Evening star., 1953-10-02
The KremIin's S Latest

The eye will search in vain for anything
new, affirmative or straightforward in the
latest Soviet note to France, Britain and the
United States Although it purportS to be
reply to their September proposal for meet
ing of the Big Four foreign ministers at Lugano,
Switzerland it adds up to little more than
5000 words of stale propaganda and evaSion-a
fact strongly supporting the State Depart
ment's suspicion that the Kremlin is engaged
in dilatory tactics designed to put off indef-
nitely all efforts to negotiate just settlements
of such vital issues as the reunidcation of par
titioned Germany.
In their September PROPOSAL reply to
the Soviet notes of August and 15-France,
Britain and the United States called upon the
Kremlin to join with them in convening for
egn ministers conference at Lugano on Oc-
tober 15 They asked, further, for Russian
agreement to limit the conference to a simple
agenda-namely Gin the first instance" the
question of free alderman elections, the status
of Germany'S future government, and re-
newed effort to work out an Austrian treaty.
Their argument was that the Big Four by ad-
herring to such an uncluttered agenda, would
have better chance of making real progress
toward settlements of kind that could open
the way to an easing of tension throughout
the world, in Asia as well as Europe
buC now, III responding 10 tulS pedC6-
promoting appeal, the Kremlin-as far as
essentials are concerned-has merely repeated
what was set forth in it's notes of August and
Is. That is to say. it has proposed Q) that
there should be foreign ministers conference
of the Big Five, including Red China, Ito lessen
tension in international relations" and (2) that
the foreign ministers of France, Britain the
United States and Russia should meet to discuss
the German problem and other "baSc" Euro
pean issues-excepting the Austrian question,
which should be dealt with "in normal diplo-
matte channels" While calling for these two
meetings, however, the Soviet note has Studi-
ouSly refrained from saying anything about
where and when they should take place or about
which of them should precede the other. This
vaguenesS speaks pretty much for itself as
evidence that the Malenkov regime, because it
does not want to get together with the West at
this time, has deliberately made its suggestions
much too amorphous and unreasonable to be
acceptable.
Certainly, the Kremlin must know that
France, Britain and the United States can only
Scorn and reject the idea of special Big Five
get-together with Red China at time when
Red China, with Soviet support, is obStructing
the projected Korean conference. The Russians
are fully aware, too, of the thumbs-down
Western attitude toward their insistence that
any Big Four meeting on Germany must deal
not only with Germany but also with numerous
extraneous isSues-an agenda that would enable
them to block all progress toward agreement by
arguing interminably (and mendaciouSly, as
in their new note) against the Atlantic alliance,
the proposed European Defense Community,
our air bases overseas and other favorite tar
gets of Moscow'S propagandiSts.
Why is it, then, that the Kremlin, when
it knows that the three Western allies cannot
and will not accept then has resubmitted these
useless proposals? Why is it that ViShinsky, in
his latest speech to the United Nations, has
threatened that there will be no Korean con-
ference unless the General Assembly reverseS
itself and submits to Communist terms? The
two questions fit together. What they plainly
suggest is that Russias leaders-perhaps be-
cause of internal trouble or perhaps because Of
some aggressive Red move in the making-are
playing delaying game to prevent any kind of
peace-promoting talks at this stage. Seldom
has Soviet conduct been more negative or more
discouraging. The only thing good about it is
that it may lead to an awakening in Indian,
British and other circles where there has been
a recent tendency to assail American "inflexi-
bility" and clamor unrealistically for Big Four
meeting at all costs.
A..