Evening star., 1962-09-23

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ness to negotiate with our Com
munist adversaries In good faith
for an international control
agreement with adequate safe
guards.
6. Skill and patience In dealing
with friends, neutrals and adver-
saries, keeping In mind not only
our own interests but also their
own, refraining from placing our
opponents in impossible situa-
tions, always leaving q door open
for peaceful adjustment.
No thoughtful man doubts that
the development Of United States
foreign policy and the conduct of
our relations with other nations in
this jungle world Of ours Is in
herently a tough-minded business.
Yet even the most casual read
ing Of history viii show that those
who have placed their faith in q
narrow-minded concentration on
military power, and who have re-
manned insensitive to forces
which move men to fight or work
or believe, have proved to be
wrong far more often than right.
'ReoIists' Were Wrong
In most recent years, the tragic
limitations Of the "realist" school
of thought have been apparent
in regard to developments in
Asia and Africa.
In postwar Britain for in
stance, representatives Of the
"realist" school asserted that If
the British withdrew from India,
Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, and
the irresponsible natives" were
left to handle their own affairs,
these countries would promptly
fall apart and become easy pick
ings for the Communists.
Fortunately for US all, this par
ticular group Of "realists" failed
to get their way.
The "realist" school Of public
policy also had its French chap
ter in Asia. Under its influence, q
succession Of postwar French
governments adopted policies in
Indochina for which we are all
still paying a heavy price.
By attempting to maintain q
colonial foothold in Asia under
impossible political and geo.
graphic conditions, the French
"realists" managed to create what
thoughtful men feared most: A
united front Of Southeast Asian
anti-colonialists, nationalists and
Communists.
MorsholI Plan Success
The disaster in Indochina
taught these "realists" nothing.
1t was they who made 1t impossi-
BILE for the French Government
to negotiate q reasonable settle
ment in Algeria until years Of
bloodshed had tragically washed
away many Of the ties binding
Frenchmen and Algerians together.
An even more dramatic exam
pie Of the bankruptcy Of the pro
fesSional "realists" may be seen
in the contrast between Soviet
and American experience in
Europe after World War II.
While we "Soft-headed" Ameri-
cans were pouring billions into
rehabilitating both our allies and
our defeated enemies, the 'rhard-
headed" Russians under Stain
we're pillaging all - of Eastern
Europe and carting off everything
that could possibly be moved.
Now. is years later, the United
States-having long ago ceased
aid to Europe-is doing q 81 bill
lion a year export trade with
Western Europe; our former enc
mics, the West Germans are now
among our best customers and
firmest allies.
The Russians, on the other
hand, are now frantically pour
ing back the capital which they
had previously removed in q des-
perate attempt to place their un-
happy satellites on a more solid
economic and political footing.
Cites the WoII in Berlin
Not only has the USSR failed
to win lasting allegiance to COM
munism among their conquered
peoples; they have failed to de-
velop trustworthy military allies
among these embittered popula-
tions. Indeed, they were forced a
year ago to build a wall bristling
with barbed wire and tommy
guns to keep their" Germans
from leaving en- masse for the
West.
The lesson of these examples
should be clear; a truly realistic
policy must be based not solely
on Stockpiles of military hardware,
but on the power Of people and
the power of ideas.
Does this mean that military
power has suddenly become un-
important? Not at all.
1t means that military force
alone cannot produce a peaceful,
rational solution to political
problems. This is the meaning of
the Nationalist failure on main
land China, the Soviet failure in
Eastern Europe, the debacle at
Suez, the French defeat in Indo-
china. and the eight-year tragedy
in Algeria.
AS long as ideas influence the
minds of men, and as long as
men and their aspirations are q
major component Of power, ideas
both good and evil-will con-
tinue to upset nations, defy
armies and write history.
No one has put this concept
more clearly than Admiral Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Americas great
naval strategist. THE purpose of
military power" Mahan asserted,
''is to provide time for mora
ideas to take root" The recogni-
ton of this essential dimension
of power is, I believe, the new
realism.
II We look closely we will see