Order — ECLI:EU:T:2003:228
Date: 2003-09-16
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Application for interim measures: suspension of operation of the contested measure and other interim measures
Procedure: Staff cases;Application for interim measures - unfounded

SUMMARY - CASE T-272/03 R 
Summary 
1. Applications for interim measures - Conditions for admissibility - Consideration 
of the admissibility of the main application - Inappropriate - Limits 
(Arts 242 EC and 243 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, 
Art. 104(1)) 
2. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation - Conditions for 
granting - A prima facie case - Urgency - Cumulative nature - Order and 
manner in which conditions are to be examined — Discretion of the judge hearing 
the application 
(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) 
3. Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation — Conditions for 
granting - Urgency - Serious and irreparable damage - Strictly financial damage 
- Expiry of a temporary staff contract - None 
(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) 
1. In principle the issue of the admissibility of the main action should not be 
examined in proceedings for interim relief so as not to prejudge the substance of the 
case. However, where it is contended that the main action to which the application 
for interim relief relates is manifestly inadmissible, it may prove necessary to 
establish whether there are any grounds for concluding that the main action is prima 
facie admissible. 
(see para. 17) 
See: 376/87 R Distrivet v Council [1988] ECR 209, para. 21; 160/88 R Fédération 
européennede la santé animale and Others v Council [1988] ECR 411, para. 22; T-13/99 
R Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR II-1961, para. 121, confirmed on appeal 
in C-329/99P(R) Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR I-8343 
I-A - 198 
FERNANDEZ GOMEZ v COMMISSION 
2. An application for interim measures must state the circumstances giving rise to 
urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim 
measures applied for. Those conditions are cumulative, so that an application for 
suspension of the operation of a measure must be dismissed if any one of them is 
absent. 
In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application has a 
wide discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances 
of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be 
examined, there being no rule of Community law imposing a pre-established scheme 
of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be analysed and 
assessed. 
(see paras 24-25) 
See: C-363/98 P(R) Emesa Sugar v Council [1998] ECR I-8787, para. 50: T-234/02 R 
Michael v Commission [2002] ECR-SC I-A-321 and II-1543, para. 17 
3. The urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation 
to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage 
being caused to the party who requests the interim measure. It is for that party to 
adduce proof that it cannot await the outcome of the main action without suffering 
such damage. 
Purely financial harm cannot as a matter of principle be regarded as irreparable, or 
even difficult to repair, because financial compensation can be made for it 
subsequently. However, it is for the judge hearing the application for interim relief 
to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether the 
immediate execution of the contested decision may cause the applicant serious and 
I-A - 199 
SUMMARY — CASE T-272/03 R 
imminent harm that even the annulment of the decision at the close of the main 
proceedings would be unable to repair. 
The fact that a member of the temporary staff whose contract is expiring is forced, 
by reason of his family circumstances, to find new employment at the place where 
he was formerly employed does not as such constitute serious and irreparable harm. 
It is merely a consequence of the fact that his contract is coming to an end. 
(see paras 29-33) 
See: C-213/91 R Abertal and Others v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, para. 24; 
T-203/98 R Tzikis v Commission [1999] ECR-SC I-A-37 and II-167, para. 49; T-70/99 
R Alpharma v Council [1999] ECR II-2027, para. 128; T-373/00 R Tralli v ECB [2001] 
ECR-SC I-A-19 and II-83, paras 26 and 27; T-300/01 R De Nicola v EIB, not published 
in the ECR, paras 52 and 60, confirmed on appeal in C-198/02 P(R), not published in the 
ECR, paras 46 and 49 
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