Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-13

connection. I note with deep
satisfaction that you oppose
composition In the production
Of every newer type Of weap-
on" When ] read that state
ment I expected to 60 on to
read proposals to stop such
production. But ! was disap-
pointed.
You renew the oft-repeated
Soviet proposal that the United
States. the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union should
cease for two or three years to
test nuclear weapons: and you
suggest that nuclear weapons
should not be stationed or pro-
duced In Germany. You add
the possibility that Poland and
Czechoslovakia might be added
to this non-nuclear weapons
area.
These proposals do not serve
TO meet the real problem Of
armament. The heart Of that
problem Is. as. you say. the
mounting PRODUCTION pri-
marily BY the Soviet Union and
the United States. Of new types
OF weapons.
Your proposal regarding
Central Europe win Of course
be studied by NATO and the
NATO countries directly In
volved from the standpoint Of
It's military and political Inn
plications. But there cannot
be great significance In de-nu-
clearizing Q small area when,
as you say. "the range Of mod
ern types Of weapons does not
know Of any geographical
limit" and when you defer 70
the indefinite future any meas
ures TO stop the production Of
such weapons.
]. note. furthermore. that
your proposal on Germany Is
In no way related 10 the ending
Of the division Of that country
but would. in fact. tend TO per-
petuate that division. Il is un-
realistic thus TO ignore the
basic link between political So
lutions and security arrange
ments.
Surely. Mr.. Chairman, at q
time when we share great
responsibility for shaping the
development of the inter-
national situation. We can and
must do better than what you
propose.
ID. I Propose that We
strengthen the United Nations.
This organization and the
pledges Of its members en-
bodied In the charter consti-
tute mans best hope for peace
and justice. The United States
feels bound BY its solemn
undertaking to act In accord
ance with the principles Of the
charter. win not the Soviet
Union clear away the doubt
that 1t also feels bound by its
charter UNDERTAKINGS? And may
We not perhaps go further and
build up the authority Of the
United Nations?
Too often its recommenda-
tons 90 UNDECIDED.
] propose. Mr.. Chairman.
tlf1t We should rededicate our
selves 10 the United Nations.
its principles and purposes and
10 our charter obligations. But
I would do more.
Too often the Security Coun-
ell Is prevented. by veto. from
discharging the primary re-
sponsibility we have given II
for the maintenance Of inter-
national peace and security
This prevention even extends
to proposing procedures for the
pacific settlement Of disputes
/ propose that We should
make It the policy Of our two
governments at least not 10 use
veto power TO prevent the
Security Council from propos-
ing methods for the pacific
settlement Of disputes pursuant
TO Chapter vi.
Nothing. ] am convinced,
would give the world more
justifiable hope than the con-
viction that both Of our govern
ments are genuinely deter
mined to make the United
Nations the effective instru-
ment Of peace and justice that
was the original design.
Confidence In Pledges
(2) II confidence is to be
restored, there needs. above all.
to be confidence in the pledged
word. To US 1t appears that
such confidence Is lamentably
lacking. That Is conspicuously
so In regard to two areas where
the situation Is q cause Of grave
international concern.
/ refer first Of all to Ger
many. This was the principal
topic Of our meeting Of July,
1855, and the only substantive
agreement which was recorded
in our agreed directive was
this:
The heads Of government,
recognizing their common re-
sponsibility for the settle
ment Of the German question
and the reunification Of Ger
many. have agreed that the
settlement OF the German
question and the reunifica-
ton Of Germany by means Of
free elections shall be car
ried out in conformity with
the national interests Of the
German people and the in
terests Of European security"