Evening star., 1963-04-28

/ Vi 1901 anu ILlG NONcI IlIIlCllJ
is particularly anxious to avoid
sharing in any more futile es-
says against the Cuban re-
gime.
Not UndercOver Long
The Government is also anx-
ious to avoid the chance that
Cuban exiles, operating out of
Florida, will fall victims to a
dramatic catastrophe which
could inflame public sentiment
to the stage Of demanding the
formal invasion to which
President Kennedy is strongly
opposed.
The undercover sponsorship
of the activist exiles has be-
come complicated almost to
the point of being impossible.
This kind of support does not
stay undercover long among
the garrulous Cubans, who
have a penchant for convey
ing their accomplishments and
Illustrations to the press.
The CIA has not managed to
find a way to work effectively
with even the most dedicated
of the Cuban exile groups. Be-
fore April, 1861, the practice
was to supply the necessary
weapons to the small vessels
with few questions asked. Many
abuses developed from this
laxity - some Cuban captains
would deliver the arms into
the sea instead of to the un-
derground in Cuba before re-
turning to Miami for their
CIA pay.
Don't Work Together
After the Bay of Pigs, the
CIA adopted a policy of close
supervision agents rode
aboard the ships and directed
the operations with an Off
cial thoroughness which Of
Tended the exiles and led to
an almost implacable hostility.
The latter have a litany Of
complaints against the CIA
agents, who emerge from these
accounts as bumbling and cow
ardly bureaucrats. No official
has been able to unScramble
the rights and wrongs of these
complaints but their tenor does
not seem applicable to the
high degree of character and
patriotism which marks the
general level of CIA person.
mel.
I The fact nevertheless re-
mains that, as far as can be
learned, no United States in
telligence agent has today a
working relationship with any
of the $50 or so Cuban men
who are the hard core of the
action groups. The six or seven
major groups do not even have
a working relationship with
each other and the extent of
their relationship with active
undergrounds within Cuba is a
subject of great dispute.
Their offshore raids from
fishing boats will not do the
job that is necessary now in
Cuba. The task of significant
subversion is a far cry from
the relatively free and easy op-
erationS in the EScambra
Mountains against Batista, who
had only a dispirited army tt
defend him. The Communists
informers in every city BLOCK
and village and the militia
units that patrol the beaches
make penetration of the islanc
a hazardous venture for agents
with the finest professional
training. Courage is only one
of the many attributes thai
are necessary to develop anc
maintain an underground II
the circumstances which exist
Action With ExiIes
The administration haC
hoped that the Cubans with
brave hearts would qualif!
themselves for these sophisti
Gated endeavors by enlisting ii
the army, which can providl
the training that they need
But the army cannot, as |
matter of policy, assure tn
Cubans before they enlist ant
demonstrate their potentia
that they will be used agains
Castro and on this point, tn
great majority of the activist
have baked. They see a sure
promise of action with the ex
lie groups.
But the prospect of mean
ingful action by these group
seems distant at the present
Their hoatS arc heinp seize,