Evening star., 1953-07-12

WGSo
being cheerfully toted into the far
thest corners of the world some
Frenchmen were arguing against the
idea.
For what the colonies are worth. +"
wrote a dyspeptic French legislator
III 1929, "and for what they cost
us, we should be much better OF If
we did not possess them."
Today, surveying their worldwide
domain Of 4,870, 900 square miles and
lit million people, more and more
Frenchmen are inclined to admit
the logic Of the argument.
For many years, in fact, the
French have had little return on
their vast, haphazardly acquired
overseas possessions except a success
sion Of headaches. From the govern
ment'S point Of view, each part Of
the Sprawling empire adds UP to an
economic liability. And through
seven years of war in Indo- China,
the French have learned q bitter les
son on what the cost Of empire can
come to.
S. Billion Price Toe
In terms of hard cash, the cost Of
the Indo- Chinese war has totaled
somewhere close to S. billion, of
which the United States has con-
tributed 81 billion. The rest has come
out Of the French military budget.
At this point the war is costing
plan is for the United States to
shoulder about one-third Of that
amount.
But the cost Of the Indo- Chinese
war cannot be measured in money.
It must also include the drain on
French military manpower, and par
ticularly in commissioned officers,
which has greatly slowed up French
military recovery since the war. At
the beginning Of the struggle, losses
were so great and the output of new
officers so small that there was a net
loss in the number Of officers avail
able for service. Even in the first
10 months Of last year, the 414
French officer casualties in Indo-
China amounted to half the number
of officers graduated from the mill
tary academy at st. Cyr in 1852.
Today, France has nearly quar-
ter of its career officers in Indo-
China and more than a third of its
n-commisSioned officers. The drain
on the regular army is especially
great since no French draftees, un-
der. the present law, can be shipped
to that battlefront.
Less ToneibIe Costs
The cost must also be measured
in less tangible wayS-in the lapse
of French leadership in Europe, in
which the burden of Indo-C China has
played an important part. With such
a large proportion of it's military
force tied down 5000 miles from
home, France has been reluctant to
go along with the creation of a Euro
pean army, and the revival of Ger
man military power which is part
of that plan.
Finally, recent developments in
1ndo-China have added another LA
bility to the French colonial posi-
ton. The upsurge of nationalism
in the Associated States of Wet Nam,
Cambodia and Laos, the dramatic
demands for independence from
French rule have not only compro-
missed the chances for a military
success in Indo-C China, but also put
France on the defensive before the
bar of anti-colonial world opinion.
Considering our own Korean trou-
bles with the same kind of national
ism, it might seem logical that pub
lie opinion in the United States
would be sympathetic to the French
dilemma. But in Congress, where
public opinion counts most these
days, it has been made quite clear
along with suitable quotations from
our own Declaration of Independ-
ence-that the continued support of
a goodly number of influential Sena-
tors for aid to Indo-C China depends
on the liberality of the French an
swer to the Nationalists. It was also
made plain that the only thing that
prevented the Senate from present.
ing the French with q real ulti-
matum on the issue was the we'll
grounded fear that France would fol-
low the mandate to its logical
conclusion and pull out of the
mdo-Chinese struggle altogether.
Indo- Chinese Deficit
Such, briefly, is the situation in
one corner of the far-fiung French
colonial system which has strength
ened the argument that the game is
not worth the candle. If the cost of
maintaining the French position in
Indo-China is to be measured against
the assets that are being defended
a scant 81 billion in local invest
ments-the direction of French self
interest should not be difficult to
calculate.
To less acute degree, the same
arguments apply to the rest of the
French colonial holdings, in Africa,
off the American coast and scattered
over the area of the Pacific Ocean.
Each of these possessions means a
net economic loss to the French gov
ernment.
Even in the vast French African
territories-in Tunisia, Morocco, in
French West Africa, the Cameroons
and French Equatorial Africa-the
figures are enlightening to those who
think of COLONIES" in 10Th century
terms of domination and exploita-
ton. In North Africa alone, French
public investments since the war
have totaled more than $1.8 billion
far in excess Of any tangible eco
nomic benefits returned. In Central
Africa, where economic development
is still in the painful stage of build
ing up essential communications,
the trade deficit was greater in 1852
than the previous year, in spite of
fNn1y &c bnk