Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-03-03
Why America
Must Test in Air

III
The fact of the matter Is that
we cannot make similar strides
without testing in the atmos-
phere as well as underground
For, In many areas of nucleal
weapons research, we have
reached he point where oul
progress is stifled without ex.
periments in every environ.
ment. The information from
our last series of atmospheric
tests in 1858 has all been an
alyzed and re-analyZed. 1t can.
not tell us more without new
data. And it is in these very
areas of research missile
penetration and missile de-
Tense, for example - that fur
ther major Soviet tests, in the
absence of further Western
tests. might endanger our de-
Ierrent.
In addition to proof tests Of
existing systems, two different
types of tests have therefore
been decided upon. The first
and most important are called
effect tests" determining
what effect an enemy's nuclear
explosions would have upon our
ability to survive and respond
We are spending great sums OF
money on radar to alert our
defense and to develop possible
anti-missile systems - on the
communications which enable
our command and control GEN.
ter to direct a response = on
hardening our missiles sites.
shielding our missiles and their
warheads from defensive action,
and providing them with cleo
tronic guidance systems to find
their targets. But we cannot
be certain how much of this
preparation will turn out to be
useless; blacked out paralyzed
or destroyed by the complex eff
fectS of a nuclear explosion.
Must Have Precise Data
We know enough from earl
Ter tests to be concerned about
such phenomena. We know
that the Soviets conducted such
tests last fall. But until we
measure the effects of actual
explosions in the atmosphere
under realistic conditions, we
will not know precisely how to
prepare our future defenses,
how best to equip our missiles
for penetration of an anti
missile system or whether it is
possible to achieve such a sys-
tenn for ourselves.
Secondly, we must test in the
atmosphere to permit the de-
velopment of those more ad-
vanced concepts and more eff
fective. efficient weapons which
in light of Soviet tests, are
deemed essential to our secur-
ity. Nuclear weapons tech
nology is still a constantly
changing field. If our weapons
are to be more secure, more
flexible in their use and more
selective in their impact - if
we are to he alert to new
breakthroughs, to experiment
with new designs - if we are
to maintain our scientific mo-
mentum and leadership - then
our weapons progress must not
be limited to theory or to the
confines of laboratories and
caves.
AO DTlHS MANY Results
This series is designed to lead
to many important, if rot al
ways dramatic, results. I'M
proving the nuclear yield per
pound of weight in our weap-
ons will make them easier to
move, protect and fire - more
likely to survive a surprise at
tack - and more adequate for
effective retaliation. It will
also, even more Importantly,
enable us to add to our mis-
Siles certain penetration aids
and decoys, and to make those
missiles effective at higher alti-
-tude detonations, in order to
render ineffective any anti
missile or interceptors system
an enemy might some day de-
velop.
Whenever possible, these de-
velopment tests will be held I'M
foreground. But the larger ex-
plosions can only be tested in
the atmosphere. And while our
technology in smaller weapons
is unmatched, we now know
that the Soviets have made ma
jor gains in developing larger
weapons of DOWNRIGHT and
high explosive content - of
to S megatons and upward
Fourteen of their tests last fal.
were in this category, for q
total of 80 such tests over the
years. The United States, on the
other hand, had conducted
prior to the moratorium, a tota
Of only 20 tests within thi.
Inp0at0n range