Evening star., 1954-11-10
| letters to The Star
'Busic Misunderstundino'?.

DuSlC MISUNDERSTANDING I.
fSee editorial. "Basic Misunder-
! stGndtng"?l
This community Is indebted to The
Star for directing the attention of the
people of the District to the administra-
ton Of the laws relating to the mentally
Ill who are involved in criminal acts.
I am afraid, however, that The Stars
editorials have contributed to basic
misunderstanding by some Of our citi-
zens as to the meaning and effect of
the recent decision of the Court of
Appeals in Monte Durham " United
States. This case announced a new test
to be applied in criminal cases in the
District for the purpose of determining
whether an accused should be held re-
sponsible for acts In violation of the
criminal law. It did not establish new
principle Of law. It merely prescribed
new. more realistic and more scientific
test for applying the law.
s. The principle that an ''insane" de-
fendant should not be punished appears
to have been established in England as
long ago as the 14th century, and it
is followed in all of the civilized coun-
tries of the world. It has always been
accepted in this country.
Views have changed, however, con-
corning the test to be applied by the
courts in determining whether an
individual is insane" so that he should
not be held criminally responsible.
Before the Durham case, the test Of
insanity in the District was whether
the defendant was unable to distinguish
between right and wrong in connection
with the act that he committed, or
whether he committed the act because
OF an irresistible impulse" Both the
right and wrong" and Irresistible
impulse" tests have been severely
criticized by most of the expert groups
that have examined them These tests
were formulated long before the dis
coveries of modern psychiatry revolu-
tionized our understanding of the
human personality. They are as
obsolete as the belief that an insane
person is possessed by the devil.
There is widespread agreement that
the tests do not provide useful basis
for distinguishing between those who
should and those who should not be
punished for their acts. In practice.
the right and wrong" test is frequent-
ly abandoned. Where it is proved that
an accused person is "insane" and cir
responsible" the common sense of
judges and juries has often prevailed
even though it is clear that the de-
fendant knew that his act was wrong.
For many years, our law has not
required that there be specific proof
that the accused did not know the diff
ference between right and wrong. Evil
dence from which this may be inferred
(however arbitrarily has been deemed
sufficient.
The real difficulty with the fright
and wrong" and Irresistible impulse"
tests, however, is that they seriously
interfere with scientific determine
tion of the mental condition of the
accused. They make it needlessly diff
cult for psychiatrists to lay before the
court and the jury complete and OBJ
jective account of the psychiatrist's
diagnoses of the accused's mental con-
dition. Demanding that psychiatrists
testify in these terms is like asking a
doctor to testify as to- whether a man
has pneumonia and insisting that the
standard by which the patient is to be
judged is whether he bushes.
The ability to distinguish between
right and wrong is neither disease
nor symptom. The vast majority of
persons who are insane are aware of
the difference between right and wrong
conduct. but they may be incapable
of adjusting their conduct to the con-
SEQUENCES of this knowledge.
Because of the wide gap between
psychiatric reality and the legal formu-
la, many competent psychiatrists have
preferred not to participate in criminal
proceedings. They have felt that they
are not competent to testify as to
right and wrong" and they have not
been willing to submit to questioning
based on these standards which, to
them, relate to metaphysics and not to
their science In short, the fright and
wrong" test has been powerful OBJ
stacle to the contribution that psy-
clliatry should make to criminal ad-
ministration. It has obStructed free
and meaningful communication be-
tween the psychiatrist and the Judge
and jury, which is so essential If courts
are correctly to classify those persons
who should not be held criminally re-
sponsible.
The Durham case substituted for
these irrelevant and discredited tests a
simple but comprehensive standard:
That the accused sis not criminally re-
sponsible If his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental
defect" This is substantially the test
which has, with slight variations, been
employed with conspicuous success in
New Hampshire since 1869. It is test
which has been approved by a great
many distinguished and expert COM
mittees and commissions both in this
country and in England. This test
enables the psychiatrist to tell the court
all that he knows about the defendant.
and to tell 1t in terms that are ac-
curately descriptive of his diagnosis.
He does not have to face the sometimes
impossible and always distasteful
prospect, under the questioning of
lawyers. Of fitting his scientific findings
to the mold of irrelevant legal cliches.
The Durham decision is thus un-
related to the question of what shall