Information;Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2025:1015
Date: 2025-11-12
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Procedure: Action for annulment
Origin: Portugal

summary of the pleas in law relied upon. It is clear from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his or her defence and for the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that the essential elements of fact and law on which an action is based must be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, therefore, specify the nature of the plea in law on which the action is based, so that a mere abstract reference to that plea does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (order of 18 September 2018, eSlovensko v Commission, T‑664/17, not published, EU:T:2018:559, paragraph 29). 125 It should also be recalled that, according to the case-law, the application must be interpreted with a view to giving it practical effect by carrying out an overall assessment of the application (see, to that effect, order of 28 June 2011, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Council, C‑93/11 P, not published, EU:C:2011:429, paragraphs 20 and 21). 126 In the present case, as is apparent from the presentation of the applicants’ arguments (see paragraphs 76 and 77 above), the applicants set out in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the reasons why they consider that the safeguard measure of 25% prevents the recurrence of injury linked to Brazilian imports. 127 In those circumstances, it must be held that the sixth part of the second plea is sufficiently substantiated and comprehensible to enable the Commission to respond in full knowledge of the facts and the Court to exercise its power of review. Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected. 128 As to the substance, it should be noted that, according to recital 5 of Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures (OJ 2015 L 83, p. 11), the importation of certain goods may be subject to both anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on the one hand and safeguard tariff measures on the other. The objectives of the former are to remedy market distortions created by unfair trading practices, whilst the objectives of the latter are to protect the European Union against greatly increased imports. 129 It should also be noted that the Commission expressly commented on the impact of the safeguard measure in the contested regulation, in particular in recital 211. It explained that that measure, introduced in 2019 and lawfully adopted, had not prevented the rise of Brazilian imports throughout the RIP, including a sudden increase in June 2022. It considered that the temporary nature of that measure and its overall scope did not support the conclusion that there was no likelihood of recurrence of injury. 130 It is also apparent from recitals 210 and 211 of the contested regulation that the rate of 25% mentioned by the applicants is not based solely on the safeguard measure. That percentage may be influenced by other factors that may increase the cost of imports, such as the gradual implementation of the CBAM. The Commission pointed out that, until 2026, that mechanism involved only an obligation for importers to report, at no immediate cost, and that its future effect on import flows remained largely uncertain. The applicants fail to demonstrate convincingly that the combination of the safeguard measure and the CBAM already deterred or is likely to deter any Brazilian exports at dumped prices. 131 Furthermore, the applicants rely on the argument that the safeguard measure, coupled with the CBAM, further discourages import flows of hot-rolled flat products at dumped prices. However, the Commission considered, in recital 211 of the contested regulation, that it was premature to draw conclusions as to the actual impact of the CBAM, since it did not entail any mandatory financial burden before 2026 and was not specifically designed to combat dumping. The applicants do not effectively dispute that analysis or explain how, from 2023, the CBAM and the safeguard measure interacted to eliminate the risk of dumping practices. 132 It follows that the Commission was entitled to conclude, in the light of the abovementioned factors, that the maintenance of anti-dumping measures remained necessary to prevent the resumption of Brazilian imports at dumped prices and to protect the EU industry from the resulting injury. 133 By the seventh part of the second plea, the applicants submit that, far from being ‘temporary’, the safeguard measure demonstrates a lasting nature that justifies taking it into account in order to conclude that there is no likelihood of recurrence of injury. 134 The Commission contends, first of all, that the seventh part of the second plea lacks clarity and must be rejected as inadmissible. 135 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, even if the present plea is presented succinctly, its scope may be understood without the need for further elaboration. It must also be stated that the Commission was able effectively to defend itself on the substance. Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be rejected and the substance of that part must be examined. 136 In that regard, the applicants refer to other review procedures, but carried out in the context of safeguard measures. However, those measures have different objectives from those of the anti-dumping measures in dispute in the present case. The objectives, legal criteria and conditions of application of those two types of measures differ (see paragraph 128 above). 137 Similarly, the analogy drawn by the applicants with the investigation carried out in 2018 concerning ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, which concerned the existence of anti-dumping measures in several third countries, is not relevant, since it was precisely a question of finding that, worldwide, several States imposed anti-dumping measures targeted at a particular product with the same origin, which could affect the ability of Russian exporters to sell. That is not the case with EU safeguard measures, which are intended to apply to steel imports irrespective of their origin and the possible extension of which meets legal criteria other than those applicable to the extension of anti-dumping measures. 138 Consequently, following the analysis of the arguments raised by the applicants in the context of the first, second and fourth to seventh parts of the second plea, it must be held that the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in its examination of the likelihood of recurrence of injury in the contested regulation. 139 Accordingly, the first, second and fourth to seventh parts of the second plea must be rejected. The third part of the second plea and the third plea, alleging a manifest error in the Commission’s assessment of captive sales and failure to observe the principle of non-discrimination 140 By the third part of the second plea, the applicants claim that captive sales do not cause injury to the EU industry. During the RIP, all hot-rolled flat products exported by CSN were for use by Lusosider, its related company in the European Union, for further processing. The Commission found that, during the RIP, no sales were made to unrelated customers in the European Union and Lusosider did not purchase hot-rolled flat products from any supplier other than CSN. 141 They maintain that the Commission acknowledged that captive sales are not in competition with non-captive sales. Following that reasoning, the Commission should have concluded that CSN’s sales to the European Union could not cause injury to the EU industry. 142 Furthermore, the applicants submit that the Commission ignored the fact that Lusosider is de facto unable to purchase any hot-rolled flat products from EU producers, as they refused to supply to Lusosider. 143 By their third plea, the applicants submit that the Commission conducted an asymmetric assessment of Brazilian captive and non-captive sales in relation to EU non-captive sales, which artificially inflates the market share of Brazilian hot-rolled flat products in the European Union. They maintain that that mistake led the Commission to conclude that there was a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by Brazilian imports. In doing so, the Commission unjustifiably discriminates between Brazilian hot-rolled flat products and those manufactured by EU producers. 144 The applicants do not dispute the Commission’s approach of assessing, where possible, the captive market and the free market separately. However, they dispute the asymmetric treatment of captive sales of EU producers and captive sales of Brazilian producers on the EU market. 145 The applicants claim that Brazilian import volumes were determined by adding import volumes from the responses to CSN’s questionnaire to import volumes from the rest of Brazil on the basis of Eurostat data. EU free market consumption was established by adding free market sales of EU producers with imports to the European Union of both captive and free market sales from all third countries as reported by Eurostat. In other words, the Commission unjustifiably excluded captive sales by EU producers, which account for more than 50% of total sales by EU producers on the EU market during the RIP, from the total EU consumption. 146 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. 147 According to recital 121 of the contested regulation, the distinction between the captive market and the free market is relevant for the injury analysis because products destined for the captive market are not exposed to direct competition from imports, and transfer prices are set within the groups according to various price policies. By contrast, production destined for the free market is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned, and prices are set according to market conditions. The total free market includes sales of EU producers to unrelated customers and non-captive sales to related companies. 148 In recital 137 of the contested regulation, the Commission recalls that captive sales and sales to related parties are two different concepts. For sales to be considered captive, the (related) buyer must not have a free choice of supplier. 149 The Commission therefore considered that, in the present case, there was no indication or evidence that the sales between the applicants were exclusive. In fact, the applicants seemed capable of sourcing from third parties in the original investigation, and did so (recital 137 of the contested regulation). 150 The applicants dispute the Commission’s position by stating that Lusosider was not able to purchase from other EU suppliers and that the sales between CSN and Lusosider were therefore to be regarded as captive sales. 151 The applicants present a series of emails between Lusosider and other potential suppliers in order to show that Lusosider could not obtain supplies other than from CSN. Those exchanges show that several EU suppliers reported production limitations, reducing their supply capacity and increasing their prices. Other suppliers offered non-EU hot-rolled coils due to the unavailability of EU products during that period. 152 In that context, the Commission correctly points out that the steps taken by Lusosider are spot requests rather than requests indicative of a desire to establish lasting business relationships with EU producers. Those requests, often limited to small quantities with short deadlines, were probably aimed at meeting temporary needs. The replies received were not outright refusals, but rather reflected logistical adjustments. Furthermore, the fact that Lusosider nevertheless succeeded in obtaining supplies from the EU industry, including during the same year as that in which some of the refusals on which it relies occurred, shows that it had actual alternatives to CSN and that it was operating in an open market. 153 It follows that, without it being necessary to rule on the alleged ineffectiveness of the applicants’ argument in that regard, the Commission was entitled to take the view that the sales between CSN and Lusosider could not be classified as captive sales within the meaning of paragraphs 147 and 148 above and that they were rather to be regarded as sales to related parties operating on the free market. 154 In any event, it should be noted that, even if the sales made between the applicants were to be classified as ‘captive’, the applicants themselves acknowledge that, in the review, the Commission applied the same methodology as that used in the original investigation. 155 It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, compliance with the principles of equality and non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 20 March 2019, Foshan Lihua Ceramic v Commission, T‑310/16, EU:T:2019:170, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). 156 In the present case, the captive sales of the EU industry are not exposed to any external competition as long as they remain internal and thus escape the impact of imports, while imports, whether captive or not, are in direct competition with the free sales of the EU industry and may cause injury to them, as each import represents a potentially lost sale. Therefore, the difference in treatment consisting in excluding captive sales of the EU industry from the calculation of consumption while including purchases made by related companies in the volume of imports is justified by the very logic of anti-dumping investigations. 157 As regards the applicants’ argument that it incorrectly excluded captive sales from total consumption, even though it combined Eurostat data with questionnaires to calculate Brazilian imports, the Commission correctly argues that two separate issues are conflated here. First, as noted in footnote 38 to the contested regulation, Eurostat data were adjusted on the basis of the verified volumes of the two sampled companies, through the Surveillance system and Integrated Tariff of the European Union (TARIC) codes, on account of discrepancies. Secondly, the consumption used to calculate the market share is that of the free market, in accordance with the method already applied in the original investigation, in accordance with Article 11(9) of the basic regulation. 158 In the light of the foregoing, the third part of the second plea and the third plea must be rejected. 159 Accordingly, the present action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 160 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional and Lusosider-Aços Planos S. A. to pay the costs. da Silva Passos Półtorak Pynnä Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 November 2025. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President * Language of the case: English.