Evening star., 1953-04-27
European Unity a Pipedreorn
Without French Porticipution

in France can best be justified
on the basis of alternatives. It
probably is safe to say that with
out substantial American aid,
France would have a Communist
government today. It certainly
is safe to say that such progress
as has been made toward restor-
ing the French economy and re-
viving French military strength
would not have been possible
without that aid.
But the ultimate goals have
not been reached. Frances gov
ernment still is hamstrung by q
political opposition ready to ex-
plot every issue to its own ad-
vantage and capable Of blocking
any real progress toward internal
reform. In q country that has
great potential wealth. the gov
ernment still is broke. Frances
economic development still is
hampered by a morass Of restric-
tive practices and by chronic
financial instability.
It is clear that the United
States, for all the money that has
been spent, has neither gained
friends here nor bought itself
the means to influence people.
Any illusions to the contrary
were shattered by the French
reaction to efforts by the admin
istration to hurry ratification of
the European Defense Commu-
nifty treaty. However we'll inten-
toned our pressure may have
been, the net effect was to en-
barrasS the French government
leadership which was in favor of
EDO and provide the best poll
tical ammunition for the opposi-
ton.
Aid Cut Has Consequences.
In view of these facts, criticism
of the French is understandable.
The American taxpayer, one
gathers over here, feels he is be-
ing taken for a ride; that he is
making a needless sacrifice, and
that the time has come to get
hardboiled. There seems to be
widespread support for the idea
of cutting off all aid except the
delivery and procurement of
strictly military items. This, in
terms of the bill for 1853. would
amount to a saving of $525 mil
lion, divided about equally be-
tween general economic assist
ance and special dollar support
for the French military budget
Undoubtedly, such a tough
course offers many attractions.
It suggests, however. certain pre-
dictable consequences.
The first probable consequence
of an abrupt withdrawal of Amer
lean aid would be political. The
traditional French political pic
ture is of a Shaky and quarrel
some coalition of moderate CEN
ter groups, facing determined op-
position from extremists at either
end of the political spectrum.
The present trend is a slow but
steady decline in the strength of
the extremist groups-the Gaul-
lists on the right and the Com
munistS on the left. Such opti-
mism as exists about the long
term outlook for effective, dem
ocratic government in France re-
lies heavily on a continuation of
this trend
Withdrawal Of American aid
and the resulting economic crisis
would inevitably reverse the
trend and strengthen the power
of the extremists. It also would
stir up new problems and quar-
rels within the moderate groups.
Few observers here believe that
France could be driven to accept
authoritarian rule of one sort
or the other. But the alternative
would be even greater govern
ment paralysis than exists today.
French Might Quit IndO- China.
The second practicable conse-
Quence of a get-tough policy
would be a compromising Of
Frances present military effort
and encouragement of the pos
sibility of French withdrawal
from Indo-China.
1t is one thing to complain,
as many people do. about the
quality of the French military
effort. 1t is another thing to
figure out how NATO-and the
rest of the free world for that
matter-could get along without
it.
Today the French have IL
divisions in Europe, represent
ing the largest national fighting
force in NATO, with the excep-
tion Of Turkey. Of these divi-
sionS, however. only five can be
charitably rated at full strength.
The others average about IS per
cent of combat readiness. France
has an air force of approxi-
mately 800 tactical planes. She
is a long way FROM realizing her
NATO goals of "a active and
reserve divisions and 1900 first
class aircraft.
The ready explanation for the
deficiency is the burden of Indo-
China, where France has 10 divi-
SionS of her best troops and a
full third of her officer corps. A
third of the French military bud
get is spent there.
From a strategic point of view,
the military contribution which
France is making in 1ndo-China
is more important that the wal
in Korea. There is no denying
this. The job of holding up Com
muniSt expansion into southeast
Asia is one which must be done
It also is a burden which
Frances allies would very much
prefer not to have to shoulder
themselves. The Indo-C Chinese
war and the drain which it i'm