Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-12-23

is no sense In raising hell, and
then not being successful"
WEAPONS AND STRATEGY
There is a limit to how much
we need for a successful deterrent
force and how much we can af-
ford to spend on it. How many
times do you have to hit a target
with nuclear weaponsP"
The United States does not
have to reply Immediately to any
Soviet attack and so the risk of
false alarm picking up false
blipS on our radar screens is
not great The United States
could wait quite long" because
1.-The Polaris submarine rocket
alone permits us to wait to make
sure we are going to have
sufficient in hand that he (Soviet
Premier Khrushchev) knows that
we could destroy the Soviet
Union"
When the day Of any massive
nuclear exchange between the
United States and the Soviet
comes that is the end" because
it would mean a total of $50 mil
lion fatalities in the first 10 hours.
EAST-WEST DETENTE-"The
Cuban effort has made it more
difficult for us to carry out any
successful negotiations 1t is
going to be some time before it
is possible to come to any real
understandings with Mr.. Khru-
shchev. The real problem is
the Soviet desire to expand their
power and influence.
a.. It is the constant determin-
alton which the Chinese show in
the most militant form, and
which the Soviets also have
shown, that they will not settle
for that kind of a peaceful word,
but must settle for a Communist
world. That is what makes the
real danger"
Even If we get an international
inspection of the missile sites In
Cuba this would not have led to
any breakthroughs in East-West
relations. II don't think we would
have gotten the kind of inspec-
ton which really is necessary,
because a totalitarian system
cannot accept the kind of inSpec-
ton which really is desirable.
What you are saying is that Cuba
be opened, the Soviet Union be
opened. They are not going to
open it because totalitarian sys-
tenn must exist only in secrecy"
There would not be much ad-
vantage in a summit meeting I'M
til we get the chance Of a break
through in some one area. 81 don't
think there is a need for us to
meet now"
KHRUSHCHEV AND CHINESE
1t is not our duty to protect
Mr.. Khrushchev on the assump-
ton that his successor would be
worse. II don't know what his
successor would be like" But in
fairness, it must be said that If
the Chinese dominated the Com
munist movement, we would be
far worse off because they be-
lieve in war as the means of
bringing about q Communist
world.
Mr.. Khrushchev's means are
destruction, but he believes that
peaceful coexiStence and support
of these wars of liberation, small
wars, will bring about our defeat.
80 we are better off with the
Khrushchev view than we are
with the Chinese Communist view,
quite obviously. But Mr.. Khru-
shchev does not wish us well, I'M
fortunately"
AMERICAS BURDEN - "Our
troops in Europe are the best
equipped. We have six divisions,
which is about a fourth of all the
divisions on the western front.
They can fight tomorrow,
which is not true of most Of the
other units. =. We also are pro-
viding the largest naval force in
the world. We also are provid-
ing the nuclear force for the
free world . as well as carry
ing the whole burden in South
Wet Nam.
I'VE hope Western Europe will
make a greater effort on its own,
both in developing conventional
(non-nuclear) forces and in as
sistance to the under-developed
world.
I'VE have one million Ameri-
cans today serving outside the
United States. There is no other
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