Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-04-01
Only Fools Rush in

Not all Americas foreign-aid
projects are as grandiose as the
ASWan High Dam, of course. But
AsWan does illustrate the broad
range of pitfalls confronting for
eign aid donors
The answer to the first question
posed above is obvious. A hasty
response to the Soviet economic aid
challenge is dangerous no matter
how formidable the challenge.
Some of the more familiar BOBBY
traps are:
Imitation. Unless the recipient
government has the fiscal know how
and the determination to use public
funds to fight imitation, huge invest
ment programs like the Aswan Dam
can seriously disrupt the whole
nations economy.
AbSOrptive capacity. In the In
ternatlonal Cooperation Admins
tratlon 1t is a truism that most
countries don't realize their own
limitations" 1t is always difficult
TO foresee all the ancillary problems
in training a nation to handle a
higher living standard. In the case
of the Aswan Dam, for example. do
the peasants know how to work ir-
rigated land? Do the government
administrators know how to keep a
larger economy in balance? Can
Egypt set up well-organized COM
munitieS when reSettlement in the
new farm and industrial areas
begins?
Incentive. Before Egypt more
than doubles her electric power
capacity she ought to know whether
her people have the requisite eager
ness to use it. Maybe they are
happy without electric lights.
Graft. inexperienced or unscru-
pulouS administrators can Illustrate
any project.
National pride. A rule at ICA is
Convince them it was their idea"
People who have been doing thing
their way for hundreds OF years
often resent suggestions.
International complications. 1t is
not likely that the United States
and Great Britain would have given
Egypt the $40 million grant. or that
the International Bank would have
rendered the 5000 million loan, until
the Sudan'S position on the Aswan
Dam were clear - except for the
pressure of the Soviet offer. The
risks in the project are, to that
extent. greater than normal. Ethi-
opia has also taken an interest in
the Aswan dam. since her Blue Nile
water would help to feed Aswan.
This enumeration of pitfalls,
which illustrates the need for
eschewing haste in making foreign
aid commitments, also provides a
clue to the answer for our second
question. Flexibility is desirable so
that adjustments can be made
when unforeseen contingencies
arise. But since the dangers of max
ing haSty adjustments are much the
same as in making original COM
mitments. how much control of
funds Congress should abdicate to
the President is open to what will
probably be long argument.
Aswan High Dam is, of course, a
particularly good example of the
need for long-term commitments.
Premier Nasser has to know that
Congress has the intention of fol-
lowing through.
The current dispute" between
some members of Congress and the
administration about so-called long
term commitments may yet prove
to be more politics than substance
After planning was completed II
8. took the Bureau Of Reclamation
from 1888 to 1852 to bring the first
water from the Columbia River to
It's project lands. This long-range
program was accomplished without
a firm commitment by Congress
way back in 1888 that the dam and
irrigation works would be COM
pleted. But the first years appro-
priation implied Congress- good
faith.
In the case Of Aswan, the situa-
ton is similar The President has
no intention of tying Congress
hands completely. however. II
Egypt's government roamed farther
to the ieft--in the direction OF
communism--Congress would have
the right and obligation to reasSess
the whole program.
Agreement on a broad middle
ground would he easier IL this