davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1960-06-26

have been in our interest to
have done what we could. which
would have been marginal at
best. to strengthen Khru-
shchev's position vis-a-vis the
Soviet military and the Chinese
Communists.
It remains in our interest, as
the Secretary said, to encourage
Soviet proposals of a peaceful
course and to discourage Soviet
proponents of an aggressive
course. In the years ahead, this
will require an unusual degree
of maturity and discrimination
which will challenge the discre-
ton and intelligence Of the
American people and their
leaders in their approach to
foreign policy.
Finally, the U-2 incident has
pointed up the need for inter
national agreement on the
question of how high sover-
eighty extends skyward. This
question is certain to become
more acute in the future as air.
craft fly at higher attitudes and
as space satellites, many of
them equipped with cameras or
other devices, become more
common.
1t is a question full of diff
culties and one which demands
the full attention and consider
alton Of the United Nations as
well as Of the individual nations
themselves. The C ommittee
hopes that efforts will be
pushed to pursue U. N. studies
with a view to bringing about
agreement,
Evening star., 1960-06-26

the flight should not have
gone.
In regard to the second ques-
ton, for the reason s stated
above, it seems that the United
States reaction to the failure
of the U-2 complicated the
problems which resulted from
that failure.
There remains the question
of future policies in the light
Of the U-2 incident and the
failure Of the summit confer
ence.
The committee is inclined to
agree with Secretary Herter
that the basic realities of the
world situation have not greatly
changed. However. the changes,
if any, which have taken place
within the Soviet government
and between the Soviet govern
ment and the Chinese Commu-
nists may well be of more than
passing Importance.
Although the evidence is nei-
ther solid nor consistent, there
are indications, as cited above,
that Khrushchev's attitude in
Paris was due at least in part
to pressure from his own mill
tary and from the Chinese
Communists. There are also in
dications that, as Secretary
Herter related, Khrushchev, at
least before the U-2 incident,
was identified with the Soviet
advocates Of a less aggressive,
more cooperative course.
II this was true, then it would
Evening star., 1960-06-26

dent arrived in Paris, it is diff
cult to see what course of ac-
ton he could have reasonably
followed other than the one he
took.
The crucial questions in re-
gard to the events in Paris are
whether the U-2 incident was
the reason or the excuse for
KhruShchev's behavior and
whether his behavior would
have been significantly differ
ent If the U-2 incident had
been handled differently.
In the view of Secretary
Herter, the U-2 incident was
a contributing factor to Khru-
shchev's attitude toward the
summit. The Secretary also
said that prior to May / there
had been no indications that
Khrushchev intended to wreck
the summit.
Without doubt, the U-2 was
a contributing factor to the
breakup of the summit confer
ence, so far as the Soviet gov
ernment was concerned. The
other factors which the Secre-
tary mentioned as contributing
to the Soviet attitude in Paris
all existed prior to May |. It
can be accepted that they did
play a part in Soviet policy
formation. and still be reason
ably concluded that they would
not, in and of themselves, have
led to the precipitate and vio-
lent action taken by the Soviet
government in Paris.
The U-2 incident therefore
was the immediate excuse
seized upon for not proceeding
with the conference.
This is not to say that the
summit conference would have
been a success if the U-2 Incl
dent had not occurred. It is
to say simply that there prob
ably would have been a summit
conference. No one can say
what would have happened at
the conference if it had been
held.
At best. it would have per-
haps made some slight progress
on disarmament and nuclear
testing, temporized on Berlin,
and set a pattern for future
submits. At worst, it would
have resulted in complete
deadlock.
If it was in fact Khru-
shchev's purpose to prevent
the summit. then if the U-2
incident had not occurred. he
Evening star., 1960-06-26
Soviet Reaction
Was Intensified

1t is more difficult to answer
with assurance the question of
whether, given the U-2 Incl
dent, Khrushchev's behavior
in Paris would have been sig
nificantly different if the in
cident had been handled diff
ferently. Here one can only
speculate.
1t seems reasonable to sup
pose, however, that the Soviet
reaction was greatly intensi-
fed by two aspects: ID The
Interpretation that the flights
were going to continue, and
20 the assumption of personal
responsibility by the President.
1t can be argued, as Secre-
tary Herter did at some length
that it was unreasonable to
interpret the statements OF
May 7 and 9 as implying a
continuation of the flights
Nevertheless, the fact is that
KhruShchev, as we'll as many
of the free worlds newspapers,
did so interpret the statements
Thus, by the time the Pres
ident announced the Suspen-
sion in Paris May 16, the So
Wet position had already been
set and Khrushchev did not
depart from it.
In the end, one is left with
the same two questions with
which one started: Cd Should
the U-2 flight have been sent
at all on May /? And (2) Once
the flight failed, should the
United States have reacted
differently?
Evening star., 1960-06-26

FOLLOWING is the tert of
conclusions reported yester-
day By the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee after its
inquiry into the U-2 plane
incident and epents leading
to collapse of the summit
conference:
Let it be said at the outset
that the gathering of intelli-
gence with respect to foreign
activities potentially inimical
to our security and that Of the
free world is fully justified by
precedent as we'll as by vital
necessity. Since time. i'm
memorial, nations have found
it necessary to engage in such
activities of both the overt and
covert variety. The Soviet
Union itself has probably en-
gagged in covert intelligence ac-
tivities on a wider scale than
any other nation in the history
of the world. What the commit
tee is concerned with respecting
the U-2 program is not the pro-
priety. desirability, or neces-
sity Of such operations, but the
lessons, If any, which can be
DRAWN from the failure of the
May l flight and related events.
On the basis of classified
testimony which cannot be dis
cussed, the committee has no
reason to believe that technical
preparations for the flight were
faulty or that the pilot was
unreliable in any respect. From
the technical point of view
that is. the preparation and
equipment Of plane and pilot
what befell the U-2 on May /
was just plain bad luck,
There remains the question
Of the wisdom of sending the
flight at all. The committee
was told that the flight was
after information of we'll above
average Importance, but it was
not told what this information
was. The committee cannot,
therefore, come to any conclu-
sion as to whether the impor-
tance Of the information sought
justified the risks which were
taken.
Although the committee rec
ognizes the necessity for Sc
crecy in intelligence operations,
it is strongly of the opinion
that a Government based upon
a separation of powers cannot
exist on faith alone. 1t is dis
appointed that the responsible
officials of the executive branch
did not see fit to confde in it
this one piece of information
which is crucial to reaching an
informed judgment. The COM
mittee recognizes that the ad-
ministration has the legal right
to refuse the information un-
der the doctrine of executive
privilege.
Evening star., 1960-06-26
Prepared Cover Story
Proved Inadequate

In view of the combination
Of circumstances surrounding
the loss Of the U-2 on May l,
the next question which arises
concerns the reaction of the
United States Government. The
first conclusion on this point
is that the cover story, which
had been designed in advance
to meet such a contingency,
was inadequate for the circum-
stances which in fact existed.
The cover story which was
used in regard to the U-2 for
the period May / to 7 might
have served its purpose If the
plane had come down under
different circumstances. Until
May z, it was not known in
Washington where the U-2 had
come down. The planes flight
plan was known, however, and
it would have been a reason
able assumption that the
chances were quite good that
the plane was nowhere near
the Soviet border.
At any rate, the cover story
was quite obviously outfianked
on May 7, and the responsible
Officials felt that it was then
necessary to discuss the mat
ter in greater detail. 1t was
admitted that the U-2 was on
a reconnaissance mission, but
it was denied that the mission
had been authorized from
Washington.
In Khrushchev's early state
mentS about the plane, he had
implied doubt that President
Eisenhower knew about the op-
Grafton. The May 7 statement
of the State Department
seemed to confirm this doubt.
However, on May 9 Secretary
Herter said the program of
flights - though not specific
flights as such-had been au-
thorized by the President. The
substance of this statement was
repeated by the President him
self May IL.
Evening star., 1960-06-26
u. S, Safety Held
Reason Enough

The course which the Presi-
dent took is unprecedented in
intelligence operations, so far
as the committee knows or the
record discloses. 1t is known
that Central Intelligence
Agency DIRECTORY Allen Dulles
was prepared to accept the full
responsibility himself, which is
the traditional procedure under
the circumstances.
The committee feels that per-
haps too much emphasis may
have been placed on jilstiflca-
ton of the flights. II justiflca-
ton was to be made, it would
have been enough simply to
say we were seeking intelli-
gence vital to our own security.
1t seems clear that the situ-
alton was complicated by the
unnecessarily elaborate NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administrator state
ment of May 5 and the cate
gorical statements Of the State
Department press officer on
May 5 and 6.
In regard to this whole pc
riod of May l to 9. the record
is full of references to CO.
ordination among the various
agencies of the Government
and yet at crucial points, the
coordination broke down, as
for example, in NASA issuing
a statement on May within 2
or 3 hours after it had been
decided that only the State De-
partment would issue state
ment.
Further, there are few. if
any, references in the record
to direction. and this seems to
the committee to be what was
most lacking in this period.
There were many interagency
meetings to coordinate activi-
ties, but there was apparently
no one official or agency to di-
rect activities.
If this direction is not to
come from the White House.
then it ought to be made clear,
by the White House, that it is
to come from the State De-
partment. Indeed, one of the
lessons to be learned from this
whole affair is the need for re-
asserting the primacy of the
State Department in these mat
tiers.
Given the situation which
existed by the time the Presi-
Evening star., 1960-06-26
Russians Lacked
Power to Act

The U-2 overf1ights had a
record Of almost four years Of
unbroken success. The Soviet
Union had been aware of these
overflights during this time and
had been unable to do anything
about them. Against this back
ground, there would seem to
be no reason to assume that
the May l flight would be any
different from any Of its pred
ecessorS.
In approving the flight, little,
If any, consideration was given
to the proximity Of May l to
the date of the summit confer
ence. An argument was made
to the committee that if dip
lomatic considerations were
taken into account, there would
always be some reason for can
ceiling or postponing a flight
This argument is not really per-
suasive, because it fails fully
to recognize the Importance OF
the summit conference.
Further, the record is eX-
tremely obscure as to whether
or not flights had in fact beer
Cancelled or postponed in the
past for diplomatic reasons
The question here is whether
the information sought by the
May flight was of sufficient
Importance to justify the haz-
ards to which the summit con.
ference would be subjected by
failure of the flight. The ques-
ton cannot be answered, oi
course, for want of knowledge
of what information wa,
sought by the fight.
The fact that neither the
President, the Secretary oi
State, the Acting Secretary oi
State, nor the Secretary of De.
fense knew that this particular
flight was even in the air i;
an indication of how routine
these flight operations hac
become.
In view of the almost psyche
pathic addiction to secrec!
which has characterized thu
Russian government. probing
of this secrecy such as that in
Evening star., 1960-06-26
Future Policy
Question Remains

In regard to the first ques-
ton, the committee is handi-
capped, as stated above, by its
lack of knowledge of the spe-
cif1c mission of the U-2. In
looking back. if one accepts the
conclusion that the failure of
the mission furnished an ex-
cuSe for KhruShchev's wrecking
of the summit conference, then,
in the absence of compelling
reasons to the contrary, there
is good reason to conclude that
Evening star., 1960-06-26

would have had to find other
means to do so. In this sense.
the U-2 incident made his task
easier.
On the other hand, the cir
cumstances under which the
conference would have been
aborted in the absence of the
U-2-if it would have been
are unknown. They might
have been more favorable to
the West or less favorable. But
the crucial point here is that
it is by no means certain what
the outcome Of the conference
would have been, as a matter
of deliberate Soviet policy, if
the U-2, incident had not oc-
Cured.
Evening star., 1960-06-26
COMMITTEE TEXT
COMMITTEE TEXT
Need Of Unified Direction
Called Lesson of U-2 Case

volved in the U-2 operations,
coupled with the Illustrations
and chagrin of the Soviets over
a period Of almost four years.
could only have been expected
to result in the most violent
reaction when this penetration
OF their territory was made
public.
Evening star., 1960-10-29
IRVING L. CHAsEN,
Attorney for Parties Secured,
Investment Building.
oc',l l.o5,o7,oa-nol
THOs. J. OWEN 4 son.
Auctioneers, III E st. NV.

TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE
ROW BRICK DWELLING KNOWN
AS l23 ROCK CREEK CHURCH
ROAD NORTHWEST.
BY virtue Of certain deed OF trust
duly recorded. in Liber. No. 1926.
Tesopds TSG 81 tS. s p.fst fss q ot ths com smd
bia, and at the request Of the
party secured thereby. the under.
signed trustees Will sell, at public
auction. in front Of the premises
on MONDAY. THE SEVENTH DAY
OF NOVEMBER. A.D. 1850. AT
ToUR-THIRTY O'CLOCK Pm.
the following described land anc
premises: n.,s;,;, situate in the District
and being Lot 80 in Sousre 332S
of part Of the tracts Of ianc
called Generosity" and pleasant
the once OF the Surveyor for thC
District OF Columbia in Liber 81
At at, Folio Fol- O. 81; subject to buildinI
Plat: subject to agreement o.
TERMS: Sold subject to a prio,
building association deed Of trust
for approximately S6,763.1a: fur.
ther particulars of which will bC
announced at time OF sale: thu
purchase price above said trust t.
be paid in cash. A deposit o.
$500 required. Conveyancing. re.
cording. etc. at purchasers cost
Adjustments made as OF date Of
sale. Terms to be complied witt
within thirty .days,. otherwise de.
posit forfeited and the pTopert,
may be advertised and resold ai
the ;.r discretion Of the trustees.
WALLACE W. KIDWELL,
0e27,29-no1,3,6 Trustees.
Evening star., 1960-10-29
TROS. J. OWEN 4 son
AuetioneerS. iii 8 81. NV.
TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE
RRICK SEMIDETACHED DWELL

TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE
BRICK SEMIDETACHED DWELL
ING. KNOWN AS PREMISES $40
N STREET NORTHWEST; ,
By vlrlue of a certain deed Of trust
duly recorded. in Liber No. eS41
Folio 343, ct sea-, Of the land
records Of the District Of Colum-
party secured thereby. the under
auction, in front of the promises
on MONDAY. THE FOURTH DAY
OF NOVEMBER AID. 1860. AT
THREE O'CLOCK PM, the fol-
lowing described land and prem.
ises, situate in the District OF
Columbia. and DESIGNATED as and
being Lot 130, subdivision made
by Scheckers and otS.rs, In
SQUARE 36S as per plat recorded
in the once Of the Surveyor for
the District Of Columbia. in LibeI
%, at Polio II.
TERMS: Sold subject to q prior
building association deed Of trust
for approximately So. 3.347 As: fur
ther particulars Of which will be
announced at time Of sale: the
purchase price above said trust to
be paid in cash; A deposit Of
cording, etc, at purchasers cost
Adjustments made as Of date Of
sale. Terms to be complied with
within thirty days, otherwise de-
posit forfeited and the property
may be advertised and resold al
the discretion OF the trustees.
A. SLATER CLARKE,
GEORGE BASILIKO.
oc.25,27,29-nol.3 Trustees.
Evening star., 1960-10-29
THOs. J. OWEN 4 SON,
AuctiOneers. iii z st. NV.

TRUSTEES, SALE E,o or VALUABLE Va ydJE
A STORE ON THE FIRST FLOOR
AND APARTMENTS ABOVE. BE-
NUMBERS 39i5 GEORGIA AVE-
NUE. NORTHWEST AND 651
KEEPER PLACE NORTHWEST.
By virtue of certain deed Of trust
duly recorded. in Liber No. 1OS06:
sadpd. TSo lOs ~ ,s. ct SsS Sct Of IT the eo land
bia, and at the request Of the
party secured thereby. the under
signed trustees will sell, at public
auction in front of the premises.
on WEDNESDAY, THE NINTH
DAY OF NOVEMBER. AD. 1850,
AT .TWO-TH1RTY O'CLOCK PM,
the following described land and
premises. situate in the District
Of Columbia. and designated as
and being Lot "a in SQUARE 3041
In subdivision Of part Of land
Leon Tobriner and others as per
plat recorded in the once OF the
Surveyor for the District of Column
bia in Liber "A, at Folio 20
TERMS: Sold subject to prior
(building association deed Of trust
for approximately SS,SS7 90, fur
ther particulars OF which will be
announced at time OF sale; the
purchase price above said trust
to be paid in cash. A deposit OF
$500 required. Conveyancing, re-
cording. ETC.. at purchasers cost.
Adjustments made as of date of
sale. Terms to be complied with
within thirty days. otherwise de-
post forfeited and the property
may be advertised and resold at
the discretion Of the trustees.
8. S, FREEDMAN.
SHELDON E. BERNSTEIN,
oc29, mol ,3,5,S Trustees.
THOS. J. OWEN & son,
AuCtiOneers, I'LL z st. NV.
Evening star., 1960-10-29
AUCTION SALES
FHos. J. OWEN 4 SON.
Auetioneers, l111 3 81. NV.

TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE
DETACHED BRICK DWELLING
KNOWN AS PREMISES NUMBER
1l32 oERANIUM STREET NORTH
BY virtue Of a certain deed Of trust
duly recorded, in Liber No. 1892
Polio 4S2 Ct seq, of the lanC
records Of the District Of Colum.
bia, and at the request Of thu
party secured thereby, the under.
signed trustees will sell. at public
suction in front Of the premises
on WEDNESDAY. THE SECONL
DAY OF NOVEMBER. AID. 1850
At THREE O'CLOCK PM. thl
premises. situate in the Districi
Of Columbia. and DESIGNATED a.
and being Lot number So in Yetta
Korman's and others subdivision
Of Lots in Square 1855, as pei
plat recorded in Eiber ia al
Folio 3e in the once Of the Sur.
yeyor for the District Of Colum
bia
TERMS: Sold subject to q prior
building association deed Of trust
for approximately Sl3,541 .S3, fur.
ther particulars Of which will be
announced at time Of sale; the
purchase price above said trust
70 be paid in cash. A deposit OF
$500 REQUIRED. Conveyancing, re-
eofdinE, etc. at purchasers cost
Adjustments made as of date oi
sale. Terms to be complied with
within thirty days. otherwise de-
post forfeited and the property
may be advertised and resold at
the discretion Of the trustees.
ROBERT A. HUMPHREYS. Jr..
oc22,26,27, ,2Q-nol Trustees
Evening star., 1960-10-29
TH0s. ,. OWEN . son, 4,
AuetioneerS, iii 3 st. NV.

TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE
BRICK, SEMIDETACHED DWELL
FORTIETH STREET SOUTHEAST
BY virtue of a certain deed Of
trust duly recorded, in Liber No,
11434, Folio 446 ct sea-. Of the
land records Of the District Of Co
T%1a .sed snG a. the les 1n S5 the
signed trustees will sell, at public
ises, on MONDAY. THE THIRTY
1850, AT FoUR O'CLOCK PM,
the following g-described land and
premises, situate In. the District
Of Columbia, and desiEnated as
and being Lot .35. in Square 5h23.
loney as. per plat recorded in the
al Folio 40: subject to covenants
an6 restrictions of record
TERMS: Sold subject to a prior
for approximately !SS,097 so: fur
ther particulars of which will be
announced at time Of sale; the
Be paid In cash. A deposit Of
cordine. etc. at purchasers cost.
Adjustments made as Of date of
sale. Terms to be complied with
within thirty days, otherwise de-
posit forfeited and the property
may be advertised and resold at
the discretion of the trustees.
HENRY s. SNYDER.
WALTER d. NEWRATH
c2O.o2,25.27,29 Trustees.
TH0S. J. OWEN & SON.
Auctioneers, III E 81. NV.
Evening star., 1960-10-29

SALE OF VALUABLE
DETACHED FRAME DWELLING
BEING KNOWN AS PREMISES
NUMBER 54O3 EIGHTH STREET
BY Virtue Of a certain deed Of trust
duly recorded, in Liber No. l0S25
records of the District of Columbia.
and at the request Of the parts
secured thereby, the undersigned
trustees will sell, at public auction
in front Of the premises, on FRI
DAY THE FOURTH DAY OF NO.
VENEER, A. D. 1860, AT ONE
O'CLOCK PM, the following.
described land and premises, sit
uate in the District of Columbia
a, in Davis subdivision Of lots ir
"Brightwood Park" ;" as per plat
recorded in the once Of the Sur.
veyor for the District OF Columbia
in Liber County IA, at Folio 10
except part taken for alley Is pei
plat recorded in said surveyor
once, in Liher 20 at Folio As
taxed as Lot S14, Square 3153
subject to right of way of record.
TERMS: Sold subject to a prior
building association deed OF trust
1or approximately S6.R34 AS: fur
ther particulars Of which will be
announced at time OF sale; the pur-
chase price above said trust to bt
paid in cash. A deposit OF $500 re.
ouired.. Conveyancine. recording
ETC., at purchasers cost. Adjust.
mentS made as OF date of sale
Terms to be complied with withir
thirty days. otherwise deposit for;
feited and the property may bi
advertised and resold at the dis
cretion OF the trustees.
DAVID NIMETZ,
HOWARD BERNSTEIN,
oc25,27, ,29-no1~3 Trustees,
Evening star., 1960-10-29
WALTER MILLER
oc2a.no1.2.9,s Trustees.
THoS, J. OWEN 4 SON,
AuetiOneers, iii Z 81. NV.

TRUSTEES SALE OF VALUABLE Z
ROW BRICK DWELLING BEING
KNOWN AS PREMISES NUMBER
124 KENTucKY AVENUE SOUTH
BY virtue of a certain deed of trust
duly recorded, in Liber No. lO35T,
rono 122 et seq. OF the land
bia.. and at the request Of the
party secured thereby, the UNDER
signed trustees will sell, at public
auction in front Of the premises,
on THURSDAY, THE TENTH DAY
OF NOVEMBER. AID. 1860, AT
FOUR-FIVE 4:06) O'CLOCK PM,
tollowing-described land and prem
iseS. situate in the District OF
Soiumnia; and designated as and
subdivision Of Square i0I3 as per
plat recorded in the sOffice OF the
Columbia in Liber 10, at Folio 13T,
TERMS: Sold subject to prior
(building association deed Of
trust Tor approximately S1,O1S.7S,
further particulars of which will
be announced at time of sale; the
purchase. price. above said trust TO
De paid in cash. A deposit Of $500
required. Conveyancing, recording,
ETC.. at purchasers cost. Adjust-
ments made as Of date Of sale
Terms to be complied with within
thirty days, otherwise deposit for
1eited ana the. property may be
advertised and resold at the
discretion of the trustees.
ROBERT W, KIDWELL.
WALLACE W. KIDWELL,
oc2a-no2,4,7,a Trustees.
TH0S. J. OWEN q son,
AuctiOneers, I'LL E st, NV.