Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:68
Date: 2026-02-05
Language of the case: Bulgarian
Court formation: Second Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Bulgaria

Summary C-718/24 – 1 
Case C-718/24 [Aleb] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
22 October 2024 
Referring court:  
Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaria) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
9 October 2024 
Applicant in the main proceedings:  
NP 
Defendant in the main proceedings:  
Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Proceedings at first instance before the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
(Administrative Court Sofia City, ‘ASSG’), initiated as a result of an action 
brought against a decision by the Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za 
bezhantsite (Chairperson of the State Agency for Refugees) at the Ministerski 
savet na Republika Bulgaria (Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
‘Council of Ministers’) refusing to grant the applicant refugee status and 
humanitarian status. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Request under Article 267 TFEU concerning the interpretation of Article 33(2) 
and Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Adopting a broad interpretation of recital 46 and of point (c) of 
Article 33(2), read in conjunction with Article 38, of Directive 2013/32/EU, 
can it be assumed that the rules set out in those provisions, which permit an 
application for international protection to be regarded as inadmissible and 
which concern the concept of a safe third country within the meaning of 
Article 38 of [Directive 2013/32], must be applied in a procedure under 
Chapter III of that Directive in accordance with the basic principles and 
guarantees of Chapter II of that Directive, that is to say, when an application 
for international protection is examined in substance? 
2. Are recital 46 and point (c) of Article [33](2), read in conjunction with 
Article 38, of Directive 2013/31, to be interpreted as permitting national 
legislation, such as that in Article 75(2) of the ZUB, and administrative and 
judicial practice, under which an application for international protection 
examined in substance may be rejected without the application being 
declared as manifestly unfounded or inadmissible, solely on the grounds that 
the applicant has the possibility of benefiting from the protection of a safe 
third country, without the methodology envisaged by point (b) of 
Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 having been developed and applied in 
national law, and if the administrative authority recognises that there is 
armed conflict in the applicant’s country of origin and the qualification 
criteria laid down in point (c) of Article 15 of Directive 2011/95 are met? 
3. Is point (b) of Article 38(2), read in conjunction with recital 46, of Directive 
2013/32, to be interpreted as meaning that an administrative authority 
examining an application for international protection in substance may apply 
the safe third country concept to a particular country and to a particular 
applicant solely on the basis of information from publicly available sources 
and a decision of an executive body (Council of Ministers) in which a 
particular third country is deemed to be a safe third country, without a 
methodology within the meaning of that provision being provided for in 
national law, by application of which the administrative authority satisfies 
itself that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular 
country and a particular applicant? 
4. Is point (a) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 to be interpreted as 
meaning that it is mandatory for Member States to lay down in their national 
law criteria which, if met, it can be assumed that there is a connection 
between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which 
it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country? 
5. Is point (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, which sets out the 
possibility for an applicant to challenge before the courts the existence of a 
connection between himself or herself and a third country recognised as 
being safe, as referred to in point (a), to be interpreted as meaning that, in 
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the absence of national legislation providing for judicial review of the 
lawfulness of the existence of a connection between the applicant and the 
third country concerned, the court hearing an action against the 
administrative decision refusing the applicant international protection on the 
grounds that a third country is recognised as being safe for the applicant, 
must necessarily declare that it has jurisdiction and rule on the lawfulness of 
the existence of such a connection, as found by the administrative authority? 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Article 78(1) TFEU 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9), points (d) and (f) of Article 2 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), recitals 44 and 46, point (c) of Article 33(2), 
and Article 38 
Judgments of the Court of 25 July 2018 (Grand Chamber), С-585/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:584, Serin Alheto (paragraph 121); of 19 March 2020, С-
564/18, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C-564/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:218, paragraphs 37 to 40, 36 to 39; of 14 May 2020 (Grand 
Chamber), C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, FMS, SA, SA junior (C-925/19 PPU 
v Orszàgos Idegenrendészeti Fôigazgatôsàg Dél-alfôldi Regionâlis Igazgatôsàg, 
Orszàgos Idegenrendészeti Fôigazgatôsàg, ECLI:EU:C:2020:367, paragraphs 158 
to 160 and 291) 
Provisions of international and national law relied on 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 
1951 (United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, No 2545 [1954], p. 150), which 
entered into force on 22 April 1954, as supplemented and amended by the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in New York on 31 January 
1967, which entered into force on 4 October 1967, Preamble, Article 1 A. 2 and 
Article 33 
Zakon za ubezhishteto i bezhantsite (Law on Asylum and Refugees; ‘ZUB’) 
Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Article 13(1)(14), Article 13(4) and (5), Article 70(1), 
Articles 75, 84, 98 and 99, and Section 1(9) of the Supplementary Provisions  
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicant, NP, is a Syrian national of Arab ethnicity. He is an unmarried 
Sunni Muslim, with primary school level education. He is an unaccompanied 
minor within the meaning of Section 1(4) of the Supplementary Provisions to the 
ZUB and as such was represented in the administrative procedure by a lawyer 
appointed ex officio and a social worker from the ‘Zakrila na deteto’ (‘Child 
Protection’) department at the ‘Sotsialno podpomagane’ (‘Social Assistance’ 
Directorate). 
2 When registering his application for international protection with the State 
Agency for Refugees (‘DAB’) on 2 November 2023, NP did not present any 
identity document, but stated that he had been born on 1 November 2006, without 
being sure of the precise month. 
3 At the hearing held on 1 December 2023 he stated that he had left Syria illegally 
two/three months before the hearing date with the help of a smuggler, together 
with two of his brothers. After that, he had stayed in Istanbul for approximately 
one month, then he had reached the green border of Bulgaria with a group through 
Edirne and entered the territory of the country illegally. He had travelled with his 
cousin the whole time. His brothers had remained in Türkiye. 
4 NP stated that he had lived in the city of Azaz, in the Aleppo Governorate, which 
was ruled by the Free Syrian Army. His mother, who is around 60 years old, 
currently lives there with his youngest brother and two younger sisters. Three of 
his sisters live in Türkiye, where they are married. He has a brother living in 
England and two other brothers who remained in Türkiye. 
5 NP stated that he had not been persecuted in Syria because of his religion, had not 
been a member of a political organisation, had not been arrested or convicted and 
had not participated in military acts, but had witnessed such acts. He had left the 
country because of the war in the region where he lived. The city where he had 
lived had been under the control of the Free Syrian Army since 2012, but since 
then regular army forces had repeatedly tried to retake it. Furthermore, the 
different factions of the Free Syrian Army were fighting among themselves. NP 
stated that he had nowhere else to go in Syria as the Free Syrian Army did not 
allow civilians to leave the city and he knew of no other place in the territory of 
Syria where he could settle. 
6 Decision No 7122, made by the Chairperson of the DAB on 18 June 2024 and 
refusing to grant NP refugee status and humanitarian status, is being challenged 
before the referring court. The administrative authority found that the foreign 
national had not been persecuted in his country of origin for his race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. It had not 
been demonstrated that the foreign national would have been exposed to a real 
risk of serious harm in his country of origin, such as the death penalty or 
execution, or torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Analysis of 
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the information gathered on the country of origin led the administrative authority 
to conclude that Syria was still in a state of internal armed conflict. The level of 
indiscriminate violence was such that there were serious and verified reasons to 
believe that NP, as a civilian, would suffer the violations and threats referred to in 
Article 9(1)(3) of the ZUB by his mere presence in the territory of that country if 
he were returned to Syria. According to the Chairperson of the DAB, the military 
conflict was ongoing with varying intensity and the asylum seeker could not be 
expected to settle in another part of the territory where he would enjoy effective 
and enduring protection, and the criteria for the possibility of internal 
displacement could not be met and therefore this alternative was not applicable to 
him. 
7 On the other hand, the DAB found that NP had lived for a period of one month in 
the city of Istanbul in the territory of Türkiye, where two of his brothers and three 
of his sisters were currently living, two of his sisters being married in Türkiye. 
According to the administrative authority, the foreign national had stayed in the 
Republic of Türkiye without any risk to his safety. There had been a legal 
possibility for him to register with the Turkish authorities and legalise his stay 
there, but he had not done so. From the information gathered from publicly 
available sources, it was concluded that stateless persons and refugees from Syria, 
who had entered Türkiye due to events in Syria after 28 April 2011, were granted 
temporary protection by the Turkish government. There was no reason to believe 
that these persons would be returned to Syria unless they themselves expressed 
such a wish. This also applied to persons who are unable to produce identity 
documents. Persons granted temporary protection would receive defence and 
protection against their return to Syria, and their most basic needs would be 
satisfied. The administrative authority was therefore of the opinion that the 
Republic of Türkiye was a ‘safe third country’ within the meaning of Section 1(9) 
of the ZUB, in which the applicant could settle without risk. 
8 The referring court requested, of its own motion, information from the defendant 
on the following points: firstly, whether a methodology within the meaning of 
point (b) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 had been developed and applied in 
the DAB, enabling the administrative authority to satisfy itself, before deciding on 
the application for international protection, that the safe third country concept may 
be applied to a particular country, in this case the Republic of Türkiye, and to the 
particular applicant; and secondly, whether the methodology envisaged by 
Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 had been applied in the present case in relation 
to the unaccompanied minor applicant and whether a causal examination of the 
safety in the third country recognised as being safe, in this case the Republic of 
Türkiye, had been carried out, and whether the applicant had been informed, in 
accordance with point (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, which is a 
directly applicable legal provision, that he could challenge the application of the 
safe third country concept on the grounds that the third country was not safe in his 
particular case and that he could challenge the existence of a connection between 
himself and the third country referred to in point (a). 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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9 In response, the defendant informed the referring court by letter of 4 September 
2024 that the DAB had applied Decision No 247 of the Council of Ministers of 
the Republic of Bulgaria of 3 April 2024 recognising the Republic of Türkiye as a 
safe third country. Up to that point in time, the DAB had not developed a 
methodology in accordance with point (b) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32. 
In the present case, the applicant was not expressly informed that he could 
challenge the application of the safe third country concept in his case or that he 
could challenge the existence of a connection between himself and the third 
country concerned. 
Essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
10 The applicant is seeking annulment of the decision on the grounds of 
unlawfulness. He argues that the administrative authority failed to take into 
consideration and analyse all the facts and circumstances and that it therefore 
wrongly concluded that the substantive conditions for granting international 
protection were not met. The administrative act contains incorrect information, 
namely that NP resided in the Republic of Türkiye for more than three years. His 
stay there had, in fact, been less than one month and therefore that country could 
not be a safe third country for him within the meaning of Section 1(9) of the 
Supplementary Provisions to the ZUB. According to the applicant, that decision 
was in breach of Article 39(2) of Directive 2013/32. The Republic of Türkiye 
ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees by means of the 
‘geographical clause’, under which it accepts and grants asylum and protection 
only to persons whose country of origin is in the European territory, so that it 
could not be assumed that the asylum seeker could apply for refugee status and, if 
granted, could enjoy international protection as a refugee. It is argued that there is 
nothing in the documents before the court to suggest that he may enter the 
territory of the Republic of Türkiye. The defendant failed to examine the existence 
or non-existence of the risk that the Turkish authorities would return Syrian 
nationals to Syria, which is a fundamental issue in light of the mandatory respect 
for the principle of non-refoulement. Given that the person applying for 
international protection is a minor, it is argued that the circumstances essential for 
determining the best interests of the child were not examined. 
11 The defendant, the Chairperson of the DAB, disputes the merits of the action and 
considers that it should be dismissed. He considers that the documentary evidence 
and the asylum seeker’s flight history were discussed in the contested decision. 
Although internal armed conflict is ongoing in Syria which may expose NP to a 
real risk of serious harm, such as a serious threat to his life or person as a civilian 
as a result of indiscriminate violence, the Republic of Türkiye constitutes a safe 
third country for him where he can settle and live without danger. His interests as 
a child would be best served in that country, as relatives of his live there. Thus, he 
is not separated from his family environment. 
ALEB 
 
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Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for the preliminary 
ruling 
12 In the view of the ASSG, the factual and legal context of the case clearly falls 
within the scope of European Union law, namely Article 78(1) TFEU, Directive 
2011/95 and Directive 2013/32. It has not identified any decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union on issues identical to those of the present case, 
namely concerning the possibility of refusing international protection on the basis 
that the applicant can obtain such protection in a safe third country which is not a 
member of the Union. 
13 The referring court is asking whether recitals 44 and 46 and Article 38 of 
Directive 2013/32 – and, by analogy, a national provision such as that in 
Article 75(1) in conjunction with Article 75(2) of the ZUB – permit an applicant’s 
application for international protection to be rejected by the competent 
administrative authority after examination in substance solely on the grounds that 
a particular third country, which is not the applicant’s country of origin, appears to 
constitute a safe third country for the applicant, and if the administrative authority 
has expressly determined in its decision that the applicant fulfils the conditions to 
be granted subsidiary protection set out in point (c) of Article 15 of Directive 
2011/95. The question also arises as to whether the rules relating to the safe third 
country concept under Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 may be applied in the 
context of the ordinary procedure under Chapter III of that Directive, in 
accordance with the basic principles and guarantees set out in Chapter II of that 
Directive. 
14 It is clear that, with regard to point (a) of Article 38(2), the European legislature 
has left it to the discretion of the Member States to lay down criteria in their 
national law, which, if met, it can be assumed that there is a connection between 
the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be 
reasonable for that person to go to that country. That provision does not provide 
any indication as to the factual circumstances required for it to be assumed that 
there is a sufficiently stable connection between the applicant for international 
protection and the safe third country for his or her admission to the territory of 
that third country. 
15 The question also arises whether it is even possible, in the absence of a 
methodology laid down in national law as referred to in point (b) of Article 38(2) 
of Directive 2013/32 (as is the case here, according to the defendant), to apply the 
safe third country concept to an applicant in accordance with the rules of 
Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 solely on the basis of information gathered from 
publicly available sources concerning the third country recognised as being safe 
and on account of the existence of a decision by a national executive body, in this 
case the Council of Ministers, that said third country is safe for the applicant. 
16 The referring court also notes that the ZUB does not provide for a procedure 
enabling the applicant to challenge before the courts, in accordance with point (c) 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, the existence of a connection between 
himself or herself and the third country concerned as referred to in point (a) of that 
article. In the absence of national legislation providing for judicial review of the 
existence of a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned 
as referred to in point (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, it is necessary to 
determine whether the referring court, as a national court, is required to declare 
that it has jurisdiction in the context of a challenge to the refusal to grant 
international protection, adopted solely on the basis of a connection, presumed by 
the administrative authority, between the applicant and the safe third country, and 
to decide whether there is, in fact, a connection between the applicant and the 
third country concerned. 
17 In that regard, the referring court takes into account the case-law of the Court in 
which the provisions of Articles 33 and 38 of Directive 2013/32 have been 
interpreted in specific cases. Accordingly, the conditions set out in Article 38 of 
Directive 2013/32 are cumulative (judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C-585/16, 
EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 121) and therefore the reason for inadmissibility set 
out in point (c) of Article 33(2) of that directive cannot apply if one of those 
conditions is not met. The cited judgments of the Court do not provide a 
conclusive answer to the questions that are relevant to the correct decision in the 
present case and therefore an interpretation of the provisions in points (a) and (b) 
of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 is necessary. 
18 This reasoning is directly related to the previous administrative practice and case-
law of the Varhoven administrative sad (Supreme Administrative Court, ‘VAS’) 
on the application of Article 75(2) of the ZUB and Article 38 of Directive 
2013/32. The referring court details below several cases in which the VAS has 
held that, where the administrative authority has found that the Republic of 
Türkiye appears to constitute a safe third country for a particular applicant, 
irrespective of whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection on the 
basis of point (c) of Article 15 of Directive 2011/95 or point (3) of Article 9(1) of 
Directive 2011/95 are met, the applicant’s application for international protection, 
which was examined in substance in the main proceedings, is to be rejected. 
In Judgment No 1886 of 23 March 2023, the ASSG, as the court of first instance, 
ruled on an action against a decision by the Vice Chairperson of the DAB at the 
Council of Ministers rejecting an application for refugee status and humanitarian 
status. The underlying facts of the case are similar to the present dispute: A Syrian 
national, who had left his country of origin because of the ongoing war there and 
had lived for a time in the territory of the Republic of Türkiye, entered Bulgaria 
illegally and applied for international protection there. The administrative 
authority found that the conditions laid down in point (c) of Article 15 of 
Directive 2011/95 were met for the applicant, but he was refused protection on the 
grounds that the Republic of Türkiye appeared to be a ‘safe third country’ for him. 
According to the court of first instance, it is important to take into account the 
conditions laid down in Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 in order to classify as a 
‘safe third country’ a third country which is not a foreign third-country national’s 
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country of origin. A literal and systematic interpretation of the cited provisions of 
secondary EU law and of the ZUB leads to the unconditional conclusion that the 
competent authorities may, if they consider that the asylum seeker comes from a 
‘safe third country’, reject his or her application as manifestly unfounded, that is 
to say that they have the option not to examine the application in substance. The 
examination of the applicant’s application in substance and the adoption of a 
decision under Article 75(1) and (2) of the ZUB would constitute a material 
breach of the rules of administrative procedure, constituting grounds for 
annulment of the contested decision. 
In its further reasoning, the ASSG points out that application of the safe third 
country concept under point (a) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 is subject to 
rules requiring a connection between the applicant and the third country 
concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to 
that country. The connection must be specific enough reasonably to assume that 
the applicant will return to the third country. Member States have a wide margin 
of discretion in determining the intensity of that connection. In some Member 
States, a residence permit or residence certificate issued in the third country is 
recognised as proof of such a connection, while in others it is personal 
connections that are important, such as the applicant’s origin, knowledge of the 
official language of the third country, proven family, social or cultural ties, etc. 
According to the ASSG, the interpretation of point (b) of Article 38(2) of 
Directive 2013/32, which has not been transposed in the ZUB, leads to the 
conclusion that the concept of ‘safe third country’ can only be applied if the 
Member State has not provided in its national law a methodology by which the 
competent authorities can satisfy themselves that the concept of ‘safe third 
country’ can be applied to a particular applicant. The referring court also relies on 
recital 46 of Directive 2013/32, which lists a number of documents that the 
Member States must take into account in this context. 
Finally, the ASSG points out that, under point (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 
2013/32, the applicant must have the possibility to challenge the application of the 
safe third country concept and the existence of a connection between himself or 
herself and the third country concerned. The referring court notes that point (c) of 
Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 is not reflected in the ZUB. It is essential to 
ensure that applicants for international protection have the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of safety on the basis of their own statements and individual 
circumstances; this does not exist as an independent possibility under national law 
(ZUB). 
The court of first instance considers that, even if the Vice Chairperson of the DAB 
were able to reject an application for international protection by applying the 
concept of ‘safe third country’, his or her decision should be based on a proven 
connection between the applicant and the third country, on a methodology 
developed for determining a third country as a safe third country and on the 
possibility for the applicant to challenge that presumption of the safety of the third 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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country, whereas the ZUB does lay down such conditions. In the present case, 
none of those conditions was taken into account, discussed and applied in the 
administrative decision, which is why the ASSG annulled that decision and 
referred the case back to the Vice Chairperson of the DAB for a new decision on 
the Syrian national’s application for international protection. 
On appeal by the Vice Chairperson of the DAB, the Supreme Administrative 
Court (‘VAS’), by Judgment No 9704 of 16 October 2024, set aside the judgment 
of the ASSG and dismissed the action brought by the Syrian national. In its 
reasoning, the VAS stated that the court of first instance had erred in finding that 
the administrative authority had wrongly invoked the provision in Article 75(2) of 
the ZUB. In adopting the decision, the authority had complied with its obligation 
under Article 75(2) of the ZUB, namely to assess all relevant facts concerning the 
applicant’s personal circumstances, his country of origin or the possibility of 
benefiting from the protection of another state when making its decision on the 
application for refugee status. The court of first instance wrongly held that the 
Republic of Türkiye should not be regarded as a ‘safe third country’. The foreign 
national had not demonstrated that the Republic of Türkiye was not a safe third 
country in his specific circumstances. A report on the current situation in the 
Republic of Türkiye was presented during the proceedings, from which it could be 
concluded that the Law on Foreign Nationals and International Protection and the 
Ordinance on Temporary Protection after Registration with the Competent 
Authorities provided a legal framework for lawful residence and access to rights 
and services for persons in need of international protection, including access to 
education, health care and social services. According to the judgment of the VAS, 
the administrative authority was right to consider that Türkiye appeared to be a 
safe third country, as it fell within the legal definition of Section 1(9) [of the 
Supplementary Provisions to the] ZUB. Upon re-examination of the facts 
established, the VAS found that the foreign national had left Türkiye for economic 
reasons and not because he could not benefit from protection in Turkish territory 
and in particular not because he could not obtain identity documents on that basis. 
The VAS judgment did not address the ASSG’s arguments concerning the 
absence of a proven connection between the Syrian national who applied for 
international protection and the Republic of Türkiye, which is recognised as a safe 
third country in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 38(2) of 
Directive 2013/32. 
19 Examining a similar case about an action, again brought by a Syrian national 
against a decision rejecting his application of international protection, the VAS, 
by Judgment No 9750 of 17 October 2023 and with similar reasoning, set aside 
Judgment No 1888 of the ASSG of 23 March 2023 annulling a decision of the 
DAB. This VAS judgment also does not address the existence of a proven 
connection between the applicant and the Republic of Türkiye, which is 
recognised as a safe third country. 
20 By Judgment No 45 of 4 January 2024, the VAS upheld a judgment of the ASSG 
dismissing the action brought by a Syrian national against a decision of the Vice 
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Chairperson of the DAB rejecting his application for international protection. The 
VAS found that the foreign national had been rightly refused refugee status and 
humanitarian status, as none of the mandatory conditions for granting protection 
set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the ZUB had been met. In the opinion of the court of 
cassation, the administrative decision correctly found that the foreign national had 
left Türkiye voluntarily in search of a better life and not because of the risk of 
persecution and the significant risk of serious harm in that state, given his history 
of flight, and that the foreign national had not claimed such risks or such harm in 
the administrative procedure conducted or in court, and a fortiori had not provided 
any evidence to that effect. The Vice Chairperson of the DAB, in compliance with 
his obligation under Article 75(2) of the ZUB, examined and discussed whether 
Türkiye could be recognised as a safe third country. Furthermore, in this case, the 
existence of a third country which was safe for the foreign national precluded the 
need to grant humanitarian status, even in the case of Article 9(1)(3) of the ZUB, 
regardless of the existence of internal armed conflict in his country of origin. The 
VAS judgment does not address the existence of a proven connection between the 
applicant for international protection and the Republic of Türkiye, which was 
recognised as a safe third country. 
21 Examining a similar case about an action, again brought by a Syrian national 
against a decision rejecting his application of international protection, the VAS, 
by Judgment No 12526 of 14 December 2023, set aside Judgment No 3013 of the 
ASSG of 4 May 2023 upholding the action of the applicant for international 
protection. In its reasoning, the VAS pointed out that Article 33 of Directive 
2013/32 did not mean that the competent administrative authority was always 
under an obligation to declare the application inadmissible and had no discretion 
to examine the application in substance in accordance with the provisions of 
national law. Under Article 13(1)(14) of the ZUB, a foreign national’s application 
for international protection is to be rejected as manifestly unfounded if the 
conditions laid down in Article 8(1) and (9) are not met, and by analogy the 
conditions laid down in Article 9(1), (6) and (8) of the ZUB, and if the foreign 
national comes from a safe third country provided that he is admitted to that 
country. For the purposes of applying that provision, the authority must carry out 
a relevant assessment taking into account the conditions laid down in Section 1(9) 
of the Supplementary Provisions to the ZUB. For those reasons, the VAS did not 
share the view of the court of first instance that the examination of the Syrian 
national’s application and the adoption of a decision in substance, in accordance 
with Article 75(1) of the ZUB, constituted a material breach of the rules of 
administrative procedure. The VAS found that the administrative authority had 
carried out the required assessment of the applicant’s connection to the Republic 
of Türkiye and that Türkiye constituted a ‘safe third country’ for him. On that 
basis, the VAS considered that the only reason why no protection had been 
granted by the Republic of Türkiye to the Syrian national was that he had not 
taken any steps to legalise his stay in the territory of that State. 
22 Analysis of the cited Bulgarian case-law and the reasons set out above lead to the 
conclusion that an interpretation of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 is required 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-718/24 
 
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in accordance with Article 267 TFEU. That conclusion is supported by the fact 
that the cited provision has not been fully transposed into Bulgarian law. Its 
incomplete transposition in Article 13(1)(14) and Article 13(4) of the ZUB and its 
application in the context of Article 75(2) of the ZUB by the administrative 
authorities entrusted with the examination of applications for international 
protection in substance lead to a contradictory interpretation and application of 
points (a) to (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32. In addition, the absence of a 
methodology developed and established at national level, in accordance with point 
(b) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, makes it necessary to interpret that 
provision.