Milford chronicle. [volume] (Milford, Del.) 1878-1974, 1955-05-06

and Peiping.
There was very quick State
Department reply to Chou say
ing that in any discussions on
Formosa. the us. government
would insist that Nationalist
China participate as an equal.
If Communist China is sincere
in the offer to negotiate, the
statement continued, there are
steps which could be taken to
demonstrate sincerity - for in
stance putting an immediate
cease-fire into effect, releasing
the Americans held in China,
and accepting the invitation of
the U.N. to take part in talks to
end hostilities.
Cold Reception
The Chou suggestion got a
very cold shoulder from Chang
Kai-shek's government.
The next day Chou reiterated
the stand which Communist
China has been taking for long
time now-that Formosa mustN
he liberated" Chou didn't,
however, reveal the secret of
how he was going to get Ground
the US. 7th Fleet to do this.
The next development was a
change in the US. position. Sec
rotary of State Dulles said in a
news conference that National
list China would not have to be
present at any negotiations on
"a cease-fre. But he said the
Nationalist certainly would be
brought in as equal participants
in any talks which sought to
dispose of territory in the area.
This position was reiterated
by President Eisenhower the
following day. He said the earl
Ter State Department announce
ment may have been a bit of an
overstatement.
Islands in Background
In the background was the
fate of the two Chinese offshore
Islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
AS things have worked out it
would indeed be a serious blow
to Chang Kai-shek's prestige
should he have to evacuate
Quemoy and Matsu-unless the
United States could devise some
for him which
would counteract the effect of
this loss.
Somehow the "Formosa cri-
sis" and the concentration on
Quemoy and Matsu have man.
aged to distract everyone in the
West from the basic issue posed
by the US. stand on the Chinese
Nationalist government and
Formosa.
The Main Point
Signature of the Chinese
American mutual assistance
treaty earlier this year whereby
the United States undertakes
the obligation to come to the
aid of the Chinese Nationalist
on Formosa if they are attacked
was formulation of the notice
which the United States had
previously served on the Com
munists that it does not intend
to let free, anti-Communist
China perish. 1t was reaffirma-
ton of the policy formulated
when Communist aggression in
Korea took place-that America
would see to it that there con-
tinued to be two Chinas, that
two different Chinas would COM
pete for the loyalty of Chinese
on the mainland and overseas.
So long as Formosa remains
non-C Communist there must al
ways remain the hope among
Chinese on the mainland that
they will not always be ruled by
the Communists in Peiping.
Success Possible
This "two-China" policy re-
quires very effective imple-
mentation, of course. For it to
succeed Nationalist China would
have to become a strong center
of attraction to Chinese every
where. Formosa would have to
become such Towering center
of Chinese culture, such light
house of prosperity and material
welfare as to be the showplace
of the entire Far East. With
American military protection,
material aid, and political and
technical advice this would be
possible.
One of the most effective
weapons in the Communist ar
mory is their ability and skill
at distracting attention from the
main issues in the world. The
evidence is that once more they
have been successful at this.
There was no real "Formosa
crisis" this week, but Peiping
had convinced the world there
was one.
The really important Ques-
ton is the future of Fof1nosa as
the center for development of
a new China. And not much, at
any rate not enough. thought is
being devoted to that formi-