Evening star., 1954-09-12

cept, In the name of edo would not
be acceptable In q less all-embrac-
ing system. Today. German sover-
eighty including the right to re-
arm. Is demanded. not as d favor.
but as q right which no Western
nation, and certainly no German
politician, can afford to ignore.
Accepting this as q departure,
pr. AdeTauer's new demands are
understandable: In the first place.
he wants Gerrnany's sovereignty
handed back without reservations.
After that, he has limited that he
will be willing to trade some Of it
back again, II others are willing to
do the same. German rearmament
should take place within NATO.
and possibly also within some Eu-
ropean system that will formalize
IN advance the balance OF force be-
tween the major countries OF West
ern Europe. The usual question
remains: How to reach these goals
ina way that will satisfy both the
French and the German people.
The first step toward restoring
German sovereignty is already
clearly charted. Agreement between
the United States and Britain to
put the Bonn agreements into force
are already drawn up. The French
government. in what may seem to
be q belated attempt to rewin old
friends. is committed to play bali.
BY themselves. the Bonn agree
ments would end the occupation.
put the high commissions out of
business and go long way toward
giving Germany back to the Ger
mans. There is even some question
"a matter presently under closed
door discussion whether the Bonn
agreements as they stand, might
not open the door to German re-
armament.
Greatest Danger
And vet the Germans, in their
present mood of evaporation. may
not buy this. The greatest danger
which DR.. Adenauer faces today is
the anger of his countrymen toward
the French and diSillusion with the
idea of a united Europe" which he
has embraced SO faithfully. In
terms of cold, political logic, DR..
Adenauer's coalition parties which
once rallied firmly around the EDO
now find themselves badly split.
And at a time of indecision they
are pulled strongly by a combination
OF disgust with their allies and rising
natiohalistic pride.
But the Germans are also realists.
They know that short of complete
surrender to the Russians (and no
German leader advocates that there
are only three possible courses open.
One is cooperation with the West
on whatever terms can be agreed on.
The second is acceptance Of tenn
porary German naturalization, with
the long term hope of reunification
and the hazy possibility Of some day
playing the role of a third balancing
power in the East-West struggle.
The third alternative would be to
accept the present state of things
for the time being and wait for the
breaks.
DR.. Adenauer is known to favor
the first course as the only road to
German salvation. In spite of the
tough talk now, any reasonable
effort to fit Germany into the West
ern scheme of things would hardly
be expected to be turned down by
the present government. But If
things 60 badly with the effort to
find a substitute formula for the
EDO, the pressure on DR.. Adenauer
to make his own agonizing reap
praisal of German policy will be
great.
In spite Of all that has happened,
furthermore, most observers seem to
think that DR.. Adenauer's personal
stature in Germany is great enough
to ride out the political storm that
has been kicked up during the sum-
mer months. But the respite will
be temporary. The allies will have
perhaps two or three months to
make up their minds what to do be-
fore the serious trouble starts. If
the reappraisal lasts longer than
that-if new obstacles are raised to
making Germany full-fiedged
member of the Western European
community-then even the optimists
won't talk about DR.. Adenauer's
future, or Germany's. in a comfort
ing way.