Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-05-16

Nl04IA Io-o|IA NtAoAA NAtAA VIZ -
Most OF the Indonesian
toward which the United Sta
sympathetic, are apparently
realized. even though the rebellI
and Premier Djuanda's govern
ment has itself been abortive.
This week seven young IN \
donesian ofiicers who fought on
the loyalist side IN Sumatra
went 70 Fort Benning. Ca. 10
begin advanced infantry train
ING. lt
The Jakarta governments
decision to send them 10 the
United States In the face Of It's
recent public worry about In
direct American aid 70 the
rebels Is significant.
U. 9. Training Continues
Indonesia plans to continue
sending the cream Of its officer
corps TO the United States for |
training. rs was the pre-
rebellion practice. None are /
being sent TO Iron Curtain
countries. American ofiicials
confirm that TO their knowa |
edge no Soviet equipment has |
been used against the rebels.
Plans for granting the outer
islands political autonomy and !
. bigger share in the nations
economic proceeds have been ,
completed. And there is ex-
pected TO be q Encouragement |
Of the government setup,"
which Is taken to be an Indo-
nesiai1 government euphemism,
meaning that participation Of
Communists in government Is
to be minimized.
InGonesia is making special
efforts TO renew its close ties |
with the United States. Ameri- |
can ofiiciais In Jakarta have
been told that Indonesia would
like to look to the United States
for assistance, that the gov
eminent Is suspicious Of the
Soviet bloc
Red Role Exaggerated
The role in the rebellion Of
Communists IN government has,
of course, been exaggerated. |
Rebel leaders used 1t to at
tract American and free-world |
support. Communists used it |
TO ingratiate themselves with |
the Jakarta government. The
United states used 1t to awaken |
the lndoneSian leadership to
the dangers of letting any kind
of Communist indigenous or
foreign controlled get a foot |
hold.
But the rebels detectives !
were mainly in the economic |
and political fields. The feeling |
was that Java got more than
its share of the profits from |
Indonesian production, and |
that Jakarta did not leave |
enough Of the political deci-
sions to local governments and |
leaders.
Now it Is expected that the |
central governments National
Advisory Council. a 45-member \
group composed of specialists \
In functional fields" like BUSH
ness, farming. labor and youth, |
viii be expanded into a kind Of /
"pre-Senate." Representatives
from the outlying islands re-
portedly are to be brought in. |
The ,24-member Cabinet is
expected TO be tailored to meet |
the interests Of outlying is
lands.
Leniency for Rebels
Communist participation In
the National Advisory Council
and the cabinet is expected to |
be minimized. American and
ndonesian conceptions of what |
constitutes an Objectionable |
Communist differ, of course. In
donesian officials are expected
to be more tolerant of fellow
travellers and "Trotskyites" than
Americans would like. "Trotsky-
ties" are Communists who do
not take their orders from Mos
COW and are considered in
digneous.
The Indonesian government |
Is reported to be planning no
executions for rebel leaders If \
they are caught. Public trials I
are expected to be held, but 1
the punishment for their viola /
tons Of the Indonesian consti- !
tuition is expected to be COM
paratively lenient. There is
even some question whether
they will or can be caught.
Anti Communist Gen. Abdul !
Harris Nasution, chief Of staff |
of the Indonesian Government |
Army, has gained greatly in |
prestige for his conduct Of the |
campaign against the rebels.
He is also reported to have had |
some influence in gaining gov
eminent acceptance Of the plan |
to minimize Red participation.
All Indonesla repeatedly ad-
mires the Nasution soft-touch
generalship. which put down
the rebellion with an amazingly
small number Of casualties.
No casualty totals have yet
been extremely light.
How much Of the credit for