Evening star., 1955-01-27
Story Of q Lost Victory

Stov0f LOST VIcfoy
BY any standard Of measurement, the
report Of the Senate's Internal Security
subcommittee report detailing how and
why we failed to win the Korean wars
q significant document,
It is Significant because 1t gathers
together for the first time the stories Of
hve ranking commanders in the Korean
theater-G General Mark Clark, Lieutenant
General George E. Stratemeyer, General
James A. Van Fleet. Lieutenant General
Edmond M Almond and Admiral Charles
Turner Joy. These men were outspoken
in their criticism Of the political" direction
OF the war from washington. This report
is also significant because, despite its parti-
san political implications, 1t emerged with
the unanimous Endorsement Of the subcorn-
mittee- Republican Senators Jenner, Wat
kins, Welker and Butler, and Democratic
Senators Eastland. Johnston and Mcclellan.
In fairness, it should be pointed out that
the views expressed by the officers who
testified conflict IN many respects with
views held by General Bradley, then chair
man Of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Rnd Gem
eraI Collins, then Army Chief Of STAFF.
subcommittee, and presumably were not
asked to do so. Toathis extent. the report
is one sided Even with this reservation,
however, 1t is an important document.
Among the Ave field commanders, there
was q remarkable lliaanimity in indorsing
General MacArthur's views as TO how the
war should have been conducted. There
was general agreement that the Korean war
could have resulted In decisive victory
for us had it not be6n FOR politically inspired
limitations laid upon the hriled forces.
With some qualifications, there was agree
ment that the Chinese Communist army.
could have been routed II not destroyed,
and that the failure to destroy 1t led directly
to the debacle In Indo- China and to the
situation which now faces us with respect
to Formosa. Admiral Joy was of the opinion
that interference based on faulty political
considerations prevented successful armi-
stice negotiations, and he indicated that
General Ridgway, now Army Chief Of Stan,
shared in part at least In this view.
There was great deal OF testimony
with respect to incidents which may have
been relatively minor, but which still shed
q revealing light on the strange conduct Of
this war. They can be touched upon only
briefly here, but recitation Of q few may
be Illuminating. Thus, General Clark land
also General Van Fleet) were anxious to
train more South Korean troops to relieve
the pressure on American forces General
Clark, with the approval Of the Secretary
of the Army, made study and then sought
authorization from washington to proceed
with training plan. He did not even get
an answer to this request until after General
Van Fleets letter to General Eisenhower (a
letter similar to the Clark request) was
released in the midst Of the 1852 presidential
campaign. General Clark testified: Very
shortly after that got action Immediately
authorizing me to start In on the build-up
Of the ROK forces" Much the same thing
was true Of hitherto little-knoWn recon-
mendations from the two generals for em-
ployment in Korea Of three Of Chang Kali
shek's divisions mother story OF . recOnl-
mendation sent to washington: no answer.
General Stratemeyer testified in similar
vein. He was talking about November and
December, 1850. He stated that he @didn't
care what any one back home said"-that,
ct that time, he had the air power to break
the back Of the Chinese Communists crosse
ing the Yalu. But under the almost uii-
believable restrictions imposed from WASH
ington upon bombing Of the Yalu bridges.
according to his testimony. he had to pun
his punches while the Chinese and their
supplies streamed across the bridges 9
siighted highway" as he described It. AS q
result, he testified. "a lot Of American blood
was spilled over there In Korea"
General Almond. who commanded the
10th. Corps, was equally blunt. He testi-
ned: Events now past have proved that
General Macarthur was right and General
/ Bradley was wrong. I need add nothing to
this series Of facts. Their noise IS deafenine
to those who listen. The opportunity g
deal death blow to expanding communism
presented itself III Korea. But don't be-
iieye General Bradley ever could see it,
And he ended on this note: 1T IS bad
enough to have to fight the enemy: Il i
terrible to have 10 night both the enemy
and those that yon are supposed TO have
support from.
These, to repeat. are the views Of the
field commanders, not balanced against the
views OF their superiors In washington and
not setting forth the considerations Of those
il washington whose responsibility va