Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-12-18

bigger roles ana missions WHICH inc
new weapons promise - runs the
grave risk of wasting government
money, manpower and precious time
in the deadly arms race with Russia.
But until one service and one uni
form appear to have more OF
chance, they frankly feel that mo.
comes first"
It should be added hastily that
the national defense effort Is not
completely hampered by this COM
petitive aspect, but 1t is often i'm.
peded, sometimes seriously.
Two Phases
AS with any new weapon, there
are two phases in the race for pro.
prietorship over the various guided
missiles. The first phase is develop
ment. The second comes in assign
ment Of roles and missions.
Guided missiles, generally speak
ing, are in the development stage
now. Rivalries have been kept at
a minimum, although there have
been two revealing rhubarbs be.
tween the Army and the Air Force.
One was over the effectiveness OF
the Army's relatively primitive anti
aircraft missile, the Nike. Recently
the Air Force pitted its equally
primitive Matador pilotless bomber
against the Nike in duel" to see
II the Nike could stop Matador
attack. On the first test, the Nike
failed ludicrously. But on the second
try it succeeded well. Both sides
claimed victory"
No third test, or fourth or NTH.
has been reported. Neither the Air
Force nor the Army Is convinced 1t
was wrong in its first appraisal Of
the Nike. The Mixes continue to be
produced and improved, at what
unnecessary cost is difncult to Judge
for the civilian decision-makers in
the Pentagon, who are hard put to
find completely impartial advice.
The Redstone Cose
Since last weeks Defense Depart
ment decision to give the Army and
Navy joint responsibility for de-
veloping the medium-range guided
missile. called the Redstone, there
has been much quiet CONSERVATION
in the Air Force.
Under the traditional three-serv-
ice assignment Of strategic and tao
tical bombing missions to the Air
Force. of course, the Redstone would
come under Air Force control in
: both development and use. But ira.
ditions are getting In the way Of
progress.
Missions will survive, Of course.
but the best way to accomplish
them will not likely be to assign
them to one of the old services.
1t would be more logical to discard
the three-service compartmental-
ization, and organize properly ball
anced task forces from one big pool
Of weapons and forces.
1t is the unpleasant duty Of the
civilian chiefs of the Defense De-
partment, with the advice-often
conflicting-of the Joint Chiefs OF
Staff, to use the outmoded three
service organization to develop q
coherent effort in this age Of nu-
clear warfare.
Its decision to assign an Army
Navy team to the Redstone project
and confine the Air Force to the
intercontinental ballistic missile, or
Atlas, points up how the present
system works. First there was the
command decision at the highest
level that the United States must
be the first in the world to get
the ICBM, the so-called ultimate
weapon"
There was an honest disagreement
among the services scientists how
to do it. Those working for the
Air Force insisted the fastest way
to develop the ICBM would be to
go about for the 5.000-mile. inter-
contlnental-range weapon immedi-
ately. German scientists working
with the Army and the Nays ex-
pertS, however, think development
OF shorter-range missiles first
learning to walk before trying to
run-will achieve an operational
ICBM faster. The Wilson decision
was to allow both theories q chance
to compete.
Actually this is much the way
1t would likely have happened II
there were only one, integrated
service. Two teams working along
different paths would be encour-
aged to race for the objective. The
rub comes in the second phase Just
ahead.
Decision Delayed
The Defense chiefs have put OF
the decision on who will have con.
troll Of the Redstone weapon once
1t is developed. of course, II
the outmoded missions of the
three services are adhered to.
the Redstone would logically be
transferred to Air Force control.
and airmen would be trained to
use the missiles. But since the
Army and Navy are also likely to
think they have use for the Red.
stone IN modern warfare, they per.
haps will want to train crews to
operate the missiles, too. The old
possibilities for duplication will re.
cur.
When the time comes, top-layer
Pentagon officials say they will be
able to make the proper decisions.
and the Nations taxpayers will be
none the worse. for it. But it has
not happened this way in the past.
Services have forced compromises.
The Solution
The only way to assure the most
efficient development of modern
war-making potential, in the view
of most military men today, is to
convert the three services into one.
with one uniform, one commander
in chief fully oriented to the broad
picture instead Of any one service.
The place to start, most hands
agree is at the cadet and StoH