Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1956-05-08

iN~SW NNAAA AiO POooLU1y uioCIldIR e
his obligations with regard tc
American security?
The President soon saw he was
winning a tough battle. A House
leader suggested that the lam
guage of the Dirksen rider be wa
tered down so that it merely
stated congressional opposition
to the admission of China with
out threatening to strange the
U. N. financially.
That would be all right, said
Mr.. Eisenhower, just so long as
Congress did not forecloSe free
dom of action by the United
States in the future.
Victory for Eisenhower
The dramatic conference of the
President and the congressional
leaders ended in a victory for the
responsiveness of Mr.. Eisenhow-
er. A Senate leader said he
guessed his colleagues on the
Senate Appropriations Commit
tee would withdraw the poten-
tally explosive Dirksen rider
about Red China and the u. N,
which they did.
Just as President Eisenhower
had thrown his influence against
American involvement in a war
with Red China in the cases of
Korea and Indo-China, so he did
in 1855 when the Communists
were posing an ominous threat
in the Formosa region.
Red China avowed it's inten-
ton of Selling Formosa by
force. On September 90, 1854,
Premier Chou En-lai said: 1.-THE
people of China must liberate
Taiwan (F'ormosa). Unless Tai
wan is liberated. the peace of
China will be threatened" Pub
licly, he did not set time. Pri-
vately, according to Joseph
Alsop, writing from Hong Kong,
ne informed Burmese leaders
that the attack would come in
1855.
Reds Shell Islands
In that same month of Sep
TENDER. 1854, the Chinese Reds
began Smelling the Quemoy and
Matsu Islands in the Formosa
Strait just off the shore of the
mainland. On December 2, 1854,
the United States signed a mu-
tual defense treaty with the Ma
tionalist government on For
moSa, pledging to defend For.
mosa and the nearby Pescadores
Islands.
Pressed upon Mr.. Eisenhower
in the debate that developed.
was the view long identified with
Admiral Radford that a show
down between the United States
and Red China was inevitable.
Gen Ridgway has made clear in
his writings that there were per-
sons lin high places" felt we
should take a stand" against in
vasion of Quemoy and Matsu
and thus. if challenged, bring on
the showdown then and there by
going to war.
Gen. Ridgway wrote in his
that: II challenge any
thesis that destroying the mill
tary might of Red China would
be in our own long range inter-
est We could create there, by
military means. a great power
vacuum. Then we would have to
go in there with hundreds of
thousands Of men to fill that
vacuum-which would bring us.
face-to-face with Russia along
a 7,0O0-mile frontier. If we
failed to go in, then Russia her.
self would fill it, and the threat
to our own security would not
have abated one iota."
Island Seized
On January 10. 1855, the Chi
nese Reds offered a new
challenge by moving into the
Tachens and seizing the island
Of Yikiang. The Tachens are 200
miles northwest of Formosa and
close to the mainland. Presi-
dent Eisenhower and Secretary
Dulles at their press conferences
promptly wrote off the Tachens
as not being an essential part
of the defense Of Chang Kali
shek's bastion.
At this time q misunderstand-
ing arose. The Chinese got the
impression that If they were to
withdraw from the Tachens
as they did - they would get
better promises from the United
States regarding defense Of the
Quemoy and Matsu Islands. The
United States position is that
no promises were made, and that
the Chinese misunderstanding
resulted from crossed cablegrams
and was cleared up in few days.
However, an air of crisis pre-
vailed. President Eisenhower.
Secretary Dulles and Admiral
Radford agreed that the United
States should take some dramatic
step that might deter Red China
from starting a war. Mr.. Eisen-
hover insisted on getting the
approval of Congress. He thought
former President Truman had
made a serious mistake in not
going to Congress before COM
hitting American forces in Ko-
rea in 1850.
Asks Authority to Use Force
Out of these conversations
evolved the idea of the Formosa
resolution, a Landmark in recent
American military diplomatic
history. On January "a, 1855,
Mr.. Eisenhower asked Congress
for authority to use armed force
II necessary to defend FormoSa
and its approaches, specifically
mentioning only the Pescadores
Islands.
The most commanding figure
In the congressional debate was
~ ttno. af.g O. So