Judgment — ECLI:EU:C:2026:294
Date: 2026-04-16
Language of the case: French
Court formation: Second Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Procedure: Appeal;Staff cases;Action for damages

summary-safe-and-healthy-working-environments-free-violence-and. 29 See the judgment in KF v EIB, paragraphs 126 and 127 and the case-law cited. Collective harassment is sometimes, but not exclusively, referred to as ‘mobbing’. See Leymann, H., ‘Mobbing and psychological terror at workplaces’, Violence and Victims, Vol. 5, No 2, Springer Publishing Company, 1990, p 120. 30 See also, judgment of 13 July 2022, TL v Commission (T‑677/21, EU:T:2022:456, paragraph 51), in which the General Court assessed the behaviour of the applicant’s line managers. 31 Judgment of 22 November 2023 (T‑613/21, EU:T:2023:739, paragraph 126 and 127). This case is currently under appeal before the Court of Justice. See OJ C C/2024/3148 of 21 May 2024. 32 See, by analogy, Article 7(b) and recital 24 of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence (OJ L 2024/1385), on, inter alia, the collective nature of cyber harassment. 33 Which is not directly confrontational. 34 Manipulative behaviour which undermines a person’s self-esteem and belief in his or her own observations. 35 In extreme cases, exclusion constitutes ostracism. 36 The establishment of the facts by the institution following the investigation is essential for the person who considers himself or herself to be a victim of harassment. A situation of harassment, if established, harms the personality, dignity and physical or psychological integrity of the victim and the recognition, following the administrative investigation, of the existence of psychological harassment is in itself likely to have a beneficial effect in the therapeutic recovery process of the victim. See judgment of 4 June 2020, EEAS v De Loecker (C‑187/19 P, EU:C:2020:444, paragraph 74). 37 See point 15 of the present Opinion. 38 Order of 20 May 2022, Germann Avocats v Commission (C‑233/21 P, EU:C:2022:409, paragraph 16). 39 It must be stressed, however, that in certain instances, unless an individual seeks informal redress or makes a request for assistance, his or her colleagues and/or hierarchical superiors may have no knowledge of or at best may only have indirect knowledge of the relevant circumstances based on ‘hearsay’ information. Such information, however, may be fragmented or incomplete and unreliable. 40 See point 27 of the present Opinion. 41 See points 42 to 45 of the present Opinion. 42 This is particularly the case in instances such as the present proceedings since it is unclear to what extent D and F could have opposed the alleged behaviour of C, their hierarchical superior. 43 I therefore agree with the EEAS’s submission in paragraph 65 of its defence that ‘it is not because an official claims to be the victim of harassment in generic terms that his or her hierarchical superior is the author of that harassment’. 44 In its judgment of 19 June 2024, TO v EUAA(T‑831/22, EU:T:2024:404, paragraphs 142 and 143), the General Court held that the failure of the applicant’s hierarchical superior to resolve a conflict between her and a colleague demonstrated at most ‘clumsy management’ but not improper conduct by her hierarchical superior. This was the case despite the fact that certain remarks made to the applicant, either by her colleague or by her hierarchical superior, could be perceived as inappropriate or threatening. The General Court considered nonetheless that they were insufficient to give rise to a climate of moral harassment. It is clear from paragraph 134 of that judgment that the applicant’s hierarchical superior had intervened at least to some extent (albeit in an ineffectual manner) to resolve the conflict. 45 This departs from the general rule that such intent is not required for a finding of psychological harassment. See point 23 of the present Opinion. 46 See, paragraphs 46 to 54 and 57 to 65 of the judgment under appeal. 47 See, for example, paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court stated that in a 2018 evaluation report D had highlighted the need to offer the appellant the prospect of professional development. See, also, paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court stated that F’s conversation with another colleague on the appellant’s lack of prospects of appointment to a position of responsibility was merely a subjective assessment of the appellant’s professional situation. In my view, those findings of fact by the General Court do not demonstrate malicious intent on the part of D and F. 48 See, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 1994, Klinke v Court of Justice (C‑298/93 P, EU:C:1994:273, paragraph 38). See also, judgment of the General Court of 4 July 2024, EUIPO v KD (C‑5/23 P, EU:C:2024:575, paragraph 66). The requirements of the duty to have regard for the welfare of its officials cannot, however, prevent the appointing authority from adopting the measures it believes necessary in the interests of the service. In that regard, see judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 March 2008, Giannini v Commission (T‑100/04, EU:T:2008:68, paragraph 105). 49 See judgment of the Court of First Instance of 3 March 2004, Vainker v Parliament (T‑48/01, EU:T:2004:61, paragraph 125). While the Court of First Instance considered inter alia that the European Parliament’s ‘Jurisconsult’s conduct towards Mr Vainker cannot be considered to have amounted to harassment and bullying’ and held that Mr Vainker had not established that that institution had committed an unlawful act in connection with the onset of his occupational disease, that court nonetheless awarded Mr Vainker compensation for the damage suffered by him as a result of the irregularities attributable to the Parliament in the procedure for the recognition of the occupational origin of his disease. See also, judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 18 November 2014, McCoy v Committee of the Regions (F‑156/12, EU:F:2014:247, paragraphs 108 to 117 and 126 to 129). 50 See, judgments of 8 October 2014, Bermejo Garde v EESC (T‑530/12 P, EU:T:2014:860, paragraph 106), and of 3 October 2019, DQ and Others v Parliament (T‑730/18, EU:T:2019:725, paragraph 62). In paragraph 124 of the former judgment, the General Court emphasised that the facts and the behaviour in question must be ‘serious’. See also, recital 13 of the 2023 Commission Decision which provides that ‘Staff members who have witnessed directly a behaviour that could qualify as harassment should act in accordance with Article 22a of the Staff Regulations.’ 51 The victim of harassment has a right, not an obligation, to report such behaviour pursuant to Article 22a of the Staff Regulations. See, to that effect, judgment of the General Court of 8 October 2014, Bermejo Garde v EESC (T‑530/12 P, EU:T:2014:860, paragraph 106). 52 It also goes without saying that an official can refuse, on the basis of Article 21a of the Staff Regulations, to participate in psychological harassment. 53 Judgment of 2 June 2022, EM v Parliament (C‑299/21 P, EU:C:2022:429, paragraphs 128 to 132). 54 It must be stressed that the General Court previously examined in detail, in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal, the alleged professional marginalisation of the appellant by D himself.