Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-10-22
Much Ado About Very Little

II
The great to-do over what General
Macarthur sailor didn't say-about
bringing Russia into the war against
Japan stems from q single sentence
uttered on the Senate floor last March 70
by Senator Lehman Of New York.
Senator Lehman was discussing the
publication by the State Department OF
the Yalta papers. He was criticizing that
action and defending the role Of President
Roosevelt at Yalta. With other things,
he said that Yalta cannot be understood
except In the light of the recommended
tions Of General Macarthur regarding the
course Of the war against Japan. Then
came this sentence: General Macarthur
strongly favored and urgently recon-
rnended that Soviet Russia be involved
In the war against Japan"
This statement, read In It's context,
seemed to say that General Macarthur
had been consulted prior to Yalta and
that the Yalta decisions were based In
part on his recommendations Certainly
this was General MacArthur's interpre-
tation. for on March Is he came back
with strong statement Of his own.
He said that his views on the advis-
ability Of Soviet Russia entering the war
at that late date 1.-THE time Of Yaltal
s'were never solicited" He contended
that the Imminent collapse" Of Japan
was clearly apparent from the time Of
the seizure Of the Philippines by our
forces, and that all Of his dispatches and
reports clearly enunciated this view
point" Then he added: Had my views
been requested with reference to Yalta
/ would most emphatically have recon-
mended against bringing the Soviet into
the Pacific war at that late date. To have
made vital concessions for such a purpose
would have seemed to me fantastic"
It is clear, from the records. released
by the Defense Department, that Gen.
eral Macarthur is right in saying that
his views were not sought prior to the
Yalta meeting. He says, In fact. that he
did not even know 1t was being held. But
there is room, on the record, for differ
ence Of opinion as to what advice he
might have given II he had been
consulted.
General Macarthur comedies that In
1941, shortly after Pearl Harbor, he 'urg-
emily recommended" to Secretary of War
Stimson that Russia wage war on Japan.
He says he received no reply. Presumably,
however, he would have welcomed
Russian participation from that time on,
the only real question being what price,
II any, he would have been willing to pay
to get this assistance.
No document signed by General Mac
Arthur has been produced to show that
he would have willingly paid any price.
On the other hand, an entry In the For
restal diary and reports Of conversations
with General Macarthur from two other
ofticers--aH coming after the Yalta meet
ing-suggest that he was very anxious to
have Russia enter the Pacific war subse-
quent to the conquest Of the Philippines,
and that he understood that the Russians
wanted substantial concessions in ex-
change for their help.
But all OF this Is inconcluSive. 1t win
be interpreted, no doubt, in accordance
with each individuals attitude toward
General MacArthur-wheth one is for
or against man concerning whom there
are very few neutral views.
There is one further point worth
mentioning This whole affair Is really
Of small Importance. It is a perfect ex-
ample Of much ado about very little.
Why should we get all steamed up In
1855 over the question of what General
Macarthur sailor didn't say--or what
he thought--or didn't tfink--10 years
ago? We would be better of If we stopped
raking over these old ashes and got down
to work on the important business which
lies ahead.