Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-06-18
THE w AFFAIR
Powers-A Summing Up

remained silent, by admitting 1t
had lied. by disclaiming Presi-
dental responsibility, then ad-
hitting Presidential RESPONSE
biity, and finally by implying
the flights would continue. the
United States all but made it
impossible for the summit
meeting to take place.
1t is difficult to see how any
head Of government could have
been expected to sit down at a
peace conference under the
yelled public threat Of further
violations Of his air space. To
reverse the circumstances Is to
see the situation clearly: If, on
the eve of a summit meeting.
Mr.. KhrushcheV had threat
ened to send his planes over
New York or Chicago, could
President Eisenhower-or any
other President-have agreed
to sit down with him?
1t Is true that President
Eisenhower finally announced
at the summit table that he
had called off the U-2 flights,
but by then it was too late. 1t
is quite possible, even probable,
that Mr.. Khrushchev came to
Paris ready to blow up the
summit. But this misses the
point. BY the time the summit
convened on May Is, Washing
ton had already taken a posi-
ton - on May 0 - that would
have made it politically hazard
Gus for Mr.. Khrushchev to par
ticipate and still hope to remain
Premier Of the Soviet Union.
Private Admission
In retrospect, the President
realized that the crisis had been
badly handled. He admitted
privately that the United States
jumped too soon in issuing its
May 5 statement. And he con-
coded that the administration
had become overconfident in
its conduct of the U-2 opera
ton.
There was reason for this
overconfidence. The U-2 pro-
gram had operated without
exposure for four years, pro-
viding the underpinning for
some of the most important
policies Of the Eisenhower
years. 1t had convinced the
President, as he expressed it
in his farewell address, that
the celebrated bomber gap"
and missile gap" were "fic-
tion." 1t had also persuaded
him that Soviet advances in
space were not as spectacular
as they seemed and that the
Russians, too, were secretly
experiencing their share of
failures.
The U-2 affair revealed the
extraordinary extent to which
information and activities that
are secret to the American
people are shaping the Ma
tons destiny. Secrecy on a
large scale became an accepted
fact Of life in the governments
effort to survive in the post
war power struggle with Com
munism. AS a result, a secret
layer Of government has de-
veloped spontaneously and
established itself with the
power to conceal its mistakes
behind a claim of national
security" 1t includes, but is
not limited to, the CHA. 1t has
mushroomed to vast proper
tons outside the normal
checks and balances of the
government. 1t is largely ig-
nored until is existence is ex-
posed by a celebrated failure
such as the U-2.
Beyond mere intelligence
gathering, the CHA has en-
gagged in subversion, the over
throw Of unfriendly govern
ments, attempted invasion and
other quasi-military opera
tions. These activities may at
times be necessary, but the ex-
tent to which they are con-
sistent with our democratic
institutions has never been
properly assessed. Such a
scrutiny would seem to be long
overdue.