Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
I'LL. Three Types
OF Wur

now ana III the years anead.
I'LL. Three Types
OF War
We are confronted by thre,
major threats to our security
lall-out war. limited war and /
kind Of war new to the 2Oti
Century and highly developed
by the communicable dis,
euised or obscure war con,
cealed as internal take-over b,
coup d'etat or by civil war.
l. About War
OF the threats to our secur,
ity, About war Is the mos
overwhelming. Il can be defines
as an attack Of such magnitud,
that our survival would be di
lrectly and Immediately q
stake. Preparedness for all-ou
war must therefore be the frs
charge on our military estab.
lishment.
Preparedness for about wa
reflects q combination OF thre,
/ factors:
/ a. A retaliatory force 3
powerful and well protectes
that. no matter what the seal
Of the enemy attack. the az,
gressor must always contens
with q return blow which VII
linfiict an intolerable amount d
damage:
tbl An active defense which
can assure survival Of . stzabl.
portion Of the retaliatory fore
and which is able to limit thu
disruptive effects Of an enemy
blow on our population and
economy to the smallest pos.
sible proportions:
lcl A passive defense which
AFFORDS some protection for oul
population and our economy
1 Reason for Concern
In looking at the strategic
equation for .lll-ous war there
Is reason for serious concern
Our retaliatory power is i'm.
periled by Soviet advances In
the missile field and by the
inadequate dispersal and pro-
lection Of our Strategic All
Command. Our active defense
designed against manned
planes will have TO be rede-
signed for the missile age. Our
civil defense program and thai
Fof our allies is completely in
adequate.
2. Limited War
Though About war Is our
greatest danger. 1t Is not our
most likely threat. II about
war becomes our only counter
TO aggression. the Soviet Union
may be enabled TO use its stra-
tegic striking force as q shield
behind which to achieve limited
advances. confronting us In
each case with the alternative
Of yielding to what will seem .
marginal Soviet gain or OF
precipitating . worldwide holo-
cauSt.
It Is imperative that In add.
ton to our retaliatory force, w
develop units which can inter-
vene rapidly and which arr
able to make their power fell
with discrimination Of yer.
satility. To conduct such q linn.
tied war. we require modern
sea lift and an air-lift capacity
We do not now possess. Our mo-
bile forces must be tailored te
the gamut OF possible limited
wars which may range from
conflicts involving several coun-
tries to relatively minor police
actions.
:. Non-Overt Aggression
Our security can be imperilec
not only by overt aggression buI
also by transformations which
are made to appear. insofar q,
possible. as not aggression ai
all.
I 1t should be our aim to pre-.
vent such situations from de.
veloping. When they do becom,
acute we may have a choic,
only between evils. Our secu.
rity and that Of the rest o.
the nom Communist world viii
then hinge Importantly OF
our willingness to supper
friendly governments In situa'
tons which At neither the sol
dier's classic concept Of wal
nor the diplomats traditiona
T 0AaaoHf - nAa~ar~a-..