Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2020:566
Date: 2020-07-16
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Grand Chamber
Subject matter: Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;Area of freedom, security and justice
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Italy

Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged:  
19 February 2019 
Referring court:  
Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) 
Date of the decision to refer:  
29 January 2019 
Appellant:  
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
Respondent:  
BV 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Appeal brought by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (Office of the Italian 
Prime Minister) against the judgment of the Corte di appello di Torino (Appeal 
Court, Turin) by which the latter upheld almost in its entirety the decision at first 
instance of the Tribunale di Torino (District Court, Turin), which granted an 
Italian citizen resident in Italy, who had been the victim of a violent intentional 
crime, the right to compensation from the Italian State for the damage caused by 
its failure to implement Directive 2004/80/EC in the national legal system. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
The request for a preliminary ruling, made pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, relates 
to the failure to fulfil the obligation to implement Council Directive 2004/80/EC 
of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims (hereinafter: ‘the 
directive’), with particular reference to Article 12(2) thereof. 
EN 
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Questions referred 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is requested to rule [in the specific 
circumstances in the main proceedings concerning an action for damages, brought 
by an Italian citizen ordinarily resident in Italy, against the legislator State on 
grounds of non-fulfilment and/or incorrect fulfilment and/or incomplete fulfilment 
of the obligations laid down in Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 
relating to compensation to crime victims, and, in particular, the obligation, set out 
in Article 12(2) thereof, on the Member States to introduce, by 1 July 2005 (as 
laid down in the subsequent Article 18(1)) a general scheme of compensatory 
protection capable of guaranteeing fair and appropriate compensation to the 
victims of any violent and intentional crimes (including the crime of sexual 
violence of which the party concerned was victim), in cases where such victims 
are unable to obtain, from those directly responsible, full compensation for the 
damaged sustained] on the following questions: 
(a) In relation to the situation of late (and/or incomplete) implementation 
in the national legal system of Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 
29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims, which is non-
self-executing as regards the establishment, required by it, of a scheme 
for compensation for the victims of violent crimes, which gives rise, in 
relation to cross-border persons, who are the sole addressees of the 
directive, to a liability on the part of the Member State to pay 
compensation in accordance with the principles set out in the case-law 
of the Court of Justice (inter alia the judgments in Francovich and 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III), does [EU] law require that 
a similar liability be imposed on the Member State in relation to non-
cross-border (and thus resident) persons, who are not the direct 
addressees of the benefits deriving from implementation of the 
directive but who, in order to avoid infringement of the principle of 
equal treatment/non-discrimination in that [EU] law, should have and 
could have — if the directive had been implemented in full and in 
good time — benefited, by extension, from the effet utile of that 
directive (that is to say, the abovementioned compensation scheme)? 
-  If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative: 
(b) Can the compensation established for the victims of violent intentional 
crimes (and in particular the crime of sexual violence referred to in 
Article 609-bis of the Italian Criminal Code) by the Decree of the 
Minister for the Interior of 31 August 2017 [issued pursuant to 
Article 11(3) of Law No 122 of 7 July 2016 on provisions to comply 
with the obligations arising from Italy’s membership of the European 
Union — European Law 2015-2016)), with subsequent amendments 
(referred to in Article 6 of Law No 167 of 20 November 2017 and 
Article 1(593) to (596) of Law No 145 of 30 December 2018)] in the 
fixed amount of EUR 4 800 be regarded as ‘fair and appropriate 
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compensation to victims’ within the meaning of Article 12(2) of 
Directive 2004/80? 
Provisions of EU law cited 
Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime 
victims (in particular recitals 2, 6 and 14 and Articles 12 and 18) 
Article 18 TEU 
Articles 20, 21 and 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
Provisions of national law cited 
Article 609-bis of the Criminal Code — Sexual violence 
Legge 7 luglio 2016, n. 122 Disposizioni per l’adempimento degli obblighi 
derivanti dall’appartenenza dell’Italia all’Unione europea — Legge europea 
2015-2016, which entered into force on 23 July 2016, as amended, first, by 
Article 6 of legge 20 novembre 2017, n. 167 Disposizioni per l’adempimento degli 
obblighi derivanti dall’appartenenza dell’Italia all’Unione europea — Legge 
europea 2017 (Law No 167 of 20 November 2017 on provisions to comply with 
the obligations arising from Italy’s membership of the European Union Law — 
European Law 2017) and, most recently, by Article 1(593) to (596) of legge 30 
dicembre 2018, n. 145 Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 
2019 e bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2019-2021 (Law No 145 of 
30 December 2018 on the estimated State budget for the financial year 2019 and 
the multi-annual budget for the three-year period 2019-2021). In particular: 
- Article 11, paragraph 1 of which provides for ‘the right to compensation 
from the State for a victim of an intentional offence committed with violence to 
the person and in any event the crime referred to in Article 603-bis of the Criminal 
Code, with the exception of the crimes referred to in Articles 581 and 582, save 
where aggravated circumstances provided for in Article 583 of the Criminal Code 
arise’. Under paragraph 2, compensation for the offences of murder, sexual 
violence or grave personal injury is to be paid to the victim or, in the event of the 
victim’s death as a result of the crime, the persons so entitled, to the extent 
determined by the ministerial decree referred to in Article 11(3). In respect of 
offences other than those mentioned above, compensation is to be paid instead for 
reimbursement of medical and care costs. 
Decree of the Minister for the Interior of 31 of August 2017 determining the 
amounts of compensation to the victims of intentional violent crimes. This decree 
determines the amounts of compensation to the victims of intentional violence 
crimes as follows: ‘(a) as regards the crime of murder, in the fixed amount of 
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EUR 7 200, and, in the case of murder committed by a spouse, including one who 
is separated or divorced, or by a person who is, or was, linked by emotional ties to 
the injured party, in the fixed amount of EUR 8 200 exclusively for the victim’s 
children; (b) as regards the crime of sexual violence referred to in Article 609-bis 
of the Criminal Code, except where the attenuating circumstance of lesser gravity 
raises, in the fixed amount of EUR 4 800; (c) as regards crimes other than those 
referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b), up to a maximum of EUR 3 000 by way 
of reimbursement for medical and care costs’ (Article 1). 
Article 1218 of the Civil Code: ‘Any party who does not properly discharge his 
obligations is required to make good any consequent loss unless he can show that 
his failure to do so was due to force majeure.’ 
Succinct presentation of the facts and the main proceedings 
1 In October 2005 a female Italian national, of Romanian origin, ordinarily resident 
in Italy (hereinafter: ‘BV’) was the victim in Turin of a violent intentional crime 
(sexual violence) committed by two male Romanian nationals. For that crime the 
latter were sentenced finally in criminal proceedings to ten years and six months’ 
imprisonment and ordered to pay compensation for the harm occasioned, to be 
paid in separate proceedings, with an award to BV of an immediately enforceable 
interim payment of EUR 50 000.00. However, the victim was unable to obtain that 
amount since the perpetrators of the crime absconded.  
2 In February 2009 BV brought an action before Tribunale di Torino against the 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (hereinafter: ‘the PCM’) seeking a 
declaration that it bears civil liability for non-fulfilment and/or incorrect fulfilment 
and/or incomplete fulfilment of the obligations laid down in Directive 2004/80. 
3 The PCM contended that the action should be dismissed on the following grounds: 
Directive 2004/80/EC relates solely to cross-border situations; Article 12(2) has 
an indeterminate content such as to leave to the national legislature both the 
choice of the individual crimes with which to link the compensation laid down 
therein and the determination of the fairness of the sum to be paid to the victim; 
Italy already provides for a similar compensation scheme for the victims of violent 
intentional crimes, albeit limited to particular cases such as, inter alia, terrorism-
related and mafia-type crimes, and in relation to the crimes of usury and extortion. 
4 By judgment of 26 May 2010, the Tribunale di Torino found, as to the substance, 
that the PCM had failed to fulfil its obligations by not implementing Directive 
2004/80 and ordered it to pay to BV the sum of EUR 90 000.00. 
5 The PCM lodged an appeal against that judgment before the Corte di appello di 
Torino. By a judgment published on 23 January 2012, the Corte di appello 
confirmed that the Italian State had failed to fulfil its obligations by not complying 
with the obligation laid down in Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80. The Corte di 
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appello accordingly allowed only in part the appeal brought by the PCM and 
merely reduced the sum due to BV to EUR 50 000. 
6 The PCM appealed on a point of law against the judgment of the Corte di appello 
di Torino. The proceedings before the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) 
were stayed pending a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European (hereinafter: 
‘the Court of Justice’) on the infringement proceedings brought by the European 
Commission on 22 December 2014 against the Italian Republic (Case C-601/14), 
and the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Roma (District 
Court, Rome), by an order made on 24 March 2015, on the interpretation of 
Article 12(2) of that directive. 
7 Proceedings have been resumed following the completion of those two sets of 
proceedings (the first by judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 October 2016 in 
C-601/14; the second by presidential order of 28 February 2017 following the 
abandonment of the reference for a preliminary ruling by the referring court). 
Essential arguments of the parties to the main proceedings 
8 The PCM contends that the legal conditions for imposing liability on the State for 
the damage caused by the transposition of Directive 2004/80 into domestic law are 
not satisfied. More specifically, the PCM contends that the directive, and in 
particular Article 12, is not a source of rights on which residents may rely directly 
vis-à-vis the home State since the directive can relate only to ‘cross-border 
situations’ as it is designed to ensure that, where a violent intentional crime is 
committed in a Member State other than that of the victim’s residence, he or she 
has access to the compensation procedures laid down in the place where the 
offence is committed. The PCM further contends that the amount of compensation 
awarded to BV is excessive. 
9 As regards the settlements made by other courts ruling on the substance which 
have accepted, in respect of the Italian State, the claim for compensation for the 
damage caused by the failure to implement Directive 2004/80 in cases of victims 
of the crime of sexual violence, BV recalls the orders for payment of the amount 
of EUR 70 000 and EUR 150 000 upheld by Corte di appello di Milano (Court of 
Appeal, Milan) by judgment No 1653 of 18 April 2017. 
Succinct presentation of the grounds for the request for a preliminary ruling 
First question referred 
10 The Corte di Cassazione holds that, according to the settled case-law of the Court 
of Justice, the principle of the non-contractual liability of a State for damage 
caused to individuals by breaches of EU law for which the State can be held 
responsible is inherent in the EU legal order and individuals harmed have a right 
to compensation on the basis of that liability, provided that three conditions are 
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met, namely (1) that the rule of EU law infringed is intended to confer rights on 
individuals, (2) that the breach of that rule is sufficiently serious, and (3) that there 
is a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation on the State and the 
damage sustained by the individuals. 
11 The Corte di Cassazione considers that, for the purposes of the question referred 
for a preliminary ruling under (a) above, it is necessary to address in particular the 
first of those conditions. There is no doubt that the other two conditions are met in 
the present case since the Court of Justice declared (in its judgment in C-601/14) 
that the Italian State had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2004/80 and 
because the damage, complained of by BV, resulting from the late and/or 
incomplete fulfilment of that obligation is causally related to that failure.  
12 The Corte di Cassazione points that out that the Court of Justice, in its judgment in 
C-601/14, ruled that, ‘by failing to adopt all the measures necessary to guarantee 
the existence, in cross-border situations, of a compensation scheme for victims of 
all violent intentional crimes committed on its territory, the Italian Republic has 
failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 12(2) of Council Directive 
2004/80/EC’. 
13 It did so on the premise, clarified as a result of the interpretation provided by the 
Court of Justice regarding the overall scope of Directive 2004/80 (see 
paragraphs 36 to 44 of the judgment of 11 October 2016 in Case C-601/14), that 
Article 12(2) must be interpreted ‘as meaning that it is intended to guarantee to 
Union citizens the right to fair and appropriate compensation for the injuries they 
suffer on the territory of the Member State in which they find themselves in 
exercising their right to free movement, by requiring each Member State to 
introduce a compensation scheme for victims of any violent intentional crime 
committed on its territory’ (paragraph 45). 
14 In response to the objection raised by the Italian Republic as to the restricted 
scope of the obligations arising from Directive 2004/80 (paragraph 48), the 
judgment in C-601/14 pointed out that, although the Court of Justice had ‘held 
that Directive 2004/80 provides for compensation only where a violent intentional 
crime has been committed in a Member State in which the victim finds himself in 
exercising his right to free movement, so that a purely internal situation does not 
fall within the scope of that directive’ (paragraph 49), in so doing it ‘merely stated 
that the system of cooperation established by Directive 2004/80 solely concerns 
access to compensation in cross-border situations, without however excluding that 
Article 12(2) of that directive requires each Member State, for the purposes of 
securing the objective pursued by it in such situations, to adopt a national scheme 
guaranteeing compensation for victims of any violent intentional crime on its 
territory’ (paragraph 49; see also paragraph 50). 
15 The Corte di Cassazione takes the view that the judgment in C-601/14 is in line 
with previous judgments of the Court of Justice which have always understood 
Directive 2004/80 as being intended to govern only ‘cross-border situations’ (see 
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judgment of 28 June 2007, Dell’Orto, C-467/05, EU:C:2007:395, paragraphs 57 
and 59, and of 12 July 2012, Giovanardi, C-79/11, EU:C:2012:448, paragraph 37; 
and order of 30 January 2014, Paola C., C-122/13, EU:C:2014:59, paragraphs 12 
and 13). 
16 Therefore, fulfilment by the Italian State of the obligation to set up a scheme on 
compensation to victims of ‘any’ violent intentional crimes (and thus also that of 
sexual violence) committed in its territory must be regarded, on the basis of 
Directive 2004/80 alone, as intended to govern ‘cross-border situations’ and not 
‘purely domestic situations’. Therefore, it follows that Article 12(2) of Directive 
2004/80, as infringed by the Italian State, is such as to constitute an immediate 
and direct condition for access to compensation for damages as a result of the 
liability of the legislator State only with regard to ‘cross-border situations’ and 
thus not immediately and directly to the victims of violent intentional crimes who 
are ordinarily resident in the Italian State. 
17 The question set out under (a) above is therefore relevant since an answer in the 
negative would have repercussions as to the very existence of the right to 
compensation claimed by BV. 
18 The question referred also remains relevant even in the light of the recent 
introduction of Law No 122 of 7 July 2016, which, precisely as a result of the 
infringement proceedings, laid down ‘the right to compensation in the case of 
sexual violence’ and the effect of which was made retroactive by Law No 167 of 
2017 and thus also applicable to violent intentional crimes committed ‘after 
30 June 2005 and prior to the entry into force of that law’, with reopening of the 
time-limits for submitting an application for compensation under Law No 145 of 
2018. 
19 However, although BV can be a beneficiary of the effects of Law No 122 of 2016, 
the question referred is relevant since BV invokes the right to compensation for 
damage resulting from the failure by the State to fulfil its obligation to transpose 
EU law in good time and not the entitlement to obtain, under national law, the 
compensation now established as a result of the abovementioned law.  
20 In particular, there is an action for damages against the legislator State on grounds 
of a breach of the EU-law principles of equal treatment and/or non-discrimination 
as a result of late and/or incorrect and/or incomplete fulfilment of the obligations 
laid down in Directive 2004/80.  
21 In that regard, the Corte di Cassazione recalls the established case-law of the 
Court of Justice on fundamental rights (judgment of 12 December 2002, 
Caballero, C-442/00, EU:C:2002:752, paragraph 30) which ‘include the general 
principle of equality and non-discrimination’ (C-442/00, paragraph 30; judgment 
of 7 September 2006, Cordero Alonso C-81/05, EU:C:2006:529, paragraph 45; 
order of 16 January 2008, Molinari and Others, C-128/07 to C-131/07, 
EU:C:2008:15, paragraph 24). 
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22 The principle of equality is expressly stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (hereinafter: ‘the Charter’), in Article 20 thereof. The 
principle of non-discrimination of grounds of nationality is to be found in 
Article 18 T[F]EU (ex Article 12 TEC) and Article 21(2) of the Charter. 
23 The Corte di Cassazione recalls the legal value of the Charter and its application 
(judgment of 22 December 2010, DEB, C-279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraph 30; 
judgment of 15 November 2011, Murat Dereci, C-256/11, EU:C:2011:734, 
paragraph 71) and notes that the obligation to respect fundamental rights defined 
in the context of the European Union is binding upon the Member States only in 
respect of matters covered by EU law, whilst the concept of ‘implementing Union 
law’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, requires a certain degree of 
connection (judgment of 29 May 1997, Kremzow, C-299/95, EU:C:1997:254, 
paragraph 16; judgment of 6 March 2014, Siragusa, C-206/13, EU:C:2014:126, 
paragraphs 24 and 25). 
24 The existence of a link or connection with EU law was regarded as necessary also 
in the context of an action seeking to establish non-contractual liability brought 
against a Member State on grounds of an alleged breach of EU law, on the 
premise that a national of that Member State may derive rights from the 
fundamental freedoms provided for in Articles 49, 56 or 63 TFEU (judgment of 
15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C-268/15, EU:C:2016:874, 
paragraphs 52 and 53). 
25 In that judgment the Court of Justice recalled that: ‘the interpretation of the 
fundamental freedoms provided for in Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU may prove to be 
relevant in a case confined in all respects within a single Member State where 
national law requires the referring court to grant the same rights to a national of its 
own Member State as those which a national of another Member State in the same 
situation would derive from EU law’ (paragraph 52) and that ‘[t]he same applies 
in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct 
scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national 
legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a 
single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law’ 
(paragraph 53 and judgments of 20 September 2018, Fremoluc NV, C-343/17, 
EU:C:2018:754, paragraphs 20 to 24; of 7 November 2018, K and B, C-380/17, 
EU:C:2018:877, paragraph 34; and of 7 November 2018, C and A, C-257/17, 
EU:C:2018:876, paragraph 31). 
26 In the case here under consideration, as established by the Court of Justice in its 
judgment in C-601/14, the Italian State was obliged to comply with EU law which 
required it to fulfil, by a certain time-limit, its obligation to introduce a general 
compensation scheme for the victims of violent intentional crimes committed in 
its territory. 
27 Although it serves immediately and directly to govern cross-border situations, to 
promote freedom of movement of residents in other Member States, that 
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obligation was nevertheless imposed in such terms as to render the general 
compensation scheme necessarily also applicable to persons ordinarily resident in 
the Italian State. 
28 The Corte di Cassazione takes the view that such extension of effects, of an 
indirect nature for the purposes of Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80 alone, could 
be imposed on the Italian State, immediately and directly, on the basis of the 
general principle of equality (in itself) and/or the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, as fundamental rights of the European Union 
(Articles 18 T[F]EU, and 20 and 21 of the Charter), in so far as, precisely on the 
basis of these principles/rights, that State could not have implemented the 
directive in a timely manner in such a way as to make the compensation scheme 
applicable to cross-border situations alone, thereby treating nationals ordinarily 
resident in its territory in an unjustifiably discriminatory manner.  
29 Referring to the judgment of 2 February 1989 in Cowan, 186/87, EU:C:1989:47, 
(paragraph 19), the Corte di Cassazione considers that the Court of Justice appears 
to attribute an independent and specific value to the right of equal treatment (in 
the present case related to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality) compared with the value attributed to the fundamental freedoms of the 
Treaty (and, among them, freedom of movement which is relevant in the case 
under consideration here). 
30 In this regard, the general principle of equality, which is an expression of the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States, forms the backbone of that EU law. 
31 Therefore, the principles of equality and/or non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, as fundamental rights of the European Union, create the necessary 
connection between the abovementioned ‘purely domestic situations’ and EU law. 
32 By virtue of that connection and on account of the combination of the 
infringement of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union referred to in 
Articles 18 T[F]EU and 20 and 21(2) of the Charter and the established failure of 
the Italian State to fulfil timeously its obligation under Article 12(2) of the 
directive, the Corte di Cassazione considers that it must refer to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling the question set out under (a) above. 
Second question referred 
33 If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the possibility that the 
Italian State is liable for a breach of EU law also makes relevant the question set 
out under (b). 
34 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the loss or damage sustained 
can also be the subject of compensation in a specific form, by full compliance by 
the national legislature with the provisions of EU law with retroactive effect, 
where this is sufficient to remedy the harmful consequences of the breach of EU 
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law, subject to proof of any greater loss or damage sustained on account of the 
fact that it was not possible to benefit at the appropriate time from the advantages 
guaranteed by that law (judgment of 10 July 1997 in Maso and Others, C-373/95, 
EU:C:1997:353, paragraphs 39 to 42). 
35 The basic criterion for the assessment and settlement of the loss or damage 
sustained by the person harmed by the State’s failure to fulfil its obligation by 
implementing Directive 2004/80 late is the amount of the compensation to which 
he or she, as the victim of the violent intentional crime, would have originally 
been entitled. 
36 EU law provides that the compensation is to be fair and appropriate (see, to that 
effect, recital 6 and Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80; see also the Opinion of the 
Advocate General in Case C-601/14, points 86 and 87). 
37 Therefore, the interpretation referred to the Court of Justice on the ‘fairness’ and 
‘appropriateness’ of the compensation referred to in Directive 2004/80 is relevant 
for the purpose of examining the legal correctness of the criteria used by the court 
ruling on the substance in settling the damage complained of by BV. 
38 The Corte di Cassazione recalls that the Decree of the Minister for the Interior of 
31 August 2017, issued pursuant to Article 11(3) of Law No 122 of 2016, 
establishes, in respect of the crime of sexual violence, compensation in the fixed 
amount of EUR 4 800. That compensation is borne by a common fund designed 
also to compensate victims of mafia-type crimes, extortion and usury. 
39 More generally and, in any event, in the absence of any immediate specific 
information in Directive 2004/80, the Corte di Cassazione considers that it is 
possible to adopt general guidelines on the criteria of the fairness and 
appropriateness of the compensation. 
40 The criterion of fairness appears to be aimed at ensuring that the compensation 
(and thus the size of the amount thereof) takes account primarily of the inherent 
seriousness of the crime of sexual violence, by placing the victims, by reason of 
their equal dignity, in a situation which results in equal treatment. This seriousness 
of the crime has, moreover, been recognised by the national legislature in the 
context of the provisions of Law No 122 of 2016, where it sought to favour, as 
regards access to the above common fund, precisely the ‘victims of the crime of 
sexual violence’ together with the victims of ‘murder’ (Article 11(3)). 
41 The criterion of appropriateness, on the other hand, appears to require that the 
compensation be personalised, having regard to the relevant subjective and 
objective circumstances of the crime. 
42 In that context, the Corte di Cassazione considers it relevant to take into 
consideration various cases of compensation borne by the abovementioned 
common fund. Law No 302 of 1990, for example, provided for payment of 
compensation ‘up to EUR 200 000, in proportion to the percentage of disablement 
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established’ to persons permanently disabled as a result of terrorist acts or 
organised crime. 
43 It goes on to refer to its own case-law on the criteria which are to guide courts 
ruling on the substance when settling compensation, in civil proceedings, for the 
damage resulting from the crime of sexual violence. These criteria were identified 
in the intensity of the violation of the moral and physical freedom in the sexual 
sphere, the mental distress caused and the consequences at an individual 
psychological level and in terms of relationships between people, the effects over 
time, and the impact of the crime on the victim’s personality. Purely by way of a 
guide, in recent cases the settlements of the courts ruling on the substance of 
damage arising from the crime of sexual violence have varied from an amount of 
EUR 10 000 (to a minor, but limited to non-material damage) to an amount of 
EUR 200 000 (to a minor). For a case of attempted sexual violence against an 
adult the amount of EUR 15 000 has been paid. 
44 The Corte di Cassazione is aware that, unlike the level on which the legislature’s 
broad discretion in setting up the compensation scheme referred to in Directive 
2004/80 operates, the level of compensation for personal injury complies with the 
principle of full reparation for the harmful consequences sustained by the victim 
of the illegal act. 
45 However, since the legislative discretion, although broad, must in any event 
necessarily be guided by the criteria of fairness and appropriateness laid down by 
Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80, the Corte di cassazione considers that there 
must be a basic correspondence, as regards the quantum of the compensation, 
between those criteria and those, highlighted above, which guide the fair 
settlement of the non-material damage arising from the crime of sexual violence, 
even though it is not possible then to establish the necessary correlation between 
the amount owed by the person responsible for the offence and the amount paid to 
the victim by the State. 
46 On the one hand, the Corte di Cassazione considers that, in shaping the 
compensation which can be awarded under the abovementioned laws, the Italian 
legislature adopted, as a guidance for settlement, criteria which are fair (in fixing 
amounts on the basis of the seriousness of the violent crimes for which 
compensation is paid) and appropriate (in focussing on a settlement based also on 
the specific circumstances of the crime). 
On the other hand, as regards the Italian law referred to under (b) above, there is 
doubt as to whether or not the amount of EUR 4 800 in compensation laid down 
therein, because it is payment of a fixed amount (and, thus evidently ‘not 
appropriate’) and negligible (and thus a payment which is ‘not fair’), runs counter 
to the requirements of Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80.