Evening star., 1963-05-19
SoRENSEN
Presidential Decisions
( Always Involve q Risk

may be operative but rarely
presidential orders.
Following the stock market
decline of last summer, for ex-
ample, many businessmen
called upon the President to
lower promptly the margin
requirements for purchasing
stock on credit. They did not
realize that this decision was
legally vested in the independ-
ent Federal Reserve Board.
Personal Interests Involved
On the other hand, a Presi-
dents personal interests may
draw to him decisions normally
left for others. Roosevelt, for
example, took a hand in decid-
ing postage stamp designs.
I have seen President Ken
nedy engrossed In a list of IA
nous Indian Chiefs, deciding
on an appropriate name for q
nuclear submarine. Qnasmuch
as most of the Chiefs had
earned their fame by defying
the armed might Of the United
States, it was not an easy de-
ciSion. In fact, when he finally
decided on Chief Red Cloud,
the Navy protested that this
name had undesirable foreign
policy implications.)
Time rules out many deci-
Sions. A President should not
try to decide too few issues
but neither can he decide too
mbut neither can he decide too
many. Above all, he should de-
eide what 1t is he need not
decide at that time.
During last October's Cuban
crisis, the President charged his
cabinet and staff to avoid the
presentation of those issues
that could be safely delayed or
settled among themselves. The
postponement of some of these
decisions, Of course, required a
more hurried handling in later
weeks to meet budget or other
headlines; and this was not
without difficulty, as the case
of the Skybolt missile illus
trates. There were other factors
here in addition to the short
ness Of time, however, and
surely no nonfeasance can be
charged respecting the post
ponement of this issue by the
Pentagon when war and peace
were at stake.
Eight Component Steps
Finally what are the COM
ponent steps in White House
decision-making? 1t is not hard
to state the ideal-but it is
hard to state it with convic-
ton. Theoretically, it would be
desirable to undertake, for
each important decision, a Sc
.ries Of carefully measured,
carefully spaced steps, includ-
ing ideally the following:
/. Agreement on the facts:
2. Agreement on the overall
policy objective;
3. A precise definition Of the
problem;
4. A canvassing of all posi-
BILE solutions, with all their
shades and variations;
S. A list of all the possible
consequences that would flow
from each solution;
6. A recommendation and
final choice of one alternative;
7. The communication of
that selection; and
8. Provision for its execution.
Ideal Case Is Exception
In these ideal and mechan-
ical terms, White House
decision-making sounds easy, II
somewhat elaborate. 1t is SIM
ply the inter-action of desire
and fact-Simply q determine
ton Of what the national in
terest requires in a given sit
uation. But unfortunately it /;
neither mechanical nor easy.
For the ideal case is the ex-
ception. Each step cannot bt
taken in order. The facts may
be in doubt or dispute. Severa
policies, all good, may conflict
Several means, all bad, may b.
all that are open. Value judg
ments may differ. Stated goal
may be imprecise. There ma,
be many interpretations o