Consumer complaint received 2022-09-17
Product: Checking or savings account — Checking account
Issue: Managing an account — Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed
Company: JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (NY)

The bank I am having problems with is Chase. On XX/XX/2022, I got involved in an APP banking scam. I received an email that I had been auto-debited for a service I, actually, use- and, if I didn't want that, I should call for a refund. I called ... and ended up being " hacked '' into believing that $ XXXX had " accidentally '' been transferred into my checking account. And the guy who made the " mistake, '' fearful of losing his job, had a way to get that $ XXXX back to his company without anyone knowing. I just wanted that money OUT of my account, so I said, whatever, let 's just fix this thing. His " way '' was to authorize him to create a XXXX account, by which I would transfer the first $ XXXX of the $ XXXX BACK to his company 's bank XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX is what I was lead to believe it was ), using a name and email that appeared to be associated with XXXX. Chase canceled that $ XXXX transfer and locked my account. When I called to unlock, of course I told Chase it was a legitimate transfer and should be put through next time it was attempted : that is what I had been lead to believe. Chase told me to wait 2 hours to try again... I told the scammer... and we agreed to meet again in 2 hours. But he came back early and made the XXXX transfer himself. When i discovered this, It took me a long time and a lot of research to figure out what had happened? Eventually, I got enough information to be able to safely say : a ) the scammer " hacked '' a phony c-prompt window for me to see the $ XXXX " accidentally '' get transferred, b ) then, he " hacked '' a phony XXXX  " statement '' with over $ XXXX in it, so I'd think that's where my refund was coming from ( and where the $ XXXX was going back to ) and ( this was the hardest one to figure out ), c ) the scammer " hacked '' into the javascript of my Chase checking page, where he changed my balance to appear to be increased by $ XXXX, and added a transaction line indicating a $ XXXX deposit. When I called Chase Fraud about the scam, before I could even think about reimbursements, I was tersely informed it wasn't Chase 's problem ( though maybe I should ask XXXX they might give me my money back ). Well, I think it IS their problem so, since the woman at Chase Fraud wasn't interested, I sent the details of the incident to Chase ( via XXXX ). The next day ( XX/XX/XXXX ), I received a short letter from Chase informing me that I'd been in a " discussion '' and had made an " agreement '' and Chase wasn't going to do anything for me, so... case closed. All news to me. I, then, wrote to Chase Corporate, twice. The second one was a week ago, but ... no response. Which is why I am, now, here. To say : I believe Chase owes me a $ XXXX reimbursement ... because Chase failed to protect me from this scammer. And I say this because : Chase 's " protection '' seems to be in the " canceling/locking/questioning legitimacy '' process. The problem is, that process works against only one type of scam : the one where the customer doesn't know someone is in their account. Canceling and asking about the transfer, in that case, informs the customer there is a problem and immediately allows them to fix it. But that " protection '' doesn't address APP scams in any way : APP scams are all about making the victim an active participant in the scam. So, asking me if I authorized the transfer is useless : of course I do. I've been " hacked '' into believing a non-reality. And Chase should be aware of this : they are the one with the " experts '' to advise them on how to protect their customers. So why haven't they upgraded their " protection '' to address APP scams, too? In fact, in my letters to Corporate, I have suggested that, if Chase really wants to protect its customers from EVERY scam, they need to become aggressively pro-active : they need to provide information. Such as " We have canceled this money transfer because large money transfers have been found to indicate a possible bank scam in progress. '' That would give the customer information enough to stop and consider the possibility that they're not seeing things straight : that what they think they're doing may not be what they really ARE doing. I know for a fact that, had Chase said that to me, I would NOT have lost my $ XXXX. I would have stopped and said, " Wait a minute ... '' and started figuring out how ever did I get to THAT place to do THAT thing I was doing. Just a little information of which average customers are not aware : that, when your money is involved, there very well might be bad people trying to do bad things to get it from you. We're at a time in history where, for their own self-defense, people need to be informed, made aware. So they don't go blindly down the wrong path ... that some scammer has glad-handed them to. Additionally, I'd like to point out that Chase 's " protection '' protocol is so weak ... the scammer I dealt with actually USED it in his scam. To wit : that first money transfer was the " set up '' for him to move the second one smoothly through the Chase system. In other words, canceling the first transfer actually " opened the door '' for the second, REAL transfer to just mosey on through. So, if for no other reason than protecting ITSELF from scammers making it look weak and gormless, I'd think Chase would start using their " experts '' to figure out some new ways to, not just be better " husbands '' to their customers ' money, but to surprise- and foil- these APP hacker/scammers. 

[ I have attached a copy of the last letter I sent to Chase Corporate ; a copy of the Chase " denial '' letter ; and a screenshot of the phony c-prompt window " created '' ( hacked ) for me to see the $ XXXX transfer. ]