The Republican., 1963-10-03

guards from responsible officials
Of the Administration were needed
before the Senate could prudently |
determine whether to give its adj !
vice and consent to ratification. !
The Executive Branch gave us un-
qualified assurances on effective !
action to carry out the safeguards. !
The President himself sent to the i
Senate an 8-point guarantee. Civ
ing positive assurances on the safe |
guards defined by the Joint Chiefs. !
The President also gave these as
surances that the treaty will in |
no way limit the use of nuclear |
weapons for defense of the United |
States or its allies; that, if Cuba !
is used directly or indirectly" to |
circumvent the treaty, the United
States will take all necessary ac-
ton in response; and that the |
treaty will not change the status |
of East Germany-our Govern
ment will not recognize the Soviet |
occupation zone of East Germany
as a state or as an entity possess |
ing national sovereignty.
Even though the treaty offered |
hope for the future, | decided to |
vote for ratification only after l
satisfied myself that the people |
of the United States were suffici- !
entity protected. 1 could not avoid |
the conclusion that the treaty in
no way sacrificed anything vital tot
our security, that our military pos
ture would not be compromised.
If our ratification of the traety
had been contingent upon our
trusting the Soviets, l would have
flatly opposed it. But it was not
contingent on that. 1t was con-
tingent upon our trusting our own
people. We had the assurances of
our military and scientific chiefs,
the assurances of the Secretaries
of State and Defense, and the as
surances OF the President. l do
not question the sincerity of these
assurances. l accept them. In like
measure, we will not shrink from
the duty of holding them to their
word. By making these assurances,
they have entered into solemn
pact with the American people on
the vital question of our national
security.
/ There may be some element of
risk involved in the treaty, but,
in my opinion, there would be
greater element of risk without
such a treaty. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff testified that in their
considered judgment the strengths
of the treaty outweighed its weak
nesses, that the benefits exceed
the risks. 1t was a matter of bal
ancing the risks.
Notwithstanding our justifiable
| distrust of the Soviets and our
aWareness of the limitations of the
treaty, the Senate was mindful OF
the grave danger of nuclear war
and the advantage of keeping open
any channel, however remote, for
the avoidance of worldwide nu
clear destruction.
What was the alternative? Sup
pose the nuclear test ban treaty
had been killed by the Senate,
what then? Would it possibly have
been our last chance for such a
treaty? Had we turned it down,
would we have been saying to
our people that we were giving
up all hope for peace and that
they and their children and their
children's children must look for
ward only to an endless dark age
of cold war and the constant threat
of nuclear attack? Without some
kind of treaty or agreement, how
could such threat be ended? Would
any sensible person recommend
nuclear war? Not wanting a nu-
clear war and not wanting to con-
tinue forever the ever-enlarging
monstrous arms race, what can we
do but take this one more
chance on the Russians? If it
weren't for this treaty, would we
not even now be searching for
an opening leading to an agree
ment? Who can say that this
treaty is not such an opening?
There are two possible roads to
peace. One is the proved road of
strength and vigilance. The other
is the improved road of negotia-
ton. We must travel both roads. I
feel that to forsake either path
would be to court war and invite
destruction. Let us place our trust
in the path of strength and our
hope in the path of negotiation.
This issue goes to the very exist
ence of this Nation and to the
principles for which it stands. 1t
goes to the aspirations of men of
good will everywhere in the
world-that the prospect of eventu-