Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-03-27
April Rendezvous?

81 ~Hsst tASsb0G&VV0Ss .-351-5.5st
It seems long, long time since Alan
Seeger, soon to die in the fury OF the First
World War, wrote Of a rendezvous when
spring brings back blue days and fair" That
war to end war" was fought and won Some
two decades later still more terrible war
engulfed the world-the war which was
fought to hammer the aggressors into "un-
conditional surrender" Then there was Ko-
rea, and now another spring comes round
again." Does 1t mean-must 1t mean-an-
other fateful rendezvous?
This somber question, If seemingly re-
liable reports can be believed, soon will be
pressing in upon us, demanding an answer.
The forecast, apparently authoritative, is
that the Chinese Communists in midApril
will launch an attack, first against Matsu
and then the Quemoys. If this proves to be
the case, our Government will Immediately
have to make two grave decisions
The first is whether to assist in the de-
tense Of the coastal islands. Our military
authorities believe that the Nationalist
troops of Chang Kai-shek cannot hold the
islands against determined Communist
attack. They also believe that the islands
can be held If United States forces inter-
vene. What are the arguments pro and con?
There are two major arguments against
intervention. The coastal islands, as dis
tinguished from Formosa are unquestion-
ably Chinese territory. If we fight there, we
will be intervening in what is left OF China's
civil war. The second argument is that if we
fight for the coastal islands, we will fight
ole bo% &c a
British, will not fight with us. There also are
other considerations. Where would such a
war end? Would the Russians come to Red
China's aid? The Presidents military adj
visers believe that the Russians would not,
but can they be sure?
The arguments in favor of intervention
run in the following vein: If Chang is de-
termined to fight for the coastal islands, and
he says he is, the morale of his troops would
be destroyed If we let them go down to de-
feat A decision on our part not to help de-
fend the costal islands would wipe out
confidence in other Asian nations in our
willingness and ability to take stand any
where against the Communists. There is also
the question of the course that the fighting
for the coastal islands might take. Last jan
udIyt d1tCI CdICkul GllOuS1lL dIlO CO1lo4OCA
ton, the President asked and received from
Congress authority to defend Formosa and
the Pescadores. This grant included author
ity to secure and protect "such related posi-
lions and territories of that area now in
friendly hands and the taking of such other
measures as he (the President) judges to
be required or appropriate in assuring the
defense Of Formosa and the Pescadores"
Suppose, then, that a Communist attack on
the coastal islands should include bombing
assaults on Formosan airf1elds. Would this
be the signal for American intervention?
These are some, but certainly not all, of
the considerations that would go into the
answer to the first Observation-Disclosures to
fight for the coastal islands.
Let us assume, however, that the answer
to that question Is in the affirmative, that
we decide to resist an attack on the islands.
Should this resistance take the form Of
strictly defensive action, or should we throw
off the wraps and strike, with all weapons,
for decisive victory? There cannot be much
doubt on this point. We cannot afford an
other Korea in the FormoSa theater. If the
Chinese Communists attack the coastal
islands, and If we decide to resist that
attack, our objective should be to destroy
the warmaking power of the enemy.
We should endeavor by all proper means
to avoid the necessity of making such an
ultimate decision. If we can stay out OF war
without sacrificing vital national interests
we should do so. If this cannot be done, how
ever, If the decision is that we must fight,
then, this time, we should fight to win.