Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-24
Eden Wants Both Sides to Guard Asia Peace

Minerva from the head Of.
Jupiter.
It really was not so. It's rel
evance to current events must
not be exaggerated. It could
be a future safeguard. but it
is not a present panacea.
It had seemed essential that
military studies should be made
of all the possible situations
which might arise IN Southeast
Asia on the various possible as
sumptions about the success or
failure of the conference.
AS the five-power staff existed
already with terms of reference
which covered Southeast Asia,
the military review Of these five
powers could examine the vari-
Gus situations with which they
might be faced. This was the
best contribution that could then
be made toward organizing uni
ted action.
These proposals were accepted
by the other four powers and
they began in Washington on
June 8. AS a result, we should
be better equipped for any de-
cisionS we might be called upon
to take.
Gives Three Reasons.
The United Kingdom govern
ment has been reproached in
some unofficial quarters for their
failure to support armed inter-
vention to try to save Diem Bien
Phu. It was quite true that we
were not willing to support such
action. This was for three rea-
sons which then seemed to be
good and still seem to be good.
Firstly, we were advised that
air action alone could not have
been effective; secondly, any
such military intervention could
have destroyed the chances of a
settlement at Geneva; thirdly,
it might well have led to a gen.
eral war in Asia.
We have at no time been re-
preached by our French allies
for our decision, in spite of, the
fact that the burden Of it fell
upon them.
There were no clearly defined
battle front in Indo- China, and
ways Of separating the opposing
forces had to be found. Detailed
military decisions had to be
brought about. Everyone agreed
that representatives Of the OPP
posing commands should meet
for these purposes. But the diff
f1culty was to agree who these
commands were and what prin-
cipleS should guide their dis
cussions.
The Communists argued that
the French command should ne
gotiate with the Wet Mini and
the So-called resistance move
mentS in Laos and Cambodia,
and also wanted the military
representatives to discuss plans
for the regrouping Of forces in
all three states, thereby i'm
plying that the fighting was Of
the same character in all three
states.
Three Governments Ignored.
This seemed to ignore the le-
Ultimate governments of the
three associated states and to
take no account Of the fact that
in Laos and Cambodia the Wet
Mimi were foreign invaders.
After much discussion the con-
ference accepted the proposal on
May 20 which provided that mill
tary talks should begin with Wet
Nam. Representatives of the
commands of France and Wet
Nam, on the one hand, and the
Wet Mimi, on the other, met on
June 2 and their discussions are
still going on.
I hope they will soon submit
to the conference recommends
lions for the separation of OPP
posing forces in Wet Nam and
their concentration in clearly de-
fined areas.
There were two considerations:
First, the question of supervision
for the whole of this fighting
and the cessation of hostilities
in Laos and Cambodia. Every
body was agreed on the need for
supervision, but the question
was how it should be done and
who should perform it.
There was the Communist pro-
poSal that it should be on the
model used in Korea with the
two military commands repre-