Evening star., 1960-10-13
Risk of War

The Kennedy-Nixon exchange on
Quemoy and Matsu which occurred in
their televiSion debate last week, and
which has prompted subsequent Dem
ocratic charges that Mr.. Nixon would
risk war needlessly over islands of little
or no value, followed a pattern very
similar to that attending overwhelming
bipartisan congressional approval in
1855 of Joint resolution giving the
President broad discretionary authority
for defense of FormoSa and the Pes
cadoreS.
Speaking first on the issue the other
night, Senator Kennedy affirmed his
support for defense of Formosa, and
presumably the nearby PeScadores, but
questioned the defensibility of Quemoy
and MatSu and suggested that line be
drawn closer to FormoSa itSelf-in other
words, that Quemoy and Matsu be lab
eled expendable. Mr.. Nixon, in turn, did
not say that Quemoy and Matsu must
be defended in any circumstance-any
more than did the congressional reSolu-
ton. What he did say was that I'VE
should not force our Nationalist (Chi-
nese) allies to get off of them and give
them to the Communists. If we do that,
we start a chain reaction, because the
Communists aren't after Quemoy and
MatSu. They are after FormoSa."
The 1855 resolution-paSSed by a
vote Of 400 to 8 in the House and IS to 8
in the Senate-did not mention Quemoy
and Matsu by name. 1t specified how
ever, that the presidential authority "in-
clude the security and protection of such
related positions and territories Of that
area now in friendly hands" as might
be considered essential to the defense of
FormoSa and the Pescadores. But pro-
ceedingS on the Senate side pinpointed
Quennoy and Matsu, and resulted both in
committee and on the floor in fiat rejec-
ton Of proposals that they be openly
declared outside the FormoSa defense
zone. Amendments to that effect were
beaten in joint session of the Foreign
Relations and Armed Services Commit
tees by 20 to 8, and on the floor by rs
to IL.
Significantly, the reasoning which
prevailed against labelling Quemoy and
Matsu as outside the defense area was
very much the same as that cited by
Mr.. Nixon in his warning against "a
chain reaction" The Senate commit
tees, for example, reported that if Amer
ican support for these islands were to be
specifically forbidden, defense forces
might be deprived of "fexibility that
may be needed . In this particular
case, 1t would seem unwiSe to define too
precisely the geographic scope of the
resolution" Senator Knowland ex-
pressed this view even more bluntly by
saying that formal exclusion Of the is
lands would "Set up a green light on
Quemoy and MatSu telling the Com
munists just to come and get them"
What all this boilS down to, it seems
to us, is that the Congress in 1855 and
Mr.. Nixon in 1860 are on record, not
necessarily for going to war over Quemoy
and Matsu but against telling the Com
munist Chinese that they may be taken
without fear Of American reaction. Mr..
Kennedy, on the other hand, appears
willing Gust as South Korea once was
written Off to write off the islands,
position that could be highly inviting to
the Chinese Communists if it should be-
come official United States Government
policy. The debate now is heating UP
and the exact positions of the two men
are becoming involved in politicking. It
is our belief, however, that adoption of
Senator Kennedy's view would bring a
Communist attack on the islands Should
that happen, we doubt that the United
States would stand aside.