Evening star., 1961-03-24
The Problem in Laos

The Presidents report on the dete-
riorating situation in Laos fell somewhat
short Of expectations raised by the
advance notices Of his news conference.
And 1t also fell short, it seems to us,
OF enabling "all Americans to under
stand this difficult and potentially dan
gerouS problem"
Mr.. Kennedy made clear enough the
fact that neutral and independent
Laos is gravely threatened by a Com
munist-supported effort to overthrow
the existing government. He did not
make clear why it is that the govern
ment'S armed forces, larger in terms of
numbers and supported by substantial
shipments Of American arms, have not
been able to cope with the numerically
smaller rebel army. One assumption is,
however, that they lack the will to fight
for their own freedom, and If this is
correct considerable doubt is cast on
Mr.. Kennedy's statement that the Lao
tian people wish only to be independent
and neutral" A strong suspicion is that
q great many Laotians do not care much,
one way or the other
The President was unequivocal and
certainly correct in putting great en-
phaSis on his desire for a peaceful, nego-
ttated settlement in Laos, settlement
which would leave that country free and
genuinely neutral. But the question is
whether the Communists, who have en-
1oyed extraordinary success in Laos in
recent months, are interested in any
such solution. To say the least, this is
doubtful, since there is a real prospect
that, by chipping away, they will be able
to take over in Laos without reSorting
to overt aggression.
It is at this point that a certain
fogginess envelops the Presidents re-
port. Mr.. Kennedy said he was sure
every American will want his country
to ''honor its obligations" to the point
that freedom and security Of the free
world and ourselves may be achieved
While not spelling them out, he spoke
Of our commitments and obligations
under the SEATO pact. In its published
form this pact, in situation such as
that in Laos, obligates us to consult"
with the other treaty signatories. Fin
ally, Mr.. Kennedy said that Commu-
mist take-over in Laos would endanger
the security Of and the peace of all
Southeast Asia, and that this is some
thing which quite obviously affects the
security Of the United States"
The President, in contrast to early
news reports, did not say or even clearly
suggest that United States armed forces
would be used as last resort to
prevent Communist domination of Laos
He did not seem to go quite as far as
did the Vice President, who, in an earlier
statement, said the United States "is not
in Q mood to meekly permit an inde-
pendent nation to be gobbled up by an
armed minority supported from out
side"
Still, running through all Of this,
including the Kennedy statement, is an
implication that armed force may be
used II necessary. In view Of this, it
seems to us that at least three things
are needed. One is Showing that there
exists In Laos, as in Korea, a degree Of
determination to fight for freedom upon
which successful resistance effort can
be built. Second, it should be estab-
liShed that our SEATO allies have the
means and the will to provide some
thing more than token assistance. Fin
ally, bearing in mind that armed inter
vention on our part might lead to major
war under highly unfavorable strategic
conditions, the nature of the United
States vital national interest in preser-
vation of free and neutral Laos should
be spelled out clearly and Enthusiastically