Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2016:254
Date: 2016-04-28
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber), 28 April 2016 1. Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation — Support for the Iranian government — Concept — No need for a causal link between the conduct constituting support for the Iranian government and the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities (Council Decisions 2010/413/CFSP, Art. 20(1)(b) and (c), and 2012/35/CFSP, thirteenth recital; Council Regulation No 267/2012, Art. 23(2)(a) and (d)) 2. Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation — Support for the Iranian government — Concept — Research and technical development in military or military-related fields — Whether included — Condition (Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, Arts 1(1)(c), and 20(1)(c); Council Regulation No 267/2012, Arts 5(1)(a), and 23(2)(d)) 3. Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation —Restriction of right to freedom of expression and information — Restriction of the right to education — Restriction of the right to property — No breach of principle of proportionality (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 11, 14, 17(1), and 52(1); Council Decisions 2010/413/CFSP and 2014/776/CFSP; Council Regulations No 267/2012 and No 1202/2014) 4. Non-contractual liability — Conditions — Unlawfulness — Damage — Causal link — Cumulative conditions — One of the conditions not satisfied — Claim for compensation dismissed in its entirety (Art. 340, second para., TFEU) 1. In relation to restrictive measures taken against Iran, such as the freezing of funds of entities providing support to the Iranian government, the criterion concerning the provision of support to that government does not involve establishing a causal link between the conduct constituting such provision and the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities. It is true that the said criterion does not concern any form of support to the Government of Iran, but covers forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to the pursuit of Iran’s nuclear activities. Interpreted, subject to review by the EU judicature, by reference to the objective of applying pressure on the Iranian government to end activities posing a risk of nuclear proliferation, the criterion of support for the government thus objectively defines a limited category of persons and entities which may be subject to fund-freezing measures. In the light of the purpose of the fund-freezing measures, it is unequivocally clear from the contested criterion that it is aimed in a targeted and selective manner at the relevant person’s or entity’s own activity, which, even if it has no actual direct or indirect connection with nuclear proliferation, is nevertheless capable of encouraging it by providing the Iranian government with resources or facilities of, inter alia, a material, financial or logistic nature which allow it to pursue proliferation activities. However, it does not follow from the case-law that the concept of ‘support to the Government of Iran’ involves proof of a connection between that support and the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that regard, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the criterion relating to the provision of support to the Government of Iran set out in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 concerning the adoption of restrictive measures against Iran, and, on the other hand, the criterion relating to the provision of support ‘for … Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems’ set out in Article 20(1)(b) of that decision and Article 23(2)(a) of that regulation. The application of the first criterion does not imply a certain degree of connection, even indirect connection, with Iran’s nuclear activities, required for the purposes of the application of the second criterion referred to above relating to the provision of support for Iran’s nuclear activities. As regards the criterion of providing support for the Iranian government, it is apparent from recital 13 of Decision 2012/35, which inserted that criterion into Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, that the Council, considering that the provision of support to the Iranian government was capable of encouraging the pursuit of proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, intended to expand the criteria for listing by extending the adoption of fund-freezing measures to persons and entities providing support to that government, without requiring a direct or indirect link between that support and such activities. Thus, the existence of a connection between the provision of support to the Iranian government and the pursuit of nuclear proliferation activities is expressly established by the applicable legislation. In that context, the contested criterion must be construed as being aimed at any support which, even though it has no direct or indirect connection with the development of nuclear proliferation, is nevertheless capable, as a result of its quantitative or qualitative significance, of encouraging such development, by providing the Iranian government with resources or facilities of, inter alia, a material, financial or logistic nature. Accordingly, the Council is not required to establish that there is a connection between the conduct constituting support and the facilitation of nuclear proliferation activities, since such a connection is established by the general rules applicable. (see paras 49-54) 2. It follows from Decision 2010/413 and Regulation No 267/2012 that restrictive measures may be adopted in respect of persons or entities involved in procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in military or military-related fields, of prohibited goods and technology or providing technical assistance in relation to such goods and technology. The connection between the latter and nuclear proliferation is established by the EU legislature in the general rules of the relevant provisions. In particular, Article 1(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 prohibits the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of arms and related material of all types, including military vehicles and equipment. Moreover, by virtue of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 267/2012, it is prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance relating to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council, or associated with the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods on that list to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran. Thus, by providing for such a ban in so far as concerns certain military equipment, within the framework of Regulation No 267/2012, the legislature established a connection between procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of that type of equipment and pursuit by the Iranian government of proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. That interpretation is confirmed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1929, referred to in recitals 1 and 4 of Decision 2012/35 respectively. The general rules of the European Union providing for the adoption of restrictive measures must be interpreted in the light of the wording and purpose of the Security Council resolutions which they implement. The abovementioned two resolutions refer to the adoption of suitable measures to constrain the Islamic Republic of Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes. In particular, satellites and UAVs, inter alia, feature on the lists of equipment and technology whose provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran is prohibited by those resolutions, lists to which Resolution 1929 more specifically refers. Accordingly, the provision of support to the Iranian government in respect of research and technical development in military or military-related fields satisfies the criterion of providing support for the Iranian government, set out in Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 where it relates to equipment or technology on the Common Military List, the procurement of which by the Islamic Republic of Iran is prohibited. (see paras 61-65) 3. See the text of the decision. (see paras 109, 110) 4. See the text of the decision. (see paras 120, 121)