Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-09-17

1nere are tnree SlQeS-CnTee points
of view-involved in the war threat
which is building up in the FormoSa
Strait. 1t may be profitable to take
look at each of them.
Chiong's View
From the point of view of General
isSimo Chang Kai-Shek, the problem is
not complicated. He has made no secret
of his hope and purpose to reconquer
the mainland of China. Quemoy and
the related coastal islands, heavily gar
risoned with perhaps 100000 of Chiang's
best troops, could serve as jumping off
points for such an undertaking. There
fore, the continued Communist Smelling
and attendant blockade of these islands,
which may make it impossible for the
Nationalist troops to stay there, is
most serious matter from Chiang'S point
of view. The logical thing for him
would be to bomb and destroy the Com
inuniSt gun emplacementS on the main
land. If this should involve the United
States in war with China, and possibly
with Russia, so much the better from
Chiang'S viewpoint. This probably is the
only way he can ever really hope to re-
establish himself on the mainland.
The Communist View
Putting their buster aside, the Chi
nese Communists may see the matter
In a quite different light. After all,
these coastal islands, some five miles
offshore, have always been under the
control of the government of China,
and the Communists are governing
China today. They may look upon the
islands as legitimate goals in con-
tinuing civil war. Or, in the unlikely
event that they take Chiang's Twill
return threats seriously, they may look
upon them as threat to their security
on the mainland. In any event, 1t is
unlikely that the Communists consider
their efforts to reduce these islands as
q form of armed aggression" in any
way comparable to HitlerS armed ag-
greSsionS in Europe. 1t may be that
their long-range objective is to drive
the United States out of the Western
Pacific. But it is moss unlikely that
they would think of an attack on the
coastal islands as significant step in
that project.
Our Point of View
This leaves the viewpoint of the
United States, fully committed as we
are to the defense of FormoSa and the
nearby Pescadores. Where lie the real
interests of this country in the struggle
between Chang and his Communist
rivals for possession of the coastal
Islands?
In keeping with an authorization
from Congress, the President has said
In all but so many words that we will
fight for the coastal islands if the Com
f11uniStS assault them on scale or in
manner which, in his Judgment,
threatens FormoSa. That is our ma
tional position and it must have national
support. We venture the hope, however,
that the essentially of the coastal
islands to the defense of FormoSa will
be very carefully weighed, and that, in
any event, we will not permit some rash
act on the part of Chang Kai-Shek to
drag us into war which may turn into
the nuclear holocaust which every ra-
tional American wants to avoid.
Mr.. Eisenhower also stated a propo-
sition which seems to go beyond the de-
fend-FormoSa concept. He said it is as
"certain as can be" that the Chinese
Smelling of Quemoy "iS part of what is
indeed an ambitious plan of conquest"
namely, the liquidation Of all free
world positions in the Western Pacific.
He also said that the position of the
United States is that there will be no
retreat in the face of armed aggression,
which is part and parcel Of a continuing
program of using armed forces to con-
quer new regions" If the assumptions
implicit in these statements are we'll
founded, there can be no quarrel with
Mr.. Eisenhower. We must resist-at the
risk of nuclear war if necessary Indeed,
If Mr. Eisenhower is right, the logic of
the situation might well dictate an
attack by the United States to silence
the mainland guns that are Smelling
Quemoy.
The big question we now face is
whether the obvious desire of the Chi
neSe Communists to capture the coastal
Islands, or at least to drive Chiang's
troops off them, really is part and
parcel" of an ambitious program of con-
quest in the Western Pacific. Consider
ing the historic relation of these islands
to the Chinese mainland, plus the mill
tary threat posed by ChiangS occupa-
ton of them, there surely is consid-
cradle reason to doubt that Commu-
mist attack on the coastal islands would