Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2013:10
Date: 2013-01-15
Language of the case: Spanish
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Economic, social and territorial cohesion;European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded
Origin: Spain

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 15 January 2013 1. Economic, social and territorial cohesion — European Regional Development Fund — Decision to reduce financial assistance — Time limit — Indicative character — Non-compliance by the Commission — No effect — Obligation on the Commission to comply with the principle of legal certainty (Council Regulation No 1260/1999, Art. 39(3)(b); Commission Regulation No 448/2001, Art. 5(3)) 2. Economic, social and territorial cohesion — European Regional Development Fund — Decision to reduce financial assistance — Need for a prior cooperation procedure (Council Regulation No 1260/1999, Arts 38 and 39) 3. Approximation of laws — Procedures for the award of public supply contracts — Directive 93/36 — Derogations from common rules — Restrictive interpretation — Existence of exceptional circumstances — Burden of proof (Council Directive 93/36, Art. 6(2) and (3)) 4. Approximation of laws — Procedures for the award of public supply contracts — Directive 93/36 — Negotiated procedures — Conditions for applications (Council Directive 93/36, Art. 6(3)(c)) 1. With regard to the procedure for the reduction of aid from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Article 39(3)(b) of Regulation No 1260/1999, laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds provides that, where no agreement has been reached between the Commission and the Member State has not made the financial corrections required, the Commission may decide to make those by cancelling all or part of the contribution of the Funds to the assistance concerned. Under the said provision and Article 5(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 448/2001 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the procedure for making financial corrections to assistance granted under the Structural Funds, the Commission may adopt a decision within a period of three months from the date of the hearing provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 39(2) of Regulation No 1260/1999. In the absence of clear evidence of legislative intent to the contrary in Article 39(3)(b) of Regulation No 1260/1999 and Article 5(3) of Regulation No 448/2001, that period is, in principle, merely indicative and failure to comply with it has no effect on the lawfulness of the Commission’s decision. The Commission is required to reject the defrayal by ERDF of expenditure which has not been incurred in accordance with EU rules, and that obligation does not disappear merely because the Commission’s decision was taken after the expiry of the three-month period, running from the date of the hearing. However, in the absence of wording imposing an imperative time limit in Regulation No 1260/1999, the fundamental requirement of legal certainty has the effect of preventing the Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of its powers. The Commission must thus endeavour to comply with that period, but, because of the complexity of the verification of such expenditure, it may be necessary for it to have more time to conduct an in-depth analysis with a view to avoiding the defrayal of irregular expenditure. (see paras 22, 23, 27-29) 2. See the text of the decision. (see para. 26) 3. It follows from recital 12 to Directive 93/36, coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts, that the negotiated procedure is exceptional in nature, Article 6(2) and (3) of Directive 93/36 exhaustively and expressly listing the only exceptions for which recourse to the negotiated procedure is allowed. Those provisions, as derogations from the rules intended to ensure effectiveness of rights conferred by EU law in the public procurement sector, must be interpreted strictly. The burden of proving the actual existence of exceptional circumstances justifying derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances. (see paras 34-36) 4. See the text of the decision. (see paras 40, 54)