Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-07-29
Answering Mr.. Nosser

There is good reason, it seems to us,
for making haste slowly in any moves
to retaliate against President NasSers
deplorable decision to nationalize the
Suez Canal.
This is an act on his part which can
cut more than one way, At the moment
it seems to have the fervent support of
the Egyptian people, which is not sur
priSing. 1t also appears to have consid-
cradle support in other Arab countries,
although that is something that could
change If their oil revenues should dwin-
die. 1t has also provided something of
happy hunting ground for the Soviet
propagandiStS, who have jumped in with
both feet to capitalize on anti-Western
sentiment among the Egyptians.
But we are long way from the last
chapter of this sorry tale. Much depends
upon what NaSSer really intends to do.
II he compenSateS the canal owners on
the terms that he has outlined, the ma
tionalization of the canal, standing alone,
is something that the world can live with.
It is not the first time that this sort Of
thing has been done, and it probably will
not be the last. The real question is
concerned with what the future will
bring. 1t is. possible that the Egyptians
will operate the canal efficiently and that
it will be kept open to world shipping at
reasonable tolls. If this proves to be the
case, no intolerable harm, as a practical
matter, will have been DONE 1t is also pos
Sible, however, that NaSser may boost tolls
to an exorbitant level and that he may
try to restrict the use Of the canal as a
political and economic weapon against
the West.
If this happens, then the time will
be at hand for serious consideration Of
alternatives and reprisals involving pos
Sible use of force The latter, it seems
to us, belong in the last-resort category.
NaSSer'S move has been compared with
Premier MoSSadegh'S action in expropri-
ating the Iranian oil fields, and there is
a similarity. But NaSSer's internal posi-
ton, at this time at least, is much
stronger than MossadeghS. And the his
tory OF open repriSalS designed to force
the capitulation of a popular dictatorial
leader has not been a happy one. Most
Of them have proved Self-defeating in the
end. So this is something which we
think should be put at the bottom of the
list, to be tried only when some over
riding necessity makes such action i'm
perative.
There is much that the West can do
short of risky repriSals. Britain has al
ready frozen EgyptS sterling balances and
canal company assets in the United
Kingdom. France may follow suit. If
Nasser tries to cut of the Vests oil sup
ply by closing the canal to tankerS, the
essential oil can be shipped in other ways
and to some extent from other sources.
This, while more costly, would fashion
two-edged sword for the Egyptian Presi-
dent. 1t would reduce the oil revenues Of
other Arab states and would cut NaSSer'S
revenues from the canal to a nominal
figure.
So let's wait while and see. 1t may
be that NaSser really wants the canal rev.
enues and that he will try to operate the
canal on q reasonable basis. II not, If
he has some sinister purpose in mind,
that will develop in time, and the bridge
can be crossed when we get to it. Mean
while, the West should not permit an
entirely justified sense of outrage over
the seizure of the canal to goad it into
hasty and possibly rash counter-moveS.