Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-16
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that the G. A. c. could have
adopted Q middle course"
%. Looking back on it, do you
feel that the @. A. c. in con-
sistency and with technical integ-
rity would have recommended
something short of the crash pro-
gram, but something at the same
time that was more active and
productive than the alternate
program?
"a. Indeed I do. Indeed ! do.
We could nave very well written
the report to the following effect,
that the present state of the pro-
gram is such and such as we see
it. This we did do. That in order
to get on with it, this and this
and this and this would need to
be done: This we did co. We
could have said that the pi esent
state of fog about this is such
that we don't really know just
what the problem is that is to be
decided. Let us get to work and
remove as much Of this fog as
fast as possible.
1--WE could further have said
the decision as to whether this is
the important, the most impor-
tant, an important, an undesir-
able or disastrous course involves
lots of considerations of which
we are dimly aware in the mil
itary and political sphere. and
we hope that these will be taken
into account when the decision
is made. We could have writ
ten such a report.
81 think apart from what per-
sonal things, feelings, still of the
people involved, the best expla-
nation of why we wrote the kind
of report we did II that we
said what we thought, rather
than pointing out that there
were other people who could be
asked to evaluate II was (a)
because we thought it. and (b)
because the pressure, the threat
of public discussion, and the feel
of the time was such that we
thought our stating our own
case, which was a negative case,
was a good way, and perhaps the
only way to insure mature de-
liberation on the basic problem,
should we or shouldn't we."
We can hardly think OF a more
candid statement of the con-
siderations that caused DR.. OPP
penheimer and the G. A. c. to
take the action they did.
Glib WAS THE COMMITMENT
NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH
AN ACTIVE HYDROGEN
BOMB PROGRAM UNQUAL1-
FLED?
Turning to the second of the
three italicized phrases above,
the Board majority stated:
81. The record reflects that
DR.. Oppenheimer expressed that
opinion in writing that the super
bomb should never be produced,
and that the commitment to this
effect should be unqualified"
We are not clear whether the
majority meant to criticize DIR.
Oppenheimer's candor with re-
spect to this point. He said, OF
course, that the "super bomb
should never be produced" since
this phrase was in the majority
annex to the G. A. C. report
which he signed. A question
arose at the hearings as to
whether this phrase was meant
to%be unqualified. The phrase
occurred in the following pass
age: -
1--WE believe q super bomb
should never be produced. Man.
kind would be far better on not
to have a demonstration OF the
feasibility of such weapon until
the present climate of world
opinion changes"
In the discussion that took
place, the chairman seemed to
think that these two sentences,
and particularly the first one,
meant that the United States
should never under any circum-
stances build a super bomb. DR..
Oppenheimer's interpre t a tion
was:
1.-THE majority annex I still
think never said that we should
not have it. think it said that
it would be better if such weap-
ons never existed"
And DR.. Oppenheimer amplified
his testimony on this point as
follows:
"a" /. We did discuss this
point with the commission on two
subsequent occasions. On one oc-
casion we made it clear that
nothing in what we had said
was meant to OBTAIN should 1t be
clear or should it be reasonably
probable that the enemy was on
this trail"
He further said:
ST think many things could
have qualified our unqualified
view. I have mentioned two OF
them. I will repeat them. One
is indications of what the enemy
was up to. One of them is a
program technically very differ
ent from the one that we had
before us. One of them is seri-
Gus and persuasive conclusion
that the political effort to which
we referred to in our annexes
could not be successful.
The GAG report itself, to
which the annexeS were attached,
says (italics are petitioner's):
1--WE are all reluctant to see the
United States take the initiGttDe
in precipitating this develop
ment."
And DR.. oppenheimer testi-
fed:
1T think in the report itself we
were unanimous in hoping that
the United States would not have
to take the initiative in the de-
velonnent of this weapon"