Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-07-05
Moscow Purqe

VlOSSVW 0SC
When the Kremlin erupts in such
spectacular and startling fashion as to
topple men of the stature of Molotov,
Malenkov and Kaganovich 1t is wiser
for the uninitiated to content themselves
with minimum estimates of the signif1-
canoe of the phenomenon.
The first such estimate is that Nikita
Khrushchev, already first among equals,
has materially strengthened his personal
position. In any circumstances, it was
no small feat to condemn and GUST from
leadership posts such prominent figures
as Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich,
not to mention the lesser men who have
been consigned to outer darkness. To
accomplish this, Khrushchev must have
had the firm support of the bureaucracy
and the army. The elevation of Marshal
Zhukov to full membership of the Presid-
ium of the Central Committee is some
evidence with respect to the latter point.
A second minimum estimate is that
this Shakeup, whatever may be the total
ramif1cations, is hopeful development
from the point of view of the West. For
the ousted leaders, especially Molotov and
Kaganovich, are hard-core Stain men.
Their attitude toward any liberalization
of Kremlin policy, any easing of cold-war
tensions, has been one of harsh, unyield-
ing opposition. Had they prevailed in the
struggle for power which has been going
on within the Kremlin, the probable re-
suit would have been to destroy any hope
for improvement in relations between the
Soviet Union and the Western powers.
The prospects in this respect should not
be exaggerated. On the record, there is no
persuasive reason to believe that Khru-
shchev and those allied with him are
more trustworthy, or less committed to
the ultimate goal of Communist world
domination, than the Stain men, But
there is some indication that the Khru-
shchev faction has a greater aWareneSS
of the need of the Kremlin to adjust
to changing conditions, not only in Rus
STA and in the satellite countries, but
throughout the world. Where Molotov
is adamant and uncompromising, Khru-
shchev shows some signs of fiexibility,
some awareness that the policies of Stain
are not well suited to an age in which
the H-bomb may be the ultimate arbiter
of international differences. If the hope
for peaceful world rests upon concilia-
ton and negotiation with the Russians,
which we think is the case, it certainly is
far better to deal with Khrushchev than
with Molotov.
These, to repeat, are minimum eSti-
mates. For surely there must be great
deal more significance to this purge of
the old Bolsheviks. What part have diff
ferenceS over internal policies played in
the shakeup? Do the changes foreshadow
an improvement, or otherwise, in the liv-
ing standards of the Russian people? Will
there be more rapid development of the
Soviet economy? Will the pacification of
Tito, opposed by Molotov, move forward?
What should one look for in the Krem-
Inns future relationship with Red China
and the Eastern European satellites?
We do not suppose that any outsider
would pretend to know the answers to
such questions. The answers, If any, will
come only with time and with the I'M
folding of the policies to be promulgated
by the revamped Central Committee. On
balance, however. it is our belief that this
shakeup, or shaking down, of the Krem-
lin leadership is an encouraging response
to evolutionary pressures which could
not be resisted. We do not think that
Mr.. Khrushchev intends to abandon the
Communist drive toward world domina-
ton. But men and methods differ, and
the emergence of Mr.. Khrushchev as the
top man in the Kremlin, assuming that
he can survive for while. should facil-
itate rather than impede the working out
of an East-WeSt arrangement which will
rest, at the least, upon live-and-let-live
basis.