Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1958-01-07

JoHhS0H 10 the meeting OF !
morning folloips.
Members of the Conference
For this presentation thi.
morning. I shall divide my owr
remarks In two parts.
I shall. briefly. summarize
certain OF the findings which
have been made thus far By
the Senate Armed Services
Preparedness Subcommittee
Other members Of the subeom-
mittee will. in greater detail
deal with specific areas OF the
investigations.
In all candor. however.
cannot begin these remarks
with q simple recapitulation Of
the work We have done. Illu-
minating as such might be.
realize--as / know all men,
bers realize - that we have,
thus far. barely begun q work
that will occupy and dominate
the Congresses of free men for
lifetimes to come. II Is. there
fore. Of first importance that
no matter how feeble our
understanding We strive "a
establish perspective.
Our security may very well
depend, above all else. on how
well and how quickly we grasp
such perspective.
Let US begin with this fact
The ground beneath US when
We last met has been. largely,
swept away. How much is gone.
how much remains are ques-
tions no man can answer with
authority.
Peril Obvious
The peril of the hour is
obvious.
Less obvious. but Of far
greater Importance. is the fact
that beyond the peril lies a po-
tential for peace that exceeds
any ever before within mans
reach.
Since. August 80. when the
FIRST session OF Congress ad-
journed. the human race itself
without regards to flags or
philoSophy-has multiplied its
capabilities to infinity.
The exploitation OF these
capabilities OF men OF selfish
purpose holds the awful threat
Of world in Subjugation.
The mastery of such capa-
bilities by men wholly dedicated
to freedom presents. instead,
the prospects OF a world at last
liberated from tyranny. hber-
ated in fact from the fear OF
war.
What this Congress does will.
at best. be only a small begin
ing on what must ultimately
be done-and will be done in
decades and perhaps centuries
ahead. But. small as our effort
may be in the long view Of his
tory. we can see that lack OF
sufficient effort on our part
would be compounded through
out the ages ahead into a fall
ure OF tragic proportions.
Superiority Not Sure
We cannot. in the months of
this session. assure the Nation s
superiority: the era We have
entered Is too young. its ulti-
mate dimensions too far be-
yond our vision. for us to an
ticipate so fruitful a result
from our labors.
We can. however. by hes.ta-
ton. by diSsension. by narrow
partiSanship do much TO build
an inSurmountable barrier
about ourselves and perpetuate
our relative inferiority.
Responsible men have no
choice.
We must work as though no
other Congress would ever have
an opportunity to meet this
challenge, for. in fact. none
will have an opportunity COM
parable.
We must. Furthermore, bring
TO this opportunity freshness.
an originality. a diligence far
exceeding our previous stand
ards, for many Of the con-
cepts and ideas and rules
which have applied to our ac-
tons in the past are no longer
pertinent and applicable.
Blames Policy Decision
Let me expand this by deal
ing with certain general facts
which have been established in
the short time Of our hearings:
/. Our national potential
exceeds our national perform
ance.
2. Our science and technology
has been. for some time, capable
OF many of the achievements
displayed thus far by Soviet
science.
3. That the Soviet achieve
ments are tangible and visible.
while ours are not. Is a result
OF policy decisions made within
the governments of the rcspec-
tive nations. II is not--as yet.
at least-the result OF any great
relative superiority of one ma
tons science over the others.
The heart Of the matter then
Is the national policy nj each
OF the two great world powers.
for this fact stands higher than
all others: We could have had
what the Soviets have in the
way OF technical achievements
II II had been the aim OF our
Government to employ our re-
sources and capabilities in
comparable pursuit OF COM
parable goals.
From this. we deduce these
matters OF Importance:
First. 1t is obvious that the
Soviet valuation on the signifi-
canoe Of control OF outer space
has exceeded that OF our
officials.
Second. it is equally obvious
that our valuation has heen