Information;Order — ECLI:EU:T:2021:564
Date: 2021-09-09
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: Research and technological development
Procedure: Arbitration clause - application inadmissible
Origin: Germany

summary of the pleas in law’. 35 Under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is applicable to proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a brief statement of those pleas in law. 36 Those particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary without other supporting information (judgment of 17 May 2017, PG v Frontex, T‑583/16, not published, EU:T:2017:344, paragraph 90). In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice it is necessary, in order for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal and factual particulars relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see order of 27 March 2017, Frank v Commission, T‑603/15, not published, EU:T:2017:228, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). 37 The application must, accordingly, specify the nature of the grounds on which the action is based, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. Similar requirements are called for where a submission is made in support of a plea in law (see judgment of 25 March 2015, Belgium v Commission, T‑538/11, EU:T:2015:188, paragraph 131 and the case-law cited; order of 27 November 2020, PL v Commission, T‑728/19, not published, EU:T:2020:575, paragraph 64). 38 Thus, the applicant is required to set out in a sufficiently systematic manner the arguments relating to each plea in law on which it relies, and the General Court is not obliged, because of the lack of structure of the application or lack of rigour on the part of the applicant, to reconstruct the legal structure intended to support a plea by bringing together various diffuse elements of the application. The risk would be to reconstruct that plea by giving it a scope which it did not have in the mind of that party. To decide otherwise would be contrary both to the principle of the sound administration of justice and the principle that the subject matter of an action is delimited by the parties and to the defendant’s rights of defence (order of 6 September 2019, Romańska v Frontex, T‑212/18, not published, EU:T:2019:581, paragraph 42). Lastly, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the applicant and attempt to seek and identify in the annexes the grounds on which it may consider the action to be based, since the annexes have a purely evidential and instrumental function (see order of 28 April 1993, De Hoe v Commission, T‑85/92, EU:T:1993:39, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 39 In the present case, the action lacks clarity in its entirety, in that, despite the fact that the applicant claims not to dispute the validity of the set-off decisions and does not base its action on Article 263 TFEU, but on Article 272 TFEU, it nevertheless follows from its arguments, on several occasions, that it considers those set-off decisions to be ‘ineffective’, ‘without effect’ or ‘ void’ on account of the application of German insolvency law, which, in its view, justifies its action for payment. Therefore, it is apparent from its written pleadings that there is an inconsistency between the legal basis relied on and the arguments put forward. 40 As regards, more specifically, the Commission’s complaint that almost no reference is made to the clauses of the relevant grant agreements, it is clear that the applicant, in Annex A.23 to the reply, produced ‘all the relevant grant agreements’, without providing any explanation as to their contents or relevant parts. As there are more than 2 900 pages of text, which is largely repetitive, that documentation is, in practice, of no explanatory value. 41 The only specific and precise reference to the relevant clauses made by the applicant concerns Article ‘11.14.1 of the grant agreements [which] defines eligible costs to be actual costs (1), incurred by the beneficiary (2) during the duration of the project (3), determined according to the usual accounting and management principles and practices of the beneficiary (4), used for the sole purpose of achieving the objectives of the project and its expected results in a manner consistent with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (5), recorded in the accounts of the beneficiary (6) and indicated in the estimated overall budget annexed to the Grant Agreement (7)’. 42 Even if it is assumed that that definition of eligible costs is uniform for all the relevant grant agreements, it is clear that the dispute in the present case raises issues which are not governed under that clause, in particular as regards the procedures to be followed in order to recover the costs incurred from the coordinators of the projects in question or relating to the applicable provisions concerning the agreed reference periods, to which the costs claimed by the applicant related. 43 The Court finds that the contractual framework of those issues is otherwise not clarified in the applicant’s pleadings. The Commission’s complaint that there are no references to the relevant clauses of the grant agreements must therefore be upheld. 44 As regards the Commission’s complaint that the application is vague and unspecific as regards the amounts claimed by the applicant, the Commission contends that the application contains no explanation enabling it to understand how the various amounts set out in the two tables on pages 8 and 10 of the application were calculated. The tables set out in Annexes A.14 and A.15, although more detailed than those set out on pages 8 and 10 of the application, are no more clear in that regard. 45 According to the Commission, it is impossible for it to reconcile those amounts with the costs claimed by the applicant, amounts communicated to the Commission via the coordinators. The amounts communicated to the Commission and accepted by it do not correspond to the amounts claimed by the applicant in the present dispute. 46 Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to assess whether the costs claimed by the applicant, in the tables included as Annexes A.14 and A.15, are the costs that were communicated by the coordinators in connection with the projects in question. First, the applicant does not provide any details regarding the costs, but merely lists the costs allegedly incurred and claimed per project. Secondly, it lists the costs incurred during two periods, that is, between August 2015 and April 2016 and between May and June 2016. Those two periods do not correspond to the contractual reporting periods laid down for each project in question. The Commission cannot therefore assess whether the costs set out in Annexes A.14 and A.15 are in fact those that were communicated to the Commission and accepted by it. 47 The Court finds that the action relates to the payment of amounts allegedly owed by the Commission to the applicant under the grant agreements relied on for that purpose by the applicant, even though that is not expressly stated. The legal framework is therefore constituted by the grant agreements in question, which, according to those agreements, are supplemented by the relevant provisions of EU law or, where appropriate, Belgian law. 48 The essential elements of fact and law on which the action is based consist in turn of assertions concerning the two central circumstances of the dispute. First, in the light of the fact that the action is based on Article 272 TFEU, the applicant is under an obligation to identify the contractual clauses on which the Commission’s alleged payment obligation is based, in particular the terms concerning the procedures to be followed in order to claim the costs incurred from the project coordinators or the terms concerning the agreed reference periods, to which the costs claimed by the applicant refer. Secondly, the applicant is under an obligation to explain how the various amounts to which it refers were calculated. 49 It must be held that the action manifestly does not satisfy the requirements referred to in paragraphs 35 to 38 above. In addition to the fact that the action lacks consistency (see paragraph 39 above), the essential elements of fact and law on which it is based are not apparent from either the application or the reply. 50 The action must therefore be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, without it being necessary to rule on the Commission’s other pleas of inadmissibility. Costs 51 Under Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 52 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as inadmissible. 2. GABO:mi Gesellschaft für Ablauforganisation:milliarium mbH & Co. KG shall pay the costs. Luxembourg, 9 September 2021. E. Coulon D. Spielmann Registrar President * Language of the case: English.