Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1963-10-25
NATO and Our Troops

1t is hard to understand why the
NATO allies are confused and Suspi-
cious"-as Crosby Noyes reports from
Paris-over plans to reduce American
troops in Europe If the allies had paid
closer attention to the actions and the
policy statements of American officials
over the past few years it would all be
quite clear. The facts are, however, that
some American air and support units
will certainly be brought home from
Europe, slowly, over a period Of years.
And second, despite the promptings of
MesSrS Eisenhower and Goldwater,
there is no present intention to bring
back entire army divisions until late
in this decade. This, Of course, assumes
no worSening of the Communist threat.
These reductions will be made pos
Sible by chronological changes. Deputy
Secretary Of Defense Gilpatric said last
week that we have new ability today
ito bring to bear in combat theaterS
United StateS-baSed air power in no
deploy planes stationed on rear bases
overseas" Those countries with rear
bases can expect to lose American air
units in the next few years.
Mr. Gilpatric said also that "Ex-
erciSe Big Lift" the current Jump Of an
armored division from Texas to Ger
many, will demonstrate our ability to
project our military power far more
quickly over far larger distances than
has ever been the case in the past"
Europe can see that Big Lift, the first
experiment of this scale, is somewhat
artificial. 1t required weeks Of advance
planning and ties up most of the avail
able military cargo and troop planes.
More exercises and bigger and fast
er planes are on order, however. In the
late 1905 we will have enough large Jet
transports and enough experience to
move several divisions at once on min
utes notice. When that time comes,
American officials now believe, one or
more divisions can be returned from
Europe.
1t is important also for Europeans
to understand that there is more pres
sure on the American government to
move fighter-plane squadrons out Of
Europe Immediately than to move Army
divisions. Those squadrons in Germany
are very vulnerable; those in other coun-
tries cost us more in gold dollar drain
than their presence in Europe under
today's conditions is worth.
The five divisions, all in Germany,
are not a great drain on our gold re-
serves, though they do cost extra in
ordinary tax dollars. Under special
agreement Germany spends about as
much money in America as we spend
in Germany. 1t evens out as far as the
gold crisis is concerned. Also, Germany
is cooperating fully in building combat
and support units for NATO and in i'm
plementing agreed on NATO defense
plans. The same cannot be said for the
other European allies.
There is no plan to alter our COM
mitment to help Europe. We will merely
take full advantage Of the economies
we can gain by providing modern air
lifts for home-baSed divisions.
All of these things will happen, we
are sure, under any administration
faced with the fiscal and defense prob
lens forseeable in this decade. Any
European country which objects should
first match American defense spending
las percentage of gross national prod
uct) and then our people will be glad to
cfa