Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2026:230
Date: 2026-03-19
Language of the case: German

Summary C-530/24 – 1 
Case C-530/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
1 August 2024 
Referring court: 
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
25 July 2024 
Applicant and appellant on a point of law: 
DK 
Defendant and respondent on a point of law: 
Tipico Co. Ltd 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Civil action at final instance (appeal on a point of law) before the referring court, 
seeking annulment of a sports betting contract governed by private law and 
concluded over the internet, as well as reimbursement of lost betting stakes 
Nature and subject matter of the request 
Interpretation of EU law; subject matter: the law governing gaming; sports betting 
contracts 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. 
EN 
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Does the freedom to provide services of a gaming and betting operator established 
in another Member State of the European Union preclude a sports betting contract 
governed by private law and concluded over the internet without the authorisation 
required under national law from being regarded as null and void where the 
operator has applied in Germany for authorisation to organise sports betting and 
the licensing procedure to which that application is subject has been conducted in 
breach of EU law? 
2. 
Does the freedom to provide services of a gaming and betting operator established 
in another Member State of the European Union preclude the national prior 
authorisation scheme governing the organisation of online sports betting from 
being regarded as a rule conferring legal protection, with the possible consequence 
of liability for damages, where the operator has applied in Germany for 
authorisation to organise sports betting and the licensing procedure to which that 
application is subject has been conducted in breach of EU law? 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Staatsvertrag zum Glücksspielwesen in Deutschland (State Treaty (inter-Länder 
agreement) on gaming in Germany; ‘the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012’) 
Paragraph 1 Objectives of the State Treaty 
‘The objectives of the State Treaty, which rank equally, are as follows: 
1. to prevent dependency on gambling and on betting, and to create the conditions 
for effectively combating dependency, 
2. by means of a limited supply of games of chance, which constitutes an 
alternative to unauthorised gaming, to channel the gaming instinct of the 
population in an organised and supervised manner and to combat the development 
and expansion of unauthorised gaming in black markets, 
3. to ensure the protection of minors and players, 
4. to ensure the proper conduct of games of chance and the protection of players 
against fraudulent manoeuvres, and to prevent criminality connected with and 
arising from games of chance, and 
5. to avoid risks to the integrity of sporting competition in the organisation and 
intermediation of sporting bets. 
In order to achieve those objectives, differentiated measures are laid down for the 
various forms of gaming in order to take account of their specific potential for 
dependency, fraud, manipulation and criminality.’ 
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Paragraph 4 General provisions 
‘(1) The organisation or intermediation of public games of chance may take place 
only with the authorisation of the competent authority of the Land concerned. The 
organisation or intermediation of such games without such authorisation 
(unauthorised gaming) and participation in payments in connection with 
unauthorised gaming are prohibited. 
… 
(4) The organisation and intermediation of public games of chance on the internet 
are prohibited. 
(5) By way of derogation from subparagraph (4), the Länder, in order to better 
achieve the aims set out in Paragraph 1 of this Treaty, may authorise the direct 
operation and intermediation of lotteries and the organisation and intermediation 
of sporting bets on the internet where there are no grounds for prohibition under 
Paragraph 4(2) and the following conditions are met: 
1. The exclusion of under-age or barred players is ensured by means of 
identification and authentication. 
2. The maximum stake per player may not, in principle, exceed an amount of 
EUR 1 000 per month. The authorisation may set a different amount for the 
purpose of achieving the objectives of Paragraph 1. Winnings cannot be offset 
against players’ stakes. Compliance with the prohibition of credit is guaranteed. 
When registering, players are instructed to set a daily, weekly or monthly payment 
or loss limit (self-limitation). In addition, players are to be given the opportunity 
at any time to reset their daily, weekly or monthly payment and loss limits. If a 
player wishes to increase his or her payment or loss limit, the increase does not 
take effect until a seven-day cooling-off period has elapsed. Where payment or 
loss limits are reduced, the new limits apply immediately to new stakes. 
3. Particular incitements to dependency involving rapid repetition are ruled out. 
4. A social plan within the meaning of Paragraph 6, adapted to the particular 
conditions of the internet, is to be developed and applied; its effectiveness is to be 
scientifically evaluated. 
5. Betting and lotteries are not offered through the same web domain, nor does the 
domain contain references or links to other forms of gaming. 
…’ 
Paragraph 4a Licence 
‘(1) In so far as Paragraph 10(6) is not applicable under the experimental clause 
for sporting bets (Paragraph 10a), the gaming operations reserved therein to the 
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organisers specified in Paragraph 10(2) and (3) may be organised only with a 
licence. The second sentence of Paragraph 4(1) shall apply by analogy. 
…’ 
Paragraph 4b Licensing procedure 
‘(1) The licence shall be granted following a call for applications and the conduct 
of a transparent, non-discriminatory procedure. The notice shall be published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 
…’ 
Paragraph 10a Experimental clause for sporting bets 
‘ … 
(2) During that period, sporting bets may be organised only with a licence 
(Paragraphs 4a to 4e). 
(3) The licence shall entitle the licensee to organise and intermediate sporting bets 
on the internet in accordance with the substantive and ancillary provisions laid 
down pursuant to Paragraph 4c(2) in derogation of the prohibition set out in 
Paragraph 4(4). Paragraph 4(5) and (6) shall apply by analogy. The scope of the 
licence shall be limited to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and of 
States which recognise the German licence for their territory. 
…’ 
Dritter Staatsvertrag zur Änderung des Staatsvertrages zum Glücksspielwesen in 
Deutschland (Third State Treaty amending the State Treaty on gaming in 
Germany; ‘the Dritter Glücksspieländerungsstaatsvertrag’) 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code; ‘the BGB’) in the version 
promulgated on 2 January 2002 (Federal Law Gazette I, pp. 42 and 2909; 2003 I, 
p. 738). 
Paragraph 134 Statutory prohibition 
‘A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute 
leads to a different conclusion.’ 
Paragraph 812 Claim to surrender 
‘(1) A person who obtains something as a result of the performance of another 
person or otherwise at that person’s expense without legal grounds for doing so is 
under a duty to surrender to that person what has been obtained.’ …’ 
Paragraph 823 Liability in damages 
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‘(1) A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, limb, 
health, freedom, property or some other right of another person is liable to provide 
compensation to the other party for the damage arising therefrom.’ 
(2) The same duty is incumbent on a person who commits a breach of a statute 
that is intended to protect another person. If, according to the contents of the 
statute, it is possible to violate it also without fault, then liability to compensation 
only exists in the case of fault.’ 
Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code; ‘the StGB’), in the version promulgated 
on 13 April 2009 
Paragraph 284 Organising illicit gaming 
‘(1) Whoever, without the permission of an authority, publicly organises or runs a 
game of chance or provides the means of doing so incurs a penalty of 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine.  
…’ 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 56 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia 
Regulation), Articles 18(1) and 17(1)(c) 
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I), Articles 6(1)(b), 10(1) and 12(1)(e) 
Case-law of the Courts of the European Union relied on 
Judgment of 2 April 2020, Reliantco Investments and Reliantco Investments 
Limassol Sucursala Bucureşti, C-500/18, EU:C:2020:264 (‘the Reliantco 
judgment’) 
Judgment of 8 September 2010, Carmen Media Group, C-46/08, EU:C:2010:505 
(‘the Carmen Media Group judgment’) 
Judgment of 24 January 2013, Stanleybet International and Others, C-186/11 and 
C-209/11, EU:C:2013:33 (‘the Stanleybet judgment’) 
Judgment of 12 June 2014, Digibet and Albers, C-156/13, EU:C:2014:1756 
(C-156/13) (‘the Digibet judgment’) 
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Judgment of 8 September 2010, Stoß and Others, C-316/07, C-358/07 to 
C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, EU:C:2010:504 (‘the Stoß judgment’) 
Judgment of 4 February 2016, Ince, C-336/14, EU:C:2016:72 (‘the Ince 
judgment’) 
Judgment of 12 September 2013, Biasci and Others, C-660/11 and C-8/12, 
EU:C:2013:550 (‘the Biasci judgment’) 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The defendant, which has its registered office in Malta, offers sports betting on a 
German-language website with a German top-level domain. From 2013 until 
9 October 2020, the applicant used the defendant’s online sports betting service. 
2 During that period, the defendant did not hold a licence in Germany to organise 
sports betting. It had applied for such a licence. By means of a notice dated 
9 October 2020, the defendant, in a new licensing procedure based on the Dritter 
Glücksspieländerungsstaatsvertrag, applicable from 1 January 2020, received a 
licence to organise sports betting and online sports betting in Germany. 
3 The applicant claims that the defendant’s provision of an online sports betting 
service was unlawful and that the betting contracts concluded with it are null and 
void. He sought to have the defendant declared liable for repaying lost betting 
stakes amounting to EUR 3 719.26, plus interest, and for indemnifying him for 
pre-trial legal costs. The Amtsgericht (Local Court) dismissed the action. The 
Landgericht (Regional Court) rejected the applicant’s appeal against that decision. 
By means of an appeal on a point of law, for which the Regional Court granted 
leave and which the defendant considers should be rejected, the applicant seeks to 
have his claims upheld in full. 
4 The success of the appeal on a point of law depends on the interpretation of the 
freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU of gaming and betting 
operators registered in another Member State of the European Union. The scope 
of the defendant’s freedom to provide services is relevant to the assessment of the 
foundations of both claims which may be taken into account in respect of the 
applicant’s reimbursement demand, namely a claim based on unjust enrichment 
under the first option of the first sentence of Paragraph 812(1) of the BGB on 
account of nullity of the sports betting contracts by virtue of Paragraph 134 of the 
BGB and a claim for damages in tort under Paragraph 823(2) of the BGB for 
breach of a rule conferring legal protection. 
5 The action is admissible. The international jurisdiction of the German courts 
follows from Article 18(1) and Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels Ia Regulation). The consumer’s forum thus 
determined also covers an action in tort if it is indissociably linked to a contract 
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actually concluded between that consumer and the seller or supplier (see the 
Reliantco judgment, paragraph 73). The same applies to claims based on unjust 
enrichment where the recovery of payments is based on the nullity of the 
concluded contracts. 
6 Under Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), the applicant’s claims must be assessed in the 
light of German substantive law. In particular, that instrument determines the 
validity of contracts (Article 10(1) of Rome I) and the consequences of nullity of 
contracts (Article 12(1)(e) of Rome I) 
7 On the first question: by virtue of Paragraph 134 of the BGB, the applicant may 
have an entitlement to reimbursement based on unjust enrichment under the first 
option of the first sentence of Paragraph 812(1) of the BGB on account of nullity 
of the sports betting contracts. Under national law, a sports betting contract which 
a provider concludes in contravention of the prior authorisation scheme governing 
public sports betting pursuant to Paragraphs 4(1), (4) and (5), 4a(1) and 10a(2) 
and (3) of the State Treaty on gaming in the version which entered into force on 
1 June 2012 and applied until 30 June 2021 (‘the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012’) 
is null and void. It is questionable, however, whether the freedom to provide 
services (Article 56 TFEU) of a gaming and betting operator established in 
another Member State of the European Union precludes a sports betting contract 
governed by private law and concluded over the internet without the authorisation 
required under national law from being regarded as null and void where the 
operator has applied in Germany for authorisation to organise sports betting and 
the licensing procedure to which that application is subject has been conducted in 
breach of EU law. 
8 The question in the present case is whether, for reasons of EU law, a different 
assessment is required, given that the defendant had already applied, during the 
relevant period, for a licence to operate sports betting in Germany, but the 
licensing procedure to which that application is subject was conducted in breach 
of EU law – which evidence suggests in the present case – and therefore, in 
accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, no criminal penalties could 
be imposed on those responsible within the defendant company. 
9 The prior authorisation scheme, imposed by the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012 on 
online sports betting is, in principle, compatible with EU law. The defendant does 
not dispute that. 
10 The Court of Justice has consistently held that restrictions on betting and gaming 
may be justified by overriding requirements in the public interest, such as 
consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander 
money on gambling. The legislation on games of chance is one of the areas in 
which there are significant moral, religious and cultural differences between the 
Member States; it is for each Member State to determine in those areas, in 
accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that 
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the interests in question are protected (see the Stanleybet judgment, 
paragraphs 23-24, and the Digibet judgment, paragraphs 23-24). It is therefore for 
each Member State to assess whether, in the context of the legitimate aims which 
it pursues, it is necessary to prohibit, wholly or in part, betting and gaming or only 
to restrict them and, to that end, to lay down more or less strict supervisory rules 
(see the Stanleybet judgment, paragraph 44). Any practical problems which the 
State may experience in effectively applying prohibitions in the realm of gaming 
and betting, especially in the context of the internet, which, as a transnational 
medium, is difficult to control, cannot call into question the fundamental 
appropriateness of the prohibition (see the Stoß judgment, paragraphs 86-87). In 
EU law there is no obligation of mutual recognition of authorisations issued by the 
various Member States (see the Stoß judgment, paragraph 113, and the Biasci 
judgment, paragraphs 40-41). 
11 However, when introducing a prior authorisation scheme governing public gaming 
and betting, a Member State must, in particular, observe the freedom to provide 
services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU, the principle of equal treatment, the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and the consequent 
obligation of transparency. The introduction of an administrative permit scheme 
for the provision of certain types of games of chance must be based on objective, 
non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to 
circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ discretion so that it is not 
used arbitrarily. Furthermore, any person affected by a restrictive measure based 
on such a derogation must have an effective judicial remedy available to them (see 
the Carmen Media Group judgment, paragraph 87, the Stanleybet judgment, 
paragraph 47, and the Ince judgment, paragraph 55). 
12 Paragraph 10a(2) and the first sentence of Paragraph 4b(1) of the 
Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012 did stipulate that, under the licensing procedure for 
the organisation of sports betting introduced in the experimental clause 
framework, licences would be granted following a call for applications and the 
conduct of a transparent, non-discriminatory selection procedure. However, 
according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the licensing procedure 
introduced by the experimental clause cannot be regarded as having remedied the 
incompatibility with Article 56 TFEU identified by the national courts of the pre-
existing public monopoly regime with regard to the organisation of sporting bets if 
the procedure does not observe the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality and the consequent obligation of 
transparency and if the provisions establishing a public monopoly regime with 
regard to the organisation and intermediation of sporting bets, deemed by the 
national courts to be contrary to EU law, has persisted in practice (see the Ince 
judgment, paragraphs 93 and 95). In view of the foregoing, the Court of Justice 
has ruled that, in accordance with the principle of primacy of EU law, a Member 
State may not apply a criminal penalty for failure to satisfy an administrative 
requirement where such satisfaction has been refused or rendered impossible by 
the Member State concerned in infringement of EU law (see the Ince judgment, 
paragraphs 63 and 94). 
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13 Much of the evidence suggests that the aforementioned condition has been met. 
The Hessischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court of Hesse), 
for example, has held – albeit without binding effect on the present case – that the 
procedure for granting licences to private organisers of sports betting laid down by 
the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012, which is also relevant to the case, did not 
comply with EU law because it breached the obligation of transparency 
established in EU law and created an unjustified restriction on applicants’ freedom 
to provide services. 
14 The supreme federal courts have also held, on the basis of the case-law of the 
Court of Justice, that the sports betting services offered by an operator which has 
endeavoured to obtain a licence under the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012 cannot be 
penalised by criminal law or prohibited by administrative law. 
15 According to the jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of 
Justice), Paragraph 284 of the StGB, which penalises the organisation of illicit 
gaming, is administrative in nature, so that, in principle, the absence of an 
administrative authorisation is sufficient to meet the conditions for commission of 
the offence, regardless of any scope for authorisation in substantive law. Even if 
the facts could, or even should, warrant an authorisation, that is no basis for ruling 
out the commission of an offence. That consideration also applies in cases where 
the person concerned is entitled not only to a decision without error of 
appreciation on his or her application for authorisation but even to the 
authorisation itself. If the refusal to grant authorisation is subsequently found to 
have been unlawful or if the authority issues a retrospective authorisation, there is 
normally no ground for quashing a penalty which would retroactively extinguish 
criminal liability in spite of the fulfilment of the conditions for commission of the 
offence and the illegality of the unauthorised conduct. The position is different, 
however, where the person concerned has failed to satisfy administrative 
requirements which are themselves contrary to EU law, because, in accordance 
with the principle of primacy of EU law, a Member State may not apply a criminal 
penalty for failure to satisfy an administrative requirement where such satisfaction 
has been refused or rendered impossible by the Member State concerned, in 
infringement of EU law (see the Ince judgment, paragraph 94). 
16 According to the jurisprudence of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal 
Administrative Court), the absence of an authorisation cannot form the basis of a 
prohibition of sports betting if the authorisation procedure is not transparent and 
non-discriminatory and a public monopoly on sports betting has therefore 
persisted in practice. This does not exempt operators, however, from submitting 
an (initial) licence application where that would have been a straightforward 
option. 
17 In an indicative order, the Chamber expressed the provisional opinion that, for 
online sports betting services which would not have been automatically eligible 
for authorisation even in an EU-compliant licensing procedure, particularly 
because the sports betting on offer was contrary to the substantive law on gaming 
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and betting, the consequence of nullity under Paragraph 134 of the BGB would 
certainly remain applicable with no need to clarify the position in EU law. 
18 In the view of the Chamber, EU law does not require such offers of sports betting 
services to be treated as valid in civil law. A sports betting organiser cannot derive 
from the incompatibility of the licensing procedure with EU law rights which it 
would not have been able to obtain in an EU-compliant licensing procedure either. 
EU law allows a lawful provision of sports betting services to be limited by 
effective rules designed to protect the public. A Member State is required to take 
decisions on applications for authorisation solely on the basis of objective and 
non-discriminatory criteria (see the Stanleybet judgment, paragraph 45). EU law 
does not prescribe a particular content for those decisions. 
19 In the present appeal proceedings, however, the Chamber must primarily decide 
whether the sports betting contracts concluded by the defendant with the applicant 
online are void under Paragraph 134 of the BGB because the defendant did not 
have the required licence, in breach of Paragraphs 4(1), (4) and (5), 4a(1) and 
10a(2) and (3) of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012. The Chamber is inclined to 
draw that conclusion but must clarify whether the freedom to provide services 
guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU of a gaming and betting operator established in 
another Member State of the European Union precludes such a legal consequence. 
20 The Chamber is inclined – having regard also to the existing case-law of the Court 
of Justice – to hold that sports betting contracts concluded on the basis of 
unauthorised online offers are generally null and void under Paragraph 134 of the 
BGB. 
21 In connection with an action for an injunction under competition law, the 
Chamber ruled that the unfairness of the offer already follows from the absence of 
the authorisation to be granted in an administrative procedure and that the operator 
must be referred to the legal protection afforded in the licensing procedure. The 
spirit and purpose of the reservation of authorisation would be undermined if, in 
civil proceedings challenging the enforcement of the legal consequences of 
formally unlawful conduct, it were necessary to verify not only the existence of an 
authorisation but also the substantive requirements for authorisation and their 
conformity with EU law. In addition, the result would be a transfer of the statutory 
powers of review and decision from the more specialised administrative 
authorities and courts to the civil courts. In any case, in so far as the licensing 
depends on an assessment by the authorities, the exercise of their discretion 
cannot be replaced in civil proceedings; that absence of discretion, moreover, 
cannot be to the unilateral detriment of the players who are to be protected. The 
authorisation procedure also performs a separate function with regard to the public 
protection which is the objective of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag. In that context, it 
seems logical that, even within the scope of Paragraph 134 of the BGB, a formal 
breach of the authorisation requirement should be sufficient to trigger the legal 
consequence of nullity. 
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22 The fact that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, those responsible 
within provider companies cannot be subject to criminal penalties in the event of 
infringement of EU law in the conduct of the licensing procedure (see the Ince 
judgment, paragraph 94) does not invalidate that argument. The legal consequence 
of nullity in civil law under Paragraph 134 of the BGB does not constitute a 
penalty but rather a restriction on freedom of choice designed to safeguard general 
legal transactions. 
23 It is true that the effort to avoid inconsistencies in the legal system could warrant 
limiting the consequence of nullity prescribed by Paragraph 134 of the BGB. The 
German administrative courts have ruled, on the basis of the case-law of the Court 
of Justice on criminal penalties, that the sports betting service offered by an 
operator which has applied for a licence but has not obtained it because of the 
non-EU-compliant organisation of the licensing procedure could not be prohibited 
by administrative law. When Paragraph 134 of the BGB is applied, however, it 
must also be considered whether administrative or penal measures can lend 
sufficient force to the prohibition. Even if the provisions of Paragraph 134 of the 
BGB open civil law to assessments made in other areas of law, that does not mean 
that full parallelism must necessarily be established. In particular, the legal 
consequences arising in the relationship between the State and the sports betting 
provider cannot simply be extended to that provider’s relationship with the player, 
who is a private third party. Furthermore, non-recourse to administrative or penal 
measures does not lead to legalisation of the service offered, which could only be 
effected by means of an administrative authorisation. 
24 Players, including potential players, still require protection, regardless of whether 
it is possible to enforce the prohibition under administrative law or to impose 
criminal penalties for failure to comply with it. In the absence of administrative or 
criminal sanctions, the achievement of the protective objectives of the 
Glücksspielstaatsvertrags 2012 actually becomes even more dependent on the 
consequence of nullity under civil law. The Oberlandesgerichte (Higher Regional 
Courts) seized of this matter have held, almost without exception, that sports 
betting contracts are null and void. Be that as it may, the civil assessments make it 
possible to invoke the absence of a need to protect the player in order to curtail a 
right to reimbursement of losses on a case-by-case basis – for example in the 
event of knowledge of undue payment or of a reciprocal infringement of the 
prohibiting statute – although there is no indication of any such absence in the 
present case. 
25 As regards the relative importance of protecting the public, it should be noted that 
the amount at issue in the present case is below average. In a significant number 
of the proceedings pending before the Chamber, the net loss claimed per player 
amounts to more than EUR 100 000. The fact relied on by the respondent in the 
appeal on a point of law that litigation funders are often involved on the player’s 
side and claim a considerable share of the amounts at issue for themselves cannot 
affect the legal assessment, since players have recourse to legally authorised 
support to facilitate their legal action. 
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26 In the Chamber’s view, the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU) of 
sports betting operators on which the defendant relies dictates no other 
assessment. 
27 At the outset, account must be taken of the fact that the licensing procedure was 
available without distinction to operators established in Germany and in other 
Member States of the European Union. The defendant does not allege 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
28 The overriding reasons of the public interest which justify encroachment on 
freedom to provide services exist regardless of the answer to the question whether 
the licensing procedure was organised in conformity with EU law. The defendant 
does not allege that the substantive provisions of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrags 
2012 regarding sports betting are in breach of EU law; in that regard, its objection 
that the consequence of nullity in civil law introduces retrospective protection for 
players is not convincing either. With its legal arguments, which are partly 
directed against consideration of the substantive provisions of the law governing 
gaming and betting, it ultimately seeks the removal of any restrictions at all. 
However, a completely unregulated situation would unilaterally favour operators’ 
freedom to provide services over the protection of the public which is the aim of 
the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012. If the provisions of the 
Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012 applied to claims made under civil law, the 
operators concerned would still be able to rely on the non-conformity of the 
licensing procedure with EU law in any action for damages against the State under 
EU law. 
29 In so far as the defendant relies, in the appeal on a point of law, on having been 
granted a Maltese licence, it is questionable from the outset whether that argument 
can still be taken into account in the appeal proceedings on a point of law. In any 
event, a licence granted in another Member State has no bearing on the case. 
Under the case-law of the Court of Justice, each Member State retains the right to 
require any operator wishing to offer games of chance to consumers in its territory 
to hold an authorisation issued by its competent authorities, without the fact that a 
particular operator already holds an authorisation issued in another Member State 
being capable of constituting an obstacle (see the Stoß judgment, paragraph 113, 
and the Biasci judgment, paragraph 40). That conclusion is not called into 
question by the fact that, in its affirmative response to the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling in the case of a licensing procedure contrary to EU law, the 
Court of Justice limited the exclusion of criminal penalties to holders of a licence 
in another Member State (see the Ince judgment, paragraphs 65 and 94). 
30 The question referred for a preliminary ruling is relevant to the resolution of the 
dispute. In particular, according to the findings of the Regional Court, it does not 
appear that the applicant’s entitlement can be entirely ruled out for reasons other 
than those examined in the present case. 
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31 On the second question referred, the applicant may also be entitled, under 
Paragraph 823(2) of the BGB, to claim damages from the defendant under tort law 
to reimburse losses arising from violation of the prior authorisation scheme, 
pursuant to Paragraphs 4(1), (4) and (5), 4a(1) and 10a(2) and (3) of the 
Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012. Under the first sentence of Paragraph 823(2) of the 
BGB, anyone who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to protect another 
person is liable to provide compensation to the other party for the damage arising 
therefrom. In that respect, the question arises, corresponding to Question 1, 
whether the freedom to provide services of a gaming and betting operator 
established in another Member State of the European Union precludes the national 
prior authorisation scheme governing the operation of online sports betting from 
being regarded as a rule conferring legal protection, with the possible consequence 
of liability for damages, where the operator has applied in Germany for 
authorisation to organise sports betting and the licensing procedure governing that 
application has been conducted in breach of EU law 
32 According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice, a rule of law 
constitutes a rule conferring legal protection within the meaning of 
Paragraph 823(2) of the BGB if at least part of its aim is to protect individuals or 
individual categories of persons from adverse effects on a particular legal interest. 
What matters in that regard is not the effect but the content and purpose of the 
statute, as well as the question whether, in adopting the statute, the legislature 
specifically intended, solely or at least in part, to create a judicial remedy of the 
type being sought for the alleged infringement in favour of individuals or certain 
categories of persons. It is sufficient that the rule is also intended to protect the 
interest of the individual, even if it is focused primarily on that of the general 
public. What is not sufficient, however, is that, objectively, individual protection 
is achieved only indirectly by adherence to the rule; on the contrary, the protection 
must lie within the remit of the rule. 
33 The purpose of the prior authorisation scheme pursuant to Paragraphs 4(1), (4) 
and (5), 4a(1) and 10a(2) and (3) of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012, namely to 
protect the population from dangers arising from public gaming and betting, lends 
weight to the argument for regarding the prohibition as a rule conferring legal 
protection in that sense. The fact that the individual protection intended by the 
Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2012 goes beyond a mere indirect effect is evident not 
only from its objectives but also from certain of its provisions. 
34 Players belong to the category of persons whom the prior authorisation scheme is 
intended to protect. Moreover, the harm suffered by a player as a result of losses 
deriving from unlicensed sports betting falls within the substantive protective 
scope of that instrument. That is not precluded, in principle, by consideration of 
the fact that losses can also be incurred in authorised gaming and betting and that 
players are aware of that. The prior authorisation scheme also serves to protect 
players from the irrational attractions of gaming and betting. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-530/24 
 
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Anonymised version 
35 As in the context of reimbursement claims based on unjust enrichment, the 
question arises whether the freedom to provide services of a gaming and betting 
operator established in another Member State of the European Union precludes 
the adoption of a rule conferring legal protection which has the legal consequence 
of entitlements to damages. 
36 The question referred for a preliminary ruling is relevant to the outcome of the 
dispute because, according to the findings of the Regional Court, fulfilment of the 
other conditions for the applicant’s entitlement to damages from the defendant is 
not ruled out from the outset.