Order — ECLI:EU:C:2025:948
Date: 2025-12-05
Language of the case: German

Translation C-540/24 – 1 
Case C-540/24 
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged: 
8 August 2024 
Referring court: 
Handelsgericht Wien (Austria) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
1 August 2024 
Applicant: 
Cabris Investments Ltd 
Defendant: 
Revetas Capital Advisors LLP 
  
IN THE MATTER OF:  
Applicant […] 
Cabris Investments Limited […] 
Beckenham 
UNITED KINGDOM 
[…] 
Defendant 
Revetas Capital Advisors LLP […]  
London UNITED KINGDOM 
[…] 
concerning: EUR 360 000 plus appendages (Other claim – General dispute) 
a. The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for a preliminary ruling: 
1. Is Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) to be interpreted as 
meaning that an agreement conferring jurisdiction in which the contracting 
parties, who are domiciled in the United Kingdom and therefore (now) in a third 
State, agree that the courts of a Member State of the European Union are to have 
jurisdiction over disputes arising under that contract, falls within the scope of that 
provision, even if the underlying contract has no further connection with that 
EN 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 1. 8. 2024 – CASE C-540/24 
 
2  
Member State chosen as the place of jurisdiction? Do the underlying principles of 
the decision of the European Court of Justice on C-566/22 of 8 February 2024 
therefore also apply in the same way if the date of conclusion of a jurisdiction 
agreement between two parties domiciled in the United Kingdom still falls within 
the period before the end of the transitional phase of Brexit on 31 December 2020, 
but the action was only brought after Brexit took effect? This is taking into 
account the fact that the contractual situation between these (now) third-country 
nationals has no further connection to the chosen Member State of the European 
Union (see, however, Recitals 13 and 14 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012) and, 
in addition, Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, 
OJ C 326/1, 13) generally excludes the applicability of the European treaties for 
the United Kingdom after Brexit. 
If the European Court of Justice rejects the application of Article 25 of the 
Brussels I Regulation in the third-country scenario in question, the following 
further questions arise: 
2. Is Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) to be interpreted as 
meaning that it has definitively repealed the European Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 27 September 1968 – ‘the Brussels 
Convention’ – including in proceedings relating to the United Kingdom (taking 
into account Brexit) – so that recourse to this Convention is currently no longer 
possible for a Member State of the European Union? 
3. Are Article 69 of the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters) in the version of ‘List 3’ as notified 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 
2015/C4/02) and Article 55 of the Brussels Convention, 13th indent, (European 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 
27 September 1968) to be interpreted as meaning that they have also definitively 
repealed the British-Austrian Convention on the Mutual Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed in Vienna on 
14 July 1961 and the Protocol signed in London on 6 March 1970 in relation to 
the United Kingdom (taking into account Brexit), so that in proceedings relating 
to the United Kingdom (taking into account Brexit), recourse to that international 
treaty of 14 July 1961 is no longer possible? This is also taking into account the 
fact that, pursuant to Article 70(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters), the conventions 
referred to in Article 69 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 retain their validity 
for those areas of law to which the regulation does not apply. Can an international 
treaty concluded with the Republic of Austria that has already been declared 
CABRIS INVESTMENTS 
 
3 
‘superseded’ by primary law in the past be declared retroactively applicable again 
between those states after Brexit (so-called ‘revival of an international treaty’) 
pursuant to Article 70(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) with regard to the 
United Kingdom? If so: Would such a ‘revival’ also apply within the scope of 
application of Article 56 of the Brussels Convention (European Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 27 September 1968), 
which is similar in this respect? 
4. Is Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, OJ C 
326/1, 13) to be interpreted as meaning that it also precludes the application or 
‘revival’ of Articles 17 and 18 of the Brussels Convention (European 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 
27 September 1968 – ‘the Brussels Convention’) in relation to the United 
Kingdom (taking into account Brexit) if, in proceedings initiated in Austria, two 
litigants domiciled in the United Kingdom are facing each other who have agreed 
in their contract – concluded on 6 May 2020 – that the Handelsgericht Wien 
(Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria) has exclusive jurisdiction? Does the 
provision in Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, 
OJ C 326/1, 13) take precedence over Article 66 of the Brussels Convention 
(European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed 
on 27 September 1968 – ‘the Brussels Convention’), according to which the 
Brussels Convention ‘[is concluded] for an unlimited period’? 
5. Should the European Court of Justice come to the conclusion that the Brussels 
Convention (European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ 
L 299 of 31 December 1972 – ‘the Brussels Convention’) also takes precedence in 
the sense of questions 2.) to 4.) above in relation to the United Kingdom, the 
question arises: Does the fundamental primacy of the Brussels Convention 
preclude an arrangement in the United Kingdom according to which recourse to 
the Brussels Convention (European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
1968, OJ L 299 of 31 December 1972 – ‘the Brussels Convention’) is also 
expressly excluded with regard to jurisdiction agreements that were concluded 
prior to Brexit taking effect (see the UK provision under Section 82(1)(b)(i) of the 
‘Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments [amendments etc.] [EU Exit] 
Regulations 2019 [Sl 2019/479]’, which is valid until 29 February 2024 and is 
obviously still applicable here, as the action was brought on 30 June 2023)? If 
not: When examining the validity of a jurisdiction agreement concluded on 6 May 
2020 (i.e. before Brexit) between two British companies with the choice of an 
Austrian forum, is an Austrian court nevertheless bound by this exclusion of 
application of the Brussels Convention – standardised in the United Kingdom – 
pursuant to Section 82(1)(b)(i) of Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments (amendments etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (Sl 2019/479), in 
particular due to the primacy of primary law, which would in principle prevent 
effective enforcement in the United Kingdom (The last question assumes, for the 
purposes of question 3.), the expiry of the UK-Austrian Convention on the Mutual 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 1. 8. 2024 – CASE C-540/24 
 
4  
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
signed in Vienna on 14 July 1961 and the Protocol signed in London on 6 March 
1970)? 
[…] [stay of proceedings] 
Grounds: 
I. Subject matter of the proceedings and initial situation: 
According to the parties’ submissions to date, the applicant is seeking payment 
from the defendant of an outstanding balance of (in total) EUR 360 000 on the 
basis of a contractual payment obligation resulting from the assumption of a 
function under company law by a chief financial officer (CFO) named in more 
detail. The applicant is a company incorporated under English law, namely a 
liability company with its registered office in London, registered at Companies 
House under number 12455993. The defendant is a limited liability partnership 
incorporated under English law with its registered office in London, registered at 
Companies House under number OC371868. The contractual basis for the service 
requested by the applicant can be found in the ‘consultancy agreement’ and the 
associated side letter dated 6 May 2020. In bringing the matter before the 
Commercial Court of Vienna, the applicant relies on an agreement on the place of 
jurisdiction, which can be found in this consultancy agreement with the associated 
side letter dated 6 May 2020. That reads as follows: 
‘This agreement and the relationship between the parties shall be governed by 
and construed in accordance with Austrian law. The Handelsgericht Wien 
(Commercial Court, Vienna) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes 
arising out of or in connection with this agreement or its enforcement or validity.’ 
There is no recognisable close relationship between the parties to the dispute and 
the Republic of Austria beyond this agreement on jurisdiction. 
In its response, the defendant disputes the international jurisdiction of the 
Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) essentially on the grounds that 
the Brussels I Regulation 2012 (Regulation [EU] No 1215/2012 of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters) has no longer been applicable in relation to the United 
Kingdom since the end of the transitional phase of Brexit (31 December 2020). As 
a result, Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 is no longer applicable to the 
parties in this dispute, meaning that the underlying principles of the recent 
decision of the European Court of Justice of 8 February 2024 on C-566/22 are not 
relevant. The agreement on jurisdiction in favour of the Handelsgericht Wien 
(Commercial Court, Vienna) according to the consultancy agreement with the 
associated side letter dated 6 May 2020 is therefore invalid and the court seized 
has no international jurisdiction. 
CABRIS INVESTMENTS 
 
5 
On the request for a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice: 
As part of the examination of jurisdiction, the court entitled to make a referral 
under Article 267 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
C 202 of 7 June 2016) is faced with questions relevant to the interpretation of 
European jurisdiction law in connection with Brexit (the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union), particularly as the jurisdiction agreement of 
6 May 2020 still falls within the period before the end of the Brexit transitional 
phase on 31 December 2020, the action in question was brought after Brexit took 
effect (i.e. on 30 June 2023) and the interpretation of the provisions mentioned in 
the request for referral is also the subject of highly controversial academic debate 
(see Exenberger/Karl, Anerkennung und Vollstreckung zivilgerichtlicher 
Entscheidungen Post-Brexit, ecolex 2021/227; Tretthahn-Wolski/Förstel, Der 
Brexit von Rom und Brüssel, ÖJZ 2019/60; Cap, BREXIT – Die justizielle 
Zusammenarbeit mit dem Vereinigten Königreich in Zivilrechtssachen nach 
31.12.2020, RZ 2012, 124). 
The international jurisdiction of the courts of the EU Member States in civil and 
commercial matters is primarily governed by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation 2012). The Brussels I Regulation 2012 
presupposes membership of the European Union and requires continued 
reciprocity. Due to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union with Brexit on 31 December 2020, the Brussels I Regulation as EU law no 
longer applies to nationals of the United Kingdom. 
In its statement of defence, the defendant disputes that Article 25 of the Brussels I 
Regulation 2012 continues to apply in the present proceedings, notwithstanding 
the agreement in favour of the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) 
reached between the contracting parties during the transitional period. The 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union meant that an 
autonomous choice of law in favour of an Austrian forum could no longer 
establish jurisdiction after Brexit took effect, especially since the contracting 
parties have no further connection to Austria. 
The question therefore arises in the context of the request for a preliminary ruling 
as to whether the underlying principles of the decision of the European Court of 
Justice on C-566/22 of 8 February 2024 also apply in the event that a jurisdiction 
agreement between two contracting parties domiciled in the United Kingdom still 
falls within the period before the end of the transitional phase of Brexit on 
31 December 2020, but the action was only brought after Brexit took effect and 
the contracting parties have no further connection to Austria. Does Article 25 of 
the Brussels I Regulation 2012 therefore continue to apply to these (now) third-
country nationals from the United Kingdom if the case – recognisably – has no 
further connection to the Member State of the European Union chosen as the place 
of jurisdiction? It should be borne in mind that, according to Recital 13 of the 
Brussels I Regulation 2012, there must be an explicit connection between the 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 1. 8. 2024 – CASE C-540/24 
 
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proceedings covered by that regulation and the territory of the Member States. 
Accordingly, common rules of jurisdiction from the Brussels I Regulation 2012 
should, in principle, only apply when the defendant is domiciled in a Member 
State. Consequently, Recital 14 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 states that 
defendants not domiciled in a Member State are generally subject to the national 
rules of jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of the court 
seized. In this respect, it is already questionable and therefore subject to 
interpretation whether Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 can be applied 
to a party autonomously if the case – recognisably – has no further connection to 
the chosen Member State of the European Union. This is also underlined by 
Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, OJ C 326/1, 
13), which expressly excludes the applicability of the European treaties for the 
United Kingdom after Brexit in general. Whether the underlying principles of the 
decision of the European Court of Justice on C-566/22 of 8 February 2024 also 
apply to an agreement on jurisdiction between two (now) third-country nationals 
in favour of the Austrian Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna), if – 
recognisably – there is no further connection to the chosen Member State of the 
European Union, is the crux of the first question referred for a preliminary ruling. 
Only in the event that this first question referred for a preliminary ruling is 
answered in the negative by the European Court of Justice do the following 
questions arise: 
Since in the present case the jurisdiction agreement is dated 6 May 2020 and the 
action was brought after Brexit (namely on 30 June 2023), is it questionable 
whether the wording of Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 now means, 
in terms of jurisdiction, that the European Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 27 September 1968 – ‘the Brussels 
Convention’ – has been definitively repealed, including in relation to the United 
Kingdom (taking into account Brexit), so that recourse to this Convention is no 
longer possible for a Member State of the European Union (in this case Austria) in 
relation to the present case? In the academic literature (again Exenberger/Karl, 
Anerkennung und Vollstreckung zivilgerichtlicher Entscheidungen Post-Brexit, 
ecolex 2021/227; Tretthahn-Wolski/Förstel, Der Brexit von Rom und Brüssel, 
ÖJZ 2019/60; Cap, BREXIT – Die justizielle Zusammenarbeit mit dem 
Vereinigten Königreich in Zivilrechtssachen nach 31.12.2020, RZ 2012, 124), a 
so-called ‘revival’ of the Brussels Convention is discussed with regard to the 
United Kingdom on the basis of Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012, 
especially as that convention was never formally repealed, but remained 
applicable to certain territories of EU states in accordance with Article 68(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation 2012. According to the referring court, the better reasons 
speak against a ‘revival’ of the Brussels Convention, since it is not an original 
EU act, but a multilateral international treaty that can be terminated by mutual 
agreement between the contracting states in accordance with Article 54 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’ of 23 May 1969). 
Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, OJ C 326/1, 
CABRIS INVESTMENTS 
 
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13) stipulates that the withdrawal of a state from the European Union terminates 
all acts of EU law in relation to the withdrawing state. Due to the substantive 
proximity of the Brussels Convention to EU law and because all contracting states 
of the Brussels Convention then also became contracting states of the TEU, there 
are better reasons to believe that the Brussels Convention was also definitively 
terminated in relation to the United Kingdom as a result of Brexit. The 
clarification of this question, which requires interpretation, lies with the European 
Court of Justice. (This request for a preliminary ruling by the European Court of 
Justice assumes, from a legal point of view, that the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements of 5 October 2005 does not apply to the proceedings of the 
referring court due to the lack of internationality of the facts submitted in 
accordance with Article 1(3) of that convention.) 
In a further step, jurisdiction is conferred on the British-Austrian Convention on 
the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters signed between the Republic of Austria and the United Kingdom in 
Vienna on 14 July 1961 and the Protocol signed in London on 6 March 1970, 
including in relation to the United Kingdom. In that respect, it is questionable and 
therefore subject to interpretation whether this bilateral agreement from 1961 still 
applies in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Austria. The question to be referred to the European Court of Justice in this case is 
whether the annulment provisions of Article 69 of the Brussels I Regulation 2012 
in the version of ‘List 3’ as notified pursuant to Article 76 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 
2015/C4/02) and Article 55 of the Brussels Convention, 13th indent, (European 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed on 
27 September 1968) have had the effect of definitively repealing the British-
Austrian Convention on the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters signed in Vienna on 14 July 1961 and the Protocol 
signed in London on 6 March 1970, including in relation to the United Kingdom 
(taking into account Brexit)? Does the explicit annulment within the meaning of 
the above provisions therefore mean that recourse to this British-Austrian Treaty 
of 14 July 1961 is currently no longer possible in the legal assessment of a 
jurisdiction agreement between two (now) third-country nationals in favour of the 
Austrian Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna)? 
It should be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 70(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation 2012, the conventions referred to in Article 69 of the Brussels I 
Regulation 2012 (and thus also the bilateral agreement between the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Austria from 1961) retain their validity for the areas 
of law to which the regulation does not apply. This therefore raises the question 
discussed in the academic literature as to whether, with regard to the United 
Kingdom, a treaty concluded with Austria in 1961 that has already been declared 
‘superseded’ by primary law can be declared retroactively applicable again after 
Brexit between these states (so-called ‘revival of a treaty’). Should this question 
be answered in the negative by the European Court of Justice for the Brussels I 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 1. 8. 2024 – CASE C-540/24 
 
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Regulation 2012, the question also arises as to whether such a ‘revival’ also 
applies within the scope of application of Article 56 of the Brussels Convention 
(European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed 
on 27 September 1968), which is similar in this respect? This is because 
Article 17 of the Brussels Convention expressly requires that at least one party 
must be domiciled in the territory of a contracting state for a jurisdiction 
agreement to be valid under that provision. The further question arises as to 
whether Article 17 of the Brussels Convention is based on the time of the 
conclusion of the contract or the time of the pendency of proceedings for the 
assessment of the existence of those conditions. 
Furthermore, with regard to Articles 17 and 18 of the Brussels Convention 
(European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299, signed 
on 27 September 1968 – ‘the Brussels Convention’) concerning the United 
Kingdom (taking into account Brexit), the question arises as to whether such a 
‘revival’ of the Brussels Convention as a result of Brexit is generally excluded 
pursuant to Article 50(3) TEU (Treaty on European Union of 26 October 2012, OJ 
C 326/1, 13). 
Only in the event that the European Court of Justice comes to the conclusion that 
the Brussels Convention (European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
1968, OJ L 299 of 31 December 1972 – ‘the Brussels Convention’) has priority – 
including in relation to the United Kingdom – does the following further question 
arise: 
The United Kingdom has prevented recourse to the Brussels Convention through 
its own national regulations by expressly excluding the applicability of the 
Brussels Convention in its domestic law (see the UK provision under Section 
82(1)(b)(i) of the ‘Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
[amendments etc.] [EU Exit] Regulations 2019 [Sl 2019/479]’, which is valid 
until 29 February 2024 and is obviously still applicable here, as the action was 
brought on 30 June 2023). Does the fundamental primacy of the Brussels 
Convention therefore preclude an arrangement in the United Kingdom according 
to which recourse to the Brussels Convention (European Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement 1968, OJ L 299 of 31 December 1972 – ‘the 
Brussels Convention’) is also expressly excluded with regard to jurisdiction 
agreements concluded prior to Brexit taking effect? Only if the answer is in the 
negative does the question arise as to whether a court of the European Union (in 
this case the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna)), when examining 
the validity of a jurisdiction agreement concluded on 6 May 2020 (i.e. before the 
end of the Brexit transitional period) between two British companies with the 
choice of an Austrian forum, is nevertheless bound by this exclusion of 
application of the Brussels Convention standardised in the United Kingdom 
pursuant to Section 82(1)(b)(i) of the ‘Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments (amendments etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (Sl 2019/479), in 
particular due to the primacy of primary law, which would in principle prevent 
effective enforcement in the United Kingdom. 
CABRIS INVESTMENTS 
 
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[…] [on the stay of proceedings] 
[…]