Evening star., 1954-01-16
None So Blind

HGQuDllCau OGudtOI WelkGI says tIldt tIG
past record OF Arthur H. Dean, our special
Ambassador to Korea and former law partner
OF Secretary of State Dulles, "fails to show any
outstanding shrewdness in his understanding
of the devious ways of the Communists" This
is judgment based on Mr. Deans former con-
nection with the Institute of Pacific Relations,
and 1t should not be Of much concern to any
one.
There Is considerable reason to be con-
cerned, however, when Senator Welker goes on
to suggest that Mr.. Dean is guilty Of "appease-
,ment" and is chanting the siren song of
collaboration with the rulers of Red China"
because he thinks we ought to "explore the
possibility that the Chinese Communists are
more interested in developing themselves in
China than they are in international COM
munism."
Senator Welker evidently denies even the
possibility that this may be the case, and
that kind of thinking, If it could control our
national policies would constitute most dan
gerous threat to this country. For policy
which might further our national interests
in one set Of circumstances could easily be
detrimental to those interests under other
circumstances.
The Star does not know whether there is
any reason to hope that the Chinese Com
munists can be split away from Russian COM
munism by encouraging them to develop their
own independent interests in Asia Mr. Dean
does not know, and he has never pretended to
know What he urges is that we should not let
our minds become SO imprisoned by our current
hostility toward China that we render ourselves
incapable of exploring the possibility. Senator
Welker's position seems to be that our current
Asiatic policy is the only possible correct policy
and that any proposal that we take second
look at the policy is appeasement. I'VE have
only to look" he says, cat the fatal record of
the past two decades to remind ourselves OF the
consequences which have always followed
policy OF appeasement"
Well, let us look at some chapters in that
record. Within just the past decade we have
not only changed, but have reversed, num-
ber of our policies. In 1945 we were going to
keep Germany forever disarmed. We've changed
that policy. When Japan fell few months
later, we decided that the japanese should
have a constitution And at the urging of
General Macarthur, it was stipulated in the
constitution that never again should Japan
have national armed forces. We've changed
that policy. In 1916, when Tito was supposed
to be Stalin's staunchest ally the Yugoslav air
force shot down some unarmed American
planes. We were outraged and our policy was
one of no assistance to Tito. But we've
changed that policy. The about-face In the
case of Spain is another illustration, and still
others could be cited.
Would Senator Welker say that these policy
changes constituted appeasement, or would he
say that they were dictated by considerations
of self-interest in changed situations? If he
would agree to the latter, why does he say that
we should not even consider the possibility
that some day it may serve our own interests
to revise our policy toward Red China?
The thing to remember in all of this is
that enduring national policies toward other
nations are seldom forged in the heat of con-
troversy. Most of us, for instance, do not still
hate the British because we fought two wars
against them Conditions are not static, and
as they are altered so must national policies
change. Perhaps there has not been any
change in the attitude Of Red China which
would justify revision of our policy toward
China But we cannot safely assume that there
will never be such change. And we should
not let ourselves get into that state OF mind
of which it has been said There are none so
blind as those who will not see.