Evening star., 1963-05-18
DISASTER IN THE DEEP
The Lesson Is Still Hidden

rectly installed and fully In
spected before the crew was
even asked to accept the work.
BY this time, almost all testi-
mony was behind closed doors
"a situation which one Navy
information officer remarked
usually works out better.
Thresher's Builders
Days went by as men With
blueprints trooped one by one
into the room. These were the
men who had helped build
ThreSher-men with pride In
their work, submariners' gos-
sip to the contrary notwith-
standing.
One Of these workers, tssti-
flying In open session before
matters got overly secret.
"surmised" (his world that
a piping system failure would
be the most hazardous condi-
ton. :" The witness, James
c. Rogers, the yards assistant
superintendent for quality con-
troll, added that there could
be many, many more things
which could cause q similar
casualty"
Admiral Austin, the court
president. commented, Which
all goes to show, the more COM
lplicated we make things, the
more difficult 1t is to ascer-
tain what may have failed"
One day the court opened
briefly and q small, white
topped tornado blew through
in the person Of Admiral Rick
over, testifying briefly In open
session. defending his men, de-
Tending his reactors, saving
whatever else he had for the
ears of the court only. After
ward, leaving the courtroom,
the civilian-clad admiral re-
fused even to state his name
to reporters-who knew 1t all
the time.
Earlier Criticism Recalled
What he said behind closed
doors can only be imagined.
It could hardly be more damn
ing, however, than some Of the
things he has said in the past
about siipbuilders and the ef-
fects Of SUBJ standard work.
Recently" he once told 9
group in New York, I'VE dis
covered that Q stainless steel
fitting had been welded into
a nickel-copper alloy piping
system. The fittings had been
certified by the manufacturer
as nickel-copper and had all
the required certification data
and inspection results. Yet 1t
was the wrong material. Had
it been placed In operation
with this stainless steel fitting,
a serious casualty would have
resulted"
Again: Faulty welding,
faulty photography. defective
castings -. Underlying cause :.
management's failure to en-
force standards We finally
traced the cause Of q reac-
tori failure to the use of the
wrong material in q small pin"
At mid-May the inquiry was
still going on; so was the
search. An answer would even
tually be forthcoming: the an
swer, never. Thresher was for
ever lost, her ruined hulk be-
yond the reach of man.
What caused the death Of
the big, sharklike watcher and
waiter of the sea?
i Was 1t human error, q skip
per diving deeper than he
should have done? Almost In
conceivable in the sort Of ma
neuver Thresher was UNDER
taking.
Was It hull failure7 The vir-
tually unanimous view Is that
this did not happen to q hun
that had been to test depth
40 times before.
Hard to Determine
Was 1t material deficiency7
This seems the nkeliest cause,
but here again 1t is hard to
see how 1t could have been,
since every system subject to
pressure was tested at dock
side to half again the pressure
found at test depth.
| Was 1t some action or In
action by 1t. Comdr. Hecker7
Definitely not: all hands In
cluding the court that cited
him say nothing he could have
done would have saved Thresh-
er. A prompter signal might
have started the search sooner,
but all that time Skylark was
searching. too. .-.
Somewhere in the death Of
Thresher lessons are to be
learned. One. for example, Is
that tape recorders aboard sur
face escort vessels can fire.
quently iron out antiquities
and clear up points Of con-
fusion. Another is that you do
not expect such escort ships
to moor themselves In 8,400
feet Of water II they have only
1900 feet OF line aboard.
Whatever other lessons will
be learned remain to be seen.
One thing is certain: In q pur-
suit as vital as submarine
warfare. progress is not 10 be
stopped. Indeed, 1t is not even
TO be impeded, and brave men
will die. as Thresher's men
died. before the sea and other
enemies are pacified. ..