Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1961-09-07
term, the Soviets made their

reSS Photo.
term, the Soviets made their
big attempt to bull
through" their own final
solution Of the issue. 1t be-
gan with Khrushchev's ulti-
matum of November 81, 1858
declaring that he would sign
a separate treaty with East
Germany and that the West
. had six months to leave
Berlin.
1t eliminated at Camp
David on September 25-27,
1859 when Eisenhower and
the Soviet boss sat face to
face.
Khrushchev began by
fencing. He suggested that
the President might want to
talk about Red China. Eisen-
hover quickly disposed of
that gambit, saying that if
they talked about all the
issues involving Red China
they would never get around
to more Immediately useful
matters. Briefly, Eisenhower
told Khrushchev that the
United States could take care
of itself in the area of Red
China. And that was that.
The two heads of state
then went at the subject OF
Germany. Khrushchev reit-
Grated the Soviet intention
to sign a separate treaty
with East Germany. Eisen-
hover replied that he could
not prevent Khrushchev
from making any treaty he
wished with the East Ger
mans even though, person.
ally. he supposed any treaty
between Russia and a satel-
lite was likely to be a one
sided affair.
only this" he said to
Khrushchev. Don't try to
interfere with our rights in
Berlin"
Khrushchev. affecting sur
prise, protested that there
would be no Western rights
after the proposed treaty.
I'VE won't accept that"
Eisenhower told him fatty.
He added that If Khrush-
chev persisted in his ulti-
matum the then proposed
summit meeting would never
take place. But, more impor-
family. both Eisenhower and
KhruShchev understood that
the line had been drawn. In
vasion of Western rights in
Berlin then meant war.
Khrushchev then withdrew
what had been an ultimatum
and touted peaceful cock
istence" in the spirit Of
Camp David"
The so-called spirit of
Camp David" Eisenhower
recalled, was an optimistic
illusion which he, personally,
never shared.
Today. as Khrushchev
brandishes his bombs and
his ultimatums more saw
agely than ever, Berlin con-
tinues to be the focal point
of a worldwide struggle.
Eisenhower believes the
basic American attitude to-
ward Berlin continues clear
and firm. The American de-
termination to defend Berlin
was first made manifest in
1913, when the airlift main
tanned Berlin's access to the
free world, and it grew
stronger during the eight
Eisenhower years.
X y
The reasons for the Essen
hover and the American
stand on Berlin go deep.
They are, obviously deeper
than a quarrel over legalistic
terms. Legal rights are on
our side, and these legal
rights are menaced. But es-
sentially Berlin embodies a
moral issue and this is what
President Eisenhower en-
phasizes and spells out. 1t is
morally wrong for the Com
munists, in dividing Berlin.
TO separate families. It is
morally wrong to attempt to
choke the life out of more
than two million West Ber-
liners. And what is most of
all morally wrong is to i'm
prison the people of East
Germany. These are moral
issues and these, should be
emphasized.
In the same way, we for
our part have a moral obi
cation to the people of Ber-
lin. History, Eisenhower
points out, is not static, and
so Berlin today has become
quite different matter than
it was at wars end. Years
have passed there has been
no general peace treaty COW
ering all of Germany and
meanwhile West Berlin has
grown, by it's efforts and
spirit. into a great CONNER
cial and industrial city. Ber-
liners have a right to the
life which they have built
and as ve have affirmed m