Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2024:663
Date: 2024-10-02
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Third Chamber
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Commercial policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - inadmissible

summary. 375 Thirdly, the applicants criticise the way in which the data in question were extrapolated to the Union industry as a whole. 376 The Commission contends that the applicants’ arguments should be rejected. 377 Under Article 3(5) of the basic regulation, the examination of the impact of dumped imports on the Union industry concerned is to include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. That article contains a non-exhaustive list of the various factors which may be taken into consideration. 378 That provision thus gives those institutions discretion in the examination and evaluation of the various items of evidence (judgment of 10 September 2015, Bricmate, C‑569/13, EU:C:2015:572, paragraph 54). 379 In the present case, according to recital 382 of the contested regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered, in accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic regulation. 380 In recitals 384 to 386 of the contested regulation, for the purpose of determining injury, the Commission distinguished between the macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators and assessed the former on the basis of data provided by the intervener and cross-checked with the data provided by the sampled Union producers. The data submitted were adjusted based on cross-checking with data provided by the sampled Union producers. The adjustments only took into account some inconsistencies in the data, but did not substantially change the data submitted by the intervener. According to recital 387 of the contested regulation, the Commission verified the accuracy of the data and therefore considered they were an appropriate basis for the determination of macroeconomic indicators. 381 In addition, the Commission explained in recital 385 of the contested regulation that it had protected the confidentiality of those data because they were provided at company level. Accordingly, the intervener estimated the total amount for macroeconomic data by extrapolating data based on the share of those producers in the total Union production and determined the total Union production on the basis of the information available in Prodcom. 382 It must first be stated that, in the present plea, the applicants do not dispute the relevance of the economic factors and indices used by the Commission in assessing the injury suffered by the Union industry. 383 As regards the applicants’ first complaint, that the Commission failed to specify the number of companies concerned, the Commission explained that 44 companies had replied to the questionnaire and that the number 34 was merely a typing error in the correspondence it had received, which had been reproduced in the letter sent to the CCCME on 1 December 2021. 384 Since that clarification has now been made by the Commission and accepted by the applicants, the first complaint must be rejected. 385 By their second complaint, the applicants dispute the Commission’s refusal to provide them with the production or sales volumes of the 44 companies that responded to the macroeconomic questionnaire. 386 In that regard, first of all, it is apparent from the letter sent to the CCCME on 1 December 2021 that the Commission informed the CCCME that the production or sales volume was not information available in the file. 387 The applicants rely on the non-confidential version of the responses to the macroeconomic questionnaire in order to claim that the Commission was aware of that information, since it appeared in cell B69 of Table ‘1 Production’. However, the Commission explained that that cell in the table indicated the share of all the companies which were members of the intervener and which had replied to the macroeconomic questionnaire on the total Union production estimated by the Commission. The Commission explained that, since the total Union production was an extrapolation of the data supplied by the cooperating Union producers, it did not have the exact share represented by the producers that replied to the macroeconomic questionnaire. 388 Next, it must also be borne in mind that, in order to ensure the cooperation of producers in the countries of the European Union which brought market knowledge, the Commission was required to restrict rights of access to that information and to preserve its confidential nature. That approach is confirmed by the case-law which held that the estimated production of the Union producers concerned, on which the Commission had relied in calculating the injury, could correctly be regarded as confidential, since it was based on the intervener’s market knowledge (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 May 2021, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, T‑254/18, EU:T:2021:278, paragraph 507). 389 Furthermore, the nature of the questions put to the intervener and the non-confidential summary of the individual contributions of the Union producers were made available to interested parties. Although the applicants dispute the late disclosure of the non-confidential summary, it is apparent from the file that they still had the opportunity to submit comments, as a result of an extension of the time limit for submitting those comments, despite the constraints imposed by the basic regulation and the notice of initiation on the time limits for the investigation. 390 It follows that the second complaint must be rejected. 391 By their third complaint, the applicants challenge the extrapolation of the data provided by the intervener to the entire Union industry. 392 In that regard, first of all, it should be noted that the Commission used sampling for the present investigation in respect of both Union producers and Chinese producers of the product concerned. As is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraph 353 above, that argument must be rejected, in so far as it seeks to call into question the technique of sampling chosen by the Commission. 393 Next, it should be noted that in anti-dumping cases the Commission depends on the willingness of the parties to cooperate in providing it with the necessary information within the prescribed periods (judgment of 28 October 1999, EFMA v Council, T‑210/95, EU:T:1999:273, paragraph 71). However, the macroeconomic factors make it possible to determine the injury suffered at the level of the industry as a whole and support the Commission’s calculations in that regard. 394 It is apparent from the contested regulation that the complaint was supported by producers representing more than 58% of the total Union production of iron or steel fasteners during the period concerned. Therefore, the data shared by the intervener can be regarded as representative of the situation of the Union industry. Furthermore, the objective of obtaining as precise and detailed a view of the Union industry as possible could not be attained if the Commission were obliged to disregard, from all the data available, the microeconomic data on the ground that the latter were not available for all of the Union industry producers (judgment of 20 May 2015, Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals v Council, T‑310/12, not published, EU:T:2015:295, paragraph 147). 395 Finally, the Commission explained that it had cross-checked the data shared by the intervener with those of the Union producers included in the sample. The Commission recalled that the extrapolation of data for the macroeconomic questionnaire of such a fragmented industry was a statistical exercise which, by definition, required inferring unknown values from trends found in the known data. 396 In that regard, it should be noted that the applicants’ claim that the Commission did not duly verify the data provided by the intervener is speculative and is not supported by any concrete evidence which would call into question the checks carried out by the Commission when examining those data. 397 The applicants’ third complaint and, consequently, the eighth plea in its entirety must be rejected. 9. The ninth plea, alleging infringement of the applicants’ procedural rights 398 By their ninth plea, the applicants claim that their procedural rights were infringed during the administrative investigation. The present plea is divided into three parts, the first alleging excessive confidential treatment of the information in the file, the second alleging poor management of the non-confidential file by the Commission, and the third alleging failure by the Commission to disclose essential facts. 399 The Commission disputes the merits of that plea. 400 As a preliminary point, it is necessary to recall the principles and procedural guarantees that the Commission is required to comply with when the parties concerned in an anti-dumping investigation wish to exercise their rights of defence by having access to information concerning the facts and considerations likely to form the basis of anti-dumping measures, in particular where that information is confidential. 401 Article 19(1) of the basic regulation provides that any information which is by nature confidential is to be treated as such by the authorities, provided that there is good cause. Article 19(2) of that regulation provides that interested parties providing confidential information are to be required to provide non-confidential summaries thereof in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that such information is not capable of being summarised, but must state the reasons why it is not possible to provide such a summary. 402 Pursuant to Article 19(3) of the basic regulation, if it is considered that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information available or to authorise its disclosure in generalised or summary form, such information may be disregarded unless it can be satisfactorily demonstrated from appropriate sources that the information is correct. It also provides that requests for confidentiality are not to be arbitrarily rejected. 403 Under Article 6(5) of the basic regulation, the parties which have made themselves known within the prescribed period following publication of the notice initiating the investigation are to be heard if they have shown that they are in fact interested parties and that there are particular reasons why they should be heard. 404 Furthermore, Article 6(7) of the basic regulation provides that the Union producers, trade unions, importers and exporters and their representative associations, users and consumer organisations, which have made themselves known in accordance with Article 5(10) of that regulation, as well as the representatives of the exporting country, may, upon written request, inspect all information made available by any party to an investigation, as distinct from internal documents prepared by the authorities of the European Union or its Member States, which is relevant to the presentation of their cases and not confidential within the meaning of Article 19, and is used in the investigation. Such parties may respond to such information and their comments are to be taken into consideration, wherever they are sufficiently substantiated in the response. 405 According to Article 20(2) of the basic regulation, the complainants, importers and exporters and their representative associations, and representatives of the exporting country, may request disclosure of the details underlying the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which provisional measures have been imposed. Article 20(4) of that regulation states that final disclosure is to be given in writing as soon as possible and, normally, no later than one month prior to the initiation of the procedures set out in Article 9 of that regulation, taking into account, however, the need to protect confidential information. Where the Commission is not in a position to disclose certain facts or considerations at that time, they are to be disclosed as soon as possible thereafter. 406 It follows from the case-law that respect for the rights of the defence, which is of crucial importance in anti-dumping investigations, presupposes that the undertakings concerned should have been placed in a position during the administrative procedure in which they could effectively make known their views on the correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the evidence presented by the Commission in support of its allegation concerning the existence of dumping and the resultant injury (see judgment of 14 July 2021, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant v Commission, T‑716/19, EU:T:2021:457, paragraph 209 and the case-law cited). 407 However, the alleged failure to take into account the applicants’ observations does not constitute a breach of their rights of defence or their right to be heard. Although for those rights to be observed the EU institutions must enable the applicants to make their views known, those institutions cannot be required to accept them. In order for the applicants’ submission of views to be effective, it is necessary only that they have been submitted in good time so that the EU institutions may take cognisance of them and assess, with all the requisite attention, their relevance for the content of the measure being adopted. In any event, it must be noted that the Commission is not required to respond, in a regulation fixing definitive anti-dumping duties, to all of the arguments advanced by the interested parties during the investigation procedure and that that failure to respond does not automatically establish a failure to consider those arguments (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council, T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited). 408 Infringement of the right of access to the investigation file can result in total or partial annulment of the contested regulation only if there is a chance, which may be slight, that disclosure of the documents in question might have caused the administrative procedure to have a different result if the undertaking concerned had been able to rely on them during that procedure (judgment of 10 March 2009, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP v Council, T‑249/06, EU:T:2009:62, paragraph 134). 409 That said, procedural rights must be granted lawfully to a person in order for that person to be able to be regarded as individually concerned by those rights and to be entitled to bring an action for annulment against a measure adopted in breach of those rights (judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 52). 410 Moreover, those rights require the active participation by those parties in the proceedings in question, which must take the form, at the very least, of the submission of a written request within a stated deadline (see judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 214 and the case-law cited). The act, for the interested parties, of making themselves known and providing relevant information in order to establish a representative sample of those parties, or even being included for that purpose, constitutes a form of participation in the anti-dumping proceeding. However, that participation does not confer on those parties the procedural guarantees listed in Article 6(5) and (7) and in Article 20(1) and (2) of the basic regulation. The grant of those guarantees is subject to certain requirements which involve participation specific to that procedure by those same parties, in the form of demonstrating an interest and written requests. Participating in sampling, as provided for in Article 17 of the basic regulation, does not constitute such specific participation (judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 216). 411 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the protection of business secrets is a general principle of EU law. The maintenance of fair competition is an important public interest, the safeguarding of which can justify a refusal to disclose information which reveals business secrets (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council, T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, in order to reconcile the principle of respect for the rights of defence of the parties concerned and the principle of the protection of business secrets, in performing their duty to provide information, the EU institutions must act with all due diligence by seeking to provide the undertakings concerned, as far as is compatible with the obligation not to disclose business secrets, with information relevant to the defence of their interests, choosing, if necessary on their own initiative, the appropriate means of providing such information (see judgment of 1 June 2017, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council, T‑442/12, EU:T:2017:372, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited). 412 Accordingly, when it is necessary for them to reconcile the requirements of confidentiality with the right to information for the interested parties, the institutions concerned must consider, in the light of that information, the particular situation of the interested party and, in particular, the position that that interested party occupies on the market under consideration in relation to the position of the supplier of that information (see judgment of 19 May 2021, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, T‑254/18, EU:T:2021:278, paragraph 469 and the case-law cited). 413 However, the objective of Article 19 of the basic regulation is to protect not only the business secrets but also the defence rights of the other parties to the anti-dumping proceeding. In that context, use by the Commission of information of which no non-confidential summary was supplied cannot be relied upon by parties to an anti-dumping proceeding as a ground for annulment of an anti-dumping measure unless they are able to demonstrate that use of that information constituted an infringement of their rights of defence (see judgment of 15 October 2020, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, T‑307/18, not published, EU:T:2020:487, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited). 414 It is also apparent from the case-law that the sufficiency of the information provided by the Commission must be assessed in relation to how specific the request for information was (see judgment of 15 October 2020, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission, T‑307/18, not published, EU:T:2020:487, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited). 415 The ninth plea put forward by the applicants must be examined in the light of those principles. (a) Admissibility of the ninth plea 416 In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the action is brought by several applicants, which are affected differently by the contested regulation. The applicants are the 3 sampled Chinese exporting producers and the 36 non-sampled cooperating exporting producers whose names are listed in Annex 1 to the contested regulation. As is apparent from paragraph 37 above, 31 of those exporting producers are represented, in the present action, by the CCCME. 417 In the second place, as is apparent from paragraphs 24 and 37 above, the arguments raised by the CCCME in its own name are inadmissible in the context of the present action. The applicants also acknowledged that the arguments of the CCCME, in their written reply of 15 January 2024 to the questions put by the Court and at the hearing on 7 February 2024, were inadmissible. 418 In the third place, it should be noted that, in the judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685), the Court of Justice confirmed the inadmissibility of the allegation of a breach of the rights of defence of the members of the CCCME and the other legal persons whose names appeared in the annex to the regulation, in that they had not made specific requests to be provided with information essential to the defence of their interests. In those proceedings, the CCCME represented ‘the interest of the Chinese cast iron industry as a whole’ and its members had not been identified during the administrative procedure. 419 In the present case, the situation is different, since the CCCME participated in the investigation as an association representing the interests of its members and provided the Commission with evidence that it had been empowered to do so by its members. 420 It should be noted, first, that, in point 5.6 of the notice of initiation of the investigation that led to the adoption of the contested regulation, the Commission stated that, in order to participate in the investigation, interested parties, such as exporting producers, Union producers, importers and their representative associations, users or their representative associations, trade unions and representative consumer organisations, had to first demonstrate that there was an objective link between their activities and the product under investigation and that access to the file open for inspection by interested parties would be made via the Tron.tdi platform. 421 The applicants maintained, in their replies to the questions put by the General Court, that all the undertakings and members which had complied with that step had automatically acquired the status of interested party. 422 In that regard, the applicants claimed that, in the notice of initiation, the Commission had invited all Chinese exporters of the product concerned to participate in the investigation, by submitting a form specifying that all producers which participated in accordance with the requirements of that notice of initiation would be regarded as interested parties if there was an objective link between their activities and the product under investigation. Therefore, according to the applicants, all exporting producers which participated in the proceedings via the Tron.tdi platform were interested parties which had acquired procedural rights. Accordingly, since the wording of the notice of initiation invites all interested parties to participate in the investigation and since the procedure for the exchange of information between the Commission and the interested parties are different from those of the case which gave rise to the judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685), in so far as it is carried out exclusively via the Tron.tdi platform, the present case can be regarded as different to the case which gave rise to the abovementioned judgment. The applicants therefore consider that all three parts of the ninth plea are admissible. 423 First, with regard to the first part of the ninth plea, alleging infringement of Article 19(1) to (3) of the basic regulation, the applicants claim that, at any rate, those provisions impose objective obligations on the Commission, which should ensure that confidential treatment of the relevant data is limited to what is strictly necessary. Furthermore, the applicants claim that, in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission (C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685), none of the pleas concerned the infringement of Article 19 of the basic regulation. Therefore, the applicants claim that that part is admissible in so far as it is raised both by the individual exporting producers and by the CCCME on behalf of its members. 424 Next, the applicants claim that the second part, by which they allege mismanagement of the confidential file in breach of Article 6(7) and Article 19(1) to (3) of the basic regulation and the rights of the defence, is also admissible. 425 Finally, the applicants claim that individual exporting producers and members of the CCCME expressly requested access to the file and to the final disclosure by registering on the Tron.tdi platform and that, by failing to disclose essential facts to them, the Commission infringed Article 20(2) and (4) of the basic regulation. 426 In the alternative, in the event that the Court does not accept the admissibility of certain complaints raised in the ninth plea by the CCCME on behalf of its members, the applicants claim that the ninth plea is admissible as regards the arguments raised by the individual exporting producers that the CCCME represented during the investigation. 427 In that regard, the applicants supplied the powers of attorney empowering the CCCME to represent several companies, which had been notified to the Commission during the investigation. As is apparent from paragraph 5 above, the CCCME could be considered to be an interested party to the administrative procedure only to the extent it was empowered by those specific fasteners producers to represent them. 428 It is apparent from the powers of attorney sent to the Court by the applicants that the CCCME did not represent before the Commission all the members concerned on whose behalf it brought the present action, that is to say, that the exporting producers which the CCCME represented before the Commission were in part different to those which it represents before the Court in the present action. 429 First, it is apparent from the powers of attorney provided to the Court by the applicants that the CCCME had been empowered to represent the three sampled exporting producers in the administrative procedure. However, they have not adduced evidence that they were members of that association. 430 Secondly, the CCCME represented nine companies which are non-sampled cooperating exporting producers listed in Annex 1 to the contested regulation. They are members of the CCCME and are also represented by the CCCME in the present action. 431 Thirdly, the CCCME also represented before the Commission eight other companies which are listed in Annex 1 to the contested regulation and are not parties to the present action. Those companies have not adduced evidence of being members of the CCCME either, but they are not, in any event, applicants in the present action. 432 Fourthly, the CCCME also represented before the Commission two companies the names of which do not appear in the contested regulation and which are not represented by the CCCME in the present action either. 433 Therefore, as regards the admissibility of the claims raised by the CCCME before the Court on behalf of its members, of the 31 relevant members of the CCCME on whose behalf it brought the present action, it represented before the Commission only 9 non-sampled Chinese exporting producers. As the parties confirmed on several occasions at the hearing, the Commission did not verify whether the companies granting those powers of attorney were members of the CCCME. No additional evidence was submitted by the parties in that regard. The applicants were unable to confirm with certainty whether all the companies granting powers of attorney before the Commission were members of the CCCME. The applicants also claimed that the power of attorney alone should be sufficient for the purpose of representing the interests of those companies before the Commission. 434 First, as is apparent from paragraph 26 above, an association such as the CCCME is entitled to represent exporting producers before the EU Courts only if it provides evidence that those exporting producers are among its members. 435 Secondly, the Court of Justice has held that even if the members of the CCCME and the other legal persons whose names are listed in the annex had participated in the sampling undertaken during the anti-dumping procedure in question, those members and those other persons were precluded from arguing that there had been an infringement of their procedural guarantees due to the Commission having failed to disclose to them information essential for the defence of their interests, since they had not made requests to be provided with that information during that procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 217). 436 Procedural rights are rights specific to the person on whom they are conferred and are of a subjective nature, such that it is the concerned parties themselves that must be able effectively to exercise those rights, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings to which they are subject. An association’s ability to exercise the procedural rights of its members cannot result in the circumvention of the conditions with which, under the case-law, the undertakings in question ought to have complied if they had wished to exercise their procedural rights themselves (judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraphs 223 and 224). 437 It follows from those considerations that an exporting producer which is a member of the CCCME cannot merely rely on the CCCME’s claims if it did not expressly assert its rights of defence during the administrative investigation. Although registering on the Tron.tdi platform allowed individual exporting producers to receive information in a timely manner and to follow the progress of the administrative investigation, in the absence of an explicit request for more information, the exporting producers in question could not claim to exercise procedural rights specific to them. 438 In that regard, it should be recalled that the right of access to non-confidential information pursuant to Article 6(7) of the basic regulation is linked to the status of an interested party which has made itself known in accordance with Article 5(10) of that regulation (judgment of 27 January 2000, BEUC v Commission, T‑256/97, EU:T:2000:21, paragraph 32) and that the Commission must decide on a case-by-case basis whether a party should be considered an interested party in the light of the particular circumstances of each case (judgment of 27 January 2000, BEUC v Commission, T‑256/97, EU:T:2000:21, paragraph 76). 439 Moreover, it is clear from the case-law that it is for the interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation procedure to place the institutions in a position to assess the difficulties which the absence of an element in the information put at their disposal could cause them. A fortiori, such an interested party is not entitled to complain before the EU Courts that information was not put at its disposal if, in the course of the investigation procedure that led to the contested anti-dumping regulation, it had not made any request to the institutions in relation to that particular information (see judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council, T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). It follows that those claims must be made by the individual exporting producers themselves, which cannot merely rely on the CCCME’s claims. 440 The difference in the present proceedings, on which the applicants rely, in so far as the Commission’s communication with the interested parties took place in a different way, namely by means of the Tron.tdi platform, which enabled the interested parties to submit information and observations and to follow the investigation, is not capable of calling into question that finding as regards the procedural requirements attached to the parties’ rights of defence. As the Commission rightly argued at the hearing, the Tron.tdi platform is intended solely to simplify communication with the parties and to facilitate correspondence. In any event, the status of interested party under the basic regulation and the rights attached thereto cannot depend on the Commission’s means of communication with those parties. 441 Consequently, the complaints raised in the ninth plea are inadmissible in so far as they concern non-sampled exporting producers which did not make specific requests for disclosure of additional information for the exercise of their procedural rights, whether they are raised by the CCCME on behalf of its members or by the five non-sampled exporting producers. 442 In the fourth place, as regards the three sampled Chinese exporting producers, it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 410 above that participation in sampling does not, in itself, grant the exporting producers concerned specific procedural rights in the absence of requests to be provided with information which they consider essential for the defence of their interests. 443 Consequently, it must be concluded in the light of the foregoing considerations that the ninth plea can be admissible only in so far as it is raised by the individual exporting producers alleging infringement of their rights of defence which demonstrated during the administrative procedure that they wished to exercise those rights. In order to assess the admissibility of the complaints raised, it is therefore necessary to examine, for each part of the plea, whether the undertakings in question complied with the conditions enabling them effectively to exercise their rights of defence. (b) Exercise of the applicants’ procedural rights (1) The first part 444 By the first part of the ninth plea, the applicants claim that there has been an infringement of Article 19(1) to (3) of the basic regulation and of their rights of defence, in so far as all the documents submitted by the intervener or by the sampled Union producers were treated as confidential without due cause, or the non-confidential summary of the documents was severely deficient, which deprived the interested parties of the opportunity to comment on or verify the accuracy of the evidence contained therein. The applicants dispute, in particular, the confidential treatment granted (i) to the macroeconomic questionnaire, (ii) to the non-confidential versions of the replies to the questionnaire of the sampled Union producers, and (iii) to the intervener’s response to the Commission’s request for additional information concerning the macroeconomic indicators. 445 According to the applicants, the infringement of their procedural rights is aggravated by the anonymous treatment granted to all Union producers which provided information and by the repeated refusals to provide any information on the product range of those companies and on the representative nature of their sales volume. 446 In that regard, with respect, first, to the confidentiality of the responses to the macroeconomic questionnaire, it is apparent from the contested regulation that only EFDA and the CCCME disputed the confidentiality of that information during the administrative procedure. The same is true of the challenge to the confidentiality of the replies to the questions put by the sampled Union producers and the confidentiality of the intervener’s response to the Commission’s request for additional information concerning the macroeconomic indicators. 447 First, EFDA is not an applicant and, secondly, in accordance with the conclusion in paragraph 434 above, the CCCME cannot rely on the infringement of its members’ procedural rights if they have not asserted those rights before the Commission in the form of written requests. 448 Moreover, as regards the names of the companies which replied to the macroeconomic questionnaire, it is apparent from recitals 21 and 396 of the contested regulation that the only interested parties which disputed the anonymity of the Union producers were the CCCME, EFDA and the People’s Republic of China. Since none of the exporting producers among the applicants requested further information from the Commission as to the identity of the Union producers, as concluded in paragraph 441 above, that complaint must be rejected. 449 It follows that the first part of the ninth plea is inadmissible and must be rejected. (2) The second part 450 The applicants challenge the Commission’s management of the non-confidential file, which in their view infringed Article 6(7) and Article 19(1) to (3) of the basic regulation and their rights of defence, since the interested parties did not have full and timely access to the non-confidential file during the investigation. 451 First, that deprived interested parties of the opportunity to follow as closely as possible significant developments in the investigation, such as the Commission’s decision to modify the sample of Union producers, or to submit comments on them. Furthermore, interested parties were not informed of the ex parte communications between the Commission and the intervener. 452 Secondly, the applicants claim that a number of files were deleted from the non-confidential file. 453 Thirdly, the applicants suggest that there are various other files that were never uploaded to the non-confidential file. 454 As regards the Commission’s management of the non-confidential file, in the first place, it should be noted that it follows from the wording of Article 6(7) of the basic regulation, set out in paragraph 404 above, that the interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation procedure, such as the applicants, are not able to raise a complaint regarding the absence of a document in the non-confidential file if they have not submitted a written request to acquaint themselves with that document (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council, T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378, paragraph 109). 455 It is apparent from recitals 22 and 24 of the contested regulation that the alleged insufficiency of the non-confidential file was challenged during the administrative procedure only by the CCCME and EFDA following the final disclosure. 456 In the second place, as regards the communication between the Commission and the intervener, it is apparent from recital 47 of the contested regulation that only EFDA and the CCCME had requested its disclosure. 457 In the third place, as regards the alleged deletion of a number of documents from the non-confidential file, only the CCCME requested further information from the Commission in that regard. 458 Therefore, in the light of the identity of the interested parties that made claims during the administrative procedure and the conclusion in paragraph 441 above, it must be held that this part of the plea is also inadmissible. (3) The third part 459 The applicants challenge the Commission’s refusal to make available to interested parties information that the Commission relied on for its definitive findings, in breach of Article 20(2) and (4) of the basic regulation and of the rights of the defence. The information provided by the sampled Union producers and the macroeconomic questionnaire were the two key sources that the Commission relied on for its findings on injury and causation. 460 In that regard, it is apparent from the contested regulation that none of the individual exporting producers among the applicants requested disclosure of the precise information provided by the Union producers. It follows that the applicants’ claims in the present part of the plea are inadmissible and, with them, the ninth plea in its entirety, which must be rejected. 461 In the light of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 462 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and by the intervener, in accordance with the forms of order sought by them. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME) and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to pay the costs. Schalin Steinfatt Kukovec Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 October 2024. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President * Language of the case: English. 1 The list of the other applicants is annexed only to the version sent to the parties.