Evening star., 1959-06-15

70 kusslo ono 6reot bHtoin ono for'
mer Governor OF New York Stote, is
currently visiting the Soviet Union.
In this ortiels he tells Of revisitins
Yolto, scene Of the historic World
War u conference which he et-
tsndsi. and reflects on the lessons
learned there.
the West might bring loans and
aid to rehabilitate his war-torn
country.
On the other hand. by ignor-
ing his Yalta promises and
going his own way" as he
later put it to me, he could as
sure the political consolidation
of the Red army's military
occupation of Eastern Europe
and exploit postwar economic
dislocations to advance COM
munism in Western Europe
The latter. in fact. was only
prevented by the Marshall Plan
and NATO. Our headlong uni
lateral disarmament under pub
lie pressure to bring the boys
home" may also have influ-
enced his decisions.
Whatever his reasons, the
Communist coup in Czechoslo-
vakia, the subsequent attempt
ed takeover of Berlin by the
blockade and finally the North
Korean attack left no doubt
which Of the two courses he
had chosen.
When Mr.. Khrushchev after
Stains death revealed the i'll
treatment he and his colleagues
had suffered from Stalin's ruth
lessness, he might well have
acknowledged the difficulties
Russia's wartime allies likewise
encountered from Stalin's arbi.
trary behavior.
The subsequent development
Of the hydrogen bomb with the
threat Of annihilating war may
have modified the new Soviet
leaders attitude toward the
cold war.
AS Soviet military authori-
ties have openly admitted tc
me. there are enough nucleal
bombs in existence to destroy
both the West and Russia.
In addition, the cost Of these
new weapons is prodigious anc
competes seriously for Soviet
material and financial resource,
with M. Khurshchev's pledge tt
raise the standard Of living ol
the Soviet people to levels com.
parable with our own.
Want More U. S. Trade
Furthermore, Deputy Premier
Mikoyan's reiterated pleas fol-
increased trade with Americ;
are shared by factory manager
with whom I have talked
They cannot understand tht
reason for the American EN-.
barge on the export Of ma.
chine tools, some Of which
they would like to have to in.
crease the efficiency of theil
plants.
Finally the pressure of So.
Wet public opinion on the
Kremlin is not as negligible al
some would think. The long.
ing for peace and security
which I have witnessed every.
wherein factories, farms anc
even prisons-must play a role
in the Kremlin's counsels.
AS the possibility of another
summit conference looms or
the horizon, the West shoulc
have learned some lesson,
from its wartime dealings with
Russia. Although I believe that
meetings Of heads Of state art
sometimes necessary-and Ger.
tainly so now-it should bt
borne in mind that through
out history. such negotiation.
have been regarded with grave
misgivings by historians.
Heads of states are otter
loathe to devote the time nec-
essary to achieve clearcut
agreements and prone to &C.
cept ambiguous formulas tc
disguise unresolved conflicts
Faced with failures they also
have often lacked the courage
to admit 1t to an expectant
public.
II Summit Farley Is Held
1t seems to me that If thu
heads Of government onc'
again meet at the summit
they should try patiently II
understand the legitimate as
pirations Of the other side. Il
speak tempperately but to ne
gotiate firmly where basit
principles are involved. Fur
thermore they should seel
genuine agreements that leav,
no room for misunderstanding
Finally. where they canno
agree they should be prepared
to admit their failures and II
await a more propitious mo
ment to tackle unsettled issues
But in the last analysis
even with the wisest states
manship on the part Of tn,
West. it.. will depend largel.
on the Kremlin leaders of to
day whether the proposed
summit conference or subse
quent ones achieve the basi'
settlements so devoutly desired
not only by ourselves, but b.
the crowds at Livadia palacl
and elsewhere throughout tn,
Soviet Union.
(Copright 1859 BY
W. Averell Harriman)
Reproduction OF this drticl
in whole or in part is torbiddel
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