Evening star., 1953-04-24
NATO and a Gomble

NATO and a Gamble
At its current Paris meeting the Council
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has
as one Of its most important tasks the problem
Of working out safe and satisfactory revision
of the pace and scope of the Western defensive
build-up against the threat Of Soviet aggression
All signs indicate that the meeting, before
1t ends, will formally decide to stretch OUT
the build-up over longer period of years than
heretofore contemplated. Although it will in
volve risks, there appears to be general agree
ment within the 14-nation NATO community
that such a change is economically and politi-
cally necessary. There appears to be general
agreement, too, that it can be put into effect
without increasing the degree of present danger
That this danger is still grave reality how
ever has been emphasized to the Council in
President Eisenhower's message warning that
I'VE cannot afford to seek less" than the
strength needed to deter aggression.
In the past as the leading member of the
Atlantic alliance, the United States has taken
dim view of "stretch-out" proposals. but now
1t seems very definitely to have changed its
mind This does not mean, however, that our
Official American position differs-in terms of
objectives-from what it was in December when
the NATO Council last met. Actually, the
objectiveS remain the same. AS indicated by
Secretary of State Dulles on the eve Of his
departure for Paris our Government viii con-
tinue to press, as always, for steady growth
in Western strength and unity, but it will adjust
its own operations to the allied view that
economic; political and social factors require
a revised timetable for such growth-a slower
rearmament tempo.
Accordingly, as Mr.. Dulles has said, one Of
will be to lay the groundwork for long-range
defensive program (which will enable us to deter
military attack from without while maintaining
inner economy and political strength" In other
words as far as common security is concerned,
the 1-nation Atlantic Council must strive for
revisions in the build-up that will strike sound
balance guaranteeing against doing too little
too late while at the same time avoiding the
danger OF doing too much too fast in a way
that could shatter the internal domestic sta
bility OF the countries making up the NATO
community. Economically speaking, this seems
particularly necessary because of prospective
cuts in the scale of American foreign aid.
Neither our own nor any allied government
has as yet issued definitive statement on this
subject but the indications are clear that off,
cial American thinking has been revised in
recent months It is closer now to that OF. the
British and other NATO members, who have
doubted the wisdom of the Pentagon'S thesis
that 1854 or 1855 should be regarded as the key
year of critical danger and that the defensive
build-up against the Soviet threat ought there
fore be pushed forward on an all-out basis in
the meantime. The view today seems to be
that the Kremlin, because of its power deficien-
cies and not because Of its dubious conciliatory
moves, is hardly likely to strike so soon
It may well be, Of course, that the Penta-
CONS thesis is quite right, and the less urgent
one quite wrong. Nevertheless, apparently with
American concurrence, the Atlantic Council
is reported to be ready for "stretch-out" based
on the assumption that the West must organ
lie its strength for cold war that may con-
tinue for the next 10 or 20 years-f not
longer-without erupting into major armed
conflict. AS for the near future, the advocates
of the revision seem satisfied that the NATO
powers will be in no greater danger than they
are now.
Assuming that this relatively optimistic
view is sound, then the Atlantic alliance may
in fact be better off If it adjusts it's build-up
to avoid excessive economic strains and keep
its armed power in line with fast-developng
changes in modern weapons-power that might
eventually become great enough to oblige the
Kremlin to cooperate in an enduring peace.
Yet for all that the free world had better
realize that defensive "stretch-out" involves
a large gamble that could result in catastrophe
If the Russians should decide not to play Q
waiting game.