Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-09-11
Why Fight for Quemoy?

In his latest comments on the
threatening situation in the Far East,
Secretary Dulles has set forth two sets
of conditions under which the United
States may fight for Quemoy and the
MatSus.
One comment was limited to the
familiar argument. That is to say, the
United States is not interested in Que
moy and the MatSus as ''pieces of real
estate" We will not fight for these
coastal islands "as SUCH" We are COM
mitted, however, to fight for Formosa
and the PescadoreS, and we will abide
by that commitment. Consequently, II
the coastal islands should be involved in
what is in effect an attack on Formosa
and the PescadoreS, I'VE will meet that
attack at that point" at the
coastal islands.
There are those who doubt-and we
share the doubt-that Nationalist pos
session of these coastal islands, Quemoy
and MatSu, really is essential to the de-
Tense of FormoSa and the Pescadores.
Without question, however, the Presi-
dent has been given discretionary au-
thority to throw American forces into
fight over the coastal islands If he
deems it necessary, and this position is
well understood in this country and
throughout the world.
1t seems to us, however, that Mr..
Dulles went beyond this consideration
the relation of the coastal islands to the
defense of FormoSa-in his preSs-con-
kI,;r .
in these words:
You cannot isolate and say that the
only problem involved here is Quemoy
and Matsu. What is involved, and what
is under attack, is the entire position Of
the United States and that of its free
world allies in the Western Pacific, ex-
tending from Japan, Korea, Okinawa,
Formosa the Philippines, on down to
Southeast Asia. That is what is under
attack. That is of vital interest to the
United States. And we have to conduct
ourselves in relation to that situation,
not as though little bits of it could be
segregated and treated as isolated prob
lens to be dealt with entirely on their
own.
This, it seems to us, is a far-reach-
ing, even a startling, expansion of the
original proposition. Will our decision
in the matter of fighting for the coastal
islands be confined to their essentially
in the defense of FormoSa? Or are
we going to fight for Quemoy and the
MatSuS on the premise that these tiny
islands, lying just off the coast of China,
are necessary to the protection of the
entire position of the United States and
that of the free world in the Western
Pacific? If the latter is the case, we
had better not be leaving any doubt in
anyoneS mind concerning our inten-
lions respecting the coastal islands.
Mr.. Dulles was also asked what he
thought about the deSirability of having
the support of public opinion in this
matter. His answer was that he recog-
nized that policy which involves taking
grave decisions of thiS kind should, as
far as practicable, have the support of
the American people. But" he added,
II am aware of the fact that the ele-
mentS which go into the making of final
decisions are so delicate, oftentimeS not
subject to public appraisal, that there
lies responsibility upon the President
and his principal advisers which cannot
be shared with the general public"
We find nothing that is reassuring
in this remark. 1t may not be feasible
to inform the public of the delicate"
considerations which go into the making
of final decisions, but it is the public
which will have to bear the brunt of it
if these decisions plunge us into major
war over the coastal islands If the
United States is preparing to fight war
over these islands, the American people
are entitled to a clearer exposition of the
considerations involved than has been
forthcoming from Mr.. Dulles. We hope
the President will give it when he speaks
to the Nation tonight.