Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-12-01
Monpower Is the Key to Victory
Even in Prostitution Warfare

that wants them and can use
them.
This being the situation. we
should ask ourselves: What will the
West do when nucIear weapons
are in the possession Of the USSR
and its satellites in abundance?
Obviously. our prospects are rather
grim il we subscribe to the theory
that nuclear weapons can be
equated with manpower. Actually.
nucIedr Weapons are but a phrt Of
push button warfare and OF far
lesser importance than the men
Uho make and use them.
Briefly. the solution to our
dilemma lies in learning to accept
the normally of nuclear weapons
and then creating systems employ
ing. nuclear material that can
apply power with discrimination
and serve the policies Of our col
lective nations.
One is reminded Of the words
Of J. F. c. Fuller in his Armament
and History:
yet one and oil ore fighting uni
vefsoI disease: il h the meehanizotion
Of life: the blind Dominance Of the
moehiae over mon.
mot untd this dominance is shot
tered, and the machine and oil il
beeets, politically, economically. so
eiolIy ond finoneiaIly. ceases 10 be the
moster Of mon and insteod becomes
his seront, vor will remain eonstont
in our civilizotion.
TO beset and build in order 10 kill
end demoIish IS lunoey And the more
powerful becomes the war machine, the
more certoin is il thot war viii bring
losses for in excess Of gains, not only
10 the venauished but also to the
victors."
The Foee Of. Future War
Finally, are we nearing the
Utopia of pushbutton warfare;
quick, decisive wars with mini
mum Of manpower participation
Clearly, the answer seems TO be
that, quite the contrary. we are
moving in the opposite direction.
The current atomic weapons situa-
ton makes crystal clear one fact
Of survival: No nation can afford
to unleash an enormous thermo-
nuclear exchange. since by doing
so it invites suicide
The ultimate in the quick and
intense war has been reached;
1t will be so quick and so intense
that it will be mutual suicide. The
grim prospect Of such a war is
enough in itself to deter it, And
within that deterrence nations
must find the ways and means Of
creating the weapons systems that
will serve the needs of policy.
Limited wars. fought for limited
detectives with limited resources.
and usually in limited geographic
areas. are far more likely a pros
pect than general wars. And since
limited wars may be gradual tram
sition from disorder to police ac-
ton, then to open hostilities. they
will be neither black nor white
but gray enough to be any or all
Of these.
No Limit on Time
Limited war will be limited in
several respects but. very likely.
not in time. More likely than
not, limited war in one area will
cause the opening of disorder.
leading to limited war in one Or
several other areas. The time
span in which they may occur
will be limitleSs.
One is reminded Of Mao Tse-
lungs ''On Protracted War" II
the West is to survive in response
to this very challenging prospect
it must rely on a high degree OF
automation in its weapons sys-
TENS, a full exploitation Of its
nuclear resources. and a complete
mechaniZation Of its military
forces: pushbutton warfare in
its fullest sense.
To a large extent we are trying
TO do this now. Pushbutton war
fare is now upon us and we must.
if we are to survive, make the
most Of it.
1t will demand a great deal Of
us. Even to achieve a minimal
understanding of the complexities
of modern weapons systems re-
QuireS extensive training. And
their use requires high skill, since
these things are not a bit better
in combat use than the men who
make them. the men who man
them. and. in the last analysis,
the men who push the buttons.
1t is quite clear now that man
remains the common denomination
of a nations effort in war. OF
all that We have learned about
pushbutton warfare so far. this
is the one truiSm: A nations
contribution to its own survival
in the field of applied military
power will not be a bit better
than the men that the nation
can produce, both in quality and
quantity.