Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-01-01
The SHOOTING Starts

The Eisenhower administration pre-
Sumably was employing the trial balloon
technique in Informally divulging the
outlines Of its new Middle East program.
1t wanted to see who would shoot at it
and how heavy the firing would be. That
experiment has been reasonably success
full in both respects.
Some of the domestic criticism has
been of the peevish variety, coming from
critics who seem to think that this new
program is some kind of political trick.
These people wouldn't like anything that
was proposed by the President. A slightly
different line is being taken by few par
tisanS who had been belaboring the adj
ministration for not having any Middle
Eastern policy, and who now profess to
be diSmayed, not so much by the new
policy, but by the manner in which it
has been made public. A spokesman for
Syria, where Russian influence in the
Middle East probably is strongest, inter-
pretS the policy as new kind of i'm
perialism. And the reaction in Cairo has
been lukewarm to say the least
On the whole, however, the response
must be moderately reassuring to the
President and Secretary Dulles. For if
this new policy, designed to combine eco
nomic aid with armed assistance to any
help-seeking state which may be attacked
by the Communists, has not been re-
ceived in many places with enthusiasm,
there have also been very few responsible
indications of any disposition to sum-
marily reject it. The preponderant at
titude has been one of wait-and-see, an
unwillingness to offer any significant
comment until the details of the plan are
known.
This is perfectly understandable, for
this project in some respects is unlike
anything the United States has under
taken before. When we went to the aid
of Greece and Turkey there not only was
visible threat to those countries, but
there were also governments in power
which were anxious to have our sup
port. Much the same thing was true Of
FormoSa. The Chinese Communists had
been openly and loudly threatening to
take Formosa by armed assault. And the
government of Chang Kai-shek not only
intended to fight back, but was plead
ing for American help. The case of the
Middle East is different. There is no
overt threat of Communist armed ag-
erosion in that area, and the Subtler
menaceS of subverSion and political in
filtration are difficult to identify and re-
SiSt. Furthermore, there is precious little
evidence that the countries we think are
threatened either want or would accept
American armed support. They may see
the light later, but they have not seen
it yet.
All of these considerations, and 9TH
erS' as well, make this delicate and diff
f1cult undertaking. There will be plenty
of opportunities to shoot holes in the
Presidents plan. But we must never lose
sight of the fact that this question of
the Middle East is a deadly serious one.
There is kind of vacuum there now, and
some influence is going to fill it. If it
should turn out to be the Russians who
gain the upper hand there-and they will
try-the whole Western position could be
fatally undermined. So let us hope that
this Middle East program, when fully UNI
veiled will be studied earnestly and ma
turely-and that it will not be converted
into kind of pingpong table for the
scoring of petty political points.