Order — ECLI:EU:C:2003:90
Date: 2003-02-12
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Subject matter: Staff regulations and employment conditions - EC
Concepts: Application for interim measures: suspension of operation of the contested measure and other interim measures;Appeals
Procedure: Appeal - unfounded;Staff cases;Application for interim measures

Summary of the Order 
1. Appeals — Pleas in law — Pleas directed against a ground of the judgment or order 
not necessary to support the operative part — Plea inoperative 
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 56, first para.) 
2. Appeals — Pleas in law — Erroneous assessment of the facts and evidence — 
Inadmissibility 
(Art. 225 EC; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58) 
I -1417 
SUMMARY — CASE C-399/02 P(R) 
3. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — 
Conditions for granting — Serious and irreparable damage — Causal link between 
the damage alleged and the contested act 
(Art. 242 EC) 
4. Applications for interim measures — Court's obligation to give reasons — Scope 
5. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — 
Conditions for granting — Serious and irreparable damage — Prima facie case — 
Dismissal of the application on the ground of lack of urgency alone — Consequences 
in the context of an appeal 
(Art. 242 EC; Rules of Procedure of the Court, Art. 83(2); Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2)) 
1. In appeal proceedings, pleas directed 
against grounds which do not provide 
the necessary basis for the operative 
part of the judgment or order under 
appeal are inoperative. 
(see para. 16) 
2. Under Article 225 EC and Article 58 of 
the Statute of the Court of Justice, any 
appeal is to be limited to points of law 
and must lie on the grounds of lack of 
competence of the Court of First 
Instance, a breach of procedure before 
it which adversely affects the interests 
of the appellant or infringement of 
Community law by the Court of First 
Instance. The Court of First Instance 
alone has jurisdiction to make findings 
of fact, except where the documents 
before it caused it to make a material 
error in so doing, and to assess the facts 
as so found. Furthermore, the Court of 
Justice does not in principle have 
jurisdiction to examine evidence which 
the Court of First Instance has accepted 
in support of its finding or assessment 
of the facts. Where the general prin­
ciples of law and rules of procedure 
governing the burden of proof and the 
taking of evidence have been observed, 
it is for the Court of First Instance 
alone to assess the weight to be 
attributed to the evidence adduced 
before it. 
(see para. 21) 
3. In interlocutory proceedings which 
seek the suspension of operation of an 
act of an institution, the existence of a 
causal link between the contested act 
and the alleged harm is relevant evi­
dence for the purposes of assessing 
urgency. For a claim for interim meas­
ures to be upheld, it is necessary for the 
measures requested to be urgent in so 
I - 1418 
MARCUCCIO v COMMISSION 
far as, in order to avoid serious and 
irreparable damage to the applicant's 
interests, they must be made and pro­
duce their effects before a decision is 
reached in the main action. Interim 
measures which would not serve to 
prevent serious and irreparable harm 
cannot a fortiori be necessary for that 
purpose. 
(see para. 26) 
4. A judge hearing an application for 
interim measures cannot be required 
to reply explicitly to all the points of 
fact and law raised in the course of the 
interlocutory proceedings. It is suffi­
cient that the reasons given validly 
justify the order in the light of the 
circumstances of the case and enable 
the Court of Justice to exercise its 
powers of review. 
(see para. 40) 
5. In the context of an appeal brought 
against an order dismissing an appli­
cation for suspension of operation of a 
measure on the ground of lack of 
urgency of the measures sought, with­
out any consideration of whether the 
main action appeared prima facie well 
founded, pleas which relate to the 
existence of a prima facie case but do 
not call into question the lack of 
urgency of the measures sought cannot 
form grounds for setting aside, even 
partially, the order under appeal, since 
the conditions for granting suspension 
are cumulative. 
(see paras 56-58) 
I - 1419