Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-12-16


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in approach by the two countries,
and it is gratifying to Indians. that
greater emphasis is being laid on
the areas of agreement than on diff
fefenceS.
The range of the Nehru-Eisen-
hover discussions, it is felt, will be
global in character. Their success
depends mainly on what accord is
achieved on power blocs and mill
tary pacts. American military aid
to Pakistan, admission of Commu-
mist China into the United Nations,
and American economic aid to the
underdeveloped countries.
midas opposition to power blocs
and military pacts springs from the
conviction that they keep the en-
tire world on its nerves. They are
viewed here as the result of fear
complex-fear by the West of Com
munist aggression; fear by the So
Wet Union of Western military
might and German rearmament. In
midas view, neither the Commu-
mist countries nor the Western
powers want war, and once this
premise is accepted and each side
shows willingness to trust the
other, durable peace could become
easier to achieve. OF course, the
Indians concede that disarmament
must be preceded by a foolproof
method of insurance against any
derelictionS.
Military alliances by themselves,
India contends, are no solution to
world problems. 1t is asserted that,
for instance, the Baghdad Pact,
primarily formed to keep the So,
Wet Union out of the Middle East,
has actually led to increased Soviet
interest in this area.
On American military aid to-
Pakistan, India's fears are based
on the supposition that Pakistan's
aim in accepting this aid is to be
militarily strong against India. This
military aid. Indians feel. will pre-
vent any real improvement in hdo-
Pakistan relations.
Stond on Red China
Mr.. Nehru will impress upon
President Eisenhower the urgency
Of getting Communist China into
the United Nations. midas argu-
ment is that the Peking Govern
ment is in effective control Of the
entire Chinese mainland and has
come to stay. Without it. the United
Nations is not really universal.
Such admission, Of course, would
not in any way imply approval Of
the Peking policies by any country.
1t would merely mean the accept,
ance Of an established fact. Tho
very essence of the United Nations
IN the Indian view, is its diversified
composition.
President Eisenhower might pro-
duce a long chart of the Chinese
dragons black record" But India
feels that If Communist China had
been admitted into the United Ma
tons long ago. much Of the trouble
In the Far East would have been
avoided. For as member Of the
United Nations, Picking would have
been bound by certain international
moral standards. Even If PekinR is
considered to be ''vagrant," it is far
better, India feels. to place It within
the bounds of international disci-
pline by bringing it into the UN.
Though Mr.. Nenru has said he
Is not going to the United States
TO seek financial help, India well
comes aid from anywhere. And the
Prime Minister believes firmly that
the possible spread OF communism
toLhe underdeyeloped countries can
be prevented only by raising the
standards OF living Of their people.
Mr.. Nehru symbolizes the aSpira-
tons and urges Of the Asian and
African nations. President Eisen-
hover symbolizes Western morality
and democratic impulses.
midas foreign policy Is one OF
independent judgment and action,
conditioned by midas particular
&%NNAsSs0AANNo NAAA AENAHs Az n WdJa
II resembles the American policy
OF freedom from foreign entangle-
ments during the early years Of
Its independence.
Indians feel Americans are peace.
loving and democratic. the United
States Is the only great power,
which In the eyes OF Asiatlcs, has
kept Its hands clean during the
recent Suez crisis India would like
the United States 70 assume the
moral leadership n the world by
casting on old inhibltions and cold
war completes and nv Initiating 4
new approach Of disarmament. co.
existence and peace.
The general belief here is that
II Mr Eisenhower and Mr.. EehrI
could come down 70 brass tscks.
many world problems would ~
brought nearer OFntlon. But NJ
one expects total conversion b. ons
Of The 0ther