Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-02-05
Courage

Today administrators and scien-
lists in charge of the Pentagons
vast military spending program live
in daily dread of the second-guess-
ing Congressman who may hold
them UP to public chastisement as
"boneheads" for "squandering
public money on some weapon that
suddenly develops a bug" A GER
tain amount of such dread In
healthy, of course, because it pre-
vents carelessness with public
money.
But in the postwar period this
criticism and the fear Of 1t have
forced our weapons development
into an unhealthy conservatism, 1t
is charged. Administrator are
loathe to take flyer where flyers
are called form the research and
development phases, where new
ideas can be tested cheaply. Many
good ideas are not even developed
to the mockup stage unless whole
panel Of scientists is dead sure the
mockups can be tested and mass
produced.
Worse still, politician-shy admin
istrators. once committed" to re-
search model. have tendency to 60
through with it. all the way to the
exceedingly expensive production
stage, whether or not the weapon
merits it. There are critics in and
out of Government who will assert
that the B-66 bomber. now in pro-
duction after several false starts,
is such a weapon.
Over a period Of years, some in
dustrialistS and scientists say the
cautious research and development
administrator has become, in effect,
the virtual controller of the whole
multi-billion dollar weapons pro-
gram. This means that our new
weapons are chosen largely in the
dark, before they have been tested
or masS-produced. and before much
Is known about them.
Cheop or Costly?
Since these decisions are taken in
, secret, the system may give the ap-
pearance of being economical, but in
reality it is extremely expensive.
Officials have a natural tendency to
cover up" by continuing to produce
an inferior or even useless product
as if it were spectacular success.
If faults do not appear until the
advanced test stage or the early
production stage. the pressure on
the administrator is all the greater.
Visions of being called to Capitol
Hill, there to answer questions about
a $50 million blunder," swim be-
fore his eyes. He usually decides
to spend another $3.50 million try
ing to make hopeless situation q
little bit better.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who
headed the nuclear submarine prof.
ect, is held up as one of the ex-
ceptionS. After having spent
around. 81 million on one approach
he became convinced it wouldn't
work. He halted the whole project
and started over again. How much
he saved can't be calculated, of
course.
If more administrators stopped
dubious projects in the relatively
high i cost test and production
phases, industrialiSts believe, real
economies could be made. The
savings could be "plowed back"
into research and development,
opening up many more avenues
and thus broadening the whole
weapons spectrum.
This is one of the dividends to
be hoped for from Secretary OF
Defense Wilson's plan to appoint
missiles car" to steer the race
for intercontinental and medium
range ballistics missiles.
The Soviet Union, of course. de-
velops even stronger inclinations
among its civil servants to cover
up mistakes. Penalties are meas
ured in mortality rates as well as
rubies and ridicule.
That is why "R and D" critics
think an improvement In the Amer
lean system would yield big divi.
dends in strengthening our deter.
rent.