Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-07-23
Proof of Bad Faith

The Russians have shown that they
are not interested in helping the United
Nations clear the way for withdrawal OF
American troops from Lebanon.
This is one obvious conclusion to
be drawn from Mr.. Sobolev's veto of the
resolution submitted by Japan to the
Security Council. Another conclusion,
With much to support it,, is that the
Russians, far from genuinely seeking to
reduce tensions in the Middle East,
actually want to keep that pot boiling.
Every member of the Council, ex-
eept Russia, voted for the Japanese. pro-
posal. As explained by its sponsor, the
japanese resolution was designed to
authorize an increase in the size of the
u. NJ observer team in Lebanon, with
this to be followed by withdrawal of
our forces. In the hope of meeting
anticipated Soviet objections, the Ian
guage of the resolution had been wa
tered down-So much so that there was
doubt 1t would be accepted by Lebanon.
The Lebanese, however, were prevailed
upon to accept 1t.
At that point Mr.. Sobolev made his
FIRST move. He offered q series Of
Amendments" drastically altering the
meaning and intent of the Japanese
proposal. He knew these would be re-
jected, and, Of course, they we're. Only
Russia voted for them, with, Japan and
Sweden abstaining. Then came the vote
on Japan's resolution. Ten Of the IL
Council members voted for 1t. Russia
voted no.
This, we think, is plain evidence Of
bad faith. BY voting for the resolution,
or even by abstaining, and Russia did
abstain when the Council voted in June
to send observers to Lebanon, the Soviet
Union could have made q significant
contribution toward improving the in
ternational climate. Instead, Russia
cast It's 85th veto. Possibly the Soviets
think we are in tight spot In Lebanon
and would like to keep us there. Dag
Hammarskiold, the U. N. Secretary Cen
eral, has announced, however, that he
intends to materially increase the size
of the observer force, despite the Soviet
veto Of the Japanese plan. Presumably
the original resolution gives him author
ity to do this, and so we may yet find
ourselves in a position where we can
pull back our troops.
Meanwhile, the stage seems to be
set for some kind Of summit meeting.
Mr. Khrushchev has said that he wants
such q meeting and that he will go
anywhere to attend it. Mr.. Macmillan,
undar sfrnp0 oracSura IN prifoin hoe
said that he will certainly attend. Mr..
Nehru has said much the same, and
General de Gaulle evidently is willing.
This leaves Mr. Eisenhower. There Is
nothing to indicate that he wants
summit meeting. But yesterdays White
House statement and the note to Mr..
KhruShchev seem to have burned the
bridges Mr.. Eisenhower, one gathers,
will be among those present.
1t Is unfortunate that the Soviet
performance is so stepped in bad faith.
For there is great deal to be done in
the Middle East beyond bolstering Leb-
anon and withdrawing the American
troops. II one could have even a little
confidence in the professions of the
Kremlin, q summit conference, in the
prevailing climate, could serve a very
useful purpose, even If limited to discus
sion and exchange of views There is
no apparent basis for such confidence,
however, and therefore we suppose that
all Of the participants in the summit
conference, If 1t is held, will enter into
1t with their eyes open and their fingers
crossed.