Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-28

It is logical to suggest here
that the West have two armies,
The containing army would be
ultramodern. mobile, small. It
would be able to push the Com
munists back behind the line
without bringing SAC and the
V-bombers into play and with
out threatening Russia's stra-
tegic air command (for once
Russia's ultimate counter weap-
on, its SAC. were threatened. i'll
would have to use that weapon
or admit defeat).
The shield would be used
without the sword.
Local wars then could be kept
local. but the retaliatory army
would still be there to deter a |
general outbreak.
There is another attraction to
this plan. NATO in fact has
never had its 90 division army
or even its atomic-age minimum
army Of 80 divisions. It could |
muster only half of that mini
mum, and many units Of the
half are unavailable (most
French units, for instance. are
fighting the rebels In Algeria i
NATO has,vbeen fiounderingl
somewhere between the "trip
wire" concept "a thin line of
soldiers along the frontier who
can ring the alarm for SAC III
the Reds invade) and the
shield" concept. The NATOl
army has been too small to be
a real shield and too large tol
benefit from the economy Of the
trip wire.
Possible Drawbacks
The trip-wre idea has draw
backs. European nations which
would be overrun by the Rus
slams in the process Of tripping
the wire might well prefer to
become. cold-war neutrals and
abandon NATO and the West.
There Is enough trip-wire think !
ing among NATO country politi-
cal leaders. however, to make
them satisfied with a weak shield
and delay-perhaps forever--its
creation.
But the two-force idea might
make enough sense to stiffen
NATO-nation support of a tough
Western defense. II aggression
could be stopped without World
War III suicide. then European
nations might be happy to buy
the plan.
To create the double army |
there would have to be a clear
separation between NATO and
the retaliatory backstop. 1t would
have to be stated clearly to Rus
STA that the NATO army will
stop Q small aggression without
SAC and v-bomber support. !
Otherwise Russia would use its
retaliatory power on a war
that the containing army could
handle. /
Meanwhile the NATO army
would have to be made truly
effective.
The expected German con-
tribution Of five divisions this
year and several more soon after
will bring NATO at least closer
to the shield goal. But all
NATO units would have to be
modernized and equipped with
small. tactical atomic weapons. |
This would be expensive.
Need Dual Weapons"
Today this modern force ex-I
lists only in the form Of q 5000
man American nuclear unit in
Italy. the American A-weapon
equipped 9Th Fleet in the Med
iterranean, and the British and
American tactical air units sta
toned in Europe. Other NATO
units will need perhaps dual"
weapons. capable Of firing or
dropping either TINT or atomic /
projectiles.
The atomic warheads would |
have to come from America, I
which is prohibited by law from
giving them to its allies. or Brit
ain. which has too few.
The use and capability Of /
small atomic weapons will have
to be studied. Perhaps the look |
Of NATO will have to be altered |
to use these weapons to the best |
effect. And military and civilian
leaders will have to find sure
fire methods Of keeping a small, /
containing" atomic war from |
snowballing into a large, ire
taliatory." war.
All these things will be grist /
for the NATO foreign ministers
mill in Bonn this week.
No one knows whether a new
basic NATO concept will emerge
or whether the proposal will be
subjected to further scrutiny. |
But there is a growing realiza-
ton that time has overtaken
the earlier NATO defensive con- |
cept and that a defense plan
based on the certainty Of mu-
tual suicide calls for a sober
second look.