davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06

clear deterrent based on surface
ships rather than submarines.
The ships can be built in
Europe rather than in the
United States, he said. The
force can be built more quickly,
there viii be no balance of pay
ments drain on the United
States. and surface ships are
much easier TO operate, the
President declared.
Building submarines in the
United States for the European
force would take at least two
years or so longer than the
surface program In Europe, Mr..
Kennedy said.
He anticipated It may take
some months Of negotiation by
Ambassador Livingston Mer-
chants mission before Europe
decides what form Of nuclear
deterrent it wants.
The proposal for q multi
lateral force manned by mixed
nationalities Of seamen from
NATO countries may not be
accepted by Europe. the Presi-
dent conceded.
They may not feel that II
provides sufficient additional
security to warrant the addi-
tional expenditures OF money
and may decide that the pres
ent arrangement Is satisfac-
tory" Mr.. Kennedy said.
That we Of course would
accept"
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
.AniIine Deal
Is Defended

President Kennedy today de-
tended the tentative agreement
TO give Swiss interests a share
In the proceeds from sale OF
the General Aniline d Film
Corp, which was seized by the
United States as a German as
set during World War II.
He told his news conferences
the settlement is equitable"
and fair" II the United States
refused TO compromise, he said,
litigation might continue an
other 10 years and might pro-
duce no better deal.
Interhandel, a Swiss holding
company. claims ownership Of
80 per cent Of the General
Aniline stock seized by the
United States. The United
States contends that Inter-
handel did not really own the
stock but served as q cloak
for the real owner, /. q. Far
benindustrie, a German firm.
II the settlement is ratified
and General Aniline is sold for
about 5000 million. the United
States would receive approxi-
mately 70 per cent Of the pro-
ceeds and Interhandel would
receive 30 per cent.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Conodion Trade
Cooperation Seen

Q. Mr.. President. recogniz-
ing the interdependence OF
Canada and the United States
and Of course conscious that
the current anti-American
flare-up is about defense, are
there any attempts being made
TO ease the irritations that are
chronic, such as wheat surplus
policy or the trade balance be-
tween the two countriesp
A. Well. on the wheat we are
In constant communication with
the Canadians and other wheat
producers. also that our dis
posal p. L. $50 would not dis
turb their normal markets.
In the question Of trade bal
ances, we are able 10 be OF
some assistance 10 Canada
during It's difficulties some
months ago. on the Canadian
dollar, with other countries,
and I would hope that the
United States and Canada
would be able too, having been
Joined by nature, would be
able 10 cooperate.
q. Mr.. President, for 20 years
the Justice Department has as
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Question of Oil
To Cuba Weighed

Q. Mr.. President. Ambassa-
dor, or former Ambassador
Guillermo Belt, the Ambassa-
dor from Cuba TO the United
States in the old days, said in
a lecture at Georgetown
Visitation Convent last Sunday
that Castro would not be able
TO survive two weeks II he was
denied Soviet oil.
! wonder If there isn't some
thing that you can do about
this, or maybe bring greater
pressure on some Of our allies
who are shipping Soviet oil In
their ships TO Cuba2
A. Yes, but those are not our
figures. There isn't any doubt
that over a long period OF time
that denial Of oil would make
a difference.
To deny the oil would re-
quire, OF course, q blockade.
and a blockade Is an act OF
war. and you should be pre-
pared 10 60 for II.
I think we indicated last
october that In periods where
we considered the United
States was In danger, we were
prepared 10 90 as far as was
needed 10 remove that danger,
and we would. OF course. be
willing always 10 do so again.
II we felt there was a situation
which carried with II that kind
OF danger 10 the United States.
But you should not be under
any impression that a block
ade Is not an act OF war, be-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06

sured Congress that it had
evidence showing that Inter-
handel was a cover for the
German firm Of I. G. Farben,
and therefore the seizure Of
General Analine and film in
this country during the World
War II was justified.
Now in the past few days
there has been an agreement
between Justice and Inter-
handel on the division of the
proceeds from the sale OF
General Anaine. Has Justice
Department discovered that its
facts are wrong, or has there
been, or is this the result Of
pressure from the Swiss gov
eminent?
A. No, ! would say that the
agreement is an equitable
agreement. 1t could have gone
on 10 years more, in the courts,
and 1t has been now is or 20
years, and lawyers have en-
joyed it, but / don't think that
there is anything else.
I don't think we would get
% betted arrangement If we con-
tinued the litigation for an
other 10 years. We feel that
the arrangement which has
been worked out win return the
assets to those who have q
claim to them. and I think
the division Of resources il
fair.
So that I think it was the
best solution.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06

zuela in q good number o.
ways.
But II you are asking me. I
would have to see what the
conditions were, what the re
sponsibilities were under the
Rio Treaty, the GAS, If we
knew we were going into q
more substantial situation,
II you are talking about ag-
gression from outside the
answer is very clear. If you are
talking about internal acts we
would have to Judge those acts
and depend on what Govern
ment Of Venezuela decided was
the appropriate response.
II you are talking about In
ternal acts we would have to
judge those acts and depend on
what Government Of Vene-
zuela decided was the appro-
pirate response.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
cubo Issue Charges
So Fast, Furious

q. Mr.. President, Of late,
some of your congressional
critics have started to charge
that your administration has
been deliberately Withholding
important information on the
Cuban situation.
Among the claims that have
been made is that your Central
intelligence chief, John Nc
Cone. actually knew before
October IA that the Soviets
had planted offensive missiles
in Cuba. Is there anything that
you can say on this?
A. No, / have seen charges
Of all kinds. One day a dis
tineuished Republican charges
that It Is all the GAS fault,
and the next day 1t Is the
Defense Departments fault,
and the next day the CHA is
being made a scapegoat by an
other distinguished leader. SO
that we could not possibly an
swer these charges, which come
so fast and so furiously.
Mr.. Arens said the other day
that the testimony by the Air
Force before the committee
indicated that we knew all
about this October 10th. even
though Gen. LeMay made II
very clear In the same testi-
mony that the Air Force
didn't have such information
So we are not In q position
10 answer these.
I think, In hindsight. I sup
pose we could have always per-
haps picked up these missile
bases q few days earlier, but
not very many days earlier,
because the missiles didn't
come In. at least in hindsight
II now appears, until some time
around the middle Of Septem-
Der.
The installations began at q
later date. They were very fast,
and I think the photography
on the same areas. II we had
known that missiles we're going
In. 10 days before might not
have picked up anything.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06

cause when a ship refuses to
stop, and then you then sink
the ship. there is usually a
military responSe by the coun-
try involved.
We are attempting to per-
'suade NATO and other coun-
tries not to ship into Cuba,
but the primary source Of ship
ments into Cuba are bloc
ships, and at this time we do
not believe that war in the
Caribbean is to the national
advantage.
q. Mr.. President, 1t is 10
years now, sir. since the death
Of Stain, and 1t is a fact
ironically noted much more in
the Western world than the
Communist world.
Could you give us your APP
praisal. sir, Of the significance
Of the changes in the Soviet
Union in terms Of the future,
Of the East-West relations in
this period Of time?
A. No, I think that it would
take at least a half-hour pro-
gram on a national network
and I couldn't comment on
that.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Threat to Europe
Less Than in Past

Some Of our difficulties in
Europe have come because the
military threat to Europe is less
than 1t has been in the past.
In other words, whatever sue
cesses we may have had in re-
ducing that military threat to
Europe brought with 1t In its
wake other problems.
That is quite natural and in
evitable. I prefer these prob
lens to the other problems. I
think in the summer Of 1851
and Of course this all may come
again-we were calling up re-
serves in preparation of what
might be q collision Of major
proportions between the Soviet
Union and the United States in
Berlin.
/ would say our present diff
culties in Europe, while annoy
ing in a sense, are burdensome,
are not nearly as dangerous as
they we're then.
As for Cuba, 1t continues to
be a problem. On the other
hand, there are advances in the
solidarity Of the hemisphere. I
think we have made it clear
that we vii not permit Cuba
to be an offensive military
threat.
I think we are making some
progress in other areas so that
If you ask me whether this was
the winter Of our discomfort"
I would say no. II you would
ask me whether we were quite
as well this winter as we were
doing in the fall. I would say
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Kennedy Sees No Cut
In Southeast Asia Aid

The United States cannot
reduce its economic and mill
tary aid to South Wet Nam,
Cambodia and Thialand "un-
less we are going to pull out of
Southeast Asia" President
Kennedy said today.
He told q questioner at his
press conference that the eco
nomic burden should be judged
against the possibility that
Communists would gain control
Of Southeast Asia with the
inevitable effect that this would
have on the security of India
and, therefore. really begin to
run, perhaps all the way, to-
ward the Middle East"
The President was comment
ing on reported views Of Senate
Majority Leader Mansfield who
is disturbed about the ineffec-
tiveness Of American foreign
aid to the SEATO nations.
Il don't see any real prospect
Of the burden being lightened
for the United States in South
east Asia in the next year" Mr..
Kennedy declared, IF we are
going to do the Job and meet
what ] think are very clear
national needs"
The President denied his for
eign programs are losing mo-
mentum.
THE military threat to
Europe is less than 1t has been
in the past" the President said.
Whatever successes we may
have had in reducing that mill
tary threat brought with
1t in It's wake other problems
-. I prefer these problems to
the other problems.
Mr.. Kennedy defended the
administrators program for
supplying Europe with q nu-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Cuba Letter Didn't
Ask u. S. for Talks

@. Mr.. President, yesterday
u. N. Secretary General u
Thant received a letter from
the Cuban Foreign Minister in
which Roa limited that the
Cubans might like to discuss
the resumption Of friendly
relations with US. I wonder II
you think that this might be
possible, and If so, what con-
ditions would have to be met
first?
A. I understand the note had
some reference to it from
Havana but the note actually
delivered from the U. N. did
not have any such reference.
We have had no indication
that there is desire to resume
friendly relations with us. We
have said on many occasions
that we regard the present
Soviet presence in Cuba. as UNI
acceptable to US and we regard
the Communication of Cuba
and the attempt to subvert the
hemisphere as matters which
are not negotiable.
I don't see any evidence that
there Is In prospect q normal
ization Of relations between
Cuba and the United States.
Q. The length of your Joint
communique with the Presi-
dent Of Venezuela, you say
The President Of the United
States pledges the full support
Of his country to the Republic
of Venezuela" ct cetera.
Can you tell US something
about the nature Of that full
support in case there was a
serious or q successful coup
d'etat revolution against Presi-
dent Betancourt?
A. Well. it would depend a
good deal on the conditions and
what our obligations might be
under the Rio Treaty. We
strongly support President
Betancourt's efforts in Vene-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Merchont Mission
To Take Time

Now. No. 2, how goes the
Merchant Mission?
In the first place, we have
indicated that we would keep
our commitments to Europe
and we have indicated that our
atomic strength Is sufficient to
defend Europe and the United
States and our other interests
There has been concern, how
ever, in Europe about what
might happen over a long
period. So in an attempt to
meet that concern without pro-
viding for the ultimate dis
tribution Of nuclear weapons
to every national entity which
would increase the danger and
increase the expense and not
increase the security, this con-
cept of multilateral force was
put forward.
We are responding to Euro
pean suggestions. It may be
that when the proposal is
examined in detail they may
not feel that 1t provides suffi-
Gent additional security to
warrant the additional expen-
ditures Of money and may de-
eide that the present arrange
ment is satisfactory.
That we Of course woulc
accept.
But If they are interested in
the multilateral force. II they
feel the multilateral force does
provide extra security. the
United States wants to be re-
sponsive. We take the lead in
this matter because we are the
nuclear power and have had
the nuclear experience.
It may take some months OF
negotiation to determin e
whether such a force can come
into being but If there is q
desire for it. we are responsive
to it and that is why Ambassa-
dor Merchant is going because
we feel this is a way of main
tanning the close ties between
Europe and the United States.
So / think If we decide In the
final analysis, or Europe de-
cides that this isn't what they
want, we would be glad TO hear
any other proposals and we
would feel that the exploration
itself has been interesting and
useful, because II we had re-
fused to cooperate. then the
burden really would have been
on US.
q. Mr.. President, Congress
man Leonard Farbstein has
announced that he viii in
troduce an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act which
would give the President the
right to deny aid TO any nation
that discriminates against
American citizens because OF
race, creed or color. How do
you view this and would you
exercise this mandate?
A. Well. / would like to take
a look at his language. and
find out under what conditions
IL would give US this lower,
before I could comment on the
amendment.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Judge Appointments
In South Defended

Q. Mr.. President, yesterday
Gov. Rockefeller charged that
you had been appointing seq
gregationist judges" to the Fed
eral bench in the south.
Privately, some NAACP Of
ficials have said before that
they, too, had been critical Of
some of the judgeship appoint
ments that you had made in
the South, and that that had
blunted a certain amount the
aggressive stand that the ex-
ecutive branch had taken
against segregation and race
problems in the South. VIII
you comment on that?
A. No, I think that some Of
the judges may not have ruled
as / would have ruled in their
cases. In those cases, there is
always q possibility for an APP
peal. on the whole, / believe
and this is not true just Of this
administration, but the previ-
GUS administration - ! think
that the men that have been
appointed to judgeships in the
South, sharing, perhaps, as
they do. the general outlook of
the South, have done a re-
markable job in fulfilling their
oath Of office.
So I would not generalize.
There may be cases where this
is not true, and that is un-
fortunate, but I would say that
on the whole 1t has been an
extraordinary and very credit
able record and / would say
that Of Federal judges generally
that / have seen in the last
certainly in the last 10 years,
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Hearings Scheduled
On Mental Illness

Third, hearings began in the
Senate this week on our bills
to combat mental illness and
m entail retardation. Almost
every American family at some
stage will experience or has
experienced a case of mental
affliction, and we have to offer
something more than crowded
custodian care in our State
institutions.
Our task is to prevent these
conditions. Our task is to treat
them more effectively and SYM
pathetically. in the patients
own community.
/ hope the Congress win en-
act this bill"
Q. Mr.. President, is 1t fair
to assume from the language
you used before the American
Bankers Symposium that. If
necessary, if all else fails in
Congress, you would accept a
Sl3.5 billion tax cut without
any reforms at alp"
A. "No, that isn't what !
said. The program which we
have set up is the fairest and
most equitable program, and
the most fiscally responsible
program. 1t provides for q COM
bination Of tax reduction and
tax reform. and / think that
a good many Of the reforms
make more equitable the tax
reductions and more equitable
the burden which the great
mass Of our taxpayers carry.
So / think that the best pro-
gram is the one we set up which
provides for $13.5 billion in tax
reduction and a 1925 billion
revenue in tax reform. think
that is the best combination.
What we will do viii depend,
Of course, on what kind Of bill
the Congress enacts. but my
Judgment is that they will en-
act the tax reduction bill which
will include important elements
Of the reform that We set up"
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
Kennedy Hopeful
Of Accord on
Mexico Border

President Kennedy expressed
hope today for an early settle
ment Of the Chamizal case,
q United States-Mexico dis
pute over land in Ell Paso, Tex,
ITO wipe out a black mark"
against the United States.
He told his news conference
the black mark was due 10
United States refusal 10 &C
cept the decision OF an inter-
national arbitration commits
sion In the 50-year-old case
I'VE are close. / would hope,
to agreement" the President
said. He added that the nego-
tiations have been under way
for many years. and we're
stepped up following his visit
TO Mexico last summer.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06
No Timetable Set
On Ch0mozoI Issue

q. Mr.. President, reports
from Texas seem to indicate
that the United States is ready
to transfer the Chamazal to
Mexico. If this is true, could
you give US some idea Of the
timetable expected2
A. No, but there have been
negotiations on Chamazal for
a good many years. and they
were stepped up following the
visit to Mexico. we are close,
! would hope. to an agreement
and I think that the next week
should tell us whether we can
get an accord.
The advantage Of course Of
the Chamazal is that if we can
get a solution. is that it will
wipe out a black mark in the
record Of the United States
where we refused to accept an
arbitration claim 40 years age
and as q result we have never
been able to get the Mexicans
to agree to any arbitration
with us.
So I am very anxious TO see
that settled and we have made
pretty good progress on it,
There are still some questions
that have to be settled but the
prognosis ! would think was
hopeful and we would know In
the next few weeks.
Q. Mr.. President. I have q
two-prong question on the
NATO nuclear force. First, car
you tell US how goes the Mer-
chant Mission2 Secondly, In
view Of the lack Of enthusiasm
II we can believe the press, re-
fleets a certain amount Of pub
lie opinion in Europe as TO the
Polaris armed surface force
because Of Its alleged greater
vulnerability as compared Il
the atomic submarine.
Why haven't the proposals
for a conventionally powered
submarine force been put forth
a proposal which would no
apparently annoy Congress a.
much as an atomic submarine
and would cost only about hal
as much as the atomic sub
mariner
A. There are some people whC
are opposed In Europe 10 thu
multilateral concept because o.
national reasons. Now II WI
had come forward with a pro.
posal for submarines, thosI
submarines would have 10 b,
built In the United States
They would be quite expensive
they would take at least two
years or so longer than thli
program would; there would b,
elements OF control by III,
United States inevitably be.
cause Of various technical rea.
sons, and that is the system
that would have been under
attack.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-03-06

the 18th and 18th that you had
pictures that would be general
ly acceptable.
So this was a very clandestine
and fast operation. So ! feel
that the intelligence services
did a very good job.
When you think that the job
was done, the missiles were
discovered, the missiles were
removed, the bombers we're dis
covered, the bombers were re-
moved, I don't think that any,
body should feel that anything
but good job was done.
But I think we can always
improve, and particularly with
the advantage of hindsight.
i am satisfied with Mr.. Nc
Cone, the intelligence commu-
nifty, the Defense Department
and the job they did in those
days particularly taken in
totally.
@. Mr.. President, as you pre-
pare for your visit to Costa
Rica this month, there seems
to be a position there among
Central American countries in
Panama that the United States
should take a more active
leadership in attacking the
problem Of Cuba.
/ wonder If you could give US
some of your thoughts about
how you think this project
should move along that you
might find it possible TO discuss
with your colleagues there in
San Jose?
A. Well one Of the matters
of course that is Of interest to
us is the question Of the move
ment Of people in and out who
might be trained by the Com
munists in Cuba for guerilla
work or subversion in other
parts Of the hemisphere.
This is an action which must
be taken by each Of the coun-
tries In Latin America. We are
making proposals to them BIZ
laterally.
There has been an GAS
Committee which has reported
on the need for control. Now
it is UP to the Latin American
countries, / would hope in COM
mon consultation as well as
individually, to take those steps
which will control the move
ment Of people in and out. So
we will know who they are,
why they are going, what hap
pens to them when they get
there, when they are coming
out, and what happens to them
when they come out.
This is the kind Of thing
which each country finally has
to do itself because it is part
Of the element Of sovereignty
that the control Of movement
is within the country Of citizen
ship. but we are bringing this
to the attention Of the Latin
American countries as perhaps
one Of the most important
things we can do this winter.
In addition, there have been
other things which have been
done on trade, diplomatic
recognition and all the rest. /
think we have indicated very
clearly that what we feel is the
wisest policy is the isolation of
Communism in this hemi-
sphere.
We would hope that the
countries Of Latin America
with us will participate actively
with US In that program,