Evening star., 1955-02-12

ceQ. 1Z.-1u6 6IlLiSIl III Mdldy d
are fighting war they appar-
emily cannot win.
After nearly seven years Of
battle, security forces have whit
Mr.. Eleeont is o veteron foreign GORE
spondent who hos specialized in Far
Eostern offoihs and is outhor .of
Chimes Red Master" political bios.
rophies Of Chinese Communist leaders.
tied Communist guerrilla
strength from 10000 to 5000.
But they cannot destroy the hard
core, and an intensive recruit
ing campaign, plus few ship
ments of smuggled arms could
start the insurrection blazing
anytime Peiping pulled the
switch.
Since the international situa-
ton is not now ripe for a full
scale push, Communist guerrillas
are lying low while the party
concentrates on its new program
of subversion.
Malaga, the worlds largest
rubber producer and the geo.
graphical heart Of Southeast
Asia, is on tremendous economic
and strategic Importance in it.
self. AS important in the battle
against communism in Asia is
/ the "Malayan races liberation
army's" demonstration that a
small band of determined ter
! rorists can survive and do tre-
mendous damage despite all ef-
forts to eliminate it.
The Communist attack IN
Southeast Asia will almost GER
tainly concentrate on guerrilla
action in the next several years
It is, therefore, highly signifi-
cant that the Malayan Com
munists remain one OF the
strongest weapons in Peiping s
campaign to conquer Southeast
Asia despite glaring errors in
planning and executing on theii
part.
] Missed Advantage.
! The Communists, starting
their revolt in l948 on outside
orders, failed to take full .ad-
vantage of the initial shock to
indulge in widespread slaughter
and destruction. They have
changed their tactics three OF
four times and lost much
thereby. Moreover, the eXecu-
tive arm of the terrorists is
greatly inferior to the policy
makers and, for example, after
seven years still cannot pro-
perly blow up a railroad OF
bridge.
Nonetheless, 5000 terrorists
now operating tie up nearly $780,
600 soldiers, policemen and home
guards, plus thousands of civil
ians. The emergency. a soft
name for armed rebellion, ac'
counts for direct costs Of SCI
million a year in a total govern
ment budget of 5000 million. In
direct costs probably total a
least as much again through
time lost from work. direct ter
rorists. destruction. individual
and company precautions agains
attack. inefficiency and a gen
eral slowing down of the coun
try's economic life.
The actual campaign agains
the terrorists is divided into two
parts: A holding action by thu
police, concentrating on defens'
of inhabited areas: and the mill
tary's offensive action, aimed al
destroying Communist guerrilla'
in their jungle hideouts.
Destruction Limited.
The police are successful in Sc
far as Communist killing anc
destruction are severely limited
and the party has ordered ter
rorism restricted. On the othel
hand, the police cannot prevent
an average of at least four major
incidents a month, staged tc
demonstrate terrorist strength
Nor can the police check sys.
tematic infiltration Of community
organizations or stop civilians
from providing the terrorists with
food, money and information.
The army. for its part. is max.
ing little progress in destroying
The Communist military elite
secluded in the jungle. One high.
ranking general summed up the
problem: IF only they'd come
out and fight we could destroy
them"
The Communist show no in.
tention of coming out to fight
at this time. That's why it take:
1000 man hours on jungle patro
to make single contact with the
terrorists and 1900 man hour.
for each terrorist killed OF
wounded.
As the Reds pull their head.
quarters deeper into the jungle
Nhe problem grows worse. Al
long as the Communists continue
to get food from the villages, they
can sit it out indefinitely. The
British believe that is what the.
will do. One staff officer said:
THE real hard core are goin,
to stay in the jungle until the.
win or they get bullet or the!
die"
Terrorists Confident.
Intelligence reports indicat,