Evening star., 1953-05-02

after despairing Of the effective.
ness Of a Scandinavian pact.
The second was the belief that
NATO provided the best assur-
ance that there would be no war.
The example Of Denmark also
discourages the illusion that all
the United States has to do is
put food in European bellies and
guns in European hands to create
a citadel of Western strength.
With the help OF some $270
million in Marshall Plan aid. the
Danish economy, compared to
most Of Europe, is in excellent
shape. The shipping industry is
booming. The famously efficient
Danish farmers-who produce
the major part Of Denmark's ex-
port earnings-are turning in
bumper crops. Since last year.
the Danes have been able to carry
the cost of their rearmament
program without outside help.
except in the form Of finished
military equipment.
Prosperity and economic inde-
pendence, however, have not gen.
Grated any notable amount Of
steam behind the military effort.
There is at least as much con-
Germ over maintaining what the
Danes call the social front"
de. high living standards) as
there is over the creation of an
effective fighting force.
What good does it do you to
have weapons" they ask. If. in
the meantime. you have lost
mems hearts?"
In Russia's Gunsights.
In criticizing Denmark's per-
formauce, there is one factor
that should not be overlooked.
1t is that this small and histori-
cally neutral country lies right
under the guns Of the Red
Army. Russian troops are quar-
tered just IS miles away from
the Danish frontier. Russian
planes are within 13 minutes
flying time of Danish towns.
The Danes are under no illu-
sion about how much security
they can expect from their
NATO allies. if war should break
out at this point. Their border
lies east of the Elbe River-on
the wrong SIDE of any defense
line that the NATO forces Of
Central Europe could hope to
hold.
Because of their strategic po-
sition. the Danes realize that
they would certainly be invaded
early in any general war. They
know that they can never hope
to muster enough strength to
hold more than a small part Of
the country for a short time.
They have no assurance on the
question of how soon and in
what force help will be forthcom-
ing.
From the standpoint of prac-
tical self-interest. it is not en-
tirely surprising that the Danes
should adopt a cautious attitude.
The more remarkable fact, per-
haps, is that this self-consciously
unheroic people should have
gone as far as they have in
abandoning their traditional
neutralism.
National Forces.
Finally. Denmark, with its
manifold weaknesses, points up
one fundamental fact about
NATO's military strength. The
force that is being created in
Western Europe today cannot be
counted in terms of so many
men, so many divisions and so
many planes as if the total rep
resented a unified force.
Despite the illusion provided
by a unified command, these
forces are still essentially ma
tional forces with national limi-
tations. With few exceptions
they are tied down firmly to
their own limited geographical
area. Whether they will fight
and how well-depends a lot
more on the attitudes of people
in Copenhagen or Istrand than
it does on the attitudes to be
found in Washington or at
SHAPE headquarters. 1t de-
pends, in the final analysis, on
a complex tangle of factors un-
dreamed of in the philosophy Of
American aid programs.
To the extent that these atti-
tu6es can be strengthened and
improved, NATO's strength will
increase. But it is a problem
that goes we'll beyond the ques-
ton of how many guns and
tanks and planes are on hand.
And so far as Denmark Is con-
cerned, the solution will not b0
quickly or easily found.
(Tomorrow-West Germany