Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-11-09
POLICY
Inspection of Cuban Arms Poses
Touchy Issue for u. S. and Soviet
Continued From Page Al

SOhtAhuCA II AOAh u 06C "a
counted about 20 Ilyushin-28
bombers on Cuban airfields by
October % and officials now
say this figure has practically
doubled"
Seek to Bar Return
Mr.. Kennedy considers the
bombers offensive weapons
capable of delivering nuclear
explosives to any point from
Canada to Peru and will insist
that they be removed and that
assurances be given for pre-
venting the return of any Of
fensive weapons systems to
Cuba before he agrees to issue
the no-invasion pledge.
Another outstanding problem
is the United States need Tor
assurance that nuclear war
heads have not been hidden in
Cuba. There is 10 hard evil
dence that such warheadS we're
present. only strong suspicion
because the 1000 to 1000 mile
ballistic missiles would be in
effective without them.
1T is assumed the Soviet
Union has stored at least some
Of the warheads below decks
in the ships now pulling out
Of Cuban waters with the mis-
siles above decks, but Washing
ton cannot be sure that nuclear
bombs which could be dropped
from the IL-28 bombers have
not been left behind.
Will Press Inspection
For this reason the President
is expected to press hard for
ground inspection under United
Nations supervision as well as
aerial inspection throughout
Cuba.
Evidence continues to ac-
cuinulate that Premier Castro
is furious with the Soviet Union
and treating Mr.. Mikoyan with
something less than comradely
consideration.
Contrary to some reports out
Of Havana, official information
here is that Mr.. Castro did
not attend the public celebra-
ton Wednesday night of the 9
Soviet Unions october revolu- =
ton. Mr.. Castro has fire. y
quently left what would nor y
mally be considered to be press =
ing business to talk at length =
with students at Havana Uni
versity.
Brazil Seeks Role "
Brazil, meanwhile, continues p
to, aspire to a mediator role C,
between the United States and a
Cuba, once the principal Amer II
ican-Soviet problems have been y
settled. ;,
One objective of Brazilian
policy. according to United 2
States informants, is to en- c
courage Mr.. Castro to adopt
an. independent Communist
line. following the example of ,
President Tito in Yugoslavia. I
The Kennedy administration
appeared to be split on the /
timing of an about Wash il
ington campaign to get effec- C
tive ground inspection inside
Cuba, with or without Castro's Il
approval. n
Two Key Points =
The .degree of pressure the b,
United States puts on Russia ts
and the United Nations in in W
siSting on ground inspection
inside Cuba depends on two
things:
/. Washington's confidence lie
in its intelligence to have m
spotted the great preponder- c
ance, if not all, of the Soviet Of
missiles, bombers and nuclear II
warheads taken into Cuba. W
2. United States foreign W
policy detectives in the greatly W
changed situation in the
Caribbean.
If the objective is merely to
get the offensive weapons sys-
TENS out of Cuba, and if Wash
ington is confident of its intel
ligence estimates of what went
in, off shore inspection could be
accepted as sufficient.
If the administration OBJ
jective is to establish a prece-
dent for effective inspection in +
a general disarmament agree 8
ment or a nuclear-test ban, the j
President would be expected to :
press more strongly than he !
has so far for ground inspec- O
ton inside Cuba.
Force a Possibility
If the President decides to v
bid for the downfall of Fidel C
Castro and communism in s
Cuba, he would be likely to in v
sist on ground inspection, even il
to the point of using unilateral 4
United States force to get it.
This is the only effective s
method to make as certain as S
possible that all offensive So v
Wet weapons have been cleared C
out Of Cuba.
Either United Nations or +
other international inspection, t
not to mention American in r
spection, would be expected to {
provoke new troubles for Mr..
Castro among the sullen Cuban I
population.
1t is presumably for this rea-
son that Mr.. Castro has baked
openly at Premier Khru-
shchev's commitment to allow
international inspection in {
side Cuba.
American officials believe Mr..
Mikoyan could have persuaded
Mr.. Castro to accept on-the-
spot inspection If he really
wanted to. Cuba is so heavily
dependent on Soviet aid that a