Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1961-09-07

survival depended on United
States aid, the Russian Of
ficers he dealt with were not
only suspicious but truculent
and bullying. Later, as ST.
preme Commander in Eu-
rope, he found the Commu-
nists no easier to deal with.
AS the war drew toward its
end, and the Western and
Soviet armies rushed toward
one another across crum-
bling Germany. the task of
constant liaison to prevent
clashes between Allies be-
came vital. But, Ike recalled
with remembered irritation,
no cooperation could be got
from the Russians. Instead
he got active belligerence and
angry suspicion while the
German armies, anxious to
stay out of Russian hands,
tried to surrender only to
the West. Still later, in Ber-
lin after it was all over, he
grew accustomed to the So
VETS demonstrating fits of
pique by suddenly refusing
to show up at inter- Allied
social functions.
Even before the war ended,
he recalled, he had become
pretty thoroughly disillu-
stoned about Soviet good
faith. And, though it could
not come entirely clear I'M
der the day by day pressures
of fighting a war, he began
to get a glimpse of what the
future held.
In 1914, the European
Advisory Commission was
working out a plan for Allied
occupation zones In Ger
many. Although Eisenhower's
responsibilities were military
instead of political, the
scheme shaping up disturbed
him. In the light of Soviet
intransigence he saw the
potentiality of trouble.
Eisenhower flew to Wash
ington where he found Presi-
dent Roosevelt in bed with
influenza.
This is my pet" he told
the President. Let's not
have separate occupation
zones in Germany. Instead,
let's have joint Allied ad-
ministration of the whole
country"
Impossible" Roosevelt re-
piled. I'm already COM
mitted."
Eisenhower then urged
that, if it was politically
necessary to allow the So
VETS a separate zone, it
would at least be advisable
to establish joint Western
control of the remainder of
Germany. Roosevelt again
refused.
Again in 1945, when
Churchill and Roosevelt were
en- route to the Yalta Con-
ference. Eisenhower sent his
chief of staff, Gen. Walter
Bedell Smith, to intercept
them at Malta and urge that
the Soviet zone be restricted
and that Soviet promises
should not be fully trusted,
AS he later wrote in his book,
Crusade in Europe, Eisen-
hover felt that the Western
Allies could probably have
secured an agreement to oc-
cupy more of Germany than
we actually did. I believe that
if our political heads had
been as convinced as we were
at SHAEF of the certainty
of early victory in the West
they would have insisted, at
Yalta, upon the line of the
Elbe as the natural geo.
graphic line dividing the
eastern and western occupa-
ton areas"
Berlin itself was in ruins
and. not considering it a
primary military target, he
did not foresee the para
mount political Importance
it would later have. Seven
years after the war, when he
came to the Presidency, he
found that the question of
occupied Germany. with iso-
lated Berlin as it's prickly
danger point, had become
one of his most persistent
and troublesome concerns.
y
A "realist" could we'll say
that Berlin, 10 miles inside
Red territory, was not milf
tarily tenable. But much
more than military expedi-
ency was now involved. Ber-
lin had become a symbol of
freedom and the West was
determined to keep it SO.
Many contest had been
lost to communism in the
years since the war, China
the greatest. Others were still
to be lost or nibbled away
by Soviet "salami" slicing.
But on Berlin there would
be no Western retreat from
DrinciDle or moral right