Evening star., 1954-01-13

It is now nearly a year since
the Eisenhower administration
took Office. During that year ]
have often spoken Of various
parts of our foreign policies.
Tonight / should like to pre-
sent an overall view of those
policies which relate to our
security.
Good in Past Policies
First of all. let us recognize
that many of the preceding
foreign policies were good. Aid
to Greece and Turkey had
checked the Communist drive
to the Mediterranean. The Eu-
ropean Recovery Program had
helped the peoples of Western
Europe to pull out Of the post
war morass. The Western pow
ers were steadfaSt in Berlin
and overcame the blockade
with their airlift. AS a loyal
member of the United Nations,
we had reacted with force to
repel the Communist attack IN
Korea. When that effect eX-
posed our military weakness,
we rebuilt rapidly our military
establishment. We also sought
a quick buildup of armed
strength in Western Europe.
These were the acts OF a
Nation which saw the danger
of Soviet communism; which
realized that its own safety
was tied up with that OF 9TH
ers: which was capable OF re-
spending boldly and promptly
to emergencies. These are pre-
cious values to be acclaimed.
Also, we can pay tribute to
congressional bipartisanship
which puts the Nation above
politics.
Insufficiency of Post Policies
But we need to recall that
what we did was in the main
emergency action, imposed on
US by our enemies.
Let me illustrate.
/. We did not send our Army
into Korea because we Judged.
in advance, that it was sound
military strategy to commit
our Army to fight land battles
in Asia. Our decision had been
to pull out of Korea. 1t was
Soviet-inspired action that
pulled us back.
2. We did not decide in
advance that it was wise to
grant billions annually as for
eign economic aid. We adopted
that policy in response to the
Communist efforts to sabo-
tage the free economies Of
Western Europe.
3. We did not build up our
military establishment at a
rate which involved huge
budget deficits, a depreciating
currency and a feverish econ
omy, because this seemed, in
advance, a good policy. Indeed.
we decided otherwise until the
Soviet military threat was
clearly revealed.
We live in a world where
emergencies are always pos
sible and our survival may de-
pend upon our capacity to
meet emergencies. Let us pray
that we shall always have that
capacity. But, having said
that, it is necessary also to
say that emergency measures
however good for the emer-
Rency - do not necessarily
make good permanent policies.
Emergency eaSureS are
costly. they are superficial and
they imply that the enemy has
the initiative. They cannot be
depended on to serve our long
time interests.
Need for Long, e-Ronqe Policies
This "long time" factor is Of
critical Importance.
The Soviet Communists are
planning for what they call
"an entire historical era," and
we should do the same. They
seek. through many types Of
maneuvers. gradually to divide
and weaken the free nations
by over-extending them in ef-
forts which, as Lenin put it,
are beyond their strength, SO
that they come to practical
bankruptcy" Then, said Len
in, '"our victory is assured"
Then, said Stain, will be "the
moment for the decisive blow"
In the face of this strategy.
measures cannot be judged
adequate merely because they
ward of an immediate danger.
It is essential to do this. but it
is also essential to do so with
out exhausting ourselves.
When the Eisenhower ad-
ministration applied this test.
we felt that some transforma-
tionS were needed.
It is not sound military
strategy permanently to COM
nit United States land forces
to Asia to a degree that leaves
us no strategic reserves.
It is not sound economics,
or good foreign policy. to sup
port permanently other coun-
tries; for in the long run, that
creates as much i'll will as good
will.
Also, it is not sound to be-
come permanently committed
to military expenditures so
vast that they lead to "prac-
tical bankruptcy"
Change was imperative to
assure the stamina needed for
permanent security. But it was
equally imperative that change
should be accompanied by un-
derstanding of our true pur-
poses. Sudden and spectacular
change had to be avoided.
Otherwise, there might have
been a panic among our
friends, and miscalculated ag-
gression by our enemies.