davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Taxes:
Harder Fight

President Kennedy took his
fight for q tar cut 10 the
people in . televised appeal last
week. Republican Representa-
tive Byrnes Of Wisconsin coun-
tered with q measure 10 cancel
any cuts II spending exceeds
certain levels.
In the past 80 years, the United
States has run deficits In all but
six annual budgets. Since the tide
OF red ink began in the depression
year Of 1890, the national debt
has climbed from $l6.S billion 10
more than s305 billion.
Deficits are no stranger 10
either party. They occurred In
the last half Of the Hoover ad-
ministration, In every one OF
FDRs l3 years in office, In four
OF Harry Humans seven years,
IN five Of President Eisenhower's
eight years. President Kennedy
has an unbroken record so far OF
deficits, including an estimated
S6.S billion for the current fiscal
year which ends next June 30.
That seems 10 be the chief argu-
ment behind public resistance 10
the tax cut proposed by the White
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

1t down. A clue to their optimism:
The coalition Of Republicans with
conservative Southern Democrats,
working like q well-oiled machine
In other matters this year, was
creaking last week. The Southern
wing met Tuesday to seek some
other way Of curtailing adminis-
tration spending. q sign the
@. o. p. win have to. look else
where for help.
Even If voting goes well for the
tax bill this week on the House
floor. it's Still miles ana miles
from law. The Senate Finance
Committee won't even begin hear
ings on the measure until mid
October, and testimony there is
expected to consume nearly two
months,
In addition, q Southern fill
buster on civil rights could in
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
A Quiet Struggle

Between the summer Of 1851
ard the launching of Sputnik In
October 1857 there emerged a
relatively quiet interval, inter
rupted by the Suez and Hun
garian crises. which resulted d.
rectly less from the tensions of
the cold war than from tn
dynamics Of change within the
free world and within the Com
munist bloc. 1t is likely Soviet
planners recognized that the
phase Of exploitation Of I'M
mediate postwar opportunities was
over; and the positions taken at
the 10Th Party Congress in Octo-
Der 1852 in Moscow reflected
thoughts about a new, longer-run
Communist strategy. Then
Stains death interviewed, yielding
some four years of quiet struggle
for power. 1t was only In 1857
that Khrushchev established I'M
ambiguous control over the ma
chinery of the Soviet government
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
The Argument

President Kennedy took note
OF this widespread feeling in his
appeal to the Nation last Wednes-
day, but countered with several
arguments. National debt has
risen much more slowly than ma
tional output since World War II,
ne said. Federal civilian employ
ment Is less than 1t was q dec
AIDE ago, he added, pledginE 10
keep payroll padding down.
High postwar tax rates, the
President said, are no longer
necessary, are actually harmful,
and do not leave enough money
IN private hands to keep this
country's economy growing and
healthy" He warned they would
help cause recessions again, as
they did in 1858 and 1860.
The Commute talk drew fire
from Republicans. @. o. p. Ma
tional Chairman william E. Miller
demanded and got equal time,
charging the White House with
economic craftsmanship" More
to the point, House Republicans
have shaped a strategy to kill the
whole Sill billion tax cut bill
unless President Kennedy holds
down spending in 1864 and 1865.
Their method is an amendment
to be offered by Representative
Byrnes OF Wisconsin this week.
Its message: Not one penny Of the
tax cut will take effect unless
Mr.. Kennedy announces by next
January he will spend no more
than s97 billion In the current
fiscal year and no more than So8
billion the following year.
Current estimates put the total
spending for this year around sos
billion. and possibly si02 billion
the next year.
Democrats oppose the Byrnes
formula and think they can vote
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
THE NATIONAL SCENE

continue investing billions In
weapons for non-fallout, limited
engagements as well as the long
range nuclear missiles.
A major Kennedy program,
medical care for the aged died
quietly last week-at least for this
session. Chairman Mills Of the
House Ways and Means Commit
tee said there will be no House
action on the bill In 1858 as his
panel wouldn't even send it to the
floor.
For years, medicare bills have
been bottled up in his committee.
Hopes sank this year for enact
ment after the Senate by q narrow
50 to 4s vote killed a medicare
scheme tied to Social Security.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

Continued From Page B-1
openly in Washington: The division
Of opinion between State Depart
ment elements who wish to cut
aid TO the Diem regime and the
Pentagon-CIA group which, has
warned against any action likely
10 adversely affect the war eff
fort. This division is apparent
both here and among the official
American community In Saigon.
Senator Mansfield warned that
the United States would be "face-
to-face with q disaster" unless
all American Government agen-
cies obeyed the President In car
ryine out our 'win-the-war" pol
icies in South Wet Nam. ....
Meanwhile. Defense Secretary
Mcnamara and Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, chairman Of the Joint
Chiefs OF staff, prepared to leave
tomorrow At the Presidents re-
quest for an inspection visit 10
South Wet Nam.
On the war front last week.
Saigon reported Q major victory
over the Red gusrillas. A COM
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Continued From Page B.,

Continued From Page b.
run the Pentagon from here"
He may never have achieved
precisely that, but Representa-
tive Vinson probably was in
terested to learn late last week
that no commanders have yet
followed the Mcnamara invita-
ton to declare segregated areas
off-limits.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Red Enismu

AS Of the present time no one
can say with confidence whether
the Soviet Union is prepared to,
move toward a definitive settle
ment of the critical issues of
arms control and disarmament =
which evidently require mutual
inspection-or toward system
of mutual security combined with
the right of self determination in
Central Europe. ....+ =.
The objective case for effec-
lively controlling the arms race
and easing the dangers to all
represented by the Ulbrich regime
is strong. even viewed from Mos
cows perspective. The first steps
resulting from the limited test
ban could lead on, with patience,
toward more solid results. But
one cannot expect men. Of the
age. history and commitment Of
Khrushchev and his colleagues
suddenly to undertake the revolu-
tionary transformations which a
stable peace demands. We must
allow time and the workings OF
progress rather than coupS de
theatre. s +.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

The first charge on the Ken
nedy administration in 1861 -
somewhat like the challenge faced
by the Truman administration
early in 1947-was to turn back
this Communist offensive by dem
onstrating that the two hypoth-
eses on which 1t was built were
not viable. Roughly speaking, be-
tween May, 1861 when o precar-
ious cease-fire in Laos was ar
ranged, and the October 1862 mis-
sile crisis In Cuba, the task was
substantially accomplished.
The answer to the first ques-
ton posed by Soviet policy-our
possible vulnerability to nuclear
blackmail-was given by the whole
course Of the Berlin affair in
l96l-62, including especially the
Presidents July 1851 speech and
the subsequent military build-up.
After the failure Of the Soviet eff
fort In February-March 1852 to
crack the unity of the Western
Alliance by intruding into the Ber-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

lin air corridors, Moscow appar-
emily judged the Berlin position
Of the West too difficult to I'M
dermine directly. The Cuban mis-
sile gambit was then mounted, and
its denouement brought to an
end. for the time being at least,
the notion that vital interests Of
the free world would be surren-
dered under the threat Of liuclear
war.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Disruptivs Chinese

Third, within the Communist
bloc the assertion Of nationalist
impulses - notably in the Sino-
Soviet split, but elsewhere as well
shattered the intellectual unity
and organzational discipline of
the international Communist
movement. The process also
yielded the possibility that the
Chinese Communists might
emerge with some kind Of indie
pendent nuclear capability within
a time span relevant to current
planning.
Fourth, quite aside from the
chronic inability Of Communist
nations to grow food efficiently,
a marked industrial deceleration
began to take hold In the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe as the
heavy-industry sectors on which
postwar momentum was built ran
their inevitable course. In 1862
the countries Of NATO had an
average growth rate Of 40 per
cent Of GIMP: the Communist
loc-leaving wallowing Commu-
mist China aside-of 3.6 per cent.
The effect Of this declaration,
which has brought the overall
Soviet growth rate down in re-
cent years from something like
Z per cent to Just about I per
cent. is to reduce the annual In
crement Of Soviet resources avail
able for ALLEGATION to military,
foreign-policy and domestic pur-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Uncertainty Aheod

Uncertainty Aheod +
Fourth, since what we are likely
to see, at best, Is q slow and pro-,
tracted process, it is also essential,
II this third round is to succeed,
that there be no premature
throwing Of hats In the air. We
deluded ourselves and tempted
the Communist leadership by
popular over-reaction In the West
in 1856 and in the mid-lo50s, ,
two intervals Of apparent detente.
Very minor progress yielded "a
widespread sense that peace had
broken out. We Of the West ought
to be mature enough and case
hardened enough now to permit
our celebrations to match the
actual performance In moving
toward peace--whatever that per-
Torrance may prove to be. We
can we'll afford, at the present
time, TO attach TO the test=ban
agreement the Importance 1t de-
serves as q major step forward,
since we now are sufficiently eX-
perienced to know 1t is but one
Of a difficult series that must be.
taken for success.
The stakes for us all are 30
great that this sequence OF nego-
tiation must be approached-by
ourselves and by our allies-with
all the imagination and sincerity
we can summon. It Is unrealistic
to assume that history Is static
and that we are doomed TO repeat.
failures Of the past. But the hard
won lesson Of a generations has
ardous experience is that our
powder should be kept dry. An
awareness Of the truly revoiu-
tionary character Of the ultimate
isSues-and an awareness also OF
the undiminished, even gathering
strength and vitality Of the West
and It's values-should give us
the poise to be patient. We should
make the most Of the third round,
but not be afraid, II necessary,
to await the fourth. =
tcopyfisht. Council on ForslKn Relations
Inc. New York;
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
The RED Orchestra"

The second great new factor
on the world scene, which evil
IDENTIFY inflamed Soviet hopes, was
the marked acceleration in the
revolutions Of nationalism and
moderniSation In Asia. the Middle
East, Africa and Latin America.
There is no doubt that Moscow
came to believe that 1t had deeply
rooted avantages in seeking to
expand Communist power and in
fluence in these regions at the
expense Of the West by orches-
trating flexibly the devices Of sub
version and guerrilla warfare;
trade and aid; appeal to anti
colonialism and nationalist senti-
ments; and by the claim that
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Au.ttla Freed

There evidently was also some
thought given to the possibilities
Of accommodation with the West
As noted above, the Indo- Chinese
war was brought to o formal
close, Moscow acquiesced In the
Trieste settlement. and Austria
was granted its freedom in neu-
trality Gully 1850. But on the
two great issues arms control
and Germany - no substantial
progress was made. The summit
meeting Of 1855 yielded no i'm
portant result; and the subsequent
Foreign Ministers discussion of
Germany October 1850 proved
fruitless. A surface atrnospere of
relative detente persisted, never
theleSs, down to the summit
meeting Of May 1860, which was
exploded by the U-2 incident. But
III fact the sky had darkened at
least two years earlier.
In retrospect, the reason for the
failure of the detente Of the 1950s
is tolerably clear. Two major new
factors had emerged on the world
scene and Soviet policy-makers
evidently came to the conclusion
that they could be turned to
major advantage.
First. there was the emergence
In the 1950s Of themonuclear
weapons and the possibility of
their delivery over long distances
by rockets. For the first time
the Soviet Union was put In Q
position Of being able to threaten
the destruction Of Western Eu-
rope and the imposition Of mas
sive direct damage on the United
States. Contemplating these in
strumentS, MOSCOW evidently
judged 1t possible, in their shadow,
to force the West to make limited
diplomatic concessions. The theme
of nuclear blackmail first emerged
in Soviet policy In 1856, most not
ably during the Suez crisis.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
This Article

This article Is, reprinted by
special permission from the
October, 1868, issue Of Foreign
Affairs Magazine. The author
is Counselor Of the State De-
partment and chairman Of the
Policy Planning Council.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

House for the past year. A nation
wide survey by U. s. News g.
World Report last July found
most people welcomed the idea
but many wondered how 1t could
be done without cutting spending
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Expansion Trend

Assessing his opportunities
hopefully, Stain made clear in his
tough speech Of February 8. 1916,
that he regarded the days ahead
as Q period for the extension of
Communist power. And he
mounted a sustained offensive,
first in the West, then in the
East. In the West Stain, al
though set back in Iran, increased
Soviet pressure against Turkey by
diplomacy and threat during the
summer of 1916; In Greece by
supporting substantial guerrilla
warfare; and in Italy and France
by vigorous Communist Party eff
forts to gain parliamentary power
In 1947 he accelerated the move
ment toward total control in
Eastern Europe, symbolized by the
creation Of the Cominform In
September 1947. He succeeded in
Prague February, 1948), but
failed In Belgrade where Tito's
detection was announced in June,
1913.
But from early l947 the West
eEn counterattack began with the
Truman Doctrine and the Mar
shall plan. The election in April
1913 saved Italy, and the Com
muniSt effort In Greece fell apart
IN the face Of the Greek effort
and Communist schiSms. France
found a group Of center parties
capable Of governing, If uncertain
ly, and containing the domestic
Communist menace.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

sues pose for those responsible
in Moscow the same question
which the Chinese Communists
have put to them in recent,
months with such brutal candor;
Is the policy Of the Soviet Union
to be q policy rooted in the inr
terests of the Russian nation and
its people? or is 1t to be a policy
rooted in an abiding effort to
spread the cause of communism,
over the face Of the earth2 In
the end, this remains tie relevant
question. .,-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Born at StOIingrod

II starts, one might properly as
sumo, with Stalingrad. From the
time when victory appeared GER
tain, Moscow prepared actively to
eploit the confusion that the war
itself and the postwar years would
inevitably bring. Communist rule
In Russia was born Of such
confusion: and, as the Second
World War came to q close, 1t
became increasingly clear that,
despite vast destruction within
Russia, its rulers looked to the
postwar period as an interval of
opportunity for expansion, based
in part on the disposition Of the
Red Army and the leverage this
provided.
How far expansion could 90 de-
pended, Of course, on how the then
overwhelming power Of the United
States would be deployed. In
1s45-46 Stain evidently judged
that the United States was, in
fact, behaving as President Roose-
welt told him 1t would behave when
he predicted the United States
States could not maintain troops
abroad for more than two years
after the war. We negotiated
about Europe and China against a
background Of hasty, drastic, uni
lateral rehabilitation.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22

poses, although the declining In
dustrial growth rate is still quite
high. CThe United States over
all growth rate figure for 1862,
as we confined to emerge from
recession, was q better than-aver-
age 81 per cent?
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Mixed Weapons

Mixed Weapons
The answer to the second ques-
ton concerning the ability Of the
West to avoid Communist take
over in the underdeveloped areas
had TO be given at many points
by many devices in Laos, by an
evident determination to Illustrate
"a Communist takeover; In Wet
Nam, by the mounting from De-
cember 1851 Of q massively en-
larged counter insurgency pro-
gram: in 1ndoneSia, by tho sue
ceSsful negotiation over West New
Guinea by The Netherlands and
Indonesian governments; in Afri-
ca, by the whole cast of our ap-
proach to the new African ma
tions-in particular. our support
for the U. N. effort In the Congo:
In Latin America, by the isolation
Of Communist Cuba, c o m bined
with the Alliance for Progress.
BY the end Of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis In the autumn Of 1852,
the momentum had drained out
Of KhruShchev's post-Sputnik Of
fensive, despite the unresolved
crises In Cuba and Southeast
Asia.
In the course Of this sequence,
situations emerged which we're
bound to affect the future Of So.
Wet policy. : First, Western Eu-
rope continued to display an as
tonishing economic momentum,
not matched since 1914; and it
moved toward great-power status,
with q strong likelihood Of ex-
pansion, in one form or another,
OF its nuclear role.
Second, quite aside from the eff
forts Of the United States to deal
with the major dimensions of the
Communist thrust into underde-
veloped areas, those nations and
peoples demonstrated q capacity
to defend their independence with
increasing skill and determination
and with an increased understand
ing Of Communist detectives and
methods. The overall trend of
recent events In Asia, the Middle
East, Africa and Latin America.
while still marked by dangerous
instability capable of Communist
exploitation, made the notion Of
Moscow control over these areas
an increasingly unrealistic pros
pect. -.,
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
Which Cool?

Finally, while Moscow's post
Sputnik offensive was being con-
Quoted with great eclat and con-
siderable acceptance of risk, long
run trends operating in Russia
and Eastern Europe tended to
liberalize somewhat those societies
as well as to strengthen nation
alist Strends within them and the
popular will for peace.
This, as nearly as we can I'M
derstand It,, Is the setting In
which the third major round of
postwar negotiations is being I'M
dertaken.
There Is q sense In which the
fundamental diplomatic issues
and problems involved remain
precisely what they were in the
immediate postwar days. The
fundamental issues are arms con-
troll and Germany. The funda-
mental problems are the unwill-
ingness Of the. Soviet Union to
accept the kind Of inspection and
international control required to
get q serious grip on the arms
race, and the Soviet unwilling
ness to accept clear separation
Of its legitimate national security
interests In Central Europe from
its theological commitment to
hold East Germany as a Com
munist state against the will Of
its people. .4-e,.
In 1945-46 the diplomatic issues
were dramatized by the Baruch
proposal for international con-
troll Of atomic energy and Secre-
tary Of State Byrnes' proposal
for q 50-year German diSarma-
ment treaty to be applied to a
German nation unified by free
elections. -.-..
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
DUTY to Expond"

On the other hand. the whole
Of the story since Stalingrad has
in 1t important lessons for the
West. n os3s-
First, we must reckon that the
impulse in Moscow to seek The
expansion of Communist power is
so deeply rooted and institution
allied that Soviet leaders will
feel almost an historical duty to
exploit gaps in the capacity, unity
and will of the West. the five
basic questions which we had to
answer in the course Of Stains
and Khrushchev's offensiveS we
must be prepared to answer again
and again. That is, the United
States commitment to the security
Of the Western world must re&-
main firm; Western Europe must
continue to demonstrate its eco
nomic. social and political via
bility; the whole of the West must
be prepared to deal effectively
with any Communist thrust
across the frontiers of the cold
war; we must continue the still
incomplete demonstration in the
underdeveloped areas that, with
our help. these peoples and gov
ernments can maintain their In.
dependence and move on to build
and shape modern societies. In
conformity with their own tradi-s
tons, cultures and ambitions;
and, above all, the West. must
continue so to equip itself and
so to behave as to make nuclear
blackmaA q counter productive
diplomatic or military technique.
Second, in a world where, as
the result Of the burgeoning en-
ergies Of nations and peoples in
many quarters, power and au-,
thority are becoming diffused,
we, as leaders of the West, must
conduct this sequence Of explora-7 :,
tons In ways which respect not
merely the interests Of other eov-. .
ernments but their proper desire,
for consultation and a voice in
the outcome. Only over very
narrow range Of issues, indeed, is
this still, in fact. a bipolar world.
The agreement of Washington and
Moscow is necessary to make a
framework for peace; but its sub
stance must take into account the
interests and engage the energies
Of many peoples.
Third, the solutions that we
propose must encourage the Soviet
Union-and, indeed, other nations
with Communist governments-
to perceive that the world we In
the West are trying to create by
our own efforts and by negotia~
ton has a place Of dignity for all
nations which pursue their ma
tional interests with integrity,
which respect the hard impera-
tives Of interdependence and the
rights Of other nations and
peoples.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-09-22
BY w. w. ROSTOW

We are evidently at the begin
ming Of the third major effort
since 1945 to establish whether
or not it is possible for the Soviet
Union and the West to live to-
gether on this planet under con-
ditionS Of tolerable stability and
low tension. The first effort
occurred in the immediate after
nath Of the Second World War:
the second. In the years after
Stains death; and historians
may well date the third from
the aftermath Of the Cuban
missile crisis Of last October.
Sandwiched between these In
tervaB Of diplomatic exploration
and negotiation were two massive,
sustained Soviet offensives: Sta
Inns. Of 1946-l951, and Khru-
shchev's Of l958-l962. To UNDER
stand where we are and what the
prospects and conditions for sue
cess may be, 1t Is, perhaps worth
recalling briefly this familiar Sc
uence which takes on q certain
shapeliness with the passage Of
time and the benefit Of hindsight.