Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-13

Draft calls should be raised i
per month, they say. The strength
of the Army, they add, should be in
creased by "at least 100 per cent"
from its present IL million. And
the ways should be creased now. the
Army believes, for maximum mobi-
lization if that proves necessary.
Here is the basis of Army reason
ing:
What is happening now in 1ndo-
China is merely the symptom OF
the disease. The Communist threat
might just as well have erupted in
Iran, or along the Greek and Turk
ish borders with Bulgaria. Commu-
nism may challenge our friends at
these points at any time. The free
world, led by the United States.
must prevent it from spreading as
a matter of self-preservation.
But America cannot command re-
spect with the military establish
ment it now has. If proof were
needed of this, it has now been
made available for all to read at
Geneva. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles and his deputy, Gen.
Walter Bedell Smith, have assumed
the role of traffic cop. THUS far and
no farther" they have said to the
Reds. in effect. But Russia'S WA
cheslav Molotov and China's Chou
En-lai have just laughed and
laughed. The Reds know, OF course,
that behind Americas diplomats
there stands steadily shrinking
military establishment.
Mossive Retaliation
The United States does. Of course,
have its Strategic Air Command
with its important threat OF mas
sive retaliation" But the Army
points out that this is an absolute
weapon which Moscow has already
proved this country will not use
haphazardly because Of the threat
of Red retaliation in kind on our
vulnerable cities. Massive retaliation,
the Army believes. is not the answer
to the nibbling technique which the
Reds have used since the end OF
World War II.
The answer to nibbling, says the
Army, is a strong. mobile force
(mainly ground) which can contain
Communist expansion with conven-
tional-or at least non-atomic-
weapons. And an Army of II divi-
sions-such as the United States
L. nk nf
is hopelessly inadequate.
The Army adds that even a mere
announcement of intention = a
presidential request for Congress for
increased mobilization or actual
congressional approval would
strengthen the American position
at Geneva long before the mobiliza-
ton becomes an accomplished fact.
For these reasons. the Army,
thinks a radical increase in mobil-
ization is necessary regardless OF
what the United States decides to
do in Indo-China. @
Intervention
Talk of intervention in 1ndo-
China doubles the urgency. in the
opinion of Army officials. If Amer
lean forces were to be sent into Wet
Nam at the end of the rainy season
next September or october, draft
calls ought to be increased to 1OO,-
900 a month beginning in July. they
believe.
From the beginning, Army plan
ners have not believed that our air
and sea power would be enough to
win for the West in Indo-China.
They point to the experience of Ko-
rea. This peninsula provided the
Navy with easy access to two long
coastlineS along both sides OF the
country, from which artillery and
air power could pound the enemy.
The Air Force also was much more
favorably situated, with big bomber
bases in nearby Japan and Okinawa,
and later in South Korea itself. In
spite of these relative advantages,
air and sea power were not decisive
In Korea.
In Indo- China, the Nays activi-
ties would be much more restricted.
There is coast only on one side. The
nearest safe base for heavy aircraft
would be the Philippines, 1900 miles
away.
In Korea, of course, it was only
few days before ground forces were
called in to join the Air Force and
Navy. The Army expects that the
same sequence of events would be