Consumer complaint received 2020-12-10
Product: Debt collection — Mortgage debt
Issue: Attempts to collect debt not owed — Debt was result of identity theft
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (IL)

Dear CFPB, Please find my follow up Complaint against XXXX XXXX who stole my property and my money though the chain of fictitious intermediaries who posed as Lenders ( XXXX ), XXXX XXXX XXXX and fake Servicer Wells Fargo whose employees very professionally lie to Federal Authorities and defrauded by XXXX XXXX XXXX homeowners. 
I demand XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX and Wells Fargoto provide me accounting for the money proceeds from the sale and PROOF that these money were entrusted to XXXX XXXX as Trustee and Board of Directors ; and deposited in XXXX Trust XXXX XXXX account. 
I also demand a copy of releases of ANY liens after the sale since I became a victim of another racketeering activity by fake Servicer XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX who tried to collect from me on behalf of non-disclosed creditor AFTER my stolen property was illegally sold by XXXX XXXX who did not even knew who was his clients since all instructions were provided by the same XXXX XXXX XXXX system who hired lawyers to commit fraud upon the Court and perjuries. 
Under the law, EVEN IF the real default happened, the supposed creditor still must provide proof of any damages as well as satisfaction of the debt. None of it was ever provided to me. Not even purportedly original Note ( forged by XXXX XXXX ) Thus far, the banks have been selling property and then depositing the cash into an account controlled by a concealed investment bank notwithstanding the naming of the sham conduit claimant in whose name the foreclosure process was started. 
My transaction with XXXX XXXX was not a loan. It was a singe-time payment for me to PERFORM SERVICES to the wit issue a Promissory Note which XXXX XXXX indefinitely sold as DATA to investors who placed BETS not backed by ANY collateral. 
I was expected to return my compensation, with interest ( involuntary servitude aka SLAVERY ) plus return the property ( theft ) back to XXXX XXXX so they can defraud another homebuyer who is not in possession of stolen from me property. 
It is not a secret anymore that XXXX XXXX  Banks operate a giant criminal scheme, which created XXXX Crash which resulted in over {$31.00} XXXX bailouts for non-damaged parties ( like {$50.00} XXXX bailout to XXXX which in fact went to XXXX XXXX as a pure profit ) and millions of illegal foreclosures by Big Banks as additional revenue. Now they collapsed the economy again - and nobody on the Government level is even talking about it. 
The banks have been siphoning off trillions of dollars from the US economy for over 20 years. The level of Mayhem generated by the banks is virtually beyond human comprehension. But as a reference point for the scope of their illegal activities, consider this : there is about XXXX XXXX in XXXX currency worldwide. that is all the money there is. But the shadow banking market, which had XXXX in XXXX, now is estimated by most analysts to be in excess of {$1.00} quadrillion more than 15 times all the money in the world.

That makes the banks who make a market in this nominal stuff ( but treated as cash equivalents ) in a position far beyond the ability of anyone who wants to regulate them or otherwise keep their abuses in check. And the fact that much of the money that was siphoned out of the US economy is sitting in various off-shore locations makes control over the banks virtually impossible across political borders. 
With no control, the banks will not just do the same, they will escalate because that is what they do. It is already apparent that the availability of credit has lured workers into allowing their wages to be replaced by debt. At this point, the XXXX XXXX banks are in a position where they could and no doubt will find ways to present incentives for US consumers to take on more debt that in actuality is a wage for services rendered. The service rendered by consumers is issuing the necessary paperwork to establish a reference data point against which investors can place bets. The revenue from selling such bets is literally infinite. 
Meanwhile, the consumer who was lured into such transactions without knowledge of the real transaction is stuck with overpriced assets and is lured into strategies that create the illusion of delinquency, default, judgment, and sale of the property encumbered by liens. 
All of this happens because consumers believe they are taking on loans went in fact they have become partners in a business scheme in which consumers receive none of the profits and assume all of the risk of loss. 
Yet, Banks lawyer appear in the Courts when they try to get the money back that they paid to homeowners in exchange for starting a series of transactions in which unregulated securities were sold, on an infinite basis, to investors who were betting on future announcements of data performance by the issuer doing business under the name of a legally nonexistent trust because nothing had actually been entrusted to the named trustee of the named trust and LIE non-stop while none of the lawyers do not even know who is their actual clients all instructions are provided by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXX. 
In plain language all such assertions were false and all evidence of default was equally false. Such sales and the orders and judgments that permitted them were and remain void for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Such court actions are ultra vires. 

These illegal acts do not ripen with time. They are still void. It is the same with any wild deed. The money proceeds from such sales were paid to parties who neither intended nor received the money to reduce any debt owed by the homeowner ( s ). This was a for profit venture that succeeded by deceit, camouflage, manipulation and fabrication of documents, and false testimony. 

The courts have permitted this false securitization venture and false foreclosure venture to continue under the erroneous belief that the proceeds of foreclosure sales would eventually find their way into the hands of someone who had a loss arising from the failure or refusal of homeowners to make scheduled payments in accordance with a promissory note that was executed at the time of the closing of the transaction with the homeowners. This assumption was and remains completely and utterly false. 

Neither the debt nor the owner of any debt owed by the homeowner existed at the time of the foreclosure. The filing of such foreclosures was a malicious attempt to cover up a fraudulent scheme that was part direct fraud on investors and homeowners, and part Ponzi scheme. 

The goal of foreclosure was XXXX a ) to perpetuate the illusion of an existing established loan account receivable on the books and records of a valid legal creditor and ( b XXXX to generate funds for the foreclosure players including but not limited to some of the securitization players. In effect, each such foreclosure was a bonus lawsuit i.e., where the proceeds were used to pay bonuses and other compensation to people and companies who assisted in the scheme. 

Like other institutionalized practices in this countrys history that were eventually revoked and abandoned as abhorrent to simple notions of decency, law, justice and equity, the time has come for the courts to exercise their independence from executive policy and to apply the laws as they have existed for hundreds of years. 
Yet, Big Banks lawyers continue to present FALSE statements ( Lies and Perjuries ) to the Courts, along with forged documents, and in 99 % walk away with someones stolen home and all the money when they reinforce the myth that the debts exist and that there is a creditor who owns the debt. In fact, the process referred to as securitization is a process of liquidating any entry on the ledger of any company on which a receivable had appeared. 
The money never goes to the named claimant where the alleged claim was based upon securitization of the debt because the loan, debt, note, and mortgage were never securitized. ( Securitization means breaking up an asset into component parts that are sold to investors in pro-rata shares. Such sales never occurred. Securities were sold but they did not represent an ownership interest in any asset. ) Thus, Federal Reserves unlimited purchases of Mortgage Backed Securities ( over {$2.00} XXXX ) is another lie to keep this myth floating through the Courts. XXXX, XXXX and XXXX did not purchased any loans simply because here was no one who can sell them. All their Prospectuses are based on forward-looking statements such as we will, we shall but never we did. Moreover, GSEs and other Propsectuses specifically state that their securities are not related to mortgages. 
All so-called mortgages ( data about borrowers identity ) is processed via Federal Reserve Depository Trust Corporation who assign them to XXXX XXXX XXXX Big Banks sell BETS on performance of DATA which they control without any supervision. 
XXXX XXXX Transactions with Homeowners and other borrowers are Not Loans. 
It is incomprehensible to most people how they could get a loan and then not owe it. It is even more incomprehensible that there could be no creditor that could enforce any alleged obligation of the homeowner. After all, the homeowner signed a note which by itself creates an obligation. 
None of this seems to make sense. Yet on an intuitive level, most people understand that they got screwed in what they thought was a lending process. The reason for this disconnect is that most people have no reason to know what happens in the world of investment banking. 

First, every investment banker is merely a stockbroker. They do business with investors and other investment bankers. They do not do business with consumers who purchase goods and services or loans. The investment banker is generally not in the business of lending money. The investment banker is in the business of creating capital for new and existing businesses. They make their money by brokering transactions. They make the most money by brokering the sales of new securities including stocks and bonds. 

The compensation received by the investment banker for brokering a transaction varied from as little as 1 % or 2 % to as much as 20 %. The difference is whether they were brokering the sale of existing securities or underwriting new securities. Obviously, they had a very large incentive to broker the sale of new securities for which they would receive 7 to 10 times the compensation of brokering the sale of existing securities. 

But the Holy Grail of investment banking was devising some system in which the investment bank could issue a new security from a fictional entity and receive the entire proceeds of the offering. This is what happened in residential lending. And this way, they could receive 100 % of the offering instead of a brokerage commission. 

But as youll see below, by disconnecting the issuance of securities from the ownership of any perceived obligation from consumers, investment bankers put themselves in a position in which they could issue securities indefinitely without limit and without regard to the amount of the transaction with consumers ( homeowners ) or investors. 

In short, the goal was to make it appear as though loans have been securitized even know they had not been securitized. In order for any asset to have been securitized it would need to have been sold off in parts to investors. What we see in the residential market is that no such sale ever occurred. Under modern law, a sale consists of offer, acceptance, payment, and delivery. So neither the investment bank nor any of the investors to whom they had sold securities, ever received a conveyance of any right, title, or interest to any debt, note, or mortgage from a homeowner. 

At the end of the day, the world was convinced that the homeowner had entered into a loan transaction while the investment banker had assured itself and its investors that it would be free from liability for violation of any lending laws as a lender. 

Neither of them maintained a loan account receivable on their own ledgers even though the capital used to pay homeowners originated from banks who loaned money to investment bankers ( based upon sales of certificates to investors ), which was then used to pay homeowners as little as possible from the pool of capital generated by the loans and certificate sales of mortgage-backed bonds. 

From the perspective of the investment banker, payment was made to the homeowner in exchange for participation in creating the illusion of a loan transaction despite the fact that there was no lender and no loan account. This was covered up by having more intermediaries claim rights as servicers and the creation of payment histories that implied but never asserted the existence or establishment of a loan account. Of course, they would need to dodge any questions relating to the identification of a creditor. That could be no creditor if there was no loan account. This tactic avoided perjury. 

Of course, this could only be accomplished through deceit. The consumer or homeowner, government regulators, and the world at large, would need to be convinced that the homeowner had entered into a secured loan transaction, even though no such thing had occurred. From the investment bankers perspective, they were paying the homeowner as little money as possible in order to create the foundation for their illusion. 

By calling it securitization of loans and selling it that way, they were able to create the illusion successfully. They were able to maintain the illusion because only the investment bankers had the information that would show that there was no business entity that maintained a ledger entry showing ownership of any debt, note, or mortgage against which losses and gains could or would be posted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ( and law ). This is called asymmetry of information and a great deal has been written on these pages and by many other authors. 

Since the homeowner had asked for a loan and had received money, it never occurred to any homeowner that he/she was not being paid for a loan or loan documents, but rather was being paid for a service. In order for the transaction to be perceived as a loan obviously, the homeowner had to become obligated to repay the money that had been paid to the homeowner. While this probably negated the consideration paid for the services rendered by the homeowner, nobody was any the wiser. 

As shown below, the initial sale of the initial certificates was only the beginning of an infinite supply of capital flowing to the investment bank who only had to pay off intermediaries to keep them in the fold. By virtue of the repeal of Glass-Steagall in XXXX, none of the certificates were regulated as securities ; so disclosure was a matter of proving fraud ( without any information ) in private actions rather than compliance with any statute. Further, the same investment banks were issuing and trading hedge contracts based upon the performance of the certificates as reported by the investment bank in its sole discretion. 

It was a closed market, free from any free market forces. The theory under which XXXX XXXX, Fed Chairman, was operating was that free-market forces would make any necessary corrections, This blind assumption prevented any further analysis of the concealed business plan of the investment banks a mistake that XXXX later acknowledged. 

There was no free market. Neither homeowners nor investors knew what they were getting themselves into. And based upon the level of litigation that emerged after the crash of XXXX, it is safe to say that the investors and homeowners were deprived of any bargaining position ( because the main aspects for their transition were being misrepresented and concealed ), Both should have received substantially more compensation and would have bargained for it assuming they were willing to even enter into the transaction highly doubtful assumption. 

The investment banks also purchased insurance contracts with extremely rare clauses basically awarding themselves payment for nonexistent losses upon their own declaration of an event relating to the performance of unregulated securities. So between the proceeds from the issuance of certificates and hedge contracts and the proceeds of insurance contracts investment bankers were generally able to generate at least {$12.00} for each {$1.00} that was paid to homeowners and around {$8.00} for each {$1.00} invested by investors in purchasing the certificates. 

So the end result was that the investment banker was able to pay homeowners without any risk of loss on that transaction while at the same time generating capital or revenue far in excess of any payment to the homeowner. Were it not for the need for maintaining the illusion of a loan transaction, the investment banks couldve easily passed on the opportunity to enforce the obligation allegedly due from homeowners. They had already made their money. 

There was no loss to be posted against any account on any ledger of any company if any homeowner decided not to pay the alleged obligation ( which was merely the return of the consideration paid for the homeowners services ). But that did not stop the investment banks from making claims for a bailout and making deals for loss sharing on loans they did not own and never owned. No such losses ever existed. 

Investment bankers first started looking at the consumer lending market back in XXXX. But there were huge obstacles in doing so. First of all none of them wanted the potential liability for violation of lending laws that had recently been passed on both local and Federal levels ( Truth in Lending Act et al. ) So they needed to avoid classification as a lender. They achieved this goal in 2 ways. First, they did not directly do business of any kind with any consumer or homeowner. They operated strictly through intermediaries that were either real or fictional. If the intermediary was real, it was a sham conduit a company with virtually no balance sheet or income statement that could be collapsed and disappeared if the scheme ever collapsed or just hit a bump in the road. 

Either way, the intermediary was not really a party to the transaction with the consumer or homeowner. It did not pay the homeowner nor did it receive payments from the homeowner. It did not own any obligations from the homeowner, according to modern law, because it had never paid value for the obligation. 

Under modern law, the transfer or conveyance of an interest in a mortgage without a contemporaneous transfer of ownership of the underlying obligation is a legal nullity in all states of the union. So transfers from the originator who posed as a virtual creditor do not exist in the eyes of the law if they are shown to be lacking in consideration paid for the underlying obligation, as per Article 9 203 Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all 50 states. The transfers were merely part of the illusion of maintaining the apparent existence of the loan transaction with homeowners. 

And this brings us to the strategies to be employed by homeowners in contesting foreclosures and evictions based on foreclosures. Based upon my participation in review of thousands of cases it is always true that any question regarding the existence and ownership of the alleged obligation is treated evasively because the obligation does not exist and can not be owned. 

In court, the failure to respond to such questions that are posed in proper form and in a timely manner is the foundation for the victory of the homeowner. Although there is a presumption of ownership derived from claims of delivery and possession of the note, the proponent of that presumption may not avail itself of that presumption if it fails to answer questions relating to rebutting the presumption of existence and ownership of the underlying obligation. Such cases usually ( not always ) result in either judgment for the homeowner or settlement with the homeowner on very favorable terms. 

The homeowner is not getting away with anything or getting a free house as the investment banks have managed to insert into public discourse. 

They are receiving just compensation for their participation in this game in which they were drafted without their knowledge or consent. Considering the 1200 % gain enjoyed by the investment banks which was enabled by the homeowners participation, the 8 % payment to the homeowner seems only fair. Further, if somehow the homeowners apparent obligation to pay the investment bank survives, it is subject to reformation, accounting, and computation as to the true balance and whether it is secured or not. 

The obligation to repay the consideration paid by the investment bank ( through intermediaries ) seems to be a negation of the consideration paid. If that is true, then there is neither a loan contract nor a securities contract. There is no contract because in all cases the offer and acceptance were based upon different terms ( and different deliveries ) without either consideration or execution of the terns expected by the homeowner under the advertised loan contract. 
Payments By Homeowners Do Not Reduce Loan Accounts Each time that a homeowner makes a payment, he or she is perpetuating the myth that they are part of an enforceable loan agreement. There is no loan agreement if there was no intention for anyone to be a lender and if no loan account receivable was established on the books of any business. The same result applies when a loan is originated in the traditional way but then acquired by a successor. The funding is the same as what is described above. The loan account receivable in the acquisition scenario is eliminated. 
Once the transaction is entered as a reference data point for securitization it no longer exists in form or substance. 
For the past 20 years, most homeowners have been making payments to companies that said they were servicers. Even at the point of a judicial gun ( court order ) these companies will fail or refuse to disclose what they do with the money after receipt. Because of lockbox contracts, these companies rarely have any access to pools of money that were generated through payments from homeowners. 

Like their counterparts in the origination of transactions with homeowners, they are sham conduits. Like the originators, they are built to be thrown under the bus when the scheme implodes. They will not report to you the identity of the party to whom they forward payments that they have received from homeowners because they have not received the payments from homeowners and they dont know where the money goes. 
* As I have described in some detail in other articles on this blog, with the help of some contributors, the actual accounting for payments received from homeowners is performed by third-party vendors, mostly under the control of XXXX XXXX. Through a series of sham conduit transfers, the pool of money ends up in companies controlled by the investment bank. Some of the money is retained domestically while some is recorded as an offshore off-balance-sheet transaction. 

In order to maintain an active market in which new certificates can be sold to investors, discretionary payments are made to investors who purchase the certificates. The money comes from two main sources. 

One source is payments made by homeowners and the other source is payments made by the investment bank regardless of whether or not they receive payments from the homeowners. The latter payments are referred to as servicer advances. Those payments come from a reserve pool established at the time of sale of the certificates to the investors, consisting of their own money, plus contributions from the investment bank funded by the sales of new certificates. They are not servicer advances. They are neither in advance nor did they come from a servicer. 

Since there is no loan account receivable owned by anyone, payments received from homeowners are not posted to such an account nor to the benefit of any owner of such an account ( or the underlying obligation ). Instead, accounting for such payments are either reported as return of capital or trading profits. In fact, such payments are neither return of capital nor trading profit. Since the investment bank has already zeroed out any potential loan account receivable, the only correct treatment of the payment for accounting purposes would be revenue. This includes the indirect receipt of proceeds from the forced sale of property in alleged foreclosures. 

By retaining total control over the accounting treatment for receipt of money from investors and homeowners, the investment bank retains total control over how much taxable income it reports. At present, most of the money that was received by the investment bank as part of this revenue scheme is still sitting offshore in various accounts and controlled companies. It is repatriated as needed for the purpose of reporting revenue and net income for investment banks whose stock is traded on the open market. By some fairly reliable estimates, the amount of money held by investment banks offshore is at least {$3.00} XXXX. In my opinion, the amount is much larger than that. 

As a baseline for corroboration of some of the estimates and projections contained in this article and many others, we should consider the difference between the current amount of all the fiat money in the world and the number and dollar amount of cash-equivalents in the shadow banking market. In XXXX, the number and dollar amount of such cash equivalents was zero. Today it is {$1.00} quadrillion around 15-20 times the amount of currency.

In the final analysis, if the truth was fully revealed, each foreclosure involves a foreclosure lawyer who does not have any idea whose interest he/she is representing. They may know that they are being paid from an account titled in the name of the self-proclaimed servicer. And because of that, they will often saying that they represent the servicer. They are pretty careful about not specifically saying that the named plaintiff in a judicial foreclosure or the named beneficiary in a nonjudicial foreclosure is their client. That is because they have no retainer agreement or even a relationship with the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary. Such lawyers have generally never spoken with anyone employed by the named plaintiff or the named beneficiary. 

When such lawyers and self-proclaimed servicers go to court-ordered mediation, neither one has the authority to do anything except show up. Proving that the lawyer does not actually represent the named trustee of the fictitious trust can be very challenging. 

If you find the cases in which investors have sued the named trustee of the alleged XXXX trust for failure to take action that wouldve protected the interest of the investors meaning that the trustee does not represent the investors, the investors are not beneficiaries of the XXXX, and that the trustee has no authority, right, title, or interest over any transaction with homeowners. Since the named trustee has no powers of a trustee to administer the affairs of any active trust with assets or a business operating, it is by definition not a trustee. For purposes of the foreclosure, it can not be a named party either much less the client of the attorney, behind whom the securitization players are hiding because of a judicial doctrine called judicial immunity. 

If you ask whether the lawyer who shows up is representing for example XXXX XXXX. Or you might ask whether XXXX XXXX is the client of the lawyer. The answer might surprise you. In some cases, the lawyer insisted that they represented XXXX or some other self-proclaimed servicer. 

I am writing to you because In less than XXXX days, most moratoriums on foreclosures will expire, unless they are extended. That means that hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of foreclosures will be filed or completed over the next year. And just like the XXXX meltdown, the securities brokerage firms that call themselves investment banks will be swarming like maggots over the carcass of millions of lives for demand back money received by homeowners was an inducement to enter into a concealed transaction in which the homeowner was not intended to receive any benefits. 

Borrowers asked for a loan but never received a loan. It was not part of a loan agreement because the money was received from players who had no intention of being lenders subject to statute and who had no intention of maintaining a loan account receivable against which payments could be received and posted. 
The attempt to get payment from homeowners is a concealed attempt to zero out the consideration paid to the homeowner for the concealed transaction. 
In short, the homeowner was attempting to purchase a loan with the note and mortgage but didnt get it. And the money paid to the homeowner was only temporary consideration for a concealed transaction in which the players received all the benefit and the homeowner took all the concealed risks. 
And just like the XXXX crash, the impact of the new wave of foreclosures and evictions based on such foreclosures will be felt for years to come. The full impact of the COVID pandemic wont be known for a long time. It could result in many more people falling into the grasp of greedy XXXX XXXX bankers.