Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-04-17
BY EARL H. vOSS

booed, according to their views,
when the Democrats 1852 presi-
Dental candidate, Adlai E. Steven
son, charged that the administra-
ton has handicapped its own for
eign policies by beclouding them
with bluff.
1t was q harsh Judgment, and an
intensely political one. But in at
least one respect, Mr.. Stevenson
seems to have had some facts be-
hind his polemics.
Those facts concern the so-called
strategic reserve"-America's high
ly mobile. home-based pool Of air,
sea and ground forces ready on q
moments notice as a fire brigade"
for use against outcroppings Of vio-
lence anywhere in the world.
theoretically, the strategic re-
serve would absorb an initial shock
tsuch as the Red push into South
Korea) until more force could be
brought to bear.
(How it fits into our overall mill
tary program was outlined in The
Evening Star by Cecil Holland and
Charles B. Seib last week.
But practically, it doesn't work
out that way. Some key components
of the strategic reserve are hard to
find, others are non-existent, and
there are only the faintest hopes
today of building this mobile strik-
ing force into anything like effec-
tive reality. i.
Tine and Diplomacy
Before taking closer look. there
are two general aspects of the prob
lem to be kept in mind.
First. speed. Rapidity in deploy-
ing the strategic reserve will be ex-
tremely important in the nuclear
age. Forces land equipment) that
can't be modified within 80 days
may not even get to the scene be-
fore it is all over. Navy transports
may be too slow. Military stategists
estimate the decisive phases Of an
about nuclear war might last four
to eight weeks. Limited nuclear
wars could last less time. Nom
nuclear aggressions, on the other
hand, probably would give us more
time. But how can we count on the
Communists to withhold nuclear
weapons, especially If we use them
in defense?
Second. diplomacy. The value Of
our strategic reserve is at least as
much political as it is military. II
it is convinclngly strong, in all re-
~spects, it can instill confidence in
allies who might otherwise give in
to Communist diplomatic or sub
versive pressures rather than risk
wars devastation.
Our strategic reserve. as 1t is now
being planned. will have two strong
links and two weak links.
The Strong Links
The Air Force has a formidable
strategic and tactical capability.
The Strategic Air Command is
equipped to supply both kinds of
strength. With nuclear weapons 1t
could wreak havoc.
But that Is not an unmixed bless
ing. Nuclear havoc frightens our
allies. Some Of them who do not
share our horror Of communism
prefer to take their chances with
Red dictators rather than with our
nuclear destruction. however WELL
intentioned.
The Many demonstrated in the
Tachen Islands evacuation that 1t
could muster a formidable combat
reserve of sea and air power in a
comparatively w-deyeloping crisis.
BY emitting home biased mainten-
ance schedules 1t perhaps could
handle its part in absorbing the in
itial shock Of an aggression.
The Week Links
The weak links in the strategic
reserve are the ground forces. Army
and Marine, and their Transports
ton.
o. The Army strategic reserue,
strictly speaking, consists OF only
one division---the 82d Airborne. It
is combat ready. at full strength.
There are three other Army di-
visions in the United States with
combat-ready cadre. But they have
been set to training recruits. II
war came suddenly, Army Chief of
STAFF Matthew B. Ridgway says the
recruits would have to be moved
out and trained men brought back
In before these divisions would be
ready to 60. That would take val
liable time--up TO q month, Army
men say. II the emergency were
acute. however. these divisions
might be sent into battle half.
green. Worse things have happened
in our Army.
One other division might be
classed in the strategic reserve, al
though it is hard to see how 1t
could be moved any other place but
Southeast Asia, no matter where
the aggression. This division is
stationed in the Hawaiian Islands.
Perhaps It would be more &C.
curate to consider the Hawaii
based division as part of the Far
EaEt deployment. The United