Judgment;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2024:766
Date: 2024-09-19
Language of the case: Italian
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions
Procedure: Action for annulment;Appeal - unfounded;Appeal - inadmissible
Origin: Belgium;Italy

summary review of the proportionality of Decision No 14/2018 (as follows from paragraph 13 of the expert opinion prepared by that service, which was presented by the appellants to the General Court). 91. However, the Parliament did not make that expert opinion available to the appellants, and the General Court was therefore wrong to incorporate it into the reasoning for the decisions at issue (for further details, see points 107 to 109 below). The aforesaid expert opinion cannot therefore be used as evidence that the Parliament verified the compatibility with EU law of the application of Decision No 14/2018. Furthermore, the Legal Service’s assessment of the proportionality of that decision is in any case inadequate, since the Legal Service contented itself with a reference in one paragraph to the fact that that decision provides for a minimum amount for pensions and contains two hardship clauses. A summary review of that kind is not sufficient to determine whether that national rule is compatible with EU law, as demonstrated by the example outlined in point 83. Instead, a comprehensive assessment of the national rule must be carried out for that purpose in order to confirm that the rule is not arbitrary and that it is comprehensible and coherent. 92. First and foremost, however, the viewpoint in question ignores the General Court’s own jurisdiction because the EU Courts must not under any circumstances substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act. (33) 93. However, the General Court’s approach in the cases at hand results in precisely such a substitution of reasoning because, when dismissing the pleas in law at first instance, the General Court based its decision on an assessment that was not contained in the grounds for the decisions at issue and thus fills a gap that exists in them. By acting in that way, the General Court exceeded the limits of its power of review. (34) 94. Finally, the assessment of the compatibility with EU law of the decisions at issue, particularly as regards the proportionality of the national measure to be implemented by those decisions, which the General Court carried out independently without referring to a corresponding statement of reasons by the Parliament, is at any rate insufficient in relation to the benchmark explained in point 83 of the present Opinion. As shown by the example cited therein and as already outlined in point 91 above, an assessment of this kind requires a precise and comprehensive examination of the national measure to be implemented with regard to its context and its concrete impacts in order to confirm that it is not arbitrary and that it is comprehensible and coherent. Merely a general finding that the measure serves the objective of economical budgetary management and contains hardship clauses does not meet that benchmark. 95. It follows from the above that the General Court erred in law several times when it confirmed the compatibility of the decisions at issue with the higher-ranking rules and principles of EU law. The grounds of appeal based on the above are therefore well founded. 96. In view of the central significance of the compatibility of the decisions at issue with EU law, the well-founded nature alone of those grounds of appeal results in the setting aside of the judgments under appeal. It is nevertheless expedient, particularly in view of the applications pending before the General Court against the decisions replacing the decisions at issue (see point 41 above), also to examine, in the alternative, the remaining grounds of appeal submitted by the appellants. 3. The jurisdiction of the author of the decisions at issue 97. According to the appellants in Cases C‑725/20 P and C‑198/21 P, the General Court erred in law again when it confirmed that the Head of the ‘Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements’ Unit of the Parliament’s DG for Finance was competent to adopt the decisions at issue. The appellants asserted at first instance that those decisions should instead have been adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament. 98. The General Court rejected that complaint on the basis of the following reasons: ‘In response to a written question from the Court, the Parliament stated, supported by evidence, that the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance had been appointed authorising officer by subdelegation for budget line 1030 relating to retirement pensions referred to in Annex III to the PEAM Rules, by Decision FINS/2019-01 of the Director-General for Finance of the Parliament of 23 November 2018. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 73(3) of Regulation 2018/1046, Decision FINS/2019-01 expressly states that that subdelegation of competence authorises the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance, inter alia, to make legal and budgetary commitments, validate expenditure and authorise payments, and also draw up estimates of amounts receivable, establish entitlements to be recovered and issue recovery orders.’ (35) 99. In the light of those considerations, the General Court found that, ‘contrary to the applicants’ submissions, the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s DG Finance was therefore competent to adopt the contested decisions’. (36) 100. It is not, however, clear from the General Court’s reasoning reproduced in point 98 above, which merely repeats the substance of Decision FINS/2019-01, why the General Court believed that the Head of Unit was competent to adopt the decisions at issue. In particular, it is not clear why, in the General Court’s opinion, the subdelegation of competence by means of Decision FINS/2019-01 encompasses the competence to assess the compatibility with EU law of the implementation of a national reduction measure that entails an encroachment upon the acquired rights of former Members of the Parliament. The response to that question is also not apparent from a simple reading of Decision FINS/2019-01. The General Court’s reasoning does not therefore allow the Court of Justice to verify whether the General Court correctly confirmed that the Head of Unit concerned was competent to adopt the decisions at issue, since it gives no indication of the grounds upon which the General Court based that viewpoint. 101. It follows from this that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by a lack of reasoning. Inadequate reasoning of that kind is to be assessed ex officio. (37) It follows from the foregoing that the appellants’ submissions are justified in so far as they rightly assert that the General Court erred in law in dismissing their submissions regarding the competence of the author of the decisions at issue. (38) 102. The Court of Justice could however only base the setting aside of the judgments under appeal on that lack of reasoning determined on an ex officio basis if it had heard the parties beforehand in that connection. (39) Since the judgments under appeal, as established in point 96 above, are however already to be set aside on other grounds, a hearing of that kind is not necessary in the cases at hand. 4. The reasons for the decisions at issue 103. The appellants in Cases C‑725/20 P and C‑198/21 P continue to assert that the General Court erred in finding that the decisions at issue contained adequate reasoning. According to the appellants, those decisions are conversely vitiated by a lack of reasoning because the Parliament failed to document in them an assessment of the compatibility with EU law of the implementation of Decision No 14/2018. 104. The General Court essentially based its opinion that the decisions at issue were adequately reasoned on the fact that those decisions made clear both their legal basis and the opinion of the Parliament that Decision No 14/2018 applied to the appellants pursuant to Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, read in conjunction with Article 75 of the Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members. (40) 105. The General Court’s analysis is based on the assumption that the Parliament did not need to carry out any further assessment of the compatibility with EU law of the application of Decision No 14/2018 to the appellants. As explained in point 89 above, that assumption is incorrect. 106. Instead, before adopting the decisions at issue the Parliament ought to have assessed and substantiated why, in its opinion, those decisions were compatible with the higher-ranking EU law, in particular the principle of proportionality. The reasoning for the decisions at issue was inadequate owing to the absence of the relevant details that would have allowed the General Court to carry out a review of lawfulness in that connection without substituting its own assessment for that of the Parliament (see point 93 above). 107. That is all the more true since the appellants rightly assert that the General Court incorrectly incorporated into its assessment of the reasoning set out in the decisions at issue the expert opinion by the Parliament’s Legal Service in which the proportionality of Decision No 14/2018 was examined at least in summary form, albeit inadequately (see points 90 and 91 above). (41) That expert opinion was not attached to those decisions and was not made available to the appellants by the Parliament. It was only mentioned to them indirectly. Thus, the note which was included in their pension statements for the month of February 2019 (see point 22 above) and to which the decisions at issue refer merely indicates that the Parliament’s Legal Service had confirmed the automatic applicability of Decision No 14/2018 to the appellants. However, that note did not contain a direct reference to the Legal Service’s expert opinion or an indication of whether and where that opinion could be accessed. (42) 108. Although it is true that the statement of reasons for an act of law must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context, (43) a document whose existence must be ‘guessed at’ by the addressees of a decision and which they must obtain for themselves cannot be categorised as part of the known context of that decision. This must apply even if the addressees present the document in question in proceedings before the judicature of the European Union. Even if that fact proves that they have subsequently obtained the document, it cannot serve as evidence that the original decision was adequately reasoned at the point in time used to determine the start of the time limit for commencing proceedings, that is when it was served to the addressees. 109. The Courts of the European Union, when reviewing the lawfulness of a decision, can only take into consideration further details provided by its author if those details supplement a statement of reasoning that is adequate in and of itself; (44) in the case at hand, however, the original statement of reasoning was specifically not adequate, as explained above. 110. To sum up, the General Court’s rejection of a defective statement of reasons for the decisions at issue is therefore vitiated by an error in law. 5. Ms Panusa’s application at first instance 111. Finally, the appellants in Case C‑725/20 P also assert that the General Court erred in law when it dismissed Ms Panusa’s application at first instance in Case T‑453/19 as inadmissible on the grounds of a lack of interest in bringing legal proceedings, because the decision at issue did not result in any reduction in the level of Ms Panusa’s survivors’ pension. (45) 112. According to the appellants, however, Ms Panusa has an interest in clarifying the question raised in the hearing before the General Court as to whether her survivors’ pension should be calculated on the basis of Annex I to the PEAM Rules instead of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, as had been the case to date. The appellants stated that if the latter were true, the level of her survivors’ pension may in fact increase. 113. As the Parliament correctly responded, the judgment in Coppo Gavazzi does not however contain any reference to submissions at first instance by Ms Panusa to the effect that her survivors’ pension should have been calculated on the basis of Annex I to the PEAM Rules. As far as can be seen, Ms Panusa’s application at first instance also does not contain any corresponding plea in law. As regards Ms Panusa’s reference to the hearing before the General Court, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. Ms Panusa however fails to adduce any such arguments. 114. Ms Panusa’s submissions in the present appeal proceedings are thus to be dismissed as inadmissible, since it is inadmissible to put forward in appeal proceedings a new plea in law which was not raised during the proceedings at first instance. (46) 6. Interim conclusion 115. It follows from all of the foregoing that all of the judgments under appeal in all of the joined cases forming the subject of those judgments and the present appeal proceedings were vitiated by errors of law and are therefore to be set aside, with the exception of the judgment in Coppo Gavazzi in so far as it relates to Case T‑453/19, Panusa v Parliament. C. The applications before the General Court 116. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the Court of Justice quashes the decision of the General Court, it may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits. 117. That applies in the cases at hand. 118. The aforesaid results in particular from the examination of the ground of appeal stating that the General Court incorrectly confirmed that the reduction in the appellants’ pensions which resulted from the decisions at issue did not breach higher-ranking principles of EU law and in particular the principle of proportionality (see points 75 to 95 above). 119. It emerged from an examination of that ground of appeal that the General Court wrongly determined that it was irrelevant that the Parliament had not assessed to what extent the application of Decision No 14/2018 might be compatible with EU law (point 89 above). Instead, it results from the Court of Justice’s case-law that the compatibility with EU law of a reduction carried out by a Member State must be assessed within the framework of a detailed analysis of the specific content of that measure as well as its system and context (points 82 and 83 above). 120. It also necessarily results from that case-law that an assessment of that kind should in each individual case be carried out with reference to the specific measure in question. 121. As explained above, Decision No 14/2018, which was implemented in the decisions at issue, has been amended at national level in the meantime, and the decisions at issue have been replaced by new decisions by the Parliament (points 35 to 41 above). An assessment of the compatibility with EU law of the decisions at issue can therefore no longer provide the appellants with any advantage. There is therefore no need to adjudicate on the applications at first instance against these decisions. 122. Instead, within the framework of the applications against the Parliament’s new decisions (point 41 above), the General Court must assess whether the Parliament carried out an adequate assessment of the compatibility with EU law of the new Italian rules implemented in those decisions before the adoption of those decisions. If that were not the case, the General Court would need to annul the relevant decisions of the Parliament. The Parliament would subsequently be able to carry out the necessary assessment and, if it were to confirm that the implementation of the national rules was compatible with EU law, adopt new decisions implementing these rules in respect of the former Members affected, which could then in turn form the subject of a review by the General Court. 123. As explained in point 41 of the present Opinion, only some of the appellants challenged the new decisions by the Parliament concerning the second recalculation of their benefits. If it resulted from the assessment of the corresponding actions that those decisions are to be annulled, the Parliament would need to assess the compatibility with EU law of the second recalculation not merely in respect of the former Members who had brought applications against that second recalculation. Instead, in keeping with Article 266 TFEU, the Parliament would need to assess whether the implementation of the new Italian rules was compatible with EU law for all of the Members affected and, where applicable, amend all of the decisions concerning them correspondingly. After all, it would be unlawful for the Parliament to continue paying former Members reduced benefits, at least as regards the future, despite the fact that the unlawfulness of the relevant reductions had been determined by the Courts of the European Union, albeit in relation to other former Members. D. Interim conclusion 124. It follows from all of the aforesaid that there is no need to adjudicate on the appellants’ applications before the General Court, with the exception of the application in Case T‑453/19. VI. Costs A. Costs of the appeal proceedings 125. Under Article 184(2) of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded or where the appeal is well founded and the Court of Justice itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. In accordance with Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to the procedure on appeal in accordance with Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 126. Since the Parliament is the unsuccessful party and the appellants, with the exception of Ms Panusa, are the successful parties, the Parliament is to bear its own costs as well as the costs of the appellants, with the exception of Ms Panusa, in the appeal proceedings, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the appellants. Ms Panusa is however to be ordered to bear her own costs as well as the costs of the Parliament in the appeal proceedings on a pro rata basis in relation to the appeal proceedings of Ms Panusa. B. Costs incurred at first instance 127. Since the judgments under appeal are to be set aside, the Court must also adjudicate on the sharing of costs for the proceedings at first instance, with the exception of the proceedings in Case T‑453/19, Panusa v Parliament, for which the decision on costs at first instance remains in place. 128. Article 149 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, which pursuant to Article 190(1) of those rules applies to the appeal proceedings, stipulates that the Court shall give a decision as to costs if it declares that the action has become devoid of purpose and that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on it. Pursuant to Article 142 of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to the appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, where a case does not proceed to judgment the costs shall be at the discretion of the Court. 129. Although the present examination has revealed that it is unnecessary to adjudicate on the cases at first instance, it has also revealed that the General Court was wrong to confirm the lawfulness of the decisions at issue even though the Parliament had not carried out any assessment of the compatibility of those decisions with EU law. In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to order the Parliament to bear its own costs as well as the costs of the appellants, with the exception of Ms Panusa, in the proceedings at first instance. VII. Conclusion 130. Based on the foregoing considerations, I propose, in respect of Case C‑725/20 P, that the Court should: (1) set aside points 2 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment by the General Court of the European Union of 15 October 2020, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament (T‑389/19 and Others, EU:T:2020:494) in so far as they concern all of the appellants listed in the annex to the present Opinion, with the exception of Ms Panusa; (2) decide that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the legal dispute underlying the applications at first instance cited in the annex to the present Opinion, with the exception of the application in Case T‑453/19; (3) dismiss the appeal in Case C‑725/20 P in so far as it concerns Ms Panusa; (4) order the Parliament to bear its own costs as well as the costs of the appellants in relation to both sets of proceedings, with the exception of the costs incurred by Ms Panusa as well as the costs incurred by the Parliament on a pro rata basis in relation to the appeal proceedings of Ms Panusa; (5) order Ms Panusa to bear her own costs in the appeal proceedings as well as the costs incurred by the Parliament on a pro rata basis in relation to the appeal proceedings of Ms Panusa. 131. In addition, I propose, in respect of Case C‑198/21 P, that the Court should: (1) set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 February 2021, Santini and Others v Parliament (T‑345/19, T‑346/19, T‑364/19 to T‑366/19, T‑372/19 to T‑375/19 and T‑385/19, EU:T:2021:78); (2) decide that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the legal dispute underlying the applications at first instance in the Cases T‑345/19, T‑346/19, T‑364/19 to T‑366/19, T‑372/19 to T‑375/19 and T‑385/19; (3) order the Parliament to bear its own costs as well as the costs of the appellants in relation to both sets of proceedings. 132. Finally, I propose, in respect of Case C‑391/21 P, that the Court should: (1) set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 5 May 2021, Falqui v Parliament (T‑695/19, EU:T:2021:242); (2) decide that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the legal dispute underlying the application at first instance in Case T‑695/19; (3) order the Parliament to bear its own costs as well as the costs of the appellant in relation to both sets of proceedings. 1 Original language: German. 2 Doc. PE 113.116/BUR./rev.XXV/01-2009. 3 OJ 2005 L 262, p. 1. 4 OJ 2009 C 159, p. 1. 5 OJ 2010 C 340, p. 6. 6 This list is annexed only to the version sent to the parties. 7 So far as can be seen, this relates to Cases T‑735/22, Falqui v Parliament, T‑751/22, Avitabile v Parliament, T‑752/22, Ceravolo v Parliament, T‑761/22, Sboarina v Parliament, T‑804/22, Gemelli v Parliament, T‑807/22, Lombardo v Parliament, T‑808/22, Mantovani v Parliament, T‑809/22, Napoletano v Parliament, T‑810/22, Nobilia v Parliament, T‑812/22, Viola v Parliament, T‑815/22, Aita v Parliament, T‑817/22, Bonsignore v Parliament, T‑818/22, Carollo v Parliament, T‑819/22, Catasta v Parliament, T‑820/22, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament, T‑821/22, Di Meo v Parliament, T‑823/22, Dupuis v Parliament, T‑824/22, Filippi v Parliament, T‑825/22, Cucurnia v Parliament, T‑826/22, Gallenzi v Parliament, and T‑375/23, Di Prinzio v Parliament. 8 See judgments of 7 June 2007, Wunenburger v Commission (C‑362/05 P, EU:C:2007:322, paragraph 42); of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 61); and of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission (C‑57/16 P, EU:C:2018:660, paragraph 43). 9 Judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 62). 10 Judgments of 6 March 1979, Simmenthal v Commission (92/78, EU:C:1979:53, paragraph 32); of 7 June 2007, Wunenburger v Commission (C‑362/05 P, EU:C:2007:322, paragraph 50); and of 6 September 2018, Bank Mellat v Council (C‑430/16 P, EU:C:2018:668, paragraph 64). 11 Judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 65). 12 Judgment of 6 September 2018, Bank Mellat v Council (C‑430/16 P, EU:C:2018:668, paragraph 65). 13 First part of the second ground of appeal in Case C‑725/20 P, second and fourth grounds of appeal in Case C‑198/21 P, and first ground of appeal in Case C‑391/21 P. 14 First part of the first ground of appeal in Case C‑725/20 P, first ground of appeal in Case C‑198/21 P, and first ground of appeal in Case C‑391/21 P. 15 Second part of the first ground of appeal in Case C‑725/20 P, third ground of appeal in Case C‑198/21 P, second and third grounds of appeal in Case C‑391/21 P. 16 Second and third parts of the second ground of appeal in Case C‑725/20 P, fifth and sixth grounds of appeal in Case C‑198/21 P. 17 Third ground of appeal in Case C‑725/20 P. 18 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 126, 136, 137, 138 and 141); in Santini (paragraphs 81, 84, 85, 86 and 89); and in Falqui (paragraphs 49, 52, 53, 54 and 57). 19 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 138, 141 and 180); in Santini (paragraphs 86 and 89); and in Falqui (paragraphs 54 and 57). 20 See judgments of 22 December 2008, Centeno Mediavilla and Others v Commission (C‑443/07 P, EU:C:2008:767, paragraphs 61 and 62 and the case-law cited), and of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament (C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraph 84). 21 Se, to that effect, judgments of 22 December 2008, Centeno Mediavilla and Others v Commission (C‑443/07 P, EU:C:2008:767, paragraph 63), and of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament (C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraph 84). See also judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament (T‑439/09, EU:T:2011:600, paragraph 44). 22 See, a contrario, judgments of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament (C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraphs 84 to 87), and of 9 March 2023, Galeote and Watson v Parliament (C‑715/21 P and C‑716/21 P, EU:C:2023:190, paragraphs 79 to 82). See also judgments of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament (T‑439/09, EU:T:2011:600, paragraph 46), and of 13 March 2013, Inglewood and Others v Parliament (T‑229/11 and T‑276/11, EU:T:2013:127, paragraph 50). 23 See judgments of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament (C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraphs 88 and 89), and of 9 March 2023, Galeote and Watson v Parliament (C‑715/21 P and C‑716/21 P, EU:C:2023:190, paragraphs 83 and 84). 24 See, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2019, Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein (C‑168/18, EU:C:2019:1128, paragraph 39). 25 See, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others (C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraphs 50 and 51). This is especially true concerning the pension scheme of Members, which pursues the goal of guaranteeing the independence, including the financial independence, of the Members as representatives of the people, who are meant to act in the general interest of the people (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2011, Purvis v Parliament, T‑439/09, EU:T:2011:600, paragraph 59). 26 C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 46 to 50. 27 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 215); in Santini (paragraphs 58, 155 and 220); and in Falqui (paragraph 45). 28 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 220), and in Santini (paragraph 164). 29 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 221), and in Santini (paragraph 165); although the General Court did not state this explicitly in the judgment in Falqui as far as can be seen, that judgment is also based on the relevant assumption. 30 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 229 to 235), and in Santini (paragraphs 173 to 179). 31 Judgment in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 239), and in Santini (paragraph 222). 32 Judgment in Falqui (paragraphs 104 to 110). 33 Judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission (C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). 34 See, to that effect, judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission (C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 88). 35 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 90), and in Santini (paragraph 71). 36 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraph 92), and in Santini (paragraph 73). 37 Judgment of 20 December 2017, EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others (C‑677/15 P, EU:C:2017:998, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). 38 See, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2013, Mindo v Commission (C‑652/11 P, EU:C:2013:229, paragraph 54). 39 See judgment of 2 December 2009, Commission v Ireland and Others (C‑89/08 P, EU:C:2009:742, paragraphs 54 to 61). 40 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 103 to 105), and in Santini (paragraphs 184 to 186). 41 Judgments in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 110 to 116), and in Santini (paragraph 188). 42 There are two exceptions to that statement: Mr Falqui, appellant in Case C‑391/21 P, and Mr Florio, applicant in Case T‑465/19, which was the subject of the judgment in Coppo Gavazzi but is no longer the subject of the present appeal proceedings, since Mr Florio is no longer a participant. Mr Falqui and Mr Florio both submitted comments to the Parliament, to which the Parliament responded with letters containing an internet link to the Legal Service’s expert opinion (see point 24 of this Opinion and paragraphs 108 and 115 of the judgment in Coppo Gavazzi). Since Mr Falqui is not however complaining of a defective statement of reasons and Mr Florio is not participating in the present appeal proceedings, it is unnecessary to answer the question of whether such a reference is sufficient to categorise a document as part of the reasoning for a decision. 43 Judgment of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France (C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 63). 44 See, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2000, Finnboard v Commission (C‑298/98 P, EU:C:2000:634, paragraph 46). 45 Judgment in Coppo Gavazzi (paragraphs 66 to 70). 46 See judgment of 9 June 2016, Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission (C‑617/13 P, EU:C:2016:416, paragraphs 58 and 59 and the case-law cited).