The Key West citizen. [volume] (Key West, Fla.) 1879-current, 1953-07-25

Igef from three years Of fighting!
AT the moment these seem 10 &c
lthe positive benefits:
i. The ComEnnnixts' first post
lwar aggression was stopped and
1.-THE South Korean Republican was
saved from them.
4. The United Nations, Of which
the United States Is the main sup
porter, met its first big challenge:
lCuuid the members act together
Ito stop aggression? They could and
did.
3. The shock If the Korean hi
lvasi0n pushed the Western world
Into ! biz re.armament and closer
ALLIANCE, thus making 1t . tougher
target for bigger attack later. Il
THE Communists planned one.
/ 4. Small countries, seeing the
10. N. rush to Korea's rescue,
were heartened 70 Withstand any
future pressnres and threats from
the Communists.
| Summed up, this was the net
leffect Of the four benefits:
| The United States, because 81 its
lre-arming, Is IN letter shape 10
handle Russia, If h has to, than
Iit was before Korea. Communist
Expansion, for those three years At
least, was stopped cold.
Yet, these benefits which seem
ls0 obvious and real now, may in
1.-THE end prove to have been illus.
lory and temporary. The whole
Korean War, because Of future
levents, may turn out 10 have been
wasted effort by die United States.
Why? Because Korea, through
infiltration and suhversion. may
-lyet wind up in the Communist
camp.
And China, with time 10 grow
stronger economically and mill.
Itarily after . truce, may be able
to terroriIe the rest Of Asia into
submission without the necessity
Of direct military attack.
The Western Allies, through Ia.
d tigue. economic ENHANCEMENT
glwith the Communist bloc, or dis
nlagreements with the United States,
slmay grow soft toward Moscow and
r move closer to il than before
t Korea.
s. A severe depression in Western
+ Europe, for instance, would be /
supreme test Of each country:
liability to resist Communist pres
Insure, internally and externally.
al The people Of The United States
yllong tired Of The Korean War, later
8 Ion may be reluctant--to the poini
Iof being too late-t0 move againsi
new Communist aggression else
nIwhere.
: But suesses about the future arr
3 mot the meat Of acton. The Essen
Z hover administration can not feeC
Z upon guesses in trying to reach
!. decisions and peace in Asia.
II can only hope that what seem
/. now like positive gains from The
4 Korean War win prove, in the his
! tory books Of the future, to have
. been true and lasting benefits.
To make them last the admins
ltration viii have to work cease,
: lessly for the rest Of its term, viii
Fits eyes wide open.
! In the peace negotiations with
Z the Chinese one wrong decision on
the part Of the United States coult
lead to such disaster for this coun
2 try and such victory for commu
oslnism that the whole Korean Wa
y would have been N vain.
e WASHINGTON R--Walter S
2 Robertson is q 59-year-old Virgin
y ian who comes into . room like
much younger man. He looks likl
lone you'd pick, at first glance, TO
9 the job Of calming people down
8 That may have been reasoI
President Eisenhower sen
lhim to South Korea in June T
stalk to President Syngman Rhee
III Another was the fact that he j
nlassistant secretary Of state for Fai
81 Eastern affairs.
AT the time, as be Is now ono
,rImore, Rhee was the biggest prob
ellen ia the Far East. He wa
II Threatening to block . KOreal
i, Itruce. Rhee is an extraordinar.
Islman who needs more than ord
mary handling. He got It iron
Ie Robertson, now back here.
N TIE trim Robertson looks like
and sef-cOnfident business
IdIman, which he was: an investmen
d banker in Richmond until EiseT
hover tapped him for the Stat
a Department.
I'll But, unlike some other Stat
q Department officials, past an
n present, Robertson Is neither poi
Y derous nor afflicted with that vagu
Z, and rubbery kind Of talk whic
I, grows like weeds IN the Ihnguag
Of diplomats.
s This is not Robertson's first ID
g with the government but he va
= never career diplomat. II he ha
= one outstanding quality ii woul
seem to be his realism. He do
S not sound like . man looking 4
y silver lining.
He had been head Of the =.