Evening star., 1954-04-14
French Political Dilemma on Indo-Chino
BY Crosby S. Moves

Foreign Correspondent Of The starr
PARASITIC French government has
reacted to Americas sudden new in
terest in Indo-C China with all the ret
icence of person contemplating a
quick trip from the frying pan to the
fire.
Fortunately. what with Marshal JUN
and Dien Bien Phu so prominently in
the news, there have been enough dis
fractions to keep the heat off the gov
ernment since Secretary Dulles historic
united action" speech. So far 1t hasn't
been necessary for Mr.. Laniel or Mr..
Bidault to stand up and tell the French
Assembly what it all means and where
France stands now.
But the respite cannot last long.
Already, there have been pointed quer-
les from the opposition in the Assem-
bly,.
The questions: Does the objective Of
the French government remain the
same as the one SO recently undertaken
before the Assembly, negotiated end
to the Indo-C China WARP. And is the
government prepared to reaffirm its
declarations on this subject so that
France will not run the risk OF being
faced with the accomplished fact OF an
extension and an internationalization of
the Indo-China war?
What can Messrs. Laniel and Bidault
reply to this? Shall they admit that
Mr.. Dulles simply pulled the rug out
from under them and that France must
now resign itself to being pulled along
in the wake of American policy? Or
shall they make the best of it and try
to square their former position with
the new developments?
II the latter, the government runs
the lively risk of being pinned to the
mat by the record itself
On March 6, Premier Laniel told the
Assembly:
"In the negotiations (for peace in
Indo-C -China) the presence Of the great
democracies will not only be pre-
cious. but essential, since 1t will null
tiply the possibilities of transaction
Such has been the orientation OF
our diplomacy for long months. No
chance has been lost to put over our
point of view thanks to the most
effective work Of the foreign minister
on the same day, the Premier de-
clared
"Until 1853, there were two conflict
ing tendencies Some wanted TO
end the conflict through negotiation.
Others believed we might triumph by
force of arms Today. we are
unanimous in wishing from now on Tor
a settlement of the conflict by means
of negotiation. This Is one thing that
is settled. There is no need for any
one to argue it further"
Now. in addition to Mr.. Dulles own
statement, the French have number
of other American pronouncements to
ponder. They haven't missed the stark
contrast. for instance, between their
own official view and Senator Wylle's:
Several of our allies and numerous
other free powers hope that out OF
Geneva will come some arrangement
whereby Communist China may be ad-
mitted to the United Nations in return.
perhaps, for assettlement in 1ndo- emma
and elsewhere. I. for one, strongly OPP
pose any such spurious and self-defeat-
ing arrangement"
Or the congressional report on Asia:
For the free world to seek a truce
with the Communists in Indo-China vs.
to engage In appeasement equivalent to
an Indo- Chinese Munich" ~
or again, the verdict of Admiral Rad
ford:
"We are providing military equip
ment and technical assistance to the
French Union forces. We are doing this
in the expectation that increased mil
itary operations by the French and by
the Associated States will defeat the
Communist military forces"
Despite the obvious difficulties, the
State Department must hope that the
French government can accommodate
itself somehow to the new line and sur
vive the embarrassment of its present
position. In support of this hope, it is
admitted that the earlier policy OF
negotiation in Indo-China was based on
the assumption that the United States
would never actively intervene in 1ndo-
China.
On the other hand, one must also
admit that the idea of "Americanizing"
the Indo-China war Tin the sense OF
letting the State Department call the
tune) meets with intense opposition
here.
Rightly or wrongly, few Frenchmen
buy the idea that their search for a ne
gotiated truce adds up to cowardice,
defeat, or a sellout of Western interests.
They think. furthermore, that they
know a good deal more about the sit
uation in Indo-China than most Amer
leans, and that our estimates tend to be
dangerously superficial. They admit
that the United States has the re-
sources and the power, perhaps, to
T0.,k u cVNSf
and Frenchmen.. by and large, want no
part of the process.
At the same time, direct intervention
by the United States in Indo-China,
with the inevitable risk of all-out war
with China, would be considered catas-
trophic by a majority of people here.
The fat. however, is already in the