Evening star., 1954-04-25

Inc DaSlC objective OF American
foreign policy, as stated by Dean
Acheson in 1850 and still in effect, is:
To moke possible world in which all
peoples. including the peoples of Asio,
con work, in their own woy. toword q
better life.
The key words in this context
are lin their own way" AS Mr..
Dulles pointed out to Senator Nc
Carthy last January, the way to get
allies who are dependable, who will
freely sacrifice much in a common
effort" is to allow them to make
their own decisions.
The problem is basically the old
one that has confronted all coali-
tions: How to reach the common
objective Tin this case, stop Com
munist expanSion) while keeping the
coalition intact. The ideal would
be to keep moving toward both
goals simultaneously. But not all
leaders share our concern about the
spread of communism.
The trick is to keep the anti-Red
front operating as close to full speed
as possible without driving our
allies-eSpecially their leaders-out
of the coalition because we fail to
understand their internal prioritieS
on pressing problems.
In its relations with Far Eastern
countries and their leaders, the
United States has exercised a COM
mendable amount of restraint in the
past. In the case of Syngman Rhee
in Korea. for example, the United
States has resisted reaching for a
club ever since the doughty old
patriot took Office in 1948. In DR..
Rhee's case, however. the problem
is not to bolster his anti-C -Commun-
ism, but to keep it in reasonable
bounds.
Another example: In Indo- China.
the United States has so far deferred
to French and Wet Namese policies
on training troops. Here, however,
the urgency Of putting strong Wet
Namese army into the field against
Ho Chi Mimi has prompted the
United States to be more persistent.
Since last year Wet NameSe leaders
have shown a marked tendency to
accept the American view on troop
training. and the problem has be-
come increasingly one of reconciling
the French with the American-Viet
Namese position.
Japan provides third example of
Americas use of restraint. So far
Nippon has been slow to rearm. Wise
ly, the United States has allowed
Japan to proceed at her own ex-
asperatingly slow pace. Now the
United States still has hope of work.
ing with the Yoshida governments
successor. For opposition leaders, in
Japan and other countries, have had
a gratifying tendency to become
more responsible, to work with Amer
ica, when they come to power. The
best parallel here, of course, is the
British Labor party. which worked
well with the United States while in
power, in marked contrast from its z
pre- and post-power conduct.
Geneva Problems
How will the impending changes
in Far Eastern leadership affect
our policies at Geneva?
Broadly speaking, the United
States will have to exercise the
aforementioned restraint. particu-
larry in seeking the support Of small
Far Eastern nations for United
States actions. The accent again
must be on helping our allies to
work toward better life "in their
own way"
In the specific case of Korea.
Americans at Geneva probably will
have it in the back of their minds
that, come the post-Rhee era, there
will be an opportunity for more
flexibility in the allied stand for
peaceful unification of the country.
If Korean negotiations at Geneva
break down, then, it may be in
the door open for new negotiations
later. A United Nations-supervised
election, for instance, would un-
doubtedly be an easier matter to
work out without Syngman Rhee.
whose vested interests in the status
quo are greater than any other
mans on the Korean scene.
The plan for withdrawal Of all
foreign troops from North and South
Korea, also, is now hopelessly
blocked by DR.. Rhee. who openly
processes his intention to strike
north on a mission of liberation as
soon as the opportunity presents
itself. This problem. too. may be-
come less complicated later.
In the case of Indo-China the
United States must make it clear
again that it has the long-range
ambitions of all the peoples of the
Associated States uppermost in its
mind. That will mean, on the one
hand, genuine attention to the
viewpoints of Bao Dai, representing
Wet Nam. and to the problems of
Cambodia and Laos The United
States will have to keep in mind.
on the other hand, that Bao Dai
may not last indefinitely az the
i-Communist leader in Wet Nam.
America will have to base it's pol
icieS openly on the general welfare
of the Wet NameSe, avoiding, if pos
sible. any moves which might imply
irrevocable support to Bao Dai per-
sonally.
The Communists, for their part,
already have indicated that they
plan to conduct all their Indo-China
business at Geneva in a carefully
contrived atmosphere of independent
Ho Chi Mini actions independently
arrived at. The fiction should not
be hard to expose for the people
Of Wet Nam to see.
Conversely. however, the West
would be well-advised to avoid crude
pressures on the Associated States
representatives which would con-
firm Asian peoples suspicious that
the white Big Three has no respect