The Detroit tribune. (Detroit, Mich.) 1935-1966, 1958-12-20
How We Lost The War


One Of the most decisive naval battles in the Pacific
war was fought in Leyte Gulf in October 1914 resulting
In the destruction Of he japanese Navy except by land
based aircraft the United States had vndspvted com.
mand Of the When Admiral Mtsvmasa Yoni. Navy
Minister Of the Koo cabinet questioned on the battle
after the war; he realized that the defeat Of Leyte was
tantamovnt TO loss Of the Philippines As for the larger
significance Of the battle. he said Il felt that that
the end"
THIS LARGER SIGNIFICANCE" WAS MISSED By
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND HIS ADVISERS. WHO
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION
OF THEIR OVERWHELMING VICTORY. THERE IS NO
QUESTION THAT THE JAPANESE NAVY VIRTUALLY
CEASED TO EXIST. AND THAT JAPAN THEREFORE
COULD NOT POSSIBLY WIN THE WAR. AS SHE WAS
DOOMED TO LOSE IT. THE AMERICAN PROBLEM WAS
PREDoMNANTLY POLITICAL: NAMELY. HOW COULD
HER DEFEAT BE BROUGHT ABOUT AT THE HIGHEST
PROFIT TO THE UNITED STATES?
Il was far simpler problem than the one that faced
President Roosevelt in Europe where he had to consider
his allies The with Japan IS per cent American
and TO win II at the highest profit II essential in
order to complications that the United States should
win IL singe-handed. HAD THIS BEEN UNDERSTOOD. "
WOULD HAVE BEEN APPRECIATED THAT AS RUSSIA
WAS THE ONLY POWER THAT COULD coMPLIcATE
THE ISSUE, IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR THE
UNITED STATES TO BRING THE WAR WITH JAPAN TO
AN END WHILE RUSSIA WAS STILL AT GRIPS WITH
GERMANY.
The japanese Emperor realized the critical situation fac
ing his country The evidence in the Tokyo War Criminal
Trials reveals that acted peaeemaker the various
topisve conferences He realized that negotiated peace
would his country from total destruction BY
late l944 moreover should have BEEN apparent
to American military officials through intelligence that what
remained of the Kwanfvng Army largely composed OF
eonscrpts and sscondrae troops. with virtually no
air support incapable of prolonged campaign: had neen
blsd white provide reinforcement for other fronts Thus
Lieutenant General Tia Kswsbe commander OF the japanese
Air Force in Manchvrs from May l943. to August 's44
told inter- of ihe srac- bombing Survey mar IN
July August Of 943 the bulk Of his planes were moved
out OF Manchuri, FOR The last six months was mere
anyhow the actual planes which could be considered opera
fional were nil. practically nons.'
As lie pert Of tho bargain the Soviet Union agreed 70
enter the war against Japan three months after he oetea
OF Germany Marshal Satin nsisient. however, thar
Russia would have 10 b supplied and sioskpled with Aer
material before any action taken against the
Japanese. All in ALL Stain seid. THE RUSSIANS WOULD
NEED MORE THAN ONE MILLION TONS OF CARGO. and
they must be delivered by June 30. l94S BY The TIME
OF THE PoTsDAM CONFERENCE. UNITED STATES Or
FlclALs HAD SUPPLIED RUSSIA WITH ENOUGH EQUIP
MENT TO k.A.sE HER A MAJOR POWER IN THE PACIFIC.
AND THIS WAS DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR OWN
FIGHTING FORCES IN THAT PART or THE GLOBE
General Macarthur protested very bitterly when ne re-
cslvsd directive from Washington which AZ er''ea. "e
vpsst HE stsbe for The Philippines campaign mSlo'
General Whitney tells The sorY -. one nvndreo o' ~"
trauspor ships DO withdrawn immediately ne sso
TO be vsed 10 carry munitions and supplies across me ~
Pasinc to tss Sovss forces in vadsossok ls's'. "
eoUrss they were the basis Of Soviet military support "
North Nor ard osIC