarian Supreme Court, while 
maintaining the validity of the contested decision. 
Opinion 2/2011 of 12 December 2011 of the Plenary Session of the Civil Division 
of the Hungarian Supreme Court on certain questions relating to the validity of 
consumer contracts, including guidelines of principle in relation to the application 
of the Civil Code. 
Opinion 1/2010 of 28 June 2010 of the Plenary Session of the Civil Division of 
the Hungarian Supreme Court on the legal consequences of invalidity. 
Judgment Gfv.VI.30.382/2023/3 of the Hungarian Supreme Court of 14 February 
2024, delivered on appeal. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and the main proceedings 
1 On 14 February 2008, the appellant and UniCredit Bank concluded a loan 
agreement pursuant to which UniCredit Bank granted a mortgage-backed loan of 
HUF 5 100 000 (approximately EUR 13 000) denominated in Swiss francs, with a 
term of 366 months and a final maturity of 15 February 2038. Prior to the 
conclusion of the loan agreement, the appellant had submitted a loan application 
to UniCredit Bank on 21 January 2008 with an information document annexed to 
that application. On 17 May 2012, UniCredit Bank terminated the loan agreement 
because the appellant had been in arrears since 15 November 2011 in the payment 
of the monthly instalments due. UniCredit Bank applied on 26 June 2012 for 
enforcement to be commenced in respect of the appellant. Enforcement 
proceedings commenced on 28 December 2012. 
2 On the basis of the settlement of accounts determined under the new legislation of 
2014 (the DH 2 Law), on 15 April 2015, UniCredit Bank calculated an amount of 
CHF 4 999.19 – with a reference date of 1 February 2015 – to be charged to the 
appellant in respect of an unfair ‘exchange rate differential’ and as a result of a 
unilateral amendment to the agreement. No further additional claims were made in 
this regard. On 17 March 2017, UniCredit Bank assigned its claim under the 
contract to Momentum Credit. 
3 On 4 April 2023, the appellant brought a claim before the court of first instance 
seeking a declaration that the loan agreement concluded in 2008 with UniCredit 
Bank was null and void and a consequent declaration that the agreement was valid 
as if the contractual clause imposing the exchange rate risk on the appellant did 
UNICREDIT BANK AND MOMENTUM CREDIT 
 
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not exist. The appellant requested the settlement of accounts in accordance with 
the judgment of the Court of Justice of 31 March 2022, Lombard Lízing 
(C-472/20), and stated that the outstanding debt to UniCredit Bank as at 
5 September 2012 was HUF 5 223 492 plus interest, which it agreed to pay when 
the final court decision was delivered. In the alternative, the appellant requested 
that the agreement be declared enforceable in accordance with Article 37(1) of the 
DH 2 Law. 
4 UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit requested in their defence that the claim 
be dismissed. Both raised a defence of limitation, according to which the 
appellant’s claim for a determination of the legal consequences was time-barred, 
even if the loan agreement in question was invalid. Both entities denied that the 
agreement was invalid. 
5 In its judgment, the court of first instance dismissed the claim. 
6 The appellant appealed the judgment of the court of first instance to the referring 
court. In the appeal, the appellant sought, principally, an alteration of that 
judgment and, in the alternative, an order that the judgment be set aside and that 
the court of first instance be ordered to conduct fresh proceedings. 
Essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
7 The appellant submits that the agreement is without effect because it is void under 
the provisions of Hungarian law (in particular the Civil Code), since the obligation 
to provide information was not complied with, and that it is also invalid under the 
provisions of the Civil Code, since the information about the exchange rate risk 
was unfair. 
8 The appellant believes that the information about exchange rate risk does not 
comply with the requirements laid down in the judgments of the Court of Justice 
in Case C-26/13, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, and Case C-51/17, OTP Bank and 
OTP Faktoring. 
9 The appellant asserts that the loan agreement in question is void. It submits that 
the court of first instance erred in finding that the claim was time-barred. On that 
point, the appellant relies on the judgments of the Court of Justice in Cases 
C-609/19, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, and C-776/19 to C-782/19, BNP 
Paribas Personal Finance, which held that if the consumer is unaware that a term 
in a loan agreement is unfair, there is no limitation period for obtaining repayment 
[of the sums paid]. In the appeal, the appellant also relies on the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 31 March 2022 in Case C-472/20, Lombard Lízing, and the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-679/24 
 
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order of the Court of Justice of 14 June 2023 in Case C-705/21, AxFina 
Hungary. * 
10 The appellant claims not to have received adequate information about the 
exchange rate risk, which has the effect of rendering the contract completely 
invalid. The appellant also maintains that legal action is not time-barred and that, 
for that reason, the claim should not be dismissed. That party stresses the fact that 
the application of Article 37 of the DH 2 Law prevails over the application of the 
provisions of the Civil Code relating to the statute of limitations, irrespective of 
the reason for invalidity. The appellant also considers that it is possible to invoke 
invalidity without any time limit. 
11 The respondents, on the other hand, believe that the information about the 
exchange rate risk is fully in line with the relevant EU and national case-law. 
Furthermore, according to the respondents, the five years referred to in the Civil 
Code – calculated from the point in time when the agreement was concluded – 
have elapsed without the appellant having asserted its claims arising from the 
invalidity of the agreement. They claim that the statute of limitations has also run 
if it is calculated from the unilateral termination of the agreement. 
12 The respondents assert that the court of first instance assessed the facts correctly 
and gave a correct decision on the merits, for which it also gave detailed reasons 
with regard to the statute of limitations. In its judgment of 14 February 2024, the 
Hungarian Supreme Court dealt in detail with the judgment of the Court of Justice 
of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C-776/19 to C-[782]/19), relied 
on by the appellant, and did not consider the application of the statute of limitation 
to be contrary to that judgment. The Hungarian Supreme Court has also confirmed 
in other cases the judgments of the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, 
Hungary) to this effect. 
Summary of the decision of the court of first instance 
13 In the present case, the court of first instance dismissed the claim – in line with its 
previous case-law – on the ground that, due to the statute of limitations, the 
appellant could not assert its claim before a court, even if the contract had 
otherwise been valid. The court held that the appellant’s application was seeking a 
declaration of invalidity of the agreement independently of other claims. What 
prevented the court of first instance from ruling on the merits of the claim for a 
declaration of invalidity was not the statute of limitations, but rather the fact that 
the appellant could not, by virtue of the special rule laid down in Article 37(1) of 
the DH 2 Law, independently apply for a declaration of invalidity of the loan 
agreement, irrespective of the main subject matter of the agreement. 
 
* [Translator’s note: The referring court is most probably referring to the judgment of 27 April 
2023 in Case C-705/21 (EU:C:2023:352) and not to the rectification order of 14 June 2023, 
which, moreover, concerns only the Hungarian version of that judgment]. 
UNICREDIT BANK AND MOMENTUM CREDIT 
 
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14 In its judgment, the court of first instance held that the claim seeking a 
determination of the legal consequences of the invalidity of the agreement could 
be time-barred, irrespective of its content. The grounds for invalidity already 
existed at the time when the agreement was concluded and the agreement already 
contained – at that time – the content contested by the appellant in relation to the 
information about exchange rate risk. Therefore, the action for invalidity could 
already have been brought at the time when the agreement was concluded. In the 
present case, the statute of limitations means that this claim can no longer be 
asserted before a court, irrespective of whether it is invalid. 
15 Neither can the limitation period be suspended where what is unknown to the 
person entitled to bring a claim is not the facts but, rather, the rules and case-law 
necessary to make a legal assessment of those facts, or where that person makes a 
different interpretation of the rules of law on which the claim is based. Unilateral 
termination of an invalid contract cannot produce legal effects, and unilateral 
termination can only have an effect on the statute of limitations if the court has 
declared the contract valid, which is only possible as long as the statute of 
limitations has not run. The court of first instance also noted that the evidence in 
the file did not indicate that the statute of limitations had been interrupted. 
16 The court of first instance did not alter its position in the light of the judgment of 
the Court of Justice of 8 September 2022 in Cases C-80/21 to C-82/21, D.B.P. and 
Others (Mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency), since the content of 
Polish law is different and has no bearing on the present case. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
17 The referring court, acting as the court of second instance, has doubts as to the 
computation of the limitation period, since the unfair term relating to the main 
subject matter of the agreement results in the invalidity of the agreement as a 
whole and, therefore, the unilateral termination of that agreement cannot have the 
effect of terminating it. 
18 In the present case, the period of five years from the conclusion of the agreement 
(14 February 2008) laid down by the Hungarian Civil Code has already elapsed. 
Not even the possibilities offered by the DH 1 Law and the DH 2 Law to suspend 
the limitation period (whereby the limitation period expired on 31 December 2015 
at the latest) provide an extension of the limitation period during which the 
consumer could have become aware of the unfair nature of the information about 
exchange rate risk contained in the agreement. 
19 The criteria established by the Hungarian Supreme Court in its Judgment 2/2014 
on the consistent interpretation of the provisions of civil law of 16 June 2014 in 
relation to the ‘non-abusive’ nature of information about exchange rate risk have 
been extended in successive decisions handed down by the Court of Justice. The 
Court of Justice has given various rulings on the appropriate criteria to be met by 
information about exchange rate risk (judgments of the Court of Justice of 
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20 September 2017, Andriciuc and Others, C-186/16, and of 20 September 2018, 
OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring, C-51/17, and order of the Court of Justice of 
8 November 2018, VE, C-227/18), and the consumer was therefore not in a 
position to recognise the unfair nature of the main subject matter of the agreement 
concluded. The referring court is therefore concerned that, in those circumstances, 
the limitation period of five years from the conclusion of the agreement laid down 
by the Hungarian Civil Code might not be sufficient for the consumer to become 
aware of the unfair nature of the agreement and to assert a claim, even in view of 
the possibility recognised in the DH 1 Law and the DH 2 Law in relation to 
suspending the limitation period.