Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-04-03

1.-THE resources we have avail
able.
Confronted by such urgent
needs. we cannot allow differ
ing service viewpoints to de-
termine the character of our
' defenseS-either as to opera
tional planning and control, or
as to the development, produce
ton and use of newer weapons.
To sanction administrative con-
fusion and inter-service de-
bate is, in these times, to court
disaster. I cannot overempha-
size my conviction that our
country's security require
ments must not be subordinated
to outmoded or single-service
concepts of war.
An understanding of the
course over which We have
come to the present will help
determine the path we should
follow now and in the future.
when our republic was
founded, we had a simple solu-
ton to the problem of military
organization-at first, only a
War Department. then soon
thereafter, a Department of the
Navy. The Nays mission was
WAR at sea. The War Depart
ment's mission was war on
land.
| For a century and q half this
two department organization
WAS well suited to our needs.
Recently. however, the airplane
has added a third dimension to
the arts Of war. At first the
airplane was integrated into
the traditional two-department
organization. and there is. re-
NAMED until World War II.
Right after Pearl Harbor we
adjusted our organization to
accord a fuller role to rapidly
! growing air power. Within the
War Department. the Army Air
Forces were placed on equal
footing with ground and service
forces In the Navy. task forces
built around naval aviation be-
came the heart Of the feet. The
! Commanding General Of the
{ Army Air Forces became a
member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with the Army Chief of
Staff and the Chief Of Naval
, Operations.
: Based on Lessons of War
Immediately after the war.
! efforts began to build a defense
organization based upon the
lessons Of World War II. A
! basic theme was to provide an
adequate organizational frame
work for air power armed with
the aweSome destructive force
OF atomic weapons. There
emerged three co-equal execu-
tive departments-Army. Navy
and Air Force. But World War
II experience had proved that
no longer could warfare be eff
fectively waged under separate
Army. Navy and Air Force doc
trines. So. over all our forces
the Congress established a
Secretary Of Defense.
This reorganization in l947
was marked by lengthy debate
and eventual compromise. In
that battle the lessons were
lost, tradition won. The three
service departments were but
loosely Joined. The entire
structure. called the National
Military Establishment, was
: little more than a weak con.
federation Of sovereign mill
tary units. Few powers were
vested in the new Secretary of
Defense. All others were re-,
served to three separate exec
utive departments.
Events soon showed that this
loose aggregation was unman-
; ageable. In 1919. the National
: Military Establishment was re-
placed by an executive Depart
ment OF Defense. The author
ity OF the Secretary Of Defense
over his department was made
5 specific. He was vested with
the power of decision in the
operation of several inter-
service boards in his office. A
chairman was provided to pre-
: side over the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Departments of
Army. Navy and Air Force were
! converted from independent
executive departments to sub
ordinate military departments.
They became represented in
the Presidents cabinet and the
, National Security Council by
= the Secretary of Defense alone.
Other changes with similar eff
feet were made.
. Process Moves Forward
The unifying process moved
forward again in 1858. The
L Secretary Of Defense was given
staff facilities adapted to his
> heavy responsibilities. Certain
boards and agencies were abol-
! ished and their duties trans
ferred to him. Additional As
siStant Secretaries of Defense
were provided. The chairman
E OF the Joint Chiefs OF Staff was
authorized to manage the Joint
Stah for the Joint Chiefs.
These various steps toward
y more effective coordination Of
S our armed forces under one
e civilian head have been neces-
sary, sound. and in the direc-
: ton pointed by the lessons OF
modern warfare. Each such
: step, however. has prompted
: opponents to predict dire re-
4 suits. There have been allega-
lions that our free institutions
! would be threatened by the
: influence Of a military leader
r serving as the principal mill
[ tary adviser to the Defense