Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-02-15
Both Sides Have Good Points
In Any Korean Offensive

by rotation. But the Koreans are
short of trucks and trained STATS
and might not be too efficient
in quick moving war. although
they are brave and attack
minded.
AS for the Communists, they
apparently have q little more
than q million men in Korea.
Three quarters are Chinese Conn
munists and the rest North
Koreans. About half Of these
men are at or near the front,
organized In 80 to 40 combat
divisions Of all kinds.
The other half Is in reserve
and probably engaged Ia the life
and death struggle to move sup
plies from Manchufia to the
front under unending torment
from Allied air power. There
are many more Red troops in
Manchuria. and in Red China.
The strength Of the Commu-
mist army is in It's superior NUM-
bers Of infantry. In the ruthless
ness of its commanders, and In
the willingness Of its fanatical
or terror driven soldiers to die
in unending human seal at
tackS.
Reds Short on Air Power.
On the present fortified line
the Reds have also shown COM
siderable ability tomass artillery
and mortars. occasionally equal
ing the U. N. fires at certain
times and places, although never
on the average.
The Communist army has two
grave weaknesses. One is its
present total lack of offensive
air power - and that means
bombers. The other is its lack.
Of mobility that holds its speed
of maneuver to that of marching
infantry.
Today'S stalemate on the forth
ned Korean line battle gives the
Reds the best possible break. It
cancels out the worst results of
their weakness and shackles the
United Nations strength.
The smaller, hard-hitting, air
supported U. N. Army is made
for war Of movement. In siege
war. air and artillery lose power
against deeper and deeper bunk
erS and there is little scope for
strategy and tactics.
There are also unknown pos
sibilities Of nasty novel surprises
such as mass air attacks. subma-
rines, amphibious landings. Sc
cret weapons and the atom bomb.
Any one of these could change
the whole Korean picture.
Need to Get Into Open.
Apparently the key to Allied
victory is to get the war back
into the open again-either by
breaking through the Reds for
titled crust or by one or more
end runs with amphibious or air.
borne troops. Il
It seems from the evidence
that Gen. Van Fleet believes that
the present 9th Army. granted
normal planning. supplies and
reinforcemehts required for any
offensive, could do the job be-
fore too long without any vast
addition of strength.
# This seems TO rule out elab-
crate end runs and indicates a
drive for either q SCATTERING
breakthrough or q gradual Fore
ing of the Reds back from their
defense line.
Gen. Van Fleet obviously does
not mean q crude frontal push.
That would be bloody and risky.
His own past strategy in Korea
suggests the answer.
Gen. Van Fleet made most
Of his own advances in Korea
with "one-tWO" ana "one-tWo-
three" punches, with one part
of the 9th Army slugging on one
sector and another part all ready
to slug on another sector the.
minute the enemy got OF bal
ance.
This was also the way Cen
Eisenhower set, UP the famous
Saint Lo .breakthrough a few
weeks after the Normandy IN
vaSion.
Whether this strategy could
succeed, or whether the all-out
effort foreseen by Gen. Bradley
would be needed, remains an
open question.