Evening star., 1961-04-30
POLICY
Continued From First Page

COnLlnue0 FROM flrSL rage
only way to meet the challenge
it will be undertaken neverthe-
less with a full consciousness of
the risks involved. These risks
are summed up in a word much
used now by officials in dis
cussing the grim outlook-"es-
calation."
| Oscillation simply means that
if the United States puts forces
into Southeast Asia the Com
munist side may also put in
forces. In fact the Communists
already have about a quarter
of a million men in the army
of North Wet Nam, so they
start out well ahead in the
game of raising the ante.
The oscillation could go so
that the United States would
put in man, seas and air units
and North Wet Nam would
raise its manpower interven-
ton in Laos. BY this process
Red Chinese forces might be
drawn in If the Western forces
became sufficiently strong to
threaten North Wet Nam as a
Communist area. Should the
Red Chinese enter, the issue
would likely arise as it did in
Korea 10 years ago-whether
to bomb Red Chinese bases,
which is a way Of saying
whether to attack Red China
directly.
BY this process a situation
could be created which could
plunge the world into nuclear
war. Officials say the process
would not be inevitable. 1t
might be stopped at any stage
of development by good diplo-
macy in a mutual East West
desire to avoid destruction. 1t
is the kind Of danger always
present in any small war.
Site Bad for us.
But the Southeast Asia area
as a theater of conflict seems
particularly bad from the
United States point of view,
1t is even farther away than
Korea. 1t is bad jungle coun-
try. The problems Of supply
and communications are ex-
tremely difficult and the Com
munists are present, or nearby,
in great force.
This lack Of balance might
increase the danger Of escala-
ton because the Reds presum-
ably would feel confident that
at some point they could bring
the Western military effort to
a halt without surrendering
anything important.
Authorities in Washington
discount any prospect that the
United States would intervene
by itself in Laos, although 1t is
in position to give single hand
ed support to threatened neigh
boring countries, particularly
South Wet Nam and Thailand.
But President Kennedy's
feeling about intervention is
said to be that it would have
to be done through the South
east Asia Treaty Organization.
This involves difficulty because
France and Britain are basi-
cally opposed to involvement Of
this or any other Western pow
er in that remote region Of In
do-Cina. The French fought
there for several years after
World War II and they hold no
real hope that a military oper-
alton would be successful.
Alternative Cost High
! Balanced against the risks
and the cost, Mr.. Kennedy was
disturbed by the price Of not
making a sufficient effort to
keep Laos from being "gobbled
up" as Vice President Johnson
recently expressed it. The main
price seen here is that the
United States would seem ir-
resolute, lacking in the will to
support a country which it had
undertaken to protect. Perhaps
the original decision was wrong,
perhaps not; former President
Eisenhower and Mr.. Kennedy
both are known to believe that
if Laos were lost all Southeast
Asia might be open to Commu-
mist conquest.
But even more important is
the critical question Of the re-
spect and prestige enjoyed by
the United States in the eyes
of the Kremlin. Specifically.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev still
does not. know whether the
United States under Mr.. Ken
nedy is going to be a tough or
an easy country to deal with
whether it will run a long bluff,
then back away, or whether at