Evening star., 1953-11-29

and the equipment from America)
to carry the day.
Gen. Rene Cogny, the most i'm
portant commander under French
Union Commander in Chief Henri
Navarro, estimates that with the
buildup going on this year he will
have enough mobility to turn the
tide in his favor in the dry season
from September, 1854, to May, 1855.
He foresees final victory in the
spring of 1856.
Contrary to recent expectations in
the United States, Gen. Cogny does
not predict that decisive battles will
be fought this year. He sees this
year as one of keeping the Wet Mimi
off balance, hitting them before
they can get set, while his French
and Wet NameSe forces are them
selves built up. Of course, he does
not rule out the possibility of some
"break" which might turn the tide
in his favor faster than he now
foreSeeS.
The october Operation Mouette"
(nlouette means seagulD on the
southern coast of the delta was Gen.
Cogny's first major attempt at an
operation to strike the Wet Mini
before they themselves could attack.
There is some dispute over it's sue
cess. Gen. Cogny, while admitting
that he could not entice one division
to battle, claimed that the other
had been put out of action with at
least one-third casualties. Others,
including Wet Namese military ex-
perts, think this division will be
capable of action again very soon.
AS Mouette was completed early
this month. Gen. Cogny reported
signs of activity to the north of
the delta. from the 308th and 312th
Wet Mimi divisions. He also i'm
piled that he intends to strike at
them first, before they attack.
What would happen. however, if
the Wet Mini confronted Gen.
Cogny with a two-front offensive,
attacking from both the north and
the south, no one knows. Gen.
Cogny's still thinly spread forces
would face a serious threat.
ImponderpbIes
The French grand strategy to
bring the Indo-Chinese war to an
end by the spring of 1856, is, like
any long-range military plan,
harassed by imponderables, some
of them completely out of control
OF the French military command.
Biggest of these, of course, is
will the Chinese Communists come
in?" Most observers on the scene
think not. They admit that neither
Indo-China nor the rest of South
east Asia could be held if the Chi
ense Reds made full-scale march
southwark. But these same OBJ
servers think the Chinese know such
march would mean World War
III, a contingency Mao Tse-tung
is said to be avoiding.
Another notable question mark
hanging over Indo-China is the
French National Assembly. Here in
Indo-China most students of the
situation think the year ahead will
be the critical one. If heavy re-
verses can be avoided until Sep
tember. 1854, they think the
French-Viet Namese buildup will be
well enough established to hold
French political support in Europe.
A third question mark is the de-
velopment of the Wet Namese light
battalion, the special formation de-
signed for mass production to take
over and "pacify" the territory
taken under Franco-Viet Namese
control
The fourth question mark, men
toned only by the French, is the
outlook for American aid. Few
Americans, Wet Namese or other
foreign. observers in Indo- China
have any doubt that the war effort
here will be supported to the limit
of the capacity of the French and
Wet Namese to fight it. But the
French, who see their needs to be
greater than do most Of their allies,
persist in mentioning this question
of continued and adequate Ameri-
can aid as one of the big points
on which the issue here hangs.
With these four doubts hanging
over his head-about par for the
course in any military operation of
this scope - French Commander
in Chief Navarro faces the future
With qualified optimism. Once freed
of the threat to his rear, he is sure
his crack. well-equipped French
Union forces, with the aid of Wet
Namese troops, can seek out and
destroy or at least permanently dis
courage the Wet Mini guerrillaS.