Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:658
Date: 2025-09-04
Language of the case: English

summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The purely probative and instrumental purposes of the annexes mean that, in so far as these contain elements of law or of fact on which certain grounds expressed in the application are based, those elements must be set out in the actual body of that application or, at the very least, be sufficiently identified in the application. (34) 91. In that context, since the appellants did not state in their application the reasons why the Chair of the JURI committee did not offer, in their view, a guarantee of impartiality, the General Court was right to reject those arguments as inadmissible. Their arguments alleging the distortion of evidence, the breach of their right to effective judicial protection and of the rights of the defence, and the General Court’s failure to fulfil its obligation to state reasons, arguments which are based on the failure to examine the elements contained in the annexes in question, must also be rejected. 92. In the second place, in paragraph 261 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected as unfounded the argument based on the alleged hostility of the Chair of the JURI committee and relating to the strategy carried out in order to prevent the appellants from taking their seats in the Parliament. In the view of the General Court, those alleged initiatives were made not by the Chair but by his party. 93. That paragraph of the judgment under appeal relates to paragraph 145 of the application for annulment, in which the appellants simply stated that the Chair of the JURI committee and his party had displayed fierce hostility towards them, whilst claiming that the Chair had carried out a strategy in order to prevent them from taking their seats as MEPs. 94. I agree with the Parliament that the appellants’ claims in paragraph 145 of the application for annulment are very brief and insufficiently developed to be admissible. The question thus arises as to whether the Parliament’s request for substitution of grounds should be upheld. 95. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, if a request for substitution of grounds is to be admissible, the party concerned must have an interest in bringing proceedings, in the sense that the request must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party making it. That may be the case where the request for substitution of grounds amounts to a defence to one of the appellant’s pleas. (35) 96. Since such an interest exists on the part of the Parliament, I propose that the Court substitute the grounds of the judgment under appeal and find that the appellants’ arguments, contained in paragraph 145 of the application for annulment, are also inadmissible because they were not sufficiently developed in the application. The complaint alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons on account of a failure to point specifically to the inadmissible elements should be dismissed as ineffective, since all those elements must be rejected as inadmissible. 97. I wish to add, in the event that the Court were not to agree with my proposal on this matter, that any steps taken by the Chair of the JURI committee and his party to prevent the appellants from taking their seats in the Parliament stem, in my view, from a conflict of a purely political nature, the existence of which is not sufficient to find there to be a breach of the principle of impartiality. (36) 98. In the light of the foregoing, the third part of the third ground of appeal should be rejected. 4. The fourth part of the third ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 99. The appellants allege that the General Court committed an error of law that also involved an error of reasoning and an infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and the rights of the defence, by misconstruing the fourth part of the third plea in law of the application and rejecting it. In their view, that part is independent of the two preceding parts. The appellants submit that they stated in the application for annulment, first, that Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure was illegitimate, disproportionate and infringes the principles of publicity and transparency provided for in Article 15 TFEU and, secondly, that the decision to hold the meetings of the JURI committee in camera prevented them from gathering evidence of a misuse of powers. 100. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that this part should be rejected. It repeats, in particular, the argument put forward in its defence before the General Court and argues that the rules on the confidential nature of those procedures cannot be waived by the Member whose immunity is at issue, since the rule in question is intended to protect not only the interests of that Member, but also those of third parties, as well as of the public prosecutor and the judicial authorities. (b) Assessment 101. The General Court took the view, in paragraph 262 of the judgment under appeal, that, since the claims of bias made against the rapporteur and the Chair of the JURI committee were rejected, it was not necessary to assess the fourth part concerning the obstacle created by the confidential nature of that committee’s work to establishing proof of the impact of their alleged bias on the decisions at issue. 102. I note that the fourth part of the third ground of appeal was presented in paragraphs 147 to 162 of the application for annulment, in section IV.3.4 entitled ‘Effects of the confidential nature of the procedure. Infringement of Article 15 TFEU, in conjunction with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. Illegality of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure’. It is true that the appellants do refer, in paragraphs 147 to 151 of the application, to the confidentiality of the procedure, not in abstracto and in general, but in the context of the difficulties encountered in determining the influence of the Chair of the JURI committee and the rapporteur on the outcome of that procedure. 103. However, in the subsequent paragraphs of the application, the appellants submitted general comments on the validity of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure and stated, in the second sentence of paragraph 162, that the confidential nature of the procedure constituted a breach of Article 15 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with the rights of the defence. 104. The General Court did not respond expressly to the argument based on the invalidity of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure. However, in any event, since this is a plea that is purely a matter of law, the Court of Justice may remedy the omission of the General Court. (37) 105. In that regard, I note in the first place that Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the JURI committee must always consider requests relating to procedures on immunity in camera. It is true that it follows from Article 15(1) TFEU, which enshrines the principle of transparency, that the Union’s institutions are to conduct their work as openly as possible. However, provision is not made in that article for the absolute transparency of all the work of the institutions. It is apparent, not least from Article 15(2) TFEU, that the Parliament is to meet in public, but that does not mean that the work of all its committees is made public. Article 232 TFEU recognises the autonomy of the Parliament as regards its internal organisation, which entails the right of that institution to define the limits on the publicity of the work of the committees. 106. As is apparent from the Parliament’s defence, Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure is the result of a balance struck by the Parliament between the principle of transparency and other legitimate interests that must be protected, such as the protection of the confidentiality of criminal proceedings during the investigation stage. In particular, the Parliament states that the purpose of that provision is to protect not only the interests of the Member concerned, but also those of third parties, as well as those of the public prosecutor and the judicial authorities. In that context, I note that the solution adopted by the Parliament is consistent with the recommendations of the Venice Commission, which advocates requests for waiver of immunity being handled behind closed doors, without the member concerned being present. (38) In those circumstances, I see nothing capable of affecting the validity of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure in the light of Article 15 TFEU. 107. In the second place, the appellants state in their application for annulment that Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure constitutes an unlawful interference with their rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. They do not, however, put forward any reasons in that regard. Those arguments should therefore be rejected. 108. For the sake of completeness, I observe that, if the appellants were to be understood to be of the view that their rights of defence were breached by Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure, that argument should be rejected as ineffective. That provision and Article 15 TFEU do not restrict the rights of the parties to the procedure for waiver of immunity, but rather the right of the general public to access the relevant information. The rights of defence of a party to the procedure cannot therefore be restricted by the provisions allowing for a case to be dealt with in camera, but potentially they could be by the provisions governing the conduct of the procedure and the participation of the parties, such as, in the present case, the second subparagraph of Rule 9(6) of the Rules of Procedure, which provides that the Member concerned is not to be present during debates of the JURI committee, except for the hearing itself. The appellants refer to that provision for the first time in the appeal, without providing any explanation. There is therefore no need to examine it. 109. In the light of the foregoing, the fourth part of the third ground of appeal should be rejected. 5. Conclusion on the third ground of appeal 110. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that the third ground of appeal should be rejected. E. The sixth ground of appeal 111. By their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by rejecting the sixth (39) and the seventh plea for annulment, (40) either by departing from its own practice or by making an error of assessment. 112. That ground of appeal is divided into two parts. The appellants allege, in essence, that the General Court, first, erred in law in determining and applying the criteria for waiver of immunity and, second, erred in law by finding there to be no error in the Parliament’s assessment of fumus persecutionis. In the first part, the appellants raise nine specific complaints. (41) 1. The first and second complaints in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 113. The first complaint in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal alleges infringement of Article 343 TFEU in that the General Court concluded, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that that provision does not impose on the Parliament any limit, of any kind whatsoever, as far as concerns its right to waive the immunity of its Members. The appellants state that while the continuation of proceedings, including criminal proceedings, against a Member of the Parliament does not generally prevent that Member from exercising his or her mandate, the situation is different in cases concerning the pre-trial detention of the Members concerned, as is at issue here. The appellants argue that it is in that context that they raised, on several occasions, in their application the principle of proportionality, a principle which they claim the General Court did not take into consideration. 114. The second complaint in that part alleges infringement of Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure in that the General Court concluded, in particular in paragraphs 117 to 122 and 126 of the judgment under appeal, that the existence or absence of fumus persecutionis was the only criterion that the Parliament had to consider. In that regard, the appellants consider that it is apparent from that provision that the Parliament must uphold its integrity as a democratic legislative assembly and ensure the independence of its Members in the performance of their duties. 115. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that those complaints should be rejected, some of which it submits are based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal, some are inadmissible and others are unfounded. (b) Assessment 116. Relying on paragraph 76 of the judgment in Junqueras Vies, the General Court held, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 343 TFEU cannot be interpreted as meaning that the immunity of a Member of the Parliament can never be waived if the continuation of the proceedings in respect of which the waiver of immunity was sought may hinder the exercise of his or her mandate, or even, at the end of those proceedings, lead to the loss of that mandate. In the General Court’s view, such an interpretation would deprive the third paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 of all practical effect. 117. With regard to Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court found, in paragraphs 119 and 120 of the judgment under appeal, that, since the Parliament adopted the fumus persecutionis criterion taking into account both the objective of safeguarding its independence and its proper functioning, and the need to comply with the principle of sincere cooperation, it therefore necessarily considered, by ruling out the existence of fumus persecutionis, that a waiver of the appellants’ immunity would not adversely affect its interests, in particular its proper functioning and its independence. 118. I am of the view that the General Court did not make any error in the cited paragraphs of the judgment under appeal. 119. First, as regards the complaint concerning paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, I note, as is clear from my summary of that paragraph, (42) that contrary to what the appellants claim, the General Court did not state that Article 343 TFEU does not impose any limit on the Parliament’s right to waive the immunity of its Members or that the principle of proportionality does not apply to decisions to waive immunity. However, it did state that the risk of an obstacle to the exercise of a mandate, in particular the loss of that mandate, at the end of the proceedings in respect of which the waiver of immunity was sought does not preclude that waiver of immunity. That complaint therefore stems from a misreading of paragraph 122 of that judgment and must, as a result, be rejected as unfounded. Furthermore, the finding made by the General Court in that paragraph is accurate. 120. Secondly, as regards the second complaint, I note that Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure is a general provision establishing the objectives pursued by the Parliament in the exercise of its powers regarding privileges and immunities. That provision does not refer to any criterion that must be taken into consideration when adopting a decision on the request to waive immunity. Such a criterion does, however, appear in point 43 of Notice No 11/2019, which provides that immunity is to be waived unless it appears that the intention underlying the legal proceedings may be to damage a Member’s political activity and thus Parliament’s independence (fumus persecutionis). The use of that criterion by the Parliament comes under the broad discretion which it enjoys in relation to waiving immunity (43) and is, moreover, recommended by the Venice Commission. (44) The adoption of that principle by the JURI committee should be understood, in my view, as following from the finding that the application of the fumus persecutionis criterion allows the objectives set out in Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure to be achieved. In the light of the foregoing, the second complaint should therefore also be rejected. 2. The third complaint in the third part (a) Arguments of the parties 121. The appellants allege that by maintaining, in paragraphs 128 to 131 of the judgment under appeal, that they had not established their entitlement to the immunity afforded in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, the General Court distorted evidence, erred in law and breached the right to effective judicial protection. Furthermore, the General Court was also wrong to conclude, in paragraphs 132 and 133 of that judgment, that the appellants were not justified in claiming that the decisions at issue had been adopted in breach of the second paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. 122. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that that complaint should be rejected. In its view, the appellants have no legal interest in challenging the findings made by the General Court in paragraphs 128 and 131 of the judgment under appeal. A potential error affecting those findings cannot lead to the annulment of the decisions at issue, which concern merely the waiver of the appellants’ immunity under point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7. In the alternative, the Parliament considers that the appellants’ arguments should be rejected as unfounded. (b) Assessment 123. With regard to the extent and scope of the immunity enjoyed by Members in their national territory, the General Court held, in paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants were not justified in claiming that the Parliament had erred in law by referring to national law as interpreted by the national courts. Based on that interpretation, parliamentary authorisation is not required to continue criminal proceedings against a person who was charged before he or she acquired the status of a Spanish Member of Parliament. In addition, with regard to the appellants’ argument that the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Protocol cannot be waived without the immunity provided for in the second paragraph of that article also being waived, the General Court found, in paragraph 133 of that judgment, that, in the circumstances of the present case, the appellants were not justified in claiming that the decisions at issue had been adopted in breach of the second paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol, in particular since the Kingdom of Spain had recognised their status as Members of the Parliament. 124. In the first place, like the Parliament, I am of the view that the complaint relating to the Parliament’s interpretation of point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 is ineffective because it concerns grounds of the judgment under appeal that do not affect the operative part of that judgment. (45) The decisions at issue do not concern the waiver of the immunity referred to in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. 125. For the sake of completeness, I note that Article 18 of Chapter VII of Protocol No 7 provides that, for the purposes of applying that protocol, the institutions of the Union are to cooperate with the responsible authorities of the Member States concerned. The Parliament was therefore right to rely on the interpretation of the Spanish courts in order to establish that the appellants did not enjoy the immunity provided for in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol, since they had been charged before being elected to the Parliament. 126. In the second place, as regards the argument relating to the second paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, it is apparent from the judgment in Junqueras Vies that, while the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol provides for immunities which are enjoyed by Members of the European Parliament equally during the entire duration of the sessions of a given term of the Parliament, (46) the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Protocol provides, by contrast, that they also enjoy that immunity before their term of office has begun. (47) The first and second paragraphs of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 thus have different temporal scopes, (48) since, according to settled case-law of the Court, the Parliament must be considered to be in session, even if it is not actually sitting. (49) Accordingly, a Member who, after the opening of the first session of a parliamentary term, has already assumed office enjoys only the protection afforded by the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7. It follows that the General Court did not err in law by holding that the appellants were not justified in claiming that the decisions at issue had been adopted in breach of the second paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. 127. In the light of the foregoing, the third complaint should be rejected. 3. The fourth complaint in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 128. In the introductory complaint, (50) the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by concluding, in paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament has broad discretion when deciding whether to grant or to refuse a request for waiver of immunity. However, the adoption of the decisions at issue could affect several fundamental rights. 129. In the fourth complaint in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants submit, first, that, contrary to what is stated in paragraphs 135 to 143 of the judgment under appeal, the decisions at issue constitute interference with their fundamental rights enshrined in Article 6, Article 39(2) and Article 45 of the Charter. Secondly, they criticise the General Court for having taken the view, in paragraphs 126 and 127 of that judgment, that the legality of the European arrest warrants issued against them had no bearing on the examination of a request for waiver of immunity intended to allow those warrants to be executed. In that regard, the appellants claim that the Parliament was obliged to assess the risks of infringement of their fundamental rights, just like the executing judicial authority in the context of surrender procedures under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. (51) 130. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that that complaint should be rejected. It argues that some arguments are inadmissible while others are ineffective, and, in any event, none of them is well founded. As regards the argument concerning paragraphs 126 and 127 of the judgment under appeal, the Parliament contends that it should be rejected in so far as it is based on a misreading of those paragraphs. (b) Assessment 131. In paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court observed that, in so far as the third paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 does not specify the conditions under which the Parliament must assess whether or not to waive immunity, that institution has very broad discretion when deciding whether to grant or to refuse a request for waiver of immunity, owing to the political nature of such a decision. The General Court went on to state, in paragraphs 113 and 114 of that judgment, that the substantive criteria for examining requests for waiver of immunity stem not from the Rules of Procedure, in particular Rule 5(2) thereof, but rather from points 41 to 44 of Notice No 11/2009, under which the immunity provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7 is to be waived unless the Parliament finds there to be fumus persecutionis. Furthermore, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 115 of that judgment, that the immunities are accorded solely in the interests of the European Union. 132. As is clear from that summary of paragraphs 112 to 115 of the judgment under appeal, the introductory complaint is based on a misreading of paragraph 112 of that judgment. Contrary to what the appellants claim, it is by no means apparent from paragraph 112 nor from the subsequent paragraphs of that judgment that, according to the General Court, the very broad discretion enjoyed by the Parliament means that a decision of the Parliament is incapable of affecting their fundamental rights. The argument based on the fact that an institution’s broad discretion means that it is not required to respect fundamental rights is therefore manifestly erroneous. That complaint should therefore, in my view, be rejected because it is based on a misreading of paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal. 133. In paragraph 138 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that immunity cannot constitute a fundamental right granted to Members of the Parliament since it is granted exclusively in the interests of the Parliament. The fact that a decision to waive immunity alters the legal position of a Member is irrelevant in that regard. The General Court went on to find, in paragraphs 140 and 141 of that judgment, that the waiver of parliamentary immunity does not in itself have any effect on the exercise of the mandate nor on the appellants’ freedom, in particular their freedom of movement, and does not infringe their right to respect for the presumption of innocence. Lastly, the General Court concluded in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal that, as a consequence, the argument seeking to establish that such interference does not comply with the requirements laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter are ineffective and must be rejected on that ground. 134. It should be stated that the General Court did not err in law in those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal. The appellants do not rely on any legal argument that would call into question the General Court’s findings, but simply contest them. I am in complete agreement with the General Court’s view that the waiver of parliamentary immunity, as such, does not have the effect of a Member losing his or her mandate and does not affect his or her freedom of movement, since the immunity in itself is not a fundamental right of a Member. 135. In paragraphs 126 and 127 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that it is not for the Parliament to assess the legality, first, of the acts adopted by the judicial authorities in the course of the proceedings which triggered the request for waiver of immunity, since that issue falls exclusively within the competence of the national authorities, and, secondly, of the national and European arrest warrants adopted as part of the criminal proceedings at issue. 136. As I have observed, (52) Article 18 of Chapter VII of Protocol No 7 provides that, for the purpose of applying that protocol, the institutions of the Union are to cooperate with the responsible authorities of the Member States concerned. It follows from that fact that, when a request for waiver of immunity is made to it, the Parliament is in principle required, in order to establish the relevant facts, to take as a basis the information provided by the competent national authority regarding the subject matter and the status of the judicial proceedings in respect of which immunity should be waived. Moreover, where certain information is missing or unclear, the JURI committee may ask the authority concerned to provide it with information and explanations, in accordance with Rule 9(5) of the Rules of Procedure. However, the Parliament is not competent to examine the legality of the decisions adopted in the context of a national procedure. 137. Similarly, nor is the Parliament competent to rule on the risk of infringement of fundamental rights arising from the execution of European arrest warrants in the way that judicial authorities would do when called upon to rule on their execution. Not only has such competence not been entrusted to it, but its decision does not have the effect of depriving other authorities of the power to carry out the necessary review of such warrants. The decision to waive parliamentary immunity does not replace the decision of the judicial authorities to execute a European arrest warrant, in the context of which those authorities are required to examine that warrant and, in particular, assess whether any conditions laid down in Framework Decision 2002/584 apply with a view to granting or refusing its execution. The Parliament’s decision does not require the executing authorities to implement a European arrest warrant. It follows that it is not for the Parliament to question such a warrant issued by national authorities or to examine any effect of its execution on the appellants’ fundamental rights. 138. In that context, I note that the Venice Commission makes it clear in its report that the parliamentary body handling a request for waiver of immunity should not make a legal examination of the case as such and, in particular, should not under any circumstances rule on whether there is justification for criminal prosecution. (53) 139. In the light of the foregoing, the fourth complaint should be rejected. 4. The fifth complaint in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 140. In the fifth complaint, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by rejecting their arguments based on the principle of proportionality and thus breached not only that principle but also its obligation to state reasons. 141. The Parliament contends that that claim is inadmissible as it is not sufficiently precise. For its part, the Kingdom of Spain states that that complaint is not linked to any paragraph of the judgment under appeal and is therefore irrelevant. (b) Assessment 142. The fifth complaint is, in my view, inadmissible in that it concerns the General Court’s alleged disregard for the principle of proportionality. That complaint, read to that effect, is unreasoned and is confined to a reference to the application for annulment. 143. As regards the appellants’ claim that the General Court did not respond to their arguments concerning compliance with the principle of proportionality, I should point out that it is settled case-law that a plea alleging that the General Court failed to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts essentially to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons which derives from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and from Article 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. (54) 144. However, the Court has also consistently held that the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case, and that the General Court’s reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why it has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review. (55) 145. In that context, there can be no doubt, in my view, that the General Court rejected, even if only implicitly, the complaint alleging disregard for the principle of proportionality, since the appellants submitted, in the sixth plea for annulment, that the authorisation of their arrest was disproportionate given, in the first place, the consequential infringement of their fundamental rights and, in the second place, the stage of the criminal proceedings. (56) With regard to that first argument, as is apparent from my analysis of the fourth complaint, the General Court was right to reject it. As regards the second argument, the General Court held, in paragraph 126 of the judgment under appeal, that it was not for the Parliament to assess the legality of the acts adopted by the judicial authorities in the course of the proceedings, since that issue falls exclusively within the competence of the national authorities. It should therefore be stated that, in the context of the sixth ground of appeal, that judgment is not vitiated by a failure to provide a ruling nor, more generally, by a failure to state reasons in that regard. The statement of reasons for the judgment under appeal enables the persons concerned to know why their arguments were not upheld. 146. In the light of the foregoing, the fifth complaint should be rejected. 5. The sixth complaint in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 147. In the sixth complaint, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by finding in paragraphs 141 to 143 of the judgment under appeal, in principle, that a decision to waive the immunity of a Member of the European Parliament and the procedure that led to its adoption do not – and cannot – infringe the right to respect for the presumption of innocence. In that connection, point B of the decisions at issue refers to the order of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of 25 October 2018, even though that order concerns not the appellants but their co-accused. In addition, since the only document submitted to the members of the JURI committee was the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of 14 October 2019, which convicts other individuals, the adoption of the decisions at issue was based on the assumption that the appellants were guilty, thereby violating their right to be presumed innocent. The same conclusion must be drawn in the light of the fact that, in their view, the General Court failed to examine their arguments alleging a misuse of powers and the existence of an ulterior purpose, arguments relied on in the sixth plea for annulment, and, in so doing, it failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons. 148. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that that complaint should be rejected. It submits, inter alia, that that complaint is based on a misreading of paragraph 141 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court simply found that, in itself, the waiver of a Member of Parliament’s immunity did not infringe his or her right to respect for the presumption of innocence. Moreover, with regard to the argument alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the Parliament considers that it must be rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, as unfounded. (b) Assessment 149. The General Court held, in paragraph 141 of the judgment under appeal, that a decision to waive immunity does not infringe the right to respect for the presumption of innocence. In its view, the question whether the conditions for waiver of parliamentary immunity, pursuant to Article 9 of Protocol No 7, are met at the time when the request for waiver is submitted is separate from the question whether the facts alleged against the Members in question are established, with the latter question falling within the competence of the Member State’s authorities. 150. As the Parliament observes, the sixth complaint is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal and, for that reason, should be rejected as unfounded. 151. It appears to me that, by the complaint, the appellants are in reality criticising the General Court for having failed to respond to their arguments, raised in the application for annulment, concerning the account taken by the Parliament of judicial decisions that may be understood to demonstrate their guilt, even though those decisions did not concern them. The fact that, in their view, the Parliament relied on those decisions is relevant having regard to their arguments relating to the misuse of powers and the existence of an ulterior purpose. 152. As I have just observed, (57) first, the plea alleging that the General Court failed to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts essentially to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons and, secondly, the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case. 153. In that context, it should be found that the General Court did indeed examine, first, point B of the decisions at issue (58) and, secondly, the potential impact of the inaccurate statements contained therein about the Parliament’s decision to waive immunity. That argument is therefore unfounded. 154. With regard to the arguments relating to a misuse of powers and the existence of an ulterior purpose, they must be rejected as inadmissible since the appellants do not provide, in the appeal, any reasons to support them and refer to the application for annulment in general terms. 6. The seventh and eighth complaints in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 155. In the seventh and eighth complaints in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by assessing, in paragraph 147 to 161 of the judgment under appeal, the Parliament’s incorrect statements contained in points S and B of the decisions at issue concerning, respectively, the purpose of the parliamentary immunity provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7 and the status of the criminal proceedings concerning them. Those incorrect statements had an impact on the Parliament’s decision to waive immunity, since they misled its Members. 156. According to the appellants, first, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the votes of the Members of the European Parliament in favour of the decisions at issue would have been different if they had known that, as regards the immunities provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7, point S of those decisions was manifestly inaccurate. Secondly, if the Parliament had been aware of the fact that, contrary to what is stated in point B of those decisions, the investigation phase in respect of the appellants was not closed, it could have taken the view that issuing a European arrest warrant against them, before the closure of the investigation phase, was disproportionate. In addition, paragraph 159 of the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law relating to a distortion of the provisions of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure. 157. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that both those complaints should be rejected. According to the Parliament, the argument alleging that its decision to waive the appellants’ immunity was based solely on the ground stated in point S of the decisions at issue is contradicted by its observations contained in points T to W of those decisions and must be rejected as unfounded. Furthermore, the argument based on the distortion of the provisions of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure should be rejected as inadmissible since it is relied on by the appellants for the first time in the appeal. In any event, that argument should be rejected as unfounded. The Kingdom of Spain argues that the eighth complaint is ineffective since it is immaterial, for the purpose of granting the request for waiver of immunity, whether or not the investigation phase was closed. (b) Assessment 158. The General Court recalled, in paragraph 148 of the judgment under appeal, that point S of the decisions at issue restates the principle set out in point 3 of Notice No 11/2019, according to which ‘the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to protect Parliament and its Members from legal proceedings in relation to activities carried out in the performance of parliamentary duties and which cannot be separated from those duties’. In that regard, the General Court held, in paragraph 149 of that judgment, that it was common ground that the appellants were covered by the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, even though the criminal proceedings at issue concerned activities unrelated to the exercise of parliamentary duties. Nevertheless, it found in paragraph 152 of that judgment, that the general statement contained in point S of the decisions at issue had not been given effect in the sense that the request for waiver of the immunity of a Member of the Parliament must be granted if it concerns legal proceedings pertaining to facts unrelated to the performance of parliamentary duties. 159. The General Court went on to recall, in paragraph 155 of the judgment under appeal, the wording of point B of the decisions at issue and found, in paragraph 157 of that judgment, that the appellants were justified in claiming that that point was vitiated by an error of fact or, at the very least, a lack of clarity as to whether the investigation phase of the criminal proceedings in question had been closed in respect of them. It concluded, however, in paragraph 160 of the judgment under appeal, that it did not appear that that error or, at the very least, that lack of clarity had an impact on the examination of the request for waiver of immunity. 160. Therefore, the General Court did indeed find that certain statements made in points B and S of the decisions at issue were incorrect. However, it went on to conclude that, contrary to what the appellants submitted, those inaccuracies were incapable of affecting the Parliament’s decision to waive immunity. 161. I am of the view that the General Court’s conclusion is correct. The reasons stated for the decisions at issue are not limited to points B and S of those decisions. In order to assess the impact of those incorrect statements, account must be taken of the context and of the reasons stated for those decisions in their entirety. In the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants have not put forward any argument capable of demonstrating that the inaccuracies in the statements made in points B and S were such that the Parliament’s decision to waive immunity would have been different if those statements had been correct. I agree, in particular, with the position of the Kingdom of Spain, namely that, in the case of a decision to waive immunity, it is irrelevant whether or not the investigation phase of the criminal case is closed. 162. In the alternative, with regard to the appellants’ argument that the Parliament could have taken the view that issuing European arrest warrants against them, before the closure of the investigation phase, was disproportionate, I would reiterate (59) that under no circumstances does it fall within the scope of the Parliament’s powers to assess the proportionality of the appellants’ arrest in the light of the stage of the criminal proceedings concerning them. 163. With that in mind, it is my view that the arguments based on provisions of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure are ineffective. 164. In the light of the foregoing, the seventh and eighth complaints should be rejected. 7. The ninth complaint in the first part (a) Arguments of the parties 165. In the ninth complaint in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants allege that the General Court, in the first place, erred in law in concluding, in paragraphs 162 to 172 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament had not disregarded the principles of equal treatment and good administration. In addition, the Parliament did not follow its consistent practice of refusing to waive a Member’s immunity in the cases referred to in paragraphs 162 and 163 of that judgment. In the second place, the General Court also erred in law in concluding, in paragraph 166 of the judgment under appeal, that the elements mentioned in their sixth and seventh pleas for annulment relating to the Parliament’s practices and modalities of work in the field of immunities were no longer relevant, in accordance with point 53 of Notice No 11/2019, which provides that that notice replaces previous notices. In the third place, the General Court distorted the evidence by finding that the appellants had not shown ‘how’ the decisions relied upon were capable of establishing the existence of a particular practice. In the fourth place, in paragraphs 166 to 172 of that judgment, the General Court distorted evidence and erred in law by disregarding all the precedents relied upon by the appellants, as well as the related arguments, in order to establish fumus persecutionis. 166. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that that complaint should be rejected as unfounded. The Parliament argues that neither the principle of good administration nor the principle of equal treatment prohibit it from altering and amending its previous practice. In addition, the arguments alleging that the General Court distorted evidence are inadmissible, since the appellants do not state precisely which errors were made or which evidence was distorted. In any event, those arguments are wholly unfounded. (b) Assessment 167. In paragraphs 162 and 163 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court summarised the appellants’ claims relating to the elements of the Parliament’s alleged practice which that institution disregarded. 168. In paragraph 166 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court observed that, in order to establish the existence of a practice of the Parliament consisting in the refusal to waive the immunity of a Member where that Member is being prosecuted for his or her political activities, where those proceedings have been brought by a political opponent or where the national authorities in question have requested exemplary penalties against that Member, the appellants relied on Notice No 11/2003 of 6 June 2003. That notice was drawn up by the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, which was responsible at the time for issues relating to immunities, and is a summary of the Parliament’s previous decision-making practice. The General Court provided a summary of the relevant passages of that notice and then observed that it had been replaced on 19 November 2019 by Notice No 11/2019. 169. The General Court set out, in paragraph 167 of the judgment under appeal, the Parliament’s argument that it had abandoned its practice, as summarised in Notice No 11/2003, in the sense of limiting cases in which the Parliament refused to waive immunity. 170. In paragraph 168 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted that the Parliament’s practice of refusing to waive immunity if the purpose of the legal proceedings in question is to hinder the exercise of a Member’s parliamentary duties is not disputed. It went on to find that, as regards cases in which the Parliament refuses to waive the immunity of one of its Members, the appellants simply relied on certain decisions of the Parliament, without showing how those decisions are capable of establishing the existence of such a practice. Moreover, the General Court pointed out that most of the decisions relied on by the appellants had been adopted between 1982 and 2003. 171. I am of the view that the General Court did not commit any error in the paragraphs at issue of the judgment under appeal. 172. As is apparent from point 53 of Notice No 11/2019, that notice replaced all previous notices and any other documents of the JURI committee regarding the Parliament’s practices and modalities of work in the field of immunities. This shows the Parliament’s clear intention to change its previous practice. In view of the discretion enjoyed by the Parliament as regards the waiver of parliamentary immunity, I am of the view that it was entitled to act in that way, especially since the alteration of its practice was justified by the analysis of case-law. 173. That conclusion is borne out by the Court of Justice, which has already had occasion to find that Notice No 11/2003 ceased to apply following the publication of Notice No 11/2019 and that the General Court was therefore not required to take it into account. (60) Since the appellants base their line of argument on the Parliament’s former practice, as summarised in Notice No 11/2003, the finding by the Court of Justice applies, a fortiori, to any practice of the Parliament prior to Notice No 11/2019. 174. In view of those circumstances, the appellants’ arguments based on the Parliament’s previous practice must be considered unfounded. 175. In the alternative, as regards the arguments based on the General Court’s alleged distortion of the evidence, I am of the view that they are inadmissible since the appellants do not state precisely which evidence was distorted or point to the errors of appraisal by the General Court which, in their view, led to that distortion. (61) They simply refer in abstract and general terms to the evidence produced in support of their action for annulment. In so doing, they are in reality asking the Court of Justice to assess the evidence submitted with the application for annulment. 176. In those circumstances, the ninth complaint should be rejected. 8. The second part of the sixth ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 177. The second part of the sixth ground of appeal is based on the error in law allegedly committed by the General Court in concluding that the Parliament had not erred in the assessment of fumus persecutionis. 178. In the first place, the appellants allege that the General Court failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons. They again (62) contest the principle, set out in paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament has broad discretion when deciding whether to grant or to refuse a request for waiver of immunity. 179. In the second place, the appellants claim that the General Court breached its obligation to state reasons and disregarded the right to effective judicial protection ‘by failing to take a stand on the standard of review applied’ and by failing to apply the standards of review set out in the application for annulment. 180. In the third place, the General Court distorted evidence, committed errors of law, breached its obligation to state reasons and disregarded the right to effective judicial protection ‘by not addressing most of the arguments which, being relevant for the assessment of fumus persecutionis, were raised by them in their sixth, seventh and eighth pleas for annulment’. The appellants refer, in that regard, to the arguments which they put forward in the application for annulment. They also claim that the inaccurate wording of point S of the decisions at issue affected the assessment of fumus persecutionis. 181. In the fourth place, in paragraphs 174 to 186 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court distorted evidence and committed an error of law in its assessment of the errors committed by the Parliament, according to the appellants, in its examination of fumus persecutionis. 182. Specifically, the appellants challenge (i) the General Court’s assessment vis-à-vis the lack of any impact on the examination of fumus persecutionis of the date on which the European arrest warrants were issued (paragraph 174 of that judgment) and of the fact that there were no European arrest warrants in force between July 2018 and October or November 2019 (paragraphs 175 to 178 of the judgment under appeal); (ii) the General Court’s finding, in paragraphs 179 to 182 of that judgment, that the arguments based on the truth of the facts alleged against them, their classification under Spanish criminal law and the question whether or not those facts justified criminal proceedings were ineffective; (iii) the General Court’s assessment, in paragraphs 183 and 184 of the judgment under appeal, of the relevance of the factors taken into account by the Parliament in the assessment of fumus persecutionis; and (iv) the General Court’s error in law in taking the view, in paragraph 185 of that judgment, that it was not for the Parliament to assess the legality of the acts adopted by the judicial authorities in the course of the criminal proceedings at issue. Each of those challenges made by the appellants is followed either by their own assessment of the relevance of the factors mentioned for the assessment of fumus persecutionis, or a reference to other grounds of appeal or the mere statement that the General Court erred in law. 183. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that the appellants’ arguments should be rejected as either inadmissible or unfounded. (b) Assessment 184. In paragraph 183 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court first of all found, in order to conclude that there was no fumus persecutionis, that the Parliament had relied on a number of factors considered together, namely the fact that the alleged offences were committed in 2017, whereas the appellants had acquired the status of Members of the Parliament on 13 June 2019, and the facts that the appellants had been charged on 21 March 2018, at a time when acquisition of the status of Members of the European Parliament was hypothetical, and that that indictment also covered other persons who were not Members of the Parliament. 185. The General Court went on to find, in paragraph 186 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had not established that, by relying on the circumstances concerned (as recalled in the preceding point) in order to rule out the existence of fumus persecutionis, the Parliament had committed a manifest error of assessment. In that regard, in the General Court’s view, the facts that (i) the appellants are being prosecuted for their national political activities; (ii) they could, as part of or at the end of the criminal proceedings at issue, be temporarily prevented from exercising their mandate or even, as the case may be, lose that mandate; (iii) the Spanish party VOX brought the popular action in the criminal proceedings at issue; and (iv) they were targeted by certain negative public statements, in particular calling for exemplary penalties to be imposed on them, are not capable of calling that conclusion into question. The same applies to the appellants’ claims challenging the impartiality of the judicial authorities involved in the criminal proceedings at issue. In addition, for the purpose of establishing the existence of that manifest error of assessment by the Parliament, the appellants cannot reasonably rely on events subsequent to the decisions at issue, such as the communication from the Central Electoral Commission of 3 November 2022 and the fact that they themselves and their advisors were spied on by the Spanish authorities. 186. It is my view that the General Court did not err in its analysis of the Parliament’s assessment of fumus persecutionis. I agree, in particular, with the view that the Parliament has a broad discretion, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, to establish the existence of fumus persecutionis and that its decision could be annulled solely in the event of a manifest error in that assessment. (63) The General Court’s assessment that the Parliament did not make such a manifest error is not, in my view, erroneous. 187. For the sake of completeness, as regards, in the first place, the appellants’ arguments summarised in point 178 of this Opinion, they are, in my view, unfounded. Although the appellants formally allege a breach of the obligation to state reasons, I am nevertheless of the view that, by those arguments, they are in reality challenging the principle, set out in paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, upon which the General Court based its assessment. I have already examined those arguments in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal, in connection with the alleged violation of the appellants’ fundamental rights. (64) If read more generally, the finding contained in paragraph 112 of that judgment is correct, as I have already set out. (65) 188. In the second place, as regards the arguments summarised in points 179 and 180 of this Opinion, they are, in my view, inadmissible since they are imprecise and seek a re-examination of the arguments contained in the application for annulment. I should point out that, according to settled case-law, an appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court does not satisfy the requirements relating to the duty to state reasons under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. (66) This is the case with the arguments set out in points 179 and 180 of this Opinion, since the appellants merely refer in general terms to the arguments contained in the application for annulment. 189. Lastly, as for the arguments summarised in points 181 and 182 of this Opinion, the appellants simply either put forward their view as to the impact of certain factors deemed relevant or irrelevant by the Parliament (paragraphs 174 to 182 of the judgment under appeal), refer to the pleas for annulment (paragraphs 183 to 184 of that judgment) or state that the General Court erred in law (paragraphs 185 and 186 of the judgment). Those arguments are therefore inadmissible since the appellants do not point to an error in the General Court’s reasoning. 190. Be that as it may, assuming those arguments are admissible, they would have to be rejected as unfounded, as they cannot call into question my finding set out in point 186 of this Opinion. 191. In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the sixth ground of appeal should be rejected. 9. Conclusion on the sixth ground of appeal 192. In the light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the sixth ground of appeal should be rejected. F. The fifth ground of appeal 193. By their fifth ground of appeal, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by rejecting the fifth plea for annulment, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty relating to the lack of clarity of the decisions at issue. They claim, in that regard, that the General Court failed to take account of the fact that the Parliament (i) had never dealt with a request for waiver of immunity concerning the continuation of a surrender procedure pursuant to Chapter 2 of Framework Decision 2002/584 and (ii) waived for the first time just one of the immunities provided for in Article 9 of Protocol No 7. This ground of appeal is divided into two parts. 1. The first part of the fifth ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 194. By the first part of the fifth ground of appeal, the appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by taking the view, in relation to the proceedings in respect of which immunity was waived, that the decisions at issue did not lack clarity. In that regard, they contest the interpretation of the decisions at issue set out by the General Court in paragraphs 94 to 97 of the judgment under appeal, which, in their view, is not the only possible interpretation. They argue, inter alia, that the sole purpose of the requests for waiver of immunity concerning them was the continuation of the ongoing surrender procedures, namely the procedures for execution of the European arrest warrants in Belgium and the United Kingdom. 195. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that this part should be rejected, arguing that the arguments are inadmissible or ineffective and, in any event, unfounded. (b) Assessment 196. The General Court examined the decisions at issue in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the judgment under appeal. It stated, first, that, according to point 1 of their operative part, those decisions waived the appellants’ immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, that is to say, the immunity conferred on the territory of any Member State other than the Kingdom of Spain, without making any selection of those States. Secondly, the General Court listed the passages of those decisions indicating that the waiver of immunity had been requested in order to remove the barriers to the execution of the European arrest warrants issued against the appellants. The General Court thus concluded that the decisions at issue, read independently or in conjunction with the requests for waiver of immunity, were not unclear. 197. I agree with the General Court’s conclusion. The interpretation of the requests for waiver of immunity proposed by the appellants, namely that their sole purpose was the execution of the European arrest warrants in Belgium and the United Kingdom, is not sustainable if one takes into account, not only certain factors drawn from the context, as the appellants do, but also the decisions at issue in their entirety. 198. It is true that Article 9(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 does provide that the judicial authority issuing a European arrest warrant may transmit that warrant directly to the executing judicial authority when the location of the requested person is known. However, such transmission does not have the effect of limiting the scope of a European arrest warrant to the territory of the Member State of that executing authority. That European arrest warrant can still be executed in all Member States. Thus, in the absence of explicit statements made in the requests for waiver of immunity at issue indicating that immunity was to be lifted by the Parliament solely in connection with the execution of the European arrest warrants in Belgium and the United Kingdom, the appellants’ interpretation of those requests and of the decisions at issue must be rejected as erroneous. The General Court did not therefore err in law in concluding that it is apparent from the decisions at issue that the Parliament decided to waive the appellants’ immunity in the territory of all Member States, except for the Spanish territory. 199. In the light of the foregoing, the first part of the fifth ground of appeal should be rejected. 2. The second part of the fifth ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 200. The second part of this ground of appeal is based on the error in law allegedly committed by the General Court in taking the view, in paragraphs 98 to 109 of the judgment under appeal, that the decisions at issue did not lack clarity as regards the measures that may be adopted in the context of the execution of the European arrest warrants. Thus, the appellants claim that the General Court erred in law by misinterpreting the scope of the immunities provided for in point (a) of the first paragraph and in the second paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, and by finding that only the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol constituted an obstacle to the appellants’ arrest and surrender to the Spanish authorities. In so doing, the General Court distorted evidence. In addition, the appellants again raise arguments that form the subject matter of the fourth part of the third ground of appeal. 201. The Parliament, supported by the Kingdom of Spain, contends that that part should be rejected and states that the complaints raised by the appellants are ineffective, since the requests for waiver of immunity concerned only immunity under point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7. In the Parliament’s view, the complaints relating to paragraphs 103 and 106 to 109 of the judgment under appeal are based on a misreading of those paragraphs. (b) Assessment 202. In paragraphs 101 to 105 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court set out the content of the decisions at issue and the related conclusion of the Parliament, namely that only the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 constituted an obstacle to the appellants’ arrest. In addition, it held in paragraphs 106 to 108 of that judgment that the second paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol did not confer on the appellants protection separate from that which they enjoyed under the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7. 203. As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, since the requests for waiver of immunity concerned only the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, the appellants’ complaints regarding any observations by the General Court relating to the scope of their immunity in Spanish territory are ineffective. First, those complaints are directed against grounds which have no bearing on the operative part of the judgment under appeal. (67) Second, as the Parliament has rightly observed, the General Court reproduced, in paragraphs 100 to 105 of that judgment, the content of several points of the decisions at issue as well as the conclusions made by the Parliament, and those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal by no means set out the General Court’s own interpretation of the scope of the immunity provided for in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. 204. In the first place, as regards the appellants’ arguments based on the immunity provided for in the second paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, which is allegedly independent from the immunity provided for in the first paragraph of that article, those arguments should, in my view, be rejected as unfounded. As I noted in my analysis of the sixth ground of appeal, (68) after the opening of the first session of a parliamentary term and the actual assumption of the duties of an MEP, a Member enjoys only the protection provided for in the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. In the present case, the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7 was lifted after the appellants actually took up their duties as Members. At that stage, they likewise ceased to enjoy the protection provided for in the second paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol. In order to guarantee the protection provided for in the second paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, there was thus no need to clarify, in the decisions at issue, the measures that may be adopted in the context of the execution of the European arrest warrants. 205. In the second place, as regards the arguments alleging the distortion of evidence, I am of the view that they should be rejected. The arguments concerning, first, the scope of the appellants’ immunity, as provided for in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of Protocol No 7, are ineffective since the line of argument based on the alleged error by the General Court is, as I have just stated, (69) ineffective. Secondly, the arguments regarding the immunity provided for in point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 9 of that protocol are unfounded, since the General Court did not err in the interpretation of the judgment in Junqueras Vies. 206. In the third place, as regards the argument based on the confidentiality of the procedure conducted before the JURI committee, I have already examined that argument. (70) 207. In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the fifth ground of appeal should be rejected. 3. Conclusion on the fifth ground of appeal 208. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that the fifth ground of appeal should be rejected. G. Costs 209. With regard to the appeal lodged by the first appellant and the third appellant, in accordance with Article 142 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 184 of those Rules, the costs are, in such cases, in the discretion of the Court. In the present case, since the circumstances justifying a finding that there is no need to adjudicate on the appeal are beyond the parties’ control, the parties should each be ordered to bear their own costs. 210. As regards the appeal lodged by the second appellant, since this Opinion is confined to an analysis of the third, fifth and sixth grounds of appeal, I will not make a proposal as to costs, since the solution in that regard is dependent on the outcome of the other grounds of appeal, in accordance with Article 138 of the Rules of Procedure. V. Conclusion 211. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should: – declare that there is no need to adjudicate on the appeal lodged by Mr Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Ms Clara Ponsatí i Obiols; – in relation to the appeal lodged by Mr Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Ms Clara Ponsatí i Obiols, order the parties each to bear their own costs; – reject the third, fifth and sixth grounds of the appeal lodged by Mr Antoni Comín i Oliveres. 1 Original language: French. 2 I note, as is apparent from paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, that those three decisions are virtually identical, with the exception of the names of the Members concerned, the date on which certain judicial acts were adopted and, as regards Ms Ponsatí i Obiols, the circumstances of her election to the Parliament and the fact that she is being prosecuted in the criminal proceedings at issue solely for the alleged offence of sedition. 3 OJ 2012 C 326, p. 266. 4 OJ 2019 L 302, p. 1, in the version prior to amendment by the decision of the Parliament of 17 January 2023. 5 DOGC No 7449A of 6 September 2017, p. 1. 6 DOGC No 7451A of 8 September 2017, p. 1. 7 Namely, the third, fifth, sixth and seventh pleas. 8 Judgment of 6 September 2018, Bank Mellat v Council (C‑430/16 P, EU:C:2018:668, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 9 Judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission (C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 10 Judgment of 13 July 2023, D & A Pharma v EMA (C‑136/22 P, EU:C:2023:572, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). 11 Judgment of 18 October 2018, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills v Council (C‑100/17 P, EU:C:2018:842, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 12 See point 22 of this Opinion. 13 I note in that regard that, on 12 September 2024, the second appellant brought before the General Court an action under Article 263 TFEU, registered under number T‑477/24, seeking the annulment of the European Parliament’s decision not to recognise him as an elected Member of the Parliament for the parliamentary term 2024-2029. That case was removed from the register, following the discontinuance of the proceedings by that appellant, by order of the President of the Eighth Chamber of the General Court of 14 November 2024, Comín i Oliveres v Parliament (T‑477/24, EU:T:2024:836). 14 Judgment of 19 December 2019 (C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, operative part) (‘the judgment in Junqueras Vies’). 15 See my Opinion in Junqueras Vies (C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:958, points 3 and 4). 16 See, in that regard, ECtHR, 17 May 2016, Karácsony and Others v. Hungary (CE:ECHR:2016:0517JUD004246113, § 138), and ECtHR, 20 December 2016, Uspaskich v. Lithuania (CE:ECHR:2016:1220JUD001473708, § 98), cited by the Court of Justice in the judgment in Junqueras Vies. 17 The judgment in Junqueras Vies (paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). 18 See my Opinion in Junqueras Vies (C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:958, point 5). 19 ECtHR, 20 December 2016, Uspaskich v. Lithuania, CE:ECHR:2016:1220JUD001473708, § 91. 20 See, inter alia, judgments of 17 January 2013, Gollnisch v Parliament (T‑346/11 and T‑347/11, EU:T:2013:23, paragraph 60); of 8 November 2018, Troszczynski v Parliament (T‑550/17, EU:T:2018:754, paragraph 44); of 1 December 2021, Jalkh v Parliament (T‑230/21, EU:T:2021:848, paragraph 24); and of 26 June 2024, Fest v Parliament (T‑305/23, EU:T:2024:422, paragraph 24). 21 The General Court classifies decisions to waive immunity as ‘decisions of a political nature’. In that regard, it is apparent from the Report on the Scope and Lifting of Parliamentary Immunities adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th plenary session (Venice, 21-22 March 2014) (‘the Venice Commission report’) that that classification reflects that of some national legal systems (paragraph 135 of the Venice Commission report). Regardless of the term used to describe the nature of that decision, the broad discretion enjoyed by the Parliament in adopting it is the most important factor. 22 Judgment of 17 September 2020, Troszczynski v Parliament (C‑12/19 P, EU:C:2020:725, paragraph 25). 23 See, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 24 May 2022, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain (C‑629/21 P(R), EU:C:2022:413, paragraphs 193 and 194). 24 Judgment of 1 February 2024, Scania and Others v Commission (C‑251/22 P, EU:C:2024:103, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). 25 The second sentence of point 8 of Notice No 11/2019 is irrelevant to the issue forming the subject of the first part of the third ground of appeal. However, it will be relevant to the analysis of the second part of that ground of appeal and will be set out in the next section. 26 Judgment of 22 December 2022, Parliament v Moi (C‑246/21 P, EU:C:2022:1026, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 27 See point 60 of this Opinion. 28 Judgment of 7 March 2024, Nevinnomysskiy Azot and NAK “Azot” v Commission (C‑725/22 P, EU:C:2024:217, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited). 29 Judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). 30 Judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 31 Judgment of 11 December 2019, Mytilinaios Anonymos Etairia – Omilos Epicheiriseon (C‑332/18 P, EU:C:2019:1065, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited). 32 See judgment of 16 September 2020, BP v FRA (C‑669/19 P, EU:C:2020:713, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 33 See judgment of 16 September 2020, BP v FRA (C‑669/19 P, EU:C:2020:713, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 34 See, to that effect, judgment of 3 March 2022, WV v EEAS (C‑162/20 P, EU:C:2022:153, paragraphs 67 to 69 and the case-law cited). 35 Judgment of 9 November 2017, TV2/Danmark v Commission (C‑649/15 P, EU:C:2017:835, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 36 See point 54 of this Opinion. 37 Judgment of 9 September 2003, Kik v OHIM (C‑361/01 P, EU:C:2003:434, paragraph 101). 38 See paragraph 194 of the Venice Commission report. 39 Alleging infringement of the immunities provided for in Article 343 TFEU and in Article 9 of Protocol No 7, read in conjunction with Article 6, Article 39(2) and Article 45 of the Charter as well as Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure. 40 Alleging breach of the principles of good administration and equal treatment. 41 The nine complaints in the first part are preceded by an introductory complaint relating to the infringement of the appellants’ fundamental rights. Since that question forms the subject of the fourth complaint, there is no need to consider it as a separate complaint and I will therefore examine it in the context of the fourth complaint. 42 See point 116 of this Opinion. 43 See point 43 of this Opinion. 44 See paragraphs 162, 188 and 190 of the Venice Commission report. 45 Judgment of 27 April 2023, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Pesaro and Others v Commission (C‑549/21 P, EU:C:2023:340, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). 46 The judgment in Junqueras Vies, paragraph 78. 47 The judgment in Junqueras Vies, paragraph 80. 48 The judgment in Junqueras Vies, paragraph 79. 49 Judgment of 10 July 1986, Wybot (149/85, EU:C:1986:310, paragraph 27). 50 See footnote 41 to this Opinion. 51 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1). 52 See point 125 of this Opinion. 53 See paragraph 168 of the Venice Commission report. 54 Judgment of 28 September 2023, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission (C‑123/21 P, EU:C:2023:708, paragraph 185 and the case-law cited). 55 Judgment of 4 October 2024, Mylan IRE Healthcare v Commission (C‑237/22 P, EU:C:2024:850, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). 56 Paragraphs 339 to 365 of the application for annulment. 57 See points 143 and 144 of this Opinion. 58 See the next section of this Opinion. 59 See points 138 and 145 of this Opinion. 60 Order of 22 December 2022, Jalkh v Parliament (C‑82/22 P, EU:C:2022:1039, paragraph 38). 61 See, in that regard, judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 62 See point 128 of this Opinion. 63 See, in that regard, Section IV.C of this Opinion, in particular points 43 to 45. 64 See Section IV.E.1 of this Opinion. 65 See Section IV.C of this Opinion, in particular points 43 to 45. 66 Judgment of 22 December 2022, Parliament v Moi (C‑246/21 P, EU:C:2022:1026, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). 67 See, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2023, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Pesaro and Others v Commission (C‑549/21 P, EU:C:2023:340, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). 68 See point 126 of this Opinion. 69 See point 203 of this Opinion. 70 See Section IV.D.4 of this Opinion.