Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:24
Date: 2025-01-16
Language of the case: French
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Summary C-600/23 – 1 
Case C-600/23 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling under Article 98(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
2 October 2023 
Referring court: 
Cour de cassation (Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
8 September 2023 
Applicant, appellant and appellant in the appeal on a point of law: 
Royal Football Club Seraing 
Defendants, respondents and respondents in the appeal on a point of law: 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association (UEFA) 
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football-Association 
(URBSFA) ASBL 
Other party: 
Doyen Sports Investment Limited (party served notice that it is a 
third party to the proceedings) 
  
I. Subject matter of the main proceedings 
1 The case in the main proceedings concerns an action brought by Royal Football 
Club Seraing against the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA), the Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association (UEFA) and 
the Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football-Association (Royal Belgian 
Football Association; ‘the URBSFA’) seeking, in essence, a declaration that 
FIFA’s rules providing for a prohibition of the third-party ownership of players’ 
economic rights (practices known as ‘third-party ownership’ or ‘third-party 
investment’) are unlawful under EU law. That action also seeks damages to 
EN 
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compensate for the harm allegedly suffered by Royal Football Club Seraing as a 
result of the application of that prohibition. At the same time, the FIFA 
Disciplinary Committee imposed on Royal Football Club Seraing disciplinary 
measures which were confirmed by an award of the Tribunal Arbitral du Sport 
(Court of Arbitration for Sport, Switzerland), which was upheld by the Tribunal 
fédérale (Federal Tribunal, Switzerland). 
II. Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
2 The Cour de cassation de Belgique (Court of Cassation, Belgium) considers that, 
in order to be able to rule on the case in the main proceedings, it must refer to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, questions 
on the interpretation of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in order to determine whether those 
provisions preclude an arbitral award from being given the force of res judicata 
and probative value vis-à-vis third parties, where the review of conformity with 
EU law has been carried out by a court of a State which is not a Member of the 
European Union. 
III. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
1. Does Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction 
with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
preclude the application of provisions of national law such as Article 24 and 
Article 171[3](9) of the Code judiciaire (Belgian Judicial Code), laying 
down the principle of res judicata, to an arbitral award the conformity of 
which with EU law has been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a 
Member State of the European Union, which is not permitted to refer a 
question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary 
ruling? 
2. Does Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction 
with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
preclude the application of a rule of national law according probative value 
vis-à-vis third parties, subject to evidence to the contrary which it is for them 
to adduce, to an arbitral award the conformity of which with EU law has 
been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a Member State of the 
European Union, which is not permitted to refer a question to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling? 
IV. Main provisions of national law relied on 
3 The provisions of national law relied on are inter alia the following. 
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A. Loi du 16 juillet 2004 portant le Code de droit international privé (Law of 
16 July 2004 on the Code of Private International Law) 
– Article 22(1) 
‘A foreign judicial decision that is enforceable in the State in which it was 
delivered shall be declared enforceable in Belgium, in whole or in part, in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 23.’  
– Article 26: 
‘Probative value of foreign judicial decisions 
§ 1. A foreign judicial decision shall be authentic in Belgium in respect of the 
findings made by the court if it satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its 
authenticity under the law of the State in which it was delivered. The findings of 
the foreign court shall be set aside in so far as they produce an effect which is 
manifestly incompatible with public policy. 
§ 2. Evidence in rebuttal of the facts found by the foreign court may be adduced 
by any legal means.’ 
B. Code judiciaire (Judicial Code) 
– Article 24: 
‘Every final decision shall, from the time of its delivery, have the force of res 
judicata.’  
– Article 28: 
‘Every decision shall have the force of res judicata as soon as it is no longer open 
to objection or appeal, save as otherwise provided by law and without prejudice to 
the effects of extraordinary appeals.’  
– Article 1713(9): 
‘An award shall have the same effect in relations between the parties as a decision 
of a court or tribunal.’ 
V. Succinct presentation of the facts and the procedure in the main 
proceedings 
4 The first defendant, respondent and respondent in the appeal on a point of law 
(‘defendant’), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), is a 
non-profit association governed by Swiss law whose registered office is in Zurich, 
Switzerland. It is a grouping of national associations responsible for the 
organisation and control of football in their respective countries. 
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5 According to its statutes, it has regulatory powers which enable it to lay down 
rules which are binding both on its members and, directly or through the 
intermediary of those associations, on clubs in each country and on the players 
registered with those clubs. 
6 The objective of those rules must be to promote integrity, ethics and fair play, and 
to prevent methods and practices such as corruption, doping or manipulating 
matches from jeopardising their integrity and that of competitions, official players 
and clubs, or from giving rise to abuse. 
7 The second defendant, Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association 
(UEFA), is a non-profit association governed by Swiss law whose registered 
office is in Nyon, Switzerland and which brings together the national associations 
of the continent of Europe. 
8 According to its statutes, its objectives are inter alia to promote football in Europe 
in a spirit of ‘fair play’, to monitor and control the development of every type of 
football in Europe, to organise and conduct international competitions by setting 
the criteria to be met in order to participate, to ‘prevent all methods or practices 
which might jeopardise the regularity of matches or competitions or give rise to 
the abuse of football’ and to ‘seek to achieve its objectives by implementing any 
measures it deems appropriate, such as setting down rules, entering into 
agreements or conventions, taking decisions or adopting programmes’ (Article 2 
of its statutes). 
9 The third defendant, the Royal Belgian Football Association (URBSFA), whose 
registered office is in Brussels, Belgium, is a de facto Belgian association 
recognised as a public service body. It manages the first two divisions of 
professional football and amateur football in Belgium, together with other 
associations. Its full members include football clubs. It is the Belgian national 
association which is a member of the first two defendants. It is required to comply 
with and ensure that the Belgian clubs comply with the statutes, regulations and 
decisions of FIFA and UEFA, subject to general principles of law, public policy 
provisions and relevant national, regional and Community legislation. In addition, 
its statutes confer on it regulatory, executive, sporting, disciplinary and 
jurisdictional powers over Belgian clubs. 
10 The party served notice that it is a third party to the proceedings, Doyen Sports 
Investment Limited, is a private company incorporated under Maltese law whose 
registered office is in Sliema, Malta. It focuses its commercial activity on 
providing financial assistance to football clubs in Europe. According to its articles 
of association, its aims are inter alia (a) the purchase of football players, (b) 
coaches and managers; (c) the representation of football players, coaches and 
managers; (d) the transfer of players, coaches and managers between different 
clubs; (e) the representation of clubs; (f) profiting from football clubs or playing 
an active role in their day-to-day management, provided that they comply with 
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FIFA regulations and any other relevant national or international regulations, and 
(g) granting loans to football clubs. 
11 The applicant, appellant and appellant in the appeal on a point of law (‘the 
applicant’), Royal Football Club Seraing, whose registered office is in Seraing, 
Belgium, is a non-profit association governed by Belgian law which runs the 
Seraing football club, which is affiliated with the URBSFA. During the 2013-
2014 season, the club was taken over by new management with ‘the ambition of 
returning the club … to the Belgian or even the international elite’. It ‘is still 
evolving for the time being in Amateur Division 1, thus on the cusp of professional 
football which it legitimately aspires to reach as soon as possible, which involves 
being able to strengthen its position in sporting and financial terms’. 
12 FIFA has adopted ‘Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players’ (‘the STP 
Regulations’), which lay down global and binding rules concerning the status of 
players and their eligibility to participate in organised football. Some of the 
provisions of those regulations are directly binding at national level and must be 
included without modification in the regulations of national associations. Others 
must be included by each association in its own regulations. 
13 On 26 September 2014, a FIFA press release announced that, ‘in order to protect 
the integrity of the game and the players, the Executive Committee took the 
decision of general principle that third-party ownership of players’ economic 
rights (TPO) shall be banned with a transitional period’. 
14 By a circular dated 22 December 2014 addressed to its members, FIFA informed 
the national associations, and therefore the URBSFA, that, at its meeting on 18 
and 19 December 2014, its Executive Committee had approved ‘new provisions to 
be included in the [STP] Regulations concerning the third-party ownership of 
players’ economic rights and third-party influence on clubs’, with the clarification 
that they would enter into force on 1 January 2015 and that they must be included 
in the list of binding provisions at national level. 
15 The new Article 18bis of the STP Regulations (‘Third-party influence on clubs’) 
has provided, since 1 January 2015: 
‘1. No club shall enter into a contract which enables the counter 
club/counter clubs and vice versa, or any third party to acquire the ability to 
influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its 
policies or the performance of its teams. 
2. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures 
on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.’ 
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16 Article 18ter (‘Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights’) of the same 
regulation has provided, since 1 January 2015: 
‘1. No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party 
whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, 
in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from 
one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future 
transfer or transfer compensation. 
2. The interdiction as per paragraph 1 comes into force on 1 May 2015. 
3. Agreements covered by paragraph 1 which predate 1 May 2015 may 
continue to be in place until their contractual expiration. However, their 
duration may not be extended. 
4. The validity of any agreement covered by paragraph 1 signed between 
1 January 2015 and 30 April 2015 may not have a contractual duration of 
more than one year beyond the effective date. 
5. By the end of April 2015, all existing agreements covered by 
paragraph 1 need to be recorded within the Transfer Matching System 
(TMS). All clubs that have signed such agreements are required to upload 
them in their entirety, including possible annexes or amendments, in TMS, 
specifying the details of the third party concerned, the full name of the 
player as well as the duration of the agreement. 
6. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures 
on clubs or players that do not observe the obligations set out in this 
article’. 
17 Thus, under Article 18ter, (i) the conclusion of new agreements contrary to that 
provision is totally prohibited as from 1 May 2015; (ii) contracts may still be 
entered into and come into force between 1 January and 30 April 2015 but they 
remain valid for only one year from their date of signature; (iii) contracts entered 
into and which came into force before 1 January 2015 remain in force until the 
date of their contractual expiry but may not be extended beyond that date. 
18 A third party, within the meaning of those provisions, is any ‘party other than the 
player being transferred, the two clubs transferring the player from one to the 
other, or any previous club, with which the player has been registered’ (STP 
Regulations, Definitions, point 14). 
19 On 30 January 2015, the applicant entered into an agreement with Doyen Sports, 
the contractual term of which was set at 1 July 2018. That agreement made 
provision for the conclusion of future specific financing agreements for any player 
of the applicant chosen by mutual agreement between the two parties and 
governed the transfer of the economic rights of three named players; under that 
agreement, Doyen Sports became the owner of 30% of ‘the financial value 
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deriving from the federative rights’ of those players, the applicant being 
prohibited from transferring its share in the economic rights of those players 
‘independently and autonomously’ to a third party. 
20 On 3 April 2015, Doyen Sports, inter alia, brought proceedings against the three 
defendants before the tribunal de commerce francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels 
Commercial Court (French-speaking), Belgium); on 8 July 2015, the applicant 
intervened voluntarily in the proceedings. 
21 The applicant requested inter alia that the court declare that a total prohibition of 
the practices excluded by Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations (known 
as third-party ownership or third-party investment) is unlawful under EU law and 
more specifically the right to the free movement of capital, the right to the 
freedom to provide services, the right to the free movement of workers and 
competition law; to declare as null and void any regulation containing such a total 
prohibition; to order UEFA to amend its ‘Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations’ so as to make them compatible with the practice of third-party 
ownership or third-party investment, and to pay it, under Article 1832 of the 
former Code civil (Belgian Civil Code), in accordance with which any act of an 
individual causing damage to another obliges the one whose misconduct has 
caused it to make good the damage, the provisional sum of EUR 500 000 by way 
of compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the application of 
Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations. 
22 On 7 July 2015, the applicant and Doyen Sports entered into an agreement, which 
was similar to the agreement of 30 January 2015, to transfer 25% of the economic 
rights of a new named player. 
23 On 4 September 2015, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee found the applicant 
guilty of infringement of the abovementioned Articles 18bis and 18ter for having 
entered into those agreements; it prohibited it from registering players for four 
registration periods and ordered it to pay a fine of 150 000 Swiss francs. 
24 On 7 January 2016, the FIFA Appeal Committee dismissed the applicant’s appeal 
against that decision. 
25 On 9 March 2016, the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision of 
7 January 2016 before the Swiss Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance 
with an arbitration clause in FIFA’s statutes. 
26 By judgment of 17 November 2016, the Brussels Commercial Court (French-
speaking) declined jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s claims. 
27 On 19 December 2016, the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. 
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28 In an award dated 9 March 2017, the arbitration tribunal held that the applicable 
law was constituted by 
– FIFA Regulations and Swiss law, including the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the 
ECHR’); 
– EU law, in particular the provisions of the Treaties on freedom of 
movement and competition, as mandatory provisions of foreign law 
within the meaning of Article 19 of the loi fédérale sur le droit 
international privé (Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law) 
of 18 December 1987. 
29 It concluded that Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations were lawful, 
reduced the prohibition on registering players to three periods and upheld the fine. 
30 On 15 May 2017, the applicant filed an application for annulment of the award of 
9 March 2017 before the Swiss Federal Tribunal. That court dismissed that 
application by judgment of 20 February 2018. 
31 Before the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of Appeal, Belgium), the 
applicant sought to establish the liability of the three defendants on the basis of 
Article 1382 et seq. of the Civil Code. It claimed that the three defendants 
infringed EU law by preventing it from entering into ‘third-party investment’ or 
‘third-party ownership’ agreements, that that infringement of EU law deprived it 
of a means of financing or development and that the disciplinary measures had 
had detrimental consequences. 
32 As it was unable to strengthen the core of the team by recruiting new players, the 
sporting progression of the team had been hindered. The club had also been 
prevented for three consecutive periods from registering new young people or 
from extending the registration of young people already at the club, which had 
resulted in the deregistration and forfeiture of about 10 teams, all of which 
resulted in a loss of income from the membership fees paid by new entrants and 
the admission fees received during the matches played at the club. 
33 The applicant requested that the Court of Appeal declare that Articles 18bis and 
18ter of the STP Regulations are unlawful inasmuch as they infringe EU law and 
the ECHR, which, in its view, gives rise to liability on the part of FIFA. 
34 It put forward 13 grounds of appeal: 
(1) infringement of the right to the free movement of capital; 
(2) infringement of the right to the freedom to provide services; 
(3) infringement of the right to the free movement of workers; 
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(4) infringement of Article 102 TFEU; 
(5) infringement of Article 101 TFEU; 
(5) infringement of the right to property as guaranteed by the ECHR; 
(7) unlawfulness of UEFA’s ‘Financial Fair Play’ Regulations having 
regard to EU law (Articles 63, 101 and 102 TFEU); 
(8) unlawfulness of the disciplinary measures in the light of the 
‘fundamental freedoms of the European Union’; 
(9) unlawfulness of the disciplinary measures in the light of the principle 
of proportionality; 
(10) unlawfulness of the disciplinary measures in the light of the principle 
that penalties must be specific to the offender; 
(11) the Court of Arbitration for Sport does not meet the requirements of 
independence and impartiality laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 of the ECHR; 
(12) the imposition of such compulsory arbitration has increased the 
effectiveness of infringements of the fundamental freedoms of the European 
Union and, more broadly, has deprived those parties of the EU rights 
guaranteed to them; 
(13) the lack of exequatur of the award of 9 March 2017 of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport. 
35 As the Court of Appeal noted, the applicant thus submits that Articles 18bis and 
18ter of the STP Regulations infringe several provisions of the FEU Treaty and 
the ECHR. The first, second, third and fourth grounds of appeal concern the 
infringement of fundamental freedoms. The fourth and fifth grounds of appeal 
concern competition law. The sixth ground of appeal relates to the right to 
property as guaranteed by the ECHR. The eighth ground of appeal concerns the 
lawfulness of the disciplinary measures. The ninth to thirteenth grounds of appeal 
concern the lawfulness (i) of the disciplinary measures imposed on it by FIFA and 
(ii) of the award in the light of EU law. 
36 As regards the freedoms guaranteed by the European Union, the applicant claimed 
inter alia that the prohibition at issue was liable to hinder the free movement of 
capital since, as in the present case, it prevents a Maltese third-party owner from 
investing in a Belgian club. That prohibition restricts the free movement of 
services since the deflationary effect it generates on ‘player’ costs (wages, 
transfers, etc.) leads to a reduction in the volume of services. It submits that the 
prohibition of third-party ownership will limit the opportunities available to 
certain European citizens (professional football players whose international 
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transfer would have been possible by a ‘third-party ownership’ contribution) to 
leave their Member State of origin in order to find employment at a club 
established in another Member State. It considers that those restrictions on the free 
movement of capital, services and workers cannot in any way be justified by an 
overriding reason in the public interest. 
37 As regards competition law, it claims, with regard to Article 102 TFEU, that, 
since FIFA has given itself the exclusive power to regulate the transfer market 
(and then to extend its regulatory activity to third parties present on that market), 
it is indisputable that it holds a dominant position on that market. The abuse 
consists in the complete exclusion of all current and potential operators which are 
not clubs from the market concerned, in order to reserve that market for its 
ultimate members, the clubs. 
38 As regards Article 101 TFEU, it considers that Articles 18bis and 18ter, which 
may be regarded as the product of an agreement between the members of FIFA, 
with the participation of UEFA, give rise to restrictions of competition. 
Restrictions on the freedom to invest limit the freedom to finance clubs and strike 
at the heart of the competitive process: clubs are restricted in defining their 
recruitment policy. It is the consumers of the ‘football’ product who will suffer 
from receiving a lower quality product. 
39 FIFA, which must prove that the total prohibition of the practice of third-party 
ownership or third-party investment is justified and proportionate to the 
attainment of its legitimate objectives, has not provided such proof. 
40 As regards the lawfulness of the disciplinary measures, the applicant submits that 
any measure based on a rule that infringes the freedoms of the European Union 
itself infringes those freedoms. 
41 FIFA contested all the grounds of appeal put forward by the applicant and 
submitted inter alia that the positive effect of the force of res judicata attaching to 
the award of 9 March 2017 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport precluded a 
challenge to the lawfulness of the prohibition of third-party ownership in those 
proceedings. 
42 The Brussels Court of Appeal held, with regard to the first to sixth and the eighth 
grounds of appeal, that it follows from Article 1713(9) of the Judicial Code, and 
Articles 24 and 28 of that code, that an arbitral award has the force of res judicata 
from the date on which it is delivered without the need for a prior exequatur 
procedure, subject to annulment by the national court. In the present case, the 
award is final and acquired the force of res judicata following the dismissal of the 
action for annulment by the Swiss Federal Tribunal on 20 February 2018. The 
award settles the question in dispute as to the compatibility of Articles 18bis and 
18ter of the STP Regulations with EU law, raised using identical wording before 
the Court of Appeal in the civil liability action. 
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43 As regards the ninth to thirteenth grounds of appeal, the Court of Appeal held that 
the applicant was unsuccessful in challenging the validity of the disciplinary 
measures imposed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport and of the award. The 
jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport has not been challenged by any of 
the parties. Consequently, the plea of illegality of the disciplinary measures 
inferred from the forced nature of the arbitration is unfounded. Next, according to 
the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal is not a court or 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU and cannot therefore refer 
questions to it for a preliminary ruling. 
44 It considered that the fact that it is impossible for an arbitral tribunal, whether 
Belgian or foreign, to refer a matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling, which has its origin in Article 267 TFEU as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice, does not in itself have the effect of invalidating the decisions of that 
tribunal in the light of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
45 It recalled that, in a judgment of 20 February 2018 which contained a detailed 
statement of reasons, the Swiss Federal Tribunal had confirmed its previous case-
law and held that the Court of Arbitration for Sport is a genuine independent and 
impartial arbitral tribunal and that it had no reason to go back on firmly 
established case-law. 
46 Under Article 22(1) of the Belgian Code of Private International Law, any foreign 
judgment is recognised by operation of law in Belgium without any procedure. 
The effect of that recognition is that the force of res judicata in respect of the 
foreign decision is accepted in Belgium. The positive effect of the force of res 
judicata attaching to the judgment of 20 February 2018 of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal prevents the applicant from being able to challenge before the Court of 
Appeal the independent and impartial nature of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
and the validity of the award, in particular in the light of the principle of 
proportionality. 
47 Lastly, exequatur concerns only the enforcement of the decision, that is to say 
forced execution. An arbitral award is not invalidated merely because it has not 
been the subject of an exequatur. Consequently, the plea of illegality of the 
disciplinary measures inferred from the lack of exequatur of the award is 
unfounded (thirteenth ground of appeal). 
48 The disciplinary measures imposed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport pursuant 
to Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations are imposed on the applicant 
and not on third parties, who remain free to play football. Those measures are 
therefore not unlawful in the light of the principle that penalties must be specific 
to the offender (tenth ground of appeal). 
49 The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the grounds of appeal alleging 
infringement of EU law and of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR were 
inadmissible or unfounded. The misconduct alleged against FIFA has therefore 
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not been established. Consequently, the applicant’s claim for damages is 
unfounded. 
50 By judgment delivered on 12 December 2019, the Brussels Court of Appeal 
therefore dismissed the appeal brought by the applicant against the judgment of 
17 November 2016 and held that the claims put forward by the applicant were 
unfounded. 
51 The applicant lodged an appeal on a point of law against that judgment. 
VI. The essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings 
52 The applicant puts forward three grounds of appeal before the Court of Cassation. 
A. First ground of appeal 
53 By its first ground of appeal, alleging the forced nature of the arbitration, it claims 
that the following provisions were infringed: 
– Article 19(1) TEU; 
– Articles 18, 45, 56, 63, 101, 102, 267 and 344 TFEU; 
– Articles 15, 16 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union; 
– Articles 1, 2(1), 4 and 5 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union; 
– principle of effectiveness of EU law; 
– principle of the primacy of EU law over national provisions, deriving 
in particular from Article 4 TEU and Article 288 TFEU; 
– Articles 23 to 28 and 1713(9) of the Judicial Code; 
– Articles 22 to 27 of the Law of 16 July 2004 on the Code of Private 
International Law; 
– Articles 1383 and 1384 of the Civil Code; 
– Article 149 of the Constitution. 
54 By the first part. the applicant claims that it had argued before the Court of Appeal 
that the compulsory arbitration before the Court of Arbitration for Sport imposed 
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on it unilaterally increases the infringement of the fundamental freedoms of the 
European Union and more broadly deprives it of the European rights guaranteed 
to it. 
55 In Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, the European 
Commission decided, with regard to the arbitration clauses in favour of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport imposed by the statutes of the International Skating 
Union, that ‘(57) The Appeals Arbitration rules are contained in Article 25 of the 
ISU Constitution, and read as follows: … Decisions of the CAS shall be final and 
binding to the exclusion of jurisdiction of any civil court’. (58) …. The Appeals 
Arbitration rules reinforce the restrictions of competition …. The Commission 
takes the view that the Appeals Arbitration rules reinforce the restrictions of 
competition that are caused by the Eligibility rules. … In combination with the 
Eligibility rules, the Appeals Arbitration rules reinforce the restriction of their 
commercial freedom and the foreclosure of [the International Skating Union’s] 
potential competitors’. 
56 The applicant also submitted that, in its judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea 
(C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158), the Court of Justice reaffirmed that the arbitration 
institution was subject to genuine judicial review, from the moment when 
fundamental provisions of EU law are at stake, and inferred from that, in essence, 
that a Member State is in breach of its obligation to ensure the full effectiveness of 
EU law and its autonomy when it consents to submit to certain types of 
arbitration. Even in the case of ‘commercial arbitration’, resulting from the freely 
expressed wishes of the parties, it is essential that there is judicial review with the 
possibility of referring questions for a preliminary ruling to ensure consistency 
with the public policy of the European Union. Just as much as (if not more than) 
arbitration imposed by two Member States under a bilateral treaty, the 
requirement in FIFA’s statutes to have recourse to arbitration by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport prevents the full effectiveness of EU law and undermines the 
autonomy of that law, in particular by preventing questions from being referred to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 
57 By no means, it submits, does the judgment under appeal respond to that ground 
of appeal that the compulsory arbitration before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
combined with the extremely marginal nature of the review of legality carried out 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, precludes the proper application of EU law. It is 
therefore not properly reasoned (Article 149 of the Constitution). 
58 By the second part of the first ground of appeal, the applicant complains that the 
judgment under appeal refrains from examining whether the award by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport of 9 March 2017, which it recognises as having the force of 
res judicata, complies with the fundamental provisions of EU law even though 
that award has not been the subject of a review of compliance with EU law. 
59 By virtue of the principle enshrined in Article 344 TFEU, Member States – 
including Belgium – cannot allow a dispute concerning the application or 
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interpretation of the Treaties to be submitted to any method of settlement other 
than those provided for therein (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, 
EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 31). Furthermore, EU law ‘is characterised by the fact 
that it stems from an independent source of law, the Treaties, by its primacy over 
the laws of the Member States, and by the direct effect of a whole series of 
provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States 
themselves …. In order to ensure that the specific characteristics and the 
autonomy of the EU legal order are preserved, the Treaties have established a 
judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law’ (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, 
paragraphs 33 and 35). 
60 In accordance with Article 19(1) TEU, it is for the national courts and tribunals 
and the Court of Justice to ensure the full application of EU law in all Member 
States. In particular, the judicial system as thus conceived has as its keystone the 
preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 
6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraphs 36 and 37). 
61 Although the rules implementing the principle of res judicata are a matter for the 
national legal order of the Member States, in accordance with the principle of the 
procedural autonomy of those States, ‘those rules must not be less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence); nor may they 
be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively 
difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community law (principle of 
effectiveness)’ (judgment of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, 
EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 24). 
62 Where, as a result of the wishes of the parties concerned, their dispute is settled by 
a decision given by an arbitral tribunal which cannot be regarded as a ‘court or 
tribunal of a Member State’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU and which is 
therefore not entitled to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling, the review carried out by the courts of a Member State may be limited in 
scope, that is only ‘provided that the fundamental provisions of EU law can be 
examined in the course of that review and, if necessary, be the subject of a 
reference … for a preliminary ruling’ (judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, 
C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraphs 54 and 55). That review of fundamental 
provisions of EU law, and in particular those of European public policy, is all the 
more essential where arbitration is ‘forced’ by the statutes of an association such 
as FIFA. 
63 Articles 23 to 28 of the Judicial Code and Articles 22 to 29 of the Code of Private 
International Law cannot prevent the points decided, in other proceedings, by an 
arbitral tribunal on an interpretation of the public policy rules of EU law relating 
in particular to the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU and Article 15 of 
the Charter), the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU and Article 16 of 
the Charter), the free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU) and competition law 
(Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) from being called into question before the courts of 
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a Member State. An application of the principle of res judicata prohibiting the 
Belgian courts from ascertaining whether or not the arbitral award of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, as reviewed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, infringes 
fundamental provisions of EU law and, in order to do so, from referring questions 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling if necessary, would, in the matter 
referred to above, create obstacles to the effective application of the rules of EU 
law which cannot be justified by the principle of legal certainty and must therefore 
be considered to be contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law (judgment 
of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub, C-2/08, EU:C:2009:506, 
paragraphs 30 and 31). 
64 Moreover, it follows from Article 1, Article 2(1) and Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 
2014/104/EU that EU law ensures that the right of anyone who has suffered harm 
caused by an infringement of competition law (thus of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU) to claim and obtain full compensation for that harm can be effectively 
exercised and that, in accordance with the principle of effectiveness, national 
substantive and procedural rules must be applied in such a way that they do not 
render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of that right. 
65 Similarly, under Article 47 of the Charter, everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective 
remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by 
law. 
66 It follows that, in holding that the grounds of appeal alleging infringement by 
FIFA of EU law and of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR are inadmissible or 
unfounded, without examining whether the award complies with the fundamental 
provisions of EU law which the applicant maintains have been infringed and in 
respect of which it may claim compensation for the damage resulting from that 
infringement, the judgment under appeal infringes all of the provisions referred to 
in the ground of appeal, with the exception of Article 149 of the Constitution 
(obligation to state reasons). 
B. Second ground of appeal 
67 By its second ground of appeal, alleging that the judgment under appeal 
incorrectly rejected the applicant’s claim for damages against UEFA, the applicant 
alleges infringement of the following provisions: 
– Article 149 of the Constitution; 
– Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; 
– Articles 1(1), 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of 
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the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union; 
– Articles 1382, 1383 and 1384 of the Civil Code. 
68 By the first part, the applicant submitted that UEFA had actively campaigned for a 
prohibition of third-party ownership or third-party investment agreements. By 
application of the theory of equivalence of conditions, UEFA must therefore be 
regarded as having itself, at least indirectly, contributed to the various instances of 
harm suffered by the applicant and, consequently, must be held liable to pay 
compensation to the applicant. In the light of Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/104, 
as it is thus one of the ‘undertakings which have infringed competition law 
through joint behaviour’, UEFA must be held jointly and severally liable for the 
harm caused by those infringements and accordingly it is bound to pay 
compensation for that harm in full. 
69 By the second part, the applicant submitted that the judgment under appeal had 
found that FIFA ‘is a non-profit association governed by Swiss private law which 
is a grouping of national associations responsible for the organisation and 
control of football in their respective territories’ and that UEFA ‘is a non-profit 
association which brings together the national associations of the continent of 
Europe’. In conclusion, the applicant submitted that UEFA is a confederation of 
associations which is itself a member of FIFA. UEFA has disputed that claim. 
70 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU produce direct legal effects in relations between 
individuals and directly create rights for individuals which national courts must 
protect (judgments of the Court of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions 
and Others, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 24, and of 5 June 2014, Kone 
and Others, C-557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 20). The full effectiveness of 
those provisions and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibitions laid 
down therein would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim 
damages for loss caused to him or her by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition (judgment of the Court of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial 
Solutions and Others, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 2[5]). That right to 
full compensation is borne out by Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Directive 2014/104/EU. 
71 For the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU, the applicant claimed that every 
decision of an association of associations of undertakings is binding on its 
members, who are obliged to comply with it and ensure that it is complied with, 
with the result that they, like the association of associations of undertakings within 
which the decision is taken, are co-authors of that decision (judgment of the 
General Court of 26 January 2005, Piau v Commission, T-193/02, EU:T:2005:22, 
paragraph 75). It is not necessary that the members of the association should have 
actually participated in the infringement, but only that the association must, by 
virtue of its internal rules, have been able to bind its members (judgment of the 
Court of 16 November 2000, Finnboard v Commission, C-298/98 P, 
EU:C:2000:634). 
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72 For the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU, the applicant submitted that the 
rules laid down by FIFA prohibiting ‘third-party ownership’ or ‘third-party 
investment’ agreements may also be regarded as constituting a collective abuse of 
a dominant position, within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, in which both 
FIFA and UEFA, to the extent of its statutory involvement within FIFA, 
participate, since the national federations or federations which bring clubs 
together present themselves as a collective entity vis-à-vis economic operators and 
consumers. 
73 Under Article 102 TFEU and Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/104, participation in 
a collective abuse of a dominant position, thus ‘joint behaviour’, may result from 
a ‘passive contribution’ and even from ‘tacit approval of the behaviour’, without 
there being any need for the undertaking to have its own power to take decisions, 
intervene or impose penalties as regards the implementation of the abuse of a 
dominant position. 
74 It follows, according to the applicant, that the exclusion of any liability on the part 
of UEFA for the damage resulting from the application of the prohibition of 
‘third-party ownership’ or ‘third-party investment’ is not legally justified. 
C. Third ground of appeal 
75 By its third ground of appeal, the applicant complains that the judgment under 
appeal dismissed its action against the URBSFA by incorrectly holding that the 
probative force of res judicata attaching to the award of 9 March 2017 of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport placed on it the burden of proving that 
Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations are incompatible with EU law, 
evidence which it failed to adduce. 
76 The applicant alleges infringement of the following provisions: 
– Article 149 of the Constitution; 
– Article 19(1) TEU; 
– Articles 18, 45, 56, 63, 101, 102, 267 and 344 TFEU; 
– Articles 15, 16 and 47 of the Charter; 
– Articles 1(2)(1), 4 and 5 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union; 
– principle of effectiveness of EU law; 
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– principle of the primacy of EU law over national provisions deriving in 
particular from Article 4 TEU and Article 288 TFEU; 
– Articles 23 to 28, 870 and 1713(9) of the Judicial Code; 
– Articles 1165, 1315, 1350(3), 1352, 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code. 
77 The applicant submits that, where a restriction on the free movement of capital, 
guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, is established, which may result from a cartel, an 
agreement or a decision prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, it is for the party 
responsible for that restriction to establish that it is justified by legitimate 
objectives and proportionate to the attainment of those objectives. 
78 Although an arbitral award which has the force of res judicata between the parties 
has probative value vis-à-vis third parties who were not parties to the case and 
may be relied on by them, the probative value resulting from those provisions 
cannot, however, undermine the effectiveness of provisions of EU law. 
79 According to the applicant, it follows that those provisions cannot result in the 
burden being placed on the party adversely affected by a restriction on the free 
movement of capital resulting from a FIFA decision to establish that that 
restriction is not justified by legitimate objectives or proportionate to those 
objectives, on account of the probative value attached to a decision of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport the annulment of which has been rejected by the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, that is to say, a court which – unlike the Belgian courts – is not 
required to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. 
80 Such an application of those provisions, which would attach probative value to the 
decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as to the compatibility of 
Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations with the free movement of 
capital, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of workers and 
with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, would have the consequence that, before the 
Belgian courts, which can – and must – refer questions on the interpretation of EU 
law to the Court of Justice, the burden of proving that the measure does not have a 
legitimate objective or that it is not proportionate to the objective attained lies 
with the person adversely affected by those restrictions. That would constitute a 
considerable obstacle to the effective application of the relevant EU rules and 
must therefore be regarded as contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law. 
81 By refusing to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the 
judgment under appeal infringes all of the provisions referred to in the ground of 
appeal. 
82 The defendants put forward pleas of inadmissibility against all of those grounds of 
appeal. 
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VII. Findings of the Court of Cassation and reasons for the request for a 
preliminary ruling 
A. The first ground of appeal 
83 The Court of Cassation considers that, in the first part of the first ground of 
appeal, the plea of illegality of the disciplinary measures based on the forced 
nature of the arbitration is unfounded since the Court of Appeal responded to it by 
finding that the applicant had confirmed the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport after the dispute had arisen and that the jurisdiction of that 
court has not been challenged by any of the parties. 
84 As regards the second part, the Court of Cassation holds that the plea of 
inadmissibility cannot be upheld. The judgment under appeal bases its decision to 
dismiss the applicant’s claim against FIFA not on the ground that the applicant 
has not adduced evidence of its complaints based on EU law, but on the ground 
that the fact that the award of 9 March 2017 has the force of res judicata precludes 
the Court of Appeal from re-examining the question of the compatibility of 
Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations with EU law. 
85 According to Article 19(1) TEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union is to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed; Member States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective 
legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. 
86 In accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal. 
87 Directive 2014/104/EU provides: 
– in Article 1(1), that that directive sets out certain rules necessary to ensure 
that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law 
by an undertaking or by an association of undertakings can effectively exercise the 
right to claim full compensation for that harm from that undertaking or 
association; it sets out rules fostering undistorted competition in the internal 
market and removing obstacles to its proper functioning, by ensuring equivalent 
protection throughout the Union for anyone who has suffered such harm; 
– in Article 2(1), that, for the purposes of that directive, ‘infringement of 
competition law’ means an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, or of 
national competition law; 
– in Article 4, that, in accordance with the principle of effectiveness, Member 
States are to ensure that all national rules and procedures relating to the exercise 
of claims for damages are designed and applied in such a way that they do not 
render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the Union 
right to full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law 
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and that, in accordance with the principle of equivalence, national rules and 
procedures relating to actions for damages resulting from infringements of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU are not to be less favourable to the alleged injured 
parties than those governing similar actions for damages resulting from 
infringements of national law. 
88 In its judgment of 23 March 1982, Nordsee (102/81, EU:C:1982:107), the Court 
of Justice recalls that Community law must be observed in its entirety throughout 
the territory of all the Member States, parties to a contract are not therefore free to 
create exceptions to it, and draws attention to the fact that, if questions of 
Community law are raised in an arbitration resorted to by agreement, the ordinary 
courts may be called upon to examine them either in the context of their 
collaboration with arbitration tribunals, in particular in order to assist them in 
certain procedural matters or to interpret the law applicable, or in the course of 
review of an arbitration award – which may be more or less extensive depending 
on the circumstances – and which they may be required to effect in case of an 
appeal or objection, in proceedings for leave to issue execution or by another 
method of recourse available under the relevant national legislation. 
89 In its judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158), the Court 
of Justice states that, in order to ensure that the specific characteristics and the 
autonomy of the EU legal order are preserved, the Treaties have established a 
judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law; that, in that context, in accordance with Article 19 TEU, it is for the 
national courts and tribunals and the Court of Justice to ensure the full application 
of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of the rights of 
individuals under that law, and that, in particular, the judicial system as thus 
conceived has as its keystone the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in 
Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, 
specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States, has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law, 
thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well 
as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties. 
90 In its judgment of 7 April 2022, Avio Lucos (C-116/20, EU:C:2022:273), the 
Court of Justice held, first, that, in order to ensure stability of the law and legal 
relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial 
decisions which have become final after all rights of appeal have been exhausted 
or after expiry of the time limits provided for in that regard can no longer be 
called into question. Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to 
disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring the authority of res judicata on a 
judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation 
which is incompatible with EU law. Second, the rules implementing the principle 
of res judicata are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance with the 
principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. Those rules must not, 
however, be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (the 
principle of equivalence) nor may they be framed in such a way as to make it in 
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practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by the 
EU legal order (the principle of effectiveness). 
91 After having found that, ‘under Article 1713(9) of the Judicial Code, “an award 
shall have the same effect in relations between the parties as a decision of a 
court”’ and that, ‘under Articles 24 and 28 of the Judicial Code, every final 
decision, from the time of its delivery, is to have the force of res judicata … and 
every decision is to have the force of res judicata as soon as it is no longer open to 
objection or appeal, save as otherwise provided by law and without prejudice to 
the effects of extraordinary appeals’, the judgment under appeal states that ‘it 
follows from those statutory provisions that an arbitral award has the force of res 
judicata from the date on which it is delivered without the need for a prior 
exequatur procedure, subject to it being varied on appeal before other arbitrators 
or set aside by the national court’. 
92 It states that the arbitral award of 9 March 2017 is final and has acquired the force 
of res judicata, that it settles the question in dispute as to the compatibility of 
Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations with EU law and that, 
consequently, the pleas alleging that those articles are unlawful in the light of 
provisions of the FEU Treaty and of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR are 
inadmissible on the ground that the award has the force of res judicata. 
93 That part of the ground of appeal criticises the judgment under appeal for 
refraining from examining whether the award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
of 9 March 2017, which it recognises as having the force of res judicata, complies 
with the fundamental provisions of EU law which the applicant alleges have been 
infringed by claiming that it has suffered damage as a result, even though that 
award was not subject to a review of conformity with that law which would have 
made it possible to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
for a preliminary ruling. 
94 Examination of that part of the ground of appeal requires the interpretation of 
Article 19(1) TEU and referring to the Court of Justice of the European Union the 
first question set out in the operative part of the judgment before a ruling can be 
given. 
B. The second ground of appeal 
95 The Court of Cassation considers that the first part of the second ground of appeal 
has no factual basis since the Court of Appeal answered it by finding that the fact 
that UEFA actively campaigned for the prohibition at issue is irrelevant from the 
point of view of civil liability, particularly since, in view of its ranking in 2015, 
the applicant’s participation in matches organised by UEFA was purely 
hypothetical. 
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96 It considers that the examination of the second part of the second ground of appeal 
requires findings of fact exceeding its powers, and therefore that ground of appeal 
is inadmissible for a reason specific to the cassation proceedings. 
C. The third ground of appeal 
97 The Court of Cassation finds this ground of appeal admissible, since it does not 
require it to determine the merits of the applicant’s grounds of appeal to rebut the 
evidence of the arbitral award and the plea alleging infringement of Article 19(1) 
TEU is a matter of public policy and may be raised for the first time before the 
Court of Cassation. Infringement of that provision would be sufficient, if the plea 
were well founded, to quash the judgment. 
98 The judgment under appeal dismisses the applicant’s claim against the URBSFA 
on the grounds that ‘a judgment is enforceable against third parties in the sense 
that its very existence within the legal order is binding on everyone’, that ‘the 
enforceability of the judgment against third parties means that the probative value 
of what has been held on a disputed issue or point may be relied on against and 
by third parties, subject to evidence to the contrary’, that ‘that rule applies to the 
arbitral award’ and that the applicant does not overturn the probative force of the 
award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport of 9 March 2017. 
99 The ground of appeal criticises the judgment under appeal for imposing on the 
applicant the burden of rebutting the presumption drawn from that award that the 
restrictions resulting from Articles 18bis and 18ter of the STP Regulations are in 
line with the fundamental provisions of EU law which the applicant alleges have 
been infringed by claiming that it has suffered damage as a result, even though 
that award was not subject to a review of conformity with EU law which would 
have made it possible to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling. 
100 Examination of that part of the ground of appeal requires the interpretation of 
Article 19(1) TEU. It is therefore necessary, before a ruling can be given, to refer 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union the second question set out in the 
operative part of this judgment.