Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-12

Continued from Page Ais
clare war. However. since the
commitment Of the armed forces
into action Is likely to cause q
state Of war. the act Of Congress
can be compelled by the act Of
the executive.
Oddly enough, the previous
forms are likely to describe the
future pattern. The Congress has,
IN all previous wars Of the United
States. never declared war as q
future action; Il has always de-
clared that state Of war already
existed at the instance Of the
executive. The awful power to de-
clare war. that decision Of ulti-
mate importance to q state was
held. undoubtedly. to be subjected
TO the theory Of checks and ball
ances within the past ITS years.
But now this is only true to a
far lesser degree. Thus, President
Humans use Of armed force in
Korea was based on legal prece-
dent as far back as President
John Adams authorization to seize
French vessels. Mr.. Eisenhower.
somewhat gingerly, assayed TO
employ 1t in Southeast Asia.
Few descents are gradual. Even
II the angle Of decline Is the
same. the rate Of descent In
ereases. The Senate Is no exc
ception. For example, CONGRESS
provided that no air line fran
chises should be granted without
hearing. Under executive agree
ments. franchises were and are
granted to foreign powers with.
out hearing. and with some i'm
pudence-and complete immunity
-are so reported by the executive
branch to the Senate.
The executive branch has re-
fused repeatedly to put to use
the Air Force funds for the. pur-
pose for which Congress appro-
priated them. again with no
Senate sanctions. The executive
branch has ordered officers Of
the armed services to supply the
Senate with only such informa-
ton as has been approved by the
military command, i.e., the Presi-
dent.
Thus. economically and mill
tarily, the Senate is circumvented
IN q manner unthinkabIe only
rs years ago. Its treaty powers, its
international sources, its advisory
function have been deeply en-
croached upon by de facto pat
terms in daily usage Even execu-
tive discretion in the admins
tration Of its important appropria-
tons has been accepted by IL,
grumblingly perhaps. but ac-
cepted nevertheless.
Seowoy ExompIe
II further example is needed of
the general decline Of Senate
powers. the st. Lawrence Seaway
Is an almost conclusive example.
The United States was probably
as shortsighted in not promulgat-
Ing the seaway as the Spaniards
were In attempting TO bottle up
the Mississippi. Aside from the
merits. however. the Senate op-
posed II. II was voted down re-
peatedly. Thereafter. the execu-
tive branch. which wanted the
seaway. encouraged the State Of
New York to enter into an agree
ment with the Province OF Ontario
70 construct great hydroelectric
dams. These great dams provided
the water to make the scaway
possible. The executive branch.
then confronting the Senate with
. fait accomph. secured It's con-
sent 10 the seaway.
Just how far the Senate has
vacated It's previous position Il
indicated by the william oirard
case.
The interesting feature Of the
case. from a constitutional stand
point. Is that a private citizen was
enabled TO challenge successfully
an Executive Agreement in the
courts. when. In point Of fact, the
Issue represented as much Of an
incursion on the treaty rights OF
the United States as II did on
the defendants; yet the Senate
a