Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1959-09-27


istration, set the cost Of q ma
jor shot such as the Atlas-Able
operation at between IS million
and $40 million. He explained,
however, that both pecuniary
and scientific losses on this one
were reduced somewhat by the
fact that the 375-pound instru-
mented payload was not on the
rocket during test firing and
hence was not destroyed.
an the state Of affairs that
prevails today" DR.. Stewart
said in an interview. there is
no high assurance Of any test
being successful. So no test
can in itself be Of major sig
nificance. 1t would have been
nice to have this one fly. but
the fate Of the Nation was not
riding on it,"
Series Of Shots Restudied
This was his comment on
published reports that the whole
space program would have to
be restudied as a result Of the
Thursday accident. Actually,
all that came up for immediate
restudy was the sequence Of
a series of shots that began with
the "Paddlewheel" Explorer vi
last August.
The original plan last year
was to put this Paddlewheel
into the vicinity of Venus, our
nearest planetary neighbor, in
mid-l959. This was abandoned
when the propitious time for
a Venus shot approached and
the Thor-Able rocket to carry
the instruments was not yet
ready.
Rescheduling resulted in the
Explorer VI concept, using the
Venus instrument package as
an earth orbiter with a highly
elliptical path. Following this.
1t was planned that there
would be a moon-orbiting shot
using a two-stage Atlas-Able.
This was the one that blew
up nine days before its sched-
uled launch date of October 8.
The third in the three-shot
series would have been a Thor
Able deep-space probe, to go
out approximately to the dis
lance of the Venus orbit
some 80 million miles-though
Venus would not be at that
point at that time. This was
tentatively scheduled for No
vember.
October Moonshot Doubtful
The immediate problem
which confronted NASA PLAN
ners after the moon rocket
explosion was whether to shoot
the third rocket anyway, or to
maintain the one-two-three
sequence originally laid out.
The latter alternative would
result in the practically indef-
mite postponement of the No
vember space probe unless a
substitute Atlas could be &C.
quired.
A question that arose prompt
ly after the blow-up was
whether the Space Administra.
ton had a backup vehicle
which could be substituted for
one that exploded. The an
swer was no. but it now APP
pears that an Atlas originally
scheduled for another mission
may be available.
Even so. as DR.. Stewart
points out. getting hold of
another round and organizing
a shot is not something you do
overnight" It is certain that
the golden moment for an
October moonshot cannot be
recaptured. and there is con-
siderable doubt that a Novem-
Der shot is feasible. However.
November is a possibility.
All Aliases AllOcated
In general, every Atlas now
in existence, under construc-
ton. or planned for building in
the next two years already is
allocated for some specific pur-
pose. Those marked for NASA
are chiefly for use in the Mer-
curry man-in-space program.
The rest have weapons test,
training and operational pur-
poses within the Air Force.
On the face Of it, it would
appear that two alternatives
present themselves to NASA if
another Atlas-Able moonshot is
to be tried: Either bobtail the
Mercury program or wangle
another Atlas from the Air
Force. Less likely alternatives
would be to reshuffle the allo-
cation of Aliases in late phases
Of the Mercury program or to
wait couple Of years to make
the moonshot.
None of these prospects would
be desirable from NASA's point
10 view. However, another al
tentative presented itself in so
subtle a fashion that even