Judgment;Judgment (extracts) — ECLI:EU:T:2016:721
Date: 2016-12-13
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible
Origin: United Kingdom

summary list, as communicated to him by the Commission on 10 May 2010, were essentially the same as those which had already been communicated to him by the United Kingdom authorities as evidence underlying the United Kingdom’s listing request as long ago as 12 June 2007 (see paragraph 3 above). 60 The Commission and the interveners did not invoke any other particular circumstance peculiar to the applicant’s case that might explain why the review process took such an abnormally long time in his case. 61 In those circumstances, it must be held that there has been a breach of the ‘reasonable time’ principle. 62 However, breach of the ‘reasonable time’ principle justifies annulment of a decision taken at the end of an administrative procedure only in so far as it also entails an infringement of the rights of the defence of the person concerned. Where it has not been established that the undue delay has adversely affected the ability of the persons concerned to defend themselves effectively, failure to comply with the principle that action must be taken within a reasonable time cannot affect the validity of the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2015, Ministry of Energy of Iran v Council, T‑564/12, EU:T:2015:599, paragraphs 73 to 77; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 21 September 2006, JCB Service v Commission, C‑167/04 P, EU:C:2006:594, paragraphs 72 and 73, and of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T‑66/01, EU:T:2010:255, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited). 63 In the present case, it has not been proved, or even seriously alleged, that the ability of the applicant to defend himself effectively was actually compromised by the excessive duration of the review procedure. The applicant merely sets out purely hypothetical considerations in the reply, arguing that if a full statement of reasons is not disclosed to him until years after the event, it becomes more difficult to mount his defence, because exculpatory evidence ‘may’ be unavailable or more difficult to obtain, his memory ‘will’ fade over time, and crucial witnesses ‘may’ no longer be available or capable of providing useful evidence. 64 As regards the applicant’s argument that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were infringed as a result of the unreasonable delay, in that, in the absence of a reasoned decision, he was unable to bring an action before the General Court, it is sufficient to point out, in rejecting that argument, that the FEU Treaty provides in Article 265 for a legal remedy specifically designed to counter an institution’s wrongful failure to act, in the form of an action for failure to act. At any time between 13 February 2009 and 6 March 2013, the applicant could thus have asked the Commission to remove his name from the list at issue and, should the Commission’s failure to do so have extended beyond the two months prescribed in Article 265 TFEU, have brought an action for failure to act (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2014, Yusef v Commission, T‑306/10, EU:T:2014:141, paragraphs 62, 63 and 68). 65 Without prejudice to the applicant’s right under Article 340 TFEU to seek compensation for the damage, if any, which he might have suffered as a result of the Commission’s delay in fulfilling its obligations, the applicant may not therefore rely on that delay to annul the contested decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 8 September 2015, Ministry of Energy of Iran v Council, T‑564/12, EU:T:2015:599, paragraph 77). 66 It follows from the foregoing that the breach of the ‘reasonable time’ principle established in this instance is not capable of justifying the annulment of the contested decision, and that the first plea in law must therefore be rejected as being ineffective. Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the Commission’s obligation meaningfully to evaluate for itself whether the applicant satisfied the relevant criteria for the retention of his name on the list at issue 67 The applicant argues that the contested decision is unlawful in that the Commission infringed its obligation meaningfully to evaluate for itself whether the applicant satisfied the relevant criteria for the retention of his name on the list at issue. The plea is divided into four parts. – First part of the second plea in law 68 By the first part of the second plea in law, the applicant complains, by reference to paragraph 8 of the contested decision, that the Commission failed to try to obtain from the Sanctions Committee or from the designating State evidence in support of the allegations made against him. In those circumstances, the Commission carried out a purely formal and artificial review, merely reproducing the statement of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, and its alleged consideration of the applicant’s comments was illusory. The applicant relies, to that effect, on the findings made by the General Court in the judgment of 21 March 2015, Yusef v Commission (T‑306/10, EU:T:2014:141, paragraphs 103 and 104). According to him, the Commission’s view of its role is such that it would never remove a person’s name from the list at issue in defiance of the Sanctions Committee’s assessment. By simply reproducing the Sanctions Committee list, refusing to request and critically evaluate the supporting material and then passing the decision over to the Court for critical evaluation, the Commission abrogated its primary responsibility to assess for itself the validity of an entry on the list at issue. 69 In order to respond to the applicant’s arguments, regard must be had to all the considerations set out by the Court of Justice, in paragraphs 104 to 134 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, ‘Kadi II’, EU:C:2013:518), in relation to the obligations on, on the one hand, the competent EU authorities — in this instance the Commission — in a procedure to include the name of an organisation, person or entity on the list at issue or to maintain such listing after re-examination, and, on the other, the Courts of the European Union, in the context of their judicial review of the lawfulness of the administrative decision taken at the end of that procedure. 70 It follows from these considerations that, for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection to be respected, and also, in this instance, for the principle of good administration to be observed, first, the competent EU authority must (i) disclose to the person concerned the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee which is the basis for listing or maintaining that person’s name on the list at issue, (ii) enable him effectively to make known his observations on that subject, and (iii) examine, carefully and impartially, whether the reasons alleged are well founded, in the light of the observations presented by that person and any exculpatory evidence that may be produced by him (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 135). 71 Secondly, respect for those rights and observance of that principle implies that, in the event of a legal challenge, the Courts of the European Union are to review, in the light of the information and evidence which have been disclosed inter alia whether the reasons relied on in the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee are sufficiently detailed and specific and, where appropriate, whether the accuracy of the facts relating to the reason concerned has been established (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 136). 72 On the other hand, the fact that the competent EU authority does not make accessible to the person concerned and, subsequently, to the Courts of the European Union information or evidence which is in the sole possession of the Sanctions Committee or the Member of the United Nations (UN) concerned and which relates to the summary of reasons underpinning the decision at issue, cannot, as such, justify a finding that those rights and that principle have been infringed. However, in such a situation, the Courts of the European Union, which are called upon to review whether the reasons contained in the summary provided by the Sanctions Committee are well founded in fact, taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory evidence produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent EU authority to those observations, will not have available to it supplementary information or evidence. Consequently, if it is impossible for the Courts to find that those reasons are well founded, those reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the contested listing decision (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 137). 73 In view of those reminders and in the light of those principles, the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. In particular, it is apparent from paragraph 107 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), that the Commission must take its decision on the basis of the statement of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee and that, on the other hand, there is no provision, at that stage, for that committee automatically to make available to the Commission, for the purposes of the Commission’s adoption of its decision, any material other than that statement of reasons. It is also apparent from paragraph 108 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), that the Court of Justice examined and validated, or at least was not critical of, the procedure laid down in that respect by Article 7c of Regulation No 881/2002, as amended by Regulation No 1286/2009, which envisages ‘exclusively’ the communication to the person concerned of the statement of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee. 74 Admittedly, in paragraphs 114 and 115 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), the Court of Justice made clear that it was for the Commission, in accordance with its obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged reasons were well founded, to assess, having regard inter alia to the content of comments made by the individual concerned, whether it was necessary to seek the assistance of the Sanctions Committee in order to obtain the disclosure of additional information or evidence. 75 That is precisely the procedure which was followed in the present case, as is evident from paragraphs 2 to 4 of the contested decision, the Commission having decided, in that decision, to maintain the applicant’s name on the list at issue after having communicated his observations to the Sanctions Committee, having twice sought the committee’s assistance to enable it to respond to those observations and having obtained, as a result, disclosure of additional information or evidence, in the form of the first and second further sets of reasons (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 115). It is also common ground that the Commission disclosed to the applicant the statement of reasons and the first and second further sets of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, these having moreover given rise to further exchanges of observations between the applicant and the Commission. 76 By contrast, the Commission cannot be criticised in the present case, solely on the basis of paragraph 114 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), for having failed, during the administrative procedure that led to the adoption of the contested decision, to obtain from the Sanctions Committee or the designating State information or evidence in support of the allegations made against the applicant and for therefore having carried out a ‘purely formal and artificial’ review as to whether the alleged reasons were well founded, in the light of the observations made by the person concerned in relation to the statement of reasons. 77 It should be borne in mind in that regard that, in the case giving rise to the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), and in contrast to the facts of the present case, the Commission had made no further attempt to obtain from the Sanctions Committee or the designating State any information or evidence to substantiate the allegations made against Mr Yassin Abdullah Kadi in the statement of reasons provided by that Sanctions Committee. It is not, however, for that reason that the Court of Justice confirmed the annulment of the regulation at issue, but because, in the context of its own judicial review of the lawfulness of that regulation, it appeared to the Court that none of those allegations was such as to justify the adoption, at EU level, of restrictive measures against Mr Kadi, either because the statement of reasons was insufficient, or because information or evidence that might have substantiated the reason concerned, in the face of detailed rebuttals submitted by the party concerned, was lacking at the judicial stage (see the analysis of those allegations in paragraphs 151 to 162 and the general conclusion in paragraph 163 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518)). 78 On the contrary, the Court of Justice held in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), that the General Court had erred in law by basing its finding that the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection had been infringed on the failure by the Commission to disclose to Mr Kadi and to the General Court itself the information and evidence underlying the reasons for maintaining Mr Kadi’s listing, since the Commission was not in possession of that information and evidence (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 138 and 139). 79 It would therefore be contrary to the principles established by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), to penalise the Commission in the present case on the basis of an alleged failure to fulfil its obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the reasons alleged against the applicant were well founded, or indeed for having failed to obtain from the Sanctions Committee the information or evidence enabling it to discharge its duty to carry out a careful and impartial examination when, in circumstances similar to those of the case that gave rise to that judgment, the Court of Justice did not find the Commission responsible for any infringement of that obligation or, more generally, of the rights of the defence. 80 Furthermore, there is nothing in the file to confirm that, prior to adopting the contested decision, the Commission had failed to examine, carefully and impartially, all the information at its disposal, including the applicant’s observations. As it indicated in paragraph 7 of the contested decision, the Commission remained of the view that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list at issue was still justified, given in particular the fact that the applicant had not provided any reason to doubt the veracity of the allegations made against him. 81 As regards the argument derived from the judgment of 21 March 2014, Yusef v Commission (T‑306/10, EU:T:2014:141), this must be rejected, since the facts and circumstances of that case are not the same as those of this. In the case giving rise to that judgment, it was ‘common ground’ (see paragraph 94 of that judgment) that the applicant in that case was unable to rely on any of the principles or guarantees set out by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), until the action was brought, and that the failure to act continued at the time when the oral part of the procedure was closed (paragraph 100 of that judgment). Furthermore, according to the statements made at the hearing (paragraph 103 of that judgment), the Commission had continued to regard itself as strictly bound by the findings of the Sanctions Committee and as not having any discretion in that regard, in contradiction with the principles laid down by the Court of Justice in its judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), and of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 114, 115 and 135). The General Court concluded from this that the way in which the Commission purported, by implementing the review procedure with regard to Mr Yusef’s case, to remedy the infringements of the same kind as those found by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), was formal and artificial in nature. In the present case, on the other hand, the Commission stated at the hearing that it was prepared to dissociate itself from the Sanctions Committee’s findings if these appeared to it to be manifestly erroneous or contradicted by the exculpatory evidence put forward by the person concerned. 82 It follows from all of the foregoing that the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. – Second part of the second plea in law 83 By the second part of the second plea in law, the applicant complains that the Commission did not ascertain whether the Sanctions Committee had relied on allegations or essential confidential information, not disclosed to the applicant, as the letter from the FCO to the applicant of 12 June 2007 (see paragraph 3 above) and a communication between the FCO and the United States authorities of 7 November 2006, revealed as part of ‘Wikileaks’ (Annex 1 to the application), would tend to suggest, and that the Commission did not require disclosure of that material. 84 The Commission counters that it disclosed to the applicant the totality of the reasons provided to it by the Sanctions Committee and on which adoption of the contested decision was based, and that there is nothing in the file that would call in question that assertion. In paragraph 5 of the contested decision, the Commission had moreover already indicated that that information constituted the ‘totality of the reasons’ for that decision. 85 In the present case, it must be held that the applicant has not adduced any evidence that would call in question the Commission’s assertions. 86 In those circumstances, the fact that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the Sanctions Committee list may possibly be based on other allegations not disclosed to the Commission, or on evidence or information which is in the sole possession of the Sanctions Committee and which has not been communicated to the Commission — even on the assumption that that is established in the light of the material mentioned in paragraph 83 above — cannot, as such, justify a finding that the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection have been infringed (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 137 and 139), or that there has been a breach of the principle of good administration. 87 As to the argument that the Commission was obliged to ask the Sanctions Committee to disclose additional confidential material, the Commission correctly considers this to be contrary to what the Court held in paragraphs 111 to 115 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), as has already been stated in response to the first part of the second plea in law. 88 The second part of the second plea in law must, therefore, be rejected as unfounded. – Third part of the second plea in law 89 By the third part of the second plea in law, the applicant complains that the Commission failed to consider whether the allegations made against him by the Sanctions Committee were based on information obtained by torture, even though the applicant had referred to that point in his letter of 28 June 2010. The presumption, on which the Commission relied, that the Sanctions Committee does not base its findings on such information is not reasonable. On its internet site, the UN Ombudsperson recognises, moreover, that the secret services of certain designating States may use information that is tainted in this way. In the present case, the applicant considers it ‘possible’ that information about him may have been obtained from individuals in custody in the United States or Pakistan, against whom coercive measures amounting to torture may have been used. Thus, he states that Mr Faraj al-Libi was captured in Pakistan on 2 May 2005 by Pakistan’s intelligence services, then transferred to the United States, held in secret detention facilities for over a year and finally transferred to Guantánamo. According to a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of 14 February 2007, 14 individuals detained in Guantánamo, including Mr Al-Libi, described treatment and interrogation techniques amounting to a form of torture. 90 The Commission, supported by the United Kingdom and by the Council, contests that argument. 91 It must be noted in that regard that, in his letter of 28 June 2010, the applicant did not put forward any precise allegation, or any plausible ground, to the effect that certain information in the statement of reasons had been obtained by torture. At most, he asked in that letter for ‘confirmation that the European Commission has taken the necessary steps to assure itself that none of the information on which it relies in the statement of reasons was obtained by torture’. 92 The Commission correctly found that, in such circumstances, it is reasonable to rely on a general presumption that the Sanctions Committee does not base its findings on evidence obtained by torture. Contrary to what is maintained by the applicant, the Commission thus applies the same criterion as that used by the UN Ombudsperson, namely to seek first of all to ascertain whether there is ‘sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the allegation of torture’, as is apparent from the UN Ombudsperson’s internet site. 93 In the present case, there is nothing in the file that might lend credence to such an allegation, as regards the material used against the applicant. More specifically, there appears to be no information in the file that could be linked to Mr Faraj Al-Libi or to any other person detained in Guantánamo or in Pakistan. 94 The United Kingdom also judiciously points out that significant parts of the evidence produced by the Commission rely on judgments of the United Kingdom courts delivered by Judges who, in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the House of Lords in its judgment in A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), [2006] 2 A.C. 221, were obliged to consider whether allegations of the use of torture had been made to them. 95 It is, moreover, apparent from the defence lodged by the FCO in the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) (‘the High Court’), in proceedings brought by the applicant against the FCO’s decision refusing his request that the FCO invite the Sanctions Committee to remove his name from the Sanctions Committee list, that, in the course of those proceedings, the applicant had also speculated as to whether certain evidence used against him was the product of the interrogation of Mr Al-Libi by the Pakistani or United States intelligence services. The FCO stated in those proceedings that none of the allegations against the applicant relied on the product of interrogation of detainees. Since the applicant subsequently withdrew those proceedings, the High Court did not have an opportunity to confirm that point. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is, however, no reason to call in question the FCO’s assertion. 96 The third part of the second plea in law would thus appear to be wholly unfounded. – Fourth part of the second plea in law 97 By the fourth part of the second plea in law, the applicant complains that the Commission failed to attempt to obtain any relevant exculpatory material from the Sanctions Committee or the designating State. 98 That complaint is, however, unfounded, since the Commission twice submitted the applicant’s observations to the Sanctions Committee but received no exculpatory material from it; in fact the opposite is the case. In any event, it is apparent from the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 114, 123, 135 and 137), that any exculpatory material must emanate, primarily at least, from the person whose name is on the list at issue. In the present case, the applicant did not communicate any such material and merely refuted as a whole all the inculpatory evidence against him. 99 It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rules on the appropriate burden and standard of proof 100 The applicant claims that the contested decision is unlawful in that the Commission infringed the rules on the appropriate burden and standard of proof. This plea is in two parts. – First part of the third plea in law 101 By the first part of the third plea in law, the applicant submits that, as paragraph 7 of the contested decision shows, the Commission inverted the burden of proof and placed it on him, contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121), according to which it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. 102 That line of argument is, however, based on a misunderstanding of the obligations to which, according to the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), the Commission is subject with regard to the burden of proof in the context of a review of the grounds underlying the decision to list a particular person or to retain that person’s name on the list at issue. 103 As the Commission correctly states, the ‘legal test’ which it must apply at the administrative stage of the review of listing decisions, as described in paragraphs 111 to 116 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), has to be distinguished from the test that applies to the review by the Court, as described in paragraphs 117 to 134 of that judgment. 104 Thus, while the burden of proof undoubtedly lies with the Commission, it does not have to be applied by the Commission at the re-examination stage, but only at the subsequent stage of the judicial review of its decision to maintain the listing after re-examination. That is clear from paragraph 121 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), which is among the general considerations set out by the Court of Justice, in paragraph 117 et seq. of that judgment, in relation to ‘court proceedings’. 105 More specifically, and as the Commission also observes, the point of departure of the review it has to carry out, at the request of an interested party, is the findings of the Sanctions Committee as expressed in its summary of reasons, which serve as the basis for the statement of reasons of the EU act. If that statement of reasons is sufficiently detailed and specific, the Commission is not making a mistake in concluding that it can, in principle, call it in question only if the listed person provides specific and detailed evidence that disproves the findings at issue, without prejudice to the burden of proof that will subsequently fall on the Commission when the reasons underlying the decision to list or to retain the listed person’s name on the list at issue are reviewed by the Court as to whether they are lawful and well founded. 106 The Commission duly complied with those principles in the present case, as is evident from paragraph 7 of the contested decision, the first part of which is set out in paragraph 23 above. In the next part of that paragraph, the Commission, moreover, did not confine itself to stating that the applicant had failed to provide any reason to doubt the veracity of the allegations made against him. In particular it provided an in-depth factual analysis of some of his denials, and concluded that they lacked relevance or credibility. 107 It follows that the first part of the third plea in law is unfounded. – Second part of the third plea in law 108 By the second part of the third plea in law, the applicant submits that the reference to the standard of proof applied by the FATF, that of ‘reasonable grounds ... to suspect or believe’, as set out in paragraph 9 of the contested decision, is irrelevant and in any event incorrect, since the Court of Justice called, in its judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), for a ‘sufficiently solid factual basis’. As regards paragraph 149 of that judgment, referred to by the Commission and the United Kingdom, the applicant maintains that it does not call that requirement in question and does not set down the ultimate legal test. The United Kingdom itself abandoned the test of ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ in favour of the more stringent test of ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ when adopting the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. 109 In the reply, the applicant also emphasises the gravity of the impact of the restrictive measures on designated individuals, which justifies an exacting standard of proof to avoid the risk of infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). In that context, the applicant maintains that the standard of proof required is practically indistinguishable from that required in criminal matters, despite the proceedings in question not being strictly of a criminal character. He invites the General Court to adopt the approach taken by the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) in Gough & Anor v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351, in which a person was subject to a travel ban because of his alleged propensity to engage in football-related violence. 110 As regards that line of argument, the considerations set out in the context of the examination of the first part of this plea apply mutatis mutandis. It is therefore only at the stage of the Court’s review as to whether the reasons underlying a decision to list a person or, after re-examination, to maintain his listing, are lawful and well founded that the question of the requisite standard of proof arises. 111 In that respect, it is for the Court alone to satisfy itself that the contested decision ‘is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis’ (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119), by determining whether the facts alleged in the summary of reasons are ‘supported’ (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 122) and, therefore, their accuracy ‘established’ (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 136). 112 In those circumstances, the second part of the present plea may be rejected outright as ineffective, since any error of law by the Commission in the definition of the standard of proof required or in its application is not capable, by itself, of justifying the annulment of the contested decision if that decision otherwise satisfies the evidential requirements set out in the preceding paragraph, which it is for this Court to determine in the context of its examination of the fourth plea in law. 113 In any event, the Commission did not err in referring, in paragraph 9 of the contested decision, to the operational test formulated by the FATF in the Interpretative Note on its Special Recommendation III on Terrorist Financing, namely that the designation or listing of an individual’s name on the list at issue and, therefore, the freezing of his funds should be based ‘on reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that such funds or other assets could be used to finance terrorist activity’, since that standard of proof is consistent with the criteria established by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518). 114 Admittedly, that test is not entirely unambiguous, in so far as ‘suspect’ and ‘believe’ are distinct mental steps giving rise to different degrees of conviction. 115 It must, however, be noted that, in its judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), the Court validated the application of the less exacting of those two possible standards of proof, namely that of suspicion, when examining whether a particular ground used against the listed person was well founded. 116 The Court made clear, in paragraph 149 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), that the reasons for inclusion on the list at issue could be based on ‘suspicions of involvement in terrorist activities, without prejudice to the determination of whether those suspicions are justified’. In the light of paragraph 162 of that judgment, it must be added that, in order for suspicions of involvement in terrorist activities to be legitimately relied on vis-à-vis an individual, information or evidence must be produced to support those suspicions, which is a matter that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 117 While that approach does not call in question the requirement for a ‘sufficiently solid factual basis’ set out in general terms in paragraph 119 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), it must be acknowledged that that requirement may be met by the application of the ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ test, provided that those grounds are supported by sufficient information or evidence, since the Court of Justice applied that test in paragraphs 149 and 162 of that judgment. 118 As to the fact that the United Kingdom abandoned the test of ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ in favour of the more stringent test of ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ when adopting the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, that is entirely irrelevant. On the contrary, the ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ test, provided that those grounds are supported by sufficient information or evidence, appears adequate in circumstances such as those envisaged by Regulation No 881/2002, by the FATF recommendations and by the relevant Security Council resolutions, notably Resolution 2161 (2014) of 17 June 2014, in paragraph 11 thereof. That was also the opinion of the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) in Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 1302, [2014] 2 WLR 1082. 119 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s argument that the standard of proof required in circumstances such as those of the present case is practically indistinguishable from that required in criminal matters, namely ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, must also be rejected. It has, moreover, consistently been held since the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), that restrictive measures such as those at issue in the present case are not of a criminal character. The preventive rather than punitive nature of restrictive measures necessarily has a bearing on the nature, form and degree of the proof that the Commission may be asked to provide (Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P and C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:2, point 111). 120 As to the arguments set out in that respect in the reply, the Commission, supported by the United Kingdom, correctly counters that the competent English courts have rejected the quasi-criminal test applied in Gough & Anor v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351 with regard to preventive measures such as those at issue in the present case. As regards the implementation of measures decided on at UN level, the correct approach in English law, as established by the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140, [2007] QB 415, and Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 1302, [2014] 2 WLR 1082, is based on a test of ‘reasonable suspicion’ (that is the existence of material such as to raise suspicions). 121 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the third plea in law must be rejected. Fourth plea in law, alleging errors vitiating the statement of reasons 122 This plea in law was considerably amplified following the communication of new information and evidence during the proceedings. 123 In the application, the applicant submitted, in essence, that the contested decision was legally defective in that, first, none of the allegations against him had been proved; secondly, some allegations were insufficiently precise to enable the applicant to challenge them effectively; thirdly, some allegations were so old or vague that they had no rational connection with the relevant criteria; and, fourthly, some allegations were inconsistent with the exculpatory material. 124 In its defence, the Commission, supported by the United Kingdom and the Council, contended that the reasons for including him in the list at issue that were sent to the applicant were sufficiently precise, detailed, specific and concrete for the purposes of the case-law (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116, 130 and 142 to 149), and that they satisfied the requirement to state reasons (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 102 and 116). 125 The Commission referred, moreover, to certain principles set out by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 117, 119 to 122), concerning the process of the judicial review of the lawfulness of decisions to list or to maintain, after re-examination, the name of a person on the list at issue, in particular after the verification by the Courts of the European Union of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning such decisions. 126 Next, the Commission stated that, in the interest of the efficient administration of justice and having regard to the case brought by the applicant, ‘[it had] decided not to limit itself to defend[ing] the contested decision on the basis of the elements of the administrative procedure [alone] but [had] turned, in the spirit of effective cooperation under Article 220(1) TFEU, to the ... Sanctions Committee as well as, in line with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, to the authorities of the United Kingdom, as the UN Member having proposed the listing of the applicant’ on the Sanctions Committee list. 127 As a result of those contacts, the Commission produced, first, as Annex B.4 to the defence, a letter sent to it by the Sanctions Committee on 20 January 2014 informing it that, as part of its annual review of names on its list, that committee had reviewed the applicant’s listing and decided that it remained appropriate. 128 Secondly, the Commission produced, as Annex B.5 to the defence, extensive detailed information and evidence sent to it by the United Kingdom authorities, which it decided, in close coordination with those authorities, to submit to the General Court, to allow the General Court to ascertain that the contested decision had been taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis as regards at least some of the reasons for the listing (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518 paragraph 130). The United Kingdom submits that that material includes documents relied on in support of its proposal to the Sanctions Committee that the applicant should be, and should continue to be, included on the Sanctions Committee list. 129 That material consists of a formal written statement (‘First Statement’) (‘the official statement’) drawn up for the purposes of the present proceedings and dated 18 March 2014, signed by the Head of the Counter Terrorism Department of the FCO, and a number of documents intended to serve as proof. As is clear from paragraphs 12 to 14 of the official statement, it is based on advice and an assessment by the United Kingdom’s Security Service, which is responsible for protecting national security (‘the Security Service’). 130 In the reply, the applicant objects to the account taken by the General Court of, and its reliance on, the new allegations, particulars and evidence produced in Annex B.5 to the defence, which were not relied on before the contested decision was adopted or taken into account at the time of its adoption. He submits that, according to the principles set out by the Court of Justice in its judgments of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), and of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 115), all of that additional material should have been called for by the Commission from the Sanctions Committee or the Member State concerned and disclosed to him ‘at the outset’ in order to respect his rights of defence and right of access to a court. According to him, the full disclosure of that material is not contingent on the bringing of legal proceedings, but must in any event precede such proceedings in order to ensure that the rights of the defence may be exercised. 131 Furthermore, the applicant maintains that, in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), the Court of Justice made it clear that it was to be provided with any confidential material relied on and that it would then itself decide what should be revealed to the person concerned, in accordance with the principles laid down in the judgment of 4 June 2013, ZZ (C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:36). In the present case, the United Kingdom had sought to bypass all judicial safeguards of the General Court, asking it to rely on its own judgement that the information provided complied with the criteria laid down in the judgment of 4 June 2013, ZZ (C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:36). The argument that any State which proposes a designation to the Sanctions Committee ought then to decide what information may be provided to the General Court is, in the applicant’s submission, fundamentally flawed. 132 As regards, specifically, the material found at his house during a search, the applicant states that he was acquitted in criminal proceedings brought against him in relation to that material. He maintains that if he had known that the Commission was intending to use the material against him, he could, as before, have sought to respond. Obtaining transcripts or other material from the trial takes considerable time and effort, whereas the United Kingdom Government has the exculpatory transcripts and material on the basis of which the jury acquitted the applicant. He claims that it is unfair, in these circumstances, to expect him to produce exculpatory material at great cost and effort. The applicant maintains that this example demonstrates the need for the disclosure to the General Court, at the request of the Commission, of the exculpatory material in the possession of the United Kingdom. 133 The applicant further submits that the General Court ought not to rely on findings adverse to the applicant made in United Kingdom court proceedings to which the applicant was not a party and against which he was accordingly unable to defend himself. As regards the claim made by the United Kingdom that those court proceedings were compliant with Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter, the applicant responds that, while that may be true with regard to the individuals concerned, it is not so in his case since he was not even a party to those proceedings. 134 Finally, inasmuch as the United Kingdom refers to court proceedings to which the applicant was a party, notably against the conditions imposed by HM Treasury and against the FCO’s decision not to seek his de-listing from the Sanctions Committee list, the applicant claims that those proceedings are not equivalent to the present proceedings and that they achieve a different remedy. 135 In that regard, and as the Court of Justice emphasised in paragraph 136 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), respect for the fundamental rights of the person concerned, and specifically the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, implies that, in the event of a legal challenge, the Courts of the European Union are to review, in the light of the information and evidence which have been disclosed, inter alia, whether the reasons relied on in the summary provided by the Sanctions Committee are sufficiently detailed and specific and, where appropriate, whether the accuracy of the facts relating to the reason concerned has been established. 136 In the present case, in accordance with the requirements laid down by the case-law, the particulars contained in the statement of reasons and in the first and second further sets of reasons identify some, at least, of the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the applicant must be subject to restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 140). 137 In particular, the grounds and, above all, the first and second further sets of reasons communicated to the applicant are not confined only to making general assertions but contain numerous details and precise particulars relating both to the identity of the persons concerned and to the time, place, context and other circumstances of the relevant conduct. 138 As to the question whether, in the light of the material which has been disclosed, the accuracy of the facts relating to those reasons may be regarded as established, within the meaning of paragraph 136 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), this entails verifying whether those facts are ‘sufficiently substantiated’ to permit the inference that the contested decision was taken on a ‘sufficiently solid factual basis’ (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119), given that the reasons for a listing may be based on ‘suspicions of involvement in terrorist activities, without prejudice to the determination of whether those suspicions are justified’ (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 149). 139 In the present case, it is true that, when the contested decision was adopted, no information or evidence had been put forward to substantiate the grounds given in that decision with respect to the applicant. 140 As regards the new information and evidence produced in Annex B.5 to the defence and the corresponding appendices thereto, the Commission rightly responds to the applicant’s arguments summarised in paragraph 130 above by contending that he is confusing two different issues, namely, on the one hand, the procedural requirement of a sufficiently specific statement of reasons and its disclosure to the person concerned in the course of the administrative procedure (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 111 to 116), and, on the other hand, the determination, to be made by the Courts of the European Union, that the statement of reasons thus disclosed has a sufficiently solid factual basis, after having requested the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 117 to 120). The new material produced in Annex B.5 to the defence is specifically intended to serve that purpose, and it is consistent with the principles laid down by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), to take it into account for the purposes of the review of lawfulness to be carried out by this Court. 141 As regards the applicant’s argument that the Commission may not rely on new information or evidence to which he has not had an opportunity to respond, suffice it to note that the applicant had the opportunity to respond to that new material in the reply and at the hearing. 142 The applicant’s argument, summarised in paragraph 131 above, that it is for the Courts of the European Union to ensure that they are provided with any confidential material relied on and to decide themselves what should be revealed to the person concerned is based on what is clearly a misreading of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518). In paragraph 122 of that judgment, the Court of Justice stated that there was no requirement that the competent EU authority produce before the Courts of the European Union all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged in the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, given that, if the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request of the Courts of the European Union (for example because the designating State or the Sanctions Committee refuse to disclose to it the information and evidence in question), it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them, with the consequences contemplated in paragraph 123 of that judgment. As regards the discussion by the Court of Justice, in paragraph 125 et seq. of that judgment, of the application by the Courts of the European Union of special techniques for examining confidential material, this starts from the premiss, as indicated in paragraph 124 of that judgment, that such material has been voluntarily communicated to them beforehand by the competent EU authority, together with a request for confidential treatment vis-à-vis the person concerned. Moreover, even in those circumstances, the Court of Justice has stated, in paragraph 127 of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), referring to paragraph 63 of the judgment of 4 June 2013, ZZ (C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:363), that if that authority does not permit disclosure of all or part of the information or evidence communicated to the Courts of the European Union with a request for confidentiality vis-à-vis the person concerned, those Courts will then undertake an examination of the lawfulness of the contested measure solely on the basis of the material which has been disclosed. 143 It is not necessary to uphold the applicant’s argument concerning the material found at his house during a search (see paragraph 132 above), since it was taken into account in the official statement by virtue of the findings made on the basis of that material by the High Court in its absolute discretion. In so far as the applicant points out that he was acquitted in the criminal proceedings brought against him in relation to that material, it is sufficient to note, with reference to the assessment of the second part of the third plea in law, that the standard of proof applicable in the present case is not the criminal standard of proof. 144 As regards the applicant’s argument, summarised in paragraph 133 above, that the General Court should not take into account the findings of the United Kingdom courts in proceedings to which he was not a party, the Commission correctly observes that, to the extent that the findings in question serve to show that there are reasonable grounds to suspect, or even to believe, that the applicant is associated with Al-Qaida, and thus to substantiate the allegations in the statement of reasons, they are relevant and may be taken into account by this Court. The Commission is also fully entitled to argue that those findings may be afforded particular weight by this Court, given that they are the findings of a national court with jurisdiction in judicial proceedings conducted in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter. 145 Lastly, as regards the court proceedings in the United Kingdom, invoked by the United Kingdom, to which the applicant was a party, it is entirely irrelevant that those proceedings are not equivalent to the present proceedings and that they sought a different remedy, since they include material capable of substantiating the allegations made against the applicant in the Sanctions Committee’s statement of reasons. 146 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the General Court may have regard to all the new information and evidence contained in Annex B.5 to the defence. 147 It is appropriate, therefore, to examine them in detail, in the order of submission adopted by the author of the official statement. 148 According to paragraph 4 of the official statement, at the time of listing, the applicant was one of the most prominent Islamist extremists in the United Kingdom, and his activities posed a considerable threat to the national security of that Member State. Those activities included, inter alia, heavy involvement in the facilitation of funds, travel of others overseas for extremist purposes, and the production and distribution of extremist media. 149 According to paragraph 9 of the official statement, the United Kingdom’s request for the initial inclusion of the applicant’s name on the Sanctions Committee list and the FCO’s subsequent decision not to seek his de-listing in 2012 are based on advice from the Security Service, advice which in turn was supported by ‘sensitive material’ which, in the view of the High Court, could not be disclosed to the applicant in the proceedings before that court and which has not been produced in the present proceedings either. 150 The official statement itself is presented as a series of assessments and pieces of information intended to supplement the statement of reasons, which come from the Security Service and have been verified by its author. The author of the official statement confirms, in particular, that she has personally considered the supporting material which forms the basis for the Security Service’s assessments and agrees with the assessments which have been made (paragraphs 11 and 12). In so far as that material could be disclosed in the present proceedings, it was annexed to the official statement. In every case in which, on the advice of the Security Service, such material cannot be disclosed, the author of the official statement confirms that she has reviewed it personally and is confident that it is of a sensitive nature, that its disclosure would cause damage to the interests of the national security of the United Kingdom, that it is ‘reliable’ and that it ‘clearly supports’ the assessments made in that statement (paragraph 13). In paragraphs 15 to 21 of the official statement, the author sets out, in so far as she considers it possible for her to do so in these proceedings, the reasons why disclosure of the material in question would be damaging to the interests of the national security of the United Kingdom. 151 In paragraphs 22 to 24 of the official statement, the author describes the ‘closed material procedures’ established by the United Kingdom Parliament and the courts of the United Kingdom, notably under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (see paragraph 18 above). She notes in this context that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules were considered in detail by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 4 June 2013, ZZ (C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:363). Those rules, and the Civil Procedure Rules, establish a mechanism for the United Kingdom courts to consider any supporting sensitive material in a private hearing, from which the person concerned and the public are excluded, but with the assistance of specially appointed advocates who represent the interests of the person concerned. In the present case, the official statement relies, in part, on the findings of the United Kingdom courts in the control order proceedings to be referred to below, concerning individuals anonymised by those courts and identified only by the initials AY, AM and AH. In that respect, it should be noted, as does the author of the official statement, that (i) the proceedings in question were required to be conducted in a manner consistent with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR, and in all likelihood were so conducted, no appeal having been brought against the decisions concerned; (ii) the findings made by those courts were made following consideration both of ‘open’ evidence and of the ‘closed’ evidence that could not be disclosed to the persons concerned because such disclosure would be damaging to the interests of the United Kingdom; and (iii) the courts of the United Kingdom have confirmed, by decisions that are also appealable, that disclosure of the closed evidence in question would, in fact, cause damage to the public interest of the United Kingdom. 152 As regards content, the official statement provides detailed information in paragraphs 27 to 34 about the documents and material found at the applicant’s house when he was arrested in July 2003, which support the allegation in the statement of reasons that the applicant played a central role in radicalising young Muslims in the United Kingdom, in particular through the distribution of extremist media. According to the United Kingdom authorities, the documents and material in question could be considered likely to be used by a person preparing an act of terrorism. As is shown by Appendix 5 to the official statement, namely the file of evidence provided to the jury in April 2004 in the criminal proceedings Regina v Mohammed Al-Ghabra, the documents and material include two CD-ROMs discovered in the drives of a computer found in the applicant’s room, containing information on how to make dynamite, landmines, light bulb bombs, bottle bombs and flame guns, as well as a ‘home terrorist kit’ and a 70-page ‘terrorist handbook’. One of the CD-ROMs also contained video footage of the Washington Post journalist, Mr Daniel Pearl, being beheaded. A further CD-ROM, found on the window sill of the applicant’s room, contained the ‘19 martyrs’ video, an Al-Qaida video detailing the events of 11 September 2001 and training undertaken by those involved. Printouts from the internet, including several containing the text of statements made by Usama bin Laden, were also found in the living room of the house where the applicant was sleeping at the time of his arrest. 153 According to the official statement, during his trial for the terrorism offence in April 2004, the applicant explained that he was unaware that the CD-ROMs found in his house contained any extremist material. He stated that he had viewed the ‘19 martyrs’ video in order to consider one side of the debate as to whether Muslims had been involved in the attacks of 11 September 2001. The applicant also gave evidence that he had shown the ‘19 martyrs’ video to friends, including Mr Abbass Taj. According to the official statement, Mr Taj was convicted of conspiracy after having attempted, in September 2008, to firebomb the home of publisher, Mr Martin Rynja, a few days before the publication in the United Kingdom of the book The Jewel of Medina, which had caused a storm among Islamic clerics in the United States. 154 Although the applicant was acquitted in the subsequent trial, the Security Service maintains that he was in possession of those materials for Islamist extremist purposes, both for his own use and also for use in the radicalisation of others in order to convince them to adopt his own extremist beliefs. 155 That information and evidence would give reasonable grounds to suspect, or even to believe, that the applicant sought to radicalise others. 156 In paragraphs 35 to 47, the official statement provides detailed information as to how the applicant provided members of Al-Qaida with material and logistical support and how he is considered to have facilitated the travel of a number of individuals to Pakistan in order to enable them to take part in training in terrorist techniques. 157 More specifically, it is the Security Service’s assessment that the applicant was involved in the travel of Mr Muktar Said Ibrahim and two other individuals, Mr Shakeel Ismail and Mr Rizwan Majid, to Pakistan, in order to undertake terrorist training. Together with three other associates, Mr Ibrahim was convicted of involvement in an attempted terrorist attack on the London transport network on 21 July 2005 and jailed for life, with a minimum tariff of 40 years’ imprisonment. The Judge in the trial stated that he was in ‘no doubt’ that both the attack of 21 July 2005 and the attack on the London Underground on 7 July 2005 were inspired and controlled by Al-Qaida (see Appendix 19 to the official statement). 158 It is apparent from the statement of the Scotland Yard investigator, Mr Brian Gerard Allison, in Appendices 15 and 16 to the official statement, that, during the questioning and search of those three individuals at Heathrow airport on 11 December 2004, Mr Ibrahim provided a mobile telephone number, which subsequent enquiries revealed corresponded to a ‘pay as you go’ telephone which had been registered to ‘Mohammed Al Ghabra’ on 9 December 2004. The Security Service thus presumes that, prior to the three men’s attempted travel in December 2004, the applicant had provided them with SIM cards to take to Pakistan, and advised them on how to avoid the attention of the authorities. 159 It is, moreover, apparent from an analysis by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (United States), which is described as an independent organisation (Appendix 17 to the official statement), that Mr Ibrahim, Mr Ismail and Mr Majid did reach Pakistan in December 2004, and that they were received there by an Al-Qaida commander, Mr Rashid Rauf, who introduced them to an associate, believed to be senior Al-Qaida commander, Mr Abu Ubaydah Al-Masri, in order for them to receive explosives training. Independent media have also reported (Appendix 18 to the official statement) that Mr Rauf himself subsequently claimed to have instructed these men in ‘counter-surveillance methods’ and to have introduced them to ‘Haji’, considered to be an alias for Mr Al-Masri. According to independent media reports (Appendix 18 to the official statement), Mr Ismail and Mr Majid were killed by accident during their explosives training in Pakistan. 160 According to the official statement (paragraphs 37 and 44 et seq.), Mr Ibrahim had been driven to Heathrow on 11 December 2004 by an individual who was subsequently placed under a control order on 29 August 2006, and who was anonymised as ‘AH’ in the proceedings against the control order which he brought before the United Kingdom courts. At the High Court hearing, the Judge, Mitting J, considered AH’s involvement in transporting Mr Ibrahim, Mr Ismail and Mr Majid to Heathrow and his association with the applicant (Appendix 20 to the official statement). Having had access to the classified documents provided by the Security Service, Mitting J made the following findings with regard to the relationship between AH and the applicant, who was anonymised as ‘BC’ in the published judgment: ‘AH’s admitted association with BC is one of the building blocks upon which the Secretary of State founds her suspicion ... Material relevant to the assessment of BC’s position has been considered by me in the closed session. ... I am satisfied that, even though AH has said things which are true about his relationship with BC, he has by no means told the whole truth about it. I am satisfied that BC was an Islamist extremist and that AH knew or believed that he was.’ 161 In those proceedings, Mitting J was also satisfied on the basis of ‘the totality of the material’ (which included classified documents) that AH had given assistance to individuals who were known or believed by him to be involved in terrorism-related activity. 162 In the light of the foregoing, and as is stated in paragraph 47 of the official statement, the Security Service had reasonable grounds to suspect, and even to believe, that the applicant had been involved in Mr Ibrahim’s terrorist activities, specifically providing advice prior to Mr Ibrahim’s travel to Pakistan, encouraging and developing the latter’s extremist views, particularly with regard to his martyrdom aspirations, and providing material support in the form of the telephone and SIM card. The Security Service also had reasonable grounds to suspect, and even to believe, that the applicant was likely to have been involved in arranging the travel of Mr Ibrahim, Mr Ismail and Mr Majid to Heathrow airport through AH. 163 In paragraphs 48 to 70, the official statement provides detailed information in relation to the additional reasons communicated to the applicant on 29 May 2012, including references to the conclusions of the High Court in proceedings dating back to 2011. Specific information is provided about the applicant’s involvement in the plot, instigated by Al-Qaida in the United Kingdom, to bring down aircraft flying transatlantic routes by detonating improvised explosive devices disguised as soft drinks bottles smuggled on board aircraft. The plot was disrupted by United Kingdom and Pakistani services in August 2006, in an investigation of a planned attack which was known as ‘Operation Overt’. That information relates to the grounds concerning ‘links with AY’, ‘provision of logistical support to Al-Qaida’ and ‘radicalisation of young Muslims in the United Kingdom’ in the statement of reasons and the first and second further sets of reasons. 164 According to the author of the official statement (paragraph 49 et seq.), who refers to the findings made by the United Kingdom courts in their decisions supplied in Appendices 21 and 22 to that statement, Mr Rashid Rauf was a key figure in the planned attack, in contact with a senior Al-Qaida commander based in Afghanistan, and believed to be the senior operational planner of Operation Overt. It is believed that Mr Rauf sent an explosives expert to the United Kingdom to provide operational tasking to the Operation Overt network and to assist them in the development of explosive devices and in the testing of explosives. 165 It is clear from paragraph 51 of the official statement that, in addition to 11 successful prosecutions brought following the disruption of that planned attack, two further individuals, anonymised by the United Kingdom court as ‘AM’ and ‘AY’, were placed under control orders. AY was said to be the explosives expert referred to in paragraph 164 above, which is confirmed by Appendix 22 to the official statement. According to the High Court, during AY’s second trial in relation to his involvement in the transatlantic airlines plot, the prosecution was able to produce emails which, together with the other evidence already produced, showed that AY had lied during his first trial. In fact, Mr Sarwar and Mr Ali Khan had acknowledged that AY had been sent to them as an explosives expert who had come to the United Kingdom to assist them. 166 Although the applicant was not himself prosecuted or placed under a control order as a result of the investigation covering Operation Overt, the Security Service assessed (paragraph 52 of the official statement) that he was an associate of several members of the network, including AY and AM, that he shared their ideology and that he had provided assistance and advice on several occasions. 167 Accordingly, in the legal proceedings concerning the control order imposed on AY, the Judge, Owen J, set out in his judgment of 26 July 2010, Secretary of State for the Home Department v AY [2010] EWHC 1860 (Admin) (Appendix 24 to the official statement), the Security Service’s assessments as to AY’s involvement in Operation Overt and AY’s association with the applicant for that purpose, and his conclusions on those assessments, based inter alia on classified documents. In the non-confidential version of his judgment, he stated: ‘50. The Open 5th Submission (5OS), served in May 2010, addressed the relationship between AY and [the applicant]. In the course of the trial, AY was questioned about an individual known as “Gabs”. The Security Service assesses that the individual known to AY as “Gabs” is identical with [the applicant] ... 51. On AY’s own evidence he met [the applicant] “at least half a dozen times” in South Africa in April/May 2006 when, on his account, [the applicant] was trying to establish whether there was a market for leather jackets. The Security Service assesses that [the applicant] and AY were likely to have discussed Islamist extremist matters whilst in South Africa, an assessment supported by the information set out in paragraphs 8 to 16 of 5OS, which relate to meetings between AY and [the applicant] in the United Kingdom following AY’s arrival on 18 July 2006. The Security Service assess that the meetings that they had between 21 July and 4 August were suspicious, being held around the area of Wanstead Flats, an isolated location which afforded open spaces in which they could hold private conversations. 52. As stated in paragraph 13 of 2OAS [the 2nd Open Submission], AY was observed passing a package to [the applicant] in the course of their meeting in August 2006. Immediately prior to the meeting, AY had met other plotters and had been handed what was assessed to be the same package. AY claimed that the package contained electrical items that one of them had sold to him for [GBP] 100, and that he sold some of the items on to [the applicant]. The Security Service does not accept that explanation, and assesses that the nature of the meeting with the plotters followed by that with [the applicant] indicates that they were unlikely to be for a legitimate sale of electrical items, being held in the dark, and in quiet public areas. When arranging to meet [the applicant], AY called him from a telephone kiosk using an international calling card, and prior to the meeting AY was seen to carry out extensive counter-surveillance which included hiding in bushes, walking in a circuitous route and altering his pace of walk. 53. The second subject addressed in 5OS was martyrdom videos. The assessment, which is supported by the email correspondence as set out in its paragraphs 13 to 16, is that it is likely that the items passed to AY by included martyrdom videos, some of which he then passed to [the applicant], and that [the applicant] may have had a role in facilitating their transportation to Pakistan.’ 168 Owen J went on to conclude: ‘55. In the light of the material contained in the open Security Service Submissions, the principal features of which are summarised above, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that AY was involved in terrorism-related activity. There has been no challenge [by AY] either to the facts set out in the Submissions, nor to the assessments made by the Security Service in reliance upon such factual material.’ 169 As stated in paragraph 64 of the official statement, the High Court delivered its judgment in the case concerning AY in July 2012 (AY v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2054 (Admin), annexed to the official statement as Appendix 22). In his judgment, Silber J set out the assessment of the Security Service regarding the meetings held shortly before the disruption of the planned attack: ‘72. AY, during his criminal trial, confirmed that he had been given [the applicant’s] mobile number by [Mr Abdul Muneem Patel, arrested at the same time as others involved in Operation Overt] and that he made a telephone call to him on 21 July 2006, before meeting him later that day in the region of Wanstead Flats in East London. AY claimed that he and Patel travelled there together and that when they were on their way, [the applicant] phoned them to say he was en route to meet them requiring them to drive a particular route so that they could cross paths on the way and then stop there for their meeting. They duly met near Wanstead Flats. The Security Service does not accept AY’s account and they assess that the route stipulated by [the applicant], and taken by AY, was a form of security aware behaviour.’ 170 Silber J, ruling that AY’s control order should be maintained, concluded as follows: ‘119. ... the close association of AY with many of those convicted of conspiracies in relation to the transatlantic Plot at the time when they were actively involved in the conspiracies is a potent factor in support of the Security Service’s assessments. ... 120. Similarly, the evidence relating to the suicide videos is important and supportive of the Security Service’s assessments that AY was involved in terrorism-related activity. 121. I have considered with care all the assessments made by the Security Service. I have concluded that they are fair and reasonable when all the evidence is considered. In my view, there is an overwhelming case that the Secretary of State reasonably believed that AY had been involved in terrorism-related activity in the light of his involvement in the Overt bomb Plot and in the dealings with suicide videos, as well [as] the extremist material found at his home after his arrest.’ 171 In paragraph 65 of the official statement, the author states that the creation of martyrdom videos prior to planned terrorist attacks and their dissemination and publication after an attack has been successfully carried out is a known modus operandi of Al-Qaida, which is used as a method of justification, and of radicalisation and recruitment. 172 In the present case, the author of the official statement assesses, in paragraph 68 thereof, that the applicant’s involvement in couriering the martyrdom videos of the Overt plot conspirators demonstrates his involvement in supporting determined and advanced extremist Al-Qaida networks. It is also her assessment that the act of conveying the martyrdom videos to Al-Qaida figures in Pakistan was a key aspect of the overall plot. Furthermore, in her view, had those attacks been successfully carried out, the videos would have been distributed and broadcast by Al-Qaida as a powerful radicalisation and recruitment tool. 173 The author of the official statement also considers, in paragraph 69, that the ‘security-conscious behaviour’ exhibited by the applicant at the time of the meeting described in paragraph 169 above is indicative of the nature of the activity with which he was involved. 174 In that respect, this Court must share the view of Silber J, in his July 2012 judgment in Appendix 22 to the official statement, that, ‘in an appropriate case, the fact that the individual is very security conscious can and does amount to a building block, which entitles [one] to reasonably believe that the person concerned was or has been involved in terrorism-related activity’. In the present case, and as Silber J held in regard to AY, the extent and nature of the security-conscious behaviour of the applicant can therefore constitute an additional reason for suspecting and even reasonably believing that he was involved in terrorism linked to Al-Qaida. 175 According to paragraphs 71 to 77 of the official statement, in October 2011 a High Court Judge validated the Security Service’s assessment that the applicant might assist a person referred to by the initials AM, who is subject to a control order for suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, notably in connection with Operation Overt, by facilitating travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes (AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486 (Admin), contained in Appendix 31 to the official statement). In paragraph 80 of the High Court judgment of 3 October 2011, it was, more specifically, held as follows: ‘Second, AM is assessed by the Security Service to have links to [the applicant], a prominent UK-based Islamist extremist with links to a significant number of extremist individuals. Further details of AM’s connections with [the applicant] are set out in the accompanying closed [confidential] judgment. ... the Security Service assesses that [the applicant] may assist AM in facilitating his travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes should AM seek such assistance. I regard these assessments as valid.’ 176 Lastly, in paragraph 78 of the official statement, it is asserted, on the basis of the conclusions of the High Court mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that the applicant continues to pose a risk to the United Kingdom’s national security. 177 Following that overview of the official statement and having carefully reviewed all the information and evidence appended to it, this Court is satisfied that some, at least, of the grounds set out in the statement of reasons and the first and second further sets of reasons, as communicated by the Sanctions Committee, are sufficiently supported by that information or evidence as to have a particularly solid factual basis and to withstand some vague attempts by the applicant to refute them. 178 Account must also be taken of the existence of other legal remedies that were available to the applicant but which he chose not to pursue. 179 First, the United Kingdom has pointed out that the applicant has at no time since his initial inclusion on the Sanctions Committee list sought to approach the Ombudsperson appointed by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) with a view to launching an in-depth investigation that might lead to the removal of his name from the Sanctions Committee list, even though Security Council Resolution 2161 (2014) (paragraph 48) requests that States ‘encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are already in the process of challenging their [inclusion on the Sanctions Committee list] through national and regional courts to seek removal from [that list] by submitting de-listing petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson’. There is no rational reason for failing to do so, particularly as the applicant claims to have arguments to support the removal of his name from the Sanctions Committee list. 180 Secondly, having issued proceedings in the High Court on 28 January 2013 against the FCO’s decision of 1 November 2012 not to make a request on his behalf for his name to be removed from the Sanctions Committee list, the applicant withdrew his claims by a consent order dated 17 October 2013 (Appendix 4 to the official statement), after the High Court had accepted that, in order to justify that decision, the FCO had relied on confidential evidence, accessible only to the court and not to the applicant. 181 While the applicant cannot be criticised for adopting that judicial strategy as such, it is not one that might help to allay the reasonable suspicion falling on the applicant in the light of the information and evidence considered above. 182 In view of all the foregoing, it must be held that at least some of the grounds mentioned in the statement of reasons and in the first and second further sets of reasons are sufficiently detailed and specific, are substantiated and constitute in themselves sufficient basis to support the contested decision (judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 130). 183 It follows that some at least of the allegations made against the applicant in the statement of reasons and in the first and second further sets of reasons were such as to justify the adoption, at EU level, of restrictive measures against him. 184 Accordingly, the fourth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality 185 The applicant submits that the contested decision is unlawful in that the Commission failed to carry out an examination of proportionality, balancing the applicant’s fundamental rights with the actual risk he is said to pose now. 186 The Commission, supported by the Council, contests that argument and refers to paragraphs 360 to 363 of the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461). 187 It is apparent from the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), that, with reference to an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international community as the fight by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, against the threats to international peace and security posed by acts of terrorism, the freezing of the funds, financial assets and other economic resources of the persons identified by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee as being associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban cannot per se be regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate (see judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 363 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraphs 120 to 130). It is nevertheless appropriate to ascertain that, when those measures were adopted, the procedural rights of the persons concerned, notably their rights of defence, were respected (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi I, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 367 to 370). In the present case, it is apparent from the examination of the other pleas in the action that the applicant’s procedural rights were duly respected in the review of the grounds for the inclusion of his name on the list at issue. 188 Inasmuch as the applicant particularly objects to the fact that the Commission failed itself to weigh up the restrictions of his fundamental rights and the risk he is said to pose, suffice it to note that such a balancing exercise is neither provided for by the applicable legislation nor contemplated by the case-law. On the contrary, the Court of Justice held in paragraph 107 of its judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518), that where, under the relevant Security Council resolutions, the Sanctions Committee had decided to list the name of an individual on its consolidated list, the competent EU authority had, in order to give effect to that decision on behalf of the Member States, to take the decision to include the name of that individual, or to maintain it, on the list at issue on the basis of the summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee. In that context, the only obligations of the competent EU authority are those identified by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 111 and 112 (respect for the rights of the defence), 114 (careful and impartial examination as to whether the alleged reasons are well founded) and 116 (statement of reasons identifying the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures) of the judgment of 18 July 2013, Kadi II (C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518). In the present case, it is also apparent from the examination of the other pleas in the action that those obligations were duly complied with in the review of the grounds for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list at issue. 189 As regards the proportionality of the contested decision in view of the time that has elapsed since the applicant’s name was included on the list at issue, it is true that the applicant’s funds had been frozen for a little over six years when the contested decision was adopted, that decision being the only one subject to review by the Court in the present proceedings. 190 However, as has been stated above, the retention of the applicant’s name on the Sanctions Committee list and, consequently, on the list at issue, following a review, is based not only on the Sanctions Committee’s initial statement of reasons but also on various more recent assessments, both by UN bodies and by the competent authorities and courts of the United Kingdom, of the threat which the applicant was continuing to pose to national and international security. Thus, when the contested decision was adopted, less than 18 months had passed since the High Court had upheld the Security Service’s assessment that the applicant remained a prominent Islamist extremist based in the United Kingdom with links to a significant number of extremist individuals (see paragraph 175 above). 191 Furthermore, as has already been stated in paragraph 181 above, the Court considers that, by failing to make any approach to the UN Ombudsperson (see paragraph 179 above) and by withdrawing his claims in the High Court (see paragraph 180 above), the applicant’s conduct does nothing to allay the reasonable suspicions falling on him in the light of the information and evidence considered above. 192 The applicant has, moreover, put forward no specific information or evidence to demonstrate that he no longer poses a threat to national and international security. 193 In those circumstances, the contested decision cannot be considered disproportionate in view of the time that has elapsed since the applicant’s name was included on the list at issue. 194 The fifth plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 195 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the Commission’s costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. 196 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action as inadmissible in so far as it seeks annulment of Commission Regulation (EC) No 14/2007 of 10 January 2007 amending for the 74th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001, in so far as it concerns Mr Mohammed Al-Ghabra; 2. Dismisses the action as unfounded as to the remainder; 3. Orders Mr Al-Ghabra to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; 4. Orders the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs. Papasavvas Bieliūnas Forrester Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 December 2016. E. Coulon Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 This judgment is published in extract form.