Evening star., 1960-01-26
Melancholy Memoirs


Anthony Eden's account of the
events which led to the Anglo-French
attack on Suez in 1856 is the story of
a man who is embittered and even over
Whelmed by the utter failure of that
tll-adviSed adventure. Furthermore, as
the first inStalment of these memoirs
appears in the February issue of Nc
Calls, the Eden story simply does not
hang together.
From the moment of Colonel Mas
Ser'S seizure of the canal, it appears
that Mr.. Eden and his government were
resolved to use military force If neces-
Sary to restore the canal to interna-
meeting shortly after the seizure, Mr..
Eden writes: 1.-THE government deter
mined that our essential interests in
this area must be Safeguarded, If nee
esSary, by military action, and that the
needful preparations must be made"
These essential interests" consisted
fundamentally of Britain's and West
ern Europe's dependence on the oil
which moved through the canal by
tanker. What Mr.. Eden feared most
was that Colonel Nasser might clamp
down on this essential source of supply.
AS the Eden story moves along it
Is notable for its extreme bitterness He
does not quite accuse President Eisen-
hover and the late Secretary Dulles Of
double-crossing him, but he comes close
to such an accusation.
With the end of October, 1856, how
ever, the story changes direction. On
the 29th of that month Israel attacked
Egyptian attack which Mr. Eden de-
fends and condones. He also Seizes upon
1t as the excuse for Anglo-French armed
intervention. The British and French
forces were sent in at that juncture, not
to ouSt Nasser from control of the canal,
but, as Mr.. Eden tells it, to protect the
canal from the belligerents and to pre-
vent the spread Of the Israeli-Egyptian
conflict. Mr.. Eden did not know, until
few days prior to the event, that an
Israeli attack was imminent. But the
Anglo-French military preparations for
seizure Of the canal zone were begun
some three months earlier.
Mr. Eden says he remains convinced
that the Anglo-French attack, launched,
incidentally, without consulting the
United States, was choice of the lesser
evil, and he is entitled, of course, to
that opinion. But there is much to be
said on the other side.
For one thing, more than three
years later, the oil tankers are still
moving freely and even more eficiently
through the Nasser- controlled canal.
The threat to Britain's oil supplies,
which Mr.. Eden feared, has not ma
terialized. Egypt has not become a
Communist puppet. Nor has Nasser
gobbled up the other Arab countries.
AS things go there, the Middle East, for
the time being at least, is relatively
stable
1t is impossible to say what might
have happened had the Anglo-French
military attack not been abandoned as
result of pressure quickly and firmly
applied by the United States and the
United Nations. 1t is hard to believe,
however, that 1t would not have resulted
in condition far worse from Britain's
point Of view than that which prevails
today. And it might have resulted in
disaster of the first magnitude. Mr..
Eden evidently did not anticipate such
a consequence-just as he did not fore
see that neither the United States nor
the United Nations could possibly stand
aside in the fare of an art nf oUoracejop
against Egypt.