davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

bamboo tube, so that he can
live to fight again.
An American lieutenant col
onel, back from a ground OPP
Grafton in which two companies
of Wet Namese had chased a
group Of Wet Cong through the
jungle in q rainstorm, said
afterward:
This was only a sweep. You
couldn't call it a clear-and-
hold operation. We can't hold
it, because there are no roads
and these people depend on
roads.
Take away the jeeps and
trucks and let them fight
like the VIC, and we could beat
them a lot sooner"
The helicopters also we're ex-
pected to work as a lever to
give the American advisers a
hand in the planning Of opera
tons against the Wet Cong
The Americans had rarely been
able to get a look at a plan
before the mission began.
BY providing the transporta-
ton, it was though, the Ameri-
can officers would have some
thing approaching a veto over
the grandioSe sweeps" so Of
ten employed by the Wet Ma
mese. These drives through
Wet Cong territory merely ha-
rass the enemy and do nothing
toward extending the area un-
der reliable government con-
troll.
But the expected leverage
has not worked. The sweeps
continue and the advisers still
complain that their advice is
often disregarded.
OFFICIAL comments are
more optimistic. After the wave
of complaints last month about
the Wet Namese army. Gen.
Paul D. Harkins, the top United
States commander in South
Wet Nam, said anyone who
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

ton Of independence for Eu-
rope. The revolution which he
has launched will certainly
have its painful moments. The
goals which he has set for
Europe may never be reached,
To some, however. 1t seems
that the collision is between
the idea Of a strong Europe and
the policy of the administra-
ton to retain all real power
and all real freedom of deci-
sion in its own hands. In this
sense the challenge to Ameri-
can predominance within the
alliance was inevitable. And the
basis for a new relationship be-
tween Europe and the United
States must now be found.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

dominance in Europe would be
assured.
"Interdependence" to many
Europeans has long been a
rather suspect term along with
Indignation" and partner
ship" Since 1t is clear that the
United States is in no way really
dependent on Europe, interde-
pendence as expounded by
American military leaders has
seemed a singularly one-way
proposition. So has indignation
which means the perpetuatior
Of American command Of the
forces Of the alliance. So does
a partnership in which Ameri-
can supremacy is a foregone
conclusion.
All of these ideas have beer
pushed hard by the Kennedy
administration since 1t came
to power. But while plugging
interdependence the trend Of
the administration has also
been to assert more strongly Its
own freedom Of action so far al
the alliance was concerned.
Cuba Crisis a Factor
Cuba provided a clear dem.
onstration that Europe with.
out lifting a finger could vel
become involved in a nucleal
war with the Soviet Union. Anc
short Of this President Ken
nedy's year-end press confer.
ence seemed TO imply that thu
administration was In the mooC
to pursue its own interests
without very much regard II
those Of its allies.
These factors combined with
the Skybolt and Polaris cpl
sodes served TO precipitatt
Gen. de Gaulle's own declara'
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18
Basis for New Relationship Must Now Be Found

curb or compromise either must
be resolutely opposed.
The idea of collective security
to be sure, is admitted. Gen.
de Gaulle is perfectly aware of
the fact hat Europe at this
point cannot defend itself with
out American help. His convic-
ton that it must some day be
able to do so explains his in
sistence on an independent
French nuclear deterrent. But
until this deterrent be-
comes effective he accepts the
necessity of NATO and the
presence of American troops In
Europe.
At the same time, however,
there is no doubt that the gen.
erals policy is based on a firm
conviction that the real threat
to Europe from Russia today
is political rather than mill
tary. In his conception NATC
will have a limited and di-
minishing importance from now
on. And when the treaty comes
up for revision or denuncia-
ton in 1869 it faces from the
French point Of view a most
uncertain future.
Economic independence fol-
Europe is a goal which. with
in the Common Market al
least is a good deal closer tc
being achieved. And yet the
current anti-American trend ir
this field is perhaps even more
clearly pronounced.
France Sees Threat
In France-though the vol
ume Of American investment
is much lower than In
either Britain or Germany-thC
symptoms are serious. Sine
Brussels considerable Juror ha.
been raised over the fact that
Chrysler has bought a con.
trolling interest in the Simcs
automobile factory and thai
Libby is planning a large-scale
operation in Southern France
The danger that important
segments Of the economy nigh
fall under foreign DONNA.
ton" is the subject OF minis
terial conferences. For the aver
age man the phrase coca CO.
lonialism" sums up the threat
Absurd as these preoccupa
lions may be. they spell rea
trouble. The possibility Of cas-.
accommodation between tn
Common Market and othe
members OF the Western al
lance has dimmed rapidly II
the aftermath Of the Brussel
fiasco. Gen. de Gaulle. who's
economic ideas are somewha
elementary is most certainl.
In a position 10 veto the hug
fr eetrade thingamajig" Il
which he believes the Angll
Saxons aspire. And so far Their
is no sign OF a serious revol
among his Common Marke
partners.
.. These features OF curren
French policy have led !,
charges that Europe, as Gen
de Gaulle conceives OF II, 4
exclusive and inward looking.
The general Is also a littl,
glibly compared 70 Louis XIV
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

and Napoleon in seeking to i'm
pose French hegemony on the
rest of Little Europe"
Stood Together
Neither Of these charge.
bears serious examination. how.
ever. Apart from his unilatera
veto of Britain, Gen. de Gaulle's
relations with his European
partners have been far more
in the spirit Of cooperation
than domination. Even in thu
Brussels negotiations, the six,
nation front on the conditions
of Britain's entry was main.
tanned to the end.
In reaching all the impor,
tant agreements the French
have shown a willingness Il
compromise their own interests
for the benefit Of the com.
munity as a whole. Since thu
breakdown at Brussels. French
overtures to Denmark anC
Spain belle the impression o.
a closed club.
Indeed Gen. de Gaulle's out,
look is neither narrowly French
nor narrowly European and thu
discovery Of this fact may in
volve some new unpleasant sur,
prises in Washington.
1t is learned on good au,
thority. for example. that thu
generals next major diplomat,
initiative" may not be In Eu'
rope at all but in Latin Amer,
lea. There is talk Of a visi
to these parts before the enC
Of the year and a strong huncl
that his present Irritation will
Franco is more than somewha
connected with this larger plan
Concerned About Trends
This too, is likely to have 9
slightly anti-Anglo Saxon fla.
vor. Gen. de Gaulle Is reported
to be deeply concerned abou'
political trends in South Amer
lea. He is aware OF the great
need In many countries for eco
nomic and technical assistanc,
to say nothing OF politica
guidance.
He believes that South Amer
leans would welcome an al
tentative to the present choic,
between Yankee imperialism
and Castro Communism. HI
. thinks that Europe-prodded b.
France-would be In a position
: TO provide this alternative. An,
} he is convinced that his initia
: tive-apart from enhancing hi
own stature as q world leade
would be In the interests o
) the Western alliance. including
! the United States.
Such possible moves, however
: are Of relatively minor i'm
; portance compared TO the ulti
mate role which Gen. de Gaull
} foresees. His sights are set 70
: the mid-l970s by which tim
Europe, growing In unity an
strength, will be able TO max
It's weight felt strongly in tn
East-West struggle.
What happens then is no
4. precisely spelled out. There ar
limits to even the generals au
> dicious prophecies. Yet 1t
clear that he expects that Eu
: rope will exert a powerful at
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18
FRONTIERS
Continued From Page Al

SUhNhuCu EHuu csc NJ
cans were killed, gave further
indication Of what a few mod
ern guns can do in enemy
hands.
The Communist led Wet
Cong is fighting on a shoe
string. Some American officials
speak Of massive infiltratior
of North Wet Namese troops
and weapons along the So
called Ho Chi Mini trail
through Laos and even far
south through Cambodia.
Other sources, well-informed
Western officials, discount this
infiltration and insist that the
Wet Cong now gets its new
manpower and weapons MAIN
ly from inside South Wet Nam,
Part of the confusion on this
point, says a Canadian OBJ
server, is that American intel
ligence on the subject comes
mainly from Wet Names
sources, which often exag-
gerate.
American military experts in
Cambodia and Laos say it would
take Is American divisions to
seal off the wild, unmarked
border between Wet Nam and
Cambodia. But they say there
would be no need to do that,
since there is only a little
movement back and forth,
nothing of military signi-
ficance.
They deny entirely the Wet
Namese claim that an extern
sion of the Ho Chi Mini trail
extends down through Cambo-
dia. They asesrt that this
would be needlessly difficult
when the Wet Cong has easier
access through LaSo.
Main Support from South
1t is true that the Wet Cong
gets much of its direction,
many of its leaders and much
of its propaganda encourage
ment from Hanoi, the capital
of North Wet Nam.
But the insurgents continu-
ing numerical strength, their
material support and their
vitality as a guerrilla army
come mainly from the South
Vietnamese peasantry. They
obtain this support partly
through terror, partly through
ignorant fanaticism that be-
lieves charges of American
imperialism" partly through
real grievances against the re-
gime in Saigon and partly
through the peasants choice of
what they see as the easiest
path at the moment between
two evil forces.
Guerrilla prisoners Of war
often say they were forced into
the Wet Cong by threats
against themselves or their
families. Some American offici-
ais conclude that the Wet Cong
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

group busy cooking their lunch
and preparing for q siesta In
stead Of chasing the enemy.
Sometimes I think these
people are laughing UP Their
sleeves at u.s." said q soldier
who had seen such incidents
Maybe we ought to charge
them an amusement tax and
get back at least part of what
this is costing u.s."
Top Officials Tolerant
Top officials take a more
tolerant view. They point Out
that habits are hard to change
and that the Wet Namese have
been fighting one or another
enemy for the last 20 years anc
cannot be expected to have the
same sense Of urgency as 9
soldier who has been assigned
there for a year and wants tc
see quick victory.
They recall the irritable com.
plants by Americans in World
War II that British fighting
men always stopped for tea.
Two new weapons, added tC
the war in the last year, were
expected to turn the tide. He'll
copters have permitted rapiC
development Of an enemy
stronghold, and the tank-likt
M-1l3 amphibious personne,
carrier, with aluminium armol
plate and chain tread, has
helped pursue the elusive Wet
Cong through the canals anc
rice paddles Of the southern
delta area.
But the new vehicles ado
further to the dependence Of
the Wet Namese army on mod
ern carriers to fight a shadowy
enemy who has only his gun
and his bag of rice, who travels
on foot and who is willing to
crouch for hours under water
with leeches clinging to his
body, breathing through a
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

we didn't know-it Just came
over the radio, might have
been from the Arvin."
Operations from the air are
not always so precise. Some
flyers say they fire at any
group of black clad figures or
the ground If they look suspi-
cious and If a nod Of approval
can be obtained from an car
vim" observer.
Black Pants an Indication
A common rule Of thumb is
that anyone in black pants
who is running must be a Wet
Cong.
They must be guilty or they
wouldn't be running" explained
an American officer. Besides,
President Diem has ordered
them to stand still when they
see a plane.
The disastrous helicopteI
ambush Of January 2 gave new
evidence of some basic short
comings in the Wet Namese
operation as a purely military
exercise.
American military advisers
charge repeatedly that Wet Ma
mese soldiers are poor shots
and lack aggressiveness.
They're short on two ships
leadership and Workmanship.
says an American captain, re-
peating one of the G.I. gags
that sums up a widespread
view.
According to a common COM
plant, Wet Namese soldiers hit
the dirt at the first sound OF
gunfire, instead of advancing
and returning the fire accord
ing to the anti-guerrilla train
ing they have been given.
The advisers also report re-
peated instances of arriving in
helicopters at a drop zone"
with a second group of Wet
Namese troops to find the first
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

criticized the fighting qualities
of the Vietnamese armed
forces was doing q disservice
to the thousands Of gallant and
courageous men who are fight
ing in the defense Of their
country"
He said 10000 South Wet Ma
mese soldiers had been killed
in action In the last year and
that almost 10000 dead Wet
Cong insurgents attest to
their courage"
Peasants Support Needed
Official estimates of the mil
itary operation are influenced
by the needs of psychological
warfare. An essential to victory
is swinging the peasants to
Diem's support. They will swing
If they think he is winning.
Hence, there is a policy Of de-
liberate optimism.
Important visitors also are
given a rosy view Of the hamlet
defenses by being taken to a
few demonstration h a mlets,
where the peasants have been
put through their emergency
drill in front of so many visi-
tors and cameras that they no
longer want to work but sit
around waiting for the gong to
sound for the next drill.
IN THE LAST few months Of
1862, the standard phrase for
the war in Wet Nam came to
be cautious optimism"
The rash of new mass attacks
by the Wet Cong has given
more reason for caution and
less reason for optimism. Vic
tory, even in a purely military
sense, is not yet in sight.
Policital victory is another
story. to be discussed In subse-
quent articles.
TOMORROW: DictatOriaI
rule Of President NgO Dinh
Diem.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18
Help Is Pledged
In Arrests for
Vote Registration

Persons arrested for encour-
aging Southern Negroes to reg
lister to vote we're assured of
competent legal defense Sat
urday by Jack Greenberg, di-
rector-counsel Of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational
Fund.
Mr.. Greenberg, attending a
two-day conference here Of the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

plains a realistic American
captain.
An official statement, posted
at an American helicopter base
allows the same leeway:
There is no change in the
status of American advisers in
Wet Nam. They remain advis-
ers, not combat troops. They
are authorized by the President
of the United States to return
fire to protect themselves OF
other Americans when fired
upon.
This decision can only be
made by the individual on the
scene in light Of the immedi-
ate and specific circumstances
pertaining at a given moment"
The "ARVIN" (short for
Army Of Wet Mann observer
who is supposed to accompany
the Americans in the new COM
bat helicopters is often regard
ed as just so much surplus
baggage. He is left behind II
he is slow in appearing for q
flight, or If Ameicans need all
the seats.
American filters often find
the restrictions an annoyance
and believe they are fully justi-
fled in blasting an entire vii
lage with rockets and machine
guns If a man in black pants
steps out Of a shack and fires
at a circling helicopter.
Description Of Mission
Here is the way an Ameri-
can officer discussed a mission
in one Of the new HU-18 armed
helicopters:
1--WE took a couple of bursts
Of automatic weapon fire from
a village and then small arms
fire opened up from all over
We were ready to shoot back,
but we had a general aboard
who ordered us not to. He said,
Don't shoot back-you might
hit some innocent women and
children
Now, one way to look at 1t
is that maybe 10 Wet Cong
were in the village and they
were the ones doing the
shooting and the rest Of the
villagers shouldn't have to suf-
fer for it.
But another way to look ct
it is that If those villagers are
harboring 10 Wet Cong they
aren't really neutral. Besides,
If the VIC can fire at us with
out getting something back in
return, it sets a bad precedent
and makes them think they
can get away with anything.
1--WE called for an air strike
and some fixed-wing aircraft
went in with rockets and ma
palm and really clobbered that
village.
THE general was sore, Of
course. He wanted to know who
ordered that air strike. We said
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

tai bloc which Gen. de Gaulle
has always envisaged.
This does not mean that the
negotiations at Brussels were
carried on in bad faith from
the beginning or that. as
British Prime Minister Mac
milan claims, they were broken
off because they were on the
point of succeeding.
In all fairness, there were
still many important points Of
difference remaining to be
settled and a certain realism
to Gen. de Gaulle's own esti-
mate of the state Of affairs:
Either Britain climbs aboard
without buying her ticket and
the Common Market explodes
or the clauses Of the Treaty of
Rome are vigorously respected
and Britain explodes."
Even in Britain today there
are many who will admit that
the negotiations were a long
way from reaching a successful
conclusion.
Emphasis on Treaty
At the same time, however
there was a good deal more to
Gen. de Gaulle's decision to
break off the negotiations than
a simple calculation Of their
chances Of success. So far as
the general is concerned, ere
spect Of the Treaty Of Rome"
implies first of all an end TO
the preferential relationship
which Britain has enjoyed with
the United States for many
years.
1t is essential that this fact
be faced squarely because any
understanding Of Gen. de
Gaulle's actions and his con-
cept Of Europe depends on 1t.
Independence OF the United
States either as a distant goal
or immediate policy lies at the
center Of his. thinking. And
the survival OF the Western
Alliance on Gen. de Gaulle's
terms depends on accepting
this idea on both sides Of the
Atlantic.
In the immediate context, II
was Britain's military depend
ence on the United States
which clinched the decision to
slam the Common Market door.
The collapse Of the Skybolt
rocket program undoubtedly
raised hopes in France that
Mr., Macmillan would drop his
reliance on American weapons
and pool Britain's resources In
development OF a European
nuclear deterrent. When these
hopes were dashed at Nassau
by prompt British acceptance
Of the American offer OF Polaris
submarines II provided-for
Gen. de Gaulle-conclusiye
evidence that Britain was not
ready TO "join Europe"
Opposes Compromise
Independence, so far as Gen
de Gaulle is concerned, is no
divisible. The goal OF politica
| independence 10 which n,
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

Here is a pleasant way TO overcome
loose plate discomfort. FASTEETH.
an improved powder. sprinkled on
upper and lower plates holds them
firfner 20 that they feel more COM
Portable. No gummy, gooey. pasty
taste or feeling. It's alkaline mon
acid Does not sour. Checks plate
odor breath. Oct FASTEETH today
at drug counters everywhere.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18

sign the accords but promised
to refrain from the threat or
use Of force to distrub them. I"
If it admitted publicly the ex-
tent Of its aid to South Wet
Nam, it would be making a
case for the Communists to
charge violation.
Thus 1t was only unofficially
that spokesman disclosed that
about 1000" American troops
were in Wet Nam. They did not
make clear whether or not this
figure includes the hundreds or
thousands Of troops on tempo
rary duty from Okinawa or
other American bases in the
Far East.
Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara testified recently, how
ever that there is now a total
of more than 1000 u. s. mill
tary personnel in Wet Nam,
providing training, airlift COM
munications and advices to
Wet Namese forces, and ad-
ministering the military assist
ance program"
Officials explained afterward
that the American forces are a
temporary buildup, needed be-
cause the Communists had vio-
lated the limitations Of the
1854 agreements, and would be
withdrawn whenever the Com
muniSts withdrew.
No figure is being given out
for the total cost Of the opera
ton. American military and
economic aid to South Wet
Nam is running at about 81
million a day. How much it
costs in addition to pay, feed,
transport, supply the American
forces is an unanswered ques-
ton.
The Pentagon approach is to
point out that the troops in
Wet Nam would be getting
their salaries, food and other
benefits somewhere else If they
were not in Wet Nam. BY this
reasoning, no military opera
ton costs anything but trans
portation.
A reasonable estimate would
be another 81 million a day
including additional operating
costs and the sizeable losses of
planes and other equipment
and expenditures Of American
ammunition.
Role Of U. S. Forces
Confusion also surrounds
the precise role of the Ameri-
can forces. Officially they are
nothing but advisers" en-
gage in no combat, shoot only
when fired at, and fly armed
planes only when accompanied
by at least one Wet Namese.
Actually, they frequently are
involved in combat. The new
er-shoot-firs rule is broadly
INTERPRETATION can always
say There goes q BURST" ex-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-02-18
FRONTIERS
1000 U. S. Military in Wet Nam
Oppose Reds in Vague Official Status

relies exclusively on terror. But
such statements can be self.
serving; no prisoner is likely
to say he Joined the guerrillas
because he thought they were
on the right side.
1t is q dangerous oversimpli.
fication to call the Wet Cong
merely a tool of international
communism.
Propaganda statements Out
Of Hanoi and Peking lead some
to believe the Wet Cong Is
nothing more than that. 1t is
that, but 1t is also an express
sion of Wet Namese national
ism, drawing on indigenous
sources for its strength.
HO Turned TO u. S.
The same can be said Of He
Chi Mini, president of Commu-
mist North Wet Nam. He
turned to communism after
trying unsuccessfully at the
Versailles conference to qualify
Wet Nam for Woodrow Will
sons principle of self -determi-
nation. After World War II, he
turned first to the United
States and Nationalist China
for support for his independ-
ence movement.
Even now, he is above ali
else q Wet Namese nationalist
He maintains a degree of In
dependence Of Communist Chi
ma and the Soviet Union, while
siding with them and accept
ing their aid.
A minority view in the State
Department holds that the
United States is overlooking a
good bet in not making some
overture to Ho Chi Mimi, some
appeal to his Wet Namese ma
tionalism that might override
his ties to China and Russia.
In this view, he might be in
clined to seek trade and even
tually a truly neutral coalition
with South Wet Nam in hopes
of building a strong nation
that could be independent of
China.
u. S. Backs Diem
Current American policy,
however, runs in the opposite
direction and is devoted to
wholehearted support of Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem. regardless
Of his widely conceded short
comings.
The extent of American mill
tary involvement is an open
secret. No official reports are
given out on the number of
men and weapons committed
to the undeclared war. The
secrecy stems from the fiction
kept up by both East and West
that they are abiding by the
Geneva agreements of 1854,
which prohibited additional
troops or arms in the area.
The United States refused to