Evening star., 1953-06-14
|Appeosemenf From the KremIin

Because of what bitter experience has
taught about Soviet deviousnesS and bad faith
there is every reason why the free world should
take an exceedingly wary view of the Kremlin's
latest conciliatory moves in Europe. Neverthe-
less, inSincere and suspect as they may be- the
moves themselves are interesting enough to
merit something more than purely negative
response. For it is conceivable conceivable
that they are forerunners Of the kind of con-
crete deeds that President Eisenhower has asked
for as evidence that the Russians really mean
1t when they say they want to negotiate good
peace promoting settlements.
The moves in question: besides including
an apparent abandonment of past Soviet
claims regarding the Dardaneles and certain
territory on the Turkish frontier, have had to
do particularly with Austria and East Ger
many. Thus, following the example set long
time ago by France, Britain and the United
States, the post-Stalin Malenkov-B Beria -Molo-
tov government has within recent days de-
emphasized the military aspect of the occupa-
ton in both countries. It has done so by naming
high commssioners-who are to serve also as
ambassadors-to replace the Red Army COM
manders as the Kremlin's top representatives.
Further, it has backed up this change with
several relatively benevolent acts.
More specifically; in the case of Austria,
numerous Soviet restrictions on interzonal
travel and traffic have been lifted, and Vienna's
authorities have had various powers restored
to them, including the power to choose their
own police officials. Similarly in East Germany,
the Kremlin controlled Communist regime has
agreed to stop prosecuting the dominant Prot
estant church. to keep hands off the church's
youth groups to permit revival of religious
instruction in the schools and to hand back
confScated ecclesiastical property. In addition,
as if to make the Russian occupation zone look
more attractive, and as if to intensity the all
German desire for unified country, the Reds
have issued number of special DEGREES promls-
ing such things as bank credits for capitalistic
private enterprise and an end to further COL
lectivization of farms.
Considering the Kremlins past record on
Germany considering also It's refusal last
month to join in renewed effort to work out
treaty giving the Austrians the independence
promised them in the Moscow Declaration OF
1943 all these gestures must be viewed with
great deal of reserve. Actually although they
have an appealing look, they may amount to
nothing but lot of fake "appeasement" cal
culated among other things, QD to stimulate
West German opposition to Chancellor Ade-
nauer'S program of association with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, (2) to undermine
projects like the six nation European army, 10
to slow down NATOs build-up az to drive
wedges between the United States and its allies,
and (5) to achieve, in short, the disintegration
of the free worlds defense by lulng people into
a false sense of security
Yet, even though their objectives are thus
open to the deepest kind of suspicion, the fact
remains that the men of the Kremlin have
lately been acting in a manner sharply at
variance with the conduct of Soviet policy
under the late Josef Stain. OF course, their
"appeasement" in that sense may be merely
tactical maneuver, and the free nations must
therefore be on guard against 1t. That does
not mean, however, that it should be brushed
aside as if it had no significance whatever. On
the contrary, it should be inspected most care
fully as a development that may possibly re-
fleet a bona fde desire to negotiate genuine
peace agreements.
Certainly, the United States and its allies,
as long as they go forward with their joint
defensive effort, need not fear entertaining the
idea that the Russians may in fact wish to work
out an enduring live-and-let-live understand
ing with U.S. After all, such an understanding is
essential to the prevention of global war that
could be even more catastrophe for them than
for us. In the circumstances, we ought not to
let the notion be frozen in our minds that
every Soviet conciliatory move is automatically,
ipso facto, complete fraud. Maybe it is not.
There is still reason to keep the door open for
negotiation.