Evening star., 1960-06-01

In Paris he drew a sharp
distinction between the two
conferences. While the nuclear
test talks still offered some
prospect Of success. what was
going on in the disarmament
negotiations was merely pro-
crastination." He was almost
convinced, Mr.. Khrushchev
said, that the West did not
want disarmament but only
''the collection of espionage in
formation" If procrastination
continued, Premier Khrushchev
warned, he was ready to chuck
the Geneva conference COM
pletely and take his case to
the United Nations General
Assembly.
Back in Moscow last Satur-
day, the Russian leader, in a
somewhat milder mood, told
a workers conference that
Russia was prepared to con-
duct above-board negotiations
with the Western nations,
provided they really seek ways
to disarm instead Of paying
lip service to it."
Makes Geneva Gesture
Finally, in private conversa-
tions before leaving Paris, the
Soviet Premier is said to have
complained that the summit
failure was particularly un-
fortunate in view of the in
teresting disarmament pro-
posals that he had come pre-
pared to make. These pro-
posals, he is reported to have
said, would now have to be
made in Geneva.
From these assorted remarks,
the Western team of negotia-
tors here has drawn few con-
clusions. American Ambassa-
dor Frederick Eaton and his
British, French, Italian and
Canadian colleagues have no
real idea what to expect when
Soviet Delegate Antonin Zorin
flies back to town.
They are prepared, however,
for a rough time. AS an ele-
mentary precaution. Mr.. Eaton
will have at least three state
ments rather firmly in mind
when he returns to the meet
ing room Tuesday. First would
be a now. where were We
resuming of business. Second
would be a response to an
angry blast from Mr.. Zorin
about perfidious American
spies. Third could be a state
ment about breakoff Of the
talks.
Previous Trouble Cited
The main reason for the
present uncertainty about Rus
sian intentions Is the fact that
the disarmament conference inI
its opening phase already had
run into plenty of trouble. mi
contrast to his business-like
colleagues in the nuclear test
talks, Mr.. Zorin has proved
himself a tough customer, given
TO unpleasant propaganda out
bursts. If Mr.. Khrushchev
wants to drop a bomb on the
conference, his deputy foreign
minister is a logical candidate
for the job.
Most Of the betting, however,
is against an abrupt break-od.
A more likely prospect, 1t is
thought, is that Mr.. Zorin will
return with his same demands
for general and complete dis
armament" in four years, call
ing for agreement on basic
principles" as opposed to basic
conditions, for disarmament.
The guess is that the talks will
drag on until the normal sum-
mer recess and that any de-
cision to break OF will be de-
ferred until the U.N. General
Assembly meets in September.
May Have Meant 1t
A more optimistic possibility
is that Premier Khrushchev
meant what he said in Paris
and that sooner or later Mr..
Zorin will come up with some
new proposals. Whether these
turn out to be as interesting
as the Russian Premier claimed
is perhaps open to doubt. But
those who believe that the Rus
slams are seriously interested
in some measure of disarma-
ment think they may ultimately
drop their sweeping generalities
and settle for some more linn
tied plan for disengagement OF
forces in Europe.
If so, the Western team
would be willing enough to go
on with the talks, although any
scheme for reducing arna-
ments in specific areas Of Eu-
rope raises the inevitable prob
lens within the Western alli-
ance.
No New Proposals
For their part, however the
Allies will not return to the
conference with any startling
new suggestions. Whatever dis
armament ideas may have been
cooked up for the Summit
meeting they will not be
warmed over for he reopening
of the Geneva talks. The three
phase disarmament plan with
its careful guarantees Of in
spection and control. is still the
basic brief of the Western team
here. And still presumably as
disagreeable to the Communist
side as it seemed during the
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