Evening star., 1955-01-31
Allies 'ExpIoin Treotlto ReormG Germany
BY Crosby S. Noyes
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PARIS Russian propaganda aimed
at blocking ratification Of the Paris
agreements to rearIm Western Germany
is having q lot more effect than Official
allied statements might indicate.
The latest and strongest Red maneR-
yer came last week when Russia de-
clared an end to its state Of war with
Germany and at the same time an
nounced that all restrictions it has inn
posed on German nationals have been
lifted.
Moscow's attempt to junk the Paris
treaty has been made easier because Of
differences Of opinion on the Western
side as to what the treaty itself is all
about. These differences show clearly
through the harmonious official veneer
and raise certain doubts that the Paris
agreements viii in themselves assure. as
Anthony Eden suggests, the unity OF
the WeSt."
Each in their own way. Americans,
British, French and Germans see the
plan for rearniing Germany in a differ
ent light. And the Kremlin recently
has gone to considerable pains to bring
out the contrasts.
To an observer in Europe, it seems
that the Americans have by now de-
veloped much the same attitude toward
the Paris treaty as they Unce had
toward EDO. It is considered primarily
(and very optimistically) as the "solu-
ton to the German problem It is the
means of bringing into being the IL
West German divisions, the need for
which has impressed American strate-
gists for SO long. Finally, it will restore
the sovereignty of the Bonn Republic
and establish framework for binding
Germany closer to the defensive organ
ization Of the West.
The Americans, one feels, look on
these goals as so desirable az to be an
essential end in themselves. Western
union has the connotation of perma-
nent military and political structure.
There is an obvious effort to isolate the
immediate objective from all the larger
questions connected with it, such as
reunification Of Germany and negotia-
tion with the Russians. To most Euro
peans the American attitude seems to
be, Take this step first and well talk
about the rest afterward."
OF all our European allies, the British
come. closest to following the American
line. Their official statements often
sound as If they could have been writ
ten in Washington. Their support OF
our general policy in Europe has been
unfailing.
And yet one suspects that the British.
who pride themselves on their diplo-
matte sophistication, are a little less
inclined to oversell the Paris treaty or
to pin all their hopes on it. They admit
privately that treaty or no treaty, the
German problem" will be around for
some. time. What worries them far
more at this point is the American
problem.
Talk in the United States about
"unilateral action" and "peripheral
strategy" when the EDO fell through
gave the British Foreign Office bad
scare. More than most Europeans. the
British are convinced that the day the
United States pulls out of Europe will
mark the beginning of the end. Also
more than most they understand that
Americans aren't bluffing when they
warn that there is a limit to their
patience. So far as the British are con-
cerned, if ratification of the Paris
treaty solves the American problem and
satisfies the conditions set BY the
United States for sticking it out in
Europe-that alone would make It
worthwhile.
It is when one moves onto the con-
tinent that differences about the mean
ing of the Paris treaty become serious.
The French. Of course, have never ac-
cepted the essential American dogma
that German troops will necessarily
contribute to the security of Western
Europe. Since this is so, they look on
the Paris treaty not as a means OF
rearming Germany, but rather as q
mechanism for curbing its rearmament,
limiting the freedom OF the Federal
Republic and preserving as far as pos
sible the control which France has
enjoyed as an occupying power since
the war.
If the French are not satisfied with
these controls, it is because they are
convinced that the German problem"
will begin, rather than end with ratifi-
CaIlOu Ol tLlc EdL1o tCdty. no aou6 80
the treaty exists they see no happy
solution to the problem. They are sure
that the division of Germany into two
armed spearheads will make trouble.
Quite OF the record the French are
equally opposed to a reunited, rearmed
Germany as the undisputed leader Of
Western Europe.
Instead of either of these alterna-
tives, the French would very much pre-
fer to make deal with the Russians.
They would be more than happy to
accept permanent demilitarization Of
Germany as condition of unifying
the country through free elections. And
to the extent that they support the
Paris treaty at all, 1t is with the hope
that this may someday be the outcome.
Curiously enough, this same hope
stated in somewhat different terms is
echoed by good many German voices.
In Germany. as in France, there Is q
tendency to look on ratification Of the
Paris treaty not as an end in itself but
rather as steppingstone or a bargain
ing weapon. In Bonn, the objective Of