Order — ECLI:EU:T:2026:134
Date: 2026-02-10
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Procedure: Staff cases

summary of the contested decision in paragraph 11 above. The appointing authority therefore did not decide to impose the penalty in question without also taking into account the interests of the applicant. 52 It follows that the argument concerning the infringement of the duty of care must be rejected without there being any need to rule on its admissibility, raised by the Council. 53 Secondly, as regards the applicant’s conduct throughout the course of his career, it should be noted that the contested decision states that the conduct and performance of the applicant during his career were not beyond criticism and that, in 2018, he received a severe warning from his line manager in relation to his unexplained absences, to his failures to comply with his security and discipline obligations and to his personal translation activities, which is also reflected in his evaluation report for 2018. By contrast, the appointing authority took into consideration that, from 2018, the applicant’s conduct at work improved considerably and was in line with what is expected of an EU official. 54 Furthermore, in the decision rejecting the complaint, the appointing authority stated that, in accordance with Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, it was not necessary to establish a link between the outside activities and the conduct of the applicant at work during his career. The appointing authority adds that, notwithstanding the improvement of the applicant’s conduct at work from 2018 to a level in line with what was expected of an EU official, the fact remains that the applicant was still engaged in outside activities from 2018 to 2021, which prevents that aspect from being taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. 55 In that connection, in a case where there has been serious misconduct over a long period of time, such as here, it is not necessary to take account of the good conduct of the official being sanctioned by way of mitigating factor, with the result that any good conduct by the person concerned does not preclude the imposition of a severe penalty, such as downgrading by two grades, or even removal from post (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 2021, AV and AW v Parliament, T‑43/20, not published, EU:T:2021:666, paragraph 143 and the case-law cited, and of 19 April 2023, OQ v Commission, T‑162/22, not published, EU:T:2023:205, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant’s performance improved only from 2018 onwards. 56 In addition, as regards the regrets expressed by the applicant, it suffices to note that the contested decision states that the appointing authority took note of them. Nevertheless, first, the appointing authority indicated that, throughout the procedure, the applicant had changed his version of the facts on several occasions and, secondly, as noted in paragraph 46 above, his apologies were presented at a very late stage of the procedure, namely 15 July 2024, only three days before the contested decision was adopted. 57 In the third place, as regards the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 40, 41, 43, 55 and 56 above, the arguments concerning the alleged lack of a causal link between the applicant’s misconduct and the impact on his work and the regrets that he had expressed should be rejected. 58 As regards the additional impact of the imposed penalty on the applicant’s complicated financial situation, it should be noted that the appointing authority could have decided on a penalty with even more severe financial consequences, as permitted by Article 9 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. As is apparent from paragraph 51 above, the appointing authority nevertheless sought to impose a balanced penalty, in the light of all the facts in question. It should also be recalled that it is necessary to ensure the deterrent effect of the penalty (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2021, KT v EIB, T‑415/20, not published, EU:T:2021:368, paragraph 137). 59 In the light of all the above considerations, it must be held, first, that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the appointing authority committed a manifest error of assessment in the contested decision and, secondly, that there is nothing to suggest that the penalty imposed is disproportionate with regard to the misconduct alleged against him. 60 Consequently, the single plea in law must be rejected as manifestly unfounded and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. Costs 61 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 62 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 2. IR is ordered to pay the costs. Luxembourg, 10 February 2026. V. Di Bucci K. Kowalik-Bańczyk Registrar President * Language of the case: English.