Evening star., 1960-08-24

policy of military pressure
and adventurism continued.
He probed our resistance and
our determination in Greece
and Turkey and Iran, at Ber-
lin during the days of the
blockade and the airlift, and,
in league with the Chinese
Communists, in Korea. We
held the line against this
type of Communist attack.
Then, in 1855, Khrushchev
took over the effective leader
ship of the Soviet Union. He
had the same objectives, the
same philosophy Of the world
wide mission of communism
as his predecessors, but he
proposed different techniques
to accomplish these objec-
tiveS.
4 = -
What are the basic ele-
ments Of Khrushchev's pres
ent policy?
First of all, he proposes to
build up Soviet military
might based on ballistic mis-
sileS to give him an effective
weapon for direct attack on
the United States.
Second, Khrushchev pro-
poses to build up Soviet in
dustry. the base of Soviet
military power. by completing
the a m bilious seven-year
plan which covers the pc
riod through 1865. This
will still leave him we'll be-
hind the United States in
overall industrial production
but he believes he can devote
to military and world power
aims a far greater percentage
of his industrial production
than we are likely to do.
Third. he is supporting all
elements of extreme, rabid,
nationalism in Asia, Africa
and Latin America. At the
XXI Party Congress held in
February. 1859, as we'll
documented reports in our
hands establish, the leaders
OF Communist parties from
these areas were specifically
instructed to play down the
link with Moscow and with
the Communist movement
and to stress nationalism and
hostility to the nations of the
non-Communist block, the
United States in particular.
He is working for chaos in
countries from Cuba to the
Congo. And chaos breeds
communism.
Fourth. He is targetine
economic and technical aid
to certain critical countries
in Asia, Africa and Latin
America where the Commu-
nistS believe they can make
the most headway.
Fifth. Khrushchev has put
into high gear his worldwide
subverSive apparatus con-
sisting of local Communist
parties, underground and
overt, Communist fronts.
and all the espionage and
agitprop assets of Moscow
and its satellite allies. This
apparatus is very active to-
day from Cuba to Central
Africa and to Southeast
Asia, and indeed through
out the world.
Sixth. Khrushchev is di-
recting the greatest propa-
ganda machine the world has
ever known. One voice of
Moscow goes abroad to try
to seduce the newly emerging
countries by citing the Soviet
example of rapid industrial
and military growth and of
the aid which awaits them if
they turn to Moscow. Behind
the Iron Curtain, quite an
other voice is aimed at the
people of the Communist
bloc to reassure them that all
is going we'll.
And seventh. The Kremlin
is jealousy guarding the
physical security of great
areas of the Soviet Union
where it is building up in Sc
crecy its formidable military
weapons. The Soviets have
repeatedly refused to accept
a meaningful form of in
spection, the best guarantee
that disarmament can be
honest.
To protect their security the
spy phobia is being ex-
plotted by the Soviets with
attacks on our planes and
harassments of our tourists.
Well-publicized trials and
the imprisonment of our
RB-47 airmen are all calcu-
lated in Khrushchev's view to
bring preSSureS to bear to
help preserve the secrecy of
military preparations.
By these tactics Khru-
shchev hopes to prevent the
Free World from gaining the
knowledge which may be es-
sential to our own security.
Behind this shield, rejecting
the Presidents proposals for
adequate inspection and open
skies, the Kremlin believes
that it is free to prepare for
a surprise attack on the Free
World in relative security.
\ Il y 4
For too long, and by too
many, subversive communism
has been viewed as just an
other international danger
like those which we have