Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1961-09-22
POLICY
u. S. Enters Arena
In u. N. Conflict

the appointment Of a new ex-
ecutive officer. 1t was no sur
prize to anyone that Russian
Foreign Minister Gromyko
showed up in New York threat
ening to block the appoint
ment of any single secretary
general.
Rules Stretched
If the game were played
strictly according to the rules,
of course, Mr.. Gromyko would
be in a position to get his way.
When it comes to the appoint
ment of a new secretary gen.
eral, the U. N. charter clearly
provided that the nomination
must be in the Security Council
where all five of the permanent
members have the right of veto.
TIL Assembly can only ratify
the nomination once the Sc
curity Council has acted.
The rules, however, have been
stretched once before IN extend
ing the term of former Secre-
tary General Trygve Lie by a
vote of the General Assembly
over Russian objections. And
by stretching them just a little
further, it is argued, the same
procedure could be used in the
interim appointment Of Mr..
Slim.
Preliminary nose counting
among the delegations indicates
that this plan stands a good
chance of success. Among the
neutral countries there is over
whelming opposition to the
Russian troika proposal and
growing support for Mr.. Slim,
who is widely admired as a
moderate and experienced dip
lomat. Mr.. Slim himself, after
some earlier hesitation, seems
to be warming up to the idea
OF taking on the job.
Makeshift Plan
His appointment by the AS
sembly undoubtedly would
amount to a serious defeat for
the Russians and prevent a
complete paralysis of the United
Nations at a critical time.
Though Mr.. Gromyko can be
counted on to denounce the
move as illegal and refuse to
recognize Mr.. Sims new duties.
this would be no greater handi-
cap than that which Mr.. HAM
marskjold faced for many
months before his death.
While it may provide a way
out of the immediate crisis,
however. the appointment of
Mr.. Slim-or any other candi-
date-by the General Assembly
would hardly amount to a long
term solution of the problem
that confronts the United Ma
tions. AS far as many delegates
are concerned, it is at best a
makeshift arrangement of du-
bious legality. Unless the Rus
slams eventually withdraw their
troika demand, the chances Of
finding regularly elected
successor to Mr.. Hammarskjold
will remain as remote as ever.
For some diplomats, more
over, there are a number of
rather serious long-range i'm
plications involved in this tenn
porary solution. What it
amounts to essentially is still
another move to strengthen
the power of the General AS
sembly at the expense of the
Security Council, increasing
still further the predominance
of the neutral Afro-Asian bloc
at the expense of the great
powers. e.
Vests Control Weakened
AS long as this process worked
generally to the advantage of
the West, it has received the
hearty support of the United
States. On most critical issues,
a majority of the Assembly
could be counted on to rally to
the Western side. And with a
neutral of the caliber of Dag
Hammarskjold in control, the
increasing power of the Gen.
eral Assembly has been well
coined as a means of -bypassing
Russian distractions.
How long this state of affairs
is likely to continue, however,
is another question. Today the
control of the Assembly by the
West has been enormously
weakened by the admission of
scores of newly independent IA
tons. And today these neutral
iSt states are asserting them
selves more strongly than ever
along lines which are hardly
sympathetic with Western in
terests throughout the world.
No doubt at this point there
is much to be said for any plan
that will foil Mr.. Gromyko ard
allow the United Nations to get
on with its business. If there
are reservations, it is simply
that some day the shoe may
well be on the other foot and
that the United States, in its
anxiety to overcome the short
term crisis, could be creating
a precedent which it will come
to regret.
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