Evening star., 1961-04-09
How Much Lonqer?

INV Vt0SB AObB4OGs
Senator Humphrey, chairman of the
Disarmament Subcommittee Of the
Foreign Relations Committee, has not
exaggerated in accusing the Russians of
playing craftsmanship" and bargaining
reckleSsly with mankindS future" in
the Anglo-American-Soviet negotiations
aimed at working out trustworthy ban
on nuclear testing.
This is so, as Mr.. Humphrey has Just
declared on the Senate floor, because
the Kremlin's representatives have
offered nothing but "retrogreSsion and
hlibuStering" since resumption of the
negotiations nearly three weeks ago.
The f1libuStering has amounted to
deliberate "Stalling tactics" and the
retrogreSSion has taken the form of a
demand-not heretofore made by the
Soviet Union-for sweeping veto powers
over any and all controls set up to police
the projected prohibition of tests and to
safeguard against the danger of clan
deStine detonationS under the ground
or in outer space.
Such veto, quite obviously, would
make a mockery Of the ban, and the
Russians, by insisting upon it, are
following line rightly described by Mr..
Humphrey as both irresponsible and
dangerous" Essentially the same view
has been voiced at Geneva, the site of
the three-power talks, by Vice President
Johnson and Senator Gore, one Of the
most influential members Of the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy. AS for Arthur H. Dean, our
chief negotiator over there, it may
safely be assumed that he shares in
these sentiments and that he finds the
outlook for an acceptable agreement
becoming bleaker and bleaker with each
passing day, even though he still is
said to feel a measure of hope-a
diminishing meaSure-that the Kremlin
may yet modify its position in a way that
will make an effective treaty possible.
Regardless of wishes and hopes,
however, the big question that becomes
increasingly tnSiStent now, and even
urgent, Is simply this: How much longer
can the United States safely debar it
self from nuclear tests while trying
to arrive at good agreement with the
f1libuStering Russians? We have denied
ourselves all such experimentation for
the past two-and-a-half years, but we
have had no real assurances, meanwhile,
against the possibility Of clandestine
Soviet hots-detonations of a sort that
could give them a decisive military
advantage over us. Thomas E. Murray,
the distinguished former member Of the
Atomic Energy Commission, has said
something about this matter that is
worth repeating. Referring to practical
new lines Of nuclear development, he has
declared as follows:
The nation that pursues them will possess
an entirely new symbol Of military strength
radically new type Of nuclear weapon, q
"third-generation" weapon, as radically diff
ferent from the H-bomb as the H-bomb was
from the Hiroshima-type A-bomb.
The new weapon will not be q larger
and more efficient H-bomb, nor a smaller
and more efficient A-bomb It will be a
weapon Of different category primarily
anti-personnel in destination and effect
1t lends itself to new type of nuclear
strategy Conceptual designs for this new
type Of weapon have existed in American
laboratories. They would have already been
tested had it not been for our test moratorium.
The moratorium has effectively blocked
American advance to new position of
military and political strength
take 1t for granted that the Soviet
Union is actively developing nuclear tech
nicues along this revolutionary line. / must
assume that they have done some preliminary
tests of the new fantastic" weapon. Such
tests could easily have been carried on with
out detection.
The grave warning implicit in these
words Is that the Russians conceivably
may have been cheating on us with un-
detachable underground shots designed
to equip them with the weapon Mr..
Murray has referred to with note of
grimness that comes from his own
personal knowledge Of the possibilities
involved in further nuclear experimental
tion. Clearly, the more the Russians
stall at Geneva, the more reason there
is to question the sanity Of our no
testing policy.