Evening star., 1955-10-20

10 half conversation with Ger
lAIacAFthur:"
Gen. Macarthur then elabor
lated on his concept of operation
flor the ultimate defeat Of Japan
HE was In thorough agreemen
that the only means Of defeating
Japan was BY the invasion Of TIN
industrial heart Of Japan. HI
Istressed the potency Of the Jap
lanese army and stated that wher
we entered Japan we must b,
prepared to reckon with the Jap.
Ianese army in far greater
strength thansis now there. HI
was apprehensive as to the pos.
Esibiiity Of the movement Of thu
bulk Of the Manchurian army
land other Japanese forces from
China to the defense OF
THE homeland. He emphaticaliy
stated that we must not invade
Japan proper unless the Russian
army is previously committed tc
action in Manchuria. He said
that this was essential, and that
|it should be done without the
three months delay upon The
conclusion OF the defeat Of Ger
many as iltimated by Marshal
Stain TO the President. He said
that it was only necessary fol
action to commence in Man
Ichuria to contain that force oi
Japanese In order to make pos.
IsihIe our invasion Of Japan and
the rapid conclusion Of the war
He understands Russia,s aims:
that they would want all Of
Manchuria. Korea and possibly
part of North China. This seiz-
ure of territory was inevitable:
but the United States must In
sist that Russia pay her way BY
invading Manchuria at the earli-
est possible date after the defeat
of Germany.
Still Favored Plan
Ale understood that the
Navy still favored q plan whereby
they would ring Japan proper
with air bases and naval bases
and eventually blockade and
lombard them into submission.
He said that this never would be
effective. q informed him that
that was the opinion Of the JcS
and was agreed upon at Sextant
tCode name for Cairo Confer
ence. Noyemb ber- December
l943)).
B.-Gen. Macarthur agreed
that the Tokyo Plain was the
proper place TO invade Japan and
he was fully conversant with the
restrictions Of seasons. He be-
lieved it would be q mistake to
make q prior landing in Japan,
either in Kyushu or Hokkaido.
He felt that proper timing. in
conjunction with a move by the
Russians and the strategic sur
prise to be gained, would be a
far greater advantage in landing
initially In the heart Of Japan
whereby the enemy force could
be split, rather than to tip our
hand by FIRST landing at some
other part Of the Japanese is
lands.
Wire from Macarthur
5. A telegram from Gen. Mac
Arthur read By Gen. Marshall at
\ June Is, 1945, meeting Of MILL
tary leaders with the President:
] believe the operation presents
less hazards Of excessive loss
than any other that has been
suggested and that its decisive
effect viii eventually save lives
BY eliminating wasteful opera
tions Of rOndecisive character.
l regard the operation as the
most economical one In effort
and lives that ID possible. In this
respect it must be remembered
that the several preceding
months win involve practically
no losses in ground troops and
that sooner or later a decisive
ground attack must be made.
The hazard and loss win be
greatly lessened If an attack is
from Siberia sufficient-
" ahead Of our target date 10
commit the enemy to major COM
bat. I most earnestly recommend
no change in OLYMPIC. Addi-
tional subsidiary attacks will
simply build up our final total