Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-03-02
Can We Deal With the Russians?

Cne broken or DENT agreements.
made since 1915; the barrenness
Of Yalta's promise for post-World
War II cooperation: the armed
Communist aggression in Korea
and Indo-C China and Malaga: the
suppression of the Hungarian re-
volt; the coup in CzechoSlovakia.
Whatever the Moscow rationale
cation of these events, the fact
remains that each and all of them
have strengthened the voices in
the nom Communist world which
assert vigorously that no UNDER
standing is possible with duplicity.
Distrust of Soviet sincerity in
the West is matched by Russian
doubts about the intentions Of the
non-Communist nations. A So
Wet Union formed in a bloody
civil war in which the Western
powers were intervenors against
Bolshevism has an ingrained sus-
picion Of capitalist intentions.
Even in the darkest days Of the
Nazi peril, when the Russians
stood at bay before Hitler's might
and survived with the help Of
capitalist America and capitalist
Britain. there was suspicion in
Moscow. The recent publication
in the Soviet Union of the letters
exchanged between Josef Stain
and President Franklin D. Roose-
welt during the dark days Of the
World War II alliance reveal a
Stain so suspicious as to irritate
FDR's patience constantly.
Thus any real beginning toward
a meeting of the minds sufficient
to arrange cold war truce would
need, as a prerequisite, the
achievement Of an atmosphere of
tolerance II not of trust. Achieve
ment Of such a small but essential
beginning is not helped, of course,
by harsh attacks on the integrity
or intentions Of either side.
Mr.. Khrushchev's recent speech
at Minsk was an unbridled attack
on the West; certain Of the Soviet
Unions military leaders continue
to speak publicly of the war plans
of the imperialist powers" On
the Vests side, repeated ref
erences to the "atheistic agrees
sion" and brutal suppression of
freedom" ascribed to communism
hardly sets the table for friendly
repast.
Questions for Eoch
If an atmosphere at least APP
preaching politeness can be Gre
ated, it will still be necessary that
each side consider carefully what
concessions can safely be made to
the other. For example, can the
United States accept. for purposes
Of negotiation on other issues, the
status quo in Eastern Europe and
the Baltic states? Would the
United States continue to bar
Communist China from EaSt-West
discussions? Is the reunification
OF Germany a necessary concomi-
tant to successful summit"
meeting?
On the Soviet side, will Mos
COW accept the continued Ameri-
can recognition of Chang Kali
Shek and Nationalist China? viii
the Kremlin be able to agree, even
in principle, with the proposal for
reunification of Germany on the
basis of free elections? Can the
Korean armistice be thawed out
enough to hold U. N. sponsored
elections there toward unification?
Would the Russians accept the
military preparations deemed es-
sential to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and especial
ly the bases for missiles and nu-
clear weapons planned for West
ern Europe?
These are but few of the prob
lens that divide East and West.
Any one Of them could be a fatal
stumbling block to even a minor
degree of agreement toward a
workable truce. But given the will
on both sides, and an absence of
skulduggery and duplicity, even
these grave problems might be ac-
commodated somehow into a
workable 'live-and-let-live" ar
rangement that could, with luck,
guarantee a long period of peace.
Unfortunately, the pattern of
American-Soviet relations since
the end of World War II has set
tied into a rigidity that will be
extremely difficult to dissolve.
When it is considered that the
growing rivalry for world leader
ship is complicated by a bitter
theological gulf, the outlook for
amity and harmony seems dim.
But the alternative to a working
accord is a steady drift toward
war. Given the extinction powers
Of the modern weapons possessed
by both sides, there exists as a
consequence a genuine concern for
survival.