Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-05-29

before the National Conference OF
Christians and JetDs at Cincinnati on
MAJ rs auGs made GUGilGble yesterday.
The controversial part tollot0s:
I cannot tonight discuss all the
other problems of foreign policy. but
as I hear them discussed in the For
eign Relations Committee and 1T the
Presidents legislative conference. I am
impressed with the tremendous diff
Guilty of all of them and the fact that
in no case does there seem to be
satisfactory solution. My discussion
of the situation tonight is merely in
tended to be in the nature OF COM
ment and information. I do not In
tend it as any criticism Of what Is
being done or not done, because think
the problems are so difficult that any
one would have great difficulty in feel
ing confident that he is right.
During the past three years. the for
eign policy of the United States.
whether under Democratic or Repub-
lican charge, has been based on the
general opposition to the spread of
communism beyond its present limits,
either as an theology or as an adj
vance by force. Certainly our policy
has not been based on any reliance on
the United Nations or on any other
country. Unfortunately, the last adj
ministration did not go all out for
this policy against communism in
Asia until 1t was too late to make it
truly effective. The failure to check
communism on the mainland. the I'M
fortunate withdrawal from Korea, has
involved us in a war situation and a
Communist situation in Asia for which
there seems to be no satisfactory Solu-
ton. Nevertheless, the last admin
istration certainly believed in the gen.
eral policy of opposition to commu-
nism, since they backed up Greece and
Turkey in 1947, and Of course, in Asia
since the Korean war.
Again I point out that this policy
is not policy of working through the
United Nations, but is policy of mil
itary alliance. It is an attempt to
build up freedom throughout the world
and provide arms for all those nations
which are sufficiently free so we can
be reasonably certain or reasonably
hopeful that they will use their arms
to fight the Communists if they are
attacked. The difficulty with the
United Nations as a means of prevent
ing military aggression was obvious
from the beginning. pointed out in
the first speech made in favor Of
ratifying the U. N. treaty that. it
could not possibly prevent aggression
because of the veto power which could
be used by any one of the five powers
to veto united action against them
selves and against any one of their
satellites. The United Nations was
based in the theory of five-power
control of the world, and whenever one
of those powers refused to go along
it was hopeless to create any sanctions
that would be binding on the other ma
tons to provide troops against ag-
erosion.
We made an abortive attempt to rely
on the United Nations when the North
Koreans attacked in 1850. It hap
pened that the Russians were boy
cotting the Security Council, and so
we were able to persuade the others
to call for troops from all members
against the North Koreans. There is
some doubt whether the call was q
valid call even then, because the
charter clearly requires the afdrma-
tive vote of all of the five controlling
nations, and don't think that absence
provides an affirmative vote. Never
theleSs, it was treated as proper sane
ton and produced few troops in adj
dition to those which we had to send
to Korea. But Russia returned at
once to the Security Council, and when
Communist China attacked, then the
United Nations failed to take any action
against the real aggressor, and from
that time until today has refused in
every way to take action or punish the
real aggressor. There has been some
attempt to substitute the General AS
sembly as a body which can call on
nations to join in defeating an ag-
greSsor. but the General Assembly has
absolutely no such power under the
United Nations Charter It is very
doubtful to me whether we would be
wise to try to set up and develop any
such power. In an assembly where
we have one vote out of 70, it can be
easily turned against us in the future.
I believe we might as well forget the
United Nations as far as the Korean
war is concerned. I think we should
do our best now to negotiate this
truce, and If we fail, then let England
and our other allies know that we are
withdrawing from all further peace
negotiations in Korea Even the best
truce under present conditions will be
extremely unsatisfactory 1t will d.
vide Korea along an unnatural line
and create an unstable condition likely
to bring war again at any moment
It will release million Chinese SOL
diers, who no doubt will promptly be
moved down to Southern China for use
against Chang Kai-shek or against
the French in Indo-China. It seems
to me that from the beginning we
should have insisted on a general peace
negotiation with China, including a
unif1cation Of Korea under free Ko-
reans, and a pledge against further
expansion in Southeast Asia. If we
once make this present truce, no mat
ter what we put in the agreement
about further negotiations for a united
Korea. 1t is no more likely to occur
than a united Germany.
In any event, I think we are bound
to the policy Of preventing Commu-
mist aggression where 1t occurs and
where it is within our means to stop
it. I have never felt that we should