davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
, 1963-07-31
F. B. !. .

F. B. L..
garding the interstate trans
portation of fraudulent checks
from San Juan, Puerto Rico
to Alexandria, Virginia.
al a hearing before US.
Commissioners Ramon G. Julia,
On July 26, 1868, Malain was
ordered held in the San Juan
District Jail in default Of a
total Of $4,000 bond.
According to Mr.. Bishop,
Malain is presently awaiting
prosecution on charges Of forgery
and defrauding an innkeeper
at Philadelphia, Pennsylya-
MIA automobile theft at Ard
more, Pennsylvania and inter
state transportation Of fraudu-
lent checks at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. On March /,
1863 he was under arrest in
San Francisco, California on
charges Of contribution to de-
linquency of minors and sus-
picion of forgery.
The State Of Virginia charge
against Malain arose out Of the
allegation that, while working
as an itinerant house to house
magazine salesman and posing
as a disabled veteran, he par
ticipated in a fraudulent
scheme which obtained $4,000.
from an elderly woman.
Malain is charged at San
Juan regarding worthless
checks passed during Deem
Der, 1862, using an Alexandria
Virginia bank and a fictitious
name. When arrested on July
26, Malain, carried identified
ton and had cashed checks
using two additional assumed
names.
, 1963-07-31

NEW ...
people back into their hot
homes.
Thunder storms are fire.
quent. But they are short and
vicious and do not clear the
air. Thunder rolls and cracks
overhead, while lightning
lights up the city in jagged,
scarey streaks, adding one
more weather annoyance to
the tired population.
Said one couple, from st.
croix, after visiting New
York Eve hurried back to
the island to cool off" When
the tropics become cooler than
Few York, that's news, man.
, 1963-07-31
Delaware

the Look Out on St. Peters
Mountain, and have a Welcom-
ing Campfire the first night.
Scouts and Explorers from St.
Thomas will camp with them.
During the 4 day visit to St.
Thomas the group will tour
the island, visit beaches, make
a special presentation to Gov
ernor P~aiewonsky and present
him with the Delaware State
Flag. A teenage hop will be.
given with the help Of the
Youth Council.
The group will arrive on ST.
John August 7th for s days of
wilderness camping with
Scouts and Explorers of St.
John at Cinnamon Bay. The
St. John Scout Committee has
made up a list Of things to
DO which includes a water
tour around the island, hike
to the Annerberg Ruins, a
native food feast, snorkeling
at Trunk Bay, hike to Bour-
deaux Mountain the highest
point on the island and hike to
Reef Bay.
The group will return to St.
Thomas on August 18th for q
nights rest before returning
to Delaware, the 18th.
, 1963-07-31

AOh4 So
to Rico, spent two years in the
us. Army and rejoined the
organization in 1858 as a BAN
quet steward. He has since
held various executive posi-
tons in hotels in New York,
Canada and the Caribbean.
The Jamaica Hilton, the 23rd
hotel Of Hilton international,
will officially come under Hill
ton Hotels international man
agement at ceremonies in
Ocho Rios on August 3rd. The
H6-room hotel was formerly
as the Arawak.
, 1963-07-31
NOTICE
TO e FIRMS DOING
BUSINESS WITH HI
GOVERNMENT OF THE
VIRGIN ISLANDS

Effective in July, 1868,
and until further notice, all
dealers and suppliers doing
business with the Govern
ment of the Virgin Islands
shall be required to forward
their invoices to the indi-
vidual government depart
ments and agencies sup
piled with the goods or
crvices.
Government suppliers
are asked to take special
note Of this change in pro-
.edures.
PERCY de JONGH
Commissioners of Finance
, 1963-07-31
NOTICE TO CONTRACTORS

"A 81 uni apartment project
will be built in Christiansted.
Plans are now ready for
bidding. All interested
contractors should contact
William Sigal & Associates
2 Church Street.
Christiansted
Tel. 773-lS45
, 1963-07-31

garding the interstate trans
portation Of fraudulent checks
from San Juan, Puerto Rico
to Alexandra, Virginia.
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Experience Cited

Mr.. Bell testified that both Mr..
Mcnamara and Secretary Zuckert
told them they were relying upon
their experience in the field pre-
viously, and that they were able
to make rough judgments"
Mr.. Newman testified that he
would have expected "the fullest
kind Of Recommendation" because
of the enormous expenditure in
volved and because 'in case I am
not around when I am asked to
explain something, the documents
will be available"
The Pentagon now diSavows the
evaluating teams cost estimates as
unreliable, but Senator Curtis, Re-
publican of Nebraska, recalls the
Zuckert memorandum which said:
I'VE have reviewed the source
selection evaluation for the Tx
most carefully. This evaluation is
by far the most comprehensive
source evaluation in our exper-
ience, and we have great conf
dence in the details as well as the
general conclusions"
William M. Allen, Boeing presi-
dent. told the subcommittee his
company Offered to do a GER
tain job at a certain price" and
intended ito back up that COM
mitment with all it's resources"
Boeing officials said they had
exhaustive cost studies to support
their bid against Mr.. McNamara's
trough judgment" that it was un-
realistically low.
Q On the question Of "com-
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Mcnamara Decision Siqna|s Basic Contract Reform

Of a two-service plane. The Navy
could not be satisfied on weight
without a completely separate
plane, and without the taxpayers
paying that extra 81 billion.
If money were no object. both
services could have separate planes
and each would be better at its
single job than the Tx will
ever be.
But the Government cannot af-
ford that. and fortunately the
Russians cannot either.
Finally, there is the question
of the new technical advances Of
fered in the Boeing design-the
thrust reversers. the high air
scoops and titanium.
The thrust reverSers would turn
the flaming jets around so that
they shoot forward and SLOW the
plane for dogfights or landings.
But no one has ever designed
thrust reversers for supersonic
flight. Boeing promises to build
them in time for $500 each.
without explaining how.
Pratt and Whitney has offered
a detailed plan to put them ON
either design for 100000 each
after A months Of research.
The Boeing proposal was con-
sidered unrealiStically low and
quick. II Boeing we're wrong the
plane could be delayed or the
whole design invalidated.
Evening star., 1963-05-05

most. General Dynamics is the
better design.
For instance, the committee
chart completely ignores the job
which 85 per cent OF the Tx
planes will have as their primary
mission. This is the low, fast
bomb mission.
The service analyses. which are
in the committee files, show the
General Dynamics plane is far
ahead.
Equally important, neither de-
sign meets Air Force requirements
for this mission.
To bring either OF them up TO
snuff the manufacturer will have
10 sacrifice some other bonus"
feature. Boeing would have TO
sacrifice more than General Dy-
namics. and in many categories
In The Star chart where Boeing
now has the edge, General Dy-
namics will move ahead.
In one service requirement.
weight OF the Navy plane-neither
plane meets the specification and
neither will.
1t is true that the Navy now
has several kinds Of carrier-based
planes which weigh even more
than the General Dynamics de-
sign, and they are used success
fully. But no one wants the extra
pounds.
This is the price TO the Navy
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Less Risk and Waste

No one knows, but any Secretary
of Defense can see that there is
less risk Of delays and waste when
a company tries to solve one tough
problem rather than four.
General Dynamics was one-up
as far as the Secretary was con-
cerned.
Then he looked at the service
analysis Of the interchangeability
Of parts in the different versions
offered for the Navy and Air
Force.
He found that General Dynam-
les offered ola per cent inter-
changeability of airframe parts
by weight-essentially the same
airplane for both services.
Boeing offered A per cent in
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS two
different planes.
The calculations also showed
that Boeing or the services would
have to design two parts instead
of one, make two sets Of blue
prints, give two sets OF fatigue
test to each component, etc.
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. Air Force
Chief OF Staff, says that by having
one plane instead OF two the tax
payers can save 5000 million over
the life OF the plane. Mr.. Nc
Namara estimates a whole billion
dollars.
General Dynamics was two-up.
so put yourself in Mr. McNa-
mara's position. Both planes met
service requirements. One design
had a lower risk Of time and
money-consuming problems. That
same design could save many
hundreds OF millions Of dollars
by having more interchangeable
parts.
He chose General Dynamics.
Now. he could have picked Boe-
ing, set a price and deadline and
told the company that any over
costs would come out Of the stock
holders hide.
Experience shows, however. that
the results would be this: Where
estimates are unrealistically low,
and this is common-the COM
Evening star., 1963-05-05

pany runs over, often by several
hundred per cent, and the Penta-
gon is faced with a choice Of
bankrupting the company and
having no plane or picking up the
bill.
Mr.. McNamara's decision started
the battle.
The Senate committee started
asking questions, particularly:
Why did he pick the plane that.
according TO a chart prepared by
the committee staff with Air Force
help, will be the poorer performer?
This is the chart distributed by
the committee which gives the
Boeing design an edge in 20 out
OF 2l "operational" features and
implies an edge in another.
Defense witnesses have not yet
been able 10 correct that chart,
but they are expected 10 show II
is inaccurate and misleading.
A different chart, showing an
accurate comparison In important
performance features. has been
prepared by The Star, using un-
classified data from the four serv-
ice evaluations of the two bids.
Both charts appear on this page0
In general The Star chart shows
that both planes have apparent
advantages In different areas.
that both planes meet all but one
service specification and that in
the performance that counts the
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Greater Range

In this respect, according to the
Air Force figures, the General
Dynamics plane was rated as hav-
ing an TX" range tx stands for
the secret capability of the plane),
and Boeing as TX" plus 1,100 nau-
tical miles.
In bomb-carrying capacity the
Boeing plane was rated far supe-
rior ranging from a capacity to
carry so per cent more nuclear
bombs up to $50 per cent more
weapons of other kind.
Gen. LeMay and Admiral Ander-
son testified that they we're sur
prised when the unanimous rec
concentrations of the military were
overruled and the award made to
General Dynamics. Neither was
consulted before the civilian Sec
retarieS made their decision.
The civilian secretaries are still
to be questioned. When they do
go before the Mcclellan subcom-
mittee in the next two or three
weeks they will be confronted with
one pointed question from Senator
Mcclellan:
THE big issue here is, are
we getting the best, because the
best may not be more than just
good enough when the real test
comes. :. I don't care anything
about Mr.. Boeing' or Mr.. Dy-
namics. They don't mean anything
to me. We are dealing with the
destiny Of our country. :"
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Fourth EvoIuotion

Since Mr.. McNamara's basic in
tent was TO solve as many prob
lens in advance as possible, the
service secretaries had no choice
but 10 order a fourth evaluation.
The recommendations resulting
were again less than clear-cut. A
combined Air Navy group
composed Of the top officers)
recommended for Boeing but said
both contractors could do the
needed Job. The Navy, in an in
dependent submission. said there
was no clear preference in con-
tractor or design.
In the past that would have
ended 1t. Boeing would have won.
Secretary Mcnamara, however.
insisted that his civilian officials
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Senate Probers Ask Are We Getting the Best Plane?

program, and the production of
% planes. The contract price was
$500 million, or $148 million more
than Boeing's.
1T seems to me that what
happened here is, in deciding or
rationalizing in the end, the argu-
ment of realism was used" said
Senator Jackson, Democrat of
Washington. But when the con-
tract was signed, you went back
to the original unrealistic costs
of General Dynamics which, ac-
cording to your own standards,
was 18 per cent unrealistic. :"
With the cost figures a high
point of the controversy, Senator
Mcclellan requested the GAO to
review those used by Mr.. McNa-
mara and the other civilian secre-
tarieS in reaching their decision
William A. Newman and HasSell
B. Bell, two top GAO officials.
testified that they conferred with
Secretary Mcnamara on April l6
and asked him for information on
cost estimates used in making the
decision.
Secretary Mcnamara went
back, away back to the beginning,
to give us the story of the whole
philosophy of the program and
everything" Mr.. Newman testi-
fled, but when it came time to
really go to work he stated
that he had the figures in his
head, indicating that he did not
have them on paper"
Can you audit figures in some
body's head?" asked Senator Nc
Clellan.
mo, sir" Mr.. Newman replied.
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Better Proposal

1.-THE problem before us is
which is the better plane" he
testified. &c. We think that Boe-
ing gave us a better proposal at
a lower cost. You certainly don't
want to pay money to get an in
ferior product just because it
meets some word 'commonality'
better"
. On Boeing's proposed use Of
thrust reversers as against Gen.
eral Dynamics' conventional dive
brakes as a deceleration device,
the subcommittee was told.
". Boeing's proposed use Of
engine thrust reversers would
impose an added degree of risk
in terms of meeting an early OPP
irrational date for the Tx
Mcnamara statement.
There are examples Of excess
sive optimism in the Boeing pro-
posal-the apparent belief that
thrust reversers can be developed
without major problems and en-
gineering changes ."-Zuckert
memorandum.
Military and civilian experts
told the subcommittee this would
be a desirable addition to the
TFX-and one reason why the
Boeing plane was rated as having
a capacity to land in 500 feet
shorter distance than the Gen.
eral Dynamlcs version.
John Stack, a former Govern
ment expert now with the Re-
publican Aviation Corp. foresaw
the device on all fighter planes
in the future. He was questioned
by Subcommittee Counsel Jerome
Alderman.
Alderman: Do you think there
are any particular engineering
problems that would arise by
using the thrust reverSer. :?
Stack: Well, it is a difficult
problem, but nothing insurmount-
able
Alderman: Do you feel it was
overly optimistic :?
Stack: Why, no.
Col. Gayle testified considera-
ton was being given to having
the device incorporated in the
General Dynamics plane.
The subcommittee receive d
testimony that Pratt & Whitney,
which will make the engines used
in the Tx, had estimated it
would cost an additional $446
million for this purpose-$2l mil
lion for research and develop
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Design Inadequate

Neither design was good enough,
but Boeing is a distinguished
builder OF Air Force planes, and
the Air Force would have been
perfectly willing to sign a contract
and then work closely with Boeing
on design.
From the Navy point OF view,
the designs we're both inadequate.
In general, service technicians
the experts on production, de-
sign and cost--Saw a lot OF prob
lens and wanted both companies
10 try again.
Some OF the ultimate customers
--high-ranking flyers-wanted TO
choose Boeing Immediately and
trust the company TO solve the
problems.
The service secretaries sided
with dissenting flyers and the
technicians and ordered another
go-around.
II is important 10 note that they
did not overrule a unanimous mill
itary recommendation. And equally
important, they did not accept a
manufacturer on faith. The top
civilians insisted on more facts.
The second time around the
technicians and flyers again dis
agreed, and the Chief Of Naval
Operation. Admiral George w.
Anderson, said he doubted II either
design met Navy requirements.
Again there was no unanimous
Evening star., 1963-05-05

spokesmen imply was not made
or was unimportant:
First, the technical problems.
The General Dynamics design
contained one major unsolved
problem: How to get those wings
to move back and forth at high
speed.
The Boeing design had four
major unsolved problems: How to
move the wings at high speed,
how to invent a thrust reverser"
that would work at super-sonic
speeds, how to maintain maneu-
verability of a plane that puts the
air scoops on top of the fuselage
and how to build the center-sec-
ton of the wings out Of titanium.
a metal never before used in high
buffeting situations.
Now, few persons doubt that
the one General Dynamics and
four Boeing problems can be solved.
Engineers have licked tougher
ones.
But how long will the solutions
take, and how much money will
they eat up?
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Continued From Page Al

Continued From Page Al
tend, eventually save the tax
payers 81 billion?
But the answer to this question
is vastly more complicated. 1t is
wrapped up in all sorts of tech
nical details. 1t involves such
topics as cost realism" COM
monality (the amount of common
or similar parts in a plane de-
signed for use by both the Navy
and the Air Force) and technical
matters, some classified for secu-
rity reasons.
The subcommittee has explored
every point against the back
ground of a 32-page statement
submitted by Mr.. Mcnamara JUS
tifying his decision and the
Zuckert memorandum.
. Cost realism" was cited by Mr..
Mcnamara as one Of the major
reasons for his decisions. In his
statement to the subcommittee,
he said:
"The General DynamicS pro-
posal reflected a more realistic
understanding of COSTS"
Secretary Zuckerts memoran-
dunn said:
ut is hard to understand the
optimism of the Boeing estimates
for engineering, tooling and man.
ufacturing."
Evening star., 1963-05-05

they had proposed two planes.
The matter of "commonality,"
Edward C. Wells, another Boeing
official, testified, involved only
the planes that would be built
for the Navy.
The Tx program calls for
$500 planes for the Air Force and
about 200 for the Navy.
Mcclellan: Anybody who says
there is a billion dollars in savings
in that is certainly using pretty
rough Judgment, is he not?
Wells: I would say so, yes, sir.
Mcclellan: We have a rough
judgment in this hearing now.
The chairman said the eSti-
mated cost of all the Navy planes
was $500 million and wondered:
How can you save 81 billion on
an $500 million total cost?
Gen. Robert T. Ruegg, who
headed the Source Selection Board
which recommended the Boeing
design, and other witnesses dis
counted the emphasis Of the civil
ian secretaries on the difference
Evening star., 1963-05-05

study the technical problems as
outlined by service people as we'll
as the final recommendations OF
the flyers.
This material has been in the
Senate committee files for weeks,
but II has never been put into the
hearing record. II the committee
studies that material-summed up
in detail in the file on the fourth
analysis-the committee and the
public would see that the civilian
bosses were faced with this picture:
Both designs could meet service
requirements. Both manufacturers
were completely reliable and
competant.
But-and this is the all-impor-
tant reservations which the two
services, In the old tradition,
skipped over lightly-one manu-
facturer obviously had a much
better chance OF meeting the time
deadline for operation of the plane
and much better chance TO hold
costs TO a minimum.
That company was General
Dynamics.
Here is the Mcnamara analysis
the analysis which committee
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Hinged Wings

The proposed solution to the
problem of an all-purpose fighter
was to hinge the wings. They
could stick straight out during
long, low flights and takeoff and
landing; and then, for a dash
to a target, the wings could be
folded back like a plummeting
hawk.
Each service set performance
requirements-Speed, altitude, dis
tance, weight, etc. - and was
ready to go to work.
Then Mr.. Mcnamara stepped in
to insist that the two services
team up to design and use the
same airplane.
Both said it couldn't be done.
Mr.. Mcnamara said, TRY"
Military men. contrary to popu-
lar opinion. do what they are told.
They grumbled, but they did agree
on characteristics Of plane that
would meet the original require
ments of both.
That's the Tx. the Tactical
Fighter, Experimental.
The next step was TO find a
designer and builder. Bids we're
invited. Six major aircraft COM
panies submitted plans.
None came close except General
Dynamics and Boeing.
Evening star., 1963-05-05

ment plus 100000 per engine
Cor 100000 per plane) for the
more than LOO planes. plus spares.
Thrust reversers, the Senators
had been told, we're included in
Boeing's overall proposal of S.
364, ,000,0 900. If they should be in
cluded in the General Dynamics
plane, according to the subcom-
mittee. it would widen still fur
ther the overall price in favor of
Boeing from $4l6 million to more
than $500 million.
. On Boeing's proposed use Of
titanium:
The Boeing proposal
seemed likely to produce more
complicated development risks
(in) its extensive use of titan
ium"-McNamara statement.
1T is our opinion =. we should
accept the General Dynamics
proposal on the basis that it &.
contemplates the use of conven-
tional materials :" Zuckert
memorandum.
Evening star., 1963-05-05

monality," the subcommittee was
told:
"Boeing did not meet the fun
damental requirement of mini
mum divergence from a common
goal. If I had approved what was
essentially two different types of
planes, the prospects of saving 81
billion would have evaporated."-
Mr.. McNamara's statement.
ION a reasonably comparable
basis, IS per cent of the parts of
the General Dynamics version are
identical, contrasted with go per
cent in the Boeing proposal. :"
Zuckert memorandum.
While Mr.. Zuckert's statement
was correct except for a minor
error favoring the General Dy-
namics proposal, the rival planes
we're not far different when both
identical and similar parts we're
considered. In this respect, Gen.
eral Dynamcis had a "commonal-
ity" percentage of 85.2 per cent
to 80.6 for Boeing.
Boeing officials disputed the
Pentagon claim that, in effect,
Evening star., 1963-05-05
Justified by Weight

Extensive testimony failed to
support their misgivings about
the use of this metal. While it
costs more, the testimony showed,
it was justified in the less weight
involved.
Donald ]. Jordan, chief engi-
neer of Pratt g. Whitney, told the
subcommittee that the engines to
be used in the Tx will contain
80 per cent titantium.
william H. Sharp of Hartford,
Conn.,, a metallurgist, testified
that he could see nothing in the
use of titanium that would cause
any serious problem.
. Both Secretary Mcnamara and
Secretary Zuckert questioned
Boeing's proposed engine installa-
ton with top-mounted air scoops
or intakes as against General Dy-
namics' with the inletS on the
side of the fuselage under the
wings.
While Mr.. Mcnamara mini
mized the problem of foreign OBJ
ject damages, several witnesses
emphasized this as an important
consideration in favor Of the Boe-
ing design.
AS a multi-purpoSe plane in
tended for use if the need arise
on "austere" or undeveloped air
fields, the military experts said
there would be a greater hazard
of the "ingestion" Of rocks and
other foreign objects in a plane
with the air scoops located under
the wings.
For the men who must use the
planes and fly them in combat if
war comes, there is another side
Of the coin other than Mr.. Nc
Namara's "cost realism"
In his statement to the sub
committee. the Secretary said:
Both the General Dynamics
and the Boeing designs met stated
military requirements and would
provide significant improvements
in combat capabilities of the Navy
and the Air Force"
The military leaders find no
disagreement with the Secretary
on this score.
But what they contend is that