Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-04-30

continent stems from the his
torical role she has played there,
especially from her performance
during the last war. No Euro
pean has forgotten the days
when the hope of freedom rested
entirely on the will and the
courage of the people of Eng
land 1t is a leadership that
draws strength from common in
terests and general respect for
British diplomatic skill. But in
NATO today. it takes on par
ticular meaning because of a
shared economic problem.
The impression you get from
talking to European leaders is
that sympathy between Europe
and the United States is weak
ened by the tremendous differ
ences in wealth and power. Tie
European is willing to admit the
fact of American leadership in
the cold war. But in figuring
out his own course and his
degree of participation in the
common effort, he is likely TO
look closer to home.
Few Europeans are inclined
to take the American effort as
a yardstick to their own per-
Torrance in NATO. There is a
feeling that American resources
and productive capacity are able
to absorb almost any burden
without putting a serious strain
on the country. Europe, on the
fine edge of her economic capa-
bilities and facing the political
presSures of q too-low living
standard, must calculate the
risks and gauge the effort more
nicely.
British Never Wager. .
This common attitude ex-
plains the fact that Britain, as
pace-setter in NATO, yields
an influence which the United
States, for all it's power. is not
always able to match.
In the example they have set,
the most critical would have to
admit that the British have done
very well. They have shown a
willingness matched by few
European peoples to sacrifice in
the name of the common Secu-
rity. In their determination to
protect their way of life and
resist the spread of communism,
they have never wavered.
This is not to say that British
leadership in NATO has been
uniformly exemplary. When
Prime Minister Churchill came
up with the off-hand comment
last winter that the danger of a
general war seemed to him to
have receded, he set off a politi-
cal chain reaction throughout
NATO which certainly was not
foreseen. Ever since then. NATO
leaders have been trying hard
and not always successfully to
convince their people that the
time to relax had not yet arrived.
The British Government it
self, reporting on the December
NATO Council meeting, went to
some pains to correct the general
Interpretation of Mr.. Churchill's
statement.
IF the risk of general was APP
pears to have receded," it warned,
this is because the NATO coun-
tries are resolved to resist ag-
erosion by combining and de-
veloping their combined strength.
Any slackening in this effort
could only defeat its purpose"
There also are critics-includ-
ing a number of Englishmen-
who complain that Britain has
not thrown the full weight of
her influence behind the idea Of
European unification. particu-
larly the immediate objective
of an integrated European army.
European Army Stand.
Certainly, if Britain could be
talked into committing any part
of her military strength to such
an army, it would go long way
toward soothing European fears
of German re-armament. 1t
would virtually assure European
ratification of the European De-
Tense Community treaty. which
Britain officially favors.
The arguments you get here,
however. is that the EDO is not
an end in itself. The argument
was summed up the other day in