Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:C:2025:741
Date: 2025-10-02
Language of the case: English
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Ireland

summary of the Commission’s findings on transposition is set out on page 115 
of the report. Ireland’s failure to fully transpose Article 17 is summarised as 
follows: 
“In [Ireland], the existing scheme for compensation to victims of violent 
crimes (namely the Criminal Injury Compensation Schemes) only recovers 
verifiable expenses, and not pain and suffering. Although the possibility to 
start a legal action is open, in practice, victims of trafficking’ eligibility to 
free legal aid is not guaranteed.” 
45 As appears from the above, there is a focus at Union level on strengthening and 
safeguarding the rights of victims of violent intentional crime and, in particular, 
their right to access “fair and appropriate” compensation. In interpreting the 
Compensation Directive, and the minimum standards required, this evolution in 
Union law is an important factor to take into account. 
The Charter 
46 Union legislation must be interpreted to comply with the Charter and ought to be 
assessed by reference to same.14 Thus, the Compensation Directive must be 
interpreted in a manner which is compliant with the Charter. 
47 The Plaintiff contends that the exclusion of compensation for non-material 
damages, including pain and suffering, breaches his right to an effective remedy 
under Article 47 of the Charter, which provides inter alia: 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article...”. 
48 In the Plaintiff’s case, he suffered serious, lifelong injuries in a violent assault, and 
received compensation of only €645.62, which purported to cover his out-of-
pocket expenses directly attributed to the crime. This sum fails to vindicate the 
Plaintiff’s right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter and is 
manifestly insufficient to compensate him for the injuries he suffered. It is 
submitted that in order to provide an effective remedy, “fair and appropriate” 
 
13 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0427 
(last accessed 12 August 2024). 
14  See Case C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications 
EU:C:2014:238. 
CASE C-284/24 – 14 
14  
compensation must be interpreted to include some recognition for the severity of a 
victim’s injuries and the long-lasting effects of same. 
D. THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS 
b.  If the answer to Question (a) is yes, what forms of loss fall within the 
scope of “non-material loss”? 
c. In particular, does a victim’s ‘pain and suffering’ fall within the scope 
of “non-material loss?” 
What is Non-Material Loss? 
49 The term “non-material” loss has not been defined in the context of the 
Compensation Directive. It has been the subject of recent judicial consideration in 
data protection cases15 and in cases where damages are sought under Article 340 
of the TFEU. The term has also been considered in connection with the rights of 
victims of human trafficking to receive compensation. 
50 In European Union (represented by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union) v Kendrion NV,16  the Advocate General described the concept of non-
material damage in the following way: 
“106. ... that [calculation of a sum equal to losses] is impossible for losses 
which are non-pecuniary, or non-material. In most legal systems, the 
concept of ‘non-material’ damage refers to types of damage that are 
intangible and that cannot be easily given an economic value since there is, 
strictly speaking, no market value for them. Typical examples of such 
damage include pain and suffering, emotional distress, impairment of life 
or of relationships. In essence, it covers different forms of physical and/or 
psychological harm. 
… 
110. That said, a point which I find worth stressing is that non-material 
damage is, as I see it, not simply damage whose pecuniary value may be 
difficult to estimate for practical reasons. It is only damage that, by its very 
nature, cannot be financially determined in a precise and unequivocal 
manner.” 
 
15 See, for example, Case C-300/21 UI v Österreichische Post AG EU:C:202:756 in which the 
Court confirmed that Member States were precluded from introducing a national rule or practice 
which made compensation for non-material damage subject to a condition that the level of 
damage suffered had reached a certain degree of seriousness. In that case, the applicant had 
suffered no harm other than ‘emotional effects of a temporary nature’. 
16 Case C-150/17, EU:C:2018:612. 
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS 
15 
51 Material and non-material damages were also described in a “Briefing” of the 
Court entitled “Action for damages against the EU”,17  which states: 
“The Court may grant both material damages (damnum emergens [actual 
loss] and lucrum cessans [lost profit]), as well as non-material damages 
(préjudice moral), i.e. those that are not of a patrimonial nature, but are a 
form of quantification of the applicant’s suffering, distress, loss of faith in 
the EU justice system, etc.” 
Pain and Suffering 
52 Arising from the Kendrion decision, it is respectfully submitted that non-material 
damages must include pain and suffering. This is consistent with the Court’s 
guidelines in BV that “fair and appropriate” compensation must take into account 
the consequences of the seriousness of the crime for the victim and represent an 
appropriate contribution to the reparation of material and non-material harm 
suffered by them. 
53 The Plaintiff also relies on the meaning and function of non-pecuniary damages 
under national law. The Irish Supreme Court, in Sinnott v Quinnsworth,18  held as 
follows in connection with non-pecuniary damages (at page 531): 
“General damages are intended to represent fair and reasonable monetary 
compensation for the pain, suffering, inconvenience and loss of the 
pleasures of life which the injury has caused and will cause to the Plaintiff.” 
54 Finally, it is noted that in the Milquet Report, the Special Adviser considered the 
“most important” recommendation to improve state compensation schemes was to 
include non-pecuniary damages and corresponding support to victims.19 
55 In the present case, the Plaintiff received an award of compensation in the sum of 
€645.62. That sum covered the out-of-pocket expenses incurred (and claimed) by 
him. As stated above, the Plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses were relatively low 
due to the fact that certain of his medical expenses were covered by private health 
insurance and he received sick pay during the period he was unable to work. The 
Plaintiff is a young man who has suffered a permanent and serious injury. Despite 
that, he wanted to return to work and did not, therefore, submit a claim for loss of 
earnings, whether past or future. 
 
17 See 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630333/EPRS_BRI(2018)630333,
EN.pdf at page 7 (last accessed 12 August 2024). 
18 [1984] ILRM 523. 
19 Executive Summary (see https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/0184a9c1-09ae-
4773-a42a-7107238ddbbd_en?filename=strengthening_victims_rights_-
‚from_compensation_to_reparation_rev.pdf at page 8 (last accessed 12 August 2024)). 
CASE C-284/24 – 14 
16  
56 The exclusion of compensation for “pain and suffering” in the Scheme resulted in 
an Award that was manifestly insufficient having regard to the seriousness of the 
consequences of the crime and the significance of his injuries. 
E. THE FOURTH QUESTION 
d. If the answer to a) and c) is yes, bearing in mind that [M]ember [S]tates 
are required to ensure that their schemes are financially viable, what 
relationship should the “fair and appropriate compensation[”] awarded 
to a victim pursuant to the Compensation Directive bear to the damages 
in tort that would be awarded to that victim as against the relevant 
perpetrator as tort-feasor. 
57 The Plaintiff accepts that the Compensation Directive affords discretion to 
Member States in formulating their respective compensation schemes, but submits 
that any such discretion must be exercised to give effect to the ultimate objectives 
of the Compensation Directive. 
58 The Court in BV considered whether the Compensation Directive required 
Member States to pay an equivalent level of compensation to victims of violent 
intentional crime as might be awarded to the victim, to be paid by the perpetrator 
of the crime. The Court stated as follows: 
“59. In that context, it must be observed that the compensation referred to in 
Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80 is to be paid not by the offender who 
committed the violence concerned himself or herself, but by the competent 
authority in the Member State in the territory of which the crime was 
committed, in accordance with Article 2 of that directive, by means of a 
national scheme for compensation whose financial viability must be ensured 
in order to guarantee fair and appropriate compensation to any victim of 
violent intentional crime committed in the territory of the Member State 
concerned. 
60. Therefore, it must be held, as the Advocate General stated in points 137 
to 139 of his Opinion, that ‘fair and appropriate’ compensation, provided 
for in Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80, is not necessarily required to 
correspond to the damages and interest that may be awarded to the victim 
of a crime that is a violent intentional crime, which are to be paid by the 
perpetrator of that crime. Consequently, that compensation is not 
necessarily required to ensure the complete reparation of material and 
non-material loss suffered by that victim. 
61. In that context, it is ultimately for the national court to ensure, with 
regard to the national provisions establishing the compensation scheme 
concerned, that the sum awarded to a victim of violent intentional crime 
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS 
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pursuant to that scheme is ‘fair and appropriate compensation’, within the 
meaning of Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80.” 
59 It therefore appears to the Plaintiff that it is a matter for national courts to ensure, 
in each case, that the sum awarded to the victim amounts to “fair and 
appropriate” compensation which contributes to the reparation of material and 
non-material loss suffered by that victim. As was held in BV, that sum is not 
necessarily required to ensure the complete reparation of material and non-
material loss suffered by the victim. 
60 However, the fact that the compensation to be paid by the Member State does not 
“necessarily” have to equate with that which would be paid by the perpetrator 
does not mean that the levels of damages awarded in civil claims against the 
perpetrators are irrelevant. 
61 Rather, they are of central relevance. 
62 In the Milquet Report, the Special Adviser noted that there are two main sources 
of compensation for victims of violent crimes – offender compensation and State 
compensation. The Special Adviser recommended four key “paradigm shifts” in 
the Union’s approach to victims’ compensation: 
“a) A shift from the concept of “victims’ needs to state compensation to a 
concept of victims’ rights to state reparation. 
• A shift from the concept of “victims’ needs to victims’ rights” means 
that currently under EU law, victims of violent acts have a mere right 
to access national schemes of compensation, which results in their need 
for compensation not being fully met. This right should be 
strengthened. EU law should provide for a right to be fully 
compensated by the offender or, if not possible, by the state. 
• A shift “from compensation to reparation” implies an evolution from a 
mere financial assistance “compensation” to the concept of 
“reparation” covering the compensation for the personal, physical, 
psychological and financial harm suffered (and not via lump sums) 
but also elements of recognition, reparation (as much as possible), 
rehabilitation and building resilience. 
b) A shift from the priority of the offender compensates first to the priority of 
state compensates first - by adopting the principle of the states’ upfront 
payment where the state compensates victims first and later recaptures it 
from the offender. It means that compensation has first to be granted by the 
state and not any more, as in a majority of Member States, after the judicial 
decision concerning the offender. 
c) ... 
CASE C-284/24 – 14 
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d)  A shift from disparities and lack of cooperation to stronger 
cooperation, coordination and harmonised minimum standards.”20 
63 In respect of the recommendation at a) above, the Special Adviser states that 
where an offender is inter alia insolvent or unidentified, the victim’s right to be 
fully compensated by the offender is not respected. In her view, it has to be the 
duty of the Member State to compensate instead of the offender and to implement 
the victim’s right. She states (page 37): 
“Therefore, the second shift is closely linked to the first one and requires 
that the right of a victim of a violent act is to be compensated for the 
different damages suffered which should be defined in the same way 
independently of whether the victim is compensated by the State or by the 
offender. The objectives of compensation should be the same in the case of 
compensation from the perpetrator on the basis of its own civil 
responsibility and also in cases where the State compensation replaces or 
advances the compensation of the perpetrator owed to the victim.” 
64 It is submitted that the objectives of State compensation and offender 
compensation ought to be aligned to compensate the victim for the damage 
suffered as a result of the violent crime. 
65 Thus, the Plaintiff submits that there ought to be parity between the compensation 
awarded to a victim by the Member State pursuant to the Compensation Directive 
with the compensation that would be awarded to the victim in a damages claim 
against the perpetrator, unless the Member State demonstrates to the national court 
that parity would cause such a degree of disruption to the compensation scheme as 
to render it financially unviable. 
66 Indeed, reasonably assuming that damages awards in civil claims against 
perpetrators in Member States are proportionate to the injuries suffered, there 
would appear to be no reason of principle not to require parity between 
compensation by perpetrators and compensation by the Member State. 
67 Finally in respect of the Fourth Question, it is worth noting that the Scheme has on 
occasion resulted in very generous awards in respect of verifiable loss of earnings 
claims; these awards have not rendered the Scheme unworkable or financially 
unviable. 
 
20  See https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/0184a9c1-09ae-4773-a42a-
7107238ddbbd_en?filename=strengthening_victims_rights_-
‚from_compensation_to_reparation_rev.pdf, page 36 (last accessed 12 August 2024). 
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS 
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F. THE FIFTH QUESTION 
e.  Can the compensation established for victims of violent intentional 
crimes under the ‘Scheme of Compensation for Personal Injuries 
Criminally Inflicted’(the “Scheme”) be regarded as “fair and 
appropriate compensation to victims” within the meaning of Article 
12(2) of the Compensation Directive if a victim is awarded the sum of 
€645.65 as compensation for a serious eye injury resulting in permanent 
sight impairment? 
68 As noted above, the Plaintiff accepts, as he must, that in the absence of any 
indication in the Compensation Directive as to the amount of compensation 
deemed to correspond to “fair and appropriate” compensation, or as to the 
detailed arrangements for the determination of same, there is a degree of 
discretion afforded to Member States in that regard.21 
69 However, it is respectfully submitted that on the facts of this case, an award of 
compensation in the sum of €645.65 was outside any possible margin of discretion 
afforded to the Member State; the Award was wholly inadequate and “manifestly 
insufficient” considering the significant and life-changing injuries the Plaintiff 
suffered as a consequence of the assault. 
70 Leaving aside the figure that was actually awarded, a difficulty in this case is what 
that figure actually represents for the victim. That the Scheme has no upper limit 
in respect of the payment of compensation for purely financial loss does not, in 
the Plaintiff’s submission, relieve the Irish State of its obligation to have in place a 
scheme which contributes to the reparation of non-material harm suffered by 
victims of violent intentional crime. 
71 In that regard, it is submitted that a victim, such as the Plaintiff, who has suffered 
significant injuries, with serious and permanent consequences, but who is capable 
of working and/or has suffered minimal financial loss will only ever receive 
“purely symbolic or manifestly insufficient” compensation on foot of the Scheme. 
72 Thus, a sum of €645.65 as compensation for a serious eye injury resulting in 
permanent sight impairment cannot be regarded as “fair and appropriate” within 
the meaning of Article 12(2) of the Compensation Directive. 
G. CONCLUSION 
73 The Plaintiff suffered serious, lifelong injuries in a violent assault. He received an 
Award of €645.62 under the Scheme which purported to cover his out-of-pocket 
expenses directly attributed to the crime. He contends that the Award is manifestly 
insufficient to vindicate his rights under the Compensation Directive and does not 
 
21 See, BV, at §58. 
CASE C-284/24 – 14 
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amount to “fair and appropriate” compensation within the meaning of the 
Compensation Directive. 
74 The Plaintiff also submits that the exclusion from the Scheme of damages for pain 
and suffering is in breach of Article 12(2) of the Compensation Directive. The 
effect of the exclusion is that the Award was reached without any consideration of 
the severity of the assault and the significance of his injuries. 
75 For the reasons set out herein, the Plaintiff submits that the answer to the 
questions posed are as follows: 
Question (a): 
• Yes. The obligation imposed on Member States by Article 12(2) of the 
Compensation Directive to provide “fair and appropriate compensation” 
to victims of violent intentional crimes requires that a victim be 
compensated for both material and non-material loss within the 
meaning of BV. 
Questions (b) and (c): 
• Non-material loss includes pain and suffering, emotional distress, and 
impairment of life or of relationships. In essence, it covers different 
forms of physical and/or psychological harm. 
Question (d): 
76 This is ultimately a matter for national courts. However, where the national 
legal system has ensured that general damages awards in personal injury 
cases are fair and proportionate such that they are not unduly burdensome 
on the party who caused the injury and is liable to make reparation for it, 
then there is no good reason why such an award should not be made under a 
compensation scheme in which the Member State pays the award. The 
Plaintiff therefore submits that there ought to be parity between the 
compensation awarded to a victim by the Member State pursuant to the 
Compensation Directive with the compensation that would be awarded to the 
victim in a damages claim against the perpetrator, unless the Member State 
demonstrates to the national court that parity would cause such a degree of 
disruption to the compensation scheme as to render it financially unviable. 
Question (e): 
• No. 
Dated 13 August 2024 
Signed   
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS 
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James MacGuill S.C. Solicitor 
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