Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-06-02
BY SYLVAN M. herman


West German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer's visit to the United States
last week has Washington circles
specializing as to how long Bonn
viii be able to continue her present,
uneQuivocal Western orientation.
While nobody questions the Chan
ceilor's logged determination to
make his country Western Europe's
eastern bulwark against Commu-
mist penetration, his visit seems
timed to meet resentment against
his policy at home and to lend an
aura Of prestige to the faltering
popularity Of those policies in adj
vance Of the coming September
elections.
It is known here that there are
serious questions within Mr.. Ade-
nauer's own party IS to the wisdom
Of indefinitely continuing Bonn's
present all-out pro-Western COM
mitments. At present, intraparty
opposition centers around one Of
the Sl-year-old Chancellor's pos
sible successors. He is Defense Min
lister Franz Josef Strauss, whom
the Social Democratic organ Vor-
tUaerts tirelessly badgers with the
question: why Is it that the De-
tense Minister rarely makes q
speech without referring to mill
tary weight and power as instru-
ments Of German policy?"
Coustic Criticism
Mr.. Strauss, whose outspoken
views have earned him the nick.
name "the Bavarian Siegfried," has
summed up widespread German
feelings in q few Enthusiastically
pungent comments. In one Of his
maiden statements as Defense Min
lister he alarmed Western diplomats
with the blunt assertion that he
didn't intend to provide German
.footsloggers for the American
atomic calvary" According to Der
SpieCel. Mr.. Strauss, during his 1856
visit to Washington. described the
proposed European Defense Com
munity as q recruiting ONCE for "a
German suicide squad to cover the
retreat Of NATO forces"
Last February the conservative
Die Welt Of Hamburg editorialized
that Mr.. Strauss world outlook is
one which strives to make West
Germany 70 participant in inter-
national politics and not an OBJ
ject Of barter"
Growing West German apprehen.
sion over Bonn's allegedly infiexible
pro-Western commitments appears
against the rising clamor for the
reunification Of East and West Ger
many. From any viewpoint SYM
pathetic to Germany's unification
the question arises as to how this
might be effected without sparkling
World War III. in which Germany
would become q battle-ground and
perhaps obliterated in the process.
Stolemate at Present
The likelihood Of immediate full
Allment not only appears to be Oh
structed by Bonn's present dipl0-
matte infiexibility, but equally BY
unacceptable Russian terms for uni
fication. Maximum Soviet demands
to date include: I'D Absolute di-
vorcement Of q neutral Germany
from NATO. 90 Retention Of East
Germany's socialist reforms" in a
reunited Germany. CD Uncondi-
tional German recognition Of the
existing Oder-Niesse frontier.
1t also seems likely that any
German-Soviet unif1cation scheme
might involve the traditional"
result Of German Russian negotia-
ton: A partition of Poland-or at
the very least q sacrifice Of Polish
territory-which might prove to be
risky business. Polish Communist
Party Chief Wladyslaw Gomulka
was quoted recently as having ad-
vised party intimates fatty that all
Poles, Of all political convictions.
adamantly oppose "our withdrawal
from the Warsaw Pact without
guarantees concerning the Oder
Neisse frontier" A probable out
come of any Soviet attempts to
make frontier adjustments in the
face Of determined Polish OPPOSE
ton would be to evoke an acute
case Of anti-Russian filters in all
the Eastern European Soviet satel-
lite countries.
Unification schemes involving not
only Poland's sacrifice but aliena-
ton Of Germany from the West as
well could quench any Pickering
hopes Of the Kremlin with regard
70 broader, global issues. Any sim
eere moves Moscow may be con-
templating with regard to nuclear
weapons control and disarmament
would be throttled by a resurgence
Of Western mistrust. The violence
which Moscow might be required
to exert. in order to crush Polish