Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-02-16

government in advance of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
ton meeting in Paris last De-
cember. BY thus holding out the
hope of settlement to Western
Europe's fearful peoples, he was
trying to disrupt the allied confer
ence.
Similarly his January message
to President Eisenhower and other
Western leaders demanding an
East-West summit session in three
months appeared designed to steal
world attention away from Mr.. Eli
senhower's state-of -the-U Mon
message. This. he partially sue
ceeded in doing.
But Russia's persistence in call
ing for a meeting-whether in
notes to Presidents and premiers
or by Soviet Communist Boss
Khrushchev at a cocktail party
has finally come to be recognized
here as having much more serious
and far-reaching purposes. From
the Washington point of view, two
appear to be dominant:
/. The Soviets are riding the
crest of their Sputnik success and
their lead over the United States
in producing long-range ballistic
missiles. They want to translate
this military scientific power into
international political prestige by
calling the worlds leading states
men together and giving them
Soviet program for settling East
West issues
2. They want a top-level meet
ing instead of going through the
slow process of diplomatic and
foreign minister negotiations.
They want it because they believe
they can get concessions from
heads of government that they
could not get from foreign min
listers. Russian diplomats here
have been saying privately for
months there is no point in meet
ing with Mr.. Dulles because they
contend he will not make any
agreements and they must NEE
directly with Mr.. Eisenhower.
The 'PeocemokeI Pose
Apart from these two conSid-
erations, Soviet demands for
summit Observation-Disclosures of
any tangible result - are the
cheapest form of propaganda
Moscow can produce. BY harping
day after day on the need for top
level talks, the Russians hope to
extend and reinforce their con-
tention that they are the leaders
of global drive for peace and
that the Western powers are the
troublemakers.
Confronted with such an often
sive. the United States, Britain
and France, face these dangers
. If they appear unwilling tc
meet, they tend to confirm Rus
Sia's charge that they do not want
settlements.
. If they are trapped into at
tending an unprepared meeting
they risk the danger of making
concessions on vital issues to prove
their willingness to get along with
Russia.
. If they insist too much on ;
well-prepared meeting. they ma,
be blamed for blocking any meet
ing at all.
. If they go into a meeting whicl
is well-prepared but ends in fail
ure, they may create far more in
ternational tension and greater
danger of nuclear war than a.
ready exists.
Risky Perch
The tightrope which the We
has to walk at this point holds
greater degree of risk than SOM
previous conferences because o.
the issues at stake-disarmament
German unity. allied solidarity
and the future of Asia and Africa
But each side has considerabl'
experience in across-the-tabl
dealing.
Since the end Of World War'I
in 1945, United States leader;
have met with top Moscow au-
thorities a dozen times. President
Truman, after experiencing thu
hopes and disappointments o
Potsdam, never became involved
IN another meeting with Stain.
President Eisenhower, afte,
Stains death and the rise ~
power of the Khrushchev- Bull
ganin collective leadership, Jour-
neyed to foreign territory for a
meeting "at the summit of
affairs" as Winston Churchill
phrased it - to see whether the
heads Of government could make