Order;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2022:149
Date: 2023-10-25;2022-03-14
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Competition;Dominant position
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Bulgaria

summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based. According to settled case-law, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (judgments of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v Commission, T‑201/04, EU:T:2007:289, paragraph 94, and of 24 May 2012, MasterCard and Others v Commission, T‑111/08, EU:T:2012:260, paragraph 68). 719 In the present case, the applicants merely rely on alleged contradictions between the 2007 Access Rules and the 2007 Market Rules, without explaining what those contradictions consist of. 720 Consequently, since it is not for the General Court to examine, independently, the contradictions relied on by the applicants, the second complaint must be rejected as inadmissible. (5) The third complaint, alleging that the 2007 Access Rules were incomplete and, therefore, difficult to apply 721 The applicants submit that there were numerous shortcomings in the 2007 Access Rules which made it difficult to apply them. They put forward two arguments. 722 In the first place, the applicants submit that Article 5 of the 2007 Access Rules required the TSO to publish the general terms and conditions for transport contracts (‘the harmonised contract’), after approval by the Bulgarian regulator. Although Bulgartransgaz provided that regulator with a draft harmonised contract on 8 April 2010, the Bulgarian regulator failed to approve it. The applicants submit that, despite those obstacles, Bulgartransgaz complied with its rules as a TSO. 723 In that regard, the Commission observed, in the contested decision, that the applicable regulatory framework, including the 2007 Access Rules, required TSOs such as Bulgartransgaz to publish detailed information on the services provided and the conditions that were applicable in order to facilitate effective third-party access to their networks, including, inter alia, the harmonised contract (see recitals 81 and 82 and recital 85(a) of the contested decision). 724 It is apparent from the letter from the Bulgarian regulator sent to Overgas on 18 October 2010, and from its response of 3 August 2012 to the Commission’s request for information of 3 July 2012, that the draft harmonised contract which Bulgartransgaz had provided to that regulator on 8 April 2010 had not been approved by the regulator because it was not the final version of that document. The Bulgarian regulator explained, in that regard, that, by submitting the draft harmonised contract, Bulgartransgaz had indicated that that draft was being discussed with its customers and that Bulgartransgaz would submit to the regulator the final version of the harmonised contract for approval after its board of directors had approved it. The Bulgarian regulator also stated that, on the date when the regulator prepared its response, Bulgartransgaz had still not submitted to it the final version of the harmonised contract for approval. Lastly, it stated that only the final harmonised contract would ‘regulate all relations between [the TSO] and potential customers’. 725 The Commission stated, in the contested decision, without being challenged by the applicants, that it was not until 3 October 2012 that Bulgartransgaz’s board of directors approved the final version of the harmonised contract (see recital 85 of and footnote 121 to the contested decision). It follows that, before that date, Bulgartransgaz had not complied with Article 5 of the 2007 Access Rules. 726 In addition, it follows from paragraph 724 above that responsibility for that breach of the 2007 Access Rules lay exclusively with Bulgartransgaz, and was not due to the alleged shortcomings in those rules, as the applicants claim. 727 It follows from the foregoing that the first argument must be rejected. 728 In the second place, the applicants claim that, despite the incomplete nature of the 2007 Access Rules, Bulgartransgaz complied with the provisions of Article 7 of the 2007 Access Rules by publishing, from July 2010, a form by which third parties could request access to the transmission network. 729 In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 7(1) of the 2007 Access Rules, the TSO was required to provide interested third parties with a form by which they could submit to it a request for access to the transmission network. 730 Although the applicants claim that they published the form on their website in July 2010, they have not adduced any evidence in support of that argument. The only information provided dates back only to 29 September 2010, that is to say, the date on which that form was used by Overgas. 731 In any event, it is true that the Commission stated in the contested decision that the 2007 Access Rules required TSOs to provide third parties with a template application form for access to the transmission network (see recital 85(b) of the contested decision). However, that decision does not rely on any failure by Bulgartransgaz to comply with that regulatory obligation in order to support the conclusion that the applicants adopted abusive conduct in relation to third-party access to the transmission network (see recitals 471 to 481 of the contested decision). 732 The second argument is therefore ineffective. 733 The third complaint must therefore be rejected. (6) The fourth complaint, alleging that the Bulgarian national regulatory framework did not provide for two stages for the processing of requests for access 734 In the reply, the applicants argue that the Bulgarian national regulatory framework did not provide for a two-stage procedure for access to the transmission network, as stated in the contested decision. They consider that the 2007 Market Rules concern not the stage subsequent to that governed by the 2007 Access Rules, but a procedure for the conclusion of the gas transmission contract that is separate from that provided for by the 2007 Access Rules and which can be used as an alternative to the latter. 735 The Commission considers that this complaint is inadmissible on the ground that it was not raised either in the application or during the administrative procedure. 736 According to settled case-law, it is for the Court to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the proper administration of justice justifies the dismissal of the action on the merits without first ruling on the ground of inadmissibility raised by the Commission (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52; of 24 March 2022, Hermann Albers v Commission, C‑656/20 P, not published, EU:C:2022:222, paragraph 24; and of 12 May 2021, Alba Aguilera and Others v EEAS, T‑119/17 RENV, EU:T:2021:254, paragraph 39). 737 The Court considers that, having regard to the circumstances of the case and for reasons of procedural economy, it is necessary to examine the merits of the present complaint without first ruling on its admissibility, which has been challenged by the Commission, since this complaint must, in any event, be rejected on the merits. 738 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the Commission found, in essence, that: – as a first step, governed by the 2007 Access Rules, the TSO had to assess the application for access to the transmission network, including by requesting any necessary documentation if it deemed the application to be incomplete; that first step ended with a written opinion to be given by the TSO on the conditions for access to the transmission network, or with a reasoned rejection (see recital 85(b) and (c) of the contested decision); – once the TSO had issued a favourable opinion on the application for access, a second step in the procedure, governed by the 2007 Market Rules, took place, at the end of which the TSO had to offer a transmission contract to the applicant seeking access, or issue a reasoned rejection (see recital 93 of the contested decision). 739 The Commission based its analysis on the provisions of the 2007 Access Rules and the 2007 Market Rules, as well as on the Bulgarian regulator’s interpretation of those two sets of rules (see recital 85(b) and (c) and recital 93 of, and footnotes 122, 123 and 134 to 139 to, the contested decision). 740 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that a question relating to the interpretation of the national law of a Member State is a question of fact in respect of which the Court is required, in principle, to carry out a comprehensive review (see judgment of 8 September 2016, Generics (UK) v Commission, T‑469/13, not published, EU:T:2016:454, paragraph 218 and the case-law cited). 741 Accordingly, the question of to what extent a rule of national law applies to the case in point is subject to the rules on the taking of evidence and on the burden of proof (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 September 2010, France v European Commission, T‑154/10, EU:T:2012:452, paragraph 65, and of 26 November 2015, Abertis Telecom and Retevisión I v Commission, T‑541/13, not published, EU:T:2015:898, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited). 742 In the present case, it is apparent from the 2007 Access Rules that: – the application for access to the transmission network had to be submitted in writing, by way of a form to be provided by the TSO (see Article 7(1) of the 2007 Access Rules); – the TSO had to examine the application and its annexes and, if the TSO considered that it was incomplete and that additional documents and information had to be submitted, the TSO had to request the applicant to supplement the application, which the applicant was required to do within 14 days (see Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules), as is apparent from recital 85(b) of the contested decision, and as the parties confirmed at the hearing; – the TSO had one month, upon receipt of the complete application, to send the applicant a written opinion on the conditions for access or to reject the application in a reasoned manner (see Article 9(3) of the 2007 Access Rules); that one-month period was, where applicable, extended by an additional period, corresponding to the time taken by the applicant to complete its initial application (see last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules); the written opinion had to cover the site specified in the application for access and it was obligatory for it to specify the permitted capacity, the annual load profile and the natural gas metering points at the entry and exit of the transmission network (see Article 10 of the 2007 Access Rules). 743 The 2007 Access Rules also stated that, in the event of access being granted to the transmission network, the gas transmission had to be carried out in accordance with written contracts concluded between the beneficiary of that access and the TSO (see Article 14 of the 2007 Access Rules). 744 The 2007 Access Rules, the aim of which is, pursuant to Article 1 thereof, to define, inter alia, the conditions and procedure for access to the transmission network, are supplemented by the 2007 Market Rules, which were adopted on the same day and which, pursuant to Article 1(2) thereof, establish the rules governing the procedure and methodology applicable to the relevant transactions. 745 In that regard: – the extraction companies, natural gas traders and eligible consumers had to conclude gas supply contracts between themselves at freely negotiated prices (see Article 14 of the 2007 Market Rules); – the contracting parties then had to notify, in writing, the TSO of their contracts (see Article 15(1) of the 2007 Market Rules); that notification had to be made using a form drawn up by the TSO and contain, inter alia, the quantities of gas to be delivered in accordance with the timetable agreed between the contracting parties (see Article 15(2) of the 2007 Market Rules); – the TSO then either had to agree to implement the deliveries thus notified and to conclude, for that purpose, a transmission contract, or to reject them, giving written reasons for the rejection within two days of receiving the notification (see Article 15(4) of the 2007 Market Rules). 746 In that regard, it should be noted that the Bulgarian regulatory framework was interpreted by the Bulgarian regulator in its statement of findings of 14 June 2010 relating to the complaint lodged by company B against Bulgartransgaz on 20 April 2010 concerning Bulgartransgaz’s refusal to grant it access to the transmission network (‘the statement of findings of 14 June 2010’), reproduced in its response of 3 August 2012 to the Commission’s request for information of 3 July 2012. The Bulgarian regulator found that the processing of requests for access to the transmission network followed two separate stages: – the first, governed by the provisions of the 2007 Access Rules referred to in paragraph 742 above, was the procedure leading to the grant or refusal of access; – the second, governed by Section II of the 2007 Market Rules, referred to in paragraph 743 above, was initiated when access had been granted; that second stage made it possible to conclude a transmission contract between the TSO and the applicant for access. 747 It is true that, in the reply, the applicants criticised the Commission for having relied, in order to conclude that the procedure for access to the transmission network was divided into two stages, on the interpretation adopted by the Bulgarian regulator, which in turn was based on an allegedly incorrect reading of the 2007 Access Rules in conjunction with the 2007 Market Rules. However, they have failed to put forward specific arguments contradicting the Bulgarian regulator’s interpretation. Moreover, in its response to the statement of objections, Bulgartransgaz argued that, although the Bulgarian regulator had concluded that Bulgartransgaz had requested certain information too early in the process for granting access to company B, that premature request was due to Bulgartransgaz’s different interpretation of the 2007 Market Rules, but it subsequently followed the interpretation adopted in the Bulgarian regulator’s decision. Ultimately, that applicant claimed that evidence of supply to the network entry point was ‘a criterion for conclusion of a transport contract ([that it to say,] after access has been approved)’. 748 Furthermore, the information in the file confirms that Bulgartransgaz did actually comply with the abovementioned interpretation of the Bulgarian regulator, in particular when it dealt with Overgas’ application for access to the transmission network for 2013. In its letter to Overgas of 12 December 2012, Bulgartransgaz highlighted the two stages of the procedure for dealing with that application. It first stated, in essence, that Overgas’ application for access met the conditions laid down by the 2007 Access Rules and sent, as an attachment, its favourable opinion on the conditions for access to that network, in accordance with those rules. It then stated that it agreed to conclude, as a second step, a transmission contract covering the requested volumes of gas, but that Overgas first had to provide proof that it had entered into a contract, upstream, for a supply and capacity corresponding to the volumes of gas that it wished to have transported in the transmission network, as well as the delivery schedule for those volumes for 2013 at the entry point of that network, thus referring to the second stage of the access procedure. 749 The complaint must therefore be rejected. (7) The fifth complaint, arguing that the Bulgarian national regulatory framework allowed for a request for proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 750 The applicants dispute the Commission’s interpretation of Article 2(2) of the 2007 Access Rules, which was that Bulgartransgaz was not authorised to require that applicants for access to the transmission network provide proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, before dealing with their applications for access to that network. They consider, on the contrary, that that provision could be interpreted as allowing Bulgartransgaz to require proof of access to that pipeline, since that access was necessary, in practice, in order to have gas in Bulgaria. 751 In that regard, the Commission’s findings on the transmission network concern Bulgartransgaz’s processing of requests for access to that network submitted by Overgas, RWE and Toplofikacia Razgrad before 14 March 2013, that is, before the entry into force of the 2013 Access Rules (see paragraph 699 above). The complaint must therefore be examined in the light of the 2007 Access Rules and the 2007 Market Rules. 752 It should be noted, in the first place, that, under Article 9(2) of the 2007 Access Rules, during the first stage of the procedure for access to the transmission network, the TSO’s examination of the application for access covered the existence of the conditions for access that were specified, in essence, in Articles 2 to 4 of those rules, the absence of technical obstacles to granting access and the periods within which access could be implemented. 753 Article 2(1) of the 2007 Access Rules provided that the right of access to the transmission network was granted to the public supplier, suppliers of last resort, natural gas traders, gas producers and eligible customers in the country connected to that network. Under Article 2(2) of those rules, the TSO had to grant access, on equal terms, to the eligible customers who met the access conditions specified in those rules, provided that they had previously concluded one or more contracts for the supply of gas from the public supplier, gas traders or producers, in or outside the country. 754 The applicants submit that Article 2(2) of the 2007 Access Rules allowed Bulgartransgaz to require applicants for access to prove that they had previously obtained gas supplies, on the one hand, and access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, on the other, in order to ensure that those applicants could actually transport gas to Bulgaria and inject it into the transmission network. 755 First, as the applicants acknowledge in the reply, none of the provisions of the 2007 Access Rules governing the first stage of the procedure for access to the transmission network expressly required the applicant for access to provide, at that stage, proof that they had previously concluded a contract for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 756 Moreover, the applicants also conceded, in the reply, that it was because of ‘well founded concerns’ that such a requirement was not laid down in the 2007 Access Rules, and that that requirement would not have complied with the regulatory framework in force at the time. 757 Second, the interpretation of the 2007 Access Rules advocated by the applicants does not correspond to the Bulgarian regulator’s interpretation in its statement of findings of 14 June 2010, as regards the first stage of the access procedure. 758 In its statement of findings of 14 June 2010, the Bulgarian regulator found that company B met the conditions for access to the transmission network, after having found, first, that that operator had a connection to the transmission network and, second, that it had previously entered into a contract for procured quantities of gas, that is to say, the two conditions imposed by Article 2(1) and (2) of the 2007 Access Rules respectively. The Bulgarian regulator therefore found that Bulgartransgaz had not complied with its regulatory obligations because it had not, inter alia, issued a written opinion on the conditions for access to that network within a one-month period required by Article 9(3) of those rules. 759 It should be noted that no reference is made, in the Bulgarian regulator’s analysis, to the question of whether or not company B had access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 760 In those circumstances, the applicants have not proved that Article 2(2) of the 2007 Access Rules had to be interpreted as allowing Bulgartransgaz, from the first stage of the procedure for access to the transmission network, to make such access subject to the provision of proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 761 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicants. 762 First of all, the applicants argue that the 2013 Access Rules required the applicant for access to provide proof of access to a neighbouring network connected to the transmission network. They submit that, under Article 4(4) of those rules, the application for access had to include information on the gas transmission capacity purchased or reserved from the TSO of a neighbouring transmission network connected to the transmission network, under a contract concluded with that TSO for a period and capacity corresponding to those reserved at the entry point of that network. 763 For the reasons set out in paragraph 751 above, the 2013 Access Rules were not applicable in the present case. The provisions of Article 4(4) of those rules could not therefore justify Bulgartransgaz’s requirement, from the first stage of the access procedure, that applicants for access to the transmission network provide proof of having first obtained access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 764 In any event, the Commission states, in the contested decision, without being challenged by the applicants, that, following its objections submitted to the Bulgarian regulator, in its Opinion of 22 April 2015 on the 2013 Access Rules, those rules were amended in 2015 and the provision in Article 4(4) of those rules was deleted (see recital 133 of the contested decision and paragraph 5(3) of the 2015 Access Rules). 765 The applicants concede, moreover, that the 2015 Access Rules deferred the requirement to produce proof of reserved capacity on an adjacent network until the stage, according to them, of the conclusion of the transport contract, namely the second stage of the procedure laid down by the Bulgarian legislation. 766 It is apparent from paragraph 11(14) of the 2015 Access Rules that applicants for access had to provide proof of access to the neighbouring transmission network, namely the Romanian Pipeline 1, at the latest on the date of performance of the transmission contract, that is, after the grant of access to the transmission network. That amendment confirms that it was not essential to provide that proof during the first stage of the procedure for access to the transmission network and that such a condition could not be inferred from the access rules as worded in 2007. 767 Furthermore, the applicants submit that Article 9 of the 2007 Access Rules allowed the TSO to request additional information and documents if it deemed them necessary in order to examine an application for access. 768 In that regard, Article 9(1) of the 2007 Access Rules provided that, upon receipt of the application for access together with all the necessary documents, the TSO had to examine the possibility of granting access to the applicant. 769 It is true that, under Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules, if it considered that the application and the annexes were incomplete, the TSO had to invite the applicant to supplement its application. 770 As follows from paragraphs 744 to 746 above, and as Bulgartransgaz had already acknowledged during the administrative procedure, proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 came solely under the second stage relating to the conclusion of a transmission contract, namely the stage following the grant of access to the transmission network at the end of the first stage. 771 Therefore, Article 9(1) of the 2007 Access Rules, even read in conjunction with Article 8, could not be interpreted, as the applicants claim, as allowing Bulgartransgaz to block the requested access to the transmission network if proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was not provided when the application was submitted. 772 In the second place, as regards the second stage of the access procedure, namely the stage relating to the conclusion of the transmission contract giving access to the transmission network, the applicants have not referred to any provision of the 2007 Market Rules that required applicants for access wishing to conclude such a contract to provide proof of access to a neighbouring transmission network. 773 As the Commission rightly stated in recital 93 of the contested decision, Articles 14 and 15 of the 2007 Market Rules, which were applicable to the second stage of the procedure, namely the time of conclusion of the contract, required only notification of the gas supply contracts concluded between: – either the applicants for access and their eligible customers (if the applicants for access were gas producers or traders); – or the applicants for access and the producers or traders which supplied them with gas (if the applicants for access were eligible customers). 774 However, Articles 14 and 15 of the 2007 Market Rules did not require the provision of proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, even during the second stage of the access procedure. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 764 to 773 above, that proof could be required only at the time of implementation of the access contract. 775 It follows from the foregoing that the applicants have not proved that, before 14 March 2013, that is to say, during the period to which the Commission’s complaints against Bulgartransgaz related in respect of the processing of the applications for access to the transmission network made by Overgas, RWE and Toplofikacia Razgrad, access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was one of the conditions required by the applicable national legislation in order to obtain access to that network. 776 It is true that the applicants claim that, without access to that pipeline, the volumes of gas covered by contract outside Bulgaria could not be delivered at the entry point of the transmission network. 777 However, it must be stated that, as the Commission has observed, an applicant for access could still obtain access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 after the conclusion of the first stage of the procedure for access to the transmission network, or even after the conclusion of the transmission contract with Bulgartransgaz, constituting the second stage of that procedure, and before the implementation of that contract. 778 The applicants nevertheless submit that, if Bulgartransgaz had to conclude a transmission contract without requiring proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, it would still be required to perform that contract at the exit points of the transmission network, even if the applicant for access had not had any volume of gas delivered at the entry point of that network. 779 It is sufficient to note, in that regard, that the applicants’ argument is based on a purely speculative scenario, namely the possibility that, after the conclusion of the transmission contract, the applicant for access did not have any volume of gas delivered at the network entry point. Reasoning based on a mere hypothesis cannot in any event justify Bulgartransgaz’s imposition of a condition relating to proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, which did not appear in the applicable legislation, especially where, as the applicants acknowledge, the absence of such a requirement was justified on account of ‘well founded concerns’. 780 For all the foregoing reasons, the complaint must be rejected. 781 The first part must therefore be rejected. (b) The second part, arguing that Overgas was not refused access to the transmission network 782 The applicants dispute the Commission’s findings, in the contested decision, that Overgas was refused access to the transmission network. They put forward four complaints. The first three concern Bulgartransgaz’s handling of Overgas’ request for access to that network for 2011. The fourth concerns the handling of Overgas’ request for access to that network for 2013. 783 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. 784 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court may take account of the legislation applicable to the gas sector in order to consider the merits of the Commission’s application of Article 102 TFEU to Bulgartransgaz’s practices. Since that legislation defines the legal framework applicable to the sector in question and, in doing so, contributes to the determination of the competitive conditions under which Bulgargaz carried on its business in the relevant markets, that legislation is a relevant factor in the application of Article 102 TFEU to the conduct of that undertaking and, in particular, for the assessment of the abusive nature of such conduct (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraphs 223 and 224). 785 In the contested decision, the Commission criticised Bulgartransgaz for adopting delaying tactics vis-à-vis Overgas, which impeded the latter’s access to the transmission network, those tactics consisting of: – not acting transparently and failing to respond to the requests for access to that network in accordance with the required written procedures or statutory deadlines; – making unreasonable demands in order to grant access to that network, in particular concerning the information to be provided or the conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant for access so that its application could be processed; – deliberately misinterpreting the requests for access or providing incorrect information regarding the conditions for access (see recitals 472 and 473 of the contested decision). (1) The first three complaints, relating to the processing of Overgas’ request for access to the transmission network for 2011 786 The applicants raise three complaints concerning the processing of Overgas’ request for access to the transmission network for 2011, alleging, in essence, first, that Overgas’ communications prior to 29 September 2010 were classified incorrectly, second, that Overgas’ requests for access were dealt with appropriately and, third, that Overgas had no interest in gaining access to the transmission network before 2013. 787 In that regard, the Commission found, in the contested decision, that the discussions between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz concerning access to the transmission network took place according to the following sequence: – by letter of 30 July 2010 (‘the letter of 30 July 2010’), Overgas requested the transmission of 1 billion cubic metres of gas from the Negru Vodă 1 entry point of the transmission network to a number of exit points which it did not identify (see recital 101(a) of the contested decision); the Commission concluded that that was the first request for access to the transmission network that had not been granted by Bulgartransgaz and made that finding in the part of the contested decision dealing with the determination of the duration of the infringement, which therefore began on 30 July 2010 (see recital 646 of the contested decision); – following the letter of 30 July 2010, a meeting took place between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz on 12 August 2010; – on 24 August 2010, Overgas sent a letter to Bulgartransgaz (‘the letter of 24 August 2010’), in which it provided, as agreed at the meeting of 12 August 2010, its preliminary nominations for gas transmission for 2011 and requested a draft transmission contract (see recital 101(b) of the contested decision); – on 26 August 2010, a second meeting took place between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz, during which the latter refused to provide the contractual terms and conditions for transmission because they had not yet been approved by the Bulgarian regulator (see recital 101(c) of the contested decision); at that meeting, Bulgartransgaz informed Overgas that it would not would be until October 2010 that it would make a decision on Overgas’ request for access; – by letter of 31 August 2010, Overgas informed Bulgartransgaz that it considered that the proposed period for processing its request was too long and asked for a response within the statutory period of one month from the date of receipt of its nominations for gas transmission, which had taken place on 24 August 2010; – by letter of 24 September 2010 (‘the letter of 24 September 2010’), Bulgartransgaz informed Overgas that its request for access set out in the letter of 24 August 2010 was incomplete and that additional information was required (see recital 101(d) of the contested decision); – in response to the letter of 24 September 2010, Overgas, on 29 September 2010, sent Bulgartransgaz a detailed request for access, together with the requested information (‘the letter of 29 September 2010’) (see recital 101(e) of the contested decision); that letter was accompanied by 43 completed application forms specifying the quantity of gas to be transported between the Negru Vodă 1 entry point of the transmission network and, for each, a different point of exit from that network; – the letter of 29 September 2010 was supplemented, on 4 October 2010, by another letter, by which Overgas confirmed the Negru Vodă 1 entry point and attached a schedule concerning the volume of gas that Overgas was intending to deliver at that entry point for it to be transported through the transmission network (see recital 101(f) of the contested decision); it also confirmed that the quality characteristics of the gas to be delivered were in conformity with the technical specifications published on Bulgartransgaz’s website and requested that Overgas be provided with a transmission contract by 10 October 2010 at the latest. (i) The first complaint, alleging that Overgas’ communications prior to 29 September 2010 were incorrectly classified as requests for access to the transmission network 788 The applicants submit that the Commission incorrectly classified, in recital 101 of the contested decision, the instances of contact between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz prior to 29 September 2010 as requests for access to the transmission network, whereas they were only instances of preliminary contact. They consider that the letter of 30 July 2010 could not constitute a request for access to the transmission network. 789 The applicants consider, in particular, that the letter of 30 July 2010 was not formulated as a request for access to the transmission network, since essential elements were missing. They submit that, in order to be complete, such a request had to include the total volume of gas to be transported, the entry points, the exit points, the quantities to be delivered to each of those exit points, the delivery schedule and the quality characteristics of the gas. 790 The Court notes that, as the applicants state, in the letter of 30 July 2010, Overgas had merely stated that it would have 1 billion cubic metres of gas in 2011 under a delivery contract which had already been signed and that it wished that volume of gas to be delivered to its customers connected to the transmission network. It then asked Bulgartransgaz, as the TSO, to inform it of the conditions under which it could use the gas transmission services. Overgas concluded its letter by expressing its intention to negotiate the transmission of the abovementioned volume for the period 1 January to 31 December 2011, from the Negru Vodă 1 entry point of the transmission network to the ‘exit points of the gas transmission grid’, which were not further identified. To that end, it requested Bulgartransgaz to provide it with the transmission contract. 791 It must therefore be held that the letter of 30 July 2010 was worded in a rather vague manner and contained only a minimum amount of information, with the result that it cannot constitute a request for access in compliance with Article 7 of the 2007 Access Rules. 792 Furthermore, it is indeed true that, on 30 July 2010, Bulgartransgaz had still not complied with its regulatory obligations which required it, as the TSO, to publish an application form for access to the transmission network containing the information to be submitted in support of a request for access to that network (see paragraph 730 above). 793 However, a third party wishing to submit a request for access to the transmission network would have had to take into account the 2007 Access Rules, from which it is apparent that certain information necessarily had to be provided to the TSO to allow it to draft the written opinion on the requested access (see paragraph 742 above). That opinion concerned the parameters referred to in Article 10 of those rules, such as the authorised capacity, the annual consumption profile and the gas metering points at entry and exit from the transmission network, with the result that the applicant for access to the transmission network could not have been unaware of the need to submit such information in its request. 794 Moreover, the contested decision overlooks two important elements already in the investigation file. 795 In the first place, the correspondence between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz from September 2010 did not describe the letter of 30 July 2010 as an ‘application for access’. That description was reserved: – initially, for the letter of 24 August 2010, which Overgas appears to regard, in its letter of 29 September 2010, as an application for access, but which Bulgartransgaz, for its part, in its letter of 24 September 2010, described as an incomplete application; – then, subsequently, for the letter of 29 September 2010, that description being used again by Overgas in the letter sent to Bulgartransgaz on 11 November 2010 (‘the letter of 11 November 2010’). 796 In the second place, the report drawn up by the applicants’ external representatives at the time of their access to the data room (‘the data room confidential report’), lodged following the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), included a summary of the detailed minutes of a meeting which the Commission had had with Overgas on 15 December 2011 (‘the summary of the meeting of 15 December 2011’). This shows that, on that occasion, the Commission had found that Overgas’ first application for access made to Bulgartransgaz, concerning the Negru Vodă 1 entry point and 42 exit points, was dated 29 September 2010. 797 In that context, the Commission could not validly conclude, in particular in recitals 100, 117 and 646 of the contested decision, that the letter of 30 July 2010 constituted an application by Overgas for access to the transmission network. 798 The applicants’ first complaint must therefore be upheld in part, in so far as it concerns the Commission’s finding that Overgas’ letter to Bulgartransgaz of 30 July 2010 constituted an application for access to the transmission network. (ii) The second complaint, arguing that Overgas’ requests for access for 2011 were handled appropriately 799 The applicants consider that Bulgartransgaz dealt with Overgas’ requests for access to the transmission network for 2011 in an appropriate manner. 800 In the contested decision, first, the Commission found that Bulgartransgaz had not dealt with Overgas’ request for access to the transmission network for 2011 within the period laid down by the 2007 Access Rules because the handling of that request had taken two years (see recital 474). 801 The applicants argue in response, in that regard, that Bulgartransgaz diligently dealt with Overgas’ requests for access by setting up an internal working group in order to examine those requests (‘the working group’), which did examine them and promptly indicated that certain clarifications were necessary. 802 Second, the Commission found that Bulgartransgaz had deliberately misinterpreted Overgas’ letters containing that request, by aggregating the capacity requested on that network, in order to justify its decision of 19 June 2012 refusing access (see recitals 475 and 476 of the contested decision). 803 The applicants submit, however, that the duplication of Overgas’ applications, resulting from the letter of 11 November 2010 being sent in addition to the letter of 29 September 2010, complicated the handling of those applications. 804 The applicants’ two arguments must be examined separately. – The first argument, relating to the diligent and prompt handling of Overgas’ access requests for 2011 805 It should be noted that, as follows from paragraph 742 above, under Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules, Bulgartransgaz was required to examine any application for access to the transmission network and, in the case of an incomplete application, to invite the applicant to supplement its application within 14 days. 806 Next, under Article 9(3) of the 2007 Access Rules, as TSO, Bulgartransgaz was required to decide on any application for access to the transmission network within one month of the date of submission of the application. That period was extended, in the case of an incomplete application, by an additional period, corresponding to the time taken by the applicant to supplement its initial application. The parties agreed at the hearing that the one-month period granted to the TSO to decide on the application did not start to run until the application was complete. 807 By contrast, no deadline was imposed on the TSO to request, from the date of receipt of an initial application which it considered to be incomplete, that that application be supplemented, which the parties also expressly agreed at the hearing. 808 In the first place, it follows from the analysis of the preceding complaint that, contrary to what the Commission claims, the letter of 30 July 2010 did not constitute a request by Overgas for access to the network. Consequently, the assessment of the dilatory nature of Bulgartransgaz’s conduct, in the contested decision, from that date, is based on an incorrect premiss which is contradicted by the evidence in the file. 809 In the second place, as regards the successive applications, it should be noted that: – as follows from paragraph 796 above, in the summary of the meeting of 15 December 2011, the Commission considered that the first application for access to the network had been submitted by Overgas by letter of 29 September 2010; – moreover, in its letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010, Overgas referred to its letter of 29 September 2010 as the ‘application for access to the gas transmission system’ in accordance with the 2007 Access Rules. 810 It follows from those elements that the period laid down in Article 9(3) of the 2007 Access Rules for the sending of Bulgartransgaz’s written opinion in response to Overgas’ application for access did not begin to run until the date of receipt of the letter of 29 September 2010. 811 In that regard, it is irrelevant that, in its letter of 29 September 2010, Overgas stated that the letter of 24 August 2010 constituted an application for access to the network, since: – as Bulgartransgaz had rightly stated in its letter of 24 September 2010, although the ‘nomination [of Overgas] for the transmission of natural gas [namely, the letter of 24 August 2010] was considered as an application for access to the gas transmission network in accordance with the [2007] Access Rules’, it was incomplete, with the result that Overgas still had to provide additional information before the application could be processed; – in response to Bulgartransgaz’s request of 24 September 2010, Overgas had supplemented its initial request of 24 August 2010 by letter of 29 September 2010, by providing Bulgartransgaz with the requested information and the relevant annexes, then again by letter of 4 October 2010, by providing, inter alia, a schedule relating to the volume of gas which Overgas was planning to have transported in the transmission network (see recital 101(f) of the contested decision). 812 In the light of those factors, it must be held that the letter of 24 August 2010 did not constitute a full application within the meaning of the 2007 Access Rules, and was only supplemented on 29 September and 4 October 2010. 813 As is apparent from recital 85(c) of the contested decision, and as the parties agree, the one-month period for sending the written notice to the applicant under the last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules did not begin to run until the point at which the application was complete, namely 4 October 2010. 814 It follows that it is only from 4 October 2010 that the allegedly dilatory nature of Bulgartransgaz’s conduct in the processing of Overgas’ application for access for 2011 must be assessed, and that assessment must be carried out in the light of the successive events described below. 815 On 18 October 2010, Bulgartransgaz convened the working group in order to examine Overgas’ application for access to the network made on 29 September 2010. 816 By the letter of 11 November 2010, Overgas: – complained that, ‘for three months’, it had been attempting to conclude a transmission contract on Bulgartransgaz’s transmission network but that it did not, however, have the draft contract proposal; – stated that, by letter of 29 September 2010, it had also sent requests for access to the transmission network and complained that, although the one-month period for a response had already expired, it had still not received a response; – stated that it had concluded a contract with Gazprom for the supply of gas which it was seeking to have transported through the transmission network, this time from the Negru Vodă 2 and 3 entry points to 42 exit points that had already been identified in the letter of 29 September 2010 (see recital 101(g) of the contested decision). 817 In a report which is undated but concerns the letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010, the working group, examining Overgas’ applications in accordance with Article 9(1) and (2) of the 2007 Access Rules, stated that Overgas met the conditions to be granted access to the transmission network, while proposing a meeting between Bulgartransgaz and Overgas to have technical clarifications concerning ‘the establishment of a communication environment between the two companies for the exchange of technological parameters at the entry and exit points, as well as to coordinate the pressure set at the entry points of the gas transmission system’. 818 As is apparent from recital 103 of the contested decision, on 1 December 2010, a meeting was held between Bulgartransgaz and Overgas. It is apparent from the minutes of that meeting that, on that occasion: – Bulgartransgaz informed Overgas that it was processing all of its applications for access to the transmission network, and informed Overgas of the need to obtain certain technical clarifications, as had been proposed by the working group (see paragraph 817 above); – Overgas complained that its applications for access to the transmission network had not been processed and that that was hindering the implementation of the gas supply contracts which it had concluded with end users; it requested Bulgartransgaz to provide it with a transport contract before the end of the year and explicitly stated that, if a contract were not signed, it would forward the case to the Bulgarian regulator, the Bulgarian national competition authority and the Commission. 819 On 22 December 2010, the Executive Director of Bulgartransgaz (‘Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director’) sent Bulgartransgaz’s board of directors a memorandum dated 17 December 2010 proposing that he be delegated the task of submitting, for prior approval by BEH, the necessary information for the conclusion of the transmission contract with Overgas. 820 On 20 January 2011, Overgas lodged a formal complaint with the Bulgarian regulator. A copy of that complaint was sent to the Bulgarian Minister for Energy (see recital 105 of the contested decision). 821 On 17 May 2012, Overgas requested the Bulgarian regulator to provide an update on the examination of its complaint (see recital 225 of the contested decision). 822 On 19 June 2012, Bulgartransgaz sent Overgas a letter stating that its applications for access to the transmission network had not been approved (‘the letter of 19 June 2012’). It stated that it had examined the applications of 29 September and 11 November 2010 and that it had found that: – those applications had not been accompanied by gas supply contracts previously concluded with the end customers at the exit points; – the total quantities referred to in both applications exceeded the quantities consumed at those exit points; – it was not possible to transport gas to customers connected to the transmission network and the Chiren storage facility from the Negru Vodă 2 and 3 entry points because the latter were part of the Bulgarian transit pipeline used for the transmission of gas to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Türkiye; – at the meeting of 1 December 2010, it had asked Overgas to clarify the issue of the entry point for which access had been requested as well as the volume that Overgas wished to supply through the transmission network. 823 It must therefore be held that it was only by way of the letter of 19 June 2012 that Bulgartransgaz finally replied to Overgas’ application of 29 September 2010 for access to the transmission network, as supplemented on 4 October 2010 (see paragraphs 811 to 813 above). Bulgartransgaz therefore failed to comply with the one-month period laid down in the last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules, which expired on 4 November 2010. 824 It follows that the applicants’ argument that Overgas’ access requests were handled diligently and promptly must be rejected. – The second argument, based on the duplication of the capacity requested by Overgas in its letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010 825 In recitals 475 and 476 of the contested decision, the Commission found that Bulgartransgaz had deliberately misinterpreted Overgas’ letters containing the request for access to the transmission network for 2011, by aggregating the capacity requested on that network, in order to justify its decision of 19 June 2012 refusing access. 826 Although it is true that, as follows from the analysis of the first argument, a priori, Bulgartransgaz infringed the last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules by failing to respond to the application for access of 29 September 2010, as supplemented on 4 October 2010 within the stipulated one-month period, the assessment of the dilatory tactics alleged against Bulgartransgaz, referred to in paragraph 825 above, must take into account the applicants’ argument that, by the letter of 11 November 2010, Overgas submitted a second application for access to the network, and that, therefore, Bulgartransgaz could not have made a decision on Overgas’ access requests for 2011 because they exceeded the capacity of the transmission network. 827 In recital 101(g) of the contested decision, the Commission expressly stated that, in its letter of 11 November 2010, Overgas was requesting access, in respect of the same quantities of gas as those covered by the previous application of 29 September 2010, to the 43 exit points by means, this time, of the Bulgarian transit pipeline with the Negru Vodă 2 and 3 entry points. 828 As follows from paragraph 822 above, Bulgartransgaz’s letter of 19 June 2012 refusing to grant Overgas access to the transmission network stated, inter alia, that the total quantities referred to in the applications for access of 29 September and 11 November 2010 exceeded the capacity of that network, while claiming that it was not possible to transport gas to customers connected to the transmission network and the Chiren storage facility from the Negru Vodă 2 and 3 entry points because the latter were part of the Bulgarian transit pipeline used for the transmission of gas to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Türkiye. 829 In that regard, it should be noted that Overgas’ letter of 11 November 2010 was worded as follows: ‘More than three months Overgas … has been trying to conclude a contract for natural gas transport through [Bulgartransgaz’s] … gas transmission network. To date, we do not even have a proposal for a draft of such a contract … With letter [of 29 September 2010], we have sent you an application for access to the … transmission system … Although your statutory one-month response period has expired, we have not yet received that response. As a result of the agreements reached with our supplier Gazprom … for supply of natural gas quantities for 2011, please find enclosed more applications for access to the gas transmission network of Bulgartransgaz … with an entry point … Negru Vodă 2,3. We are looking forward to your response for the terms and conditions for access to the … transmission network regarding the applications enclosed herein as well as those submitted with our letter of 29 September 2010.’ 830 It is apparent from the wording of the letter of 11 November 2010 that it was not unambiguous, in particular in so far as: – it referred to the application for access contained in the letter of 29 September 2010, while submitting ‘more applications’; – it enclosed applications for access covering exactly the same quantities of gas as the letter of 29 September 2010 and the same exit points. 831 Thus, it cannot be ruled out, on reading the letter of 11 November 2010, that, a priori, Overgas was submitting an independent application for access to the transmission network, to which it was expressly referring, particularly since that new application did not clarify its relationship with the previous application in the letter of 29 September 2010. 832 However, in recital 101(g) of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the letter of 11 November 2010 concerned a request for access to the Bulgarian transit pipeline and not to the transmission network. Moreover, at the hearing, the parties confirmed that the letter of 11 November 2010 was an application for access that was separate from, and additional to, the application of 29 September 2010, concerning an entirely different network. 833 However, it must be noted that Overgas’ letter of 11 November 2010 made no reference to the Bulgarian transit pipeline, but referred only to the transmission network. 834 It follows from those considerations that, due to the juxtaposition of the two letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010, it was objectively more difficult to understand exactly which were Overgas’ requests for access to the transmission network for 2011. 835 It is true that, as follows from the analysis of the first argument, when the letter of 11 November 2010 arose, Bulgartransgaz had already infringed the last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules by failing to respond to the application for access of 29 September 2010, as supplemented on 4 October 2010, within the required period of one month. 836 However, it is apparent from the summary of the meeting between the Commission and Overgas of 15 December 2011, which appears in the data room report, that the application of 29 September 2010 and that of 11 November 2010 were separate. 837 It is also apparent from the summary referred to in paragraph 836 above that, during the same meeting, the Commission pointed out to Overgas that the transmission network and the Bulgarian transit pipeline were two separate networks, without a connection between them. Overgas replied that such a connection existed through the Chiren storage facility. That is also apparent from Overgas’ follow-up observations of 19 July 2012 concerning that meeting, in which Overgas stated that a connection between the transmission network and the transit pipeline could be established with insignificant costs and within a very short period of time. 838 However, in the same follow-up observations of 19 July 2012, Overgas clearly stated that the two routes referred to in its requests for access, namely the transmission network and the Bulgarian transit pipeline, were alternative routes for the transmission of the same volumes of gas, with a strong preference on its part for access through the transmission network. 839 Thus, an overall and contextual reading of all the information in the file validates the finding, in recital 101(g) of the contested decision, that, by the letter of 11 November 2010, Overgas was seeking to ascertain whether the same quantities of gas, indicated in its application of 29 September 2010, could be transported, by an alternative route, to the same exit points as already set out in the original application, through the Bulgarian transit pipeline, with the Negru Vodă 2 and 3 entry points. 840 As regards, next, the conclusion which the Commission drew from recital 101(g), in recitals 475 and 476 of the contested decision, concerning Bulgartransgaz’s deliberate misinterpretation of the letters referred to in paragraph 839 above as constituting two cumulative requests, it must be noted that both the report of the working group and the memorandum of Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director of 17 December 2010 stated that, by its letter of 11 November 2010, Overgas had ‘confirmed to Bulgartransgaz EAD the quantities of natural gas [to be transported] and the transmission schedule, [and had] also indicat[ed] another entry point [namely] Negru Vodă 2, 3’. 841 In addition, the working group had recommended, in its report preceding the meeting of 1 December 2010, that, pursuant to Article 9(3) of the 2007 Access Rules, Bulgartransgaz should send Overgas ‘written statements of opinion on the condition of access to the transmission network’ and conclude ‘gas transmission contracts that meet the technical parameters … set in th[ose] statements of opinion’. 842 Similarly, in his memorandum of 17 December 2010, Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director had reiterated that position, expressly acknowledging that ‘Overgas [met] the conditions for … access to the … transmission network’. 843 It follows that both the working group and Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director had indeed understood that the letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010 presented alternative requests by Overgas regarding the transmission of gas through either the transmission network or the Bulgarian transit pipeline, despite the fact that the letter of 11 November 2010 did not expressly mention the Bulgarian transit pipeline, but only the related entry points, namely Negru Vodă 2 and 3. 844 It follows that the applicants cannot claim that the time taken by Bulgartransgaz to reply to Overgas’ requests for access for 2011 was justified by the duplication of the requested quantities, which was clearly not something that Bulgartransgaz would have had to consider at the end of 2010, when the processing of applications for access to the transmission network should have been completed. 845 The second argument, based on the duplication of the capacity requested by Overgas in its letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010, must therefore be rejected. (iii) The third complaint, arguing that Overgas had no interest in gaining access to the transmission network before 2013 846 The applicants submit that Overgas’ conduct demonstrates that it had no interest in obtaining access to the transmission network before 2013. They put forward two arguments. 847 In the first place, that lack of interest is apparent from the fact that Overgas did not request access to the transmission network for 2012 and that it was not until May 2012 that it made enquiries about the status of the complaint that it had made to the Bulgarian regulator. According to the applicants, Overgas’ main objective was to bring an action against them. 848 In that regard, it must be noted that, according to the case-law, the Commission, as an administrative authority acting in the general interest, must carefully examine all the facts and points of law brought to its attention by the complainants in order to establish whether there has been an infringement (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 October 1983, Schmidt v Commission, 210/81, EU:C:1983:277, paragraph 19). Where the complainant shows a valid legitimate interest, the Commission cannot be required to investigate the possible existence of other reasons in respect of the complainant (judgment of 7 June 2006, Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft v Commission, T‑213/01 and T‑214/01, EU:T:2006:151, paragraph 118). 849 It follows that the possible existence of reasons other than those establishing the complainant’s legitimate interest is irrelevant for the purposes of the Commission’s decision, acting in the general interest, whether or not to pursue an alleged infringement. 850 In the present case, the file shows that Overgas sent requests for access to the transmission network in 2010 and contacted the Commission, the Bulgarian regulator and the Bulgarian Minister for Energy in 2011 to complain about Bulgartransgaz’s conduct. 851 Furthermore, as follows from the examination of the first argument of the second complaint (see paragraphs 805 to 824 above), by its letter of 29 September 2010, as supplemented by the letter of 4 October 2010, Overgas had submitted a full application for access to the transmission network for 2011 and Bulgartransgaz failed to take a decision on that application within the period laid down by Article 9(3) and the last sentence of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules. 852 Those factors establish, beyond other possible reasons, which are irrelevant, that Overgas did have an interest in obtaining the requested access to the transmission system for 2011. 853 Lastly, the applicants also cannot rely on the absence of an application by Overgas for access to the transmission network for 2012, since it was not until 19 June 2012 that Bulgartransgaz took a decision on Overgas’ first application for access to that network, which was submitted in 2010 and related to 2011. 854 The first argument must therefore be rejected. 855 In the second place, the applicants submit that, until 2013, Overgas did not have gas at the entry of the transmission network, due to not having access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, and that Bulgartransgaz had no knowledge either of Overgas’ approaches to Transgaz to obtain such access or of Transgaz’s refusal to grant it that access. 856 In that regard, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 755 to 758 above, the 2007 Access Rules did not allow Bulgartransgaz to make access to the transmission network subject to access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 857 In any event, it is not apparent from the file that Bulgartransgaz ever requested Overgas, in the context of the examination of its requests for access submitted for 2011, to provide proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 858 In those circumstances, the applicants cannot rely on the fact that Overgas had not obtained access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in 2011 in order to argue that it did not have a genuine interest in obtaining access to the transmission network before 2013. 859 The argument must therefore be rejected and, thus, the third complaint must be rejected in its entirety. (2) The fourth complaint, arguing that the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013 was not restrictive 860 The applicants dispute the finding, made by the Commission in the contested decision, that the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013 was restrictive. 861 In the contested decision, the Commission found that, although Overgas had been granted access to the transmission network for 2013, the conditions for that access were restrictive and non-transparent. In that regard, it found that Bulgartransgaz had initially granted Overgas access for a short period, initially of three months, under uncertain conditions, and that Bulgartransgaz had then decided, in an arbitrary and non-transparent manner, not to extend the contract concluded with Overgas before, ultimately, extending that contract (see recitals 475 and 479 of the contested decision). 862 The applicants submit, by contrast, that Overgas obtained uninterrupted and satisfactory access to the transmission network from January 2013 and that the conditions to which that access was subject, namely first providing proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and proof of gas supply contracts concluded with customers, were justified. 863 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the letter of 19 June 2012, Bulgartransgaz rejected Overgas’ applications for access of 29 September and 11 November 2010, stating, inter alia, that Overgas had not provided contracts that had previously been concluded with final customers at the transmission network exit points to which the applications related (see paragraph 822 above). 864 By letter of 23 November 2012, Overgas submitted an application for access to the transmission network for the 2013 gas year. It expressly stated in that letter that, even though it was not required to provide the contracts concluded with final customers under the 2007 Access Rules, it attached them to its application in order to comply with the requirements set out by Bulgartransgaz in its letter of 19 June 2012 (see recital 108(a) of the contested decision). 865 On 12 December 2012, Bulgartransgaz informed Overgas that it would be granted the requested access only after providing evidence that it could deliver the requested volumes of gas at the Negru Vodă 1 entry point, by producing the contract concluded for the upstream transmission of those volumes through the Romanian Pipeline 1 and the schedule relating to that contract, which had to reflect the volumes and delivery deadlines covered by the application for access to the transmission network (see recital 108(b) of the contested decision). 866 By letter of 22 January 2013, Overgas informed Bulgartransgaz that it had concluded an agreement with Bulgargaz for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. It also attached to that letter its supply contract concluded with Gazprom for the first quarter of 2013 and the schedule for the delivery of gas at Negru Vodă 1 for 2013 (see recital 108(c) of the contested decision). 867 By letter of 29 January 2013, Bulgartransgaz sent the draft transmission contract to Overgas, for signature, reminding it of the need to provide Bulgartransgaz with an agreement concluded upstream for the transmission of gas on the Romanian Pipeline 1 as well as the corresponding schedule for the delivery of gas at the Negru Vodă 1 point. 868 On 31 January 2013, Overgas provided a copy of the access agreement for 2013 which had been concluded that same day, with Bulgargaz, for the transit of gas through the Romanian Pipeline 1 (see recital 108(c) of the contested decision). 869 On the same day, Bulgartransgaz and Overgas, in turn, signed a contract for the transmission of gas through the transmission network from the Negru Vodă 1 entry point to 37 exit points (‘the 2013 transmission contract’) (see recital 110 of the contested decision). That contract stipulated that it applied retroactively from 1 January 2013 (see Article 4.1 of that contract) and that it ended on 31 December 2013 (see Article 3.1(a) of that contract), subject to early termination in the cases provided for in Article 3.1(b) to (h) thereof. Article 3.1(h) of that contract granted Bulgartransgaz, inter alia, the right to terminate it unilaterally if Overgas did not provide, at the end of each quarter, proof that it had obtained the right to use the Romanian Pipeline 1 for the following quarter. 870 By letter of 26 March 2013, Overgas informed Bulgartransgaz that, pursuant to Article 3.1(h) of the 2013 transmission contract, it confirmed that it had concluded, first, a gas supply contract with Gazprom at the entry point of the Romanian Pipeline 1, and attached, in that regard, a letter from Gazprom of 1 March 2013 attesting to that. Second, Overgas also stated that it had concluded the 2013 pipeline access agreement, which guaranteed it the possibility of having its gas transported on that pipeline, and, in support, attached a letter from Bulgargaz dated 22 March 2013. 871 It follows from the information set out in paragraphs 865 to 870 above that Bulgartransgaz made the conclusion of the 2013 transmission contract subject to the provision of proof that Overgas had access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and, under Article 3(1)(h) of that contract, Bulgartransgaz granted Overgas only conditional access to the transmission network. 872 As follows from paragraphs 755, 758 to 760 and 771 to 779 above, the 2007 Access Rules did not allow Bulgartransgaz to make the conclusion of the 2013 transmission contract subject to the provision of proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 873 However, although the fact that Bulgartransgaz did not comply with the applicable regulatory framework when it granted access to the transmission network may be a relevant factor for the determination of the abusive nature of its conduct on the market (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraphs 223 and 224), it is also necessary, for that conduct to be abusive, that it was capable of producing at least potentially anticompetitive effects on the relevant markets (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission, C‑165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraphs 50 and 51). 874 In the present case, it is apparent from recital 475 of the contested decision that the Commission bases its finding, namely that the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013 was restrictive, on the considerations set out in recital 312 of the contested decision, relating to the manner in which Overgas had obtained access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 for that same year, 2013. 875 In recital 312 of the contested decision, the Commission states that, according to Overgas, the access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, Bulgargaz had granted that access only after concluding gas supply contracts with its own customers and that access only allowed Overgas to conclude similar supply contracts with its own subsidiaries (see recital 312(a)). Second, the 2013 pipeline access agreement was concluded for a short duration, without any guarantee that it would be extended beyond 31 March 2013, and the conditions for the extension of that contract were unclear, which prevented Overgas from entering into commitments in the medium or long term, upstream, with its gas supplier and, downstream, with its customers in Bulgaria (see recital 312(b) of that decision). 876 Similarly, the finding made in recitals 479 and 480 of the contested decision, referring to the restrictive and non-transparent nature of the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013, is based on the relevant considerations set out in recitals 108 to 111, in Section 5.2.4.2 of that decision. 877 The Commission’s analysis in recitals 108 to 111 of the contested decision repeatedly links the finding of Overgas’ insufficient access to the transmission network for 2013 to the fact that Bulgartransgaz made both the granting of that access and its renewal each quarter conditional on access being obtained to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 878 It is therefore apparent from the contested decision that the conclusion that Bulgartransgaz did not grant Overgas satisfactory access to the transmission network for 2013 is based solely on the fact that that access was subject to the access granted to Overgas to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in 2013; according to the Commission, the latter access was itself of a short duration and subject to uncertain conditions. 879 However, it follows from the analysis set out in paragraphs 863 to 878 above that the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgargaz had not granted Overgas satisfactory access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 for 2013. In particular, the Commission has not adduced sufficient evidence of the circumstances put forward in recital 312(a) and (b) of the contested decision, referred to in paragraph 875 above. In particular, it has not established that the initial three-month duration of the agreement for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 for 2013 had had at least a potentially anticompetitive effect on the Bulgarian gas supply markets, and the contemporaneous evidence demonstrates, on the contrary, that that agreement, from which Overgas benefited, enabled competition to be dynamic by allowing several customers of the Bulgarian gas supply markets to change supplier and join that new entrant. 880 It follows that the Commission’s conclusion that Bulgartransgaz did not grant Overgas satisfactory access to the transmission network for 2013, which is based exclusively on the unproven granting of allegedly restricted access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in that same period, has not been established to the requisite legal standard either. 881 The Commission has therefore failed to demonstrate that the conditions under which Bulgartransgaz had granted Overgas access to the transmission network for 2013 could have had anticompetitive effects on the Bulgarian gas supply markets. 882 The complaint is therefore well founded. 883 Accordingly, the second part must be upheld in part. (c) The third part, arguing that Toplofikacia Razgrad was not refused access to the transmission network 884 The applicants submit that Bulgartransgaz did not refuse Toplofikacia Razgrad access to the transmission network. 885 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 886 In the contested decision, the Commission found that, as a result of the difficulties encountered by Overgas in obtaining access to the transmission network, its subsidiary and customer Toplofikacia Razgrad requested access to that network from 11 July 2012 (see recitals 107, 151 and 473). The Commission accused Bulgartransgaz of having, de facto, refused that request after making the granting of the requested access subject to conditions which were unnecessary and which Toplofikacia Razgrad could not satisfy (see recitals 107, 151, 156, 473, 475 and 477 of that decision). 887 Thus, on 11 July 2012, Toplofikacia Razgrad made an application to transport [300-350] million cubic metres of gas from the Negru Vodă 1 entry point to the Razgrad 2 exit point in 2012 and 2013. The application was accompanied by a preliminary gas supply contract between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas, dated 9 July 2012, for the period 1 November 2012 to 31 January 2013, under which Overgas undertook to supply Toplofikacia Razgrad with gas at the Razgrad 2 delivery point. That preliminary contract made the conclusion of a final contract between the two parties conditional on Overgas obtaining access to the transmission network (see recitals 107, 151 and 152 of the contested decision). 888 By letter of 18 July 2012, Bulgartransgaz requested Toplofikacia Razgrad to establish that it was able to supply, during the relevant period, at the Negru Vodă 1 entry point, the volumes of gas indicated in its application. Furthermore, Bulgartransgaz indicated that the delivery point specified in the preliminary contract between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas, namely Razgrad 2, was an exit point of the transmission network and that, therefore, it was for Overgas to submit an application for access to that network (see recital 153 of the contested decision). 889 Following that comment by Bulgartransgaz, on 23 October 2012 Toplofikacia Razgrad submitted an addendum to its preliminary contract with Overgas stipulating that, from then onwards, the gas delivery point was Negru Vodă 1, and no longer Razgrad 2. However, the clause which made the conclusion of a final contract between the two parties conditional upon Overgas obtaining access to the transmission network remained unchanged (see recital 154 of the contested decision). 890 On 20 November 2012, Bulgartransgaz gave a favourable opinion on Toplofikacia Razgrad’s application for access (‘the opinion of 20 November 2012’). However, in that opinion, Bulgartransgaz stated that the conclusion of a transmission contract with Toplofikacia Razgrad was subject to the latter providing a timetable for the deliveries of gas to be transported through the transmission network and subject to proof that the contracted volumes of gas could be delivered at the Negru Vodă 1 entry point. In that regard, Bulgartransgaz stated that Toplofikacia Razgrad could provide either proof that it was able itself to transport the gas through the Romanian Pipeline 1, or proof that its supplier, Overgas, could do so (see recital 155 of the contested decision). 891 In addition, in the opinion of 20 November 2012, Bulgartransgaz stated that the preliminary contract concluded between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas provided that the conclusion of their final gas supply contract was subject to Overgas obtaining access to the transmission network. It inferred from this that ‘the conclusion of a final contract for natural gas supply and the ensuring of the natural gas quantities for transmission [was] not contingent on [Toplofikacia Razgrad] obtaining access to the … transmission network, but on [Overgas] obtaining access to [that] network’ (see, also, recital 155(b) of the contested decision). 892 The Commission concluded that Bulgartransgaz had, ultimately, refused Toplofikacia Razgrad’s application by imposing two conditions, namely: – that Toplofikacia Razgrad provide proof that it had secured a gas supply to the Negru Vodă 1 entry point; – that Overgas obtain access to the transmission network (see recitals 156 and 475 of the contested decision). 893 According to the Commission, the first of those conditions could not be satisfied before 2013 and, as regards the second, Overgas’ application for access to the transmission network had, at the time of Toplofikacia Razgrad’s application for access to that network, just been refused (see recitals 475 and 477 of the contested decision). 894 The applicants put forward, in essence, three complaints against those findings. (1) The first complaint, arguing that the condition for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was justified 895 The applicants submit that the Commission erred in law in criticising Bulgartransgaz for having required Toplofikacia Razgrad to provide it with proof that it was able to deliver the volumes of gas to the entry point of the transmission network, Negru Vodă 1. They submit, on that point, that: – Bulgartransgaz’s requirement set out in its letter of 18 July 2012 was justified because the preliminary contract concluded between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas, as had initially been notified to Bulgartransgaz, referred to Razgrad 2 as the point of delivery of the gas by Overgas to Toplofikacia Razgrad; – Bulgartransgaz could, under the applicable rules, request such proof at the stage of concluding the transmission contract. 896 In that regard, for the reasons set out above, in particular in paragraphs 755, 758 to 760, 771 and 777 to 779, the 2007 Access Rules did not allow Bulgartransgaz to make third-party access to the transmission network subject to the provision of proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, either at the first stage of the access procedure or at the time of the conclusion of the transmission contract. 897 It is true that the application for access submitted by Toplofikacia Razgrad by its letter of 11 July 2012, referred to in paragraph 887 above, required clarification in so far as the preliminary contract between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas accompanying that letter incorrectly identified Razgrad 2 as being the point of delivery of the gas. However, that letter clearly indicated that Toplofikacia Razgrad wished to transport the gas from the Negru Vodă 1 entry point to the Razgrad 2 exit point. Therefore, the only information that Bulgartransgaz was entitled to request was verification of the transmission network entry point in the supply contract and, above all, the identification of the operator, Overgas or Toplofikacia Razgrad, who would carry out the delivery of the gas that was to be transmitted through that network. 898 However, the regulatory framework did not in any way require Toplofikacia Razgrad or Overgas to prove that at least one of them was able to deliver to the Negru Vodă 1 entry point the volumes of gas to which the application for access related. 899 The Commission therefore did not err in law in finding, in recital 156(b) and in recital 477 of the contested decision, that Bulgartransgaz had made Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network conditional on the provision of information that was not necessary, or even justified, regarding access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 900 The first complaint must therefore be rejected. (2) The second complaint, arguing that Bulgartransgaz did not make Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network subject to Overgas’ access to the same network 901 The applicants submit that the Commission erred in finding, in recital 156 of the contested decision, that Bulgartransgaz had made Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network conditional on Overgas first obtaining access to that network. They argue that it was clear that Bulgartransgaz was seeking clarification as to the intended user of the transmission network because the preliminary contract between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas stipulated that the delivery through the transmission network would be carried out by Overgas. 902 In that regard, the Commission found, in recital 156 of the contested decision, that, since it was unable to meet the conditions imposed by Bulgartransgaz in the opinion of 20 November 2012, in particular the condition concerning Overgas’ access to the transmission network, Toplofikacia Razgrad ultimately never obtained access to the transmission network. According to the Commission, that condition was irrelevant. 903 The Court finds that the wording of the opinion of 20 November 2012 (see paragraph 891 above) shows that, despite the amendment, in the addendum to the preliminary contract concluded between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas, of the gas delivery point, Bulgartransgaz stated that the conclusion of the final supply contract between those two parties remained subject to Overgas obtaining access to the transmission network. 904 It is true that Overgas’ access to the transmission network, prior to the conclusion of the final supply contract between Toplofikacia Razgrad and Overgas, did not in any way concern Bulgartransgaz, who was a third party to that contract. 905 However, the finding that the conclusion of the supply contract was subject to Overgas obtaining access to the transmission network was in no way expressed, in the opinion of 20 November 2012, as being a condition for granting Toplofikacia Razgrad access to the transmission network. 906 The Commission was therefore wrong to find that Bulgartransgaz had in fact made Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network conditional on Overgas obtaining access to that network. 907 Consequently, the second complaint must be upheld. (3) The third complaint, arguing that Toplofikacia Razgrad was not refused access to the transmission network 908 The applicants dispute the finding in recital 475 of the contested decision, whereby the Commission alleged that Bulgartransgaz had in fact refused Toplofikacia Razgrad access to the transmission network because the two conditions to which the grant of such access was subject, referred to in paragraph 892 above, were impossible to satisfy. The applicants submit, in essence, that it follows from their first two complaints that the finding that there was a refusal of access is factually incorrect. They argue that Bulgartransgaz had approved Toplofikacia Razgrad’s application for access and that, if Toplofikacia Razgrad had been able to deliver gas to the entry point of the transmission network, a contract in that regard would have been concluded. 909 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as follows from the analysis of the first complaint (see paragraphs 896 to 899 above), Bulgartransgaz could not make access to the transmission network subject to access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, with the result that that condition could, ultimately, amount to a refusal of access. 910 The third complaint must therefore be rejected. 911 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the only complaint in the third part which must be upheld is the second complaint, which relates solely to the issue of an alleged condition to which Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network was made subject. Since that is not sufficient to conclude that Bulgartransgaz did not refuse Toplofikacia Razgrad access to the transmission network, it follows that the second complaint cannot, on its own, lead to the third part being upheld, and, consequently, the third part must be rejected. (d) The fourth part, arguing that RWE did not make an application for access to the transmission network 912 The applicants submit that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct did not hinder RWE’s access to the transmission network, since RWE had not made a genuine application for access to that network. 913 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 914 In the contested decision, the Commission concluded that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct had made it difficult for RWE to access the transmission network (see recital 473). The Commission found, first, that Bulgartransgaz had taken six months to respond to RWE’s initial request for access to that network and, second, that Bulgartransgaz had not provided RWE with the information on the available capacity on that network to enable it to submit a proper request (see recital 474). 915 The Commission also stated that Bulgartransgaz’s failure to allow RWE access to the transmission network differed significantly from the treatment of Bulgargaz, who had been granted access to that network without even signing a contract with Bulgartransgaz (see recitals 143 and 474 of the contested decision). 916 The applicants dispute the contested decision on that point, raising two complaints. (1) The first complaint, arguing that RWE did not submit an application to which Bulgartransgaz was required to respond 917 The applicants submit that the form which RWE submitted for requesting access to the transmission network, dated 2 February 2011 (‘the form of 2 February 2011’), was an almost blank document, which contained only RWE’s address and information on that company, and that Bulgartransgaz was not required to respond to it within the regulatory period. 918 In that regard, as described in paragraph 742 above, under Articles 7 to 9 of the 2007 Access Rules, which were applicable when the form of 2 February 2011 was submitted, any application for access to the transmission network had to be submitted in writing, by way of a form to be provided by the TSO. If the latter considered that the application was incomplete, it had to invite the applicant to supplement its application within 14 days. Next, the TSO had one month from receipt of a complete application to send the applicant a written opinion on the conditions for access or to reject the application in a reasoned manner. 919 It is apparent from the file that, in the present case, the form of 2 February 2011 entitled ‘Application for providing access to Bulgartransgaz EAD gas transmission network’ was submitted according to the template published by Bulgartransgaz on its website. However, in that form, RWE did indeed merely mention its name, contact details, the names of its representatives, the name of the contact person and the fact that it was a trader in natural gas. However, the headings relating to the volume and quality of the gas to be transported, the period concerned and the information on the entry and exit points of the transmission network were not completed. 920 It must be stated that the form of 2 February 2011, in the version submitted, did not constitute a sufficiently complete application for access to the transmission network for Bulgartransgaz to be able to respond to it as it stood. Despite those shortcomings, the contested decision described the form of 2 February 2011 as a ‘formal application for access to the Bulgarian transmission network’. 921 Furthermore, it is apparent from recitals 137 and 138 of the contested decision, which are not disputed by the applicants, that Bulgartransgaz did not react following receipt of the form of 2 February 2011 and that RWE subsequently sent, on 28 April and 30 June 2011, two letters repeating its request for access to the transmission network and threatening to refer the matter to the Bulgarian regulator. 922 By letter of 13 July 2011 (‘the letter of 13 July 2011’), Bulgartransgaz stated that it was replying to the form of 2 February 2011, that it had reviewed it in accordance with the 2007 Access Rules and that RWE needed to provide Bulgartransgaz with the following information in order for that application to be processed: – the entry and exit points of the transmission network that were covered by that application; – minimum and maximum hourly usage at those entry and exit points; – the period, volumes of gas, delivery schedule and technical characteristics of the gas covered by that application; – a copy of the gas supply contracts, whether preliminary or already concluded. 923 Bulgartransgaz concluded the letter of 13 July 2011 by proposing a meeting with RWE. It is apparent from recital 140 of the contested decision that two meetings took place during which Bulgartransgaz explained to RWE that it could not process its application without the additional information. 924 The Court notes that the information requested in the letter of 13 July 2011 is only the information that RWE should have provided in the form of 2 February 2011. It was therefore only from the date on which RWE provided that information that it could be considered that the one-month period, at the end of which the TSO was required to adopt a decision under the last paragraph of Article 8 of the 2007 Access Rules, began to run. However, as stated in recital 142 of the contested decision, according to Bulgartransgaz, RWE never provided the requested information, and there is nothing in the file to refute such an assertion. 925 For the sake of completeness, it should also be noted that it is true that Bulgartransgaz did not respond to the form of 2 February 2011 until RWE had sent it two letters, on 28 April and 30 June 2011, repeating its request for access to the transmission network and threatening to refer the matter to the Bulgarian regulator. However, Bulgartransgaz cannot be criticised for having acted in breach of the 2007 Access Rules, since the prescribed period did not begin to run until the application was complete. At the hearing, the parties confirmed that no deadline was imposed on the TSO to inform an applicant for access that its application was incomplete and that the 14-day period laid down in Article 8 of those rules concerned the applicant for access, as regards the completion of its application. 926 It follows that the first complaint is well founded and must therefore be upheld. (2) The second complaint, arguing that there was no difference in treatment between Bulgargaz and RWE 927 In the first place, the applicants submit that any allegation of discrimination, by Bulgartransgaz, between Bulgargaz and RWE is irrelevant unless it constitutes an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. 928 That argument must be rejected. 929 Although an abuse of a dominant position may take the form of an unjustified difference in treatment (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 1997, GT-Link, C‑242/95, EU:C:1997:376, paragraph 41; of 24 October 2002, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C‑82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617, paragraph 114; and of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T‑228/97, EU:T:1999:246, paragraph 140), in the contested decision, the Commission did not find that there was an abuse of that kind. In particular, it did not classify Bulgartransgaz’s conduct as discriminatory when compared with its conduct towards Bulgargaz, but referred, in recitals 143 and 474, to the difference in treatment between Bulgargaz and RWE in order to highlight the readiness with which Bulgartransgaz, in the Commission’s view, reacted to Bulgargaz’s requests for access to the network, when compared with the treatment of RWE’s requests. The Commission stated, in particular, that Bulgartransgaz granted access to Bulgargaz, even in the absence of a contract signed in that regard. 930 Therefore, that consideration cannot be rejected, a priori, as being irrelevant. 931 In the second place, the applicants argue that there was no difference in the way in which Bulgartransgaz treated Bulgargaz and RWE as found in recitals 143 and 474 of the contested decision. They submit that those two operators were in different situations on the ground that, unlike Bulgargaz, RWE had requested general access to the transmission network, since it had not specified the entry and exit points of that network which it wished to use. The applicants state that Bulgartransgaz did not grant Bulgargaz general access to the transmission network. 932 As follows from the analysis of the first complaint (see paragraphs 928, 929, 931 and 934 above), the Commission was wrong to classify the treatment of RWE’s request for access as a refusal of access. 933 It follows that, in so far as, in the contested decision, the Commission referred to Bulgartransgaz’s difference in treatment between Bulgargaz and RWE, respectively, only in order to support its analysis as regards Bulgartransgaz’s alleged infringements vis-à-vis RWE, the upholding of the first complaint also means, consequently, that the second complaint must be upheld. Bulgartransgaz cannot be criticised for having treated RWE in a discriminatory manner, when RWE was not refused access, since it did not supplement its application for access notwithstanding Bulgartransgaz’s request to that effect. 934 Accordingly, the second complaint and, thus, the fourth part must be upheld. (e) The fifth part, arguing that there was no elimination of competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets 935 The applicants submit that the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgartransgaz’s alleged practices regarding access to the transmission network had led to the elimination of competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets. First, satisfactory access to that network was granted to company B and company C between 2010 and 2012 and to Overgas from 2013. Second, the obstacle to Overgas gaining access to that network before 2013 was that Transgaz had refused it access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, which was a circumstance unconnected to the applicants’ conduct. 936 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. 937 In that regard, first, it must be noted that, if conduct falling within the scope of an exclusionary practice is to be characterised as abusive, that presupposes that that conduct was capable of restricting competition and, in particular, of producing the alleged exclusionary effects, and that assessment must be undertaken having regard to all the relevant facts surrounding that conduct (see judgments of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and Others, C‑307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 154 and the case-law cited, and of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraphs 50, 64 and 72 and the case-law cited). 938 The Commission must, in that regard, demonstrate, in the first place, that the practice at issue was capable, when implemented, of producing such exclusionary effects, in that it was capable of making it more difficult for competitors to enter or remain on the market in question and, by so doing, that that practice was capable of having an impact on the market structure, and, in the second place, that that practice relied on the use of means other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits (judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraph 61). 939 However, those exclusionary effects must not be purely hypothetical. Consequently, the Commission cannot rely on the effects that that practice might produce or might have produced if certain specific circumstances – which were not prevailing on the market at the time when that practice was implemented and which did not, at the time, appear likely to arise – had arisen or did arise (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). 940 Second, in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, such as the assessment of the abuse of a dominant position and its effects on competition, the EU judicature must, in the review of legality laid down in Article 263 TFEU, amongst other things, not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 941 It follows from the examination of the ‘sub-plea’ alleging an incorrect finding that access to the transmission network was refused that: – Bulgartransgaz could not require proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 as a precondition for the processing of applications for access, inter alia, from Overgas and Toplofikacia Razgrad (see first part and first complaint of the third part); – Bulgartransgaz did not process Overgas’ application for access to the transmission network for 2011 within the period laid down by the 2007 Access Rules and, on 19 June 2012, it justified its refusal by deliberately misinterpreting Overgas’ letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010 (see second complaint of the second part). 942 However, in the first place, it follows from that examination that the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard that Overgas’ letter of 30 July 2010 constituted an application for access under the 2007 Access Rules. Thus, the analysis of Bulgartransgaz’s abusive conduct on the transmission network should be only from the letter of 29 September 2010 (see first complaint of the second part). 943 In the second place, the Commission has also not established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgartransgaz’s modus operandi, consisting of preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the transmission network, continued during the period after 1 January 2013 (see fourth complaint of the second part). 944 In order to conclude that Bulgartransgaz had not granted Overgas genuine access to the transmission network in 2013, the Commission only relied on its incorrect findings that Bulgargaz had abusively refused or restricted Overgas’ access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in 2013 (see paragraphs 875 to 879 above). Consequently, the conclusion that insufficient access was granted to the transmission network in 2013 is also necessarily incorrect. 945 Moreover, the Court notes that the contested decision does not refer to any application for access to the transmission network for 2014 that was rejected. Although, in recitals 112 to 116, that decision contains a description of the reasons why Overgas considered that its access to the transmission network in 2014 and 2015 remained insufficient, the Commission states in those recitals that Overgas had enjoyed uninterrupted access to that network during that period and that Overgas’ criticisms at the time concerned, principally, the procedure used by Bulgartransgaz to process applications for access. 946 However, in recital 479 of the contested decision, the Commission concluded that, despite Overgas’ criticisms regarding the nature of the information required by Bulgartransgaz for processing applications for access, Bulgartransgaz had granted Overgas uninterrupted access to the transmission network for the years 2014 to 2016, in accordance with a procedure which correctly applied the 2013 Access Rules in force at the time. 947 Nevertheless, the Commission considered that Bulgartransgaz’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct on the transmission network had continued, in essence, until the point at which Bulgargaz put an end to its allegedly abusive conduct on the Romanian Pipeline 1, namely until 1 January 2015 (see recitals 479 and 480 of the contested decision). 948 Since the Commission has not established that Bulgargaz had engaged in abusive conduct with regard to access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 during that period, it has also not proved that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct was abusive in relation to access to the transmission network for 2014. 949 It follows that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgartransgaz had adopted a modus operandi consisting of preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the transmission network only between 29 September 2010 and 31 December 2012. 950 In particular, the Commission has demonstrated that, during that period, Bulgartransgaz hindered the access of Overgas and Toplofikacia Razgrad to that infrastructure. 951 However, it follows from the examination of the first ‘sub-plea’ that, until 1 January 2013, Overgas and Toplofikacia Razgrad did not have access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 for reasons which are not attributable to proven abusive conduct on the part of the applicants (see paragraphs 291 to 293, 325 to 333 and 686 above). 952 Consequently, even if Bulgartransgaz had granted Overgas and Toplofikacia Razgrad access to the transmission network before 1 January 2013, those two operators could not have entered the Bulgarian gas supply markets. The gas supply to those two operators came exclusively from Russia. Access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, which they did not have for reasons not attributable to the applicants, was essential for the transportation of their gas from Russia to Bulgaria and thus to allow entry to the Bulgarian gas market. 953 It follows that, although the Commission has proved that, between 29 September 2010 and 31 December 2012, Bulgartransgaz failed to comply with its regulatory obligations and hindered the access of Overgas and Toplofikacia Razgrad to the transmission network, it has not, however, established that that conduct was capable, and not merely hypothetically, of restricting competition and, in particular, of having exclusionary effects on the Bulgarian gas supply markets, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 937 to 939 above, or, therefore, that that conduct constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 954 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Commission has not demonstrated that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct concerning access to the transmission network was capable, and not purely hypothetically, of restricting competition and, in particular, of having exclusionary effects on the Bulgarian gas supply markets or, therefore, that that conduct constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 955 The fifth part must therefore be upheld. (f) Conclusion on the second ‘sub-plea’ 956 First, it follows from the foregoing that the Commission has not proved that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct between 29 September 2010 and 31 December 2012, by hindering third-party access to the transmission network, was capable of restricting competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets and, therefore, that it fell within the scope of Article 102 TFEU. Second, it has not established that that conduct continued after 31 December 2012. 957 Consequently, the second ‘sub-plea’ must be upheld. 4. The third ‘sub-plea’, alleging an incorrect finding that access to the Chiren storage facility was refused 958 The applicants dispute the finding in the contested decision that Bulgartransgaz refused access to the Chiren storage facility. The ‘sub-plea’ is divided into four parts: – in the first part, the applicants complain that the Commission has failed to establish that the Chiren storage facility was an essential facility; – in the second part, they dispute the anticompetitive nature of Bulgartransgaz’s conduct during the period prior to the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules; – in the third and fourth parts, they claim that the 2012 Storage Access Rules and the 2014 Storage Access Rules are not anticompetitive. (a) The first part, alleging that the Commission has failed to establish that the Chiren storage facility was an essential facility 959 The applicants complain that the Commission has failed to establish, in the contested decision, that the Chiren storage facility was an essential facility, for the purposes of the establishment of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. They argue that: – neither the applicable regulatory framework under EU law nor the fact that that facility was the only gas storage facility in Bulgaria demonstrates that it was essential; – the Commission has not established either that access to the Chiren storage facility was indispensable in order to compete on the Bulgarian gas supply markets, or that the lack of access to that facility eliminated competition on those markets. 960 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. 961 In that regard, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has already held that although, within the meaning of the judgment in Bronner, the dominant undertaking may be forced to grant a competitor access to its infrastructure, only where such access is indispensable to the business of such a competitor, a regulatory obligation to grant access can be relevant for the assessment of abusive conduct, for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU, on the part of a dominant undertaking that is subject to sectoral rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission, C‑165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraphs 49 and 57). Since that legislation defines the legal framework applicable to the sector in question and, in so doing, contributes to the determination of the competitive conditions under which the undertaking in a dominant position carries on its business in the relevant markets, it is a relevant factor in the application of Article 102 TFEU to the conduct of that undertaking and, inter alia, for the purposes of the assessment the abusive nature of such conduct (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraphs 223 and 224). 962 In particular, where an undertaking in a dominant position is subject to such a regulatory obligation, the Commission is not required to demonstrate, in order to find that there has been an abusive refusal of access to that infrastructure, that it is ‘indispensable’ within the meaning of paragraph 41 of the judgment in Bronner (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission, C‑165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraph 60). 963 The applicants submit that the case-law cited in paragraph 962 above is not applicable in the present case because, first, there is no general obligation to grant access to the Chiren storage facility and, second, that facility can be replicated. 964 As the Commission found in recitals 164 to 166 of the contested decision, the regulatory framework for access to gas storage facilities is established at European and national level. 965 The legislation at European level includes: – Regulation No 715/2009, which establishes, inter alia, standards for third-party access services, capacity allocation, congestion management and transparency in gas storage facilities; – Directive 2009/73, which provides, in essence, in Article 33(1) thereof, as did Article 19(1) of Directive 2003/55, which it replaced, that, where access to a storage facility is technically and/or economically necessary to ensure efficient access to the gas network for the purposes of supplying customers, Member States may opt for one of the two access regimes, namely either negotiated or regulated access, provided that the implementation is based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 966 At national level, the Bulgarian Law on Energy established a regulated access regime for gas storage facilities. 967 In particular, since 1 July 2007, Article 172b(1) of the Bulgarian Law on Energy provides that gas storage facility operators are required to grant access to those facilities to all users under equivalent conditions. In addition, under Article 30(1)(14) of that law, gas storage is subject to tariffs regulated by the Bulgarian regulator. 968 Accordingly, the regulatory framework applicable to the Chiren storage facility established that access to that facility was necessary in order to be able to compete effectively on the Bulgarian gas supply markets and imposed an obligation on Bulgartransgaz to grant third-party access to that facility on equal terms. 969 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 961 above, in order to establish that a refusal to grant access to the Chiren storage facility constituted an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, the Commission was not required to demonstrate that that facility was indispensable, under the last condition set out in paragraph 41 of the judgment in Bronner. 970 It follows that the first complaint, arguing that there was no general obligation to grant access to the Chiren storage facility, must be rejected as unfounded. 971 Furthermore, as regards the complaint regarding whether the Chiren storage facility could be replicated, Bulgartransgaz’s obligation to grant access to that facility under the applicable regulatory framework, referred to in paragraphs 965 to 968 above, exempted the Commission from having to demonstrate that that facility was indispensable and, consequently, from having to demonstrate that it could not be replicated (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, Slovak Telekom v Commission, T‑851/14, EU:T:2018:929, paragraph 121). 972 In any event, it should be noted that the Commission found, in recital 628 of the contested decision, that there were technical and economic obstacles which made it excessively difficult to replicate the Chiren storage facility. In that regard, it stated that, although there was a depleted gas field in Galata (Bulgaria) which could have been converted into a storage facility, the approvals necessary for that purpose had not been granted. Lastly, the Commission stated that Bulgarian legislation imposed certain licensing requirements for the operation of a storage facility, which in practice proved very difficult to obtain. 973 The applicants have not adduced any evidence to dispute those considerations and thus to support their argument that it is possible to replicate the Chiren storage facility. 974 The complaint must therefore be rejected as ineffective and, moreover, unfounded. 975 The first part must therefore be rejected. (b) The second part, arguing that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct during the period prior to the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules was not anticompetitive 976 The applicants dispute the finding in the contested decision that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct during the period prior to the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules was anticompetitive. They put forward three complaints. 977 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. (1) The first complaint, arguing that Bulgartransgaz acted transparently 978 The applicants dispute the Commission’s finding, in recital 499 of the contested decision, that Bulgartransgaz acted in a non-transparent manner. They put forward four arguments. (i) The first argument, regarding an independent finding of anticompetitive discrimination in favour of Bulgargaz 979 The applicants submit that the findings in recital 499 of the contested decision, regarding Bulgartransgaz’s lack of transparency, are in fact an independent finding of anticompetitive discrimination in favour of Bulgargaz. They argue that such a finding is flawed because it does not appear in the statement of objections, which found that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct amounted only to a refusal to supply. 980 In that regard, in recital 450 of the contested decision, the Commission found that the BEH Group had abused its dominant position by preventing, restricting and delaying access to the transport and storage infrastructures which it controlled and that its conduct was capable of foreclosing its actual or potential competitors. 981 As regards, more specifically, the Chiren storage facility, the Commission formulated, in essence, the same criticism in paragraph 305 of the statement of objections, finding that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct prevented or attempted to prevent third parties from accessing that facility and that those third parties were thus deprived of access to a source that could allow them to compete on equal terms with Bulgargaz on the Bulgarian gas supply markets. 982 In addition, in recital 499 of the contested decision, the Commission found that: – Bulgartransgaz had acted in a non-transparent manner by failing, until mid-2012, to publish information on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility; – as a result of that conduct, third parties were supposed to submit their requests for access without having information on the capacity allocation mechanism, the available storage capacity or the timeframe allowing them to be treated in accordance with the ‘first come, first served’ principle; – for example, in 2011, company F was refused access to the Chiren storage facility, because Bulgartransgaz had granted the available capacity to Bulgargaz without first informing potentially interested operators of the availability of that capacity; – it was apparent from Bulgartransgaz’s letters to Bulgargaz, as well as from Table No 1 (recital 182) and footnote 267 to the contested decision, that Bulgargaz was the only operator that was properly informed about the available storage capacity; – that non-transparent and discriminatory approach allowed Bulgartransgaz to reject requests from third parties. 983 It follows that the main purpose of recital 499 of the contested decision is to demonstrate how the failure to publish the information regarding the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility, combined with the allocation of that capacity based on the ‘first come, first served’ principle, made it practically impossible for third parties to gain access to that facility, and thereby favoured Bulgargaz. 984 Thus, the contested decision does contain not, as such, an independent finding of anticompetitive discrimination in favour of Bulgargaz as regards access to the Chiren storage facility, but only a comment which remains marginal to the criticism of Bulgartransgaz in terms of the non-transparent processing of third-party requests for access. Moreover, that complaint had been set out in paragraph 312 of the statement of objections. 985 Therefore, the argument that the Commission found, in recital 499 of the contested decision, that there had been independent abuse in the form of anticompetitive discrimination which, moreover, did not appear in the statement of objections, must be rejected. (ii) The second argument, regarding the fact that the rejection of company F’s request for access was based on the ‘first come, first served’ principle 986 The applicants submit that the Commission could not rely, in recital 499 of the contested decision, on the rejection of the application for storage capacity submitted by company F on 1 September 2011, because the reason for that refusal was that Bulgargaz had submitted its application beforehand, namely on 25 August 2011. They argue that, if company F had made enquiries with Bulgartransgaz regarding the available storage capacity, as Bulgargaz had done previously, Bulgartransgaz would have given company F priority. 987 In that regard, it must first of all be noted that, under Article 15(1)(b) and Article 19(1) and (2) of Regulation No 715/2009, applicable from 3 March 2011, Bulgartransgaz was, as the SSO, required to make public the information that was necessary for the users of the Chiren storage facility to gain effective access to that facility, inter alia the available storage capacity, as well as detailed information on the services offered and the conditions applied in connection with such access. 988 In particular, Regulation No 715/2009 required Bulgartransgaz to: – make public information on contracted and available storage facility capacity on a numerical basis on a regular and rolling basis and ‘in a user-friendly standardised manner’ (see Article 19(2) of Regulation No 715/2009); – always disclose the information required by that regulation in a meaningful, quantifiably clear and easily accessible way and on a non-discriminatory basis (see Article 19(3) of Regulation No 715/2009); – make public the amount of gas in the Chiren storage facility, inflows and outflows, and that facility’s available capacity and update that information at least daily (see Article 19(4) of Regulation No 715/2009). 989 Furthermore, as follows from paragraph 967 above, under Article 172b(1) of the Bulgarian Law on Energy, Bulgartransgaz was required, as SSO, to grant access to gas storage facilities to all users under equal conditions. Moreover, that obligation appears, as a prohibition of discrimination, in Article 13(1)(b) and Article 33(1) of Directive 2009/73. 990 The Commission found, in recitals 167, 168 and 499 of the contested decision, that, at the time when company F submitted its request, on 1 September 2011, Bulgartransgaz was still not complying with its obligation, under Articles 15 and 19 of Regulation No 715/2009, to make public the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility, which the applicants do not dispute. 991 In addition, in the same period, Bulgartransgaz was allocating the capacity of the Chiren storage facility in accordance with the ‘first come, first served’ principle (see recital 168 of the contested decision). 992 As the Commission rightly stated, in the absence of information being made public on the storage capacity, third parties were supposed to submit their requests for access to that facility without having any information about the capacity allocation mechanism, the available storage capacity or the timeframe allowing them to be treated according to the ‘first come, first served’ principle (see recital 499 of the contested decision). 993 The Commission also found, without being challenged by the applicants, that: – Bulgargaz injected gas into the Chiren storage facility from at least the 2007/2008 gas year and, up to and including the 2011/2012 gas year, it was the only gas operator to do so (see Table No 1 (recital 182) of the contested decision); – when Bulgargaz submitted its request on 25 August 2011, it already had a storage capacity of [300-350] million cubic metres at that facility and that request concerned whether it was possible to obtain additional storage capacity; on the same day, Bulgartransgaz responded favourably to Bulgargaz’s request by informing it of the possibility of storing an additional 20 to 25 million cubic metres of gas in September 2011 and, potentially, additional volumes in October 2011; – on 29 August 2011, Bulgargaz accepted the injection of additional volumes of gas in September 2011 and rejected the proposal for October 2011 (see recitals 222 and 247 of the contested decision); – on 1 September 2011, company F submitted a request to Bulgartransgaz for the injection of [5-30] million cubic metres of gas into the Chiren storage facility in September 2011 and for the withdrawal of those volumes at the end of 2011 (see recital 248 of the contested decision); – on 15 September 2011, Bulgartransgaz informed company F that there was no available capacity for the requested period because the remaining capacity in September 2011 had just been allocated to Bulgargaz, and potentially interested operators had not been informed beforehand that that capacity was available; Bulgartransgaz also informed company F that it was in the process of examining the possibilities of injecting gas in October and that it would announce any available capacity on its website (see recital 249 of the contested decision); – it was not until the beginning of July 2012 that Bulgartransgaz began to publish on its website the data on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility (see recitals 169 and 256 of the contested decision). 994 It follows from the foregoing that Bulgargaz’s request of 25 August 2011 was made in the context of an ongoing commercial relationship between it and its sister company Bulgartransgaz (see recitals 182, 222, 247 and 256 of the contested decision). Moreover, since the 2007/2008 gas year, Bulgargaz had been the only user of the Chiren storage facility and, since no information on storage capacity was made public, was the only operator to be properly informed of the available capacity in that facility (see recitals 182 and 499 of the contested decision). 995 Thus, Bulgartransgaz could not rely either on its failure to comply with the obligation to make public the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility under Articles 15 and 19 of Regulation No 715/2009 or on the fact that Bulgargaz had requested information on the available storage capacity before company F did so, in order to refuse the latter’s request for access. That is all the more so since Bulgartransgaz had to refrain from any discrimination between users of the Chiren storage facility under Article 172b(1) of the Bulgarian Law on Energy. 996 In those circumstances, the applicants also cannot criticise company F for not having made enquiries as early as Bulgargaz regarding the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility. 997 Therefore, the argument that the Commission could not rely on Bulgartransgaz’s treatment of company F to support its conclusion in recital 499 of the contested decision must be rejected. (iii) The third argument, regarding the information available at the time of company C’s request for access 998 The applicants submit that the Commission was wrong to conclude, in recital 241 of the contested decision, that company C had no, or almost no, information on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility when it submitted its request for access to that facility on 5 June 2012. They maintain that the information published by Bulgartransgaz on 30 March 2012 on the allocation procedure for the 2012/2013 gas year included information on the available storage capacity. 999 In that regard, it should be noted, as the Commission observed in recital 245 of the contested decision, that the information regarding capacity at the Chiren storage facility published on 30 March 2012 concerned only the available storage capacity, to be allocated in the context of the first capacity allocation procedure which was to take place within the following three weeks and for which the deadline for the submission of applications was 17 April 2012, that is to say, more than one and a half months before company C submitted its application (see recital 186 of the contested decision). 1000 The applicants have not provided any evidence to show that, following the closure of that first allocation procedure and, therefore, at the time when company C submitted its request, Bulgartransgaz had published information on the outcome of that procedure or on the storage capacity that was still available. 1001 In those circumstances, the argument that the Commission was wrong to conclude that company C did not have information on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility when it submitted its request for access to that facility, on 5 June 2012, must be rejected. (iv) The fourth argument, concerning the general allegation that Bulgargaz was informed in advance, by Bulgartransgaz, regarding the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility 1002 The applicants dispute the allegation in recital 499 of the contested decision that Bulgartransgaz had informed Bulgargaz in advance about the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility, arguing first of all that Table No 1 in recital 182 of the contested decision shows that Bulgargaz had made enquires with Bulgartransgaz before receiving the information on the available capacity. Next, the applicants submit that that table incorrectly states that, for the 2008/2009 storage period, Bulgargaz had been informed of the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility before submitting its request, on 13 March 2008, because, according to them, the information sent to Bulgargaz in that regard on 17 October 2007 was in response to a letter that Bulgargaz had sent to Bulgartransgaz on 4 October 2007. Lastly, the applicants submit that, in any event, the Commission was not entitled to rely on that latter circumstance because it was outside the infringement period. 1003 In that regard, it should be noted that, as the applicants state, Table No 1 in recital 182 of the contested decision shows that, during the infringement period, namely for the 2009/2010 and 2011/2012 storage periods, Bulgargaz received information on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility only after having requested it. The only circumstance in support of the Commission’s allegation concerning information provided even before an application was made goes back to the 2008/2009 storage period, which is outside the infringement period. 1004 It is true that, as the Commission submits, evidence that does not date from the infringement period is not devoid of any probative value and may be taken into account either in order to corroborate the interpretation of other evidence or if it forms part of a body of evidence as to abusive conduct during the infringement period (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 July 2008, Lafarge v Commission, T‑54/03, not published, EU:T:2008:255, paragraphs 427 and 428, and of 2 February 2012, Denki Kagaku Kogyo and Denka Chemicals v Commission, T‑83/08, not published, EU:T:2012:48, paragraph 188). 1005 However, in the present case, the Commission has not adduced any evidence or indicia capable of demonstrating that, during the infringement period, Bulgargaz received information on the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility before even requesting that information. Moreover, the only information in the contested decision in support of that allegation, namely Table No 1 in recital 182, demonstrates the opposite (see paragraph 1003 above). 1006 It follows that the fourth argument is well founded and that, therefore, the first complaint must be upheld, in part, in that regard, and rejected as to the remainder. (2) The second complaint, alleging that the Commission disregarded the fact that the ‘first come, first served’ principle applied within a given timeframe 1007 The applicants submit that the conclusion in recital 497 of the contested decision that Bulgartransgaz accepted Bulgargaz’s access request for the 2011/2012 storage period, yet ignored Overgas’ earlier request, is based on a misunderstanding of the ‘first come, first served’ principle. They submit that requests for storage capacity were examined, in accordance with that principle, based on a specific timetable for each gas year and that no applicant was entitled to request storage capacity well in advance, as Overgas had done. 1008 In that regard, it is apparent from the file that: – on 29 April 2010, Overgas informed Bulgartransgaz of its intention to store gas at the Chiren storage facility and requested, to that end, information on the available storage capacity (see recital 214 of the contested decision); – on 30 July 2010, Overgas requested Bulgartransgaz to grant it access to that facility, stating that it intended to store 500 million cubic metres of gas there in the 2011/2012 gas storage year (see recital 214 of the contested decision); – on 18 February 2011, Bulgargaz submitted to Bulgartransgaz its schedule for the injection of gas at the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period (see recitals 222 and 497 of the contested decision). 1009 Bulgargaz’s request of 18 February 2011 was accepted, under the ‘first come, first served’ principle, even though it had been submitted almost seven months after Overgas’ request (see recitals 222 and 497 of the contested decision). 1010 In that regard, the applicants emphasise that the storage requests submitted well in advance of the gas year for which storage capacity was requested were not examined under the ‘first come, first served’ principle. 1011 In recitals 182 and 507 of the contested decision, the Commission provided only one example of a request which it claims was made by Bulgargaz well in advance, namely that of 20 October 2009, which sought to obtain access, not for the 2009/2010 storage period that was ongoing at the time, but for the subsequent 2010/2011 storage period, which started almost six months later, in April 2010. 1012 However, it is apparent from Table No 1 in recital 182 of the contested decision that: – Bulgargaz’s letter sent on 20 October 2009 requesting access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2010/2011 storage period was followed, on 9 March 2010, by another request for the same storage period; – Bulgartransgaz’s only response is dated 16 April 2010, that is to say, after the request of 9 March 2010, which was made within the strict timeframe of the access requests for the 2010/2011 storage period that was ongoing at the time. 1013 In those circumstances, the Commission could not, in recitals 182 and 507 of the contested decision, solely on the basis of Bulgargaz’s letter of 20 October 2009 requesting access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2010/2011 storage period, dispute Bulgartransgaz’s claim that the ‘first come, first served’ principle applied within a strict timeframe relating to the storage period that was ongoing at the time. 1014 It is true that, in its pleadings, the Commission maintained that it was Bulgartransgaz’s ‘practice and own initiative’ to inform its sister company regarding the available storage capacity well before the beginning of the gas year. In that regard, the Commission based a general argument on Table No 1 in recital 182 of the contested decision, from which it is apparent, inter alia, that, as regards the 2011/2012 storage period, starting in April, Bulgargaz’s first request was submitted on 18 February 2011 and Bulgartransgaz replied to it on 15 April 2011. The Court finds that that was a request made approximately six weeks before the beginning of the gas year in question, and therefore not ‘well in advance’, with the result that the Commission’s general argument is not supported by that circumstance either. 1015 Consequently, it must be concluded that the Commission has not demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the fact that Bulgartransgaz accepted Bulgargaz’s request of 18 February 2011 for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period despite Overgas’ request of 30 July 2010 was not justified by the application, within a strict timeframe, of the ‘first come, first served’ principle, as the applicants claim. 1016 Moreover, the applicants submit, without being challenged on that point by the Commission, that the ‘first come, first served’ principle had to apply within a strict timeframe in order to prevent an accumulation of capacity at the Chiren storage facility, which would have run counter to the purpose of that facility, which was to cover fluctuations in demand. 1017 It follows from the foregoing that the second complaint must be upheld. (3) The third complaint, alleging distortion of the evidence relating to Overgas’ requests for access for the 2011/2012 storage period 1018 The applicants submit that the Commission distorted the evidence relating to Overgas’ requests for access for the 2011/2012 storage period by concluding, in recital 498 of the contested decision, that Bulgartransgaz had overburdened Overgas with unreasonable requests for information and that it had deliberately misinterpreted the information provided by Overgas. 1019 In recitals 226 and 498 of the contested decision, the Commission found that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct was based on the fact that it had deliberately misinterpreted the storage requests submitted by Overgas in September and November 2010 by aggregating those requests. That led Bulgartransgaz to reject them on the ground that they exceeded the technical capacity of the Chiren storage facility (see footnotes 172 and 614 to the contested decision). 1020 The applicants maintain that the storage requests submitted by Overgas on 4 October and 11 November 2010 were not alternatives, but were separate requests to which Bulgartransgaz had to respond and that, in view of the capacity constraints of the Chiren storage facility, Bulgartransgaz could not accept all the capacity requested by Overgas and, therefore, had to request clarification from it. 1021 In that regard, it is apparent from the file that, following its request of 30 July 2010 for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period (see paragraph 1008 above), Overgas repeated its request to Bulgartransgaz on four occasions, namely on 24 August, 29 September, 4 October and 11 November 2010 (see recitals 214 to 218 of the contested decision). Thus: – by letter of 24 August 2010, Overgas made a request to Bulgartransgaz, on the one hand, to inject 160 million cubic metres of gas into the Chiren storage facility in September and October 2010 and then 480 million cubic metres of gas in the second and third quarters of 2011, that is, a total of 640 million cubic metres of gas between September 2010 and September 2011 and, on the other hand, to withdraw 300 million cubic metres of gas between January 2011 and March 2012 (see recital 215 of the contested decision); – on 24 September 2010, Bulgartransgaz replied to Overgas, stating that, as regards the storage requests for September and October 2010, Overgas had not submitted any information or schedule for the transmission of the gas volumes to be injected into the Chiren storage facility (see recital 216 of the contested decision); – on 29 September 2010, Overgas submitted a detailed request to Bulgartransgaz for the transmission of 480 million cubic metres of gas to the Chiren storage facility for the second and third quarters of 2011, detailing the relevant monthly volumes for each of those two quarters; – Overgas repeated that request, on 4 October and 11 November 2010, for the same volume of 480 million cubic metres of gas and the same period, again detailing the relevant quarterly and monthly volumes (see recitals 217 and 218 of the contested decision). 1022 In its letter of 19 June 2012, that is, more than 19 months after Overgas’ last letter of 11 November 2010, Bulgartransgaz made a decision on Overgas’ request for access to the Chiren storage facility and concluded that the requested access could not be granted because the requested storage capacity, namely 960 million cubic metres of gas, far exceeded the technical capacity of that facility. That conclusion was based on the fact that Bulgartransgaz had aggregated the storage capacity that had been requested in the two letters sent by Overgas on 29 September and 11 November 2010. 1023 It is apparent from the file that, in the two letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010, Overgas had still indicated that it wished to store 480 million cubic metres of gas at the Chiren storage facility during the second and third quarters of 2011 and had attached, on each occasion, a detailed injection schedule in that regard (see recitals 215 to 218 of the contested decision). 1024 Moreover, it is not apparent either from the report by Bulgartransgaz’s working group or from the memorandum of Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director that Bulgartransgaz raised internally the issue of Overgas’ supposed double request for access to the Chiren storage facility or that it interpreted the requests submitted by Overgas on 29 September and 11 November 2010 as having to be aggregated. Those two documents show that Bulgartransgaz’s working group and Executive Director only assessed Overgas’ request for access to the transmission network made on those dates and recommended that it be granted. They did not, however, make a decision on Overgas’ storage request (see recital 219 of the contested decision). The working group and Bulgartransgaz’s Executive Director nevertheless stated that Overgas’ storage request, as set out in the letter of 29 September 2010, concerned a volume of 480 million cubic metres of gas for the second and third quarters of 2011 and that the request in the letter of 11 November 2010 was a confirmation of the request of 29 September 2010. 1025 In any event, even if there could have been doubts as to the volumes of gas to which Overgas’ storage request related, the applicants have failed to explain why it took Bulgartransgaz more than 19 months to inform Overgas of its position in that regard, which could, at least, have led Overgas to clarify the quantity of gas for which it was requesting storage. 1026 In those circumstances, the Commission was entitled to find that, by aggregating the access requests submitted by Overgas in 2010, Bulgartransgaz had deliberately misinterpreted those requests. 1027 For the sake of completeness, the Court notes that Overgas’ letter of 24 August 2010 concerned two different storage periods, namely the 2010/2011 period and the 2011/2012 period. The applicant’s reaction, which is dated 24 September 2010, focused on the storage requests for the 2010/2011 period. Bulgartransgaz’s next communication to Overgas took place only on 19 June 2012, and contained the rejection of the access request for the 2011/2012 storage period. Therefore, the contested decision does not demonstrate that Bulgartransgaz overburdened Overgas with unnecessary requests for information regarding its requests for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period. 1028 However, that does not invalidate the finding in recital 498 of the contested decision as regards Bulgartransgaz’s abusive conduct in relation to Overgas’ request for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period, since, as follows from paragraphs 1023 to 1026 above, Bulgartransgaz acted abusively, inter alia, by deliberately aggregating the requests of 29 September and 11 November 2010. 1029 The complaint must therefore be rejected. 1030 In the light of the foregoing considerations, although the second part, which argues that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct during the period prior to the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules was not anticompetitive, must be upheld in part as regards the first and second complaints, it can, ultimately, only be rejected. (c) The third part, arguing that the 2012 Storage Access Rules were not anticompetitive 1031 The applicants dispute the conclusion in recitals 492 and 515 of the contested decision that the 2012 Storage Access Rules constituted an implicit refusal to supply. They raise four complaints. 1032 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. (1) The first complaint, alleging a lack of proof that Bulgartransgaz designed the 2012 Storage Access Rules to favour Bulgargaz 1033 The applicants submit that the Commission has failed to establish that, as it claims in recital 493 of the contested decision, the 2012 Storage Access Rules were designed by Bulgartransgaz to favour Bulgargaz by giving it priority access to the Chiren storage facility. 1034 In that regard, it is apparent from the contested decision that the 2012 Storage Access Rules laid down a procedure for the allocation of storage capacity in two stages, and that has not been disputed by the applicants. 1035 In the first stage, priority was given to the gas supplier which had the highest ‘base sale quantity’. That supplier was granted the full capacity requested (see recital 170(a) of the contested decision). 1036 The base sale quantity of each supplier requesting access to the Chiren storage facility was equal to the smaller of the following two quantities, namely: – first, the volume of gas sold during the ongoing gas storage year to public suppliers, in other words, during the storage year preceding the year covered by the access requests (see Article 5.1 of the 2012 Storage Access Rules and recital 170(a) of the contested decision); – second, the volume of gas contracted for sale to public suppliers for the following gas storage year, namely the year covered by the access requests (see recital 170(a) of the contested decision). 1037 In the second stage, the remaining available capacity was allocated to the other applicants in proportion to their base sale quantity (see Article 5.2 of the 2012 Storage Access Rules and recital 170(b) of the contested decision). 1038 The Commission considered that the taking into account, during the first stage of the procedure for the allocation of storage capacity, of the lower of the two compared quantities of gas sale meant that, in practice, smaller suppliers and new entrants would always have a very low base sale quantity, given their limited sales during the ongoing year. That would be the case even if they had contracted higher sales for the following year. By contrast, the already established operator, in this case Bulgargaz, would always have a higher base sale quantity, given the higher contracted sales during the ongoing year, and would, therefore, as a matter of fact, have priority for capacity allocation (see recital 171 of the contested decision). 1039 The applicants dispute that finding, relying on two arguments. 1040 In the first place, the applicants rely on the fact that the Chiren storage facility was the only storage facility in Bulgaria and that it had limited capacity. Thus, in order to ensure that suppliers bound by public supply obligations could meet their obligations in the event of a seasonal increase in demand, the 2012 Storage Access Rules gave priority to the applicant with the highest volume of contracted sales to public suppliers, which Bulgargaz was during the relevant period. 1041 The Commission argues in response that, according to its Interpretative note on Directive 2009/73 concerning third-party access to storage facilities, dated 22 January 2010, ‘in determining the storage needs for fulfilling [public service obligations], there must be no discrimination against newcomers, i.e. new market entrants taking [public service obligations] must be given the same right and their storage needs for [public service obligations] must be taken into account in the same manner as for the incumbent companies’ (see last paragraph of that note). 1042 In that regard, it should be noted that the system of judicial review of Commission decisions relating to infringements which it finds pursuant to Article 102 TFEU consists in a review of the legality in accordance with Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 42). 1043 The Court notes that, in the contested decision, the Commission did not rely on the conformity of the 2012 Storage Access Rules with its Interpretative note on Directive 2009/73 concerning third-party access to storage facilities, of 22 January 2010. The contested decision, in recitals 511 to 515, merely establishes that the 2012 Storage Access Rules were equivalent to a refusal to supply. Therefore, the Commission’s argument alleging that those access rules did not comply with the interpretative note is irrelevant. 1044 That being so, the Court notes that Bulgartransgaz was entitled, under Article 172b(2) of the Bulgarian Law on Energy, to refuse access to the Chiren storage facility because of a lack of capacity to fulfil the public supply obligations imposed on Bulgartransgaz, which is consistent with Article 35 of Directive 2009/73, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) and (13) of that directive. However, no provision of EU law allowed it to give priority to its sister company Bulgargaz, even if it was bound, as follows from paragraph 322 above, by public supply obligations. 1045 Moreover, even if, as the applicants claim, the aim of the system established by the 2012 Storage Access Rules was to ensure the fulfilment of public supply obligations, the applicants have failed to explain how the market shares of a gas supplier for the ongoing storage year are relevant for ensuring a priority in the capacity allocation procedure that complies with the public supply obligations for the following year, the latter being the year concerned by that procedure. As the contested decision rightly states in recital 171, the already-established operator would always have a higher base sale quantity in view of the higher contracted sales in the ongoing year, and would, therefore, as a matter of fact, have priority for capacity allocation, without that being justified on the basis of a public supply obligation during the year concerned by the ongoing allocation procedure. 1046 In the second place, the applicants submit that the fact that the 2012 Storage Access Rules placed new entrants with low existing sales at a disadvantage is irrelevant. They argue that, even though, during the relevant period, Bulgargaz always had higher sales, on the one hand, access to the Chiren storage facility was not a prerequisite for competing with Bulgargaz on the Bulgarian gas supply markets and, on the other hand, a new entrant could have attracted significant volumes of future sales over a period of two years and thus remove Bulgargaz from its position as a priority applicant. 1047 In that regard, it should be noted that, in recitals 339 and 491 of the contested decision, the Commission found, without being challenged by the applicants on that point, that access to storage facilities was essential in order to manage fluctuations in demand and thus to allow active participation in the gas supply markets. As the Commission then found in recital 530 of that decision, if a competitor of Bulgargaz had contracted a larger volume of gas sales for a given year, it would have needed a larger storage capacity from that year in order to cover seasonal fluctuations in demand from its larger customer base. Therefore, in practice, no competitor could have negotiated a larger volume of gas than Bulgargaz if it did not have the possibility of using the Chiren storage facility. 1048 It follows from the foregoing that the first complaint must be rejected. (2) The second complaint, arguing that there was a sufficient period of time for the preparation of access requests during the first procedure for the allocation of storage capacity 1049 By their second complaint, the applicants submit that the Commission was wrong to conclude that the period of 19 days set by Bulgartransgaz for the submission of requests for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2012/2013 storage period was insufficient (see recital 188 of the contested decision). They argue, first, that that period did not prevent Bulgargaz from making such a request in good time and, second, that, in 2012, Overgas did not make any request for access to the Chiren storage facility or to the transmission network, which demonstrates that it had no interest in obtaining access to those infrastructures. 1050 In that regard, in the first place, the Commission found, in the contested decision, without being contradicted by the applicants, that: – the procedure for the allocation of storage capacity for the 2012/2013 storage period, covering a capacity of 300 million cubic metres at the Chiren storage facility, was launched only two days after the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules, namely on 30 March 2012, and operators wishing to participate in that procedure had until 17 April 2012, that is, only 19 days after the adoption of those rules, to submit their application for capacity (see recitals 169, 186 and 188 of and footnote 274 to the contested decision); – in that limited 19-day period, operators wishing to participate in that procedure had to prepare a supply plan including access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 for the requested volumes of gas (see recital 188 of the contested decision, relying, in that regard, on Overgas’ response of 3 October 2013 to the Commission’s request for information of 18 September 2012); – Bulgargaz was the only operator to submit such an application within that period; under the 2012 Storage Access Rules, it was allocated all of the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility that was the subject of the allocation procedure for the 2012/2013 storage period and concluded a gas storage contract with Bulgartransgaz covering that capacity (see recital 187 of the contested decision). 1051 It follows that, before the launch of the procedure for the allocation of storage capacity for the 2012/2013 storage period, potentially interested third parties had almost no time, since they had only two days, to familiarise themselves with the new procedure and the new methodology for the allocation of capacity at the Chiren storage facility which were introduced by those rules. 1052 In addition, since the 2012 Storage Access Rules introduced a right of priority for allocation based on supply contracts concluded with public suppliers, a new entrant first had to conclude such contracts with its customers and a contract with Bulgartransgaz for the use of the transmission network, connected to the Chiren storage facility, and with Bulgargaz for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 1053 In those circumstances, the applicants cannot claim that the period of 19 days was sufficient to enable those third parties to prepare a supply plan and to submit an application for access to the Chiren storage facility. 1054 The fact that Bulgargaz managed to submit its application in the context of the allocation procedure for the 2012/2013 storage period does not call into question that conclusion. Unlike other potential applicants, Bulgargaz had a well-established commercial relationship with Bulgartransgaz, inter alia for access to the Chiren storage facility, an infrastructure which it had been using for several years. Furthermore, it already had access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, to the transmission network and to an extended customer base on the Bulgarian gas supply markets, and thus fulfilled the conditions enabling it to receive priority treatment under the procedure referred to in paragraphs 1035 to 1037 above, which was not the case for the operators entering those markets. 1055 In the second place, in so far as Bulgartransgaz waited until 19 June 2012 to make a decision on Overgas’ applications for access to the Chiren storage facility for the 2011/2012 storage period (see paragraphs 1022 and 1026 above), the applicants cannot rely on the absence of an application by Overgas for access to that infrastructure in 2012 in order to argue that Overgas had no interest in obtaining access to that infrastructure. 1056 In addition, Overgas’ multiple steps, from 2010, to obtain such access and the fact that it participated in the capacity allocation procedures for the 2013/2014 storage period and then for the 2014/2015 storage period confirm that it did have such an interest. 1057 In the light of the foregoing, the second complaint must be rejected. (3) The third complaint, alleging inconsistency in the Commission’s conclusions regarding the 2015/2016 storage period 1058 The applicants submit that the Commission’s position regarding the 2012/2013 storage period is inconsistent with its finding that there was no abusive conduct in relation to the 2015/2016 storage period, since, for those two periods, Bulgargaz was the sole applicant for access to the Chiren storage facility. 1059 In that regard, it should be noted that it is not apparent from recitals 518 and 519 of the contested decision that the reason why the Commission ruled out any abusive conduct on the part of Bulgartransgaz for the 2015/2016 storage period was that Bulgargaz was the only operator to have submitted an application for capacity at the Chiren storage facility for that period. 1060 The Commission found that Bulgartransgaz’s abusive conduct in respect of the Chiren storage facility had ended on 19 September 2014 because, from that date, it had, in essence, put an end to the delaying tactics set out on recital 492 of the contested decision (see recitals 518 and 519 of the contested decision) for the following reasons. 1061 First, the Commission stated that Bulgartransgaz had responded promptly to a request for access to the Chiren storage facility submitted by a company on 19 September 2014 and that it had issued a favourable opinion on that request. The access was thus granted four days later, on 23 September 2014 (see recitals 208 and 518 of the contested decision). 1062 Second, the Commission observed that, following the storage capacity allocation procedure in April 2014, Bulgartransgaz publicly advertised that there was spare storage capacity available (see recitals 207 and 518 of the contested decision). 1063 Third, the Commission stated that, in the context of the storage capacity allocation procedure in April 2015, Bulgargaz had requested only one third of the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility and that, following that procedure, Bulgartransgaz had immediately published the remaining available capacity (see recitals 209 and 519 of the contested decision). 1064 Fourth, the Commission found that, when company B requested access to the Chiren storage facility in December 2015, Bulgartransgaz had immediately accepted its request (see recitals 209, 213 and 519 of the contested decision). 1065 However, for the 2012/2013 storage period, the Commission was entitled to find that Bulgartransgaz had not given third parties sufficient time to prepare their applications (see paragraph 1053 above). It also found, without being challenged by the applicants on that point, that, during that period, Bulgartransgaz had not published the withdrawal capacity that remained available at the Chiren storage facility, which had prevented potential applicants from taking the necessary steps to use that capacity (see recital 189 of the contested decision). 1066 It follows that the Commission was entitled to conclude that, from 19 September 2014, Bulgartransgaz’s conduct in respect of the allocation of the capacity at the Chiren storage facility radically differed from its conduct as regards the 2012/2013 storage period. 1067 The third complaint must therefore be rejected. (4) The fourth complaint, regarding the storage access granted to Overgas for the 2013/2014 storage period 1068 The applicants submit that Bulgartransgaz processed Overgas’ storage request for the 2013/2014 storage period in accordance with the 2012 Storage Access Rules, that access to the Chiren storage facility was thus granted to Overgas and that the latter’s refusal to conclude a storage contract with Bulgartransgaz has nothing to do with the way in which Overgas’ request was dealt with. 1069 In that regard, it should be noted that, for the 2013/2014 storage period: – Bulgartransgaz initiated a procedure for the allocation of 300 million cubic metres of capacity available at the Chiren storage facility; it announced the capacity available for injection, namely 355 million cubic metres, and for withdrawal, namely 400 million cubic metres, exceeding the available storage capacity (see recital 190 and Table No 2 (recital 194) of the contested decision); – Bulgargaz requested firm and interruptible capacity for the injection of [310-385] million cubic metres of gas and the withdrawal of [290-365] million cubic metres of gas, and Overgas requested only firm capacity for injection and withdrawal of [150-200] million cubic metres of gas (see recital 191, Table No 2 (recital 194) and recital 195 of the contested decision); – as a result of the application of the 2012 Storage Access Rules, Bulgargaz was allocated a storage capacity of [200-275] million cubic metres of gas and, on 30 April 2013, Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz concluded a storage contract for that volume with an injection and withdrawal plan similar to that requested; in particular, Bulgargaz was authorised to withdraw gas between December 2013 and March 2014; by contrast, Overgas was allocated only the surplus, namely the capacity that Bulgargaz had not requested, namely [25-50] million cubic metres of gas, and that was conditional on Overgas withdrawing that volume from the Chiren storage facility in October and November 2013, and subsequently in October and November 2014; Overgas ultimately decided not to conclude a storage contract with Bulgartransgaz for the 2013/2014 storage period (see recitals 192 to 194, 196 to 198, 228 and 517 of the contested decision). 1070 The Commission was thus entitled to find, in recital 517 of the contested decision, that the storage capacity offered to Overgas was virtually useless because it would not have enabled it to balance its purchases and sales of gas. As is apparent from the file, Overgas would have had to withdraw all the gas stored at the Chiren storage facility during October and November, that is, before the beginning of the coldest period during which the peak consumption of gas in Bulgaria occurs, which is from 15 December to 15 February. Thus, if Overgas had accepted that offer, it would have had to incur additional storage costs for no consideration because the obligation to withdraw the volumes of gas before the peak consumption season would have prevented it from properly balancing its purchases and sales of gas (see recitals 199 and 228 of the contested decision). 1071 It is true that, as is apparent from recitals 38 and 161 and from Table No 2 in recital 194 of the contested decision, gas is injected into the Chiren storage facility during the ‘summer’ months (namely April to September) and withdrawn during the ‘winter’ months (namely October to March). However, the conditions which Bulgartransgaz granted to Bulgargaz were, in that regard, much more advantageous, since, unlike Overgas, Bulgargaz was authorised to withdraw gas from that facility between December 2013 and March 2014 (see Table No 2 (recital 194) of the contested decision), that is, for the most part, during the season of peak consumption. 1072 Consequently, the fourth complaint must be rejected and, therefore, the third part must be rejected. (d) The fourth part, arguing that the 2014 Storage Access Rules are not anticompetitive 1073 The applicants dispute the finding in recital 492 of the contested decision that the 2014 Storage Access Rules are anticompetitive. They put forward two complaints. 1074 The Commission, supported by Overgas, disputes the applicants’ arguments. (1) The first complaint, arguing that there was no abusive rejection of Overgas’ request for storage access for the 2014/2015 storage period 1075 The applicants submit that the Commission failed to carry out an objective assessment of the evidence relating to Bulgartransgaz’s handling of Overgas’ request made in the context of the storage capacity allocation procedure in April 2014 because the Commission concluded that there was an abusive refusal on the basis that Overgas was dissatisfied with the storage capacity that it had been offered. 1076 In that regard, it must be noted that, in recitals 201 to 206 and 229 of the contested decision, the Commission stated, without being challenged by the applicants, that: – in April 2014, Bulgartransgaz launched a procedure for the allocation of capacity at the Chiren storage facility for the 2014/2015 storage period (‘the 2014 allocation procedure’), governed by the 2014 Storage Access Rules; – the available injection capacity was 300 million cubic metres of gas and the available withdrawal capacity was 415 million cubic metres of gas; – Overgas requested the injection and the withdrawal of [80-130] million cubic metres of gas, whereas Bulgargaz requested all the available capacity for injection and withdrawal; – in application of the 2014 Storage Access Rules, Bulgargaz was allocated [85-95]% of the injection capacity that it had requested, whereas Overgas received an offer for only [20-30]% of the injection capacity that it had requested; – Overgas decided not to conclude a storage contract with Bulgartransgaz. 1077 The Commission has thus shown that the implementation of the 2014 Storage Access Rules continued to favour Bulgargaz to the detriment of third parties, for whom the allocation of the capacity at the Chiren storage facility under those rules was commercially unattractive (see recitals 206, 518 and 529 of the contested decision). Consequently, the fact that Overgas decided not to conclude a storage contract at the end of the 2014 allocation procedure, after Bulgartransgaz had offered it barely more than a quarter of the requested injection capacity, whereas its competitor Bulgargaz saw its request almost fully satisfied, constitutes evidence on which the Commission could rely in order to establish that there was a refusal to supply in respect of the Chiren storage facility (see recitals 201 to 206 and 229 of the contested decision). 1078 Furthermore, the Commission noted that Bulgargaz had ultimately not concluded a storage contract with Bulgartransgaz on the basis of the 2014 allocation procedure. The storage contracts which the two sister companies concluded in July and September 2014 covered only [5-30] million cubic metres and [70-95] million cubic metres of gas, respectively (see recital 207 of the contested decision), that is, a very small fraction of the volume initially requested by Bulgargaz and of the volume granted to it by Bulgartransgaz during that procedure. Thus, at the end of the 2014 allocation procedure, the Chiren storage facility retained a significant volume of available capacity. 1079 In the light of those considerations, the Commission could legitimately conclude that Bulgartransgaz’s modus operandi during the 2014 allocation procedure was aimed at preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the Chiren storage facility. 1080 The first complaint must therefore be rejected. (2) The second complaint, arguing that the 2014 Storage Access Rules were still in force at the end of the infringement period found in respect of the Chiren storage facility 1081 The applicants submit that the conclusion in recital 492 of the contested decision regarding the anticompetitive nature of the 2014 Storage Access Rules is invalidated by the finding, in recital 649, that the abusive conduct relating to the Chiren storage facility ended when access to that facility was granted to a third party on 19 September 2014, when the 2014 Storage Access Rules were still in force. 1082 However, it is apparent from recital 492 of the contested decision that the Commission did not base its findings regarding the Chiren storage facility on the existence of the 2014 Storage Access Rules as such. It found, in particular, that it was the way in which Bulgartransgaz had applied its 2014 Storage Access Rules when dealing with requests from third parties for access to that facility that constituted delaying tactics and, thus, a refusal to supply, which ended when Bulgartransgaz moved away from that practical application of the storage access rules on 19 September 2014 (see recital 492 of the contested decision and paragraph 1066 above). 1083 Thus, in recital 518 of the contested decision, the Commission found that the 2014 Storage Access Rules, adopted in April 2014, had not materially improved third-party access to the Chiren storage facility as regards the 2012 Storage Access Rules, because the storage capacity allocation system was still based on the ‘base sale quantity’ rule, which generally continued to favour the undertaking with the highest ongoing sales, namely Bulgargaz. In that regard, the Commission validly held that Bulgartransgaz’s modus operandi consisting of preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the Chiren storage facility had continued with the implementation of the 2014 Storage Access Rules, during the 2014 allocation procedure, the outcome of that procedure having once again favoured Bulgargaz to the detriment of third parties (see recitals 204, 206, 518 and 529 of the contested decision and paragraphs 1076, 1077 and 1079 above). 1084 The Commission found, however, that, in September 2014, Bulgartransgaz’s conduct had changed because it had ceased its delaying tactics by accepting, in the space of only four days, a request for access to that infrastructure from a third party and by, then onwards, properly announcing the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility (see recitals 207, 208 and 211 of the contested decision). 1085 The Commission thus concluded, in recital 649 of the contested decision, that the anticompetitive conduct relating to the Chiren storage facility had ended on 19 September 2014, when, in essence, Bulgartransgaz had processed for the first time a request for access to that facility in a non-dilatory manner (see recitals 208 and 211 of the contested decision). 1086 It follows that the 2014 Storage Access Rules constituted a tool used by Bulgartransgaz to perpetuate its delaying tactics vis-à-vis third parties until 19 September 2014. The fact that, on that date, Bulgartransgaz granted a third party satisfactory access to the Chiren storage facility, when those rules were still in force, merely shows that the anticompetitive application of those rules, which is the conduct of which Bulgartransgaz is accused in the contested decision, ended on that date. 1087 The argument that the abusive nature of the 2014 Storage Access Rules is invalidated by the finding that the abusive conduct relating to the Chiren storage facility ceased on 19 September 2014 must therefore be rejected as ineffective. 1088 Accordingly, the fourth part must be rejected. (e) Conclusion on the third ‘sub-plea’ 1089 It follows from the examination of this ‘sub-plea’ that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgartransgaz had adopted an modus operandi consisting of preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the Chiren storage facility between 30 July 2010 and 19 September 2014. In particular, it has demonstrated that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct hindered the access of Overgas, company F and company C to that facility. 1090 The Commission considered that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct was capable of restricting competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets because, in the absence of access to the Chiren storage facility, Bulgargaz’s competitors were not able to manage seasonal fluctuations in gas supply and demand and, therefore, were prevented from developing offers on equal terms on those markets (see recital 623 of the contested decision). 1091 The factual situations concerning the barriers encountered by Overgas, company F and company C as regards access to the Chiren storage facility are twofold. (1) Company F’s request for access of 1 September 2011 and Overgas’ requests for access before 1 January 2013 1092 Bulgartransgaz’s conduct in relation to its handling of company F’s request for access, submitted on 1 September 2011, and its conduct in respect of Overgas’ requests for access before 1 January 2013, should be considered together. 1093 In that regard, it should be noted that, during the infringement period, the ability to gain access to the Chiren storage facility depended on the ability to gain access upstream to the Romanian Pipeline 1. The latter was the only route transporting gas to the transmission network which, in turn, was the only infrastructure connected to that storage facility (see recitals 578 and 611 of the contested decision). 1094 The examination of the first ‘sub-plea’ led to the conclusion that the Commission had failed to establish to the requisite legal standard that Bulgargaz’s conduct in relation to access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 constituted a refusal of access capable of falling within the scope of Article 102 TFEU (see paragraph 689 above). 1095 The Commission has not established that the volumes of gas that company F wished to store at the Chiren storage facility came from the negligible production of domestic gas in Bulgaria. 1096 It is common ground between the parties that, during the infringement period, the supply of gas in Bulgaria depended almost entirely on gas from Russia, since Bulgarian domestic production of gas was negligible and, moreover, was purchased mainly by Bulgargaz (see recitals 47, 62, 66, 68 and 423 and recital 629(a) of the contested decision). Although it is stated, in the contested decision, that company C purchased part of that domestic production (see footnotes 58 and 88), it has not been demonstrated in that decision that the volumes of gas which company F wished to store at the Chiren storage facility came from that domestic production. 1097 Similarly, Overgas did not have access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 prior to 1 January 2013 for reasons that are not attributable to proven abusive conduct on the part of the applicants (see paragraphs 951 and 952 above). 1098 In those circumstances, the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct as regards the Chiren storage facility was capable of restricting competition and, in particular, of preventing company F, in 2011, and Overgas, before 1 January 2013, from entering the Bulgarian gas supply markets during the infringement period, as required by the case-law cited in paragraph 239 above (judgments of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and Others, C‑307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 154, and of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others, C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379, paragraphs 50, 61, 64 and 72). 1099 Therefore, the Commission could not rely on the manner in which Bulgartransgaz handled, on the one hand, company F’s request for access to the Chiren storage facility and, on the other hand, Overgas’ requests for access for the 2011/2012 storage period to support the conclusion that the lack of access to that infrastructure prevented those two competitors of Bulgargaz from developing their offers on the Bulgarian gas supply markets on equal terms. The grant of full access to the Chiren storage facility would not, at the time, have enabled those two operators to transport gas on those markets, because they did not have prior access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 1100 Accordingly, the Commission has not established that Bulgartransgaz’s handling of the request for access submitted by company F and the requests submitted by Overgas for the 2011/2012 storage period was capable of restricting competition and, in particular, of producing exclusionary effects on the Bulgarian gas supply markets, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 239 above. (2) Company C’s request for access of 5 June 2012 and Overgas’ requests for access from 1 January 2013 1101 It should be noted that: – it is apparent from the file that company C obtained access to the transmission network on 1 January 2012 and that it did not need access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 to be able to transport its gas to Bulgaria, including to the Chiren storage facility, since its gas came from Bulgarian domestic production (see footnotes 58 and 88 to the contested decision); – as follows from paragraphs 490 and 943 above, Overgas obtained access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and to the transmission network from 1 January 2013. 1102 Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain whether Bulgartransgaz’s conduct relating to company C’s request for access to the Chiren storage facility and Overgas’ requests from 1 January 2013 was capable of restricting competition and producing exclusionary effects, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 239 above. 1103 In that regard, it must be stated that the obstacles created by Bulgartransgaz with regard to the requests for access by company C in June 2012 and by Overgas between 1 January 2013 and mid-2014, when the capacity allocation procedure for the 2014/2015 storage period was carried out, were, by themselves, capable of affecting competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets. The lack of access to the Chiren storage facility deprived those two companies of an essential tool for managing seasonal fluctuations in demand and thus prevented them from developing their offers on those markets on equal terms with Bulgargaz. 1104 It follows from the foregoing that, although Bulgartransgaz’s conduct concerning the management of access to the Chiren storage facility was not capable of restricting competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets before June 2012, which is when company C’s request was made, it may have been capable of doing so between 5 June 2012 and 19 September 2014, the latter being the date on which Bulgartransgaz ceased its delaying tactics in relation to the handling of requests for access to that facility. 1105 Accordingly, the third ‘sub-plea’ must be upheld in part. 5. Conclusion on the fourth plea 1106 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard that there was a refusal to grant access to the three infrastructures held by the BEH Group that was capable of falling within the scope of Article 102 TFEU as regards: – first, Bulgargaz’s conduct in relation to access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 between 31 January 2011 and 1 January 2015 (see the third and the fifth to eighth parts of the first ‘sub-plea’, and the conclusions drawn in paragraph 689 above); – second, Bulgartransgaz’s conduct in relation to access to the transmission network between 30 July 2010 and 1 January 2015 (see the fifth part of the second ‘sub-plea’ and the conclusions drawn in paragraph 954 above); – third, Bulgartransgaz’s conduct in relation to access to the Chiren storage facility before 5 June 2012 (see paragraphs 1092 to 1100 above). 1107 By contrast, the information in the file demonstrates that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct regarding access to the Chiren storage facility was capable of restricting competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets between 5 June 2012 and 19 September 2014 (see paragraphs 1101 to 1104 above). 1108 That being so, it should be noted that the system of judicial review of Commission decisions regarding infringements which it finds under Article 102 TFEU consists in a review of the legality in accordance with Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 42). 1109 In reviewing the legality of acts under Article 263 TFEU, the EU judicature cannot substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the act in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). As Advocate General Kokott observed in her Opinion in Frucona Košice v Commission (C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2012:535, point 92), the prohibition of a substitution, by the EU judicature, of the reasoning of the author of the contested act reflects the cassatory nature of the action for annulment, which is based on the principle of institutional balance which characterises the structure and functioning of the European Union. Observance of that institutional balance means that each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. 1110 Thus, although the Commission has the power to adopt decisions applying Article 102 TFEU, the EU judicature has jurisdiction under Article 263 TFEU, inter alia, to review the legality of the reasoning of those decisions, without being able, in principle, to substitute its own reasoning for that of the Commission or to supplement the Commission’s reasoning. 1111 In that regard, it should be noted that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is based on two fundamental pillars, namely, first, the anticompetitive strategy implemented by the applicants aimed at protecting Bulgargaz’s dominant position on the Bulgarian gas supply markets and, second, the concept of a ‘single and continuous infringement’. 1. The anticompetitive strategy 1112 The contested decision found that the applicants’ conduct in relation to the Romanian Pipeline 1, the transmission network and the Chiren storage facility, which consisted of preventing, restricting and delaying access to each of those infrastructures, formed part of an anticompetitive strategy aimed at protecting Bulgargaz’s dominant position on the Bulgarian gas supply markets by foreclosing third-party access to those markets (see recital 389, recital 454(b) and recitals 467, 569, 572 and 643). According to the Commission, that strategy was designed by BEH and implemented by its subsidiaries Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz (see recital 570 of that decision). 1113 In that regard, in recital 567 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that, given the fragmented nature of the practices at issue, in order to prove that overall strategy, it relied on a body of evidence demonstrating: – the consistency of the infringement over time; – the comparable nature and complementarity of the practices in question; – the common standard of the applicants’ conduct relating to each infrastructure, consisting of the ability to foreclose the competitors from the Bulgarian gas supply markets. 1114 Thus, the Commission observed, first, that those practices, consisting of capacity hoarding on the Romanian Pipeline 1 and preventing, restricting and delaying access to the transmission network and to the Chiren storage facility ‘complemented and mutually reinforced each other’ (see recital 577 of the contested decision). 1115 Second, the Commission emphasised that ‘the practices were explicitly interlinked, by making access to the … transmission network (controlled by Bulgartransgaz) conditional upon third-party access to the Romanian Transit Pipeline (controlled by Bulgargaz and subject to authorisation by BEH)’ (see recital 577 of the contested decision). In that regard, it must be noted that the Commission concluded that Bulgartransgaz’s requirement that proof be provided as to reserved capacity on the Romanian Pipeline 1 operated by Bulgargaz, which belonged to the same group of undertakings, had ‘made … access [to the transmission network] de facto impossible until 2013’ (see recitals 475 and 480 of the contested decision). 1116 Third, the Commission stated that the transmission network was the only infrastructure capable of transporting gas to the Chiren storage facility and that, therefore, access to that network was required in order to obtain access to the storage. It also found that the ability to access that facility during the infringement period was ‘indirectly linked to the ability to access the Romanian Transit Pipeline 1[, which] … was the only route bringing gas to the … Tran[s]mission Network during [that] period’ (see recital 578 of the contested decision). 1117 The Commission therefore concluded that Bulgartransgaz and Bulgargaz had been ‘able to influence and jointly contribute to the prevention, restriction and delay of third-party access to the infrastructure owned or controlled by the BEH group’ (see recital 579 of the contested decision). It also stated, first, that Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz coordinated their behaviour in relation to third-party access requests, while dealing with each other as entities within an integrated undertaking, and, second, that BEH was directly involved in all the practices at issue (see recital 579 of that decision). 2. A single and continuous infringement 1118 The Commission concluded that the applicants had committed a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 TFEU between 30 July 2010 and 1 January 2015 by refusing third-party access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, the transmission network and the Chiren storage facility, which had resulted in foreclosure of the Bulgarian gas supply markets (see Articles 1 and 2 and recitals 1, 2 and 450 of the contested decision). 1119 According to the case-law, the concept of a ‘single and continuous infringement’ relates to a series of actions which form part of an overall plan because their identical object distorts competition within the internal market. For the purposes of characterising various instances of conduct as a single and continuous infringement, it is necessary to establish whether they complement each other inasmuch as each of them is intended to deal with one or more consequences of the normal pattern of competition and, by interacting, contribute to the realisation of the objectives intended within the framework of that overall plan. In that regard, it will be necessary to take into account any circumstance capable of establishing or casting doubt on that complementary link, such as the period of application, the content (including the methods used) and, correlatively, the objective of the various actions in question (judgments of 28 April 2010, Amann & Söhne and Cousin Filterie v Commission, T‑446/05, EU:T:2010:165, paragraph 89; of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca v Commission, T‑321/05, EU:T:2010:266, paragraph 892; and of 8 September 2016, Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission, T‑467/13, not published, EU:T:2016:450, paragraph 384). 1120 In the present case, in order to demonstrate that all of the applicants’ practices constituted a single and continuous infringement, in recitals 608, 609 and 614 of the contested decision, the Commission relied, in essence, on the fact that they formed part of a ‘comprehensive and long-term plan to foreclose [Bulgarian] gas supply markets … to the benefit of Bulgargaz’. 1121 In that regard, first, the Commission again stated that Bulgargaz itself had the ability to foreclose its competitors and to restrict the possibility of viable competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets by hoarding capacity on the Romanian Pipeline 1 (see recitals 611 and 624 of the contested decision). 1122 Second, the Commission stated that ‘the BEH group’s three practices’ linked, respectively, to the three infrastructures which it controlled ‘complemented and mutually reinforced each other and were implemented with the single aim of foreclosing the [Bulgarian] gas supply markets’ (see recital 612 of the contested decision). It found, in that regard, that access to the transmission network and, therefore, to the Chiren storage facility was conditional upon first obtaining access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, which was, during the infringement period, the only available infrastructure for the transportation of gas through that network and, therefore, to that storage facility (see recitals 51, 578 and 611 of the contested decision). 1123 Therefore, as is apparent from recitals 578 and 611 of the contested decision and as the Commission states, moreover, in its defence, ‘without access to the Transit Pipeline 1, (potential) competitors had no access to the transmission network, and consequently also [no access] to the [Chiren] storage facility’. 1124 Third, the Commission reiterated that Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz coordinated with each other regarding the examination of access requests by third parties and dealt with each other as entities within an integrated undertaking (see recitals 579 and 612 of the contested decision). 1125 Fourth, the Commission found, once again, that the practices complained of were also ‘explicitly interlinked’ in so far as ‘access to the … transmission network (controlled by Bulgartransgaz) [was] conditional upon third-party access to the Romanian Transit Pipeline 1 (controlled by Bulgargaz) and subject to authorisation by BEH’ (see recital 612 of the contested decision). It emphasised that, even after January 2012, BEH had retained control over Bulgartransgaz, since access to the transmission network, and thereby, indirectly, access to the Chiren storage facility, was conditional upon first obtaining, from Bulgargaz, access to the Romanian Pipeline 1, which itself was subject to BEH’s prior approval (see recital 611 of the contested decision). 1126 According to the Commission, the link between those practices enabled: – first, the three applicants to influence each others’ behaviour with the result that, together, they contributed to preventing, restricting and delaying third-party access to the infrastructures owned or controlled by the BEH Group; – second, the BEH Group to coordinate its behaviour in a consistent manner by applying similar methods (see recital 612 of the contested decision). 1127 It follows from all the considerations set out in paragraphs 1112 to 1126 above that: – neither in the grounds of the contested decision, nor even less in the operative part of that decision, did the Commission impute to the applicants a number of separate infringements, each of which was allegedly linked, respectively, to one of the infrastructures in question; – the anticompetitive strategy of which the applicants are accused is a key constituent element of the single and continuous infringement imputed to them by the contested decision; they are accused of having contributed to the implementation of that strategy, which was based on the interdependence of the conduct relating to each of the three gas infrastructures in question and had the sole objective of foreclosing the Bulgarian gas supply markets in order to protect Bulgargaz’s dominant position on those markets; – the Commission stated, on several occasions, in the contested decision, that Bulgargaz’s actions concerning the Romanian Pipeline 1 were essential, and sufficient on their own, to foreclose the access of its potential competitors to those markets. 1128 It follows that the allegedly abusive conduct relating to the Romanian Pipeline 1 is the linchpin on which the Commission’s analysis and the statement of reasons for the contested decision are based as regards the constituent elements of the single and continuous infringement identified. 1129 In that context, the fact that Bulgartransgaz hindered company C’s access to the Chiren storage facility in June 2012 and Overgas’ access between 1 January 2013 and mid-2014 (see paragraphs 1101 to 1104 above) and that that conduct had, by itself, the ability to produce anticompetitive effects on the Bulgarian gas supply markets cannot, by itself, justify the finding, in the contested decision, that there was a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 TFEU imputable to the applicants. 1130 It should be noted that Articles 1 and 2 of the contested decision find that the applicants committed ‘a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 [TFEU] [in that they refused] third-party access to the … transmission network, the Romanian … Pipeline 1 and [the] Chiren [storage facility] resulting in foreclosure of the gas supply markets in Bulgaria’ from ‘30 July 2010 … until 1 January 2015’. 1131 Therefore, in the light of all the forms of conduct alleged against the applicants in the contested decision and the emphasis placed by that decision on their interdependence, complementarity and mutual reinforcement, it cannot be inferred from the operative part of the contested decision that the operative part is based on a number of grounds concerning separate forms of abusive conduct each of which would, in itself, be sufficient to justify the operative part. 1132 According to the settled case-law cited in paragraphs 234 and 1109 above, in the context of a review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the EU judicature cannot substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the act at issue. In the present case, the finding, in the operative part of the contested decision, that there was a single and continuous infringement imputable to the applicants, indicating the nature and scope of that infringement of EU competition rules and which is inseparable from the statement of reasons for that decision, encompasses all of the applicants’ forms of conduct relating to the three gas infrastructures in question. As noted in paragraphs 1113 and 1131 above, the characterisation of the single and continuous infringement is based on the complementarity and interdependence of the number of forms of conduct. 1133 In those circumstances, the sole ground relating to Bulgartransgaz’s conduct concerning the Chiren storage facility after June 2012 cannot, without distorting the contested decision by substituting a new assessment of the facts for that of the Commission contrary to the case-law cited in paragraph 1109 above, constitute the essential, or even sufficient, statement of reasons capable by itself of justifying the operative part of that decision. 1134 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard the infringement in the form of an abuse of a dominant position imputed to the applicants by the contested decision. 1135 The fourth plea must therefore be upheld, and there is no need to examine the other ‘sub-pleas’ raised by the applicants. D. The first plea, alleging substantive procedural defects affecting the exercise of the applicants’ rights of defence and breach of the principle of good administration 1136 By their first plea, the applicants, supported by the Republic of Bulgaria, submit that the Commission infringed the principle of good administration and their rights of defence in several respects. The plea is divided into five parts: – the first alleges that the Commission infringed its obligation properly to record and include in the investigation file the minutes of the meetings with Overgas; – the second alleges that the Commission failed subsequently to disclose the minutes of the meetings with Overgas, and certain written observations made by Overgas; – the third alleges that the Commission deprived the applicants of access to the statement of objections in the Gazprom case and to underlying documents relating to the Bulgarian gas market; – the fourth alleges that certain confidential information belonging to the applicants was disclosed to Overgas; – the fifth alleges that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligations as a result of the failure to send a request for information to Transgaz, the owner and the TSO of the Romanian Pipeline 1. 1137 The Commission disputes all of those arguments. 1138 It should be noted at the outset that, in the context of this plea, the applicants have not sufficiently substantiated the failure to fulfil obligations alleged in the fifth part. 1139 In that regard, as stated in paragraph 718 above, under Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the brief statement of the pleas in law must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any other supporting information, with the result that a mere abstract statement of the grounds does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. Similar requirements are called for where a submission is made in support of a plea in law (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2022, Wieland-Werke v Commission, T‑251/19, not published, EU:T:2022:296, paragraph 59). 1140 In so far as the applicants have not explained how the absence of a request to Transgaz for information infringed their rights of defence, the minimum formal requirements laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure are not satisfied, with the result that that line of argument, and, consequently, the fifth part, must be rejected. 1141 The Court considers that it is appropriate to deal with the first and second parts together, those parts being linked by alleged failures to record and place in the file certain documents concerning Overgas, and a failure to grant access to those documents. 1. The first and second parts, alleging infringement of the obligations to record and place on the file the documents relating to the Commission’s meetings with Overgas, and alleging insufficient access to those documents 1142 During the administrative procedure, the Commission organised a total of eight meetings with Overgas: – the first five took place before the statement of objections was communicated to the applicants, more specifically on 13 October 2010, on 13 January, 17 March and 15 December 2011 and on 17 June 2013 (‘the meetings of 2010 to 2013’); – the remaining three meetings took place after the adoption of the statement of objections, more specifically on 13 October 2015 and on 17 March and 20 October 2016 (‘the meetings of 2015 and 2016’ and, together with the meetings of 2010 to 2013, ‘the meetings with Overgas’). 1143 The Commission states that, after each of those eight meetings with Overgas, it drew up non-confidential brief notes as well as confidential detailed minutes. At the hearing, the Commission admitted that it could not indicate precisely the date on which the latter documents were drawn up, but that, because of their degree of detail, it assumed that those documents had been drafted just after each meeting. 1144 In addition, following each of those meetings with the Commission, with the exception of those of 13 October 2015 and 17 March 2016, Overgas submitted written observations (‘the follow-up observations’), in which it developed the arguments raised during those meetings. 1145 It is also apparent from the file that the applicants first of all had access, inter alia, to the brief notes of the meetings of 2010 to 2013 and to a non-confidential version of the follow-up observations in the context of the access to the file following the statement of objections. On 5 January 2018, following the judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission (C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632), which clarified the Commission’s obligations to keep records and to keep the file in proceedings initiated to penalise infringements of competition rules, they put forward a new request for, inter alia, access to the detailed minutes and notes of any other meeting between the Commission and Overgas. 1146 On 23 March 2018, the Commission replied, admitting that it had had three meetings with Overgas after the statement of objections, namely the meetings of 2015 and 2016; it sent the brief notes of those meetings to the applicants at that point. However, it refused access to the detailed minutes on the ground that, on the one hand, they contained confidential information and, on the other hand, no evidence could be found in those detailed minutes that was not already present in the other non-confidential documents to which the applicants had had access, given that they had also had access to the follow-up observations. 1147 The applicants therefore sent their access request to the Hearing Officer who, in his response of 14 May 2018, stated that he considered that the refusal to disclose the detailed minutes was justified on grounds of confidentiality and that those documents did not contain any additional exculpatory evidence. However, in order to balance the effective exercise of the applicants’ rights of defence with Overgas’ legitimate confidentiality concerns, the Hearing Officer proposed limited access to the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas, through the applicants’ external representatives, in the context of a data room procedure. 1148 In addition, by letter of 18 June 2018 (‘the letter of 18 June 2018’), the applicants requested the Commission to give them access to a less redacted version of the follow-up observations, which the Commission refused. 1149 On 28 June 2018, the applicants’ external representatives obtained access to the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas, in the context of a data room procedure. In line with the instructions given by the Commission, the applicants’ external representatives were able to take into the data room hard copies of the statement of objections, the Letter of Facts, the brief notes of the meetings with Overgas and the non-confidential versions of the follow-up observations. 1150 On that occasion, the applicants’ external representatives drafted the confidential data room report in which they expressed their views on the information which they regarded as exculpatory evidence in the detailed minutes. A non-confidential version of that report (‘the non-confidential data room report’) was drawn up under the supervision of the Commission and communicated to the applicants. The representatives were able to use the information made available to them in the data room for the purposes of defending the applicants, however the representatives could not disclose any confidential information (order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission, T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149, paragraphs 20 to 22). 1151 In the context of the first two parts of their first plea, the applicants put forward, in essence, two sets of arguments: – the first targets the procedure for the recording and placing of the brief notes and detailed minutes on the file; – the second concerns the access granted to the detailed minutes and follow-up observations. 1152 For the purposes of the analysis, it must first be ascertained whether the Commission did in fact commit the procedural errors alleged by the applicants; if so, it will then be necessary to examine the consequences of such errors on their rights of defence, and in particular to ascertain whether, in the light of the factual and legal circumstances specific to the present case, the applicants have adequately demonstrated that they would have been better able to ensure their defence had there been no procedural error on the part of the Commission (judgments of 2 October 2003, Thyssen Stahl v Commission, C‑194/99 P, EU:C:2003:527, paragraph 31; of 13 December 2018, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, EU:T:2018:930, paragraph 129; and of 15 June 2022, Qualcomm v Commission (Qualcomm – Exclusivity payments), T‑235/18, EU:T:2022:358, paragraphs 160 and 202). 2. The existence of procedural defects 1153 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that access to the file, provided for in Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 and in Article 15(1) and (2) of Regulation No 773/2004, is one of the procedural safeguards enabling the principle of equality of arms to be applied and the rights of defence of the parties concerned by the procedure conducted by the Commission to be protected. They are entitled to have access to the investigation file, with the exception of business secrets of other undertakings, internal documents of the Commission and other confidential information. 1154 The right of access to the file means that the Commission must provide the undertaking concerned with the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation that might be relevant for its defence. Those documents comprise both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, with the exception of business secrets of other undertakings, internal documents of the Commission and other confidential information (see judgment of 25 October 2011, Solvay v Commission, C‑109/10 P, EU:C:2011:686, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). 1155 The scope of the right of access to the file as an integral part of the rights of the defence has been the subject of recent case-law which has further clarified the contours of the Commission’s obligations, in particular as regards its recording obligations (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission, C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632; of 15 June 2022, Qualcomm v Commission (Qualcomm – Exclusivity payments), T‑235/18, EU:T:2022:358; and of 14 September 2022, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android), T‑604/18, under appeal, EU:T:2022:541). 1156 In that regard, it must be noted that Article 19(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 provides that, in order to carry out the duties assigned to it, the Commission may interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation. That provision therefore constitutes the legal basis empowering the Commission to conduct an interview in the context of an investigation and is intended to apply to any interview conducted for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation (judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission, C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraphs 84 and 86). 1157 When it conducts such an interview, the Commission is, under Article 3 of Regulation No 773/2004, required to record, in a form of its choosing, the statements made by the persons interviewed (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission, C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraphs 90 and 91). 1158 Thus, whilst it is, admittedly, permissible to exclude from the administrative procedure evidence which has no relation to the allegations of fact and of law in the statement of objections and which therefore has no relevance to the investigation, it cannot be for the Commission alone to determine the evidence of use in the defence of the undertaking concerned (judgments of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 126, and of 16 June 2011, FMC Foret v Commission, T‑191/06, EU:T:2011:277, paragraph 306). 1159 From that point of view, interviews conducted for the purposes of collecting information on the subject matter of the investigation, which therefore fall within the scope of Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003, must be recorded and cannot be omitted from the file (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 June 2022, Qualcomm v Commission (Qualcomm – Exclusivity payments), T‑235/18, EU:T:2022:358, paragraph 199). 1160 Furthermore, the Commission’s obligation, under Article 3 of Regulation No 773/2004, to record, in a form of its choosing, the statements made by the persons interviewed during an administrative investigation, cannot be given concrete expression in the drafting of a brief summary of the subjects addressed during the interview. The Commission must be in a position to provide an indication of the content of the discussions that took place, in particular as regards the nature of the information provided during the interview on the subjects raised (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission, C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 92). 1161 It is in the light of those principles that it is necessary to examine the applicants’ arguments alleging that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligations to record, to place in the file and to grant access to that file. (a) The first complaint, alleging a failure properly to record and include in the file the statements made during the meetings with Overgas 1162 The applicants, supported by the Republic of Bulgaria, claim that the way in which the Commission recorded or failed to record its meetings with Overgas, and the way in which it included in the file the statements made during those meetings, is contrary to the recording obligations under Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation No 773/2004. In that way, the Commission also infringed the principles of good administration and transparency as well as the applicants’ rights of defence. As a consequence, the Court cannot exercise its power of review. 1163 It is necessary, in that regard, to distinguish between, on the one hand, the arguments relating to the meetings with Overgas from 2010 to 2013 and, on the other, those relating to the meetings of 2015 and 2016. 1164 The Court considers that it is appropriate to begin by analysing the arguments concerning the meetings of 2015 and 2016. (1) The meetings of 2015 and 2016 1165 The applicants submit that: – no records of the meetings of 2015 and 2016 were added to the file during the investigation; – the Commission acknowledged the existence of those meetings and of the detailed minutes relating to those meetings only in response to a request by the applicants of 5 January 2018, following which access to brief notes was granted on 23 March 2018. 1166 The Commission states that, as soon as the applicants asked whether it had had any other meetings with Overgas after the statement of objections, the Commission informed them of the meetings of 2015 and 2016, and sent them the brief notes relating to those meetings. 1167 In that regard, the Commission submits that, under paragraph 27 of the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ 2005 C 325, p. 7), a party will be granted access to documents received after notification of the objections at later stages of the administrative procedure, only where such documents may constitute new evidence, whether of an incriminating or of an exculpatory nature, pertaining to the allegations concerning that party in the statement of objections. 1168 According to the Commission, the documents relating to the meetings of 2015 and 2016 constituted neither the basis of the objections addressed to the applicants, nor new evidence as regards the allegations already made and, therefore, it was under no obligation to include the brief notes or the detailed minutes of the meetings of 2015 and 2016 in the file and to give access to them. Moreover, it was for the Commission alone to assess the potentially exculpatory nature of those documents. 1169 However, it is apparent from the brief notes and the detailed minutes that the meetings of 2015 and 2016 were aimed at gathering information relating to the subject matter of the investigation which led to the adoption of the contested decision. 1170 From that perspective, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 1157 and 1159 above, interviews aimed at gathering information on the subject matter of the investigation and therefore falling within the scope of Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003, such as the interviews in question, must be recorded and cannot be omitted from the investigation file. 1171 It is true that the possibility of drawing a distinction between documents relevant to the investigation and those which are not and, consequently, the possibility of excluding the latter from the investigation file remains essential in order to prevent the Commission from being exposed to an excessive procedural burden. Nevertheless, it is not for the Commission to exclude material from the file by exercising its supposed discretion as to the potentially incriminatory or exculpatory nature of those documents, since the absence of any written record of an interview would prevent the Court from verifying whether the Commission complied with the provisions of Regulation No 1/2003 and, more generally, whether the rights of the undertakings and natural persons involved in an investigation have been fully respected. 1172 Furthermore, the recording obligation laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 773/2004 would be deprived of any practical effect if the Commission were allowed to exclude, on its own initiative, the recording of certain meetings, particularly since, in the circumstances of the present case, the interviews took place with Overgas, who played a not-insignificant role in the Commission’s decision to open and continue the investigation and who alleged that the applicants had engaged in anticompetitive practices in respect of Overgas. 1173 It follows that the Commission’s arguments based on the absence of an obligation to record and place on the file the minutes of the meetings of 2015 and 2016 which took place with Overgas after the statement of objections was issued cannot succeed. 1174 Lastly, in so far as the applicants submit that the Commission failed to inform them of the meetings of 2015 and 2016, it must be noted that, during the administrative procedure which led to the adoption of the contested decision, the Commission did not actually refer to the interviews which it had had with Overgas after the statement of objections. 1175 As follows from paragraphs 1157 and 1159 above, the Commission cannot fail to include in the investigation file a record of interviews such as the meetings of 2015 and 2016 and, consequently, cannot fail to inform the parties of those meetings. 1176 It follows that the applicants’ arguments relating to the Commission’s failure to fulfil its obligations regarding the meetings of 2015 and 2016 are well founded, in so far as the Commission should have recorded the statements made during those meetings, should have placed in the file the documents relating to those meetings, and should have updated the index of the file to enable the applicants to be informed of the interviews in question, subject to the protection of the confidentiality of certain information legitimately claimed by Overgas. 1177 The Commission therefore made a procedural error by failing properly to record the statements made during the meetings of 2015 and 2016 and to place them on the file, and by failing to inform the applicants of those meetings. (2) The meetings of 2010 to 2013 1178 The applicants: – criticise the Commission for not properly recording the meetings of 2010 to 2013, since it included only the brief notes in the file, which contained only vague and general summaries; furthermore, the brief notes were placed in the file only several years after those meetings were held, in 2014, which may have weakened their accuracy; – complain that it was not until 2018 that they discovered that there were detailed minutes in relation to the short notes, which were not in the file; they claim that the Commission could not explain why those minutes had been kept outside the file. 1179 Those failures are also reflected in the index of the investigation file, provided after the adoption of the statement of objections, which did not list in sufficient detail the documents gathered during the investigation and failed to indicate, in particular, the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas. 1180 The Commission argues in response that there is no requirement that evidence be placed on the file and included in the index relating to the time when the meetings took place and when the relevant notes were drawn up. It claims that, in any event, the contested decision is not based either on the brief notes or on the detailed minutes of the meetings in question. 1181 The Commission also maintains that, as a result of the access given to the brief notes of the meetings of 2010 to 2013 after the statement of objections, the applicants were indeed in a position to exercise their rights of defence, which they did by submitting their responses to that statement as well as subsequent observations in which they relied, as mitigating circumstances, on certain elements referred to at those meetings. It also submits that the follow-up observations submitted by Overgas, which developed the points raised during those meetings, were placed on the file and disclosed to the applicants. 1182 In that regard, it must be stated that the brief notes of the meetings with Overgas to which the applicants had access take up, for each meeting, less than half a page. Each half-page contains an indication of the date of the meeting, the participants and the topics discussed during the meeting, described in no more than five to eight lines. 1183 The content of the brief notes is thus manifestly insufficient to reflect the content of the discussions that actually took place between the Commission and Overgas and, in particular, the nature of the information provided by Overgas on the topics addressed. 1184 There is nothing in the wording of Article 19(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, or in the objective it pursues, to suggest that the legislature intended to introduce a distinction between, on the one hand, ‘brief notes’, finalised for the purposes of access to the file, and ‘detailed minutes’, intended to remain confidential. Such an interpretation would be tantamount to depriving the right of access to the file of all practical effect, as referred to in paragraph 1153 above, as well as the principle of equality of arms. 1185 In that regard, the fact, referred to by the Commission, that the contested decision is not based either on the brief notes or on the detailed minutes, is irrelevant. The right of access to the file means that the Commission must give the undertaking concerned the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation file which may be relevant for its defence (judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 68). 1186 It follows that, as regards the brief notes of the meetings of 2010 to 2013, the Commission did not comply with its obligations under Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003, read in conjunction with Article 3(3) of Regulation No 773/2004 and in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 1157 and 1159 above. That failure to fulfil obligations was demonstrated, first, by the introduction of an unjustified distinction between two types of document, namely the detailed minutes, intended for internal use, and the brief notes, intended for the file and thus to be accessed by the applicants, and, second, by the manifest inadequacy of those notes in terms of setting out the content of the discussions between the Commission and Overgas, in particular the nature of the information provided by the latter on the topics addressed, as required by the case-law cited in paragraph 1160 above. 1187 However, the Court considers that the lapse of time between the meetings of 2010 to 2013 and the inclusion in the file, which was not until 2014, of the brief notes relating to those meetings does not support the conclusion, by itself and in the absence of other evidence or, at least, clear indicia, that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligations as regards access to the file. 1188 In the first place, despite the late inclusion, in the file, of the brief notes of the meetings with Overgas, the applicants had the opportunity to take those notes into account and to exercise their rights of defence, not only by submitting their response to the statement of objections, but also and above all, as follows from paragraph 1147 above, by submitting arguments to the Hearing Officer regarding their request for access to the detailed minutes, which gave rise to the grant of access in the context of a data room. 1189 In the second place, as regards the argument concerning the alleged lack of accuracy of the brief notes of the meetings of 2010 to 2013, based on the fact that they were included late in the file, even if the Commission had prepared those notes in 2014, the reliability of their content would have been liable to be affected only if the detailed minutes of those same meetings, which would necessarily have been the basis for the drafting of those brief notes, had also been drawn up in 2014. In such circumstances, the fact that a significant period of time elapsed between, on the one hand, the meetings and, on the other, the preparation of the detailed minutes relating to those meetings could give rise to doubts as to the accuracy of those minutes and, consequently, the brief notes drawn from them. 1190 In the present case, the applicants have not adduced any evidence or indicia to support the conclusion that the detailed minutes were prepared years after the holding of, inter alia, the meetings of 2010 to 2013. On the contrary, as the Commission submitted at the hearing, the level of detail in those minutes constitutes evidence that they were drawn up on a date close to that of the meetings to which they relate. 1191 In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 1182 to 1186 above, the applicants’ arguments concerning the Commission’s failure to fulfil its obligations in relation to the meetings of 2010 to 2013 are well founded, in so far as the brief notes were manifestly insufficient to provide an account of the content of the discussions between the Commission and Overgas, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 1160 above. 1192 The Commission therefore made a procedural error by failing properly to record the statements made during the meetings of 2010 to 2013 and to include them in the file. 1193 As regards the Commission’s argument that any possible failure to fulfil obligations arising from the excessively vague and general nature of the brief notes was remedied, first, by the access to non-confidential versions of the follow-up observations and, second, by the access to the detailed minutes in the context of the data room procedure, the applicants submit, in essence, that, due to heavy redactions, the access to those documents was of no use for their defence. Thus, that argument and the second complaint overlap, and it is therefore appropriate to analyse them together. (b) The second complaint, regarding the access to the detailed minutes and to the follow-up observations 1194 The applicants criticise the Commission, first, for having given them restricted access to the detailed minutes and, second, for having refused them access to some of the follow-up observations, on the pretext that the information contained in those documents was confidential. 1195 Thus, in the first place, the applicants take issue with the fact that the right of access to the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas was replaced, following numerous requests for access, by restricted access, through their external representatives, in the context of a data room procedure. The report drawn up by those representatives, which was sent to the applicants in non-confidential form, was, because of the heavy redactions, devoid of value for their defence. 1196 By contrast, the Commission insists that the access which the applicants’ external representatives were granted to the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas in the context of the data room procedure enabled the applicants to express their views on the information contained in those minutes and thus to exercise their rights of defence, while respecting Overgas’ legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality. 1197 In the second place, the applicants submit that the confidential follow-up observations could potentially have contained exculpatory evidence, so that access to a less redacted version of those documents would have enabled them better to exercise their rights of defence. 1198 The Commission argues in response that, precisely because of the access to the follow-up observations, the applicants were able to exercise their rights of defence by submitting their response to the statement of objections. 1199 The Commission also states that, between access to the file and the submission of their response to the statement of objections, the applicants never complained that they were unable to exercise their rights of defence effectively because of the redaction of the confidential parts of the follow-up observations. Furthermore, any subsequent request for access would have been late and unjustified, given that the applicants had already exercised their right to be heard regarding those documents. 1200 In addition, the Commission submits that most of the follow-up observations were not redacted and that it did not use the redacted information in its analysis that led to the adoption of the contested decision. 1201 It follows from paragraphs 1194 to 1200 above that, in essence, the arguments put forward by the parties in the context of this complaint raise two issues, which it is appropriate to analyse in the following order: – the first issue concerns the absence of an immediate challenge to the redactions in the follow-up observations to which the applicants had access; – the second issue concerns the allegedly excessive redactions, on the one hand, in the detailed minutes which were accessed in the data room and, on the other hand, in the follow-up observations. (1) The obligation to challenge the redactions in the follow-up observations immediately 1202 As regards the letter of 18 June 2018, by which the applicants requested access to a less redacted version of the follow-up observations, the Commission submits that the disclosure of the non-confidential versions of those observations to the applicants had already taken place on 2 and 8 April 2015 and that, up until their response to the Letter of Facts was submitted on 9 December 2016, the applicants had never indicated that they could not exercise their rights of defence effectively because of the redactions in those observations. 1203 It is apparent from the letter of 18 June 2018 that the request for access to less redacted versions of the follow-up observations was linked to the fact that, when setting up the data room, the Commission had authorised the applicants’ external representatives to take into that data room, among other documents, the redacted versions of the follow-up observations. In putting forward their request, the applicants stated, for each of the follow-up observations, what role the redacted information could have played in the preparation of their defence, also in the light of the new information which might have emerged from the access in the data room. 1204 The applicants’ request for access to less redacted follow-up observations was therefore indirectly triggered, in essence, by the judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v Commission (C‑413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632). It was on the basis of that new case-law, reinforcing their rights of defence, that the applicants requested the Commission, on 5 January 2018, to grant them access to full and detailed notes of any calls and meetings with Overgas. That approach, as follows from paragraph 1203 above, gave rise to the data room procedure, for which the applicants received the detailed rules setting how that data room was to operate. Those rules provided, inter alia, that the redacted versions of the follow-up observations formed part of the limited number of documents that the applicants’ external representatives could bring into the data room. 1205 In that regard, it cannot be ruled out that a more complete version of the follow-up observations could have enabled the applicants to have a better understanding of the documents to which they had access in the data room through their external representatives and, consequently, could have enabled them to exercise their rights of defence more effectively. In those circumstances, they cannot be criticised for having requested, only at that stage, more detailed access to those follow-up observations. 1206 It follows that the absence of an immediate challenge to the redactions in the follow-up observations disclosed to the applicants after the statement of objections cannot be relied on against them in order to prevent them from claiming that their rights of defence were infringed. (2) The access to the documents made available in the data room and to the excessively redacted versions of the follow-up observations 1207 When granting or refusing access to part of the file during investigation procedures, the Commission is, in particular, required to balance undertakings’ right to the protection of business secrets against safeguarding the rights of the defence (see judgments of 29 June 1995, ICI v Commission, T‑36/91, EU:T:1995:118, paragraph 98, and of 14 December 2005, General Electric v Commission, T‑210/01, EU:T:2005:456, paragraph 631). 1208 In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with the order of 26 May 2021, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, not published) and in accordance with Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure, and in view of the guarantees provided for in Article 103(1) of those rules, the Commission lodged in the file: – the detailed minutes of the meetings with Overgas and the latter’s confidentiality claims relating to those minutes; – the confidential versions of the follow-up observations; – the confidential data room report. 1209 Subsequently, in the context of the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), and in accordance with Article 103(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court examined the documents referred to in paragraph 1208 above on the basis of the matters of law and of fact relied on by the Commission as to the confidential nature of those documents vis-à-vis the applicants and their relevance for the purpose of ruling on the dispute, in the light, where necessary, of weighing that confidentiality against the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection, in particular the adversarial principle (order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission, T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149, paragraphs 5 to 10). 1210 In particular, the Court noted that the applicants’ external representatives had been authorised by the Commission to communicate only the non-confidential version of their data room report to their clients (order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission, T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149, paragraphs 20 to 22). 1211 It is apparent from the analysis carried out in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), that several pieces of information which had been redacted in the non-confidential data room report were not, or, in any event, were no longer, confidential. The Court therefore included the confidential data room report in the file, with the exception of two short pieces of information which were of no relevance for the purpose of ruling on the dispute. 1212 In that regard, it is apparent from the analysis of the non-confidential version of the data room report to which the applicants had access that that version did not contain, in essence, any additional information in the light of the brief notes to which they had previously had access during the administrative procedure. 1213 Even if, at the time of the data room procedure, certain information in the confidential version of the data room report, especially as regards the information resulting from the detailed minutes of the meetings of 2015 and 2016, was able to remain confidential, the information in the detailed minutes of the meetings of 2010 to 2013 was, by then, historical in nature. 1214 It follows that the Commission was not entitled to redact any relevant information in the data room report to the point that the non-confidential version of that report was practically equivalent to the brief notes. 1215 Such a situation could, in practice, compromise the purpose of the data room procedure, namely to protect confidential information while giving access to the evidence that a party needs in order to substantiate its position. That is all the more so since, as the applicants have argued, the data room procedure, as it took place in the present case, was capable of affecting the rights of defence of the applicants, which were able to exercise those rights only indirectly, through their external representatives. 1216 It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 1207 to 1215 above that, by granting the applicants excessively restricted access to the file in the context of the data room procedure, the Commission made a procedural error capable of giving rise to an infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence. 1217 Next, as regards the follow-up observations, in the first place, it must be noted that, for the meetings of 2015 and 2016, Overgas submitted such observations only in relation to the meeting of 20 October 2016. The Court notes that, as stated in paragraphs 51 to 57 of the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), that document is irrelevant for the purpose of ruling on the dispute. 1218 In the second place, as follows from paragraph 49 of the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), the allegedly non-confidential version of the follow-up observations on the meeting of 17 June 2013 did not contain any redaction. 1219 In the third place, following the verification of the nature of the information in the follow-up observations on the first four meetings of 2010 to 2013, the Court granted the applicants access to less redacted versions of those follow-up observations (order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission, T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149, paragraphs 34 to 48). 1220 In that regard, the Court notes that the information in the follow-up observations on the meetings of 2010 to 2013 had already lost its confidential nature by the time the applicants, by the letter of 18 June 2018, requested access. 1221 Consequently, by refusing access to less redacted versions of the follow-up observations, in particular those of the meetings of 13 October 2010 and of 13 January, 17 March and 15 December 2011, the Commission also made a procedural error capable of giving rise to an infringement of the applicants’ rights of defence. (c) Conclusion on the procedural defects 1222 It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 1177, 1192 and 1211 to 1221 above that the Commission made a procedural error by refusing the applicants a level of access to the file that would have been sufficient to ensure the exercise of their rights of defence. 1223 Thus, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 1152 above, it is necessary, at this stage, to determine whether, in view of the factual and legal circumstances specific to the present case, the applicants have adequately demonstrated that they would have been better able to ensure their defence had there been no procedural error on the part of the Commission. If that is not demonstrated, no infringement of their rights of defence can be established (judgment of 14 September 2022, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android), T‑604/18, under appeal, EU:T:2022:541, paragraph 934). 3. The effects of the identified errors in terms of the guarantee of the applicants’ rights of defence 1224 In their observations lodged on 27 April 2022 (‘the observations of 27 April 2022’), following the Commission’s production of the non-confidential documents pursuant to the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), the applicants provided clarifications in order to demonstrate specifically that access to certain pieces of information in the file, which were not disclosed during the administrative procedure, would have enabled them better to ensure their defence. 1225 It is in the light of those arguments that it is necessary to analyse, inter alia, the evidence which was disclosed to the applicants following the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), and which, on account of its origin, its detail and the circumstances in which Overgas provided it to the Commission, would have enabled the applicants to substantiate significantly or consolidate certain arguments in their defence. 1226 In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that the infringement of the right of access to the file is not remedied by the mere fact that access was made possible, as in the present case, during the judicial proceedings. As the examination undertaken by the General Court is limited to review of the pleas in law put forward, it has neither the object nor the effect of replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative procedure. Moreover, belated disclosure of documents in the file does not return the undertaking which has brought the action against the Commission decision to the situation in which it would have been if it had been able to rely on those documents in presenting its written and oral observations to that institution before the adoption of the contested decision (judgments of 25 October 2011, Solvay v Commission, C‑110/10 P, EU:C:2011:687, paragraph 51, and of 15 June 2022, Qualcomm v Commission (Qualcomm – Exclusivity payments), T‑235/18, EU:T:2022:358, paragraph 200). (a) The undisclosed elements of the detailed minutes 1227 In their observations of 27 April 2022, the applicants state that there are a number of pieces of information which emerged from the summaries of the detailed minutes in the confidential data room report to which they had access pursuant to the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), which could have enabled them better to ensure their defence. The Court considers that it is sufficient, for the purposes of the examination required under the case-law cited in paragraphs 1152 and 1223 above, to focus the analysis on the following elements. 1228 In the first place, the applicants submit that it is apparent from the summary of the meeting of 13 October 2010 that Overgas considered that the Bulgarian Government was preventing it from supplying gas to customers in Bulgaria. In particular, it is apparent from that summary that Overgas considered the Bulgarian gas supply markets to be very difficult to operate due to the incorrect and incomplete transposition of the EU directives and the constant interference by the government in favour of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz. 1229 The Court notes that it is apparent, however, from the follow-up observations of 18 November 2010, to which the applicants had access during the administrative procedure, that Overgas considered that the applicants were committing infringements of Article 102 TFEU with the support of the Bulgarian regulator and the Bulgarian Government. 1230 Thus, the Court finds that the applicants’ clarifications as to the usefulness of the statements set out in paragraph 1228 above for the exercise of their rights of defence are well founded. Those are elements which could have been capable of confirming and substantiating the applicants’ argument that the difficulties encountered by Overgas in entering the Bulgarian gas supply markets were not attributable to them, in particular in view of the fact that the Commission had, in response to Overgas’ allegations, raised the possibility that those difficulties might be due to errors or failures by the Republic of Bulgaria in the transposition of European legislation. 1231 In the second place, the applicants state, in their observations of 27 April 2022, that it is apparent from the summary of the meeting of 13 January 2011 that Overgas considered that Transgaz, and not the applicants, controlled access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 1232 The contested decision states, in recital 296, that Overgas had contacted Transgaz to request access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 but did not, however, expressly make a statement as to the entity having control over that pipeline. The Court considers, as do the applicants, that the statement in question could have been used as exculpatory evidence to support the applicants’ position, as set out in recital 282 of the contested decision, that Transgaz, as the TSO, was the entity responsible for granting and managing third-party access to the Romanian Pipeline 1. 1233 In the third place, the applicants claim that the summary of the meeting of 15 December 2011 shows that the Commission and Overgas agreed that the first request for access to the transmission network was submitted on 29 September 2010, which confirms their position that all the contact prior to that date did not constitute requests for access and that, consequently, the abuse could not have started on 30 July 2010. 1234 In the context of the second ‘sub-plea’ of their fourth plea, the applicants submit that the letter of 30 July 2010 could not constitute a request for access to the transmission network and that the Commission incorrectly classified, in recital 101 of the contested decision, the contact between Overgas and Bulgartransgaz prior to 29 September 2010 as requests for access to that network. As follows from paragraphs 790 to 797 above, the summary of the meeting of 15 December 2011 clearly shows that the Commission itself found, during that meeting, that Overgas’ first request to Bulgartransgaz for access was dated 29 September 2011. That factor, which is not consistent with the considerations set out by the Commission in the contested decision, clearly has a bearing on the assessment of the starting date of the alleged abuse, the assessment of the applicants’ conduct, the duration of the infringement and, therefore, the level of the fine. The applicants are therefore right to maintain that disclosure of that material could have enabled them better to ensure their defence. 1235 In the fourth place, it is apparent from the summary of the meeting of 17 June 2013 that Overgas had, inter alia, confirmed to the Commission that it had had access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and to the transmission network since 1 January 2013 and that, for both of those infrastructures, the duration of the relevant agreements had been extended until 31 December 2013. According to the applicants, that statement would have enabled them to strengthen their argument that no abuse had taken place after Overgas gained access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and to the transmission network on 1 January 2013. 1236 In that regard, it should be noted that, as early as the stage of the application initiating proceedings, the applicants claimed, as they had done during the administrative procedure, that Overgas had never requested that the 2013 pipeline access agreement be valid for a particular period and that Overgas had never challenged the three-month duration of that agreement. The applicants also argued that the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013 was not restrictive. 1237 In those circumstances, the fact that, as is apparent from the summary of its meeting with the Commission of 17 June 2013, that is, a few months after the signing of the 2013 pipeline access agreement, Overgas did not express its dissatisfaction with the access granted to the Romanian Pipeline 1 and to the transmission network could have been used by the applicants to substantiate their argument that there was no abuse regarding those infrastructures, at least from 2013. 1238 It thus follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 1228 to 1237 above that the applicants have established to the requisite legal standard that, had the Commission not committed the procedural irregularity with regard to access to the information in the detailed minutes, they would have had access to information that could have enabled them better to ensure their defence (judgment of 25 October 2011, Solvay v Commission, C‑110/10 P, EU:C:2011:687, paragraph 52). Moreover, as follows from paragraphs 1233 and 1234 above, read in conjunction with paragraphs 790 to 797 above, some of the information referred to by the applicants in their observations of 27 April 2022 could even have called into question the content of the contested decision. (b) The undisclosed elements of the follow-up observations 1239 In their observations of 27 April 2022, the applicants focus their criticisms, regarding the overly restricted access granted in respect of the follow-up observations during the administrative procedure, on two documents. 1240 In the first place, the applicants submit that it is apparent from the follow-up observations of 18 November 2010 in their less redacted version, to which the applicants had access pursuant to the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), that Overgas had acknowledged that the demand resulting from the claimed agreements for the supply of nine industrial customers in 2011 amounted to more than 260 million cubic metres. The applicants emphasise that those quantities were considerably lower than the volume in respect of which, as is apparent from recital 101(e) of the contested decision, Overgas had sought access to the transmission network, which amounted to more than 1 billion cubic metres. 1241 The Court finds that the applicants would have been better able to ensure their rights of defence by using the information referred to in paragraph 1240 above to support their argument that Overgas had significantly inflated the quantities in respect of which it was requesting access to the transmission network in 2011 and that, therefore, the applicants had been forced to request clarification at the meeting held with Overgas on 1 December 2010. 1242 In the second place, the applicants claim that it is apparent from the follow-up observations of 10 June 2011, in a less confidential version to which they had access pursuant to the order of 14 March 2022, Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission (T‑136/19, EU:T:2022:149), that Overgas based its complaint on the misleading premiss that its entry into the Bulgarian gas supply markets would have increased alternatives sources of gas supply, which would have obliged suppliers to establish their prices on market economy principles. 1243 In their observations of 27 April 2022, the applicants submit that, in 2011, Bulgaria had only one upstream source of supply of gas, namely Gazprom, to which Overgas had direct access, whereas Bulgargaz had only indirect access to that supply, through Overgas. They state that, at that time, Overgas was Gazprom’s intermediary in Bulgaria and was under investigation for abuse of a dominant position, inter alia because it was charging Bulgargaz excessive prices. Thus, not only would Overgas’ entry into the Bulgarian market not have increased competition downstream, but Bulgargaz would not, in any event, have been able to purchase gas on reasonable terms. 1244 In that regard, the Court finds that the applicants are right to claim that knowledge of the information referred to in paragraph 1242 above would have enabled them better to ensure their defence, in particular by arguing before the Commission that the conditions relating to healthy competition on the downstream market were not satisfied, mainly because of Overgas (and Gazprom), which could have supported their defence based on an objective justification or, at least, their arguments in favour of a reduction of the fine. 1245 It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 1239 to 1244 above that the applicants have established to the requisite legal standard that, had it not been for the errors made by the Commission with regard to the information in Overgas’ follow-up observations, they would have had access to information which could have enabled them better to ensure their defence during the administrative procedure, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 1238 above. (c) Conclusion on the first and second parts 1246 It follows from the analysis of the defects in the administrative procedure set out in paragraphs 1153 to 1223 above and from their consequences for the applicants’ rights of defence, examined in paragraphs 1224 to 1245 above, that the first and second parts of the first plea must be upheld. 4. The third part, alleging a failure to disclose the statement of objections in the Gazprom case 1247 The applicants submit that, by refusing to grant them access to a less redacted version of the statement of objections in the Gazprom case and to the related documents concerning the gas market in Bulgaria, the Commission denied them access to potentially exculpatory evidence. They add that the access to the redacted version that they had through a third party did not provide them with a sufficient overview of Gazprom’s conduct in Bulgaria, and that such access cannot replace the access to the file which the Commission was required to grant them. 1248 The Commission submits that the applicants had access, even if through a third party, to a non-confidential version of the statement of objections in the Gazprom case, which enabled them to submit a detailed supplement to their statements of reasons. 1249 It should be noted that, under Article 15(1) of Regulation No 773/2004, only the parties to whom a statement of objections is addressed have a right of access to the file. Therefore, the applicants cannot claim that they have a right of access to the file in the Gazprom case, held by the Commission, on the same basis as Gazprom, as the undertaking under investigation, could do (judgments of 24 June 1986, AKZO Chemie and AKZO Chemie UK v Commission, 53/85, EU:C:1986:256, paragraphs 27 and 28, and of 15 July 1994, Matra Hachette v Commission, T‑17/93, EU:T:1994:89, paragraph 34). 1250 In such a case, in order to justify their request for access to a statement of objections addressed to a third-party undertaking, it would have been necessary, at least, for the applicants to adduce prima facie evidence of its usefulness (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2012, Vermeer Infrastructuur v Commission, T‑353/06, not published, EU:T:2012:484, paragraph 208). 1251 A fortiori, in a case such as the present one, where the applicants admit that they have had access to a redacted version of the document at issue through a third party, they must indicate the potential exculpatory evidence in question or adduce evidence that it exists and therefore of its relevance for the purposes of the case (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 June 2011, Bavaria v Commission, T‑235/07, EU:T:2011:283, paragraph 251, and of 16 June 2011, Heineken Nederland and Heineken v Commission, T‑240/07, EU:T:2011:284, paragraph 257), which the applicants have failed to do. 1252 It must be noted that the applicants, in their arguments, have not adduced any evidence as to the elements of the statement of objections in the Gazprom case which they could have relied on in order better to ensure their defence. 1253 Consequently, the third part of the first plea must be rejected. 5. The fourth part, alleging disclosure of some of the applicants’ confidential information to Overgas 1254 The applicants submit that the Commission infringed Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 and the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ 2005 C 325, p. 7) by disclosing to Overgas confidential information regarding the discussions which they had had with the Commission concerning their possible commitments. 1255 In order to substantiate this part, the applicants rely on Overgas’ response of 5 April 2016 to a request for information from the Commission of 15 March 2016. In particular, they state that it is apparent from that response that, at the meeting of 13 October 2015, the Commission mentioned to Overgas the possibility of separating Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz structurally, by subjecting those two entities to the control of different ministries. 1256 As the Commission contends, the applicants have not specified why the information disclosed is confidential and how the alleged infringement of such confidentiality led to an infringement of their rights of defence for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraphs 1152 and 1223 above. 1257 It follows that the fourth part of the first plea must be rejected. 6. Conclusion on the first plea in law 1258 In the light of the foregoing, the first plea must be upheld in so far as the applicants have demonstrated, in the context of the first and second parts, that the defects in the administrative procedure set out in paragraphs 1153 to 1223 above affected their rights of defence. The first plea must be rejected as to the remainder. E. Conclusion on the claim for annulment of the contested decision 1259 Since both the fourth plea, alleging an incorrect finding of abuse of a dominant position, and the first plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, have been upheld, the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the other pleas in law relied on. 1260 It follows, consequently, that there is no need to grant the applicants’ applications for measures of organisation of procedure or measures of enquiry aimed at obtaining first, the statement of objections in the Gazprom case and the documents to which it relates in so far as they concern the Bulgarian gas market and, second, the documents underlying the Transgaz case since, as matters now stand, those applications are of no interest in the resolution of the dispute (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 June 2002, British American Tobacco (Investments) v Commission, T‑311/00, EU:T:2002:167, paragraph 50, and of 9 March 2022, Zardini v Commission, T‑511/20, not published, EU:T:2022:122, paragraph 58). IV. Costs 1261 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicants. 1262 The Republic of Bulgaria and Overgas shall bear their own costs pursuant to Article 138 of the Rules of Procedure. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Annuls Commission Decision C(2018) 8806 final of 17 December 2018 relating to proceedings under Article 102 TFEU (Case AT.39849 – BEH Gas); 2. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD, Bulgartransgaz EAD and Bulgargaz EAD; 3. Orders the Republic of Bulgaria and Overgas Inc. to bear their own costs. Gervasoni Madise Nihoul Frendo Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 October 2023. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President Table of contents I. Background to the dispute A. Factual background 1. Gas supply in Bulgaria 2. Gas supply in Bulgaria 3. The Bulgarian Law on Energy 4. The Chiren storage facility B. Administrative procedure C. Contested decision 1. The relevant markets and the applicants’ dominant position on those markets 2. The applicants’ conduct constituting abuse of a dominant position 3. The anticompetitive effects of the applicants’ conduct 4. The duration of the infringement 5. The fine and the remedies 6. Operative part II. Forms of order sought III. Law A. The second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons and errors of law and of fact concerning the definition of the market for capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 1. The first part, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons for the definition of the market for capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 2. The second part, alleging a failure to analyse the market for capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 3. The third part, alleging errors of law and errors in the assessment of the facts in the definition of the market for capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 (a) The errors of law and of fact based, respectively, on the argument that the Commission failed to distinguish between the primary and secondary capacity markets on the Romanian Pipeline 1 and did not identify Transgaz as being a supplier of that capacity (b) The error of fact regarding the identification of Bulgargaz as being a supplier on the Romanian Pipeline 1 B. The third plea in law, alleging an incorrect finding that the applicants held a dominant position on the relevant markets 1. The first part, alleging an incorrect finding that Bulgargaz held a dominant position on the market for capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 (a) The first complaint, alleging that the Commission erred in finding that Bulgargaz controlled third-party access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 (b) The second complaint, alleging that the Commission did not identify Transgaz as being a supplier of capacity services on the Romanian Pipeline 1 (c) The third complaint, alleging that the Commission failed to assess whether Bulgargaz held a dominant position in the context of the discussions with Transgaz relating to the renegotiation of the 2005 Agreement (d) The fourth complaint, alleging that the Commission misinterpreted its decision-making practice 2. The second part, alleging an incorrect finding that BEH held a dominant position on the relevant markets (a) The existence of an ‘indirect’ dominant position (b) The independence of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz from BEH C. The fourth plea in law, alleging an incorrect finding of abuse of a dominant position by the applicants 1. Applicable principles and case-law (a) The principles applicable to the assessment of evidence (b) The scope of the Court’s review (c) The concept of ‘abuse of a dominant position’ 2. The first ‘sub-plea’, alleging an incorrect finding that access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was refused (a) The first part, alleging an error of law in the application of Article 102 TFEU to a contractual clause that had been agreed bilaterally ………………………………………………………………... (b) The second part, alleging an error of law in the application of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine in that an abusive refusal to supply was imputed to Bulgargaz, even though the latter was merely a user of the Romanian Pipeline 1 (c) The third part, alleging that Transgaz did not forward, to the applicants, requests for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 (1) The first complaint, concerning Transgaz’s request of 24 January 2011.. (2) The second complaint, alleging a failure to forward to the applicants requests for access that had been made by third parties and addressed to Transgaz (d) The fourth part, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons in the contested decision concerning the inclusion, in the infringement, of a restriction on Overgas gaining access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in 2013 … (e) The fifth part, alleging a lack of evidence of a refusal or restriction on Overgas gaining access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 in 2013 (1) The first complaint, arguing that the Commission cannot impute to Bulgargaz a rejection of Overgas’ requests that were made to Transgaz for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 (2) The second complaint, alleging that Bulgargaz provided Overgas with access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 without delay from the time of its first request (3) The third complaint, arguing that Bulgargaz did not delay signing the 2013 pipeline access agreement until it had concluded downstream contracts with its own customers (4) The fourth complaint, alleging that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the initial three-month duration of the 2013 pipeline access agreement with Overgas was insufficient (5) The fifth complaint, alleging that the conditions for extending the 2013 pipeline access agreement were not uncertain (f) The sixth part, alleging that that there was no refusal to supply C Energy Group (g) The seventh part, alleging the lack of probative value of the reservation of the entire capacity on the Romanian Pipeline 1 (h) The eighth part, alleging that the discussions relating to the renegotiation of the 2005 Agreement have no probative value (1) The first complaint, regarding the intergovernmental nature of the renegotiation of the 2005 Agreement (i) The fact that the 2005 Agreement stemmed from the 2003 Intergovernmental Agreement (ii) The fact that the purpose of the renegotiation of the 2005 Agreement was to resolve the concerns raised in the infringement proceedings against Romania (iii) The central nature of the security of gas supply in Bulgaria and the role of Bulgargaz, as a public supplier, in the renegotiation of the 2005 Agreement (iv) Conclusion on the first complaint (2) The second complaint, arguing that the applicants’ conduct during the negotiations was constructive (i) The first condition: the request for several documents (ii) The second condition: the proposal for the guarantee of a minimum capacity on the Romanian Pipeline 1, for Bulgargaz, of [3-4] billion cubic metres per year (iii) The third condition: the applicants’ request to amend the price fixed under the 2005 Agreement in order to reflect the lower level of Bulgargaz’s use of the capacity of the Romanian Pipeline 1 (iv) Conclusion on the second complaint (3) The third complaint, arguing that the applicants are not responsible for the length of the negotiations (i) The first period (ii) The second period (iii) The third period (iv) Conclusion on the third complaint (i) Conclusions on the first ‘sub-plea’ 3. The second ‘sub-plea’, alleging an incorrect finding that access to the transmission network was refused (a) The first part, alleging a misinterpretation of the regulatory framework governing access to the transmission network (1) The regulatory framework under EU law (2) The regulatory framework under Bulgarian law (3) The first complaint, alleging that the applicable regulatory framework was incomplete (4) The second complaint, alleging a contradiction between the 2007 Access Rules and the 2007 Market Rules (5) The third complaint, alleging that the 2007 Access Rules were incomplete and, therefore, difficult to apply (6) The fourth complaint, alleging that the Bulgarian national regulatory framework did not provide for two stages for the processing of requests for access (7) The fifth complaint, arguing that the Bulgarian national regulatory framework allowed for a request for proof of access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 (b) The second part, arguing that Overgas was not refused access to the transmission network (1) The first three complaints, relating to the processing of Overgas’ request for access to the transmission network for 2011 (i) The first complaint, alleging that Overgas’ communications prior to 29 September 2010 were incorrectly classified as requests for access to the transmission network (ii) The second complaint, arguing that Overgas’ requests for access for 2011 were handled appropriately – The first argument, relating to the diligent and prompt handling of Overgas’ access requests for 2011 – The second argument, based on the duplication of the capacity requested by Overgas in its letters of 29 September and 11 November 2010 (iii) The third complaint, arguing that Overgas had no interest in gaining access to the transmission network before 2013 (2) The fourth complaint, arguing that the access to the transmission network granted to Overgas for 2013 was not restrictive (c) The third part, arguing that Toplofikacia Razgrad was not refused access to the transmission network (1) The first complaint, arguing that the condition for access to the Romanian Pipeline 1 was justified (2) The second complaint, arguing that Bulgartransgaz did not make Toplofikacia Razgrad’s access to the transmission network subject to Overgas’ access to the same network (3) The third complaint, arguing that Toplofikacia Razgrad was not refused access to the transmission network (d) The fourth part, arguing that RWE did not make an application for access to the transmission network (1) The first complaint, arguing that RWE did not submit an application to which Bulgartransgaz was required to respond (2) The second complaint, arguing that there was no difference in treatment between Bulgargaz and RWE (e) The fifth part, arguing that there was no elimination of competition on the Bulgarian gas supply markets (f) Conclusion on the second ‘sub-plea’ 4. The third ‘sub-plea’, alleging an incorrect finding that access to the Chiren storage facility was refused (a) The first part, alleging that the Commission has failed to establish that the Chiren storage facility was an essential facility (b) The second part, arguing that Bulgartransgaz’s conduct during the period prior to the adoption of the 2012 Storage Access Rules was not anticompetitive (1) The first complaint, arguing that Bulgartransgaz acted transparently (i) The first argument, regarding an independent finding of anticompetitive discrimination in favour of Bulgargaz (ii) The second argument, regarding the fact that the rejection of company F’s request for access was based on the ‘first come, first served’ principle (iii) The third argument, regarding the information available at the time of company C’s request for access (iv) The fourth argument, concerning the general allegation that Bulgargaz was informed in advance, by Bulgartransgaz, regarding the available capacity at the Chiren storage facility (2) The second complaint, alleging that the Commission disregarded the fact that the ‘first come, first served’ principle applied within a given timeframe (3) The third complaint, alleging distortion of the evidence relating to Overgas’ requests for access for the 2011/2012 storage period (c) The third part, arguing that the 2012 Storage Access Rules were not anticompetitive (1) The first complaint, alleging a lack of proof that Bulgartransgaz designed the 2012 Storage Access Rules to favour Bulgargaz (2) The second complaint, arguing that there was a sufficient period of time for the preparation of access requests during the first procedure for the allocation of storage capacity (3) The third complaint, alleging inconsistency in the Commission’s conclusions regarding the 2015/2016 storage period (4) The fourth complaint, regarding the storage access granted to Overgas for the 2013/2014 storage period (d) The fourth part, arguing that the 2014 Storage Access Rules are not anticompetitive (1) The first complaint, arguing that there was no abusive rejection of Overgas’ request for storage access for the 2014/2015 storage period (2) The second complaint, arguing that the 2014 Storage Access Rules were still in force at the end of the infringement period found in respect of the Chiren storage facility (e) Conclusion on the third ‘sub-plea’ (1) Company F’s request for access of 1 September 2011 and Overgas’ requests for access before 1 January 2013 (2) Company C’s request for access of 5 June 2012 and Overgas’ requests for access from 1 January 2013 5. Conclusion on the fourth plea 1. The anticompetitive strategy 2. A single and continuous infringement D. The first plea, alleging substantive procedural defects affecting the exercise of the applicants’ rights of defence and breach of the principle of good administration 1. The first and second parts, alleging infringement of the obligations to record and place on the file the documents relating to the Commission’s meetings with Overgas, and alleging insufficient access to those documents … 2. The existence of procedural defects (a) The first complaint, alleging a failure properly to record and include in the file the statements made during the meetings with Overgas (1) The meetings of 2015 and 2016 (2) The meetings of 2010 to 2013 (b) The second complaint, regarding the access to the detailed minutes and to the follow-up observations (1) The obligation to challenge the redactions in the follow-up observations immediately (2) The access to the documents made available in the data room and to the excessively redacted versions of the follow-up observations (c) Conclusion on the procedural defects 3. The effects of the identified errors in terms of the guarantee of the applicants’ rights of defence (a) The undisclosed elements of the detailed minutes (b) The undisclosed elements of the follow-up observations (c) Conclusion on the first and second parts 4. The third part, alleging a failure to disclose the statement of objections in the Gazprom case 5. The fourth part, alleging disclosure of some of the applicants’ confidential information to Overgas 6. Conclusion on the first plea in law E. Conclusion on the claim for annulment of the contested decision IV. Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 The present judgment is the subject of publication in extract form. 2 Confidential data omitted.