Consumer complaint received 2023-04-28
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Mobile or digital wallet
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: Early Warning Services, LLC (CA)

The following is a description of the events and information leading up to my XX/XX/XXXX request of Zelle to investigate quickly XXXX, its owner and its activity on the Zelle system and the Zelle account receiving funds from my XXXX XXXX account on XX/XX/XXXX. 

On XX/XX/XXXX at approximately XXXX XXXX  PT, I received a call on my mobile phone, XXXX which was listed in documents at the XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX ) showing my telephone number and relationship to my son, a XXXX XXXX, from someone claiming to be a police officer from the XXXX Police. That person claimed that my son had been arrested and was currently held in XXXX in a police car pending transport to being booked and having a record for possession of XXXX XXXX XXXX  XXXX  and XXXX, which carried both felony and misdemeanor charges. However he was calling to tell me of a program that the police and the University had involving community service in a diversion program and not part of the to being porcessed ain the judicial system, a diversion program for alternate resolution of infractions of law than charging students and having them with arrest and processing records. However I needed to pay for this program and for bonds that were to be provided a total of {$2500.00} with {$1000.00} for the program and {$1500.00} to the bondsman for bonding the student. Both my wife, who was extremely agitated by this call, and I listened as two different people spoke about the situation with one of them called " Captain '' and the other called " Lieutenant ''. Finally in desperation and with much anxiety I sent via Zelle, {$1000.00} for participation in this supposed program from our XXXX XXXX account which has Zelle added as a money transfer service to a Zelle account at XXXX. 
After making the Zelle money transfer, my wife took my mobile phone and I went into another room to make a call on another phone to the XXXX  XXXX XXXX Police department to ask if the person calling himself Captain was in that department. The officer answering my call to XXXX, the same number as displayed on my mobile phone, indicated that they had no such person in their department. I immediately went into the next room where my wife was processing the second payment and told her to stop and took the phone and asked the individual for his telephone number and I would call him back. He hung up. If only we had the presence of mind to not be agitated and gullible upon receiving this very disturbing telephone call late at night we would not have sent {$1000.00} to XXXX. 
After that call I informed XXXX XXXX of the transfer and they established a case # XXXX XXXX XXXX. The next day after calling the bank to learn what had been done in the early hours since the money transfer through the Zelle system to thwart this scam form being successful, I was told to wait 7-10 business days for a response which I interpreted as quite negative thinking that the trail of where our money went could grow cold in that time as the account the money had been sent to could have been closed and the records expunged from the Zelle system XXXX 
Then I called Zelle and worked around their telephone tree to actually reach a person who almost agreed to help me find out something more about XXXX, e.g., did that account still exist some XXXX hours after I sent {$1000.00} to it and to whom did it belong, but ultimately the Zelle customer service employee would only forward my call back to XXXX XXXX, Zelle 's customer and member bank with the same interests in pursuing their business relationship which may not align with my current need to recover {$1000.00} wrongfully extorted from us on XX/XX/XXXX in the late evening hours through use of the Zelle system. At this time I am waiting on XXXX XXXX 's response and writing this description of events with hopes that CFPB may be able to assist in accessing the account information from Zelle related to XXXX. I may be able to provide additional details with more time but this is largely the scam described as I know it. 
As a classification matter using this CFPB format, I am uncertain that the category/description ( wallet ) selected is exactly corresponding to the terms used by the CFPB in this process. However, I am certain that the non-response was from Zelle, the entity providing the mechanisms for transferring funds from a source to a destination. Zelle provides the mechanism for transferring funds and I understand does not store any funds. The source of funds is a XXXX XXXX XXXX account, and the destination, XXXX, is/was a Zelle traceable entity receiving funds wrongfully obtained. Why would Zelle not choose to vigorously pursue fraudsters improperly using their system when contacted by those who have been defrauded? Given Zelle 's current position vis a vis this defrauded XXXX XXXX XXXX customer, why would XXXX XXXX not expeditiously pursue resolving this fraud involving its business functions as a repository and source of funds for its customers? 
Thank you.