Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-08-01
Test Bon Treaty

tons in general and Soviet
American economic relations
in particular may not be re-
ceiving sufficient attention
in terms Of current and flu
ture planned disarmament
negotiations with the Soviet
Union. Consideration Of pos
Sible economic agreements
might be Of value in favor
ably influencing the disarma-
ment negotiations as well as
the strictly political negotia-
lions such as those concern
ing Laos, Berlin and German
unification.
Despite the slight current
Softening in the Soviet dis
armament position, if one
analyses the reasons behind
the general Soviet rigidity
concerning both disarmament
and East-WeSt political is
sues, one possibility almost
unavoidably presents itself.
The Soviets have used q hard
line In order to buy time to
strengthen themselves in
ternally. They have greatly
needed to build an even
broader industrial base, to
straighten out the agriculture
problem, to consolidate the
Eastern bloc economically.
and to raise general living
standards to gain popular
home support.
Thus, economic agreements
which may possibly aid them
in these endeavors might
make a belligerent policy as
a time-buying device less at
tractive. Such agreements, Of
course, could only be consid-
cred by us If they were
equally beneficial to the
United States. Furthermore.
they would have to be en-
tered into with exceeding
care in order not to give Rus
STA indirectly a military adj
vantage greater than would
accrue to the United States.
In any event if the Soviets
have used a belligerent front
as a time-buying device, then
their attitude toward dis
armament Is indeed directly
related to their economic
state. In this case it would
seem a more direct approach
on the part Of the United
States to consider deliberate
ly linking in some way mu-
tually beneficial economic ne
gotiations to disarmament
negotiations. This would
have the salutary effect of
beginning to channel the
theological conflict from the
military arena into the eco
nomic arena. twill be in this
arena that a truer test Of the
two ideologies can be made.
Lawrence Fagg.
Besides the recognition Of
Eastern Germany, one Of the
many goals Of the non-ag-
erosion pact proposed by
the Soviets is recognition of
the political status quo in
Poland and in other Iron
Curtain countries. This
would not only stop the ever
growing popular pressure of
the subjugated European ma
tons for more freedom and
independence, which has al
ready borne some fruit, but
also destroy the existing re-
sistance against communism
and Soviet domination. Con-
tinuing resistance would
seem hopeless and senseless,
and would be replaced by a
trend toward the accommo-
dalton with the Soviets. AS
a result the free world would
lose its allies behind the Iron
Curtain-allies whose hostil-
ity toward Russia shields
Western Europe along with
NATO divisions. Needless to
say, recognition Of the status
quo would be contrary to
often stated official Ameri-
can policy as exemplified by
the recent Presidential proc
lamation OF Captive Nations
Week.
To avoid these detrimental
consequences 1t is impera-
tive that in the forthcoming
negotiations q firm position
be taken. Any non-aggres-
sion pledge must safeguard
the inalienable right Of self
determination Of the subju-
gated nations. Otherwise, by
the stroke Of a pen all the
plumbers Of Teheran and
Yalta would be confirmed.
Stefan KOrbonski,
Chairman, Polish Delegation
to the Assembly Of Captive
European Nations.
- v
1t is quite possible Presi-
dent Kennedy suppressed
some Of his optimism in re-
lating to the Nation the sue