Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2022:811
Date: 2022-12-14
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Commercial policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of the pleas in law and that statement must be clear and precise enough to enable the defendant to prepare its arguments and the Court to rule on the application (judgment of 3 May 2018, Sigma Orionis v Commission, T‑48/16, EU:T:2018:245, paragraph 54). In view of the arguments submitted by it in the defence and in the rejoinder, the Commission was in a position to understand clearly the applicants’ criticisms of the contested regulation. In addition, the essential elements of fact and of law on which that part of the third plea is based are indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself, despite the indication in the heading of that part that income or price support is provided to ‘CPO suppliers’ and despite an incorrect reference to recital 172 of the provisional regulation, which in fact concerns the existence of a financial contribution under Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2018, Transtec v Commission, T‑616/15, EU:T:2018:399, paragraph 46). The application therefore satisfies the requirements of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. 149 Moreover, Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. According to the case-law, a plea which constitutes an amplification of a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which is closely connected therewith, will be declared admissible. The same applies to a submission made in support of a plea in law (judgment of 19 March 2013, In ’t Veld v Commission, T‑301/10, EU:T:2013:135, paragraph 97). 150 The second part of the third plea, concerning the Commission’s findings regarding income or price support, had already been raised in the application initiating proceedings. The clarifications provided by the applicants in the reply, in response to the allegations made in the defence, merely amplify that part of the plea, which must therefore be regarded as admissible. 151 The applicants submit that the Commission adopted too broad an interpretation of the concept of ‘income or price support’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation, disregarding WTO case-law. That concept includes only direct government intervention in the market with the aim of fixing the price of a product at a particular level. Actions having only an indirect effect on the market, such as the export restrictions and the communication of prices by PTPN in the present case, do not come within that scope. Nor did the other measures taken into account by the Commission result in income or price support. 152 In that regard, it must be stated that the applicants do not dispute, in the context of this part of the plea, the existence of the series of measures adopted by the Indonesian Government set out by the Commission in recitals 188 to 190 of the provisional regulation, the findings of which were confirmed by recital 169 of the contested regulation, but only their classification as ‘income or price support’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation. 153 Since that expression is not defined in the basic regulation, it must be interpreted, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 98 above, in accordance with its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the objectives of the rules of which it is part. 154 The objective of Article 3 of the basic regulation is to define the concept of a ‘subsidy’ which would justify the imposition of a countervailing duty. More specifically, Article 3(1) of that regulation provides, under point (a), that a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a ‘financial contribution’, ‘or’, under point (b), if there is ‘any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994’. It follows that the objective of Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation is to provide for an alternative form of subsidy to that referred to in Article 3(1)(a), as is clearly indicated by the use of the coordinating conjunction which marks the alternative, ‘or’, in order to extend the scope of that provision. 155 That provision is used in the context of determining whether a subsidy exists and expressly refers to Article XVI of the GATT for its interpretation, hence the EU legislature’s own intention to limit its discretion in the application of the GATT and WTO rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, Commission v Rusal Armenal, C‑21/14 P, EU:C:2015:494, paragraphs 40 and 41 and the case-law cited). That article refers to ‘any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory’. It follows from this that, for the purposes of that provision, ‘income or price support’ is a form of subsidy and that that provision focuses on the effects of that subsidy on exports and imports. 156 According to its usual meaning in everyday language, the term ‘support’ means ‘help’, ‘protection’, ‘assistance’ or ‘back-up’ and the action of ‘supporting’ means ‘maintaining, carrying, backing up’ or ‘helping, encouraging, assisting’. It is clear from the wording of Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation and from Article XVI of the GATT that such action may take ‘any form’, a formulation which leaves open the ‘appearance’, ‘look’, ‘configuration’ or ‘way or manner of acting or proceeding’. Thus, the expression ‘income or price support’ must be interpreted as encompassing any act of the government which amounts, directly or indirectly, to maintaining or increasing revenue stability or prices. The reference in Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation to Article XVI of the GATT means that account must also be taken of the effects of that action on exports and imports. 157 In the present case, in order to establish the existence of income or price support in the provisional regulation, the conclusions of which are confirmed in recital 169 of the contested regulation, the Commission found that – by means of a series of measures, namely (i) a system of restraints on the export of CPO, (ii) the de facto setting of CPO prices in the internal market at an artificially low level and (iii) direct subsidies granted to CPO producers in order to encourage them to comply with the objectives of the government, considered in the wider context of encouraging the development of the biodiesel industry, for example through mandatory blending requirements as well as the establishment of the Oil Palm Plantation Fund for the benefit of biodiesel producers – the Indonesian Government intended to intervene in the market to ensure a particular result, namely that the biodiesel producers would benefit from artificially low prices for their supply of CPO – the raw material that represents around 90% of their production costs. 158 The Commission concluded, in recital 191 of the provisional regulation, that those actions of the Indonesian Government had contributed to the income received by biodiesel producers by allowing them to have access to their main raw material and main cost component at a price below the world market price, which was then translated into artificially higher profits resulting mainly from exports to third markets. The Commission also noted a significant increase in biodiesel exports in 2018, as is apparent from Table 2 set out in recital 192 of the provisional regulation. That analysis was confirmed in its entirety by the contested regulation (see recital 169 of the contested regulation). 159 It follows from those findings, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 154 to 156 above, that the Commission did not infringe Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation and did not commit a manifest error of assessment when it concluded that the measures implemented by the Indonesian Government could be classified as income or price support for biodiesel producers. 160 Without prejudice to the case-law cited in paragraphs 46 and 47 above, that conclusion cannot be called into question by the considerations contained in the WTO Panel report entitled ‘China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States’, adopted on 15 June 2012 (WT/DS 414/R), relied on by the applicants. In that case, the Panel considered that the phrase ‘any form of … price support’ in Article 1(1.1)(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement did not have a sufficiently wide scope to encompass voluntary restraint agreements restricting imports of steel into the United States, which could have an incidental side-effect, of random magnitude, on prices. Therefore, that dispute did not concern a series of measures having the same objective and nature as those examined by the contested regulation, in particular specific export restrictions and de facto price-setting through an undertaking fully owned by the Indonesian Government. 161 Accordingly, the second part of the third plea in law must be rejected. The third part of the third plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(2) and Article 6(d) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission found that a benefit had been conferred on Indonesian producers 162 By the third part of the third plea, the applicants claim that, in finding that there was a benefit and in using incorrect benchmark prices for the calculation of that benefit, the Commission infringed Article 3(2) and Article 6(d) of the basic regulation. 163 In that regard, it should be noted that Article 3 of the basic regulation provides that a subsidy is deemed to exist where there is a ‘financial contribution’ or ‘income or price support’ provided by a government and if a ‘benefit’ is thereby conferred. Articles 6 and 7 of that regulation lay down the procedures for calculating the ‘benefit’ conferred. As regards a financial contribution or income or price support consisting in the provision of goods by a government, Article 6(d) of the basic regulation provides, in essence, that that provision confers a benefit if it is made for less than adequate remuneration (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T‑300/16, EU:T:2019:235, paragraphs 195 and 196). 164 Article 6 of that regulation lays down rules for determining, according to the type of measure concerned, whether it may be regarded as a ‘benefit conferred on the recipient’. In accordance with those rules, a benefit exists if, in practice, the recipient received a financial contribution enabling it to obtain more favourable conditions than those to which it would have access on the market. As regards, in particular, the supply of goods, Article 6(d) of the basic regulation provides that there is a benefit only if ‘the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration’, ‘the adequacy of remuneration [being] determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the product or service in question in the country of provision or purchase, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale’. It follows from that wording that the determination of the ‘benefit’ involves a comparison and that, since it aims to assess the appropriateness of the price paid as against normal market conditions, in principle in the country of provision, that comparison must take into account all the elements of the cost to the recipient of receiving the goods provided by the government. Therefore, it follows from that provision that, as far as possible, the method used by the Commission to calculate the advantage must make it possible to reflect the benefit actually conferred on the recipient (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T‑300/16, EU:T:2019:235, paragraphs 208 to 210). 165 In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 170 and 171 of the contested regulation that the Commission determined the existence of a benefit by using as the benchmark price for the purposes of the comparison the free on board (FOB) CPO export prices from Indonesia to the rest of the world, as found in the Indonesia Export Statistics, and that it calculated the benefit conferred on the recipient as being the sum of the differences between those benchmark prices of CPO calculated per month during the investigation period and the prices paid for domestically purchased CPO. More specifically, according to recitals 199 to 201 of the provisional regulation, the Commission calculated the monthly average FOB world export price from Indonesia for the investigation period and then compared the domestic price of CPO paid by the Indonesian biodiesel producers with that price. The Commission considered that the total difference represented the ‘savings’ obtained by the Indonesian biodiesel producers that purchased CPO in the Indonesian domestic market compared to the price they would have paid in the absence of distortions on the Indonesian market and that that amount corresponded to the benefit conferred on those producers by the Indonesian Government during the investigation period. 166 It is apparent from those grounds, first, that the applicants’ argument that the Commission wrongly used international prices as benchmark prices is based on a misreading of the provisional regulation and of the contested regulation and must be rejected. It is clear from recital 198 of the provisional regulation and recital 182 of the contested regulation that the Commission did not use international prices as benchmark prices, but rather the FOB export prices from Indonesia to the rest of the world. 167 Second, the applicants’ arguments seeking to invalidate the Commission’s conclusion that the CPO prices on the Indonesian market were distorted by the intervention of the Indonesian Government have already been rejected in the context of the first part of the present plea. Accordingly, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in finding that, in order to calculate the benefit conferred on the recipient by the provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration, it was necessary to determine an appropriate benchmark price. 168 Third, it is apparent from recital 198 of the provisional regulation that the Commission considered that the FOB CPO export prices from Indonesia to the rest of the world constituted an appropriate benchmark because they were set according to free market principles, reflected prevailing market conditions in Indonesia, were not distorted by government intervention and, therefore, were the best indicator of what an undistorted Indonesian domestic price would have been without the intervention of the Indonesian Government. Against that analysis, the applicants claim that, even if the CPO prices on the Indonesian domestic market were distorted, the export FOB price is not a valid benchmark price, since it is itself distorted by the export restrictions. The applicants substantiated that argument at the hearing, emphasising that a price which incorporates the export levy, amounting to USD 50 per tonne, which is by definition paid only for the exported product, cannot be used as a reference price for what would have been an undistorted price on the domestic market. According to the applicants, the Commission itself acknowledged, in the defence, that the difference between domestic CPO prices and the export CPO prices was approximately the amount of the export levy. 169 That argument must be rejected. First of all, the fact that the FOB CPO export price from Indonesia includes the effects of the export levy, as noted by the Commission in recitals 173 and 181 of the contested regulation, does not necessarily mean that that price is distorted. On the contrary, given that the price of CPO on the domestic market was less than adequate, because of a series of measures including the export tax, the export levy and the setting of prices by PTPN, the CPO export price, once the export levy had been paid, corresponded, as the Commission rightly points out, to the export price that was offered by sellers and that buyers were prepared to pay on the international market. 170 Next, the Commission explained, in recital 173 of the contested regulation, that the starting point for the applicants’ arguments was the premiss that the domestic CPO prices were not artificially low, but that the export prices were too high because of the export levy. It is common ground that the applicants’ argument is based on a comparison between the price on the domestic market and the FOB export price. The Commission demonstrated, without making a manifest error of assessment, that CPO was sold to the biodiesel producer at an artificially low price as a result of a set of measures taken by the Indonesian Government, of which the export levy was merely one component. It follows that the applicants’ argument is based on a false premiss. 171 Lastly, although the export levy is one of the measures which have the effect of inducing CPO suppliers to sell on the domestic market at less than adequate prices, it does not, for that reason, render the FOB export price inappropriate as the benchmark price for calculating the benefit. 172 Therefore, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in taking the view that that price was capable, in accordance with the rule laid down in Article 6(d) of the basic regulation and the case-law cited in paragraph 164 above, of reflecting, as far as possible, the benefit actually conferred on the recipient. 173 In the light of those considerations, the third part of this plea and, consequently, the third plea in law in its entirety, must be rejected. The fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in finding that there was a subsidy in the form of a direct transfer of funds, committed a manifest error of assessment and infringed Article 3(1)(a)(i) and (2) of the basic regulation 174 The fourth plea consists of two parts, which are disputed by the Commission, supported by EBB. The first part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission classified the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund as a grant 175 By the first part, the applicants claim that the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund do not constitute a direct transfer of funds in the form of a grant, but a payment for the purchase of biodiesel. 176 It should be borne in mind that Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic regulation provides that there is a ‘financial contribution by a government in the country of origin or export’ where ‘a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (for example, grants, loans, equity infusion)’. 177 The objective of Article 3 of the basic regulation is to define, on the one hand, the concept of a ‘subsidy’ that would justify the imposition of a countervailing duty and, on the other hand, the concept of ‘financial contribution’ so as to exclude from that concept government measures that do not come within one of the categories listed in that provision (see paragraphs 99 and 100 above). 178 It is apparent from Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic regulation, and in particular from the words ‘a government practice’, that the direct transfer of funds must be attributable to the government. However, that provision contains no details as to the origin of the funds transferred. Thus, in paragraph 1(a)(i), that article includes in the concept of ‘financial contribution’ a ‘government practice’ which involves a direct transfer of funds, without adding requirements as to the origin of those funds. The fact that the source of the funds does not affect the classification of a government practice as a ‘financial contribution by a government’ is clearly apparent in the situation envisaged by the second indent of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) in which a government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out certain functions such as the direct transfer of funds, without specifying the origin of the funds used. It is clear from those provisions that the concept of ‘financial contribution by a government’ covers all the financial means a government may actually use. Furthermore, in order to determine whether a direct transfer of funds may justify the imposition of a countervailing duty, the absence of consideration, or of equivalent consideration, on the part of the undertaking receiving it, must be taken into account. 179 In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 30 to 33 of the contested regulation and it is not disputed that the Oil Palm Plantation Fund is a public body. That body is used to support purchases of biodiesel by entities appointed by governmental bodies and it entrusted an agency, the Fund Management Agency (‘the Management Agency’), to collect export levies on the exportation of palm oil commodities, which constitute its funds (recitals 41 to 43 of the provisional regulation). 180 According to recitals 45 to 50 of the provisional regulation (and recital 37 of the contested regulation), the procedure classified by the Commission as a ‘direct transfer of funds’ was the following: ‘(45) More precisely, Presidential Regulation 26/2016 stipulates in its Article 9(1) that “[t]he Director-General of [the Directorate-General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation] shall appoint the Petrofuel Entity which shall carry out the procurement of biodiesel as meant in Article 4 in the framework of financing by the … Management Agency by observing the policy of the Steering Committee of the … Management Agency” and in the following Article 9(8) that “[b]ased on the approval from the Minister as meant in paragraph (7), the Director-General of [the Directorate-General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation] on behalf of the Minister shall appoint: a. the biodiesel producers which are going to participate in the procurement of biodiesel; and b. the allocation of volume of biodiesel for each biodiesel producer”. … (46) The biodiesel producers which choose to participate and have been allocated a quota pursuant to that regulation are under the obligation to sell the monthly amount of biodiesel to the so-called “Petrofuel Entity”. So far, the [Indonesian Government] has appointed the following as Petrofuel Entity: (a) PT Pertamina (“Pertamina”), a State-owned oil and gas company, and (b) PT AKR Corporindo Tbk (“AKR”), a private oil and gas company. (47) The [Oil Palm Plantation Fund] envisages a specific payment mechanism, whereby Pertamina (and for some small volumes, AKR) pays biodiesel producers the diesel reference price (as opposed to the actual biodiesel price which, during the [investigation period] … would have been higher), whereas the difference between such diesel reference price and the biodiesel reference price is paid to the biodiesel producers out of the [Oil Palm Plantation Fund] by the Management Agency. (48) The reference price for diesel and biodiesel is determined by the Minister [for] Energy and Mineral Resources … in [the] following way: (a) The diesel reference price is based on prices reported by Platts Singapore for oil … and the production cost of diesel in Indonesia. (b) … the biodiesel reference price is based on the CPO domestic price, to which transformation costs are added … (49) More precisely, each biodiesel producer – including all the exporting producers – invoices Pertamina (or AKR, as the case may be) the volume of biodiesel which the buyer is required to use under the blending obligation [under which, for a number of applications, such as for example public transport, operators are under the legal obligation to use as fuel a blend of mineral diesel and biodiesel which contains at least 20% of biodiesel], and Pertamina (or AKR) pays to the producer the diesel reference price for that period. … (50) The producer of biodiesel, in order to obtain reimbursement of the price difference between the price paid by Pertamina and AKR (based on the diesel reference price) and the reference price for biodiesel, shall then send an additional invoice for the same volume to the Management Agency, enclosing a list of documents. Once the Management Agency has received the invoice, and after verification of the elements contained therein, the Management Agency shall pay to the relevant biodiesel producer the difference between the reference price for diesel (paid by Pertamina or AKR, as the case may be) and the reference price of biodiesel set for that period.’ 181 In the first place, the applicants claim that the Commission was wrong to classify the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund as a direct transfer of funds in the form of a grant and not as payments made in consideration for the sale of biodiesel to PT Pertamina (‘Pertamina’), since, as Pertamina is also a public body, it was part of the Indonesian State and, in any event, was, together with the Management Agency, part of a single economic entity. 182 In that regard, first, it should be noted that it is clear from recital 46 of the provisional regulation that Pertamina belongs to the Indonesian State. However, apart from the fact that Pertamina and the Management Agency belong to the Indonesian State, the applicants do not put forward any matter of fact or law in support of their claim that, in accordance with the case-law on which they rely (judgment of 16 February 2012, Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraphs 52 to 55), those entities act within a group formed by legally distinct companies which organises in that way activities that in other cases are carried on by what is, also from a legal point of view, a single entity. On the contrary, it is common ground that a private undertaking which is not affiliated to the State, namely PT AKR Corporindo Tbk (‘AKR’), performs the same functions as Pertamina. 183 Second, even if, contrary to the Commission’s findings in recitals 48 and 49 of the contested regulation, Pertamina were a public body, it is a separate entity from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and the Management Agency and there is nothing to indicate that Pertamina acted, together with the Management Agency and the Indonesian Government, as a single purchaser of biodiesel by means of the ‘combined actions’ of several public bodies, as the applicants maintain. As the Commission rightly points out, Pertamina was not an agency entrusted by the Government to perform only certain functions, but an oil and gas company which performed the same functions as AKR, a private oil and gas company, as is clear from recital 46 of the provisional regulation and recital 55 of the contested regulation, a point that has not been disputed by the applicants. The applicants’ argument put forward at the hearing, that it is apparent from the evidence in the file submitted by the Commission that Pertamina and AKR were designated by the Indonesian Government to provide biodiesel, is not capable of altering that conclusion. 184 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be observed that, even if the applicants’ claims that Pertamina was a public body were correct, such an error on the part of the Commission would justify annulment of the contested regulation only if it called into question its lawfulness by invalidating the Commission’s entire analysis relating to the existence of a subsidy (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 October 2011, Transnational Company “Kazchrome” and ENRC Marketing v Council, T‑192/08, EU:T:2011:619, paragraph 119), which is not the case here. 185 In the second place, the applicants put forward a series of arguments seeking to establish that, if the Court considers that Pertamina is not a public body and that it does not form a single economic entity together with the Indonesian Government, it must therefore be held that it was ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ by the Indonesian Government to purchase biodiesel within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic regulation. 186 In that regard, it must be stated that it was not Pertamina’s payment of the reference price for diesel as consideration for the purchase of biodiesel that was considered by the Commission to be a ‘direct transfer of funds’, but rather the payment, by the Management Agency, a public body, of the difference between the reference price for diesel and the reference price for biodiesel fixed for the period in question to the biodiesel producer concerned. Accordingly, Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic regulation, which concerns the conduct of private bodies (see paragraph 96 above), is not applicable. 187 In the third place, the applicants claim that there was a contractual relationship between them and the Oil Palm Plantation Fund which made payment by the latter conditional on the delivery of biodiesel to Pertamina. It is a purchase for which it is not necessary for the entity making the payment for the goods to also gain possession of those goods. 188 In that regard, it should be noted that, in recital 38 of the contested regulation, the Commission stated that ‘the disbursement[s] of the [Oil Palm Plantation Fund] in favour of the biodiesel producers cannot qualify as payments due in a purchase contract between the [Indonesian Government] and the biodiesel producers but constitute a direct transfer of funds’. 189 It is apparent from the factual context of the present case, as set out in recitals 45 to 50 of the provisional regulation and recital 37 of the contested regulation (see paragraph 180 above), and which is not disputed by the applicants, that, in the context of the system conceived by Presidential Regulation 26/2016, the Management Agency did not intervene in the transaction between the biodiesel producers and Pertamina and AKR. It was the Director-General of the Directorate-General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation who, first, appointed the entities that would carry out the procurement of biodiesel (in accordance with the policy defined by the Steering Committee of the Management Agency) and, second, on behalf of the Minister, appointed the biodiesel producers who were to participate in the procurement of biodiesel and allocated the volume of biodiesel for each biodiesel producer. The reference price for diesel and biodiesel was determined by the Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources. Next, each producer invoiced Pertamina or AKR the volume of biodiesel which these undertakings were required to use under the blending mandate and the latter paid the producer the diesel reference price. It was only at the end of that transaction that the biodiesel producers sent an additional invoice for the same volume of biodiesel to the Management Agency in order to obtain reimbursement of the difference between the reference price for diesel and the reference price for biodiesel, together with a copy of the decision of the Directorate-General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation certifying that they were allowed to participate in the procurement of biodiesel and indicating the respective volumes of biodiesel allocated, a copy of the contract for procurement of biodiesel between them and Pertamina or AKR, the certificate signed by Pertamina or AKR and the biodiesel producer in question, stamped by the Indonesian Government and including information about the place of delivery, the volume and type of biodiesel provided and the amount of transport fees, and a copy of the agreement between the Management Agency and the relevant biodiesel producer. 190 In addition, the Commission also considered, in recitals 67 and 69 of the contested regulation, and that point was not disputed by the applicants either, that the reference price for biodiesel that was paid to independent suppliers did not reflect supply and demand under normal market conditions without government intervention, and that the amount of the transformation costs calculated by the Indonesian Government as part of the formula used to calculate the reference price for biodiesel was excessive. The Commission deduced from that situation, in recital 68 of the contested regulation, that, without those payments, biodiesel prices in Indonesia would be lower. Since the payments made by the Management Agency to biodiesel producers are calculated on the basis of a reference price for biodiesel that does not result from normal market conditions, they cannot be regarded as a price supplement which the producers are entitled to obtain in return for their supplies to Pertamina or AKR. 191 On the basis of those facts, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding, in recital 37 of the contested regulation, having regard for its broad discretion in determining whether there was a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the basic regulation and in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 95 above, that the funds paid by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund ‘[were] not therefore part of a contract for consideration (such as the purchase of biodiesel by the government in exchange of a price)’. It is not apparent from the presentation of the facts that the Oil Palm Plantation Fund was involved in the transaction between the biodiesel producers and the ‘Petrofuel entities’, namely Pertamina and AKR, or that that fund received any consideration for the payments it made. Thus, the nature of the transaction does not lead to the conclusion that the payments made by that fund formed part of a reciprocal obligation scheme. 192 Against that background, the applicants’ argument that the concept of conditional grants must be interpreted restrictively is ineffective. 193 Consequently, the whole of the first part of the fourth plea must be rejected. The second part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(2) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission in finding that a benefit was conferred 194 By the second part of the fourth plea, the applicants dispute the Commission’s finding that the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund constitute a benefit. 195 By their first complaint, the applicants submit that the Commission relied on a manifestly incorrect counterfactual scenario when it found that, in the absence of the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and its payments, the biodiesel producers could not have sold their product on the Indonesian market and that the prices of biodiesel would be lower. The Oil Palm Plantation Fund and the blending mandate are two separate legal tools with different objectives. In the absence of the first, the second would still exist and the blenders would be required to purchase biodiesel in order to comply with the blending mandate. 196 As was pointed out in paragraph 163 above, Article 3 of the basic regulation provides that a subsidy is deemed to exist where there is a ‘financial contribution’ by a government and if a ‘benefit’ is thereby conferred. Articles 6 and 7 of that regulation lay down the procedures for calculating the ‘benefit conferred’. According to the case-law, a benefit is conferred on the recipient if the latter is in a more favourable situation than it would have been in in the absence of the subsidy scheme. In addition, it is clear from Article 3(1) and (2) of the basic regulation that it is only where a government financial contribution confers a real benefit on an exporting producer that a subsidy is deemed to exist for that exporting producer (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T‑300/16, EU:T:2019:235, paragraphs 195 and 210). 197 In the present case, the Commission considered, in recital 65 of the contested regulation, that the correct counterfactual scenario was not one in which, in the absence of the Oil Palm Plantation Fund, the blenders would pay the reference price for biodiesel. According to the Commission, without the blending mandate, without the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and without its payments, blenders would not have an incentive to purchase biodiesel and biodiesel producers would not receive the supplement corresponding to the difference between the reference price for diesel and the reference price for biodiesel set by the Indonesian Government. The Commission also considered, as stated in paragraph 190 above, that the reference price for biodiesel paid to independent suppliers was excessive. 198 It is apparent from the provisional regulation that the blending mandate was introduced by Regulation of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources No 12/2015 (recital 189). In the same year, 2015, the Biodiesel Subsidy Fund, which is part of the Oil Palm Plantation Fund, was established by Presidential Regulation 61/2015 (recital 40) and the Management Agency was entrusted with the task of collecting export levies on the exportation of palm oil commodities which constituted the financing of the Oil Palm Plantation Fund (recitals 41 and 42). By the same provision (Article 1(4) of Presidential Regulation 61/2015), the Indonesian Government granted the Management Agency the right to use export levies and export taxes imposed on CPO and its derivatives and imposed an obligation to procure and use biodiesel (recital 60). The funds used to pay biodiesel producers the difference between the diesel reference price and the biodiesel reference price came from the funds thus allocated to the Management Agency. 199 It appears that the implementation of the blending mandate in the system devised by the Indonesian Government depended on financing by the Management Agency. It is a complex scheme established by the Indonesian Government with the objective of supporting purchases of biodiesel by entities appointed by governmental bodies, as is apparent from Presidential Regulations 24/2016 and 26/2016 (recital 44 of the provisional regulation). The scenario of the existence of the blending mandate without funding by the Management Agency is thus purely hypothetical and the Commission cannot be criticised for not having based its analysis on it. 200 Accordingly, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 24 and 25 above, which also applies to the determination of the existence of a benefit conferred on the recipient of a subsidy, in considering the scheme as a whole and concluding, in recital 71 of the contested regulation, that its existence put biodiesel producers in a more favourable situation than they would otherwise have been in and therefore conferred a benefit on them. 201 In addition, the applicants have not disputed the Commission’s finding that, in that scheme, the amount of transformation costs in the context of the formula used to calculate the reference price for biodiesel was excessive (paragraph 197 above). Thus, as the Commission correctly points out, the biodiesel reference price taken into consideration by the Management Agency in order to determine the amount of its payments to biodiesel producers does not reflect what the price would be under market conditions. The Commission was entitled to deduce from this, without committing a manifest error, that, as a result of that financial contribution by the government, the recipients were better off than they would have been without that contribution, even in the counterfactual scenario proposed by the applicants. 202 Accordingly, the applicants’ first complaint must be rejected. 203 By their second complaint, the applicants claim that, if a benefit was conferred, it was fully passed on to the blenders, Pertamina and AKR. According to the applicants, the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme was designed to support blenders in their purchases of biodiesel and to ensure that they pay a price lower than the market reference price for that product, and not to support biodiesel producers. 204 In that regard, it must be stated that the applicants’ arguments seeking to dispute the existence of a financial contribution conferring a benefit on them have been rejected (paragraphs 181 to 192 and 195 to 201 above). It is also common ground that the payments at issue, corresponding to the difference between the diesel reference price and the biodiesel reference price, were paid by the Management Agency to the biodiesel producers, including the applicants. The applicants have failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show that part of those sums or the benefit derived from their payment was transferred to AKR and Pertamina. Such evidence is, however, necessary in order to establish that an EU institution has committed a manifest error of assessment such as to justify the annulment of a measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 62). The fact that the scheme established by the Indonesian Government could also have been beneficial to AKR and Pertamina does not mean that the benefit conferred on the recipients was passed on to those undertakings. Furthermore, even assuming that the blenders benefited from advantageous purchase terms for biodiesel by acquiring it at the reference price for diesel and not at the reference price for biodiesel, that fact does not preclude that, under the same scheme, the biodiesel producers enjoyed another benefit as a result of the payments made by the Management Agency. 205 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second complaint and, consequently, the whole of the second part of the fourth plea must be rejected. 206 Since all of the arguments put forward in the context of the fourth plea in law have been rejected, that plea must be rejected. The fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7 of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme 207 The applicants’ arguments under the fifth plea can be divided into two complaints. The first complaint concerns the manifest error of assessment that the Commission allegedly committed in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme, by not deducting from the amount of the subsidy the export levies paid to the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and transport costs. The second complaint concerns the manifest error of assessment that the Commission allegedly made in the same calculation by allocating the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund to the total biodiesel turnover. 208 The Commission, supported by EBB, disputes this plea in law. The failure to deduct export levies and transport costs from the amount of the subsidy 209 Article 7(1) of the basic regulation provides as follows: ‘… In establishing [the amount of the countervailable subsidy], the following elements may be deducted from the total subsidy: (a) any application fee or other costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify for, or to obtain, the subsidy; (b) export taxes, duties or other charges levied on the export of the product to the Union specifically intended to offset the subsidy. Where an interested party claims a deduction, it must prove that the claim is justified.’ 210 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is clear from Article 7(1) of the basic regulation, and in particular from the wording ‘may be deducted’, that the Commission enjoys a broad discretion in the application of that provision, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above. The deduction of those elements from the amount of the countervailable subsidy is subject to the interested party proving that its claim for deduction is justified. Once that proof has been adduced, the Commission must make the deduction requested. 211 In the first place, the applicants submit that the Commission should have deducted from the amount of the countervailable subsidy the export levies paid to the Oil Palm Plantation Fund, since those levies are different in nature from ordinary taxes and are linked to the biodiesel industry as they form part of the biodiesel value chain. 212 It must be stated that no evidence has been adduced by the applicants, in accordance with the burden of proof borne by them under the last subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the basic regulation and the case-law cited in paragraph 204 above, establishing that the export levies in question were specifically intended to offset the subsidy. On the contrary, it is clear from recital 89 of the provisional regulation, and it has not been disputed by the applicants, that the export levy does not concern only biodiesel, but rather ‘CPO and the downstream products’, including biodiesel. The applicants do not explain how an export levy which concerns several products is specifically intended to offset the subsidy from which one of those products benefits. In addition, the fact that those levies fund the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and enter into the biodiesel value chain is not sufficient to establish that they were specifically intended to offset the subsidy and, therefore, that the Commission erred as to the scope of Article 7(1)(a) of the basic regulation or vitiated its analysis by a manifest error. 213 Accordingly, the applicants’ argument in that regard must be rejected. 214 In the second place, the applicants submit that the transport costs were necessary, for the purposes of Article 7(1)(a) of the basic regulation, in order to deliver the biodiesel and thus receive payment from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund and that they should have been deducted from the amount of the countervailable subsidy. In their view, the Commission was wrong to rely on its information on the calculation of the amount of subsidy in countervailing duty investigations (OJ 1998 C 394, p. 6) (‘the guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy’), a document which has no binding force, in order to refuse to deduct transport costs on the ground that they were non-compulsory costs which were paid to private undertakings. 215 In that regard, it should be noted that guidelines are an instrument intended to define, while complying with higher-ranking law, the criteria which the Commission proposes to apply in the exercise of its discretion when calculating the amount of countervailable subsidies (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2006, Daiichi Pharmaceutical v Commission, T‑26/02, EU:T:2006:75, paragraph 49). It follows that, when it adopts guidelines, the Commission cannot depart from the higher-ranking text of which it sets out the application criteria. 216 Furthermore, according to the case-law, by adopting rules of conduct intended to produce external effects, as is the case with guidelines which are aimed at economic operators, and announcing by publishing them that it will apply those rules to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as the principles of equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraphs 210 and 211). 217 The guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy provide, under heading ‘G. Deduction from amount of subsidy’, that ‘the only fees or costs that may normally be deducted are those paid directly to the government [during] the investigation period’, that ‘it must be shown that such payment is compulsory in order to receive the subsidy’ and that ‘payments to private parties, e.g. lawyers, accountants, incurred in applying for subsidies, are not deductible’. 218 Those clarifications are compatible with the higher-ranking text which they are intended to clarify. First, the specification that the deductible fees and costs must be ‘compulsory in order to receive the subsidy’ is consistent with the condition laid down in Article 7(1)(a) of the basic regulation, namely that the deductible fees or costs must be ‘necessarily incurred’ in order to qualify for the subsidy. Second, the clarification that ‘the only fees or costs that may normally be deducted are those paid directly to the government [during] the investigation period’ is also compatible with that provision. In view of the Commission’s broad discretion in this area, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above, the Commission did not, contrary to what the applicants claim, wrongly limit deductible fees and costs when it stated in the guidelines that the ‘application fee … or other costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify for … the subsidy’ referred to in Article 7(1)(a) of the basic regulation were those ‘paid directly to the government [during] the investigation period’. 219 Accordingly, the Commission was fully entitled to apply, in recitals 87 to 92 of the contested regulation, the guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy to the request for the deduction of transport costs. 220 In the present case, first, the applicants do not claim that the transport costs for delivery of the biodiesel were paid directly to the Indonesian Government during the investigation period. Second, their argument that the payments from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund were conditional on the biodiesel being delivered and, therefore, that the transport costs relating to them were ‘necessarily incurred in order to qualify for … the subsidy’ within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of the basic regulation, cannot be accepted. Those costs were linked exclusively to the performance of the sale contract between the applicants and Pertamina or AKR. The fact that, in order to receive the payments from the Management Agency, the biodiesel producers had to attach to their invoice a series of supporting documents including the information relating to the place of delivery, the volume and type of biodiesel provided and the amount of transport costs does not mean that those costs were ‘compulsory in order to receive the subsidy’ within the meaning of the guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy and does not alter that conclusion. 221 Accordingly, those arguments must be rejected. The allocation of the amount of the subsidy to the total biodiesel turnover 222 Article 7(2) of the basic regulation provides that ‘where the subsidy is not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported, the amount of countervailable subsidy shall be determined by allocating the value of the total subsidy, as appropriate, over the level of production, sales or exports of the products concerned during the investigation period for subsidisation’. 223 It is clear from the provisions in the heading ‘(b) Appropriate denominator for allocation of subsidy amount’, which appears under the heading ‘F. Investigation period for subsidy – calculation expense versus allocation’ of the guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy, that ‘(ii) For non-export subsidies the total sales (domestic plus export) should normally be used as the denominator, since such subsidies benefit both domestic and export sales’. 224 In the present case, in recital 81 of the provisional regulation, confirmed in recital 100 of the contested regulation, the Commission allocated those subsidy amounts over the total turnover generated by the sales of biodiesel of the exporting producers during the investigation period, a turnover including domestic sales and export sales. 225 The applicants submit that the Commission made a manifest error in allocating the amount of the payments received by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund in respect of the total turnover of their biodiesel sales. According to the applicants, those amounts should have been allocated solely over sales of biodiesel on the Indonesian domestic market, those being the only sales that justify obtaining payments from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund. 226 However, first, since the subsidies were not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported, the Commission, by allocating the amounts of subsidies over the total turnover generated by the sales of the product concerned, namely biodiesel, during the investigation period, complied with Article 7(2) of the basic regulation. Second, and since, in the present case, the subsidies in question are not export subsidies, the Commission acted in accordance with the guidelines on the calculation of the subsidy by using as denominator total (domestic and export) sales of that product. As the Commission rightly points out, the payments from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund did not limit their effects on the Indonesian domestic market, but constituted support provided to biodiesel producers and could also confer a benefit on export sales. The argument put forward by the applicants in their pleadings and at the hearing, that if the principle that money is a fungible asset were to be applied the benefit would have to be allocated in respect of all sales, is not such as to alter that conclusion, but rather to support it. Such an argument amounts to accepting that the allocation should be made on a broader basis than only in respect of sales of biodiesel on the domestic market. 227 It follows that the approach consisting in taking into account the total turnover of biodiesel sales is appropriate and does not therefore appear to be manifestly incorrect. 228 Furthermore, the applicants submit that the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons by failing to respond, in the contested regulation, to their argument that the amount of the subsidy should have been allocated over their total turnover. 229 According to settled case-law, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the parties concerned, but it is sufficient if it sets out the facts and the legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (judgment of 6 March 2003, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission, T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraph 280). Thus, the Commission is not required to reply, in the statement of reasons for the provisional or definitive regulation, to all the points of fact and law raised by the persons concerned during the administrative procedure (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 October 2011, Transnational Company “Kazchrome” and ENRC Marketing v Council, T‑192/08, EU:T:2011:619, paragraph 256 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the Commission is not required to give specific reasons, in the regulation imposing a definitive countervailing duty, explaining why it did not take account of the various arguments put forward by the parties in the course of the administrative procedure. It is sufficient for that regulation to contain a clear explanation of the main factors considered in its analysis, provided that that justification is capable of casting light on the reasons why the Commission rejected the relevant arguments raised in that regard by the parties during the administrative procedure (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 June 2017, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council, T‑442/12, EU:T:2017:372, paragraph 90). 230 However, where, in an anti-subsidy case, the interested parties insist during the administrative procedure on obtaining answers or clarifications in respect of the key method to be used by the institutions in making the calculations, it must be held that it is even more important for the institutions to give reasons for their decision in such a way that the persons concerned are able to understand the calculations thus made (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles v Council, T‑67/14, not published, EU:T:2017:481, paragraph 127). In addition, the reasons for a measure must appear in the actual body of the measure and may not, save in exceptional circumstances, be stated in written or oral explanations given subsequently when the measure is already the subject of proceedings brought before the EU judicature (judgment of 1 June 2017, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council, T‑442/12, EU:T:2017:372, paragraph 91). 231 In the present case, it is common ground that one of the applicants claimed during the administrative procedure, in the alternative, that the amount of the subsidy should be allocated over its total turnover, including both biodiesel and other products, and that the contested regulation does not explicitly address that argument. However, it is clear from recital 81 of the provisional regulation, the analysis of which was confirmed by the contested regulation, that the allocation took place in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic regulation, which provides for the allocation of the value of the total subsidy over the level of production, sales or exports of the ‘products concerned’, which is, in the present case, biodiesel. 232 It is clear that that justification is capable of casting light on why the Commission rejected the arguments relied on in that respect by the parties during the administrative procedure in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 229 above. 233 In addition, the method of allocating the amount of the subsidy is sufficiently clear from recital 100 of the contested regulation and recital 81 of the provisional regulation, which enabled the applicants to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to defend their rights and enabled the Courts of the European Union to exercise their power of review, as is apparent from paragraph 225 et seq. above. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 141 above. 234 Therefore, the complaint alleging the existence of an infringement of the obligation to state reasons must be rejected. 235 Since all of the complaints put forward in the context of the fifth plea in law have been rejected, that plea must be rejected. The sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1) and (8) of the basic regulation in the determination of the existence of a threat of material injury 236 By the sixth plea, the applicants claim that the Commission infringed Article 8(1) and (8) of the basic regulation in finding that there was a threat of material injury without examining certain factors set out in Article 8(8) of the basic regulation and without taking into account all the evidence submitted. 237 In the present case, the Commission concluded, in recitals 319 and 320 of the contested regulation, that the EU industry had not suffered material injury during the investigation period, even though that industry was not robust. Yet, it considered that there was, in the present case, a threat of material injury to that industry. 238 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled, in that regard, that Article 2(d) of the basic regulation defines the term ‘injury’ as meaning, unless otherwise specified, inter alia, material injury to the Union industry or threat of material injury to the Union industry, and that it refers to the provisions of Article 8 for the interpretation of that concept. 239 Article 8(1) of the basic regulation governs the determination of injury. Such determination is to involve an objective examination of the volume of the subsidised imports and the effect of the subsidised imports on prices in the Union market for like products as well as the consequent impact of those imports on the Union industry. 240 Article 8(8) of the basic regulation governs the ‘determination of a threat of material injury’. It is specified that that determination is to be based on facts and not merely on allegations, conjecture or remote possibility and that the change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the subsidy would cause injury must have been clearly foreseen and must be imminent. It follows that the determination of a threat of injury must be clearly apparent from the circumstances of the case. It also follows that the injury threatened must be impending (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paragraph 54). 241 That provision sets out a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is a threat of material injury (see, by analogy, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Joined Cases ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Council and Council v Hubei Xinyegang Steel, C‑186/14 P and C‑193/14 P, EU:C:2015:767, point 44), namely factors such as: ‘(a) the nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom; (b) a significant rate of increase of subsidised imports into the Union market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports; (c) whether there is sufficient freely disposable capacity on the part of the exporter or an imminent and substantial increase in such capacity indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidised exports to the Union, account being taken of the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports; (d) whether imports are entering at prices that would, to a significant degree, depress prices or prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred, and would probably increase demand for further imports; (e) inventories of the product being investigated.’ 242 Article 8(8) of the basic regulation also states that no one of those factors can give decisive guidance, but the totality of the factors considered must be such as to lead to the conclusion that further subsidised exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken, material injury will occur. 243 In addition, the Court of Justice has already stated that the existence of a threat of injury, like that of an injury, must be established as at the date of the adoption of the anti-subsidy measure, having regard to the situation of the Union industry at that time. It is only in view of that situation that the EU institutions can determine whether the imminent increase in future subsidised imports will cause material injury to that industry if no trade defence measure is taken. However, the EU institutions are entitled, in certain circumstances, to take post-investigation period data into consideration (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems, C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94, paragraphs 40 and 41). 244 It must be borne in mind, in that respect, that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine. In that respect it must be observed that the examination of a threat of injury involves the assessment of complex economic matters and that the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there have been manifest errors in the assessment of those facts or a misuse of powers. That limited judicial review does not mean that the EU judicature must refrain from reviewing the institutions’ interpretation of information of an economic nature (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paragraph 53). In particular, it is for the General Court not only to establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also to ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions reached (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 October 2018, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council, C‑100/17 P, EU:C:2018:842, paragraph 64). 245 In addition, the Commission’s conclusion as to the situation of the Union industry, established in the context of the analysis of material injury caused to a Union industry, for the purposes of Article 8(4) of the basic regulation, remains, in principle, relevant in the analysis of the threat of material injury to that industry, within the meaning of Article 8(8) of that regulation (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems, C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94, paragraph 42). 246 It is in the light of those principles that the Court must examine whether the Commission infringed Article 8(1) and (8) of the basic regulation when it concluded, in recital 405 of the contested regulation, that, during the investigation period, the imports from Indonesia had constituted a threat of material injury to the Union industry. The situation of the Union industry 247 In order to reach the conclusion that the Union industry was not robust during the investigation period, the Commission took into consideration, in recitals 309 to 340 of the provisional regulation, a number of microeconomic and macroeconomic indicators, and confirmed that analysis in recitals 279 to 317 of the contested regulation, in which it also examined, in recitals 321 to 341, economic indicators relating to after the investigation period. 248 The applicants, without calling into question the veracity of the data used by the Commission, claim that, in the light of the microeconomic and macroeconomic indicators which show certain positive trends, the Commission is wrong to claim that the Union industry was in a fragile situation. 249 In the first place, as regards the macroeconomic indicators, first, the applicants submit that EU production, production capacity and capacity utilisation increased during the investigation period. 250 In that regard, it should be observed that it is apparent from Table 3 set out in recital 268 of the provisional regulation that, after an increase between 2015 and 2017, EU production remained almost stable between 2017 and the investigation period (an increase from 13 071 053 tonnes to 13 140 582 tonnes for a stable index of 111), whereas EU consumption increased considerably, as is apparent from Table 4 set out in recital 271 of the provisional regulation (from 14 202 128 tonnes to 15 634 102 tonnes, an increase of 10.08%). It follows that EU production did not follow the increase in EU consumption and therefore in demand. Moreover, it is apparent from Table 8 set out in recital 309 of the provisional regulation that EU production capacity increased slightly between 2017 and the investigation period (from 16 594 853 tonnes to 17 031 230 tonnes), while the use of that capacity, after increasing in 2015, 2016 and 2017, fell slightly between 2017 and the investigation period. 251 On the basis of those data, the Commission found, in recital 310 of the provisional regulation, that the increase in the Union industry’s production capacity was significantly lower than the increase in demand, since that industry had been able to benefit from market growth only to a very limited extent due to the significant increase in subsidised imports, in particular during the investigation period. 252 Since that finding corresponds to the data analysed and is capable of substantiating the conclusion that the Union industry was in a fragile situation, the applicants’ first argument must be rejected. 253 Second, the applicants claim that the volume of sales increased. 254 However, it is clear from Table 9 set out in recital 314 of the provisional regulation that, although the Union market sales volume increased between 2015 and 2017, those sales decreased between 2017 and the investigation period, a period which corresponds, as the Commission observes in recital 317 of the provisional regulation, to the removal of duties on imports from Indonesia. The applicants’ argument in that regard must therefore be rejected. 255 Third, the applicants submit that the Union industry retained a high market share of between 81% and 95%. 256 However, it must be stated that it is apparent from Table 9 set out in recital 314 of the provisional regulation that the Union industry’s market share decreased significantly between 2017 and the investigation period (from 91.6% to 81.5%). The Commission explains, in recital 317 of that regulation, and the applicants do not challenge that point, that that decrease is due to the removal of duties on imports from Indonesia which changed the market situation in March 2018, during the investigation period. In the light of those data, the applicants’ argument in that regard must be rejected. 257 Fourth, the applicants argue that employment and productivity display positive trends. 258 It is apparent from Table 10 set out in recital 319 of the provisional regulation that the number of employees of the Union industry increased slightly between 2015 and the investigation period (by 78 employees). However, productivity decreased between 2017 and the investigation period (from 4 782 tonnes per employee to 4 625 tonnes per employee). It follows that the slight increase in the number of employees is not in itself sufficient to invalidate the Commission’s conclusions drawn from all the macroeconomic indicators. According to the case-law, although the examination by the institutions must lead to the conclusion that the threat of injury is significant, it is not necessary for all the relevant economic factors and indices to show a negative trend (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 23 April 2018, Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel v Commission, T‑675/15, not published, EU:T:2018:209, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). 259 It follows that the arguments of the applicants in that regard must be rejected. 260 In the second place, as regards the microeconomic indicators, first, the applicants submit that the sale prices in the European Union increased. 261 It is clear from Table 11 set out in recital 325 of the provisional regulation that, after increasing between 2015 and 2017, the period during which there were duties on imports from Indonesia, prices fell from EUR 832 per tonne to EUR 794 per tonne between 2017 and the investigation period. The applicants’ argument must therefore be rejected. 262 Second, the applicants submit that production costs have decreased since 2017. 263 It is apparent from Table 11 set out in recital 325 of the provisional regulation that production costs decreased from EUR 827 per tonne to EUR 791 per tonne between 2017 and the investigation period. However, it is apparent from all the data in that table, in particular the decrease in the sales price, that the Union industry was unable to benefit from that decrease in costs, since it had to pass on that decrease in full to its customers, as the Commission correctly observes in recital 328 of the provisional regulation. The applicants’ argument in that regard must therefore be rejected. 264 Third, the applicants maintain that cash flow, sales profitability and return on investments showed positive trends. 265 In that regard, it must be stated that it is apparent from Table 14 set out in recital 334 of the provisional regulation that cash flow increased between 2015 and 2017 (with a sharp increase between 2016 and 2017) and then fell back to 2016 levels. It is therefore not possible to infer a positive trend, contrary to what the applicants claim. 266 As regards the return on investments, it increased considerably between 2015 and 2016 and then remained relatively stable (18% in 2016, 16% in 2017 and 17% during the investigation period). That stabilisation of the return on investments, and the stabilisation of the profitability of sales in the European Union to unrelated customers at 0.8% in 2017 and during the investigation period, a rate which remains low, do not call into question the Commission’s findings as to the situation of the Union industry based on all the relevant factors in that regard. 267 As regards the post-investigation data, the applicants claim that they are not representative and cannot be relied on in order to draw meaningful conclusions. 268 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the possibility of taking into consideration, in certain circumstances, post-investigation period data is justified in the context of investigations intended, not to find injury, but to determine whether there is a threat of injury which, by its very nature, requires a prospective analysis. Those data may thus be used to confirm or invalidate the forecasts in the Commission regulation imposing a provisional countervailing duty and allow, in the former case, the imposition of a definitive countervailing duty. However, the EU institutions’ use of those post-investigation period data cannot escape review by the Courts of the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems, C‑324/19, EU:C:2021:94, paragraph 41). 269 In the present case, the Commission examined, in recitals 321 to 341 of the contested regulation, the data relating to the period from October 2018 to June 2019 (‘the post-investigation period’) and concluded that, during the post-investigation period, the economic situation of the Union industry had further deteriorated. 270 The applicants claim that the Commission used data that were not representative because, first, it is mentioned in the contested regulation that, for four out of the nine months of the post-investigation period, the data were skewed because of exceptional circumstances faced by one producer and, second, it is held, in recital 322 of the contested regulation, that ‘the figures for the investigation period are not directly comparable to the figures for the [post-investigation period]’. 271 Those claims made by the applicants are unfounded. The Commission was careful to specify the circumstances that made it possible to quantify the representativeness of the post-investigation period data or to justify its relevance. First, it explained, in recital 331 of the contested regulation, that the higher profits in winter 2018-2019 were exceptional because they were recorded by one sampled company which was able to take advantage of a temporary shortage of supply in its region, enabling it to increase its prices and, therefore, its profits during that period. Second, the Commission stated, in recital 322 of that regulation, that the figures for the investigation period were not directly comparable to the post-investigation period figures. Thus, it noted that, given the time limits for the investigation, certain macroeconomic indicators could be analysed only for the sampled Union producers. Moreover, it compared the 12 months of the investigation period to the 9 months of the post-investigation period, because the data relating to the 12 months of the post-investigation period were not yet available. 272 It follows that those data may be used to confirm or invalidate the forecasts in the Commission regulation imposing a provisional countervailing duty in order to allow the imposition of a definitive countervailing duty, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 268 above. 273 In the light of all the foregoing, the applicants’ arguments must be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the issue of admissibility, addressed by implication by the Commission, according to which those arguments were raised for the first time at the stage of the reply (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2017, France v Commission, T‑344/15, EU:T:2017:250, paragraph 92). The nature of the subsidies at issue and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom 274 The applicants claim that the Commission failed to take account of the evidence which they and other parties had provided concerning the nature and effects of the subsidies at issue. That evidence demonstrated, first, that the alleged provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration no longer had trade effects, since the export tax and export levies had ceased to apply in December 2018 and, second, that the payments made under the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme had dropped to zero between September and December 2018, before resuming at lower levels from January 2019, and no longer had trade effects on Indonesian biodiesel producers’ export activities. In addition, any benefits received by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund should be allocated solely to biodiesel sales on the domestic market. 275 In that regard, it should be recalled that the applicants’ arguments seeking to invalidate the Commission’s conclusions concerning price undercutting, the provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration and the existence of a subsidy in the form of a direct transfer of funds from the Oil Palm Plantation Fund were rejected in the context of the first, third and fourth pleas, respectively. The arguments concerning the allocation of the amount of the subsidy to the total turnover of biodiesel were rejected in the context of the fifth plea in law. 276 In those circumstances, the facts put forward by the applicants, relating to the setting of the export tax at zero, the suspension of the export levy from December 2018 and the fluctuation of payments made under the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme, all of which relate to the post-investigation period, cannot invalidate the Commission’s conclusion that the Indonesian Government, by means of a series of measures, distorted the domestic market for CPO in Indonesia and kept the price of that product at an artificially low level to the advantage of the downstream biodiesel industry (see recitals 80, 162, 172, 190 and 203 of the provisional regulation). 277 Therefore, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding, in recital 343 of the contested regulation, as it had noted in recital 349 of the provisional regulation, that the subsidies in question were capable of keeping exports of Indonesian biodiesel at a price level affecting the Union industry even more negatively, thereby confirming (recital 351 of the contested regulation) the assessment in recital 350 of the provisional regulation that the measures taken by the Indonesian Government affected the economic situation of the Union industry. The rate of increase in subsidised imports 278 The applicants claim that the post-investigation period data show no increase in imports of Indonesian biodiesel into the Union market and that, consequently, it is unlikely that such an increase will occur in the future. 279 However, it must be observed that Table 4 set out in recital 353 of the contested regulation shows that there was a greater quantity of imports from Indonesia during the three quarters of the post-investigation period (581 078 tonnes) than during the four quarters of the investigation period (516 068 tonnes), and the applicants do not challenge the accuracy of that data. The applicants’ argument that the quarterly volume of imports in the post-investigation period was lower than the volume of imports in the third quarter of 2018 cannot invalidate the Commission’s findings as to the rate of increase in imports. As the Commission rightly points out in recital 355 of the contested regulation, the first three quarters following the investigation period are not directly comparable to the last three quarters of the investigation period on account of seasonal variations, and the peak achieved in 2018, namely 263 678 tonnes in the third quarter, cannot be compared with the result of the third quarter of 2019, since the imports during that period were affected by the imposition of provisional duties. 280 Accordingly, the applicants’ claims that the post-investigation period data show no increase in imports must be rejected. 281 The applicants also submit that the adoption of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ 2018 L 328, p. 82) restricts imports of PME. 282 In that regard, it must be noted that that directive was adopted after the investigation period and the time limit for transposition did not expire until 30 June 2021, pursuant to Article 36(1) of that directive. In addition, under Article 26(2) of that directive, the full restriction on the import of ‘high indirect land-use change-risk biofuels, bioliquids or biomass fuels produced from food and feed crops for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with high-carbon stock is observed’ will be gradual as from 31 December 2023, in accordance with Article 26(2) of that directive. Accordingly, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding, in recital 360 of the contested regulation, that the effect of that directive could not be forecast and that it ‘[did] not affect the … analysis [being undertaken at that time] of threat of injury that Indonesian imports pose[d] to the Union industry in the near future’. 283 The applicants’ arguments must therefore be rejected. Sufficient freely disposable capacity of the exporter 284 As regards the freely disposable production capacity of Indonesian exporters, the applicants submit that the Commission received contradictory information from the Indonesian Government and from EBB and that it chose to rely on the information received by EBB and on the 2019 ‘US GAIN Jakarta’ report concerning Indonesian biofuels. In those circumstances, the Commission should have concluded that the evidence available on that subject was of little probative value. 285 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 244 above, it is for the Court not only to establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also to ascertain whether that evidence contained all the relevant information which had to be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it was capable of substantiating the conclusions reached. 286 In that context, it must be noted that, when the institutions examine the risk of material injury to the Union industry, taking into account production and exportation capacities in the exporting country, they must take into account not only the existence of other export markets, but also the potential development of internal consumption in the exporting country (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2014, Hubei Xinyegang Steel v Council, T‑528/09, EU:T:2014:35, paragraph 81). 287 In the present case, the applicants do not call into question the Commission’s findings in recitals 353 and 354 of the provisional regulation, based on information provided by the Indonesian Government, according to which the production capacity of Indonesian biodiesel producers greatly exceeds the domestic demand by approximately 300% and that the spare capacity of the Indonesian producers during the investigation period is estimated at around 40% of EU consumption. Nor do they dispute the Commission’s finding in recital 373 of the contested regulation that, according to the 2019 ‘US GAIN Jakarta’ report, the Indonesian biodiesel production capacity was expected to increase from 11.5 thousand million litres to 13 thousand million litres between 2019 and 2021. 288 The applicants claim that the Indonesian Government provided information showing that there was an expected capacity utilisation of 85% for 2019. However, it is apparent from the Indonesian Government’s arguments of 6 September 2019 to which the applicants refer that the 85% capacity utilisation for 2019 results from an extrapolation of the available data for the period from January to May 2019 and concerns the part of production used by the internal and external demand. The applicants do not explain precisely how those data call into question the Commission’s findings. Furthermore, even in the situation set out by the applicants, 15% of production capacity in 2019 remained unused. 289 The applicants also submit that the Indonesian Government provided information seeking to show that Indonesia would pass, in 2020, from a ‘B20’ blending mandate, that is to say, from a biodiesel and mineral diesel blend containing 20% of biodiesel, to a ‘B30’ blending mandate, that is to say, to a blend containing 30% of biodiesel, which would absorb the entire freely disposable capacity of Indonesian producers. The Commission therefore wrongly sided with EBB, which maintained that the implementation of the ‘B20’ blending mandate had caused problems and that the switch from the ‘B20’ blending mandate to a ‘B30’ blending mandate could pose similar problems. 290 More specifically, the applicants claim that it is apparent from the 2019 ‘US GAIN Jakarta’ report that the ‘B20’ blending mandate was extended to the transport sector not covered by the public service obligations only in September 2018, which led to an increase in local biodiesel consumption of 54% in 2019 and that the blending rate has been increasing exponentially since 2017 (from 8.2% in 2017 to 12.7% in 2018, reaching 19.9% in 2019). The declarations set out in that report state that implementation of the ‘B30’ blending mandate is planned for 2020. 291 It is apparent from recitals 374 to 376 of the contested regulation that the Commission took note of the Indonesian Government’s comments concerning the move from the ‘B20’ to the ‘B30’ blending mandate. 292 The Commission noted, in recital 382 of the contested regulation, that, according to the 2019 ‘US GAIN Jakarta’ report, it had been possible to meet the ‘B20’ blending mandate – which had been a mandatory target since 2016 – for the first time only in 2019, that is to say, three years after the deadline set. The applicants accept, in their written pleadings, the accuracy of that information. 293 It is also apparent from recital 376 of the contested regulation that the Commission had studied the data provided by the Indonesian Government in relation to information provided by EBB in its observations of 29 April 2019, showing that Indonesian operators were facing difficulties in distribution, availability of storage and blending infrastructure in implementing the ‘B20’ blending mandate and that the purpose of that mandate was to reduce imports of mineral diesel, rather than to reduce exports of biodiesel to other markets. It also took into consideration, in recital 377 of the contested regulation, information provided by EBB showing that the implementation of the ‘B30’ blending mandate was expected to take time. 294 As regards the possibility of increasing the blend rate to 30% biodiesel in a single year, the Commission considered, in recital 383 of the contested regulation, that, taking into account the increase in blend rates since 2011, an increase from 19.9% to 30% appeared to be extremely ambitious. 295 In that regard, it must be stated that, as the applicants claim (see paragraph 290 above), the largest increase in the mixture rate took place from 2018 to 2019, the blend rate increasing from 12.7% to 19.9%. That increase of 7.2 percentage points was considerably lower than the 10 percentage points necessary to achieve the ‘B30’ blending mandate in one year. 296 In the light of the foregoing observations, the Commission complied with its obligation to examine, with care and impartiality, all the relevant factors of the case (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2009, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP v Council, T‑249/06, EU:T:2009:62, paragraph 53), and did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding, in recital 384 of the contested regulation, that it was unlikely that a ‘B30’ blending mandate would be met in the near future and significantly affect the spare capacity in Indonesia in the short term. 297 It must be held that the applicants have failed to adduce sufficient evidence to render implausible the Commission’s assessment, in the contested regulation, of the facts regarding the blending mandate. Since such evidence is necessary in order to establish that an EU institution has committed a manifest error of assessment such as to justify the annulment of a measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v Council, T‑444/11, EU:T:2014:773, paragraph 62), those circumstances are sufficient for the applicants’ arguments to be rejected. Price level of the subsidised imports 298 The applicants submit that, as regards the price level of the subsidised imports, the Commission simply referred to its findings as regards undercutting, which, as demonstrated in the context of the first plea, do not satisfy the requirements of Article 8(1) and (2) of the basic regulation. Moreover, imports from Indonesia do not exert any pressure on EU prices. 299 In that regard, it should be recalled that the arguments put forward by the applicants in the context of their first plea in law, seeking to demonstrate that the Commission infringed Article 8(1) and (2) of the basic regulation when determining price undercutting and that the Commission was wrong to find that the imports of biodiesel from Indonesia had exerted pressure on EU prices, were rejected in their entirety. Furthermore, it is apparent from Table 7 set out in recital 283 of the provisional regulation and which is not disputed by the applicants that the import price of biodiesel from Indonesia was EUR 671 per tonne during the investigation period, whereas, as is apparent from Table 11 set out in recital 325 of the provisional regulation, the average unit selling price in the European Union fell from EUR 832 per tonne to EUR 794 per tonne between 2017 and the investigation period. 300 Consequently, those arguments of the applicants and, accordingly, the sixth plea in law, must be rejected. The seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence 301 In the context of their seventh plea in law, the applicants claim that certain information was disclosed to them only in the contested regulation, thus depriving them of the opportunity to comment on that information. According to the applicants, it cannot be ruled out that if they had been able to submit their observations on those points, the outcome of the procedure might have been different. 302 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, respect for the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of EU law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question (see judgment of 1 October 2009, Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardware v Council, C‑141/08 P, EU:C:2009:598, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited). 303 Under that principle, the undertakings concerned should have been placed in a position during the administrative procedure in which they could effectively make known their views on the correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the evidence presented by the Commission in support of its allegation concerning the existence of subsidisation and the resultant injury (see, by analogy, judgments of 16 February 2012, Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 76, and of 28 October 2004, Shanghai Teraoka Electronic v Council, T‑35/01, EU:T:2004:317, paragraph 289 and the case-law cited). 304 Although, it is true, respect for the rights of the defence is of crucial importance in anti-subsidy investigations (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2012, Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited), the existence of an irregularity with regard to the respect of those rights can lead to the annulment of a regulation establishing a countervailing duty only to the extent that there is a possibility that, as a result of that irregularity, the administrative procedure might have had a different outcome, thereby materially affecting the rights of defence of the party concerned (see judgment of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T‑300/16, EU:T:2019:235, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited). 305 In accordance with the case-law, the applicant cannot be required to demonstrate that the institutions’ decision would have been different, but simply that such a possibility cannot be totally ruled out, since it would have been better able to defend itself had there been no procedural error thus in fact affecting the rights of the defence (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2012, Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraphs 78 and 79). 306 It is in the light of those principles that it is necessary to examine whether the applicants’ rights of defence were infringed during the investigation procedure. 307 In the first place, the applicants criticise the Commission for having allegedly made, in recitals 230 to 233 of the contested regulation, new findings relating to the lack of sensitivity of demand for biodiesel to fluctuations in prices on the EU biodiesel market, stating that a low-price biodiesel did not lead to increased consumption and that price competition was therefore a zero-sum game irrespective of the raw materials used. 308 This argument must be rejected. By the findings set out in recitals 230 to 233 of the contested regulation, the Commission clarified the scope of the explanations provided, first, in recital 289 of the provisional regulation, namely in that ‘in most cases the final customer purchasing biodiesel is not aware of, nor concerned by, the feedstock that was used in the production, but requires a product that fulfils a certain maximum CFPP level’, then, in recital 299 of that regulation, namely in that ‘imports of PME from Indonesia at subsidised prices would have the effect of lowering the price of most blends sold on the Union market’ and, lastly, in recital 328 of that regulation, namely in that ‘a price undercutting of around 10% does exercise a significant downward pressure on prices’. The applicants cannot therefore claim that recitals 230 to 233 of the contested regulation contained new information altering the analysis made up to that point by the Commission and on which they should have been able to submit comments. 309 In the second place, the applicants claim that the Commission introduced, in recitals 251 to 254 of the contested regulation, new statements regarding changes on the Union market since the previous investigation and the fact that imports of PME were in competition with other types of biodiesel. 310 This argument must be rejected. The applicants cannot be unaware that the Union industry was then producing PME. That statement was, in fact, set out in recitals 292 to 294 of the provisional regulation. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the Commission infringed the applicants’ rights of defence by failing to inform them of the fact that the Union industry produced PME. 311 Accordingly, the Commission set out in the provisional regulation, during the administrative procedure which comes to an end with the adoption of the contested regulation (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 21 November 2002, Kundan and Tata v Council, T‑88/98, EU:T:2002:280, paragraph 131), its position concerning the evidence relied on by the applicants set out in paragraphs 307 and 309 above. It follows that the applicants had, as from the stage of the communication of the provisional regulation, the opportunity to state their views on those points. 312 In the light of the foregoing, the seventh plea in law must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 313 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and by EBB, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Commission and EBB. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action. 2. Orders PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri and PT Permata Hijau Palm Oleo to pay the costs. Gervasoni Madise Nihoul Frendo Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 December 2022. E. Coulon M. van der Woude Registrar President Table of contents Background to the dispute Forms of order sought Law The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1) and (2) of the basic regulation in the establishment of undercutting The first part of the first plea, alleging failure on the part of the Commission to take into account all the relevant data when establishing undercutting – The first method of calculation – The second method of calculation – The third method of calculation The second part of the first plea, alleging a failure to determine the price undercutting for the Union industry’s product as a whole and an error in finding that there was price pressure – The determination of price undercutting for the product as a whole – Price pressure The second plea in law, alleging that the contested regulation, in its analysis of the causal link, infringes Article 8(5) of the basic regulation The third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment by the Commission in finding that there was a subsidy in the form of the provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration The first part of the third plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission concluded that the Indonesian Government entrusted or directed the CPO suppliers to provide their goods for less than adequate remuneration – The export tax and the export levy – Price control by PTPN The second part of the third plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(1)(b) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission found that the Indonesian Government had provided income or price support The third part of the third plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(2) and Article 6(d) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission found that a benefit had been conferred on Indonesian producers The fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in finding that there was a subsidy in the form of a direct transfer of funds, committed a manifest error of assessment and infringed Article 3(1)(a)(i) and (2) of the basic regulation The first part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment inasmuch as the Commission classified the payments made by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund as a grant The second part of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 3(2) of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission in finding that a benefit was conferred The fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7 of the basic regulation and a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission in calculating the amount of the benefit conferred by the Oil Palm Plantation Fund scheme The failure to deduct export levies and transport costs from the amount of the subsidy The allocation of the amount of the subsidy to the total biodiesel turnover The sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1) and (8) of the basic regulation in the determination of the existence of a threat of material injury The situation of the Union industry The nature of the subsidies at issue and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom The rate of increase in subsidised imports Sufficient freely disposable capacity of the exporter Price level of the subsidised imports The seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence Costs * Language of the case: English.