Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-07-22
Aswon Gamble

The State Departments decision to
withdraw from our agreement to help
build the Aswan dam on the Nile is
calculated-we hope carefully calculated
risk.
Two formal explanations for this
about-face have been given: First,
failure by Egypt and her neighborS to
settle the question of the use of Nile water
rights, and, second, doubt as to Egypt's
willingness and ability to accept the
severely auStere internal program neceS-
Sary to enable that country to foot its
share of the bill. Consequently, says the
State Department, this Government has
concluded that cit is not feasible in pres
ent circumstances" to participate in the
project.
This, of course, is by no means the
whole explanation. The Aswan dam is
vital to Egypts future. It was expected
that the project, when complete IL to
16 years hence, would increase Egypt'S
irrigated land by one-third and her cleo
trio power resources eightfold. Without
this, there is little future for the rapidly
expanding Egyptian population. So it is
safe to assume that our Governments
decision was not taken lightly.
What are the other reasons which
Influenced the decision? Our officials
realize of course, that the Russians may
move in, now that we are pulling out.
And it is said, informally, that it might
not be bad idea to let them do it. The
idea behind this is that Russia is suffer-
ing from internal economic stresses. The
Russian people want better standard OF
living and the Soviet government has
been limiting that they are going to get it.
So, it is reasoned in some quarters here,
let the Russians take over the ASWan
project. If they do, we will try to capt.
talize on resulting discomfort within the
Soviet Union.
That, to us, sounds like wiShful
thinking. Perhaps we could reap some
propaganda benefits of that sort, but
they would be trif1ing compared to the
disadvantages to us of having Russian
influence firmly established in Egypt. If
that should happen, our whole position in
the Arab world would be gravely under
mined, and we dare say that nobody
knows where we would go from there.
But perhaps the State Department
does not think it will come to such
pass as this The phrase Sin present cir
cumStanceS" in the official release should
not be overlooked, for it leaves the door
open.
Egyptian President Nasser has been
trying to work both sides of the street
in recent months Unable to buy arms
here because he lacked the dollars, he
made his deal to buy Communist arms
and mortgaged Egypt's present and future
cotton crop-its only export crop-to do
1t. He has also been following neutral
list line which, in many ways, is much
more pleasing to the Kremlin than to us.
So perhaps the State Department has
decided to serve implicit notice on Mr..
NasSer that he can no longer have it both
ways. If he wants to-and he certainly.
does not want to-he can turn to the
Russians for help on the Aswan project.
Or, presumably, he can come back to the
West for aid If he changes his tactics in
such way as to alter present circum-
stances"
If this is the thinking that really
underlieS our action, we are taking a
gambia big gamble. For Egypt deS-
perately needs its dam, and NaSSer will be
forced to accept aid from whatever source
he can get it. We hope that our officials
have weighed the risks very carefully, and
that they know what they are doing.