davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
Once-for-AH Approach

The problem of limited war is
particularly searching for two rea-
sons. The first reason is that linn
tied war raises, in an unavoidable
way. the question of the Nations
abiding power interests. Lacking
clear concept of an abiding ma
tional interest. we have tended to
regard each war in our history as
a once-for-all episode.
In the 10Th century this worked
well enough On this continent our
power detectives were tolerably
clear and widely accepted and they
were associated with the great moral
purpose of building and extending
the democratic process in North
America.
When we fought abroad, how
ever, we acknowledged no such self
evident power detectives. We found
it hard to acknowledge that we our
selves were in military peril and,
lacking this sense of danger, we
looked to our sense of theological
mission on the world scene as q
rationale for our efforts.
Why do we have such difficulty
acknowledging that war can and
must be fought for limited objec-
tives, in which an improvement Of
the Nations power position may. in
itself, be legitimate goal?
There are many complex reasons
in our history for this difficulty
which we cannot fully explore here:
Our religious sense that power is
intrinsically evil; the illusion that
our 10Th century isolation and the
Monroe Doctrine were achieved
without reference to the Eurasian
balance of power, by grace of native
virtue alone; the abiding sense
that we have no serious interests
beyond our shores except to see
the world peaceful, happy and
democratic.
In addition, lacking the long,
grueling military history Of the
Eurasian states, lacking a wide
spread professional military tradi-
ton, Americans do not take easily
to the notion that they or their
children may have to fight and
die for any but the greatest Of
moral purposes.
All these things and more make
us shy away from creating mill
tary force in being frankly designed
to deter or to deal with limited war.
AS nation we regard the Korean
War as a mistake for precisely
the wrong reason: 1t was mistake
not to have had the forces in being
and the evident will to use them
Continued on Page A-28
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

lost place wherein to seek the means
Of eoinins national triumphs."
This view Of the provisions of the
Constantinople Convention of
october 20, 1888, in which the then
ten World Powers agreed in the
Suez Canals status, is strength
ened by innumerable articles in that
17-article treaty. The whole pur-
pose of the convention obviously
was to insure that the canal re-
mains free and open in peace and
war to every vessel of commerce
or war without any distinction of
flag. But that is not the whole
story.
Sovereignty Protected
Article 10 of the 1888 Convention
clearly states that barring the
obligations (of free navigation ex-
pressly envisaged In the provisions
of the treaty, the convention does
not prejudice in any way the
sovereign rights of the Egyptian
Government. Then again Article
16 of the concession granted by
Ismail PaSha (the then Viceroy Of
Egypt to NJ. Ferdinand de Lesseps
for the construction, maintenance
and operation of the canal on a
99-year lease provides that the
Suez Canal Company is an Egyp-s
tian Company subject to Egyptian
laws and customs" In 1899 an
agent Of the British Government
asserted in a memorandum to the
Mixed Courts of Appeals of Alex
andria:
The Suez Conol Company is o IesoI
person in oecordonee with Egyption low.
Its notiOnoIity ond character ore solely
ssYpiion. II is therefore subject to
Eeyption lows"
Also, Article 8 of the Anglo Egyp-
tan Evacuation Agreement of 1854
recognizes that the canal lis an
integral part Of Egypt"
One must conclude here that the
authors Of the original concession
and Of the 1888 Convention were
anxious to stress the two basic con-
cepts-the Egyptian character Of
the canal and the company's respon-
sibility to the laws Of Egypt, and at
the same time to guarantee free
and open navigation. in war and
peace. to every vessel Of commerce
or Of war without discrimination.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

not translated this fact into a posi-
tive formulation of its interests suf-
ficiently precise and widely accept
ed to permit it to deal with the
challenges it confronts before they
take the form of acute crises.
Put another way. believe that in
order to have a stable military and
foreign policy, capable of antici-
pating problems, we must, from the
National Security Council to the
grassroots, hammer out a consen-
sus concerning our abiding inter-
ests more precise than any now
widely accepted.
Let me try to apply this broad
generalization to two urgent con-
crete problems of American policy:
The problem of limited war, and
the problem of national policy
toward the underdeveloped areas Of
the free world.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

remained constant over the whole
postwar period.
In the past year the enemy has
made important progress towards
this goal The gap between his mill
tary strength and ours has been
narrowed. Our air base structure
is being undercut politically at
many points; NATO is evidently in
jeopardy; we have permitted Arab
nationalism to be channeled along
lines that--soon or late-threatens
the continuity of the Middle East
ern oil supply; the United States
since the war has never been more
dangerously isolated from the gov
ernments and peoples of the under
developed areas in Asia as well as
the Middle East; in Africa power
full forces are boiling up, and we
have no policy capable of either
controlling them or aligning them
with our abiding interests.
There is, then, nothing in the
present situation or in the changes
over the past year that would lead
me to alter the prescription have
previously offered for meeting the
challenge facing the United States.
Stripped to bare essentials, what l
have previously proposed is a three
point program:
We must continue to outstrip
lie the Soviet Union in the arms
race in nuclear weapons, means of
delivery, and means of defense
against them so that at no time
might it ever appear a rational
course Of action for the Soviet
Union to launch sudden attack
on our delivery capabilities.
= We must develop American
4" capabilities in the general area
of limited war. We must round
out the spectrum of deterrence
down to the level of guerrilla oper-
atoms. The object of military
policy is to force the conflict for
power and influence out into the
arena of political, theological, and
economic competition, and to keep
it there. This we cannot do unless
we have the capabilities to fight war
limited in detectives, terrain and
weapons and the evident will to use
them.
= Having forced the conflict out
OS into the non-military arena,
we need a foreign policy designed
squarely to meet and defeat our
avowed enemies in the political,
theological, and economic conflict
now taking place.
An American policy Of this kind,
II sustained for another decade,
might well lead to a meanineful
peace. If the Communist Bloc is
not permitted further cheap mill
tary and diplomatic victories, if
1T is confronted for another decade
with a unified, purposeful Free
World, maintaining pace in eco
nomic and social progress by demo-
cratic means, there is at least a
decent hope that the generation of
Communist leaders who must take
over in the next decade might con-
clude that the only realistic course
of action open to them is to turn
in fact, rather than in gesture-to
the great unsolved problems of
economic welfare and human
liberty within the Communist Bloc.
do not believe we as a nation
have yet created a military policy
and civil foreign policy designed
to fulfill these three purposes and
to exploit the potentials for social
and political change favorable to
our interest within the Communist
Bloc.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

influence, not merely in Asia but
throughout the world.
Under such crisis circumstances
it has proved possible to mobilize
the Nations resources, creative en-
ergy and idealism to meet concrete,
practical threats. In none of these
cases, however, did we successfully
anticipate danger and prevent it's
arrival in an acute and dangerous
form. In none of these cases did
the Nation emerge with a clear
knowledge of the underlying in
terests which had led it to act
The present Communist offensive
is being conducted against us with
a lively sense of these American
characteristics.
Specifically. the Korean war
taught the present generation of
Communist leaders that, while the
United States may be quite vulner-
able to actions which gradually re-
duce its power and capabilities, the
United States is a nation dangerous
to arouse with sharp, concrete,
direct challenge.
Communist leadership is pro-
ceeding in Asia, the Middle East and
Europe, with policies designed to
unhinge our key positions, includ-
ing our SAC bases, step by step, in
a new version of what Rakosi (the
recently deposed ruler of Hungary
once called "salami tactics" Their
evident intent is to confront us
with defeat in forms where a con-
vulsive mobilization of American
strength will be impossible or inef-
fective, irrelevant or too late.
They aim now for victory as the
cumulative result of small actions
and seizures which would dis
integrate the Free World and isO-
late the United States quite as
effectively as victory in a major
war. And, unwittinglv, the cast
of our military and foreign policy
cOnspires to assist them in pro-
ducing this result.
In order to regard what is going
on in the world as a dangerous
challenge to the United States, one
must have some clear abstract con-
cept of Communist intent; one
must have some clear abstract
concept Of the American interest;
one must be prepared to regard as
real and urgent-as justifying cur
rent action projected trends
rather than immediate situations.
AS nation of operators, we find
this hard to do; and this is one of
the reasons why we jolt along, max
ing policy in response to a series of
crisis situations rather than in a
steady and sustained effort gov
erned by clear touchstones of the
national interest and purpose.
To anticipate one must work on
some theoretical, abstract assump-
tons Operators don't like theories.
This does not mean that they don't
use theories, but that they tend to
apply that most arbitrary of theo-
retical hypothesis-that what is
true today will be true tomorrow.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
By IMADUDDIN A. sHEIKH

ny AMADOOOAN "A. SHEAhH
The West is having serious trou-
BILE in devising an acceptable meth
cd of handling the Suez crisis.
The plan for an association of
users has had a mixed reception
and there seems to be considerable
doubt that it will work.
Some Western strategists seem
still to favor a powerful squeeze on
the economy of Egypt, although
this course apparently was rejected
at the just-ended London confer
ence. Such a squeeze. diverting
traffic from the canal seized by
Egypt's President Canal Abdel
Nasser and even risking the loss of
the Arabian oil supply, probably
would, in the long run, hurt Mr..
Nasser severely. But at the same
time the price would be high in
damage to the economies of West
ern nations and in the loss of good
will in Afro-Asia and Southern Eu-
rope.
AS one recently returned from
the focal point of this grave world
controversy, the author feels that
the extreme positions that Mr.. Mas
ser has taken on the one hand and
England and France have taken
despite Secretary of State Dulles
moderating influence) on the other,
still permit a face-saving COM
promise.
But consideration Of possible So
lutions to the Suez problem must
take into account the position in
which Mr.. Nasser now finds him
self at home.
He Hos Twin Missions
1t must be remembered that his
regime bases its claim to popular
support on the twin missions Of
bolstering every segment of Egypt's
economy and eliminating foreign
ESPECIALLY British influence.
The Nasser regime set out firmly
on the first path with its agrarian
reform program However, it be-
came apparent that for large-scale
economic advancement, the Aswan
Dana massive food control-irri-
gation-power proiect-was needed.
Mr.. Nasser. perhaps taking a
leaf from the books Of other "neu-
tralists." tried 10 get the best deal
on ASwan from the free world versus
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
Staff Work Is Weak

There is a second consequence of
this pragmatic bias in our perform
ance. Let me state it bluntly: Our
national staff work, at the level of
military and foreign policy, is ex-
ceedingly weak.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the National Security Council are
committees Of operators, bureau
cratic departmental chieftains,
rather than men surveying, in a
systematic way, the horizons of
our national position and for
muIating policies which effec-
lively bind up and unity day-tO-
day operations.
Under these circumstances high
level policy tends to emerge in one
of two forms: Either as general
statements so broad that operators
can go on doing what they are
doing, interpreting policy state
ments as they will; or as tough,
practical compromises in allocating
money or other scarce resources, in
which the pattern of policy is much
less important to the outcome than
the bargaining weight of the nego-
tiators.
The dominant values in our So
ciety put a premium on the ability
to do something concrete rather
than to think in abstract terms.
This is, of course, one of our great
strengths when confronted with
practical problems requiring i'm
mediate solution.
But the balance between staff and
line. between men of reflection and
men of action. which is instinctively
built into American institutions.
does not meet the requirements of
mid-century America.
This does not mean that we
Americans are incapable of think
ing in abstract terms or that we
do not formulate general goals. In
fact we have a marked tendency
to formulate general goals in abb
stract terms.
In this old national habit, I be-
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

lieve, lies the basis for the gap
between broad, loosely defined OBJ
jectives-as set out, for example,
in high-level papers-and the day
to-day reality of military and for
eign policy. 1t is this gap we must
seek to fill.
do not believe that we shall
fill that gap until we have created
a staff for the National Security
Council, made up of the ableSt
military and civil servants we can
mobilize, responsible as a group
for examining our national Sc
curity problem as a whole, with
the right to lay before the Presi-
dent and the Security Council as
a whole concrete plans and pro-
pOsals, at their own initiative.
/ do not believe We will have a
sound military policy until we
have effectively unified the serv-
ices and there is a combined staff
that does serious staff planning
rather than interservice negO-
tiatiOn.
Staff men should never them
selves decide policy. The respon-
sible operators must have their say.
We cannot run our Nation with
eggheads alone. Plans and OBJ
jectives must, of course, be married
to sober and responsible assess
ment of operating capabilities.
I am talking now about a shift
in the balance of our system, not
about a substitution of staff for line
dominance. l am talking about a
responsible linking of national OBJ
jectives, precisely defined, and the
day-to-day operations which would
achieve those detectives.
The third consequence of the
Nations acutely practical bent is
that we find 1t difficult to make
the most of the Nations resources
and talents in the arms race. At
its core that race is a technology
lcal competition in innovation; that
is, in invention and the rapid APP
plication of invention.
Historically the United States
has been strong in production and
engineering, but relatively weak in
creative science. Few of the revo-
lutionary break-throughs which
have transformed war-making in
recent decades have been made by
Americans. This holds for atomic
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

correct course for at least the past
two years.
Why, then. has the United States
not followed this course? Why has
the gap between American and
Soviet capabilities in major war
been permitted to narrow? Why
have we not faced the issue of de-
terrence against limited war? Why
have we failed to produce an eco
nomic. political, and psychological
policy that would sustain NATO
and associate the United States
with the underdeveloped areas of
the Free World?
I propose to turn the focus OF
this discussion inward on our do
nestle life, on our national style of
operation, and on its inadequacies;
for, in the end, the challenge fac
ing the United States is the chal-
lenge of learning to do some things
that we have never done before.
In order to overcome our enemies
we must first learn to master our
selves and to evoke from American
society the qualities within it ca
pable Of meeting the challenge we
face.
Ultimately, the Nations difficulty
in formulating and sustaining the
kind of military and foreign policy
I would propose can be traced back
to two characteristics of American
society whose roots lie deep in our
history.
The first of these fundamental
characteristics Is that we have
been, at least since the 183Os,
when the westward frontier push
came to dominate our life, a ma
ton given over to action rather
than to reflection, to practice
rather than theory, to engineer
ing rather than to fundamental
science.
The second fundamental char
acteristic is that we have not yet
recOnciled, in a stable way, the
Nations power interests on the
world scene and its sense of NOR
al mission and purpose. This fail
ure of reconciliation lies behind
the Nations uncertain grasp on
its national interest; and that
uncertainty about the national
interest makes difficult the for
mutation and execution of a sta
BILE and effective military and
foreign policy,
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

mSudlH9 E9ypt'
---------~~-
the Communist world, but ended UP
with no deal at all. 1t was then
that he took over Suez in a ma
tionalistic fury. apparently COM
bining his missions of ouSting for
eigners and securing funds for
Egypt's economy in one grand ges-
ture.
1t would have been too naive on
Mr.. NasSer's part to have omitted
from his calculations the chance of
a Western counter-blast of detours
and even substitution for Arabian
oil. And therefore it may be that
the abrupt naturalization at this
particular time was a serious risk
even an error. But he seems to have
staked his all on this move and to
retreat now from his basic stand of
Egyptian operation of the canal
would be political suicide. On the
other hand, it may very well be that
palatable compromise would be
welcomed in Cairo.
The first step toward such a
compromise must be recognition
of the true role and status of the
Suez Canal Co., which Mr..
Nasser took over in so spectacular a
fashion last July 26.
Secretary of State Dulles. in his
first London speech on the crisis,
eloquently developed the theme of
the basic international character
OF the canal company:
In the Suez canol the interdepend-
enee Of nations reaches perhaps its
highest point The economic life Of
monY nations hos been shaped By
reliance on the susz conoI system,
which hos treaty sonetion. To shoks
and perhaps shotter thot system or to
seek gains from Threatening TO do 50 is
not triumph. :. The Sgez Camel BY
reason Of its intsrnatieaoHIsd char
oetsr, both in Iov and in fact, is the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
Businessmen Decide It's Time
To Jump Into Political Pond

prise. Since business firms, cham
bers of commerce and trade as
sociations are forbidden by law to
make contributions to political
campaigns, the political defense of
business must therefore come from
individuals, Mr.. Atkinson points
out. How much to give? A stand
ard frequently suggested in WASH
ington. he says, is five per cent
of the income tax paid by the
individual the previous year.
= Take part in local political
~ affairs, starting right at home,
in the precinct and in the COM
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
THE AUTHOR

w. w. Rostow is a profess
sor at the Center for
international Studies of the
Massachusetts, Institute of
Technology. He is director
of a Carnegie-financed
study of the interplay of
United States domestic
society with our military
and civil foreign policy. The
paper from which this ar
ticle is excepted is an at
tempt to apply to the
current scene preliminary
judgments arising from
that study.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
Some Questions

Assume for moment that some
such program of sustained, vigorous
effort in military and foreign policy
is the correct course for the United
States and that this has been the
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23
By w. w. ROSTOW

The challenge facing the United States the challenge
of preventing Moscow and Ppng from achieving their
mon purpose The purpose of the enemy is to drive the
United States from power and influence in Eurasa to isolate
the United States this island continent and to deal with
us in his own good time from the peponderan base which
he would then control That purpose has, in my view
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

Mr. Sheikh, motive Of Pokiston, is in this
country on leave from the editorship
Of two opinion ournoIs-one in English
and the other in Urdu-pubIished in
Koroehi. Before coming to this country
for this summers international Seminar
OF Harvard. he spent three months in
most Of the countries Of the Middle Eost,
including Egypt
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-23

And they define today in terms Of
the incoming cables.
Montgomery County sentinel., 1956-04-19
RMHS Comedy
Set April II

June Wedding" a comedy in
three acts. will be presented
under the sponsorship of the
Dramatic Club on April 27 at
Richard Montgomery High
School This will be the first
production directed by Mrs.
Gallegos.
The cast includes Sue Grogg
as Dandy Perry; Mandy Evans
as Mrs. Perry; Marcia Barsditis
as Linda Perry; Linda Pfeifle
as Ruthie Miller; Judy Johnson
as Mrs. Lucia Gavin; Betty
Milwee as Mrs. Henshaw; Jane
Cooper as Gladys; Robert Ma
lone as Mr.. Perry; Duane Cox as
Gordon Gavin; William Wood
end as Billy Briggs; John
Menke as Art Coleman; Roger
Bride as Dutch Whyte; Perrin
Shaeffer as Professor Gavin;
and Kay Simms as Claudia.
Montgomery County sentinel., 1956-04-19
Children in Trouble
Subject of Forum

"When A Child Gets Into Trou-
BILE" will be the topic of a panel
discussion at the April current
issues forum sponsored by the
Unitarian Church of Montgomery
County.
DR.. Christine Kehne, psychia-
trist with the county's Psychiat-
ric Youth Service, will analyze
what II Means; Judge Alfred
Noyes of the Montgomery County
Juvenile Court will present what
Happens to Him" and H. Owen
Knight in charge Of pupil per-
sonnel for the county school sys-
tenn, will discuss the role of the
schools in helping the youngster
"in trouble"
The forum will be held Tues
day at the Chevy Chase Women's
Club, 1881 Connecticut Avenue,
at 8:15 pm. N
Montgomery County sentinel., 1956-04-19
Science Fair
At High School

The fourth annual science fair
at Richard Montgomery started
yesterday and will end today.
The projects were assembled
Tuesday and Judged the same
night by five area scientists.
They are DR.. Howard L. An
drews, DR.. c. F. T. Mattern, DR..
Louise Marshall, DR.. Norman
Sharpless and DR.. John Waite.
All science students at RMHS
were required to make an entry
and final total of 267 projects
was listed in the program. First,
second land third place awards
will be presented and 20 honor
able mention awards will be
made.
The areas of exhibits are:
botanical science, electronics,
health, zoology, photography,
conservation, chemistry, physics
and engineering.