Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2026:92
Date: 2026-02-12
Language of the case: Polish
Court formation: Eighth Chamber
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Poland

Summary C-680/24 - 1 
Case C-680/24 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
15 October 2024 
Referring court: 
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie (Poland) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
4 September 2024 
Applicant: 
Wizz Air Hungary Légiközlekedési Kft. 
Other party to the proceedings: 
Prezes Urzędu Lotnictwa Cywilnego 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
The subject matter of the main proceedings is an action brought by Wizz Air 
Hungary Ltd against the decision of the Prezes Urzędu Lotnictwa Cywilnego 
(President of the Civil Aviation Authority) of 31 October 2019 to approve an 
amendment to an airport charges tariff, and thus a review of the legality of that 
decision. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union concern the interpretation of Article 11(7) 
of Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 March 2009 on airport charges, read in conjunction with Article 6 of that 
directive (Question 1), and of Article 6(2) of Directive 2009/12/EC, read in 
conjunction with Article 2(3) thereof (Question 2). 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
2  
Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
(1) Must Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2009 on airport charges [OJ 2009 L 70, 
14.3.2009, p. 11] be interpreted as meaning that the obligation arising 
therefrom for the independent supervisory authority to consult the parties 
concerned when undertaking an investigation into the justification for the 
modification of the system or the level of airport charges as set out in 
Article 6 of the directive does not apply to a case where that authority 
applies the mandatory procedure under national law as referred to in 
Article 6(5)(a) of the directive, under which procedure airport charges, or 
their maximum level, are determined or approved by the independent 
supervisory authority, having regard to the requirement of transparency of 
the national procedure under the second sentence of Article 6(5) of the 
directive? 
(2) Is the provision of national law under which the airport managing body, 
when introducing modifications to the system or the level of airport charges, 
must consult only the air carriers that regularly use the airport in question or 
the entities representing them, including in particular the committee of air 
carriers operating at the airport in question or associations of air carriers, and 
not airport users within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the directive, that is to 
say, any natural or legal persons responsible for the carriage of passengers, 
mail and/or freight by air to or from the airport concerned, compatible with 
Article 6(2) of the directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(3) thereof? 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2009 on airport charges (‘Directive 2009/12’): recitals 1, 2, 11, 12, 15, 19; 
Articles 1(1), 1(2), 2(1) to (4), 6, 7, 11(1) and 11(7) 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 2002 r. Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami 
administracyjnymi (Law of 30 August 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative 
Courts, consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2024, item 935): 
Articles 3(1), 134(1), 134(2), 135, 145 and 153 
Ustawa z dnia 3 lipca 2002 r. Prawo lotnicze (Aviation Law of 3 July 2002, 
consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2019, item 1580, ‘the 
Aviation Law’): Articles 2(16), 21(1), 21(2)(3), 75, 77, 77c and 77d 
Article 77(1)–(3) of the Aviation Law: 
WIZZAIR HUNGARY 
 
3 
1. The managing body of a public-use airport shall, prior to the introduction or 
amendment of airport charges, develop a draft airport charges tariff, stipulating 
the levels of standard charges, additional charges and discounts on those charges, 
together with the rules for calculating charges and granting discounts, and shall 
consult the draft airport charges tariff with the air carriers that regularly use the 
airport in question or the entities representing them, including in particular the 
committee of air carriers operating at the airport in question or associations of air 
carriers. The airport managing body may also consult other entities that use the 
facilities, equipment or services referred to in Article 75(1). The consultations 
shall concern the level and structure of airport charges, the rules for calculating 
those charges, and the granting of discounts on those charges. 
2. An air carrier that regularly uses the airport referred to in paragraph 1 above 
is an air carrier that meets one of the following conditions: 
(1) performs scheduled air transportation to or from the airport in question 
during the scheduling season in which the consultation is conducted, or performed 
such transportation during the scheduling season preceding the season in which 
the consultation is conducted and notified the managing body of the public-use 
airport of its intention to perform scheduled air transportation during the 
equivalent scheduling season in relation to which it performed such transportation; 
(2) in the scheduling season preceding the season in which the consultation is 
conducted or in the scheduling season in which the consultation is conducted, has 
made ten or more non-scheduled flights and continues to perform air 
transportation from that airport during the consultation period. 
3. The purpose of the consultation referred to in paragraph 1 above is to 
provide information on the proposed airport charges and to obtain the opinions of 
the entities referred to in paragraph 1 above, and for the parties to reach an 
agreement on the airport charges tariff to the widest extent possible. 
Article 77c(1)–(3) of the Aviation Law: 
The managing body of a public-use airport whose annual traffic is over five 
million passenger movements or, if no public-use airport in the Republic of 
Poland meets that criterion, the public-use airport with the highest passenger 
movement among airports in the territory of the Republic of Poland in the 
calendar year preceding the start of the consultations, in addition to the obligation 
to conduct the consultations referred to in Article 77(1), shall be obliged to 
conduct annual consultations with the entities referred to in Article 77(1) on the 
operation of the system of airport charges, the level of such charges, and the 
quality of service provided in exchange for airport charges. […] 
Article 77d(1) and (5) of the Aviation Law: 
1. The managing body of a public-use airport referred to in Article 77c(1) 
shall, following the consultations referred to in Article 77(1), submit for approval 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
4  
by the President of the Authority, at least three months prior to the planned date of 
its entry into force, an airport charges tariff together with its justification. 
[…] 
5. The President of the Authority shall, by way of an administrative decision, 
refuse to approve an airport charges tariff or a part thereof or order its 
modification where it is inconsistent with the rules for determining airport charges 
established in the Convention referred to in Article 3(2), aviation law, European 
Union law or international regulations, including where the airport managing body 
has failed to comply with the obligation to conduct consultations under Article 77 
or Article 77c. In the decision, the President of the Authority shall determine 
whether the managing body of a public-use airport is obliged to repeat the 
consultations referred to in Article 77(1), having regard to the scope of the ordered 
change and its impact on air carriers. 
Succinct presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
1 Warsaw Chopin Airport is an airport of the type referred to in Article 1(2) of 
Directive 2009/12 and in Article 77c of the Aviation Law, that is to say, an airport 
whose annual traffic is over five million passenger movements and the airport 
with the highest passenger movement in the Member State. 
2 On 31 July 2019, the President of the Civil Aviation Authority (‘the President of 
the CAA’) received an application from Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. with its seat 
in Warsaw (‘PPL’), the company that is the managing body of Warsaw Chopin 
Airport, for approval of an amendment to the provisions of the ‘Tariff of airport 
charges at Warsaw Chopin Airport’ (‘the Tariff’). 
3 Together with the application, PPL submitted documents concerning the 
consultations conducted with air carriers that regularly use Warsaw Chopin 
Airport or with the entities that represent them. 
4 By decision dated 31 October 2019, the President of the CAA approved the 
amendment of the Tariff with respect to certain items, including the level of 
parking charges, as, in his opinion, the proposed change to the parking charge met 
the requirements of non-discrimination and equal treatment. On the other hand, 
the President of the CAA refused to approve the amendment of the Tariff with 
respect to the noise charge as, in his opinion, the proposed change was not cost-
based.  
5 The only party to the decision issued by the President of the CAA was PPL as the 
airport managing body. In the grounds of the decision, the President of the CAA 
referred to the letter dated 18 July 2019, submitted by Wizz Air Hungary Ltd with 
its seat in Budapest (‘the applicant’ or ‘Wizz Air’), which is a user of Warsaw 
Chopin Airport within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Directive 2009/12, in which 
Wizz Air requested to be considered a party to the proceedings for approval of the 
WIZZAIR HUNGARY 
 
5 
amendment to the Tariff if such proceedings had already been initiated or were yet 
to be initiated at PPL’s request. The President of the CAA assessed whether the 
air carrier Wizz Air could be a party to the administrative proceedings for 
approval of the amendment to the airport charges tariff. However, having found 
that Wizz Air lacked the necessary attributes to be a party to the proceedings 
under the applicable national legislation, he issued the administrative decision 
solely to PPL as the only party to the administrative proceedings in question. 
6 In addition, in his decision, the President of the CAA discussed the legal 
provisions applicable to the case, and indicated that the airport managing body 
had enclosed documents with its application confirming that consultations had 
been held on the proposed amendment to the Tariff. Those documents show that 
by letter dated 30 April 2019, PPL informed 65 regular users of the airport about 
the consultation meeting that was held on 15 May 2019. During the consultation 
meeting, PPL presented a proposal for amendments to the Tariff that were subject 
to approval by the President of the CAA. 
7 Wizz Air then brought an action against the decision of the President of the CAA 
to the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny (Regional Administrative Court in 
Warsaw, Poland), which is the referring court. In response to the action, the 
President of the CAA requested that it be dismissed as inadmissible or, in the 
alternative, that it be dismissed as unfounded. He confirmed that Wizz Air had no 
legal interest in the approval of the airport charges tariff. 
8 In its judgment of 19 August 2020, the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw 
set aside the contested decision of the President of the CAA on formal grounds. 
The court found that the contested decision had been issued on the basis of 
evidence only partly translated into Polish. 
9 An appeal on a point of law was filed against the 19 August 2020 judgment by the 
President of the CAA and PPL. In its judgment of 24 April 2024, the Naczelny 
Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, Poland) set aside the 
contested judgment and referred the case back to the Regional Administrative 
Court in Warsaw for reconsideration. In the opinion of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the position of the court of first instance set out in the 
grounds of the contested judgment did not provide a clear answer as to what 
evidence had been necessary to assess the legality of the contested decision and 
what specific evidence included in the case file had not been translated into 
Polish.  
10 After the case had been referred back to it for reconsideration, the Regional 
Administrative Court in Warsaw summarised the facts of the case, stressing that 
the following was common ground between the parties: 
(a) the President of the CAA is an independent supervisory authority within the 
meaning of Article 11 of Directive 2009/12; 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
6  
(b) in the case at issue, the President of the CAA applied the procedure provided 
for in national law under Article 6(5)(a) of Directive 2009/12, that is to say, the 
procedure whereby airport charges, or their maximum level, are determined or 
approved by the independent supervisory authority; 
(c) the above national procedure is mandatory under national law; 
(d) prior to submitting the application for approval of the Tariff amendment to 
the President of the CAA, PPL carried out the consultations referred to in 
Article 6(2) of Directive 2009/12 (and Article 77(1) of the Aviation Law); 
however, those consultations involved only the 65 entities that meet the criterion 
of a carrier that regularly uses Warsaw Chopin Airport within the meaning of 
Article 77(2) of the Aviation Law; 
(e) meanwhile, 137 entities that meet the criterion of an airport user within the 
meaning of Article 2(3) of Directive 2009/12 were operating at Warsaw Chopin 
Airport in the year preceding the decision; 
(f) in the course of the proceedings before the President of the CAA for 
approval of the amendments to airport charges, the President of the CAA did not 
conduct new consultations with the parties concerned within the meaning of 
Article 11(7) of the directive. 
Essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
11 The President of the CAA and PPL believe that under the mandatory national 
procedure provided for in Article 6(5)(a) of Directive 2009/12, the provisions of 
both Article 6(3) and (4), as expressly provided for in Article 6(5) of the directive 
and in Article 11(7) of the directive, may be disapplied. Specifically, the President 
of the CAA and PPL argue that the first sentence of Article 11(7) refers to ‘an 
investigation into the justification for the modification of the system or the level 
of airport charges’, while Article 6(5)(a) refers to approval of ‘airport charges, or 
their maximum level’. They also argue that under Article 6(3) of Directive 
2009/12 ‘Member States shall ensure that in the event of a disagreement over a 
decision on airport charges taken by the airport managing body, either party may 
seek the intervention of the independent supervisory authority referred to in 
Article 11 which shall examine the justifications for the modification of the 
system or the level of airport charges’, and thus the first sentence of Article 11(7) 
of the directive applies only to the procedure provided for in Article 6(3) of the 
directive, and not to the mandatory national procedure provided for in 
Article 6(5)(a) thereof. The President of the CAA further argues that since in its 
judgment in Deutsche Lufthansa, C-379/18, the Court of Justice did not question 
the correctness of the actions of the German supervisory authority, which, 
according to the Polish authority, does not conduct new consultations under the 
national procedure either, this means that the Court considered such actions to be 
correct. 
WIZZAIR HUNGARY 
 
7 
12 By contrast, Wizz Air believes that the obligation to conduct new consultations 
provided for in the first sentence of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12 also applies 
to the mandatory national procedures established under Article 6(5)(a) of that 
directive. 
Succinct presentation of the reasoning in the request for a preliminary ruling 
13 The referring court emphasises at the outset that the questions it has referred are 
admissible, since it is a national court whose decisions, under Polish law, may be 
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. Furthermore, it is a court within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. The present case is an 
EU cross-border case as the applicant is a company incorporated under Hungarian 
law, the body whose decision is being challenged by Wizz Air is a Polish 
authority, and a party to the proceedings is a company incorporated under Polish 
law – the managing body of Warsaw Chopin Airport. It is also undisputed that the 
contested decision was issued on the basis of provisions implementing Directive 
2009/12 into the national legal order. 
14 As regards the first question, the referring court notes the need to decide whether 
excluding the application of Article 6(3) and (4) of Directive 2009/12 under 
Article 6(5)(a) of that directive in the national procedure provided for by that 
provision also means excluding the application of Article 11(7) of the directive 
(with respect to the authority’s obligation to conduct separate consultations of its 
own), or whether the mandatory new consultations (held after the consultations 
conducted by the airport managing body) by the regulatory authority under 
Article 11(7) of the directive are also mandatory when the national procedure 
provided for in Article 6(5)(a) of the directive is applied. The referring court 
points out that the mandatory national procedure referred to in Article 6(5)(a) of 
Directive 2009/12 is established in Articles 77 and 77d of the Aviation Law and 
was applied in the administrative proceedings under review in the present 
proceedings before the administrative court. 
15 The referring court emphasises that the consultation procedure – whether carried 
out by the entity submitting an application prior to the initiation of the 
administrative proceedings or by an authority, including in particular a regulatory 
authority, during the administrative proceedings prior to the adoption of a 
decision – does not belong exclusively to the domain of Directive 2009/12. For 
instance, it is provided for in Articles 23 and 24 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) in the form of consultations 
conducted by an authority before issuing a decision. 
16 In the view of the referring court, consultations are a procedural arrangement 
serving to ensure the transparency of administrative proceedings, thanks to which 
the parties concerned can present their positions to the authority in proceedings in 
which they do not have the status of a party to administrative proceedings. Those 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
8  
proceedings usually concern a specific market segment, where, for instance, the 
approval of certain charges or tariffs by the regulatory authority not only has a 
direct effect on the entity applying for approval of those charges/tariffs, but also 
indirectly affects other participants in that market segment. In order for 
consultations to be of any practical use, they should be accompanied by an 
obligation on the part of the authority to consider the comments made by the 
parties concerned in the decision issued after the proceedings have concluded. 
17 According to the referring court, the consultation model provided for in Directive 
2018/1972 appears to be the closest to the consultation model provided for in 
Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12, since in both cases the consultations should be 
conducted by independent authorities that supervise or regulate the (aviation or 
telecommunications) market in question, and are conducted with a view to the 
authority taking specific decisions in the market in question. Comments within the 
framework of the consultations may, under both directives, be made by the 
‘parties concerned’ or ‘interested parties’, that is to say, entities that are active in 
the relevant market, but which are nevertheless not parties to the administrative 
proceedings in question. That is because the parties to the proceedings in question 
may take positions in the course of those proceedings, and the authority is obliged 
to respond to those positions in the decision it issues. It is not necessary, therefore, 
to conduct consultations in order to learn the positions of the parties. Thus, the 
consultation procedure takes place ‘outside’ the proceedings proper so that the 
authority can obtain the opinions of the entities concerned (‘non-parties’) while 
implementing the principles of transparency and non-discrimination or other 
principles applicable in the given regulatory model. 
18 The above model of ‘external’ consultations, that is to say, consultations that 
concern the positions of parties other than parties to the proceedings (PPL was the 
only party to the proceedings before the authority), appears to be confirmed by 
Directive 2009/12 itself, namely the first sentence of Article 11(7) thereof. In 
paragraph 58 of its judgment of 21 November 2019 in Deutsche Lufthansa, 
C-379/18, the Court of Justice indicated that airport users were ‘parties concerned’ 
within the meaning of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12. According to the 
referring court, the first sentence of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12 thus 
indirectly indicates that airport users as the ‘parties concerned’ that participate in 
consultations before the independent supervisory authority are not parties to the 
administrative proceedings conducted by that authority, as in that case they could 
participate in those proceedings and express their views as parties rather than as 
participants in the consultations. 
19 Given the above, the referring court points out that the interpretation of the law 
presented by Wizz Air in the case at issue, according to which the obligation to 
conduct new consultations provided for in the first sentence of Article 11(7) of 
Directive 2009/12 also applies to the mandatory national procedures established 
pursuant to Article 6(5)(a) of that directive, appears to be correct. 
WIZZAIR HUNGARY 
 
9 
20 First, it appears impossible that an independent national regulatory authority 
approving or determining – on the basis of the national procedure provided for in 
Article 6(5)(a) of the directive – ‘airport charges, or their maximum level’ would 
not have preceded that approval or determination with ‘an investigation into the 
justification for the modification of the system or the level of airport charges’, as 
referred to in the first sentence of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12. Therefore, in 
the opinion of the referring court, PPL’s arguments in that regard are based solely 
on a narrow, literal interpretation of the regulations rather than on the actual 
actions that the authority should take in order to approve the charges. 
21 Second, the referring court assumes the rationality of the EU legislature. Since, in 
Article 6 of Directive 2009/12, the EU legislature laid down three procedures for 
the broadly defined intervention of the supervisory authority with respect to new 
airport charges in the event no agreement is reached between the airport managing 
body and its users [firstly: Article 6(3) and (4) of the directive; secondly: 
Article 6(5)(a) of the directive; thirdly: Article 6(5)(b) of the directive], it would 
be necessary to give rational reasons as to why, only in the case of the first 
procedure, the authority would be obliged to consult the proposals of the airport 
managing body with users a second time (since the first consultations conducted 
by the airport managing body are mandatory under all procedures). The referring 
court sees no rational reason for the differentiation of those procedures. 
22 Third, the first sentence of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12 explicitly refers to 
the whole of Article 6 of the directive, and not just to the procedure provided for 
in Article 6(3) and (4) of the directive. 
23 Fourth, Article 6(5) of Directive 2009/12 only excludes the application of 
Article 6(3) and (4) with respect to the national procedures provided for therein 
and does not exclude the application of Article 11(7) of the directive. 
24 Fifth, the final sentence of Article 6(5) of Directive 2009/12 requires that the 
national procedures adopted by Member States thereunder, including the 
procedure provided for under Article 6(5)(a) of Directive 2009/12, be transparent. 
The purpose of mandatory consultations with the parties concerned is precisely to 
ensure that the procedure is transparent. The authority is then able to verify, for 
instance, whether the user maintains its views regarding the planned airport 
charges, or whether the airport managing body has submitted all the users’ 
positions obtained during its own consultations. 
25 Sixth, in the view of the referring court, Case C-379/18, Deutsche Lufthansa, 
which was heard by the Court of Justice, did not concern the carrying out of new 
consultations by the authority at all, and the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling by the German court did not even address that issue, nor did the Court’s 
judgment. 
26 The referring court, finding that the provisions of Directive 2009/12 are neither 
acte clair nor acte éclairé in that regard, considers it appropriate to refer the first 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
10  
question to the Court of Justice. Indeed, the referring court believes that if the 
provision of the first sentence of Article 11(7) of Directive 2009/12 was not 
properly implemented into the Polish legal order, the authority cannot rely that 
circumstance as a justification. In that context, it should be pointed out that a 
Member State cannot rely on the provisions of an unimplemented or improperly 
implemented directive against individuals (judgments in the following cases: 
14/86, Pretore di Salo/X, 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, C-168/95, Arcaro, Joined 
Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, Berlusconi and others, C-321/05, 
Kofoed). In addition, as the Court of Justice pointed out in its judgment in Ratti, 
148/78, a Member State may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to 
perform the obligations which a directive entails. 
27 As regards the second question, the referring court points out that it is apparent 
from the wording of recitals 2 and 15 of Directive 2009/12 that the directive seeks 
to avoid a situation in which the airport managing body would be in a position of 
strength vis-à-vis air carriers with respect to the setting of airport charges because 
of the airport’s ‘privileged position’ (see paragraph 66 of the Court’s judgment in 
Case C-176/09). 
28 Two categories of airport might find themselves in a position of strength, namely 
the main airports of each Member State, since they are, as a general rule, located 
near to the capital city and constitute the ‘points of entry’ into that country, and 
major airports which, because of their size, are in a situation comparable to that of 
airports in the first category. Airports in the first category clearly benefit, 
particularly because of their location immediately adjacent to densely populated 
urban areas, the quality of their infrastructures, and the existence of business 
customers not overly sensitive to changes in ticket prices, but, conversely, 
unwilling to waste time travelling to airports located more than 100 km from those 
urban areas. 
29 The referring court further stresses that the national legislature granted the right to 
take part in the consultations provided for in Article 6(2) of Directive 2009/12, 
that is to say, the consultations conducted by the airport managing body, not to all 
airport users, but only to air carriers that regularly use the airport in question. 
30 Having analysed the national legislation, the referring court points out that two 
interpretations of Article 6(2) of Directive 2009/12, read in conjunction with 
Article 2(3) thereof, are possible. The first interpretation is that it is possible to 
restrict in national law the group of entities that the airport managing body is 
obliged to consult to carriers that regularly use the airport. That restriction has a 
practical effect, as it only allows regular carriers to express their views and makes 
the procedure for introducing changes to the system and the level of charges at 
major airports easier and faster. According to the second interpretation, the 
provisions of Directive 2009/12 allow for no such restriction. 
31 In the view of the referring court, the second interpretation is correct. 
WIZZAIR HUNGARY 
 
11 
32 The referring court emphasises that, in its view, it is permissible to expand in 
national law the group of entities entitled to participate in the consultations to 
include entities that represent air carriers that regularly use the airport in question, 
including in particular the committee of air carriers operating at the airport in 
question or associations of air carriers. Indeed, Directive 2009/12 introduces 
minimum standards for consultation, and thus where national law provides for a 
broader group of entities entitled to participate, the referring court is of the 
opinion that this does not violate EU laws. 
33 However, as regards the restriction of the group of entities that the airport 
managing body is obliged to consult, the referring court believes that the 
arrangement provided for in national law violates Article 6(2), read in conjunction 
with Article 2(3), of Directive 2009/12. In the view of the referring court, that 
arrangement violates the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, since 
no provision of the directive allows for the differentiation of airport users in terms 
of how frequently they use that airport. 
34 The referring court points out that the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination appear to be closely linked, in the sense that compliance with the 
former allows users to identify infringements of the latter. In order to ensure that 
airport charges do not discriminate among airport users, as required by the first 
sentence of Article 3 of Directive 2009/12, read in conjunction with recital 11 of 
that directive, airport managing bodies are to put in place a compulsory procedure 
for regular consultation with airport users. In light of national regulations, the 
airport managing body may also consult other entities that use the facilities, 
equipment or services referred to in Article 75(1) of the Aviation Law. However, 
the word ‘may’ used by the national legislature points to the optional nature of 
consultations with entities which do not meet the criteria referred to in 
Article 77(2) of the Aviation Law, namely entities which are not air carriers that 
regularly use the airport. 
35 A corollary of the requirement of equal treatment of undertakings that are airport 
users within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the directive is the need for decisions 
on charges to affect all those concerned in the same way. Since the directive 
recognises that all airport users have both a legitimate interest and actual 
subjective rights, the referring court must decide whether the implementation of 
the directive should include an obligation, when introducing modifications to the 
system or the level of airport charges, to conduct consultations also with those 
users of Chopin Airport who, during the relevant scheduling season, did not meet 
the requirements of ‘regular use of the airport’ as defined in Article 77(2) of the 
Aviation Law. The court must therefore decide whether those users were 
discriminated against under national laws with regard to the need to include them 
in the consultations. 
36 The referring court emphasises that the proportionality of the solutions provided 
for in Directive 2009/12 was examined by the Court of Justice in Case C-176/09. 
In its judgment in that case, the Court of Justice found that as regards the 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-680/24 
 
12  
proportionality of the directive, ‘there is nothing to support a finding that the 
charges under the system introduced by Directive 2009/12, for the airports 
concerned or for Member States, are manifestly disproportionate to the advantages 
which that system brings’. 
37 However, having found that the provisions of Directive 2009/12 are neither acte 
clair nor acte éclairé in that regard, the referring court considers it appropriate to 
refer the second question to the Court of Justice. 
38 In the view of the referring court, the Court’s response to the questions referred 
and its ruling on the issue of the mandatory nature of new consultations by the 
national authority and the group of participants in those consultations will allow 
the national court to properly review the decision of the President of the CAA. If it 
transpires that the President of the CAA issued the contested decision on the basis 
of regulations that were incorrectly transposed into the national legal system (as a 
result, for instance, of a misinterpretation of EU law), then the contested decision 
may need to be invalidated in the judgment of the national court.