Evening star., 1955-01-23

Mr. Brines was Chief Of the Associated Press
bureou In Tokyo while Gen. MocArthur
vas supreme commander for the allied
powen.-
lull, and remains sure that the free
world lost q great chance for peace
by turning down his proposals for
smashing Chinese, military power
In Korea.
Close associates say these. are
some Of the thoughts Gen. Mac
Arthur discusses privately as he
approaches the fourth year of his
enforced retirement.
To the press and public generally.
the general has been virtually un-
reachable since shortly after he was
depoSed as supreme commander IN
the Pacific by President Harry S.
Truman. The two men differed on
how to meet Red China's participa-
ton in the Korean fighting.
No Interview
In the aloofness of retirement,
Gen. Macarthur turned down my
request for an interview in advance
Of his birthday, maintaining that
to grant the request would obligate
him to meet the press generally.
The general now spends much of
his time in plush apartment in
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, behind
silken security that in some re-
spectS is tighter than that which
he maintained in wartime.
The elevator operator will not let
a stranger of at his floor in the
Waldorf tower-the 37th--withou
clearance from the hotels front
desk. Aides say they can telephone
him only when Mrs. Macarthur is
present, because "the old man won't
answer the phone.p
Talking with associates and others
close to the generals new head
quarters" however, one gets pic
ture of q man who is busy and in
energetic good health as he rounds
out momentous three quarters OF
q century.
It is q picture OF q man who
has drawn the past, and some Of
his associates from the past, tightly
around himself; of a general who
never wanted TO retire and still
awaits call back to duty that has
never come: and of man who
clings fast to his firm convictions
Of the past.
Suspects Double Cross
Gen. Macarthur remains con-
vinced, his associates say, that the
Chinese Communists were assured
their Manchurian sanctuary" would
not be attacked before they entered
the Korean war. He did not believe
that any general would risk his
major force In q peninsula like
Korea II there were a chance his
lines of communication and his
attacking bases would be destroyed.
1t would have been easy, he is
described as believing, for someone
playing both sides" to transmit that
information to Peiping.
The general was stopped from de-
stroying the Yalu River bridges, Lead
ing from Manchuria to North Korea.
only because Washington spotted
routine order, the ,informants main
tain. These associates give this
account:
4 Gen. Macarthur on November 6,
1850, ordered his air commander,
Gen. George Stratemeyer. to attack
the bridges across which Chinese
forces were pouring. A 75-plane raid
of B-29s was set up for the next day,
but copies Of the orders reached
Washington on a routine teletype
relay.
The attack was countermanded in
an order signed by Gen. George c.
Marshall, then Secretary Of Defense.
Marshall also ordered Macarthur to
refrain from bombing within five
miles of the south bank of the Yalu.
Gen. Macarthur replied he would
not be responsible for the conse-
quences Of such an order. After a
long distance teletype discussion, he
was given permission to bomb the
southern end of the bridges.
One bridge was knocked out under
this authority. But the informants
contend that most of the bridges ran
almost due east and west and still
are standing today.
Gen. Macarthur, say his intimates.
also believes:
/. The failure to cripple Red