Evening star., 1960-07-04

correspondent Of the London Sunday
Times.
anyone's naive to believe that |
under present conditions, by
bringing the Chinese Commu-
nists into the United Nations it |
would relax their vigor, their
outward drive, or inward driver.
@: Do you think the United
States could afford to give up
Formosa?
A: In exchange for what? |
Or for what reason. or under
what conditions? 1t might be
possible that Formosa would
be recognized as an independ-
ent country, and so on, but it
would depend a good deal on
what the relationship was be-
tween the United States and
Communist China-how Wig
orous they were in carrying
out their present Stalinist
policies-how hard they were
pushing against India and
Burma.
I think that the United
States should attempt to en-
courage the Chinese Com
munistS to come into negotia-
tionS on disarmament and
nuclear testing. If they are
successful, we can possibly get
other areas of negotiation on
problems which may divide us
the admission of newspaper
men, travel, an dso on-and
begin to lay a foundation for
a more satisfactory relation
ship. But. under present con-
ditions. I'm not optimistic that
the Chinese Communists are at
all desirous of paying a price
they would have to pay-at
least in relaxing their aggres-
sive Intentionally entering in
to harmonious relations with
us or by meeting the condi-
tions which are set for admis-
sion to the United Nations.
I think they're far more de-
termined, far more ruthless,
and that they in some ways
rather like the present condi-
ton which permits them to
pursue their objective with
little restraint.
@: And how do you feel
about the Chinese offshore
islands?
A: I think it was unwise for
us to draw the line at Quemoy
and MatSu. They're not essen
tial to the defense of FormoSa
and they are rather difficult
to defend. I objected at the
time of the Formosa resolution
to their inclusion five years ago
I said on several occa-
sions that this was not the
place to draw the line. Formo-
sa we should defend, however.
@: What kind Of lessons do
you draw from the summit
fiasco?
A: Well, think we should
realize how tentative are the
signs of improvement in the
relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
They can always turn cold
again and we should maintain
our strength in every area of
national life so that if the ne
are successful, we
gain; if they're unsuccessful,
we have the means of protect
ing our security and our COM
That's the first.
Second, I thought it was un-
wise to have the U-2 flights so
close to the summit. I thought
the lack of executive co-ordi-
nation and the lack of prepa-
ration for this engine failure
contributed to the disastrous
summit meeting.
@: Would you want to re-
sumo the U-2 flights again?
A: No. think they're gone
as a method of gaining intelli-
gence-it would be far too pro-
vocative and dangerous to con-
tinue them.
@: And how do you feel
about going to another summit
meeting?
A: Not unless there had
been some reasonably success
full action at the secondary
level, either at the foreign min
lister level or the ambassadorial
level or at the United Nations,
SO that we had some reason to
believe the summit would be
successful, that the Russians
were genuinely interested in
it,