The Key West citizen. [volume] (Key West, Fla.) 1879-current, 1953-12-19

WASHINGTON R--Here al the
fail end Of 1858 the West grabbed
and ran with the psychological
Gag which the Russians had
seized early In the year and then
dropped.
The West threw Moscow on the
defensive twice within "A hours
with lis two invitations: to q for
eign ministers meeting Jan. In
Berlin, and to private talks on
pooling atomic materials for peace.
Russian refusal 10 attend the
Berlin meeting would be pretty
plain admission ii was unwilling
70 take even that small step to-
ward q chance for peace, even
though no one expects much Of
The meeting.
Russia viii look bad, too, If 1t
says mo" 10 President Eisen-
hower's proposal that the atomic
powers Sit down and talk Of pooling
some Of their atomic materials.
When the Eisenhower admins
tration took over last January this
country had been at war with the
Communists for more than 2Is
years In Korea. The mood against
Russia was tcdgh.
The new administration
expressed no softness. Neither did
Stain, sitting halfway around the
world, still stolid, stubborn, APP
parently still willing to keep push.
Ing, even il II meant fighting. as
4 did in Korea.
Stain died In March. His sue.
eessor, Malenkov. switched tactics
1t once. He talked peace. He had
much to gain. nothing to lose by
the switch.
II this country didn't take his
bait and start yielding ground, he
might drive a wedge between the
United States and It's European
friends. They wanted pace. Being
nearer Russia. they were nearer
destruction il war began.
Malenkov had some effect. When
this country didn't bite, some
Europeans criticized the United
States as being too rigid. The
French, who had long delayed
joining q single European army
in defense against Russia, delayed
some more.
They feared seeing their old
enemy, Germany. rearmed. II
there was a single European army,
German troops would be in it.
II there was chance for peace,
The European army would not be
needed. The Russians even
dangIed the idea Of a nonaggres.
sion pact before the French In an
attempt 10 weaken their link with
this country.
The Russians had other fish to
fry with their peace talk too. In
West Germany, for example,
where Chancellor Konrad Alden
auer, . solid ally Of the West,
was up for reelection or defeat
IN September.
II The Russians could persuade
Che West Germans that tagging
along with Moscow meant peace
but that re-electing Adenauer
might drag them into war, Alden
auer might be thrown out.
Eisenhower was unimpressed hy
: Sislenkov. II the Russians meant
peace, he said In April, they could
prove Il by deeds. There were
20 deeds. But Malenkov had an
effects even on Sir Winston Chur.
chill, never starry-eyed.
Churchill said maybe some good
might come Of = meeting between
him, Eisenhower, the French Pre-.
nAier and Malenkov. He proposed
u. Eisenhower rejected it. Summer
came, and several things hap
ened.
Workers in Russian.held East
Germany rioted, showing their
Seeing about Moscow. That was
Moscow's first big psychological
setback In 1858.
The Communists agreed to q
eruce In Korea, which might have
seemed evidence for Eisenhower
81 MoScow's good intentions. But
he Communists wiped out that
impression fast by blocking the
peace talks.
Eisenhower helped pull the West
Germans closer to the side Of the
Vest BY pouring in food for the
East Germans, who couldn't get
enough from the Russians. In
2. -.
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