Evening star., 1953-11-14
Wilson
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mained in the postwar period
one at the Russian embassy in
Washington, another at the Sow
let consulate in New York.
New Groups Rising.
New groups, however, seemed
to be rising. One included only
women, a circumstance that ex-
| cited some comment.
There was a new American
official, too, who had not figured
prominently in previous discus
sionS. He was, the White House
was informed, an employe of the
Office of Scientific Research and
Development. This was the
agency where all the devices OF
the push-button war of the fu-
ture were being developed.
The F'BI looked over the whole
situation and concluded that in
addition to agents planted in
key positions in industries and
the Government, NKVD had a
considerable reservoir of men,
bers of the Communist Party;
registered or secret, from which
to draw.
It was hazardous business,
however, for none of them ever
knew when one of their number
might break. For example, the
FBI received in 1943 an anony-
nous letter in the Russian Ian
guage outlining a major part of
the then existing espionage Or
ganization.
Diplomatic Break Seen.
Hazards or not, the NKVD
apparently was preparing for
the contingency that diplomatic
relations with the United States
might be broken off, and their
operations would no longer be
under the cover of official rep
reSentation.
This would require a new ap-
proach, and new personalities
not known to, or in a position
to be suspected by American au-
thorities. Some of the old con-
facts, like Vassili Zubilin, a for
mer Soviet embassy official,
would no longer be valuable.
One particular portion Of the
information submitted to the
White House deals with Gov
ernment employees who were said
to be connected with the Comm
tern apparatus. Seventeen per-
sons in all were named in this
section, and they ranged from
military officers to employees OF
minor agencies which would not
normally be considered as very
sensitive agencies, from the es-
pionage point of view.
These people were not neces-
Sarily open members Of the Com
munist Party. but many Of them
were said to be in a position
where they could furnish valu-
able information to the Soviets.
They had been in contact with
persons identified as direct con-
facts of Soviet officials engaged
in espionage activities.
Most, if not all, of these people
have since been separated from
the Government, either by their
own decision or the suggestion
of their bosses. This would in
dicate that some action was
taken as the result of the re-
port, or that, at least, the 10y
atty investigating processes of
the Government may have got
ten some of them out of the way.
Counterfeit Money Used.
To those who received this in
formation, much of it must have
seemed to be a historical recita-
ton, without too much applica-
ton to the problems of the day
except to show that Soviet
agents had been at work for a
long time. They had photo
graphed the complete plans of a
warship. They had printed
counterfeit money to finance
their operations and been caught
at it by the Treasury Depart
ment's Secret Service. They had
operated under the protection
of phony business covers" One
agent and his wife did their
spying in France and extended
their activities to the Canal
Zone. where they induced an
army corporal to dig up secret
defense documents.
AS far back as 1881. industrial
employees in this country were
being approached by Soviet rep
reSenCaClVeS VINO OuereQ to pay
well for secret military informa-
ton.
Back in 1928 an immigrant in
a position to obtain secret in
formation was drafted into the
NKVD at a salary Of $35 per
week. Expense money for spy
ing operations was brought in
by seamen. One agent induced
an undertaken to give him the
naturalization certificate of a
deceased American war veteran.
Passports were falsified to give
other agents a new identity.
These early activities, not on
a large scale, were undertaken
before the United States recog-
-