Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-02-26
Why Fear Geneva?

In reporting to the Nation on the results Of
the Berlin conference, Secretary Of State Dulles
has presented clear, sensible and thoroughly
persuasive case in defense of the agreement
under which the Chinese Communists will take
part in the forthcoming Geneva negotiations on
Korea and Indo- China.
Although there has been no serious argu-
ment about other aspects of the Berlin talks,
the Geneva decision has stirred up considerable
criticism, much of it surprisingly shallow. The
criticism, as expressed in some congressional
circles is based chiefly on the fear that by
agreeing to meet with Red China, and with
the other countries principally concerned the
United States has paved the way for de facto
American diplomatic recognition of the Peping
Communists. In addition, there has been a lot
of Nervous Nellie comment to the effect that
our representatives at the projected negotiations
may be outmaneuvered and hoodwinked into
veritable orgy of appeasement.
But this view, besides amounting to an
utterly absurd estimate of the competency of
American diplomacy, greatly distorts the nature
of the Berlin agreement on Geneva In the first
place, as Mr.. Dulles has said, that agreement
provides for the very kind of conference we have
been seeking for months past in accord with the
Korean armiStice terms In the second place,
far from participating in the talks as co-equal
manded), Communist China is to attend as
belligerent-a belligerent not Ito be honored by
us, but rather to account before the bar of
world opinion" And in the third place, in
formal, written understanding, the Soviet Union
has joined the Western Big Three in affirming
that the April get together will in no sense imply
American diplomatic recognition of the Pepng
regime
That regime exists, of course. And 1t has
power. But our readiness to meet with it does
not mean that we credit it with international
legitimacy. In Mr.. Dulles words, 1--WE deal with
1t where occasion requires. It is, however, one
thing to recognize evil as fact. 1t is another
thing to take evil to ones breast and call it
good" Certainly, even though our country has
agreed to negotiate with them on Korea and
1ndo-China, it has done anything but agree to
accord diplomatic responsibility to the Chinese
Communists. On the contrary, once again
through Mr.. Dulles, it has made clear that it
will continue to deny them recognition and to
oppose their admission to membership in the
United Nations.
AS for the danger of our being outsmarted
by the Communists at Geneva, Mr.. Dulles has
effectively treasured the faint of heart with
these simple, common-senSe words: There is
no reason why we should refuse to seek
peacefully the results we want merely because Of
fear that we will be outmaneuvered at the con-
ference table No informed observers believe
that we were outmaneuvered at Berlin. We need
not, out Of fright, lay down the tools Of diplo-
macy and the possibilities they provide. Our
cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so
low, that our Nation must seek security by sulk-
ing in its tent"
Actually, it is at least possible that the
Geneva conference may turn out to be fruitful.
Mr.. Dulles, for his own part, has measure Of
hope. As If suggesting that Peiping- Moscow
split Is conceivable, he has made a special point
OF declaring that 81 do not wholly exclude the
idea that the Soviet Union might In fact want