Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-01-12

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information provided by the Sec
The article said Mr.. Dulles a
munists back down in these dis,
putes and for these reasons:
/. Korean-CommuniSt China
negotiated an end of the Korean
war in the face Of an American
decision to attack Manchuris
with atomic bombs If hostilitie.
were renewed.
2. Indo-China Communists
China decided to allow its Viet
Mini stooges in ndo-China tt
accept peace after two United
States aircraft carriers armed
with atomic bombs put to sea
ready to A-bomb South China
as part of a united allied action
if the Chinese Communists
openly interviewed in the Indo-
China struggle.
3. moSa war was
avoided mainly by a resolution
drafted by Dulles and passed by
an overwhelming bipartisan vote
in Congress which authorizes the
President to use United States
military forces should the Chi
nese Communist attack Formosa
-. Dulles has never doubted, in
cidentally. that Eisen h owel
would have regarded an attach
on Quemoy and the Matsus a.
an attack on FormoSa.
The United States had prom
Used to help defend Quemoy ant
Matsu if they were attacked il
an operation which Mr.. Eisen'
hover thought was aimed a
Formosa.
"a Fair Inference"
The article quotes Mr.. Dulles
as saying:
body is able to prove
fundamentally that it was TIT
policy of Difference which
brought the Korean war to al
end and which kept the Chimes
from sending their Red armie!
into China, or that it ha!
finally stopped them in Formosa
I think it is a pretty fair infer
ence that it has. 80.
You have to take chances fol
peace. just as you must taxi
chances in war. Some say tina
we we're brought to the verge O
war. OF course we were brough
to the verge of war.
THE ability to get to the verge
without getting into the war i
the necessary art. If you canno
master it, you inevitably get int
war. If you try to run away from
it, If you are scared to go to thu
brink, you are lost.
Walked to the Brink
"We've had to look it squar'
In the face-on the question O
enlarging the Korean war, OF
the question of getting into thu
Indo-C China war, on the question
of Formosa. We walked to thu
brink and we looked it in tn
face. We took strong action.
1T took a lot more courage
for the President than for me
His was the ultimate decision.
did not have to make the de
cision myself, but only to recon-
ment it. The President neve
f1inched for a minute on any o
these situations. He came VI
taut."
The edition of Life carryini
the article went on the news
stands today, but reporters hat
advance copies yesterday ant
sought to challenge Mr.. Dulle
on some parts of the story as re-
lated in the article by Jane
Shepley, chief of the Time-Lif'
Washington bureau.
One reporter told Mr.. Dulle
that "a number of interesting
statements are made Gin the ar
ticle) that don't always jibe will
the information we have beef
getting in this department ant
in the embassies of the inter
ested countries, about numbe
of major historical events in tn,
past two or three years"
Plan for United Action
Mr.. Dulles said he could no
discuss the article because h
had not seen it. When anothe
reporter challenged the CLAIM
that a policy of deterrence
helped end the Indo-China wal
Mr.. Dulles did say:
There was the program TO
united action in that area ant
you will recall that ! went frs
to London and then to Paris ant
reached what / thought was al
agreement on united action.
We had also had the agree
ment of the Philippines ant
Thailand to united action at tina
time, which was a matter of pub
lie knowledge.
I'VE had hoped to get tn
united action into force promptl
and before the Geneva confer
ence ION the Indo- China war
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