Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-03-18
By EARL H. vOsS

4IIC UcUdIC dUOuU tIlc dUcqudCy VI
American air power has become in
creasingly confused of late, partly
because Of a cloud Of misconcep-
tions which have gained currency.
These misconceptions are not
entertained by principals on either
side Of the dispute. But in the pub
lie give and take, each side, perhaps,
has contributed to their growth.
To shoot down some of these
bogeys. here is list of misconcep-
lions on which there is general
agreement among leaders of both
sides:
Guided and boIlistic missiles ore
the some thing.
Guided missile" has become a
misleading generic term. Specif1-
cally speaking. guided missiles are
only those which are guided all the
way to their targets-can be con-
trolled throughout their fight.
Ballistic missiles are guided mainly
on the first part of their upward
flight; then they are carried to the
peak of their trajectory by inertia
and fall freely to their target by
gravity. They are employed more
like artillery than like airplanes.
Near the end of their fall. ballistic
missiles again may be guided to-
ward cities or other installations,
hx, baot 30 dio fin,, ;y,f,a rod ROVE ~.
other methods.
Russia is likely to atom bomb
Europe or Southeast Asio or
Jopon If it achieves O ! 500 mile
boIIistic missile before we do.
Nobody knows what the Kremlin
will do, of course. But this is not
at all likely. The Reds already have
a medium bomber force Gncluding
jet IL-28s) which could atom bomb
our allies. It is highly unlikely that
the Soviet Union would dare to
atom bomb our allies so long as its
air defenses can be penetrated by
our Strategic Air Command. Our
massive retaliation" deterrent
would be called into play the in
slant aggression occurred. since we
have mutual security treaties with
most of the Reds potential targets.
The ! ,500-mile boIIistic missile is
just onother weapon in the grow
ing missiles spectrum.
Militarily this may be true. But
psychologically this 1.50O-mile mis-
sile could be Of vast Importance if
the Soviet Union we're to produce
it first. A Soviet victory in the
race to achieve it could raise grave
doubts among all our allies about
our ability to stay ahead of the
Soviet Union in the all-important
Observation-Disclosures field.
We should concentrate on the
intercontinentol boIIistic missile
no matter whot the effect on the
rest'of our weapons proerom.
Concentrating on a single weapon
is strategy that only a potential
aggressor can employ. The United
States, which has renowned ag-
erosion, must be prepared to de-
fend against whatever the agrees
sor starts. We need many weap-
ons and many defenses. because we
don't know what kind of war we
will have to fight. We must de-
velop a highly diversified arsenal,
capable of lettering all conceivable
kinds of attack. And if the poten-
tial aggressor stages several crash"
programs for several revolutionary
weapons simultaneously, as the So
Wet Union apparently is doing, we
are forced to keep our well-diversi-
fled defenses ahead of him even
then.
The major argument in the Pento-
eon is over missiles development.
This is only a part of the story.
The argument is now disappearing
as the Administration moves to
speed up the work. Much bigger
arguments are still going on, how
ever, over the needs for shorten
ing lead time Cfrom drawing board
to operational unit in weapons
production; for more development
spending, to explore promising ave-
nues opened up by research, some
Of which might result, it is claimed,
in weapons almost as radically new
as the atomic bomb or guided
missiles. Some experts actually
fear that public preoccupation with
the missiles development aspects of
defense spending will harmfully
distort the rest of the picture.
IntercontinentoI boIIistic missiles.
tlCBMs) ore likely to be used
some doy.
Again. nobody can read the
Kremlin's mind. But unless the
Soviet Unions defense some day
catches UP not only with its own
offense but with the United States
offense (Which Is still ahead Of the
Soviet Unions today. across the
board, the Kremlin would be fool
hardy to use ICBMs because of the
retaliation from the United States
which this would trigger. And as
retaliatory bases Become more and