Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-05-07

uOur lie OF Lne american como
own son.
The stalemated war in Kore
six months and 26 days when Mr.
Eisenhower entered the White
House.
He had to make one of hi
most grave decisions what
course to pursue to bring thu
war to an end. Some Republi-
cans advocated an enlargement
of the Korean conflict into &
great air and sea offensive tt
defeat Communist China anc
then to unity Korea by crushing
all Red forces south of the Yall
River.
This was more or less in lint
with Gen. MacArthur's memo
randum to the Joint Chiefs o.
Staff in which he proposed {
naval blockade of Red China
bombardment of bases and mill
tary centerS on the mainland o.
China and announcement of as.
saults from Formosa on coasta
areas.
Decides Against War Expansion
Mr.. Eisenhowe decided
against any immediate adoption
of a war-expansion program. HI
told the cabinet on March Is
1853. that the cost in men anc
dollars of a large land offensive
in Korea would be huge. AS 6
military man. he said, he wa:
fully aware of the immense, un.
practicable consequences of &
great offensive against China
an undertaking in which oul
principal allies probably woulc
refuse to join.
The alternative was to con.
tinue the exasperating truce ne.
gotiations at Panmunjom within
the framework that had devel'
oped during the Truman admin.
istration.
Mr.. Eisenhower decided tt
continue the truce talks. He de-
cided also to devise ways of put.
ting pressure on Communis
China. He was determined mo-
to accept an endless stalemate
He wished to impress upon Rec
China the thought that an in.
definite Korean truce delay
would create situation inSwhict
the United States would strike
at China not only in Korea but
on two or three other fronts Of
its own choosing.
Fleet Gets Order
The methods of putting pres
sure on Red China for an armi-
stice in Korea can be recorded
as follows;
/, The It'll Fleet Order. In
June, 1850. following the North
Korean attack, the United States
18th Fleet was instructed by the
Truman administration to pre-
vent attack upon Formosa-and
also to insure that Formosa
should not be used as base of
operations against the Chinese
Communist mainland.
Mr.. Eisenhower changed the
order to the 7th Fleet. The
United States Navy, he said,
must no longer be required to
serve as a defensive arm of CON-
munist China" The new order
to the 7th Fleet, dated February
2, 1858. was sent by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Stripped only OF
its classified predatory references
to other directives, it read: THAT
portion ur Navy cablese for
YOU'RE current directive which
requires you insure that Formoss
and Pescadores will not rpt moi
be used as bases opns topera-
tions) against Chi mainland By
Chi Mats (Chinese Nationalists)
is rescinded."
The President and Secretary
Dulles meant this as a warning
to the Reds that Formosa might
yet be used by the United State;
as base for an invasion of the
mainland If a truce was moi
signed.
2. Talk with Prime Minister
Nehru of India. Secretary Dulle,
had three days of talks with the
Prime Minister in the last weel
Of May. He told Mr.. Nehru thai
II the Korean stalemate contin-
ued. the United States woulc
have to blast the Communists
sanctuary in Manchuria NORTH
OF the Yalu River. Mr.. Dulles
thought Mr.. Nehru would pas.
the word on to Pieping.
3. AS a possible omen of thing,
to come If the Communists die
not end the stalemate, the
United States moved atomic mis-.
siles to Okinawa. Ostensibly thi,
was a training exercise but ir
reality it was a blunt warming
to the Chinese.
Discussed in Cabinet
The subject of Korea came w
repeatedly In the cabinet. Or
March 80. during a discussion O.
the need for standby consumer
controls, Mr.. Dulles warned the
cabinet not to assume that thu
crisis was over. He warned thai
a decision to allow the Korean
war to continue in stalematt
could cost the administration
the support Of Congress.
On May 20. Undersecretary o.
State Bedell Smith told the cab.
met Of a report he heard from
Senator Hickenlooper. Republi.
can Of Iowa. that "go-it-alone'
sentiment was growing in Con
gress.
Through the months OF ne.
eotiations the President and Mr.
Dulles persisted in the conviction
that the Chinese would agree Il
a truce If they came to fear al
attack on two or three othe
fronts. Later, at a press confer
ence on JanunrY II 1855 MI