Evening star., 1954-10-03
The KremIin's New Arms Plan

The KremIin's New Arms Plan
Together with the French and British
representatives, Ambassador Lodge, our
chief delegate to the United Nations, has
responded with proper circumspection- a
guardedly hopeful but "show-me" manner
to the latest Soviet proposal for general dis
armament and the control and prohibition
of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons OF
mass destruction.
There is good reason, of course, why the
proposal should be viewed with the kind Of
caution that Mr.. Lodge has displayed. For
Andrei Vishinsky, in presenting it to the
General Assembly, has seen fit at the same
time to cut loose once again with menda-
cious and vitriolic attack on the United
States and its allies-a circumstance re-
1ecting precious little Soviet readiness to
cooperate with the West. Further than
that, as experience has repeatedly shown,
the Kremlin's words which so often have
been belied by the Kremlin's deeds, must
always be read with a large measure OF
reserve and skepticism.
Nevertheless, with that said, the fact
remains that what Mr.. Vishinsky has out
lined to the Assembly seems to be de-
parture-conceivably a significant depar-
ture-from the Soviet Unions past position
on this subject That is to say, it appears to
abandon the old Russian demand for an
immediate and unconditional ban on the
mass-deStruction weapons. It appears, too,
to come little bit closer to the Western
view that the use of those weapons would be
justified in defense against aggression; that
their control and prohibition must be
worked out in conjunction with an equit-
able stage-by stage program to reduce and
regulate armed forces and arms of every
kind: and that there must be established
before the free world divests itself of its
atomic hydrogen armaments-a genuinely
effective vetoless system of international
inspection to guard against violations.
Partial agreement with all this seems to
be implicit in the new Soviet proposal, under
which the U. N. Disarmament Commission
would draft treaty that would take effect,
after ratification, In two separate stages.
In the first stage, which would cover period
of six or IL months, the powers involved
would (1) carry out so per cent of the total
cuts agreed upon in conventional arms,
armed forces and military expenditures and
(2) create temporary control body under
the Security Council to keep check on the
degree of compliance or noncompliance
with the treaty's obligations. Next, in the
second stage, which would cover another six
or IL months, these things would be done:
Q) the remaining SO per cent of the agreed
upon cuts would be effectuated; (2) manu-
facture of the mass-destruction weapons
would be brought to an end and their use
al xxyi$n a.
rial to be employed thereafter for peaceful
purposes only; and (S) a permanent inter-
national inspection agency would be estab-
lished to insure against violations.
AS thus presented by Mr.. Vishinsky, the
Soviet plan-which in the first stage would
enable the Russians to veto actions by the
temporary control body, and which Is still
quite unclear as to the powers of the second
stage inspection agency-falls far short OF
the program sponsored by the Western Big
Three and supported by the overwhelming
majority of the U. N Even so, compared to
the Kremlin's past rigid position, 1t appears
to be step forward in the right direction,
and possibly it may mean that the Malenkov
regime is contemplating policy change
that could lead to an acceptable and trust
worthy disarmament agreement.
But such a possibility still seems so re-
mote that one can only hope for 1t with
fingers crossed. After all, the proof OF the
pudding is in the eating thereof AS Mr..
Lodge has said, the decisive test of the So
Wet proposal-the test as to whether 1t Is
any good or not-will not come until 1t Is
studied and discussed and spelled out in
detail Not until then will its real meaning
be known.