Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1959-09-20

them put 1t. "sets the clock b
Ever since the text Of tn
speech became available. the
searching for openings that will
permit progress toward East
West agreement in the arms
question.
They feel, that the plan as
It now stands has two insur-
mountable stumbling blocks.
First, Mr.. Khrushchev has
gone back to advocating con-
trolls after disarmament in
stead of before. That would
mean the world would have to
take it on faith that the Soviet
war machine was being dis
mantled in the three stages
Mr.. Khrushchev prescribed.
Reverses Soviet View
Second. the proposal assumes
1t is possible to prevent hiding
nuclear weapons produced or to
detect> future clandestine nu-
clear-weapon production. The
Soviet Union itself has admitted
since 1855 that this is scientific
ally impossible.
In its May 10. 1855 proposal
to the United Nations Dis
armament Subcommittee the
Soviet Union said:
"a. There are possibilities
beyond the reach Of interna-
tional control for evading con-
troll and for organizing the
clandestine manufacture of
atomic and hydrogen weapons.
even if there is a formal agree
ment on international control.
In such situation. the Sc
curity Of states signatoties to
the international convention
cannot be guaranteed. since
the possibility would be open
to a potential aggressor to &C
cumulate stocks of atomic and
hydrogen weapons for a sur
prise atomic attack on peace
loving states"
Switch Depresses officials
Equally depressing from
American officials standpoint
is Premier Khrushchev's rever-
sion to the old pre-1955 search
for a universal disarmament
formula.
From the end of World War
II until 1855 the whole world
had sought a general and
complete" disarmament agree
ment. But by 1855 nuclear
weapons had been developed to
the point where both sides
agreed enough of them were
available so that no foolproof
inspection system could be de-
vised to gather them all in
again. Nor could anyone be
assured that more nuclear
weapons could not be made
secretly.
Early in 1855 the Eisenhower
administration stated this as
one of seven guiding principles:
"In the existing state Of Sci
entif1c knowledge. there could
be no safe agreement to elimi-
nate nuclear weapons. 1t is not
possible by any known scientific
or other means to account for
the total previous production of
nuclear weapons material. The
margin Of error in existing
methods is sufficient to allow
for clandestine fabrication or
sequestering of enough nuclear
weapons to constitute a devas-
tating power advantage to the
poSseSSor.
Rude Jolt Dealt
Shortly thereafter the Soviet
Union and the United States
agreed not to seek universal
disarmament, but to try for a
step-by-step arms limitation
only.
1t was at that time that the
West - and presumably the
Soviet policymakers as we'll
resigned themselves to the prop
osition that nuclear weapons
are here to stay.
The new Khrushchev pro-
posal, however, seems based ON
the pre-1955 assumption that
nuclear stockpiles or production
is detachable.
The Soviet Premier also dealt
another rude jolt to American
optimists' hopes that the Krem-
lin might now be ready to ac-
cept a control system to go into
effect as the disarmament
process starts.
Sees u. s. Unwilling
These hopes have been fed
during the past year by So
Wet negotiators' slow progress
toward agreement on an in
Spection system to verify a nu-
clear-weapons test ban. The
Kremlin accepted in principle
the proposition that controls
for this pre-disarmament step
should be instituted as the ban
was put into effect.
But the Declaration of So
Wet Government" released after
Premier Khrushchev's United
Nations speech clearly rejects
what the United States regards
as effective control. It also
implies the United States itself
would not accept effective con-
trolls.
ITO assure oneself in the at
mosphere Of existing distrust,"
the paper says, against sus-
picions of concealing by this
or that state the use of atomic
materials for military purposes
would require granting foreign