Evening star., 1953-04-26
By Eorl n. Voss

sive has received around the free
world is its remarkable resemblance,
with minor exceptions, to the Tru-
man-Acheson policies which most of
our allies feared would be changed
radically under the Republicans.
A close reading Of Gen. Eisenhow-
er's campaign speeches should have
left no room for such fears. In last
summers political contest, for in
stance, the PreSident-to-be said:
"Our friends must know that they
can depend upon the continuity of
our policies The Republican
Party is dedicated to the principle
of national unity in foreign policy"
In the past fortnight the Eisen-
hover foreign policy has been out
lined in some detail. and it is now
apparent how literally the President
meant what he said.
No Big ReversoIs
No broad policies Of the postwar
period have been reversed. Shifts in
emphasis have been slight, although
the ballyhoo accompanying them
has tried to make the changes seem
more significant than they are.
The Eisenhower Administration
has accepted the basic line that
America and its allies must build
their strength and maintain their
unity in the face Of the Soviet
threat.
NATO and the European Defense
Community have been indorSed as
the best methods of building Euro
pean strength. United States goals
in Korea have been re-af1lrmed. Aid
for Indo-China and FormoSa has
been ordered increased, moving more
rapidly. but essentially in the same
direction the Truman administration
was already headed.
Probably the principal difference
between the Eisenhower and Tru-
man foreign policies Is In attitude.
The new administration Ii con-
sciouSly building q new hope for
all mankind" as Secretary John
Foster Dulles puts it. Fearful Of
the effects Of too many and too often
dashed hopes, the Truman-Acheson
approach was to strive for q quieter
confidence in the free world, one
with hope. but not one with sudden
exultant crescendoes. The idea was
to avoid the painful diminuendos
that follow.
Secretary Acheson said in 1949:
TOO much depends on the United
States for US to indulge in the luxury
Of either undue pessimism or pre-
mature optimism. Our foreign policy
has been and must continue to be
guided by the fundamental interests
of the United States in our quest for
a world of peace and security. We
cannot allow it to become subject
to the fluctuations produced by q
raising and lowering of the inter-
national temperature. To accept
these fluctuations as a guide for our
policy would be to put in foreign
hands q large measure of control
over the conduct Of our foreign
relations"
New Planning Bosis
There may be other differences in
the making, but most of them grow
out Of the normal advance of time.
For instance, Secretary Dulles has
indicated that new NATO plan
ming basis, founded on longer-range
aims, will be sought. The death
of Stain helped to make this
stretchout possible, but it might
have been inevitable anyway because
of the strain on European econo-
mics.
In the Far East, the Eisenhower
program calls for stepping up aid
for countries fighting communism,
and q stronger posture against
communism. Increases in military
aid to Indo- China and FormoSa had
been planned by the Democrats,
although not such large ones.
Both regimes show concern for
world poverty and need. The Tru-
man approach was to help needy
countries as much as possible even
while re-arming against the Soviet
threat. The Eisenhower policy, as
now proclaimed, makes no mention
of continuing programs like Point
-Four. Instead. there is a pledge to
contribute disarmament savings to
q war on poverty and need"
Other differences (See accom-
panying table,. indicated in the
Eisenhower and Dulles speeches of
the last fortnight, are minor.
How closely the new administra-
tion's thinking follows it's prede-
cesSor's is shown in comparisons of
recent Eisenhower and Dulles re-
marks with Truman and AcheSon
statements:
Strength and Unity
Eisenhower-"The amassing of
Soviet power inStilled in the
free nations-and let none doubt
this-the unshakable conviction
that, as long as there persists a
threat to freedom, they must, at
any cost, remain armed, strong and
ready for the risk of war. 1t inspired
them-and let none doubt this-to
attain unity OF purpose and will
beyond the power of propaganda or
pressure to break, now or ever"
Acheson February 20, 1882
'"The free peoples of the world need
two things to protect themselves
against this threat of Soviet expan-
sion. The first is strength. The
second is unity. What we have been
seeking to do is to help strengthen
and unite free nations so that there
will be no tempting opportunity for
further aggression"
Reody to Neeotiote
Eisenhower There remained,
however, one thing essentially un-
changed and unaffected by Soviet
conduct: This unchanged thing was
the readiness of the free world to
welcome sincerely any genuine evi-
dence of peaceful purpose enabling