Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1961-01-22
BY RICHARD FRYKLUND
star staff Writer

@r-%~~ ''sASSe
Naval officers say the Stra-
tegic Air Command is elbowing
them out of their proper role
on the Joint Strategic Target
ing Committee-proudest Pen
tagon creation Of former Sec
rotary Of Defense Gates.
Only months after it was set
up, the committee Is torn by
complaints and counter-com-
plants by naval and Air Force
officers at its Omaha head
quarters. The immediate issues
are over who should shuttle
what papers, but both sides
agree the dispute really goes to
the most basic principles of our
nuclear war strategy.
The committee was set up
last year to make Americas
first master list of targets to be
hit in the event Of atomic war.
1t was Secretary Gates answer
to Air Force insistence that one
strategic command" should
run both air and sea long grange
striking forces and to Navy in
sistence on autonomy. He called
1t his most important decision.
Gen. Power Chairman
Mr.. Gates created the Air
Force-Navy committee, with
SAC boss Gen. Thomas S. Power
as chairman and with a minor
ity Of Navy members. This
group worked Air Force, Navy
and NATO strategic war plans
into one target list, which was
approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff last month. The list de-
termines what the targets are
and how many weapons will
hit them with what force.
The two services never did
reconcile their differences over
nuclear war policy, however.
The differences have broken
out in inter-service shipping in
Omaha and threaten to force
the Joint chiefs to review basic
nuclear war policy again.
Navy members Of the target
committee say that they are
being cut off from vital infor-
nation at Omaha and that
their role in the targeting work
is being reduced by SAC. What
is worse. they say. Gen. Power
has drawn up q reorganization
plan which would push Naval
officers off the committee or
into q quiet corner.
These officers say that i'm
portant papers are stamped
AIR FORCE EYES ONLY"
that less and less work is given
to Naval officers, that Naval
forces are offered only the |
least important targets by SAC, |
that aircraft carriers and Po-
laris submarines are being |
forced into limited spheres of |
action under the control of
SAC, that Naval officers can
not find out some of the SAC |
justification for hundreds of |
targets on the master list, and
that the Navy is allowed a sub
Stantial role only in deciding
about targets allotted to sea-
borne weapons.
In general, the Naval officers
say. they are not given an equal
role with the Air Force on the
committee. More seriously, they
doubt the validity of many SAC |
targeting plans. and they would
like to examine closely not only
the final list but also the pre-
liminary work and rationale
that goes into it.
Official Air Force and Navy
spokesman have no comment |
on reports Of friction at Oma-
ha. But privately SAC officers
assert that the complaints of |
the naval officers are I'M
founded. They say naval mem
bers Of the committee are
drawing up their own reorgan-
ization plan which would give
the Navy power all out of pro-
portion to its minor role" in
strategic warfare.
There is no dispute at Oma-
ha over the nature OF the tar
gets. Both SAC and naval Of
ficers agree that all the major
enemy cities must be destroyed
in time Of war, on the agreed
naturalization that cities are