Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-04-13
The Years Tick Off
As the Pentogon
Makes Its Decisions

the 20 or 80 sets of suggested re.
visions in the official requirement.
STEP NINE: Return to inter-
ested Air Force Offices for final
comment.
STEP TEN: Preparation Of
final draft by Air Force head
quarters
STEP ELEVEN: Approval Of
the weapons system requirement
by higher authority-the Secre-
tary Of Defense and probably the
President. acting on the advice of
the National Security Council.
STEP TWELVE: Issuance Of a
Development Directive. the actual
decision to start design Of the
weapons requirement.
. Total time: FIVE YEARS.
How can this process be speeded
up? 1t is not solely a problem of
making decisions faster, DR.. Liv-
ingston points out. THE problem
also is one of emphasis. What
weapons are We going to empha-
size?"
Charges Neglect
He believes that the military
services have unfortunately" neg
lected development of radically
new weapons. IN order to ensure
maximum readiness they have
tended to concentrate on those
weapons which would be opera
tionally ready in the shortest Pc
Rod of time. to the detriment Of
long-range and radical weapons
development" he says, He cites
this example:
THE Air Force in 1916 placed
a contract with Convair (which
was then Consolidated Vultee) for
study of the feasibility of the
long-range ballistic missile. That
study contract was Cancelled in
l947 and the decision was made
to concentrate on the air-breath-
ing Shark and Navajo missile be-
cause these missiles appeared to
be capable of becoming operation
ally ready in shorter period of
time. The Convair missile study
was not Reconstructed until 1851,
and the Air Force did not give
ballistic missiles a high priority
until 1854, when the Strategic
Missile Evaluation Committee, a
civilian scientific advisory group
headed by the late DR.. Won Neu-
mann Of Princeton University, adj
vised this action.
There is no doubt that we
would be further behind today if
Convair had not continued re-
search on the intercontinental
ballistic missile with its own funds
when military support of the prof.
ect was dropped"
Prof. Livingston warns that "if
We concentrate on the short-term
objective of developing ballistic
missiles which are now in the de-
velopment stage and we neglect
the equally fundamental problem,
long-term research and develop
ment, we will certainly be out
claSSed by the Soviets in the flu
tre."
Won Broun Joins In
DR.. Wernher Won Braun. head
of the Armys ballistic-miSsile
program, has also emphasized the
danger:
I'VE do not have a really
powerful rocket engine today
simply because none of our crash
missile programs need it. but in
order to beat the Russians in the
race for outer space we absolutely
need it and the development of
such an engine needs several
years"
A Massachusetts Institute of
Technology physicist who helped
develop the hydrogen bomb and
many other of the latest Ameri-
can weapons. Professor Jerome
Wlesner, has another worry.
"One of the frightening things
to me, and a source of real danger
to us, is that some inconceivable
development. some new idea, some
new scientific insight might give
the discoverer a decisive advan-
tage If he chooses TO exploit 1t,