Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-09-21
'Eormoso's 3 Sides
There IS an unmistakable

1leTe Is al ullLilloIhkhulC
proappeasement flavor to
your September II editorial.
"Formosa's Three Sides"
Here are several points
worth considering: ID Every
thing the Communists do to
further the Com m unist
cause, no matter how sdis-
honest, dishonorahle or dia-
bolical, is right" and COM
mendable in their eyes. Can
anyone imagine the Com
munists ever admitting that
their military action. how
ever outrageously aggressive.
is anything but "self-defense
against the imperialist war
mongering aggressors"P
Quite naturally, they see
nothing aggressive about at
lacking Quemoy or, for that
matter, any other objective.
co Since all Communist ac-
ton Is designed to further
their ultimate aim Of de-
stroying the free world. it is
plain common sense for the
free world to be automati-
cally opposed to anything the
Communists want. 90 APP
peasement Of q totalitarian
power rarely works as a
means Of preventing or
avoiding war. 1t is automatic
that a blackmailer never
stays paid Off" Just how
long do you think they would
stay appeased by the acqui-
Sition of these small offshore
islands? az When the Com
munists have decided that
war is what they want. we
may be sure they will have
no trouble dreaming up the
necessary "provocation" to
start it. Until then there Is
no danger Of their being pro-
voked into a war not Of their
own choosing. When will
they want war? When they
have concluded that the
United States is weak
enough, either militarily or in
national spirit, to make 1t a
good gamble.
President Eisenhower was
abundantly right when he
classified the Communist at
tack on Quemoy as part and
parcel" of an ambitious pro-
gram of conquest in the
Western Pacific. And If we
find ourselves at war it will
not be, as your editorial sug-
gests, a case of "plunging the
United States into war over
Quemoy," but because the
Communists have decided
they would gain by it. One OF
the sureSt ways Of bringing
about such a conclusion on
their part would be for the
United States to show weak
ness and vacillation instead
of strength and firmness.
r. L. Mitten.
~
Most of the experts have
believed from the beginning
that Quemoy and MatsI are
completely unsuitable for an
invasion of Formosa and
would never be used for that
purpose, because of their size
and location. They have also
believed that these offshore
islands are of no value as a
staging area for launching an
attack on the mainland OF
China, and for the same rea-
son. Current events certainly
seem to confirm that view.
And according to a recent
CHS broadcast, the United
States Pacific Fleet comman-
der informed. Mr.. Dulles In
1855 that these two islands
were indefensible against a
determined mainland attack,
If the views of these ex-
perts are correct, the Ameri-
can people are entitled to
candid answers to some ques-
tons.
What motive, for instance,
caused Chang Kai-shek to
commit one-third Of his most
experienced and presumably
best troops on two indefen-
sibIe islands almost within
rife range Of China properf
Was his motive political, since
1t obviously could not have
been military? And if so, was
it for the purpose of involv'
ing the United States in
shooting war with China?
The Secretary of States re-
cent comments and those Of
the President suggest thai
the defense of the offshore is.
lands is now necessarily pri.
marily because of Chiang''
new troop disposition; other
wise they imply that this de.
Tense would not be necessary
If the prestige" to b
maintained is that Of Chang