Evening star., 1960-02-29

]
Union.
toward East Germany and
Eastern Europe was Nikita
Khrushchev's threat to Berlin,
his delegations actions at the
Geneva conferences in the sum-
mer of 1859 and his own per-
formance during his visit to
the United States. The inten-
ton disclosed was to establish
Soviet dominance of Europe by
a 2-stage operation.
Berlin a Wedge
The first stage is designed to
make plain that the United
States, and hence NATO, has
neither the will nor the power
to protect Berlin, and, in the
course of making this plain,
to obtain from NATO the rec
ognition of the permanence Of
the Soviet-dominated Commu-
mist regimes in Eastern Europe.
The second stage, to follow
this demonstration of where
decisive power resides in the
Eastern Hemisphere. would be
aimed to bring about the with
drawal of American forces from
Europe, the abandonment of
a unified defense force, the
dissolution of NATO and the
undiSputed dominance of the
Soviet union in the hemisphere.
To people living in Central
Europe under the shadow of
Soviet power it is not hard to
see how, in the total absence
Of American leadership, this
could all happen. without a
shot being fired, and all in the
spirit of Geneva or Camp
David.
! The mode is to continue to
relax tensions in Europe-per-
haps increase them in the
Formosa Strait and the Carib-
bean = to play on the divisive
tendencies developing within
Europe and between Europe
and North America, to con-
vince Eastern and Western
Europe that Soviet power is
irresistible in Europe, and that
the inevitable trends of Soviet
and American nuclear power
and of the American balance
of power are such that for
another year, at least, the
United States will not even try
to resist it.
No Relaxation Seen
Europeans do not share the
American view that the in
tensity of Soviet pressure on
Berlin and for an acceptance
of the Soviet position in East
ern Europe has relaxed. ~
! The Soviet six months time
limit was a maneuver which
has paid, and continues to pay,
Thigh dividends - two foreign
ministers conferences, tn e
Khrushchev visit, an invitation
! to four summit meetings and
an Eisenhower visit to Moscow
The Western concessions at
Geneva on Berlin have seemed
to Chancellor Adenauer so dan
gerous as starting points for
the summit talks that his main
effort at Paris was to get them
withdrawn, for whatever good
that may do.
Not only did the Russians
make no concessions, but their
success in introducing the East
Germans into the Geneva
meetings so distressed the
West Germans that they have
insisted on taking themselves
out of any role at the summit,
hoping to prevent the East
Germans from climbing to that
height also.
Finally, it did not escape no.
tice in Germany that during
the KhruShchev visit any ques-
tion raised about the Soviet
controlled regimes in Eastern
Europe sent Mr.. Khrushchev
into lifelike facsimile of a
tantrum and caused his hosts
to back away.
Strong U. S. Needed
The Germans believe that
without strong American lead
ership of a united Western al
lance a summit meeting will
be dangerous, and especially
dangerous for Germany and
German interests. In this they
seem to me to be wholly right.
They see, also with a clarity
denied US. that strong Ameri-
can leadership depends upon
a strong United States. They
have no doubt whatever of our
pacific intentions, but as they
read, for instance, the Con-
gTessional Record and the re-