Order — ECLI:EU:T:2010:31
Date: 2010-02-05
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Judge hearing applications for interim measures
Subject matter: Public procurement in the European Union
Procedure: Action for annulment;Action for damages;Application for interim measures

summary nature of the reasoning contained in the evaluation report. The second alleges several obvious errors of assessment arising, first, from contradictions in reasoning appearing in the evaluation report, and, second, erroneous statements and assessments of the evaluation committee. The first complaint, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons 113 Concerning the first plea, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons, the applicant argues that, having regard to the summary nature of the reasoning in the evaluation report, the ‘depth’ and the validity of the reasoning set out therein are affected. 114 In that respect, it should be noted that the parties agree on the summary nature of the reasoning contained in the evaluation report. On that subject, they both refer, in support of their respective arguments, to grounds arising from various points in the judgment in Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (paragraph 64 above). 115 However, it must be held that in this instance the applicant makes a selective reading of the judgment in Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (paragraph 64 above), with the result that it draws erroneous conclusions in comparison with the legal solution actually reached in that case. 116 First, the applicant has confined itself to citing paragraph 134 of that judgment, from which it is however apparent that the General Court, by using the conditional tense, was content to express guidelines which might be followed in the future, without however being required pursuant to the duty to state reasons referred to in Article 296 TFEU in order to take account of the principle of transparency which permeates all public contract award procedures. 117 Secondly, the applicant fails to mention that, at the end of paragraphs 131 to 133 of the same judgment, to which the Commission refers in its pleadings, the General Court concluded that the summary nature of the evaluation report, although regrettable, could not call into question the conclusion that the Commission had satisfied, to the requisite legal standard, the duty to state reasons incumbent upon it. 118 Having regard to the considerations set out in paragraphs 116 and 117 above, the applicant is wrong, in basing its argument on an erroneous reading of the grounds of the judgment in Case T-59/08 concerning the summary nature of the reasoning, to rely on the summary nature of the reasoning contained in the evaluation report, in itself, to support its complaint that the duty to state reasons has been infringed. 119 The first complaint in the fourth part of the second plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded. The second complaint, alleging six obvious errors in the assessment of the applicant’s tender 120 Concerning the second complaint, the applicant argues that the contested decision is vitiated by six obvious errors of assessment, which it will be convenient to set out and examine consecutively. 121 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the Commission enjoys a broad margin of assessment with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract following an invitation to tender, and that review by the Court is limited to checking compliance with the procedural rules and the duty to give reasons, the correctness of the facts found and that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers (Case T‑145/98 ADT Projekt v Commission [2000] ECR II-387, paragraph 147, and Case T‑169/00 Esedra v Commission [2002] ECR II‑609, paragraph 95). – The first manifest error of assessment 122 The first manifest error of assessment by the Commission is alleged to arise from the contradictory nature of the reasoning appearing in the evaluation report under the first and second technical award criteria concerning door-to-door distribution. The applicant argues that it is indicated as a positive factor under the first criterion that its tender describes the door-to-door distribution system, whereas it is mentioned as a negative factor, under the second criterion, that door-to-door distribution is not ‘touched upon in the applicant’s tender’. 123 In that respect, the Court finds, first, that it is not indicated in the evaluation report, under the second criterion, that door-to-door distributions are not ‘touched upon in the applicant’s tender’, but that door-to-door distributions and distributions to post office boxes are not treated. Consequently, contrary to what the applicant would have the Court believe in order to demonstrate the contradictory character of the reasoning concerning the evaluations of its tender under the first and second technical award criteria, the evaluation committee clearly did not find a lack of any proposal for door-to-door distribution ‘in the applicant’s tender’. 124 Next, from a substantive point of view, in so far as each of the four technical award criteria used was designed to evaluate the tenders received having regard to parameters specific to them and as the Court has held in paragraph 72 above, the applicant is wrong to maintain that the first two technical award criteria overlap as to their purpose. 125 Moreover, from a more formal point of view, it should be noted that the tender specifications required tenderers to complete a questionnaire concerning the technical award criteria, which was annexed thereto as Annex 8. It is undisputed that that is the same questionnaire which the applicant annexed to its tender under insert 14. It must be held that that questionnaire was subdivided into four parts that were strictly separate and formally independent. Those four parts referred respectively and exclusively to one of the four technical award criteria. Moreover, tenderers had, at the end of each of those four parts, to enter their name, signature and the date on which the document concerned was established. Such formalism permits the conclusion that, contrary to what the applicant attempts to argue, there was no ambiguity in the call for tenders as to the absence of possible conjunction between the elements of information communicated by the tenderers under each of the four technical award criteria. Therefore, it was impossible that information required under the second technical award criterion, such as that concerning door-to-door distribution, which was referred to not in the part of the tender dealing with that precise criterion, but in that relating to one of the other applicable technical award criteria, could be regarded as having been actually communicated in a sufficient manner as regards the second criterion. 126 It follows from the above considerations that the evaluation by the evaluation committee concerning the absence of indications concerning door-to-door distribution concerned exclusively the content of the applicant’s tender regarding the second criterion and not the content of that tender as a whole. Moreover, the Court finds that, as has not been denied by the applicant and as the evaluation committee rightly pointed out, no information concerning door-to-door distribution was contained in the applicant’s tender concerning the second criterion. 127 Therefore, the applicant is wrong to accuse the Commission of committing the alleged first manifest error of assessment. – The second manifest error of assessment 128 Concerning the second manifest error of assessment allegedly committed by the Commission, the applicant argues that this arises from the contradictory character of the reasoning appearing in the evaluation report under the first technical award criterion, in that the evaluation committee censures the applicant’s tender, first, for not containing enough detail on ‘the method put in place to ensure delivery within the time-limits’ and, secondly, for containing a description which ‘limits itself too much to the transport delays’. 129 In that respect, the Court points out that the purpose of the first technical award criterion was to evaluate the proposed arrangements in the tenderers’ tenders, in order to monitor and guarantee the quality of the services offered under the heading of all the services sought (see paragraph 68 above), in relation to time-limits for distribution, the frequency of collection operations, the distribution of mail and the physical protection of the mailings during transport operations. 130 Firstly, as regards the first negative factor found by the evaluation committee, namely that the applicant’s tender was not sufficiently detailed as to ‘the method put in place to ensure delivery within the time-limits’, it must be held that, concerning the first technical award criterion, the applicant’s tender, and in particular heading A, entitled ‘For traditional mail’ contains only an overall description of the various international systems for measuring after the event of the distribution times of the mailings entrusted to it. On the other hand, as the evaluation committee pointed out, the applicant has not stated the concrete arrangements which it has taken to ensure compliance ex ante and in situ with distribution times. It is clear in clear, precise and unequivocal terms from the description of the first criterion that tenderers were asked to describe the methodology proposed in order to ensure, in particular, the distribution of packages and parcels within the time-limits set. 131 Secondly, as regards the second negative factor found by the evaluation committee, namely that the description appearing in the applicant’s tender as regards the first criterion was ‘too focused on transport delays, which is only one part of the quality concept’, it must be held that, having regard to the purpose of the first technical award criterion, that evaluation clearly refers to the incomplete character of the description of the methodology proposed by the applicant in order to carry out monitoring and guarantee the quality of the performance of the whole of the services sought. 132 In that respect, it must be held that, contrary to the purpose of the first technical award criterion, as recalled in paragraph 129 above, the applicant’s tender in relation to that criterion, concerning the treatment of traditional mail in particular, dealt preponderantly with delivery times and contained only a little summary information on the other characteristics of methodology proposed as to the whole of the services sought in the context of that first criterion. 133 It follows from the above considerations that the two negative factors formulated by the evaluation committee were not only well founded but also independent of each other, so that no contradiction between them can be found. 134 Consequently, the applicant is wrong to accuse the Commission of committing the second alleged manifest error of assessment. – The third manifest error of assessment 135 The third manifest error of assessment by the Commission is alleged to result from the erroneous statement by the evaluation committee that, in relation to the first technical award criterion, ‘the concept PT BE for [the PO] is too focused on the context of the UNEX activities’. The applicant argues that its tender describes not only the UNEX system but six other measurement systems. It further argues that the UNEX system constituted the reference system, since it was designated in the tender specifications as a basis and reference for the monitoring of performance by the contractor and for the imposition of liquidated damages. 136 In that respect, the Court finds that, as the applicant observes, it is apparent from the introductory paragraph of point 4.8 of the tender specifications, headed ‘Time-limits’, that compliance with the time-limits imposed was to be monitored by the use of the UNEX measurement system and the instructions relating thereto. 137 However, first, contrary to what the applicant maintains, it is apparent from the same paragraph that the applicable quality norms in terms of time-limits for distribution were taken from the provisions of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ 1998 L 15, p. 14). 138 Secondly, the Court finds that it is apparent from the terms of the negative commentary on this subject by the evaluation committee, in combination with the provisions appearing under point 4.8.1 of the tender specifications, headed ‘Quality control’, and in particular the first two paragraphs, that that description of the UNEX measurement system did not meet the requirements of the tender specifications. 139 Indeed, it is apparent from the first two paragraphs of point 4.8.1 that tenderers were expressly asked to describe their own system of monitoring services so as to ensure a continuity in monitoring in order to detect deficiencies rapidly and immediately adopt corrective measures. In that regard, tenderers were to describe the protocols, procedures and means implemented in order to ensure such monitoring of the distribution of packages and parcels. However, as the evaluation committee rightly pointed out, the applicant did not meet that requirement to describe its own monitoring system, but simply indicated, in a general manner, the various measurement systems it had adhered to and in particular the UNEX measurement system. 140 It follows from the above findings that the evaluation committee did not make a manifest error of assessment by taking the view that the applicant’s tender was ‘too focused on the context of the UNEX activities’. 141 The applicant is therefore wrong to accuse the Commission of committing the third manifest error of assessment. – The fourth manifest error of assessment 142 The fourth manifest error of assessment by the Commission is alleged to have arisen from the erroneous statement of the evaluation committee in relation to the first technical award criterion that ‘the operating methods of the [applicant] are not described, except BPI Shipper’. In fact, the applicant argues, it submitted an extensive and detailed description of its operating procedures in the part of its tender dealing with the second technical award criterion. 143 In that respect, it is sufficient to note that, as the Court has already held in paragraphs 72 and 125 above, the four parts of the questionnaire concerning the technical award criteria were formally and substantively distinct and independent, so that there was no ambiguity in the call for tenders as to the absence of possible interference between the elements of information communicated by the tenderers under each of the four technical award criteria. 144 Thus, since the applicant does not deny not having described the elements in question in the part of its tender dealing with the first technical award criterion, it is wrong to accuse the Commission of committing the fourth manifest error of assessment. – The fifth manifest error of assessment 145 The fifth manifest error of assessment by the Commission, at the stage of evaluating the applicant’s tender under the third technical award criterion, is alleged to have arisen from two erroneous statements by the evaluation committee according to which the emergency plan proposed by the applicant, first, limited itself to the management of the vehicle fleet and, secondly, did not concretise the problems which could occur on a daily basis. 146 First, the Court recalls, at the outset, that the purpose of that third criterion was to evaluate the qualitative level of the measures proposed by tenderers in order to meet difficulties in transport and in the context of two precise phases, namely, first, transport towards the distribution centre and, second, deliveries to final addressees (see paragraph 74 above). 147 Second, concerning the first phase, it is apparent from the applicant’s offer that it proposed, in a concrete and detailed manner, an ‘immediate’ solution which would be adapted by reference to the difficulties encountered. More precisely, it indicated that both the vehicle fleet of its sub-contractor, charged with transporting mailings from the offices of the PO in Luxembourg to the EMC sorting centre, and its own vehicle fleet could ‘serve as back-up’. It proposed in particular an ‘immediate’ solution of additional or replacement transport means to enable daily difficulties to be dealt with. In addition, as is apparent from the applicant’s tender, transport from the offices of the PO to the EMC sorting centre was carried out by motor transport. Finally, it should be noted that this detailed explanation formed the subject-matter of a positive comment by the evaluation committee in the evaluation report. 148 Thirdly, concerning the second phase, the Court finds that it appears from the applicant’s tender that the applicant identified four examples of difficulties likely to be encountered after the transport of packages and parcels collected in Luxembourg to the EMC sorting centre, namely closure of the EMC sorting centre, interruption of national or international transport and, finally, interruption of distribution in the destination country. 149 However, it should be noted that, in those four examples, the applicant referred, first, in the case of unavailability of the EMC sorting centre, to its ‘contingency plan’ and, without any further explanation, merely indicated that it would use its own national sorting centres. 150 Next, the Court notes that, in relation to the two following examples, namely a shutdown of international transport and a shutdown of national transport, first, the applicant reproduced almost word for word the parts of its ‘contingency plan’ dealing with the same subjects, and, second, whilst those parts identify several cases of severe disruption, they describe an internal communication process within the undertaking in order to seek or coordinate the search for alternative solutions, without, however, as is the case with the first phase, proposing concrete and detailed alternative solutions. 151 Finally, concerning the fourth example regarding shutdown of distribution in the destination country, the applicant’s tender contains only a description of the communication processes in order to provide the PO with information as to the problem encountered, only ‘in countries with which the [applicant] has relations’. However, there is no description of any concrete and detailed procedure in order to reach a solution to the difficulties encountered. 152 Fourthly, it should be noted, first, that, as regards the finding of the evaluation committee that the applicant’s tender did not identify the problems which may arise on a daily basis, the ‘contingency plan’ which the applicant refers to in its tender concerning some of the four difficulties encountered during the first phase expressly provided that it came into operation only in the event of ‘serious disruption of the activities for more than 24 hours’. Such a plan could therefore clearly not be applied in respect of localised difficulties arising daily. 153 Similarly, contrary to what the applicant argues, the evaluation committee cannot be accused of committing a manifest error of assessment in finding, under the third criterion, an absence of explanations as to the problems which may arise on a daily basis, whereas, under the second technical award criterion, the applicant had described the tasks of the ‘dedicated working group’ and the evaluation committee had considered that description sound. 154 Apart from the fact that the ‘dedicated working group’ is not mentioned at any point, either in the part of the applicant’s tender dealing with the third criterion or in the ‘contingency plan’ which it annexed to its tender, it should, first, be recalled that the technical award criteria were autonomous, so that the contracting authority could not use, under one of those criteria, elements of the tender set out under another criterion, and, secondly, be pointed out that, in any event, the description under the second technical award criterion of the tasks assumed by the said working group does not permit the conclusion that it was entrusted with dealing specifically and in situ either with daily difficulties or serious disruptions, as regards both transport towards the distribution centre and distribution to the final addressee. 155 Secondly, it must be held that the difficulties envisaged by the applicant and capable of arising after delivery of the goods to the EMC distribution centre were envisaged either on the subject of serious disruptions in national or international transport or on the subject of disruptions not clearly identified concerning disruptions in the destination country. It is not at any point indicated that the difficulties envisaged at that stage concern less serious, but daily, disruptions, so that no solution in their respect is envisaged either after the delivery of the goods to the distribution centre. 156 In the fifth place, it is apparent from the measures described by the applicant in its tender concerning difficulties likely to be encountered during the second phase referred to in the third technical award criterion that the said offer was limited to describing in a general and hypothetical manner, first, cases of serious disruption, and second, internal communication procedures in order to seek an alternative solution. Nowhere does the said tender contain any concrete and detailed proposal, in relation to the second phase, for a measure such as that proposed under the first phase in terms of additional or replacement means of motor transport. 157 Consequently, having regard to the above findings, it must be held that, in relation to the measures envisaged and described by the applicant in order to meet the difficulties likely to be encountered during each of the two phases referred to in the third technical award criterion, the evaluation committee was right to find, first, that those measures could essentially be summarised as the management of the vehicle fleet (the solution proposed in respect of the difficulties encountered during the first phase) and, second, that, in substance, concerning the second phase in any event, the applicant’s tender did not identify problems which may occur on a daily basis. 158 In conclusion, the applicant is wrong to accuse the Commission of committing the fifth manifest error of assessment. – The sixth manifest error of assessment 159 The sixth manifest error of assessment allegedly committed by the Commission concerns the fourth technical award criterion. The latter was designed to evaluate the quality of the system tenderers in order to ensure the monitoring on demand of the delivery of the packages and parcels to their addressee. The applicant argues that that obvious error of interpretation resides in the erroneous assessment by the evaluation committee that its tender ‘provides only for a monitoring function towards [eight] other countries’ and follows from an incorrect reading of the said tender. 160 In that respect, it should first be noted that both the applicant’s tender and the tender by P&T Luxembourg formed the subject-matter of an identical negative observation, in the form of a reminder formulated in the following terms: ‘compliance with binding conditions (applies to the [two] tenderers offering the system)’. Similarly those two offers formed the subject-matter of an identical positive observation according to which ‘[t]he tenderer offers the system envisaged by the tender specifications’. 161 Next, it is true that the part of the applicant’s tender concerning the fourth technical award criterion lacked clarity. It is clear from the wording of the fourth criterion that tenderers were invited to describe a service for monitoring deliveries on demand and to provide a list of countries covered by that service. As the Commission argues, it is apparent from that part of the applicant’s tender that, after having indicated, in the first paragraph, that it had decided to offer a ‘parcels’ service instead of a ‘registered’ service, it then describes, in the fourth paragraph, its proposition for ‘monitored deliveries’, without stating whether that proposal was in fact to be attached to the ‘parcels’ service referred to in the first paragraph. 162 However, the Court finds that, contrary to what the Commission claims, despite that lack of clarity in the terms used by the applicant in that part of its tender, two particular points, which concern the number of countries for which the monitoring of parcels could be carried out by the offer of monitoring proposed by the applicant, are unequivocal. First, it is clear from the wording of the third paragraph of the part of the tender concerning the fourth criterion that the list of eight countries corresponded to the list of countries towards which the ‘registered’ delivery service could be carried out. Secondly, it is expressly indicated in the sixth paragraph that the applicant had annexed to the part of its offer concerning the fourth criterion a detailed list of several dozen countries for which the monitoring service which it proposed in its tender was assured. 163 Therefore, the applicant is right to complain of a manifest error of assessment by the evaluation committee where it held that ‘the PT BE tender provides only for a monitoring function towards eight other countries (fifteen for another tenderer)’. 164 However, as regards the consequences which must be drawn from the finding of that obvious error of assessment by the Commission, having regard to the application for annulment of the contested decision, it must be held that, first, all the other pleas and arguments used by the applicant to demonstrate the unlawfulness of the contested decision have been dismissed and, second, that the difference between the total number of points attributed respectively to the applicant’s tender and to that of P&T Luxembourg is 15 points. In those circumstances, given that the applicant obtained 3 points out of a maximum of 5 in relation to the fourth criterion, it must be held that even if the evaluation committee had not committed the manifest error of assessment referred to in paragraph 163 above and had awarded the applicant’s tender the maximum number of points, namely 5, the total number of points awarded to its tender would have been 77. Such an increase would not have changed the final classification drawn up at the conclusion of the procedure for awarding the contract in question. Consequently, the manifest error of assessment referred to in paragraph 163 above cannot entail the annulment of the contested decision. Therefore, the second complaint of the fourth part of the second plea, and thus the second plea in its entirety, must be dismissed. 165 It follows from the whole of the above considerations that the application for annulment of the contested decision must be dismissed. B – The application for compensation 166 In the application, the application demands compensation of EUR 2 836 444.94, corresponding to 10% of the estimated total value of the contract. According to the applicant, that amount is based on the loss of the chance to win the contract and on the costs which it has incurred in drawing up and editing its tender. In the reply, the applicant relies on a new head of damage, claiming infringement of its legitimate expectations, to which the Commission had given rise, in its letter of 20 January 2010, as to the prolongation of the 2006-2010 contract until 22 September 2010. 167 In accordance with settled case-law, for the Community to incur liability, the applicant must prove the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the institution concerned, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage complained of (Case T-175/94 International Procurement Services v Commission [1996] ECR II-729, paragraph 44; see also to that effect Case T-336/94 Efisol v Commission [1996] ECR II-1343, paragraph 30; and Case T-267/94 Oleifici Italiani v Commission [1997] ECR II‑1239, paragraph 20). Where any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the action must be dismissed in its entirety and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability (Case C-146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECR I-4199, paragraph 19; Strabag Benelux v Council, cited in paragraph 66 above, paragraph 83). 168 In this case, in the first place, concerning the new head of damage alleged by the applicant at the reply stage, it is sufficient at the outset, for reasons of keeping the pleas considered to a minimum and the sound administration of justice, and without there being any need to examine the Commission’s claim that that head of damage is inadmissible, to hold that, in any event, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Commission’s letter of 20 January 2010 cannot have given rise to any legitimate expectation that the 2006-2010 contract would be prolonged. 169 It is apparent from the four following passages of that letter that that proposal by the Commission could not be legally binding upon it. First, it is indicated that the ‘PO has the intention’, in consequence of the order of 5 February 2010 in Case T‑514/09 R de Post v Commission (not published in the ECR), to provide for the prolongation of the 2006-2010 contract. Secondly, it is stated that that ‘measure will obviously be subject to the agreement of the competent administrative authorities’. Thirdly, it is added: ‘In the event of agreement on your part, the corresponding amendment to the contract will be sent to you when the time comes after conclusion of all the internal administrative procedures’. Fourthly, it is expressly indicated that ‘[o]nly the signature of an amendment to the contract can bind the Commission’. 170 Consequently, no illegality can be found in that respect in the Commission’s conduct. 171 In the second place, concerning the damage alleged by the applicant through losing the opportunity to be awarded the contract in question, it must be held that it is apparent from the conclusions drawn after examining the whole of the arguments set out in support of the two pleas raised for the purposes of obtaining the annulment of the contested decision that the only illegality committed by the Commission arises from a manifest error of assessment, but that the said illegality cannot entail the annulment of the contested decision. Even in the absence of such an error, the applicant would not have been successful at the conclusion of the contract award procedure. 172 Consequently, the applicant is wrong to base its claim for damages on a loss of opportunity to obtain the contract. 173 In the third place, concerning the damage alleged by the applicant in relation to the costs incurred in preparing and drawing up its tender, it should be noted that, according to consistent case-law, it is clear from Article 101 of the financial regulation that the contracting authority is not liable to compensate tenderers whose tenders have not been accepted. It follows that the charges and expenses incurred by a tenderer in connection with his participation in a tendering procedure cannot in principle constitute damage which is capable of being remedied by an award of damages (Case T‑13/96 TEAM v Commission [1998] ECR II‑4073, paragraph 71; Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v Parliament [1998] ECR II-4239, paragraph 97). In this case, first, it is expressly clear from the wording of the fourth paragraph of point 1.9 of the tender specifications that the PO will not reimburse any costs incurred in the preparation and submission of tenders. Secondly, the applicant has provided no evidence that would permit a derogation from that principle. 174 Consequently, the applicant is not entitled to claim reimbursement of the costs relating to the preparation and drawing-up of its tender. 175 The application for damages must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. 176 Finally, it should be noted that, concerning the second head of claim, as the applicant stated at the hearing, its application for annulment of the contract is based on the prior annulment of the contested decision. Since, in paragraph 165 above, the Court has held that the application for annulment should be dismissed under the first head of claim, there is no need to adjudicate on the second head of claim formulated by the applicant. 177 This action is therefore dismissed in its entirety. Costs 178 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, and the Commission has applied for costs, the applicant must be ordered to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders bpost NV van publiek recht to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings. Pelikánová Jürimäe Prek Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 November 2011. [Signatures] Table of contents Background to the dispute Procedure Forms of order sought Law A – The application for annulment of the contested decision 1. The first plea, alleging infringement of rights of the defence 2. The second plea, alleging, first, infringement of various provisions of the TFEU Treaty and rules of law, and, secondly, various manifest errors of assessment a) The first part of the second plea, alleging a manifest error of assessment in evaluating the tender of the successful bidder b) The second part of the second plea, alleging infringement of the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, through application of award sub-criteria and weighting rules not provided for in the tender specification The first complaint, alleging the application of award sub-criteria not provided for in the tender specifications The second complaint, alleging the application of weighing rules not contained in the tender specifications c) The third part of the second plea, alleging infringement of the principles of transparency and non-discrimination in relation to the definition and application of the technical award criteria d) The fourth part of the second plea, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons several obvious errors of assessment in evaluating the applicant’s tender The first complaint, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons The second complaint, alleging six obvious errors in the assessment of the applicant’s tender – The first manifest error of assessment – The second manifest error of assessment – The third manifest error of assessment – The fourth manifest error of assessment – The fifth manifest error of assessment – The sixth manifest error of assessment B – The application for compensation Costs * Language of the case: English.