Evening star., 1955-01-28
No Time for Fear

No Time for Fear
Messrs. Morse, Long, Kefauyer and a
few other members of the Senate have
spoken out with considerable eloquence
against the broad scope Of the joint resolu-
ton authorizing the President to employ
American armed forces In whatever way he
may deem necessary to protect Formosa
and the Pescadores from conquest by Red
China. However, although they have
right to voice warnings II they believe warm
ings are needed, their views at in poorly
with current realities and seem to reflect, in
large part, the sort of fear-laden thinking
that imposed so great handicap In our
conduct of the Korean war.
Broadly summarized, the major points
made by this small Senate minority-and
especially by Mr.. Morse include the fol-
lowing: ~ Although there is a clear neces-
sity to defend FormoSa and the PescadoreS,
the joint resolution Is much too sweeping
and far-ranging in character. (2) This is
SO because 1t not only embraces the Que
moys, the Matsus and other Nationalist
held islands very close to the coast Of Red
China, but also implicitly authorizes the
President to order military action in those
areas7-even against the Chinese mainland
If In his judgment the action is required
to safeguard Formosa and the PescadoreS.
(3) Legally, morally and otherwise, such
policy-a policy of attack before being at
tacked-would amount to an unjuStifiable,
dangerous and wicked acceptance Of the
theory Of preventive war;" And (4) Gen..
eralissimo Chang Kai-shek would be sorely
tempted to capitalize on 1t In way that
could easily embroil our country in ter
rible about armed conflict with the
Peiping Communists and their Soviet Coz
conSpirators.
So the dissident Senators, with these
and similar fears in mind, have urged that
the joint resolution-already approved
overwhelmingly by the House-be watered
down and rewritten u) to exclude places
like the Quemoys and (2) to restrict the
Presidents authority solely to Formosa and
the Pescadores. Quite obviously, however,
in the present grim context of Asiatic events
and In view Of the revolutionary nature OF
modern warfare, nothing could be more
unrealistic or more perilouS than such a
restriction. For what could be better cal
culated to encourage the Communists to
try seizing the coastal islands as stepping
stones to the vital FormoSan objective?
And what could be deadlier in terms Of
reducing American political, diplomatic and
military maneuverability In the Far Eastern
crisis2 After all, there is a purpose behind
the studied ambiguity of both the joint
resolution and Mr.. Eisenhower's message
on the subject. Why should we telegraph
to Peiping every single detail Of what we
plan to do In case OF certain eventualities?
Why is 1t not enough to make clear-as the
resolution makes clear and as the president
has made clear-that our one and only
objective in this situation Is to maintain
peace, but that we are ready to fight, ready
to accept the risks Of major warfare with
Red China and the Soviet Union, II that Is
how they want It?
This is certainly not a policy Of pre-
ventive war;" It is policy, on the contrary,
designed to promote peace by taking stand
Arm enough, and unequivocal enough, to
deter aggression. And the President, In his
statement Of yesterday, has given all the
assurances that are needed against the
notion that Chang or some impetuous
American oficer in the Far Pacific will be
able-by virtue OF the Joint reSolution-to
push the United States into the abyss OF an
unlimited armed conflict. True, the situa-
ton is full of grave possibilities in other re-
spects, but there will be no such conflict
unless the Peiping- Moscow axis wills other
wise.
In any event, the following words from
Lieutenant General Edmond A. Almond.
once leader Of our forces in Korea, seem
very much to the point right now: Fear OF
what might happen If we lead from strength
is robbing the free world of its success in
opposing ever-expanding communism.
Could there be better text for our time2