Information;Order — ECLI:EU:C:2025:1021
Date: 2025-12-05
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling - decision unnecessary
Origin: Poland

Summary C-124/25 – 1 
Case C-124/25 [Jawowicz] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
6 February 2025 
Referring court: 
Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
17 January 2025 
Appellant: 
VA 
Respondent: 
BNP Paribas Bank Polska S.A. 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
An action brought by a commercial agent against a principal to compel the 
submission of certain statements and documents – Legal issue of whether a 
commercial agent can, by way of lawsuit, assert his right to receive a statement 
from the principal concerning the settlement of the commission due to him 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read 
in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter – An independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law which ensures effective legal protection – 
Article 267 TFEU 
 
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. In the light of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, where an ordinary court of last instance in a 
Member State (court of appeal) is composed of a single judge assigned to 
hear a case on the basis of a written decision of a court administrative body, 
is that court an independent and impartial tribunal that is previously 
established by law and that ensures effective legal protection where the 
decision in question: 
1. was issued in breach of the principle that the composition of a court must 
remain constant; 
2. was issued in flagrant infringement of the provisions of national law on the 
allocation of cases, assignment of judges, and changes to the composition of a 
court; 
3. was issued in the absence of a judge’s consent to be included in the 
composition of the court due to the fact that the written decision of the court 
administrative body on the allocation of the case, assignment of judges, and 
change to the composition of the court was issued in flagrant infringement of the 
provisions of national law; 
4. would result in a judge hearing the case in proceedings that are invalid due 
to the composition of the court being contrary to the provisions of law and due to 
the failure to ensure effective legal protection for the parties; 
5. was issued in the absence of an effective remedy available to the judge 
under national law against a written decision of the court administrative body on 
the allocation of the case, assignment of judges, and change to the composition of 
the court, namely: 
(a) the absence of a judicial remedy enabling the judge to appeal such a 
written decision to an impartial and independent tribunal in proceedings that 
meet the requirements arising from Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights; 
(b) the absence of an effective remedy with respect to external 
administrative supervision by the Minister Sprawiedliwości (Minister of 
Justice); 
(c) the absence of an effective remedy with respect to internal 
administrative supervision by the President of the Court; 
6. involved the use of trawling activities against the judge by the President and 
Vice-President of the Court in order to create a chilling effect with the intention of 
forcing the judge selected by a random number generator to hear the case in a 
JAWOWICZ 
 
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situation where the composition of the court is contrary to the provisions of law 
and the proceedings are invalid, including: 
(a) by subjecting the judge to administrative supervision measures that 
encroach on the domain of judicial independence; 
(b) by subjecting the judge to internal administrative supervision measures 
that are not provided for by statute; 
(c) by subjecting the judge to internal administrative supervision measures 
provided for by statute in a situation where the judge is not at fault; 
(d) by discriminating against the judge in his or her employment by 
subjecting him or her to internal administrative supervision measures while 
applying no such supervision measures (either provided for or not provided 
for by statute) against other judges of that court who bear full responsibility 
for flagrant infringements of the provisions of national law on the allocation 
of cases, assignment of judges, and changes to the composition of a court? 
2. If the answer to that question is in the negative: 
In the light of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, where an ordinary court of last instance in a 
Member State (court of appeal) is composed of a single judge assigned to 
hear a case on the basis of a written decision of a court administrative body 
in the circumstances described in points 1 to 6 above, who, guided by the 
principle of the rule of law, has subsequently given his express consent to be 
included in the composition of the court in the absence of objections from 
both parties to the case or with their consent, is that court an independent 
and impartial tribunal that is previously established by law and that ensures 
effective legal protection? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Treaty on European Union: Article 2 and the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1); 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Articles 7, 8, 47, 48(1) and 
51; 
Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the 
laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents: 
Articles 6 and 12; 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC: Articles 1(2), 4 and 6; 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Code of Civil Procedure): Articles 3671(1)(1), 
379(4), 386(2) and 39813(1); 
Kodeks cywilny (Civil Code): Articles 758 and 7615; 
Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. – Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 
27 July 2001 on the organisation of the ordinary courts) (‘the LOOC’): 
Articles 7(1), 9b, 37, 37a(1), 37b(1), 37f(1), 37ga(1), 42a(3), 45, 47a, 69, 70, 79, 
89, 107(1)(1), 107(1)(1a), 107(1)(5), Article 107(3), 109a, 112b(1), 112c, 114(4) 
and 175a(1); 
Ustawa z 20 grudnia 2019 r. o zmianie ustawy Prawo o ustroju sądów 
powszechnych, ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym oraz niektórych innych ustaw (Law 
of 20 December 2019 amending the Law on the organisation of the ordinary 
courts, the Law on the Supreme Court and certain other laws): Articles 1(20) and 
8; 
Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z 23 grudnia 2015 r. – Regulamin 
urzędowania sądów powszechnych (Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 
23 December 2015 – Rules of Procedure of the ordinary courts): 
Paragraphs 2(16), 43(1), 63(1), 66, 80, 82 and 84; 
Zarządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości w sprawie organizacji i zakresu działania 
sekretariatów sądowych oraz innych działów administracji sądowej z 19 czerwca 
2019 r. (Order of the Minister of Justice of 19 June 2019 on the organisation and 
scope of activities of court secretariats and other court administration 
departments): Paragraphs 533(1)(4), 573(2), 573(3) and 573(4); 
Kodeks pracy (Labour Code): Articles 100(1), 300; 
Ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law of 8 December 2017 
on the Supreme Court): Article 97. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 In an action dated 15 June 2016, the appellant requested that the respondent be 
required to submit to her, within 30 days of the judgment becoming final, the 
statements and documents specified in the action pursuant to Article 761(1) and 
(2) of the Civil Code. The respondent contended that the action should be 
dismissed. 
JAWOWICZ 
 
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2 By its judgment dated 6 March 2019 (No XX GC 509/18), the sąd okręgowy 
(regional court) dismissed the action. 
3 By its appeal dated 17 April 2019, the appellant appealed the judgment in its 
entirety, alleging, among other things, an infringement of Article 7615(1) of the 
Civil Code, read in conjunction with Article 12(1) of Directive 86/653/EEC and in 
conjunction with Article 288 TFEU, and also requesting that the following legal 
issue be resolved: whether it is consistent with the content and purpose of 
Article 12(1) of Directive 86/653/EEC to interpret its provision as meaning that 
the agent’s right to receive from the principal a statement of the commission due 
to the agent is unenforceable, that is to say, that the commercial agent cannot 
assert that right by means of a lawsuit? 
4 In its response to the appeal, the respondent contended that the action should be 
dismissed. 
5 Case No VII AGa 461/19 was registered on 18 June 2019. 
6 Judge B.W., who had been appointed as a judge of the sąd apelacyjny (Court of 
Appeal) on 1 February 2014, was randomly assigned to hear the case by an IT tool 
based on a random number generator (the SLPS system). Judge B.W. had served 
as the President of the Court of Appeal from 6 July 2016 to 6 July 2022. 
7 On 10 January 2020, the President of the Court Division scheduled a hearing for 
27 February 2020, but the hearing was adjourned without a new date being set. 
8 On 19 December 2023, the President of the Court Division issued an order 
requiring Judge B.W. to take action within 7 days. 
9 From 27 February 2020 until 13 May 2024, no procedural steps were taken in the 
case, and thus the proceedings before the Court of Appeal were unduly delayed by 
about four years and two months. 
10 No measures related to internal administrative supervision by the President of the 
Court or external administrative supervision were taken in the case, either. 
11 Judge B.W. has been performing her official duties without interruption since 
3 December 2024. 
12 By order dated 13 May 2024 issued in Case No VII AGa 461/19, the President of 
the Court Division, pursuant to Paragraphs 63(1) and 66 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the ordinary courts, ordered that the cases assigned to Judge B.W. be 
distributed among other judges due to her excused absence until 31 August 2024, 
and that the case in question be reallocated using the SLPS system taking into 
account absent judges, and also issued a written order to the newly assigned judge 
to take action urgently. 
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13 As of the date of the 13 May 2024 order, Judge B.W. had been absent since 
23 April 2024. 
14 Case No VII AGa 461/19 was randomly allocated by the IT tool based on a 
random number generator (the SLPS system) to Judge Przemysław Feliga (the 
currently assigned judge). 
15 Judge B.W. is serving in another division of the court. Her cases in that division 
were not distributed among other judges, but were allocated to alternate judges 
according to a substitution plan. 
16 By letter dated 22 May 2024, the newly assigned judge filed a complaint with the 
President of the Court against the order of the President of the Court Division 
dated 13 May 2024, challenging it in its entirety and requesting that it be 
rescinded. 
17 By letter dated 5 June 2024, delivered to the complainant on 1 July 2024, the 
President of the Court declared the 22 May 2024 complaint to be inadmissible. 
18 By letter dated 25 June 2024, the newly assigned judge applied to the Minister 
Sprawiedliwości (Minister of Justice) for Case No VII AGa 461/19 to be placed 
under external administrative supervision pursuant to Article 37f(1) of the LOOC 
due to the fact that the case had been allocated in flagrant infringement of the 
provisions of national law, and for steps to be taken to remedy the irregularities. 
19 By order dated 3 July 2024, the President of the Court Division scheduled a 
hearing in Case No VII AGa 461/19 for 9 August 2024. 
20 On 12 July 2024, the newly assigned judge drafted an official memorandum 
stating that the 13 May 2024 order was unlawful. 
21 On 9 August 2024, the hearing did not take place to the judge’s excused absence. 
22 A new hearing date was set for 23 October 2024. 
23 By letter dated 20 September 2024, the newly assigned judge notified the 
President and Vice-President of the Court of his refusal to hear the case in a 
composition of the court based on the 13 May 2024 order. 
24 By letter dated 2 October 2024, addressed to the judge, the Minister of Justice 
stated that the distribution of Judge B.W.’s cases on the basis of the 13 May 2024 
order had been conducted in infringement of Paragraphs 63(1) and 66 of the Rules 
of Procedure. The Minister of Justice did not send any written note to the 
President of the Court and did not request that the irregularity related to the case 
be remedied. 
25 By letter dated 2 October 2024, addressed to the President of the Court, the 
Minister of Justice ordered the President of the Court ‘to eliminate the 
JAWOWICZ 
 
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irregularities indicated in this letter with regard to the distribution of cases in the 
Division’s work going forward’. 
26 A hearing was held on 23 October 2024. At the outset, the judge informed the 
parties that he had participated in the appointment procedure for the position of 
judge of the Court of Appeal that involved the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa 
(National Council of the Judiciary) established pursuant to the ustawa z 8 grudnia 
2017 r. o zmianie ustawy o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz niektórych innych 
ustaw (Law of 8 December 2017 amending the Law on the National Council of 
the Judiciary and certain other laws, Dz. U. of 2018, item 3). The parties did not 
raise any objections concerning the composition of the court in connection with 
the aforementioned circumstances. In addition, the referring court limited its 
examination of the case to the preliminary issue of the invalidity of the 
proceedings in Case No VII AGa 461/19 due to the composition of the court being 
contrary to the provisions of law. Subsequently, by order dated 23 October 2024, 
the referring court adjourned the hearing due to the need to supplement the 
evidence by examining how Case No VII AGa 461/19 had been allocated, and 
required the President of the Court to submit certain information. 
27 Pursuant to that order, the referring court required the President of the Court and 
the Director of the Court to appoint, within one week, a team that would examine 
whether Case No VII AGa 461/19 had been correctly allocated to Judge 
Przemysław Feliga. By letter dated 19 November 2024, the President of the Court 
and the Director of the Court refused to appoint such a team due to the absence of 
grounds requiring them to do so. Subsequently, by letter dated 25 November 
2024, the newly assigned judge requested that the President of the Court rescind 
the administrative action (the 13 May 2024 order) as unlawful. 
28 In its pre-trial pleading dated 13 November 2024, the respondent in the main 
proceedings indicated that it shared the court’s view that Article 89 of the LOOC, 
understood as an absolute prohibition on bringing appeals where national laws on 
the distribution of cases to judges are violated, infringes Article 2 TEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the pleading, it was also 
pointed out that the doubts raised by the court at the hearing concerning whether 
the adjudicating panel had been correctly and lawfully appointed required judicial 
review and a decision on the composition of the court. 
29 At a subsequent hearing on 10 December 2024, the newly assigned judge stated 
that he did not consent to being included in the composition of the court due to the 
fact that the written decision of the court administrative body on the allocation of 
the case, assignment of judges, and change to the composition of the court had 
been issued in flagrant infringement of the provisions of national law. 
30 By letter dated 13 January 2025, the Vice-President of the Court informed the 
judge that ‘there were no grounds for amending the order in question’. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
First question referred 
31 In national law, there is a principle that the composition of a court must remain 
constant, which essentially means that the adjudicating panel must remain 
unchanged from the moment it has been randomly selected until the court has 
ruled on the case. Cases are allocated to judges randomly within each case 
category. The allocation is carried out using an IT system that randomly allocates 
cases and court tasks on the basis of a random number generator (System 
Losowego Przydziału Spraw) (Random Case Allocation System). 
32 In national law, exceptions to the principle that a randomly selected court 
composition must remain constant are permitted and are strictly defined in the 
LOOC and in the implementing regulations. Those are mandatory norms. 
33 The first sentence of Paragraph 63(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the ordinary 
courts provides for the mandatory distribution of a judge’s cases where that 
judge’s absence due to illness or planned absence exceeds six months, unless the 
backlog of cases in the division in question is greater. Neither the order of 13 May 
2024 nor the subsequent letter from the Vice-President of the Court of 25 June 
2024 justifying the distribution of the judge’s cases indicated that the distribution 
was related to the planned absence of the judge for more than six months. In the 
order of 13 May 2024, it was clearly indicated that the cases were distributed due 
to the judge’s illness that lasted until 31 August 2024. The second sentence of 
Paragraph 63(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the ordinary courts provides for an 
optional distribution of a judge’s cases: the President of the Court Division may 
order cases to be distributed among other judges after two months of a judge’s 
illness, if that is justified by the backlog of cases in the division and the expected 
duration of the illness. The Vice-President’s letter of 25 June 2024 justifying the 
distribution of the judge’s cases indicated that Judge B.W.’s planned absence was 
due to sick leave and its duration would significantly exceed two months. 
Therefore, on the date of the order to distribute Judge B.W.’s cases, only 21 days 
had elapsed, when it should have been six months. Thus, there was no legal basis 
under the second sentence of Paragraph 66(1) of the Rules of Procedure to 
distribute the judge’s cases, since on the date of issue of the 13 May 2024 order, 
none of the three conditions that must be met jointly in order for cases to be 
distributed had been met, that is to say, two months had not elapsed since the start 
of the judge’s absence due to illness, the distribution of cases was not justified by 
the backlog of cases in the division, and the judge’s further absence due to illness 
was not anticipated. 
34 In addition, as can be seen from the report on the random allocation of Case No 
VII AGa 461/19, absent judges whose cases had not been distributed among other 
judges, namely Judge P.I. and Judge M.M., were omitted from the draw without 
any basis. Under Paragraph 66(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the ordinary courts, 
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those judges should have been included in the draw, even where their absence 
exceeded three days. 
35 The Minister of Justice and the President of the Court stated that there had been an 
infringement of Paragraph 66 of the Rules of Procedure, but that is irrelevant to 
the selection of Judge Przemysław Feliga by the random number generator. The 
newly assigned judge does not share that view for two reasons. First, the selection 
of the assigned judge by the random number generator was based on an order of 
the President of the Court Division that was grossly flawed. If that order had not 
been issued, no judge would have been selected by the random number generator. 
Second, an independent check of the random number generator, to the extent to 
which it was available to the judge, demonstrated that had Judges I.W. and M.M. 
been included in the draw on the date on which the assigned judge was selected, 
another judge could have been assigned to the case, and the probability of another 
judge being selected instead of the assigned judge was high. 
36 The referring court notes that given an order such as that of 13 May 2024 and the 
subsequent attitude of the President of the Court, any president of a court division 
can arbitrarily shape the composition of the court of second instance in connection 
with a judge’s excused absence (including a short-term absence) by issuing an 
order in infringement of the mandatory provisions of national law. By arbitrarily 
excluding certain judges from draws conducted using the random number 
generator without observing the mandatory provisions of national law, the 
composition of the court of second instance can be freely and arbitrarily changed. 
37 Significantly, the law does not provide any IT tools to the parties (the appellant or 
the respondent) that would enable them to check the selection process conducted 
using the random number generator, as such a check would require broader access 
to the random number generator with a different level of access than that provided 
to judges and court officials. This means that each President of the Court Division 
together with the President of the Court are free to alter the composition of any 
court, and those allocations cannot be reviewed given the absence of an effective 
remedy consisting in a judge being able to challenge a written decision of an 
administrative body before an impartial and independent tribunal. 
38 According to the referring court, manipulating the composition of an adjudicating 
panel by taking a case away from one judge and assigning it to another in order to 
improve court statistics is contrary to EU law. The instrumental and unlawful use 
of institutions related to the distribution of an absent judge’s cases and the 
assignment of another judge to rule in a case, dictated solely by the desire to 
improve court statistics, undermines the foundations on which the role and 
functions of the court of appeal as the court of last instance within the ordinary 
court system were built. 
39 In the view of the referring court, where the composition of a court is established 
in a manner contrary to law and the assigned judge does not consent to accepting 
the case, that court cannot be a tribunal established by law. In that regard, the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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newly assigned judge stated that he would refrain from hearing the case and did 
not consent to ruling on it as the composition of the court had been established in 
a manner contrary to law, and provided the reasons for his position. Despite that 
statement, the court’s management initiated trawling activities against the judge. 
The judge thus feels that a gross injustice has been done to him and that he is 
being unduly influenced by the court authorities, who are taking actions against 
him in order to pressure him into hearing a case to which he was allocated in clear 
infringement of the provisions of national law. In the absence of an effective legal 
remedy by which he could either overturn the order of the President of the Court 
Division or establish that the order is lawful, the judge is taking action in order to 
avoid further trawling activities. 
40 In the view of the referring court, it is up to the adjudicating court, and not an 
administrative body of the court of second instance (its President or Vice-
President or the President of the Division), to decide whether the composition of 
the court is contrary to the provisions of law. In a system of national law in which 
a judge is deprived of an effective remedy against a disputed decision on the 
allocation of a case, he or she cannot successfully challenge the decision and must 
completely submit to the administrative bodies of the court, which results in the 
case being heard by a judge who senses a lack of elementary justice. As a 
consequence, the judge is prejudiced against hearing the case, which is noticeable 
to the parties (though he or she is obviously not prejudiced against the parties 
themselves). 
41 According to the case-law of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), a 
change in the composition of a court may only occur if it is impossible for the 
court to hear the case in its existing composition or if there is a lasting obstacle to 
it doing so, and a breach of the principle that the composition of a court must 
remain constant may cause the composition of the adjudicating court to be 
contrary to the provisions of law and result in the invalidity of the proceedings. 
Moreover, according to that case-law, a judge who is included in a panel cannot 
rule if he or she knows that the proceedings are invalid, as this would expose the 
parties to those proceedings to the negative consequences of a defective court 
ruling. 
42 In its judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private 
life of judges) (C-204/21, paragraphs 226 and 227), the Court found that a 
provision of national law which generally prevents the allocation of cases to 
judges to be reviewed, namely Article 55(4) of the LOOC, is contrary to the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. 
43 The referring court notes that at the current stage of the proceedings – taking into 
account the trawling activities which the judge has categorically resisted – it could 
only give a judgment that would state why the composition of the court is contrary 
to the provisions of law. Such a judgment would certainly be subject to review by 
the Supreme Court by way of an appeal on a point of law. Given such an appeal, if 
the Supreme Court did not share the view of the referring court, it could find that 
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the court manifestly breached the law, and that irregularity would result in a 
disciplinary case being referred to a disciplinary court. 
44 The referring court notes that there is no effective remedy in national law against a 
written decision of a court administrative body regarding the allocation of a case, 
the assignment of judges, and the composition of the court. This issue was also 
raised by the Supreme Court in its preliminary questions referred to the Court of 
Justice (Cases C-422/23, C-455/23, C-459/23, C-486/23 and C-493/23); those 
questions, however, cannot be directly applied to ordinary courts, including the 
Court of Appeal, due to the fact that the Supreme Court is separate from the 
ordinary court system and has a special function. 
45 The referring court points out that the actions taken by the Minister of Justice 
following the letter of 26 June 2024, which were limited to requesting ‘that 
measures be taken to eliminate situations in future in which an absent judge’s 
cases are prematurely distributed, and absent judges whose cases are not subject to 
distribution are excluded in an unjustified manner from the allocation of the 
distributed cases’, are contrary to the position of the Polish government, which at 
the hearing in Case C-197/23 on 7 March 2024 stated that ‘the requirement of an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law precluded the 
case from being heard by a new judge who had been appointed as the reporting 
judge in “flagrant violation” of national rules on the allocation of cases; and EU 
law requires the court of second instance to disapply national provisions which 
preclude it from examining whether, at first instance, the aforementioned 
requirement had been met’ [see the Opinion of Advocate General Medina 
delivered on 20 June 2024 in S. (Modification of the formation of the court), 
C-197/23, EU:C:2024:533, footnote 8]. 
46 The newly assigned judge wishes to draw attention to the discriminatory actions 
taken against him with regard to his employment. He has been a judge for 
20 years, and because of his exemplary judicial service, he has never previously 
been subject to administrative supervision measures. Yet administrative 
supervision measures have now been taken against him due to his alleged failure 
to fulfil his duties in the period from 17 to 27 September 2024. By order dated 
23 October 2024, the assigned judge asked the President of the Court whether 
administrative supervision measures had been taken against Judge B.W., who had 
failed to hear Case No VII AGa 461/19 for four years, and also against the 
President of the Court Division and the inspecting judge due to their lack of 
supervision over the case. By letter dated 8 November 2024, the Vice-President of 
the Court refused to answer that question. Ultimately, he stated that there were no 
documents in his possession relating to that subject. 
47 The Court’s answer to the first question referred is crucial to the outcome of the 
case. If the Court finds that in light of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with 
Article 47 of the Charter, an ordinary court of last instance in a Member State 
(court of appeal) composed of a single judge assigned to hear a case on the basis 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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of a written decision of a court administrative body in the circumstances described 
in the operative part of the order given by the referring court is an independent 
and impartial tribunal that is previously established by law and ensures effective 
legal protection, the Court of Appeal will proceed to hear the case. In such a 
situation, there will be no grounds for concluding that the composition of the court 
of second instance established on the basis of that decision is contrary to the 
provisions of law and that therefore the proceedings are invalid. Otherwise, the 
referring court will disapply the provisions of national law that are contrary to EU 
law in connection with which the composition of the court was established in a 
manner contrary to the provisions of law. As a result, the referring court will 
either set aside the written decision of the court administrative body and transfer 
the case to Judge B.W. for examination, or, if that judge is unable to hear the case, 
order that a new judge be selected using the random number generator in 
accordance with the provisions of national law, taking into account the Court’s 
judgment in the present case. 
Second question referred 
48 If the first question is answered in the negative, this will mean that the 
composition of the court in the main proceedings is contrary to the provisions of 
national law. 
49 In national law, the invalidity of proceedings as a result of the composition of the 
court being contrary to law is an objective category and is independent of the will 
of the parties and the court. A higher-instance court finds of its own motion that 
proceedings are invalid. There is no institution in domestic law that would allow 
the parties to agree on the numerical composition of the court or on the judge 
assigned to hear the case. Nor is it possible for the parties to consent to their case 
being adjudicated by a judge assigned to hear it on the basis of a written decision 
of a court administrative body that was issued in flagrant breach of national law, 
or for a judge to rule on such a case in the absence of objections from the parties. 
Furthermore, a judge who has been selected by the random number generator on 
the basis of a written decision of a court administrative body that was issued in 
flagrant breach of national law cannot subsequently cure the irregularity in the 
composition of the court by expressly stating that he or she assigns a specific case 
to himself or herself. 
50 The referring court therefore is considering whether, in light of Article 2 TEU, 
read in conjunction with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter, the assigned judge, guided by the principle of the rule of 
law and having regard to the duration of the court proceedings before the court of 
second instance, as well as the absence of proper supervision of the case by the 
administrative bodies of the court, may – with the consent of the parties or in the 
absence of objections from them – give his express consent to being assigned a 
case which he was selected to hear on the basis of a written decision of a court 
administrative body issued in flagrant infringement of the provisions of national 
law. 
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Addendum 
51 By order dated 31 January 2025, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw, Division No 7 
dealing with Commercial and Intellectual Property, decided to submit to the Court 
of Justice an addendum to the order of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 
17 January 2025 in Case No VII AGa 461/19 in connection with the fact that since 
that order was issued, developments relating to the preliminary request have come 
to light that are contrary to the rule of law and violate the judge’s civil rights and 
freedoms, and thus threaten the independence of the referring court. 
52 On 18 January 2025, an article was published online 
(https://oko.press/dyscyplinarki-bylego-rzecznika-praw-dziecka-pawlaka-dla-
schaba) concerning the decision of the Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of 
Justice (‘the disciplinary officer’) to press disciplinary charges against Judge 
Przemysław Feliga. The article included the judge’s personal data, that is to say, 
his given name and surname, and described his alleged disciplinary offences in a 
manner that is far from accurate. Those allegations are closely linked to the order 
of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 29 December 2023 in Case No I ACo 306/23 
and the grounds for that order, which dismissed a motion for the recusal of a judge 
following an examination of the judge’s compliance with the requirements of 
independence and impartiality, having regard to the circumstances surrounding his 
appointment and his conduct following his appointment. The decision to press 
charges was disclosed to three parties: the accused judge, the Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw, and the disciplinary officer. 
53 Initially, the referring court did not treat the initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
as part of the trawling activities undertaken by the President and Vice-President of 
the Court. First, the charges against the judge presented by the disciplinary officer 
relate to another case and are so frivolous that the referring court does not intend 
to comment on them. The disciplinary officer drafted the charges at the in rem 
stage without interviewing the judge in question; the grounds for the charges run 
to less than a quarter of a page of A4, while the grounds for the ruling which the 
charges concern run to 50 pages; the disciplinary officer has not challenged a 
single fact, a single piece of evidence or the assessment of evidence, but has 
alleged that the grounds for the ruling in question are not limited to giving reasons 
for the ruling and are unnecessarily elaborate, and as a result they infringe the 
personal rights of third parties (the disciplinary officer does not cite any passages 
from the grounds for the ruling to substantiate that claim). 
54 Second, the disciplinary proceedings cannot proceed under any circumstances in 
view of the order of the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Court, Poland) 
(‘the CC’) of 9 January 2025, No K 16/24, which granted an injunction following 
motions from the National Council of the Judiciary dated 23 April 2024 to declare 
as unconstitutional numerous provisions of the LOOC. Among other things, that 
order suspended the execution of decisions issued under Article 112b(1) of the 
LOOC on the appointment of the Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice 
and prohibited persons appointed under Article 112b(1) of the LOOC as 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
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Disciplinary Officers of the Minister of Justice from undertaking activities and 
tasks related to the powers, tasks and competencies of the Disciplinary Officer of 
the Minister of Justice. 
55 Third, in the view of the referring court, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
by the Vice-President of the Court – which are a flagrant and obvious 
infringement of the provisions of national law related to the issuing of the ruling 
and its grounds – confirms that the accused is an independent and impartial judge 
and is also fair to other judges. 
56 The referring judge points to the trawling activities to which he has been subject. 
It has transpired that during the dispute over the allocation of Case No VII AGa 
461/19, the Vice-President of the Court monitored the rulings given by the judge 
for possible irregularities with the intention of initiating disciplinary proceedings. 
The actions of the Vice-President of the Court are in direct conflict with Article 9b 
of the LOOC, which explicitly prohibits such actions by a supervisory body. 
57 By letter dated 2 August 2024, the Minister of Justice was notified by the Vice-
President of the Court that the referring judge was suspected of having committed 
the disciplinary offence referred to in Article 107(1)(1) and (5) of the LOOC in 
connection with the ruling of 29 December 2023. An analysis of the notification 
sent to the Minister of Justice demonstrates that it was not prompted by a 
complaint from a party to the case, but was sent on the Vice-President’s own 
initiative. Therefore, the action of the administrative body falls within the scope of 
trawling activities and is related to the dispute over the allocation of Case No VII 
AGa 461/19 that has been ongoing since May 2024. 
58 Pursuant to Article 112(3)(3) of the LOOC, the examination of compliance with 
the requirements of independence and impartiality in the case referred to in 
Article 42a(3) or Article 23a(4) of the ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. – Prawo o 
ustroju sądów wojskowych (Law of 21 August 1997 on the System of Military 
Courts) […] does not constitute a disciplinary offence. Pursuant to 
Article 112(3)(1) of the LOOC, it is likewise not a disciplinary offence if a court 
ruling issued with the participation of a given judge contains an error in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of national and EU law, or in the 
assessment of facts and the appraisal of evidence. 
59 The referring judge feels that his rights as an EU citizen have been infringed. He 
believes that he has the same right to privacy and data protection as any other EU 
citizen. 
60 Disciplinary proceedings conducted by the disciplinary officer are not open to the 
public. The President of the Court is not a party to disciplinary proceedings 
relating to a judge of that court; he is a third party. There are no provisions in 
national law that would constitute a legal basis for the direct delivery to the 
President of the Court of rulings made in disciplinary proceedings against a judge 
of that court conducted by the disciplinary officer. The group of third parties to 
JAWOWICZ 
 
15 
whom documents related to disciplinary proceedings are delivered is strictly 
limited by law. 
61 As soon as disciplinary charges are drawn up, the disciplinary officer serves them 
on the accused through the President of the Court. The judge received the charges 
against him in a sealed envelope. It is not clear whether those charges were sent in 
a sealed envelope by the President of the Regional Court in Szczecin or were 
processed by the President of the Court. However, it is clear that the decision was 
either delivered directly to the President of the Court or delivered in an unsecure 
manner for delivery to the accused. As a result of the unlawful actions of the data 
controller (the President of the Regional Court in Szczecin), a third party – the 
President of the Court – came into direct possession of the document in question 
(the decision to press charges) and was able to learn its contents. 
62 Importantly, the President of the Court is also not entitled to inspect files related 
to disciplinary proceedings. There is no legal basis for him to do so. The President 
of the Court was and is fully aware of the fact that he is a third party in the 
disciplinary proceedings and that the proceedings are conducted by the 
disciplinary officer in secret. He was therefore aware that he had received without 
any legal basis the (unsecured) ruling issued in those proceedings, yet he freely 
made use of that document. Such a ruling is part of the judge’s employee record 
that is not subject to inclusion in the judge’s personal file or in the history of the 
judge’s service. Meanwhile, as a result of the President of the Court’s omission, 
the contents of the ruling, together with the personal data of the accused judge 
(given name and surname), were disclosed to an unspecified number of 
employees. 
63 In addition, the President of the Court deliberately and unlawfully processed the 
judge’s personal data and allowed at least two judges (spokespersons) to inspect 
the decision in question, even though no journalist had requested that information. 
Besides, no spokesperson for the Court of Appeal in Warsaw was authorised to 
provide information to journalists in connection with the pending disciplinary 
proceedings, as the controller of the judge’s personal data with respect to those 
proceedings is the President of the Regional Court in Szczecin, and only the 
spokesperson for that court is authorised to provide information. Meanwhile, the 
full text of the decision (the operative part and the grounds, including the full 
personal data of the accused judge) was made available to a journalist by an 
unspecified person. In his article, the journalist distorted the allegations made 
against the judge and disclosed the judge’s full personal data. 
64 The referring court notes that the processing of the judge’s personal data to the 
extent discussed above was not necessary for compliance with a legal obligation 
to which the controller was subject, and that the processing of the judge’s data 
was not necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, and that the judge 
himself never gave his consent to the processing of his personal data. 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-124/25 
 
16  
65 To the best of the referring court’s knowledge, the President of the Court failed to 
notify the Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Danych Osobowych (President of the Personal 
Data Protection Office) about the breach involving the judge’s personal data 
without undue delay (no later than 72 hours after the breach had been discovered), 
failed to notify the judge about the personal data breach without undue delay, and 
also failed to provide the judge with an adequate description of the measures taken 
or proposed by the controller to remedy the personal data breach, including 
measures to minimise its possible negative effects. 
66 The trawling activities to which the judge was subject resulted in his secondary 
victimisation in the public domain. The judge included in the composition of the 
referring court is well known among judges and lawyers. He conducts training 
courses for judges, legal advisers, barristers and trainees of various legal 
professions, is the author of more than 130 academic papers, and takes part in 
numerous academic conferences. 
67 The effects of trawling activities are not limited to a single individual and will 
persist pending the CC judgment. The unlawful processing of a judge’s personal 
data is more damaging than initiating disciplinary proceedings for that offence. 
The reason is that if Article 112b of the LOOC is declared unconstitutional by the 
CC, which is almost certain (as the institution of disciplinary officer has been 
challenged as unconstitutional from the outset), the judge will never be able to 
prove his innocence because the disciplinary proceedings will be discontinued. 
68 The referring court wishes to point out that the CC order of 9 January 2025 was 
given by a panel compatible with the opinion of the Venice Commission on CC 
reform, and the current practice (contrary to the aforementioned opinion) of not 
publishing CC rulings is irrelevant since, due to the legal basis for that ruling, it 
will become immediately enforceable as soon as it is given. In that regard, the 
referring court shares the view expressed in March 2016 by Professor Marek 
Safjan, a former President of the CC and a former Court of Justice judge, that a 
judgment (or, in this case, an order) of the CC is final and universally binding, 
regardless of whether it is published (https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/prof-
safjan-prezes-tk-moze-sam-opublikowac-wyrok.64958.html).