Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-09-08

sition that test suspension
would have to be linked with q
cut-otf Of nuclear weapons pro-
duction.
Fundamental Issue
3. Hating nuclear explosives
output-This was one Of the
fundamental issues of the Lon
don conference. Mr.. Stassen
argued that the way to end the
atomic arms race was to stop
producing the nuclear explo-
|sives that go into weapons and
to limit all future production
|of atomic materials to those
for peaceful purposes. Again
the West said an ironclad po-
Icing system would have to be
set up. But the Soviet Union
was never willing to take this
proposition, even in principle.
4. Banning the use Of "a"
and H" bombs-Th Soviet
Union called for an agreement
to outlaw atomic devices as
weapons Of war. The West said
such agreement would be worse
than useless: 1t would delude
people into thinking they had
security they didn't have. The
Western powers offered to
agree to ban the use Of atomic
weapons other than for self
defense. This was q meaning
less propaganda 'countermove
since all nations arm for the
express purpose of defending
themselves.
5. Cutting down present.
stockpiles - the United States
and its allies proposed reduce
ing stockpiles of atomic ma
terials to an international
atoms-for-peace agency. The
American idea is that although
the size Of present stockpiles
could never be surely known
to either the Soviet Union or
the Western powers, the size Of
reductions BY the method pro-
posed would be known to both
countries and could therefore
be trusted. No agreement was
reached on this issue.
s. Tightening the arms bur-
den-the Western package pro-
poSal introduced August 20
provided for cutting armed
forces and conventional arms
such as ships. tanks and air.
craft down IN successive
stages. The United States and
Russia under this plan, would
cut their armed forces. first to
rs million each, then to 81
million. and then TO IL mil
lion, with balanced reductions
in the forces or other countries, |
these figures had been deVel-
oped in negotiations In previ- |
Gus years and represented no
new progress. Hk
Few Points Measure Talks
In fact, the progress Of the
London tails could be measured |
BY relatively few points. The
Soviet Union accepted the |
principle Of open skies and the |
idea Of inspecting the suspen- |
sion Of atomic tests. The |
United States agreed that IL
q suspension could be negoti- |
ated as part Of q plan to cut !
on production. it could last for
q period Of two years.
But basically each stood on
its own major propositions and |
periodically accused the other
of refusing to come to terms.
Basieally the concessions Of
fered were minor in COMPARE
son with the problems before
tlle powers. They appeared sig
nif1cant when they occurred
chiefly because they suggested
the possibility Of further and
more important concessions.
Probably in some instances
at least it was the desire to-
create this impression Of fiex- |
Utility and willingness to be
reasonable that prompted one
side or the other to make q
gesture Of giving m on some
point which could be conceded
cheaply.
Official Washington. logged
ly trying to find something to
show for all the spent effort,
was inclined to share Mr.. Stas-
sens estimate that on the open
skies issue and the inspection
issue the Soviet position had
moved q little bit In 1857 as