Evening star., 1961-03-27
Kennedy Policy Averts
Atonic Plant Strike


sThe Kennedy administration
used keep-them-guessing tao
tics to block a dangerous strike
at the Hanford atomic works.
High-ranking officials view
the Hanford case as a classic
demonstration of President
Kennedy's policy on crucial
labor disputes. They claim the
administration proved at Han
ford that the Government can
and should participate actively
in some types of labor-manage-
ment negotiations. without i'm
posing settlements or hamper
ing free collective bargaining.
Furthermore, these officials
contend, the Hanford case
should teach unionists that the
administration is not blindly
pro-labor, and should convince
management that stubbornness
can be dangerous.
Hanford is a Government
owned plant, operated by Cen
eral Electric, producing plu-
tonium for nuclear weapons.
There are about 5000 employees
At the plant at Richland, Wash.
How Settlement Came
GE and the Hanford Metal
Trades Council, a union group
ing with bargaining rights at
the plant. achieved a settle
lnent Of their long and bitter
dispute March 18. Here's how
It happened:
; The company last year made
b take-it-or-leave-it offer on
wages, shift differentials, vaca-
tions and holidays. GE warned
that 1t would refuse to make
the contract improvements re-
troactive If the union failed to
accept promptly. The union
rejected the offer and made
larger demands.
Negotiations continued be-
yond the expiration date Of the
old contract last October 3. A
panel headed by Cyrus s. Ching,
established to help settle labor
disputes for the Atomic Energy
Commission, held hearings and
recommended terms for a new
contract.
The Ching panels recon-
medations rejected most Of the
unions demands but was
slightly more generous than
GE's offer. The union accepted
the recommendations but GE
turned them down.
:. Union Set to Strike
At the direction Of Labor
Secretary Goldberg. negotia.
tons continued with the assist
ance Of the Ching panel and the
Federal Mediation and Concili,
alton Service. No progress wal
made, and a strike was set fol
midnight March 13.
Mr.. Goldberg and Glenn T
Seaborg, chairman of the Acc
agreed on co-ordinated policy
for handling the dispute-thu,
blocking possible efforts to split
the Labor Department and the
Acc. They agreed to make il
Clear to the union and the com.
pany that there was top-leve
Government interest in pre-
venting a strike at the vita
splant.
In addition. they agreed Il
avoid direct Intervention If pos
ssible, and resolve that the Gov
sernment should not favor eithel
sSide.
President Kennedy con.
Cured in these principles. HI
accepted Mr.. Goldberg's re.
commentator that the White
House should do nothing
about the dispute until 8 pm
Pacific time March 13, foul
hours before the strike dead.
line. Neither the union nor CT
was told about this decision
for fear they mig ht avail
presidential action instead o.
negotiating.
/ Last-Minute Move Made
: Mr.. Goldberg was informed
while en- route to Chicago b!
plane that the deadlock per
sisted as Of 8 pm. Pacifi'
time. He phoned the Presiden
from the airport, and MI
Kennedy Immediately mad
the predetermined last-min
ute move. He asked GE ant
the union to postpone th'
strike for two weeks, anC
Offered Mr.. Goldberg's gooc
offices.
+. Both sides agreed to thu
postponement. Mr.. Seaborl
and Mr.. Goldberg then starteC
talking tough, telling GE anC
the union that the Government
would not permit a stoppage o.
plutonium production.
They advised the antagonist
to negotiate a settlement OF
their own, or risk Government
action to keep the plan
operating. Neither GE nor tn
union was told what actiol
the Government would take