Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-06-15

VelUplkAB Ito AAutAtCd Wal ~@F"Si
The specific criticism being
voiced persistentely in high
Government councils by Army
Navy and Marine Corps leaders.
II not by the Air Force. is this:
Although the United States
now has an effective deterrent
to about nuclear war, there
is a continued over-emphasis
on the Nations capability in
this area.
At the same time. there is
an insufficient emphasis on
building and .equipping forces
for the much more likely small
war.
This, 1t is understood, also
was the consensus Of the OUT
standing group Of scientists,
industrialists and military ofti-
GERS who attended the Navy's
secret symposium on war in
the nuclear age" at the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory last week,
Policy Studied
The question Of limited wal
policy and forces Ordinarily
those of the conventional type
is being studied with increasing
intensity in the Government.
It is expected to rank high
on the agenda of the four-daN
super-conference called by De-
tense Secretary McElroy at thu
Marine Corps Base, Quantico
va, beginning Thursday. Nor
than ITS of the top brass, in
GLIDING members of the Join
Chiefs of staff and oversee
unified force commanders, an,
ranking civilians in severs
Government agencies, will at
tend.
There is a key problem with
in the thorny limited war pol
icy question:
How can we maintain tn
deterrent to about war eth
ability to destroy the Sovie
Union even If we are hit by
surprise attack and still haV
enough money to build an
equip conventional war force
to discourage Kremlin-inspire
brush fire conflicts or to wi
them If they are started?
Have Answer
Army leaders have an ar
swer and urge its adoption
They say reverse priorities an
spend more money for oil
small-war capability and le
for such expensive but pure
defensive items as contineI .
air defense and early-warn.
systems.
They advocate further tn
the limited war forces shou
be maintained in the same ale
status and combat readine
as that of the Strategic A
Command, currently America
principal about retaliato
arm. ~
other requirements for
adequate limited war progra
considered vital by the Arm
are these:
/. There must be advanc
Joint planning. both in Was
ington and in the overse
commands, for this type co
fiict.
2. We must maintain an
fective military aid progra
earmark personnel to expa
American military missions
the event of hostilities, and pl
vide our allies with tacti
atomic missile support.
3. We should set up We
stocked supply depots near va
Gus world trouble spots so
ready forces can react rapi
to aggression. 1t has been e.
mated that with such dep
the Army could put a full 6
borne division from the c.
tinental United States into &C
bat within two weeks. The f
Marines carry all their weap
with them and are prepared
fight on arrival.
4. The Army must have m
ern air and sea transported
for it's limited war divisions
cause speedy reaction t
might mean the difference
tween victory and defeat.
Navy and Marine comm
ders generally agree with
Army position although I
feel they now have a subst
tial capability for hand
trouble of fairly limited
ture. They reason this way
Kremlin Knows
The United States for S
time has had the definite CO
bility of destroying the u
in a retaliatory attack.
Kremlin knows this. Never
less, it has not prevented
Soviet from prosecuting
cold war relentlessly or
provoking small wars, rev