Evening star., 1962-09-23

there. It should arouse their deep
concern and their support Of our
position.
Instead, our national policy
seems aimed at suppression Of
citizen interest, avoidance Of
clear-cut goals, q reduction in
tensions. Are we prepared to fight
for the freedom Of South Wet Nam
or only to give economic aid and
military assistance? Are we max
ing q show Of fighting when we
are not really committed to VIC
tory7 How far does the Soviet
Union have to go to force our !
withdrawal from South Wet Nam
under some face-saving formu-
la? If we are committed to VIC
tory, Premier Khrushchev will
know that he cannot win and he
will withdraw. If, however, we
have q price in fear and tension
which will cause our withdrawal,
it seems probable that he will
find the price.
Mr.. Khrushchev will measure
our commitment to victory by
what we do. He Is measuring it
now by what we do today. In
what he sees, he must find ample
basis for optimism.
Money and Determination
He knows that q large COM
mitment Of funds, of military
equipment and Of training per-
sonnel is Of little significance.
These measures are of specific
domestic value in capitalist ma
ton which is seeking to increase
its growth rate and they do not
necessarily imply determination
to win.
Mr.. Khrushchev viii not be i'm
pressed by our great to-do about
guerrilla warfare. He knows that
there is nothing new in guerrilla
warfare and that this publicity is
in large measure face-saving. It
also shows weakness; q reluctance
to use the power Of regular forces
to smash the guerrillas. You will
find no corresponding tolerance
Of guerrilla activity in Soviet
lands.
Mr.. Khrushchev knows also
that the borders of South Wet
Nam are being violated daily by
North Wet Namese forces operat-
ing from the airbase at Tchepone
in Laos. He knows that the bor-
ders Of Laos are violated by
North Wet Namese who fly sup
plies and reinforcements from
Hanoi to the Wet Cong. United
States failure to challenge these
aggressions against our allies may
we'll suggest to Mr.. Khrushchev
that we have no purpose Of VIC
tory.
Terms Of the Conflict
Consider the indignities which
American policy forces on our
allies. We pride ourselves that we
areNassociated with free and SOW
ereign powers in contrast with
the Soviet system Of satellites.
Yet, those satellites know that
the puppet regimes will be pro-
tected by the swift and sure en-
ployment of Soviet power against
outside aggression. Our allies
have no such security. We call
them sovereign and deny them
the rights of sovereignty. II we
tell them that they must submit
to these violations of their SOW
ereignty, they must submit.
In the struggle with the free
world, the principal triumphs Of
communism have been intellec-
tual. From these successes, the
continuing gains In politics and
revolution flow. For example, the
Communists have sold the free
world the false premise that al
lowing sanctuary in neighboring
states for insurgent forces Is &C
ton toward peace.
When one nation, whether by
design or weakness, permits per-
sons or groups under its control
to violate borders and harass q
neighbor, the neighbor has the
right to enter the offending state
to suppress the transgreSsing
forces. The United States did this
in 1916 when the Mexican gov
ernment was unable to restrain
the depredations Of Villa.
When we require of our allies
that they forfeit rights, we un-
dermine their standing as sover-
eign powers, impose on them
tragic sacrifice and undermine
international law.
Accept Red Sanctuary Idea
Because we will not permit the
South Wet Namese to cross the
border and knock out the Tche'
pone base, our ally must fight
costly jungle warfare, uproot and
relocate populations and ulti'
mately lose faith in victory.
Thus, our intellectual failure II
reject the false claims Of sane
tuary saddles US with q police
which is defensive and negative
We hope we can win without
real clash with the Soviet Union
but the threat Of that contin.
gency might scare us away. Oul
lack Of positive purpose and actor
encourages Mr.. Khrushchev b
increase his commitments Il
South Wet Nam in the expecta,
ton that we shall withdraw q
we did in Laos. Our policy cal
lead us only to mounting cost
and casualties with no clea
prospect Of winning. We are es
calating ourselves into defeat.
It is a truth hidden from tn
fearful that vigorous and pruden
military action does not escalat
conflict-it ends it. We can Wi
in Southeast Asia and the cos
of winning is less than the cos
of losing. All the advantages q
moral and physical strength az
ours If we have the courage t
use them. Our amphibious powe
so dominates the area that n
land-based power can success