Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-03-30
Administration Examines
Weapons Test Schemes

Prof. Taketani intends to avoid
the question Of inspection, so tick
lish in the Soviet Union-thus
depriving the West of its primary
goal. The uncertainty about nu-
clear weapons development might
actually heighten world tension.
On the other hand. the dangers Of
radioactive fallout presumably
would be drastically reduced.
Z Allow testing only UNDER
Os ground. DR.. Willard F. Libby
of the Atomic Energy Commits
sion has said that radioactivity
can be sealed inside the earth by
this method. The health hazards
would be reduced. But there
would be less retardation, pre-
sumably, in the arms race. This
would not satisfy the military, but
it would be better than no tests
from their point Of view.
n Limit tests to a tOlerable
Re fallOut ceiling. This POSSIBLE
ity has been under consideration
here for some time and is now
gaining more accuracy. It may. be
the first line of retreat for Acc
and the Defense Department,
which apparently are still plug
ging for continued testing. In
spection would be required, but
not the kind that would open UP
the Soviet Union. Under this for
mula. both underground testing
Of any size and above-ground
testing Of relatively fallout-free
weapons could continue.
g Limit the size of weapons
Ne tested. Adlai Stevenson was
among the first to advance this
proposal in the political arena,
although former Acc Commits
sioner Thomas Murray is be-
lieved to have originated it. All
tests Of weapons above one meg
atom. say, or or 10 megatons,
would be banned. On the spot
inspection presumably would not
be required, since acoustic and
seismic instruments are believed
sensitive enough to pick up such
large explosions even from out
side the Soviet Union.
4 Suspend or limit weapons
We testing only. Some kind OF
international supervision would
be set up to permit continuation
of the so-called clean-bomb or
peaceful-explosion testing to aid
harbor construction, river diver
sion, mountain leveling, oil ex-
traction and other hard-to-believe
earth moving projects. This
would, in effect, take most OF the
world nuclear explosions out Of
the war context and into the
peace field. Whether it would
slow military development as
much as a total suspension is
problematical.
information Locking
One of the causes for uncer-
tainty in the American Govern
ment is the lack Of precise infor-
nation on the effects Of the va
rious proposals.
We are not sure, for instance,
that tests could be limited as to
fallout or size with enough pre-
cision to set a ceiling. Our scien-
fists have frequently been sur
prised by the kick of test weapons.
The objection to all proposals
for q limitation rather than fiat
ban on nuclear tests is that they
could easily be interpreted as a
retreat from the present Ameri-
can-NATO position. Although test
suspension has been linked with
production, the test suspension has
been absolute. Radio Moscow
could make any dilution Of this
ban look mighty sinister.
Abandonment or loosening of
the link, If it is ever ordered by
President Eisenhower, still will not
become accepted as American
policy unless Britain, France and
the other NATO allies agree.
Whether they will is still very
much of a question. The President
was about ready to suspend tests
Internationally once before-last
May. But France protested that
this would rule her out of the
atomic club without any assurance
that the nuclear Big Three would
ever agree to reduce their already
gigantic nuclear stockpiles.