Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-08-25
By DIR. D. GALE JOHNSON

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THE basic agricultural problem
.of the Soviet Union as viewed
:by the Russians. is to produce
enough grain and feed to per-
unit large expansion of live
stock production, while at the
same time keeping up with the
population growth.
(. The Russians have enough
flood, largely wheat and potatoes,
Ito maintain their present popu-
ilation. However, the diet is
:monotonous, since starchy foods
make up about TOTS per cent of
ithe total Galleries eaten. In the
UNITED States the same foods
represent only IS per cent of the
diet.
. The American who visits the
USSR concludes, in addition,
that the huge wastage of labor
:on farms constitutes a major
national problem. The Soviet
union uses upward of six times
jas much labor on their farms
as We do in the United States.
yet the total agricultural output
Us substantially less than ours.
; While the employment of labor
ION our farms has been falling
quite consistently in recent years,
we were impressed by the evil
:dence that the Russian farm
population had increased during
the last two or three years. This
means that labor which might
he used to increase industrial
output is being used on farms
in an attempt to increase food
output.
| Farm Prices Increased
: The increase in farm popula-
tion clearly seems to reflect the
decided improvement in the eco
homie circumstances of farm
people. Starting in 1853 the
prices paid by the state for many
farm products were increased
substantially. The amounts that
had to be delivered to the state
for purely nominal prices were
reduced. Measures were taken
TO help farmers sell their prod
lcts in the free markets, where
prices are substantially higher
than state purchase prices for
many products. Because of these
and other measures some factory
workers have left their jobs in
towns to return to the farm
villages, while fewer young peo-
pie are now leaving the farm.
The changes in policy which
have led to the increased farm
incomes were designed to in
crease incentives and thus to in
duce more production. Two years
is too short a period to appraise
the impact of the additional in
centives upon total production.
The serious drought whic h
affected most of the European
part of the USSR in 1854
definitely limited any effect that
the incentives might have had
upon output. However. I believe
that the rather rapid expansion
in corn acreage which occurred
this year was in large part due
to the improved economic cir
cumstances Of agriculture. The
probability of livestock produc-
ton. for which the corn will be
used, provided an incentive for
collective farms to make the nee
essary investments and for the
peasants to put forth the re-
quired labor.
Corn acreage has been in
creased from about 10 million
acres in 1854 to 40 million acres
in 1855. This is a very substan-
tial expansion and an additional
80 million acres are to be
planted to corn over the next
two or three years. 1t should be
remembered that almost all of
the new corn replaces some
other feed crop, such as oats, bar
ley, root crops and hay. Thus
the total production Of corn
will not represent net in
crease in output. In fact. only
about a. third of the total out
put will be additional production
since the crops replaced yield
about two-thirds as much as
corn.
More Labor Required
An important aspect of the
corn expansion is that corn re-
quires much more labor per acre
or per unit of production than
do crops like oats or barley. The
amount of labor used per acre
of corn in the United States is
about three to four times that
used per acre of small grains
and the relationship is probably
about the same in the Soviet
Union. While there will be some
expansion Of feed production
resulting from expanding corn
land. the main cost will be la
Dor that could be used to in
crease industrial output. Over
the next few years there may be
a substantial conflict between
the corn program and effosts to