Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:567
Date: 2025-07-10
Language of the case: German
Court formation: Tenth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Germany

Summary C-257/24 – 1 
Case C-257/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
12 April 2024 
Referring court: 
Landessozialgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) 
Date of the order for reference: 
8 April 2024 
Applicant and appellant: 
PE, legally represented by her parents 
Defendant and respondent: 
Städteregion Aachen 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Application for reimbursement of the costs incurred in connection with the use of 
school assistance for the applicant, who is a minor. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the reference 
Request pursuant to Article 267 TFEU concerning the interpretation of the scope 
of Regulation Nos 883/2004 and 492/2011 as regards integration benefits for 
disabled persons not residing in the Member State providing the corresponding 
benefit 
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Is Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems to 
be interpreted as meaning that the integration assistance provided for under the 
Sozialgesetzbuch Neuntes Buch – Rehabilitation und Teilhabe von Menschen mit 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-257/24 
 
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Behinderungen (Book IX of the Social Code – rehabilitation of and participation 
by people with disabilities, ‘SGB IX’), in the form of school assistance benefits, 
constitutes a benefit within the meaning of Article 3 and therefore falls within the 
material scope of the regulation? 
If question 1 is answered in the negative: 
2. Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Union to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which makes 
receipt of the integration assistance benefits provided for in the SGB IX, in the 
form of school assistance benefits, subject to habitual residence in the national 
territory? 
3. Is there an unjustified restriction of the rights of EU citizens under 
Article 20 and Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) if the granting of the integration assistance provided for in the 
SGB IX, in the form of school assistance benefits, is denied to EU citizens who 
have their domicile or habitual place of residence in another Member State 
(located close to the border), but the benefit-in-kind is provided in the State of 
stay? 
Cited provisions of European Union law 
TFEU, Articles 20, 21 and 45 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, Articles 1, 3, 11, 18 
and 70. 
Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, Article 7 
National legislation cited 
Constitutional law: 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law, ‘the GG’) (in the version of 23 May 1949, BGBl. I p. 1): 
Article 1: ‘(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be 
the duty of all state authority. […] 
Article 3: 
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. 
[…] 
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(3) […] No person shall be disfavoured because of disability. 
Article 20: (1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal 
state. […] 
Substantive laws: 
Book I of the Social Code – General Part (‘the SGB I’) (in as amended by the 
Gesetz vom 4. November 1982 (Law of 4 November 1982), BGBl I p. 1450): 
Paragraph 30: 
(1) The provisions of the present Code shall apply to all persons who have their 
domicile or habitual place of residence within the area to which this Code applies. 
(2) This Code shall not prejudice provisions derived from international or 
supranational law: 
(3) A person shall be domiciled where he or she occupies a dwelling under 
circumstances that indicate that he or she will maintain and use that dwelling. A 
person is habitually resident where he or she resides in circumstances that indicate 
that he or she is not staying only temporarily in that place or territory. 
Book IX of the Social Code – rehabilitation of and participation by people with 
disabilities (‘the SGB IX’) (as amended by the Gesetz vom 23. Dezember 2016 
(Law of 23 December 2016, BGBl. I p. 3234): 
Paragraph 18: 
(6) ‘If the rehabilitation carrier has been unable to provide an urgent benefit in 
good time or has wrongly refused a benefit, thereby causing beneficiaries to incur 
expenses for that benefit which they must themselves obtain, those costs must be 
reimbursed by the rehabilitation carrier in the amount incurred, in so far as the 
benefit was necessary.’ […] 
Paragraph 75: 
(1) Support benefits shall be provided for participation in education that are 
necessary to enable people with disabilities to benefit from educational 
opportunities on an equal basis with others. 
(2) The benefits include, in particular: 
1. Assistance with school education, in particular in the context of 
compulsory schooling, including preparation for it […] 
Paragraph 90: 
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(1) The purpose of integration assistance is to enable the beneficiaries to lead an 
individual lifestyle in accordance with human dignity and to claim full, effective 
and equal participation in the life of society. The benefit is intended to enable 
them to plan and lead their lives as independently and autonomously as possible. 
[…] 
(4) Participation in education has the special purpose of enabling beneficiaries 
to receive schooling and school-based and higher-education level training and 
education for a profession appropriate to their abilities and achievements in order 
to promote their participation in the life of society. 
Paragraph 99 (as amended by the Gesetz vom 2. Juni 2021 (Law of 2 June 2021, 
BGBl. I p. 1387) 
(1) Integration assistance benefits are provided to persons with disabilities, 
within the meaning of the first and second sentences of Paragraph 2(1), who are 
substantially restricted in terms of their participation in society on an equal basis 
with others (substantial disability) or who are at risk of such a substantial 
disability, if and to the extent that, after taking into account the particularities of 
the individual case, there is reason to believe that the purpose of the integration 
assistance, as set out in Paragraph 90, may be fulfilled. 
Paragraph 101 of the SGB IX (as amended by the Law of 2 June 2021, BGBl. I 
p. 1387): 
(1) Integration assistance benefits shall not be provided to German nationals 
who have their habitual place of residence abroad. The foregoing provision may 
be derogated from in an individual case only where that is unavoidable due to an 
exceptional need and it is demonstrated, at the same time, that a return to the 
national territory is not possible for the following reasons: 
1. care and education of a child who must remain abroad for legal 
reasons, 
2. long-term residential care in an institution or the severity of the 
dependency on care, or 
3. acts of a public authority. 
(2) Integration assistance benefits shall not be provided in so far as they are 
being provided, or can be expected to be provided, by the State of residence that is 
required to do so, or by others. 
Paragraph 104 (as amended by the Law of 23 December 2016, BGBl. I p. 3234): 
(1) The integration assistance benefits shall be determined according to the 
particularities of each individual case including, in particular, the person’s type of 
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need, personal circumstances, social environment and his or her own abilities and 
resources; in that respect, the type of accommodation must also be taken into 
account. […] 
Paragraph 112 of the SGB IX (as amended by the Law of 23 December 2016, 
BGBl. I p. 3234) 
(1) Benefits enabling participation in education include 
1. Assistance with school education, particularly within the context of 
general compulsory schooling and attendance at secondary schools, 
including preparation for that; the provisions on enabling school 
education within the context of general compulsory schooling remain 
unaffected […] 
Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘the UN 
Convention’) (as amended by the Gesetz vom 13. Dezember 2006 (Law of 
13 December 2006), BGBl. 2008 II, p. 1419): States Parties to the present 
Convention recognize the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the 
community, with choices equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate 
measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and 
their full inclusion and participation in the community, including by ensuring that: 
[…] (b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, residential 
and other community support services, including personal assistance necessary to 
support living and inclusion in the community, and to prevent isolation or 
segregation from the community; […] 
Brief summary of the facts and procedure 
1 The applicant and appellant, who was born in 2009 in Aachen 
(Germany)(‘applicant’) has German and Irish nationality and lives with her 
parents and siblings in a city in Belgium not far from the German-Belgian border. 
Her mother has German nationality and works full-time in Aachen as an employed 
doctor. The applicant’s father has Irish nationality and has been retired since 2021. 
The applicant is mentally disabled and therefore suffers from a development 
disorder and is in need of care. She has health insurance with the health-insurance 
fund Techniker Krankenkasse in Germany and, additionally, with the Freie 
Krankenkasse in Belgium. 
2 After attending an inclusive daycare centre in Aachen, she then attended a school 
for children with special needs situated in Eupen (Belgium) from 2015, followed 
by a community primary school in Aachen during the school years 2017/2018 to 
2019/2020. Upon receipt of the relevant application, the defendant and respondent 
(‘defendant’) granted the applicant integration assistance for the 2018/2019 and 
2019/2020 school years in the form of benefits for participation in education by 
covering the costs of a school assistant for 15 hours per week. As of the 
2020/2021 school year, the applicant has been attending a comprehensive school 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-257/24 
 
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in Aachen on a full-time basis. At her request, the defendant increased the 
integration assistance benefits for that school year to 35 hours per week. 
3 By decision of 9 June 2021, the defendant rejected a subsequent application for a 
grant of integration assistance benefits for the school year 2021/2022 on the 
ground that the applicant was barred from receiving integration assistance by 
virtue of the fact that her habitual place of residence was in Belgium. She was 
allegedly unable to derive any rights from the previous authorisation decisions. 
4 By decision of 20 August 2021, the defendant rejected the applicant’s objection to 
that decision. It asserted that the applicant had her habitual place of residence – 
which, in the case of minors, was generally determined by reference to the 
habitual place of residence of the parents – in Belgium and not in Germany. 
5 The applicant then brought an action contesting that decision on the objection 
before the Sozialgericht Aachen (Aachen Social Court, Germany). She argues that 
her domicile in Belgium serves merely as an indication of her habitual place of 
residence; her life unfolds mainly in Germany. By judgment of 25 January 2022, 
the Aachen Social Court dismissed her action. The applicant brought an appeal 
contesting that judgment before the Landessozialgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Higher Social Court, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany), by which she requested 
that the defendant be ordered to reimburse the costs incurred for the use of a 
school assistant during the period from August to November 2021, in the amount 
of €12,782.32. 
6 According to the applicant’s submissions, the costs of the school assistance were 
borne as follows: from August to November 2021 and for the 2023/2024 school 
year, by the applicant’s parents; from December 2021 to June 2022 and for the 
2022/2023 school year, by the Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiens 
(German-speaking Community in Belgium). 
Main submissions of the parties to the main proceedings 
7 The applicant asserts that the scope ratione materiae of Article 3(1)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is applicable. The Belgian school authorities had 
not made her family a specific offer regarding her schooling, but had instead 
informed them that the inclusive schooling she required would not be feasible 
there. Inclusion assistants were not used in classrooms at mainstream schools in 
Belgium. All children who could not be educated within that system had to attend 
a school for children with special needs. 
8 The defendant argues that children in Belgium with special educational needs 
could also be educated at a mainstream school. 
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Brief summary of the basis for the reference 
9 The applicant’s appeal is unfounded if considered exclusively from the 
perspective of national law. There is no entitlement to reimbursement of costs 
under the first sentence of Paragraph 18(6) of the SGB IX, which would be the 
only possible basis for a claim, because the necessary entitlement to benefits-in-
kind is not present. 
10 An entitlement to benefits-in-kind by way of benefits for participation in 
education in the form of integration assistance under Paragraph 75, 
Paragraph 99(1), Paragraph 90(1) and (4) as well as point (1) of the first sentence 
of Paragraph 112 of the SGB IX fails because the applicant does not have her 
habitual place of residence in Germany. By virtue of the first sentence of 
Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX, she is therefore precluded from receiving 
benefits. Despite her many connections to Aachen, which lead her to visit there on 
an almost daily basis, the applicant’s habitual place of residence corresponds to 
the location of her dwelling in Belgium; the requirements for a counter-exception 
to the general benefit exclusion, as set out in the second sentence of 
Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX, are not met. 
11 Nor could the applicant seek to rely on the European Convention on Social and 
Medical Assistance (‘ECSMA’) of 11 December 1953 (BGBl. II 1956, p. 564) 
because the case at issue does not concern social assistance benefits that the 
Belgian State grants to its own nationals but withholds from the applicant (see 
Article 1 of the ECSMA). In so far as the school assistance costs were covered by 
the German-speaking Community in Belgium, the Ministry of the German-
speaking Community has confirmed that it covered those costs purely as a 
goodwill gesture. 
12 An entitlement to benefits-in-kind does not arise directly from Article 19 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘the UN 
Convention’), which has been transposed into German law by the approval law 
(BGBl. II 2008, p. 1419), since that article does not confer any rights on 
individuals. Nor can the applicant derive any rights from Article 1 of the ECSMA, 
since she is not a ‘national of the other Contracting Party’ (Belgium) but instead 
holds German (and Irish) nationality. 
13 Nor can a right to benefits-in-kind be inferred from constitutional law. According 
to the case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, 
Germany), a claim based on the fundamental right to the guarantee of a minimum 
physical and socio-cultural subsistence level arising from Article 1(1), read in 
conjunction with Article 20(1), of the [GG] is available only for people who reside 
within German territory (BVerfG, judgment of 18 July 2012, 1 BvL 10/10 and 
others, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2012:ls20120718.1bvl001010, paragraph 63, juris). 
14 Furthermore, Paragraph 101 of the SGB IX does not violate the general principle 
of equality laid down in Article 3(1) of the GG. Differentiations by the legislator 
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are permissible, but must always be justified by objective reasons that are 
proportionate to the aim and extent of the unequal treatment. The objective reason 
for the unequal treatment of Germans living abroad that is at issue in the present 
case is based on the public-interest requirement for appropriate use of tax 
revenues. In that respect, the interests of the person concerned that are worthy of 
protection are taken into account by virtue of the fact that the second sentence of 
Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX lays down exceptions under which the person 
concerned is not required to return to Germany. 
I. The first question referred for a preliminary ruling 
15 When considering the case at issue from the perspective of EU law, it is first 
necessary to clarify whether the personal and material scope of application of 
Regulation No 883/2004 is applicable. 
16 Firstly, it is irrelevant that the Federal Republic of Germany has not yet declared 
that the rules on integration assistance laid down in Paragraphs 90 to 150a of the 
SGB IX fall within the scope of application of Regulation No 883/2004. The 
Court has previously held that the absence of such a declaration does not 
automatically mean that a particular law is outside the material scope of the 
regulation (see, for example, judgment of 25 July 2018, A [Assistance for a 
disabled person], C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, paragraph 30). 
17 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the distinction between benefits falling 
within the scope of Regulation No 883/2004 and those which are outside it is 
based essentially on the constituent elements of each benefit, in particular its 
purpose and the conditions for its grant. By contrast, it does not matter whether a 
benefit is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation (see, for 
example, judgments of 14 March 2019, Dreyer, C-372/18, EU:C:2019:206, 
paragraph 31; of 12 March 2020, Caisse d’assurance retraite et de la santé au 
travail d’Alsace-Moselle, C-769/18, EU:C:2020:203, paragraph 26; and of 
15 June 2023, Thermalhotel Fontana, C-411/22, EU:C:2023:490, paragraph 22). 
A benefit may be regarded as a ‘social security benefit’ if two cumulative 
conditions are met: Firstly, it must be granted to recipients without any individual 
and discretionary assessment of personal needs on the basis of a legally defined 
position. Secondly, it must relate to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 3(1) 
of Regulation No 883/2004 (judgments of 14 March 2019, Dreyer, C-372/18, 
EU:C:2019:206, paragraph 32; and of 15 June 2023, Thermalhotel Fontana, 
C-411/22, EU:C:2023:490, paragraph 23). 
18 The first of those conditions is satisfied if a benefit is granted in the light of 
objective criteria which, if they are met, confer entitlement to the benefit, the 
competent authority having no power to take account of other personal 
circumstances (judgments of 15 July 2021, A [Public health care], C-535/19, 
EU:C:2021:595, paragraph 30; and of 25 July 2018, A [Assistance for a disabled 
person] C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, paragraph 34). That condition is not satisfied 
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if the discretionary nature of the assessment, by the competent authority, of the 
personal needs of a recipient of a benefit must, above all, relate to eligibility for 
that benefit (judgment of 25 July 2018, A [Assistance for a disabled person], 
C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, paragraph 38). Those considerations apply, mutatis 
mutandis, in respect of the individual character of the assessment by the 
competent authority of the personal needs of a recipient of a benefit (judgment of 
14 March 2019, Dreyer, C-372/18, EU:C:2019:206, paragraph 35). 
19 The Chamber assumes that the first condition is not satisfied. The SGB IX 
subdivides integration assistance benefits into, among other things, benefits for 
participation in education. The integration assistance as a benefit for participation 
in education in the form of the school assistance that is at issue in the present case, 
as provided for under Paragraphs 75, 99(1), 90(1) and (4), and point (1) of the first 
sentence of Paragraph 112(1) of the SGB IX, is not subject to objective criteria 
such as, inter alia, a specific rate or level of incapacity or disability. The 
integration assistance is granted according to the personal needs of the person 
concerned on the basis of an individual assessment of those needs by the 
competent authority (see the first sentence of Paragraph 104(1) of the SGB IX; on 
the matter of integration assistance pursuant to Paragraph 35a of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch Achtes Buch – Kinder- und Jugendhilfe (Book VIII of the 
Social Code – Assistance for Children and Young People, (‘the SGB VIII’): 
judgment of 12 March 2020, Caisse d’assurance retraite et de la santé au travail 
d’Alsace-Moselle, C-769/18, EU:C:2020:203, paragraphs 30 and 31). 
20 In any event, the question arises as to whether integration assistance in the form of 
school assistance can be classified, in terms of the benefits defined under 
Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004, as a sickness benefit for the purposes of 
point (a) thereof. ‘Sickness’ in that sense is usually understood to mean a 
temporary impairment of health (judgment of 21 July 2011, Stewart, C-503/09, 
EU:C:2011:500, paragraph 37). The Court also classifies the medical 
rehabilitation benefits available under the German pension insurance scheme to 
the category of sickness benefits (see judgment of 10 January 1980, 
Jordens-Vosters, C-69/79, EU:C:1980:7, paragraph 7). However, the integration 
assistance provided for under the SGB IX is not made available as a temporary 
benefit relating to a temporary health impairment. Furthermore – in view of the 
fact that it takes the form of school assistance – it does not constitute a medical 
rehabilitation benefit, but is in fact a benefit for participation in education. Its 
purpose is to enable the beneficiaries to receive an education that is appropriate 
for their abilities and achievements and to promote their participation in the life of 
society (Paragraph 90(4) of the SGB IX). 
21 It is also necessary to establish that the integration assistance does not instead 
constitute social assistance benefits that are excluded from the material scope of 
application of Regulation No 883/2004 by virtue of Article 3(5)(a) thereof. The 
fundamental distinguishing feature lies in the benefit having an insufficient link to 
one of the risks listed in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004 as well as in need 
as an ‘essential criterion’ (see judgments of 22 June 1972, Frilli, C-1/72, 
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EU:C:1972:56, paragraph 14 and 15; and of 27 March 1985, Hoeckx, C-249/83, 
EU:C:1985:139, paragraph 13). In order to fall within the material scope of 
application of the regulation, social security benefits must, in principle, be granted 
to the beneficiaries on the basis of a legally defined situation, without any 
individual and discretionary assessment of their personal needs (see judgments of 
5 May 1983, Piscitello, C-139/82, EU:C:1983:126, paragraph 13; and of 
16 September 2015, European Commission v Slovakia, C-433/13, 
EU:C:2015:602, paragraph 71 et seq.]) and pursuant to general stipulations as to 
periods of work, contribution or affiliation (judgment of 27 March 1985, Hoeckx, 
249/83, EU:C:1985:139, paragraph 13). The key element of a social assistance 
benefit is the subsidiarity of the benefit vis-à-vis maintenance claims governed by 
private law or priority social benefits (judgment of 27 March 1985, Hoeckx, 
249/83, EU:C:1985:139, paragraph 13). There is reason to believe that the 
integration assistance provided for under the SGB IX should be classified to the 
area of social assistance. That type of benefit does not appear to be linked to one 
of the risks listed in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 883/2004. Periods of work, 
contribution or affiliation have no bearing on the emergence of an entitlement to 
tax-funded integration assistance. Furthermore, integration assistance is provided 
on a case-by-case basis (Paragraph 104(1) of the SGB IX) and in the alternative to 
benefits provided by others or by providers of other social benefits 
(Paragraph 91(1) of the SGB IX). Even if the law provides for an exemption from 
contributions for certain integration assistance benefits (Paragraph 138 of the SGB 
IX) – including in respect of the benefits for participation in education at issue in 
the present case – that should not necessarily prevent them from being classified 
as social assistance benefits. Militating in favour of that argument is the fact that a 
clear dividing line between social security benefits and social assistance benefits 
cannot be easily drawn because non-contributory legal entitlements (without 
discretion) have also been implemented in many Member States. Moreover, the 
integration assistance provided for under the SGB IX is comparable to the 
integration assistance for mentally disabled children and young people provided 
for under Paragraph 35a of the SGB VIII, in respect of which the Court has also 
affirmed its social assistance character (see judgment of 12 March 2020, Caisse 
d’assurance retraite et de la santé au travail d’Alsace-Moselle, C-769/18, 
EU:C:2020:203, paragraph 27 et seq.). 
22 The integration assistance provided for under the SGB IX is not a special non-
contributory cash benefit for the purposes of Article 70 of Regulation 
No 883/2004 because it is not listed in Annex X of that regulation. 
23 If the Court were to hold that the material scope of application of Regulation 
No 883/2004 is applicable, it would still be necessary to establish whether the 
applicant falls within the personal scope of application of that regulation. In 
principle, Belgium would be competent as the Member State of residence for the 
purposes of Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation No 883/2004. If it were to be held that 
school assistance is to be classified as a sickness benefit, the applicant would – as 
a family member of a frontier worker – have an entitlement by virtue of the first 
sentence of Article 18(2) of Regulation No 883/2004. As the Federal Republic of 
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Germany is not listed in Annex III as the ‘competent Member State’ – within the 
meaning of Article 1(s) of Regulation No 883/2004 – the restriction laid down in 
the second sentence of Article 18(2) of the regulation would not be applicable. 
II. The second question referred for a preliminary ruling 
24 The Chamber considers it necessary to clarify whether the exclusion of an EU 
citizen from receipt of integration assistance benefits is compatible with 
Article 7(2), read in conjunction with Article 7(1), of Regulation No 492/2011 if 
he or she does not reside in the State of stay (Germany) but in a frontier Member 
State (Belgium). That provision provides that a worker who is a national of a 
Member State is to enjoy in the territory of another Member State, by reason of 
his or her nationality, the same social and tax advantages as the national workers. 
In principle, that presupposes a continuing status as a worker within the meaning 
of Article 45 TFEU as well as membership of the society of the host country on 
the part of that worker. According to the case-law of the Court, social advantages 
in that sense need not be granted on the basis of a direct link to an employment 
relationship (see judgments of 31 May 1979, Even v ONPTS, C-207/78, 
EU:C:1979:144, paragraph 22; of 14 January 1982, Reina, 65/81, EU:C:1982:6, 
paragraph 12; and of 12 July 1984, Castelli, 261/83, EU:C:1984:280, 
paragraph 11). It is in fact sufficient that the advantages ‘are granted to national 
workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the 
mere fact of their residence on the national territory and the extension of which to 
workers who are nationals of other member states therefore seems suitable to 
facilitate their mobility within the community’ (judgment of 12 July 1984, 
Castelli, C-261/83, EU:C:1984:280, paragraph 11). Benefits granted to family 
members of a frontier worker are thus ‘social advantages’ of the frontier worker 
within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011, if the advantages 
arising from the benefits also constitute advantages for the frontier worker himself 
or herself (judgment of 10 September 2009, European Commission v Germany, 
C-269/07, EU:C:2009:527, paragraph 65), which is in turn the case if the frontier 
worker is responsible for the maintenance of the direct beneficiaries (judgment of 
18 June 1987, Lebon, 316/85, EU:C:1987:302, paragraph 12 et seq.). 
25 The personal scope of application of the provision appears to be applicable. The 
applicant’s mother, who is also a German national, works in Aachen as a 
full-time, employed doctor. Having exercised her right to freedom of movement, 
she is entitled to invoke Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 against the 
Member State of which she is a national. The applicant’s mother provides 
maintenance to the minor applicant. 
26 The Court has not yet ruled on whether integration assistance benefits in the form 
of assistance services to support the school attendance of the child of a frontier 
worker constitute a ‘social advantage’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of 
Regulation No 492/2011. It has emphasised, however, that that provision is a 
particular expression, in the specific area of the grant of social advantages, of the 
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principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 45 TFEU and must be accorded 
the same interpretation as Article 45 TFEU (judgments of 2 April 2020, PF and 
Others, C-830/18, EU:C:2020:275, paragraph 29; of 10 October 2019, Krah, 
C-703/17, EU:C:2019:850, paragraph 21; and of 20 June 2013, Giersch and 
Others, C-20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paragraph 35). In view of the fact that 
Article 7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 is residual in scope, the Court has so far 
accorded a fairly broad understanding to the term ‘social advantages’ (as opposed 
to ‘social security’) (see, for example, judgments of 28 May 1974, Callemeyn, 
C-187/73, EU:C:1974:57, paragraph 14 et seq.; of 18 July 2007, Hartmann, 
C-212/05, EU:C:2007:437; and of 21 December 2023, Chief Appeals Officer and 
Others, C-488/21, EU:C:2023:1013, paragraph 64 et seq.). That broad 
interpretation could militate in favour of school assistance services being included 
under ‘social advantages’. In that respect, the Chamber cites the judgment of 
2 April 2020, PF and Others, C-830/18, EU:C:2020:275, in which the Court 
stated that the residence requirement, being a condition for payment of school 
transport costs, constituted an unjustified indirect discrimination against children 
of frontier workers that was contrary to EU law. The sole determinative factor was 
the fact that the mother of that applicant (in the cited case) worked as an employee 
in Germany and her family members were entitled to the ‘social advantages’ 
(judgment of 2 April 2020, PF and Others, C-830/18, EU:C:2020:275, 
paragraph 21 et seq.). 
27 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the equal treatment rule laid down in 
Article 7 of Regulation No 492/2011 and Article 45 TFEU prohibits not only 
overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of 
discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead 
in fact to the same result (judgments of 10 October 2019, Krah, C-703/17, 
EU:C:2019:850, paragraph 23; of 13 March 2019, Gemeinsamer Betriebsrat 
EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach, C -437/17, EU:C:2019:193, paragraph 18; 
and of 8 May 2019, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, C-24/17, 
EU:C:2019:373, paragraph 70). The condition of habitual residence in Germany 
laid down in the SGB IX as a prerequisite for receipt of integration assistance 
could constitute indirect discrimination since, by its very nature, it is likely to 
affect frontier workers more than domestic workers and therefore risks placing 
frontier workers at a particular disadvantage. 
28 If indirect discrimination is to be assumed, the question then arises as to a possible 
justification. Indirect discrimination is generally prohibited unless it is objectively 
justified. It must therefore be appropriate for securing the attainment of a 
legitimate objective and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective.(judgment of 10 July 2019, Aubriet, C-410/18, EU:C:2019:582, 
paragraph 29). The purpose of the rule is apparent from the legislative history: 
Until 31 December 2003, Germans who had their habitual place of residence 
abroad could be granted social assistance in cases of special urgency. As of 
1 January 2004, Paragraph 24 of the Sozialgesetzbuch Zwölftes Buch – 
Sozialhilfe (Book XII of the Social Code – Social Assistance, ‘the SGB XII’) has 
provided that social assistance benefits are, as a general rule, totally excluded and 
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that exceptions are possible only within strict limits. That significant restriction 
resulted from a case that was debated among the German public concerning a 
German living in Florida (USA) who was in need of assistance and whose rent for 
an apartment located close to the beach had been paid by the social welfare office. 
In the explanatory memorandum to Paragraph 24 of SGB XII, the legislature 
states that the ‘entitlement to a grant of social assistance to Germans abroad has 
been called into question generally during the public debate’ and that ‘even the 
acceptance of social assistance as the lowest social safety net has suffered’ 
(BT-Drucks. 15/1761, p. 6). With effect from 1 January 2020, the integration 
assistance, which had hitherto formed part of the social assistance provided for 
under the SGB XII, was removed from the SGB XII and transferred to the SGB 
IX as a newly created benefits system subject to new jurisdictional rules. The 
content of the provision introduced in Paragraph 101 of the SGB IX essentially 
corresponds to that of Paragraph 24 of the SGB XII. Hence, in its explanatory 
memorandum to Paragraph 101 of the SGB IX (BT-Drucks. 18/9522, p. 278), the 
legislator thus refers to the parallel provision laid down in Paragraph 24 of the 
SGB XII. 
29 Against that backdrop, the risk of undermining the financial balance of the social 
security system could constitute a legitimate public-interest reason justifying the 
exclusion of benefits. If the national exclusion rule provides for hardship 
exceptions which are essentially linked to a potentially possible and likely 
provision of benefits in the state of residence, then that may also militate against 
an assumption of unjustified discrimination. Lastly, with respect to the 
compatibility of the first sentence of Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX with EU 
law, it could also be argued that the principle of non-discrimination laid down 
generally in Article 18 TFEU may be given more specific expression in relation to 
medical and social assistance benefits under Article 3(5) of Regulation 
No 883/2004 (see, with regard to Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and Article 4 
of Regulation No 883/2004: judgment of 11 November 2014, Dano, C-333/13, 
EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 61). If the Court were to hold that the benefits 
constituted such social assistance, that could be sufficient in itself to justify 
indirect discrimination on grounds of residence. In that regard, it could be argued 
that integration assistance constitutes – for the purposes of EU law – a system of 
social assistance benefits and that it is, to that extent, excluded from 
‘exportability’. That would also be in line with the fact that the rule confirms the 
principle of territoriality, founded in international law, according to which state 
(and tax-funded) social assistance benefits are to be granted only to persons 
resident within the state’s own territory. 
30 On the other hand, it is questionable whether the exclusion of benefits under the 
first sentence of Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX is actually necessary to ensure 
the proper use of tax revenues. The opinion obtained by the Chamber from the 
competent Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does not indicate the 
extent to which Germany actually saves on expenditure through the exclusion of 
benefits provided for under the first sentence of Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX. 
Before the tightening of the criteria for claiming the benefits as of 1 January 2004, 
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the legislator assumed a manageable target group of less than 1,000 people 
(BR-Drucks. 658/03, S. 1), which, out of a total number of 2.91 million social 
assistance recipients at that time, was a very small number. Consideration must 
also be given to the fact that the exclusion of benefits could potentially result in 
German nationals being compelled to return, which would thus trigger an increase 
in costs. In so far as the legislator was seeking to reduce the level of abusive 
benefit claims by wording the legislation more restrictively, that object also 
appears doubtful – especially in terms of the principles of proportionality – at least 
for the purposes of the SGB IX. Unlike, for example, in the case of transfers of 
cash benefits abroad under the right to social assistance (SGB XII), the issue of 
abusive benefit claims does not arise in the case of benefits-in-kind that are 
provided domestically. In so far as the purpose of the benefit exclusion can also be 
regarded as a means of relieving the authorities from a laborious examination of 
the eligibility conditions for Germans living abroad to receive benefits, the 
necessity for it remains questionable, at least for frontier workers and their family 
members staying in Germany. The benefit-in-kind at issue in the present case is 
not being transferred abroad but is instead provided domestically. Accessing the 
applicants for the purposes of clarifying whether the conditions for receipt of the 
benefits-in-kind have been met would also be possible in principle and, in that 
regard, there would be no apparent difference from Germans or EU citizens 
having their habitual residence in Germany. Finally, it should be emphasised that 
the legislator’s explicit aim in withdrawing the integration assistance from the 
SGB XII was to remove benefits for people with disabilities from the previous 
social assistance systems and to further develop the integration assistance into a 
modern right to participate, which finds expression, in particular, in 
Paragraphs 90(1) and (4) of the SGB IX. In that context, the Chamber considers 
that it could be appropriate to take account of the values set out under Article 19 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Article 26 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
31 There is nothing to indicate that the applicant arbitrarily brought about the 
conditions for obtaining the social advantages referred to in Article 7(2) of 
Regulation No 492/2011 that are at issue in the present case and had thus acted in 
an abusive manner (see, in that regard, CJEU judgments of 17 July 2014, Torresi, 
C-58/13 and C-59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraphs 42 and 46; and of 6 October 
2020, Jobcenter Krefeld, C-181/19, EU:C:2020:794, paragraph 76). According to 
the Chamber’s findings, comparable school assistance that is appropriate to the 
applicant’s disability-related restrictions is not provided in Belgium and hence 
claiming the benefits in Germany is understandable. It is true that pupils with 
disabilities can be taught at a regular Belgian school. However, support is not 
provided at those schools by a single assistant per pupil, but by a support teacher 
who attends to several children in a class at the same time. However, due to her 
disability, the applicant requires one-to-one support throughout the school day, 
both in class and during break times. The assertion that the claim for benefits in 
Germany is not arbitrary is further supported by the fact that the applicant also 
has, in addition to holding German nationality, a sufficient ‘genuine link’ with 
Germany as a State of stay. She regularly visits family members here in Germany, 
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where she has health insurance, attends appointments with her doctors and 
therapists, pursues leisure activities and has a mother who is in paid employment 
within the national territory. 
III. The third question referred for a preliminary ruling 
32 Lastly, the benefit exclusion laid down in the first sentence of Paragraph 101 (1) 
of the SGB IX could constitute an objectively unjustified restriction on the rights 
of EU citizens laid down in Article 20 and Article 21(1) TFEU. The first 
paragraph of Article 18 TFEU prohibits any discrimination against EU citizens on 
grounds of nationality. Point (a) of the second sentence of Article 20(2) TFEU and 
Article 21(1) TFEU provide that EU citizens have, in particular, the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. The Court has 
developed the freedom of movement based on EU citizenship into a prohibition on 
any restriction. National legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of its 
nationals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside 
in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21 
TFEU on every citizen of the EU (judgments of 18 July 2006, De Cuyper, 
C-406/04, EU:C:2006:491, paragraph 39; and of 26 February 2015, Martens, 
C-359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 25). The opportunities offered by the treaty 
in relation to freedom of movement cannot be fully effective if a national of a 
Member State could be dissuaded from using them by obstacles resulting from his 
stay in another Member State because of legislation of his State of origin 
penalising the fact that he has used those opportunities (judgment of 26 February 
2015, Martens, C-359/13, EU:C:2015:118, paragraph 26). 
33 On the basis of that case-law, the exclusion of benefits provided for under the first 
sentence of Paragraph 101(1) of the SGB IX could be regarded as a restriction on 
the right to freedom of movement. The provision would penalise the applicant, as 
a German national, simply because she has chosen to establish her place of 
residence or habitual abode in Belgium, thereby exercising her freedom of 
movement. In that regard, the Court’s considerations in its judgment of 25 July 
2018, A (Assistance for a disabled person), C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, could be 
applied to the present case. The matter in dispute in that case concerned the 
provision by Finland, as the state of origin, of disability-related personal 
assistance for the purposes of supporting higher education in Estonia. Where a 
Member State provides for a system of funding for higher education pursued in a 
Member State or abroad, it must, according to the Court, ensure that the detailed 
rules for the award of that funding do not create an unjustified restriction of the 
right laid down in Article 21(1) TFEU (judgment of 25 July 2018, A (Assistance 
for a disabled person), C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, paragraph 59). The application 
of those considerations to the present case could be supported by the fact that the 
Court has emphasised – with reference to its previous case-law – that the status of 
citizen of the EU, as a fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enables those nationals to enjoy, within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty, 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such 
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exceptions as are expressly provided for in that regard (judgment of 25 July 2018, 
A (Assistance for a disabled person), C-679/16, EU:C:2018:601, paragraph 56; 
see also, with regard to education: judgment of 11 July 2002, D’Hoop, C-224/98, 
EU:C:2002:432, paragraph 25 et seqq.). 
34 A restriction on the right to freedom of movement can be justified, with regard to 
EU law, only if it is based on objective considerations of public interest 
independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to the 
legitimate objective of the national provisions (judgment of 18 July 2006, De 
Cuyper, C-406/04, EU:C:2006:491, paragraph 40).