Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-04-12

our traditional allies but most Of
the major NOM Communist pow
ers of Asia by going to war ovel
Quemoy and Matsu, to which the
United States has no color Of
claim and which are of question.
able value to the defense of For.
n1oSa?
Would Stand Alone
Are we. in short, prepared tx
face the prospects of war in the
moraSs Of China. possibly globa
war, standing almost alone in q
sullen or hostile world? >.
At this late date there may bt
no wholly satisfactory way Of
resolving the dilemma we have
stumbled into over the offshore
islands. But If we learn some
thing from this experience. il
we realize at last that we have
been pursuing a dead-end policy
in Asia, then perhaps we car
turn our present difficulties to
good account and devise an APP
proach more in keeping with the
realities Of Asia and of the n.y.
drogen age.
And that causes me to say
that the division of our coalition
over these offshore islands, the
weakening of the grand alliance
of free nations pledged to stand
together to defend themselves, is
in my judgment a greater peril
to enduring peace than the is
lands themselves.
know some politicians who
tell us that we don't need allies.
Life would certainly be much
simpler if that were so, for our
friends can be highly irritating
But it is not so. We need allies
because we have only 6 per cent
OF the worlds population. We
need them because the overseas
air bases essential to our own Sc
curity are on their territory. We
need allies because they are the
source Of indispensable strategic
materials. We need, above all.
the moral strength that support
OF the world community alone
can bring to our cause. Let us
never underestimate the weight
OF moral opinion. It was a great
general, Napoleon, who wrote
that: I'm war. moral considera-
tons are three-quarters of the
battle. ;"
Way Out Is Seen
How shall we mend the walls
of our coalition? And is there
any hope Of a peaceful solution
OF the offshore island question?
I think so.
-. :. I would urge our Govern
ment to PROMPTLY consult out
friends, yes. and the uncommit-
ted States too. and ask them all
to join with us in an open decla-
ration condemning the use Of
force in the Formosa Strait, and
agreeing to stand with us In the
defense of Formosa against any
aggression. pending some final
settlement of its status-by in
dependence. naturalization, trus-
teeship, plebiscite, or whatever
is wisest.
Nor do I see any reason why
we should not invite Soviet Rus
STA. which is united by treaty
with Red China, to declare It's
to indicate whether it
prefers the possibility of ultimate
settlement by agreement to an
unpredictable. perhaps limit
less conflict. started by an arro-
CANT. fool hardy Communist
China either by miscalculation
or by design.
With the assurance provided
by such a common position con-
CURED In by the nations whose
weight and prestige are essential
to the Ultimate success of any
Formosan policy, neither we nor
Gen. Chang Kai-shek should
any longer need to rely upon a
militarily precarious position in
these little offshore islands to
resist the aggressive ambitions
Of the Chinese Communists to-
ward Formosa.
No Rigid Formula
Diplomacy prescribes no rigid
formula for accomplishing our
detectives, and another major
in the quest for a peace
full solution in the Far East re-
mains UNEMPLOYED; the United
Nations. ! should think that the
United States, together with
friends and allies in Europe and
Asia. could submit a resolution
to the United Nations General
calling upon the As
sembly likewise to condemn any
effort to alter the present status
Of Formosa by force. And think
we could afford to go further and
call upon the United Nations
Assembly to seek a formula for
the permanent future Of For
mosa. consistent with the wishes
Of its people, with international
law. and with world security.
One Of the weaknesses of our
position is that we have been
making Formosa policy as we
thought best regardless Of others.
But we can't expect other nations
to always support policies they
disagree with. We can persuade
out we can't coerce. And one of
the advantages Of joint action
would be to put Formosa policy
IN a much broader basis. -.
-. If the Chinese Communists
insist on force and reject
any peaceful solution, then at
east it would be clear to every
one who the aggressors were. :.
We have been making
Formosa policy lately not only on
4 unilateral basis but more on
considerations of domestic poll
teal expediency than foreign
.pa litieS D0nestic nolitics should