Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-17
SAC Dispersal Setup
Seeks No New Bases
BY ELTON c. FAY
Associated Press stan Writer

BY ELTON c, FAY
| Associated Press stan Writer
The stepped-up program Il
dispefse the Strategic Air Com.
mand's 1900 heavy and medi.
UNI bombers probably mean,
that no more giant airdrome.
will be built.
Gen. Thomas D. White, All
Force chief of staff. made that
plain even before he took over
top USAF command and whilG
the program was still in il.
early phase. Gen. White sale
in an address a year ago that
we feel super-bases woulc
mean super targets"
The aim OF the program /.
TO disperse the SAC bombers-
this country's main retaliatory
force-to about 30 fields in.
stead Of concentrating them
AT a dozen home fields. Presi-
dent Eisenhower has asked
Congress for money TO speed
the dispersal.
In general. the plan is to
deploy each OF the three squad
rons Of an SAC wing TO a sepa-
rate field. Each heavy and
medium bomber squadron has
IL aircraft. One squadron
would remain at a main base
with complete maintenance ia
cilities, including repair. re-
fueling and armament equip
ment. The two other squad
rons would be deployed 70 sat.
elite bases.
I@f At Existing Fields
These satellite bases. in most
or perhaps all Instances, would
be at existing military fields
with improved or special facili-
ties. The satellite fields would
be in the general geographical
area Of the main base. but far
enough away to escape destruc-
ton or damage from a hydro
gen weapons attack on any
neighboring air base.
Tanker aircraft. used for in
fight refuelling of B-52 heavy
bomberS and B-47 medium
bombers, would be based.
usually. at fields other than
those on which the bombers are
stationed, and located as far
north as possible. This pre-
sumably means that the tanker
dispersal program win include
bases such as Thule in North
ern Greenland and Laid Air
Force Base in Alaska. both far
from continental United States
on transpolar routes to Russia.
Directly related to the dis
persal plan is the alert" pro-
gram. That has been a key
factor in the whole operation
Of SAC since its inception a
decade ago.
The alert program is pre-
dicated on the reaction time"
needed for a portion OF a force
OF planes to get of a base. into
the air and headed for strikes
at Russia after warning OF
approaching enemy air forces.
The idea Is TO get the bombers
on the ground before the en-
envy strikes.
Until recent months. the ex-
pected alert time has been as
much as two or three hours.
This was the time Russian
bombers would require to reach
targets In the United States
after they had tripped the
Distant Early Warning Line at
the northern edge Of the con-
tinent.
Alert Time Trimmed
The threat Of Interconti-
mental Ballistic Missiles has
trimmed that alert time TO is
minutes--half the time 1t would
take for a Soviet ICBM TO
travel from its launching point
TO an American target. The
Air Force does not have proof
that the Russians now have
ICBMs at operational stage.
But the Air Force cannot afford
TO overlook any such possibility.
When as much as two, or
three hours warning was pos
sible. the Air Force was able
TO round UP crewmen from
nearby hangers and ready
rooms, get them into planes.
taxi the planes for a mile or
two TO the end OF a runway,
then take on. !,
Now the planes which may
be expected to get away and
head for assigned targets liter
ally must be standing at the