Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-26

show some real independence.
These groups may not want to
take Germany out Of NATO.
but they do want Germany to
have q strong, independent
voice In NATO circles.
Responsible Germans haven't
followed their instincts for ma
tionalism since the war. They
have been yes-men to Americas
foreign policy--and Of course
Americans have been pleased
by what has looked like en-.
thusiastic. steadfaSt German
support Of State Department
policy.
But nationalism is emerging
again. Germany can no longer
be taken for granted.
This development had been
predicted by astute observers
Of this country for some time.
They knew It had arrived when
they saw 0ermany's reaction
to the Sputniks. Bulganin
notes. the Polish de-atomiza-
ton proposal. the KEENAN, dis
engagement plan and Americas
missiles-fo r-Europe offer.
In none Of these cases did
Germany adopt promptly the
oficial American attitude.
Herr Adenauer-the rock him.
self-seemed to be wavering
strangely.
First Estimates Misleading
The first popular analysis was
that Germany was moving to-
ward neutralism. The West.
particularly Washington. wor-
ried about what would happen
TO European defense II Ger
many pulled out.
But q careful look ct the rec
ord and talks with Germans in
volved show that neutralism is
the wrong word.
Germany's Social Democrats.
who represent about a third Of
the voters. still tend to look
neutralist-but on the surface
only. Actually recent events
have not changed them q bit.
A change has come TO a seq
ment Of the majority Christian
Democratic Union and Chan
cellor Adenauer has been af-
fected by this change. The
change must be described as
nationalism.
What caused the change?
What does Germany want now?
One cause Of the change Is
simply time. The German gov
ernment under Mr.. Adenauer
has echoed the voice Of WASH
ingtcn ever since first bits Of
sovereignty began to be re-.
stored. People get tired Of that.
Il Is natural to want independ-
enee in formulating governs
msnt policy. and the new ma.
ticnalists feel they have waited
long enough.
Also. there is considerable
dullness in the German pro-
American policy. II may have
been quite successful. but 1t has
been tiresome. There Is a yearn-
Ing for novelty here. 3
And. more important. there
u Q growing conviction that the
best German interests win not
always be defended by America.
Many Germans believe that
America Is becoming less and
less interested in protecting Eu-
rope. They believe American
troops may be pulled out some
day. They fear that the United
states may make q deal with
Russia over Europe's head that
could leave Germany divided.
Sputniks Left Mark
The Sputniks showed that
America cannot always be re-
lied on to meet q Soviet chal-
lenge in time. And Americas
reaction to the Sputniks Is
considered here to be hysterical
on the part Of the public and
complacent on the part Of the
Government.
george KEENAN,. former
American Ambassador to Rus
ma and assumed erroneously
here to speak for American
Democrats-perhaps slated to
be the next Secretary Of State
presented O disbursement
plan in October which some
Germans thought would take
America clean out Of Europe.
Aneurin Bevan. Britain's next
Foreign Minister Of the Labor
ties win in 1859. Endorsed CEN
tral European neutralism and
an accommodation with the
Kremlin. And Secretary Dulles
In Foreign Affairs magazine
suggested that perhaps Europe
could fight its own small wars
while Americas big punch sat
Il out.
All these things. IN the clos
ing months Of 1867 made some
Germans wonder II their allies
could be relied on.
Then came the Bulganin
notes and Polish proposal. The
German public Immediately
was interested, wondering how
they might lead to reunification
Of the two Germanys.
American officials rejected
the proposals out Of hand
without time to study them. 1t
was felt here. There was re-
sentiment at this.
Then the Paris NATO meet
Ing started.
Several continental countries