The Glacier reporter. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1953-current, 1962-05-17
Washington
News Notes

Rusks ConceSsionS-
Washington The Russians
have already won a significant
victory in their Berlin negotia-
tons with Secretary of State
Dean Rusk. But II Is not victory
concerning Berlin, primarily. It
is a victory in the battle for Ger
many-a far more important vic
tory.
This disturbing fact is be-
clouded by the drama over Ber-
Inns unusual status and Rus
sian threats to cut Western ac-
cess routes to the former Ger
man capitol, and largest and
most important city in the Ger
manys.
Back in 1858, when he first
threatened Berlin's Western &C
cess routes, Soviet Premier Nj
kita Khrushchev learned what a
powerful and sensitive 'lever"
he had for dealing with the West.
Since that time he has used Ber-
lin as a lever to produce various
reactions in the West.
In 1858 the United States call
ed the bluff, and Khrushchev
backed down, did not turn over
Western access routes to the
East Germans.
In 1861 Khrushchev was success
ful-after shouting his threats
for all the world to hear, once
again threatening to sign peace
treaty with East Germany, turn
ing over to that satellite access
routes to Berlin. The new State
Department reacted nervously;
the threats convinced Secretary
Rusk that the United States had
to negotiate and compromise to
avoid a war over Berlin.
Since that time - mid 1861
Rusk has been in almost con-
slant negotiation with various
Russians on Berlin. II is argued
in the State Department that this
view is certainly not shared by
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of
West Germany or President
Charles DeGaulle of France. Nor
is II the view of many veteran
foreign correspondents In both
Moscow and other European cap
itols.
For example, Seymour Top
ping, writing in the New York
Times just a few weeks ago,
from Moscow, reported that it
had almost become a joke among
the Russians how a nervous re-
flex could be induced in the
West by the application of Com
munist pressure on Berlin.
Until now. however, that ner-
vous reaction had not gone much
further than just a nervous re-
action. This time the Russians
have won a major victory, and
II is vastly more important than
changing the status of Berlin.
To understand that victory,
one must first understand the
Russian goal In central Europe.
II Is to keep Germany weak and
divided. A reunited Germany
might some day be In a position
to demand the return of the ter
ritory the Russians stole from
eastern Germany, and also to de-
mand Identification of the coun-
try.
The Russians for many years
(perhaps for propaganda pur-
poses) spoke of the eventual re-
unification of Germany. That
line Is no longer heard in Mos
COW. Moscow now strives to
make permanent the division of
Germany and to integrate Ger
many into the Communist bloc.
Cast Germany has become the
sixth most important industrial
power in Europe. She is the big
gest trading partner of the Sow
let Union today.
Russian also seeks to keep
West Germany weak militarily,
to prevent her from obtaining
nuclear weapons, and to drive
a wedge between West Germans
and the Western democracies by
intimidating the West, with
threats on Berlin, into agreeing
to more firmly fix the present
borders of divided Germany.
Rusk has agreed to Communist
proposals which will accomplish
something in every one of these
directions. He has agreed to
more recognition of East Ger
many. He has agreed to an inter
national arrangement for Berlin
which would obviously more per-
manently fix Germany's present
division.
He has agreed to withhold nu-
clear weapons from West Ger
many, the United States most
valuable ally on the continent of
Europe. and a strongly anti-Com-
munist ally. Qn doing this he has
sewn the seeds of distrust and