davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
japan

TOKYO.-Japanese taxpayers in
the upper brackets this year are
getting a break. The cabinet re-
Gently approved tax cuts which will
lower the top so per cent bracket to
40 per cent. Still. United States
businessmen working here and
therefore obliged to pay japanese
taxes, find the rates far higher
than American levies. This Is be-
cause Japanese generally make
much less than Americans who UNI
happily find themselves taxed at
the rate of tycoons.
For example, under the prevail
ing old rates man earning $4,000,
with three dependents must pay the
yen equivalent Of $2,639 in Jap
anese taxes. This man would have
only paid 5000 to Uncle Sam. Under
the new system. the 40 per cent
bracket will begin at $l3,800. In
1854 only 400 taxpayers admitted
to incomes Of more than $4,000.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

state. Fundamentally, the purpose
of preventive war is the preserva-
ton Of the status quo.
Five factors figure into decision
on whether to wage preventive
war.
/. Capabilities-Basic to a deci-
sion to engage in preventive war
is the prediction that the potential
military strength Of ones own state
is declining in comparison with the
military strength of the enemy.
Preventive war normally is the
weapon neither of revolutionary
states nor of states that are on the
ascendent and rapidly growing in
military power. 1t is more likely
to be the recourse Of have ma
tions" than of "have-not nations"
and 1t is most likely to be resorted
to by states which are on the verge
of relative decline.
2. IntentiOns-A further predic-
ton is required that the conflicting
intentions Of the two states will
eventually lead them to war or to
the overt use Of the threat of war
at some point in the future. II
this prediction Is unfounded, no
reason exists for preventive war.
3. Alternatives--Any war inten-
SITES the threats to the military
security of a state for at least
two reasons. During war the re-
duction OF the military security
OF the state becomes the positive
goal of another state or a coalition
of states. Also, during war, changes
In the military security OF a state
may occur suddenly and quickly.
For these reasons, state normally
will not resort to preventive war
unless 1t has exhausted all other
possible means OF averting or neu-
tralizing Its threatened loss Of mill
tary security. Most states will pre-
fer an arms race TO a preventive
war.
Another alternative is the ne
COLLATION. Of alliances with other
states that would guarantee to come
to the aid Of the threatened state
II 1t were attacked by Its potential
opponent.
Another is direct negotiation
with the potential opponent de-
signed to eliminate the causes OF
friction between the two states.
Or an effort might be made to
reach some agreement with the po-
tential opponent which would de-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
PIonnedLeok
IsHeoded for
The Discard
BY EARL n. voss

The planned leak" is likely to
fall into disuse as q device to get
information on United States for
eign policy before the public under
the State Departments new public
relations chief.
Andrew Berding, recently sworn
In as Assistant Secretary Of State
for Public Affairs. feels there are
better ways to get more news before
the public.
He is determined to return the
so-called background news confer
ence to its basic purpose Of ampli-
flying and explaining news develop
ments. not revealing them. He
believes spot news should be given
out officially, not made available
to small group Of reporters sub
rosa, a technique for which his
predecessor, Carl McCardle. has
been both acclaimed and criticized.
In the past four years. Secretary
Of State Dulles has been the hidden
source for many important revela-
tons of new developments in Ameri-
can foreign policy. Most of them
were passed out in private to a
small group of Washington report
ers who subjected them to their
own interpretations. On occasion,
the interpretations missed or dis
torted the point the Secretary was
trying to make.
Mr.. Berding hopes TO persuade
Mr.. Dulles in the future to make
spot news developments more gen.
orally available. Also he favors
making transcripts of any back
ground conference briefings and
circulating those transcripts widely
among news media. In the past
many of the private briefings in
Washington Intentionally were not
made a matter of record.
Help for Foreign Press
Another project of Mr.. Berding's
is to pay more attention to corre-
spondents from foreign nations.
He took the first step in that
direction at Bermuda, after the
conferences between President
Eisenhower and British Prime Min
lister Harold Macmillan. Secretary
Dulles held two background con-
ferences-one for American CORES
pondents and another for the
British. 1t was Mr.. Dulles first
backgrounder for a group Of foreign
correspondents.
Working with foreign correspond
ents is one way of putting into
practice a principle which Mr..
Berding learned during his own
days as a foreign correspondent
in Europe: The most effective land
cheapest) way to get public back
ing for foreign policy is to reach
the people through the mass media
the press associations. newspapers,
radio networks and television.
1t is his intention to concentrate
on these mass media and use only
minimum Of pamphlets, exhibits
and other public relations tech
niques.
He has also resolved to make
more effective use Of speeches by
important department officials for
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

tive for politically defensive pur-
poses, was overlooked.
American willingness to fight
preventive limited wars will null
tiply the contingencies which the
Soviet Union must be prepared to
meet and thus will tend to restrict
its opportunities for aggressive ac-
ton and. correspondingly. the num-
Der of defensive limited wars which
the United States must be pre-
pared for.
Conceivably 1t might be desirable
and even essential for the United
States to resort to preventive war
in two possible types of circum-
stances: Where such action was
necessary to prevent an immediate
local change in the balance of
power in some area of the world
and where such action was nee
essary to prevent the likely out
break of total war.
A Communist coup d'etat in a
friendly or neutral power, the threat
OF local aggression by a Soviet sat-
elite. the movement of a neutral
or friendly power into the Soviet
bloc, the sudden increase in the
ornaments of a satellite or neutral
power-all these might be the &C.
casion for preventive action by the
United States and its allies.
At the very least, such situations
require a careful weighing of the
pros and cons of the five factors
involved in a preventive war
decision.
A second situation in which pre-
ventive action might be necessary
would be where the initiation of a
limited war appeared to be the only
way OF avoiding total war.
This might we'll be the case where
a potential opponent appeared to
have embarked upon a program of
aggression which would ultimately
increase his relative military capa-
bility to the point where he would
feel safe in initiating an about
war. Or it might be necessary to
undertake limited war so as to
occupy and diSsipate the forces and
distract the intentions of a power
which was apparently building up
its strength with a view to making
total war.
Normally, preventive war is
undertaken in order to secure VIC
tory now rather than risk defeat
later. The question Of victory or
defeat In total war, however, is
relatively meaningless. 1t is total
war itself. not defeat in total war,
which must be prevented
The issue is not the difference in
outcome Of war now and war later.
but rather the difference In size of
war now and war later. It might
we'll be more desirable to engage in
smaller war now with less chance
OF success than to engage in a total
war later when the military balance
was more favorable. In the extreme
case, 1t might even be preferable
to fight limited war which one was
sure to lose II the certain alternative
was total war at a later date.
It has been argued that the United
States could lose the peace without
firing shot. It may be equally
true that under certain circum-
stances the United States can only
preserve the peace by firing . few
shots.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
American Policy

All three American doctrines Of
preventive war identified preventive
war with total war: The hurting at
the Soviet Union of all the force in
nuclear weapons which 1t was with
in the capacity of the United States
to hurl. And because the advocates
of preventive war thought of it only
as total war. so also did its OPP
ponents.
The rejection of preventive war
by both Democratic and Republican
administrations and by most in
formed public opinion was not so
much a rejection of limited war
per Sc as it was a rejection Of
nuclear total war BY implication,
this blanket rejection of total war
became a blanket rejection of pre-
ventive war.
Paradoxically. the same blind
spot existed in the debate over the
desirability of limited war policy.
The supporters Of limited war
thought Of 1t exclusively as defen-
sive limited war. They admitted
that the United States would have
to surrender the initiative to the
Soviet bloc. Accepting the prevail
ing opinion. they, too, attacked
preventive war as the equivalent
Of total war. And because the
supporters OF limited war identified
1t with defensive war. so also did
It's opponents. The Eisenhower adj
ministration rejected limited war
because 1t was defensive, and
defensive war would require mill
tary budgets higher than the adj
ministration could support.
Secretary Of State Dulles de-
manded that the United States
place less reliance on limited war
and that 1t seize the initiative in
the cold war. His two arguments,
however, were incompatible. A
policy Of the initiative could not be
q policy of total war. It would have
to be a policy Of small gains and
piecemeal advances. which involved
the risk Of limited, not total. war.
In opposing limited war, Mr..
Dulles denied himself the means
with which to assume the initiative.
The possible marriage Of preven-
tive war and limited war. which
would have used military militia
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

explaining American foreign pol
icy. He intends to read early drafts
of all important speeches with q
view to getting more substantial
information into them.
One thing that will make Mr..
Berdirg's job easier than his pre-
decessor's is the appointment of
Massachusetts, former Governor,
Christian Herter. as Undersecretary
of State. In contrast to the re-
cently-resigned Herbert Hoover,
jr., Mr. Herter is affable and eager
to meet the press. He may soon
take some of the speech-making
load of Secretary Dulles.
To Examine Restrictions
There are two widely accepted
restrictions on diplomatic report
ing which are scheduled for reap
praisal by Mr.. Berding. The first
is the traditional refusal to discuss
with newsmen matters under nego-
tiation. The aim was to avoid
preSSures on the negotiating coun-
tries.
But Mr.. Berding points out that
when several nations are negotiat-
ing the chances for leaks are null
tiplied. The American version of
the negotiations may thus be late
in reaching the public. In future
multilateral negotiations he may
try to release reports on their
progress.
The other restriction is that
which occurs when State Depart
ment officials. concerned with a
specific area Of the world, plead
for suppression of news about Amer
lean policies which may offend GER
tain nations. Mr.. Berding intends
to weigh the bad effects abroad
against the good effects in this
country. and to get more news
out on controversial policies.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
Britain

LONDON.-For the first time In
years, Britons are expecting q small
measure Of tax relief this month
with the announcement Of the new
budget. pared drastically in mill
tary commitments.
Englishmen still are the most
prompt and upright taxpayers In
the world, but they no longer shell
out with quiet smile of endurance
and that famous British stiff upper
lip. After II years of the most
rugged taxation in history. they
are protesting.
Nearly II million persons out Of
q total population of so million
paid income taxes in Britain last
year. Generally speaking. every
body who earns more than $500
pays.
Up to $4,000 t$5,6OO income a
year, the standard tax rate is 8
shillings six pence ($l.20) on the
pound ($2.80). Married persons get
an exemption of $672. And $3.50
is the exemption for each child.
Stir as this is. above the $4,000
a-year-level the tax bite really gets
rugged. That is the area of the
surtax-and Englishmen talk Of
being "surtaxed" to death. It rises
progressively until. on income
above fl5,O0O ($42 .000D it is $3.50
out of every pound.
In a country where inheritance
taxes can wipe out large fortune
in a couple of generations and
where cigarettes cost so cents a
pack as a result Of taxes. it is
strange but true that there is no
such thing as a capital gains tax.
1t was overlooked by the postwar
Socialist government and is the
reason why. despite the income tax
load, number of shrewd bust
nessmen still are making-and
holding onto-lots of money in
England today.
But, for the ordinary wage
Garner. 1t is small compensation to
know there are still ways to make
money-if one has some to start
with.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

Secretary Of State Dulles already
has been sold on the need for
frequent press conferences, and his
new public affairs secretary intends
to encourage him in this.
Last week, for instance, Mr..
Dulles might have been tempted
to avoid a news conference grilling
on his Aswan Dam and Formosa
policies. precipitated by a newly
released biography by Time re-
porter John Robinson Beal. But
he chose instead to meet the press
and set the record straight.
He's Well Prepared
Mr.. Berding does not pretend to
know all the answers. But he brings
to his new job an unusual amount
of preparation. AS policy adviser
to several chiefs of the United
States Information Agency. he
worked closely with State Depart
ment public affairs officials through
much Of the Eisenhower admins
tration.
Also. he has acted as press brief
ing officer for Mr.. Dulles at most
Of the important international
conferences Of recent years, includ-
ing the summit conference at Gen.
eva in the summer OF 1855. His
recent trip to Canberra with Mr.
Dulles for the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization foreign min
listers conference was the third
SEATO meeting at which he has
briefed newsmen.
The new Assistant Secretary is
not the first. Of course, to tilt at
the ponderous State Department
bureaucracy. and he is prepared
to accept mixed results. But If
he reaches even a few Of his OBJ
jectives, public understanding OF
American foreign policy Is likely
to be increased.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
BY SAMUEL p. HUNTINGTON


The debate over American mill
tary policy has focused upon the
two alternatives Of massive re-
taliation" and limited warfare"
The supporters Of the former
have argued that the United States
cannot afford the men or the re-
sources to meet each Communist
threat on its own terms. Instead,
the United States must concentrate
upon that form Of military force
nuclear air power-where 1t is best
able to maintain a decisive su-
periorfty. The key element of Amer
lean strength must be, in the words
OF Secretary Dulles. "a great ca
pacity to retaliate, instantly, by
means and at places of our choos-
ing"
Opposed to this doctrine is the
claim Of the limited war advocates
that the United States cannot as
sumo the responsibility for turn
ing brush fire" aggression into
major conflict. The punishment
must be made to fit the crime. The
United States and its allies should
possess balanced military forces
capable Of variety of responses to
a variety Of challenges.
Each of these policies has its
limitations. Massive retaliation
violates the principle of economy
Of force; limited warfare presup-
poses strictly defensive role.
The history of the past decade
suggests that the United States
does not wish to adhere consistently
to either policy. On the one hand,
three months after announcing the
massive retaliation doctrine, the
Eisenhower administration conspic-
uously refrained from applying 1t
to Indo-China. On the other hand,
a limited war policy requires the
maintenance of military forces of
a strength and variety which are
probably beyond the willingness OF
the American people to support for
any length Of time.
American policy has been caught
IN dilemma between selective
preparation for massive action on
the one hand. and massive prep
aration for small action on the
other. AS result, the United
States has lacked the will to engage
in massive retaliation. and it has
lacked the diversity Of strength to
fight limited wars.
Both sides In the great debate"
however, neglect the role Of preven-
tive war. Americans undoubtedly
have an instructive dislike Of pre-
ventive war. The purpose Of this
essay is to suggest that perhaps
this dislike Is rooted in an overly
narrow conception Of preventive war
and that q reconsideration Of the
full role which preventive war could
play In American policy may indi-
cate q way out Of the unpleasant
dilemma of massive retaliation
versus limited warfare.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
Russia

MOSCOW.-Odd as 1t may seem.
Russia remains a fine place for
millionaires-at least as far as the
tax rate is concerned. The fact Is
many Of the privileged members Of
Russian Communist society-fac-
tory bosses. party chieftains, movie
stars and some writer's for example
live in q style that would cost
fortunes anywhere else on earth.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

were cut most heavily in the very
lowest brackets-to increase pur-
chasing power-and in the very
highest brackets-to stimulate cap
ital investment.
The top bracket rate was cut
from 80 to SIS per cent compared
with the top United States per cent
OF 81. In sample cases. the tax
paid by a married German with
one child, earning STA a year is
$11.34 tan American family with
this income pays no tax. A Ger
man family of three, earning
$2,856 pays SASS tthe equivalent
American family $172). A married
man with two children earning
$4,000 100000 marks pays
$9,044.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
Three Doctrines

From the founding Of the Re-
public until l946, the United States
at times waged aggressive war and
at other times was forced into
defensive wars. Rarely II ever in
Its history, however, did 1t confront
the issue Of preventive war. The
reason for this was simply Its isola-
ton from world affairs.
Since World War II, however,
the international position of the
United States has been drastically
altered In at least two major re-
spects. First. the continuing cold
war with the Soviet Union has
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

involved many basic conflicts Of
interest. The balance of power be-
tween these two countries has
become the most fundamental
element in world politics. Conse-
quently, the United States has a
responsibility for the maintenance
Of that balance such as it did not
have previously. Secondly. during
the decade after World War II. the
military strength Of the Soviet
Union and its allies generally
tended to increase relative to that
OF the United States and its allies.
These two new facts meant that
the United States could no longer
ignore the possibility Of preventive
war. and that under some circum-
stances 1t might have the respon-
I sibility and duty to undertake pre-
ventive military action. This revo-
luton in the American security
position was reflected in the APP
pearance. for the first time in
American history. of serious thought
on the subject of preventive war.
During the postwar decade three
authentic doctrines Of preventive
war were developed.
. Nuclear Monopoly Exploitation.
This doctrine, advanced by some
military men and others in the
years Immediately after World War
II. held that the United States
should force a military showdown
with the Soviet Union before the
latter acquired nuclear weapons
and the means of delivering them.
1t was assumed that conflict
between the two countries was
inevitable sooner or later and that
once it acquired substantial nuclear
capability the Soviet Union would
not hesitate to utilize that capable
ity against the United States. The
United States. 1t was said, should
present Russia with an ultimatum
TO cease the production Of nuclear
arms and to accept international
supervision or to be blasted to bits.
The arguments Of the nuclear mo-
nopolist school Of thought were,
Of course, accepted neither by the
American public nor by the adj
ministration in power.
. Piecemeal Destruction. This
school Of preventive war advocates
appeared after the start OF the
Korean War. They were concerned
with the possible dissipation of
American strength through series
OF small wars with Soviet satellites.
Rather than succumb to this fate,
they argued that the United States
should force an immediate show
down with the Soviet Union as the
source Of the evil and the real bene-
ficiary Of the satellite aggressions.
In August and September, 1850,
various officials Of the Government
were quoted or reported in support
OF preventive war with Russia.
While most OF them did not elab-
crate their reasons in detail, the
fear OF progressive involvement in
small-scale conflicts which would
eventually lead to general con-
Migration was apparently . major
factor in their thinking. The adj
ministration, however, forcefully
rejected this line Of thought.
. Anticipatory Retaliation. This
school Of preventive war thinking
argued not that preventive war was
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14

fine. and stabilize the balance OF
power between the two states.
4. Imminence-A decision to en-
gage in preventive war depends upon
accurate predictions as to the prob
able course of future events in the
absence of such a decision. In gen.
eral. the more long-range the pre-
diction, the less accurate 1t will be.
If the unfavorable change in the
balance of power is likely in the
immediate future, more grounds
exist for waging preventive war
than II 1t is not likely until the dis
tant future.
5. COnsequences-Bef deciding
upon preventive war a high degree
of certainty must exist that this ac-
ton will achieve its objective, that
in reducing or eliminating one
threat to its military security, for
instance, the state does not hasten
or further the emergence of other
threats. Bismarck once described
preventive war as suicide for fear
OF death" This description, how
ever. is accurate only If the cure is
equal TO or worse than the disease.
A proper decision to wage preven-
tive war is a decision to cut of
limb to save a life.
1t is sometimes claimed that any
deliberate resort to force. whatever
its purpose, is immoral and unjus-
tifiable. One must keep In mind.
however, the differences between
preventive war and aggressive war.
Aggressive war has a much weaker
moral basis than preventive war.
Aggressive war substitutes violence
for peace. Preventive war substi-
tutes present violence for future
whence
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
COMPANY FOR MISERY SUNDAY s1AEs washington C. Az
Taxes Are a G|obaI Fact Of Life
FOR MISERY

This Is the time of year when
citizens OF all civilised nations
feel a common pressure-tara-
ton. Rich and poor, COMMIT
mist and capitalist, all submit
to this price of citizenship,
although it paries considerably
from country to country. The
North American Newspaper Al
lance asked its correspondents
abroad for a report to the
American taxpayer on ho,c his
opposite numbers oUerseGs are
taring. Here Is that report:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1957-04-14
Germany

BONN.-The clerk In the station
cry store insisted: You will want
the receipt for your envelopes"
The amount was marks $50 cents).
In the coffee shop the waitress
collected the bill. prepared a receipt