Evening star., 1955-11-19

Sumed this morning. Now ] am
Isurgenee of German militarism
This was not unreasonable in the
light of what the Russians ha6
suffered from the German
armies during World War II
The Western powers were In.
deed prepared to meet the So
viet Union in this matter.
| We made security proposals
lof q serious and far-reachins
mature. Perhaps the best proof
Iof their merit is the fact that
1.-THE Soviet delegation later came
Iup with security proposals which
copied many features Of ouI
lown.
| But there was one basic and
decisive difference. Our pro-
Iposals were based upon the re-
|unification Of Germany. We dc
mot believe that solid peace In
Europe can be based on the in.
Justice of a divided Germany
The Soviet proposals were based
Ion preserving the Soviet puppei
regime in East Germany and
lthe indefinite division Of Ger.
many. at least unless Soviet
control could be extended to al
Germany.
The Soviet Union at the sum-
init conference had explicitly
promised to consider the reunifi-
cation Of Germany by free elec-
ltions and had explicitly recog-
nized the close link between the
Identification Of Germany and
European security.
Tried In Vain
We tried hard, but In vain. to
iget the Soviet delegation to dis
cuss seriously the problem Of
THE reunification Of Germany.
When the Soviet Union came
to face up to what that involved.
lit baked. Obviously. If Germany
were reunited by free elections.
this would mean the end of the
lpuppet regime which the Soviet
Union has installed in East
Germany. This. In turn, would
almost surely have serious roper
Icussions upon the other satellite
countries Of Eastern Europe.
There the Soviet-controlled gov
lernments are facing rising
pressure.
Many within the satellite
countries believe that the spirit
lof Geneva" means that they are
ENTITLED to more tolerance and
TO governments more responsive
to the needs and aspirations Of
their own nation.
So the Soviet Union took the
position that while they were
eager to get a treaty of European
security, they would not be
willing to sacrifice their East
German regime to get 1t. Despite
what they had agreed to at the
summit conference. they de-
lclared they would preserve their
regime In East Germany, in
clear defiance Of the ardent
wishes of the East Germans
themselves.
Some had thought that the
Soviet Union might be willing to
allow Germany to be reunified by
free elections II reunited Ger
many would not enter the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
But in fact the Soviet delegation
made it ahundantly clear that 1t
would not permit Germany to
be reunited by free election even
|on such terms.
So we see that although the
Soviet Union doubtless wants q
European security system TO
which it Is a party. it is not
willing to provide an essential
prerequisite, namely the reunifi-
cation Of Germany In freedom.
Directed to Help
The second problem that We
had to discuss was that Of linz
litation Of armament. Primary
responsibility in this field is now
with the United Nations Dis
armament Subcommittee. But
the foreign ministers were de
Irected to help II they could.
Both sides showed an eager
desire to bring about limitation
Iof armament. We want this both
AS an aid to peace and to permit
economic resources to be de-
voted In greater measure to the
benefit of mankind. But the
Western nations are unwilling to
agree to disarm unless we can
be sure that both sides are carry
ing out the agreement. That Is
why we insist that disarmament
be effectively supervised and
controlled.
Three times In this century
the United States experience has
shown that one-sided weakness
In disarmament does not. In fact,
preserve peace. The United
States does not intend now to
risk its very existence upon
promises which may not be kept.
The United States is, however.
second to none in its desire for
safeguarded reduction Of arma-
Iments. It was to make that more
possible that President Eisen-
hover. at the summit confer
Ience. proposed to the Soviet
Union an exchange Of blueprints
LOT military establishments. and
then aerial inspection to verify
the blueprints and thereby inn
prove the atmosphere by dispell-
ling the fear Of aggressive inten-
ltions on either side.
That concept Of President Eli
lsenhower was rejected, by the
lSoviets, although they did recog-
lnize for the first time that aerial
inspection had a proper place In
Ia control system.
But the Soviet Union does not
attach the Importance which we
do To inspection and control Tk