Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-18
Scientists and the Truth

Your editorial Of June 8, entitled
Scientists and the Truth" criticizeS 9
recent open letter to President Eisen-
hover from ten scientists regarding the
personnel security program. AS one OF
the signers Of that letter, should APP
preciate a chance to clarity my posi-
ton. OF course. I am speaking for
myself and do not necessarily represent
the opinions Of the others who joined
in that letter, or of other scientists who
participated in many similar protests
which have recently been published.
First. should like to explain why ]
feel that the reaSSeSsment of our Secu-
rity policy is so important, and why
scientists are under an obligation to
participate in the public discussion of
this problem. Today, in the absence
OF an enforceable system of world dis
armament and atomic inspection, our
national safety must be based on our
ability to defend ourselves and to re-
taliate if attacked. Our security Sys-
tenn must include provisions to guard
important military secrets; but it must
also maintain sound balance between
the negative security Of secrecy and
the positive military security of scien-
tlflc discoveries on which future
weapons and countermeasures will be
based. Scientists who have participated
IN the development Of new weapons are
among the few who thoroughly COM
prehend their potential destructiveness.
They are in the best position to APP
praise the effect of security system
upon the development of scientific re-
search. For these reasons it appears
to me that they have a duty to con-
tribute to discussion for the improve
ment of security policy.
Many believe that recent abuses of
the present personnel security system
have greatly damaged important de-
tense activities. (See, for example. the
full report by the Scientists Committee
on Loyalty and Security on the Fort
monmouth situation, where 1t appears
That dangerous generalization in inn
portant Signal Corps laboratories has
resulted from highly miSrepreSented in
designations which were often based on
improperly drawn charges containing
much irrelevant materially. Our defense
laboratories are already desperately
short OF highly trained scientists. We
are aware that Russia is training scien-
lists and engineers in greater numbers
than we are, and public announce
mentS Of test explosions indicate that
Russian atomic development appears to
be alarmingly current. If the reader
wishes to appreciate the peril we face
If we drive able scientists from defense
work while we are engaging in this close
race Tor survival, let him conjecture
what would have happened if Russia
iVN l.
ana we had not! Recent reports indicate
that over half of the graduating Ph.Ds
IN physics questioned on the matter
have changed their opinion during the
past year as to the deSirability of enter
ing secret work, and that two-thirdS
OF them are now reluctant to enter
CLASSIFIED defense research. While obvi-
Gus professional reasons, such AS the
lack OF recognition for scientists in Sc
cret work, undoubtedly have much to
do with this reluctance, the recent
change Of opinion seems significant.
Our open letter to President Eisen-
hover referred not only to the Open
heimer case, but also to the damage to
defense research done by present trends
IN the security progam. The letter point
ed out that there were many features
to be praised in-A.E.C security pre-
ceoureS, such as the prior listing of
charges. representation by counsel, and
the cross-examination of witnesses. It
is regrettable that such safeguards are
not part of the procedures of all other
Government agencies. The Personnel
Security Board took its responsibilities
in the Oppenheimer case very seriously.
permitted very extensive testimony, and
issued a lengthy report. believe the
board is to be praised for its courage
in making def1nitive finding in favor
Of DR.. Oppenheimer's loyalty and dis
erection. The lengthy report, giving both
the majority and minority views. has
led to helpful public criticism of the de-
cision, which may assist the review of
the case by the Atomic Energy Commits
sion.
1t is clear from the report that many
factors may have been involved in the
majority recommendation that DR.. OPP
penheimer's clearance be withheld. One
who has not read the extensive testi-
mony considered by the board cannot
say definitely whether on the basis of
the full testimony he would judge DR..
Oppenheimer to be security risk. But
we may criticize the grounds for the de-
cision as they appear from examination
Of the majority report. Since the case
will undoubtedly serve as a precedent
for many future personnel security
cases, believe it is very important to
elucidate any improper grounds.
The most disturbing ground to many
observers was the criticism Of the sci
entiSt'S opinions and attitude. The ma
jority opinion affirms explicitly its be-
lief that mo man should be tried for
the expression of his opinions" Never
theless the vast majority of editorial
and other comment that I have seen
agrees that a fair construction of the
majority opinion is that DR.. Open
heimer's skepticism as to the advisable
1ty of the H-bomb program was prin-
cipal, and perhaps the decisive, reason
for the majority's conclusion to with
hold clearance. For the majority and