Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2025:236
Date: 2025-04-03
Language of the case: Greek
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: Asylum policy;Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties;Area of freedom, security and justice;Fundamental rights;Charter of Fundamental Rights;Border checks
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Cyprus

Summary C-283/24 – 1 
Case C-283/24 [Barouk] i 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
23 April 2024 
Referring court: 
Dioikitiko Dikastirio Diethnous Prostasias (Cyprus) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
29 March 2024 
Applicant:  
B. F. 
Defendant:  
Kypriaki Dimokratia meso proistamenou tis Ypiresias Asylou 
      
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Action brought by the applicant in the main proceedings challenging the decision 
of the Ypiresia Asylou (Asylum Service, Cyprus) of 7 February 2022 rejecting his 
application for international protection, and the return decision adopted in the 
same proceedings, the enforcement of which is, however, suspended pending the 
decision of the referring court on the action. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Interpretation of Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU in the light of 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the 
light of the obligations to carry out individual assessments (Article 4(3)(c) of 
Directive 2011/95/EU), cooperation (Article 4(1) of that directive) and sincere 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) – Article 267 TFEU 
 
i The name given to the present case is fictitious. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings. 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-283/24 
 
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Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Is Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of 
Article 47 of the Charter, and in conjunction with the obligation to carry out an 
individual assessment referred to in Article 4(3)(c), the duty of cooperation laid 
down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of 
an express provision of national law empowering the national court under 
Article 46 to refer the applicant for medical examinations, that court may derive 
its power to issue an order referring the applicant for medical examinations 
directly from that article where that is considered necessary for a full and ex nunc 
examination of an application for international protection? 
2. Is Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of 
Article 47 of the Charter, and in conjunction with the obligation to carry out an 
individual assessment referred to in Article 4(3)(c), the duty of cooperation laid 
down in Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of 
an express provision of national law empowering the national court under 
Article 46 to refer the applicant for medical examinations, and, by extension, in 
the absence of an express statutory provision on a mechanism for referral for 
medical examinations available to the national court directly under that article, the 
court has the power to apply to the determining authority (which is always one of 
the parties to the proceedings before it) in order that it may, by analogy, 
implement the mechanism provided for in Article 18 of Directive 2013/32/EU by 
providing the national court with a medical examination of the applicant? 
3. Is Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of 
the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that the means of conducting the full and 
ex nunc examination of an application for international protection are a matter for 
the procedural autonomy of the Member States? If so, is Article 46(1) and (3) of 
Directive 2013/32/EU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, and in 
conjunction with the duty of cooperation laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 
2011/95/EU and the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to 
be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of an express provision of national 
law empowering the national court to refer the applicant for medical examinations 
and, by extension, in the absence of an express statutory provision on a 
mechanism for referral for medical examinations available to the national court, 
the court has the power to apply to the determining authority (which is always one 
of the parties to the proceedings before it) in order that it may, by analogy, 
implement the mechanism laid down in Article 18 of Directive 2013/32/EU by 
providing the national court with a medical examination of the applicant where the 
national court considers that the national measures do not comply with the 
principle of effectiveness? 
4. Is Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, in conjunction with Article 47 of 
the Charter, to be interpreted as meaning that, in cases where it is established that 
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there is an absence of appropriate mechanisms for carrying out the individual, full 
and ex nunc examination provided for in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, 
the guarantees set out in those articles are satisfied where the national court has 
the power to annul the decision rejecting an application for international 
protection? 
Provisions of European Union law and case-law relied on 
Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’): Articles 4(3) and 19(3)(b). 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’): Articles 78 and 267. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’): Articles 18 
and 47. 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60: Articles 18 and 46(1) and (3). 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9: Article 4(1) and(3)(c). 
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 December 1974, 
Van Duyn v Home Office, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133; of 19 January 1982, Becker, 
C-8/81, EU:C:1982:7; of 22 June 1989, Fratelli Constanzo v Municipality of 
Milan, C-103/88, EU:C:1989:256; of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C-348/16, 
EU:C:2017:591; of 25 January 2018, F, C-473/16, EU:C:2018:36; of 25 July 
2018, Alheto, C-585/16, EU:C:2018:584; of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C-556/17, 
EU:C:2019:626; of 19 March 2020, PG, C-406/18, EU:C:2020:216; and of 
29 June 2023, International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (Terrorist 
attack in Pakistan), C-756/21, EU:C:2023:523. 
Provisions of national law relied on 
O peri Dikastirion Nomos (Law on courts of justice) 1960, as amended on several 
occasions, the most recent relevant and applicable amendment being the second of 
those made in 2023: Article 34Α. 
O peri Prodikastikis Parapompis sto Dikastirio ton Evropaikon Koinotiton 
Diadikastikos Kanonismos (Procedural regulation on preliminary references to the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities) (1/2008): Articles 3 and 5. 
O peri tis Idrysis kai Leitourgias Dioikitikou Dikastiriou Diethnous Prostasias 
(Law on the establishment and operation of the International Protection 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-283/24 
 
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Administrative Court) 2018, as amended on several occasions, the most recent 
relevant and applicable amendment being the second one made in 2023: 
Article 11. 
O peri Prosfygon Nomos (Law on refugees) 2000, as amended on several 
occasions, the most recent relevant and applicable amendment being the one made 
in 2023: Articles 15 (medical and psychological examination of an applicant), 
Article 16 (transposition of Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/95) and Article 18(3)(c) 
(assessment of an application for international protection on an individual basis). 
I peri tis Leitourgias Dioikitikou Dikastiriou Diethnous Prostasias Diadikastikoi 
Kanonismoi (Rules of procedure on the functioning of the International Protection 
Administrative Court) 2019 (3/2019): Articles 7 and 10. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 The applicant in the main proceedings comes from Lebanon and holds a passport 
from that country. He entered the territory of Cyprus illegally through areas not 
controlled by the government. On 4 September 2018, he applied for international 
protection. With regard to the reasons why he abandoned his country of origin, the 
applicant briefly stated the following in his application: ‘political reasons – threat 
– danger’. On 5 and 26 August and on 9 September 2020, successive interviews 
were conducted with an official of the European Union Agency for Asylum 
(EUAA), as it is now named, with the assistance of an interpreter. 
2 In the course of those interviews, the applicant stated that he is a Lebanese 
national, a Maronite Christian and a supporter of the Kataeb party, the military 
branch of which he joined as a young man, as a ‘military musician’. He left his 
country 20 years ago. He states that he is married and that his wife comes from 
Georgia where she lives with their child. He maintains contact only with his 
mother, as he claims that his other relatives are supporters of the regime and spy 
on him. He has moved around many countries because in Lebanon, since 
abandoning his military training, he has constantly faced trumped-up charges, 
including those of sympathising with the Islamic Caliphate (ISIS) or spying for 
Israel, which carry the death penalty. On account of his beliefs and his 
unwillingness to cooperate with the regime’s authorities, he has become a target 
of the intelligence services of his country, and also those of Syria, as well as of 
various military and terrorist organisations. He also described, albeit in a rather 
confused and not particularly plausible manner in the view of the referring court, 
incidents of kidnapping and attempted murder, and alleged that he had been 
subjected to torture by Lebanese and Syrian authorities. 
3 On 25 January 2022, an official submitted a report/recommendation to the Head 
of the Asylum Service recommending that the asylum application be rejected. 
That recommendation was approved by the head of the service on 7 February 
2022. Specifically, when assessing the statements made by the applicant in the 
present proceedings, the Asylum Service distinguished three substantive claims, 
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the first of which, concerning his identity, other personal data and country of 
origin, was accepted, since the relevant information was provided in detail, 
without gaps or contradictions, and was confirmed by external sources. By 
contrast, the second claim, concerning problems with various Lebanese agencies, 
was rejected, as the applicant had not established the existence of a genuine 
problem. The applicant was formally exempted from military training by paying 
the relevant fine. Similarly, his third claim, which is inextricably linked to the 
second, that he had been subjected to torture by Lebanese and Syrian agencies and 
by military services, was also rejected. It was found that the applicant’s statements 
on the matter contained no evidence pointing to actual personal experience of such 
conduct. Accordingly, the Asylum Service took the view that there was no 
reasonable fear of persecution or risk of serious harm if the applicant were to be 
returned to his country of origin and that, therefore, there were no grounds to 
include him in the international protection regime. 
4 That decision was notified to the applicant on 31 March 2022. On 12 April 2022, 
the applicant brought an action before the International Protection Administrative 
Court (‘IPAC’ or ‘the referring court’) against the decision to reject his 
application. Previously, on 11 April 2022, he had applied for legal aid, but that 
application was rejected on 7 December 2022. In the present proceedings, the 
applicant is appearing in person, without the assistance of counsel. 
5 On 16 October 2023, IPAC invited the parties to submit their observations on its 
intention to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a 
preliminary ruling. The Republic of Cyprus, acting through the Head of the 
Asylum Service (‘the defendant’), submitted written observations arguing that 
there is no need for a reference for a preliminary ruling in the present case, since 
the interpretation of the relevant provisions of EU law is clear and, in the event 
that IPAC considers that the applicant was wrongly not referred for a medical 
examination, it may annul the decision at issue. The applicant did not submit 
written observations. 
The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
6 According to the referring court, the applicant, appearing in person and without 
the assistance of counsel, states, in many instances in an incomprehensible 
manner, his view that he has been persecuted for 20 years on account of his 
beliefs. He maintains that, following the civil war, Lebanon became a country 
controlled by a terrorist organisation. He claims that the decision of the Asylum 
Service is wrong and attributes it either to a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
defendant or to the influence of his political opponents. He maintains that the 
presence of an Arabic-speaking interpreter caused him to fear that information 
would be leaked, with the result that he withheld information of a sensitive nature. 
7 The defendant restated its conclusions as to the applicant’s credibility, referring to 
the points it had assessed as contradictory, inconsistent or general in nature and 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-283/24 
 
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reiterating its view that the applicant would not face a risk of persecution or 
serious harm if returned to his country of origin. 
8 As regards the referring court’s intention to refer a question to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling regarding the possibility for it to refer the applicant for 
medical examinations or to require the competent administrative authority to carry 
out such a medical examination and produce a report, the defendant submits that 
the conditions for submitting a request for a preliminary ruling are not satisfied. It 
submits, inter alia, that the referring court may be guided on the relevant issues by 
recent decisions of the national Anotato Dikastirio tis Kypriakis Dimokratias 
(Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus) and that referral for medical 
examinations is a matter for the administration, in so far as it is referred to in 
Chapter II of Directive 2013/32, which is relevant to the first stage of the 
examination of an application for international protection. 
9 As to the substance of the relevant questions, the defendant argues that the referral 
of an applicant for a medical examination is a matter for the discretion of the 
Asylum Service (see Article 15 of the Law on refugees). Moreover, it is for the 
Member States to review the application of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, as 
is apparent from the judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C-585/16, EU:C:2018:584. 
The defendant also refers to the judgment of 29 June 2023, International 
Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (Terrorist Attack in Pakistan), C-756/21, 
EU:C:2023:523, paragraphs 28 to 94, and argues that it follows from that 
judgment that the determining authority has the power to conduct that medical 
examination and report on the applicant’s mental health. Finally, referring to the 
judgment of 4 October 2018, Ahmedbekova, C-652/16, EU:C:2018:801 
(paragraphs 92 to 96), it submits that, if IPAC is not in a position to make a full 
and ex nunc assessment of the facts and points of law, national legislation 
provides the necessary guarantees to that end in Article 11(6) of the Law on the 
establishment and functioning of the International Protection Administrative 
Court, namely the possibility for IPAC to order an administrative authority to 
reply on a specific issue. 
10 The appellant, although given the opportunity to do so, did not submit any 
observations regarding the intention of IPAC to refer questions for a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
11 Under national legislation, applications for international protection are examined 
in two stages, the first before an administrative authority and the second before a 
judicial authority. The Asylum Service, which reports to the Ministry of the 
Interior (Article 2 of the Law on refugees) is the ‘determining authority’ referred 
to in Article 2(f) of Directive 2013/32. IPAC is the ‘court or tribunal of first 
instance’ within the meaning of Article 46(3) of that directive, which is called 
upon, by virtue of that provision and Article 11(3)(a) of the Law on the 
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establishment and functioning of IPAC, to examine fully and ex nunc the facts and 
points of law in the case and ultimately to decide whether to uphold or annul, in 
whole or in part, the contested decision of the administration. 
12 The obligation to make an individual assessment of applications for international 
protection, taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, is expressly 
provided for in Article 4(3)(c) of Directive 2011/95 and has been consistently 
upheld by the Court of Justice (see, for example, the judgment of 19 March 2020, 
PG, C-406/18, EU:C:2020:216, paragraph 29). In that regard, the claims made by 
the applicant in the main proceedings, during both the administrative procedure 
and the legal proceedings, suffer from a lack of consistency and plausibility. 
However, the administrative authority did not carry out psychological or other 
medical examinations in relation to the applicant’s state of mental and physical 
health in respect of any signs that might indicate past persecution or serious harm 
to him or symptoms or signs of torture or other serious acts of physical or 
psychological violence. It is therefore necessary to carry out a medical and 
scientific examination and diagnosis as to whether the marked inconsistency and 
lack of plausibility in question is based on any medical factor. 
13 National law (Article 15 of the Law on refugees) expressly provides that the 
administration has the power to refer an applicant to a doctor and/or psychologist. 
There is, however, no such provision with regard to IPAC, which may merely 
‘order the administrative authority to answer a question related to the disputed 
issue within a deadline set by the court’ (Article 11(6) of the Law on the 
establishment and functioning of the International Protection Administrative 
Court). The defendant relies on two recent judgments of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Cyprus, delivered on an application by the Attorney General of the 
Republic for a prerogative writ of certiorari, namely an application against a 
decision of a lower court claiming that it was issued in excess or absence of 
jurisdiction or in the event of manifest error of law (decision in the case regarding 
the application of the Attorney General of the Republic for the issue of a 
prerogative writ of certiorari concerning the Order of the International Protection 
Administrative Court of 10 February 2023 issued in the context of appeal 
No 7386/22, Civil Application No 31/2023, dated 7 April 2023 and the decision in 
the case regarding the application of the Attorney General of the Republic for the 
issue of a prerogative writ of certiorari  concerning the Decision of the 
International Protection Administrative Court of 10 February 2023, Civil Appeal 
No 30/2023, dated 15 May 2023). In those judgments, the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Cyprus held that IPAC had exceeded its powers and jurisdiction by 
ordering the referral of the applicant in that case for medical examinations. 
However, the referring court notes that, in the cases referred to above, the question 
of its jurisdiction to order a medical examination and report was not examined in 
the light of Article 11(3) of the Law on the establishment and functioning of the 
International Protection Administrative Court, which refers to the full and ex nunc 
examination that IPAC is to carry out of the refusal decision at issue. 
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14 Pursuant to the case-law of the Court of Justice, Member States ‘are required, by 
virtue of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, to order their national law in such a 
way that the processing of the appeals referred to includes an examination, by the 
court or tribunal, of all the facts and points of law necessary in order to make an 
up-to-date assessment of the case at hand’ (judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, 
C-585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 110). It has, moreover, been held that 
Article 46(3), which provides for the requirement of full and ex nunc examination, 
is an EU rule that has direct effect (judgment of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, 
C-556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 73). The referring court harbours doubts as 
to whether it is in a position to carry out such an examination if it does not have 
the power to refer the applicant for medical examinations, the usefulness of which 
has also been recognised by the Court of Justice [judgments of 19 March 2020, 
PG, C-406/18, EU:C:2020:216, paragraph 31, and of 29 June 2023, International 
Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (Terrorist attack in Pakistan), C-756/21, 
EU:C:2023:523, paragraph 60]. The Court of Justice has held that it may ‘prove 
useful to order other measures of inquiry, in particular the medical examination 
referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 18(1) of Directive 2013/32’ 
(judgment of 19 March 2020, PG, C-406/18, EU:C:2020:216, paragraph 31). 
However, it is not clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice whether such a 
power may derive directly from Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 or whether the 
granting of such a power is a matter for the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States. 
15 In conclusion, the referring court considers it appropriate that a medical 
examination of the applicant be carried out in order to enable that court to carry 
out an individual, full and up-to-date examination of the application for 
international protection, taking into account all the relevant facts and points of 
law. Given that there is no express provision in national law for a power of 
referral for medical examinations, the referring court asks whether, on the basis of 
the direct effect of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, it would be possible to 
recognise such a power (first question referred for a preliminary ruling) or a 
power to order the determining authority to carry out such examinations if it 
considers it necessary (second question referred for a preliminary ruling). 
16 With regard to the means provided by national legislation for establishing the 
symptoms or signs referred to in Article 15 of the Law on refugees, the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Cyprus held that the referring court does not have the 
power to order the determining authority to carry out a specific medical or 
psychological examination of an applicant who has brought an action before it. 
The referring court is uncertain, however, as to how far the possibility of 
questioning the administrative authority about not referring the applicant for 
medical examinations allows it to conduct an ‘exhaustive and up-to-date 
examination of the applicant’s international protection needs’. It may of course be 
possible for the referring court to obtain useful information from the determining 
authority as to why a medical examination was not considered appropriate or 
necessary. However, in the event that the judgment of the referring court differs 
from that of the authorities, the court will not, of its own motion, have any means 
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at its disposal to obtain an overview of the up-to-date state of the applicant’s 
health or to order that an examination of the signs and/or symptoms referred to in 
Article 15 of the Law on refugees be carried out, where the authorities have failed 
to do so. 
17 Furthermore, according to the referring court, although applicants for international 
protection are granted the opportunity to submit medical examinations, it cannot 
be presumed that they are aware of which documents are relevant to the 
examination of their application, especially in the present case, where the 
applicant is not represented by counsel. If, therefore, it is held that the means 
available to it to carry out the examination referred to in Article 46(3) of that 
directive are a matter for the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the 
question arises as to whether the referring court can effectively fulfil its obligation 
to carry out a full and ex nunc examination of the application for international 
protection by virtue of its power to put questions to the determining authority. 
That court considers that that would make it excessively difficult for the applicant 
to exercise his right to an individual review of his case. It therefore asks for 
clarification as to whether it may require the administrative authority to carry out 
a medical examination and produce a report if it considers that the national 
measures do not meet the requirements of the principle of effectiveness (third 
question referred for a preliminary ruling). 
18 If no power is recognised for the referring court itself to order the referral of an 
applicant for international protection for medical examinations or to require the 
administrative authority to carry out such examinations, that court will have to 
annul the rejection decision at issue, as it will be unable to carry out a full and ex 
nunc review. It is therefore not impossible that an otherwise correct administrative 
decision may be annulled, and thus the application for international protection re-
examined. Such a procedure does not appear to be compatible with the principle 
of expeditious examination of applications or with the structure of the asylum 
system. It is therefore doubtful whether the requirements of Article 46(3) of 
Directive 2013/32 and Article 47 of the Charter are met (fourth question referred 
for a preliminary ruling). 
19 In view of all the foregoing, the referring court considers it necessary to refer the 
questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.