davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

not an alternative to the u. NJ but It's complement
In line with Article 81 Of the Charter.
VI The United States must make concerted effort TO
meet the Joint security requirements of all partners
alliances in which we participate by contributing TO the
development of common strategic concept by assisting
in the reequppng Of allied forces by fostering political
cohesveness and by economic and technical cooperation
VII. We must pool with allies in NATO scientific
and technical information and provide them with nucear
weapons and delivery systems.
System Would Include Civil Defense
VIII Civil defense must be part OF our overall
strategic posture program must be undertaken TO in
clude a warning system and fa-out shelters.
TX. We must face the fact that meanIngful reduce
ton OF ornaments must be preceded by reduction Of
tensions and settlement Of outstanding that
divided the world since World War H. At the time,
concrete proposals to limit such might be forced
on US should be introduced into negotiations reduction
In forces. Even the Soviet Union should reject our
proposals. unilaters declaration might give strong
incentive to follow suit
X, Starting Immediately defense expenditures must
be INCREASED substantially the next few years Tes-
mony indicates that deficiencies in strategic
posture require additional expenditures each year OF
proxmaey So billion for the next several years This does
not include necessary increased appropriations for mutual
assistance and for civil defense Because must main
tain present forces 60 into production on new
weapons such missiles the cost Of military programs
will continue TO rise until at least 1855
Would Extend Aircraft Procurement
Among other things this panel recommends that:
a. Aircraft procurement to modernize existing units
be authorized into the 960 while pressing the most
rapid development OF operaonal intermediate Range and
Inter-Continental Balistc Missiles.
81 The SAC base structure be made less vulnerable
surprise attack through dispersion and other protective
measures
81 An accelerated research and development support
Be provided for such key programs missiles.
a. Additional troop transport be authorized In the
form both Of modern aircraft and ships
e. The program Of equippng both surface and under
water ships with missiles Of various types accelerated
and additional funds for anti-submarine defense be
provided.
(, Military pay scales be to retain skilled officers
and men
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
Members of Rockefeller
Security Panel Listed

J. II. whitney and Co.: Ellis A,
johnson. director. Operations
Research once. Johns Hopkins
University: Col. George A,
Lincoln. professor. social
sciences. West Point; Henry r,
Luce. editor-in-c chief. Time,
Life and Fortune.
And Gen. James Mccormack.
vice president, Massachusetts,
Institute of Technology. who
served Is panel chairman until
illness forced him TO resign that
position last october: Frank c,
Nash, United States Delega-
ton 10 the u. N. General AS
scmbly, who was a member
until his death last December
II: Laurance s. Rockefeller,
president. Rockefeller Brothers,
Inc: Arthur Smithies. depart
ment OF economics. Harvard
University: Edward Teller. pro-
fessor Of physics. University Of
California: T. F. Walkowicz,
aeronautical engineer. and Car
roll L. Wilson. president. Metals
a. Controls Corp.
The report was prepared
under the direction Of DR.,
Henry A. Kissinger. director OF
the special studies project.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
VII. The Special
Case OF NATO

Three factors have been
working 10 undermine the
cohesiveness Of NATO. which
Is milltarily the most highly
developed Of our mutual Sc
eurity arrangements.
The first is the Soviet de-
velopment Of a large-scale air
atomic capability. This has
led to speculation that the
Sword" Of NATO-the stra-
tegic air forces Of the United
States and the United Kingdom
may not be unsheathed in
the event Of Soviet aggression
on Europe for fear OF q dew
astating attack on the United
states and the United King
dom.
The second factor is that
recent trends in United States
and British military policy have
done much to discredit the
NATO effort to build forces
capable Of resisting locally.
Both countries have empha-
sized the massive deterrent at
the apparent expense Of forces
needed for the local defense
Of Europe.
A third factor making for in.
stability is the reverse Of the
above: a tendency on the part
Of some NATO allies to seek "a
escape their dilemmas by a pol.
icy OF disengagement and neu-
tralism. The retaliatory forces
In the exclusive possession OF
the United States and the
United Kingdom tend to pro.
duce q yelling Of impotence in
hibiting q major effort.
Fortunately there are two
factors which seem to Offer
possibilities for o viable com.
mon strategy. The first Of these
is the disaffection in the Soviet
bloc. so wildly illustrated ir
the cases Of Hungary and Pc.
land. The second. and more
important. is the availability ir
quantity OF tactical nucleal
weapons.
Thus a prime element In the
new strategy must be q sig.
nificant STRENGTHENING Of tn,
NATO capacity for local de.
tense. The United States mus
pursue with conviction THU
task Of STRENGTHENING the shield
forces. for II is equally in oul
interest to see that a conflict
arising in Europe. either by de.
sign or by miscalculation. doe,
not inevitably result in all-out
war. But however earnest oui
effort TO strengthen the shielc
forces. II win be unavailing un.
less our allies are prepared Il
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
v. Defense


The major defects In the
present organization are inher-
ent In It's present structure.
They will be further agera-
waited by the passage Of time.
These defects are three In
number:
l. The roles and missions as
signed TO the individual mill
tary services have become COM
petitive, rather than compile
mentary because they are out
Of accord with both weapons
technology and the principal
military threats TO our ma
tional safety;
2. The present organization
and responsibilities OF the Joint
Chiefs Of Staff preclude the
development Of q comprehen-
sive and coherent strategic doc
trine for the United states.
Since each member Of the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
VII. Pressure on the
Alliance System

Our allies are faced with q
situation In which, at one and
the same time. the danger Of
war seems less imminent and
the fear Of the consequences
OF war grows greater. In Eu-
rope and in Asia. the Commu-
mist bloc Is steadily improving
Its military capabilities, includ-
ing nuclear weapons and de-
livery systems. The concern
sssiduously fostered by the
USSR-that the use OF even
the smallest atomic weapon
would involve enormous de-
struction may weaken the will
to resist OF many allies. in and
out Of NATO.
A correlative force contribute
ing to the reluctance Of many
countries 70 make Q substantial
military effort Is the growing
cost and complexity Of modern
weapons. In many cases. the
ability to resist locally Is ac-
tually decreasing. while the
need for II has become greater
than ever.
The United States must
therefore make q concerted
effort. together with its allies,
to develop and implement plans
which meet the Joint security
requirements Of all partners.
The free world is faced with
q major task Of strengthening
and re-eQuipping its forces at
a time when both rapidly
changing technology and. In
many parts Of the world. de-
creasing popular support for
military programs combine ia
make the Job extremely costly
and difficult. II is probable
that the United States viii have
/ to provide--either directly or
Observation-Disclosures quanti-
ties OF equipment needed by
our allies, or else see their
political stability decline along
with their military strength.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
TX. Civil Defense

Civil defense will not be easy,
and 1t can never be complete.
Dtficulty does not mean i'm.
potence. however. While it may
be impossible to protect the
population against the blast
and heat Of an atomic explo-
sion.. protection against RADIO
active fall-out and other con-
tamination appears TO be more
feasible.
1t is possible TO state certain
general principles in relation
to the development Of any civil
defense program:
Ca Civil defense must be
considered as part Of the over
all United States strategic
posture.
tb) The American people
need to be told more clearly
the dimensions OF the damage
that would be inflicted on us
by q sudden attack and about
the measures to reduce its ef-
fects.
tc) A civil defense program
should be integrated with the
construction program needed
for the normal development Of
our expanding population and
economy.
An effective civil defense
program can be separated into
three stages:
ca To provide warning,
where possible, and informa-
ton about Pathological levels.
tb) Protection against fall
out. A fall-out shelter pro-
gram should be carefully
studied.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

and disputes extraneous 70 the
issues can hamstring the ma
ehinery Of the U. N. Until
United Nations action Is taken
We should try to act in concert
with the widest grouping Of
nations attainable as provided
by Article 81 Of the Charter.
The system OF free world ALI
ances thus 10 not an alterna-
tive to the United Nations but
its complement; Il Is the only
means for collective security
W here the processes Of the
United Nations may be blocked
or It's action rendered inefiee-
-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
X. Tensions and
Reductions Of
Armuments

The destructiveness Of mod
ern weapons has focused the
hopes OF mankind as never be-
fore on the attainment OF q
stable peace.
This panel. as all Americans,
considers the achievement OF q
free and peaceful world the
primary challenge before man
kind, 1t would be highly ire
sponsible, however. to raise
hopes which cannot be fulfilled
or to hold out prospects which
on closer examination prove 10
increase our peril.
We must realize that Of all
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

Iitsry expenditures But the
execution Of the reduction has
had serious consequences which
did not become evident for
some time because Of a backlog
of unspent appropriations.
Recent military expenditures
are insufficient TO maintain
even our current force levels.
And events have made clear
the inadequacy Of these levels.
Specifically this panel recon-
mends that:
(a) Aircraft procurement to
modernize existing units be au-
thorized into the 196O's. Other
wise q gap in ready forces
between the latest type OF
manned aircraft and the opera
tional stage in ballistic missiles
seems inevitable.
tb) At. the same time, we
should press for the most rapid
Development and procurement
Iof operation9l intermediate
range and inter-continental
hallistic missiles.
Co The SAC base structure.
long out Of phase with other
elements in its program, be
made less vulnerable to surprise
attack through dispersion and
other protective measures.
ID An accelerated research
and development support be
provided for all key programs,
including missiles and advance
reconnaissance systems.
te) The SAC alert time be re-
duced.
% The establishment Of q
retaliatory system based on
missile launching submarines
be expedited.
(g) Our early warning and
anti-missile defense system be
given greater attention.
(h) Additional troop trans
port be authorized in the form
both Of modern aircraft and
ships TO provide the mobile
units essential for limited war.
% The Army be permitted
to speed up the modernization
Of its weapons and It's division
structure.
% The program Of equipping
both surface and underwater
ships with missiles Of various
types be accelerated.
(k) Anti-submarine warfare
requires additional funds.
Cd Present pay scales b
raised TO retain the skilled of
ncers and men necessary to an
effective and economic military
establishment.
(m) A start be made without
delay on q program Of fall-out
shelters and related warning
and communications equip
ment.
tn) The re equipping Of
allied forces. particularly in
NATO. with modern weapons
be speeded I'D.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
w. Weapons

In dealing with the use Of
nuclear weapons We come UP
against the hard fact that the
choice Is no longer entirely our
own. Whatever we may decide.
the Soviet Union may choose
TO conduct its aggressions with
nuclear weapons.
Thus against a nuclear power
We must always be prepared to
fight a limited nuclear war.
Even when we decide TO use
conventional weapons. we would
not dare to do so without a
nuclear establishment ready at
hand. And in a war In which
the USSR is a direct partici-
pant. nuclear weapons will have
TO be used almost Of necessity.
Even United States Soviet
equality in nuclear weapons will
not change the fact that nuclear
weapons complicate the tasks
OF an aggressor and reduce the
significance Of Soviet numerical
superiority in conventional
forces.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
CONCLUSION

We like to believe that reas-
enable men can settle all dis
putes through good viii and
compromise and that power
should be invoked only as q last
resort. We therefore tend to
think Of diplomacy and force
as successive and separate
phases Of national policy. I'm
fortunately. the position in
which We ind ourselves does
not permit such absolute dis
tinctions.
Force will not solve the prob
lens Of this period but the res
olution TO use it If necessary
may afford the breathing spell
in which nations can work out
their own destiny without for
eign interference. We must not
forget that the neutrality Of
many nations is possible only
as long as we are strong. Just
as for q century and q half the
British navy made possible our
American neutrality. Many Of
our most vocal critics would be
deeply troubled were the pro-
lection of our military strength
suddenly withdrawn.
We are engaged in the phase
Of a elobal struggle which has
come to be known IS the cold
war. In this report we have
tried to set forth measures
which We feel are imperative
in the interest Of national Sc
curity. We consider them
essential II we are to reduce
the likelihood Of war and to
make sure that II IN spite Of
all our efforts war should be
forced upon US. we shall not
be overwhelmed by 1t.
The cold war poses q two
fold dilemma: In our desire for
peace. We must not overlook
the Importance Of power in
maintaining It. But once we
have recognized the role Of
force we must forever beware
that 1t does not become an
end In itself. The more drastic
the consequences OF modern
war. the more we must make
certain that we are true to
the principles the defense Of
which alone justifies resort TO
force.
When the security Of the
United States and Of the free
world IL at stake, cost cannot
be the basic consideration. The
cold war cannot be won and
q hot" war cannot be avoided
without q major effort. This
Is clearly not q time for com
placency; II u Just a. clearly
not Q time for hysteria. What
10 required throughout the
country Ia an attitude Of
sustained and informed de-
termination. II this report
makes q contribution to the
emereence Of such an attitude.
IN win have served its purpose.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
vi. Alliances and
The United Nations

The United Nations remains
the greatest symbol OF mans
hope for peace and the most
comprehensive organization
working toward II. II has
proved It's ability to act In q
number Of situations from Ko-
rea TO Suez. IL Is an indispen-
sable forum for expressing the
hopes OF humanity and an ef-
fective institution for pursuing
agreed ends.
Nevertheless, the Soviet veto
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
PHILOSOPHY Of
The Report

A. the goth century near'
the end Of It's sixth decade
America faces q world In swift
and often turbulent change
Both wthin our borders and
beyond. enormous transforms
tions--in human aspirations. In
the structure Of society. in eco
nofnie DEVELOPMENT. in scien-
tific knowledse--are reshapins
the pattern Of existence at q
speed without parallel in his
tory. The recurrent shock .ol
sur age Is the discovery that
concepts and patterns Of action
Of more secure past no longer
fit the present reality.
We live in period which in
sists continually on choice be-
ing made. But choice without
purpose leads to paralysis or
to fitful and erratic behavior,
And power without q sense Of
direction may drain life Of its
meaning II it dos not destroy
humanity altogether. Our prob
lens. therefore. require for
their solution not only great
effort and skin. but even more
Importantly steadfast convic-
ton. And our opportunities
will reflect above all the bold
ness and vision with which we
face the future.
Despite the fact that the
work OF other panels is still in
progress. we consider II appro-
pirate to release this report on
international security before
the other studies are complete.
Power alone will not supply an
answer to the challenge Of the
future. II does offer the pros
pect that there will be a future.
A people preoccupied as we are
with the tasks Of peace Is
always in danger Of confusing
its aspirations with reality. OF
refusing to believe that there
may be States which prefer
conquest to peace. Because we
would prefer to dedicate our
selves TO constructive tasks. we
need constantly to be reminded
that we are in great peril and
that We cannot substitute our
preferences for our duty.
Great Exertion Needed .
This report concludes that
We can afford what has 70 be
done to insure our security: In
deed. that we cannot afford
less. We feel that We can
achieve the necessary military
power while preserving and ex-
banding other elements Of our
strength, such as health. edu-
cation and economic growth.
We recognize that this win re-
quire great exertion. But al
though the leadership Of q
democracy Is q far more exact
ing task than the direction Of
. police state. the power which
Is generated by the voluntary
effort Of q free people cannot
be equaled by the reluctan,
compliance Of subject nations.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

make a substantially greater
contribution.
A corollary Of the central
problem Of establishing an ade-
quate NATO shield is to pro-
vide within Europe-controlIed
by Europeans-an atomic and
missile capability that will
substantially reduce Europe's
dependence on United States
and British strategic air power.
This is necessary 70 restore the
declining power position OF
NATO vis-a-vis the U.SS.R.
and give reality to the Euro
pean sense Of participation.
which Is q basic ingredient Of
the will to resist.
To accomplish these objec-
tives will require the following /:
First Of all. we must pool
with our allies scientific and
technical information and as
sist in mobilizing the research
and development capability OF
NATO both in the civilian and
the military field.
Second. we must strive for a
true military interdependence
which closely ties together the
United States and the other
NATO powers.
z Third. we must acknowledge
the necessity for maintaining
in Europe for an indefinite pc
Rod a strong contribution to
the shield forces.
Finally. we must provide
those Of our allies that desire
them with nuclear weapons and
delivery systems. as we'll as
with some Of the other COM
pick equipment Of modern war,
A step in the direction OF these
detectives was taken at the
NATO Council meeting in De-
raY,ah0V. aAgT
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
II. Developing
Power Trends

Our military problem h
four aspects:
ta) We require q growing in
duStrial chronological and
scientific base in order 70
achieve q state Of continual
readiness for the long haul.
ID Scientific development
and industrial potential by
themselves are ineffective stra-
logically II they cannot be
translated rapidly into opera
tional weapons. Great impor-
lance therefore attaches to two
kinds Of lead-time: Cd the in
terval between the drawing
board and operational weapon:
and ~ the rapidity with which
weapons are manufactured.
Cc) At the same time, long
range programs and balance
cannot become ends in them
selves. However powerful We
may be potentially. our strate-
gic effectiveness in any given
crisis depends on our active
forces supplemented by any
quickly mobilizable reserve ca
pabilities.
Id But no matter how vast
our overall strength, IL may
still be ineffective in meeting
certain challenges II 1t cannot
be applied with discrimination
Henceforth. the adequacy OF
our military establishment will
be determined by its ability to
discharge two distinct though
related tasks: One. to dis
courage an about attack
through the existence OF a
powerful. instantly ready re-
taliatory force; and two. to
react effectively TO limited ag-
erosion through the ability TO
make our response fit the chal-
lenge.
-Four power trends appear TO
be OF particular significance
today:
Ia Weapon technology will
become increasingly complex
with a corresponding increase
in the difsiculty OF choosing the
most effective combination OF
weapons.
ID The rate Of technology
zeal change will increasingly
complicate the tasks Of the de-
tense relative TO the offense.
(c) The USSR will con-
tinue to gain in overall mill
tary strength greatly aided by
Communist China and some Of
Its other allies.
ID The concept OF scar
city" in nuclear weapons will
disappear from the calcula-
tons OF the United States, the
USSR. and to q lesser extent
Great Britain.
TwO-Year Margin
II appears that the United
States is rapidly losing il
lead over the USSR in the
military race. For perhaps
the next two years. we still
possess a superiority In stra-
tegic striking power and any
Soviet attack on us would meet
q crushing reply. But our POSI-
ton a year or two hence de-
ponds on decisions which must
be taken Immediately. Unless
present trends are reversed, the
world balance Of power will
shift In favor Of the Soviet bloc.
~ tAnt sla,.tA t..ASz- 49, -.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06
TEXT or ROCKEFELLER REPORT
: 1t Is StiIINot Too Lote
TO Counter Red Power

FollowlHo Is the tert OF summary OF the special
efeler Brothers Fund report International security
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-06

not likely to be given another
chance TO remedy our failings.
However. Il Is emphatically not
too late II we are prepared to
make the big effort required
now and IN the years ahead.
The Bluffton news. [volume] (Bluffton, Ohio) 1875-current, 1958-08-28
MAINLY PERSONAL

Is IT MORE THAN COIN
CIDENCE that Mrs. Russell
Augsburger and her family have
frequently been named contest
winners in recent years? We
asked this question of Mrs. Augs-
burger Monday when we were
notitied by the Quaker Oats COM
pany that she mad been awarded
$50 in cash as winner in their
national contest to Name your
iavorite fruit-blended oatmeal"
Reluctantly Mrs. Augsburger
confided that she and her family
had been unusually lucky" but
only after making contest work
hobby and after reading and ap-
plying the information she gained
from a publication, How to Win
Contests"
I'VE enter many more contest
than we ever win, but we have
been compensated well for our
efforts" Mrs. Augsburger said.
She does not keep a record of
her successes, but it is estimated
that the Augsburgers have won
between so and 100 contest in
the last five years.
Biggest prize ever to come