Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-09-28
Crisis and Dissent

Not the least dlSquletlng aspect OF
the FormoSa crisis is that President
Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have
something less than firmly united
country behind them. This is an excep-
ton to our traditional national rule on
matters affecting foreign policy.
OF course, as far as basic policy is
concerned, there is no doubt that the
American people solidly and overwhelm-
ingly support the administrators view
that our military power must be used,
if need be, to counter armed aggression
against the free world in general and
the United States in particular. Nor is
there any doubt that virtually the same
degree of support applies to the defense
of FormoSa itself. But our national
attitude toward the Quemoy- Matsu off,
shore islands is something else again.
1t is divided. 1t is riddled with Skep-
ticism. Indeed, substantial part of 1t
is openly opposed to any suggestion that
our country should intervene with arms
to hold these little coastal points so
close to the Chinese mainland.
BY way of example, a large segment
of the Nations press, in which we in
clude ourselves, has anxiouSly voiced its
miSgivingS on that score, and some OF
it has unqualif1edly denounced the idea
as being much too foolhardy, on mill
tary and other grounds, to warrant the
risk of starting great and terrible war
in the wrong way and at the wrong
place. Further, similar doubts and crit
icism characterize most of the mail now
pouring into the State Department from
the people at large And perhaps more
important still, as reflection of split
public opinion, many leading Democrats
with the exception of men like former
President Truman and Senator Paul
DouglaS-haye emphatically disagreed
with Mr.. Eisenhower'S and Mr.. Dulles
evaluation of Quemoy in relation to the
defense of FormoSa and the vital inter-
ests of the free world. Moreover, taken
all in all, there can be no question as to
the earnestnesS, intelligence and patri-
otism of those who have delivered them
selves of these dissenting opinions.
The airing of such dissent consti-
tutes an indispensable part of freedom
in free land. Yet it unquestionably
has had the effect, in this instance,
of placing our Government at poten-
TALLY serious negotiating disadvantage.
For the Soviet-supported Chinese Com
n1unists are fully aware of our divided
national opinion regarding Quemoy, and
they may therefore be more disposed to
stick to an uncompromiSing position
than they would be If our country were
Enthusiastically united on the issue. This
is one of the prices we must pay land
it Is well worth paying) for being de-
mocracy, although it burdens us with
added difficulties, and it entails the dan
ger that Peiping and Moscow may really
believe Pravda's Interpretation of the
situation-namely, that the American
people are about ready to rebel against
the President and his Formosa policy.
There is reason to hope, however,
that the Communists have better sense
than to put faith in such view. In
any case, they ought to know, if they
do not already know, that the present
division in our country would be swiftly
converted into iron unity If they mis-
calculated, at Quemoy or anywhere
else, in way that would force upon
the President the armed resistance to
aggression that he finds necessary. If
they keep that fact in mind, they may
yet decide to negotiate honestly with us
for a peaceful settlement.