Evening star., 1959-02-03
To Explore Red Plans

Beyond this, however, there
is an obvious need for exploring
carefully and thoroughly what
ever proposals the Russians
may put forward on a settle
ment of the German problem.
If these proposals are as
phony as they now seem, they
should be exposed in all the
glare of worldwide publicity
that a summit conference would
produce. If, on the other hand,
the Russians show more fleXi-
bility than now seems probable,
a serious and honest attempt
should be made to arrive at
even a partial solution of the
problem of European security.
Even the most peSSimistic
diplomats in Europe are per-
suaded that such a conference
is necessary at this point. There
are many who think that the
Russian line has not changed
in any essentials, and that the
end result of a negotiation will
be to prove once again that the
Russian goal is to absorb. first
Berlin, and then the whole of
Germany into the Russian
sphere. But even these observ-
ers believe that. in the face Of
what is obviously a well-calcu-
lated Communist offensive, the
West cannot reply with a fiat
refusal to talk.
Cite Obligation Of People
1t is not only question Of
convincing the rest of the world
of the sincerity of Western mo-
tives in this case. A German
official explained:
There is also an obligation
here to our own people. This
thing is so serious and involved
such serious consequences that
everything possible must be
done to find the alternatives"
And this, in the end, is what
It boils down to. The willing
ness to talk now rests on the
determination of the West to
fight eventually in defense of
Berlin and Western Germany.
While the means are still
open to debate, the decision to
defend Berlin at any cost has
been taken. And this one firm
decision makes the prospect Of
a major East-West negotiation
good deal less frightening
than it has been in the past.
Conflict Expected
Meanwhile, what does the
West do about less-than-all-out
threats to Berlin?
The opinion of top Allied
diplomats here is that the
transfer of Russian authority
to the East German govern
ment in Berlin would almost
inevitably lead to conflict but
not to war.
They foresee, in such an
event, a series of incidents
which would confront the Allies
with an increasingly difficult
choice between retaliating with
force or withdrawing from Ber-
lin.
The possible variety of such
incidents is almost endless.
Starting from the proposition
that the Western allies have
no access rights to Berlin eX-
cept through agreement with
the East German regime. the
Communists would be able to
apply pressure ranging all the
way from minor harrassment
to an all-out blockade.
Drastic Action Unlikely
Judging from everything that
has been said so far. however.
the probability of any very
drastic action seems small. at
least at the beginning. Most
competent observers here think
that all the talk of airlifts or
armored tank columns being
planned by the West to relieve
q blockade of Berlin is more
than a little unrealistic.
The betting is. in fact, that
the West will never be con-
fronted with any such clearcut
decision.
In drawing up their various
contingency plans" for Berlin
after the Russian withdrawal,
the allies, then, must take ac-
count of this extraordinary
choice of possibilities open to
the East German regime. The
squeeze could be put on civilian
traffic only-or military traffic
only-or both together. It could
be applied on the roadA rail-