Judgment;Abstract — ECLI:EU:T:2021:278
Date: 2021-05-19
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition
Subject matter: Dumping;External relations;Commercial policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary must be provided by the party requesting confidentiality, and that summary must be in sufficient detail to permit interested parties to gain a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted. 468 With the same objective of respecting the rights of the defence when confidentiality precludes the disclosure of information, Article 19(4) of the basic regulation makes the institutions responsible for disclosing general information, in particular the reasons on which decisions taken under the basic regulation are based. 469 It is in the light of those principles and provisions that it is necessary to examine whether the CCCME was placed in a position in which it could effectively make known its views on the correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the evidence presented by the Commission, on the understanding that, when it is necessary for them to reconcile the requirements of confidentiality with the right to information for the interested parties, the institutions concerned must consider, in the light of that information, the particular situation of the interested party and, in particular, the position that that interested party occupies on the market under consideration in relation to the position of the supplier of that information (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council, T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378, paragraph 199). 470 In that examination, the three parts of the plea will be analysed in turn. – The first part of the third plea in law: request for disclosure of the Commission’s calculations 471 In the first part, the CCCME criticises the Commission for not having provided it with details of the calculation of (i) the normal value, (ii) dumping margins, (iii) the effects of Chinese imports on prices, (iv) injury and (iv) the injury elimination level. According to the CCCME, having access to the Commission’s detailed calculations and to the data used for those calculations enables the interested parties to submit comments which are more appropriate for their defence. Those interested parties can then verify exactly how the Commission used those data and compare them with their own calculations, which enables them to identify possible errors made by the Commission which would otherwise be undetectable. 472 The Commission does not dispute that the calculations requested by the CCCME may constitute essential facts and considerations within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the basic regulation for interested parties such as exporting producers, which risk being subject to the anti-dumping measures at issue. However, it submits that the CCCME cannot be regarded as an interested party within the meaning of the basic regulation, since the CCCME is not itself active as a producer or trader of the product concerned. According to the Commission, the duty to provide information is less pronounced for representative associations than it is for interested parties, in particular exporting producers. 473 In that regard, it must first be established whether the calculations to which the CCCME requested access contain confidential information within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the basic regulation, in accordance with the Commission’s objections on that issue during the investigation. 474 As regards the calculations of the normal value, the Commission explained in the contested regulation that different calculation methods had been used according to the situation contemplated. Thus, the first situation used is that in which the exported product type was identical or comparable to a product type manufactured on the Indian market, it being noted that the Republic of India was chosen as a market economy third country acting as a reference for calculating the normal value. In that case, different methods were applied according to whether or not the product type concerned was sold in representative quantities on the Indian market. Where the product type was sold in representative quantities on the Indian market, which in practice concerned a product type sold by one Indian producer, the Commission used the sales prices charged in the ordinary course of trade. Where the product type at issue was not sold in representative quantities on the Indian market, which was the case in respect of all other product types identical or comparable to the exported product types, the Commission also made a distinction according to whether the product type was sold ‘in sufficient quantities’ by at least one Indian producer, in which case it used the sales prices charged in the ordinary course of trade (‘the second method’), or whether the product type was not sold, but produced by at least one Indian producer, in which case it constructed the normal value on the basis of the costs of manufacturing, to which the SG&A costs and the profits linked to domestic sales made in the ordinary course of trade by that Indian producer were added (‘the third method’). The second situation is that in which the exported product type was not identical or comparable to a product type manufactured on the Indian market. In that case, the Commission used a normal value based on sales of all the product types using the same raw material (ductile or grey cast iron) by Indian producers on the domestic market in the ordinary course of trade. 475 In the light of those explanations, it must be held that the calculations of the normal value to which the CCCME requested access concern the sales prices and the costs of manufacturing, the SG&A costs and the profits of the Indian producers, broken down by product type. 476 Matters such as costs of manufacturing, SG&A costs or profits are, in the present case, confidential by nature within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the basic regulation, since, as indicated in that provision, third parties’ knowledge of those matters could, in the conduct of business, be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or have a significantly adverse effect on the person who supplied the information (see paragraph 462 of the present judgment). 477 In any event, it must be observed that, having been included in the restricted version of the questionnaire sent to the Commission, those matters, in common with the prices, were communicated by the parties to the investigation on a confidential basis, which resulted in an obligation for the authorities with knowledge of that information to respect that confidentiality if they were not to infringe Article 19(1) and (5) of the basic regulation (see paragraph 462 of the present judgment). 478 The same observation applies to the other calculations requested by the CCCME. 479 Accordingly, the calculations of the dumping margins, since they consist of a comparison of the normal value and export prices of the sampled Chinese exporting producers, involve confidential data of the Indian producers and of the Chinese exporting producers whose prices are compared. 480 Similarly, the injury calculations, including, in that context, the calculation of the effects of Chinese imports on prices, include confidential data. First, the undercutting calculations, which enable an assessment to be made of the effect of imports on prices of the products on the EU market, stem from a comparison between the export prices of the sampled Chinese exporting producers and the prices of similar models or products of the sampled EU producers. Second, the injury to the EU industry is assessed by taking into account the impact of the imports on the EU industry. In that respect, the confidential data of the EU industry, namely data from the sampled EU producers relating to prices and factors affecting prices, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital are gathered and analysed in relation to the microeconomic indicators assessed by the Commission. The same is true of the data of the EU industry producers relating to production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment and productivity, in relation to the macroeconomic indicators assessed by the Commission. 481 Finally, continuing in the same vein, the injury elimination level calculations also involve confidential data, in that they stem from a comparison between export prices and the corresponding non-injurious prices charged by the EU industry. 482 Accordingly, it is apparent from the analysis carried out above that all the calculations requested by the CCCME are confidential and merit protection. 483 However, it must be recalled that, where information cannot be communicated because of it being confidential, Article 19(2) to (4) of the basic regulation, first, requires the parties concerned to provide a non-confidential summary of that information whenever possible and, second, requires the Commission to disclose general information, in particular the reasons underlying the decisions taken within the context of the basic regulation. 484 It is therefore necessary to establish whether, in the light of the information communicated to it, the CCCME was placed in a position, as required by the case-law, to provide information appropriate to its defence. 485 In that examination, two issues must be taken into account, namely, first, the information actually available to the CCCME and, second, the CCCME’s status during the investigation (see the case-law cited in paragraph 469 above). Those issues are examined below. 486 As regards the first of those issues, it should be noted that, with regard to the calculations of the normal value, in order to protect the cooperating Indian producers’ commercially sensitive information, but also that of the sampled Chinese exporting producers, the Commission communicated to the CCCME a description of the method of calculating the normal value applied in the situations referred to in paragraph 474 of the present judgment and certain information concerning the result of those calculations. The Commission thereby informed it that that result was within a range between 3 000 and 4 000 yuan renminbis (CNY) and between CNY 8 000 and CNY 9 000 depending on the product type. Following a request by the CCCME, the Commission also stated, in paragraph 61 of its final conclusions and in recital 67 of the contested regulation, that the sum of the SG&A costs and of the profits which had been added under the third method was in a range between 1% and 10% of turnover for grey cast iron products and between 10% and 20% of turnover for ductile cast iron products. 487 For the dumping margin calculations, the CCCME was aware of the methodology used by the Commission, namely, as stated in recital 92 of the provisional regulation, that the Commission calculated the dumping margin of the sampled exporting producers by comparing the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product in the analogue country with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned. The Commission thereby obtained a dumping margin per product type. It then calculated the dumping margin for each sampled exporting producer on the basis of the product types sold by it. The CCCME was informed that the result of those calculations revealed dumping margins ranging between 15.5% and 38.1%. 488 For the undercutting calculations, the CCCME, as stated in recitals 127 and 128 of the provisional regulation, was informed of the fact that the Commission had determined price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing the weighted average sales prices per product type of the three sampled EU producers charged to independent customers on the EU market, adjusted to an ‘ex-works level’, and the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the five sampled producing exporters in the People’s Republic of China charged to the first independent customer on the EU market, established on a ‘cost, insurance, freight’ (CIF) basis with appropriate adjustments for customs duties of 1.7% for grey cast iron products and of 2.7% for ductile cast iron products. The Commission added that the price comparison had been performed on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of that comparison was expressed as a percentage of the three sampled EU producers’ turnover during the investigation period and showed undercutting margins ranging from 35.4% to 42.7%, which were subsequently adjusted, as stated in recital 122 of the contested regulation. 489 For the calculations underlying the examination of the microeconomic and macroeconomic indicators, enabling an assessment of the injury caused to the EU industry, the CCCME obtained overall figures by indicator and by year, set out in recitals 137 to 166 of the provisional regulation. 490 Finally, as regards the calculation of the injury elimination level, the CCCME was informed of the fact that, in order to determine the profit that could reasonably be achieved under normal conditions of competition by the EU industry, the Commission had examined the profits made on sales to unrelated buyers. The target profit was provisionally set at 5.3%, in line with the 2013 profits from the sales to independent customers. The Commission clarified that, in that regard, as the dumped imports underwent a large increase in 2014, after which they stabilised, it had taken the view that the 2013 level of profits reflected what could reasonably have been achieved under normal conditions of competition, that is to say, in the absence of dumped imports. The Commission then determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the cooperating sampled Chinese exporting producers, duly adjusted for importation costs and customs duties, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled EU producers on the EU market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from that comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. The result of those calculations gave a percentage of between 70.7% and 80.7%. 491 As regards the second issue to be taken into account in order to determine whether the CCCME was provided with the information it needed in order to exercise its rights of defence, it must be recalled that that entity is not a sampled exporting producer. Accordingly, the CCCME does not find itself in the situation of operators whose individualised data, which they themselves communicated to the Commission, were used by the Commission in its calculations in order to make the findings required by the basic regulation. The Commission provides to each operator the calculations concerning that operator, part of which involves their own data and which does not raise confidentiality concerns vis-a-vis that operator, and the other part of which involves the confidential data of the Indian or EU producers. For their own situation, those explanations enable them to understand, with the explanations provided by the Commission, the duties imposed on them, since those explanations must be as detailed and precise as possible in order to enable them to challenge, where appropriate, the choices made by the Commission. 492 As stated in paragraph 58 of the present judgment, during the investigation the CCCME enjoyed the status of interested party within the meaning of the basic regulation. In the context of the investigation, it acted, according to the presentation which it itself gave at the beginning of the proceeding, as an association representing Chinese producers active in the sector concerned in the People’s Republic of China as a whole, that is to say, a considerable number of undertakings. On that basis, it cannot claim to gather all the information concerning certain Chinese exporting producers without the permission of those exporting producers. Furthermore, it also cannot claim to have access to the confidential data of the Indian and EU producers whose decision to cooperate in the investigation is dependent, in particular, on the confidentiality assurances given to them. To allow the CCCME to obtain such extensive access as it requested would be at variance with the requirements for respecting confidentiality which the basic regulation imposes on the EU institutions. 493 It follows that, in the present case, the Commission was entitled, as it did, to communicate to the CCCME information which was both precise and in aggregated form, in order to respect the confidentiality obligations concerning the calculations made by the Commission. 494 Moreover, it was following comments made by the CCCME that the Commission changed its method of calculating the normal value, in particular the second and third methods, that is to say, respectively, the method which applies where the exported product type is identical or comparable to a product type manufactured and sold on the Indian market in small quantities and the method which applies when the product type is not sold, but is produced by at least one Indian producer in the sample. The Commission ultimately constructed the normal value on the basis of the sales prices charged by those sellers (second method), as explained in recital 66 of the contested regulation, and on the basis of the cost of manufacturing plus SG&A costs and profit related to domestic sales made in the ordinary course of trade by the Indian producer in question (third method), as explained in recital 67 of the contested regulation, rather than, as had previously been done, on the basis of the normal value constructed on the basis of each Indian producer’s average cost of producing the like product. The CCCME was also able to challenge the calculation of the normal value under that third method and, more specifically, the taking into account of the SG&A costs and profits of a single Indian producer, even though the CCCME’s line of argument was rejected, as is stated in recitals 70 to 72 of the contested regulation. 495 In those circumstances, it must be held that, in the present case, the Commission was entitled to refuse the CCCME, acting as an association representing the Chinese industry, access to the details of the calculations of (i) the normal value, (ii) dumping margins, (iii) the effects of Chinese imports on prices, (iv) injury and (v) the injury elimination level, which it requested during the investigation, that, together with the information which had been communicated to it and which is referred to in paragraphs 486 to 490 of the present judgment, the CCCME, as an association representing the Chinese industry, had available to it the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which the Commission intended to recommend that definitive measures be imposed, and that, while maintaining the confidentiality of the data at issue, the Commission afforded it the opportunity effectively to make its views known in that regard. 496 The CCCME relies on two judgments in order to dispute that position. 497 First, the CCCME relies on the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), in which the Court held that the Commission had infringed the applicant’s rights of defence by refusing to communicate to it the details of the calculations of the normal value, product type by product type, and the result of those calculations. 498 In that regard, it must be noted that the facts of the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), relied on by the CCCME, are different from those of the present case. On the one hand, the first case concerned a sampled exporting producer, not an association representing an entire industry such as the CCCME, which, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 491 and 492 of the present judgment, is in a different situation from that of such an exporting producer. On the other hand, the Court’s annulment in that case was, in any event, made in a specific context, in which the analogue country producer whose data were included in those calculations had authorised the disclosure of its data underlying those calculations. As the Commission points out, the Court, in the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), therefore censured a refusal by the Commission although the operator which provided the data had accepted the disclosure thereof, taking the view that that institution could accept what the operator had accepted. In the present case, there is no such situation, since the Indian producers, in particular, did not consent to such disclosure of their data. 499 Second, the CCCME relies on the judgment of 1 June 2017, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council (T‑442/12, EU:T:2017:372), in which the Court, in order to annul the regulation which was contested, relied on the fact that the Commission had refused to provide information concerning the calculation of the normal value, in particular the source of the prices used for the product concerned and the factors affecting the price comparison. 500 In that regard, the differences between the present case and the case which gave rise to the judgment of 1 June 2017, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Council (T‑442/12, EU:T:2017:372) must, once more, be pointed out. The latter case again concerned the position of an exporting producer subject to the investigation, which contrasts with the position of an association representing an industry as a whole. Furthermore, the scope of that judgment is not as broad as the CCCME claims. First of all, the Court’s annulment concerned the refusal to provide specific information concerning the calculation of normal value, namely information on the price difference between DL tartaric acid (which was the subject matter of the investigation) and L + tartaric acid (which was produced in the analogue country), there being no question, in that judgment, of communicating the prices themselves. Next, the annulment was justified by the fact that the Commission’s refusal to provide that particular information had no valid ground. The Commission had not justified its refusal during the administrative procedure. Before the Court, the Commission explained that, in short, the information requested had not been provided for reasons of confidentiality. According to the Court, however, such an explanation could not be put forward for the first time before it. That explanation should have been provided to the applicant during the administrative procedure. Accordingly, it is apparent from the abovementioned judgment that the Court did not rule out the possibility that the Commission, had it duly stated the reasons for its refusal to communicate the information at the stage of the administrative procedure, might have been able to prevent the applicant from accessing the information in question. 501 On the basis of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the CCCME cannot have access, as an association representing the Chinese industry, to the detailed calculations of (i) the normal value, (ii) the dumping margins, (iii) the effects of Chinese imports on prices, (iv) injury and (v) injury elimination level, since they contain confidential information. It is apparent from the circumstances of the present case that the information which that entity obtained concerning the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which the Commission intended to adopt definitive measures enabled it effectively to defend its interests as an association representing the Chinese industry. 502 During the investigation, the CCCME requested that its lawyers be given access to the abovementioned information, subject to respecting the confidentiality of those data. 503 In that regard, it must be noted that the basic regulation lays down no such procedure, whereas, as stated in paragraphs 467 and 468 of the present judgment, that regulation sets out precisely what must be done by the institutions and by the parties to which the information concerned is available when that information is confidential. Since the institutions and the parties concerned complied with the requirements imposed on them in that context, there is no reason to criticise the Commission’s decision to refuse such access. 504 The first part of the third plea must therefore be rejected. – The second part of the third plea in law: the request for the calculations to be communicated in aggregated form 505 In the second part, which is raised in the alternative to the first part, the CCCME asserts that the Commission ought at least to have provided the calculations referred to in the first part in aggregated form, in particular as regards, first, the calculations of (i) the normal value, (ii) the effects of Chinese imports on prices and (iii) injury elimination levels and, second, estimates relating to macroeconomic indicators. 506 The Commission contends that that part of the plea should be rejected. 507 In that regard, first, it must be noted that presenting confidential data in aggregated form does not necessarily mean that those data are no longer confidential. That is so, in the present case, in particular, as regards the calculations of the normal value. The Commission argued, correctly, in that regard that, since, for certain product types, it had used data from a single Indian producer and for others it had used data relating to a maximum of two or three Indian producers, aggregating the data could not adequately ensure that it was impossible to identify the individual data of those producers. The same is true of the estimates concerning the macroeconomic indicators made by the complainants as to the position of the remaining producers. In that regard, the Court has already held that the estimated production of the EU producers concerned, on which the Commission had relied in calculating consumption, had correctly been regarded as confidential, since it was based on the complainants’ market knowledge. The Court accordingly held that, by merely providing the total production figure, the Commission had acted in accordance with the basic regulation (judgment of 25 October 2011, CHEMK and KF v Council, T‑190/08, EU:T:2011:618, paragraph 231). 508 Second, it must be pointed out that, as the Commission has argued, the calculations made for the purposes of the investigation and the determinations required by the basic regulation do not mean that it has available to it, in every case, aggregated results for all the producers concerned. 509 Accordingly, the Commission stated in recital 24 of the contested regulation that the aggregated undercutting calculations requested by the CCCME did not exist because undercutting had been calculated solely per product type per exporting producer. Each sampled Chinese exporting producer accordingly received the undercutting calculations for each of the product types which it exported. 510 It is true that the Commission may be required to generate a document in order to guarantee a party’s rights of defence (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 November 2019, Izuzquiza and Semsrott v Frontex, T‑31/18, EU:T:2019:815, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). 511 However, that obligation cannot extend to an obligation, in the present case, for the Commission to generate a document for a party such as the CCCME, namely an association representing the Chinese industry, in order to enable the CCCME to have available to it all the information on the basis of which the trade defence measures are envisaged, if it is not to subject the Commission to requirements going beyond those laid down by the basic regulation as regards arrangements for respecting the confidentiality of information in order to preserve the rights of defence of the interested parties. 512 In that regard, it must be stated that the volume of information requested by the CCCME in the present case is such that the Commission could be impeded in its activity and in its investigation if it had to provide all that information in a form adapted to the sole needs of such an entity. It should, in that regard, be recalled that the various stages of an anti-dumping proceeding are subject to strict time limits. Accordingly, Article 6(9) of the basic regulation dictates an overall period of 15 months for investigations. Article 7(1) of that regulation provides that provisional duties are to be imposed no later than nine months from the initiation of the proceedings and, in accordance with Article 9(4), a proposal to impose definitive duties must be submitted no later than one month before the expiry of the provisional duties. 513 Accordingly, the line of argument put forward by the CCCME in support of the second part of the plea cannot alter the conclusion reached by the Court in the context of the first part of the present plea that the CCCME had available to it, in the present case, the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which the Commission intended to adopt definitive measures, and that entity was thus able effectively to defend its interests as an association representing the Chinese industry. 514 The second part of the third plea must therefore be rejected. – The third part of the third plea in law: other information requested by the CCCME 515 In the third part of the third plea, which the Commission disputes, the CCCME lists three types of information which it regards as important and to which it claims that the Commission unlawfully refused access. 516 In its first complaint, the CCCME criticises the Commission for not having communicated to it information other than the characteristics set out in the PCN, as regards the products of the Indian and EU producers which were compared with the imported products. The CCCME alleges that that situation prevented it from establishing whether adjustments were necessary in order to ensure price comparability. That line of argument is also put forward by the applicants in the context of the second part of the fourth plea in law. 517 In support of that complaint, the CCCME relies on the report of the WTO Appellate Body in the dispute ‘European Communities – Definitive Anti-dumping measures on certain iron or steel fasteners from China’ (WT/DS 397/AB/RW, report of 18 January 2016). 518 In that case, the WTO Appellate Body stated that, ‘in an anti-dumping investigation involving an analogue country producer, the exporters under investigation also need[ed] to be informed “of the specific products with regard to which the normal value [was] determined”, or they [would] “not be in a position to request any adjustments they deem[ed] necessary”’. In that case, the Appellate Body’s position was based on the fact that, in that type of investigation, the information concerning the normal value was obtained from a third source, namely the analogue country producer. In so far as the exporters under investigation do not have access to that information, they do not know whether they can request adjustments to account for differences which affect price comparability between the exported products and the products sold domestically by the analogue country producer. It is not sufficient to communicate to those producers, according to the Appellate Body, the ‘product groups’ which were used as a basis for comparing the transactions by disclosing PCNs. It was necessary to provide them with all information concerning the characteristics of the products of the analogue country producers which were used to compare prices. 519 In that regard, as has been recalled in paragraph 419 of the present judgment, in accordance with the case-law, interpretations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by that body are not capable of binding the Court in its assessment of the validity of the contested regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2005, Van Parys, C‑377/02, EU:C:2005:121, paragraph 54). 520 Moreover, the interpretation put forward by the CCCME cannot be used in the present case to provide an answer to the questions raised. 521 The case cited by the CCCME concerns exporting producers whose data were taken into account to calculate the dumping margin. In the report cited by the CCCME, the WTO Appellate Body states, in order to justify the communication of information on product models where the analogue country method is applied, that, in an ‘ordinary’ anti-dumping investigation, normal value is usually determined on the basis of the sales of the exporter concerned on its domestic market. In its view, it could therefore be expected that the exporter under investigation has the necessary knowledge of its own products used for establishing both the export price and the normal value. 522 Thus, where an exporting producer whose data are examined by the Commission in order to calculate the dumping margin is notified of the characteristics of the analogue country’s products, it is in a position to ascertain, having knowledge of all the parameters, the comparability of the analogue country’s products with the products which it has itself exported to the European Union. 523 The situation is, however, different in the present case, in so far as it is the CCCME, acting as an association representing the Chinese industry as a whole, as has already been indicated in paragraphs 445 and 446 of the present judgment, which requested access to the information concerning the characteristics of the products. 524 In the case of such disclosure to it, the information concerning the characteristics of the products would not enable the CCCME to make a meaningful comparison of the products in question, since it does not generally have models of products placed on the market by the sampled Chinese exporting producers which were compared with Indian products. 525 Accordingly, it has not been established that disclosure of the information concerning the characteristics of the products of the analogue country producers would have placed the CCCME in a position in which it was better able to safeguard its rights of defence. 526 In any event, as the Commission stated during the investigation, that information is confidential. Therefore, and for the same reasons as those relied on, in particular in paragraph 501 of the present judgment, it must be held that an association representing the whole of an industry, such as the CCCME, has at its disposal the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which measures are envisaged and may therefore effectively make known its views, where it has available to it the product (PCN) types compared for the purposes of the calculations required by the basic regulation. 527 The same conclusion applies in regard to disclosure of the characteristics of the products of the EU industry, the prices of which are compared with the prices of Chinese products in order to calculate undercutting, with the result that the first complaint must be rejected. 528 In its second complaint, the CCCME takes the view that the Commission ought to have provided it with the calculations concerning the import volumes from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India and the other third countries as well as the source documents. 529 In that regard, it is apparent from the file that the CCCME had been informed, during the anti-dumping proceeding, of the method used by the Commission to calculate the import volumes. The CCCME was aware, in particular, of (i) the percentages recorded for imports originating in the People’s Republic of China, in the Republic of India and in the other third countries, in relation to the former sub-codes which were used before the introduction in 2014 of CN General Code ex 7325 10 00, (ii) the fixed amount to be deducted from CN code ex 7325 99 10 in order to obtain imports originating in the People’s Republic of China, in the Republic of India and in third countries, and (iii) the percentage to be deducted from total imports in order to exclude channel gratings. Furthermore, since the data used to determine those imports were extracted from statistics provided by Eurostat, which are available in the Comext database, the CCCME had at its disposal all the information necessary to reproduce the Commission’s calculations for which it requested disclosure. In those circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Commission infringed the basic regulation in that respect. 530 It is true that in paragraph 207 of the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), upon which the CCCME relies, the Court held that rights of the defence had been infringed, stating that obtaining the calculations made by the Commission in that case represented, for the applicant, a substantial increase in the information it held which would have enabled it to make more relevant observations than those it had already presented. 531 However, the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), differs from the present case in two important respects. 532 First of all, the applicant’s level of knowledge was very much lower than the level which could be established in the present case. Thus, in the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), the applicant had only a general knowledge of the method used to calculate the normal value of non-matching product types. It was unaware of which market and reference prices the Commission had used in order to calculate the market value of the adjustment to the normal value of those product types, which was required due to the differences in the physical characteristics between those product types and the matching product types. In those circumstances, the Court observed that, if the applicant had had in its possession the calculations of the normal value, product type by product type, it would have been in a position to compare the Commission’s results with its own results obtained via another method. Those circumstances differ from the present case, in which the CCCME was aware of the calculation method used by the Commission, as stated in paragraph 529 of the present judgment. 533 Next, the time period available to the parties to carry out their calculations was also very different in regard to the number of documents to be dealt with. In the judgment of 30 June 2016, Jinan Meide Casting v Council (T‑424/13, EU:T:2016:378), the applicant had a very limited period (seven days) within which to reproduce the Commission’s calculations, which were voluminous since they related to 1 645 product types. In the present case, the calculations to be carried out were more limited and the CCCME received the required information concerning the method of calculating the imports used at the latest when the provisional regulation was adopted, which makes reference to the complaint, in which certain estimates are explained and to which the CCCME already had access. 534 For those reasons, the second complaint must be rejected. 535 In its third complaint, the CCCME challenges the Commission’s refusal to split, for each macroeconomic indicator used to establish the harm suffered by the European Union, the figures collected into two categories according to whether they were based on actual data or on estimates, in order to communicate those estimates to it in an aggregated form. 536 In that regard, it must be noted that, during the investigation, the CCCME had access, for each macroeconomic indicator used by the Commission, to the aggregated figures, per year, for the EU industry as a whole. Those aggregated figures, as stated in the second part of the first plea, are the result of a compilation of data provided by the complainants and the sampled EU producers with estimates made by the complainants in respect of the remaining producers. 537 The CCCME submits that its rights of defence were infringed by the Commission’s refusal to distinguish, in the figures obtained, between those which stemmed from real data and those which resulted from estimates. 538 In that regard, it must be noted that, as the Commission has stated, the Commission is not required to make such a distinction when assessing the injury to the European Union, the injury being assessed for the EU industry as a whole. However, as stated in paragraph 510 of the present judgment, the Commission may be required to generate a document where what is at issue is the requirement to guarantee the rights of defence of interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation, and it must, in accordance with the case-law, in so far as is compatible with the obligation not to disclose business secrets, provide information relevant to the defence of the interests of the interested parties, choosing, if necessary on its own initiative, the appropriate means by which to provide such information (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 March 1985, Timex v Council and Commission, 264/82, EU:C:1985:119, paragraph 30). 539 In the present case, it should, however, be noted that the actual data of the sampled producers and of the other complainants, on the one hand, and the estimates made for the remaining producers, on the other hand, are confidential, even when aggregated. 540 In that regard, as stated in paragraph 507 of the present judgment, the Court held in the judgment of 25 October 2011, CHEMK and KF v Council (T‑190/08, EU:T:2011:618, paragraph 231), that the estimated production of the EU producers concerned, relied on by the Commission in calculating consumption, had correctly been regarded as confidential, since it was based on the complainants’ market knowledge. The Court accordingly took the view that, by doing no more than providing the total production figure, the Commission had acted in accordance with the basic regulation. 541 As regards, as in the present case, a request concerning commercially sensitive data relating to part of the EU industry, which stems from an association representing all the Chinese exporting producers active in the sector and those which will, in the future, be prompted to export the products in question to the European Union, as stated in paragraphs 445 and 446 of the present judgment, it must be concluded that knowledge, by that association, of aggregated figures concerning the EU industry as a whole for each of the macroeconomic indicators used by the Commission was sufficient for it to be able to defend its interests. 542 The third part must therefore be rejected, as, consequently, must the third plea in its entirety. The fourth plea in law: the comparability of the prices used to calculate the dumping margin and to analyse injury 543 The fourth plea comprises three parts, which are disputed by the Commission. – The first part of the fourth plea in law: the PCN-by-PCN method 544 In the first part, the applicants dispute the Commission’s alleged simplification, during the investigation, of the characteristics associated with the PCNs used to calculate the dumping margin and to analyse injury. 545 In that regard, it should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that PCNs are codes used in anti-dumping investigations to establish matches between product types. During an investigation, the undertakings contacted are invited to classify their products in categories corresponding to those codes. Characteristics intended to describe the goods concerned are attached to those codes. 546 In the present case, during the investigation, the Commission excluded from the codes concerned certain characteristics which, although originally attached to them, did not appear to it to be relevant. Accordingly, the PCN communicated to the Indian producers for them to classify their products initially comprised 15 characteristics. During the investigation, only some were selected for the purposes of the comparison: a single characteristic (raw material) for situations where the product concerned was neither manufactured nor sold by a sampled Indian producer and three characteristics (raw material, load index and product type) for other situations. 547 According to the Commission, eliminating certain characteristics for the purposes of the comparison is standard practice where the product types are complex, since it makes it possible for a certain match to be identified between product types which, otherwise, could not be compared. 548 In their arguments, the applicants raise two complaints against that approach, which the Commission disputes. 549 In their first complaint, the applicants maintain that the 15 characteristics initially attached to the relevant PCNs were important and should have been retained throughout the investigation, without the Commission being able to make the simplification referred to in paragraph 546 of the present judgment. 550 In that regard, it must be stated that, where the product concerned contains a wide range of goods which have considerable differences with regard to their characteristics and their prices, it may prove necessary to group them under categories which are more or less homogeneous (judgment of 4 March 2010, Sun Sang Kong Yuen Shoes Factory v Council, T‑409/06, EU:T:2010:69, paragraph 172; see also, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2015, Einhell Germany and Others v Commission, T‑73/12, EU:T:2015:865, paragraph 76). 551 According to the case-law, the purpose of that grouping is to allow for a fair comparison between comparable products and thereby to avoid an incorrect calculation of the dumping margin, on the one hand, and of the injury, on the other, owing to unsuitable comparisons (judgment of 4 March 2010, Sun Sang Kong Yuen Shoes Factory v Council, T‑409/06, EU:T:2010:69, paragraph 172). 552 If the applicants intend to call into question the approach taken by the Commission in that context, they must demonstrate that the codification proposed by that institution is manifestly inappropriate (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 March 2010, Sun Sang Kong Yuen Shoes Factory v Council, T‑409/06, EU:T:2010:69, paragraph 180). 553 In the present case, however, the applicants have produced no evidence tangibly demonstrating how that codification led to manifestly inadequate product categories. 554 In the absence of such evidence, it cannot be concluded that the applicants have demonstrated that the Commission’s codification was manifestly inappropriate, and the first complaint must therefore be rejected. 555 In their second complaint, the applicants criticise the Commission for not having used the same characteristics attached to PCNs, first, for the determination of dumping, and, second, for the injury analysis. 556 In that regard, it must be observed that, as stated in paragraphs 550 and 551 of the present judgment, the PCN nomenclature is used to identify the types of characteristics which, within the category constituted by the product concerned, enable prices and values to be compared in the investigation. 557 As the Commission points out, the use of that nomenclature in a context involving a non-market economy country means that the characteristics resulting from that nomenclature are not necessarily identical depending on whether the injury is being analysed or the dumping margin is being determined. 558 In order to analyse the injury, products originating in the People’s Republic of China are compared with those produced in the European Union. Since the objective is to examine the effect of imports of Chinese products on the price of the EU products, there must, in order to make that comparison, be a match between the types actually compared. 559 When determining dumping, the comparison relates to the exporting producers’ sales prices on their domestic market and the sales prices of the products exported to the European Union by those exporting producers. In order to make that determination in the present case, account had to be taken of the fact that the People’s Republic of China was not considered to be a market economy country. Under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, that fact makes it impossible to use prices charged on the Chinese domestic market for the purposes of comparison. 560 That is the context in which the normal value is constructed. In order to construct that normal value, the Commission seeks the country which, of those with a market economy, is economically closest to the People’s Republic of China. In the present case, the country selected was the Republic of India. 561 To make the comparison described above, the Commission must then identify the products which are closest, in the light of the characteristics attached to the PCNs, to those products exported by the Chinese exporting producers to the European Union. In order to make that identification, the Commission’s services gradually discount the characteristics which make it impossible to find a match between the products concerned, until they have been able to identify those which will enable a comparison to be made. 562 In such a context, the difference between the PCNs used in the dumping determination and those used in the injury analysis can be explained by the difference between the products to be compared in order to carry out the necessary calculations for those two areas. 563 For those reasons, the second complaint must be rejected, since the Commission cannot be criticised for not having attached the same characteristics to PCNs, for, on the one hand, the determination of dumping and, on the other, the injury analysis. 564 Since both complaints have been rejected, the first part of the fourth plea must be rejected in its entirety. – The second part of the fourth plea in law: lack of information on the characteristics of the products under comparison 565 In the second part, the applicants claim that, even though the Commission disclosed the PCNs used, it provided no information on the product types compared, with the result that they were prevented from determining whether adjustments were necessary to ensure price comparability. 566 In that regard, it should be recalled that the members of the CCCME and the other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I have not established that they participated in the investigation or made a request to the Commission for disclosure of the information at issue. 567 Since the members of the CCCME and the other legal persons whose names are listed in Annex I thus did not place the Commission in a position to assess the difficulties which the absence of those elements in the information placed at their disposal could cause them, they are not entitled to rely on the second part of the fourth plea in support of their action, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 437 of the present judgment. 568 As regards, additionally, that part of the plea in so far as it is raised by the CCCME, it should be noted that the same line of argument, submitted by that entity under the third part of the third plea has been rejected in paragraphs 519 to 527 of the present judgment. 569 The second part of the fourth plea must therefore be rejected. – The third part of the fourth plea in law: adjustment to the production costs of ductile cast iron 570 In the third part of the fourth plea, the applicants submit that the Commission should have adjusted Indian prices in order to ensure that they were comparable to Chinese prices. In their view, Indian producers’ lack of specialisation in the manufacture of ductile cast iron products has an impact on the production costs accepted by the Commission in its analysis. Those costs are significantly higher than those borne by the Chinese exporting producers because of lack of economies of scale and lack of know-how on the part of Indian producers. 571 In that context, the applicants raise two complaints, which are disputed by the Commission. 572 In their first complaint, the applicants maintain that the request for an adjustment could not be rejected on the ground, put forward by the Commission, that it was satisfied that Indian sales were representative. 573 In that regard, it should be noted that, as it stated in recital 89 of the contested regulation, the Commission examined whether domestic sales of ductile cast iron products by the only sampled Indian producer which manufactured such products, and whose prices were used, were representative within the meaning of the basic regulation, that is to say, whether, in accordance with Article 2(2) of that regulation, they represented at least 5% of the total sales volume to the European Union, where those sales had not been made at a loss and where they were normal commercial transactions. 574 Contrary to the applicants’ submission, such examinations permit the inference that, in so far as its domestic sales of ductile cast iron products represented at least 5% of the total sales volume to the European Union, the Indian producer whose data were used possesses certain know-how and has a particular production capacity, which runs counter to the objection alleging a lack of know-how and of economies of scale in the Indian industry in relation to the production of ductile cast iron because of the small quantity produced. 575 Consequently, the first complaint must be rejected. 576 In their second complaint, the applicants argue that it was impossible to substantiate a request for adjustment without having access to data concerning the production costs of Indian producers or to a summary of that information. Accordingly, in their view, the Commission failed to have regard to the case-law arising from the judgment of 8 July 2008, Huvis v Council (T‑221/05, not published, EU:T:2008:258, paragraphs 77 and 78), which prohibits the imposition of an unreasonable burden of proof on a person claiming an adjustment. 577 In that regard, it should be noted that, under Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, a fair comparison is to be made between the export price and the normal value, with due allowance, as appropriate, in the form of adjustments, for differences in factors which are claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and, therefore, price comparability. 578 In accordance with the case-law, it is for the party making the request to establish that the adjustment sought is necessary to make the normal value and the export price comparable for the purpose of determining the dumping margin (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2012, Council and Commission v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP, C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 579 Accordingly, it was for the applicants, in accordance with that case-law, to establish, in the present case, the need for an adjustment. 580 It is true that it may be inferred from the case-law relied on by the applicants and referred to in paragraph 576 of the present judgment that a person seeking an adjustment under Article 2(10) of the basic regulation and who is required to establish that the adjustment requested is necessary must not have to bear an unreasonable burden of proof and that it is for the institutions to indicate to that person what information is necessary. 581 In the present case, however, on the basis of their knowledge of the sector, at least of the Chinese sector, the applicants could have substantiated their request by indicating the manufacturing patterns and production ratios which did not result in unreasonable unit production costs. 582 In its exchanges with the Commission, however, the CCCME merely observed that the Indian producers, in general, produced a limited volume of ductile cast iron, inferring from that situation that their unit production costs were necessarily unreasonable and that their prices could therefore not be representative. 583 In such a context, which is also characterised by the confidentiality of the information concerned, it was not inappropriate for the Commission to require the CCCME to demonstrate, initially, that the request demonstrated a certain degree of credibility and was not based solely on general assumptions. 584 In the light of those considerations, the second complaint and, consequently, the third part of the fourth plea in its entirety must be rejected. 585 It follows that the fourth plea must be rejected. The fifth plea in law: the adjustment for VAT 586 By their fifth plea, the applicants dispute the adjustment made by the Commission to the normal value for VAT purposes. 587 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that, in order to determine whether there was dumping, the Commission compared the export price and the normal value. As a rule, the normal value is calculated on the basis of the prices paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade in the exporting country, namely the People’s Republic of China. However, since that country was not considered to be a market economy country, the normal value was calculated, in the present case, on the basis of domestic sales prices in the Republic of India, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation. 588 It is apparent from recitals 79 to 81 of the contested regulation that, in the present case, the Commission made an adjustment for VAT in order to ensure comparability between the export price from the People’s Republic of China and the Indian normal value, relying on Article 2(10)(b) of the basic regulation. For the export price, in so far as the export VAT rate in the People’s Republic of China was 17%, of which 5% was reimbursed, the Commission used an export price including a VAT rate of 12%. For the normal value, in so far as the Indian prices excluded VAT, the Commission intended to apply the Chinese VAT of 17% to them by subtracting 5% from that percentage, having regard to Article 2(10)(b) of the basic regulation. 589 The fifth plea is divided into two complaints, which are disputed by the Commission. 590 By their first complaint, the applicants maintain that Article 2(10)(b) of the basic regulation does not allow the adjustment described to be made. According to the applicants, it is apparent from the wording of that provision that it permits an adjustment solely where the costs of the normal value are not collected or are refunded upon export. In the present case, however, there are no ‘indirect taxes borne by the … product’ sold in the Republic of India or any ‘indirect taxes borne by the … product’ sold in the People’s Republic of China. In fact, the Commission’s adjustment seeks to correct a situation where there are solely indirect taxes on export sales from the People’s Republic of China to the European Union which are not refunded. However, the wording of Article 2(10)(b) of the basic regulation does not allow an adjustment to be made in order to take account of that situation. 591 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, the comparison between the export price and the normal value must be fair. For that purpose, the comparison is to be made at the same level of trade and in respect of sales made at, as closely as possible, the same time and with due account taken of other differences which affect price comparability. 592 Where the normal value and the export price as established are not on such a comparable basis, due allowance, in the form of adjustments, is to be made in each case for differences in factors which are claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. 593 Where the adjustment is made, its purpose is to re-establish the symmetry between the normal value and the export price of a product. That symmetry thus constitutes a key element, reflecting the need to establish the comparability of prices within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the basic regulation (judgment of 16 December 2011, Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials v Council, T‑423/09, EU:T:2011:764, paragraphs 42 and 43). 594 Article 2(10) of the basic regulation lists the factors in respect of which adjustments may be made, including import charges and indirect taxes. Article 2(10)(b) of that regulation accordingly provides that ‘an adjustment shall be made to the normal value for an amount corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes borne by the like product and by materials physically incorporated therein, when intended for consumption in the exporting country and not collected or refunded in respect of the product exported to the Union’. 595 Article 2(10)(k) of the basic regulation states that an adjustment may also be made for differences in other factors not provided for under points (a) to (j) of Article 2(10), if it is demonstrated that they affect price comparability as required under that paragraph, in particular if customers consistently pay different prices on the domestic market because of the difference in such factors. 596 Furthermore, it must be stated that, according to the case-law, the broad discretion available to the institutions in the field of anti-dumping applies to the facts relied on to demonstrate the fairness of the comparison method used, the concept of fairness needing to be narrowed down by the institutions in each individual case in the light of the relevant economic context (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2011, Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials v Council, T‑423/09, EU:T:2011:764, paragraph 41). 597 In the present case, first, it should be noted that Article 2(10)(b) of the basic regulation does not expressly provide for the normal value of the analogue country to be adjusted to take account of export VAT in the country in which the dumped imports originate. Although the Commission erred in law in its application of that provision, that error, in the circumstances of the present case, did not have any decisive influence on the outcome of its assessment of the case submitted to it, in so far as Article 2(10)(k) of the basic regulation allows the Commission to make such an adjustment in order to re-establish the symmetry between the normal value and the export price of the product concerned and to ensure a fair comparison between those two values. 598 Second, it must be pointed out that the choice made, in the present case, by the Commission to compare the normal value and the ‘VAT-inclusive’ export price cannot be criticised, in the light of the broad discretion available to it as regards the method of comparison applied. 599 In the judgment of 16 December 2011, Dashiqiao Sanqiang Refractory Materials v Council (T‑423/09, EU:T:2011:764), the Court recognised the fairness of such a method of comparing the normal value and the export price of certain magnesia bricks originating in the People’s Republic of China. In those circumstances, the Court found that the Council had made no manifest error of assessment in taking the view that, in the instant case, the comparison between the normal value and the export price on a ‘VAT-inclusive’ basis constituted a fair comparison method because that comparison had been carried out in accordance with the requirement of symmetry between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade for sales, both domestic and for export, which were all subject to VAT at the rate of 17%. 600 In the present case, since the Commission is entitled to use an export price including VAT, and since the People’s Republic of China applies export VAT of 17%, of which 5% is refunded, the Commission is justified in adjusting the normal value by adding VAT to it at the ‘net’ rate of 12%, with a view to restoring symmetry between those two values. 601 For those reasons, the first complaint must be rejected. 602 By their second complaint, the applicants assert that the adjustment at issue cannot be performed where the Commission uses the analogue country method. The objective of that method is to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market economy countries to the extent that those parameters are not the normal result of market forces. Since the Commission regards the VAT refund system as a pervasive distortion in the Chinese economy, precluding China from being granted market economy status, it is exactly the kind of factor that the Commission ought not to be inclined to take into account. In other words, the applicants submit that the alleged distortion of the VAT system has already been remedied by applying the analogue country method. 603 In that regard, it should also be noted that, under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, for imports from countries which, like the People’s Republic of China, are non-market economy countries, the normal value is, as a rule, to be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, in the present case being the Republic of India. 604 According to the case-law, Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation seeks to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market economy countries in so far as these are not the normal result of market forces (see judgment of 28 February 2018, Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings, C‑301/16 P, EU:C:2018:132, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 605 However, that does not mean that the normal value thus determined cannot be adjusted at all. There is nothing in the basic regulation to indicate that Article 2(7)(a) of that regulation lays down a general derogation from the requirement to make adjustments on the basis of Article 2(10) of that regulation, for comparability purposes. 606 Accordingly, in a case, such as the present, in which the institutions determine normal value in accordance with the analogue country method, under Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, they must take into account, in the form of adjustments, differences in factors which are claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. 607 However, where adjustments to the normal value are envisaged, Article 2(10) of the basic regulation must be interpreted in the light and in the context of Article 2(7)(a) of that regulation. If the latter provision is not to be rendered redundant, the adjustments made must not reincorporate, in the institutions’ analysis, factors linked to the parameters which, in that country, in the present case the People’s Republic of China, are not the normal result of market forces (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Joined Cases Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Ningbo Jinding Fastener v Council, C‑376/15 P and C‑377/15 P, EU:C:2016:928, point 102). 608 In the present case, the application to the normal value of the VAT rate applicable in the People’s Republic of China does not amount to introducing or reintroducing an element of distortion of the Chinese system into the calculation of the normal value determined on the basis of the analogue country method. 609 Although the Commission was entitled to regard, in the documents produced by the applicants, the Chinese VAT system as creating distortions, that was only, as it states, because of the manner in which the People’s Republic of China applied export VAT, providing for a refund of that VAT for certain products and not for others. 610 For all of those reasons, the second complaint and, consequently, the fifth plea must be rejected. The sixth plea: SG&A costs and profits 611 In the sixth plea, the applicants maintain that, in order to establish the normal value of the product types which were not sold by the three sampled Indian producers but manufactured by at least one of them, the Commission could not use the SG&A costs and the profits related to domestic sales carried out in the ordinary course of trade by that producer. 612 According to the applicants, the Commission cannot justify its position by relying on Article 2(6) of the basic regulation, as it did in recital 71 of the contested regulation. That provision, it is submitted, applies only to companies granted market economy treatment pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic regulation. 613 The Commission contends that this plea should be rejected. It states that, in so far as the applicants seek to raise a new plea alleging infringement of Article 2(6) of the basic regulation, that plea must be deemed inadmissible because it was raised only at the stage of the reply. 614 In that regard, first of all, it must be stated that the Commission has not correctly presented the arguments raised by the applicants. The applicants maintain that the Commission infringed Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, a provision which states how to calculate normal value where the analogue country method is applied. According to the applicants, Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation thus precludes the Commission from relying on Article 2(6) of that regulation, which lays down the procedure for calculating SG&A costs and profits, because that provision applies only in the case of imports originating in a market economy country or to companies from a non-market economy country in respect of which it has been decided that they qualify for market economy treatment pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic regulation. That line of argument was raised at the stage of the application and is therefore admissible. 615 Next, it should be recalled that, as the Commission stated in recital 67 of the contested regulation, when a product type was not sold by the three sampled Indian producers, but at least one of them manufactured it, the Commission used a constructed value when calculating the normal value. That value was constructed on the basis of the Indian producer’s costs of manufacturing, plus SG&A costs and profits relating to domestic sales carried out in the ordinary course of trade by that producer. 616 Under Article 2(6) of the basic regulation, ‘the amounts for [SG&A] costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product by the exporter or producer under investigation’. That provision subsequently lists other methods for situations where those amounts cannot be determined on that basis. 617 The applicants do not dispute that the Commission could have used the SG&A costs and the profits of the only Indian producer which manufactured the product types at issue in accordance with Article 2(6) of the basic regulation, had it been applicable. They maintain that, in a case such as the present, where the normal value is, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, determined by the analogue country method, paragraphs 1 to 6 of that article do not apply. 618 In that regard, it must be stated that, as the applicants have submitted in support of their arguments, it is apparent from the case-law that under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation, in the case of imports from non-market economy countries, in derogation from the rules set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Article 2, normal value must, as a rule, be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country (judgment of 19 July 2012, Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group, C‑337/09 P, EU:C:2012:471, paragraph 66). 619 Accordingly, it is apparent from the wording and from the structure of Article 2(7) of the basic regulation that the determination of the normal value of products originating in the People’s Republic of China by reference to the rules laid down in Article 2(1) to (6) is confined to specific individual cases, which do not occur in the present case, in which the producers concerned have each made a properly substantiated claim in their own regard in accordance with the criteria and procedures laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of that regulation (judgment of 23 October 2003, Changzhou Hailong Electronics & Light Fixtures and Zhejiang Yankon v Council, T‑255/01, EU:T:2003:282, paragraph 40). 620 The objective is to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market economy countries which are not the normal result of market forces (judgment of 19 July 2012, Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group, C‑337/09 P, EU:C:2012:471, paragraph 66). 621 It follows that the Commission cannot depart from the requirements of Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation to calculate the normal value, that is to say that it must, in accordance with that provision, determine the normal value ‘on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries, including the Union, or, where those are not possible, on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the Union for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a reasonable profit margin’. 622 That having been clarified, it must be stated that, setting to one side the source of the prices or costs which must be used, which source corresponds to the market economy third country chosen by the Commission, namely, in the present case, the Republic of India, and the order in which the listed methods are to be applied, which the Commission must respect as recalled in the case-law (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 March 2012, GLS, C‑338/10, EU:C:2012:158, paragraphs 24 to 26), Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation gives no description of the methods for calculating the price or the constructed value in the analogue country, in particular as regards SG&A costs and profits. 623 In that context, it cannot be ruled out that the Commission may apply certain methodological factors contained in Article 2(1) to (6) of the basic regulation, provided that they are not manifestly inappropriate and that they do not have the effect of reintroducing parameters of the original country which are not the normal result of market forces. 624 In the present case, the SG&A costs and profits used in calculating the constructed normal value for a product type of ductile cast iron and two product types of grey cast iron are those of the only Indian producer which manufactured the products in question and whose cost of manufacturing was therefore used. 625 In the light of the Commission’s broad discretion in anti-dumping matters, it cannot be found that it was manifestly inappropriate for the Commission to add SG&A costs and profits relating to its sales to that producer’s cost of manufacturing. Furthermore, taking into account only SG&A costs and profits of that Indian producer did not have the effect of reintroducing parameters of the People’s Republic of China which were not the normal result of market forces. 626 Consequently, the sixth plea must be rejected. The application for a measure of organisation of procedure 627 At the end of their first plea, the applicants request the Court to order, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, the Commission to produce information which had already been requested from that institution during the investigation, namely the calculations and source data concerning the volume of dumped imports, the injury and the dumping margin of the Chinese and Indian exporting producers. 628 In that regard, it must be stated that, according to the case-law, it is for the Court to appraise the usefulness of measures of organisation of procedure (see judgment of 9 March 2015, Deutsche Börse v Commission, T‑175/12, not published, EU:T:2015:148, paragraph 417 and the case-law cited). 629 In the present case, the information in the file is sufficient to enable the Court to give judgment, since it has been able to give a proper ruling on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and arguments put forward during the proceedings and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties. 630 It follows that the application for a measure of organisation must be rejected, and the action dismissed in its entirety, there being no need to give a ruling on the admissibility or effectiveness of all the complaints contested by the Commission which have been rejected on the merits. Costs 631 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the Commission and by the interveners, in accordance with the forms of order sought by them. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to pay the costs. Gervasoni Madise Nihoul Frendo Martín y Pérez de Nanclares Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 19 May 2021. E. Coulon S. Papasavvas Registrar President Table of contents Background to the dispute Procedure and forms of order sought Law Admissibility The lack of clarity and precision in the application Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the CCCME in its own name – Standing to bring proceedings – Interest in bringing proceedings Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the CCCME on behalf of its members and admissibility of the arguments raised in support of that action – Lack of representativeness – Nature of the contested regulation – Members not included in the sample – Limits on the arguments which may relied upon Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by the other legal persons whose names appear in Annex I Conclusion on admissibility Substance Scope of judicial review The first plea in law: injury determination and causation – The first part of the first plea in law: the calculation of import volumes – The second part of the first plea in law: the macroeconomic indicators used by the Commission to determine the injury suffered by the EU industry – The third part of the first plea in law: the profitability of the EU producers – The fourth part of the first plea in law: the sample of EU producers – The fifth part of the first plea in law: the inclusion of intra-group prices in the calculation of the EU industry’s costs – The sixth part of the first plea in law: mainly concerning the difference in the practices attributed to the exporting producers depending on whether they were Indian or Chinese The second plea in law: causal link – The first part of the second plea in law: the increase in dumped imports and the deterioration in the situation of the EU industry did not occur simultaneously – The second part of the second plea in law: need for an assessment of injury by segment – The third part of the second plea in law: import prices and the significance of undercutting The third plea in law: refusal to disclose certain information – Admissibility of the third plea in law – The relationship between the rights of the defence and the obligation of confidentiality – The first part of the third plea in law: request for disclosure of the Commission’s calculations – The second part of the third plea in law: the request for the calculations to be communicated in aggregated form – The third part of the third plea in law: other information requested by the CCCME The fourth plea in law: the comparability of the prices used to calculate the dumping margin and to analyse injury – The first part of the fourth plea in law: the PCN-by-PCN method – The second part of the fourth plea in law: lack of information on the characteristics of the products under comparison – The third part of the fourth plea in law: adjustment to the production costs of ductile cast iron The fifth plea in law: the adjustment for VAT The sixth plea: SG&A costs and profits The application for a measure of organisation of procedure Costs * Language of the case: English. 1 The list of the other applicants is annexed only to the version sent to the parties. 2 The list of the other interveners is annexed only to the version sent to the parties.