Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:177
Date: 2025-03-13
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Ninth Chamber
Subject matter: Consumer protection;Approximation of laws
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Spain

Summary C-230/24 – 1 
Case C-230/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
26 March 2024 
Referring court: 
Juzgado de Primera Instancia n.º 8 de A Coruña (Spain) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
12 March 2024 
Applicant: 
MF 
Defendant: 
Banco Santander, S.A. 
 
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action in which a consumer is claiming the return of the amounts unduly paid to a 
bank as a result of an unfair contract term. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – 
Directive 93/13/EEC – Articles 6 and 7 – Consumer contracts – Unfair terms – 
Term charging all of the costs of creating a mortgage to the borrower – Effects of 
a declaration that those terms are invalid – Principle of equivalence – Possibility 
of recognising the inapplicability of a limitation period to the action seeking a 
declaration of invalidity and, at the same time, establishing a time limit for 
bringing the action seeking the return of the amounts unduly paid under that term 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-230/24 
 
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Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
Is it contrary to Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 and the principle of 
equivalence to apply the possibility of dissociating invalidity on the basis of 
unfairness from restitutory effects, whereby invalidity is not subject to a limitation 
period and, at the same time, actions for restitution are subject to a limitation 
period, when, in Spanish domestic law, there is no legislation or case-law which 
applies it to other legal relationships? 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29) 
Article 3(1): ‘A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall 
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’ 
Article 4(1): ‘Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term 
shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which 
the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to 
all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.’ 
Article 6(1): ‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract 
concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under 
their national law, not be binding on the consumer …’ 
Article 7(1): ‘Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and 
of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of 
unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.’ 
Judgments of the Court of Justice referred to in the reasoning given in the 
request for a preliminary ruling. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
A) Regarding the invalidity of unfair terms 
Article 82 of the texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los 
Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias (Consolidated text of the 
General Law for the protection of consumers and users and other supplementary 
laws; ‘the Consumer Protection Law’), approved by Real Decreto 
Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre (Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 
of 16 November 2007), provides: 
BANCO SANTANDER 
 
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‘1. All stipulations not negotiated individually and all practices not expressly 
agreed which, in contravention of the requirements of good faith, give rise, in a 
manner detrimental to the consumer or user, to a significant imbalance in the 
rights and obligations of the parties as arising from the contract, shall be regarded 
as unfair terms. 
… 
3. The unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed in the light of the 
nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and with 
reference to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and all 
the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs, terms shall be 
regarded as unfair if, in accordance with Articles 85 to 90, inclusive, they: 
(a) make the contract dependent on the wishes of the supplier or seller, 
(b) limit the rights of the consumer or user, 
(c) determine that there shall be no contractual reciprocity, 
(d) require the consumer or user to provide disproportionate guarantees or 
improperly impose upon him or her the burden of proof, 
(e) are disproportionate in relation to the formation and performance of 
the contract, or 
(f) contravene the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law.’ 
Article 83 of the Consumer Protection Law states: 
‘Unfair contractual terms shall automatically be void and shall be deemed not to 
have formed part of the contract. …’ 
According to Article 6(3) of the Código Civil español (Spanish Civil Code; ‘the 
Civil Code’): 
‘Acts contrary to mandatory rules or prohibitions shall automatically be void, 
except where they include provision for a different effect in the event of 
contravention.’ 
According to Article 1303 of the Civil Code: 
‘When an obligation has been declared void, the contracting parties must restore 
to one another those things that formed the subject matter of the contract, together 
with the profits derived therefrom, and the price together with interest …’ 
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That provision and related provisions govern the issue of voidability or relative 
invalidity, although, in case-law, it is also applied, for the purposes of restitution 
of performance, to ab initio, fundamental or automatic invalidity, whether of a 
contract or of any of its terms. 
B) Regarding the time-barring of actions 
According to Article 1964(2) of the Civil Code, as it was worded when the 
contract was concluded: 
‘Mortgage enforcement proceedings shall become time-barred after 20 years and 
personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period shall become time-
barred after 15 years.’ 
Article 1964(2) of the Civil Code, as worded by Ley 42/2015, de 5 de octubre 
(Law 42/2015 of 5 October 2015; ‘Law 42/2015’), provides: 
‘Personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period shall become time-
barred five years from the date on which performance of the obligation becomes 
enforceable. …’ 
The fifth transitional provision of Law 42/2015 provides: 
‘Limitation periods applicable to pre-existing legal relationships. 
In the case of personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period, arising 
before the date on which this law entered into force, the limitation period shall be 
governed by Article 1939 of the Civil Code.’ 
Article 1939 of the Civil Code provides: 
‘Limitation periods which commenced prior to the publication of this code shall 
be governed by the laws which preceded it; but where, since this code entered into 
force, the whole of the relevant limitation period specified in it has elapsed, this 
law shall take effect, even if those earlier laws require a longer period of time.’ 
Judgments of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain) and the 
provisions cited therein, referred to in the reasoning set out in the request for a 
preliminary ruling. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 On 19 January 2009, the applicant, a consumer, concluded a loan agreement with 
Banco Santander, S. A., the clause five of which is worded as follows: 
‘Costs and obligations to be met by the borrower. 
5.1. The following costs shall be borne by the borrower: 
BANCO SANTANDER 
 
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5.1.1. Preparatory costs relating to the transaction: The costs included in this 
paragraph shall be borne by the applicant, even if the loan is not ultimately 
formalised. 
* Costs involved in valuing the property. 
* Costs involved in checking the registry records for the property. 
5.1.2. The costs and taxes arising by reason of this agreement, its entry in the 
Land Register and the issuance of a certified copy for the Bank, as well as those 
resulting from its modification or cancellation, and the costs or taxes arising from 
the entry in the Land Register, where applicable, of any construction work and 
installations, in accordance with clause TWO …’ 
2 On 27 February 2023, the consumer brought a claim before the referring court 
seeking a declaration of ab initio invalidity in respect of clause five and, 
consequently, the return to her of half of the costs paid by way of notary's fees and 
the entirety of the land registry fees paid, plus the relevant statutory interest on 
those amounts. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
3 The bank maintains that, in accordance with Article 1964(2) of the Civil Code and 
the transitional rules established by Law 42/2015, the action for the return of the 
amounts claimed by the applicant is time-barred. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
4 The referring court is uncertain as to whether EU law permits the situation 
whereby, while actions for a declaration of invalidity in respect of an unfair term 
are not subject to a limitation period, actions seeking the return of the amounts 
unduly paid under that term are subject to a limitation period. In particular, the 
referring court maintains that such a dissociation or difference between the rules is 
contrary to the principle of equivalence. 
Starting point: discussion of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 July 
2020, Caixabank (C-224/19) (‘Caixabank’) 
5 The referring court focuses on the analysis of the thirteenth question submitted for 
a preliminary ruling in Caixabank, concerning whether the effects of the invalidity 
of an unfair term may be made subject to a limitation period, and in which the 
national court asked whether Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13 must be 
interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national case-law which provides 
that the bringing of an action to enforce the restitutory effects of a finding that an 
unfair contractual term is void is subject to a limitation period, even though, under 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-230/24 
 
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national law, an action for a declaration that an unfair contractual term is void ab 
initio is not subject to a limitation period. 
6 Paragraph 81 of that judgment states that the protection conferred on consumers 
by Directive 93/13 precludes a national provision which prohibits the national 
court, on expiry of a time limit, from finding that a term of a contract concluded 
between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair (judgment 
of 21 November 2002, Cofidis, C-473/00, EU:C:2002:705, paragraph 38). 
According to the referring court, the Court of Justice indicates that 
Directive 93/13 precludes the application of a time limit to a finding of unfairness 
in respect of a term. The referring court considers that that criterion is also applied 
in Spanish legislation and case-law, according to which ab initio, fundamental or 
automatic invalidity is not, as a general rule, subject to any time limit, on 
account of the fact that it contravenes mandatory legal rules. That being so, the 
question is whether, given that actions for a declaration of invalidity on the basis 
of unfairness are not subject to a limitation period, the same can be asserted with 
regard to the restitutory effects resulting from such a declaration, or, more 
specifically, whether national legislation or case-law which makes those effects 
subject to a time limit is consistent with that directive. 
7 That criterion is, however, qualified in paragraph 82 of Caixabank when it states 
that the Court has already recognised that consumer protection is not absolute 
(judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and 
Others, C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 68) and 
that, in the interests of legal certainty, it is compatible with EU law to lay down 
reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings (judgments of 6 October 2009, 
Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C-40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 41, and 
of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others, C-154/15, C-307/15 
and C-308/15, EU:C:2016:980, paragraph 69). Discussing that paragraph, the 
referring court observes that the Court of Justice implies a possible dissociation 
between the fundamental invalidity of the term and its effects. 
8 Paragraph 83 of Caixabank makes clear that the rules implementing consumer 
protection, provided for in Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13, are a matter 
for the domestic legal order of the Member States, in accordance with the 
principle of the procedural autonomy of the latter. However, those rules must 
not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of 
equivalence); nor may they be framed in such a way as to make it in practice 
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community 
law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, the judgment 
of 26 October 2006, Mostaza Claro, C-168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 24 and 
the case-law cited). Discussing that paragraph, the referring court observes that, 
while from the perspective of domestic law, a limitation period or time limit is not 
strictly speaking a procedural rule, but rather a substantive one, it may be included 
in the sphere of procedural autonomy, on account of being a means by which the 
Member State implements or incorporates a rule of EU law. 
BANCO SANTANDER 
 
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9 In paragraph 84 of Caixabank, the Court of Justice states that it follows that EU 
law does not preclude national legislation which, while providing that an action 
for a declaration as to the invalidity of an unfair term in a contract concluded 
between a seller or supplier and a consumer is not subject to a limitation period, 
subjects to a limitation period an action to enforce the restitutory effects of 
that declaration, provided that that legislation complies with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. Discussing that paragraph, the referring court 
observes that it is possible for an action for a declaration of invalidity to succeed, 
because it is not subject to any time limit, and for the effects of such invalidity to 
be limited by a time-bar, and it expresses its view that such a result seems to leave 
consumers unprotected. 
10 The referring court cites and discusses paragraphs 85 to 92 of Caixabank, which 
concern the principle of effectiveness and which state that, for the purposes of 
establishing compliance with that principle, it is necessary to take into account 
principles of national law, such as legal certainty, which may require actions for 
restitution to be subject to a limitation period. However, the question referred for a 
preliminary ruling does not relate to that principle, but rather to the principle of 
equivalence. 
11 Paragraph 86 of Caixabank states that, in the case in the main proceedings, the 
issue was whether an action to enforce the restitutory effects of a finding that an 
unfair term in a mortgage contract is void is subject to the five-year limitation 
period laid down in Article 1964(2) of the Civil Code. According to paragraph 87 
of that judgment, in so far as limitation periods of three years (judgment 
of 15 April 2010, Barth, C-542/08, EU:C:2010:193, paragraph 28) or two years 
(judgment of 15 December 2011, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta, C-427/10, 
EU:C:2011:844, paragraph 25) have been found, in the case-law of the Court, to 
be consistent with the principle of effectiveness, it must be held that a five-year 
limitation period applicable to an action to assert the restitutory effects of a 
finding that an unfair term is void does not, in principle, and subject to an 
assessment by the national court of the factors referred to in paragraph 85 of that 
judgment, appear to be such as to render the exercise of the rights conferred 
by Directive 93/13 practically impossible or excessively difficult. The referring 
court interprets that paragraph to mean that a limitation period of five years may 
be established for the action for restitution, even though the action for a 
declaration of invalidity in respect of the unfair term is not subject to a limitation 
period. 
12 Next, the referring court analyses the two judgments cited in paragraph 87 of 
Caixabank. The judgment of 15 April 2010, Barth, C-542/08, concerned an 
action seeking payment of a special length-of-service increment in respect of the 
provision of services for a specific period by a migrant worker. In that judgment, 
the Court held that such an action could be subject to a limitation period (three 
years was considered to be sufficient). That situation differs from that analysed in 
Caixabank ), in which it was argued that the effects of the ab initio invalidity of 
term in a contract concluded with a consumer may be subject to a time limit, but 
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never the invalidity itself. Thus, according to the referring court, in 
Barth, C-542/08, there was no dissociation between the recognition of a right 
and the effects of that recognition (specifically, the payment of a benefit to 
which an individual is entitled); it was simply considered that a limitation period 
of three years for actions claiming entitlement to a length-of-service increment in 
Austria was a reasonable time limit which was not contrary to the principle of 
effectiveness in relation to Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 of the Council 
of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
13 For its part, the judgment of 15 December 2011, Banca Antoniana Popolare 
Veneta, C-427/10, concerned a dispute between the Italian tax authority and a 
financial institution in which the latter sought to recover an amount of tax paid but 
not due. In that case, the Court of Justice ruled that the principle of effectiveness 
permitted the existence of different time limits for bringing actions, 
depending on whether the claimant was the taxable person or the tax 
authority. The referring court observes that that situation is also not comparable 
to the situation in Caixabank, since it concerned a different legal relationship 
(between the tax authority and the taxable person) of a different (public) nature. 
14 Accordingly, in the opinion of the referring court, the examples mentioned in 
paragraph 87 of Caixabank do not sufficiently support the view held by the Court 
of Justice. 
15 The referring court then goes on to discuss paragraphs 88 to 92 of Caixabank, 
dealing with the calculation of the limitation period and the determination of its 
starting point, taking into account the principle of effectiveness. The referring 
court itself states that ‘the purpose of our request is not … to examine in depth … 
the various points in the life of the agreement which may form the starting point 
for the limitation period applicable to actions for restitution’. It should be noted, 
however, that the referring court (i) asserts that the phrase ‘from the date on which 
performance of the obligation becomes enforceable’, in Article 1964(2) of the 
Civil Code, excludes the starting point coinciding with the date on which the 
agreement was concluded, and (ii) maintains, on the basis of paragraph 90 of 
Caixabank, that importance should be attached to the time at which the consumer 
becomes aware that the term is unfair, for example, following a Spanish judgment 
finding a term of that type to be unfair. 
16 Summarising Caixabank, the referring court observes that, regarding the 
possibility of an action being time-barred, the Court of Justice permits a 
distinction to be drawn between (i) actions for a declaration of invalidity in 
respect of unfair terms (which are not subject to a limitation period), and (ii) 
actions for the return of the amounts paid under those terms (which may be 
subject to a limitation period, provided that it is not contrary to the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence). 
BANCO SANTANDER 
 
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National case-law relating to the dissociation between invalidity and restitution 
and its relationship with the principle of equivalence 
17 When faced with an action for a declaration of invalidity on the basis of unfairness 
and the restitutory effects which that gives rise to, it is common for banks to claim 
either the expiry of the time limit under Article 1301 of the Civil Code or that the 
action is time-barred under Article 1964 thereof. 
18 It should be borne in mind that, in the present case, it is not a question of relative 
invalidity resulting from an error vitiating consent, but rather of automatic 
invalidity on the basis of the unfairness of a term. Such automatic invalidity is 
not subject to the time limit relating to voidability under Article 1301 of the 
Civil Code. Spain’s Supreme Court ruled to that effect in its judgment 
of 16 October 2017 when it declared that (i) the unfair term is automatically void, 
which prevents the consumer from being bound by the unfair term (Article 6(1) of 
Directive 93/13), and (ii) the consumer cannot be granted less protection than 
would be granted on the basis of automatic invalidity in other areas of the legal 
system, since to grant less protection would infringe the principle of equivalence 
in EU law. 
19 The referring court observes that, as regards actions for a declaration of 
invalidity in respect of an unfair term not being subject to a limitation period, 
the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Supreme Court are in agreement. 
20 On the other hand, the referring court observes that, in Spanish case-law, that 
dissociation between the inapplicability of a limitation period to actions for a 
declaration of invalidity and the applicability of a limitation period to actions 
to enforce the consequences of such a declaration does not occur. Thus, 
according to the referring court, the principle of equivalence prevents different 
treatment being given to actions for a declaration of invalidity in respect of an 
unfair term (which are not subject to a limitation period) and actions for the return 
of the amounts unduly paid under that term (which may be subject to a limitation 
period). Thus, since actions for a declaration of ab initio invalidity are not subject 
to a time limit or a limitation period, the effects of such a declaration must not be 
either. 
21 The referring court points to various similar situations in domestic law, in which 
such a dissociation does not occur and which are relevant for the purposes of 
applying the principle of equivalence. Thus: 
– Articles 1301 and 1303 of the Civil Code provide for a single time limit of four 
years, without distinguishing between the declaration of invalidity and 
restitution; 
– actions for the division of jointly owned property are adjudged not to be subject 
to a limitation period and nor may delivery of the property awarded be made 
subject to a time-bar; 
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– actions to define the boundaries of adjacent properties are not subject to a 
limitation period, nor are actions relating to the marking of those boundaries; 
– actions for legal separation are not subject to a limitation period, nor is the 
dissolution of community of property arrangements as a result of such 
separation (Article 95 of the Civil Code); 
– actions for a declaration of automatic invalidity in respect of predatory loans 
are not subject to a limitation period, nor are actions to assert the rights arising 
from such declarations; 
– Article 6(3) of the Civil Code, in establishing the fundamental invalidity of acts 
contrary to mandatory rules or prohibitions, does not provide for the possibility 
of differentiating between invalidity and the effects of invalidity. 
22 Nor, in the case-law, is there a single decision of the Supreme Court which 
unequivocally establishes different time-bar rules for invalidity and the effects of 
invalidity, such that, if the action is not subject to a limitation period, nor are its 
effects. That is to say, the indissoluble link between invalidity and its 
consequences is confirmed. In that regard, the referring court cites the following 
decisions: 
– Supreme Court judgment 491/2018 of 14 September 2018, which prevents 
the limitation period for damages from being dissociated from the breach 
giving rise to those damages, where it declares that the root of the matter lies in 
determining whether redress for the damage caused by the breach of the duty of 
maintenance imposed on owners’ associations by Article 10(1) of the Ley de 
Propiedad Horizontal (Law on commonhold property; ‘the LPH’) is subject to a 
limitation period of one year – on the basis that it is an instance of non-
contractual liability – or the general limitation period of fifteen years (now five 
years) – on the basis that it is a personal action for which no particular 
limitation period has been established and which is subject to Article 1964 of 
the Civil Code. The opinion expressed in the judgment under appeal is that the 
requirement to comply with the maintenance obligation contained in 
Article 10(1) of the LPH is subject to the general limitation period for personal 
actions and, nevertheless, the requirement to provide redress for the damage 
caused by such a breach is subject to the limitation period of one year 
applicable to non-contractual liability. However, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that the starting point for the action for damages is the undisputed assertion that 
the damage caused has its exact origin in the breach of a legal obligation, 
imposed on owners’ associations by Article 10 of the LPH, to carry out 
whatever work is necessary to maintain and repair the common parts, such that 
they do not cause any damage to other property in common or property owned 
individually. The limitation period for actions to enforce compliance with 
legal obligations cannot be dissociated from the limitation period for 
actions seeking redress for the damage caused by breaching such 
obligations; 
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– Supreme Court judgment 178/2013 of 25 March 2013, which examined the 
proposition of one of the parties that, although an action for a declaration that a 
legal transaction is a sham transaction is not subject to a limitation period, the 
action for restitution brought together with that action and seeking, with regard 
to the property forming the subject matter of the void contract, to restore the 
parties to their pre-contract position, is subject to a limitation period. The 
Supreme Court rejected that proposition, declaring that, in a case where the 
very title resulting from the sham agreement is fictitious, the return of the 
property is subject to the same rules regarding the inapplicability of a 
limitation period as the action for a declaration that the agreement is a 
sham agreement, since from nothing comes nothing – ‘ex nihilo nihil’. 
23 The referring court acknowledges that there are two judgments of the Supreme 
Court which appear to accept a possible disaggregation of effects, although 
judgment 747/2010 of 30 December 2010 examines a very particular situation (the 
case of the brand ‘Havana Club’) and relates to a single decision, and the 
judgment of 27 February 1964 concerns a mere obiter dictum, as the Supreme 
Court accepts that the case at issue is one of voidability and not of fundamental 
invalidity. The Supreme Court, by an order of 22 July 2021, has also referred a 
question for a preliminary ruling which appears to suggest that, in that case, the 
Supreme Court will opt for dissociation, although that decision has not yet 
materialised. 
Final remarks of the referring court 
24 Should the dissociation discussed above be accepted, we would find ourselves in 
the absurd situation whereby ab initio invalidity has no consequences 
whatsoever, since, even if its existence were declared, the pre-contract positions 
of the parties could not be restored if the action for restitution were deemed to be 
time-barred. 
25 Moreover, such a dissociation would frustrate the dissuasive effect declared by 
the Court of Justice (for example, in its judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez 
Naranjo, C-154/15), as the seller or supplier would be tempted to include such 
unfair terms in the hope that, even if they were declared invalid, they would not 
cause any detriment to that seller or supplier because the consumer would not be 
able to recover the amounts unduly paid. The dissuasive effect and the aim of 
preventing the use of unfair terms require that invalidity and the restitutory effects 
inherent in it should not be time-barred in any way, at any time. 
26 The proposition in favour of dissociation would lead to situations bordering 
on the absurd. Indeed, in a situation of voidability on the basis of defective 
consent, if we apply the time limit of four years to the action for a declaration of 
invalidity itself (Article 1301 of the Civil Code) and that of five years 
(Article 1964 of the Civil Code) to the restitutory effects under Article 1303 of the 
Civil Code, we may find ourselves in a situation where the action for a declaration 
of invalidity is time-barred, while the action for restitution, on the other hand, is 
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not. But since the prerequisite for the latter (the declaration of invalidity) is 
missing, it cannot succeed. Another argument in support of the view that such a 
position is inconsistent is that, in those cases in which both parties are required to 
engage in restitution of performance (for example, the bank and the consumer), 
each of their claims for restitution would be subject to a limitation period, with 
potentially varying results. 
27 In civil law cases, as the Supreme Court judgment of 25 March 2015 reminds us, 
invalidity ‘requires that its consequences be destroyed and all traces of it be 
erased, as if they had not existed, and that any effects be thus prevented from 
arising from them, in accordance with the classical rule quod nullum est, nullum 
producit effectum’. If the application of a limitation period to the restitutory 
effects were allowed, invalidity (whether automatic, ab initio, fundamental, not 
subject to a limitation period, not capable of validation, remediation or 
rectification, etc.) could indeed produce effects as a consequence of the 
application of that limitation period, thereby contravening that rule. Invalidity is 
linked to its effects to such an extent that the Supreme Court has itself held that it 
is not even necessary to seek a declaration of its effects, as they occur 
automatically, since restitution of performance is an ex lege effect of invalidity 
(Supreme Court judgments 537/2019 of 10 October 2019, specifically on 
invalidity on the basis of unfairness; 716/2016 of 30 November 2016; and 
102/2015 of 10 March 2015). 
28 If the aim is to make consumer protection consistent with the principle of legal 
certainty, a reasonable time limit/limitation period must be established for seeking 
the declaration of invalidity itself, but it is a legal artifice to draw a distinction 
between invalidity and its effects.