Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-10-14

Almost like pilots on ships in the
tricky channel of the Suez Canal
itself, beset by tides. currents, winds
and sudden storms, the foreign
ministers of the three nations di-
rectly involved in the canal contro-
versy cautiously piloted their ships
of state through long hours of
closed-door negotiations last week.
BY Friday the diplomat-pilots
appeared to have made some prog
ress. They agreed on set of six
principles, to be used as a basis
for further talks at later date.
And late last night the Security
Council of the United Nations was
still in session. Britain and France,
despite their acceptance of the six
principles, still were demanding an
international role in the operation
of the canal, although the kind
of international participation they
sought was obscured by battle of
semantics. The outlook was for
Council rejection of the demand,
and probable approval for a COM
promise resolution.
British Foreign secretary Selwyn
Lloyd. French Foreign Minister
Christian Pineau and Egypt's For
eign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi
had been meeting in the private
office of United Nations Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjold to
seek direct solution to the canal
controversy.
The Security Council met Octo-
Der on special call to take up
the Suez matter. Britain and
France had formally complained
to the Council that Egypt's uni
lateral naturalization of the ca
nal was potential threat to world
peace. Egypt had a complaint of
her own about military threats
from France and England. The
Soviet Union, equipped with
Council veto, was ready to back
Egypt.
Vitol United Stotes Role
The United States, represented at
the Security Council sessions by
Secretary of State Dulles, seemed
to be in practical charge of the
proceedings. 1t has been Mr.. Dull
les hope and plan that the Suez
issue would not become the storm
center of an acrimonious Security
Council battle. He sought to hold
the Council discussions in allegiance
after opening speeches, at the same
time encouraging private talks be-
tween the opposing principals. This
way, the United States strategist
reasoned. the critical issue might
well be resolved without fireworks.
The Security Council program
operated according to the Dulles
plan. There was some not unex-
pected asperity in the opening re-
marks. The Soviet Unions foreign
minister. Dmitri Shepilov, backed
the Egyptian position as predicted.
But Mr.. Dulles, in stating the posi-
ton of the United States on Tues
day, appealed to Egypt to accept
the principle that the canal should
never "be used by any country as
an instrument of its distinct ma
tional policy" Acceptance OF this
fundamental idea, Mr.. Dulles i'm
piled, would bring Western recip-
rocity.
The terms of the proposed reci-
procity were revealed the same day:
Britain would abandon her demand
for international control of the
Suez Canal, accepting instead Gin
ternational supervision" of an all
Egyptian operation. But there was
an important condition attached to
the compromise offev: There must
be automatic sanctions effective the
moment Egypt would discriminate
in any way against the free use of
the canal by all nations.
Result Of Pressure?
London's abandonment of her
adamant stand on international
control was reported to. be the di-
rect result of United States pres
sure. The backdown was officially
explained as no reversal of British
policy at all. but merely evidence
of British good faith in working
with Egypt toward peaceful and
mutually acceptable solution of the
crisis. But not even the best eff
forts of Whitehall and Downing
Street could obscure the fact that
Britain, official and unofficial alike,
vas downright unhappy with Mr..
Dulles. How can we be certain"
said one British Foreign Office
official, that, on the basis of past
performances. Mr.. Dulles won't
shift his position overnight"
In Paris chagrin was uncon-
cealed. The French. who had GER
tainly not accepted the compro-
mise If, in fact. they had been con-
shifted at all were loft in tba M