Evening star., 1953-12-06
Indo-Chinese War
There Is Reason for Optimism There,
But Many See Room for Improvement
By Eorl H. Voss

n. VosS
spread around among green troops
where the benefit Of their battle ex-
perience could be distributed more
widely. Foreign observers who are
familiar with the Korean training
system think the rate of seasoning
new units could be stepped up
greatly by breaking up some Of the
regular Wet NameSe units to cadre
new outfits. There are said to be
vague plans for doing this, but so
far they have not materialized.
The United States once had hoped
to sell the French the complete Ko-
rean training system. A mission of
French and Wet Namese officers
went to Korea to see replacement
training centers and military
schools. But the Franco-Viet Ma
mese team came back with four
reasons why the Korean system
would not work in Wet Nam: Cd
There is no battle line in Wet Man,
CD There are no secure rear areas;
CD Mass training techniques are
too expensive; and "a Mass train
ing is not suitable to the mentality
of the Wet Namese.
Other Troining PIons?
These looked like flimsy reasons
to American military people. who
wondered why curricula could not
be changed to teach this different
kind of war;; why secure areas
could not be provided easily (they
have); why. for once, no one thought
Of asking American aid to pay for
the training: and why the Wet Ma
nese were not capable of learning
as fast as any other race.
It was after this performance that
the Americans resigned themselves
to the unhappy conclusion that the
French (and some Wet Namese)
were looking for excuses to avoid
the Korean training system. The
United States now has settled down
to q program Of getting some of
the Korean practices accepted
piecemeal.
AS for command techniques. the
French hold to q system Of loosely
Joined battalionS which operate with
much less command supervision
than American or German armies
allow such small units. Some for
eign observers in Indo-China think
the French could gain much more
cohesiveness in their operations, in
spite Of the special circumstances
of guerrilla war.
It is q well-known American feel
ing that the French do not put all
that they can into any Of their Of
fensive operations in Indo-China.
This Is not in any way q criticism
of the fighting courage and skill
of the individual French Union SOL
dier. The French Foreign Legion
naire is one of the best-f1ghting men
in the world. The complaint is.
however. that the French are re-
luctant to exploit their advantages
if it means risking heavy losses.
Casualties mean trouble from Paris.
Audocity Needed
United States experts who have
been following the Indo-C China war
closely wish the French, military
could sell the politicians and the
French people on the idea that q
little more audacity at the COM
mand level-combined with the day
by-day heroics of the France-Viet
Namese troops-might in the long
run actually save casualties by
shortening the war. They say this
knowing full well how they failed
to sell the same bill Of goods to
American politicians in the case OF
Korea.
Political education Is another
field where observers accuse the
French of employing half-measures.
To this day the French do not at
tack all-out the question Of Com
munist involvement with the Wet
Mini. American offers Of technical
help in psychological warfare were
once spurned and now are carefully
picked over. This Of course, could
be because United States experts
do not understand the local situation
In Wet Nam. But American health
and welfare information programs
here are said to have been well re-
ceived.
This "gripe list" Of foreign by
ISLANDERS telling the French how to
win the war is, of course, the kind
of a compilation Americans could
and did harvest from foreigners
who observed the United States ef-
fort in Korea. But the enumeration
does serve to show some of the soft
spots which could rise up to thwart
the French plan for victory in Indo-
China by 1855.