Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-02-08
The War Map

HS VuI WiOP
The situation in February, 1915,
was this: The Red Army had
liberated" Poland and had driven
to within IS miles of Berlin. To
the south, half of Czechoslovakia
was in Red hands. Half of Hun
gary, including Budapest, and half
OF Yugoslavia, including Belgrade,
had been taken by the Russian
Army. The rest of the Balkan
Peninsula had long since been Sc
cured by the Communist forces.
The Western allies, on the other
hand, were only beginning to re-
cover from the Battle of the Bulge,
and had but the slimmest foot
hold in extreme Western Germany.
What it all added up to was that
the Russians were on the ground
in Central Europe and could do
about what they pleased. We had
no way to stop them putting into
effect any kind of reforms" in
GLIDING the kind they eventually
did put in behind the Iron Cur
tain. And the Reds were under
no compulsion to agree to any,
thing. Yet they did agree.
That is the basis for the claim.
often made, that Yalta was a mas
terpiece Of Western diplomacy.
Russian intentions may have
smelled fishy, but the Reds still
agreed to a high-minded set of
principles. Almost in the next
breath, they started to sabotage
their solemn undertaking.
What seemed to be definite last
week was that the United States,
If it repudiated Yalta, would be
about eight years late. The
Russians got there first, and, in
effect, repudiated it more thor
oughly than we ever could.
The Secret Deal
There was, of course, the secret
pact concerning the Far East. This
was not made public until 1947,
when the then Secretary of State,
James F. Byrnes, learned about it.
This protocol was the payoff to
Russia for getting into the war.
Hturned over to the Soviets the
southern (Japanese) half of SAX
hahn Island as well as the Kurile
Islands, and asserted the pre-
eminent interests of Russia in the
Manchurian port of Dairen. It.
also restored Port Arthur as Rus
sian naval base and gave the Reds
interest in the Chinese Eastern
and South Manchurian Railroads.
For the Russians part. they
agreed to conclude a pact of
friendship and alliance with the
Nationalist (Chiang) government.
In his book, Speaking Frankly"
Mr.. ByrneS, now Governor OF
South Carolina, said that when he
learned of this agreement he sent
over to the White House to get the
secret file. II wanted to know how
many IOUs were outstanding" he
commented wryly in his book.
No Other IoUs
Last week, at Columbia, S. c.,
Gov. ByrneS said he found no
other IOUs in the file. AS far as
he knew, he said, there are no
secret understandings that have
not yet been made public. The
Governor, one of Gen. Eisenhow-
er's stancheSt Southern support
ers during the campaign, refused
to comment on Yalta beyond what
he had said in his book. (He called
it high tide Of Big Three unity').
AS far as secret understandings
-. which permit :. enSlavement"
were concerned, Gov. Byrnes said
last week he did not know what
the President had been refer
ring to.
II have no information on any
agreement Of any kind that is not
how public" Gov. Byrnes said.
Since he was Secretary Of State
from July Of 1945 until January of
1947, and since he examined the
secret White House file shortly
before he left Office, it is reason
able to assume that he knew about
all agreements made up to that
time. Since 1947 it has not been
the policy Of the United States
Government to make secret pacts
with the Soviet Union.