Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-04-03

PROGRAMS, eacn OF WHICH is III
tended to strengthen the Ma
tons defense. I understand
quite as well the necessity for
these leaders to present hon.
estly and forcefully to their SUI
periors their views regarding
the place of their programs in
the overall national effort. But
service responsibilities and ac-
tivities must always be only the
branches. not the central trunk
of the national security tree.
The present organization fails
to apply this truth.
Rivalries Inevitable
While at times human failure
and misdirected zeal have been
responsible for Implications, in
eff1ciencieS, and publicized dis
putes, the truth is that most of
the service rivalries that have
troubled us in recent years have
been made inevitable by the
laws that govern our defense
organization.
Parenthetically. may OBJ
serve that these rivalries, so
common in the National Capt.
tai. are almost unknown in the
field. Here in Washington they
usually find expression in the
services congressional and
press activities which become
particularly conspicuous in
struggles over new weapons.
funds and publicity. It is just
such rivalries. am convinced,
that America wants stopped.
\
Coming now to specific or
ganizational changes. ! want
first to ,emphasie the vital ne
cessity of complete unity in our
strategic planning and basic
operational direction. It is
therefore mandatory that the
initiative for this planning and
direction rest not with the sep
arate services but directly with
the Secretary of Defense and
his operational advisers, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. assisted
by such staff organization as
they deem necessary.
!; Genuine Unity Indispensable
No military task is of greater
Importance than the develop
ment Of strategic plans which
relate our revolutionary new
weapons and force deploymentS
to national security detectives.
Genuine unity is indispensable
at this starting point. No
amount of subsequent co-ordin-
alton can eliminate duplication
or doctrinal conflicts which are
intruded into the first shaping
of military programs.
This unified efiDrt is. essential
not only for lohg-range plan
ming and decisiofi which fix the
pattern Of our future forces and
form the foundation Of our ma
jor military programs. but also
for effective command over mil
itary operations. The need for
greater unity today is most
acute at two points-in the
ONCE Of the Secretary Of De-
Tense. and in the major opera
tional commands responsible
for actual combat in the event
sof war.
I Now as to specifics Of the re-
visions that ! deem essential:
I. We must organize our
fighting forces into operational
commands that are truly uni
ned. each assigned a mission in
fun accord with our overall
military detectives.
I This lesson. taught by World
War II, ! learned from first
hand experience. With rare
exceptions. as / stated before,
there can no longer be sepa-
rate ground. sea. or air battles.
/ Our unified commands (by
which term / also include the
joint and specified commands
which exist today are the cut
ting edge Of our military ma
chine-the units which would
do the fighting. Our entire de-
: Tense organization exists to
: make them effective.
/ intend that. subject to ex-
ceptions personally approved
J by. the Commander-in-C Chief,
! all Of our operational forces
: be organized into truly unified
commands. Such commands
: will be established at my direc-
! ton. They will be in the De-
partment of Defense but
separate from the military de-
! partments. Their missions and
: force levels will conform to ma
/. tional detectives.
|, Truly Unified Commands
, I expect these truly unified
commands to go far toward
realigning our operational
plans, weapons systems and
force levels in such fashion as
to provide maximum security
at minimum cost.
: Because l have often seer
/ the evils Of diluted command
! I emphasize that each unified
] commander must have I'M
. questioned authority over all
units of his command. Forces
must be assigned to the COM
; mand and be removed only by
! central direction-by the Sec.
! rotary Of Defense or the Com
mander-in- Chief-and not BY
orders Of individual military
departments.
Commands Of this kind we
, do not have today. To the
extent that we are unable SC
to organize them under pres.
ent law. to that extent We
! cannot fully marshal oul
armed strength.
We must recognize that by