Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1954-06-17

Government security officials
knew as early as February, 1915
almost two and half years
before the first A-bomb was
exploded - that Red espionage
agents were transmitting secret
information from key atomic
installations to the Soviet Union.
This was disclosed with the
release yesterday of some $500
pages of testimony taken by a
special three-man board which
voted 2 to ! late last month to
recommend that DR.. j. Robert
Oppenheimer, fam d nuclear
physicist, be classified a security
risk. The full Atomic Energy
Commission is now considering
the case and will announce its
decision within the next two
weeks.
The extent of successful Soviet
espionage at Los Alamos, N. NJ,
and the radiation laboratory at
Berkeley. Calf, was Sketched by
1t. Col. John r. Lansdale. jr.,
chief of security for the A-bomb
project, during a secret inter-
view with DR.. Oppenheimer on
September IL, 1943. DIR. Open
heimer was in charge at Los
AlamoS at the time.
Russians Knew Secrets.
Referring to the Russians, Col.
Lansdale said:
"They know. we know they
know, about Tennessee Coax
RIDGE, about Los Alamos and
Chicago (metallurgical labora-
tory"
He told DR.. Oppenheimer that
the Russians knew the connec-
tions between these projects and
the method involved. Then he
added:
"They know that you would
be in a position to start prac-
tical production in about six
months from, say February. and
that perhaps six months there
after you would be in position
to 60 into mass production. Now,
you and / know, Of course, how
accurate those figures are"
At another point, the security
officer said that 1--WE know that
information is streaming out
from this place every day''-just
how much he didn't know.
During the interview. Col.
Lansdale was attempting to
elicit from DR.. Dppenheimer the
name of a scientist who had
been approached by a Soviet
Intermediary for information.
He explained the Importance Of
finding the channels of COM
munication being used by the
spy network. DR.. Oppenheimer
refused. Later, however, upon an
order from 1t. Gen. Leslie r.
Groves, chief of the Manhattan
Engineering District, he identi-
fled the man-Haakon Chevalier,
a friend.
Reds Were Headache.
The collection of suspected
Communists and fellow-travelers
at Los Alamos and Berkeley pre-
sented a tremendous headache
and dilemma to security officials,
according to the colonel.
After pointing out that Just
because a persons states he has
severed his connection with the
Communist Party it. does not
mean he is mot dangerous to
u.s." Col. Lansdale discussed the
alternatives-fire and prosecute
the suspects and cause a prob
able showdown in the A-bonb eff
fort or take the calculated risk
Of keeping them at work. In his
own words, he put it as follows:
"That again poses a terrific
problem because so many OF the
people-you know as well as I
do how difficult it is to prove
communism we feel, I be-
lieve that the first and primary
thing to do is to get the job
done. That is, the project COM
pleted. Now, if that involves
taking some risks, why, of course,
We'll take the risks.
after all. you are risking your
lives and everything else to do
this, and everything has to be
done with a risk so that we don't
want to protect this thing to
death.
But, therefore, all persons
who are essential to the project |
in any marked degree, really
unless they cease to make them
selves useful. there's no use talk
ing about severing their con-
nections while they're there
whether we believe they're, Com
munists, pro-Nazis, pro-Fascists
or what.
Difficulty Outlined.
"The only question that re-
mains is whether we shall wait |
awhile until we take somebody |
else or how we shall go about
it. Shall we try to prosecute
him for espionage or shall we
just forget about it and weed
him out? I mean. you see that
once you've made the decision.
why then the problem is prac-
teal. The difficulty is making
the decision"
In reply to a question, DR..
Oppenheimer said that while he
thought it might be a good idea