Evening star., 1954-08-08

who provided the United States
Government with much important
information regarding Soviet espi-
onage techniques, organization and
personalities before he was found
dead in a Washington hotel room.
During the great purge of 1884
1888 defections got so bad that the
system Of hostages was introduced.
Under this system some close re-
lation Of every secret agent sent
abroad was held inside the Soviet
Union as insurance against pos
sible detection. The case Of Nj
kolay Khokhlov showed that in
spite Of hostages there are people
who will defect.
Secret agents are q scarce COM
modify even in the Soviet Union,
which trains agents by the thous-
ands. A good operative needs plenty
OF on-the-job training. experience,
and seasoning. Relatively few make
agents capable of maintaining a
spy ring in good running order.
II one agent defects, he leopard
lies many more, depending on his
relative position within his partic-
ular espionage ring or within the
central espionage apparatus.
In 1916. Igor Gouzenko, code
clerk in the Soviet Embassy In Can
ada. made espionage history when
he exposed Soviet espionage opera
tions In the North American con-
tinent. His revelations before the
Royal Commission produced mil
lions Of dollars worth of counter
intelligence for both Canada and
the United States. At the same time,
this forced the Kremlin to rebuild
some Of its major American spy
networks.
Vladimir Petrov duplicated Gou-
zenko's coup Of 1946. From 30 to
so Australians are said to be di-
rectly or indirectly implicated in
the Soviet espionage effort. The re-
construction Of their spy network
will be further complicated by the
severance of diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries.
KhokhIov Causes Struggle
Nikolai Khokhlov provided our in
telligence with a fairly accurate
picture Of Soviet espionage in Ger
many and Austria. In addition he
gave information on the operation
Of some Of the central espionage
agencies in Moscow. The tKremlin
will have to shift personnel, redesig-
nate Offices, assign new agents,
recall old ones before they are
arrested or made Ineffective through
our countermeasures.
Another worry for. the Kremlin
is that defections are infectious. It
is wholesale defections that the
Soviet fears more than anything
else.
What about the net effect Of these
defectionS upon their, espionage
operations? Have the defections Of
the past six months resulted in any
impairment in the flow Of intelli-
gence into the appropriate Soviet
government Offices?
The answer was partially sup
piled in the testimony Of ISmail
Ege before the Senate Internal
Security subcommittee. Himself
former Soviet intelligence officer.
Ege said normal Soviet espionage
practice calls for 20 to Is separate
espionage networks to be in stimuli
taneous operation within given
country. Gouzenko. for example, ex-
posed four to five separate nets, leav-
ing an estimated is to 40 still In
operation.
1t is logical to assume, therefore,
that the recent wave Of defections
among Soviet agents has by no
means stopped the flow Of informa-
ton into the Kremlin from the
affected areas. But the quality of
intelligence. and the credence placed
In 1t by Moscow. probably have bean
sharply reduced.