Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-02-19
Noyes
CONTINUED From First Page.)


long as both sides cling to their
present policies land certainly
nothing that happened here Of
fered the slightest hint of
change) it is hard to see how
Identification by any means short
of war is possible. The question
Of Austrian independence and
the withdrawal of Russian oc-
cupation troops has been firmly
tied by Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov to a settlement in Ger
many on his terms.
3. At a critical time in the
development of Western policy,
harsh divisions between East and
West have been pointedly re-
emphasized. The Berlin talks
have not only proved how hard
it is to do business with the new
rulers of Communist world. They
have also shown in most unmis-
taxable terms what the conSe-
Quences of cooperation would
be.
Irony Seen on Dulles Stand.
To go beyond these facts and
try to predict their impact on
things to come means wading
into q dangerous field of specula-
ton and controversy. But even at
this early stage some tentative
conclusions are being drawn.
From the American point of
view, the fact that the Far East
ern conference was the only solid
agreement reached in Berlin has
a family ironical flavor. 1t was
Secretary of State Dulles who
came here determined to confine
the debate to European problems.
It was he who pointed to the flu
tility of conferences that merely
breed new conferences and who
spoke so scathingly of the advan-
tages of meeting with China's
Chou En-lai.
The irony is not wholly wiped
out by the argument that the
four = power agreement seems
likely to break the long deadlock
over the Korean political con-
ference or that many of the
United Nations terms for that
have been met. The
idea of seeking agreement in
Berlin for Far Eastern talks was
distinctively a Russian idea and
Mr.. Molotov can be expected to
make the most of his victory"
Against the background of
Berlin, the chances of getting
a settlement of the Korean prob
lem are dismal, to say the least.
Almost certainly, the allies will
approach the unification of Ko-
rea on the same basis that they
approached the unification of
Germany, including free super
vlsed elections and formation of
an all-Korean government. And
the Communist answer to this
proposal will almost certainly be
just exactly what it was here.
German Ties Stronger.
Acceptance of an indefinite
stalemate on German reunifica-
ton was inevitable in view of
the obvious determination of the
Russians to hang on at all cost
IN the East. One result may be
to clear the air in West Germany.
where hopes for Identification
were not high to begin with and
where problems of reunification
are beginning to impress an in
fiuential slice Of public opinion.
From a purely political stand
point. failure of the Berlin con-
ference is almost certain to
stregnthen ties of the federal
republic to the Western coalition.
But the long-range outlook is
not so encouraging. In the
opinion of many intelligent Euro
peans. ACKNOWLEDGMENT of Ger
many represents the greatest
single threat to European secur-
lty today. And that threat will
grow with the revival of German
strength and independence.
Sooner or later the four powers
will have to face the fact that