Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-12-09
PUZZLER
PUZZLER
What Does
Russia Want
In Nideost?
BY WILLIAM D. COLE

BEIRUT. Lebanon. - Diplomats
here who have sifted all the facts
now available on Soviet penetration
into the Middle East find them
selves more at a loss than ever
before to explain Moscow's ultimate
aims in this current tinderbox area
of the world. Their puzzlement is
being shared by responsible Arab
statesmen.
The record Of Russian tactics to
date apparently offers no clue on
whether the Kremlin seeks only to
stir UP trouble for the West here
or is following a master plan to
take over the Middle East by force,
as British official sources recently
intimated. On-the-spot diplomats
consider 1t noteworthy that Russia
has so far neglected to remedy the
basic flaw in the Arab war machine
the flimsy economies of its Egyp-
tian and Syrian allies. But they
are not certain what significance
this fact has.
Both in Syria and Egypt--the
nations which received the bulk of
Soviet aid - the assistance was
purely military. Those who argue
that Russia was willing to wait
until the Arab masses swept the
present regimes aside do not take
into account the fact that present
Arab nationalism is increasingly
taking on a Moslem or religious
attire. This, in essence, is anti
Communist.
Vast Stores Found
Yet, the theory that Russia was
planning an active military pene-
tration of the area was given q
spur by Israeli findings in the Sinai
desert fighting. There, 1000 tons
OF ammunition-said to be suffi-
Gent to supply a corps of troops
were captured in Egyptian storage
depots.
The war booty also included TO-
600 new tires for military vehicles,
and over 1000 heavy vehicles them
selves. The two poorly organized
Egyptian divisions posted in the
region could not have maintained.
much less operated, this array of
war machines.
To many military observers this
meant that Russia planned for her
own soldiers to use the material
stored in Sinai. At the same time,
Russia was supplying q vast guam
tlty OF oil to Israel despite the
Egyptian blockade.
Also, several months previous to
this, Russian Foreign Minister
Shepilov's visit to the Arab world
was considered something less than
successful because Of his refusal
to commit his country to Arab views
regarding Israel.
1t was reliably reported during
the height of the Suez crisis that
Syria-RuSsia's closest ally in the
Arab world-was eager to accent
the Russian volunteers. For the Z
Russians, Syria would have been the
logical staging area for the sweep
through Israel and the rest of the
Middle East.
Yet. the volunteers did not come.
possibly because of Soviet preoc-
cupation in Hungary or the fear of
risking World War III. Neverthe-
less. Moscow had q golden oppor-
tunity for military Intervention in
the Middle East. This period of
one week, perhaps the only week
In history when the Arab nations
would have welcomed her. passed
without Soviet action.
Eyes on Turkey?
The conclusion reached bv soms
military experts after the Sinai
battle were even more startling
than those Of the diplomats. The
discovery Of vast stores OF anti
freeze solutions for the radiators of
military vehicles. antifrost COM
pounds for windshields, and lots Of
winter wearing apparel has prodded
some long-range military specula-
ton.
The presence Of this material
useless in the Sinai desert country
brought forth the theory that
Russia was prepared to drop para
troopers In the area and then
turn toward the underbelly Of her
traditional enemy. Turkey, who "a
IN military alliance with the United
States.
1t thus turns out that there IA
no patent answer to the question
OF what Russia was--or is-plan-
ming IN the Middle East. After
Sinai and Suez, the question looms
larger than ever. The only thing
agreed upon by Western observers
Is that she is up to no good. And
that's no answer.