Judgment — ECLI:EU:T:2017:25
Date: 2017-01-25
Language of the case: English
Subject matter: External relations;Common foreign and security policy
Procedure: Action for annulment - unfounded

summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see judgment of 24 May 2016, Good Luck Shipping v Council, T‑423/13 and T‑64/14, EU:T:2016:308, paragraph 51 and case-law cited). 85 The question whether the Council’s decision to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis will be examined under the second plea below. 86 The present complaint must, therefore, also be rejected. – The complaint alleging lack of justification in the restrictions placed on the applicant’s fundamental rights and infringement of the principle of proportionality 87 The applicant asserts that the restrictions on its fundamental rights are not justified on the basis that they do not accord with the principle of proportionality. It argues that, in the present case, it is impossible to know whether the continuation of the restrictive measures would in fact assist in preventing the destabilisation of Ukraine, given that the Council failed to specify the applicant’s involvement in any action directed against Ukraine or the international order as such. Therefore, the restrictions on its rights do not comply with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 88 The Council disputes those claims. 89 It must be observed, as was submitted by the Council, that, by this complaint, the applicant merely reiterates the arguments already presented under the other complaints in the present plea and in the first and second pleas. 90 As regards, in particular, the principle of proportionality of the restrictive measures in the present case, it is necessary to refer to the examination of the first plea below. As regards respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, it is necessary to refer to paragraphs 66 to 86 above. 91 Therefore, subject to the examination of the proportionality of the restrictive measures in the present case, which will be examined under the first plea below, it is necessary also to reject the present complaint and the third plea in its entirety. First plea in law, alleging, in essence, infringement of the principle of proportionality 92 In relation to its first plea, the applicant claims that the Council infringed the principle of proportionality and exceeded its powers in accusing it of having contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine. It submits that the requirement that restrictive measures be necessary must be interpreted as meaning that sanctions may be imposed only on bodies or persons that are known to have an influence on the policy of the country and are known to have, or at least very probably have, been involved in the destabilisation of Ukraine. Accordingly, the applicant argues that measures against a person who is not responsible are not suitable for attaining the objective of imposing sanctions on those responsible and preventing the destabilisation of Ukraine. 93 The Council contests those claims. 94 By the present plea, it appears that the applicant seeks to call into question the proportionality of the general criteria, laid down by the Council, for imposing restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, in particular the criterion at issue laid down in Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above), whereby the funds of legal persons, entities or bodies materially or financially supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine are frozen. That criterion thus broadly covers all entities which materially or financially support actions that may have been committed by third parties which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and not merely entities which have been proven to be directly responsible for such actions. 95 It should be borne in mind in that regard that, according to the case-law, as regards the general rules defining the procedures for giving effect to the restrictive measures, the Council has a broad discretion as to what to take into consideration for the purpose of adopting economic and financial sanctions on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, consistent with a decision adopted on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, in particular Article 29 TEU. Because the EU Courts may not substitute their assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that of the Council, the review which those Courts carry out must be restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review applies, especially, to the assessment of the considerations of appropriateness on which such measures are based (see judgment of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 127 and the case-law cited). 96 As the Council makes clear, it has never accused the applicant of having directly contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine by selling arms to the separatists, but included its name, then maintained its name, on the lists on the ground that it supplied arms to the Russian Federation, thus materially supporting the Russian Federation and its actions aimed at undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 97 The idea of ‘support’ under Decision 2014/475 and Regulation No 783/2014, amending respectively Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, is wider than that of ‘actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’ and was introduced by those measures specifically to extend the criteria for listing legal persons, entities or bodies materially or financially ‘supporting’ actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 98 Since the criterion at issue, set out in Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above), forms part of a legal framework clearly delimited by the objectives pursued by the rules governing the restrictive measures against Russia, the applicant is wrong in submitting that the Council had to demonstrate that the applicant had individually threatened or undermined, and that it continued to threaten or undermine, directly the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine for the Council to be able to include its name on the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2016, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, C‑440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraphs 79 to 83). 99 However, although the Council has a broad discretion as regards the general criteria to be taken into consideration for the purpose of adopting restrictive measures, it is for the Court to ascertain, where appropriate, whether those general criteria, as interpreted and implemented by the EU institutions, comply with the general principles of EU law and the treaties and, in particular, the objective of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, laid down in Article 21(2)(c) TEU. A consequence of that interpretation is that the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in relation to the definition of the general listing criteria can be respected, while the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of EU acts in the light of fundamental rights is ensured. 100 In that regard, it must be recalled that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law and requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see judgment of 21 January 2016, Makhlouf v Council, T‑443/13, not published, EU:T:2016:27, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited). 101 It is appropriate, therefore, to examine, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 95 above, whether the criterion at issue, applied to the applicant in the present case, is not manifestly unsuitable to achieve its objectives set out under Article 21 TEU, as applied to the particular situation in Ukraine, and whether it does not go manifestly beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives. 102 In the present case, first, it must be observed that the criterion at issue pursues one of the objectives of the common foreign and security policy. The adoption of the restrictive measures against, in particular, persons materially or financially supporting actions of the Russian Government which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine meets the objective set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In that respect, it must be pointed out that, on 27 March 2014, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262, entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’, in which it recalled the obligation of all States, under Article 2 of the UN Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, and to settle international disputes by peaceful means. It welcomed the continued efforts, in particular, by international and regional organisations to support de-escalation of the situation in Ukraine. In the operative part of that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed the importance of the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and urged all parties to pursue immediately the peaceful resolution of the situation with respect to Ukraine, to exercise restraint, to refrain from unilateral actions that may increase tensions and to engage fully with international mediation efforts. 103 In addition, it must be recalled that, in the present case, while Decision 2014/145 initially provided that the restrictive measures should be imposed on persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and against persons or entities associated with them, recital 2 of Decision 2014/475 amending Decision 2014/145 states, inter alia, that, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the conditions for freezing of funds and economic resources should be expanded to target legal persons, entities or bodies materially or financially supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 104 It is therefore as a result of the persistence, even worsening, of the situation in Ukraine following the first restrictive measures adopted that the Council took the view that it had to extend the circle of persons and entities covered by those measures in order to achieve the objectives pursued. It follows from that approach, which is based on the progressive impairment of rights according to the effectiveness of the measures, that the proportionality of those measures is established (judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support &amp; Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 126). 105 Therefore, the Court shares the Council’s view that the criterion at issue does not appear to be manifestly inappropriate in order to reach the objective to prevent the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. By applying also to persons and entities materially or financially supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the Council could legitimately expect that such actions cease or that they become more costly for those who undertake them, in order to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2016:381, points 146 and 147). 106 Secondly, the criterion at issue and the restrictive measures deriving from it are necessary in order to achieve and implement the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU, given that alternative and less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the goal pursued, particularly given the possibility of circumventing such restrictions (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 January 2016, Makhlouf v Council, T‑443/13, not published, EU:T:2016:27, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). 107 Thirdly, it must be recalled that the contested measures, which implement the criterion at issue as regards the applicant, contain all the guarantees enabling the applicant to exercise its rights of defence. 108 Thus, the Council’s letters addressed to the applicant, informing it of the adoption of the new measures maintaining its name on the list of persons covered by restrictive measures, referred to in paragraphs 12, 17 and 20 above, expressly informed it of the possibility of submitting a request for reconsideration of its inclusion on the lists at issue and of bringing an action for annulment before the Court. Moreover, the applicant was able to bring such an action in accordance with the conditions laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth and sixth paragraphs of Article 263 TFEU. 109 In addition, it must be noted that Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide for the possibility to grant specific authorisation to unfreeze funds, other financial assets or other economic resources and to revise periodically the inclusion of the names of the persons or entities concerned on the lists at issue so as to allow the removal from those lists of persons or entities no longer meeting the necessary criteria for inclusion. 110 Finally, it must be recalled that the restrictive measures adopted under Article 215 TFEU are not penalties, but prospective precautionary measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2013, Anbouba v Council, T‑592/11, not published, EU:T:2013:427, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). Therefore, the mere existence of a risk that an entity may act reprehensibly may be sufficient to impose restrictive measures on that entity (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support &amp; Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 85). 111 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it does not appear that the criterion at issue as defined by the Council in Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above), is manifestly disproportionate in the light of the objectives pursued, in accordance with Article 21 TEU, of preventing the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 112 The first plea in law must therefore be dismissed. Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the legal principles applicable to the restrictive measures 113 By its second plea, the applicant claims, in the first place, that the grounds on which it was included in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 do not meet the standards for the quality of grounds required for the inclusion of a legal person’s name on the lists. It expresses the view in this regard that those acts aim solely to sanction natural or legal persons that are — as evidenced by robust facts — responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 114 The applicant argues that, given the intensity of the measures and their objective of preventing the further destabilisation of Ukraine, the Council would have needed to show that the applicant had in fact undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or still undermines and threatens its territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence, mere speculation and guesswork being insufficient in this regard. 115 The Council disputes those arguments. 116 As regards the proportionality of the criterion at issue, it is clear from the examination of the first plea above that the Council did not infringe the principle of proportionality by providing in Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended (see paragraphs 5 and 7 above), that the funds of legal persons, entities or bodies which materially or financially support actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine were frozen. 117 The applicant’s reading of the criterion at issue is thus erroneous in requiring the Council to demonstrate that the applicant is responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine or that it actually undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in order for it to be able to include the applicant’s name on the list of persons and entities covered by the restrictive measures. 118 In the second place, the applicant challenges the soundness of the grounds stated in the contested measures in relation to it, as set out in paragraph 8 above. 119 First, while it acknowledges that its sole shareholder is the Russian Federation, it asserts that it is a separate legal entity and that the Russian Government cannot exert a decisive influence on decision-making in relation to its daily commercial activities. Under Russian law, the majority of decisions are taken by executive bodies consisting of a Director General and a Management Board, not by the General Meeting of Shareholders, the approval of which is required only for major transactions representing more than 25% of the book value of the applicant’s assets. Shareholder rights are exercised in practice by the Rosimushchestvo (Federal Agency for State Property Management, Russian Federation), which is totally independent of the Ministry of Defence and is also responsible for selecting the professional directors on the applicant’s Board of Directors. In the area of exports of military goods, the function of the State organs, that is to say, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, is limited to granting authorisation for any export of military goods by the applicant. 120 Secondly, while it acknowledges that it manufactures, inter alia, anti-aircraft weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles, it asserts that it also delivers military products to countries and customers other than the Russian Federation, and that over 30% of its production is represented by a range of products for civil use. It further states that it did not begin manufacturing until 2002, with the result that the production or sale of older weapons, such as the BUK surface-to-air missile, cannot be imputed to it. 121 Thirdly, while it admits supplying weaponry to Russian governmental authorities, it states that it has never delivered weapons on Ukrainian territory since its establishment in 2002. It further states that orders for military goods and equipment from the Russian State must be approved by the Duma and ratified by the President of the Russian Federation, and that the suppliers and prices of the goods ordered are determined on a competitive basis. As far as the export of military goods and equipment is concerned, a list of the countries to which such goods and equipment may be exported has been established by a federal law and a decree of the President of the Russian Federation. The export of military goods to countries not appearing on those lists must be approved by the Russian President himself. In consequence, it is prohibited for a Russian company such as the applicant to supply military goods to any person or body not appearing on those lists, let alone to paramilitary organisations. 122 Fourthly, the applicant denies supplying or having supplied weapons to Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine or to any recipient in Ukrainian territory. It states that the BUK anti-aircraft missiles used by the Ukrainian army pre-date 1997 and thus cannot have been produced by the applicant. 123 Fifthly, the applicant denies having supplied any weaponry used by separatists, and particularly any weaponry used to shoot down aircraft. In particular, it denies any involvement in the flight incident concerning Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam (Netherlands) to Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) and states that there is no evidence of any such involvement. The precise causes of the destruction of that aircraft remain unknown and, even if it were ultimately established that a BUK surface-to-air missile was involved, this would not necessarily point to any involvement on the part of the applicant, given that, first, none of the military equipment which it manufactures has been used in Ukraine and, secondly, the Ukrainian army is still in possession of older models of BUK missiles. On that basis, until the findings of the official investigation are published, the possibility that the aircraft was brought down by such weapons cannot be excluded. 124 The Council contests those claims. 125 It must be recalled that, by the contested measures, the applicant’s name was maintained on the list of persons and entities covered by restrictive measures for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 8 above. 126 The applicant claims, in essence, that the grounds advanced against it are not sufficiently supported by evidence and that they do not justify the inclusion of its name on the lists of persons and entities covered by the restrictive measures. 127 In that regard, it should be recalled that, although the Council has a broad discretion as regards the general criteria to be taken into consideration for the purpose of adopting restrictive measures, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain a person’s name on the list of entities subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated by sufficiently specific and concrete evidence (judgment of 26 October 2015, Portnov v Council, T‑290/14, EU:T:2015:806, paragraph 38; see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraphs 41 and 45). 128 It is for the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128). 129 In the first place, as regards the grounds that the applicant is a Russian state-owned company which manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, which it supplies to the Russian army, it is sufficient to state, as the Council did, that the applicant does not deny being owned by the Russian State, or manufacturing anti-aircraft weaponry, such as surface-to-air missiles, which it supplies to the Russian army. 130 First, the fact that the General Meeting of Shareholders did not have a dominant position by virtue to Article 47 of the federalnij zakon ob akcionernih obshestvah (Russian Law on Joint-Stock Companies, No 208-FZ, 26.12.1995) is not such as to call into question the finding that the applicant is a Russian state-owned company, owned and controlled by the Russian State. As the applicant itself admits, the General Meeting is made up of representatives of the Russian Federation, as sole shareholder, and is responsible, not only for approving the applicant’s annual reports and annual accounts, but also for giving its agreement to every transaction of more than 25% of the book value of the applicant’s assets. The fact that the Russian Federation’s shareholder rights are in practice exercised by the Federal Agency of State Property Management confirms that the Russian Government controls the applicant, irrespective of the State Department which is directly responsible in that regard. 131 In addition, as a company active in the defence sector, the applicant is particularly dependent on the Russian Federation for all exports of military equipment, since the exports have to be authorised by the Russian Government or by the President of the Russian Federation directly where those exports are to a country which is not on the list of recipient countries approved by the Russian Parliament. As the Council submitted at the hearing, it is clear from Article 2 of the applicant’s new statutes that its corporate purpose is, inter alia, to ensure national defence and the security of the Russian Federation. That demonstrates that the applicant, in fact, has very limited freedom of action compared with the Russian Federation and that the applicant is largely dependent on it for its activities. 132 Secondly, the documents which the Council forwarded to the applicant, attached to the letter of 31 July 2015 also demonstrate that it manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry, including BUK M1-2 and M2E surface-to-air missiles and Aistenok radars. That information is taken directly from the applicant’s website. The fact that the applicant is also active in the civil sector is irrelevant in that respect, given that, as the applicant admits, the share of products for civilian use does not exceed 30% of its total production. 133 Thirdly, the documents provided by the Council also demonstrate that the applicant supplies the Russian Federation with weaponry, something which it also acknowledges in the present proceedings. 134 It is therefore sufficiently clear from the evidence provided by the Council that the applicant is a Russian state-owned company and that it manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, which it supplies to the Russian army, as is indicated in the statement of reasons for the applicant’s name being maintained on the lists by the contested measures. 135 In any event, the fact that the applicant is a Russian state-owned company cannot be decisive as regards the legality of the inclusion of its name on the list of persons and entities covered by restrictive measures, since, as was acknowledged by the parties at the hearing, the determining factor was that, by manufacturing weapons and military equipment and supplying them to Russia, the applicant materially supports actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 136 In the second place, as regards the ground that the Russian authorities supplied heavy weaponry to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine, it must be observed that the applicant does not in any way call into question that conclusion, but merely denies that it was itself responsible for supplying the separatists or any recipient in Ukrainian territory. 137 As the Council rightly states, the reason relied on against the applicant in the contested measures is not based on the fact that the applicant delivered weapons directly to the separatists in Ukraine, but rather on the fact that, by selling arms to the Russian Federation which itself supplies weapons to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, the applicant materially supports actions taken by the Russian Federation seeking to undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 138 In that regard, the documents provided by the Council are sufficient to demonstrate that the Russian Federation actually supplied weapons to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Thus it is clear, in particular from what the US European Command Commander, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, declared at a press briefing on 30 June 2014, that several types of heavy weaponry had crossed the border between Russia and Ukraine and had been used on the western side of that border. 139 In addition, it is clear from the documents provided by the Council that the Pantsir S-1/SA-22 Greyhound, which is one of the latest air defence systems, has been seen in the Donetsk region of Ukraine and has been used by the separatists. Since that air defence system has been ordered and exported from Russia only to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, it is very likely that the one which has been seen in Eastern Ukraine came from Russia, as is submitted by the Council. 140 The applicant, however, denies that the Pantsir system is manufactured by it or by any of its subsidiaries, as is alleged by the Council. The applicant claims that it is in fact produced by another company, which is apparent from the documents provided by the Council. 141 In that regard, the Court shares the Council’s view that it is irrelevant that the Pantsir which was seen in Eastern Ukraine is actually manufactured by the applicant or by another company, given that the grounds for maintaining its name on the list of persons and entities covered by restrictive measures are not based on the applicant’s direct involvement in the actions seeking to destabilise Ukraine or on the applicant delivering weapons to the separatists, but on the fact that the applicant is a Russian state-owned company manufacturing heavy weaponry which it supplies to the Russian Federation, which in turn supplies weapons to the separatists, and that, accordingly, it materially supports actions taken by the Russian Federation seeking to undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (see paragraphs 5, 8 and 59 above). The fact that the Pantsir system seen in Eastern Ukraine is not included in the range of the applicant’s products is, therefore, irrelevant in that regard. 142 It must be stated, in any event, that other Russian weaponry and military equipment have been seen in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine, or crossing the border between Russia and Ukraine, including the Aistenok radar station, which is manufactured by the applicant and has been used by the separatists, as is apparent from the documents provided by the Council. 143 The Council therefore did not err in its assessment when it stated in the grounds for listing the applicant that ‘the Russian authorities [had] supplied heavy weaponry to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine’. 144 In the third place, it is necessary to examine whether the third ground in the contested measures, that is to say, the fact that the weapons supplied by the Russian Federation are used by the separatists, including for shooting down aeroplanes (see point 8 above), is founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis. 145 In that regard, the Council produced numerous press articles reporting on the shooting down of Ukrainian army aircraft and helicopters by the separatists, including, in particular, a military cargo-plane transporting 49 soldiers. It is clear from those articles that, in some cases, the separatists claimed direct responsibility for those acts. 146 The applicant, however, disputes the reliability and objectivity of those articles. 147 It must be pointed out in that regard that, as is clear from the case-law, press articles may be used in order to corroborate the existence of certain facts — in the present case the fact that the weapons provided by Russia were used by the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, including for shooting down aeroplanes — where they come from several different sources and they are sufficiently specific, precise and consistent as regards the facts there described, as in the present case (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 141 and 142, and of 22 September 2015, First Islamic Investment Bank v Council, T‑161/13, EU:T:2015:667, paragraph 59). 148 It would be excessive and disproportionate to require the Council itself, as the applicant seeks, to investigate on the ground the accuracy of facts which are re-laid by numerous media. Although it is possible to accept, as the applicant does, that the media coverage of the Ukrainian conflict by the western media may also be partially biased, genuine objectivity is impossible, and the fact remains that the press articles provided by the Council corroborate the existence of Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, including the supply of weapons and military equipment to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the applicant has not called into question the purely factual information reported in those articles in that regard, nor has it even sought to establish in what way they are manifestly incorrect. 149 Finally, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Council has not in any way demonstrated that weapons which it produced had been used by separatists, it is important to recall again that the grounds relied on against it are not in any way based on the existence of such a link between the applicant and the separatists, but on the fact that it supplies weapons to the Russian government, which itself contributes to the destabilisation of Ukraine by supplying weapons, of all kinds, to the separatists (see paragraphs 8 and 137 above). 150 It must also be pointed out, as was observed by the parties at the hearing, that there was no final conclusion concerning the causes of the destruction of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 killing 298 people when the contested measures were adopted. Although it is true that the contention that the aeroplane was shot down by separatists in Eastern Ukraine was a serious line of enquiry followed by the investigators, the investigation was still ongoing and no final report had been adopted by the time the restrictive measures were adopted, and subsequently maintained, concerning the applicant, as the Council rightly observes. 151 It is important to recall that the evidence which the Council relies on in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list of persons and entities covered by restrictive measures must necessarily have been available and brought to the attention of the Council at the latest when it adopted the restrictive measures concerning the applicant, otherwise the effective control exercised by the Court over the legality of that listing would be deprived of its substance (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 October 2012, Oil Turbo Compressor v Council, T‑63/12, EU:T:2012:579, paragraph 29, and of 26 October 2015, Portnov v Council, T‑290/14, EU:T:2015:806, paragraph 47). 152 In any event, it must be pointed out, in that regard, that the applicant’s argument that Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down by the Ukrainian army, and not by the separatists, given that it also possesses outdated BUK missiles which caused the destruction of the aeroplane, according to the report from the Dutch Safety Board published in October 2015, is irrelevant, given that that evidence is not decisive for the purposes of listing its name. 153 In the grounds for listing the applicant’s name, the Council considered only that ‘these weapons [supplied by the Russian Federation to the separatists were] used by the separatists, including for shooting down airplanes’ (see paragraph 8 above). 154 The merits of that ground are sufficiently supported by the numerous documents provided by the Council in that regard, from which it is clear that several aeroplanes were shot down by the separatists and that, in some cases, the separatists claimed responsibility for those acts. 155 Therefore, it must be held that the ground that ‘these weapons are used by the separatists, including for shooting down airplanes’ is founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis and that the Council committed no error of assessment in that regard. 156 In the fourth place, it is still necessary to ascertain whether the Council was fully entitled to conclude from all the grounds set out above that ‘as a state-owned company, Almaz-Ante[y] therefore contribute[d] to the destabilization of Ukraine’. 157 As the Council submits, it is necessary to read that ground with reference to the preceding grounds, inasmuch as it constitutes the logical conclusion of those grounds. It is not merely in its capacity as a state-owned company that the applicant is subject to the restrictive measures, but as a state-owned company supplying weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, to the Russian Federation, which itself supplies weapons to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, who in turn use them in particular to shoot down aeroplanes. 158 Consequently, since the other grounds are substantiated by sufficiently specific and concrete evidence and are founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis, the Council was fully entitled to conclude that the applicant contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine, in that it materially supported Russia’s actions seeking to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. That ground must be read in the light of the objectives of the restrictive measures at issue, as set out in recital 2 and in Article 1 of Decision 2014/475 which, in amending Decision 2014/145, makes provision for the freezing of funds of legal persons, entities or bodies which materially or financially support actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (see paragraph 4 above). 159 In that regard, it is important to note that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Council was not required to demonstrate positively that the weapons which the applicant produced had been used in Ukraine by the separatists. Such evidence would be difficult to provide, in particular in a conflict situation where it is sometimes difficult to establish exactly the specific responsibilities and the types of weapons used by each of the warring parties. 160 In addition, according to the case-law, the existence merely of a risk that an entity may act reprehensibly may be sufficient to impose restrictive measures (see paragraph 110 above). 161 Therefore, it must be held that the Council has not committed any error of assessment by including, then maintaining, the applicant’s name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, given that that assessment meets the listing criteria provided for in Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended. 162 In view of the foregoing, the second plea must be rejected and the application dismissed in its entirety. Costs 163 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders Joint-Stock Company ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp. to pay the costs. Berardis Tomljenović Spielmann Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 January 2017. E. Coulon G. Berardis Registrar President * Language of the case: English.