Evening star., 1953-09-14
More Than Dollars Needed

More Than Dollars Needed
Reports that the National Security Council
has decided to recommend increased American
financial support to the French effort in the
Indo-China war should prompt little surprise
There have been clear indications in recent
months that growing Importance is being placed
by the American Government upon the neces-
sity for successful defense against Commu-
mist aggression in Southeast Asia-a threat that
still looms very large despite yesterdays broad
cast from Peiping about the possibility of truce.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles have mentioned the problem pub
lcly and warned that diversion of outright
Chinese Communist military effort to that area
would bring retaliatory American action. It
has been realized that France alone cannot
carry the full burden, and the pace of American
aid in supplies apd materiel was stepped up
months ago. Congress voted $400 million for
such assistance in the current fiscal year but
the French program, involving use of addi-
tfonal French troops and large-Scale re-
building and expansion of the VietnameSe
forces themselves is estimated to cost nearly
twice that amount 1t is this extra cost margin
that the Security Council is now reported
recommending as a further American respon-
sibility.
There is sound reason to concur in the
emphasis which is being placed on saving
Southeast Asia from Communist conquest
Communist political control of the peninsula
would outfiank the rest of South Asia, posing
a particular threat to Burma and would be
dangerously menacing to Indonesia and other
islands of the Southwest Pacific. Successful
defense of the area, however, depends on
much more than dollars or francs, soldiers or
materiel.
discerning crtique of the problem, the
strategy and the tactics employed on each side,
has been delivered recently by General L. M.
ChasSin, former commander of the French air
force in Indo-China. For eight years France
has been fighting a costly and defensive type
of war in Wet Nam, depending largely upon
professional French troops and modern equip
ment. The best it can show for this effort is
control over the coastal communities while the
Communist-supported Wet Mini forces have
won more and more of the inland territory.
General Chassin provides a relatively simple
explanation for the Wet Mimi successes.
The first answer is that the Wet Mini en-
ploys political strategy before it undertakes to
apply military techniques The infiltration and
subversion of communities by political agents
holds first place; propaganda and indoctrina-
tion against French Imperialism" the distribu-
tion of food and weapons and the training of
fighting men in guerrilla-type tactics come along
in order When military action follows the
political, it is usually undertaken by small
units, lightly armed, living off the land and
striking mostly at night.
In General Chassin's opinion, the French
must move closer to this concept of prosecuting
the war in the peninsula. There must first of
ALL be determined effort to win the minds of
the nativeS-giving them genuine assurance of
genuine form of political independence, and
assistance in the training of a real Wet Nam
army. The military force, in turn, must be
created more in the pattern of the Wet Mimi
force-having less reliance on heavy equipment,
transport conveys, tanks and airplanes and
more on light tactical aircraft, light machine
guns, parachute units, commandos and guer-
rillas. This approach, he contends, will help
provide the offensive spirit first and the mill
5 tary mobility second that are needed
Official American expressions of. intent
to give the French increased aid in Indo-China
have not touched on the detail of strategy or
tactics in the conflict. From the results thus
far, however, and from such experienced
analysis as that of General Chassin it is evil
dent that more dollars, men and materiel will
not necessarily assure success. The techniques
Asatic peninsula clearly are quite different
from those required in Europe, or even in the
mountainous country of Korea.
An illustration of the political problems
peculiar to the area is given by the latest
Cambodan development, namely, an announce
ment by the Premier of that state that his
country's forces have no interest in contesting
Wet Mimi activities in the neighboring state
of Wet Nam. 1t is this type of "neutralism"
that constitutes an obstacle to the French
effort and gives positive comfort to the Com
munist strategy of subversion.
It is to be hoped that our commitment
for increased support to the French is being
accompanied by careful consideration of these
overlapping military and political problems
involved in carrying the 1ndo-China struggle
to a successful conclusion.