Milford chronicle., 1954-05-07

WE FACE A PROBLEM IN INDO-CHTNA
AS with everything else, there is plenty
OF room for debate over the Administrations
policy toward CHINA policy which
was most clearly expressed by Vice Presi-
dent Nixon when he said that, if all else
Ialls, the United States must move in and
save that unhappy country from the Com
munlsts. But one thing is hardly debatable
Ito announce such a policy, even with all
the qualifications that would have come with
II, too political courage of high order. For
II anything is certain in this world, it is
that the American people have the deepest
possible revulsiOn toward war-and that in
cludeS little" or Splinter" wars of the KOr-
can kind. Indeed, all the evidence indicates
that the Presidents prediction stand on
the Korean conflict was in large measure re-
sponSlble for his landslide vote, and that
nothing he has done has gained greater pub
llc approval and admiration than the achieve
ment Of the Korean truce
In the view of this, why. in an election
year, and with only tissue-thin Republican
control OF Congress- has the Administration
run so great political risk?
That can be best answered by an exanina-
ton OF the map. In the Administrations
view, lndO-China is the door to the whole
southeast Asia rice bowl Mr. Nixon went
further, and said that the fate of Japan may
depend on what happens there. Therefore
this pOWerfully-documente argument runs
II lndO-China falls it will be just a matter of
time, and perhaps a relatively short time
before communism takes possession of enOr-
nous human and natural resources, includ-
ing vast wealth of materials necessary to
Cne prosecution OF war. And that the arp1I-
ment ends, must be prevented at any cast.
This is not all. There was highly impOr-
tant factor OF timing to the Nixon remarks.
The Administrations probable intention in
this regard has been we'll described by Raw
Gromley IN Wall Street Journal article. |
Writes Mr.. CrOmey "The u. S. has decided
to take lOng-shOt gamble in hopes of getting
real peace settlement on IndO-China at Ge- |
neva, Any like any gamble, the u. S. must
be prepared to make it look really strong Ito |
impress the enemy and our allies) and we |
must be prepared to back it up in case the |
communists call us on it. Secretary of State
Dulles has decided that if the Red world |
knows the u. S. is determined-at anv cost
to make certain that IndO-China does not
fal Red Russia and Red China lust might |
decide (as they did in KOrea) that continu- !
ing the IndO-China adventure-or expendng |
lt-WOuldnt be worth the cost"
This reasoning is based, Mr. CrOmley con-
tlnues, on belief that the communists can't |
afford another KOrea-Whch IndO-China GER
talnly would turn out to be, and perhaps a
much more eXhausting one. Red China, the !
State Department experts hold, needs a per-
iod of peace to store up and improve her
shaky industrial economy. She will dill
gently seize what she can get at small cost. |
but she won't run the risk of big war. So
Mr.. Dulless, to quote Mr.. Cromley once
again, .. wants to draw the line in south
east Asia that Mr.. AchesOn did not draw in
Korea"
That seems to be the situation at the mo-
ment. The potentian effect of the Geneva
meeting on the future of the world would be
difficult to exaggerate.