Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-06-18
Curb on Congress

4AACAC 10 OOAAoA0C4 aOlC 1CdoOIl W UC~
lieve that the Supreme Courts decision
In the Watkins case will cripple the in
vestigative function of Congress.
This cannot be said categorically, for
the decision, like others of recent date,
is ambiguous. Its precise meaning is OBJ
scured in fog of verbiage which seems
to say one thing at given point, some
thing different at another point.
Thus, Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for majority of the court, says in one
paragraph that "a measure Of added care
on the part of the House and the Senate
in authorizing the use of compulsory
process (the subpoena power and by
their committees in exercising that
power" would suffice to protect the rights
of witnesses against illegal encroachment.
This sounds simple and easy. But is it?
In another paragraph the Chief
Justice says this: THE bill of rights is
applicable to Investigations as to all forms
of government action. Witnesses cannot
be compelled to give evidence against
themselves. They cannot be subjected to
unreasonable search and seizure. Nor
can the First Amendment freedoms of
speech, press, religion, or political belief
and association be abridged" We do not
know what this language, especially the
last sentence, means in reference to the
Watkins case. 1t is an eloquent statement,
but it has nothing whatever to do, as far
as we can see, with the facts on which
Watkins was tried, or the basis for the
courts reversal of his conviction. But it
does raise doubt as to what the courts
position might be in some other case.
Watkins, a union official who, by his
own statement, had co-operated with
the Communists, refused to tell the
House Un-American Activities Committee
whether he could identify several indi-
viduals as having been Communists. He
did not invoke the Fifth Amendment or
the First Amendment. His position was
that he would testify concerning persons
whom he believed to be members of the
Communist Party, but that he would not
testify concerning any who may have
been Communists in the past but who,
in his belief, had left the party. His con-
tention was that the committee had no
authority to ask such questions and
compel him to answer
The court, as we understand its hold
ing, did not rule that Watkins had any
constitutional right of silence, as such.
1t held, instead, that it was unable to
comprehend the legislative purpose Of the
inquiry and the Importance of the infor-
nation sought by the committee. 1t also
was unable to determine the pertinency
Of the questions put to Watkins.
In these circumstances, both the court
and Watkins were "unenlightened as to
the subject to which the questions asked
:. were pertinent" Therefore, the in
quiry was afflicted with fatal vagueness
and Watkins under the clarity require
ments of the due process clause, could
not be punished for refusing to answer
the questions.
The court. suggests that its ruling
poses no real problem-that the situation
of which it complains can be remedied
If Congress will be more careful in author
izing Investigations and if committees
will be more specific in putting questions
to witnesses. Perhaps So But Justice
Clark, dissenting, thinks that the court
has set itself up as "the grand inquisitor
and supervisor of congressional investi-
cations" and that the effect Of the courts
ruling will be to cripple the (investigat-
ing committee) system beyond worka-
bility." Takingthe opinion in its entirety,
there is considerable support for this view.