Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-08-21
Our Korean WithdrowoI

Our Korean WithdrnwoI
Although they have voiced alarm over
1t and protested against it as terribly dam
gerous," officials Of the Republic of Korea
have long been on notice to expect the kind
Of large-scale American troop withdrawal
that is to take place within the next sew
eral months" In fact, the whole world
including not least of all the Communist
World-haS been on notice to expect 1t ever
since last December 26.
For on that date, in statement issued
at Augusta, Georgia, President Eisenhower
announced that prompt action would be
taken to pull out two Of our eight divisions
in Korea and that thereafter-"as circum-
stances warrant"-the remainder of our
ground forces over there would be progress
s1vely reduced" At the same time he made
clear that the decision to do this, wholly
apart from its economic and military mo-
tivation, was designed to demonstrate to
peoples everywhere that our country has
mo aggressive intentions and that we are
resourceful and vigilant to find ways to re-
duce the burdens of armament and to pro-
mote a climate of peace"
Accordingly not long after the Augusta
statement was made, two of our divisions
(both National Guard) were withdrawn
from Korea and returned to the United
States. And now, apparently because ''cir-
cumstances warrant" four of the remaining
six are to be pulled out Two of these, plus
regimental combat team of about 5000
officers and men, will come back to this
country. The two others are slated for re-
deployment to Okinawa and Hawaii. AS
result, when all the reshufding is completed
probably by next June at the latest-the
ROK forces will be backed up on Korean
soil by only three divisions from the outside,
two Of them ours and one consisting prin-
cipally Of troops from the British Common
wealth.
It is understandable that the South Ko-
reans view this prospect with the gravest
miSgivings. However, although there can
be no denying that such withdrawal will
involve important risks, rereading of
President EiSenhower's December statement
offers number of impressive assurances.
These include ~ the fact that the formida-
BILE ROK army will continue to be strength
ened by us; (2) the fact that "our growing
national air power possesses greater nobil-
ity and greater striking force than ever
before"-nuclear force; and (3) the fact
that the United States is committed to re-
main on the ready in that part of the world
against the possibility that the Communists
will break the truce and renew the war;
Thus, as the President declared in De-
cember, our Far Eastern forces-featuring
highly mobile naval, air and amphibious
units"-are to be maintained at appropri-
ate levels to fulfill our commitments and
safeguard our vital interests Further, the
Communists must keep in mind two other
facts emphasized in his Augusta statement.
The first Of these is his assertion that our
reduction-in-f force decision "does not i'm
pair our readiness and capacitysto react in
way which should deter aggression" or
oppose it with even greater effect than
heretofore" And the second Is that all the
allies in the u N Command-pledged to be
prompt to resist any renewal of armed at
tack"-have solemnly warned that the "con-
sequences of such q breach of the armistice
would be so grave that, in all probability, it
would not be possible to confine hostilities
within the frontiers of Korea"
In view of all this, unless they are de-
liberately intent upon precipitating gen.
eral war, 1t may be doubted that Peiping
and Moscow will react as the South Koreans
fear. For our troop withdrawal, as the Pres
ident has long since emphasized, is not
sign Of American weakness, but highly
significant token Of our countrys desire to
ease international tension. In sum, far from
inviting the Communists to embark on new
criminal adventures, it invites them to
contribute similarly to peace.