Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-13

inevitable in Indo-C China. Possibly
Intervention of ground forces could
be postponed somewhat longer. but
the Army is certain 1t would even
tually be needed.
Our ground force commanders are
also confident that, contrary to the
opinion of Gen. Henri-Eugene Ma
varre, the Wet Namese can be
moulded into a. good fighting force
if they have the proper "stiffening"
example of tough, experienced SOL
dierS.
The Army already has rough eSti-
mates of what forces it would need
in Indo- China to obtain certain OBJ
jectives. Here are the detectives and
the estimated requirements:
1. To hold the Red and MekOng
River deltas: Five to six divisions
100000 American trOOps).
2. To secure all of IndO- China:
Ten divisions (clOSe to 100000
trOopsl.
3. To hold Indo- China if the
Red Chinese send their legiOnS
into battle: More divisions than
we have to send.
The first two calculations are
based on the uneasy assumption
that Red China would not send her
own armies into the conflict. This.
of course, is not at all safe as
sumption and the Army is the first
to point it out. The Communist
Chinese could put enough soldiers
into Indo-China to drive out the
combined forces Of France. Wet
Nam, the United States and other
Western nations. The Army sub
scribes to the widely held view that
this country must not get involved
in a full-scale war on the continent
of Asia.
The best counteraction available
to the free world if Red China enters
the Indo-China war in full force
would be to carry the air war out
side Indo-China to the Red Chinese
mobilization and staging bases.
Spreading the war to China would,
of course, involve the danger, al
though by no means the certainty.
that the conflict would expand into
World War III.
General Mobilization
It is because Of this danger that
the Army considers general mo-
bilization to be the safest move the
country could make if the United
States intends to move into 1ndo-
China.
Even an immediate increase in
the draft would not bring quick re-
suits. AS Army experts put it, sew
eral months would be required to
fill the pipeline" with soldiers and
supplies. In the case of Indo-China.
the pipeline would be 10000 miles
long. Maintenance and supply per-
sonnet would be needed all along
the line, from training centers to
battle zone. Keeping a stable force
in the field would require at least
twice the number of troops in the
pipeline.
1t is probable, however, that l00.-
600 American troops could be poured
into Indo-China by September or
October-the end of the rainy sea-
son-if the word were given soon.
The proportion of engineer troops
required for the Indo-China theater
also would be much heavier than in
most other places. Indo-China in
1854 is a more primitive country
than Korea was in 1850. Its roads
are fewer and narrower. Road-nets
vital to modern warfare are almost
nonresident. There are more
swamps and jungles and mountains
natural barries-than in most the
aters. More engineers would be
needed to build roads along which
American equipment could move.
American intervention In Indo-
China with ground troops, in other
words, would be a tremendous
undertaking.
The Army makes no pretense
about the expense. It admits that
all hope of balancing the budget
would have to be abandoned. It
estimates that the mobilization it
advocates might cost around $50
billion a year.
But it maintains that national
security today is more endangered
by the threat of militant commu-
nism than by an unbalanced budget.
It is Congress, of course, which
must finally decide.