Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-05-30
Dissenting South Korea

reply to the United Nations prisoner of-war
proposals, the outlook at Panmunjom still seems
to be full of grave uncertainties. Indeed, even
If the Communists accept South Korea's dele
gate to the truce negotiations asserts that they
have already rejected a key provision, the
effectuation of an agreement may prove to be
painfully difficult.
This is so because officials of the free Re-
public of Korea have made clear that they
bitterly dissent from what the American directed
u N. Command has proposed. Attacking the
plan as a "selout' and an utter surrender"
to the Communists, they have charged that it
will permit forced repatriation and indefinite
captivity. Further than that, by indrection at
least they have threatened to ignore any
armiStice based on ia threat suggesting that
the valiant and now-powerful ROK divisions
will "go it alone" continuing to fight the Reds
regardless of the United States and the other
allied countries.
Since the U. MS proposals have not yet
been officially revealed, this South Korean
reaction must be viewed with a great deal of
reserve, particularly so because of President
Eisenhower's emphatic assurance that our
allied terms adamantly adhere to principles
guaranteeing that no prisoners will be coerced
in any way, or forced to return home, or held
in indefinite captivity. AS for the threat that
ROK troops may keep on fighting even if the
Communists accept the plan now before them,
there seems to be little realism In that. After
all, those troops are completely dependent on
the United States for supplies. Accordingly,
they could hardly "go it alone" for very long
without our assent and material help, which
of course would not be forthcoming if we our
selves were committed to an armistice
With that said, however, the fact remains
hat $hn CnI,$o c1xy
agitated, and it is impossible not to sympathize
with them. They have been enduring terrible
ordeal for the past three years. They have been
fighting with great bravery and skill. They
have been making tremendous expenditure
of blood and treasure to remain free and live
in whole country, with north and south
united not divided, They have no patience
with the argument that the U. N. went in there
originally to repel aggression, without making
any commitment to end the partition. That
does not register with them. What they fear,
to the exclusion of all other considerations is
that truce and a political settlement will
leave them with little more than what they
have at present-a battered and truncated land
unable to support itself and highly vulnerable
to renewed Communist attack on later day.
In such circumstances, considering the in
tensity Of their emotions it is not uncomfortable
GIldG tI6 SCUM MISUNDERSTANDING TO DC gov.
erned by the hard realities of the situation-will
reject truce if and when one is reached at
Panmunjom. This is a possibility that could
materialize into tragic contretemps between
them and the United Nations Command. Pre-
sumably our Government, together with that
of the redoubtable President Rhee, is alert to
the danger and taking steps to head it off
by working out an understanding clearly guar
anteeing that the u MS proposals will not lead
to "sellout" or surrender" of any kind.
All this, of course, will become academic
if the Communists turn down the terms that
have been offered them. In that case, the
United States, South Korea and other interested
allies will be faced with a choice between a
military impasse of indeterminate duration and
decision-seeking action that could lead to a
greatly enlarged war. Meanwhile, until the
enemy Is heard from, one can do little more
than hope prayerfully for the best.