Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:252
Date: 2026-03-26
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Procedure: Preliminary reference - urgent procedure
Origin: Belgium

Summary C-819/25 PPU – 1 
Case C-819/25 PPU * [Gonrieh i] 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1), 
paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
12 December 2025 
Referring court: 
Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
12 December 2025 
Applicants: 
Mrs X, acting on her own behalf and in her capacity as a legal 
representative of A, B, C and D 
Mr Y, acting on his own behalf and in his capacity as a legal 
representative of A, B, C and D 
Defendant: 
Belgian State 
  
I. The parties to the main proceedings 
1 The applicants in the main proceedings are as follows: 
(1) Mrs X, date of birth […] 1987, place of birth […] (Gaza Strip); residing in 
the Gaza Strip; hereafter ‘Mrs X’; 
(2) Mr Y, registered in the national register under no […]; address […] 
[Belgium]; hereafter ‘Mr Y’; 
Both acting on their own behalf as well as in their capacity as legal representatives 
of: 
 
* Language of the case: French. 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
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(3) A, date of birth […] 2013, place of birth […] (Gaza Strip); 
(4) B, date of birth […] 2016, place of birth […] (Gaza Strip); 
(5) C, date of birth […] 2018, place of birth […] (Gaza Strip); and 
(6) D, date of birth […] 2021, place of birth […] (Gaza Strip); 
All four of whom are residing in the Gaza Strip with their mother. 
2 The defendant is the Belgian State. 
II. Subject matter of the main proceedings 
3 The applicants are essentially asking the referring court, the tribunal de première 
instance francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of First Instance (French-
speaking) (Belgium)), to order the Belgian State, subject to periodic penalty 
payments, to provide Mrs X, as well as their four children A, B, C and D, who are 
residing in the Gaza Strip, with all the assistance required to leave the Strip and to 
collect from a Belgian Consulate the visas that have been granted to them subject 
to the verification of their identities and of the authenticity of the documents 
submitted with their remote visa application. 
4 They are asking, more specifically, primarily, for the Belgian State to be ordered 
to place Mrs X and children A, B, C and D on an ‘evacuation list’ established by 
the Belgian State and to organise the practicalities of their evacuation as soon as 
the required formalities have been completed. In the alternative, they are asking 
for the Belgian State to be ordered to inform the authorities of Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan or any other authorities concerned, via official diplomatic channels, that 
Mrs X and A, B, C and D (i) are currently residing in the Gaza Strip, (ii) have all 
obtained a visa for Belgium, (iii) are asking the authorities concerned to be 
authorised to leave the Gaza Strip via Egypt, Jordan, or Israel (or any other 
means – humanitarian corridor), to go to Belgium, and (iv) are prepared to commit 
to being legally bound to leave Egypt, Jordan or Israel as quickly as possible after 
they have left the Gaza Strip. In the further alternative, they ask that a question be 
referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
5 The rights that the applicants invoke include the right to life, the right to 
protection against inhuman treatment and the right to respect for family life, 
which are guaranteed by Articles 2, 4 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. In the view of the referring court, the protection of these 
subjective rights is the genuine and direct subject of the main proceedings. 
6 The Belgian State, in turn, is asking the referring court, primarily, to declare the 
claims to be inadmissible and at the very least unfounded, and in the alternative 
and before pronouncing a definite judgment, to refer three questions to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. 
GONRIEH 
 
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III. Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
7 The referring court is essentially asking the Court about the scope of Article 13 of 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, read in isolation or in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. More specifically, the 
court is asking whether persons who have been granted the right to family 
reunification may claim assistance measures to enable them to leave the Gaza 
Strip. 
IV. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. When a Member State, under Directive 2003/86/EC and in accordance with 
the Afrin judgment (C-1/23), grants a visa in the context of family 
reunification and requires the recipient of the visa to be present in person 
when the visa is issued (in-person delivery) so that their identity can be 
verified, does the implementation of EU law under Article 51 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights extend beyond granting the visa – for example to 
issuing it (in-person delivery)? 
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, should Article 13.1 of 
Directive 2003/86/EC, read in isolation or in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 
7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as requiring a 
Member State that has granted a visa as described in the first question, 
where the recipient of the visa (a third country national) is unable to leave 
the third country where they reside alone and their life is clearly in danger, 
to provide that recipient with assistance enabling them to leave that country 
and have the visa issued to them (delivered in person)? 
3. If the answer to the second question is yes, should the assistance to be 
provided pursuant to the aforementioned legislation consist of: 
o including the recipient of the visa (third country national) in an 
evacuation process established by the Member State concerned for 
categories of persons determined by that Member State, under the 
same conditions as those persons and even if the recipient does not fall 
into those categories; or at the very least of 
o informing the authorities of any third country preventing the recipient 
from entering the EU that that recipient wishes to reside there and has 
the required visa to do so, even if that information falls outside the 
aforementioned evacuation process? 
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V. Provisions of European Union law relied on 
A. Directive 2003/86/EC 
8 Recitals 2 and 8 of Directive 2003/86/EC are worded as follows: 
‘(2) Measures concerning family reunification should be adopted in 
conformity with the obligation to protect the family and respect family life 
enshrined in many instruments of international law. This Directive respects 
the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular 
in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. 
[…] 
(8) Special attention should be paid to the situation of refugees on account 
of the reasons which obliged them to flee their country and prevent them 
from leading a normal family life there. More favourable conditions should 
therefore be laid down for the exercise of their right to family reunification.’ 
9 Article 13(1) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right 
to family reunification, states that: 
‘As soon as the application for family reunification has been accepted, the 
Member State concerned shall authorise the entry of the family member or 
members. In that regard, the Member State concerned shall grant such 
persons every facility for obtaining the requisite visas.’ 
10 The second sentence of this provision is not transposed as such into Belgian law. 1 
B. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
11 The Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out rights including the following: 
‘Article 2 – Right to life 
1. Everyone has the right to life. 
[…] 
Article 4. – Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
 
1 As the Commission noted in its report of 8 October 2008 to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, 
COM(2008) 610 final, point 4.5.1. 
GONRIEH 
 
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No one shall be subjected to […] inhuman or degrading treatment […]. 
Article 7 – Respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, […]. 
Article 24 – The rights of the child 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is 
necessary for their well-being. […]. 
2. […]. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a 
personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless 
that is contrary to his or her interests.’ 
VI. Case-law relied on 
A. Case-law of the Court of Justice 
12 The parties rely on the judgment of the Court of 18 April 2023 in the case of Afrin 
(C-1/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:296), by drawing different consequences from it (see 
points 65 and 69). 
B. Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
13 According to the European Court of Human Rights, Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which corresponds to Article 2 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, ‘enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of 
those within its jurisdiction’. 2 The ECtHR has ruled on several occasions that this 
positive obligation may, in certain circumstances, lead the State concerned to 
‘take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at 
risk’, but that may not ‘impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities’. 3 
 
2 ECtHR, 9 June 1998, L.C.B. v. The United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1998:0609JUD002341394, § 
36; 17 July 2014, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, 
CE:ECHR:2014:0717JUD004784808, § 130. 
3 ECtHR, 28 October 1998, Osman v. The United Kingdom, 
CE:ECHR:1998:1028JUD002345294, §§ 115-116; 24 March 2011, Giuliani and Gaggio v. 
Italy, CE:ECHR:2011:0324JUD002345802, §§ 244-245; 17 January 2012, Choreftakis and 
Choreftaki v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2012:0117JUD004684608, §§ 45-46; 15 June 2021, Kurt v. 
Austria, CE:ECHR:2021:0615JUD006290315, §§ 157-158. In the same way: ECtHR, 8 October 
2015, Sellal v. France, CE:ECHR:2015:1008JUD003243213, §§ 46-47; 31 January 2019, 
Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal, CE:ECHR:2019:0131JUD007810314, §§ 108-111. 
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14 It has extended this case-law of the ‘excessive burden’ to Article 3 of the 
Convention, which corresponds to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 4 
15 A parallel could be drawn between this case-law and the case-law developed by 
the ECtHR regarding the positive obligations incumbent on a State under Article 8 
of the Convention, which corresponds to Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. In this context, the court examines ‘whether the importance of the interest 
at stake requires the imposition of the positive obligation sought by the applicant’. 
In other words, in the same way as under the case-law of the ‘excessive burden’, 
the court has ‘regard […] to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’. 5 
16 The ECtHR also points out that ‘in implementing their positive obligations under 
Article 8 [of the Convention], the States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation’. 
‘Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at 
stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted’, but ‘where, however, 
there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as 
to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of 
protecting it, […] the margin will be wider’. 6 
VII. Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main 
proceedings 
A. Facts 
17 Mrs X and Mr Y are married and have five children, who were born between 2013 
and 2021. One of them, who has already left the Gaza Strip, is not a party to the 
proceedings. 
18 Following the terrorist attacks on 7 October 2023, conducted by Hamas from the 
Gaza Strip, Israel imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip and carried out military 
action there, which included bombings. 
19 Both the blockade and the military action have occasionally been suspended, but 
neither has ever been suspended completely or permanently. This means that on 
the date of this decision (8 December 2025), only the Kerem Shalom crossing 
between the Gaza Strip and Israel is open. 
 
4 ECtHR, 28 January 2014, O’ Keefe v. Ireland, CE:ECHR:2014:0128JUD003581009, § 144; 
2 February 2021, X and others v. Bulgaria, CE:ECHR:2021:0202JUD002245716, § 181. 
5 ECt. HR, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, updated on 
28 February 2025 and available on the ECtHR website, no 7 p. 8/205. 
6 Ibidem, no 8, p. 8-9/205. 
GONRIEH 
 
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20 On a date that is not specified by the parties, but following these events, the 
Belgian State tasked its rapid humanitarian intervention group ‘B-FAST’ or 
‘Centre de crise’ (Crisis Centre), an authority that is part of the Belgian Ministre 
des Affaires étrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), with evacuating the 
following persons from Gaza to Belgium: (i) Belgians, (ii) those recognised as 
refugees in Belgium and (iii) members of their nuclear family, if they have a visa 
or residence permit for Belgium. 
21 Following diplomatic negotiations, Israel and Egypt authorised the Belgian State 
to conduct these evacuations via the Rafah crossing, at the border between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt. These evacuations led to around 500 persons in the those 
categories being brought to Belgium between November 2023 and March 2024, 
mainly Belgians and their nuclear families. 
22 On a date that is not specified by the parties, Mr Y obtained a grant for post-
doctoral studies in a Belgian university, as well as a visa to reside in Belgium and 
a permit to work there. On 3 May 2024, he left the Gaza Strip for Egypt with his 
son, born in 2014, via the Rafah crossing point. This crossing point was closed on 
5 May 2024, which prevented the rest of the family from leaving the Gaza Strip 
and joining him. 
23 Following an application made by the Republic of South Africa against the State 
of Israel, which contained a request for the indication of provisional measures, on 
26 January 2024, the International Court of Justice made an order in which it 
deemed that the ‘catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip’, which ‘is 
at serious risk of deteriorating further before the Court renders its final 
judgment’, justifies ‘urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk 
that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights found by the Court to be 
plausible, before it gives its final decision’. 
24 It also indicated that: ‘[…] Israel must, in accordance with its obligations under 
the Genocide Convention, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures 
within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II 
of this Convention’; and ‘take immediate and effective measures to enable the 
provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to 
address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip.[…]’ 7 
25 In March 2025, the Kerem Shalom crossing point between the Gaza Strip and 
Israel, near to the border between Israel and Egypt, was opened. 
26 Egypt, however, refused to open its border to persons leaving the Gaza Strip, on 
the grounds that Israel was not allowing humanitarian aid to be delivered to the 
Gaza Strip and/or that the Egyptian authorities did not want to contribute to a 
Palestinian exile. Israel also refused to allow inhabitants of the Gaza Strip to enter 
 
7 Order of 26 January 2024 of the International Court of Justice, operative part (§ 86). 
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its territory. As a result, persons in the Gaza Strip, such as Mrs X and her four 
children, were prevented from leaving, just as they were before the crossing point 
was opened. 
27 It was in this context that the Belgian State undertook fresh diplomatic 
negotiations with Israel and Jordan, in order to continue with the evacuations that 
were started in November 2023 and interrupted in March 2024. 
28 At the end of these negotiations, Israel, Jordan and the Belgian State agreed an 
evacuation process that it appears 8 can be summarised as follows: 
– phase 1: the Belgian State verifies that persons wishing to be 
evacuated who are not Belgian nationals have a visa or residence 
permit for Belgium; 
– phase 2: the Belgian State verifies whether the persons wishing to be 
evacuated are (i) Belgian, (ii) recognised as refugees in Belgium or 
(iii) members of their nuclear family. If so, the persons concerned are 
placed onto an evacuation list. This list has decreased as the 
evacuations have taken place. Initially, in April 2025, it included 
around 500 persons. On 3 December 2025, it was down to 62 persons, 
mainly persons recognised as refugees in Belgium and/or members of 
their nuclear families. Until all the persons on that list have been 
evacuated, the Belgian State does not envisage including other 
(categories of) persons; 
– phase 3: the Belgian State asks the relevant Israeli and Jordanian 
authorities to indicate the number of persons that it is actually 
authorised to evacuate. The Belgian State makes this request once it is 
physically in a position to make an evacuation; 
– phase 4: within the limit of the number of persons set by the Israeli 
and Jordanian authorities in phase 3, the Belgian State sends those 
authorities the names of the persons to be evacuated, chosen from 
among those who are still on the evacuation list. When it makes this 
choice, the Belgian State gives priority to families with young children 
and ensures that families are not separated; 
– phase 5: the Israeli and Jordanian authorities conduct checks on the 
persons to be evacuated whose names were sent to them in phase 4. 
They may ask the Belgian State for additional information and, once 
their checks have been carried out, they may refuse to evacuate certain 
 
8 If the referring court has made an error in its understanding or if there is any imprecision on its 
part, the Belgian State will provide the Court of Justice with the clarifications that it deems 
necessary. 
GONRIEH 
 
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persons. When they give their permission, they specify the date on 
which the evacuation must take place; 
– phase 6: on the date that is set, the Belgian State evacuates the persons 
who have been authorised by the Israeli and Jordanian authorities to 
leave the Gaza Strip, and transit through their respective countries, 
from the Kerem Shalom crossing point. In order to give their 
permission, the Jordanian authorities require a commitment from the 
Belgian State that the persons concerned will remain in Jordanian 
territory for no longer than 72 hours, and that, throughout their stay in 
Jordanian territory, they will be permanently accompanied by officials 
of the Belgian State, under its responsibility. 
29 According to this evacuation process, the Belgian State must therefore assume 
responsibility for transporting the persons concerned from the Gaza Strip, via 
Israel and Jordan, to Belgium. This obligation presents logistical and 
organisational difficulties, as the Belgian civil service must provide sufficient 
numbers of qualified staff (at least some of whom speak Arabic), but also coaches, 
hotel stays in Jordan, one or more aeroplanes, medical equipment, security 
measures, etc. 
30 These difficulties are increased due to a lack of qualified staff on the ground and 
the food and health conditions in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the state of health of 
some evacuees requires that medical staff be present. These conditions also 
expose the officials involved to health risks. Moreover, the current tensions in the 
areas passed through during evacuation mean that the persons being evacuated 
and the Belgian State officials are being exposed to a recognised risk of injury or 
death. Finally, those tensions also increase the level of qualifications required of 
officials sent to the area (security training). 
31 On a date that is not specified by the parties, Mrs X and the couple’s five children 
made an application to the Office des étrangers (Office for Foreigners – part of the 
Belgian Ministre de l’Intérieur (Home Office)) for family reunification with 
Mr Y. The application for the son of the couple who was born in 2014 was made 
after he was presented at the Belgian Embassy in Egypt, while the other 
applications were made via email. 
32 On 23 May 2025, the six applications for family reunification referred to in the 
previous paragraph were rejected by the Office for Foreigners, on the grounds that 
Mrs X and the couple’s five children had not proven that they had health 
insurance and that Mr Y had not proven that he had sufficient accommodation in 
Belgium to house them. 
33 On a date that is not specified by the parties, but after 26 May 2025, Mr Y left 
Egypt alone and arrived in Belgium. The son born in 2014 stayed in Cairo and is 
currently being cared for by Mr Y’s mother, who usually resides in Algeria but 
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obtained one or more tourist visas from the Egyptian authorities in order to take 
care of her grandson. 
34 On 12 September 2025, the applicants’ lawyer asked the Office for Foreigners to 
review its decision of 23 May 2025 refusing the visa. 
35 On 6 October 2025, the Office for Foreigners granted a visa to Mrs X and to the 
couple’s five children. This visa was granted subject to the verification of the 
identities of the persons concerned and the authenticity of the documents included 
with their remote visa application, by them presenting themselves at a later date at 
a Belgian embassy or consulate. 
36 On 13 October 2025, the applicants’ lawyer wrote to the Crisis Centre ‘to ask 
them to request the agreement of the Israeli authorities for the applicants to leave 
Gaza, and the agreement of the Egyptian and Jordanian authorities with a view to 
the applicants entering and passing through their territory in order to go and 
collect a visa from the Belgian Consulate and then go to Belgium’. The lawyer 
stressed that ‘a request was not being made for consular assistance, but only for 
the necessary steps to be taken so that the agreement of the Office for Foreigners 
regarding granting family reunification visas could be put into effect’. 
37 On 16 October 2025, the son who was born in 2014 collected his passport 
containing a Belgian visa lasting one year from the Belgian Embassy in Cairo. On 
21 October 2025, the Crisis Centre wrote to the applicants’ lawyer stating that, 
although it was ‘absolutely determined to help the greatest possible number of 
eligible persons to leave the Gaza Strip and be evacuated to Belgium’, it was 
‘facing a large number of challenges, particularly in terms of security and 
logistics but also from an administrative point of view’, which meant that it was 
‘impossible to predict when [the evacuations] would finally take place’ and that it 
‘also has no information on the admissions policies of the local authorities 
regarding certain persons’. 
38 During the submissions hearing on 8 December 2025, the applicants’ lawyer 
indicated verbally that, according to an Amnesty International report dated 
27 November 2025, despite the ceasefire announced on 9 October 2025 by Israel 
and Hamas, the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip were still being exposed to bombings 
or other acts of war. They were also being deprived of water, food, medical care 
and decent accommodation, due to insufficient access for humanitarian aid. 
39 Also at that hearing, Mr Y stated that his wife and children only had a tent for 
shelter and that they had been reduced to cooking the little food they found with 
rubbish containing plastic. He added that his children only had access to makeshift 
education. In addition, one of the youngest children was convinced that his father 
had abandoned them and was therefore refusing to talk to him. 
40 Finally, the applicants’ lawyer and Mr Y indicated at the hearing that the latter 
had recently made an application to be recognised by the relevant Belgian 
authority as a refugee under Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
GONRIEH 
 
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relating to the status of refugees. They conceded that on the date of the hearing 
(8 December 2025), his application was still being considered. However, they also 
claimed that the Belgian authorities could recognise Mr Y as a refugee before the 
Court made its preliminary ruling or before the referring court made its final 
ruling on their action. 
B. The main proceedings 
41 Via a summons to summary proceedings, notice of which was served on 
21 October 2025 at 18:45, which initiated the main proceedings, the applicants 
summoned the Belgian State to appear before the referring court. 
42 The Belgian State raised a plea alleging a lack of jurisdiction of the court, on the 
grounds that no Belgian court could examine the action brought by the applicants. 
43 The rights relied upon by the applicants include the right to life, the right to 
protection against inhuman treatment and the right to respect for family life, 
which are guaranteed by Articles 2, 4 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
respectively. These are subjective civil rights that the Belgian courts are 
responsible for protecting under Article 144 of the Constitution. 
44 The question as to whether the applicants may effectively claim these rights 
pertains to the merit of their action, not its admissibility. 
45 This also applies to the question as to whether the measures requested by the 
applicants are legally impossible on the grounds that they would encroach on the 
conduct of the Belgian State’s international relations through its government, 
would contravene the separation of powers or could undermine the sovereignty of 
Israel or Jordan and the principle of non-interference. 
46 The referring court therefore rejects the plea alleging a lack of jurisdiction of the 
court raised by the Belgian State and consequently declares the action brought by 
the applicants to be admissible. 
47 It also considers that the conditions relating to urgency and the appearance of 
rights are met. 
1. Urgency as a substantive condition 
48 The applicants state that Mrs X and the children who have remained in the Gaza 
Strip are living in conditions that are ‘well known, described by experts and UN 
agencies as genocide’. 
49 The statement of facts shows in any case that the conditions are so catastrophic 
that it is urgent, for their wellbeing and even for their survival (if not simply so 
that the whole family is reunited in Belgium, as the visas granted by the Belgian 
State allow) for Mrs X and her children to be able to leave the Gaza Strip. From 
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this point of view, an immediate decision is desirable. The Belgian State does not 
contest this. 
50 Urgency within the meaning of Article 584(1) of the Judicial Code is therefore 
accepted. 
2. The appearance of rights 
51 According to the Court of Cassation, when urgency is upheld: 
‘In accordance with Article 584 of the Judicial Code, the judge hearing an 
application for interim measures may order measures required to safeguard 
the rights of the applicant if there is an appearance of rights that justifies 
such a decision being taken. The judge will be going beyond the limits of 
their powers if, when examining the apparent rights of the parties, they rely 
on rules of law that cannot reasonably constitute grounds for the provisional 
measures that they are ordering’ 9 
52 Even though there are grounds for putting a question to the Court of Justice 
regarding the scope of the EU law that applies to this case, it is important from the 
outset to look at the following in terms of the appearance of rights. 
53 The Belgian State considers that the request for it to be ordered to evacuate Mrs X 
and her four children to Belgium (the main request made by the applicants) could 
be understood as seeking to amend the evacuation order that it established for the 
various persons that could benefit from the process that it has negotiated with 
Israel and Jordan. 
54 The applicants contest that they are pursuing such an objective. 
55 Their main request nevertheless is accompanied by a periodic penalty payment 
which is to start from when Mrs X and the children who remain in the Gaza Strip 
are placed on the evacuation list and continue until they are treated in the same 
way as other persons on the list. This means at the very least that the applicants 
want them to be evacuated at the same time as Belgians or recognised refugees, 
while that is not the choice made by the Belgian State. 
56 The Belgian State has a margin of appreciation for deciding on that evacuation 
order. That being the case, its action does not evade review by the judiciary of its 
legality, but that review is marginal, in the sense that it only censures manifest 
errors of assessment. 
57 Such an error is defined as ‘an infringement of the general principle of the law of 
reasonability, “which prohibits the authority from acting contrary to all reason”. 
 
9 Court of Cassation, 24 June 2013, R.G. no C.12.0450.F, Arr. Court of Cassation, 2013, p. 1597; 
Pas., 2013, p. 1450. To the same effect: Court of Cassation, 12 January 2007, R.G. no 
C.05.0569.N, Arr. Court of Cassation, 2007, p. 71; Pas., 2007, p. 71. 
GONRIEH 
 
13 
In other words, this means “an error which, in the specific circumstances, is not 
permissible for any reasonable person” […] Every doubt must be excluded, the 
error of assessment must be quite obvious.’ 10 
58 In this case, and without prejudice to the Court of Justice making an analysis to 
the contrary in its preliminary ruling, the Belgian State does not appear to have 
made any manifest errors of assessment in deciding to evacuate its nationals, 
recognised refugees and their nuclear families first, before possibly evacuating 
other categories of persons. 
59 If Mr Y is granted refugee status under Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951, before the referring court makes a final ruling on the applicants’ 
action, his wife and the children who remain in the Gaza Strip will hypothetically 
be classified as members of the nuclear family of a person recognised as a refugee 
in Belgium. The question will then arise as to whether the Belgian State will 
automatically include them in the evacuation process that it has negotiated with 
Israel and Jordan, or if they will have to make an application through the courts to 
be included. 
60 The Belgian State has not yet taken a position on this matter in the context of 
these proceedings. 
VIII. The arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
61 The parties in the main proceedings agree that the visas granted by the Belgian 
State to Mrs X and her children were so granted on the basis of Directive 
2003/86/EC. They disagree, however, regarding the interpretation of the EU law 
that applies to this case and as to the extent of the obligations arising from that law 
for the Belgian State. Each party relies upon decisions handed down by Belgian 
courts that support their theory. 
A. Discussion regarding the application of EU law 
62 The Belgian State maintains that its decision to grant Mrs X and her children visas 
subject to verification of their identity and of the authenticity of the documents 
included with their remote visa application ‘completes the family reunification 
procedure and therefore the implementation of EU law under Article 51 of the 
Charter, even though [Mrs X and her children must] still present themselves 
physically at the Embassy with [their] travel documents [so that the 
aforementioned verification can be carried out].’ 
 
10 P. GOFFAUX, Dictionnaire de droit administratif, 3rd ed., Bruylant, 2022, Brussels, p. 357-
358 (see ‘Erreur manifeste d’appréciation’). 
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B. Discussion regarding the content of EU law 
1. The applicants’ theory 
63 The applicants argue that, in view of what they present as ‘the need to escape the 
genocide that is taking place’, Directive 2003/86/EC and, in particular, 
Article 13(1), read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, obliges the Belgian State in this case to: 
– evacuate Mrs X and her four children to Belgium (main request); or at the 
very least to 
– inform the Israeli and Jordanian authorities of their desire to leave the Gaza 
Strip and go to Belgium (request in the alternative). 
64 In support of this theory, they essentially rely on the effectiveness of Directive 
2003/86/EC, the judgment of the Court in the case of Afrin, the guidelines adopted 
by the Commission and several decisions by Belgian courts. 
a) The judgment in the case of Afrin 
65 The applicants invoke more specifically the following points of the judgment of 
18 April 2023 in the case of Afrin (C-1/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:296): 
‘42. As regards the objective pursued by Directive 2003/86, the Court has 
repeatedly held that that directive is intended to promote family 
reunification and to grant protection to third-country nationals, in 
particular minors. In order to achieve that objective, Article 4(1) of that 
directive imposes on the Member States precise positive obligations, with 
corresponding clearly defined individual rights. It thus requires them to 
authorise the family reunification of certain members of the sponsor’s 
family, without being left a margin of appreciation, provided that the 
conditions laid down in Chapter IV of that directive are satisfied (judgment 
of 12 December 2019, G.S. and V.G. (Threat to public policy), C-381/18 and 
C-382/18, EU:C:2019:1072, paragraphs 60 and 61 and the case-law cited). 
[…] 
59. However, in order not to undermine the objective pursued by Directive 
2003/86 of promoting family reunification and the fundamental rights which 
that directive is intended to protect, when the Member State requires the 
sponsor’s family members to appear in person at a later stage in the 
procedure, that Member State must facilitate such an appearance, notably 
by issuing consular documents or laissez-passers and reducing the number 
of appearances to the strict minimum.’ 
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b) The guidelines adopted by the Commission for the application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC 
66 The applicants rely on the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament of 3 April 2014 on guidance for application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM (2014) 210 final 
(paragraph 5.1, p. 19): 
‘Article 13(1) requires that, as soon as an application for family 
reunification has been accepted, the MS is obliged to grant family members 
every facility for obtaining the requisite visas. This implies that when an 
application is accepted, MSs should ensure a speedy visa procedure, reduce 
additional administrative burdens to a minimum and avoid double-checks on 
the fulfilment of the requirements for family reunification. Since the purpose 
of stay of family reunification is long term, the visa issued should not be a 
short-stay visa. 
If access to travel documents and visas is particularly difficult or dangerous 
and may thus constitute a disproportionate risk or a practical obstacle to the 
effective exercise of the right to family reunification, MSs are encouraged to 
consider the specificities of the case and the circumstances in the country of 
origin. In exceptional circumstances, for instance, in the context of a failed 
state or a country with high internal security risks, MSs are encouraged to 
accept emergency travel documents issued by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), to issue a national one-way laissez-passer, or offer 
family members the possibility of being issued a visa upon arrival in the 
MS.’ 
c) Decisions of the Belgian courts 
67 The applicants rely in particular on two judgments of the Cour d’appel (Brussels 
Court of Appeal, Belgium), which state the following (identical reasoning in both 
judgments): 
‘… placing the persons concerned on this list is a formality required in 
order to actually obtain [11] the entry visa for Belgium from the Embassy in 
Cairo. Only the Belgian State could do this and, prima facie, it should do so. 
In other words, prima facie, in the circumstances of this case, placing the 
persons concerned who are of Palestinian origin and living in the Gaza 
Strip, and who have permission to enter Belgium, on the evacuation list, 
without the Belgian State being obliged to assume the financial or material 
responsibility for the journey towards Belgium, does not involve the Belgian 
State exercising its discretionary power to provide consular assistance. On 
 
11 This means issuing the visa or delivering it in person (the referring court considers all these 
terms to be synonymous). 
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the contrary, doing so firstly finalises, by means of communication through 
diplomatic channels, the procedure of granting a visa to enter Belgium to 
those concerned, and secondly, it is an action that may be undertaken 
without an excessive burden being placed on the Belgian State, which 
therefore must be undertaken in order to protect the right to life of those 
concerned, the right to respect for physical and mental integrity and the 
right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by Articles 2.1 […] 
and 7 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
Therefore, prima facie, the refusal by the Belgian State to place the persons 
concerned on the SPF Affaires étrangères (Foreign Affairs) evacuation list, 
without the obligation for the Belgian State to assume financial or physical 
responsibility for their journey to Belgium, renders the rights conferred on 
them by the [applicable] directive ineffective and infringes Articles 2.1 […] 
and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ 
(highlighted by the referring court). 12 
2. The Belgian State’s theory 
68 The Belgian State maintains that neither Directive 2003/86/EC nor Articles 2, 4, 7 
and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights require them in this case to evacuate 
Mrs X and her children, or even to inform the Israeli and Jordanian authorities that 
those persons wish to leave the Gaza Strip and go to Belgium. 
69 As well as relying on the text of the aforementioned legislation from primary and 
secondary law, the Belgian State claims that it has complied with the judgment of 
18 April 2023 in the case of Afrin (C-1/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:296). In this regard it 
maintains that it authorised Mrs X and the children who remain in the Gaza Strip 
to make their visa application remotely and that it granted them visas subject to 
the verification of the identities of the persons concerned and of the authenticity of 
the documents included with their remote visa application. 
70 The Belgian State adds that ‘issuing consular documents or laissez-passers’ as 
required by the judgment in the case of Afrin (paragraph 59), represents a much 
lesser burden for it than that of evacuation to Belgium or sending information to 
Israel and Jordan, which the applicants are requesting. 
71 According to the Belgian State, the obligation to ‘reduce additional administrative 
burdens to a minimum’, laid down in the Commission guidance for application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC (point 5.1), cannot be interpreted as involving evacuating 
persons who have visas out of the state where they are, even if those persons claim 
to be victims of inhuman treatment or genocide. 
 
12 Brussels Court of Appeal (1st chamber F), 10 March 2025, R.G. no 2024/KR/42, no 31, p. 12-
13 and Court of Appeal Brussels (1st chamber F), 10 March 2025, R.G. no 2024/KR/15, no 27, 
p. 11-12. 
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17 
72 The Belgian State relies also on a passage from the judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR of 14 September 2022, H.F. And Others v. France 
(CE:ECHR:2022:0914JUD002438419), in which the European Court of Human 
Rights indicated in § 259 that: 
‘there is no obligation under international treaty law or customary 
international law for States to repatriate their nationals. Consequently, 
French citizens being held in the camps in north-eastern Syria cannot claim 
a general right to repatriation on the basis of the right to enter national 
territory under Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No 4. In this connection, the Court 
takes note of the concerns expressed by the respondent and intervening 
Governments about the potential risk, if such a right were to be instituted, of 
establishing recognition of an individual right to diplomatic protection 
which would be incompatible with international law and the discretionary 
power of States’. 
73 It deduces from this that, given that the nationals of a state do not have a right to 
be repatriated by it, the applicants, who are not Belgian nationals, may not, a 
fortiori, require the Belgian State to evacuate Mrs X and her children from the 
Gaza Strip to Belgium. 
74 The Belgian State relies also on several decisions by Belgian courts, including 
three decisions relating to disputes similar to the one being examined here 
(persons who are in the Gaza Strip and are asking for assistance from the Belgian 
State), in which the referring court (with a different composition) ruled that the 
Belgian State was fulfilling its obligations under Directive 2003/86/EC and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 13 
75 In addition, the Belgian State maintains that ordering the measures being 
requested by the applicants would impose an excessive burden on it. First, it 
considers that the evacuation of Mrs X and her four children to Belgium (the 
main request being made by the applicants) would require a disproportionate 
effort on its part, in view of the resources (human, medical, logistical, financial, 
etc.) that have to be implemented in order to deal with the difficulties on the 
ground. 
76 Even though it is not ruling out making such an evacuation, it considers that the 
those elements justify it reserving the right to decide for itself whether to evacuate 
Mrs X and the children who remain in the Gaza Strip, without its margin for 
appreciation being limited by the rights of the applicants based on Directive 
2003/86/EC or the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
77 Second, the Belgian State considers that ordering it to inform the Israeli and 
Jordanian authorities that Mrs X and her four children wish to leave the Gaza Strip 
 
13 Orders of 5 December 2025 of the summary chamber of the Brussels Court of First Instance 
(French-speaking), R.G. no 25/281/C, no 25/282/C and no 25/284/C. 
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and go to Belgium (the request in the alternative made by the applicants) would 
also represent an excessive burden or would unjustifiably undermine its margin of 
appreciation. 
78 It considers that giving this information would mean exerting indirect pressure on 
Israel and Jordan, which could compromise diplomatic relations between the 
Belgian State and those two states. It considers that a diplomatic incident would 
be even more probable in this case, given that an evacuation process has been 
negotiated with those two states and the requested communication of information 
does not fall within that framework. It maintains that ‘such untimely 
communications, made outside of the conditions negotiated between states, which 
means they infringe the principle of sovereignty, could adversely affect the 
planned evacuation operations by creating tension and confusion among the 
third-party authorities. It is important to remember that some consider them to be 
countries at war, which are also dealing with requests made by other countries 
and with the migration crisis caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.’ 
IX. Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary 
ruling 
79 The existing case-law of the Court of Justice does not appear to shed any light on 
how to decide between these two contradictory points of view. Moreover, the 
parties themselves suggest making requests for preliminary rulings. 
80 Finally, the response that the Court of Justice chooses to make to the questions put 
forward in the operative part of this order could concern proceedings other than 
the one being examined here. At the submissions hearing on 8 December 2025, 
the Belgian State indicated that 26 proceedings similar to that being examined 
here are currently pending before Belgian courts and that others could be brought. 
A. Discussion regarding the application of EU law 
81 Verifying the identity of Mrs X and her children and them presenting themselves 
in person appear to be inherent to the family reunification procedure through 
which the Belgian State is implementing Directive 2003/86/EC. This 
implementation should therefore only logically be completed once the visas have 
been issued (delivered in person). 
82 The referring court is nevertheless questioning the Court on this point, in order to 
defer to the request made by the Belgian State. 
B. Discussion regarding the content of EU law 
83 According to the referring court, in view of the difficulties currently involved in 
an operation to evacuate persons from the Gaza Strip, ordering the Belgian State 
to evacuate Mrs X and her four children to Belgium (the main request made by the 
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applicants) would very probably have represented an excessive burden, if no 
process had been put in place for that purpose. 
84 In this case, such a process exists and has already benefited more than 400 
persons. 
85 In comparison, it seems that Mrs X and her four children amount to very few 
persons. 
86 It is nonetheless true that ordering the Belgian State to place them on the 
evacuation list amounts to increasing its humanitarian burden, when it has 
spontaneously chosen to provide assistance and other states have perhaps refused 
to do so from the start. The referring court therefore wonders whether such an 
order could dissuade the Belgian State from being so helpful in future, during 
other crisis or war situations. 
87 It should also be pointed out that, unlike the proceedings before the Cour d’appel 
de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of Appeal) (see point 66), the evacuation process 
negotiated by the Belgian State with the Israeli and Jordanian authorities does not, 
in this case, allow someone to be placed on the evacuation list ‘without the 
Belgian State being obliged to assume the financial or material responsibility for 
the journey [of the persons concerned to Belgium]’. On the contrary, placing 
Mrs X and her children who have remained in the Gaza Strip on that list would 
require the Belgian State to assume responsibility for their evacuation, from 
leaving the Gaza Strip to Belgium. 
88 The allusion by the Brussels Court of Appeal to there not being an ‘excessive 
burden being placed on the Belgian State’ refers to the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding an ‘excessive burden’ (see point 12). 
89 Based on the understanding that 26 proceedings similar to the one being examined 
here are currently pending before the Belgian courts and that others could be 
brought, it also seems that the situation of Mrs X and her four children is not the 
only one to be taken into account when assessing the burden that would be placed 
on the Belgian State by an order to evacuate them. 
90 Moreover, if Mr Y is granted refugee status in Belgium under Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951, his wife and children who remain in the 
Gaza Strip will therefore be classified as members of the nuclear family of a 
person recognised as a refugee in Belgium. The question will then arise as to 
whether the Belgian State will automatically include them in the evacuation 
process that it has negotiated with Israel and Jordan, or if the persons concerned 
will have to make an application through the courts to be included. 
91 Other persons could find themselves in the same situation. 
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92 It seems that these circumstances must also be taken into account when assessing 
the burden that the evacuation of all these persons would represent for the Belgian 
State, if it occurs, particularly if EU law requires it. 
93 In the light of the urgency and the fact that Directive 2003/86/EC was adopted on 
the basis of Article 78 TFEU, the referring court asks for the benefit of the urgent 
preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court.