Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1959-08-21
INTERPRETIVE REPORT

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ing a press conference Of Adj
miral Arleigh Burke, Chief Of
/. Naval Operations. In reply TO
questions, he said the very
Nervous" crisis in Laos might"
/ REQUIRE Navy action.
But despite the stepped-up
Communist invasion Of that
small Asian friend Of the West,
, there are no proposals from
s1any Of the three services to
come to the rescue with their
, limited war forces, Pentagon
4 sources say.
I, Advocates of increased SPEND
ing for limited war forces pos
tulate just such an invasion as
that in Laos in advancing their
doctrine. Army, Navy and to
some extent Air Force leaders
say that "nibbling" aggressions
by the Communists will slowly
erode the Western position in
Asia and the Middle East unless
this country has more limited
war forces to check the Reds.
The big A-boinb forces Of the
5Air Force cannot fight these lit
tile wars. it Is argued.
I, Cites Countering Of Threat
Admiral Burke justified his
request for more money to
.,build attack carriers on their
value in countering the limited
!; war threat. He cited Laos as
an example of that sort of
threat and said other limited
!. war situations were possible in
other Asian, Middle Eastern
!, African and even South Amer
lean countries.
Z The Army justifies the exist
;ance of its STRAC (Strategic
! Army Corp forces on similar
grounds. 8
And the Air Force says it is
sready to fight limited wars
with CAST Composite Air
Strike Force) planes.
!. The position Of the three
Services on a test in Laos is:
!, If ordered in, our service will
scarry out the mission with dis
patch. But we don't want to be
ordered in.
! One Air Force leader said the
simple fact was that if rescue
sof Laos depended on American
military action, then Laos prob
ably would be lost. Navy and
Army spokesman called this
:s'defeatism." ''s
Type Of Action Questioned
But the Laos crisis does point
up some of the difhculties of
waging limited wars. For in
stance, what kind of military
action could be taken in Laos?
Admiral Burke's answer is
that an attack carrier force
could steam to the area to
show North Wet Nam that
Ibis country is ready to defend
Its friends. If that Difference
failed, then air strikes from the
carrier could be launched
against the invaders.
The Army says STRAC forces
could fly to Laos-or any
lother limited war theater-in
7 a matter of hours.
& The Air Force says CAST
could bomb in Laos even faster
than that.
Arguments Of the Services
1, But each service DOMINATES
5 the others way Of going about
it. The arguments:
u The Navy is old-fashioned in
ats "show-the-flag" philosophy.
"A carrier or two won't impress
North Wet Nam which de-
Sfeated a major French army
and scared OF this country
from intervening during its
civil war. Furthermore, carrier
/ planes will be shot to pieces
by land based Communist
I fighter planes.
The Army is unrealistic. 1t
! couldn't get "a real fighting
. force with necessary supporting
units to Laos in less than
months. And if it did fight
there, it would be begged down
r'in jungle warfare against a
will -the-wisp enemy.
The Air Force would be worse
off. There is no large, defend
/ able air field in the area. Air
Force planes would have to fly
missions from Formosa or Oki-
nawa or Guam and wouldn't be
able to see a target in the jun
. gle when they arrived.
These same arguments apply
in almost every limited war
situation the three services can
picture in that part Of the
world. ~
Each military problem in a
limited war for Laos-or any
other Asian or Middle Eastern
country-is accompanied by
{ political problems which PEN
tagon leaders discuss but do not
I decide.
For instance, the Air Force,
II ordered, would be able to
seal of the Laotian border with
q chain Of A-bombs or by Gre
ating a no-man's-land of radio
active dust along the border.
But it is assumed in the Penta-
re- LOST
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