Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:95
Date: 2026-02-12
Language of the case: English

summary of the legal arguments advanced by the 
airlines, daa and the IAA which are of relevance to this reference is set out below. 
 
Summary of Aer Lingus Legal Arguments 
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50. Aer Lingus’ arguments insofar as they are relevant to this Request for a Preliminary Ruling, 
include: 
 
The IAA erred in law, acted ultra vires and outside its statutory powers, and / or acted 
irrationally and / or acted disproportionately in taking into account the 32mppa Conditions 
when setting coordination parameters   
 
51. Aer Lingus’s position is that the 32mppa Conditions are not a relevant constraint and that the 
IAA erred in taking them into account when determining the coordination parameters under 
Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation.  There are three aspects to this ground. 
 
52. The first is that the remit of the IAA under the Slot Regulation is to set the “capacity available 
for slot allocation”. Capacity means the maximum amount that something can accommodate.  
For the purpose of the Slot Regulation capacity is the maximum number of movements (and 
related passengers) which the airport could accommodate.  
 
53. Passenger throughput (also referred to as passenger outturn) is a different issue to capacity and 
refers to the number of passengers who actually use the terminals as opposed to what the actual 
capacity of the terminals is. The throughput of the terminals is restricted by the 32mppa 
Conditions – not the capacity of the terminals. In the case of Dublin Airport, the capacity of 
the terminals according to the Dublin Airport Local Area Plan 2020 (“DALAP 2020”) is 
40mppa which is significantly higher than the 32million referred to in the conditions.  The 
DALAP 2020 is a statutory land use plan adopted by Fingal County Council. 
 
54. Aer Lingus’s position is that in setting a PATM seat cap of 14.4 million, the IAA is in effect 
attempting to limit the passenger throughput of the terminals (as opposed to capacity), which 
it has no jurisdiction to do under the Slot Regulation.  The IAA accept in its Opposition Papers 
filed in the Aer Lingus proceedings that it cannot control passenger throughput in the Winter 
24 Decision. 
 
55. In circumstances where the 32mppa Conditions relate to throughput and not capacity the 
conditions are not a relevant constraint on capacity, regardless of whether the conditions are 
considered to be technical, operational or environmental constraints.  
 
56. Furthermore, Article 6 of the Slot Regulation requires the IAA to determine coordination 
parameters at Dublin Airport, with a view to maximising capacity, by reference to what the 
terminals could possibly accommodate.  In applying a PATM seat cap the IAA did not set 
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coordination parameters with a view to maximising the capacity which Dublin Airport could 
potentially accommodate and it has no power to set a limit on passenger throughput.   
 
57. The second aspect is that if, the CJEU find that the 32mppa Conditions relate to capacity, the 
IAA still should not have taken them into account as they are not a “relevant technical, 
operational or environmental constraint”. 
 
58. Aer Lingus maintains that “technical constraints” relate to the technical capability of 
equipment or facilities involved in the processing of aircraft, passengers and baggage.  
“Operational constraints” cover matters such as the layout of taxiways, towing of aircraft, 
mode of operation of runways. “Environmental constraints”, on a literal interpretation of the 
phrase, means that the constraint relates to or arises out of an environmental medium, for 
example noise, air and atmosphere, water, emissions, waste, soil, landscape etc and which 
because of their presence would have a limiting effect on the capacity of Dublin Airport.   
 
59. Aer Lingus does not accept that simply because an EIA was carried out in respect of the 
Terminal 2 Permission that the 32mppa Conditions were attached to mitigate identified likely 
environmental effects as contended for by daa.  Furthermore, no EIA was carried out in respect 
of the Terminal 1 Extension Permission.  In order to determine if the 32mppa Conditions are 
an “environmental constraint”, it is necessary to look at the purpose behind the imposition of 
the 32mppa Conditions.  It is Aer Lingus’s position that the 32mppa Conditions were imposed 
due to a desire on the part of An Bord Pleanála not to undermine the policies and objectives of 
the Dublin Airport Local Area Plan (2006) (the “DALAP 2006”) which proposed the 
development of a western campus at Dublin Airport in addition to the existing eastern campus 
which includes Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. In this context, it was considered by the Inspector 
advising on the Terminal 2 Permission that a capacity of approx. 30mppa for the eastern 
campus was appropriate so as not to undermine the objective of balanced development between 
the existing eastern campus and the proposed western campus. The Inspector advising on the 
Terminal 2 Permission recommended that the combined capacity of Terminal 1 and Terminal 
2 should not exceed 32mppa unless specifically allowed for following a review of the DALAP 
2006. This recommendation was reflected in Condition 3 of the Terminal 2 Permission (and in 
turn in Condition 2 of the Terminal 1 Extension Permission).  As such the reason for imposing 
the 32mppa Conditions related to policy matters and not environmental issues. 
 
60. The second stated reason for the imposition of the 32mppa Conditions relates to transportation 
constraints at the eastern campus. However, the fact that the reason refers to transportation 
constraints does not bring the 32mppa Conditions within the scope of a “technical, operational 
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and environmental constraint”.  Firstly, the transportation constraints were not the primary 
reason for the imposition of the 32mppa Conditions. The primary reason is the policy 
considerations arising from the DALAP 2006 relating to facilitating the expansion of the 
western campus. Secondly, as noted above the imposition of a limit of 32mppa derived not 
from an assessment of transport capacity but from the DALAP 2006. Fingal County Council 
during the oral hearing on the Terminal 2 application explained that environmental constraints 
or the capacity of roads did not play a role in determining the capacity of approx. 30mppa 
referred to in the DALAP. Fingal County Council further explained that the overall vision was 
to ensure that development moved to the western campus following reaching the approx. 
30mppa figure in the eastern campus, and that development of the eastern campus did not 
compromise the development of the western campus.  
 
61. daa and IAA in their Opposition Papers filed in response to the Aer Lingus proceedings argue 
that conditions attaching to planning permissions are routinely treated as a relevant constraint 
at Dublin Airport, and at in other airports (such as Luton, Stansted, Heathrow, Amsterdam 
Schiphol and Paris Charles De Gaulle), and that Aer Lingus has provided no example where 
such a condition is not treated as a relevant constraint for any of the reasons identified by Aer 
Lingus.  Aer Lingus does not accept that the conditions applicable in these airports are 
comparable to the 32mppa Conditions. 
 
62. Insofar as daa and the IAA rely on guidelines published by the Airports Council International, 
the Worldwide Airport Slot Board and the Worldwide Airport Coordinators Group, Article 6 
of the Slot Regulation does not refer to guidance documents and does not permit reliance on 
any such guidance documents for the purpose of determining coordination parameters. 
 
63. The third aspect again only arises if the CJEU finds that the 32mppa Conditions are relevant 
constraints and is that if the Decision cannot ensure compliance with the 32mppa Condition, 
these conditions can never be a “relevant” constraint because the means of ensuring 
compliance with same cannot be achieved through the setting of coordination parameters.  The 
fact that the coordination parameters cannot ensure compliance with the conditions is accepted 
by IAA. 
 
IAA erred in law and/or acted in breach of Aer Lingus’s rights under the CFEU by making a 
decision which has the consequence that historic slots, to which Aer Lingus has vested statutory 
rights under Article 8(2) of the Slot Regulation and/or which constitute a property right will be 
withdrawn from Aer Lingus, without any legal basis for such withdrawal. 
 
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64. Aer Lingus maintains that it has (a) vested statutory rights under Article 8(2) to historic slots 
and / or (b) historic slots under Article 8(2) constitute property rights which are protected under 
the CFEU. As such historic slots can only lawfully be withdrawn if the Slot Regulation 
expressly provides for their withdrawal.  The Slot Regulation contains no such provision. This 
means that the statutory scheme does not provide any guidance as to the procedure to follow 
and the factors to be considered in deciding on how historic slots are to be withdrawn.   
 
65. In terms of EU law, the removal of historic slots is an interference with inter alia Aer Lingus’s 
freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community Law and National Law as 
protected by Article 16 of the CFEU. Historic slots come within the scope of Article 16 and 
the terms of this protection and in particular the protection of the freedom to use the “economic, 
technical and financial resources at an undertaking’s disposal”.   
 
66. As such, the right to interfere with and or remove historic slots would need to be defined by 
the Slot Regulation itself. No such power is provided in the Slot Regulation, which is entirely 
silent on the question of removal of historic slots and, does not provide any mechanism or 
criteria to be applied when removing slots. 
 
67. Aer Lingus submits that, in addition to historic slots constituting vested rights as outlined 
above, historic slots also constitute property rights which are therefore protected under Article 
17 of the CFEU. Historic slots have an asset value and can be exchanged for monetary 
consideration. The Communication from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament of 30 April 2008 (COM(2008) 227) supports the argument that historic slots 
constitute property rights in that it acknowledges that “exchanges of slots for monetary and 
other consideration more commonly referred to as secondary trading, are taking place at a 
number of congested Community Airports” and further notes that the Slot Regulation is “silent 
on the question of exchanges with monetary and other consideration to reflect differences in 
value between slots at different times of day and other factors”. 
 
68. There is an established legal position enabling the holder of historic slots to exercise the right 
to use the historic slots autonomously and for the holder’s own benefit. Under Article 8a of the 
Slot Regulation the air carrier has the right to transfer historic slots from one route or type of 
service to another route or type of service operated by the same carrier. 
 
69. Aer Lingus is not aware of any cases where the determination of coordination parameters has 
resulted in the non-allocation of historic slots.  While the IAA maintain that this has occurred 
at Schiphol in Amsterdam this is not correct and is disputed by Aer Lingus. 
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70. In addition, even if historic slots could be lawfully withdrawn (which is denied), such 
withdrawal, which would amount to an interference with a statutory right / property right, 
would have to be proportionate. 
 
Summary of Ryanair Legal Arguments 
 
71. Ryanair’s arguments insofar as they are relevant to this Request for a Preliminary Ruling, 
include:  
 
The IAA’s Final Decisions on Winter 2024 and on Summer 2025 coordination parameters at 
Dublin Airport are ultra vires the IAA and/or was made without jurisdiction and/or otherwise 
in accordance with law  
 
72. This argument has several elements.  First, Article 6 of the Slot Regulation requires the IAA 
to determine coordination parameters at Dublin Airport, with a view to maximising capacity, 
by reference to what the terminals could possibly accommodate, but the PATM seat caps for 
Winter 2024 and Summer 2025 represent an artificial constraint on the throughput of 
passengers at Dublin Airport.  The IAA did not set coordination parameters with a view to 
maximising what Dublin Airport could potentially accommodate and it has no power to set a 
limit on passenger throughput.   
 
73. The 32mppa conditions constitute a limitation on the throughput of passengers at Dublin 
Airport, rather than the capacity of the airport.  Moreover, they are planning conditions, 
imposed and enforced pursuant to a separate statutory code.  The reasons for their imposition 
no longer pertain.  In other words, the 32mppa conditions do not reflect the current physical 
infrastructure at Dublin Airport, or the policy of the local authority, as expressed in the DALAP 
2020.  The current infrastructure at Dublin Airport can facilitate greater throughput than the 
32mppa. 
 
74. Second, when determining coordination parameters, the IAA was required to take into account 
only those technical, operational and environmental factors which affected the performance of 
the airport infrastructure and its different sub-systems (Article 2 (m)) and to reflect “the 
possibilities of accommodating air traffic” (Article 6 (1)).  The 32mppa conditions do not 
satisfy this definition; they are not technical, operational and environmental factors which 
affected the performance of the airport infrastructure and its different sub-systems.  
Nevertheless, the IAA impermissibly had regard to the planning conditions, which are not 
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relevant to the capacity of the airport, or affect the performance of the airport infrastructure.  
The imposition of the PATM seat caps for Winter 2024 and Summer 2024 are artificial 
constraints, which do not reflect the possibility of accommodating air traffic at Dublin Airport.  
In that respect: 
 
a. If the 32 mppa Conditions are not "a relevant technical, operation or environmental 
constraint" then they should not have been taken into account for the purposes of 
Article 6(1) notwithstanding any conclusion by the CJEU that they relate to capacity 
availability generally.  
 
b. Technical constraints relate to the technical capability of equipment or facilities 
involved in the processing of aircraft, passengers and baggage.  Operational constraints 
cover matters such as the layout of taxiways, towing of aircraft, mode of operation of 
runways. Environmental constraints means that the constraint relates to or arises out of 
an environmental medium, for example noise, air and atmosphere, water, emissions, 
waste, soil, landscape etc. and which have a limiting effect on the capacity of Dublin 
Airport.  
 
c. It is those constraints, and no others, that inform the capacity available for the purposes 
of Article 6(1). Therefore, unless the CJEU concludes that the 32 mppa conditions are 
one of the three identified categories of constraint it must follow that they are not 
relevant to an Article 6(1) decision. 
 
75. Third, the range of factors to which the IAA can legitimately have regard when determining 
coordination parameters are exhaustively prescribed by the Slot Regulation.  The IAA is not 
required or entitled to have regard to planning conditions and it has no role in the enforcement 
of those conditions; its sole function is to determine the capacity of Dublin Airport and to 
allocate slots in a manner which ensures that this is maximised.   
 
76. There was no discussion within the Coordination Committee of the method of achieving the 
restrictions proposed.  The details of the PATM seat caps for Winter 2024 and Summer 2025, 
the method of calculating the same and changes thereto were not discussed within the 
Coordination Committee.  This is a clear departure from the architecture of the decision-
making process required by Article 6 (3) of the Slot Regulation. 
 
77. Fourth, the IAA has no power to determine coordination parameters in a manner which results 
in (whether directly or indirectly, during Summer 2025 or thereafter) an interference with 
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Ryanair’s right to be allocated series of slots in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Slot 
Regulation.  Those rights are, in their terms, expressed to be subject only to “Articles 7, 8a 
and 9, Article 10 (1) and (2a) and Article 14”.  Article 8b suggests that community law 
measures “in particular in application of the rules of the Treaty relating to air transport”, or 
certain competition law measures may result in the “limitation, restriction or elimination” of 
historic slots.   Nowhere in the Slot Regulation is the IAA given power to determine 
coordination parameters in a manner which results in the limitation, abrogation or elimination 
of vested rights in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Slot Regulation.   
 
78. Whilst the IAA’s Decisions on coordination parameters for Winter 2024 and Summer 2025 
and in particular the decisions to impose a PATM seat cap are made “under Community law” 
for the purposes of Article 8b, this cannot, of itself, justify a restriction of Ryanair’s vested 
rights as the Community law measure invoked (Article 6 of the Slot Regulation) gives no 
power to interfere with historic slot rights.  Article 8b clearly envisages a clearly worded 
community law measure, which constitutes or authorises an express derogation from the rights 
granted by Article 8 (2) of the Slot Regulation.  There is no implied entitlement to set 
coordination parameters pursuant to Article 6 of the Slot Regulation in a manner which 
interferes with rights accrued under Article 8 (2). 
 
In making its Final Decisions on Winter 2024 and Summer 2025 coordination parameters at 
Dublin Airport and in particular in deciding to impose PATM seat caps which necessarily 
resulted in the interference with Ryanair’s right to be allocated series of slots for Summer 2025 
in accordance with Article 8 (2), the IAA exceeded its powers and failed to vindicate and/or to 
sufficiently to protect Ryanair’s vested rights, which are protected by Article 16 and Article 17 
of the CFEU. 
 
79. Ryanair is entitled to be allocated series of slots in Dublin Airport, in accordance with Article 
8 (2) of the Slot Regulation for Summer 2025.  This statutory right is necessary to enable 
Ryanair to carry on business from Dublin Airport.  Moreover, this statutory right has all the 
hallmarks of a property right. 
 
80. First, a historic slot carries with it an immutable entitlement to take off or land from Dublin 
Airport, subject to limited exceptions.  Any slot can be assigned or transferred between routes, 
or indeed to another carrier, in accordance with Article 8a.  These rights are of real value to 
Ryanair.  Ryanair has accrued a leading market share (52% in Summer 2024) of the slots in 
Dublin Airport.  It has acquired those historic rights strictly in accordance with the Slot 
Regulation, since 2007. 
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81. A right to a series of historic slots guarantees an airline, such as Ryanair, the right to use airport 
infrastructure, on a particular day, at a particular time, in the next equivalent scheduling season, 
for the purpose of operating commercial flights.  The bundle of rights embodied in a slot, for 
the purposes of the Slot Regulation, are undoubtedly valuable rights.  No airline can take off 
or land from Dublin Airport without a slot.  They are rights which Ryanair has earned and to 
which it is entitled and which must be honoured, unless Ryanair does not use the same (Article 
10) or is guilty of the type of misconduct contemplated by Article 14 (4) of the Slot Regulation 
or the exceptional circumstances envisaged by Article 8b arise. 
 
 
82. Moreover, slots can be transferred from one airline to another; authorities of the Courts of 
England and Wales (R v. Airport Coordination Limited Ex Parte the States of Guernsey 
Transport Board [1999] EWHC Admin 264; [1999] All ER (D) 347; [1999] EU LR 745 and 
R (Monarch Airlines Limited) v. Airport Coordination Limited [2017] EWCA CIV 1892) 
suggest this can be done in part consideration of a money payment.  The World Airport Slot 
Guidelines also suggest these rights must be honoured (paragraphs 1.7.2 and 6.10.1).   
 
83. The IAA decided to impose a PATM seat cap for summer 2025, knowing that this would 
inevitably interfere with Ryanair’s vested rights, but it did not conduct any or any lawful 
proportionality analysis before it did so.   
 
Summary of the A4A Parties’ Legal Arguments 
 
84. The A4A Parties’ arguments insofar as they are relevant to this Request for a Preliminary 
Ruling, include the following. 
 
85. First, the 32mppa Conditions are not a relevant technical, operational or environmental 
constraint within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation. In finding to the contrary, 
the IAA misinterpreted Article 6.  
 
a. When regard is had to the definition of “coordination parameters” in Article 2(m), 
which was inserted into the Slot Regulation by Regulation (EC) No. 793/2004, which 
also inserted this phrase into Article 6(1), it is evident that the “relevant” constraints 
referred to are those “that affect the performance of airport infrastructure and its 
different sub-systems”. 
 
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b. It is clear from the second paragraph of Article 6(1) that the exercise that the IAA is 
required to carry out is an objective analysis of the possibilities of accommodating air 
traffic at the airport. This is consistent with the definition of a “slot” in Article 2(a). The 
capacity of Dublin Airport to accommodate air traffic is significantly higher than the 
limit set by the PATM seat cap.  
 
c. For the purposes of Article 6(1) and the setting of coordination parameters, the relevant 
“capacity” is the capacity to accommodate air traffic. This is particularly clear when 
regard is had to Article 2(m) – inserted into the Slot Regulation at the same time as 
Article 6(1). 
 
d. Article 6(1) requires the IAA to maximise the capacity and number of slots available 
for allocation at Dublin Airport and it is evident from the Slot Regulation as a whole 
that its objective is to maximise the capacity and number of slots available at a 
congested airport. The imposition of the PATM seat cap is wholly inconsistent with 
this. 
 
e. Article 6(1) must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Slot 
Regulation. The imposition of the PATM seat cap is wholly inconsistent with these 
objectives. 
 
86. Second, giving effect to the 32mppa Conditions is not part of the IAA’s functions, as national 
competent authority, when determining the parameters for slot allocation. It is a matter for daa, 
as the owner and operator of Dublin Airport, to ensure compliance with the 32mppa Conditions 
and planning enforcement is the responsibility of the planning authorities.   
 
87. Third, the 32mppa Conditions do not operate as a constraint on the capacity of Dublin Airport 
to accommodate air traffic. Rather, the “constraint” on the capacity of Dublin Airport to 
accommodate air traffic arises from the PATM seat cap and is one created by the IAA. This is 
inconsistent with the objective of the Slot Regulation, which is to maximise capacity and 
increase the number of slots available for allocation at Dublin Airport. 
 
88. Fourth, there is no lawful basis for the withdrawal of historic slots. The entitlement of airlines 
to historic slots in accordance with Article 8(2) is a vested statutory entitlement, which can 
only be taken away if there is a clear basis to do so in accordance with the Slot Regulation. 
The IAA has failed to identify any basis for the withdrawal of historic slots to which the air 
carriers are entitled, under the Slot Regulation. 
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a. Neither Article 6 nor Article 8 of the Slot Regulation provide that the IAA can set 
coordination parameters which result in the refusal or withdrawal of historic slots.  
 
b. The IAA proceeded on the incorrect basis that, because Article 8b of the Slot 
Regulation explicitly excludes an entitlement to compensation where historic slots are 
withdrawn in accordance with the requirements of EU law (in particular in application 
of the TEEC rules relating to air transport), it follows from this that no compensation 
is payable when historic slots are withdrawn in other circumstances.  
 
c. Both Article 8(2) and Article 8b recognise that airlines acquire an “entitlement” to 
historic slots under Article 8(2).   
 
d. Article 8b does not provide that compensation is never available. Instead, it defines 
specific circumstances where rights can be limited, restricted or eliminated without 
compensation.  
 
e. The suggestion that there is an “implicit” power to withdraw historic slots under the 
Slot Regulation is not supported by the travaux preparatoires.  
 
f. The entitlement to historic slots is a valuable vested statutory entitlement, which is 
critical to the A4A Parties’ businesses. In purporting to withdraw historic slots, absent 
any lawful basis to do so, the IAA has acted in breach of the rights of the A4A Parties 
under Article 16 of the CFEU. 
 
Summary of daa Legal Arguments 
 
89. daa’s arguments insofar as they are relevant to this Request for a Preliminary Ruling, include:  
The IAA was entitled, and required, to reflect the 32mppa Conditions in the Coordination 
Parameters for Dublin Airport, where the 32mppa Conditions are relevant to the “capacity 
situation” at Dublin Airport and/or are a “relevant constraint” within the meaning of Article 
6(1) of the Slot Regulation 
90. The capacity of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 at Dublin Airport is set by the 32mppa Conditions, 
attached to grants of development consent issued in respect of the construction of Terminal 2 
and the extension of Terminal 1.  By their terms, the 32mppa Conditions place a limit on the 
combined, annual capacity of the two Terminals and thereby place a constraint on the capacity 
of those Terminals within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation. daa does not 
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accept that there is any difference, in this context, between the concepts of “capacity” and 
“throughput”.  
91. Coordination parameters must be determined having regard to relevant constraints, must be 
based on an objective analysis of the possibility of accommodating air traffic, by reference to 
a number of factors, including the “capacity situation” at the Airport, must reflect all technical 
operational and environmental factors that affect the performance of the airport infrastructure 
and must express, in operational terms all of the capacity available for slot allocation at the 
Airport. 
 
92. Both the terms of the Slot Regulation and relevant international guidance, including the World 
Airport Slot Guidelines, confirm that: (i) the 32mppa Conditions are constraints on capacity 
that must be reflected in the Coordination Parameters, as they set the capacity of the Terminals 
at Dublin Airport and place a limit on the extent of the use of the Terminals, and (ii) the IAA 
is required to adopt Coordination Parameters that reflect the capacity in fact available at the 
Airport during the relevant period, having regard the 32mppa Conditions.  
 
93. The capacity of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 can only be altered by the grant of a new 
development consent. In that regard, the claim by Aer Lingus that the capacity of Dublin 
Airport is set by the Dublin Airport Local Area Plan 2020 (“DALAP 2020”) and is, therefore 
40mppa, is incorrect. The DALAP 2020 is a plan which sets the framework for the grant of 
development consent in respect of Dublin Airport. The actual capacity of Dublin Airport is set 
by grants of development consent issued by relevant competent authorities. There is currently 
an application for development consent pending before the relevant competent authority to 
increase the capacity of Dublin Airport to 40mppa, which includes an application for 
permission for the infrastructure upgrades and works necessary for that capacity. Therefore 
while it is correct that the physical capacity of the terminals at Dublin Airport can 
accommodate in excess of 32mppa, that is not unlimited and infrastructure upgrades and 
works, and associated environmental assessments, are required to increase the capacity of 
Dublin Airport to 40mppa. Unless and until that application for development consent is finally 
determined by the relevant competent authority, including after the completion of, as 
necessary, assessments for the purposes of the EIA Directive, the Habitats Directive and the 
Water Framework Directive, the legally permitted capacity of the Terminals is set at 32mppa. 
 
94. The grant of development consent for the construction of Terminal 2 was preceded by an 
environmental impact assessment carried out in accordance with the EIA Directive. The 
32mppa Conditions, therefore, form part of the environmental impact assessment completed 
in respect of that development. Further, the DALAP 2006 to which reference was made in the 
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terms of the 32mppa Conditions was the subject of a strategic environmental assessment 
completed in accordance with the SEA Directive. The use of the Terminals other than in 
accordance with those assessments is not consistent with European Law.  
 
95. The 32mppa Conditions are therefore legally binding restrictions that impact the capacity 
situation at Dublin Airport, and are relevant constraints on the operation of Dublin Airport, 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation. 
 
96. The setting of Coordination Parameters that do not reflect the constraint on the capacity 
imposed by the 32mppa Conditions would result in a situation whereby slots available for 
allocation under the Coordination Parameters could not be lawfully operated under the legal 
framework governing the operation of Dublin Airport.  This would be contrary to the 
requirements of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation, and irreconcilable with the objectives of 
the Slot Regulation. 
daa is not empowered to enforce the 32mppa Conditions by way of unilateral action outside the 
framework of the Slot Regulation 
 
97. Dublin Airport is a level 3 coordinated airport and the control over who is entitled to land and 
take off at the Airport rests entirely with the IAA and ACL. daa is the managing body of the 
Airport and is not entitled to decide who can use slots, how they can be used or whether they 
can be used. daa is also not in control of the number of seats which are sold on flights, which 
is something in the control of the individual Airlines, subject to the application of a seat cap in 
any given season.  
 
98. The setting of coordination parameters by the IAA, the allocation of slots by ACL and the sale 
of seats by the Airlines are, therefore, the primary drivers of the number of people who use the 
Terminals at Dublin Airport. These are matters which can only be controlled through the 
process of setting of coordination parameters and slot allocation in accordance with the Slot 
Regulation. 
 
99. daa is not empowered under national or European law to take unilateral action to prevent 
Airlines from operating slots allocated to them by the Coordinator in accordance with the Slot 
Regulation, whether by closing the Airport or otherwise. The taking of unilateral action with 
the express purpose of preventing the operation by Airlines of slots lawfully allocated to them 
under the Slot Regulation would not be compatible with the Slot Regulation.  In that respect, 
daa does not accept the IAA’s position that daa has a power under national law to unilaterally 
close Dublin Airport.  However, that is not an issue that requires to be addressed by the Court; 
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rather, the issue to be determined by the Court is whether, if such a power did exist as a matter 
of national law, daa would be precluded from taking that action by reason of the Slot 
Regulation. Insofar as the IAA suggest that it is open to daa to propose a local guideline under 
Article 5 of the Slot Regulation, the IAA has previously refused to consider the adoption of a 
local guideline unless it has been proposed by a majority of the Coordination Committee. The 
airlines have the majority vote and have refused to cooperate with respect to measures seeking 
compliance with the 32mppa Conditions or with respect to the proposal of any local guideline 
by daa.   daa is therefore not in a position to take action to seek compliance with the 32mppa 
Conditions outside of the framework established by the Slot Regulation. 
Article 8(2) of the Slot Regulation does not require or permit the setting of Coordination 
Parameter under Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation that exceed the capacity of the Airport 
 
100. The Slot Regulation does not establish any absolute entitlement to historic precedence and the 
establishment of coordination parameters which may not allow for the grant of all slots in 
respect of which historic precedence arises, in circumstances where the capacity of the Airport 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation is not sufficient to accommodate all 
such slots, is not inconsistent with the Slot Regulation.  
 
101. Article 8(2) of the Slot Regulation must be read in a manner consistent with the remainder of 
the Slot Regulation and any entitlement to historic precedence is subject to the capacity in fact 
available at the Airport as determined in accordance with Article 6(1).  Airlines do not 
automatically retain slots but rather there is an entitlement to request certain slots from the 
Coordinator.  It is for the Coordinator to determine whether those slots can be allocated, and 
this must be done in accordance with the Coordination Parameters. Therefore, the allocation 
of slots with historic precedence is necessarily limited by the coordination parameters and the 
requirements of Articles 6(1), 7. 9, 10(2), (3) and (4) and 14. The non-allocation of slots to 
Airlines is envisaged by the Slot Regulation, including by Article 8(3).  Daa, in particular, 
points to Recitals 2, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No. 793/2004.  
 
102. The proceedings do not give rise to any question of the “withdrawal” of historic slots as there 
is nothing in either the Winter 24 Decision or the Summer 25 Decision which would give rise 
to the withdrawal of slots which have already been allocated. Instead, the only issue which 
may arise is the non-allocation of all slots requested by the Airlines in a particular capacity 
season.  
 
103. The true issue which arises for determination in the proceedings is whether Article 6(1) must 
be interpreted, by reason of Article 8(2), as including an implied requirement that where 
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capacity at the airport is not sufficient to allocate all slots in respect of which historic 
precedence arises, Member States must set coordination parameters that exceed the capacity 
at the Airport so as to accommodate those slots.  There is no basis in the Slot Regulation for 
interpreting Article 6(1) in that manner. 
104. The entitlement to request slots in respect of which historic precedence applies does not engage 
Article 16 or Article 17 of the Charter, having regard to the proper interpretation of the Slot 
Regulation as discussed above.  
 
Summary of IAA’s Legal Arguments 
 
105. IAA’s arguments insofar as they are relevant to this Request for a Preliminary Ruling, include:  
 
An objective analysis under Article 6(1) permits a competent authority to take account 
of a planning condition limiting passenger numbers in airport terminals which is, in 
any event, a “relevant constraint” 
 
106. The language of Article 6(1) of the Slot Regulation is broad. It requires a competent authority 
to take account of “all” relevant technical, operational and environmental constraints in the 
context of the wider, general obligation to determine coordination parameters based on “… an 
objective analysis of the possibilities of accommodating the air traffic”. 
 
107. The Union legislature clearly intended that constraints such as development consents held by 
an airport operator attaching conditions restricting passenger numbers at coordinated airport 
terminals, affecting the use of airport infrastructure, must be taken account of when 
determining slot coordination parameters in such an airport.  
 
108. A ‘slot’ is defined by reference to “airport infrastructure”. Logically, the definition of 
‘coordination parameters’– which does not itself reference the term ‘slot’, although slots are 
clearly germane to it – does also. 
 
109. All constraints to be taken account of relate to factors that affect the “performance” of the 
airport “infrastructure” in terms of its ability to process passengers/aircraft – including factors 
other than physical ones, such as planning conditions. However, that does not mean that the 
relevant constraints on the airport are purely physical.  
 
24 
110. Moreover, the 32mppa Conditions do affect the performance of the airport “infrastructure” 
because they place a limit on the capacity and/or throughput of passengers using the terminals.  
 
111. Constraints arising from national planning decisions, or equivalent limitations on the operation 
of airports, are routinely taken into account when determining coordination parameters at 
airports, and it makes no sense to do otherwise and instead determine coordination parameters 
as though the constraints did not exist. This is the case at Dublin Airport, where such 
constraints which restrict the permitted throughput of the runways are already taken account 
of, and at other airports such as Luton Airport (London), Stansted Airport (London) (which 
also have annual passenger cap planning conditions), and also Heathrow Airport (London), 
Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam) and Charles de Gaulle Airport (Paris).). 
 
112. The fact that the IAA has no statutory powers to ensure compliance by the airport operator 
with planning conditions, or that there is a statutory code for planning, does not mean that 
planning conditions cannot be relevant constraints or that regard cannot otherwise be had to 
them under Article 6(1). As the Winter 24 Decision noted (§4.29), the 32mppa Conditions 
“…are subsisting and unchallenged planning conditions which are likely to be a limiting 
constraint on demand by, at the latest, 2025.” 
 
113. The IAA variously agrees and disagrees with aspects of both daa’s and the Airlines’ different 
arguments and analysis on the purpose of the 32mppa Conditions, in terms of why they were 
originally imposed by the planning authority (for reasons explained in the Winter 24 and S25 
Decisions). But, in any event, the original purpose of those Conditions is not important or 
determinative of whether they are a “relevant constraint” or must be taken into account under 
Article 6(1), given it is their objective effect, rather than motive or original purpose, which is 
critical. As the S25 Decision correctly noted the 32mppa Conditions are a relevant constraint 
“regardless of the purpose or genesis of the particular condition” (S25 Decision, §4.93).  
 
114. Neither is the distinction between throughput and capacity relevant when interpreting Article 
6(1) and the Slot Regulation generally. These are “closely related concepts” (S25 Decision, 
§4.80). There is no such thing as a factor which constrains terminal throughput, but not 
terminal capacity (S25 Decision, §4.78). Planning conditions which are taken account of as a 
relevant constraint at Dublin Airport and other airports typically limit throughput, and the 
coordination parameters alone, by their nature, can never determine the final result in terms of 
the actual throughput. The Winter 24 Decision correctly noted (§4.45): “The proposed PATM 
seat cap is a capacity parameter which is the closest proxy available for a passenger 
limitation”.  
25 
 
There is a lawful basis for non-allocation of slots otherwise triggering an entitlement to allocation 
under Article 8(2) of Slot Regulation 
 
115. The Slot Regulation, in particular Articles 6(1), 8(1) and (2), and read in light of the purpose 
of determining coordination parameters, provides for the non-allocation of historic slots or 
components thereof where there is insufficient capacity (having regard to relevant constraints) 
to accommodate all such entitlements. Moreover, the entitlement to historic slots is not in the 
nature of a property right, nor does it engage and/or breach Article 16 or 17 of the Charter 
given that – and strictly in the alternative – if Charter rights are engaged, their limitation in the 
circumstances is proportionate.  
 
116. If there is insufficient capacity (taking account of constraints, as required by Article 6(1)), then 
it is not possible to fully accommodate all “historic slot” entitlements for the relevant 
scheduling period (as indeed has now occurred at Schiphol in Amsterdam, for Winter 2024 and 
Summer 2025). In such a situation, the entitlement to historic slots under Article 8(2)can no 
longer arise in full. Article 8(3) expressly envisages that situations will arise “…where all slot 
requests cannot be accommodated to the satisfaction of the air carriers concerned”. 
 
117. Article 8(2) is merely an exception to Article 8(1). Thus, Article 8(2) sets out when slots will 
not return to the Slot Pool. Article 8(2) does not create entitlements which prevail over aspects 
of the Slot Regulation other than Article 8(1). In particular, it does not create entitlements 
which trump the declaration of co-ordination parameters under Article 6(1) such that the IAA 
is required to set coordination parameters above the capacity of the airport sub-system for the 
relevant season so that the coordinator can fully reallocate all historic slot series. 
 
118. Indeed, Article 8b expressly envisages that historic slot entitlements under Article 8(2) can be 
subject to “limitation, restriction or elimination”. Where this occurs “under Community law” 
– such as by virtue of determinations under Article 6 – no claim for compensation arises.  
 
119. The World Airport Slot Guidelines contemplate that there can be a “capacity reduction that 
cannot accommodate historic slots” in “exceptional circumstances” (see S25 Decision, 
§§4.42-4.43).  
 
120. On the Airlines’ own case, any property right is created by the Slot Regulation itself. 
Accordingly, it must be subject to the Regulation, including other provisions thereof, such as 
26 
Article 6. No independent property right arises outside the scope of the Regulation, and any 
relevant entitlement is equally subject to the provisions of the Regulation.  
 
121. Nonetheless, and without prejudice to the last point, slots (whether under Article 8(2) or 
otherwise) do not have the characteristics of or give rise to property rights because they are: 
 
a) permissions to use someone else’s property for a limited, specified purpose;  
b) of a temporary nature and/or contingent upon the airport remaining coordinated 
(Article 3(7)); 
c) conditional upon capacity being available; and 
d) not freely alienable (see Article 8a). 
 
122. Article 8(2) does not create any entitlements against Member States or the IAA, nor any 
entitlements to which the functions under Article 6 must be subject. At its height, Article 8(2) 
merely gives rise to entitlements against other carriers (because the relevant slots do not return 
to the pool) or entitlements relevant to the independent coordinator’s slot allocation role.   
 
123. Article 17 of the CFEU is not engaged and/or is not breached. The Airlines have not identified 
any case law which holds that a right to property exists in respect of limited interests similar 
to those arising here. Moreover, a consideration of the legislative history of the Regulation 
does not lead to any other interpretation or outcome, nor does it aid the Airlines’ case.  
 
124. Article 16 of the Charter is not engaged. Taking account of a planning permission imposing 
conditions limiting the capacity at Dublin Airport (which condition has existed since 
2007/2008) does not interfere with anyone’s freedom to conduct a business. It does not even 
interfere with the freedom to conduct a business at Dublin Airport – even if that were the 
proper focus for Article 16 (which it is not, because Article 16 contemplates the freedom to 
conduct a business in general). Moreover, Article 16 is expressly subject to Union law (which 
would include Article 6 of the Slot Regulation) and national law (which would include the 
32mppa Conditions).  
 
125. If any Charter rights – whether under Articles 16 or 17 – are engaged, then the limitation upon 
them which occurs in circumstances such as the present is proportionate. Any contentions of 
any Airlines (such as Ryanair) that a proportionality assessment did not occur are contradicted 
by the face of the S25 Decision itself, including (without limitation) §§4.130-4.131 thereof.  
 
27 
126. In any event, the root cause of any impingement upon any entitlements of Airlines is the 
32mppa Conditions themselves (which they have not challenged).  
 
IAA’s response to daa’s arguments 
 
127. daa accepted the validity of, and has not to date obtained any variation or amendment of, the 
32mppa Conditions. daa proposed terminal capacity coordination parameters for W23 and S24 
which did not take account of the 32mppa Conditions, and daa did not propose any 
coordination parameters for Winter 24, whether to take account of the 32mppa Conditions or 
at all. That was notwithstanding the IAA’s invitation to daa, as part of the S19 declaration 
process, to address whether the 32mppa Conditions might represent a “relevant constraint”, 
and notwithstanding the IAA’s advice to daa to address this issue within the Coordination 
Committee as necessary ahead of any future declaration which require to take account of the 
32mppa Conditions. 
 
128. Passenger volumes for almost ten full months of calendar year 2024 were thus regulated by 
the W23 and S24 Decisions, without daa suggesting that the 32mppa Conditions should be 
taken into account. For reasons of national law which do not arise for resolution by the Court 
on this reference for a preliminary ruling, daa is not now permitted to challenge the Winter 24 
Decision on the basis that it fails to ensure a sufficiently low level of passenger access to the 
terminals during November-December 2024 which would be adequate to compensate for daa’s 
failure to act earlier in time to avoid a breach of the 32mppa Conditions. Any such breach 
would be substantially attributable to passenger volumes during January-October 2024.  
 
129. For the IAA to have declared coordination parameters for Winter 24 with a view to avoiding 
an anticipated annual overage resulting from the preceding 10 months of 2024 (governed by 
the W23 and S24 Decisions) would have had no basis in the Slot Regulation, which requires 
coordination parameters to be adopted on a seasonal basis. Such a course of action would also 
have resulted in the large-scale permanent withdrawal of 40% of Winter seasonal historic slot 
series, series which fit within a correctly specified winter seasonal seat cap coordination 
parameter to take account of the 32mppa Conditions. 
 
 
130. daa chairs the Coordination Committee which, pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) Slot Regulation, was 
obliged to “make proposals concerning or advise” the IAA “on … the coordination parameters 
to be determined in accordance with Article 6….” Neither daa nor the Coordination Committee 
28 
made any such proposals or gave such advice to the IAA. Nonetheless, the IAA proceeded to 
discharge its obligations under Article 6(1), and declared coordination parameters for Winter 
24. On this account, for reasons of national law which do not arise for resolution by the Court 
on this reference for a preliminary ruling, daa is not entitled to impugn the Winter 24 Decision 
and complain that the coordination parameters actually declared are invalid. 
 
 
131. For reasons of national law which do not arise for resolution on this reference for a preliminary 
ruling, daa is also not permitted to contend that the correct interpretation of the 32mppa 
Conditions is that they relate to (outturn) passenger throughput, when daa previously made 
submissions to the IAA in response to the Draft Winter 24 Decision that the 32mppa Conditions 
“of course” relate only to capacity, and not to throughput. 
 
 
132. In any event, if the correct interpretation of the 32mppa Conditions is that they relate to 
capacity, then forecasts as to throughput are not a relevant metric for measuring compliance 
with the 32mppa Conditions. On the other hand, if the correct interpretation of the 32mppa 
Conditions is that they relate to throughput, then it is impossible for the IAA to control 
throughput by means of declaring capacity limits at the terminals, where throughput is a 
function of the number of seats sold by airlines to passengers (and a function of whether daa 
keeps Dublin Airport open and available for use by airlines). In challenging the Winter 24 
Decision, daa wrongly conflates the distinct concepts of: (a) taking account of “relevant 
constraints” in declaring coordination parameters; and (b) taking appropriate measures to 
reduce outturn passenger throughput sufficient to ensure compliance with the 32mppa 
Conditions. Ensuring compliance with national planning and development law is not the IAA’s 
function under the Slot Regulation, and the Winter 24 Decision does not mandate a breach of 
the 32mppa Conditions. It is not the case that, once the 32mppa Conditions have any bearing 
on capacity at Dublin Airport, then the IAA must set coordination parameters so as to 
guarantee that nothing above 32mppa is possible. 
 
 
133. The PATM seat cap declared in the Winter 24 Decision tended towards a possible maximal, 
rather than minimal approach, having regard to Article 6(3) Slot Regulation, and was sufficient 
to permit full re-allocation of historic slot entitlements arising from W23. 
 
 
134. For reasons of national law which do not arise for resolution on this reference for a preliminary 
ruling, daa is not permitted to rely on arguments and evidence not submitted to the IAA prior 
29 
to the Winter 24 Decision, including that the 32mppa Conditions formed part of an 
environmental impact assessment carried out in accordance with the EIA Directive. 
 
 
135. In any event, an examination of the planning history underpinning the development consents 
establishes that the 32mppa Conditions are not in fact derived from an EIA, and were not 
imposed for the purpose of mitigating identified likely effects on the environment. The duty of 
sincere co-operation under Art.4(3) TEU does not arise, on the facts. 
 
 
136. Whether or not the DALAP 2006 was the subject of a strategic environmental assessment 
completed in accordance with the SEA Directive is not an issue which daa has pleaded in its 
challenge to the Winter 24 Decision, is not an issue which daa raised before the IAA prior to 
the making of that decision, and cannot now be relied upon by daa to impugn the Winter 24 
Decision for reasons of national law which respectfully do not arise for resolution on this 
reference for a preliminary ruling. 
 
 
137. Under national law (section 8(5) State Airports Act 2004), daa is responsible for managing and 
operating Dublin Airport. In its Terms of Use in respect of the airport, daa asserts that air 
carriers operate at Dublin Airport with the consent of daa, and daa controls whether Dublin 
Airport is open or closed at any particular point in time. Traditionally, for example, daa closes 
Dublin Airport on Christmas Day each year. There is nothing in either national or EU law 
(including the Slot Regulation) which would prevent daa from imposing an extended closure 
period (a measure which daa itself proposed ahead of the Winter 24 Decision), should daa 
consider such a measure to be necessary to ensure compliance with the 32mppa Conditions by 
achieving a reduction in passenger throughput in the terminal buildings. Neither is daa 
precluded from proposing such a measure with a view to encouraging co-operation by airlines 
with a potential Local Guideline (provided for in Articles 5 and 8 Slot Regulation) which might 
be designed to produce compliance with the 32mppa Conditions. 
 
138. It is therefore incorrect for daa to suggest that the setting of coordination parameters and slot 
allocation are the only means by which the number of passengers using the terminals can be 
controlled. It is equally incorrect for daa to suggest that control over who is entitled to land or 
take off at Dublin Airport rests exclusively with the IAA and ACL. 
 
30 
139. As a matter of reality, daa’s challenge to the Winter 24 Decision cannot now, in any event, 
affect the question of its compliance with the 32mppa Conditions in 2024. 
 
VII. Questions referred for a Preliminary Ruling 
 
1. Can a national competent authority undertaking the exercise of determining the parameters for 
slot allocation at a coordinated airport under Article 6(1) of Regulation 95/93 (as amended) take 
into account development consents granted by the relevant planning authority under the 
national planning code in respect of that airport which impose conditions providing inter alia 
that the “combined capacity” of the airport terminals shall not exceed a certain annual limit of 
passengers, and in respect of which the stated reason for the imposition of the conditions was 
“Having regard to the policies and objectives of the Dublin Airport Local Area Plan and the 
capacity constraints (transportation) at the eastern campus”? Are such conditions a“relevant 
technical, operational or environmental constraint” within the meaning of Article 6(1)?  Do 
they form part of the objective analysis of the capacity situation at the airport for the purposes 
of Article 6(1)? 
 
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, does Article 6(1) of Regulation 95/93, and insofar as relevant 
Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, permit 
Member States to make a determination of the parameters for slot allocation at a coordinated 
airport for a particular scheduling period which results in the non-allocation of some series of 
slots (or certain components thereof) to which air carriers would otherwise be entitled in 
accordance with the terms of Article 8(2)? 
 
3. If this arises for consideration strictly as a result of the Court’s answers to questions 1 and 2, 
does the Slot Regulation prohibit Airport Management Bodies within the meaning of the Slot 
Regulation from taking unilateral action to close the airport for a period of time, for the purpose 
of preventing the operation of slots which have been allocated by the Airport Coordinator so as 
to avoid a breach of an annual limit of passengers of the type mentioned in Question 1? 
 
  
31 
Annex I 
 
The within reference relates to six sets of proceedings pending before the Irish High Court: 
 
(i) daa plc v Irish Aviation Authority, Airport Coordination Limited, Aer Lingus Limited, 
Ryanair Designated Activity Company, Emerald Airlines Ireland Limited and Air 
Transport Association of America, Inc. (trading as Airlines for America), Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., JetBlue Airways Corporation and United Airlines, Inc. (Record No. 
2024/920 JR) 
 
(ii) Aer Lingus Limited v Irish Aviation Authority, daa plc, Airport Coordination Limited 
and Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (trading as Airlines for America), Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., JetBlue Airways Corporation and United Airlines, Inc.  (Record No. 
2024/927JR) 
 
(iii) Ryanair Designated Activity Company v Irish Aviation Authority, daa plc, Airport 
Coordination Limited and Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (trading as 
Airlines for America), Delta Air Lines, Inc., JetBlue Airways Corporation and United 
Airlines, Inc. (Record No. 2024/928JR) 
 
(iv) Aer Lingus Limited v Irish Aviation Authority, daa plc and Airport Coordination 
Limited (Record No. 2024/1296JR) 
 
(v) Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (trading as Airlines for America), Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., JetBlue Airways Corporation and United Airlines, Inc.  v Irish Aviation 
Authority and daa plc, Airport Coordination Limited, Ryanair Designated Activity 
Company, Aer Lingus Limited and Emerald Airlines Ireland Limited (Record No. 
2024/1297JR) 
 
(vi) Ryanair Designated Activity Company v Irish Aviation Authority, daa plc and Airport 
Coordination Limited (Record No. 2024/1299JR) 
 
 
The parties are represented as follows: 
 
32 
(i) daa – Matheson, 70 Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Grand Canal Dock, Dublin 2 (Irish 
Solicitors), Brian Kennedy SC, Fintan Valentine SC, Aoife Carroll SC and Emma 
Synnott BL (Irish barristers) 
 
(ii) Irish Aviation Authority – Mason, Hayes & Curran, South Bank House, Barrow Street, 
Dublin 4 (Irish Solicitors), Eoin McCullough SC, Margaret Gray SC, Mark Murphy 
BL and Francis Kiernan BL (Irish barristers) 
 
(iii) Airport Coordination Limited - Vincent & Beatty LLP, 67 Fitzwilliam Square North, 
Dublin 2 (Irish Solicitors), Darren Lehane SC and Niamh O’Donnabhain BL (Irish 
barristers) 
 
(iv) Aer Lingus Limited – McCann Fitzgerald, Riverside One, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, 
Grand Canal Dock, Dublin 2 (Irish Solicitors), Suzanne Murray SC and Conor Quinn 
BL (Irish barristers) 
 
(v) Ryanair Designated Activity Company – Arthur Cox, Ten Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2 
(Irish Solicitors), Martin Hayden SC, Frank Crean SC and John Kenny BL (Irish 
barristers) 
 
(vi) Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (trading as Airlines for America), Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., JetBlue Airways Corporation and United Airlines, Inc. (collectively known 
as the “A4A Parties”) - Arthur Cox, Ten Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2 (Irish Solicitors), 
Declan McGrath SC, Emily Egan McGrath SC and Barry Doherty BL (Irish barristers) 
 
(vii) Emerald Airlines Ireland Limited – Flynn O’Driscoll LLP. 1 Grant’s Row, 
Mount Street Lower, Dublin, D02 HX96 (Irish Solicitors)  
 
 
  
33 
Annex II 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for allocation of slots at 
Community Airports (OJ L 14, 22.1.1993), as amended by: 
 
a. Regulation (EC) No 894/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
May 2002 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports; 
 
b. Regulation (EC) No 1554/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
July 2003 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports 
 
c. Regulation (EC) No 793/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports 
 
d. Regulation (EC) No 545/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 June 2009 amending Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports 
 
e. Regulation (EU) 2020/459 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 
2020 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports (Text with EEA relevance) 
 
f. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1477 of 14 October 2020 amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards the temporary extension of exceptional 
measures to address the consequences caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Text with 
EEA relevance); 
 
g. Regulation (EU) 2021/250 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
February 2021 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary 
relief from the slot utilisation rules at Union airports due to the COVID-19 crisis (Text 
with EEA relevance); 
 
34 
h. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1889 of 23 July 2021 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards the extension of measures for temporary relief 
from the slot utilisation rules due to the COVID-19 crisis 
 
i. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/255 of 15 December 2021 amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards the extension of measures for 
temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules due to the COVID-19 crisis; and  
 
j. Regulation (EU) 2022/2038 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
October 2022 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary 
relief from the slot utilisation rules at Union airports due to an epidemiological situation 
or military aggression (Text with EEA relevance).