Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-09-29

condensed, By permission, from
the forthcoming issue OF West
ern World Magazine.
BY PAUL-HENRI SPAAK
Secretary General of NATO
Three months ago. assumed
my duties as secretary general Of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
1ation, and what up to then had
been but one of my concerns be-
came my constant care.
At a time when NATO not only
remains Target No. l. of Soviet
policy but, when its very efficacy
is laid open to doubt by certain
Western politicians, it may serve
some useful purpose if 1 state how
I found the alliance when I took
over and how l envisaged its
future.
Firstly. let it be said again that
the Atlantic alliance is the direct
product of the Soviets' poor foreign
policy since the end Of the Second
World War.
Detest and fear NATO as they
do, it is the Russians own fault
If it exists at all. They themselves
have made necessary that policy
of blocs" which they so vigorously
denounce.
Dor to Imperialism
The main purpose of signing the
Atlantic Treaty was to call halt
to that form Of imperialism of
which the Prague coup d'etdt and
the destruction of the CzechoSlo-
vakian democratic state were the
most spectacular European mani
festations - the most dangerous
and the most daring so far as the
free world was concerned.
Soviet imperialism is fact. The
USSR is the only great power
which has, both during and after
the last war, seized every occa-
sion substantially to expand and
to subject millions Of unwilling
men and women to its rule.
The three Baltic states were
purely and simply annexed. Fin
land, Poland, Rumania and Ger
many were in turn obliged to cede
large stretches Of territory.
Thanks to the presence Of
Soviet troops, and to that alone,
Communist governments. repre-
sentative Of but q fraction Of the
people, were set up at Warsaw.
Bucharest, Sonia. Budapest, East
Berlin and Prague. It was in
deed only Tito's personal courage
that saved Yugoslavia from a
similar fate.
Such was the horrifying
sequence Of conquest and satelli-
zation which the Western Allies
decided In 1919 to put to an end.
Late, but happily not too late, they
had at last been brought to I'M
derstand that only union among
themselves, and that alone, could
prevent all Europe from falling
under Communist domination.
1t cannot be sufficiently OBJ
served, stressed and repeated that
he main purpose Of the alliance
has been achieved: Without the
use of force, the West has halted
Soviet expansion in Europe.
1t would be folly were the West
ern world to forget this: put on
the brakes and thus voluntarily
re-create those conditions which
made Soviet expansion possible.
Avoiding Temptation
Even If, as 1 believe. the Rus
slams are not Systematically pre-
pairing for war, they must not be
led into temptation. Events in
Hungary have shown the things
of which they are capable when
they think their own interests are
at stake.
At the outset a military effort
at joint defense, the Atlantic al
lance must on no account sit
back. Costly as it may be. it is still
less so than open war.
Everyone. including. it's most ar
dent supporters. howeve, realizes
that q purely military alliance is
inadequate and therefore ineffica-
cious.
Without in any way minimizing
the undoubted success of the At
lantic alliance. it must neverthe-
less be acknowledged that this first
stage-the military stage-having
been accomplished, it is now a
question Of widening NATO's &C
tivities first to the political and
then to the economic fields.
A military alliance calls for at
least co-ordinated. If not a COM
mon, foreign policy on the part
Of member countries.
Western statesmen have long
been aware of this. That is why, at
the beginning of 1856. they en-
trusted to three Of their number,
the Foreign Ministers Of Canada,