Judgment;Information — ECLI:EU:T:2025:904
Date: 2025-09-24
Language of the case: English
Court formation: Fourth Chamber
Based on: Merger Treaty (1965)
Procedure: Staff cases - unfounded;Staff cases - inadmissible;Action for damages - inadmissible

summary of the pleas in law relied on. Those matters must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without further supporting information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly, in the application itself (see judgment of 3 February 2021, Moi v Parliament, T‑17/19, EU:T:2021:51, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2023, XH v Commission, T‑613/21, not published, appeal pending, EU:T:2023:739, paragraph 155 and the case-law cited). 51 In the present case, it is true that the application and reply are not without ambiguity. The Commission is correct to contend, first, that the applicant employed confusing terminology and, secondly, that she referred to investigation OC/2023/0004 without explaining the connection between that investigation and the subject matter of the dispute. Furthermore, in the pleas in law put forward in the application and supplemented in the reply, the applicant’s various arguments appear disordered and repetitive. 52 That lack of rigour does not, however, prevent the Court from identifying, in essence, the arguments raised by the applicant in support of her application for annulment relating to, first, the irregular nature of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 and the investigative measures adopted during that investigation, secondly, irregularities vitiating the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 and, thirdly, an alleged error made by the competent appointing authority, when that authority refused the request for assistance and rejected the request for permission to use the documents annexed to the complaint. 53 In addition, it is also apparent from the Commission’s pleadings that it was able to identify, in essence, the content of the applicant’s arguments and accordingly defend itself by responding to them in detail. 54 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the application meets the requirements laid down in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure and, consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission against the application must be rejected in its entirety. D. Claims for annulment 1. The admissibility of the claims for annulment (a) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision dismissing the irregularities vitiating investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 55 The applicant claims, in essence, that, even though no definitive decision has been adopted with respect to that investigation concerning her, her complaints concerning the irregularities of that investigation must be found to be admissible since the errors which have already occurred in the course of that investigation justify, at this stage, calling into question its lawfulness as regards the right of access to justice provided for in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). In that regard, she states that waiting for the investigation to end before bringing a complaint could have an irreversible impact on her situation in the light of, first, the potentially excessive length of that investigation and, secondly, the impossibility of addressing procedural irregularities which have occurred in the meantime. She also claims that the competent appointing authority should seek to correct these irregularities without waiting for the close of the investigation so that she is not deprived of protection since, first, Article 17(1) and 19 of the Staff Regulations enshrine the importance of confidentiality in the handling of information and, secondly, Articles 12, 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations lay down the obligation for the institutions to assist officials facing threats. In addition, she submits that, even though the measures adopted by OLAF in the course of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 were preparatory measures, they can be challenged where they affect the legal position of the party concerned. 56 The Commission disputes those arguments. 57 In that regard, the Commission contends that, according to the case-law, the alleged irregularities are inadmissible, because the measures connected with the investigation, which is still ongoing, do not constitute measures adversely affecting the applicant, in so far as they do not produce legal effects that are binding and of such a nature as to directly and immediately affect her interests by bringing about a distinct change in her legal position. 58 The Commission also contends that the preparatory measure, in the present case the decision to open investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, the outcome of which is, to this day, uncertain, cannot adversely affect the applicant in the context of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, because the subject matter of that investigation is different from that of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023. In that regard, it submits that the case-law cited by the applicant in support of her argument that the preparatory measures can be challenged was misinterpreted and is irrelevant to the present case. It does not dispute that preparatory measures may, in certain cases, be challenged, but contends that, in the present case, the decision to open investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 cannot be challenged since the outcome of that investigation is in no way prejudiced by the decision to open it or by the transfer decision of 24 March 2023. Consequently, it concludes that all the applicant’s arguments relating to investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 and all the annexes to the reply, in so far as they are intended to support those arguments, must be rejected as inadmissible. 59 Lastly, the Commission submits that the arguments concerning the alleged procedural irregularities, which it is claimed occurred in the course of the investigation, are not supported by the evidence in the documents before the Court and that, in any event, the investigation is still ongoing, with the result that the applicant’s arguments are premature and must be found inadmissible. 60 It should be borne in mind that, in order for any action brought by an official against the institution by which he or she is or was employed to be admissible, it is a necessary condition that there be an act adversely affecting him or her within the meaning of Article 90(2) and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations (see order of 18 December 2003, Gómez-Reino v Commission, T‑215/02, EU:T:2003:352, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, according to settled case-law, an applicant is adversely affected, within the meaning of those provisions, only by measures which produce binding legal effects such as to directly and immediately affect his or her interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position and only those measures may be the subject of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2021, KF v SatCen, C‑464/20 P, not published, EU:C:2021:848, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited, and order of 18 December 2003, Gómez-Reino v Commission, T‑215/02, EU:T:2003:352, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 61 As regards actions brought by officials, measures that are preparatory to a final decision do not have an adverse effect and can therefore only be challenged incidentally in an action against acts capable of being annulled. Although some purely preparatory measures may adversely affect an official in so far as they may influence the content of a subsequent challengeable act, those measures cannot be the subject of a separate action and must be challenged on the basis of an action brought against that act (see, to that effect, order of 18 December 2003, Gómez-Reino v Commission, T‑215/02, EU:T:2003:352, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). 62 Furthermore, the preparatory measures which, for the party concerned, are constituted by the opening and conducting of an internal investigation, may not be the subject of a separate action, different from that which that party is entitled to bring against the authority’s final decision. Indeed, neither the existence, even if established, of infringements of the rights of the defence nor the fact that internal investigations are conducted show in themselves that a measure having an adverse effect, that is to say a measure open to appeal, has been adopted (see judgment of 14 October 2021, KF v SatCen, C‑464/20 P, not published, EU:C:2021:848, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 63 As regards an internal investigation conducted by OLAF, procedural irregularities and infringements of essential procedural requirements, which allegedly vitiate an OLAF investigation report, may be challenged only on the basis of an action brought against a subsequent challengeable act, in so far as they are claimed to have influenced its content, and not independently, in the absence of such an act (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2019, PT v EIB, T‑573/16, EU:T:2019:481, paragraph 367 (not published) and the case-law cited). That finding applies, a fortiori, to the decision to open an internal OLAF investigation and to the various measures taken to conduct it, including the alleged refusal of OLAF to notify certain measures relating to that investigation to the party concerned and to allow him or her to defend himself or herself during it (see judgment of 3 July 2019, PT v EIB, T‑573/16, EU:T:2019:481, paragraph 368 (not published) and the case-law cited). 64 As regards, in particular, the investigative procedures conducted by OLAF during the internal investigation, a separate action for annulment of those measures is inadmissible (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of 8 April 2003, Gómez-Reino v Commission, C‑471/02 P(R), EU:C:2003:210, paragraphs 65 and 66). 65 In the present case, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that, first of all, investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, which is still ongoing, was opened by a decision taken by OLAF on 30 May 2022. Next, on 29 June 2022, OLAF authorised a digital forensic operation concerning various digital media used by the applicant in the course of her duties. Furthermore, on 21 March 2023, OLAF adopted a decision authorising an inspection of the office assigned to the applicant on the OLAF premises. That inspection was carried out on 24 March 2023 and the applicant was notified of the existence of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 which concerned her. Lastly, the applicant was invited, by a letter dated 23 July 2024, to a meeting, as a person concerned by that investigation, in order to present her comments. By email dated 30 July 2024, the applicant stated that she was refusing to participate in that meeting. 66 Accordingly, nothing in the documents before the Court indicates that, at that stage, a final report containing OLAF’s findings had been adopted or that a final decision had been taken following that investigation. Furthermore, in so far as OLAF has not yet adopted definitive findings concerning that investigation, it is also clear that, as competent appointing authority, it has also not adopted a decision on the basis of those findings capable of having a legal effect on the applicant’s situation. 67 Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 61 to 64 above, it must be found that the measures adopted by OLAF, namely the investigative measures taken, do not constitute measures adversely affecting the applicant and that they are not capable of being challenged in a separate action at this stage. So long as that investigation is currently ongoing, those measures are only preparatory acts the merit of which cannot be challenged by the applicant until a later stage, once a final decision relating to that investigation is adopted. 68 It follows that the action, directed against the preparatory measures in question, is not directed against measures adversely affecting the applicant. In those circumstances, the claim for annulment directed against the decision dismissing the alleged irregularities vitiating investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 must be rejected as inadmissible. Consequently, the fourth request for the disclosure of evidence made by the applicant on 22 February 2025, concerning investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, must be rejected as irrelevant to resolving the present dispute. (b) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision refusing the request for assistance 69 The Commission disputes the admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision refusing the request for assistance. It contends, in essence, that the applicant has misunderstood that decision. In that regard, it argues, the applicant drew incorrect conclusions from the illustrations, which were provided as examples by the Commission, of situations in which it was not bound by a duty to provide assistance in respect of EU officials. Furthermore, it contends that the refusal of the request for assistance had to be subject to a complaint, under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, before an action could be brought before the Court. 70 The applicant claims that her arguments included in the present action, in so far as it is directed against the decision refusing the request for assistance, are admissible, even though she did not submit a prior complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. In that regard, the applicant criticises the Commission for not examining whether she could reasonably have believed that a direct action was permissible or whether she had been provided with sufficient guidance on the appropriate procedural steps. 71 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the admissibility of an action brought before the Court under Article 270 TFEU and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations depends upon the pre-litigation procedure being conducted in the proper manner and the prescribed time limits for that procedure being complied with. Under Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations, an action against a measure having an adverse effect lies only if the appointing authority has previously had a complaint submitted to it within the prescribed period and if that complaint has been rejected by express decision or by implied decision (see judgments of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited, and of 15 March 2023, TO v EUAA, T‑727/21, not published, EU:T:2023:136, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited). 72 According to the case-law, the pre-litigation procedure is intended to allow, as a priority, an amicable settlement of the differences arising between officials or other servants and the administration. In order for such a procedure to achieve its objective, it is necessary that the appointing authority be in a position to know with sufficient precision the criticisms formulated by the persons concerned against the contested decision (see judgment of 23 April 2002, Campogrande v Commission, C‑62/01 P, EU:C:2002:248, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). 73 As regards, in particular, the obligation to submit a prior complaint against a decision refusing a request for assistance, it is also apparent from the case-law that a decision refusing a request for assistance constitutes a measure having an adverse effect against which the official may submit a complaint and, where appropriate, bring an action (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 June 2013, CF v EASA, F‑40/12, EU:F:2013:85, paragraph 93, and of 28 May 2020, Cerafogli v ECB, T‑483/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2020:225, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited). 74 In the present case, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the applicant did not submit a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against the decision refusing the request for assistance. It follows that, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 71 to 73 above, the applicant did not fulfil the obligation to submit a complaint as stems from Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations. 75 Furthermore, the applicant’s argument that she could reasonably have believed that a direct action was permissible or that she had not been provided with sufficient guidance on the appropriate procedural steps cannot succeed since, in the present case, the decision refusing the request for assistance informs her explicitly that ‘the rejection of this request [for assistance] may be contested by way of a complaint under Article 90(2) of the [Staff Regulations].’ 76 In those circumstances, the Commission is correct to contend that the applicant did not fulfil her obligation to submit a prior complaint against the decision refusing the request for assistance before bringing the present action and, accordingly, failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that regard by the Staff Regulations. 77 In the light of the foregoing, the claim for annulment directed against the decision refusing the request for assistance must be rejected as inadmissible. (c) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision to refuse the use of documents 78 The Commission disputes the admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision to refuse the use of documents in potential disputes outside of the jurisdiction of the European Union. It contends that that decision should have been subject to a prior complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. It therefore concludes that, in so far as the applicant has not submitted such a complaint, the arguments against that decision must be rejected as inadmissible. 79 The applicant maintains that her claim is admissible. She reiterates that the Commission should have examined whether she could reasonably have believed that a direct action was permissible or whether she had been provided with sufficient guidance on the appropriate procedural steps. She criticises the competent appointing authority for misinterpreting her request to use documents relating to OLAF investigations, which were annexed to her complaint, outside of the jurisdiction of the European Union, first, by classifying it as coming under Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, without specifying how, in the present case, that provision is relevant and, secondly, by incorrectly finding that that request concerned the use of those documents only in legal proceedings outside of the territory of the European Union, and not in legal proceedings before EU courts. Accordingly, in her view, the competent appointing authority incorrectly concluded that the Court of Justice of the European Union was the only body with jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning EU officials, in breach of her right of access to justice and to other courts. 80 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, an ‘official shall not, without permission from the appointing authority, disclose on any grounds whatever, in any legal proceedings, information of which he has knowledge by reason of his duties’, that ‘permission shall be refused only where the interests of the Union so require and such refusal would not entail criminal consequences as far as the official is concerned’ and that ‘an official shall continue to be bound by this obligation after leaving the service’. 81 In addition, according to the case-law, requests submitted by an agent or official seeking permission to send documents to courts cannot be examined by the appointing authority except in the light of that article (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2011, Strack v Commission, F‑132/07, EU:F:2011:4, paragraph 65). 82 Furthermore, the legislature has not made the requests of officials seeking permission to use in legal proceedings information they gained knowledge of in the exercise of their duties subject to a specific procedure. Consequently, those requests, referred to in the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, must be examined in the procedural conditions set by Article 90(1) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2011, Strack v Commission, F‑132/07, EU:F:2011:4, paragraph 66). There is no formal requirement when an official requests permission to disclose, in legal proceedings, information which the official knows on account of his or her duties (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 March 2022, NV v eu-LISA, T‑661/20, EU:T:2022:154, paragraph 143). 83 In addition, as regards an action brought against a decision rejecting a request to use documents under Article 19 of the Staff Regulations, it is apparent from the case-law that, for such an action to be admissible, the official or agent concerned must submit a prior complaint in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations (see, to that effect, order of 10 June 1987, Pomar v Commission, 317/85, EU:C:1987:267, paragraphs 9 to 11). 84 In the present case, it should be noted that, in her request to use documents, the applicant ‘[sought] the permission to use the documents appended to [the present] complaint in … relevant proceedings in order to raise [her] complaint before competent jurisdictions outside [the] EU’. In addition, it is possible to discern from the decision to refuse the use of documents that that request concerned documents which formed part of the case file of two OLAF investigations and that, consequently, that request referred to documents containing information of which she had knowledge by reason of her duties, within the meaning of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations. 85 In those circumstances, and since it is apparent from the wording of Article 19 of the Staff Regulations and the case-law cited in paragraph 82 above that a request to use documents by an official seeking to obtain permission ‘to use in legal proceedings information [she] gained knowledge of in the exercise of [her] duties’ is not subject to either a specific procedure or particular formal requirement, it must be found that the competent appointing authority did not err in law by finding, in the decision to refuse the use of documents, that the applicant’s request came within the scope of that article, even if that request had been made following the request for assistance and without explicit reference to that article. 86 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the applicant did not dispute the decision to refuse the use of documents or submit a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations against it. It follows that, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 82 and 83 above, the applicant did not fulfil her obligation to submit a prior complaint in that regard and did not make her action subject to the proper conduct of the pre-litigation procedure and the prescribed time limits that procedure provides for in accordance with Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations. 87 In that regard, the applicant cannot rely on the fact that she had not been put in a position to understand or had not been provided with sufficient guidance on the appropriate procedural steps, in so far as the decision rejecting the request to use the documents informed her explicitly that ‘the rejection of this request [could] be contested by way of a complaint under Article 90(2) of the [Staff Regulations].’ 88 It follows from all of the foregoing that the action is inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the decision to refuse the use of documents. 2. The merits of the claim for annulment directed against the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 89 The applicant submits, in essence, that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 is unlawful and vitiated by several irregularities linked to the fact that the competent appointing authority did not respect the criteria laid down by the Staff Regulations for adopting a transfer decision and that, in her view, it wanted to punish her by transferring her to another post. In essence, in a first plea in law, she claims that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 was not made entirely in the interests of the service as required by Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations and that the Commission failed to fulfil its duty to have regard for the interests of officials with respect to her by not taking due account of her interests. In a second plea in law, the applicant submits, first, that the Commission infringed the principle of equivalence of posts and did not ensure that that transfer was not a disguised penalty, which infringed the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to respect for private life, and, secondly, that the content of the decision was influenced by officials with a conflict of interests with regard to her, whom she alleges participated in the conduct of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1. In a third plea in law, she claims that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 undermines her dignity and integrity, as protected by the Staff Regulations. (a) The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations, breach of the duty to have regard for the interests of officials and disregard for the interests of the service 90 The applicant claims that the competent appointing authority infringed Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations. In her view, the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 was not based solely on the interests of the service. In so far as the actions which she took, namely the alleged undue access, were intended only to ensure the justice, transparency and fairness provided for in Article 47 of the Charter, her transfer to another post, she argues, cannot serve the interests of the service. Furthermore, she submits that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 is a measure adversely affecting her under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations and that, by classifying that measure as a ‘transfer decision’, the competent appointing authority sought to ‘[distort] the real impact’, namely the negative consequences of that decision. 91 In addition, the applicant claims, first, that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 harmed her career, her reputation and her well-being and that the competent appointing authority made a manifest error of assessment by not recognising the lasting negative consequences of that decision and, secondly, that the Commission breached its duty to have regard for the interests of officials by not taking due account of her interests and personal situation. Lastly, she criticises the Commission for relying on the discretion granted to the administration as regards evaluating the interests of the service for the purpose of escaping review by the Court. 92 The Commission disputes those arguments. 93 As a preliminary point, as regards the applicant’s argument that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 is a measure adversely affecting her, while the competent appointing authority sought to ‘[distort] the real impact’, namely the negative consequences of that measure, by classifying it as a ‘transfer decision’, it should be noted that the Commission in no way disputes in its pleadings the fact that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 is a measure adversely affecting the applicant. In addition, it is clear that the applicant does not explain how the Commission had sought to ‘distort’ the allegedly negative impact of that decision by classifying it as a ‘transfer’, since a decision to transfer an official implies, according to the case-law, a transfer to another post (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 May 1998, W v Commission, T‑78/96 and T‑170/96, EU:T:1998:112, paragraphs 46 to 48 and 50 and the case-law cited, and of 6 July 2022, OC v EEAS, T‑681/20, not published, EU:T:2022:422, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, since it is not sufficiently supported or well founded, that argument must be rejected. 94 As regards the argument that the competent appointing authority did not base its transfer decision of 24 March 2023 solely on the criterion of the interests of the service, it should be borne in mind that the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations provides that ‘[the administration] shall, acting solely in the interest of the service and without regard to nationality, assign each official by appointment or transfer to a post in his function group which corresponds to his grade.’ 95 According to established case-law, the institutions have a broad discretion to organise their departments to suit the tasks entrusted to them and to assign the staff available to them in the light of such tasks, on condition that the staff are assigned in the interest of the service. That broad discretion is exercised on condition, however, as follows from Article 7 of the Staff Regulations, that such assignment be in the interest of the service and the post in the function group correspond to the grade (see judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 195 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 1984, Lux v Court of Auditors, 69/83, EU:C:1984:225, paragraph 17). 96 As regards the definition of the interests of the service, it must be recalled that that concept, within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations, relates to the smooth running of the institution in general and, in particular, to the specific requirements of the post to be filled (see judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 196 and the case-law cited). 97 In addition, the obligation for the EU institutions to assign their staff solely in the interests of the service applies even where it is likely to entail a change in the place of employment not desired by the staff member concerned (see judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 197 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 1996, Aubineau v Commission, T‑102/95, EU:T:1996:104, paragraph 28). Moreover, reassignment in the interest of the service does not require the consent of the official concerned (see judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 197 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 1998, Costacurta v Commission, T‑98/96, EU:T:1998:6, paragraph 40). 98 Furthermore, having regard to the extent of the institutions’ discretion in evaluating the interests of the service, the review undertaken by the Court of whether the condition relating to the interests of the service has been respected must be confined to the question whether the administration remained within reasonable limits and did not use its discretion in a manifestly wrong way (judgment of 20 October 2021, ZU v Commission, T‑671/18 and T‑140/19, not published, EU:T:2021:715, paragraph 198; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 2004, Meister v OHIM, T‑76/03, EU:T:2004:319, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). 99 Lastly, as regards a decision of the competent appointing authority resulting in the transfer of an official to another post in the interests of the service for the duration of an investigation, it has already been held that, since the Commission has determined that the status quo could be prejudicial to the proper conduct of the investigation it had decided upon, it was entitled to consider, in the exercise of its broad discretion, that the interest of the service justified a transfer decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2007, Clotuche v Commission, T‑339/03, EU:T:2007:36, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 7 February 2007, Caló v Commission, T‑118/04 and T‑134/04, EU:T:2007:37, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). 100 In the present case, it is apparent from the statement of reasons given in the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 that the competent appointing authority found that, in so far as that investigation concerns the allegation that the applicant accessed confidential OLAF information unduly, it was necessary to transfer her to a new post where she did not have access to either OLAF’s database or its internal secure network for the duration of the investigation. For that purpose, the competent appointing authority decided to transfer her to another unit, which involved moving her place of work to another office, close to that unit, while allowing her to continue working within OLAF without having the need to access either OLAF’s database or its secure network to complete her tasks. 101 Accordingly, it must be found that that decision establishes a measure that is purely preventative, as it seeks to ensure the proper conduct of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, and temporary, as it lasts for the duration of that investigation. 102 Therefore, in the light of the statement of reasons in the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 (see paragraph 100 above) and the case-law cited in paragraphs 95 to 99 above, it must be found that the competent appointing authority was entitled to consider, within the limits of its broad discretion and in the interests of the service, that the serene and proper conduct of the investigation in question would be best guaranteed if the applicant relinquished her duties within her former unit for the duration of the investigation and that keeping her in that unit would constitute a situation prejudicial to the proper functioning of the service. In those circumstances, by assigning the applicant to a new office, the competent appointing authority acted with diligence and with a view to effectively managing available resources. 103 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 did not serve the interests of the service, in so far as her alleged undue access to confidential OLAF information, which prompted investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, was intended to ensure the justice, transparency and fairness provided for in Article 47 of the Charter, it must be found that that argument is, in reality, closely linked to the challenge of the merits of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1, which is currently ongoing, and, accordingly, is inadmissible in the absence of a definitive measure having an adverse effect, in the same way that the present action is inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the decision dismissing the irregularities vitiating investigation OC/2022/0394/A1. 104 In addition, as regards the applicant’s argument that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 harmed her career, her reputation and her well-being, the Commission is correct to contend that the applicant has not provided any specific explanation or any prima facie evidence which could demonstrate the existence of such harm. Accordingly, since it is not sufficiently supported, that argument must be rejected. 105 Lastly, as regards the alleged breach, by the Commission, of its duty to have regard for the interests of officials and the alleged failure to take into account the interests of the applicant, it should be borne in mind that, according to established case-law, the administration’s duty to have regard for the interests of its staff reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations that the Staff Regulations have created in relations between the public authority and public service employees. That balance implies in particular that when the appointing authority takes a decision concerning the situation of a member of staff or an official, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned (see judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgments of 28 May 1980, Kuhner v Commission, 33/79 and 75/79, EU:C:1980:139, paragraph 22, and of 6 July 2022, OC v EEAS, T‑681/20, not published, EU:T:2022:422, paragraph 100). 106 In the context of the reassignment or transfer of an official, the authority has a duty to have regard for the interests of officials which requires it to conduct an effective, full and detailed review of the situation in the light of the interests of the service and of the official concerned, whose interests may be reflected in any comments he or she makes about the information submitted to him or her (judgments of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 81, and of 26 March 2014, CP v Parliament, F‑8/13, EU:F:2014:44, paragraph 82). 107 However, fulfilling the duty to have regard for the interests of officials cannot result in the assignment of officials according to their personal preferences alone since they are not granted, in any event, a right to exercise or retain specific duties. Accordingly, the requirements arising from the administration’s duty to have regard for the interests of officials cannot prevent it from adopting the reassignment or transfer measures which it considers necessary, since the filling of each post must be based primarily on the interests of the service (see judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited; see, to that effect, judgment of 25 November 1976, Küster v Parliament, 123/75, EU:C:1976:162, paragraph 10). 108 In the present case, as regards the taking into account of the applicant’s interests by the competent appointing authority, as referred to in the letter accompanying the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, namely her well-being and serene working conditions, it should be noted that investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 had led to an inspection of her former office, which resulted in various documents being seized, and that, in those circumstances, keeping her in that office while the investigation was ongoing could probably have impeded the exercise of her duties. It is also appropriate to note that her new office is, in the interests of the service, located close to her new unit, which allows for the completion of her tasks and her integration. 109 Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 105 to 107 above, since the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 was adopted in the interests of the service (see paragraph 102 above) while preserving the interests of the applicant, the competent appointing authority cannot be criticised for adopting the transfer measure at issue, particularly since the filling of each post must be based primarily on the interests of the service. 110 In those circumstances, it must be found that, by adopting the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, the competent appointing authority has not failed to fulfil its duty to have regard for the interests of officials with respect to the applicant. 111 Accordingly, it is necessary to reject the first plea in law in its entirety as unfounded. (b) The second plea in law, alleging the existence of both a disguised penalty and a conflict of interests and infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts 112 The applicant submits, first of all, that the competent appointing authority infringed, in the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, the principle of equivalence of posts. According to her, the competent appointing authority neglected to examine whether the transfer in question could entail a demotion, adversely affect her career progression or impede her ability to exercise her duties effectively. She claims, next, that that decision represents a disguised penalty which infringes the principle of the presumption of innocence and her right to respect for her private life, as protected by Articles 4 and 9 of Regulation No 883/2013, and that the Commission failed to fulfil its duty to provide assistance with respect to her. Lastly, she submits that that decision might have been influenced by officials with a conflict of interests in investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 (see paragraph 17 above). 113 The Commission disputes those arguments. (1) The infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts 114 As regards the alleged infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts, it should be borne in mind that officials must be assigned in compliance with the conditions set by Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations, solely in the interest of the service and in conformity with the principle of equivalence of posts (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 March 1988, Hecq v Commission, 19/87, EU:C:1988:165, paragraph 6 and the case-law cited, and of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). 115 In that regard, the rule of correspondence between grade and post, set out in particular in Article 7 of the Staff Regulations, necessitates, where the duties of an official or member of staff are changed, a comparison not between his or her current and previous duties, but between his or her current duties and his or her grade (see judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 May 1998, W v Commission, T‑78/96 and T‑170/96, EU:T:1998:112, paragraph 103). 116 Accordingly, the rule of correspondence between grade and post does not preclude a decision from entailing the assignment of new duties which, although they differ from those previously exercised and are perceived by the party concerned as bringing about a reduction of her responsibilities, are nonetheless consistent with a post corresponding to her grade. Therefore, an effective diminution of the responsibilities of an official infringes the rule of correspondence between grade and post only if, taken together, her new duties clearly fall short of those corresponding to her grade and post, taking account of their character, importance and scope (see judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 March 1988, Hecq v Commission, 19/87, EU:C:1988:165, paragraph 7). 117 Lastly, while the Staff Regulations aim to guarantee officials the grade obtained and also a post corresponding to that grade, they do not grant officials any right to a specific post, but, on the contrary, leave to the appointing authority the power to assign officials, in the interest of the service, to the various posts corresponding to their grade (see judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 May 1998, W v Commission, T‑78/96 and T‑170/96, EU:T:1998:112, paragraph 102). Furthermore, while it is true that the administration has every interest in assigning officials to posts which accord with their particular aptitudes and personal preferences, they are not granted a right to exercise or retain specific duties or to refuse any other duties relating to their type of post (see judgment of 4 December 2018, Schneider v EUIPO, T‑560/16, not published, EU:T:2018:872, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 May 1998, W v Commission, T‑78/96 and T‑170/96, EU:T:1998:112, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited). 118 In the present case, it is apparent from the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 that the applicant is an official at grade AD 7, step 1, initially assigned to a first unit of OLAF, who was transferred to another unit of OLAF. In that regard, due to that change of unit, the applicant no longer has access to OLAF’s database or its internal secure network (see paragraph 100 above). 119 In addition, while it follows from the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 that the applicant’s grade was not affected, that decision, nevertheless, led to her post being changed as a result of her change of unit. In that regard, it is clear from the job description that the applicant, formerly an ‘investigator’, became a ‘policy officer’ and that the ‘overall purpose’ of her post changed from ‘investigate cases … including financial irregularities and serious misconduct’ to ‘contribute to the implementation of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy’. It is also apparent from those descriptions that her previous post and her new post both come under the ‘generic domain’ of anti-fraud and each require prior experience and expertise in anti-fraud. 120 Accordingly, where, as in the present case, a change of post entails a change of duties, it should be recalled that it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 115 and 117 above that compliance with the principle of equivalence of posts means, in the present case, confirming whether the applicant’s current duties are consistent with a post corresponding to her grade. 121 In that regard, the new duties entrusted to the applicant, which are listed in the job description, include, first, policy implementation tasks, in particular advising Commission services in drawing up and implementing their anti-fraud strategies, secondly, policy coordination, in particular advising Commission services on anti-fraud related issues linked to Member States, and, thirdly, policy analysis, in particular, contributing to the meetings of the Commission’s Fraud Detection and Prevention Network. 122 Accordingly, it is clearly apparent from the description of those new duties that they represent a set of tasks which require a high degree of technical competence and entail an elevated level of responsibility, which correspond to the applicant’s AD 7 grade. 123 In addition, as regards the fact that the applicant no longer has access to OLAF’s database or its internal secure network on account of that change of duties, it must be noted that, even if that loss of access may be perceived by her as a reduction of her responsibilities, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 116 above, the applicant perceiving it as such cannot in itself establish infringement by the competent appointing authority of the principle of equivalence of posts. Moreover, her new duties, given their scope, their complexity and the level of responsibility they entail (see paragraphs 121 and 122 above), do not bring about a reduction of her responsibilities and do not clearly fall short of duties corresponding to her grade and post. 124 For all of those reasons, it must be found that the applicant’s argument alleging infringement by the competent appointing authority of the principle of equivalence of posts must be rejected as unfounded. (2) The existence of a disguised penalty 125 As regards the alleged equivalence of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 to a disguised penalty, it should, first of all, be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where a transfer or reassignment decision is found to be in the interests of the service and in conformity with the rule of equivalence of posts, according to which an official may be assigned only to a post corresponding to his or her grade in his or her function group, it cannot constitute a disciplinary measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October 2004, Meister v OHIM, T‑76/03, EU:T:2004:319, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited, and of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 24) or be vitiated by a misuse of powers (judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 24; see also, to that effect, judgments of 14 July 1983, Nebe v Commission, 176/82, EU:C:1983:214, paragraph 25, and of 17 November 1998, Gómez de Enterría y Sanchez v Parliament, T‑131/97, EU:T:1998:263, paragraph 62). 126 It follows that, where a transfer or reassignment decision has been taken in the interests of the service and in conformity with the principle of equivalence of posts, it cannot be regarded as involving a disguised disciplinary penalty against the official (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October 2004, Meister v OHIM, T‑76/03, EU:T:2004:319, paragraph 130, and of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 60). 127 Furthermore, an assignment decision adopted in the interests of the service cannot be regarded as being, at the same time, a disciplinary decision if, first, it does not objectively have an adverse effect on the staff member’s professional position and if, secondly, it is not intended to censure the official concerned for a failure to comply with the rules of the Staff Regulations capable of giving rise to a disciplinary measure (judgment of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 24; see also, to that effect, judgment of 27 January 1983, List v Commission, 263/81, EU:C:1983:17, paragraph 9). 128 In the present case, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 125 and 126 above, the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 cannot be regarded as a disguised disciplinary penalty, since it was taken in the interests of the service, to ensure the proper conduct of the investigation and in compliance with the principle of equivalence of posts (see paragraphs 102, 103 and 122 to 124 above). 129 In any event, the applicant does not provide any explanation or evidence capable of demonstrating that that decision was adopted on the basis of particular circumstances, indicating discriminatory treatment or a misuse of powers with respect to her, or that that decision objectively adversely affected her professional position. Furthermore, the applicant does not explain how the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 would represent a disciplinary measure in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 127 above. 130 Moreover, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 states that she was transferred due to the ongoing investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 does not constitute an infringement of the principle of the presumption of innocence provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 883/2013. It has already been held that a decision to reassign an official temporarily, while an OLAF investigation is ongoing, was not intended to penalise the official, but was a precautionary measure, the duration of which was restricted to that of OLAF’s investigation, and that, consequently, it did not infringe the principle of the presumption of innocence (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 May 2007, Giraudy v Commission, F‑23/05, EU:F:2007:75, paragraphs 143 and 147). 131 In addition, it must be found that the statement of reasons given in that decision, from which it is apparent that the transfer is a provisional and precautionary measure, does not entail any value judgment regarding the conduct of the applicant which prompted the investigation in question and at no point prejudges a disciplinary offence on her part. 132 As regards the alleged failure by the Commission to fulfil its duty to provide assistance in respect of the applicant in the face of retaliation which she had allegedly suffered in the form of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the duty to provide assistance implies intervening with all necessary energy in the presence of an incident incompatible with the orderly and smooth running of the service. The purpose of the duty to provide assistance referred to in Article 24 of the Staff Regulations is to provide officials and other staff members in active employment with security for the present and the future so that, in the general interest of the service, they can perform their duties to the best of their ability (see judgment of 14 July 2021, AI v ECDC, T‑65/19, EU:T:2021:454, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited). 133 In the present case, in the light of the fact that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 cannot be classified as a disguised penalty (see paragraphs 128 to 131 above), that decision cannot be regarded as constituting a retaliation against the applicant. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument alleging a failure of the Commission to fulfil its duty of assistance must be rejected as unfounded. 134 Lastly, as regards the applicant’s claim that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 infringed the right to respect for her private life, it must be found that the applicant merely invoked that infringement without supporting that claim or presenting any evidence in support thereof which was capable of demonstrating the harm allegedly caused. Consequently, since it is not sufficiently supported, that argument must also be rejected. (3) The existence of a conflict of interests 135 As regards the alleged conflict of interests vitiating the content of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, it should be borne in mind, first of all, that the need for impartiality, required of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in carrying out their missions, is intended to guarantee equality of treatment, which is at the heart of the European Union. That requirement is intended, inter alia, to avoid a situation where there could be a conflict of interest on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union. Having regard to the fundamental importance of ensuring the independence and probity of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union as regards both their internal functioning and external reputation, the requirement of impartiality covers all circumstances in which an official or agent who is called upon to decide on an issue must reasonably consider that issue as being of such a nature as to be viewed by third parties as a possible source of impairment of his or her independence in that matter (see judgment of 27 March 2019, August Wolff and Remedia v Commission, C‑680/16 P, EU:C:2019:257, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 136 It is in the light of the foregoing that it is necessary to examine whether, in the present case, the competent appointing authority has infringed the principle of impartiality on account of a conflict of interests alleged by the applicant which, she argues, led to the alleged participation in investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 of officials involved in the adoption of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023. 137 In that regard, it must be noted that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 was adopted solely by the Director of OLAF and that he also signed a letter dated that same day, addressed to the applicant, explaining that that decision had been adopted as a preventative measure pending the conclusion of investigation OC/2022/0394/A1. Furthermore, those two documents were delivered by hand to the applicant on 24 March 2023 by an OLAF Human Resources official. In addition, it is not apparent from the documents before the Court or from the decision of 24 March 2023 that the Director of OLAF had, in so doing, demonstrated a bias or a personal prejudice with regard to the applicant or that he had participated in that investigation. 138 Accordingly, it is clearly apparent from that information that none of the officials involved in investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 and, in particular, none of the investigators or officials who participated in the inspection carried out in the applicant’s office was involved in the drafting or adoption of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 and that, consequently, none of them could have influenced the content of that decision. 139 Moreover, in those circumstances, it must be found that the applicant has still failed to provide any evidence and, accordingly, demonstrate how that decision and the decision rejecting the complaint revealed the existence of prejudices with respect to her following that investigation. 140 Consequently, in the light of the specific circumstances which led to the adoption of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 as set out above, it must be found that the competent appointing authority offered sufficient guarantees of impartiality. 141 Therefore, the argument put forward by the applicant in that regard must be rejected as unfounded. 142 It follows from all of the foregoing that the second plea in law must be rejected in its entirety as unfounded. (c) The third plea in law, alleging the undermining of the applicant’s dignity and integrity 143 The applicant claims that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 undermines her dignity and integrity as an official, thus infringing Articles 1 and 12 of the Staff Regulations and Article 12a(3) thereof. 144 The Commission does not respond to that argument in its pleadings. 145 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that a transfer decision does not constitute psychological harassment or establish a strategy of professional isolation with regard to an official, to the extent that, by complying with the principle of equivalence of posts and responding to the interests of the service, the rationale of that decision cannot be regarded, in and of itself, as undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of the official (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 October 2017, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑649/16, not published, EU:T:2017:736, paragraph 63, and of 18 May 2009, Meister v OHIM, F‑138/06 and F‑37/08, EU:F:2009:48, paragraph 116). 146 In the present case, since the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 was taken in the interests of the service (see paragraph 102 above) and complied with the principle of equivalence of posts (see paragraph 124 above), that decision cannot, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 145 above, be regarded as undermining the applicant’s integrity and dignity as an official. 147 It follows that the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded. 148 In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to reject in their entirety the claims for annulment directed against the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, as confirmed by the decision rejecting the complaint. E. The claim for compensation 149 The applicant seeks compensation for the non-material and material damage she claims to have suffered due, in particular, to the adoption of the decision rejecting the complaint and a negative impact on her career and well-being. 150 With regard to the non-material damage, the applicant estimates that damage at EUR 25 000. She relies, in essence, on the permanent stigmatisation within her work environment and damage to her professional reputation, to the detriment of her well-being and mental health. This is allegedly the consequence, in essence, of the non-compliance, by the competent appointing authority, with the judgment of 25 June 2020, XH v Commission (T‑511/18, EU:T:2020:291), and of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, as confirmed by the decision rejecting the complaint, allegedly vitiated by irregularities and terminating her employment by forcing her to be transferred to a post within OLAF. 151 As regards the material damage, the applicant does not specify the amount which corresponds to that prejudice. Nevertheless, she claims, in essence, to have suffered damage resulting from legal fees and potential losses in career progression. She submits that the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 and the ongoing investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 harmed her career progression, which had a negative impact on her financial situation. In that regard, she claims that the damage resulting from that investigation, although it is still ongoing, is not hypothetical, since the irregularities affecting it are already capable of causing her harm. 152 The Commission disputes those arguments. 153 It should be borne in mind that it follows from settled case-law regarding claims for compensation in staff cases that the European Union may incur non-contractual liability only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely: (i) the institution’s conduct must be unlawful, (ii) actual damage must have been suffered, and (iii) there must be a causal link between the conduct and the damage alleged. Those three conditions are cumulative, which means that if one of them is not satisfied, the European Union cannot be held liable (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 42). 154 Moreover, it is settled case-law that claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected to the extent that they are closely linked to the claims for annulment which have themselves been rejected as inadmissible or unfounded (judgments of 5 February 1997, Ibarra Gil v Commission, T‑207/95, EU:T:1997:12, paragraph 88, and of 22 March 2018, Popotas v Ombudsman, T‑581/16, EU:T:2018:169, paragraph 171). 155 In the present case, since the applicant’s request for annulment of the transfer decision of 24 March 2023, as confirmed by the decision rejecting the complaint, has been rejected in its entirety, the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the Commission’s alleged conduct is not satisfied, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 153 above. 156 In that regard, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 154 above, since the claims for annulment raised by the applicant have been rejected, the claim for compensation for the non-material and material damage must also be rejected. 157 In any event, as regards, more specifically, the applicant’s claim relating to the ‘legal fees’ she claims to have incurred, it must be borne in mind that an application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by an EU institution must state the evidence from which the conduct alleged against the institution may be identified, the reasons why the applicant considers that a causal link exists between that conduct and the damage which she claims to have suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage (see judgments of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited, and of 22 November 2018, Brahma v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑603/16, EU:T:2018:820, paragraph 219 and the case-law cited; judgment of 2 October 2024, XH v Commission, T‑11/23, not published, appeal pending, EU:T:2024:665, paragraph 151). 158 In that regard, it must be held that the damage which the applicant alleges in that respect is imprecise. It is not possible to determine with certainty, first, whether the use of the term ‘legal fees’ refers to the fees which she allegedly incurred for her defence in the course of her various pre-litigation procedures and legal proceedings and, secondly, to specifically which of the former such fees allegedly relate. The applicant also does not specify how those fees are delimited in time. In addition, in the present case, the applicant does not identify in a precise manner the scope of the material damage for which she seeks compensation, since she merely states in that regard that ‘a provisional amount is to be suggested, but this should be carefully examined’. 159 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 157 above, the claim for compensation for material damage referred to in paragraph 151 above, concerning the damage allegedly suffered on account of alleged legal fees, must be rejected as inadmissible on account of the failure to identify, in the application, the nature and extent of the material damage allegedly suffered. 160 Accordingly, the claim for compensation made by the applicant must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. IV. Costs 161 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 162 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the action; 2. Orders XH to pay the costs. da Silva Passos Półtorak Pynnä Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 September 2025. V. Di Bucci S. Papasavvas Registrar President Table of contents I. Background and facts subsequent to the dispute II. Forms of order sought III. Law A. Subject matter of the action B. The admissibility of the offers of evidence made by the applicant, on 3 June, 29 August and 7 October 2024, after the present action was brought C. The admissibility of the action D. Claims for annulment 1. The admissibility of the claims for annulment (a) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision dismissing the irregularities vitiating investigation OC/2022/0394/A1 (b) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision refusing the request for assistance (c) The admissibility of the claim for annulment directed against the decision to refuse the use of documents 2. The merits of the claim for annulment directed against the transfer decision of 24 March 2023 (a) The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations, breach of the duty to have regard for the interests of officials and disregard for the interests of the service (b) The second plea in law, alleging the existence of both a disguised penalty and a conflict of interests and infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts (1) The infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts (2) The existence of a disguised penalty (3) The existence of a conflict of interests (c) The third plea in law, alleging the undermining of the applicant’s dignity and integrity E. The claim for compensation IV. Costs * Language of the case: English.