Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-05-04
West German Role
In Cold War Grows

block In the path OF searchers for
a way 10 peace between the So
Wet bloc and the West. Basically,
the difiiculty lies In the realiza-
ton by both sides that Germany
is inevitably the only great pow
err" OF Western Europe. Geograph-
ically and strategically. as well
as politically and economically,
Germany win almost automatic
ally assume In time the chief
power role In Western Europe I'M
less artificial meaEs are used to
prevent II.
Both Sides Concerned
Few statesmen in the West
question the historical inevita-
bility Of reunited Germany, and
few question It's desirability, al
though there are many who will
be quick TO pose conditions. But
in the Soviet Union there is an
absolute determination that a re-
united Germany must be pre-
vented at all costs II that unified
nation is TO be rearmed and allied
with the West.
To the Russians and the Poles,
as well as to other peoples of
central and eastern Europe, a
remilitarized and economically
strong Germany would be again
a constant threat.
On the other side OF the cold
war, the United States, as the
leader Of the Western bloc, is
coming more and more TO depend
on Germany for implementation
Of Western policies in Europe.
The policy of gradual but
planned rapprochement with Ger
many began during the Truman
administration. as a keystone of
Secretary of State Acheson's pro-
gram for the strengthening Of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. 1t has been continued and
Speeded under Secretary Dulles.
Indeed so far and so fast has it
gone that there is serious concern
in France and Britain that the
Big Three. as the basis for NATO,
will be one day replaced by a new
big Two" when. as, and If Ger
many regains her natural power
role on the Continent.
He Hos O Good Hand
Chancellor Adenauer holds q
handful Of trumps in the inter-
national card game. All he needs
to do is to predicate his govern
ments position on one invariable
condition: The reuniflcation of
Germany by free elections. With
this as his sole goal and sole ex-
PLANTATION, he can strongly influ-
ence any international conference.
Last summer, after the Chan
cellor's visit to Washington, it was
widely reported that he had ex-
pressed grave reservations to Mr..
Dulles on the activities of Harold
E. Stassen, the Presidents special
assistant for disarmament, at the
e London Disarmament Conference.
The reason: Any agreement with
the Soviet Union that by implica-
ton accepted the status quo lie,
the continued division of Ger
many would be unacceptable to
Bonn. That the London talks
ended in failure was not, of course,
the doing of Mr.. Adenauer. But
his influence was felt.
Domestically, the Chancellor's
opposition is COMPOUNDED by the
impoSsibility of fighting him on
the issue of Identification. The
Social Democrats have taken issue
with him on details, but dare not
challenge the old statesmans basic
aim. And no other issue looms as
large in importance as reunifica-
ton to the German voters.
On the matter of the much.
talked-of summit conference, West
Germany is seriously concerned
again that an East-WeSt accord
might take place under conditions
permitting the indefinite continu-
alton Of the division of the father
land. Particularly, Bonn is worried
that the Rapacki plan for a
neutrality-suspicious. neutral zone
in central Europe might, in some
variation, be accepted by both
sides. Naturalization of Germany
is a price Mr.. Adenauer is not
willing to pay, even for unification.