Evening star., 1963-02-03

the United States If we felt our
vital interests required us to
kick Castro and Khrushchev
both out of Cuba. And by this
very fact he was pledging France
to take all the nuclear risks we
felt we might be incurring.
The President, in his recent
press conference, acknowledged
that Gen. de Gaulle responded
when we were in difficulty In
Cuba" But" he added, with
some extraordinarily peculiar
logic of his own. II would hope
that our confidence in him
would be matched by his con-
fidence in u.s."
France Gains Strength
This whole sentence must have
been q typographical error.
The President had Just ad-
mitted a period back. that when
we were in difficulties Presi-
dent de Gaulle had shown the
ultimate in confidence by his
willingness to risk nuclear war
(if risk there was) by the side
of Americal
What the President really
meant to say, Of course, was
that whereas President de
Gaulle had shown confidence
In us at the time Of the naval
blockade, the final United
States political capitulation to
Khrushchev and Castro had
diminished that confidence, and
that the President hoped that
somehow it could be restored.
The hope Is an idle one. The
fault is by no means entirely
the Presidents. France has
grown economically strong
enough to stand on her own
legs. 1t would follow naturally,
in any case, that she should de-
sire sooner or later to stand on
her own legs militarily. The
significance Of the two Kennedy
backdowns over Cuba is that
what was a desire now seems
or at least to Gen. de Gaulle-
to be an urgent necessity for
Frances own survival.
The character of the United
States nuclear commitment
made in 1946 changed in the
'fifties when Russia became
itself a nuclear power. Today,
as in 1916, that commitment
is to launch q nuclear attack
on Soviet Russia If she movaS
against Germany. But in 1868
the same commitment means a
willingness to destroy the
United States for the sake Of
Europe. When the matter is
put in this blunt fashion, how
many Americans are for it?
Khrushchev took the full
measure Of President Kennedy
and United States public opin-
! ion in the Cuban crisis. So did
Charles de Gaulle. His con-
clusion: II the war chips
should ever 60 down in Europe,
the United States will not initi-
ate nuclear war on Russia
until Russia wages nuclear war
on America-and vice versa.
The effect Of this undeclared
nuclear pact is to subtract both
United States and USSR nu-
clear forces from the European
military equation.
Borrows Kennedy Book
Europe is today, without its
own nuclear force, a limited
war" area. Consequently the
outcome Of any European con-
flict would then be decided by
Russia's 125 divisions and
NATO's 23-or a negotiation.
Militarily Europe is Germany
and France. Their choice to-
day is as plain as the nose on
Gen. de Gaulle's face. 1t is to
get their own nuclear umbrella,
or to trust the United States.
IL they are attacked by Rus
sian conventional weapons, to
launch her missiles at Russia.
knowing that she would get
Russia's l00-ton m egaton
bombs right back.
Gen. de Gaulle has made the
only choice a patriotic French
man could possibly make. Like
the rational Frenchman he is,
he chooses to build up his own
nuclear establishment. He
knows that the day United
States troops are pulled out Of
Germany, France will be un-
able to defend itself without
its own nuclear force.
In his youth, President Ken
nedy wrote book called while
England Slept" It described
how England. in 1899. was
caught militarily mapping by
the Germans. and its very
sound thesis was that no ma
ton can afford to wait until
IL is attacked to prepare Its own
defenses. and that above all,
1t cannot rely on the military
or economic strength-even OF
Its allies - to save II from
destruction.
Charles de Gaulle has paid
the author Of while England
Slept" the compliment OF TAX
ing his advice. He does not
intend to be caught mapping
II at some future date the
United States. In order 10 pre-
vent "a world holocaust" land
It's own destruction) yanks It's
nuclear umbrella away from
Europe.
II Is hard 10 see what Is