Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-02-16

settlements than their foreign
ministers.
The Geneva conference in July,
1855. appeared for a time to offer
evidence that perhaps the heads
of government could agree on
problems which had baffled and
frustrated their ministers. They
established a relationship between
German unification and European
security. for example. They talked
about peace and disarmament anO
better understanding. Mr.. Eisen-
hover made the big propaganuh
strike of the session by propos:nP
MS open skies" inspection plan
The glow of hope which radi-
ated from the historic session
lasted but a few months. 1t
dimmed with rumorS that Bull
ganin and Mr.. Khrushchev we're
thrusting their power and infiu-
ence into the Middle East by SELL
ing arms to Egypt. 1t faded to
the vanishing point when the fol-
low-up foreign minister's con-
ference in November, 1855, dead
locked as usual on the fate OF
Germany. What remained died
in the Russian suppression of the
Hungarian revolt in late 1856.
--honee of View
The breakdown of optimism
'hich came with collapse of the
Geneva spirit prompted, particu-
larly among professional diplo-
mats, talk of reviving secret di-
plomacy in approaching East
West problems. One advocate OF
this technique has been the for
mer United States Ambassador to
Moscow. George KEENAN,, who
also held high positions in thu
State Department.
Mr.. KEENAN, was shocked at the
hostility he encountered in Mos
COW and he publicly compared
conditions there to those in Nazi
Germany. The Russians re-
fused to accept him as American
,nvoy, and Mr.. Dulles dropped him
rom the Foreign Service.
The experience did not change
Mr.. Remnants thinking about
-ecret diplomacy but it affected
the thinking of many others. 1t
demonstrated that with the best
will in the world on the side of
The West, practical diplomacy
was impossible unless the Rus
lans agreed. #a
What becomes clear in any
'eading of the long and otter
lismal record of Soviet Western
relations since World War II is
that generally they are character
ized by a clash of aims and in
terests. Much of the time. the
United States and its allies have
operated on the assumption that
this clash did not really exist.
They have sought the right words
md circumstances for negotiating
greements and understanding so
hat real peace would result.
The hard facts have finally per-
uaded most top United States
,olicy makers that this is total
lonsense. But large sections of
world opinion have not reached
4 similar conclusion and that fact
,lays into Russia's hands any time
Mr.. Khrushchev and Mr.. Bulganin
want to start proclaiming their
Intention to make agreements l.
hey can only get meeting.
istory Of Trouble
Every Secretary of State who
las served in the postwar period
las been through somewhat SINH
ar experiences with the Russians.
he has engaged in both public
and secret diplomacy. He has
sound that Russian propaganda
md secret diplomacy vary with
reeds of the moment and without
having any great effect on the
'utcome.
Secretary of State James F.
,yrnes held the first foreign min
!ster's meeting at London under a
pledge of secrecy. The issues re-
lated to negotiating World War II
peace treaties. The British. French
and Chinese sat in along with the
TWO big powers. The conference
was a failure despite the formal
secrecy and lack of official dis
closures.
The naoofiofi,o Y1rooas. mo. 80