Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1959-08-03
Behind the Curtain

The significant aspect of the Vice
Presidents visit to the Soviet Union has
little to do with how many, if any, Rus
slams were converted as a result of Mr..
Nixon'S firSt-rate missionary efforts. The
important thing is that the Soviet au-
thorities were willing to permit this
spokesman for our system to come
behind the Iron Curtain and present
frankly and vigorously point of view
which has long been the Kremlin's
Public Enemy No. l..
In doing this, Mr.. Khrushchev was
taking something of a gamble. For his
deputies, Mr.. Mikoyan and Mr. Kozlov,
had met Mr.. Nixon on their visits to our
own country, and they must have re-
ported back to the Soviet Premier that
he would be an effective and hard
hitting advocate of the Western point
of view. Nevertheless, millions of Rus
slams were permitted to hear and read
the Nixon arguments which
the Russian authorities heretofore have
kept from their people by jamming for
eign broadcaStS.
So the fact that our Vice President
was allowed to go to Russia and to meet
and talk to the Russian people must be
counted, we think, as a hopeful develop
ment in Soviet policy. And this is. true
despite the fact that the Soviet press
organs and Mr.. Kozlov himself have re-
acted quickly m an attempt to answer
and rebut Mr.. Nixon'S defense of United
States policy and his criticism of Russian
oil I,or J1xyo
that the Russian authorities would
permit this strange and even startling
message to go undiSputed to their people.
But the Nixon message has gone
through, and we hope that the logical
next steps will be taken.
The first next step, as just an
nounced by the White House, is an invi-
tetion to Mr. Khrushchev to visit the
United States. The Soviet Premier will
come to this country next month. OF
course, this will pose some problems, es-
pecially IN relation to physical security.
These will not be insurmountable, how
ever, and if all goes well, the return visit
which the President will make to Russia
should be successful venture. For if
Mr.. Nixon was able to make good i'm
preston on the Russians, the Eisen-
hover personality should take them
by storm.
There is, of course, the other side
of the coin. Successful goodwill visits
are desirable things. But the most that
they can do is to help prepare climate
which may be conducive to settlement of
the real problems which divide Russia
and the West.
In this connection, however, it
should not be forgotten that Mr.. Nixon,
especially on his Siberian tour, saw some
things which should open Western eyes.
He saw country and a people who have
every reason to want peace, not war. He
saw new and potentially strong econ
omy being carved out of what, just few
years ago, was largely wilderness. 1t
must have been a scene reminiscent OF
our own development several decades
ago. Certainly, it was revealing glimpse
of nation which has before it both a
great task and great opportunity We
should ask ourselves why Mr.. Khru-
shchev, or any Russian, should want to
bring on terribly destructive war. What
sense would it make?
There are both Americans and Rus
slams, however, who genuinely fear that
the other side is bent upon conflict, now
or ultimately. And it is this fear which
is the most formidable obstacle to a
settlement of outstanding differences.
We may hope that Mr.. Nixon'S visit to
Russia, and the top-level exchange OF
visits which will follow, will make a
substantial contribution toward reducing
or even eliminating this barrier of
mutual distrust.