Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-04-17
Does U. S. Really Possess
Strategic Reserve Force?

IN the orient, TWO In Korea, one
in Japan. We also have five divt-
sions in Europe, two in the Carib-
bean. The latter two are more or
less permanent garrison forces, and
not listed among our mobile" di-
visions.
o In addition, there are the ever
ready three Marine divisions, with
their three air wings. These, of
course, are mobile by definition,
although not as impressively so as
in former times because surface
travel makes them look slow in
the nuclear age.
To summarize. the United States
has-or will have by the middle of
next year-21 divisions. 10 of them
mobile" Army divisions and three
Marine units. Perhaps seven divi-
sions could be classed as strategic
reserve. This compares with Soviet
Russia's ITS divisions, IS of them
mechanical or equipped with tanks.
The proportion gets more hisadvafl-
tageous as one expands the CONE
pariSon to include the 25 million-
man Chinese Communist army and
the Soviet satellites on the one side,
and our allies on the other.
The Reds, of course. have another
advantage: They are not threatened
by surprise brush-flre wars fomented
by us; therefore. they do not need
a fire brigade. However. on the
debit side of the Red ledger is the
need for large internal security
forces.
But the real measure CT the weak.
ness of our ground-force strategic
reserve is not even in Its discourage
ing numbers. 1t is in the trans.
portation facilities we would have
Immediately at hand to take the
reserve to the scene of the trouble.
The Air Force, on whom the Army
must rely for swift deployment, is
now equipped to carry only one regi-
mental combat team into battle inn
mediately, and with light equipment
only
The Navy can handle an assault
lift" of less than tiDo divisions. Not
even the Nays own three divisions
of Marines could be deployed at one
time. Crossing the Pacific by ship.
of course. would take roughly two
weeks. Enemy forces could get
pretty far in a fortnight, as we
learned to our sorrow in Korea in
1850. Half the defending country
might be blanketed with wars dew
astation before we could arrive on
the scene.
The Optimistic Side
AS administration hackers point
out, however, all this gives rather
too black a picture. Commercial
vessels and air transports could
quickly be pressed into service to
supplement the military's own car
riers.
BY long stretch of the magma
ton, one might be able to say that
Military Air Transport Service and
commercial planes could raise the
air lift capacity two divisions Even
tually-probably by 1960-the Air
Force hopes to build up It's ready
transport capacity from less than
one to three divisions.
In the meantime, however, our
air and sea carrying forces are dam
gerously low.
Another optimistic factor con-
Germs the specific case of the Com
munists' most immediate threat. In
the FormoSa situation, we have
Chiang's 100000 to 100000 ground
troops on the scene to absorb the
initial shock of any enemy assault.
The Worry
The weakest areas, however, are
ones in which the Communists are
very interested: Southeast Asia and
the Middle East.
II the Communists were to attack
Laos. Cambodia. Thailand or Burma
OR Iran-we would be fortunate to
have Is days. Those countries have
fewer defenders than South Korea
had in June 1850. And there is no
really strong anti-Communist feel
ing In Southeast Asia or the Middle
East.
When the Soviet Unions nuclear
stockpile reaches parity with cur
own in Investigation and in num-
beers. our planned, long haul forces
would become even less effective.
Meantime, the only way TO soup up
our strategic reserve would be to
spend more money, draft more men
land collect more taxes. One addi-
tional infantry division, for In
stance, would cost about SITS mil
lion the FIRST year and 500 million
each year thereafter. Enough
C-124s TO get one division to trou-
BILE spot In o hurry--with light
equipment-probably would cost q
minimum Of 50 billion.
Each ready division Of the stra-
tegic reserve, then, would cost
roughly per cent individual in
come tax increase across the board.
Neither Republicans nor Demo-
Gratis like to think such gruesome
thoughts with the 1856 presidential
election so near. So most Of them
probably viii Just 60 on pretending :
- -U