Evening star., 1953-04-16
Critical Period in Southeast Asia

The strategic planning OF the Communist
led military forces in Indo- China is not fully
revealed by the invasion of Laos. It appears,
however, that a major offensive-in terms of
both military and psychological warfare-is
being mounted by the Communists in Southeast
Asia at moment that may be critical in the
whole struggle for prestige and influence in
the Far East.
For seven years, France, supporting the
Indo- China states Of Viet-Nam, Laos and
Cambodia, has been fighting costly and
indecisive war against Communist directed
Wet Mimi troops with virtually all of the action
concentrated in Viet-Nam. Presumably, the
capital city of Hanoi has been the first Com
munist military objective, with drive to the
Tonkin Gulf coast next on the schedule
Meanwhile, Communist activities in Laos and
Cambodia and in the neighboring countries of
Thailand and Burma have been confined almost
entirely to political infltration and agitation.
The full-fledged invasion of Laos, a southwest
ward strike out of Viet-Nam, represents a new
departure in tactics, if not in strategy.
Militarily, it may have one of two mean
ings. 1t could be diversionary attack, calcu-
lated to draw defensive attention away from
Hanoi and be followed by a new assault upon
this stronghold of the French. Or it could
mark an entirely new offensive strategy by
which the Communists hope to drive with
relative ease to the Thai frontier, and perhaps
eventually to the Gulf of Siam itself
Communist success in either plan would
represent not only major military victory
but would pose an exceedingly dangerous politi-
cal threat to the whole non-C Communist position
in Southeast Asia. Throughout the postwar
period, the menace of communicating
particularly upon the propaganda line of resist
ing white imperialism" kept all of these
Southeast Asian countries in state of internal
weakness and turmoil. When China itself fell
to Communist hands, both the military and
political preSSures upon the relatively weak
countries to the southeast became more in
siStent and more alarming. Thus far, the
French have kept the area defense from
crumblng by baking the Communist military
effort while Burma and Thailand managed to
maintain domestic order. major breach of
the military defenses in either Burma or Indo-
China, sharing frontiers with Communist
China, might easily cause the security of the
entire area to collapse.
The fact that the NATO recently gave
formal recognition to the Indo-China war as
part of a global responsibility of the free ma
tionS, and that this position has been reafhrmed
by the United States in particular and our an
nounced plans for greater aid to the French
effort there introduces an additional psyche
logical element. Just as the Communist effort
today is being portrayed increasingly as a
fight against the white mans imperialism, SO
any measure of success in this Communist
effort would be portrayed as native superiority
and a new loss of face for the foreign
CccidentalS.
Although this danger of today has been in
the making for seven years, the margin of ad-
vantage rests with the attackers. The French,
valiant as their defense has been, have still
not enlisted and trained native forces in suf-
ficent strength, and our own capacity to extend
speedy aid is limited by many circumstances,
not least of which are time and distance 1t
would be premature to consider the area lost,
but if it is, it will be another monument to the
formula of "too little. too late"