Evening star., 1953-05-25
Importance Of Suez in World Affairs
To the Editor of The Stor:

THE present controversies between
i the British Government and the
Naguib administration of Egypt serve
to remind the American people OF the
Importance of the Suez Canal. together
with control of this iSthmuS. A study
of any world map will indicate how far
sighted British naval policy has been.
for of six vital "bottlenecks" in the
world trade routes, all the control bases
save the Panama Canal are under
British control. The British flag yet
flies over Singapore, Alden, Suez, Gibral-
tar and the Straits of Dover, and the
far southern routes around South Amer
lea, Africa, and Australia could be con-
trolled from other British bases or
supply bases in the Falkland Islands,
South Africa, Tasmania or New Zealand.
To deal American and British trade a
deadly blow. an enemy has only to
close some Of these 'Ebottlenecks."
Loss of control at SueZ would involve
a serious dislocation OF British naval
power and commercial economy. When
Germany, Italy and Japan united for
World War II; their general STATS,
worked out plans for simultaneous at
tacks on all these gatewayS Of COM
merce, and plans were made for closing
both ends of the Red Sea. The harassed
British, to forestall land drive through
Constantinople and Turkey and so to
Suez, occupied French Syria, 1raq and
Iran (May-Septernber, 194D. Though
the Germans dispatched their specially
trained and equipped Afrika Corps to
Libya and the British were driven back
almost to the gates of Alexandria. Suez
was saved, and the fulcrum of power in
the Middle East was retained.
Unquestionably relations between the
British and Egyptian governments have
seriously deteriorated. These govern
ments successfully negotiated a treaty
which was signed in August, 1896. The
agreement was for 20 years, but
capable of revision any time after 10
years. BY this treaty Egypt recognized
the vital interest to Britain of ensuring
the liberty and entire security of navi-
cation in the canal. and accordingly
granted Britain the right to retain
troops in the Canal Zone, to the
number of 10000 land troops and 400
Raj pilots with the necessary ancillary
services, until it should be agreed that
the Egyptian forces could themselves
assume full responsibility for the canal.
Egypt was to build specified strategic
roads, and to improve the railways in
the Canal Zone and the Western Desert.
The Western democracies can fervently
hope that the gap separating the Egyp-
tian demands and the British concep-
ton of what powers it is necessary to
retain in Egypt in the interest of the
Commonwealth will be bridged by con-
ceSsions from both sides. These con-
cesSions should be made If only because
both parties are acutely aware Of the
menace to their respective interests
from Soviet Russian intrigues. How
ever, there is no reason to suppose that,
if this menace were removed, Egyptian
nationalist sentiment would not once
more compel its leaders to seek the
final evacuation of British forces from
the strategic isthmus of Suez.
The opening of the Suez Canal in
1869 shortened the sea route to India
and Pakistan by 5000 miles. The canal
had been built largely with French and