Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-03-16
GREAT DECISIONS 1858 THE SUNDAY sEsH %n.Es. &C AIT
United Europe-Partner or Rival?

countries; 1t would not bring about
German unity on terms acceptable
to the West. But through a mill
tary union. including an inCe-
grated strategic nucleal force TO
which all members would contrib
ute and which all would control
together, West Germany would be
closely united with its European
partners, and the risk Of neutral
or subverted Germany would DO
reduced.
In the absence of glohal nu-
clear-arms control, only such q
military union provides the posi-
bility of fulfilling the long-stand-
ing American policy of restoring
Western Europe to an independent
position of power.
This policy runs the risk that
united independent Western Eu-
ropean power would be used to
further European interests which
might not always coincide with
those of the United States. This
risk has always been inherent in
the policy of supporting European
union, although it is obviously
Sharpened, as are most risks, by
the spread of nuclear technology.
The only sure way to eliminate
the risk is to pursue policy OF
Atlantic union. The United States
must make a choice between the
two policies, which it has tried to
follow simultaneously. If it does
not, Western Europe may drift
into a divisive national nuclear-
arms competition or into neutral
ism. an UNNECESSARILY more dam
gerouS situation for the United
States than a strong, independent
united Europe. If we choose Eu-
ropean union, we can help to en-
sure that Western Europe will
remain our friend and ally by con-
tributing weapons and technology
to an integrated European nuclear
force.
Risks and Promises
European economic indignation
creates similar potential risks and
promises. In the European com.
mon market, tariffs will be re.
duced automatically on intra-
European trade but not on i'm
ports from third countries. Amer.
lean exporters will be selling over
a tariff wall which their European
competitors will not have to hurdle.
A European economic commu-
nifty would have no obligation to
reduce its common tariff on Amer
lean imports. 1t can be expected
to do SO in the long run only If
the United States pursues liberal
commercial policy and bargains
fairly to achieve reciprocal tariff
reductions of mutual benefit to the
two large continental markets.
Whether European economic
union will lead to a world of vast
regional markets discriminating
unfairly against each other or to
a freer and more orderly world
trading system depends in part
on our determination to strength
en- global economic organizations,
committed to the principles Of
liberal and orderly trade.
If Western Europe should be-
. come a military, political and
economic unit it could deal with
the United States on equal terms.
1t could put an end to a problem
which has plagued European
American relations throughout the
postwar period: The sense Of
European inferiority to, and de-
pendence on. American power. A
relationship between political units
Of equal power may become either
a mutually rewarding partnership
or a facilitating rivalry.
1t cannot be demonstrated con-
cluSively that a united Western
Europe must become our partner
or our rival. But faith in the dem
ocratic values which both we and
the Europeans share suggests at
least the possibility that a trans
Atlantic relationship of equality
will prove more durable than one
of dependence.
In this sense European union
and a closer Atlantic association
are not incompatible. In follow
ing our strong inclination for
European union we may find that
we have also chosen a road which
will lead ultimately to a united
West.