davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

the aid plan combines fulfiilment
Of longtime Syrian aspirations
with an apparently sound devel-
opment program"
Moscow has given Syria a good
deal on repayment Of the loan. II
is repayable over l2-year period
in both commodities and freely
convertible currency. Payments
start q year after delivery OF the
items.
The Soviet willingness TO accept
local commodities Is an especially
attractive feature Of Soviet aid
among raw materials exporters.
The Soviet Union sets no price
on Its aid in its agreements. In
stead it offers facilities. Prices are
negotiated later. and based on
world market levels at the mo-
ment. The advantage for aid re-
cipients is that renegotiations be-
cause OF price fluctuations are less
likely to occur.
The United States cannot offer
this feature now. For instance.
during the Suez Canal closure.
soaring shipping prices ate into
the amounts Of surplus agricul-
tural commodities promised some
countries.
What will be the effect OF the
Soviet aid agreement with Syria?
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

would mean the withdrawal
OF all armed forces. both
Soviet and Western, from German
territory. the enforcement of both
East and West Germany from
the Warsaw and NATO military
pacts. or. as the price of uniiica-
ton. Guaranteed German nom
involvement with either the Com
munist or the Western blocs.
George F. KEENAN,, former
United States Ambassador 10 Mos
COW now lecturing in Britain. has
strongly recommended this neu-
tralization as an immediate essen
tial 10 the preservation Of peace.
In the KEENAN, view. the Soviet
Union or any other Russian gov
eminent cannot view with equani-
nifty the existence OF a powerful
Germany allied with potential
Russian enemies. Thus, in this
view. satisfactory solution Of the
German problem would pave the
way for a variety of other ac-
cords.
On the other side, former AM
bassador TO West Germany and
former President Of Harvard Uni
versity. DR.. James B. Conant agrees
with Mr.. Dulles that withdrawal
of Allied forces from Germany
would mean withdrawal from Eu-
rope. abandonment of West Ger
many TO the Communists. and a
serious weakening Of NATO's
ability to defend Western Europe.
DR., Conant sees the German
problem as only a part "of the
larger problem created by the di-
vided world In an age Of fiSsion.
fusion bombs. and rockets" The
Bonn government, he declares. is
a strong fortress Of freedom in
Western Europe.
If it is conceivable that the So
Wet leaders would at length accept
a reunited Germany under a
Western capitalist style govern
ment, 1t is certainly inoonceivable
in almost any circumstances that
Moscow would ever agree to a
united Germany allied with the
Western military bloc. II is also
just as inconceivable today that
the West, particularly the United
States, viii acquieSce in the neu-
tralization Of Germany as the
price of reunifcation.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

1857. Meanwhile. the United States
split with Britain and France over
their attack on Egypt had not only
split the alliance but shaken the
faith of the most confident leaders
in It's durability. Thus began a
series OF meetings among allied
leaders which finally eliminated
in the October proposal for a
summit session Of all the NATO
heads OF government.
Even that particular way Of try
ing to promote and demonstrate
Western solidarity did not win
approval until the Western powers.
and especially the United States.
received the most Earring blow Of
all.
IL was Russia's successful
launching Of an earth satellite
months ahead Of the United
States. Scientifically, 1t put the
Soviet Union far out ahead. Mill
tarily and automatically. 1t meant
that the lead OF the Western
nations, so long confidently main
tanned, was threatened as never
before.
To some Eisenhower officials 1t
also meant that the very survival
Of the West required holder and
more determined efforts 10 balance
the dictatorial power Of the Soviet
bloc with voluntarily pooled re-
sources OF the free world.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
Man Slowly Presses Forward
In Ills GIobqI Attack on Cancer

marrow from the shin and hip
bone Of her twin sister. Mary, and
injected 1t into Laura's blood
stream. A month later she went
home. with no trace of leukemia.
The transplanted marrow appar-
emily gave her healthy blood cells.
This victory against a killer was
tragically short Lived. Little Laura
was home for a few months
months she and her parents would
never have had otherwise-then
leukemia struck again and she
died just nine days ago. But a
fatal form of cancer had been
temporarily delayed, by scientific
searching which some day may
bear fun fruit.
Can bone marrow. or some ele-
ment in IL. become a defender
against leukemia? Time and re-
search will tell Intensive studies
are now being done on animals.
A potent chemical. methyl-
cholanthrene. causes cancers in
animals. Reasoning from animal
experiments and other obseiva-
tions. Drs. Charles Higgins and
Jack D. Mccarthy Of the Univer-
sity OF Chicago shot it into six
women dying Of cancer.
Their cancers had started in
their breasts and spread through
their bodies. Every surgical treat
ment had already been tried.
One woman has so far had
nearly a year OF healthy life. TIE
drug didn't help another at all,
cid temporarily arrest the cancers
in the other four.
In hospitals across the country.
trials are under way on handfuls
Of patients with new drugs spe-
cially devised to strike at can
GERS. A few show early promise.
Some counteract female hor-
mones, such as eStrogen or PROCESS
terone. Others came from studies
to pinpoint differences between
cancerous and normal cells. Do
they differ in the chemical foods
they need. or their appetiteS for
cersaIn foods?
Such differences are boiIg
found The new drugs are taken in
BY the cancer cells. but then Jam
the cell machinery.
Another great search screens
thousands OF chemicals COM
pounded in laboratories to see
which one strikes cancers in mice.
Those with effects are tested
further, a few are developed for
human trials.
This testing is expensive and
tirne-consuming
1t can apparently be done
effectively with new strains Of
tiny one-celled plants. says Prof.
G. F. GuaSe Of the Soviet Institute
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
RED SHOWPECE'
Russios Syrian Deal Is Model of Efficiency

American officials believe Syria's
economic development will be Put.
for all practical purposes, into the
hands Of Soviet specialists. Thus
Syria's archaeological future will be
tied 10 Soviet methods and equip
ment Her technicians will be
training In the Soviet Union.
Syria Is likely to remain a debtor
OF the Soviet Union until 1876.
Also. the Soviet Union viii natu-
rally be the market for replace
ment parts.
On the other hand. American
officials are at pains TO emphasize
that the SyrianS are no children
In matters commercial,
The Syrians ARE not vet pup
pets Of the Soviet Union" the Of
fetal report states. land in the
past they have shown no incli-
nation TO accept aid for its own
sake when the accompanying con-
ditions were considered obiec-
tionable."
Syria. 1t is estimated. will be
able to meet the approximately
SO million-a-year payments on
the loan. American aid officials
say that the Syrian economy is
sound. THE Soviets have chosen
fertile ground in which to grow
the flower Of economic cooper
alton"
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
BY FRED THEROUX
Star star Writer

The latest mail exchange be-
tween President Eisenhower and
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin
serves once again TO emphasize a
major obstacle to any East-West
understanding-the question Of a
divided Germany.
Mr.. Eisenhower. seconding a
contention frequently made by
Secretary Of State Dulles, insisted
that the reunification Of Germany
through free elections would be. N
effect. an essential prerequisite to
any summit" negotiations. MI.
Bulganin reiterated a Soviet posi-
ton that is wholly unacceptable to
West Germany and to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In effect. the Soviet position
seems to envisage the continued
division Of Germany into two ma
tons. Moscow Radio. summarize
ing the Bulganin letter OF jan
uary o, said: The ending OF the
cold war and the expansion OF in
ternational cooperation would
undoubtedly favor a solution OF
the German question by a rap
prochement between the two SOW
ereign German states. the German
Democratic Republic and the Ger
man Federal Republic"
Here is no acceptance Of even
tual reuniflcation. but a clear
reinstatement Of the Soviet in
sistence that East 0ermany--the
German Democratic Republics
sovereign. The West has rejected
that claim.
Observers hopeful for signs OF
q thawing OF cold war tensions
have looked in vain for any evil
dence Of yielding on the part OF
either East or West on the Ger
man reunification issue. Until
some permanent solution is
reached. many diplomats insist,
there can be no real peaceful CO.
existence" In Europe.
NATo Move Wos crueiel
The Importance Of the German
question to the relations between
the Communist and Western blocs
became paramount when the de-
cision was made In the West TO
include West Germany In the
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

Continued From Page All.
Four summit session at Geneva in
mid-1955. Mr.. Dulles had re-
sisted such a meeting. fearing It's
effects without the prospect Of
suitable achievements. Mr.. Eisen-
hover had long been intrigued by
the prospect Of meeting Russia's
post-Stalin leaders - Bulganin,
Khrushchev and Zhukov. But 1t
was an urgent demand by Brit
aims Prime Minister Eden which
tipped the scales finally In favor
Of a conference. Mr.. Eden was
compelled by public opinion TO
talk with the Russians
The Geneva conference pro-
duced no diplomatic settlements.
1t created the impression that
Russia and the United States had
finally convinced each other that
neither wanted an atomic war. In
this hopeful atmosphere, the At
lantic alliance lost vigor and force.
There was much more concern
about how TO get along with the
Soviet Union than how to keep the
Western coalition strong.
That heady hopefulness was
largely destroyed In the Hungarian
crisis OF November. 1856. It went
out the window altogether with
the breakdown Of disarmament
talks at London In September.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
The Causes

Many things are known to cause
or be involved IL the start eff can
2erS-tco much -1-rays. some kinds
Of chemicals, repeated irritation
or injury. Numerous studies asso-
clate heavy cigarette smoking with
greater risk Of lung cancer, but
some researchers dispute this.
Fundamentally the big question
is what happens in living systems
to make some cells so haywire in
needless cancerous growth.
Are viruses Of some unknown
kinds the culprits? Viruses are
akin TO the gsnetic material in liv-
irp cells, the msterial that con-
trolls what cells Go.
VJuSes are known 10 cause some
few kinds CT animal and chicken
cancers. The virus theory Of
human cancer now is drawing
new and revived support.
DR.. Francisco Duran-R eynalS Of
Yale. a pioneer in this thinking.
finds some evidence that viruses
may lie harmless and sleeping
within body cells. until something
happens TO stir them 10 action
and malignancy. The something
could be changes in hormone ball
arce. radiation. or other infiu-
ences, Perhaps even seemingly
harmless yiruseS micht become so
ac'ivated
Other scientists find evidence
duplicating viruSes in lcukenia and
HodGkin'S disease.
Still another find. Animals
susceptible to cancer don't get it
If raised in completely gsrm-tree
environment, reports Dr. James
A. Reyniers of Notre Danes Lo-
bund Institute.
If viruSes do cause cancer and
if they can be identified, then a
path is opened to devising effective
vaccines or other projections.
Much about cancer remains a
murky mystery. But many keen,
trained minds are searching its
by-ways. solving some puzzles.
gaining facts. Sudden break
throughs might come on sudden
inspiration, or lucky happenStance
or through tying clues toeethc
The research is supported v
growing millions Of dollars 4
the National Cancer Institute 9
American Cancer Society /
other sources, here and abro
Meantime the best weapons g
the proven CONSOLIDATION q
surgery. TechniQues in both th'se
methods are improving and they
are saving more lives, especially
when when cancers are detected
early.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
Immunity

Vaccines 10 prevent cancer are
a beckoning goal. Hope for them
lies in recent animal and human
studies.
Some cancer patients develop
antibodies against their cancers:
Others don't Mehods OF boosting
protective antibodies are sought.
A few vaccines have been 6evel-
oped which protect chickens and
laboratory animals against spe-
cit7c kinds Of cancer. These are not
yet applicable. of course, to hu-
man cancers.
In quest for basic facts about
immunity. volunteers at the OHIO
penitentary had cancer cells
planted beneath the skin of their
arms. Their systems soon de-
stroyed the cancer cells. Later
when abe same kind OF cancer
cells were planted again, they were
destroyed even faster. The men
could also throw eff cells OF a
different type of cancer. though
no. quite SO rapidly.
Cancer patients. studies by
Sican-KetteEing Institute Sci
entis-s showed. lack some defense
which healthy humans possess.
Some specific immunity mechan-
ISM seems 10 cone into play.
Blood tests and other tests are
trying 10 spell ous the differences,
and how they could be used to
boost immunity. Cancer patients
often have less Of a disease fight
ing blood substance named prop
erdin, this and other studies show.
Dr.. Jonas Salk. developer Of
POLO vaccine. has devised a SIM
p-i1ied method OF measuring anti
b9dies produced when LIVING for
eign cells are injected into AMI
mails. This could be useful to SCI
entiSts working on a variety Of
vsccines.
A key TO immunity seemingly
lis in the very rare cases of spon-
famous diSappearances Of cancer.
This happens. for no known rea-
sen. only about once in every
1000 cancer victims. Through
Nation wide cooperation, proved
case histories are being collected,
to be snalyZed for clues as TO how
nature produced this apparent
miracle.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

II. having won his point at the
convention, Mr.. Reuther is forced
to back down at the bargaining
table. his prestige will suffer
greatly.
From industry's point Of view.
this would not be a particularly
bad year for q strike. The big
manufacturers are far more loath
TO permit a work stoppage in a
good year like 1858 q million
carsl than In a $3.50 year like
estimated 1858 t5la million cars) !.
A few weeks or months Of idle
assembly lines would have the
virtue Of bringing supply and
demand into line and perhaps
even cutting down on inventories.
Some Would 6ripe
Even assuming Mr. Reuther gets
q profit-sharing plan. 1t would
seem that he would have some
fairly legitimate gripes TO contend
with inside his own union. For
instance:
It has been calculated that
profits racked up by General Mo-
tors last year would give a GIN
worker a bonus OF about $500 and
Ford profits a Ford worker about
$500. Studebaker. on the other
hand, lost money and so there
would be no bonus there.
1t apparently is not planned to
distribute the profits this way.
and herein lies grounds for gripes,
The GIN worker would feel en-
titled to say. Il had 1t coming 10
me: why don't ! get my bonus?"
But II GIN workers only partici-
pated In GIN profits. workers in
other plants would charge that
the union was setting up a wage
differential system.
II, on the other hand. the money
were used for some other Of Mr..
Reuther's eight points. a sub
stantial proportion OF the mem
bership might be expected TO ex-
press dissatisfaction over the de-
cision OF the majority. Such dis
content could be exploited by Mr..
Stellato or some other Reuther
rival to chip away at the authority
and prestige Of the union presi-
dent.
But these are internal union
matters. The real opposition 10
Mr.. Reuther's program--at least
the opposition that will have to
be faced first--will come from the
industry leaders.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

Also. the Soviet Union can move
swiftly. II took less than three
months. for instance. TO move
from an agreement in principle
that Syria wouldn't get aid until
the l9-project compact was signed.
This ability TO strike while
the iron Is hot Is one OF the things
that worry American aid admin
iStrators. The Russians can
move from one target Of oppor-
tunity to another in the uncom-
mitted world. and wrap up agree
ments before the United States
legislative and executive branches
can coordinate.
They can, that Is. under present
procedure. Mr.. Eisenhower is
seeking a bigger blank check
greater fiexibility' as the adj
ministration likes to refer to it.
Up to now. the men on Capitol
Hill have insisted on their pre-
negatives in sharing in revenue
spending DECISIONS.
Beeon in Sc
Syrias drift toward the Soviet
bloc first became a matter for
deep concern in Washington in
the fall of 1856. when President
Shukri al-Kuwaui visited the
Soviet Union and came back with
a large credit for arms purchases
from Czechoslovakia and the
USSR.
In July, 1857. another Syrian
delegation went to Moscow. BY
August 6 they signed a joint COM
munique agreeing in principle
that the Soviet Union extend ad-
ditional aid. Later in August q
team of Syrian specialists few to
Moscow to work out details"
In September and October q
Soviet technical delegation
roamed Syria on an -the-spot
survey. On October % the l9-
project agreement waas signed.
Nine days later the Syrian Par
lament ratified the pact. Four
days thereafter the Supreme So
Wet put its rubber stamp on the
deal.
And by November 8 a l9-man
Syrian delegation was on its way
to Moscow to exchange instru-
ments of ratification and make
final arrangements.
One of the more painful aspects
for American planners is that the
10 projects are based on a basic
survey conducted by the World
Bank in 1854. Ofncials here say
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
RED 'SHOWPIECE
BY EARL II. V0SS
star stan Writer

American officials are convinced
that the Soviet Union intends TO
make Syria a "showplece" OF
Communist economic aid in the
Middle East. Therefore they ex-
pect the Kremlin TO carry out its
promises of some Si68 million in
loans on 10 projects speedily
and efficiently
The terms OF the loans are re-
garded in Washington as more
attractive than the United States
could offer. much more quickly
negotiated. and dehcately ar
ranged to avoid any overt indica-
ton that Syria is about TO fall
under Soviet domination. II is
clea., however. that Moscow re-
CARDS the Syrian deal as a de-
cisive step in her long-range pro-
gram Of Middle East penetration.
Oficials here now admit to
Surprise" at both the size q va
riety of aid Moscow has agreed
to supply. Syria has been offered
help on $500 million worth Of
projects which are to supply solid
items for economic development.
Among the 10 Soviet aid prof.
ects are these:
Nitrate fertilizer plant: oil
storage facilities at the Mediter-
ranean Port of Latakia: railroads
connecting Qamishili with Aleppo
and HONS with Latakia: two
bridges on the Euphrates river;
three bridges on the Khabur river:
road repair: various irrigation
projects: survey and construction
Of a dam and 100000 kilowatt
hydroelectric power station on the
Euphrates: dams and hydroelec-
trio stations on the Orontes river
and near lake HONS: thermo-
electric plants for Damascus. the
capital, and Aleppo. the leading
commercial center: oil exploration
and drilling. prospecting for met
ais, and an agricultural laboratory.
They Move Swiftly
How does the Soviet approach
compare with the United States
foreign aid procedure?
For one thing. Soviet interest
rates are better. Borrowers have
to pay only ga per cent. That
compares with 3 to 4 per cent on
American Mutual Security pro-
gram loans. UP to So per cent on
Export Import Bank loans. and
6 per cent on World Bank loans,
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19
OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT
East and West Are Still Locked on Germany

accept or imply concurrence in
the present division of Germany?
The Paris meeting Of the NATO
Council. at which President Ell
senhower and the heads-of gov
eminent OF 10 other nations were
present. disclosed the extent of
the growing influence OF Mr..
Adenauer in the Vests affairs.
He was. in the opinion Of many at
the sessions, the lion Of the con-
ference
In the communique issued at the
close of the Paris meeting. Mr..
Dulles with the support of Mr..
Adenauer inserted statement on
the German question repeating
the Western contention that Mos
cow is flouting a 1855 accord on
Germany. Mr.. Dulles has fire.
Quently repeated the charge that
the Soviet Union reneged on a
promise made at the Geneva
summit" conference TO support
the reunification of Germany by
free elections. The actual text
OF the Geneva communiQue APP
pears to fall somewhat short Of
"pledeing" anything other than
the common agreement that the
reunification OF Germany would
be desirable thing. in conform
ity with the national interests Of
the German people and the inter-
ests Of European security"
President Eisenhower fully
shares the Dulles point view.
for in his carefully-worded reply
last Sunday to Mr.. Bulganin. Mr..
Eisenhower referred TO the Ger
man question as a major factor
In the problem of confidence"
between the Soviet Union and the
West. He quoted the Geneva
communicate, and went on:
I'm spite of our urging. your
government has. for now two and
one-half years. taken no steps to
carry out that agreement, or to
discharge that recognized respon-
sibility. Germany remains torc-
IDLY divided. This constitutes a
great error, incompatible with
European security. 1t also under
mines confidence in the sanctity
of our international agreements"
The Naturalization ldeo
Naturalization" Of Germany
the removal of any possible Ger
man threat TO the peace Of Europe
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

ton. TO re-arm the Bonn republic.
and to add newly created Ger
man divisions TO NATO's forces.
When these steps were taken,
Soviet policy hardened perceptibly.
Almost Immediately. Moscow an
nounced recognition of full ma
tional sovereignty for the Ger
man Communist regime.
Now the German situation
stands squarely athwart almost
every major area OF conflict be-
tween East and West. On dis
armament, for example, the atti-
tude OF Chancellor Konrad Ade-
nauer was influential. II not
decisive. in restraining the Vests
negotiators at London. More re-
Gently. the Bonn government S
position on the American proposal
to establish missile bases in West
ern Europe. while favorable. was
heavily qualified with caution.
and the final position Of the
Adenauer government is still be-
ing debated.
One Stondord Used
The West German stand on
every political question is deter
mined by a single standard: Could
action ON this question appear TO
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-19

lated the economy generally and
the auto industry IN particular
began to sag. II became evident
that Mr.. Reuther might end up
having a good many four-day
weeks in 1888. although not on
his terms.
Q Second is the public relations
factor, From the viewpoint Of
John @. Consumer. a wage boost
in the auto industry can mean
only one thing--higher prices for
cars. The reflective consumer
would so a step farther and dis
Germ in the car-price increase the
threat Of q general coSt-of-living