Evening star., 1953-07-29
Would We DO 1t Again?
By Crosby S. Moves

by (roSDy ,. NoyeS
Those who defend the Korean
war-from the highest admins
tration officials down to the
lowlieSt editorial writer-have
done so on the grounds of prin-
ciple.
The Korean war, they say. was
the first historical demonstration
of the principle of collective
security. Without waiting for a
direct threat to themselves. the
free nations of the world banded
together to repel and stamp out
aggression in far-off Korea. With
the end of the war, much is
made of the point that the
fruits of aggression have been
denied to the Communists.
AS far as it goes, the argument
is excellent. It overlooks the fact,
however. that a principle. once
established, retains its force only
so long as those who believe in
it continue to uphold and prac-
tice it.
Issue Still in Doubt.
In the case of Korea, that issue
is still very much in doubt. In
recent statements by public fig
ureS, both in this country and
abroad, there would appear to
be grave doubt that the prin-
ciple fought for in Korea has, in
fact, become an established part
of our international behavior
To put it bluntly. there is
doubt that. today, given the
same set of circumstances that
existed in June, 1850. the United
States and the rest of the free
nations would respond as they
did then. Or. to carry the point
a step further, whether the
United Nations will again spring
to the help of the Republic Of
South Korea, If, at some point
in the future, the Communists
should renew their attack.
Indeed. there is some reason
to believe that the Communists
are counting on this. The free
world cannot rule out the pos
Sibility that the Reds agreed to
q truce-not with any perma-
nent intention of desiSting from
aggression but rather in the
hope that, once the momentum
of u. N. resistance is inter-
rupted, it will be impossible to
restore it.
Resolution Has Weakened.
The Communists, after all,
are not completely cut OF from
the political tides that have
swept this and other countries
since the outbreak Of the Ko-
rean war. They can not be ig-
norant of the fact that the reso-
luton which led to the defense
of Korea has been greatly
weakened in the intervening
months. They can not have
missed the implication that
peace. at almost any price, is
becoming the watchword of the
free world at least insofar as
peripheral police" actions of
the Korean sort are concerned.
Already. throughout this Ma
ton, the cry is going up that
no more wars of the Korean
type will be tolerated by the
American public. Even the adj
ministration, while defending
the principle of collective secu-
rity, has not refrained from
leaving the impression with the
public that there were blunders
involved in the first act of re-
sistance. Less responsible ele-
ments Of the Republican Party
are more outspoken in their as
surances that the Truman
War" must never be undertaken
again.
The Communists know this.
They also know that as long as
the war in Korea continued, the
U. N. and the United States
could not withdraw, whatever
the existing political inclination
might be.
Truce May Solve Difficulty.
The truce may well solve this
difficulty for them. II one as
sumes that they plan to renew
the conflict at some later date,
the effect of the truce, psychology
ically and politically, will be
much in their favor.
Pressure to bring the boys
home is bound to develop. What
ever the misgivings may be, an
ultimate disengagement of the
U. N. from the Korean peninsula
is inevitable. Throughout the
free world, the Korean truce will
add new impetus to the tendency
to relax, let down and enjoy life
that is already a conspicuous re-
action to the Russian peace Of
fenSive.
Above all, the Korean war, in
the public mind, is over. II fight
ing should break out again, the
people here and abroad would
regard it as a new war-or at
least a new situation which