Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

the outstanding issues. disarm-
ament Is the most difi1cult
problem TO settle directly.
A reduction OF ornaments il
not meaningful unless it con-
tains safeguards against viola
tons Of the agreement. But
effective control has been COM
plicated by the increasingly
rapid advance Of technology.
Hence no reduction in stand
ing forces. however scrupulous-
( ly carried out, can protect q
nation against q archaeological
development in weapons which
drastically changes the stra-
tegic balance.
Because q controlled and
verifiable reduction in forces
has proved so complicated, q
major emphasis Of disarma-
ment efforts has turned to the
prevention Of surprise attack.
There is no doubt that the
danger Of surprise attack con-
tributes to the tensions of the
nuclear age. But with evolving
technology it Is questionable
Whether aerial inspection will
significantly reduce the ele-
ment Of surprise. AS the speed
OF planes increases, warning
times will be progressively re-
duced. And in the age Of the
Inter- Continental Ballistic Mis-
sile, which is close upon us.
the maximum warning time
afforded by even a perfect in
spection system will be half an
hour. the period Of time the
missile will be in transit.
War-LimitatIon Goal
This study has considered var
ious suggestions for preventing
the catastrophe Of an about
war caused by miscalculation
or through the spreading of
small wars. 1t seems doubtful
that ground rules for the con-
duct Of limited war could be es-
tablished. Nevertheless, it would
seem wise for the United States
to include on the agenda Of dis
armament negotiations con-
crete proposals to limit such
wars as may be forced on US
to the smallest necessary di-
mensions. Even should the So
Wet Union reject our proposals.
they would serve to clarity our
intentions and make less likely
a war caused by miscalculation.
Even a unilateral declaration
which gave an indication Of
some Of the steps We propose
to follow to achieve the goal
Of reducing noncombatant cas-
ualties would give an opponent
q strong incentive to follow
suit.
The value Of unilateral dec
larations is proved by the ex-
perience Of World War II,
Neither the Soviet Union nor
Japan had ratified the Geneva
Convention Of 1929 with re-
spect to the treatment Of war
prisoners. Yet on June 81. le4l,
the USSR informed the Inter-
national Committee Of the Red
Cross Of its decision TO adhere
to the convention and within
q week Of the outbreak Of the
war Japan announced that II
would abide by the Prisoner,
OF War convention. Though
violations undoubtedly occurred
this indicates that both coun-
tries saw an advantage in pro-
jecting themselves before the
world a. subscribers to rules Of
war. Clear United States dec
larations. firmly adhered TO-
might provide . similar frame
work for mitigating the conse-
ouences Of modern war.
TX. Budget
There IL . grave reason for
concern with respect to tn,
inadeQuacy Of recent levels Of
military appropriations ~ vel
as with respect to the work
ings OF the budgetary process
Programs OF great impor.
lance to United States security
now suffer from insufficient
funds. Several reasons have
brought about this state Of
affairs. When the Korean wal
ended. II was natural that ar