Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1960-11-23
Commonder-in-Chief

There was timely coincidence in
Palm Beach press conference and
release of Senate subcommittee report,
both bearing upon the organization
and functioning Of the top echelon
White House staff of the President of
the United States. In effect, the mes
sage from both was that there will and
should be no effort-by delegation or
by statute-to dilute the degree Of per-
sonal participation and the RESPONSE
bility Of the Chief Executive in day-to-
day decision-making.
The word that there will be no
such effort came from Clark Clifford,
President-elect Kennedy'S liaison repre-
sentative in this period of arranging
transfer OF duties from one admins
tration to another. Actually, Mr.. Cliff
ford'S press conference disclosure, on
behalf OF Mr.. Kennedy, went further
than this. It is the intent Of the in
coming President, Mr.. Clifford said, to
have closer and more direct contact with
the top level of executive officers in
government than has been the case
under President EiSenhower'S staff sys-
tenn. Under this plan, there will be
no Assistant to the President in the
sense Of Chief of Staff who would
screen virtually all questions, and dis
pose Of many, before they reached the
Presidents desk.
For its part, the Senate Subcom-
mittee on National Policy Machinery
tends to support this same philosophy
on how President should, and indeed
must, operate. While recognizing the
tremendous burdens of the Office, 1t con-
cludes that setting up another layer
OF intermediate responsibility by any
such device as First Secretary Of Gov
eminent would only create more prob
lens than 1t would solve. Apart from
the constitutional problems and from
the implied down-grading of cabinet
officers, for example, the committee
believes that such device also would
remove the President from the essential
exercise Of "full, frank and frequent
discussions" with his departmental and
agency chiefs.
It is possible, Of course, that all
OF this-both the expressed intent and
the studied opinion-will be bent to
meet the practical demands of Mr..
Kennedy's job in the next four years.
Probably no President has entered the
White House with rigidly precise plan
OF operation, and it is even less likely
that such an advance concept would
assuredly stand up. Franklin Roosevelt,
for example, inaugurated system of
administrative assistants and finally
installed alter egos of great power and
influence, such as James F. ByrneS and
Harry Hopkins. Harry Truman placed
John r. Steelman in comparable role.
Mr.. Eisenhower had Sherman Adams,
and now Major General Wilton Persons.
In each of these cases, the rela-
tionship between President and princi-
pal aide was one suited to the personal
Kennedy, youthful and vigorous, may
in fact be able to function without a
right-hand man in the same sense but
it will be no reflection upon his capacity
or his present intent If he finds 1t advis-
able to do otherwise after settling into
the job This is not only a demanding
period in our history, 1t is one in which
the magnitude and completely Of Presi-
Dental responsibilities are greater than
ever before. No President can delegate
the basic responsibility, but he can
create an executive office structure
calculated to give him the most effec-
tive assistance. That is what Mr.. Ken
needy will try to do. But we doubt that
at this time either he or his advisers
know precisely how 1t will be done.