Evening star., 1954-05-12
Defense of Asia

The suggestion which Secretary Dulles has
made for Southeast Asia defense alliance Is
q perfectly logical and perhaps an entirely
necessary extension of our mutual security
program
AS long ago as January, 1852, at the Paris
meeting of the United Nations General Assem-
bly,, the United States, Britain and France
Joined in warning to Russia that they would
consider any new aggression in Southeast Asia
"a matter of direct and grave concern" which
would call for most urgent and earnest con-
sideration by the United Nations" The threat
to the free world which underlay that pro-
nouncement has not subsidized. 1t is, If anything,
more ominous, and Mr.. Dulles is merely pro-
posing an attempt to implement the notice of
collective defense action which was implicit In
the 1852 statement:
There is, it must be said, certain fuzziness
about Mr.. Dulles latest comment It is not
clear whether some, all or none of Indo-China
would be included in the defense alliance.
Presumably, Mr.. Dulles did not spell this out
because he does not know the answer. An
alliance of this sort, under the most favorable
conditions will not spring into being overnight.
Much time will be required, and before the
work of organization is completed the Commu-
niStS may have won the war in Indo- China or
settlement may have been worked out In
any event, 1t is much too early to be losing
sight of the larger objective by falling into
what would have to be, at this time, an incon-
elusive argument over what we should or
should not commit ourselves to do with respect
to Indo-China. 1t will be better to cross that
bridge when we come to it, and there will be
ample time for consideration of the problem
if and when treaty of alliance for the defense
Of Southeast Asia comes up for study and
ratification in the Senate.
Meanwhile, we should be willing to face
the facts. If we are not going to let Southeast
Asia go by default. we must decide where and
under what circumstances stand is to be
made. If Indo-China should be lost, will we
try to organize a defense position elsewhere?
And with what nations as allies?
These are some of the obvious first ques-
tions which must be examined, and this, it
seems to The Star, is what Mr.. Dulles is pro-
posing to do. Nor should we be deferred from
exploring the possibilities of such an alliance
by the prospect that it would commit us to fight
in event of aggression. 1t ought to be obvious
that an alliance without any commitment
would be worthless.
The Communists are not going to be
frightened away by the appearance, as dis
tinguished from the substance, of united de-
fense action in Asia. If we are not willing to
resist aggression by joining our armed forces
with those of allies, subject to the terms of an
appropriately drafted treaty, then we had
better forget about alliances in Asia. Likewise,
if we are not willing to accept the risk that
concerted armed action against aggression may
lead to World War III, then we had also better
forget about Asian alliances.
For the risks of resolute and concerted
action are real. It is not enough to bluff; we
may have to fight. But let us remember one
mi. a. .;rl to- ,4ofI14 (,a
timidity in that ostrichlike blindness which will
not look at an ugly fact simply because it is
ugly. This very real risk is that strategically
important part of the world with millions of
people and great resources, will 60 to the Com
munists by default unless the free nations are
willing to act with courage and unity to
prevent 1t.