Evening star., 1953-03-28
The Soar and the EDC

ne C0QT 0nQ the ELL
The surprisingly quick agreement reached
by the Interim Committee Of the European
Defense Community powers on the French
protocols to the army treaty improves the
prospects for parliamentary ratification in
Paris. 1t does not by any means however,
remove all of the purely political obstacles that
are confronting the Mayer government on gain
ing acceptance of the pact.
large and uncompromisng opposition
bloc, rallying mostly around the De Gaullist
party, has given every indication of continuing
its obstructive tactics indefinitely While the
protocols themselves meet many of the criti-
ciSmS raised by this faction, and indeed were
drawn veryslargely for this purpose, the basic
weapon being used is the historic French fear
of German militarism. The Mayer government,
fully on record in support of the army treaty
and reaff1rming that support during current
conversations here, has threatened to take the
whole question of treaty adherence to the
public in nationwide referendum.
Meanwhile, aside from the problems which
may have been resolved through the protocols,
there is another issue standing directly be-
tween the Paris and Bonn governments of
Premier Mayer and Chancellor Adenauer. That
is the issue Of the future of the Saarland, the
tiny but industrially rich border state that has
so often played a trouble-making role in
Franco German relations.
Prior to World War I, the Saar was part
of the German Empire and its population
today is largely Germanic in language and In
cultural heritage. The territory was under
League Of Nations administration from 1920
until it was restored to Nazi Germany in 1885.
From 1945 to 1947 it was under French military
occupation but it was then given internal
nd cfot11 nf iN
union with France. This union which has Its
basis in the inter-relationship of the coal and
steel industries of Lorraine, Alsace and the
Saar, has been strengthened by French action
in more recent years and by the supranation-
alzation of these industries under the Schu-
man Plan.
The present Franco German friction on
the Saar revolveS more about political devel-
opments than about economic ones. By pro-
vision of a postwar agreement, the ultimate
status of the Saar was to be settled in peace
treaty with q united Germany-thus far
blocked by the East-West partition Of that
country Meanwhile, in the process Of strength
ening the economic ties, France has taken
several steps which West Germany considers
calculated to formalize a political union, or
to make the saar permanent French protec-
torate One was the raising in January, 1852,
of Ambassador. Another was the barring from
the ballots of territorial election last fall of
three pro-German parties-resulting in con-
elusive victory for the pro-French Saar gov
eminent.
On several occasions, Paris and Bonn have
attempted to- negotiate mutually satisfactory
solution on the Saar but these efforts have
invariably broken down over the <iong-term
political implications. The West German gov
ernment, and its domestic opposition, contend
that the Saarland is being deprived today OF
political liberty, and it Is asserted that Chan
cellor Adenauer could be defeated by this issue
in the West German elections later this year.
The French government disputing the charge
that it is attempting to capture" the saar,
insists that the political status be confirmed
In order to define the Saar's position within
the EDC-and perhaps as price for French
ratification of the army treaty
Further negotiations between Paris and
Bonn are expected after French and West
German missions have completed their visits
here Their outcome may be the real key to
additional progress toward genuine West Eu-
ropean unity.