Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-12


on the international scene.
has q new book out tomorrow
POWER AND DIPLOMACY
Harvard University Press;
So.
In this brief. pungent se-
ries Of essays. Mr.. Acheson
examines the scene today. or
as close to today as the exi-
gencies of publishing allowed.
He sums up his feelings with
little partisanship. . remark
able lack Of choler and at
least q strong effort to be
objective.
Our Promethean punish
ment," he reflects. for
having stolen the nuclear
iire Of the gods Is not only
to live with the horror Of
our achievement. but to live
with the achievements and
decisions Of others. II does
not lie in our hands alone
whether or not smaller nu-
clear weapons viii be de-
veloped and used. What
might be best suited to the
interest Of our coalition may
be made impossible by the
actions Of others. But. until
others do make 1t impos-
sible, We can decide whether
1t Is to our interest to rely
on the smaller nuclear weap-
ons to meet situations short
Of total nuclear war"
He points out that even
though we think some sort Of
atomic weapon should be used
to stop some future Soviet
move somewhere, II the other
members OF our alliance or
coalition think this plan
more dangerous and destruc-
tive than the threat posed
by the enemy. cohesion
within the group win end.
We ind. as we read on
that Mr.. Acheson Is extremely
reluctant justifiably. 1t
seems-to see nuclear power
used unless 1t is forced on US.
At one point IN his summation
he observes: so long as both
nations can preserve their
retaliatory force through an
initial attack. Q strategy OF
unlimited nuclear attack Is q
strategy Of mutual suicide.
It becomes one Of the highest
aims Of policy to avoid this
disaster
Pointing out that for .
decade East and West ne
gotiated to control nuclear
energy and armament. from
the more far-reachinG pro-
posals Of f94e and 1851 TO
those discussed IN london
during the year just closed.
Mr.. AcheSufi writes.
1T is my conviction that
the only agreements which
ere possible now would be
Instantaneous to US and
would not diminish the
dangers Of nuclear war.
$50. unpleasant as the con-
dlusion is. we cannot avoid
the fact that force win play
I great part in the grand
strategy of creating q work.
able non-Communist world
system"
He denies that limited war.
involving nuclear power even
Indirectly. is impossible be-
cause each side, rather than
lose, would expand the con-
hict until it ended in mutual
puclear destruction. History
and the dictates Of common
sense deny this dichotomy Of
Instruction or anpeasement.'
A Possibility
aThe escape. he feels. lies
IN the development Of allied
conventional forces capable
Of safeguarding Europe
against attack by conven-
tional (non-nuclear) forces.
II this is done with determi-
nation, there may be, for the
first time, some mutual bene-
NJ Tor an EaSt-WeSt reouc-
ton Of forces"
Mr.. Acheson Is less de-
tached, more pugnacious in
his attitude toward the adj
ministration's rebuke Of Brit
ain and France for their
swift move to wrest the Suez
Canal from Nasser by force.
In effect. We went over to the
enemy, he feels.
The United States. he aiso
feels. cannot gain In North
Africa at the expense Of
France"
Mr.. Acheson Is unrepentent
in his attitude toward China.
his feeling that we are max
ing too much Of q weak and
futile government on For