Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-09-09
CHALLENGE to Moscow

In the note and memorandum It hac
just delivered to the Kremlin, Chancellor
Adenauer'S government at Bonn has made
another timely and challenging effort to
persuade Russia's collective leaders" to
abide by their pledge to permit Germany's
reuni1cation on the basis of free elections.
This pledge was last given at the Big
Four Geneva summit" conference in
July, 1855. But since then, character
istically, the Kremlin has gone back on
its word and advanced numerous SpeciouS
arguments indicating that it Is interested
chiefly in maintaining the present parti-
ton indefinitely, If not forever One of
these arguments is that free Germany's
standardization" and its adherence to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
make reunification impossible" because
the two things constitute threat" to
the security of the Soviet empire. And
another of the arguments is that the
problem must be handled through direct
negotiations between Bonn and the East
German Communist regime, which the
Adenauer government rightly regards as
Moscow's puppet and hence not to be
dealt with as sovereign equal.
1t is against this background Of de-
Lberate Soviet obStructionism that Bonn
has now appealed directly, and urgently,
to the men of the Kremlin to reconsider
their position. The appeal consists of no
fewer than is cogent points designed to
convince them that an affirmative re-
Spouse would be in the best interests of
the Soviet Union and would at the same
time strengthen the security of all Europe
and promote good peace throughout the
world. To that end, rejecting the idea that
the issue must first be taken up in nego-
tiations between the Federal Republic and
the East Germans, the memorandum
emphasizes that the Big Four bear the
main legal and moral responsibility for
reunifying the country, and it therefore
exhorts Russia to join France, Britain and
the United States in renewed effort to
work out an agreement. 1t also stresses
the belief that the effort, instead of
starting with big international meeting,
should be carried out quietly and that "a
new conference should be convened only
when well-founded prospect has been
created through normal diplomatic chan
nels that such conference will lead to
success"
The initial Soviet response is typically
negative. But possibly, after some reflec-
ton, Nikita KhruShchev and his col
leagues will shift to a more constructive
view. Bonn, in any case, has offered
them strong arguments against their pro-
fesSed fears of German rearmament. They
have been assured, for example, that the
projected remilitarization would be purely
defensive and that the reunited Germans
would not be committed beforehand to
membership in NATO Further, they have
been told that Germany, regardless of
what it might choose to do as a free
nation in alliance with other free nations,
would be prepared to enter upon system
of ironclad guarantees (including perhaps
demilitarized zone between East and
West) insuring the Soviet empires Sc
curity.
In all of this, as far as essentials are
concerned, West Germany has full Anglo
French-American support. The challenge
implicit in Bonn's appeal is thus limited
to the Kremlin. If the answer continues
to be no." the world at large will not
have the slightest reason to doubt that
the main Soviet objective, despite the
post-Stalin smiles, remains unchanged
namely, to create German satellite and
proceed from there to the ultimate COM
munization of what is left of free Europe.
ALL 0I..