Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-07-15
Moves
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lNOyCS
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this settlement is accepted by
the Communists the United
States will guarantee the truce
line by a joint military pact witt
France, Britain and other free
nations of Southeast Asia.
Although official announce
ment of this agreement probably
will not be made until the enc
of the Geneva conference, it !;
no secret in diplomatic circles
here.
So far as the British and
French are concerned, it adds
great strength to the allied po-
sition at Geneva - strength
which has been woefully lacking
in the past.
Sought to Avoid Clash.
There is plenty of evidence
that Mr.. Dulles had little idea
of making such an agreement
when he came to Paris. His
purpose. rather. was to explain
once and for all why the United
States could not join it's allies
in their quest for peace in
Southeast Asia. The basic the
sis: The United States was
anxious to avoid a clash of in
terests at Geneva. On the one
hand there was the interest OF
the United States and its world
wide campaign against COM
munism. On the other was the
problem of France--her need fol
making peace in Indo- China and
the things she would have to
accept because of military pres
sure.
Mr.. Dulles argued more in Sor-
row than anger. There was
nothing unfriendly or unsympa-
thetic in the American attitude
But in every ones interest it was
best that the United States at
this point should fade into the
background and avoid taking
any clear-cut position.
What happened to make hin
change his mind in the CLOSING
moments of the Paris meeting?
The answer lies partly in the
plane of personality. The Sec.
rotary, in the course OF the talks
was very agreeably impressed by
Mr.. Mendes-France. Contrary
to much Of the publicity which
the new Premier has received il
the United States, he found {
man who thinks clearly, talk.
convincingly and who shows few
symptoms Of moral f1abbineSs
Although Secretary Dulles haC
met Mr.. Mendes-France before
this was their first exchange il
the field Of foreign affairs. Ant
with the reservation that per,
torrance rather than promises
supply the final proof Of an!
statesman, the first impact wa
good.
British Play Up Eden Role.
Certain sources here notably
British-see in the result of the
Paris talks the fine diplomatic
hand of Mr.. Eden. Certainly
the result was an excellent ex.
ample Of the kind of persona
diplomacy which Britain's For
eign Secretary stands for: A pc.
lite exchange between gentle
men of the common principals
which can lead to q compro-
mise Of differences and q con-
structive decision.
Most of all. however, the
agreement in Paris was the re.
suit of the fact that the allie:
found they could get together
on terms for making peace with
the Communists.
On this point. who gave in Il
matter of partisan discussion
The probability is that when botl
sides let their hair down. two
vicious fictions were dispelled
Suddenly, the Europeans under
stood that all the American
were not uncompromising bellig'
erents. For their part, the Amer
leans found that their allies werI
not on the point of caving in fol
q disgraceful sellout to commu'
nism. When that happened. thu
reason for the current split be.
tween the allies disappeared al1C
agreement was possible.
Although the Paris talks have
given q imuch-needed lift tx
Western morale. it is still TOT
early to measure their effect OF
the Geneva Conference. The ex.
act peace terms agreed to be.
tween the allies are not known
but it is q safe guess they vii
be q good deal sitter than thu
Communists have hoped. Ger.
tainly the Communist attitude
reflected so far makes it Wild.
optimistic to assume that {
happy ending is in sight. Bui
whatever happens at Geneva
whether the verdict is for peace
or war-the allies are momen,
tarily back in the same boat
And that fact alone, In the light
Of recent history. is something
70 cheer about.