Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-06-07
Second Of o Series

Second Of q Series
to stop making nuclear weapons
and put the fashionable materials
to peaceful use. That would slow
down the arms race and bring
hope of reversing it.
But HOW to stop is still a
question on which the two lead
ing nuclear powers are poles
apart.
The Kremlin's present inclina-
ton is to put the whole matter
of until a later stage.
The United States probably
will come to the same conclusion,
but wants to make one more try.
Inspection Is Crux
Inspection is still the major
problem. The Russians won't
allow it; the Americans don't
dare stop producing without
verification that the Soviet
Union is doing the same.
one alarming prospect, how
ever, obligeS both the Soviet
Union and the United States to
press for some reduction in
nuclear production.
Many other powers soon will
be able and ready to make A
bombs.
When they do, reversing the
nuclear arms race or controlling
atomic warfare will be much
more complicated. Dangers of a
new nuclear holocaust, it is felt,
would be greatly increased.
Oficials speak Of as many as
Is or 20 nations going even
tually into the nuclear weapons
field. unless something is done
now.
The United States, Britain and
the Soviet Union-the nuclear
Big Three-hope they can per-
suade fourth nations" to alb
stain voluntarily.
But France and other allies
are now making it clear to the
United States that they will not
make such a promise until the
big powers already possessing
nuclear weapons start pairing
down their capacity.
They want reliable evidence,
too, under just as strict inspec-
ton as the United States seeks
that the Soviet Union is actually
reducing its nuclear capability
U. S. Gets Backing
Thus the fourth nations are
reinforcing the American in
slstence on foolproof inspection
of whatever disarmament steps
are taken.
What progress is made in
nuclear production will have a
bearing. too. on what agreements
can be reached in some of the
other four general areas where
the United States is negotiating
Nuclear testing. conventional
arms and armed forces. outer
space objects, and guarding
against surprise attack.
This article. however, will re-
strict itself to a study Of the
differences in the Soviet and
American positions on nuclear
weapons production.
Last November II in his letter
TO President Eisenhower, Soviet
Premier Bulganin proposed four
kinds Of restrictions on nuclear
weapons:
. A declaration banning their
use, joined in by all three nu-
clear powers.
. Cessation of their production
Full destruction Of stockpiles
. Their elimination from the
ornaments Of states.
No Specific Provision
This was seen as a "compre-
hensive" program for disarma-
ment. But no specific provision
for inspection of these acts wa:
made, except for a general ont
calling for strict and effective
control"
Russia was then still pursuing
the propaganda game, talkint
loudly of banning atomic
weapons but refusing to allow
the world to see that she does it
The American response came
January IA in the United Ma
tions. The United States saiC
1t was still willing to try for {
comprehensive" disarmament
system. but suggested a new ap
preach. Why not start with ;
first-stage arms limitation?
In his U. N. presentation
American Ambassador Henri.
Cabot Lodge. jr., showed tn
weaknesses Of the Soviet APP
preach. Speaking Of banning
nuclear weapons is impractical
he implied.
The members OF the Assembl.
and scientists throughout TIL
world know that it is impossible
TO account with essential Ger
tainty, or to discover through
any known scientific means o
inspection, all Of the fissionabl
materials produced in the past
or all the existing accumulation
OF nuclear weapons"
But Ambassador Lodge did, il
effect. accept the principle tina
additional nuclear production
should be stopped. He was ais,
receptive to the idea Of destruc
ton OF nuclear-weapons stock
piles, in stages.
Procedure Outlined
He outlined this procedure:
First: Establish effective in
ternational control Of futur
production Of fashionable ma
terials and exchange firm
commitments TO use all futur
production exclusively for non
weapons purposes" This nigh
involve stationing internationa
observers at most Soviet ant
American nuclear plants.
Second. When these commit