Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:844
Date: 2025-10-30
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Seventh Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Ireland

Anonymised version
C-546/24 - 1
Case C-546/24
Request for a preliminary ruling 
Date lodged:
13 August 2024
Referring court:
Court of Appeal (Ireland)
Date of the decision to refer:
30 July 2024
Appellants:
PN
Killybegs Fishing Enterprises Ltd.
Killybegs Seafoods Unlimited
Killybegs Fishermen’s Organisation Ltd.
Respondent:
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority
[OMISSIS]
[OMISSIS] [National court references]
[OMISSIS]
[OMISSIS] [Parties to the national proceedings as set out above]
[OMISSIS]
[OMISSIS] [Information regarding the reference for a preliminary ruling set out 
above]
EN
Request for a preliminary ruling 30.7.2024 - Case C-546/24
Background
1 In these proceedings the applicants challenge the validity of a decision of the Sea 
Fisheries Protection Authority of Ireland to insist on the quayside weighing at 
Killybegs, County Donegal (Ireland) of certain fishing catch in the presence of 
authorised officials where there exists a derogation and control plan for the 
Member State in question for the purposes of Article 61(1) [OMISSIS] [and] 
Article 60(6) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009 (“the Control 
Regulation”). The High Court (Ireland) dismissed this challenge in a judgment 
delivered on 3rd November 2023: see PN v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 
[2023] IEHC 603. The applicants have now brought an appeal against that 
decision to the Court of Appeal (Ireland) and this Court gave judgment on 11th 
July 2024: PNv. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2024] IECA 171.
2 The present appeal concerns the proper interpretation of one of these regulatory 
powers, namely, Article 60(6) of [OMISSIS] [the Control Regulation] and the 
Implementing Commission Regulation (EU) No. 404/2011 of the 8th of April 
2011 (as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1962 
of the 28th of October 2015) (“the Commission Implementing Regulation”).
3 Article 61(1) of the [OMISSIS] [Control] Regulation allows for a derogation from 
aspects of Article 60 where Member States have exercised such a power pursuant 
to a control plan approved by the Commission. In such circumstances the “fishing 
products [may] be weighed after transport from the place of landing provided that 
they are transported[...] on the territory of the Member State concerned.” The 
present appeal concern[s] events which took place in October 2020. There was at 
the time a particular control plan (subsequently revoked) operated by Ireland with 
Commission approval. The applicants contend that the existence of the derogation 
reflects the fact that in Ireland (along with a range of other Member States) the 
peculiar topography of our fishing ports has meant that fish processing factories 
are not immediately adjacent to the quayside. Even though Killybegs, Co[unty] 
Donegal, Ireland is one of the major European fishing ports, the Court was 
informed that the fish factories are each located some lkm. from the actual port 
and quayside.
4 The applicants contend that the weighing of the de-watered fish at the quayside 
would impair the quality of the catch. Although Article 61(1) of the Control 
Regulation does not in terms derogate from Article 60(6), they contend that it 
would be inconsistent with the nature of the derogation if this provision could 
operate in such circumstances. Their case in essence is that the existence of the 
Article 61(1) derogation effectively overrides or suspends the operation of the 
Article 60(6) power, if only by implication.
Part II - Background facts
5 It is next necessary to consider the background facts. The first applicant, PN, is 
the master of an Irish registered fish processing vessel, the MFV Atlantic 
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Challenge (“the vessel”). The second applicant, Killybegs Fishing Enterprises Ltd. 
(“Killybegs Fishing”), is a limited liability company engaged in the business of 
catching and selling fish. It is the registered owner of the vessel and is the holder 
of the appropriate sea fishing vessel licence. The vessel itself is part of the 
refrigerated sea water fleet and the vessel’s share of the national quotas attaches to 
the vessel itself. The third applicant, Killybegs Seafoods Unlimited (“Killybegs 
Seafoods”), is one of the shareholders in the second applicant and is the buyer and 
processor of the fish landed by the vessel. Killybegs Seafoods operates a fish 
processing factory equipped with approved flow-scales. The permit which issued 
to Killybegs Seafoods authorising the weighing of fishery products following their 
transfer to the factory provides that the “weighing of fishery product as stated in 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009, Article 60(6), may be conducted in the 
course of conducting official controls”.
6 The fourth applicant is a representative organisation and recognised fish producer 
organisation (“KFO”) which was formed to represent and to defend the interests 
of the fishing industry operating out of Killybegs and fishing the waters around 
the island of Ireland. [OMISSIS] [Issue of standing resolved in the High Court]
7 The Sea Fisheries Authority (“the Authority”) is an independent statutory body 
established pursuant to the provisions of the Sea Fisheries Jurisdiction Act 2006 
(“the 2006 Act”). The principal functions of the Authority are set out in 
s[ection] 43 of the 2006 Act (as amended) including to secure the efficient and 
effective enforcement of sea fisheries law and to secure compliance with and deter 
contraventions of sea-fisheries law. The Authority is designated by s[ection] 2 of 
the 2006 Act to perform these statutory functions. It has also been tasked by 
s[ections] 12 and 13 of the 2006 Act to regulate and control the exploitation of the 
fishing opportunities in the waters of the Irish territorial sea and, to a more limited 
extent, the Irish Exclusive Economic Zone. It is also the designated body in 
Ireland for ensuring compliance with the rules of the CFP and the Control 
Regulation.
8 Up to the events giving rise to these proceedings, the standard weighing practice - 
so far, at least, as the refrigerated sea water (“RSW”) segment of the fleet was 
concerned — in respect of fish catch which operated in Killybegs, County 
Donegal was as follows. The catch was stored on board the vessel in RSW and 
transported, still in sea water, to a fish processing facility. The facility would, of 
course, have to be an approved facility for the purposes of the control plan and it 
would also have to possess either a flow scale facility or a conveyor belt weighing 
system which also complies with national metrology requirements. This was what 
was provided for in the control plan for Ireland which had been approved by the 
Commission in accordance with the Article 61(1) derogation.
9 When the fish arrived at the fish processing facility they were first sorted by 
species and then weighed. The use in this way of the flow scales for the weighing 
of fish products such as mackerel was said to be essential by the applicants in 
order to ensure that the quality, freshness and value of the fish during the 
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weighing process was thereby preserved. They pointed to the need to minimize 
the potential for the degradation of the fish catch by permitting the fish to remain 
in refrigerated water for the purpose of transportation to the factory premises 
where dewatering, sorting and weighing would occur. The Authority also 
maintained that it is possible to mitigate the effects of dewatering in the weighing 
process when the weighing does not take place at a factory premises.
10 The (Commission) Implementing Regulation envisages that at least 7.5% of the 
quantities of listed pelagic species are fully inspected. Prior to a change of practice 
which was announced in December 2019 it appears that the Authority did not in 
fact exercise its power to conduct quayside inspections. All of this changed 
because of concerns about the manner in which the control plan was in fact 
operated by Ireland and irregularities which came to light as a result of a criminal 
prosecution and, indeed, a subsequent audit by the European Commission. All of 
this had prompted the Authority to announce a public change in policy whereby a 
percentage of inspections would then henceforth be carried out at the quayside.
11 The Authority contended that that quayside weighings were considered preferable 
and more reliable because they allowed for the weighing of fish at a neutral venue 
rather than at a factory which is controlled by fish processors. From the 
Authority’s perspective such controls could be run more efficiently. It seems 
likely that this change of practice was also prompted by the Commission’s 
concerns, since the audit had revealed that the weighing processes used at certain 
fish processing facilities had been manipulated from time to time. This inspection 
had, however, been earned out on a random basis.
12 At the time the Authority announced a change in practice the quayside landing 
weighing in Killybegs infrastructure was somewhat underdeveloped. The 
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (Ireland) operated a somewhat 
old-fashioned weighbridge at Killybegs, so that if the water was not separated 
from the fish in the receptacle to be weighed, the resulting weight included fish 
and water. To facilitate the separation of fish catches from the water in which they 
had been stored and consequently a more accurate weighing of the fish, the 
Authority arranged for the availability of a water separator "hopper" at the 
quayside at Killybegs. A variety of objections were raised by the applicants (and 
others) who maintained that the water separator hopper did not meet modern 
hygiene and food safety standards. They also contended that the removal of the 
fish from the RSW in which it was stored prior to its transport to the fish 
processing facility damaged the quality of the fish. The applicants emphasised the 
fastidiousness of many Japanese (and other) buyers when it came to fish quality 
and drew attention to his personal experience of these buyers who would refuse to 
purchase if there had been even the slightest drop in the quality of the fish.
13 The events giving rise to the present proceedings took place on the 11th and 12th 
October 2020. On the evening of 11th October 2020 the Master of the vessel the 
Atlantic Challenge transmitted to the Authority what is officially known as a 
"Prior Notification of Arrival" in accordance with Article 17 of the Control 
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Regulation. The electronic logbook returns made by the Master pursuant to Article 
14 of the Control Regulation recorded a catch of 3,000 kg of herring and 450,000 
kg of mackerel.
14 The Atlantic Challenge was then selected for inspection and a monitored quayside 
weighing of the fish catch on landing control pursuant to Article 60(6) of the 
Control Regulation. [OMISSIS]
15 [OMISSIS] [Question whether a factual error which led to the inspection rendered 
it unlawful answered by the High Court]
16 [OMISSIS][T]he High Court found that the Atlantic Challenge was boarded by 
officers of the Authority when it arrived in Killybegs on the morning of 12th 
October 2020 pursuant to their powers under the 2006 Act. At that point the 
master was informed that the vessel had been selected for a quayside weighing 
and inspection in accordance with Article 60(6). The Authority then furnished the 
master with a statutory notice which stated that it required: “that fishery products 
landed from the landing referenced above are weighed in accordance with Council 
Regulation (EC 1 1224/2009[,] Article 60(6)”.
17 The notice further stated that:
"The operator responsible for the weighing of fishery products shall ensure 
that all fishery products are dewatered prior to weighing on a calibrated 
weighbridge scale. The legal allowance permitted for water and ice in 
pelagic products for human consumption landed in bulk is a maximum 
deduction of 2% from the total weight. There shall be no deduction for water 
or ice for landings of pelagic products for non-human consumption. The 
operator responsible for the weighing of fishery shall ensure that the figure 
resulting from the weighing shall be used for the completion of the official 
weigh record and associated documentation (Landing Declarations, 
Transport Document and Sales Notes). The operator weighing fisheries 
products prior to transport from the place of landing shall record the 
weighing carried out as required in Regulation 404/2011[,] Article 70(1). 
This shall be undertaken using the SFPA official pelagic weigh record to 
detail the weighing undertaken.”
18 The Authority’s officers then informed the master that they required the entire 
catch to be weighed over the weighbridge on the pier as part of a controlled 
quayside weighing. The master objected on the ground that this process would 
include the weighing of the accompanying seawater. The Authority offered the 
use of the water separator hopper, but this was declined by the master. The master 
in turn requested that the tanks on board be “dipped” (so that there could be an 
unofficial estimate of the weight of the catch), with an official weighing at the 
fishing process facility. The Authority refused this request.
19 The Authority then advised the master that the final weight from the weighing on 
the weighbridge was the official weight which was to be used for the completion 
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REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 30. 7. 2024 - CASE C-546/24
of the landing declaration and sales note. It drew the master’s attention to the fact 
that the responsibility to dewater and weigh the fish accurately lay with the 
operator.
20 The fish catches were then weighed under protest using the weighbridge. 
Critically, however, the fish were not dewatered after being discharged from the 
vessel and prior to their weighing on the weighbridge at the quayside. An Official 
Pelagic Weighing Record ("OPWR") was then completed by Killybegs Fishing, 
which was then marked with the words “under protest” in respect of the weighing 
operation on the pier.
21 The figures for mackerel and herring as subsequently weighed in the certified flow 
scales in Killybegs Seafoods’ fish processing facility came to 449,985 kg of 
mackerel and 12,189kg of herring respectively. These weighings were recorded in 
the Killybegs Fishing’s own logbooks with different weights and serial numbers. 
Even allowing for the fact that the herring had not been separated from the 
mackerel at the time of the quayside weighing, there was a differential of some 
11-12% between the weight for mackerel recorded from the weighbridge on 
landing and that recorded on the flow scales at the Factory. There is, accordingly, 
a significant differential between the figures returned by Killybegs Fishing to the 
Minister of Agriculture, Food and the Marine and those returned by the Authority 
to the Commission under Article 33 of the Control Regulation.
22 At a subsequent meeting between the master and the Authority on 3rd November 
2020 it was suggested that the former might be guilty of fishing offences by 
reason of not using the weights recorded at the quayside weighing. It does not, 
however, appear that the matter has been referred to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions by the Authority. Yet as the High Court judgment records, it is 
common case that “the monitored weighing on landing did not give an accurate 
weight as the fish had not been dewatered. It is not in dispute that a by-catch of 
herring was not sorted from the mackerel catch and separately weighed over the 
weighbridge on landing under supervision by the Authority.”
Part III: The relevant legislative provisions
23 The Court has already described how the Authority has been vested with a range 
of regulatory powers by the 2006 Act in Irish domestic law. In addition, however, 
s[ection] 11 of the 2006 Act provides that a contravention of the CFP including 
(under s[ection] 11(5)) a failure to comply with obligations imposed in relation to 
weighing or documenting fish is an offence. Section 17 of the 2006 Act provides 
for a broad power on the part of a Sea Fisheries Protection Officer to stop and 
search any person believed to be conveying sea fish of any kind and to inspect the 
fish. Section 17 also expressly provides for a power on the part of a Sea Fisheries 
Protection Officer to verify the accuracy of the information in any document or 
record which relates to the CFP (s[ection] 17(1 )(d)) and to check the weight of 
fish (s[ection] 17(l)(e)).
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The Control Regulation
24 The present case turns on the proper interpretation of Article 60(1) and Article 
60(6) of the Control Regulation. Article 5(5) recites that Member States are 
required to designate a “single authority” with responsibility for the collection and 
certification on fishing activities and the transmission of information to the 
Commission. In this State, the Authority has been designated for this purpose by 
Article 3 of the Sea-Fisheries (Community Control System) Regulations 2016 
(S.I. 54 of 2016). The Control Regulation[OMISSIS] also contains detailed 
arrangements regarding the duty to keep accurate records and to record weights. 
Article 119 delegates power to the Commission to lay down detailed rules for 
implementation of the principles established in the Control Regulation.
The Irish derogation
25 Ireland exercised the derogation provided for by Article 61(1) of the Control 
Regulation by submitting a Weighing of Fishery Products Control Plan (“the 
Control Plan”) to the Commission. The Control Plan was approved by the 
Commission by Article 1(3) of Commission Implementing Decision of the 13th of 
August 2012 (2012/474/EU). (As it happens the Control Plan was subsequently 
revoked by the Commission in April 2021 following the emergence of 
discrepancies as a result of a Commission audit). The Control Plan also created 
specific provision in the State for the weighing after transport in approved 
facilities of fishery products.
Part IV: The proper interpretation of Article 60 and
Article 61(1 ) of the Control Regulation
26 The central argument advanced by the applicants was that it was, in effect, 
incongruous for the Authority to exercise its Article 60(6) powers in 
circumstances where a control plan is in place. They contended that the entire 
point of the derogation provided for in Article 61(1) was in recognition of the 
topography associated with a variety of European Union fishing ports (including 
Ireland) such that it was impractical to have the fish dewatered at the quayside in 
order to be weighed. This was because - it was said - it was necessary to dewater 
the fish to have an accurate weighing of the fish, yet if this occurred at the 
quayside, the intervening delay between de-watered weighing and the ultimate 
transport of the dewatered fish post such weighing to the factory presented the real 
risk that the quality of the fish would be degraded prior to arrival at the factory for 
processing. This was disputed by the Authority.
27 While the High Court, did not find it necessary to resolve this particular conflict 
of fact, there may possibly be some foundation for the applicants' concerns. Yet 
the fact remains that the actual text of Article 61(1) of the Control 
Regulation[OMISSIS] is very specific in the manner in which it disapplies Article 
60(2) ("By way of derogation from Article 60(2)..."). It does not disapply Article 
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60(6). The applicants’ contention accordingly immediately meets two 
interpretative objections deriving from this perfectly clear text.
28 First, it is a general principle of the interpretation of Union legal instruments that 
exceptions and derogations are to be construed strictly: see, e.g., Commission v. 
Netherlands (C-50/06: EU: C: 2007: 325) (at para. 42).
29 Second, the Court of Justice not infrequently applies the principle of a contrario 
reasoning to the construction of legislative texts (see, e,g, Slovakia and Hungary 
v. Council of the European Union (Case C-643/16 and Case C-647/16: EU:C: 
2017: 631) (para. 58). The application of the a contrario principle would suggest 
that the fact that the Union legislator expressly disapplied Article 60(2) - but not 
Article 60(6) - in itself provides strong grounds for interpreting Article 60 in the 
manner which found favour with the High Court. In other words, had the Union 
legislator wished to disapply Article 60(6) as well as Article 60(2) it could - and 
should - have done so. The fact that it chose to disapply one such provision but 
did not disapply the other invariably leads to the conclusion that the Authority 
[OMISSIS] [was] at least in principle entitled to invoke the Article 60(6) power in 
the circumstances of the present case.
30 It is, of course, true that Union legislation must be interpretated in a teleological 
fashion and in a manner which does not undermine its fundamental purposes (effet 
utile). Yet as two distinguished commentators have stated (Lenaerts and 
Gutierrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and 
the European Court of Justice (Academy of European Law, European University 
Institute, AEL Working Paper, 2013/09)):
“It is true that an EU law provision may be interpreted in light of the 
normative content in which it is placed and/or in accordance with the 
purposes it pursues, in particular where there are certain ambiguities relating 
to the way in which the provision is drafted. However, in accordance with 
settled case law, where the wording of an EU law provision is clear and 
precise, its contextual or teleological interpretation may not call into 
question the literal meaning of that provision, as this would run counter to 
the principle of legal certainty and to the principle of inter-institutional 
balance enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU. Stated simply, the ECJ will never 
ignore the clear and precise wording of an EU law provision."
31 So, for example, in Commission v. United Kingdom (Case C-582/08, EU:C: 2010: 
429)(“the UK VAT case") the Commission had argued that the UK was in breach 
of its obligations under the VAT Directive. Article 169 to Article 171 of the (then 
principal) 6th VAT Directive gave a taxable person the general right to deduct 
VAT as an input credit for transactions carried outside the Member State in 
question “in respect of which VAT would be deductible if they had been carried 
out within that Member State." Article 2 of the 13th VAT Directive had provided 
that the Member States might make these refunds "conditional upon the granting 
by third States of comparable advantages regarding turnover taxes."
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32 The United Kingdom had availed of that latter provision in Article 2. The 
Commission had argued in subsequent infringement proceedings that the UK was 
not entitled to avail of this derogation, in part because it said that the wording of 
Article 2 had been erroneously drafted. The CJEU rejected this argument, giving 
two reasons, both of which are pertinent to the present case.
33 First, it noted that the language of the derogation provisions of Article 2 of the 13th 
Directive was “clear and precise”. These provisions amounted to a form of lex 
specialis, so that the general language of Article 170 of the earlier 6th Directive 
could not be taken as overriding this perfectly clear language (paras. 33 to 35), so 
that Article 170 of the 6th Directive could not be interpreted as permitting “a 
derogation from the clear and precise wording of Article 2(1) of the Thirteenth 
Directive.” It is necessarily follows from this reasoning that the scope of a 
derogation cannot be extended by implication, so that if a derogation is expressly 
granted solely in respect of provision A, one cannot in the absence of clear 
statutory language thereby extend that by judicial decision to provision B.
34 Second, the CJEU also held (at para. 51) that it could not “in the face of the clear 
and precise wording of a provision such as Article 2(1) of the Thirteenth 
Directive, interpret that provision with the intention of correcting it and thereby 
extending the obligations of the Member States relating to it”.
35 This Court considers that this reasoning is very much in point so far as the present 
appeal is concerned. The language of Article 60 and Article 61(1) is clear and 
unambiguous. The main argument of the appellants really amounted to saying that 
for the sake of consistency and the maintenance of the internal logic of the Article 
61(1) derogation, that very derogation should also be extended by judicial 
decision to include the Article 60(6) power. The Court considers, however, that 
the acceptance of this argument would be entirely at variance with the 
interpretative methodology employed by the CJEU in the UK VAT case.
36 This, we think, is sufficient to dispose of the principal argument advanced on 
behalf of the applicants. One can perhaps see why the applicants contend that the 
Article 61(1) derogation should extend also to the quayside inspection powers 
contained in Article 60(6) if they have also been given the right to transport the 
fish catches a little distance from the quayside to a fish processing facility where 
the fish is then dewatered and weighed. Yet one cannot say that this omission - if 
omission this really is - is somehow absurd or incongruous. The European 
legislator might justifiably think that it was nonetheless important to retain the 
right to conduct quayside inspections from time to time, the existence of a 
derogation notwithstanding. The importance of such inspections as part of 
preserving the integrity of the CFP was, after all, stressed by the CJEU in the UK 
fishing quotas case. Likewise in the more recent decision of the Court in PF and 
MF (C-564/20, EU: C: 2022: 90) the Court stressed (at para. 39) that the Authority 
must be able "to check the reliability an accuracy of the data which it collects”. 
The Union legislator might also justifiably think that quayside inspections are still 
necessary even where a control plan was otherwise in place.
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37 In any event, even if it were to be accepted that the failure on the part of the Union 
legislator to include the Article 60(6) powers within the scope of the Article 61(1) 
derogation is in some respects or other an error or a mistake, the decision of the 
CJEU in the UK VAT case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not open 
to this Court to distort or vary the perfectly clear language of Article 61(1) 
through use of some wider teleological interpretation.
38 For all of these reasons, therefore, if the final decision were to have been left with 
this Court, we would have proposed that the appeal on this ground should have 
been rejected and the decision of the High Court affirmed. We have nevertheless 
concluded that this Court should make a reference on this point to the Court of 
Justice pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and should adjourn a final decision on the 
disposition of the appeal pending the outcome of the reference. We have arrived at 
this conclusion for the following reasons.
39 First, the point urged by the applicants is not without substance. It may be that the 
Court of Justice will apply these interpretative principles differently or will vary 
them in some way.
40 Second, these are key provisions of the CFP and their proper scope and 
interpretation is a matter of considerable interest and importance to the fishing 
industry and the regulatory authorities alike, both here and in other Member 
States. One may note that Article 60 and Article 61(1) are provisions of the CFP 
which to date have not been the subject of any judicial interpretation from the 
Court of Justice. It would be desirable that any lingering doubts regarding the 
interpretation of these provisions would be dispelled by a final and authoritative 
decision of the CJEU.
41 Third, while it is clear from this Court’s decision in Sony Music Entertainment 
(Ireland) Ltd. v. UPC Communication Ireland Ltd. [2016] IECA 231, [2018] 2 IR 
623 that this Court is not a court of last resort for the purposes of Article 267(3) 
(so that the Court is under no obligation to refer), it is nonetheless salutary to 
reflect on what is likely to happen were this Court to affirm the decision of the 
High Court without having made such a reference. There must be a very real 
possibility that there would be an application for leave to appeal and that in those 
circumstances the Supreme Court would itself obliged to grant leave to appeal 
under Article 35.4.3° of the Constitution: see, e.g., by analogy the comments of 
Irvine J. in Friends of the Irish Environment v. An Bord Pleanala [2019] 1ESC 53 
at para. 29. In view of the decision of the Court of Justice in Consorzio Italian 
Management (Case C-561/19, EU:C: 2021: 799) and the comments of that Court 
(at paragraph 51 of the judgment) regarding the nature of the obligation to refer 
which is imposed on courts of last resort such as the Supreme Court, one feels that 
that Court would probably find itself compelled to make an Article 267 TFEU 
reference.
42 In these circumstances it may be more convenient if this Court were to anticipate 
these likely developments and to make the appropriate Article 267 reference itself.
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Part V - Conclusions and disposition
43 The Court would accordingly propose that the final determination of the appeal 
should await the outcome of the reference from the Court of Justice. While the 
other grounds advanced by the applicants - which essentially bear on the 
rationality of the Authority’s actions in requiring a quayside weighing of the first 
and second applicants’ fishing catches -any final adjudication on these related 
issues is so bound up with a final resolution of the Article 60/Article 61(1) 
interpretative issue that they might also conveniently await the outcome of the 
resolution of these issues.
44 We would further propose that the Court should refer the following question 
pursuant to the Article 267 TFEU:
“Where a Member State has exercised its right to derogate in Article 61(1) 
from the provisions of Article 60(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 (as amended) establishing a Community 
control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common 
fisheries policy in accordance with the terms of a control plan approved by 
the Commission of the European Union, are the competent authorities of that 
Member precluded from requiring that any quantity of fisheries products 
first landed in that Member State is weighed in the presence of officials of 
that authority before being transported elsewhere from the place of landing 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 60(6) of that Regulation?”
Signed this 30th day of July 2024
[OMISSIS]
[OMISSIS] [Names of national judges]
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