Order — ECLI:EU:C:1998:628
Date: 1998-12-17
Language of the case: Dutch
Court formation: President of the Chamber
Based on: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)
Subject matter: Agriculture and Fisheries;Association Agreement;External relations;Overseas countries and territories;Sugar
Concepts: Application for interim measures: suspension of operation of the contested measure and other interim measures;Appeals
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - successful;Application for interim measures

Summary of the Order
1. Appeals — Cross-appeal by the successful party against a decision dismissing an application for
interim measures as unfounded rather than as inadmissible — Appeal dismissed
(EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art, 49)
2. Applications for interim measures— Suspension of operation of a measure — Provisional mea­
sures — Conditions for granting — Prima facie case— Serious and irreparable damage —
Assessment to be made by the court hearing an application for interim measures
(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice, Art, 83(2); Rules of
Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
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SUMMARY — CASE C-363/98 P(R)
3. Applications for interim measures — Suspension of operation of a measure — Conditions for
granting — Urgency — Cumulative nature — Determined solely on the basis of the discre­
tion enjoyed by the Community institution — Not permissible
(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2); Rules of
Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
1. Where, following proceedings for interim
relief in which the Court of First Instance
has upheld the request of the defendant
which, although not formally contending
that the application was inadmissible,
sought to obtain a decision refusing the
measures applied for, a cross-appeal is
brought by that party, seeking to have the
order set aside solely on the ground that
the refusal of the interim measures — the
form of order sought by the defendant —
was not based on the inadmissibility of
the application, such a cross-appeal must
be rejected.
2. It is open to the judge hearing an applica­
tion to order the suspension of the opera­
tion of an act, or other interim measures,
only if it is established that such an order
is justified prima facie in fact and in law
and that it is urgent in that, in order to
avoid serious and irreparable damage to
the applicant's interests, it must be made
and produce its effects before the decision
is given in the main proceedings. Such an
order must further be provisional inas­
much as it must not prejudge the points of
law or fact in issue or neutralise in advance
the effects of the decision subsequently to
be given in the main action.
In the context of that overall examination,
the judge hearing the application has a
wide discretion and is free to determine,
having regard to the specific circumstances
of the case, the manner and order in which
those various conditions are to be exam­
ined, there being no rule of Community
law imposing a pre-established scheme of
analysis within which the need to order
interim measures must be analysed and
assessed.
3. Although it is true that, since the condi­
tions for suspension of operation or for
any other interim measure are cumulative,
an application for interim relief may prop­
erly be dismissed on the single ground that
the condition of urgency is not satisfied,
the court hearing an application for interim
measures may not, in the context of an
examination confined to the issue of the
urgency of the measures sought, establish
as a condition for the grant of an interim
measure that a connection between the
existence of a power of assessment vested
in the institution concerned and the degree
of urgency must be proved.
Specifically, although the fact that the insti­
tution has such a power of assessment may
be a relevant factor in the analysis of the
degree of urgency in the context of bal­
ancing the interests involved and the
requirement of manifest urgency, in con­
junction with a particularly strong prima
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EMESA SUGAR v COUNCIL
facie case, may be justified by the nature
of the interim measure sought or the effects
which it may produce, the mere fact that
a discretionary power is vested in the
author of the contested act cannot in itself,
in the absence of any consideration whether
there is a prima facie case and of any bal­
ancing of the interests involved, determine
the requirements relating to the condition
of urgency.
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