Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-11-01

change it would be the Soviet
Union that would strike the
first blow, it follows that our
Cor, to be technical, the
NATO) missile bases in Tur-
key are in fact worthless or
near worthless. Consequently
we can well afford to disman-
tie our Turkish bases in re-
turn for the dismantling Of
Soviet Cuban bases. Our
United States-based and ma
val striking power, while it
may be insufficient to deliver
a riposte-preventing first
blow, would still be amply
sufficient to deliver a devas-
tating counterblow.
2. Both the Presidents
speech and subsequent COM
ments have emphasized the
satellite status of Cuba. Now
it is true enough that the
presence of missile bases in a
Soviet-controlled Cuba would
be intolerable; but it is even
less tolerable to have such
bases in a Red Cuba indie
pendent of the Soviet Union
or semi-dependent on it.
Khrushchev and his col
leagues, for all their faults, are
responsive to reason; Castro,
a psychopathis personality, is
not. 1t is fashionable these
days to label Castro a Com
munist tool. That the man is
a rabid Communist no one in
his right mind would doubt;
that he is a tool, a puppet, is
open to question. A puppet is
generally a colorlesS, self
effacing man, such as Os-
waldo Dorticos, Castro'S pup
pet president, and not a
ranting egomaniac of the
Castro stripe. Indeed, there
have been frequent reports OF
clashes between Cuban Com
munists and their Soviet-bloc
advisers, resulting on one &C.
casion, at least, in a massive
pull-out of Russian and Czech
technicians. 1t is by no means
inconceivable, should the mis-
sile sites be allowed to remain,
that Castro's men would over
power the Russians guarding
the sites and fire the missiles
on their own. To sum 1t up,
the real danger is not that
the Cuba which now possesses
these missiles is a satellite OF
Soviet Russia-although such
a situation would be danger
Gus enough in itself-but that
the country is not a true
satellite.
John A. Lax.
4 4 \ 4
Adoption of a firm policy
by the administration in re-
gard to the international
situation viS-a-vis the Com
munist bloc nations has pro-
duced more important results
in the matter of cooperation
from our allies and respect
from potential enemies than
could have been accom-
plished by billions Of dollars
in foreign aid.
Why should we attempt to
court favor with nations like
Poland and YugoSlavia
through disbursing to them
foreign aid when they and
their ilk are more likely than
not to turn and rend" us?
The experience thus far as
the result of one week OF
firmness has demonstrated
the plausibility of our aban-
doning foreign aid" quit
kow-towing and devote our
resources to the implementa-
ton of e firm stand in the
matter of international rela-
tions and thereby regain the
maximum Of respect from the
nations of the world and, in
cidentally save our hard
pressed taxpayers billions of
dollars annually.
E.. M. Nichols.
4 Il
The timid and the naive
bearing picket signs against
President Kennedy's actions
in the Caribbean must feel
foolish now. They have con-
fused firmness with agrees
sion. They have missed the
point that the firmness now
has almost certainly pre-
vented a future war within
this hemisphere. Cuba or
Russia would simply have
kept on taking what they
could by threat or force until
such a time that the United
States or some Latin Ameri-
can country would respond by
military action. President
Kennedy's firmness led to a
peaceful solution of a poten-
TALLY growing threat to this
hemisphere. Even more pro-
ductive, his firmness has
likely prevented a very Sc
rious development in Ber-
lin a couple Of weeks from
now. Eternal vigilance is still