Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-07-21
by CHARLES BARTLETT
star Special Writer

4uC AAuCbuIC ia ACA@VAOAAS w
tween the Soviet Union and
Red China has raised concern
that the Chinese may now feel
obligated to demonstrate the
virility Of their policy with a
new act Of aggression.
The polarization of the Com
munist bloc has induced Pre-
mier Khrushchev, with Surpris-
ing swiftness, to seek a con-
Citation with West that will
validate his thesis Of co-exist-
ence. It is reasonable to suspect
that the Chinese may be
tempted to counter this init
alive.
The thinking within the
United States Government is
divided on whether to expect
such a thrust and those who
believe it may come are divided
on where the target may lie.
A move to take over the Off
shore islands Of Quemoy and
Matsu, which have existed un-
der intermittent bombardment
since 1858, would be possible.
The Nationalist have strength
ened the fortification Of these
outposts but they ould still be
overrun by troops from the
mainland unless the United
States were willing to involve
its air force.
No Retreat From Islands
The Administrators policy
on Quemoy and Matsu has
never been precisely stated but
Mr.. Kennedy's assertion In the
1860 campaign that he would
oppose O retreat from the is
lands under fire and his mani
fest Discrimination to yield ter
ritory to the Communists would
make a positive response very
probable.
A strategy Of joining the war
In South Wet Nam would be
difficult for the Red Chinese.
They would have to choose be-
tween air assault, for which
they are poorly equipped, and
ground invasion. The latter
presents an immense problem
in logiStics since the only &C.
cess from the north Is on foot
and large troop movements
would be difficult to supply and
easy to detect.
They would not, moreover, be
joining the struggle at an aus
picious time because the Wet
Cong penetrations are being.
pushed back by the Joint exer-1
tons Of the Saigon government
and the United States military
mission. Their appearance
would be almost certain to pro-
woke the United States into
more intense participation.
LaOs-MOst Tempting Target
The most tempting target for
increased agitation, and the
one under closest scrutiny, is
Laos. Reports Of new Chinese
incursions In the northern sec
tor have come from Bangkok
In the past two weeks and the
West Ia watching closely for
tangible evidence that China
has decided to abandon her
back-up role In the struggle.
The situation is 50 fluid and
the Control Commission Is so
limited in its capacity for OBJ
servation that O Chinese vio-
lation Of the Geneva Agree
ment may be difficult to es-
tablish.
Such q move would raise the
question Of committing Ameri-
can troops to the country, q
step that would derive fresh
appeal from the fact that the
Chinese will presumably lack
the assurance of Russia's nu-
clear umbrella or physical sup
port in such an adventure.
Russia's future role In Laos has
not yet become clear but It
seems almost certain to be
aimed at preserving the tenu-
GUS neutrality.
Red China would quickly
face the United States in al
most any aggressive turn In
Southeast Asia and 1t Is this
prospect which inclines many
officials here to believe that
a major move will not be made
for the present.
The Picking government did
not, when allied with Russia,
show any taste for q confron-
tation with the United States
and 1t Is reasoned that they
will be even more reluctant now
to risk o showdown.
Bad Economic Situation
The economic situation is
bad, the new harvest does not
look promising, a nuclear ca
pacity has not been achieved,
and the potential for q major
military move would not ap-
pear to exist. The Chinese are
essentially a cautious people,.
Many feel that this caution will
dominate any immediate imp
ulse to exhibit q dedication
to militant communism.
In these circumstances. the
prevailing judgement in WASH
ington is that while the Chi
nese must be watched intently
over the short-term after their
militarization and industriali-
zation have progressed.
The task is therefore to pur-
sue the effort in South Wet
Nam and bolster the neighbour
ing free countries. Policy to-
ward Southeast Acia has been