Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-01-22

farmer can never adjust TO
nicely - his production Is against
demand--he must produce or
slightly over-produce In order TO
be on the safe side. That, by the
way. Is not the safe side Of the
farmer-it's the safe side Of the
general economy Of this country.
I am not disturbed. or greatly
disturbed. at least, because Of the
surpluses, because to over-empha-
size surpluses, Is the Presidents
message did, In my Judgment. Is
to convert into what ought to be
blessing ct home and abroad the
very things that are necessary and
needful and inevitable If we are
TO have prosperous farm economy.
Foreign Affairs
@. Senator, I would like to ask
you to talk little bit about foreign
affairs. Several nations In the Medi.
terfanean and Southeastern areas
have recently shown an even great
er interest in what they call neu-
tralism AZ between the Western
powers and the Soviet Union. Do
you think this Ii matter Of in
teFest or concern for the United
States In developing its own foreign
policies?
A. Oh. yes, think so. But think
what they mean by neutralism Is
that they sense the passing Of i'm
mediate war danger and, therefore,
there Is breathing spell In which
they can talk more about their own
problems at home and think more
about their own problems rather
than putting al the emphasis on
/. preparations for another war.
@. In the case Of India, do you
feel that United States economic
assistance Is justifying Itself
IL paving Its own way, 20 to speak?
A. I think it open to question to
any impartial mind although have
generally favored foreign aid. going
along with that program. But I
think 1t fairly open to question to
any impartial mind whether eco
r1on1ic aid is a workable program
and whether 1t is an effective pro-
gram to reach the detectives that
we aim to accomplish.
@. You make the distinction
there, do you, between economic
aid Of the kind we gave I'm Europe
and what II generally known a.
the Point Four program?
A. Well. yes. to this extent. In
Western Europe, the homes were
destroyed. business places were de-
stroyed. the transportation systems
were interrupted. virtually de-
stroyed. but they were q homogene-
Gus people in Western Europe. They
had aspirations much like ourselves
and they also had an experience
that enabled them to rebuild and
think foreign aid or economic as
sistance In Europe did pay OF.
] heartily supported the Mar
shall program. think II was un-
questionably good for Western
Europe. / think 1t was good for
Greece and Turkey. I think that
In that area we were working on
more or less OF . certain pattern.
But when 1t comes even TO the
Middle East or the Near East, and
especially when 1t comes to the
Southeastern Asian countries the
experience has been vastly differ
ent. They were not devastated by
war. they are simply suffering from b
an age-long era Of q lack Of pros
perity.
Competitive Coexistenes
@. There has been some talk
recently about the idea that we are
now I'm state Of competitive CO.
existence with the Soviet In which
some administration officials seem
to feel that the big American
weapon Is economic. Do you feel
that this b o correct analysis for
the present state Of the conflict
with Russia?
A. / very much doubt 1t. have
come to doubt 1t because I cannot
see how the economic program has
really been effective. I have had
sympathy for it. ! have partici-
pated in 1t. I've gone along with 1t
and yet I've watched 1t from year
to year and very much doubt 1t.
It's an easy way for any govern
ment to say that we can meet the
problems of the future by spending
more money.
@. DO you have in mind. sir, any
specific steps which might be taken
In the case Of India or In the case
Of Egypt to make more effective
counter TO Soviet maneuvers there?
A. It is very difficult to say what
one would do. What ! think we
should do Is to maintain COM
pletely flexible program. do not
exclude some foreign aid. I do not
exclude some economic aid. par
ticularly when the projects or the
immediate purpose are well out
lined, well defined, clearly stated,
and we can determine the policy.
both the kind and the amount OF
the aid we will give.
But think at this time in the
worlds experience. we should main
tain q completely flexible foreign
aid program. I do not exclude
Point Four but I would like to re-
examine the success Of the Point
Four program and would like to
determine whether or not 1t Ia be-
ing wisely directed.
q. Senator, I'm view Of Russia's
progress In nuclear weapons, do you
think we are still In the position to
negotiate from q position Of
strength? DO we have anything TO
back ms up?
A. am not military expert and
can't speak, from that point Of
view. I can only say what they tell
me but I still think that we are In
a position Of great strength. I still
hope that while Russia has not
changed its ultimate objective, its
final objective of becoming the con-
queror. so to speak. Of ell Of the
civilized world. that they have
changed their tactics. They now