Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-03-03

Soviet orbit will lead to an in
and to a prolonged sharpeni
USSR and the West. 1t is also
in the world, as in the Middle East,
will cut across the lines of the basic
Soviet-American conflict, to the ex-
tent that the United States and
the USSR may find themselves
on the same side of a number of
arguments. Nor are these possible
ities-which we cannot call prob
abilities-necessarily incompatible.
The attempt to foresee all the
ramiflcations of just these two
possibilities is difficult enough. But
we must also be prepared to face
real surprise similar to Nikita
Khrushchev's secret report or the
heroic defiance of the Hungarian
people. We do appear to be in a
period of "thaw," perhaps jan
uary thaw." with much grinding of
the ice mixed with fleeting intima-
tions of better season to come.
Such seasons are VIGOROUSLY treach-
erous, not least in international
affairs.
But whether in the year ahead We
face continued, or even intensi-
fed. conflict or a more relaxed Sit
uation, it seems safe to say that
Soviet-American relations will re-
main competitive Hence we may.
at the very least. try to ascertain
he Cf,al
petition on our part, regardless of
the pattern Of events.
Minimum Conditions
Successful competition" what
ever else 1t achieves, must exclude
the following consequences:
. A further extension of Commu-
mist territorial control
. A shift in the worlds balance Of
power from the non-CommuniSt to
the Communist sectors.
. A demonstration by the Commu-
mist system of greater vitality and
creativeness in those aspects of
activity - military, archaeological,
economic, political or spiritual =
which are, or are generally thought
to be. the controlling aspects for
the future progress of the worlds
societies.
There would probably be little
disagreement about the need of
averting these three results. There
would be less agreement on the
conditions for positive success.
Some would argue that successful
competition must eventually mean
the demise or the reduction to in
significance Of Communist power
and Communist theology.
But before considering this dis
puted issue We should examine the
formidable challenges presented by
our more limited definition. We
might, in fact, discover that the
two-the negative and the positive
conditions-are less distinct than
might appear at first glance.
The most striking fact of the
past year or two Is that the terms
of SOviet-American competition
have become considerably more
complex than they were In Sta
Inns time.
Then, the military threat of the
USSR. the opacity of the Iron
Curtain. and the overt aggressive
ness of the entire Soviet bloc largely
defined the responses the non-Com-
munist powers had to make If they
were not to be overwhelmed.
Today, while these dangers re-
main as potentialities, a certain
relaxation has taken place in So
Wet domestic affairs, and the
appearance Of the Soviet bloc is
considerably less monolithic.
Mony Elements the Some
Along with these changes. how
ever, certain very important fea-
lures remain.
For all the signs OF a "thaw" and
the recent structures against Stain,
the USSR is still run by a small,
self-perpetuating group Of Comu-
nIsts. not responsible to anyone
beyond themselves. not faced with
any loyal opposition" which might
replace them by normal means, and
still capable, so far as we can Judge,
OF arbitrary and unpredictable re-
versals OF the party line.
Also. for all the notifications and
recasting OF the theology at the
10th Communist Party congress of
1856 and elsewhere, party pro-
nouncements leave little doubt that
the basic premises and outlook of
the Soviet leaders are what they
have always been.
Finally, the economic power and
capabilities Of the Soviet Union re-