davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1959-10-28
HEADLINE PERSONALITY
Hostie No Stranger
ToPubIicC Controversy

The distinguished career of
Federal Judge william H.
HASTE has not been devoid of
controversy. Yesterday, he was
the lone dissenter in the rul-
ing by the Philadelphia Circuit
Court upholding the steel strike
Injunction.
His strong liberal convictions
guided him in spearheading the
major efforts by the National
Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People to end
segregation in education and
public service.
A staunch foe Of racial dis
elimination, he resigned as
civilian aide to the Secretary
of War in 1943, charging the
Army Air Force with reaction
airy policies and discriminatory
practices against Negroes"
While Governor of the Vir-
gin Islands, the Negro judge
told a group Of elementary
school children here, Don't be
afraid of going anywhere, being
anything or doing anything you
want"
Judge Hastie, in yesterdays
dissenting opinion, did not
challenge the majority con-
clusion as to the injunction's
constitutionality, but stated he
didn't believe a case had been
established for its issuance.
Views on Purpose
Judge HASTE is a familiar
figure in Washington. where he
first worked as an assistant So
licitor in the Interior Depart
ment.
In 1857, when a vacancy re-
suited on the Supreme Court,
Chief William Denman of the
Ninth United States Circuit
Court of Appeals urged Presi-
dent Eisenhower on three sep
arate occasions to elevate Judge
HASTE to the high court.
He was the first Negro to
serve on the Federal bench
when President Roosevelt NOM
mated him to the Virgin Is
lands Federal Court in 1887.
Judge HASTE resigned two
years later to become dean of
the Howard University Law
School, the position he held
until he was recalled back to
public service-as civilian aide
to the Secretary Of War.
In resigning from the job. he
charged that the Army Air
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Temporary Effect
Not Real Goal

It is true that a Taft-Hartley
injunction may also have the
Immediately helpful effect Of
temporarily restoring, much
needed production. But If this
had been the objective primarily
in view there would have been
no reason for limiting the term
of the injunction TO an 80-day
period Of attempted settlement
It Is also to be-. considered in
Judging the primary purpose of
the legislation that Congress
had already conferred sweeping
land more direct authority upon
the Executive for satisfying
Emergency national needs for
materials and commodities by
seizing struck plants under Sec
ton 18 Of the Universal Mill
tary Training and Service Act
and by allocating scarce sup
plies under Section l01. Of the
Defense Production Act Of 1850
as amended. 1t is reasonable to
believe that some different pur-
pose motivated the Congress
in authorizing temporary in
functions under the Taft-Hart-
ley law.
To accomplish its purpose,
the statute invokes the equity
jurisdiction of the District
Courts. This is done by the pro-
vision that If the continuation
Of a strike Of a substantial part
of an industry will impair
national health or safety, the
District Court shall have juris-
diction to enjoin any such
strike (for a period which cam
not exceed 80 days. D.. and to
make such other orders as may
be appropriate" The case might
have been different had the
statute provided for an admin
istrative hearing and determi-
nation and an administrative
order suspending a strike, with
the judicial role limited to
enforcement of any permissible
order. But Congress, having
chosen to refer the whole prob
lem to a court of equity exer-
cising its normal historic juris-
diction, the court must consider
in the normal fashion of equity
whether injunctive relief will
serve its intended purpose
Equity refrains from issuing
orders which appear vain in
that they seem unlikely to serve
their intended purpose.
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Finds Court Did Not
Abuse Discretion

The union argues that even
if it be assumed that the find
ings of the court below are not
clearly erroneous an Injunction
is far too sweeping a remedy for
the ills which the court found
will result from the continuance
of the strike. The United
States contends that on the
findings of the court below
which we have approved the in
junction must issue and that
the. case presented is so strong
that a court Of equity would be
in error if it refused to give
the relief prayed for. In short,
the union contends that the
court below in granting the in
junction abused it's legal dis
cretion and the United States
asserts that if the court below
had not granted the Injunction
the refusal would have been a
breach of discretion.
A portion of the unions argu-
ment in this regard is that
there are other statutes which
could have been employed by
the United States adequately
to relieve any danger to the
national health or safety and
which would have called for q
much less drastic remedy thar
the injunction appealed from
This is a consideration which g
court of equity of necessity
must weigh.
If our conclusion is correct
that there is sufficient evidence
in the record of the present OF
future danger to national health
or safety, we conclude that the
danger is great enough anC
calls for a remedy as sweeping
Evening star., 1959-10-28

equitable considerations inner
ent In the statutory scheme or
disclosed by the evidence In a
given case. Under this analysis
a primary and essential equi-
table consideration must be
whether the underlying public
purpose Of the statute to pro-
mote and facilitate more effec-
tive bargaining would be served.
Indeed, in my judgment some
utility in accomplishing this
primary purpose Of the legisla-
tion should provide the princi-
pal equitable justification Of
injunctive relief.
Thus. a court. before issuing
an injunction :. should satisfy
itself that there is a reasonable
basis for belief that a forced
suspension Of the strike will aid
and accelerate the process Of
collective bargaining. In terms
of the present case, has 1t been
made to appear here that the
parties are more likely to set
tie their dispute within the next
80 days if the strike is suspend
ed for that period by court
order than they are to accom-
plish this result while the strike
continues?
Examining the pleadings and
proof in the present record, it
appears that neither the Gov
ernment which seeks the in
junction nor the steel COM
panies whose employees are
striking has shed any light on
this critical question. Certainly
there is no indication that
violence or any other exacer-
batting conduct in the course Of
the strike is creating a climate
harmful to negotiation. There
is no suggestion that any ten
sion or hostility inimical to
negotiation would be relieved
or any impediment to settle
ment removed by a suspension
of the strike. There is simply
nothing before us which war
rants a conclusion that the
objective of more productive
bargaining would be served by
an injunction.
On the other hand, there is
evidence to the contrary. The
question is necessarily one Of
judgment informed by expe-
rience with the course of this
strike and the history Of other
similar situations. The parties
have elected to try this case on
aff1davitS.
1t also merits mention, al
though the court below did not
have this information, that the
very day this case was argued
to us both the President, who
has invoked Taft Hartley pro-
cedures in the case, and his
Secretary Of Labor issued pub
lie statements deprecating this
procedure by injunction and
expressing the view that it is
not an effective aid in settling
an industry wide strike. :.
In brief, the sources of in
formation available to us indi-
cate that there Is real basis for
apprehension that the grant,
Continued on Page ALT, Col. l
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Majority
Opinion

Majority opinion written by
Chief Judge John Biggs, jr.,
Judge Herbert Goodrich con-
curing:
There was clear-cut recog-
milton by Congress that labor
strife affects adversely impor-
tant economic and social inter-
ests Of the public. This appears
from the National Labor Rela-
tions Act itself, enacted long
prior to the labor-management
relations act with which we are
Immediately concerned. The
latter act appears to have two
major objectives. and it is not
necessary to decide here which
has primary or secondary sta
tus. Congress intended the
Labor Management Relations
Act to operate by it's terms
when a strike affects an entire
industry or a substantial part
thereof :" and will imperil
the national health or safety
e.
The purposes of the act are
set out as follows:
Industrial strife which in
terferes with the normal flow
Of commerce and with the full
production of articles and COM
modities for commerce, can be
avoided or substantially min
imized if employers, employees,
and labor organizations .
recognize under law that
neither party has any right in
its relations with any other to
engage in acts or practices
which jeopardize the public
health. safety. or interest. !"
And 1T is the purpose and
policy of this -. (act), in or
der to promote the full flow
Of commerce, to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both en-
ployes and employers in their
relations affecting commerce,
to provide orderly and peace
full procedures for preventing
the interference by either with
the legitimate rights of the
other. to protect the rights of
individual employees in their
relations with labor organiza-
tions whose activities affect
commerce, to define and pro-
scribe practices on the part of
labor and management which
affect commerce and are mimi
cal to the general welfare, and
to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce. I"
The congressional intent
shown here is, first, to protect
the rights of both employers
and employees and, second. to
bring to an end industrial
.strife which affects commerce
to such a degree as to menace
the general welfare. Whether
or not the injunction appealed
from has or can have the ef-
feet of settling the instant la
Dor dispute depends on the
proof offered and goes to the
issue of the sound exercise of
legal discretion on the part of
the court below.
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Minority
Opinion

Minority opinion by Judge
William Haste:
Without challenging the con-
clusions Of the majority as to
the constitutionality of the stat
ute and the sufficiency of proof
that the continuing national
steel strike imminently threat
ems serious interference with
essential national defense pro-
duction, still am not persuaded
that a case has been established
for the issuance of a Taft
Hartley injunction.
These are the steps in my
r soning. The injunction
sought here is an equitable
remedy and, therefore, is to be
Igranted or withheld in the ex-
ercise Of a sound discretion.
Accordingly, it should not be
granted If it apparently would
mot accomplish its objective. In
1.-THE emergency strike provisions
of the Taft-Hartley law, the
primary purpose of a Tempo
rary injunction is not to force
strikers to return to work but
to facilitate a settlement of a
serious industry wide strike by
collective bargaining. The evil
dence here shows that an in
junction would not facilitate
and might even make more diff
f1cult a negotiated settlement
of the steel strike. In these
circumstances an exercise of
sound discretion must lead to
a denial of the requested in
junction. This reasoning is
elaborated in what follows.
The national emergency strike
provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act do not purport to deter
mine the merits of a labor dis
pute or to terminate a strike by
judicial order. The statute
merely authorizes a court tenn
porarily to suspend a strike OF
a certain nationally very HARM
full type for a period of not more
tan 80 days while the parties
negotiate and the strikers ulti-
mately vote whether to accept
whatever final offer manage
ment may make. This duty to
negotiate and vote is explicit
and constitutes the whole ma
chinery of settlement set up by
the statue. Thus, the apparent
purpose of the statute is to
create for a limited time more
favorable environment for COL
Elective bargaining between the
parties to a nationally hurtful
strike with the hope and ex-
pectation that bargaining and
Irelated procedures will ac-
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Cites Procedure
During Injunction

But there is another consider
alton here which is Of vital
consequence on the issue of the
sound exercise of legal discre-
ton by the court below. Section
179, 20 U.S,C.A., provides the
machinery to be employed dur
ing the 80-day injunction period
for the adjustment by the
parties of their differences. This
most important portion Of the
statute provides that it shall be
"the duty of the parties to the
labor dispute :. to make every
effort to adjust and settle their
differences" with the assistance
of the service created by the
act.
It further provides that upon
the issuance Of the Injunction
the President shall reconvene
the board of inquiry which pre-
viously reported in respect to
the labor dispute and at the
end of a 60-day period, unless
the dispute meanwhile has
been settled, the board Of in
quiry shall report to the Presi-
dent the current position of
the parties and the efforts
which have been made to set
tie the dispute, including a
statement "of, the employers
last offer of settlement" The
President is required by law
to make that report available
to the public.
Last, but by no means least
import, section ITO provides
that the National Labor Re-
lations Board, within the sue
ceeding IS days, shall take a
secret ballot of the employees of
each employer involved in the
dispute on the question of
whether they wish to accept
the final offer of settlement
made by their employer" and
that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board shall certify the
results to the Attorney General
of the United States within
five days thereafter.
If the injunction does not
issue the machinery designed
by Congress to effect an end
to the labor strife, which as we
have indicated is one of the
prime purposes for which the
statute was enacted, cannot be
employed, and the menace to
national health or safety, the
other prime statutory purpose,
perhaps cannot be abated. Con-
gress has designed this ma
chinery and has settled the
policy embraced in the Labor
Management Relations Act.
While the court below in the
exercise of its sound legal dis
cretion might have found that
the exercise of the provisions
of Section 178 and 179. 90
U.S.C.A., would be Intellectual,
rather than efficient, to quell
labor strife and obviate the
menace to national health or
safety, in the light Of all the
circumstances we cannot say
that in issuing the injunction
the trial court abused its sound
legal discretion. In this respect
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Finds Judgment
Was Judicial

We conclude that the court
below was called upon to make
and did make a judicial, rather
than a legislative. type Of
Judgment. Our conclusion in
this regard is confirmed, we
think, by contrasting the stat
ute as enacted with the House
proposal which was rejected.
The House would have called
upon a District Court to act
whenever in its Judgment the
public interest was imperiled.
This would have left the court
at large in deciding the eXpedi-
ency of action guided only by
statesmanlike conception of the
public welfare.
But. as enacted, the statute
requires decision whether the
Ievidence adduced in a case
shows serious interference with
essential national defense ac-
tivities or threatened impair
ment Of public health. This is
specific enough and factual
enough to bring the inquiry
within the area of judicial de-
cision as distinguished from
legislative Judgment, as in our
policv the two are DISTINGUISHED.
We are of the opinion, for
the reasons stated, that the
proceeding at bar does con-
stitute a justiciable controversy
and does not incur the inter-
diction asserted by the union
to arise under Article III. Sec
ton 2. of the Constitution.
This case was submitted to
the court below on aff1davits
and without oral testimony.
This method was agreed to by
both sides. The result OF this
method of proof is that the rule
which calls upon us to support
the findings of the District
Judge unless clearly erroneous
is inapplicable so far as it has
to do with the trial courts op-
portunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and
like matters. Moreover, it neces-
sarily deprives the instant rec
ord of any elaboration of the
evidence of the various aff1ants
which could have been brought
out had they appeared in per-
son as witnesses and had been
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Intent and Purpose
Of Congress in Act

1t may be helpful to restate
our conception of the congress
sional intent as expressed in
the act. The underlying con-
.cept is one Of tort, tortious
conduct which affects the ma
tional health or safety. That
tortious conduct consists of per-
mitting labor dispute to con-
tinue to the point where ma
tional health or safety is i'm
periled. In point of time, the
action or nonaction of en-
ployers and employees becomes
wrongful when national health
or safety is imperiled. The Pres
ident then states his opinion
that such is the case and con-
stitutes a board of inquiry which
proceeds as required by law but
without recommendations. :.
: The United States then brings
q suit such as that at bar and
1t becomes the duty of the Dis
trict Court to find or not to find
that circumstances are such,
that the national health or
safety is imperiled. 1t would,
of course, be impossible ordin-
arily to fix the exact point in
time at which the provisions of
the Labor Management Rela-
lions Act becomes operative. The
peril must exist at the time the
Jurisdiction of the United States
District Court is invoked and
1t is the duty of the court in
the exercise of it's sound legal
discretion under the act to issue
an injunction if it finds the
necessary operative facts.
In respect to the constitu-
tionality Of the act, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Cir
cult in United States VS.. United
Steelworkers of America, said:
1.-THE statute creates the right
on the part of the public to be
protected from the danger Of
such a strike or lockout.
Whether there is an existing
or threatened strike or lock-
out which, under the statute,
is an invasion of the rights of
the public presents the usual
kind of case or controversy
which is justiciable by a court. "
In United States VS.. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Associ-
alton Is. D. N. Y. 1889, Judge
Weinfeld said: I'm exercising
jurisdiction under the national
emergencies provisions of the
law, the court acts in the pub
nc interest and not in the
adjudication of private rights
OF the contending parties" 1t
Is difficult to quarrel. with the
congressional objectives.
1.-THE legislative history SUD-
ports our view as to the pur-
poses of the Labor-Manage-
su1ent Relations Act. 1t is true.
Jas the union points out, that
the legislation now embodied
in Section l78 as it was origi-
ilally proposed in the House of
Representatives had broader
scope. Under it. the President
would have had the power to
seek an Injunction whenever
ia labor dispute has resulted
Evening star., 1959-10-28
why Government
Asks Injunction

We are here concerned with
the giving Of relief by a court
of equity in a situation which
is alleged to have impaired an6
seriously menaces the public
interest.
Without placing blame upon
any Of the defendants here
the union or the steel COM
panieS, it is alleged, and the
Government insists that it has
proved, that their failure tc
reach an agreement by the
processes of collective bargain
ing has caused them, and it is
feared their country with them
to fall into a slough from
which it is necessary to lift
them, if only for an 80-day
period, lest national health and
safety be imperiled.
The use of the injunction in
a labor dispute. so frequently
abused in years past, led to the
passage of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act which prohibited
the injunction in a bona f1de
labor dispute. But the Labor
MANAGEMENT Relations Act
specifically has limited the ex-
emption against injunctionS in
labor disputes granted by the
Norris-LaG Guardia Act. How
ever undesirable we may deem
the use of the injunction in
labor disputes to be, nonethe-
less Congress has seen fit to
reinstate it to the limited de-
gree indicated. The old law Of
the injunction in the labor dis
pute, to the extent prescribed,
seems to have been returned by
Congress to at least part Of
its former standing, and we are
compelled to adhere to the
posture which Congress has
placed upon it.
When a court enters q
status judgment such as that
at bar, in our opinion it acts
judicially and not legislatively
If this were not so a substantial
portion of the jurisdiction
granted to courts Of the United
States by Congress would fall
within the interdiction of Ar
ticle III, Section 2, of the Con-
stitution. Orders Of the Ma
tional Labor Relations Board
frequently would come into
such a category, as would or
ders Of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, as well as
orders of the Interstate Com
merce Commission RENEWABLE
by the United States District
Courts under the Urgent Def
ciencies Act. Petitions for re-
view of decisions of the United
States Tax Court would also
fall within the Introduction
Proceedings to require the is
suance of a patent by the Com
missioner of Patents also
meet the ban as would pro-
ceedings for naturalization. The
line dividing the powers of the
Legislative tribunal as distin-
lguished from those of the judi.
cial tribunal is of necessity q
fine one.
Evening star., 1959-10-28

as the law will permit. Whether
the remedy provided by the
Labor-M Management Relations
Act is sufficient to accomplish
a cessation of labor strife is a
question not for this court but
for Congress. We conclude,
therefore. that the court below
did not abuse its discretion in
granting the relief which the
United States prayed for.
Evening star., 1959-10-28
Rejects Automatic
Injunction Theory

To put the matter somewhat
differently, there is no legisla-
tive mandate that a court shall
grant an injunction whenever a
strike is imperiling national
health or safety, though such
peril is essential to jurisdiction.
Rather. a court sitting in equity
is called upon to balance all
Evening star., 1959-10-28

no judge or tribunal can fore
tell the future.
The judgment Of the court
below will be affirmed. Our stay
order will be continued for a
period of six days to allow
Evening star., 1959-10-28

in. or imminently threatened to
result in, the cessation Of SUBJ
stantial curtailment of inter-
state or foreign commerce in
transportation, public utility OF
communication services essen
tial to the public health, safety,
or interest" but in the Senate
version, which became what is
now Section l78. Senator Taft
limited the applicability Of the
emergency provisions of the
statute to situations in which
the national "health or safety
was or might become imper-
lied. But the legislation as
enacted nonetheless seems tc
us to amply embrace the pres
ent circumstances.
Evening star., 1959-10-28

subjected TO examination and
discrimination in the usual
fashion.
Evening star., 1959-10-28

PHILADELPHIA, Oct 2S (APJ-Portions of the tert OF
the majority and minority opinions in the United States
Circuit Court decision uphodno the Tat-Hary injunction
and ordering the striking seelDoers back to iDork toos
Evening star., 1959-10-28

aggrieved parties, should they
desire to do so. TO petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari
Any further stay must come
from the Supreme Court.
Evening star., 1959-10-28

I Force, "by not wanting the
Negro in the first place and by
doubling his capacity has
committed itself psychologcially
to courses Of action which
themselves become major OBJ.
stacles to the success of Ne
groes in the air forces"
Judge HASTE objected to
segregated training center fol-
colored pursuit pilots at Tuske-
gee, Ala, and to a colored can
didate school at Jefferson Bar
racks, Mo.
When his nomination to be
Governor of the Virgin Islands
was sent to the Senate in 1916
futile attempts were made to
label Judge HASTE as a Com
munist sympathizer.
Born in Tennessee SIS years
ago this November II, Judge
Hastie was a Phi Beta Kappa
graduate at Amherst and re-
ceived his law degree from
Harvard, where he edited the
Harvard Law Review.
Evening star., 1959-10-28

lcomplish q settlement Of the
strike.