Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1962-06-18

not. The dispatch of the plane
was directly related to thG
summit.
Within the intelligence com.
munity of the United State
Government, there was an I'm.
easy feeling as the summit ap-
preached that a detente nigh
be reached at Paris. If so, thu
UPS might be grounded, per
haps permanently. An interna-
tional impeachment, followed
by President Eisenhower's triT
to Russia. would make further
flights politically impossible
for the foreseeable future. Al
one Of those who managed the
program put it: I'VE felt thiS
would literally be the last flight
because of the summit"
There was a strong desire
therefore, to get one last mis-
sion in under the wire. The
policy-makers at the top Of
the Government were unable tc
resist this desire, since they
had already lost genuine con-
troll of the U-2 program.
There Is no subStantiated evil
dence Of any sort of conspiracy
to scuttle the summit. But il
is clear that many important
persons in the intelligence fielC
were more concerned with the
U-2 as a valuable instrument OF
espionage than with its pos
Sible effect on the summit. In
other words, they were worried
not so much that the U-2 might
endangsr the summit as that
the summit might endanger the
U-2. BY May Of 1860, intelli-
gence had come to dominate
policy ir the U-2 program. In
stead Of serving as a basis fol
policy = m q king, intelligence.
gathering had become an enc
in itself.
Dangerous from Start
In q sense, the danger was
inherent from the start. The
U-2 operation was a complies
break with the traditional
methods Of espionage. And yet
there is no evidence that the
revolutionary implications OF
the operation were thought
through. President Eisenhower
reluctantly accepted assurances
that the Russians would not
dare expose the program, but
he apparently did not face up
to the possibility that there
would be a day Of reckoning.
When disaster struck, the
Government was not ready,
even though the program had
been running for four years.
As O result. it stumbled into a
series Of errors.
The first, perhaps, was to issue
any cover story at all. It might
have been wiser to wait for the
Russians to make the initial
move and then to respond to
each charge with the simple
statement: I'VE are investigat-
ing"
Instead, on May 5, when Mr.
Khrushchev disclosed that the
plane had been downed, the
government issued an elabor-
ately detailed lie. That was the
point Of no return. When
Khrushchev exposed the lie two
days later. on May z, the United
States was confronted with the
choice Of admitting 1t had lied
or Of trying to brazen 1t out.
The Government hedged by
stating a Observation-Disclosures
edging the flight but insisting
1t had not been authorized by
Washington.
New, Crucial Element
But when the President real
lied the full implication Of the
statement, he felt the necessity
Of asserting his full respon-
sibility for the program. When
he did so, a new and crucial
element was added-the indica-
ton that the flights were to
continue. This was done despite
the fact that President Eisen-
hover knew. and said private
ly, that the flights were a
blown instrument and would
have to stop.
BY lying, when 1t could have