Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-02-11


United States officials sal
the complicated diplomatic ga
President Kennedy and Soviet
evidence that Mr.. Khrushchev
wants to improve relations with
the United States when he can
do so at little expense or in
convenience.
Thus in recent weeks he
obviously has favored an in
crease Of top-level exchanges
Of ideas as exemplified by the
visit to Mr.. Kennedy of Alexei
Adzhubei, Mr.. Khrushchev'S
son-in-law.
The reasons Mr.. KhruShchev
wants to improve Soviet United
States relations are, Cd the
widening rift between Moscow
and Peiping holds danger of
a future threat to Russia's,
power position, and 90 Mr..
Khrushchev fears the con-
sequences of a United States
Soviet nuclear war and hopes
to avoid any such catastrophe.
Those reasons received high
priority in administration
quarters yesterday as experts
on Soviet behavior puzzled
over the answer to the ques-,
ton: Why did Premier Khru-I
shchev agree now to approve
the swap of Powers for Col.
Rudolf Abel, alleged Soviet
master spy" who had been
imprisoned here during the
Eisenhower administration?
Early Efforts Fail
Washington efforts to win
Capt. Powers release back inI
1860 and early 1861 had gotten
nowhere.
Senator Aiken, Republican
Of Vermont, put his finger on
a point that interested Off
Gals. He said he had felt for
some time that the growing
tension between the govern
ments of Red China and Rus
STA would tend to make the
Russians more friendly with
U.S."
Soviet leaders Senator
Aiken said, shave far less to
fear from the United States
than from Red China. and they
know that"
Government informants said
Soviet leaders seemed anxious
to get Col. Abel back to Russia
just as the United States for
its own reasons was anxious toll
recover Capt. Powers. But they
figured that in the Soviet
agreement were elements OIL
much greater significance than
the desire simply to recover a
has-been master spy.
One striking aspect of the
deal is similar to that which
has characterized other Khru-
Shchev moves. It cost him
nothing in terms of real Soviet
aims or in vital interests
nothing more than it cost, for
example, to make friendly
statements to President Ken
nedy following his election in
1860 and thereafter to agitate
for a summit meeting with Mr..
Kennedy.
Critical Question
Thus the really critical ques-
ton in the policy considera-
lions underlying yesterdays
dramatic event is this: Does
Mr.. Khrushchev fear nuclear
war enough, does he think bet
ter East-West relations impor-
tant enough to begin to make
accommodations on major is
sues with the West which will
involve real changes in policy
and real concessions?
So far there is no evidence
that Mr.. Khrushchev is pre-
pared to pay any such price.
Possibly he thinks nuclear
war can be avoided with less
upset to his grand designs. Per-
haps he really hopes to split
the West by negotiating sepa-
rately with Germany over Ber-
lin. Or he may hope that in
some such crisis as the Algerian
agony of France the West will
split itself.
The real test of Soviet policy
will come, Kennedy admins
tration policy makers are con-
WINGED, in fields other than
those of prisoner exchanges:
Trend Seen
The return of Capt. Powers
therefore is judged as signifi-
cant of a trend but not sig
nificant of any actual altera-
ton so far; nor does it offer
assurance that the whole trend
may not blow up tomorrow or
next week in some angry new
conflict. There are many places
where this could occur.
The United States, with re-