Order;Summary — ECLI:EU:C:2021:258
Date: 2021-03-26
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: Asylum policy;Area of freedom, security and justice
Procedure: Reference for a preliminary ruling
Origin: Belgium

Translation C-92/21 – 1 
Case C-92/21 
Request for a preliminary ruling  
Date lodged: 
15 February 2021 
Referring court: 
Tribunal du travail de Liège (Labour Court, Liège, Belgium) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
8 February 2021 
Applicant: 
VW 
Defendant:  
Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil) 
  
Tribunal du Travail de Liège – Division Liège 
Judgment of the Third Chamber, 8 February 2021 
In the proceedings: 
Mr VW, […] applicant […] 
v 
Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des Demandeurs d’Asile (‘Fedasil’) 
[…] 
defendant […] 
PROCEDURE 
[…] [Or. 2]  
EN 
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THE FACTS 
Mr VW was born on 5 October 2002. He is of Guinean nationality. 
He arrived in Belgium on 13 October 2020 and submitted an application for 
international protection on 14 October 2020, when he had just reached the age of 
18 years. 
The Belgian authorities sent a request to take charge to the Spanish authorities, 
which agreed to do so on 28 October 2020. 
On 2 December 2020, the Office des étrangers (‘the Immigration Office’) served 
on Mr VW a decision refusing leave to remain and ordering him to leave the 
territory (an ‘Annex 26quater’), requesting him to return to Spain, as that country 
had agreed to take charge of his application for international protection in 
application of the European Dublin III Regulation. 1 
On 9 December 2020, Mr VW lodged an appeal against that decision of the 
Immigration Office before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for 
asylum and immigration proceedings). 
On 4 December 2020, Fedasil amended Mr VW’s reception centre and assigned as 
a compulsory reception centre a ‘Dublin’ place in the Mouscron Centre. 
That is the contested decision. 
On 9 December 2020, Mr VW lodged an appeal […] against that decision. 
On 10 December 2020, the Tribunal du travail de Liège (Labour Court, Liège), in 
interlocutory proceedings, issued an interim measure ordering Fedasil to continue 
to accommodate Mr VW at the centre in which he is currently staying, the Red 
Cross Centre in Bierset, and to provide him with assistance as defined in 
Article 2(6) of the [Loi du 12 janvier relative à l'accueil des demandeurs d'asile et 
de certaines autres catégories d'étrangers (Law of 12 January 2007 on the 
reception of asylum seekers and certain other categories of immigrants)(‘the Law 
on reception’] […], provided that a substantive appeal was lodged against 
Fedasil’s decision of 4 December 2020 within one month of the order, and until 
such time as a judgment on the substance was delivered. 
On 5 January 2021, […] [this court confirmed that decision]. 
Mr VW brought the present proceedings on 9 December 2020. 
 
1 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 182 p. 31). 
FEDASIL 
 
3 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
Mr VW seeks annulment of Fedasil’s decision. 
He asks that, before his application is determined, the following question be 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
‘Must Article 27 of Regulation[(EU) No] 604/2003 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining [Or. 3] an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (recast) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a national procedural 
rule which does not automatically suspend transfer until the first application for 
suspension has been determined[?]’ 
He asks that Fedasil be ordered to continue to accommodate him in the Bierset 
reception centre at least until the outcome of his appeal before the Conseil du 
contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) 
against the Annex 26quater. 
[…] EXAMINATION OF THE REQUEST 
1. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES 
1. 
Mr VW maintains that Fedasil’s decision constitutes a breach of his right to a 
suspensive action against the decision of the Immigration Office (the decision to 
transfer him to Spain and ordering him to leave the territory within 10 days), 
because it already constitutes an act preparatory to the enforcement of that 
decision. 
2. 
Fedasil […] contends that, in accordance with its obligations, it provides the 
material assistance due to Mr VW, in accordance with Article 2(6) of the Law on 
reception and in compliance with the judgment [of 27 September 2012, Cimade 
and GISTI (C-179/11, EU:C:2012:594)]. 
It maintains that Mr VW’s transfer of Mr VW to the Mouscron centre has no 
impact on the effectiveness of his appeal against the Annex 26quater, since 
Mr VW [would] be in the same material and legal circumstances in that centre for 
the purpose of exercising his right to an effective remedy. 
It further maintains that the Immigration Office may decide to enforce the 
decision refusing leave to remain and ordering the applicant to leave the territory 
at any time, irrespective of the centre in which he is accommodated. 
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In Fedasil’s submission, a ‘Dublin’ place is a standard place of accommodation 
within open centres, distinguished solely by the fact that it provides support 
appropriate to the administrative situation of beneficiaries who have been notified 
of an Annex 26quater. 
Fedasil is merely carrying out its legal task by providing information relating to a 
voluntary return programme, since, according to Article 2(6) of the Law on 
reception, that programme is included in the material assistance which the 
applicant for international protection is entitled to receive. 
Fedasil adds, last, that the appeals provided for in Belgian law against an 
Annex 26quater are consistent with European law since, even though the appeal 
before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and 
immigration proceedings) does not have suspensive effect, it follows from the loi 
du 10 avril 2014 portant des dispositions diverses concernant la procédure devant 
le Conseil du Contentieux des étrangers et le Conseil d’état (Law of 10 April 
concerning various provisions relating to the procedure before the Council for 
asylum and immigration proceedings and the Council of State) that [Or. 4] that 
the removal will not be enforced until after the period prescribed for submitting an 
extremely urgent application for suspension […]. 
2. […] 
[…]  
[…] [Or. 5]  
[…] [grounds not relevant to the request for a preliminary ruling] 
3. INTERNAL LEGALITY OF THE CONTESTED DECISION  
3.1. The relevant principles 
1. 
The right to an effective remedy under the European provisions 
Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation […] guarantees that an asylum seeker will 
have an effective remedy against a decision to transfer him to another Member 
State in order to have his application for international protection processed. It 
provides that: 
‘1. The applicant or another person as referred to in Article 18(1)(c) or (d) shall 
have the right to an effective remedy, in the form of an appeal or a review, in fact 
and in law, against a transfer decision, before a court or tribunal. 
2. Member States shall provide for a reasonable period of time within which the 
person concerned may exercise his or her right to an effective remedy pursuant to 
paragraph 1. 
FEDASIL 
 
5 
3. For the purposes of appeals against, or reviews of, transfer decisions, Member 
States shall provide in their national law that: 
(a) the appeal or review confers upon the person concerned the right to remain 
in the Member State concerned pending the outcome of the appeal or review; or 
[Or. 6]  
(b) the transfer is automatically suspended and such suspension lapses after a 
certain reasonable period of time, during which a court or a tribunal, after a close 
and rigorous scrutiny, shall have taken a decision whether to grant suspensive 
effect to an appeal or review; or  
(c) the person concerned has the opportunity to request within a reasonable 
period of time a court or tribunal to suspend the implementation of the transfer 
decision pending the outcome of his or her appeal or review. Member States shall 
ensure that an effective remedy is in place by suspending the transfer until the 
decision on the first suspension request is taken. Any decision on whether to 
suspend the implementation of the transfer decision shall be taken within a 
reasonable period of time, while permitting a close and rigorous scrutiny of the 
suspension request. A decision not to suspend the implementation of the transfer 
decision shall state the reasons on which it is based. 
4. Member States may provide that the competent authorities may decide, 
acting ex officio, to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision pending 
the outcome of the appeal or review. …’. 
That right to an effective remedy therefore includes the right to a suspensive 
appeal or at least the right to request a court or tribunal to give a reasoned decision 
on the request for suspension. 
That provision is directly applicable in Belgian law. 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also 
establishes the right to an effective remedy. It provides that: 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.’ 
Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms also provides that: 
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‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’. 
In a judgment delivered on 21 October 2014, 2 the European Court of Human 
Rights states that the analysis of the right to an effective remedy does not depend 
solely on the legal arsenal made available to the asylum seeker, but also on the 
possibilities which he has in practice of exercising such a remedy. 
In that judgment, the [European] Court [of Human Rights] states that:  
‘… 
167. The effectiveness of the remedy intended by Article 13 extends to a 
sufficient degree of accessibility and reality of that remedy: “in order to be 
effective, the remedy required by Article 13 must be available in practice as well 
as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably 
hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State” 
(I.M. v. France, cited above, § 130, and the authorities cited there). On the subject 
of the remedies available for asylum seekers in Greece, the Court has also 
reasserted that the accessibility of a remedy “in practice” is decisive when 
assessing its effectiveness (M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, § 318).  
168. As the purpose of the Convention is to protect rights that are not theoretical 
and illusory, but real and effective, for every person coming within the jurisdiction 
of the High Contracting Parties, the Court cannot assess the practical accessibility 
of a remedy without having regard to the linguistic obstacles, the possibility of 
having access to the necessary information and to informed advice, the 
material conditions which the person concerned may encounter and any 
other specific circumstance of the case (I.M. v. France, cited above, §§ 145-148; 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, §§ 301-308; and Rahimi v. Greece, 
No. 8687/08, § 79, 5 April 2011)’. 
2. 
Remedies provided for in Belgian law 
In Belgian law, the lodging of an appeal against [Annex 16 quarter] does not have 
the effect of suspending the enforcement of that decision (Article[s] 39/2 and 
39/79 of the loi du 15 décembre 1981 sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, 
l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Law of 15 December 1981 on 
access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals). 
 
2 [ECtHR, 21 October 2014, Sharifi and others v. Italy and Greece, 
CE:ECHR:2014:1021JUD001664309)]. 
FEDASIL 
 
7 
Only in the context of an extremely urgent administrative application may the 
asylum seeker request suspension of the decision refusing leave to remain and 
ordering him to leave the territory. 
However, that extremely urgent application is possible only where the asylum 
seeker is subject to a removal or refoulement the enforcement of which is 
imminent (Article 39/82 of the Law of 15 December 1980). 
3. 
The right to reception of asylum seekers 
Under Article 3 of the […] Law on reception: 
‘Every asylum seeker shall be entitled to a reception that must permit him to lead 
a life in accordance with human dignity. 
Reception shall mean material assistance granted in accordance with this Law or 
social assistance granted by the public centres for social action in accordance with 
the loi du 8 juillet 1976 organique des centres publics d’action sociale 
(Institutional Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social action).’ 
Under Article 2(6) of that law, material assistance is ‘assistance granted by the 
Agency or the partner, within a reception centre, consisting in particular of 
accommodation, meals, clothing, medical, social and psychological support and 
the grant of a daily allowance. It shall also include access to legal aid, access to 
services such as interpretation and training and also access to a voluntary return 
programme’. [Or. 8]  
In application of the judgment [of 27 September 2012, Cimade and GISTI 
(C-179/11, EU:C:2012:594)] […], the asylum seeker must continue to receive that 
material assistance until his actual transfer to the State responsible for processing 
the application for international protection. 
That material assistance is, in particular, […] [granted by means] of the 
designation to the asylum seeker by Fedasil of a compulsory reception centre 
(Article 1(1) of the Law on reception). 
Article 12(2) of that law states that: 
‘2. In application of Article 11(3)(3), the Agency may on its own initiative or at 
the request of the partner or the asylum seeker alter the compulsory place of 
registration designated in application of Article 11(1).’ 
Article 11(3) provides that: ‘When designating a compulsory place of registration, 
the Agency shall ensure that that place is appropriate for the beneficiary of the 
reception, within the limits of the places available’. 
3.2. Application to the facts 
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1. 
The extent of the court’s jurisdiction 
The court recalls that its jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on the grant by 
Fedasil of the material assistance due to the asylum seeker under Article 2, 6 of 
the Law on reception. 
[…] [a description of the respective jurisdiction of the referring court and the 
Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration 
proceedings)] 
The question of the existence of an effective remedy against the ‘Annex 26quater’ 
decision of the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and 
immigration proceedings) can also be examined by the court only from the aspect 
of material assistance. 
It is therefore solely a matter of ascertaining whether the material assistance 
granted to Mr VW in the Mouscron centre will provide him with the same 
material and legal conditions as his reception in a different centre, in such a way 
as to allow him to exercise, on the same conditions, his right to an effective 
remedy. 
In order to attempt to answer that question, the court considers that it must first 
answer […] [two questions] […] [Or. 9]  
2. 
Is the transfer to a Dublin place the beginning of the implementation of the order 
to leave the territory? 
As indicated above, in Belgian law the lodging of an appeal against […] 
[Annex 26quater] does not have the effect of suspending the implementation of 
that decision. 
It is for that reason that, where an asylum seeker is notified of an order to leave 
the country with a view to a ‘Dublin transfer’, Fedasil takes a decision to modify 
the compulsory place of reception and orders his transfer to a ‘Dublin place’.  
The material assistance provided for in Article 2(6) of the Law on reception is 
then compulsorily provided in that centre. 
The decision taken by Fedasil with respect to Mr VW in that context states: 
‘… You must return to the Member State designated as responsible for processing 
your application for international protection. 
FEDASIL 
 
9 
In application of Article 12(2), and to allow you to benefit from the 
accommodation most appropriate to your procedural status, the following 
reception facility is designated as the compulsory place of registration: 
[Place Dublin-Mouscron Reception Facility]’. (emphasis added by the referring 
court) 
The decision states that material assistance will be granted until Mr VW is actually 
transferred to the responsible Member State. 
FEDASIL maintains that the sole purpose of the transfer to a ‘Dublin place’ is to 
provide the asylum seeker with support appropriate to his specific situation and 
that the staff in those centres are specially trained to explain to residents the 
consequences of the decision taken by the Immigration Office. Fedasil maintains 
that no psychological pressure is applied to residents to encourage them to leave 
the territory and that the transfer to a ‘Dublin place’ is not the beginning of the 
implementation of the order to leave the territory. 
The document of 13 July 2018 entitled ‘Info Place Dublin’, produced by Fedasil 
in other identical cases, mentions, however, the purpose of the ‘support’ organised 
in aa ‘Dublin place’ reception centre. 
It states that: 
– assignation to a ‘Dublin place’ is a phase in the reception path of 
beneficiaries for whom a ‘Dublin return’ has been requested and granted. 
– in the ‘Dublin place’, the beneficiary receives support consistent with his 
administrative situation and is permitted to prepare for his departure to the 
Member State designated as responsible. 
– the approach in the ‘Dublin place’ aims to communicate clearly the 
consequences of the notification of the Annex 26quater, to answer any 
questions which the resident may have in that respect and to prepare him as 
best as possible for the next stages in [Or. 10] the procedure. The emphasis 
is mainly on the preparation and organisation of the journey (emphasis 
added by the referring court). 
It is also stated in that document that there are three interviews, which must relate 
to different points (checklist of the three interviews): 
– the first relates to information, 
– the second relates to the decision, and in that respect it is stated that the 
asylum seeker is requested to complete and sign the document ‘declaration 
relating to the organisation of the journey’; he is reminded that the appeal to 
the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and 
immigration proceedings) does not have suspensive effect by operation of 
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law and that the failure to cooperate in the Dublin transfer carries the risk of 
removal and transfer, which may be ‘enforced’ by the Immigration Office, 
– the third relates to actual departure (again, emphasis added by the referring 
court). 
The document further states that: 
‘In view of the central role of the Immigration Office in the Dublin process, a 
liaison officer from that authority is present in the reception centre.  
That allows Fedasil’s staff to contact it at any time for fuller information 
concerning a case or a country or any other question linked with the Dublin 
regulation. It also facilitates the communication of any factor that should be taken 
into account in the context of the proposed transfer (actual organisation of the 
journey, consideration of specific needs in the journey, extension of the time to 
leave the territory)’ (again, emphasis added by the referring court). 
In a judgment of 10 February 2020 delivered in a similar case, the Cour du travail 
de Liège, division Liège (Higher Labour Court, Liège, Liège Division), states: 
‘… what distinguishes a “return” place from an ordinary place is the support put 
in place in order to prepare for a transfer to another Member State. If, as Mr M. 
maintains, his appeal against the decision refusing leave to remain and ordering 
him to leave the territory must be recognised as having suspensive effect pursuant 
to Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation, there is no reason to put in place the 
support linked with the transfer to another Member State. 
What does that mean? As is apparent from the document entitled “Info place 
Dublin” of 13 July 2018 placed on Fedasil’s file, inclusion in the “Dublin places” 
quota” 
“Constitutes a stage in the reception journey of beneficiaries for whom a Dublin 
take charge has been requested and granted (decision 26quater + laissez-passer). It 
is based on the intention to offer support that is most appropriate for the 
administrative situation of the resident”. A liaison officer from the Immigration 
Office is present at the reception centre. 
Specifically, those concerned take part in a minimum of three interviews aimed at 
clearly communicating the consequences of the notification of an 
Annex 26quater, answering any questions which the resident might have on that 
subject and preparing them in the best way for the subsequent stages of the 
procedure. It is apparent from that document that at the first interview three 
options are given to the persons concerned:  
“Option 1: be maintained in the organisation of the transfer with the support of the 
Immigration Office;  
Option 2: travel to the Member State by his own means within the period 
prescribed in the [order to leave the territory];  
FEDASIL 
 
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Option3: not cooperate in the Dublin transfer and thus be at risk of enforced 
removal by the [Immigration Office]”. [Or. 11]  
The persons concerned are also informed that an appeal to the Conseil du 
contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) 
against the Annex 26quater (the decision refusing leave to remain and ordering 
the person concerned to leave the territory and the order requiring him to return 
to another Member State) does not automatically have suspensive effect. While it 
is not disputed that, as domestic law now stands, that appeal does not have 
suspensive effect, that lack of suspensive effect is specifically a particularly 
contentious factor.’ 
On the basis of the foregoing, and in particular of the information supplied to the 
asylum seeker, which emphasises that the order to leave the territory is 
enforceable in spite of an appeal having been lodged and that the transfer may be 
enforced, it appears that the asylum seeker may fear that his right to an effective 
remedy will be compromised if he remains in the Dublin centre and he may 
therefore feel obliged to leave the place of compulsory registration assigned to 
him in order to avoid an enforced transfer. In that case he loses the right to 
material assistance supplied by Fedasil. 
If that is the case, the ‘Dublin’ transfer decision taken by Fedasil is contrary to its 
obligation to provide material assistance appropriate to the asylum seeker (since 
the asylum seeker can accept it only by waiving his rights). It is also contrary to 
European law, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy (including its 
‘suspensive effect’ component). 
Nonetheless, at this stage the court considers that it does not have sufficient 
information to determine whether the abovementioned risks are real and whether 
they are confirmed by the facts. 
Conversely, the court considers that it is already certain, in the light of the 
foregoing, that the transfer to a Dublin reception centre constitutes at the 
very least an act preparatory to the enforcement of the order to leave the 
territory. 
[That] leads the court to the next question: 
3. 
Is this beginning of an enforcement contrary to Article 27 of the Dublin III 
Regulation? 
1. 
That question implies other questions: 
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– Does Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation preclude any act preparatory to the 
enforcement of the transfer or does it preclude only the enforcement of the 
transfer while the appeal is pending? 
– Is the suspensive nature of the appeal guaranteed in Belgian law by the fact that 
the asylum seeker has the benefit of an extremely urgent application if he is the 
subject of a measure of restraint aimed at his removal from the territory? 
2. 
In the judgment of 10 February 2020 cited above, […] the Cour du travail (Higher 
Labour Court) states, in particular: 
‘Nonetheless, Article 39(82)(4) of the Law of 15 December 1980 on access to the 
territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals provides that 
where the foreign national is subject to an imminently enforceable removal or 
refoulement, he may make an extremely urgent application for suspension of 
enforcement of that measure, provided however that he has not yet lodged an 
ordinary application for its suspension. If the foreign national had already lodged 
an [Or. 12] ordinary application for suspension and the enforcement of the 
removal measure becomes imminent, he may request, by means of provisional 
measures, that the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and 
immigration proceedings) adjudicate without delay on the ordinary application for 
suspension that was previously lodged. Once that request has been received, the 
removal measure can no longer be enforced (Articles 39(84) and 39(85) of that 
law). 
Although the extremely urgent application is indeed suspensive, it is not available 
in all situations and is subject to removal or refoulement being imminent. 
Generally, lawyers representing foreign nationals maintain that the concept of 
“imminence” is interpreted by the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council 
for asylum and immigration proceedings) as meaning that such a request is 
declared admissible only when the person concerned has been deprived of his 
liberty with a view to his removal. That theory has to a certain extent been echoed 
in decisions of Labour Courts cited by Mr M. In addition, a letter from the 
Immigration Office in Fedasil’s file (relating to a similar case) gives as an 
example of imminent danger “transfer under restraint”, which strongly resembles 
a euphemism for deprivation of liberty. 
That letter confirms that the Office suspends implementation of the removal only 
where there is an extremely urgent application for suspension of the measure and 
not where there has been an ordinary application for suspension. It adds that, 
according to the case-law of the Conseil d’État (Council of State), a transfer to 
another Member State would not cause the action to become devoid of purpose 
because in the event of annulment, Belgium would again become competent in the 
event of the annulment of the transfer decision. 
FEDASIL 
 
13 
It is therefore settled case-law that an ordinary application for suspension lodged 
by asylum seekers subject to the “Dublin” procedure who are not facing imminent 
refoulement does not have suspensive effect and that only an extremely urgent 
application for suspension, subject to a condition of imminence, is suspensive. 
… 
In two judgments delivered in the Grand Chamber, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union had the opportunity to rule that a restrictive interpretation of the 
extent of the right to a remedy laid down in Article 27(1) of the Dublin III 
Regulation might preclude the attainment of the objective of protection granted to 
asylum seekers, such protection being ensured in particular by the requirement of 
an effective remedy. 
A crucial point must, however, be clarified: how is that question, which 
essentially relates to the law on foreign nationals, relevant for the purpose of 
resolving the dispute pending before the Cour du travail (Higher Labour Court)? 
On the assumption that, in application of the primacy of European law, it were 
necessary to recognise that an ordinary application for suspension directed against 
an Annex 26quater (which refuses leave to remain in Belgium, issues an order to 
leave the territory and requires him to travel to another Member State for 
examination of his application for international protection) has absolute 
suspensive effect, such an appeal would temporarily block a transfer to another 
Member State. 
If a transfer were not yet on the agenda, there would be no need to envisage a 
return path. 
Consequently, removal to a place of return intended to prepare the persons 
concerned for their transfer to another Member State (which coincides with a 
change of centre and the loss of some of the familiarity with their surroundings 
already acquired by newly arrived persons following what is frequently an 
exhausting journey) would be premature. [Or. 13]  
If a change of centre carried out in order to allow preparations to be made for the 
transfer of an asylum seeker subject to the “Dublin” procedure were premature, 
pending the outcome of a suspensive appeal, the labour courts would have to 
annul such decisions issued by Fedasil – unless it were considered that if the 
implementation of the transfer itself is halted, the implementation of the return 
path is possible. 
In short, if the effective remedy referred to in Article 27 of the Dublin III 
Regulation must be understood as an absolute suspensive appeal, Fedasil’s 
decision is unlawful and must be reversed. It might also be possible to envisage a 
more flexible suspensive effect, which would preclude the implementation of the 
transfer decision but not necessarily the establishment of a return path within a 
“Dublin place”’. 
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In those circumstances, the Cour du travail [de Liège] (Labour Court[, Liège] 
submitted … to the Court of Justice of the European Union two questions for a 
preliminary ruling […]. 
[…] [the same questions are set out in the operative part] 
3. 
By order of 3 December 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided 
that: 
– there was no need to deal with that case under the urgent preliminary ruling 
procedure; 
– there was no need to rule on the requests for a preliminary ruling submitted 
by the Cour du travail de Liège (Higher Labour Court, Liège) on the ground 
that the time limit for transferring the asylum seeker concerned had 
expired[,] so that the Dublin transfer was no longer envisaged by Belgium. 
The […] relevant [questions] submitted by the Cour du travail de Liège (Higher 
Labour Court, Liège) therefore remain unanswered to this day. 
4. 
The answer to those questions is nonetheless necessary for the resolution of the 
present dispute. 
The court considers that the dispute raises one or more questions relating to the 
areas covered by Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
It is therefore appropriate to submit to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
two questions for a preliminary ruling identical to those formulated by the Cour 
du travail de Liège (Higher Labour Court, Liège). 
[…] [Or. 14] […] 
The Court considers that there are valid grounds to request the Court of 
Justice to deal with those questions under the urgent procedure provided for 
in Article 108 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union or at the very least under the expedited procedure provided for in 
Article 105. 
Mr VW has just attained his majority. He is therefore a fragile person who must 
be afforded special protection. He is still being housed in the Red Cross Centre in 
Bierset (which he does not wish to leave) under the order made, on application by 
a third party, by the President of the Tribunal du travail de Liège (Labour Court, 
Liège). Nonetheless, he is subject to an order to leave the territory, against which 
he has lodged a non-suspensive appeal and which may be enforced at any time.
FEDASIL 
 
15 
  
As he is being housed in a reception centre, he is at an official location, so that 
there is nothing to preclude his being the subject of an enforced removal.  
Such a measure is likely to cause him serious harm.  
Mr VW has a clear interest in his rights being determined as quickly as possible. 
In addition, the Spanish authorities stated that they agreed to take charge of 
Mr VW’s international protection on 28 October 2020. In application of 
Article 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, Belgium will again become responsible 
for processing his application for international protection on 28 April 2021. With 
a view to the correct application of the Dublin III Regulation, it is right that an 
answer to the questions referred be given before that date. 
5. 
The court recalls that, according to the order made by the Tribunal du travail 
(Labour Court) in interlocutory proceedings on 5 January 2021, Fedasil must 
continue to accommodate Mr VW in the Red Cross reception centre at Bierset in 
which he is currently being accommodated until this court has adjudicated on the 
substance of his application. 
DECISION OF THE COURT 
The court […] 
before adjudicating on the substance, submits, in application of the second 
paragraph of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
the following questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: 
– Is a remedy, provided for by domestic law to asylum seekers who have 
been requested to have their applications for international protection 
examined in another Member State, which does not have suspensory 
effect and may acquire such effect only if the asylum seeker is deprived 
of liberty with a view to his imminent transfer an effective remedy [Or. 
15] within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation […]? 
– Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III 
Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a 
measure of enforced transfer while an appeal against that transfer 
decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory 
to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths 
for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum 
applications examined in another European country? 
Requests the Court of Justice of the European Union to deal with the matter under 
the urgent procedure, or at least under the expedited procedure. 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING OF 8. 2. 2021 – CASE C-92/21 
 
16  
[…] [procedure]