Evening star., 1954-04-13

Japan, the members Of the lab
oratory began to have a new
sense Of the possible import of
what was going on.
In the early days. when sue
cess was less certain and timing
insure, and the war with Ger
many and Japan in a desperate
phase, it was enough for us to
think that we had a job to do.
Now, with Germany defeated,
the war in the Pacific approach
ing a crisis, and the success Of
our undertaking almost assured,
there was a sense both of hope
and of anxiety as to what this
spectacular development might
portend for the future. This
came to us a little earlier than
to the public generally because
we saw the technical develop
ment at close range and in Sc
cret; but its quality was very
much the same as the public
response after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.
Thus is was natural that in
the spring of 1945 I welcomed
the opportunity when I was
asked by Secretary Stimson to
serve, along with Compton,
Lawrence and Fermi, on an adj
visory panel to his Interim Com
mittee on Atomic Energy.
Mapped Out Future.
We met with that committee
on the 1St of June, 1945, and
even during the week when Hiro-
shinma and Nagasaki were being
bombed, we met at Los Alamos
to sketch out a prospectus of
what the technical future in
atomic energy might look like,
atomic war heads for guided mis-
siles, improvements in bomb de-
sign. the thermenuclear program,
power, propulsion, and the new
tools available from atomic tech
nology for research in science,
medicine and technology.
This work absorbed much Of
my time during September and
October. and in connection with
it I was asked to consult with
the War and State Departments
on atomic energy legislation. and
in preliminary way on the in
ternational control Of atomic
energy. -
I resigned as director of Los
Alamos on october 16. 1945, after
having secured the consent Of
Comdr. Bradbury and of Gen.
Groves that Bradbury should act
as my successor.
There were then on the books
at the laboratory, embodied in
memoranda and reports and sum-
married by me in letters to Gen.
Groves, developments in atomic
weapons. which could well have
occupied years for their fulfill
ment. and which have in fact
provided some. though by no
means all. of the themes for Los
Alamos work since that time. 1t
was not entirely clear whether
the future of atomic weapons
work in this country should be
continued at or confined to Los
AlamoS or started elsewhere at
more accessible and more practi-
cal site, or indeed what effect
international agreements might
have on the program. But in the
meantime Los Alamos had to be
kept going until there was Gre
ated an authority competent to
decide the question of it's future.
This was to take almost a year.
The Postwar Period.
In November. 1945, resumed
my teaching at the California
Institute of Technology. With an
intention and hope. never real
lied, that this should be a full
time undertaking. The consulta-
ton about postwar matters
which had already begun contin-
ued, and I was asked over and
over both by the Executive and
the Congress for advice on
atomic energy.
I had a feeling of deep re-
sponsibility. interest and concern
for many Of the problems with
which the development of atomic
energy confronted our country.
This development was to be a
major factor in the history Of the
evolving and mounting conflict
between the free world and the
Soviet Union. When I and other
scientists were called on for ad-
vice. our principal duty was to
make our technical experience
and judgment available. We were
called to do this in a context and
against a background of the Of
ficial views of the Government
on the military and political
situation of our country. Imme-
diately after the war, I was
deeply involved in the effort to
devise effective means for the in
ternational control Of atomic
weapons, means which might, in
the words Of those days, tend to-
ward the elimination of war it
self,
AS the prospects Of success re-
ceded, and as evidence of Soviet
hostility and growing military
power accumulated, we had more
and more to devote ourselves to
finding ways of adapting our
atomic potential to offset the
Soviet threat.
In the period marked by the
first Soviet atomic explosion, the
war in Korea and the Chinese
Communist intervention there,
we were principally preoccupied.
though we never forgot long
term problems. with immediate
measures which could rapidly
build up the strength Ipf the