Opinion of the Advocate General — ECLI:EU:C:2025:362
Date: 2025-05-15
Language of the case: German

Summary C-209/23 – 1 
Case C-209/23 
Summary of the request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 98(1) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 
Date lodged: 
31 March 2023 
Referring court: 
Landgericht Mainz (Germany) 
Date of the decision to refer: 
30 March 2023 
Applicants: 
FT 
RRC Sports GmbH 
Defendant: 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
  
Subject matter of the main proceedings 
Claims for an injunction on account of infringement by the framework conditions 
adopted by FIFA within which players’ agents may offer, provide and receive 
remuneration for players’ agent services in relation to players and clubs, of the 
prohibition on cartels laid down Article 101 TFEU, the prohibition on abuse of a 
dominant position laid down in Article 102 TFEU, the freedom to provide 
services guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU, and (in part) the GDPR. 
Subject matter and legal basis of the request 
Subject matter: compatibility of FIFA’s rules on players’ agents with Article 101 
TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, Article 56 TFEU and Article 6 of the GDPR. 
Legal basis: Article 267 TFEU 
EN 
SUMMARY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING – CASE C-209/23 
 
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Question referred for a preliminary ruling 
Must Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(prohibition on cartels), Article 102 TFEU (prohibition on abuse of a dominant 
position) and Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services) and also Article 6 of 
the General Data Protection Regulation (‘the GDPR’) be interpreted as precluding 
rules adopted by a world sporting association (in this case: FIFA), to which 211 
national sports federations of the relevant sport (in this case: football) belong, and 
whose rules are therefore binding in any event on the majority of the actors active 
in the respective national professional leagues of the relevant sport (in this case: 
clubs (which also means football clubs organised as capital companies), players 
(who are club members) and players’ agents), and which have the following 
content: 
(1) it is prohibited to agree on players’ agents’ remuneration, or pay them 
remuneration, in excess of a cap calculated as a percentage of the transfer fee or 
the annual remuneration of that player, 
as provided for in Article 15(2) of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (‘the 
FFAR’), 
(2) it is prohibited for third parties to pay remuneration due under a 
representation agreement in respect of the players’ agent’s contracting partner, 
as provided for in Article 14(2) and (3) of the FFAR, 
(3) clubs are prohibited from paying more than 50% of the total remuneration 
due from the player and the club for the services of the players’ agent in cases 
where a players’ agent acts on behalf of the engaging club and the player, 
as provided for in Article 14(10) of the FFAR, 
(4) for the grant of a licence as a players’ agent, which is a condition for being 
allowed to provide players’ agent services, it is required that the applicant submit 
to the internal regulations of the world sporting association (in this case: the 
FFAR, the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Disciplinary Code, the FIFA Code of Ethics, 
the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players as well as the statutes, 
regulations, guidelines and decisions of authorities and bodies) and also to its 
jurisdiction as an association and that of confederations and member associations, 
as provided for in Article 4(2), Article 16(2)(b) and Article 20 of the FFAR, in 
conjunction with Article 8(3), Article 57(1) and Article 58(1) and (2) of the FIFA 
Statutes, Article 5(a), Article 49 and Article 53(3) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, 
and Article 4(2) and Article 82(1) of the Code of Ethics, 
(5) requirements are laid down for the grant of a licence as a players’ agent, 
under which the grant of a licence is permanently excluded in the case of 
convictions or settlements in criminal proceedings or a suspension of two years or 
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more, licence suspension or withdrawal, or other disqualification by an authority 
or a sports governing body, without the possibility of the licence being granted at 
a later date, 
as provided for in Article 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the FFAR, 
(6) players’ agents are prohibited, in connection with the conclusion of a 
transfer agreement and/or a contract of employment, from providing players’ 
agent services or any other services to, and being remunerated for them, by: 
(a) the releasing club and the engaging club, 
(b) the releasing club and the player, 
(c) any parties involved (releasing club, engaging club and player), 
as provided for respectively in Article 12(8) and (9) of the FFAR, and 
(6a) players’ agents are prohibited, in connection with the conclusion of a transfer 
agreement and/or a contract of employment together with a connected players’ 
agent, from providing players’ agent services or any other services to, and being 
remunerated for them, by: 
(a) the releasing club and the engaging club, 
(b) the releasing club and the player, 
(c) any parties involved (releasing club, engaging club and player), 
if the concept of connected players’ agent includes cooperation in accordance with 
the definition of ‘connected football agent’ laid down in the FFAR (fourth 
subparagraph on p. 6 of the FFAR), 
as provided for in Article 12(10) of the FFAR, in conjunction with the definition 
of ‘connected football agent’ in the fourth subparagraph on p. 6 of the FFAR, 
(7) players’ agents are prohibited from approaching or entering into a 
representation agreement with a club, player, or member association of the world 
sporting association or a legal person operating a single-entity league which is 
permitted to engage players’ agents and which have entered into an exclusive 
agreement with another players’ agent, 
as provided for in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of the FFAR, 
(8) the names and details of all players’ agents, the names of the clients whom 
they represent, the players’ agent services which they provide to each individual 
client and/or the details of all transactions involving players’ agents, including the 
amount of remuneration payable to players’ agents, must be uploaded to a 
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platform of the world sporting association and this information is made available 
in part to other clubs, players or players’ agents, 
as provided for in Article 19 of the FFAR, 
(9) it is prohibited to agree remuneration for players’ agent services on any 
other basis than the player’s remuneration or the transfer fee, 
as provided for in Article 15(1) of the FFAR, 
(10) it is presumed that other services provided by a players’ agent or a 
connected players’ agent in the 24 months prior to or following the provision of a 
players’ agent service to a client involved in the transaction for which player 
agency services were performed form part of the player agent’s services and, in so 
far that the presumption cannot be rebutted, remuneration for the other services is 
deemed to form part of the remuneration paid for the players’ agent service, 
as provided for in Article 15(3) and (4) of the FFAR, 
(11) the amount of the players’ agent’s remuneration to be calculated on a pro-
rata basis is to be based solely on the salary actually received by the player, 
as provided for in Article 14(7) and (12) of the FFAR, 
(12) players’ agents are required to disclose the following information to the 
world sporting association: 
(a) within 14 days of conclusion: any agreement with a client other than a 
representation agreement, including but not limited to other services, and the 
information requested on the platform, 
(b) within 14 days of payment of remuneration: the information requested on 
the platform, 
(c) within 14 days of payment of any remuneration related to any agreement 
with a client other than a representation agreement: the information requested on 
the platform, 
(d) within 14 days of occurrence: any contractual or other arrangement between 
players’ agents to cooperate in the provision of any services or to share the 
revenue or profits of any part of their players’ agent services, 
(e) if they conduct their business affairs through an agency, within 14 days of 
the first transaction involving the agency: the number of players’ agents who use 
the same agency to conduct their business affairs and the name of all its 
employees, 
as provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR, 
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(13) clubs are prohibited from agreeing on remuneration or elements of 
remuneration with players’ agents for the future transfer of a player or from 
paying remuneration or elements of remuneration to players’ agents, the 
calculation basis for which is (also) dependent on future transfer compensation 
received by the club from a subsequent transfer of the player, 
as provided for in Article 18ter(1), first alternative, of the FIFA Regulations on 
the Status and Transfer of Players (‘the FIFA RSTP’) and Article 16(3)(e) of the 
FFAR. 
Provisions of European Union law relied on 
Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, Article 56 TFEU and Article 6 of the 
GDPR 
Provisions of national law relied on 
Paragraphs 1, 19 and 33 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Law 
against restrictions of competition) (‘the GWB’) 
Paragraphs 823 and 1004 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) (‘the 
BGB’) 
FIFA regulations relied on 
FIFA Football Agents Regulations (‘the FFAR’)  
Definitions, Articles 4, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (‘the FIFA RSTP’) 
Article 18ter 
FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries 
Article 7 
FIFA Statutes 2021 
Articles 8, 14, 57 and 58 
FIFA Code of Conduct 2019  
Articles 5, 49 and 53 
FIFA Code of Ethics 2020  
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Articles 4 and 82 
Presentation of the facts and procedure in the main proceedings 
The first applicant is a players’ agent and, in addition, vice-president of the 
players’ agents’ association, the Football Forum. The second applicant is a limited 
liability company (GmbH) with its registered office in Frankenthal (Germany), 
which also acts as players’ agent and is pre-registered with the Deutscher Fußball-
Bund (‘the DFB’), the national German football association to which the 
defendant belongs. The first applicant is managing director of the second applicant 
and – according to his submission at least – also registered as a players’ agent in 
France and England. 
The defendant is a non-profit association with legal personality incorporated under 
Swiss law with its registered office in Zurich (Switzerland). It is the supreme 
global governing body of football and has 211 affiliated national member 
associations around the world, including the DFB. Under Article 11(4) of the 
defendant’s statutes (‘the FIFA Statutes’), the defendant’s member associations 
must undertake in their statutes to comply with the defendant’s regulations and 
recognise its decisions (see also Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes). 
The defendant has various bodies and committees. Its Council is the strategic and 
oversight body and issues general regulations in accordance with Article 34(11) of 
the FIFA Statutes. 
The defendant’s Council adopted the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (‘the 
FFAR’) at its meeting on 16 December 2022 and published them on 6 January 
2023. 
They are new regulations laying down the framework conditions within which 
players’ agents may offer, provide and receive remuneration for players’ agent 
services to players and clubs. 
Articles 1 to 10 of the FFAR, and also Articles 22 to 27 thereof, entered into force 
on 9 January 2023 (see Article 28(1)(a) of the FFAR). The remaining provisions 
will enter into force on 1 October 2023, pursuant to Article 28(1)(b) of the FFAR. 
Under the rules already in force prior to the adoption of the FFAR, clubs are 
prohibited from making the fee of the players’ agent dependent on future transfer 
compensation (Article 18ter(1) of the FIFA RSTP and Article 7(4) of the FIFA 
Regulations on Working with Intermediaries). 
In the present dispute before this court, the applicants make claims for injunctions 
on account of those rules and also some of the rules contained in the FFAR – in so 
far as they are referred to in the question referred for a preliminary ruling. In their 
view, the contested rules infringe the prohibition on cartels laid down in 
Article 101 TFEU, the prohibition on abuse of a dominant market position laid 
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down in Article 102 TFEU, the freedom to provide services guaranteed by 
Article 56 TFEU, and (in part) the GDPR. They therefore request that the 
defendant be prohibited from applying those rules. 
The defendant, on the other hand, contends that its rules are lawful. 
I. 
The resolution of the present dispute turns on whether Articles 101, 102 and 56 
TFEU and Article 6 of the GDPR preclude the rules at issue mentioned in the 
question referred for a preliminary ruling. 
Under national German law, in the event of such an infringement, the applicants 
would have a claim to an injunction under Paragraph 33(1) and (2) of the GWB, in 
conjunction with Paragraphs 1 and 19 thereof, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the 
second sentence of Paragraph 1004(1) of the BGB, by analogy in connection with 
Paragraph 823(2) of the BGB, Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and also Article 6 
of the GDPR, and therefore the action would be well founded and would thus 
have to be granted. Otherwise, the action would be unfounded and would 
therefore have to be dismissed. 
II. 
1. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
(a) In the view of the Chamber, the rules at issue should fall within the scope of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The defendant argues that the ostensibly economic activity of players’ agents is 
directly connected to sporting competition and for that reason does not fall within 
the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It concerns inter alia the composition of 
the teams, their continuity and their sporting strength, but also the loyalty of fans 
and viewers to clubs and their players. The activities of players’ agents thus affect 
fair sporting competition and the performance and health of sportsmen. The 
defendant, as an international umbrella organisation, is responsible for the 
regulation of that activity and can also rely inter alia on Article 165 TFEU, which 
emphasises the special social character of the field of sport. In that context, it has 
a margin of discretion. In that respect, it should be noted that there is no other 
regulatory authority at global level and that it must find global and international 
solutions which have to fit into the respective national legal frameworks. 
However, having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘the Court of Justice’) in Piau (judgment of 26 January 2005 – T-193/02), 
the Chamber considers that it should rather be assumed that the occupation of 
players’ agent constitutes an economic activity involving the provision of 
services, which does not fall within the scope of the specific nature of sport. 
Similarly, against the background of the abovementioned case-law, it must be 
assumed that the defendant is an association of undertakings within the meaning 
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of those provisions and that the rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision by 
an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. In the 
abovementioned judgment, the Court of Justice also concluded that the defendant 
held on the market for players’ agents services a dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Since player transfers are often carried out on a 
cross-border basis and the occupation of a players’ agent – like that of the 
applicants in this case – is not limited to transfers within the national professional 
league of a Member State, the rules at issue also affect trade between Member 
States. 
(b) 
The rules at issue may also constitute in principle a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU since they limit the freedom of economic 
development of the actors involved (players’ agents, players and clubs) with 
regard to a parameter of competition (in this case, inter alia, price and market 
access conditions). 
However, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice in the Meca-Medina 
and Majcen (judgment of 18 July 2006 – C-519/04 P, EuZW 2006, 593), not 
every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of 
action of the actors concerned is necessarily caught by the prohibition laid down 
in Article 101 TFEU. Rather, account must first of all be taken of the overall 
context in which the decision in question was taken or produces its effects and, 
more specifically, of its objectives. In this context, it must be considered whether 
the restrictions on the economic freedom of action of the actors involved 
associated with the rules at issue serve a legitimate objective, are necessary for the 
achievement of that objective, and are proportionate to that objective (the ‘three-
stage test’). 
Nonetheless, the Court of Justice has not clearly stated in this context whether the 
standard of that three-stage test is limited from the outset solely to rules of a 
purely sporting nature which directly affect sporting competition itself (such as, 
for example, the doping rules at issue in Meca-Medina and Majcen) or whether it 
is also applicable to other rules adopted by a sporting association. The defendant 
also argues that a distinction between rules of a purely sporting nature and other 
rules is not possible at all since rules with an economic connection – such as the 
rules at issue here on the activity and remuneration of players’ agents – also have 
an effect on sporting competition because they at least indirectly affect the 
composition of the respective squads of the clubs. 
If the three-stage test were to be limited from the outset to rules of a purely 
sporting nature, it would be not applicable in the present case. In that case, an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU would have to be found. The Chamber takes 
the view, in particular – subject to a different assessment by the Court of Justice – 
that it is not evident that the strict requirements laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU 
are fulfilled in the present case. 
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Otherwise, it will be necessary to examine whether the rules at issue satisfy the 
requirements of the three-stage test. 
In Meca-Medina and Majcen, the Court of Justice also did not take a position on 
whether the three-stage test should also be applied to the requirement relating to 
abuse of a dominant market position under Article 102 TFEU. The European 
Commission and the Bundeskartellamt consider that it should. As far as can be 
seen, the majority of German-language case-law and academic legal writings on 
the law on cartels support this view. However, a binding decision by the Court of 
Justice on this matter has yet to be taken. 
(c) 
In so far as the question of an infringement of the law on cartels by the rules at 
issue in the present case depends on an assessment of proportionality in 
accordance with the three-stage test, it is unclear whether the objectives cited by 
the defendant, which the rules at issue are intended to achieve, should be regarded 
as legitimate objectives in that sense. 
In this context, the defendant refers in general to the following objectives: 
• safeguarding the integrity of football, sporting competition and the transfer 
market, which is jeopardised by problems and undesirable developments in the 
transfer and players’ agent market (in particular, players’ agent fees which are not 
linked to the quality of the service provided, their blatant disproportion to training 
compensation and solidarity contributions, lack of transparency, undermining of 
contractual stability, abusive, excessive and unethical behaviour, and conflicts of 
interest), 
• protecting contractual stability 
• promoting solidarity between top-level and grassroots football 
• preserving sporting balance 
• establishing and improving minimum professional and ethical standards for 
the occupation of players’ agent 
• ensuring the quality of the services which players’ agents provide to their 
clients 
• limiting conflicts of interest to protect clients from unethical behaviour 
• improving financial and administrative transparency 
• protecting players who often lack experience or information on the football 
transfer system 
• eliminating unfair, disproportionate and speculative practices, and 
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• preserving the orderly nature of sporting competitions, in particular by 
preventing teams from changing their competitive strength during a competition. 
Only some of those objectives directly concern the functioning of sporting 
competition as such. Therefore, the question arises first of all whether such 
objectives can be taken into account at all in the three-stage test as legitimate 
objectives in relation to the rules of a sporting association or whether the 
implementation of those objectives must be reserved to the State legislature. In 
Meca-Medina and Majcen, the Court of Justice did not clearly state whether only 
objectives which directly concern the functioning of sporting competition can be 
considered as legitimate objectives in the three-stage test, or whether other 
objectives deemed legitimate can also be taken into account. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the rules at issue are necessary to achieve the 
specific objectives cited by the defendant, as required by the three-stage test. In 
this context, the question – which has not yet been answered by the Court of 
Justice – also arises as to the extent to which the defendant has a margin of 
discretion in that regard. 
(1) Percentage limitation of players’ agents’ remuneration (‘service fee’ 
cap) (point 1 of the question referred) 
The defendant claims in this respect that the current remuneration practice 
contributes significantly to numerous problems and undesirable developments on 
the transfer market, inter alia a threat to contractual stability, conflicts of interest, 
a general lack of transparency precisely in connection with players’ agents’ fees, 
unfair and excessive behaviour, and a threat to solidarity in football through 
speculation and sheer pursuit of profit. 
The only aspect mentioned by the defendant in this context which could directly 
affect the functioning of sporting competition is contractual stability. This is 
because the stability of the composition of a team can have a direct impact on its 
sporting performance. 
The defendant argues in this regard that higher remuneration for the players’ agent 
creates a greater incentive to work towards a transfer (which may not even make 
sense from a sporting point of view). Limiting the remuneration reduces that 
incentive and therefore protects contractual stability. The applicants argue, 
conversely, that a limitation of the remuneration means that a players’ agent has to 
arrange a larger number of transfers in order to earn a certain amount of 
remuneration and therefore the rules laid down by the defendant have precisely a 
counterproductive effect on contractual stability. The question therefore arises as 
to the extent to which the rules should be regarded as suitable at all for achieving 
the objective of contractual stability, and if so, whether they are necessary and 
proportionate in that regard. 
As regards the other objectives, there is no direct connection to the functioning of 
sporting competition and therefore – as stated above – it is questionable whether 
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they can be taken into account at all as legitimate objectives in the three-stage test. 
If they can, it would be necessary further to examine whether the rules are 
necessary to achieve the respective objective and whether they are proportionate 
to that objective. 
With regard to the objective of curbing conflicts of interest, the defendant argues 
that without the rules at issue there is a risk that a players’ agent would try to 
achieve the highest possible remuneration for himself or herself rather than the 
highest possible salary for the player represented. The limitation of the 
remuneration to a certain percentage of the player’s negotiated salary appears to 
be quite suitable to achieve the desired aim in the event the agent is mandated by 
the player. However, the rules also provide for a limitation of the remuneration to 
a certain percentage of the player’s salary in the event the agent is mandated by 
the engaging club even though the club would precisely have an interest in 
keeping the player’s salary as low as possible. Therefore, in the view of the 
Chamber, there are doubts as to whether the rules in their current form are in fact 
suitable for excluding conflicts of interest. In any event, the necessity and 
proportionality remain to be examined independently. 
In the view of the Chamber, the extent to which a limitation of a players’ agent’s 
remuneration to a certain percentage of the player’s salary or of the transfer fee 
leads to greater transparency is unclear. In this respect, the defendant argues that 
such a general limitation is known to the clients and therefore promotes 
transparency. However, even without a general limitation, the remuneration 
agreed with the players’ agent would be known to the respective clients (who are, 
after all, the contractual partners of the players’ agent with whom the 
remuneration agreement has been concluded) and therefore Chamber finds the 
defendant’s arguments unclear. 
Similarly, it is not apparent how the rules on remuneration at issue in this case are 
intended to prevent or curb the abusive and excessive behaviour of players’ agents 
cited by the defendant (cases of corruption and tax evasion as well as cases in 
which the inexperience of players was exploited are cited as examples thereof). 
In this context, the defendant also refers to a ‘hidden information’ problem 
(players’ agents generally have superior knowledge of relevant information for a 
transfer, for example concerning general market conditions, the player’s salary 
expectations and market value as well as the financial leeway of the engaging 
club, which they could use to the detriment of the players), a ‘hold-up’ problem 
(as transfers are only possible during set time windows, players’ agents try to use 
the time pressure involved to agree higher remuneration for themselves), and a 
‘gate-keeper’ problem (agents of particularly sought-after players exploit their 
strong position as, so to speak, unavoidable intermediaries on the market, to 
demand excessive remuneration). In the view of the Chamber, the intended 
limitation of the remuneration to a certain percentage of the player’s salary or of 
the transfer fee at best indirectly addresses the abovementioned problems and 
therefore it is questionable whether it can be considered to be suitable for curbing 
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those problems. In any event, the necessity and proportionality thereof would 
appear to be in doubt. 
The aspect of endangering solidarity in football through ‘speculation and the sheer 
pursuit of profit’ appears, in the view of the Chamber, too unspecific in those 
general terms to constitute a legitimate objective in the three-stage test. In this 
context, the defendant also states at another juncture that the remuneration of 
players’ agents has been decoupled from training compensation and solidarity 
contributions. In this regard too, however, it is not clear to the Chamber how the 
intended limitation of the remuneration of the players’ agent to a certain 
percentage of the player’s salary is suitable for addressing this problem. Rather, a 
direct coupling of the remuneration to the training compensation and solidarity 
contributions (and not to the respective player’s current salary) should be 
necessary. 
(2) ‘Client pays’ rule (point 2 of the question referred) 
In the view of the defendant, the ‘client pays’ rule is primarily intended to avoid 
conflicts of interest. The background to this is a practice, which clearly exists at 
present, whereby the player agent’s fee is paid in full by the engaging club despite 
the fact that the players’ agent has been mandated – also – by the player. 
Furthermore, the defendant also refers in this context to the ‘hidden information’ 
problem described above and states that clients are taking an increased interest in 
the remuneration of the players’ agents working for them and also want to shape it 
if they in fact have to pay the remuneration themselves in the end. 
Here, again, the question first arises as to whether those aspects can constitute a 
legitimate objective in the three-stage test at all since there is no direct connection 
to the functioning of sporting competition. 
The extent to which specifically identifiable conflicts of interest have arisen in this 
context in the past cannot be determined on the basis of the parties’ submissions. 
In particular, no surveys or other investigations carried out are mentioned in this 
regard. In the view of the Chamber, it seems in principle entirely possible that a 
situation where the player’s agent is not remunerated by the player as his client, 
but by the engaging club, could lead to conflicts of interest for the player’s agent 
(to the detriment of the player as client) since the interests of the player and the 
engaging club are naturally not the same. However, from the player’s point of 
view, this possible conflict of interest is offset by the considerable advantage that 
the player does not have to pay the agent’s fee, which he owes per se. In the 
player’s perception, this advantage is more likely to outweigh the risk of a 
possible conflict of interest on the part of the players’ agent. The applicants 
therefore also submit that the defendant is not at all concerned with avoiding 
conflicts of interest to the detriment of the players, but rather with relieving the 
financial burden on the clubs. 
(3) ‘50% payment’ rule (point 3 of the question referred) 
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The defendant argues that the idea behind this rule is essentially the same as that 
underlying the ‘client pays’ rule, namely that, in order to avoid conflicts of 
interest, the person who mandated the players’ agent should be the person who 
pays the agent. 
Therefore, reference can be made initially to the above comments at point (2). 
However, here the further question arises as to why the 50% limit applies only to 
the part of the remuneration to be paid by the engaging club and not, rather, also 
to the part of the remuneration to be paid by the player. 
(4) Rule on submission (point 4 of the question referred) 
The defendant argues that submission to the FFAR and also the other rules set out 
in Article 4(2) of the FFAR is directly related to, and in line with, the objectives of 
the FFAR and the football transfer system, namely to ensure the integrity of 
football, sporting competition and the transfer system. It contributes inter alia to 
the establishment and improvement of minimum professional and ethical 
standards and thus ensures and enhances the quality of the provision of players’ 
agent’s services at global level. It is a requirement for the comprehensive 
implementation and enforcement of the FFAR, the monitoring thereof and the 
sanctioning of infringements of the FFAR. 
It argues that the submission of players’ agents to the jurisdiction of the 
defendant’s association and the arbitration of the CAS is a necessary, at any rate 
appropriate and reasonable consequence of the (re)introduction of the licensing 
requirement for players’ agents in terms of compliance with the FFAR and the 
prosecution and sanctioning of infringements of the FFAR. Furthermore, the 
defendant points out that under Article 20(1) of the FFAR, players’ agents and 
their clients can agree individually on a different conflict resolution mechanism 
and thus also on the jurisdiction of the State courts. 
It is obvious that the FFAR rules at issue in this case – in so far as they prove to be 
lawful – must also be enforced against the players’ agents. Therefore, in the three-
stage test the decisive factor should be whether submission to the defendant’s 
rules and jurisdiction is to be regarded as necessary and proportionate in that 
regard. 
This is supported by the fact that the rules are to apply worldwide and the rule on 
submission ensures a uniform legal framework worldwide and provides for a 
central decision-making authority. However, to satisfy the requirements of the 
three-stage test, there is a requirement that submission to all the above rules be 
necessary for the effective implementation of the FFAR and that the jurisdiction 
of the defendant as an association and of its confederations comply with the 
minimum procedural standards to be guaranteed from an EU law perspective. 
(5) Requirements for licensing as a players’ agent (point 5 of the question 
referred) 
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According to the defendant’s submissions, the rule is intended to contribute to 
professionalisation and an increase in the quality of players’ agents’ activities. In 
view of the great influence of players’ agents on the transfer market and the 
resultant considerable effects on their clients, in particular in economic and 
financial terms, it is necessary, in order to protect the clients (in particular young, 
inexperienced players), to exclude, to the extent provided for in the rules, 
candidates fulfilling the criteria laid down therein from acting as players’ agents. 
As stated above, with regard to the possible effects of a players’ agent’s activity 
on the stability and the composition of the team squads, there is a link with the 
functioning of sporting competition. The fact that the defendant makes the 
occupation of players’ agent dependent on certain qualifications or the fulfilment 
of certain requirements should not therefore, in the view of the Chamber, be called 
into question in principle. The extent to which the individual requirements 
formulated by the defendant prove, in this context, to be actually necessary in 
each case is, however, uncertain. 
(6) Prohibition on multiple remuneration (points 6 and 6a of the question 
referred) 
Here, the defendant again cites the aspect of avoiding conflicts of interest. In this 
respect, reference can be made to the remarks at point (2). 
Furthermore, it should also be examined here whether the concept of a connected 
players’ agent is limited to the necessary extent. 
(7) Rule on making approaches (point 7 of the question referred) 
The essential reason stated by the defendant for this rule is the principle of 
contractual stability. 
In this context, the question arises inter alia as to whether an ‘additional’ 
safeguard through the FFAR is necessary for this or whether the contractual 
sanctions available in the case of infringement of an exclusive representation 
agreement already entered into with another players’ agent are considered to be 
sufficient. 
(8) Rule on transparency (point 8 of the question referred) 
According to the defendant, this rule is targeted at the currently insufficient 
transparency and accountability relating to the services of players’ agents. 
Information is only published in a graduated manner in accordance with legitimate 
processing purposes on three different channels, which are open to different 
groups of recipients, and precisely not made accessible to the public 
internationally, as the applicants believe. With regard to the fees of individual 
players’ agents, only aggregated figures are provided. Data protection is taken 
seriously and the implementation of the FFAR is monitored by the defendant’s 
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data protection department. Disclosure via the respective channels is regulated by 
‘finely balancing the interests of the relevant data subjects with the relevant 
interests of the defendant’. Only the Football Agent Directory is to be published 
on the FIFA website, whilst all other information is only to be made available on 
the platform or the FIFA Legal Hub, which is only be accessible to a narrow 
group of recipients. 
Here, too, the question arises first of all as to the extent to which increased 
transparency can be used as a legitimate goal at all in the absence of a direct 
connection with the functioning of sporting competition. 
Irrespective of this, increased transparency should not be an end in itself, but can 
only be taken into consideration as a justification for a restrictive measure if it is 
necessary to achieve or ensure another legitimate objective. It therefore depends 
on whether the respective processing purposes stated by the defendant in this 
context constitute a legitimate objective in the three-stage test and whether 
making individual pieces of information available to the relevant group of 
addressees is necessary and proportionate to achieve that objective. 
In the view of the Chamber, it appears particularly problematic in this regard that 
the wording of the provision at issue in Article 19 of FFAR only provides for the 
disclosure of the information referred to therein by the defendant and that the 
wording of the provision does not support any graduation according to recipient 
groups or processing purposes or a weighing of the interests of the data subjects, 
as stated by the defendant. Accordingly, on an objective interpretation even 
unrestricted disclosure of the information referred to in the provision might be 
permissible in extreme cases. 
(9) Calculation of the ‘service fee’ cap (point 9 of the question referred) 
The defendant argues that this rule is merely an annex provision to the rule 
restricting the remuneration of players’ agents (‘service fee’ cap; see point 1 of the 
question referred) and that the rule precisely does not prescribe a particular form 
of remuneration. However, this appears questionable both on the basis of the 
wording of the rule and on the basis of its position in the scheme of Article 15(1) 
of the FFAR. In the view of the Chamber, the rule in its current form is, on an 
objective interpretation, to be construed as having the meaning as set out by the 
applicants and formulated in point 9 of the question referred. 
The defendant does not set any objectives that could justify a rule with such 
content. Therefore, the rule in its current form – subject to a different assessment 
by the Court of Justice – probably infringes Article 101(1) TFEU. 
(10) Rule on presumption laid down in Article 15(3) and (4) of the FFAR 
(point 10 of the question referred) 
According to the defendant’s submissions, the rule serves to prevent 
circumvention of the ‘service fee’ cap. The aim is, inter alia, to prevent a players’ 
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agent from declaring the remuneration (limited in amount by the ‘service fee’ cap) 
for a players’ agent service as remuneration (not limited in amount) for another 
service and thus circumventing the ‘service fee’ cap. In this respect, it should be 
noted that players’ agents could easily generate (unlimited) income with other 
services in so far as those services were also actually provided. 
For this rule to be lawful, the ‘service fee’ cap must first be lawful. Even if that 
were the case, however, it appears questionable whether the rule on presumption 
laid down here (that is to say the associated reversal of the burden of presenting 
the facts and adducing the evidence) is necessary and proportionate for the 
effective enforcement thereof. 
(11) Only salary actually received as the basis for calculating the players’ 
agent’s fee, Article 14(7) and (12) of the FFAR (point 11 of the 
question referred) 
This rule is a mere annex provision to the ‘service fee’ cap referred to at point 1 of 
the question referred. 
Subject to a different assessment by the Court of Justice, if the ‘service fee’ cap is 
lawful, there should be no objections to basing the calculation thereof solely on 
the salary actually received by the player. 
(12) Disclosure obligations (point 12 of the question referred) 
According to the defendant, this rule serves to monitor compliance with the rules 
applicable to players’ agents, in particular the FFAR. Therefore, for the rule to be 
lawful, the FFAR must first be lawful (in particular the rules on remuneration at 
issue here). In addition, it may depend on whether the disclosure of the 
information referred to in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to (v) and (k)(ii) of the FFAR is 
actually necessary for compliance with those rules. At present, this seems 
conceivable at most if broad discretion is conferred on the defendant, as the 
defendant does not provide any specific information as to which specific provision 
of the FFAR is to be ensured by the disclosure of the various information, and the 
rule also provides for the disclosure of ‘information requested on the Platform’ 
without providing greater detail. ‘Platform’ is defined in the FFAR as ‘the digital 
platform operated by FIFA through which the licensing process, dispute resolution 
process, continuing professional development (CPD) and reporting shall occur’. 
What information is requested on the ‘platform’ is left entirely open under the 
rules. In so far as the defendant also mentions at this juncture disclosure in a 
graduated form and the limited group of recipients of the information, reference 
can be made to the explanations at point 8. 
(13) Rules on taking account of future transfer compensation (point 13 of 
the question referred) 
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According to the defendant’s submissions, this rule is intended to protect 
contractual stability and the clubs’ independence with regard to their transfer 
policy. 
Ultimately, similar questions arise in this context as they do with regard to the 
‘service fee’ cap. In this respect, too, it may depend on whether the players’ agent 
sharing in future transfer compensation provides an incentive to work towards 
unnecessary further transfers and whether, if so, a prohibition is necessary and 
proportionate to ensure the degree of contractual stability required for fair sporting 
competition. 
2. Article 56 TFEU 
Since the occupation of players’ agent – as explained above – constitutes an 
economic activity and goes beyond the borders of a Member State, it also falls 
within the scope of the freedom to provide services laid down in Article 56 TFEU. 
This applies, inter alia, not only to the action of public authorities, but also to rules 
of any other nature aimed at regulating the provision of services in a collective 
manner, such as the statutes of sports associations (see also in this regard the cited 
case-law of the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina and Majcen). Since the rules at 
issue undoubtedly restrict or regulate the provision of services by players’ agents, 
whether there is an infringement of the freedom to provide services under 
Article 56 TFEU also depends on whether the restrictions are possibly justified. 
This would be the case if they served to protect or enforce an overriding public 
interest and were appropriate, necessary and proportionate for that purpose. Thus, 
a comparable issue arises as in connection with the abovementioned three-step test 
according to the case-law of the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina and Majcen, 
although it does not appear certain whether an overriding general interest to justify 
a restriction of the freedom to provide services according to Article 56 TFEU is 
necessarily to be equated with a legitimate interest in the three-stage test. 
3. Article 6 of the GDPR 
The storage and processing of personal data provided for in Article 16(2)(j)(ii) to 
(v) and (k)(ii) and Article 19 of the FFAR can also only be justified under 
Article 6(1) of the GDPR if it can be concluded that the defendant has a legitimate 
interest. Here, too, it is therefore decisive whether the data storage or processing 
serves a legitimate objective, is necessary for the achievement of that objective 
and is proportionate to that objective, and the question also arises in this respect 
whether a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the GDPR is 
necessarily to be equated with a legitimate interest in the three-stage test. 
However, only points 8 and 12 of the question referred are affected by possible 
infringements of the GDPR. 
III. 
The Chamber [refers] the questions set out in the operative part of the order to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling of its own motion pursuant to 
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subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU and the second 
paragraph thereof and stays proceedings pending the outcome of the request for a 
preliminary ruling. 
This is appropriate as only the Court of Justice can give a binding judgment on the 
existence of an infringement of Articles 101, 102 and 56 TFEU and Article 6 of 
the GDPR. 
Since the provisions of the FFAR at issue are intended to apply worldwide, a 
resolution of the dispute can also be achieved much better by a decision of a 
supranational court such as the Court of Justice than by a decision of a national 
court of first instance. 
Contrary to the applicants’ view, the questions referred also very much concern 
the interpretation of EU law and not its application in individual cases. In 
particular, it makes no difference whether the conformity with EU law of a 
specific provision of national law or of the statutes of a sporting association is at 
issue. 
It is also not apparent that the Member State’s courts have a margin of discretion 
in this context which cannot be reviewed by the Court of Justice. Rather, if the 
necessary factual basis is established – as is the case here – the Court of Justice 
can also itself fully review and assess the issue of proportionality or the extent to 
which the defendant is acting within a margin of discretion that it may enjoy.