Evening star., 1955-07-23

better get back home. You had
no business over here in the first
place." Within a few weeks Mr.
Moley was transferred out Of
the State Department.
Mr.. Hull was more successful
in the first Inter-American Con-
ference he attended at Monte
video in December, 1888. There
his natural, homespun political
sense went long way toward
overcoming the suspicion that
Yankee statesmen" had aroused
by previous dealings in Latin
American affairs.
Foresaw Europe's Smashup.
In his mind. the building of
real good-neighbor relations in
this hemisphere assumed added
Importance at that time, because
of the troubles he saw brewing
in other parts of the world. He
was convinced that the ideas
which had brought Hitler to
power In Germany earlier that
year were heading Europe toward
a terrific smashup. .
With ominous signs that war
in Europe was fast approaching
in the summer of 1899, the ad-
ministration sought repeal of the
arms embargo in the Neutrality
Act on the ground that if Hitler
knew that Britain and France
could have full access to Ameri-
can arms he would be less likely
to risk starting war.
Mr.. Roosevelt and Mr., Hull
failed to persuade Senate leaders
of the danger at a fateful White
House conference on July l8
1889. The late Senator Borah
powerful minority leader in the
Senate Foreign Relations Com
mittee. said he had access to in
formation that convinced him nc
war would occur in the near fu-
ture and implied" according tc
Mr.. Hull, that his information
was more reliable than that re-
ceived by the State Department
| When the war came in Sep
tember, Congress quickly re-
pealed the arms embargo. Mr.
Hull later led the 1941 fight, al
the request of the President, fol
passage of lend-lease.
| FatefuI 1941 Talks
During the spring of 1941, he
also started his fateful CONVEX
sations with the Japanese am
bassador here. For months he
held numerous private talks with
Ambassador Kichisaburo No.
mura at night in his apartment
in an unsuccessful effort to reach
an agreement that would stabil-
Iize our relations with Japan.
These discussions came to 6
head in November, 1941, wher
Tokyo sent Saburo Kurusu as 6
special envoy to aid Nomura. In.
tercepted japanese message,
brought Mr.. Hull the information
d that Japan had set a deadlins
, OF November 25 for the effort.
Ito eliminate in agreement. H,
told the cabinet on November
that I'VE should be on the look.
out for a military attack b.
j; Japan anywhere at any time.
Mr.. Hull felt from the start
that Kurusu was "deceitful."
In IAN honest effort" to keel
talks going. Mr.. Hull submitted
to the Japanese ENJOYS his IA
nous l0-point proposal for a set
Element. He recalled later tina
japanese propaganda tried tt
distort" this November Is pro
posal by calling it an ultimatun
but that. at the time, even No
mura and Kurusu themselve
: recognized that the responsible
/ ity for rupture with us woult
) be Japan's."
Jap ENJOYS Call.
The Japanese ENJOYS called Of
5 Mr.. Hull on Sunday afternoon
: December 7, and while they wer
= waiting in the reception room
the President telephoned the re
: port that the japanese had at
: tackled Pearl Harbor.
When he received the envoy
Is minutes later. Mr.. HUI
skinned through the pages of
E note they handed him chargin
4 the United States was "insincere
E and was "scheming for extension
of the war" Then he explode
with a spontaneous burst of bit
D ing words:
TN all my SO years of publ
service / have never seen docu
y ment that was more crowde
: with infamous falsehoods an
|, Observation-Disclosures falsehood
D and distortions on a scale S
huge that never imagined un
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