Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2015:497
Date: 2015-07-15
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fifth Chamber
Subject matter: Provisions governing the Institutions;Access to documents;Data protection
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded;Action for annulment - decision unnecessary;Action for annulment - successful
Origin: Netherlands

summary of the pleas in law relied on, and that no new plea in law or argument may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure (judgment of 21 October 2010 in Umbach v Commission, T‑474/08, EU:T:2010:443, paragraph 60) or it is a plea or an argument that amplifies a plea put forward previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which is closely connected therewith (see judgment of 29 November 2012 in Thesing and Bloomberg Finance v ECB, T‑590/10, EU:T:2012:635, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). That is not the case in this instance, and that argument, belatedly put forward, must be rejected as inadmissible. 81 In so far as the applicant relied in his confirmatory application on the right to information and on the right to freedom of expression in order to justify the necessity of having the personal data at issue transferred, it must be held that that is not sufficient to establish that the transfer of the names of the MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme is the most appropriate of the possible measures for attaining his objective or that it is proportionate to that objective. 82 It is true that, by his arguments, the applicant clearly specified his aims and the reasons why he regarded the transfer of the data as being necessary: in essence, to produce a report on the additional pension scheme in order to make the European public aware of how the scheme operates and to exercise oversight over the MEPs who represent it. In so doing, he did not, however, make clear in what respect transferring the names of the MEPs participating in the scheme was the most appropriate measure for attaining the objective he had set himself, contrary to the requirement under Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, as interpreted by the judgment in Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above (EU:T:2011:688, paragraphs 30 and 34). 83 The applicant merely asserted in the confirmatory application that the measures designed to provide public control over public expenditure in the context of the additional pension scheme, like the discharge procedure, did not protect the fundamental rights he had invoked, namely the right to information and to communicate to the public the information gathered, and that those measures could not, therefore, justify the non-disclosure of the data at issue. It must be noted that it cannot be determined from those points in what respect the transfer of the names of MEPs participating in the scheme is the most appropriate measure for attaining the applicant’s objective, or how it is proportionate to that objective. The mere assertion that that transfer would best ensure the protection of fundamental rights cannot be considered to have been the result of even a limited analysis of the effects and implications of the various measures that might be adopted in order to meet the applicant’s objectives. 84 As regards the applicant’s argument that there is already a debate about the additional pension scheme, given the controversy about its creation and funding, or that, even without such a debate, it would be necessary to have the MEPs’ names in order to encourage a debate to arise, the applicant is merely relying on arguments that relate to the purpose of his application for access to documents. Those arguments do not establish that it is necessary for him to have the data at issue transferred, no link to the appropriateness or proportionality of the measure requested being apparent, as required by EU case-law (see, to that effect, judgment in Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:T:2011:688, paragraph 34). In addition, the existence of a debate about the scheme, or, more specifically, about the advantageous nature of the scheme for MEPs at the expense of public funds tend, like the various matters of fact alluded to by the applicant, to show that he already has precise information on the rules and operation of the scheme that may enable him to encourage or develop the public debate he seeks to initiate with regard to the sound management of the scheme and to the financial risks to the EU budget. In addition to the absence of proof of the necessity of the transfer of the personal data at issue, it must be noted that those various matters put forward by the applicant himself do not militate in favour of the proposition that it would be necessary to know the names of the MEPs participating in the scheme in order to denounce its allegedly adverse effects on public funds. 85 Next, the same conclusion must be drawn as regards the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that it was not necessary, in a democratic society, to refuse access to information constituting the personal data of an elected official, in the light of the right of journalists to receive and impart information of public interest. It cannot in any way be determined from such a finding whether the measure requested by the applicant is the most appropriate for attaining his objective, or whether it is proportionate to that objective. 86 Lastly, the conclusion reached in paragraph 82 above is also unaffected by the arguments that the applicant made an express link between the aim pursued by his application for access and the necessity of disclosing all the names requested, and that he was not obliged to be more precise in his application, particularly with regard to those MEPs who were members of the Bureau, in view of the possibility of partial disclosure provided for by Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001. There is nothing in those arguments to demonstrate the necessity of having the names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme transferred, as required by Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001. 87 Accordingly, the Court must reject the applicant’s arguments regarding the necessity of having the names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme transferred in the light of the aim of informing the public and enabling it to take part in a debate on the legitimacy of the scheme; Articles 11 and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, relating, respectively, to the freedom of expression and to the right of access to documents of the institutions and bodies of the European Union, have not, therefore, been infringed. 88 In the second place, the applicant takes the view that the transfer of personal data at issue is necessary for the purpose of being able to determine whether MEPs’ voting behaviour with regard to the additional pension scheme is influenced by their financial interests, the disclosure of all the names of the MEPs participating in the scheme being the only way for the public to hold its representatives accountable for their actions in relation to the scheme. 89 The applicant’s arguments are based, both in his confirmatory application and in his written statements, on the necessity of bringing to light possible conflicts of interest of MEPs. 90 First, it must be stated that, in reply to a question put at the hearing, the European Parliament maintained that disclosure of conflicts of interest could not, from a legal perspective, be regarded as a legitimate purpose of the processing of personal data within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, thereby restating an argument it had put forward in the defence without relating it to that provision. However, it must be noted that the Parliament did not argue, in the contested decision, that transferring the names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme would be a processing of personal data that would be incompatible with the legitimate purposes for which the data had been collected. Therefore, that argument must in any event be rejected as having no factual basis, since none of the reasons given for the contested decision includes any such assertion. 91 Secondly, Article 3(1) of the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament with respect to financial interests and conflicts of interest states: ‘A conflict of interest exists where [an MEP] has a personal interest that could improperly influence the performance of his or her duties as a Member. A conflict of interest does not exist where a Member benefits only as a member of the general public or of a broad class of persons.’ 92 It may also be noted that, for the Council of Europe, a conflict of interest arises from a situation in which a public official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official duties, such private interest including any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political relations, and also any liability, whether financial or civil, relating thereto (see Article 13 of Recommendation R (2000) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on codes of conduct for public officials, adopted on 11 May 2000). 93 In the case of an elected representative, a conflict of interest therefore presupposes, as the applicant submits, that, when voting on a given subject, that representative’s behaviour may be influenced by his private interest. In the present case, the potential conflict of interest lies in the fact that, by voting, MEPs can amend the additional pension scheme or express their views on it in such a way as to promote their interests as beneficiaries of the scheme. 94 In order to be in a position to bring to light potential conflicts of interest of MEPs when they are deciding on the additional pension scheme, it is necessary to know the names of those who are members of the scheme, without the fact that the conflict of interest in question is, as the European Parliament contends, inherent in the duties of members of an elected assembly having any influence on the assessment of the necessity of having the personal data transferred. In itself, that fact cannot in any way establish that the envisaged transfer is not necessary. Such a transfer is therefore the only measure by which the applicant’s aim can be attained, no other measure being capable of ensuring that MEPs facing a potential conflict of interest are identified. Consequently, it must be concluded, for the purpose of applying Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, that the transfer of the names of MEPs participating in the scheme is the most appropriate measure and that it is proportionate for the purpose of determining whether the interests that MEPs have in the scheme can influence their voting behaviour (see, to that effect, judgment in Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:T:2011:688, paragraphs 30 and 34). 95 Nevertheless, it must be noted at this stage that, in the present situation, in which the potential conflict of interest lies in the voting behaviour of MEPs, mere disclosure of the identity of those who are members of the additional pension scheme cannot by itself bring the conflict to light. It is also necessary to determine which of the MEPs have been called upon to decide on the scheme in a vote, since the European Parliament maintains that only MEPs who are members of the scheme and of the Bureau — the body which, according to the Parliament, takes decisions on the management of the scheme — could find themselves in a situation in which there is a potential conflict of interest. 96 Yet the applicant did not refer in the confirmatory application only to votes resulting in amendments being made to the management of the additional pension scheme but to any vote in which the European Parliament or one of its bodies decides on the scheme in one way or another. He thus relied on the possible impact of private interests on the voting behaviour of MEPs; the position of MEPs by which they can influence the way in which public funds are used for their benefit; and the lack of any means — other than disclosure of the names of the MEPs who are members of the scheme — of revealing how the elected representatives use their public powers in relation to the scheme. 97 In reply to a measure of organisation of procedure (see paragraph 23 above), the applicant submitted to the Court the measures adopted since 1 October 2005 by which, according to him, the plenary of the European Parliament, the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control and the Bureau had made amendments to the additional pension scheme or decided on its management. With regard to the plenary, the acts concerned are Decision 2008/497/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 24 April 2007 on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2005, Section I — European Parliament (OJ 2008 L 187, p. 1); Decision 2009/185/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 22 April 2008 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2006, section I — European Parliament (OJ 2009 L 88, p. 1); Decision 2009/628/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 23 April 2009 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2007, Section I — European Parliament (OJ 2009 L 255, p. 1); and Decision 2012/544/EU, Euratom of the European Parliament of 10 May 2012 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section I — European Parliament (OJ 2012 L 286, p. 1). In the case of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the relevant acts are the draft report of 8 March 2007 on amendments 1 to 21 to the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2005, Section I — European Parliament; an information document concerning the committee’s opinion on budgetary discharge for the financial year 2006; and a committee report on budgetary discharge for the financial year 2010. As regards the Bureau, the documents concerned are the decision of 30 November 2005 on the management of the scheme; the decision of 19 May and 9 July 2008 concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (OJ 2009 C 159, p. 1); the decision of 9 March 2009 on the voluntary pension scheme; and the decision of 1 April 2009 on the voluntary pension scheme. 98 Decision 2005/684/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (OJ 2005 L 262, p. 1) must be disregarded at the outset, since that decision is beyond the scope of the application for access to documents made by the applicant, which relates, in particular, to a list of names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme after September 2005. The same must apply to the information document on the opinion of the Committee on Budgetary Control on budgetary discharge for the financial year 2006 and that committee’s report on budgetary discharge for the financial year 2010, which merely refer indirectly to decisions or votes without identifying them clearly. 99 Next, it must be noted, on reading the replies of the main parties to the measure of organisation of procedure, that the four decisions of the plenary mentioned in paragraph 97 above, each of which contains a decision granting the President of the European Parliament discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget and observations set out in a resolution, were subject to a vote on the discharge decisions themselves and on the resolutions. When questioned at the hearing, the Parliament was unable to specify whether, in respect of each of those decisions and resolutions, votes had been cast as overall votes or as separate votes on particular paragraphs or proposals for amendment of certain paragraphs. 100 The written questions put to the European Parliament after the end of the hearing thus related in particular to the identification of the specific voting procedures applied in respect of the four budgetary discharge decisions mentioned above and the four accompanying resolutions, adopted in plenary. 101 It is apparent from the European Parliament’s reply that while each of the four discharge decisions referred to in paragraph 97 above and each of the accompanying resolutions was adopted on the basis of an overall vote in plenary, the votes on the resolutions on discharge for the financial year 2005, held on 24 April 2007, discharge for the financial year 2006, held on 22 April 2008, and discharge for the financial year 2010, held on 10 May 2012, were each preceded by separate votes on amendments and on specific paragraphs of the draft resolutions. In the case of the resolution on discharge for the financial year 2005, paragraphs 74 to 84 of the draft resolution, which concern the additional pension scheme, were the subject of separate votes, during which MEPs expressed their views. In the case of the resolution on discharge for the financial year 2006, paragraphs 70 to 73, which concern the scheme, were adopted in the same way. The same applies in the case of the resolution on discharge for the financial year 2010 with regard to paragraphs 98 and 99 of the draft resolution, which concerned the scheme. 102 It follows from the above that all MEPs forming part of the plenary were entitled to decide on the additional pension scheme on 24 April 2007, on 22 April 2008 and on 10 May 2012. 103 Consequently, in order to enable the applicant to attain his aim of bringing to light potential conflicts of interest of MEPs, the European Parliament would have had to transfer the names of those MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme who were also members of the plenary on the dates mentioned in paragraph 102 above and who actually took part in the votes held on those dates, not just the names of those who took part in the votes organised in accordance with the procedure for voting by roll call provided for by Article 180 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, as the applicant’s remarks in his observations lodged on 2 February 2015 might suggest. Irrespective of the voting procedure used in the votes relating to the scheme, all the MEPs who actually voted and who were members of the scheme could be influenced by their personal interest in that regard (see paragraph 102 above). 104 It follows from the foregoing that it is not necessary to examine the precise voting procedures applied by the Committee on Budgetary Control or the Bureau, since their members are also members of the plenary. 105 Thirdly, in the European Parliament’s view it is inherently impossible to determine whether or not MEPs have really been influenced by their own financial interests or by any other — legitimate or illegitimate — motive when called upon to decide on the additional pension scheme, since the identification of MEPs participating in the scheme would not provide any information on the subjective reasons for their votes on the scheme. 106 However, the concept of a conflict of interest does not relate only to a situation in which a public official has a private interest which has actually influenced the impartial and objective performance of his official duties — in this case that of an elected representative in the European Parliament — but also to a situation in which the interest identified may, in the eyes of the public, appear to influence the impartial and objective performance of his official duties. Furthermore, the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest is not aimed only at revealing those cases in which the public official has performed his duties with the intention of satisfying his private interests, but also at informing the public of the risks of public officials being subject to conflicts of interest, so that they act impartially in the performance of their official duties, after, in view of the circumstances in which they find themselves, having declared the potential conflict of interest to which they are subject and taken or proposed measures to resolve or avoid that conflict. Accordingly, the Parliament’s argument is unfounded and must be rejected, the subjective reasons for a vote cast by an elected representative being, moreover, inherently unascertainable. 107 Fourthly, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 106 above, the Court must reject the European Parliament’s argument concerning the applicant’s lack of proof of a debate on the potential conflicts of interest of MEPs in relation to the additional pension scheme or on the behaviour of a specific MEP. 108 Fifthly, it is also evident from the reasoning in paragraphs 91 to 106 above that the rule under which it follows from Regulation No 45/2001, as interpreted by the judgment in Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above (EU:T:2011:688, paragraphs 34 and 35), that it is incumbent on the person requesting the transfer of personal data accurately to provide evidence of the fact that that transfer is necessary cannot lead to the consequences that the European Parliament’s arguments would imply. 109 First of all, contrary to the European Parliament’s contention, it must be noted that the applicant set out the reasons why he needed to find out which MEPs were members of the additional pension scheme, notably as regards the possibility of thereby revealing potential conflicts of interest that might influence the performance of their duties. 110 Next, while the European Parliament seeks to argue that the applicant was obliged accurately to adduce all the evidence of the existence of conflicts of interest in order to establish the necessity of the transfer, it should be noted that, for the purpose of bringing to light the potential conflicts of interest of MEPs voting on the additional pension scheme, the applicant was, as a matter of law, entitled merely to show that they were in that situation because of their dual role as MEPs and as members of the scheme. The concept of a conflict of interest relates to a situation in which the interest identified may, in the eyes of the public, appear to influence the impartial and objective performance of official duties (see paragraph 106 above) and does not, therefore, require the lack of any impartial performance of the duties in question to be demonstrated. More specifically, the applicant cannot be criticised for not having himself identified the body within the Parliament that was required to decide on the scheme, and thus the group of MEPs concerned, before requesting that the names of the relevant MEPs be transferred. 111 A contrary interpretation would mean that the applicant was required to apply, initially, for access to documents identifying those bodies within which the additional pension scheme had been voted upon, and, in the light of the result obtained, to apply, secondly, for access to the documents identifying the MEPs who actually took part in the vote on that point, and then to the documents identifying the MEPs participating in the scheme. There is nothing in Regulation No 1049/2001 to require an applicant for access to the documents held by an institution or body of the European Union to adopt that approach, nor can it be inferred from the application of Regulation No 45/2001 with respect to documents containing personal data. 112 Sixthly, the European Parliament claims that the interest underpinning the request for the names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme to be transferred is based entirely on the assessment of the journalist applying for access to documents — in this instance, the applicant — and not on objective grounds. In so doing, however, the Parliament loses sight of the fact that the applicant relied on the existence of potential conflicts of interest on the part of MEPs who are members of the scheme when it is voted upon, which is not a subjective assessment of a given situation but a statement as to a risk to the impartial and objective performance of official duties by the MEPs concerned. 113 Consequently, it follows from paragraphs 88 to 112 above that the European Parliament made a manifest error of assessment in finding that the applicant had not established the necessity of the transfer of the names of those MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme who, as members of the plenary, had actually voted on the scheme in the votes held on 24 April 2007, 22 April 2008 and 10 May 2012, having regard to the aim of bringing to light potential conflicts of interest. 114 It is appropriate, however, to examine the action further by analysing the arguments relating to the application of the second cumulative condition for the transfer of personal data required by Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, that is that there is no reason to assume that transferring the names of the members of the plenary participating in the additional pension scheme who took part in a vote on it could prejudice their legitimate interests. Application of the condition under Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 relating to the lack of a legitimate interest in the protection of privacy of MEPs 115 The second part of the plea is divided into three claims which overlap. By the first claim, the applicant submits that the MEPs have no legitimate interest in the protection of their privacy for the purposes of Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, as they open their conduct to a significant degree of public scrutiny. By his second claim, the applicant takes the view that the European Parliament failed in the contested decision to establish that the legitimate interests of the MEPs would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the requested documents. By his third claim, he asserts that even if the Parliament had rightly considered that the requested information fell within the MEPs’ private sphere, that would not be sufficient to protect it as a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, which requires a weighing up of the interests engaged. 116 It should be noted at the outset that, according to the case-law, once the necessity of having the personal data transferred is established, the institution or body of the European Union in receipt of an application for access to documents containing such data must weigh up the various interests of the parties concerned and verify whether there is any reason to assume that the data subjects’ legitimate interests may be prejudiced by that transfer, as required by Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Bavarian Lager, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:C:2010:378, paragraph 78, and Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:T:2011:688, paragraph 30). 117 That requirement must lead the EU institution or body in receipt of the application to refuse to transfer the personal data if it is found that there is the slightest reason to assume that the data subjects’ legitimate interests would be prejudiced. 118 In the first place, the applicant’s entire argument in support of the second part of the first plea is based on the premiss that the public nature of MEPs’ duties and of their status is such that their legitimate interests should not enjoy the same degree of protection as those of individuals who are not public figures. As regards MEPs’ interests, a distinction should be made between those falling into the public sphere, which must be subject to a lesser degree of protection when being weighed against an interest that would favour the transfer of personal data, and those forming part of the private sphere, which must be protected. 119 As the European Parliament acknowledges, the distinction which the applicant makes in the case of public figures between the public and private spheres is relevant for the purposes of determining the degree of protection of personal data to which they are entitled under the rules in Regulation No 45/2001, even if that regulation does not contain any such rule. It would be entirely inappropriate for an application for the transfer of personal data to be assessed in the same way irrespective of the identity of the data subject. Public figures have chosen to expose themselves to scrutiny by third parties, particularly the media and, through them, by a lesser or greater general public depending on the policy area, even if such a choice in no way implies that their legitimate interests must be regarded as never being prejudiced by a decision to transfer data relating to them. Thus, public figures have generally already accepted that some of their personal data will be disclosed to the public, and may even have encouraged or made such disclosure themselves. It is necessary therefore to take that environment into account when assessing the risk of the legitimate interests of public figures being prejudiced in the context of the application of Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, and in weighing those interests against the necessity of transferring the personal data requested. 120 In that context, it is appropriate, for the purposes of assessing the risk of MEPs’ legitimate interests being prejudiced in this case — interests which undeniably include certain aspects of their professional activities, such as aspects of remuneration — to take into particular consideration the link between the personal data at issue, namely the names of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme who have voted on it, and their mandate. The possibility of being a member of the scheme is open only to MEPs. Thus, having a mandate as a Member of the European Parliament is the first condition and is necessary in order to benefit from the additional pension provided under the scheme. For that principal reason, the personal data at issue fall into the public sphere of MEPs. 121 In the light of that feature, which limits the scope of application of the additional pension scheme to MEPs alone, the fact that membership of the scheme is optional and a result of voluntary affiliation, and thus does not arise automatically as a result of their mandate, or that the additional pension is paid after the end of their mandate (which, moreover, is in the very nature of any retirement pension), is not determinative as regards the inclusion of the personal data at issue in the private sphere of MEPs. It is also necessary to take into consideration not only the link with the MEP’s mandate, but also all the information given by the applicant (not disputed by the European Parliament and indeed confirmed by the contents of the case-file) concerning the operation of the scheme, namely the Parliament’s funding of two thirds of the contributions paid, the fact that it makes up shortfalls in the scheme and its commitment to compensating any losses suffered by the scheme, which, according to the applicant, thus ensures the preservation of the acquired pension rights of MEPs who are members of the scheme. These are matters which reinforce the proposition that the personal data at issue belongs in the public sphere of MEPs, denoting as they do the significant financial and legal commitment of the Parliament to the scheme. 122 Account must also be taken of the case-law according to which the additional pension scheme is part of the statutory provisions which are intended, as a matter of general interest, to ensure the financial independence of MEPs and, moreover, decisions taken in that respect by the competent bodies of the European Parliament must be regarded as measures of internal organisation which are intended to ensure its proper functioning and which fall within the rights conferred by public law on the Parliament so that it is able to perform the tasks entrusted to it, the rights and obligations under that scheme being a matter of public law (see, to that effect, judgments in Purvis v Parliament, cited in paragraph 26 above, EU:T:2011:600, paragraphs 60 and 61, and of 13 March 2013 in Inglewood and Others v Parliament, T‑229/11 and T‑276/11, ECR, EU:T:2013:127, paragraph 61). 123 The European Parliament’s argument that contributions to the additional pension scheme relate to the private financial situation of MEPs must be rejected in view of the connection that can be made between the financial elements of the scheme, of which contributions form part, and the public sphere of MEPs. The same reasoning applies in respect of the Parliament’s argument that the voting behaviour of MEPs, which is always part of their public sphere, must be distinguished from their membership of the scheme, which, according to the Parliament, falls into their private sphere. Moreover, transferring the names of the MEPs who are members of the scheme merely reveals their affiliation without disclosing any information about their financial situation, including their assets, their savings or the instruments in which the funds paid into the scheme are invested. 124 Having regard to the foregoing, it must therefore be held that, in weighing up the interests engaged, the legitimate interests of the MEPs who are members of the additional pension scheme, which fall into the public sphere of those MEPs, must be subject to a lesser degree of protection than that which, following the logic of Regulation No 45/2001, would be enjoyed by the interests falling into their private sphere. 125 In the second place, it must be borne in mind that, even in that context, personal data are transferred only if there is no reason to assume that the legitimate interests of the data subjects may be prejudiced by that transfer. However, the slightest degree of protection of the names of MEPs who are members of the additional pension scheme has the effect of giving greater weight to the interests represented by the aim of the transfer. 126 As the applicant argues, bringing to light potential conflicts of interest of MEPs, which is the aim of the transfer of data requested, ensures better scrutiny of the actions of MEPs and of the functioning of an EU institution which represents the peoples of the Member States, and improves the transparency of its actions. Contrary to the European Parliament’s contention at the hearing, such interests may be lawfully taken into consideration in the weighing up of interests that must be carried out under Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 (see paragraphs 61 to 63 above). Consequently, in view of the importance of the interests invoked here, which are intended to ensure the proper functioning of the European Union by increasing the confidence that citizens may legitimately place in the institutions, it must be held that the legitimate interests of the MEPs who are members of the additional pension scheme, as defined in paragraphs 120 and 121 above, cannot be prejudiced by the transfer of the personal data at issue. 127 The weighing up of the interests engaged ought therefore to have resulted in approval of the transfer of the names of the MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme who took part in votes on it, since the European Parliament cannot lawfully maintain that there is a legally binding presumption favouring the legitimate interests of the data subjects to whom the personal data to be transferred relate. Nothing in the wording of Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 militates in favour of such a presumption being recognised, since the assessment of an application for personal data to be transferred requires the interests engaged to be weighed up after the applicant has established that there is a necessity for the data to be transferred (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Bavarian Lager, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:C:2010:378, paragraph 79, and Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:T:2011:688, paragraph 34), a condition which is to be interpreted strictly and requires the applicant to provide express and legitimate reasons for the necessity he invokes. Moreover, the Parliament wrongly relies on Regulation No 1049/2001 in order to justify the existence of such a presumption, noting that the regulation permits exceptions to the right to transparency. While Regulation No 1049/2001 does indeed provide for an exception to the right of access to documents where disclosure would risk undermining the privacy or the integrity of the individual, thus making Regulation No 45/2001 applicable, that does not have the effect of creating a presumption in favour of the legitimate interests of persons whose personal data are protected by the latter regulation. 128 Among the other arguments put forward by the European Parliament, its criticism of the proportionate nature of the measures requested by the applicant is ineffective. In arguing that point, the Parliament challenges the necessity of transferring the names of the MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme for the purpose of attaining the applicant’s objectives, and not the weighing up of the interests engaged. 129 Other arguments put forward by the European Parliament must be rejected as unfounded, as, for example, when it contends that, were the applicant’s arguments to be accepted, MEPs would no longer be entitled to any privacy, and that the transfer of personal data would endanger the independence of their mandate. No proper evidence is adduced in support of such assertions, whereas the limited nature of the information disclosed by the transfer of data at issue must be emphasised, and there is nothing to explain how the independence of an MEP’s mandate would be damaged if the public knew of his membership of the additional pension scheme. The same applies in respect of the argument concerning the fact that MEPs might attract criticism from the public in relation to an alleged conflict of interest. Since such a conflict is inherent in the function of Member of the European Parliament, any criticisms may already be made by any member of the public familiar with the issues concerning the scheme, even if that person is not precisely aware of the names of MEPs potentially affected by such a conflict of interest. Furthermore, it must be noted that the applicant voices such criticism in a representative capacity through his various written pleadings. 130 Accordingly, it must be held that the European Parliament made a manifest error of assessment in finding that the legitimate interests of MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme who took part in a vote on it might be prejudiced by the transfer of their names. 131 It is appropriate to examine the action further, since the European Parliament’s error of assessment in applying the two cumulative conditions under Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 relates only to those members of the plenary who took part in the votes on the additional pension scheme on 24 April 2007, 22 April 2008 and 10 May 2012, and not to those who did not participate in those votes or those not yet, or no longer, in office on the ground, inter alia, that their mandate had previously ended, which includes those who had exercised their pension rights. Second plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons 132 In essence, the applicant submits that the conclusion of the contested decision, that the obligation to protect privacy in relation to personal data prevails over the requirement of transparency, is vitiated by the failure to state reasons. The European Parliament, he submits, failed to explain how the disclosure of the documents requested would specifically and actually undermine the privacy of the MEPs whose names appeared in those documents. 133 It must be borne in mind that if the institution concerned decides to refuse access to a document which it has been asked to disclose, it must, in principle, explain how disclosure of that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by the exception — among those provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 — upon which it is relying (judgments in Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, cited in paragraph 35 above, EU:C:2011:496, paragraph 76, and of 28 March 2012 in Egan and Hackett v Parliament, T‑190/10, EU:T:2012:165, paragraph 90). Such an explanation cannot therefore consist of a mere assertion that access to certain documents would undermine privacy within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (judgment in Egan and Hackett v Parliament, EU:T:2012:165, paragraph 91). 134 It should also be borne in mind that, where a request based on Regulation No 1049/2001 seeks access to documents including personal data, Regulation No 45/2001 becomes applicable in its entirety, including Article 8 thereof (judgments in Commission v Bavarian Lager, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:C:2010:378, paragraph 63, and Dennekamp v Parliament, cited in paragraph 4 above, EU:T:2011:688, paragraph 26). 135 Therefore where, as in the present case, Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 is applicable to an application for access to documents, the examination of the specific and actual nature of the undermining of the interest protected by the exception provided for in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001 is indissociable from the assessment of the risk that the legitimate interests of the data subject might be prejudiced by the transfer of personal data, since the legitimate interests referred to in Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001 overlap with the privacy and the integrity of the individual referred to by Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001, which, through the disclosure of certain aspects thereof to the public, are liable to be prejudiced by the transfer of personal data. 136 Furthermore, it is clear from the case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 1 February 2007 in Sison v Council, C‑266/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:75, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). 137 According to the applicant, the statement of reasons for the contested decision does not explain how the disclosure of the documents requested would specifically and actually undermine the privacy of the MEPs participating in the additional pension scheme. 138 In the contested decision, the European Parliament took the view that it would not be proportionate to allow the transfer of personal data at issue, given the weight of the data subjects’ legitimate interests. It expressed its view that the scope of MEPs’ legitimate interests was certainly less far-reaching than those of a private person without any public commitment, while asserting that the protection mechanisms provided for by Regulation No 45/2001 did apply in the present case and that the MEPs had legitimate interests in not having the data at issue disclosed, such data falling into their private sphere and thus constituting a legitimate interest to be protected as data concerning their personal financial situation. According to the Parliament, pension contributions and the resulting pension rights are always private concerns, and the link with the MEP’s mandate or the method of funding the additional pension scheme has no relevance. The Parliament went on to find that, if that were not the case, the applicant’s proposition would apply to any member of staff of a public authority. It reiterated its view that the transfer of the data at issue, which is based on the general interest of the media and the general public in the personal financial situation of MEPs, was not proportionate, as, if it were otherwise, the media and the public would have access to all the private data of MEPs and of public officials involving public expenditure. It disputed the applicant’s argument that the disclosure of the documents requested would be more appropriate than the measures designed to provide public control of public expenditure. It concluded, in the light of these matters, that the legitimate interests of MEPs should prevail over the alleged necessity of the transfer of the data at issue. 139 It is apparent from the contested decision that the risk of MEPs’ legitimate interests, and thus their privacy, being undermined lies in the fact that, falling as they do into the private sphere of MEPs, the personal data at issue constitute a legitimate interest to be protected on the ground that they concern the personal financial situation of MEPs, pension contributions and resulting pension rights being private matters. The other findings made by the European Parliament in weighing up the interests at stake, set out in paragraph 138 above, do not relate to an evaluation of the risk of the legitimate interests or privacy of MEPs being undermined. 140 Since examination of the specific and actual nature of the undermining of the interest protected by the exception provided for in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001 is indissociable from the assessment of the risk that the legitimate interests of the data subject might be prejudiced, as referred to in Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001, it must be noted that the European Parliament carried out the latter assessment, stating that the personal data at issue fell into the private sphere of MEPs, were subject to a higher degree of protection under that regulation and therefore had to be protected as legitimate interests. It noted that contributions to a pension scheme and the resulting pension rights were private concerns, irrespective of the scheme in question and of the manner in which it was funded, that the retirement pension under the additional pension scheme was paid after the end of a mandate and that MEPs had to pay a significant personal financial contribution, which was not reimbursed by the Parliament. 141 The European Parliament’s reasoning in the contested decision is relatively succinct but none the less allows both the addressee of the decision and the Court to understand the reasons why the Parliament concluded that there was a risk that MEPs’ legitimate interests would be prejudiced if the transfer of personal data at issue were authorised. Since such an assessment necessarily encompasses an assessment of the risk of the privacy and the integrity of MEPs being specifically and actually undermined, the applicant’s argument, which is somewhat lacking in detail, must, in consequence, be rejected. 142 Accordingly, the second plea in law must be dismissed. 143 It follows from all the foregoing that the action is devoid of purpose in so far as access is sought to the names of the 65 MEPs who were members of the additional pension scheme and applicants in the cases giving rise to the order in Albertini and Others and Donnelly v Parliament, cited in paragraph 25 above (EU:T:2010:519) and to the judgment in Purvis v Parliament, cited in paragraph 26 above (EU:T:2011:600); that the contested decision must be annulled in so far as the European Parliament refused to grant access to the names of the MEPs who were members of the scheme and who, as members of the plenary, actually took part in the votes on the scheme held on 24 April 2007, 22 April 2008 and 10 May 2012; and that the action must be dismissed as to the remainder. Costs 144 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings However, pursuant to Article 134(2) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order that the costs be shared or decide that the parties are to bear their own costs where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads. 145 Since the European Parliament has been largely unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay three quarters of those incurred by the applicant. The applicant shall bear one quarter of his own costs. 146 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the institutions and the Member States which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. In the present case, the EDPS, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden shall bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber) hereby: 1. Declares that there is no need to adjudicate on the application for annulment of Decision A(2012) 13180 of the European Parliament of 11 December 2012 refusing to grant Mr Gert-Jan Dennekamp access to certain documents relating to the affiliation of certain Members of the European Parliament to the additional pension scheme in so far as access is thereby refused to the names of the 65 Members of the European Parliament who were applicants in the cases giving rise to the order of 15 December 2010 in Albertini and Others and Donnelly v Parliament (T‑219/09 and T‑326/09, ECR, EU:T:2010:519) and to the judgment of 18 October 2011 in Purvis v Parliament (T‑439/09, ECR, EU:T:2011:600); 2. Annuls Decision A(2012) 13180 in so far as access is thereby refused to the names of Members participating in the additional pension scheme of the European Parliament who, as members of the Parliament’s plenary, actually took part in the votes on that additional pension scheme held on 24 April 2007, 22 April 2008 and 10 May 2012; 3. Dismisses the action as to the remainder; 4. Orders the European Parliament to bear its own costs and to pay three quarters of those incurred by Mr Dennekamp; 5. Orders Mr Dennekamp to bear one quarter of his own costs; 6. Orders the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to bear their own costs. Dittrich Schwarcz Tomljenović Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 July 2015. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English.