Evening star., 1955-11-13
Disarmament

Apparently the Kremlin decided
last week that decent interval
has now passed since President
Eisenhower made his dramatic
Geneva proposal on July II for an
exchange Of military blueprints and
reciprocal aerial reconnaissance as
4 first step toward disarmament.
On Thursday Foreign Minister
vyacheslay Mclotov rejected the
idea on fve counts:
. It wouldn't work. That Is. It
would not guarantee against sur
prise attack. Nothing known win.
but this plan would reduce risks
significantly
. It didn't cover foreign bases. only
those IN the United States and the
Soviet Union. lThe United States
offered 10 extend the scope Of the
plan Ii other sovereign nations In
volyed would consent.)
. II would be costly and prolonged.
lWhat matters the cost u the
method Ii effectiye0
It contributes nothing to an ac-
tual cut In arms. eThe United
States wouldn't dare cut arms uIa-
til we had 4 foolproof way of check
ing to see that the Communists
we're following suit.l
II would increase suspicious,
not decrease them. tActually. this
Is q duplicate Of the previous point.
since Ii is based on the typical
dialectical argument that lack Of
provisions for immediate arms re-
ductiorl means an intensiflcatiun
Of the arms race and this in turn
means an increase in suspicious. Z
Mr.. Molotoy's reasons were 80
transpsfentiy devious that there is
no otllE conclusioSl n draw but
that the Soviet Union has no in
tention Of joining seriously IN dis
armament. BY Endly advocating
disarmament the Kremltn's main
hope. obviouslys II 10 persuade the
West "a alsarm ~ iiself.
sad ID relate. Moscow Is having
some small success The West has
no inspectors iii the Soviet Union
today. 10 1t cannot rely on the ar1-5
nouncernent OF d $40 .0O0-n1an cut
ia the Red armed forces. Yet Great
Britain has already announced
plans to cut its armed forces over
10 per cent. NATO budgets are
being re-examiiled with an eye To
economies.
Arms Cut 81 Arms Race
when MI. Eisenhower made his
proposal To Premier Nik0lai Bull
qauin and Party Boss Nilkita s.
Khrushchev at Geneva. he In effect
offered the Krernlin two choices.
Either accept genuine. safe-as-p -pcs-
sible disarmament with the accom-
panyinR reduction of arms burdens,
or face d continuation Of the ex-
tremely costly arms race, which
both sides wish they could avoid.
From the day the President made
his aerial i-inspectioFi proposal, the
international boolmakers set the
odds heavily against Moscow &C
cepting. Secretary for Peace
Harold q. Stassen's optimistic pros
ilouncenaeTlts were lonesome cries In
the wilderness. But the Presidents
offer was nevertheless rated IS g
master stroke because 1t proved 10
skepfical world the United States
peaceful Intentions. II also seized
the cold-War initiative for America.
Mr.. Molctov's rejection Of the
aerial reconnaissance military blue-
prints formula--the only type Of
inspection system that could cope
with the vast surveys which would
be required should at least help
sustain this initiative. The VESTS
problem IS to keep before the public
the fundamental that q fo0lproof
inspection system must be III being
and tn place before either side
would dare to risk actual disarma-
/ rnent.
The Follow through
Presumably more emphasis will
now be placed on the 'follow-
through which President Eisen-
hover mentioned iii his stern lec-
ture to the Reds last July. The
American people, Z ne warned tlae
Kremlii1 leaders. sare determined to
maintain and II necessary increase