Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-03-04
Foreign Program

What foreign policy do the So
Wet leaders propose to build on
their more genial theological frame
work and their enlarged military
and economic base?
They propose, quite simply, to
neutralize. if not cleanly to outstrip
American military power; to break
up the system of military alliances
we have erected around the Free
World; to attach the nations of
Eurasia, in progressive steps, to
Moscow; and to force the United
States into isolation on this island
continent, to be dealt with at lei
sure from position of Soviet pre-
ponderance.
Khrushchev described the world
in terms of four groups of coun-
tries for each of which he and his
colleagues elaborated a distinctive
program.
There are the Communist states
China and the Eastern European
satellites where they plan to expand
military and industrial power under
Moscow's leadership and project
out an image of progress and sue
cess.
There are the neutral states,
headed by India, where by economic
policy, diplomacy, and apparent
alignment with nationalism and
economic development they plan to
exert slow. steady pull toward
Moscow, while assisting the local
Communist parties to grow in au-
thority on a Popular Front basic.
There are the states hitherto
friendly to the United States or
formally allied to us, whom they
hope to detach by a mixture of
quiet threat (backed by growing
delivery capabilities with atomic
weapons). combined with a variety
of political and economic offers
and, where feasible, popular front
tactics by the local Communist
Party. Here their eyes are quite
explicitly focused on Western Ger
many, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan and Japan.
Then there are Britain and the
United States, where the Soviet
Unions enunciated objective is to
build up so powerful sense in
public opinion that peace has ar
rived that the governments will be
unable to take effective counter
measures or ask for the requisite
sacrifices. It is this possibility
which is stated by the Soviet lead
ers to be the justification for re-
vising older Communist conceptions
that war is inevitable and which
permits them to envisage "co-ex-
istence" for the long pull.
Nothing New
What is interesting about the
foreign policy outlined at the
Twentieth Party Congress is, Of
course, that it is not new. The
Congress, like many of its prede-
cessors, has been used to crystalline
and confirm lines of action already
under way and judged effective.
This policy has been under steady
development from mid-1951 at
least. when Stain and Mao decided
to seek a cease-fire in Korea. 1t
was quite clear at the Nineteenth
Party Congress in October 1852.
But it gathered force after Stains
death. His successors promptly ex-
hibited greater tactical f1exibility
than the old master who was not
inclined to take a foreign policy
seriously unless it permitted the
consolidation of new real estate
with Communist infantry. The
present Soviet leaders are now clear
in their minds that Soviet power
can be extended by other means.
The note of confidence and opti-
miSm about Soviet prospects on the
world scene is unmistakable and
authentic. Quite apart from their
evident recent successes in India,
Indonesia, Burma and the Middle
East they see the ground shifting
toward neutralism and popular
fronts in Greece and Italy. They
see all manner of attractive posi-
bilities in the French muddle and
in North Africa. They see Adenauer
holding the line in Western Ger
many under increasing difficulty.
They see even Pakistan wavering
and considering seriously whether
Nasser. If not Nehru. does not have
the right answer after all. They
see Japan uneasy, its deep economic
problems unresolved. anxious to
A