Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1955-03-30
Europeans Believed Unwilling
To Fight for Chiong's Islands
Do Not Expect Any Chino War to Spread
ToWestern Comp; NotionoIists Distrusted

larry among those who make a
living out of criticizing American
foreign policy.
1t is also quite clear that con-
siderable and important differ
ences have long existed between
European and American reading
of the Far Eastern situation and
the cold war in general. In any
showdown, several factors are
likely to play a big part in deter
mining the policy of our allies.
Nationalist Distrusted
Among these, dislike and dis
trust of the Chinese Nationalist
is perhaps the most important.
1t isn't just that from a moral
standpoint Europeans see little
to choose between Chang Kali
shek and Mao. Nor is it purely
a question of sympathy with the
Chinese claims of territorial right
to the offshore islands and For
moSa. So far as Europe is con-
cerned, the main complaint
about Chang is that he openly
wants to provoke a major war
between Communist China and
the United States. And the be-
lief that Chang exerts a sinister
influence in Washington throws
a cloud of suspicion over the
whole question.
There is also a strong tendency
to question the argument that
as defense of the Matsus and
Quemoy is necessary to prevent
the crumbling of anti Commun-
ist morale throughout Southeast
Asia. On the contrary, it is
suggested that open intervention
of the United States to save the
islands would have a disastrous
psychological effect on the neu-
trail states in far more critical
areas. So far as Formosa itself
is concerned, the thought is that
if the Nationalist regime can
not survive loss of the offshore
islands it is probably too shaky
to survive long anyway.
Hope in Talks
A third factor is the hope of
settlement with Russia on
European problems. With talk
of a new four-power conference
in the air. the old European
dream of genuine relaxation of
East-West tension is stronger
than ever. Today, Europeans
are asking themselves whether
a policy of co-existence in Europe
is in any way compatible with a
policy of force in Asia.
Perhaps the most depressing
part of the latest reports from
Washington is the prediction
that atomic weapons might be
used to defend the off shore
islands. The fear of the atom
is SO vivid in Europe that the
use Of such weapons even on a
limited scale would create a real
moral problem for the United
States, especially since it is be-
lieved that Formosa itself could
be defended without them.
Given these reservations and
qualms there can be little doubt
that all Of our European allies
would prefer to see the United
States abondon the offshore is
lands of Quemoy and Matsu
rather than fight an atomic bat
tie to defend them. If this advice
is ignored, it seems quite prob
able that the United States will
have to go it alone, at least in
the opening stages of any con-
f1ict.
On the other hand, there is
little suggestion that in a major
showdown our allies are on the
point of walking out. Britain
and France both accept the fact
that they would inevitably be
drawn into any large-scale war
with China which involves their
own interests in the Far East.
And for all the preliminary bick-
ering there would be tendency
to rally behind a strong Ameri-
can lead as the threat of war
increased.