Judgment — ECLI:EU:F:2016:3
Date: 2016-01-25
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Third Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded;Action for damages - unfounded

Summary 1. Actions brought by officials — Prior administrative complaint — Time limits — Mandatory — Request for review of a decision of the administration that has become final in order to receive retrospective payment of allowances previously denied — Review judgment delivered in proceedings not directly concerning the applicant — No new fact which would permit the re-opening of the period (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) 2. Officials — Administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials — Principle of sound administration — Scope — Obligation for the administration to set aside the time limits for lodging a complaint or bringing an action by reviewing a decision that has become final — None (Staff Regulations, Art. 24) 3. Actions brought by officials — Actions for damages — Pleas in law — Unlawfulness of a decision of the appointing authority not challenged within the time limits — Inadmissibility (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91) 1. The time limits for lodging a complaint and bringing an action, which are mandatory and not at the discretion of the parties or the court, are intended to safeguard within the EU institutions the legal certainty which is essential for their successful operation, by preventing EU measures which involve legal effects from being called in question indefinitely. To accept that, in response to a request for review lodged subsequently by the official concerned, the latter may receive retrospective payment of allowances previously denied him is likely to give rise to considerable legal uncertainty, with the risk of the institutions accumulating debts with regard to their officials, without the institutions being in a position to limit that risk. Moreover, a judgment cannot be regarded as a substantial new fact which would justify the re-opening of the time limits for lodging a complaint or bringing an action against an administrative decision that has become final, since the official concerned was not a party to that judgment or directly concerned by the measure annulled by that judgment. (see paras 27, 29) See: Judgment of 21 February 1974 in Kortner and Others v Council and Others, 15/73 to 33/73, 52/73, 53/73, 57/73 to 109/73, 116/73, 117/73, 123/73, 132/73 and 135/73 to 137/73, EU:C:1974:16, paras 36 and 39 Judgment of 5 March 2008 in Combescot v Commission, T‑414/06 P, EU:T:2008:58, para. 43 and the case-law cited therein Judgment of 13 April 2011 in Sukup v Commission, F‑73/09, EU:F:2011:40, para. 62, and order of 13 February 2014 in Probst v Commission, F‑75/13, EU:F:2014:20, para. 23 2. Concerning the alleged failure to comply both with the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and with the principles of sound administration and legal certainty, suffice it to note that neither the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials nor the principle of sound administration require the administration to set aside the time limits for lodging a complaint or an action, which being mandatory are not at its discretion, by reviewing, in respect of the past, a decision that has become final. As regards the principle of legal certainty, that principle provides the basis for the above consideration. (see para. 39) 3. The possibility of submitting a request as provided for in Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations does not allow an official to set aside the time limits laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations for the lodging of a complaint and the bringing of an action by indirectly calling in question, by means of that later request, a previous decision which has not been challenged within the time limits. In that regard, where an official has failed to challenge an administrative decision that has become final, he cannot properly obtain further time for bringing proceedings by subsequently lodging a claim for compensation, the purpose of which is clearly to obtain the same financial outcome as would have resulted from an action for annulment, lodged in good time, against that decision. (see para. 43) See: Orders of 28 September 2011 in Hecq v Commission, F‑12/11, EU:F:2011:165, para. 50 and the case law cited therein, and of 20 March 2014 in Michel v Commission, F‑44/13, EU:F:2014:40, para. 46 and the case law cited therein