Evening star., 1961-05-25

in all the social, economic,
psychological, governmental
and other efforts that are short
of open conflict but necessary
to counter Communist-spon-
sored guerillas or insurgents.
"a Fourth, the Army is de-
veloping plans to make possible
a much more rapid deployment
Of a major portion Of its high
ly trained reserve forces. When
these plans are completed and
the reserve is strengthened, two
combat-equipped divisions, plus
their supporting forces, a total
Of $4,000 men, could be ready
in an emergency for operations
with but three weeks notice
two more divisions with but
| five weeks notice-and six ad-
ditional divisions and their
supporting forces, making a
total of 10 divisions, could be
deployable with less than eight
weeks notice. In short, these
new plans will allow us to al
most double the combat power
Of the Army in less than two
months, compared to the near
ly nine months heretofore re-
quired.
go Fifth, to enhance the al
ready formidable ability of the
Marine Corps to respond to
limited war emergencies, I am
asking the Congress for $50
million to increase Marine
Corps strength to 10000 men.
This will increase the initial
impact and staying power of
our three Marine divisions and
three air wings, and provide a
trained nucleus for further i'm
mediate expansion, If necessary
Tor Self-detenSe.
60 Finally, to cite one other
area of activities that are both
legitimate and necessary as a
means of self-defense in an age
Of hidden perils, our whole in
telligence effort must be re-
viewed, and its coordination
with other elements of policy
assured. This is not a matter
on which public discussion is
useful, nor are current studies
completed. But the Congress
and the American people are
entitled to know that we will
institute whatever new organ
ization, policies and control are
necessary to insure the maxi
mum coordination and use of
all political, economic and
psychological resources in the
attainment Of our objectives.
VII. Civil Defense
One major element Of the ma
tional security program which
this Nation has never squarely
faced up to is civil defense.
This problem arises not from
present trends but from past
inaction. In the past decade
we have intermittently consid-
cred a variety of programs, but
we have never adopted a con-
sistent policy. Public consid-
erations have been largely
characterized by apathy. indif-
ference and skepticism; while,
at the same time, many of the
civil defense plans proposed
have been so far-reaching or
unrealistic that they have not
gained essential support.
This administration has been
looking very hard at exactly
what civil defense can and can
not do. 1t cannot be obtained
cheaply. 1t cannot give an
assurance of blast protection
that will be proof against sur
prise attack or guaranteed
against obsolescence or destruc-
ton. And it cannot deter a
nuclear attack.
We will deter an enemy from
making a nuclear attack only
if our retaliatory power is so
strong and so invulnerable that
he knows he would be destroyed
by our response. If we have
that strength, civil defense is
not needed to deter an attack.
If we should ever lack it, civil
defense would not be an ade-
quate substitute.
But this deterrent concept
assumes rational calculations
by rational men. And the his
tory of this planet Is sufficient
to remind us of the possibilities
of an irrational attack, a mis-
calculation, an accidental war
which cannot be either fore
seen or deferred. The nature
OF modern warfare heightens
these possibilities. 1t is on this
basis that civil defense can
readily be justified-as insur-
ance for the civilian population
in the event of such a miscal-
culation. It is insurance we
trust will never be needed-but
' if1e1 N1ro xnyINtoI ,,,a n-,,Yl