Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-02-26

Communtst regime N kosf Germany.
Ne escaped to West Germany In
1850 and eventually mode his woy
70 the United States. where he hos
new applied for citizenship.
effectiveness In selling COM
munisrn all over the world. In
fact, past events In China and
Indo- China. TO name two ex-
aInples, have tended to con-
arm this. In East Germany,
however, this propaganda
reaps almost no reward at all.
OF course, the Soviet slave
state system Is seldom popular
among the slaves. But In other
countries Communist propa-
ganda can usually be counted
on to recruit q few souls. Why
has It not had at least this
minimal success in East Ger
many?
Two Reasons
The explanation lies basil
caliy In two factors: First, the
particular way Communism
was introduced 10 Germany
by the Soviet Union; second,
the unique background Of Ger
mans who had spent 10 years
listening to and reading 0oeb-
bells monotonous propaganda
fare.
In the last stages Of World
War II, Soviet troops were adj
vancing toward Berlin. Ilya
Ehrenburs. dean Of the Red
propagandists. sent the Red
Army an order Of the day.
It read: Kill! Kill! Kill"
The German people learned
Of 1t only when the gruesome
bloodhath followed. This "im-
munized" the Germans
against the temptations Of
communism.
Even after this bloodthirsty
opener the Soviet Union still
might have saved the situa-
ton. at least partially, II they
had understood the German
temperament at that time.
The destitute Germans were
sick Of propaganda--ah prop
uganda. What they needed
was q rest.
For q decade they had been
subjected to the Joseph Goeb-
bells brand Of repetitivc propa-
ganda. They had learned to
disbelieve 1t and distrust 1t.
They greeted the Soviet prop
uganda with q here-we-go-
again attitude.
Far from giving the Ger
mans q rest, the Russians fol-
lowed up their bloodbath with
Q food Of propaganda Just Is
ridiculous as 0oebbels'. The
suffering people were told how
lucky they were ITO be lib
Grated by the Red Army"
Esat Germans did not dare
to betray their true feelings.
OF course. But the Soviet
propaganda-in billboards, In
radio programs. in parades
and mass meetings-had the
effect Of stimulating anti
Communist feelings among
the people.
Soviet experts, misleading
or misjudging the German at
titude, expanded their propa-
ganda system month by month.
Their favorite technique
monotonous repetition - not
only confirmed the anti-Com-
munists In their "heresy" but
also alienated the few Red
sympathizers that remained.
Even the school children
were not taken in. Their par
ents quietly seethed as they
walked down the street. pass
ing thousands Of identical
Communist posters-pasted UP
on long walls. side by side
knowing the while that the
paper shortage" was prevent
ing their school-age children
from getting copy books. Where
one poster might have stimu-
lated some positive reactions,
dozens Of the same kind pro-
duced exactly the opposite re-
suit.
These petty annoyances Of
Soviet propaganda accumu-
lated until June, 1858. when
the extreme anti Communist
feelings Of the East Germans
exploded into the riots that
swept the puppet state.
Ever since those violent
demonstrations. the Soviet
propaganda line has empha-
sized a German Nationalist
Socialist" line. But here too
the Communists are at O dis
advantage, for all East Ger
mans know that the only logi-
cal outcome Of a nationalistic
line is German reunification.
which the Soviet Union is pre-
venting for Its own ends. And
the persistent repetition stirs
as much resentment as ever.
Accent on Youth
The widespread hostility
among the older East Germans
has led the Soviet Union to
concentrate its propaganda
techniques on the younger
generation. But here too the
results are far from spectacu-
lar. Youths In East Germany
have been isolated from their
fathers and mothers just as
they were in the days of Hitler.
Yet there is relatively little of
sons and daughters spying on