Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-28
By Crosby S. Moves
Enraicn CnrrasnnndanA of Iha StnIP

Foreign Correspondent OF The StoP
LONDON.-It can come as no
great surprise to London that
the Washington conference has
failed to produce complete agree
ment in all areas of Anglo-Amer-
lean differences in Southeast
Asia.
Indeed, British and American
approaches to the problem of
how to deal with communism in
the Far East were so far apart
that complete harmony would
have been a remarkable achieve
ment.
The disagreement starts with
the question of what is meant
by a system of collective Sc
curity" in Southeast Asia. Spe-
officially: Is the purpose of this
organization to provide an an
Swer to the immediate emergency
in Indo-China? Or is it a long
range project designed to guar
antee and inforce some possible
future settlement in Southeast
Asia?
To many British, it has seemed
that the State Department was
definitely putting the accent on
the first idea. 1t seemed that
the aim was to form an alliance
under conditions which might
Immediately involve it in a war.
In short. the f'mutual security
organization" looked suspiciously
like a mechanism for interven-
ing IN Indo-China.
British Were Definite.
But if Mr.. Dulles was a little
ambiguous about just what he
had in mind, the British were
not. Their answer to the Sug-
gestion of intervention in Indo-
China was an unequivocal mo"
Today they still insist that no
military alliance should be
formed with the aim of swing
ing a military decision in Wet
Nam. In Mr.. Eden'S words,
such an alliance would have
only one justifiable purpose: "A
future safeguard, but not a
present panacea.
When it comes to the question
of assessment, Britain quite
simply does not consider Wet
Nam as vital to her strategic
interests. AS the British see it,
the fighting there is not an act
of Communist aggression, but a
civil war. From the outset,
their position has been that
Intervention by any combination
of Western powers would be an
open invitation to general con-
flict. Beyond that it would, in
the British view, be militarily
impractical and morally in
defenSible.
Serious as they are, if Anglo
American differences we're linn
tied to Indo-China. they might
be resolved without too much
trouble. Unfortunately, there
are much broader disagreements
that necessarily intrude them
selves in any Asian policy that
can be developed.
It's hardly news to point out
that we don't see eye to eye with
the British on the question of
Red China. To Americans the
fact that Britain recognizes Red
China, seeks closer ties with the
new regime and cherishes illu-
sions of reforming" it's Com
muniSt leaders seems an act of
dangerous folly. To Britains
nothing is more ludicrouS than
the fact the United States con-
tinues to ignore the existence of
the Communist government of
China.
It is a mistake, however, to
explain this all in terms of trade
interests. Britain, of course, does
have a vital interest in trade
with the Far East. But beyond
this there is also the firm belief
that no settlement of Asian
problems is possible which does
not recognize Red China as the
greatest single political fact in
Asia today.
Whatever settlement may be
reached in Indo- China, Britain
wants China to participate
actively in that settlement. So
far as they are concerned, it is
not a question of how much faith
ar how littlo-0no NAV have in