Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-06-13

along.
In their present mood, several
European nations might become
Seventh OF q Series
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the rocks on which this latest
disarmament voyage breaks up.
They are miffed, first of all,
because Disarmament Negotia-
tor Harold E. Stassen repeatedly
told the Soviet delegate about
the new American position on
reaching a f1rSt-Step disarma-
ment plan before he filled in
Britain, France and the other
NATO allies.
But behind these "procedural"
difficulties, as Secretary of State
Dulles called them Tuesday, are
more basic complications.
European Views
The West European powers
want assurances that inspection
is foolproof in verifying any
arms reductions. And West
Germany doesn't want to make
any commitments to allow Soviet
aerial inspection over its terri
tory at this time. The feeling
here is that the Germans might
be more willing to cooperate
after the election September Is.
Aerial inspection is the prin-
cipal means by which the United
States hopes to guard against
its No. fear, surprise attack.
After two years of hanging back,
the Soviet Union has now ac-
cepted the principle that aerial
inspection should be included,
but Moscow and Washington are
still far from agreement on the
best way to guard against sur
prise attack.
The Reds propose air inSpec-
ton mainly to please the United
States. They put more stock in
ground inspection than aerial
photography.
Guarding against surprise at
tack is the last of five parts in
the United States first-step dis
armament plan being studied in
this series. Previous articles took
up plans for controlling nuclear
weapons production. nuclear
testing, conventional ornaments
and armed forces and outer
space objects.
Inspection Proposals
What the public knows of the
Soviet position on surprise attack
is set forth in two principal docu-
ments, Premier Bulganin's letter
to President Eisenhower last
November II and a Soviet aide
memoire broadcast by Radio
Moscow April 80.
Both emphasize ground in
spection. The later proposal, for
a first-Stage test of methods for
guarding against surprise attack.
contains these main features;
Ground inspection. ION the
basis of reciprocity" at large
ports, railway functions and
main motor highways. Inspec-
tors would be charged with see
ing to it that there is no dan
gerous concentration of armed
forces and ornaments. In the
first stage. ground control
posts" would be set up "only in
the western border regions of
the Soviet Union, on the terri
tories of France. Great Britain.
and on the territories OF other
member countries of the North
Atlantic Treaty and Warsaw
Treaty, as we'll as in the East
ern part of the United States.
Other ground inspection units
could be stationed where aerial
inspection is TO be tested But
this latest first-stage Soviet pro-
posal puts of until the second
stage any ground inspection of
airflelds.
Air inspection of roughly one
third of the Soviet Union. two
thirds of the United States and
most of Central Europe west Of
the Soviet Union. The area to
be photographed from the air
by the United States would cover
Eastern Siberia. the Soviet Far
East and portions Of Europe in
Guiding East Germany, Poland.
a small part of the Western So
Wet Union and a part of the
Balkans. Soviet aerial cameras
would inspect some % States
west of the Mississippi River. all
of Alaska and most Of France.
Italy. West Germany and South
east England.
United States Attitude
The United States present
position has not been publicly
stated But administration lead
ers have made it plain they can
not accept the Soviet plan, which
calls. in effect. for ground in
spection all over the United
States and aerial inspection OF
two-thirds of the territory while
the principal Soviet installations
would not be inspected by either
aerial or ground observers.
What the United States pro-
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