The journal. (Caldwell, Ohio) 1934-1961, 1958-03-20


War II will never know exactly
how much American iron and
American powder was turned in
their direction from the enemy.
But the tremendous sales of
scrap metal to Japan before the
war are always cited as an ex-
ample of a fool-hardy national
policy in exports to a potential
enemy.
Today, in the Export Control
Act, we have a measure of super
vision to see to it that critical
items, including scrap metal, are
only exported to friendly coun-
tries. This responsibility falls to
the Department of Commerce,
which attempts to police these
exports to see that they are not
trans-shipped to potentially un-
friendly nations. Such control
should give US a measure of
confidence that our strategic ma
terials will not one day find
themselves being hurled back to-
ward Americans in the form of
bombs, missiles, or even the ma
chinery that produces or launches
such items. Unfortunately, such
| confidence seems somewhat mis-
placed.
Last week, the Banking and
Currency Committee, Of which l
am a member, was considering
legislation to extend the Export
Control Act for another two
years. The question of control
of strategic materials being ship
ped to potentially unfriendly ma
tions was raised, and the answers,
on the surface, seemed satisfac-
| tory. With minor exceptions,
which have been quickly re-
medied, it is believed that no
scrap metal is being channeled
by purchasers in friendly nations
| to buyers in the Soviet bloc. In
| the course of the hearings, I had
an opportunity to ask questions
of Secretary of Commerce Sim
clair Weeks at length on this SUBJ
ject.
In essence, my line Of question
ing went something like this:
Secretary Weeks agreed that
scrap metal was being shipped to
Japan. He also said that scrap
metal was not being trans-ship-
ped by the purchasers in Japan
| to Red China, although Japan
is increasing its trade with Red
China to a considerable extent. It
also become plain that the United
States could do very little to
| prevent a japanese purchaser of
| scrap material from using that
material in the production of a
manufactured item which in turn
was being exported to Red China.
The effect is that American scrap
can end up in Red China in a
manufactured item with Japanese
industries benefiting from the
| business. What is transpiring be-
tween Japan and Red China can
also occur with any other friend
| ly nation to whom we export
when that receiving nation is
trading with nations behind the
Iron Curtain. Of course, it would
be possible to enact legislation
which would be directed against
the trans-shipment of American
exports In any form. However,
such legislation would be almost
impossible to enforce, and the
only other alternative would be
to stop exports altogether. This
would admittedly be a tremen-
dous blow to American economic
interests.
The more we analyZe this situa-
ton and the complicated factors
that attend it, the more we are
driven to the conclusion that we
are following an export policy
whereby we may indirectly sup.
| ply Soviet bloc nations with ma.
terial which could be used ulti-
mately to wage war against US
The policies of other nations
which permit their traders to act
as middlemen to trans-hip oul
raw materials and harmless ex.
ports not only endangers our oWr
security but can enrich them as
well. The only sane alternative
seems to lie in prevailing upor
these nations to sharply curtai
their transactions with Iron Cur
tain countries. To fail to recognize
the Importance of this basic ele
ment of our foreign policy coulc
do untold damage to our future
security. Curtailment of these
transactions would also be blow
against the economic offensive
that the Communist government:
are now conducting with first
| nri0ritv energy