Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-08-06
Delicate Diplomacy
By Gornett D. Horner

Secretary of State Dulles is
getting warmed up in his talks
this week with South Korean
President Syngman Rhee for a
supreme test of diplomacy in try
ing to transform the Korean
truce into a permanent peace
there.
The problem of trying to
negotiate peace with the Com
munists is overwhelming in it
self-as demonstrated by the
more than two years it took to
get an armiStice. 1t is further
complicated by having the dis
trustful, unhappy partner in
President Rhee. plus a lot of
nerve-racking backseat driving
from U. N. friends.
Qualified observers who really
believe there is much chance of
success in achieving peacefully
the main goal-a unified, nom
Communist Korea-are hard to
find. Mr.. Dulles and his asso-
ciates turn a hopeful face to the
world. But their hope. seems to
be based more on wishful think
ing than on concrete planning.
Mr.. Dulles is in Korea this
week, concentrating on a neces-
Sary preliminary task to the real
peace negotiations. That task is
to try to line up Mr.. Rhee so he
won't kick over the traces and
wreck any chances for success
the forthcoming peace conference
might have before everything
possible to get an agreement with
the Communists is done.
Job Mainly Psychological.
The job of keeping Mr.. Rhee
on the tracks is mainly psyche
logical, though Mr.. Dulles has
practical inducements to offer.
Essentially, the Secretary's OBJ
jective in flying to Korea is to
try to lay at rest fears OF the
aged South Korean leader that
the United States and other
u. N. countries with troops there
might arrive at a hard and fast
line of action for dealing with
the Communists and then just
inform Mr.. Rhee of what had
been decided.
American officials feel that
fear of some kind of deal be-
hind his back has become a
dangerous obseSsion with Mr..
Rhee. Mr.. Dulles thought an
effort to get rid of this obses-
sion was worth flying to Korea
for.
Mr.. Rhee has made it clear
over and over again that he is
convinced the Communists
agreed to the armistice merely
as a stall to try to get by ne
gotiation what they could not
get on the battlefield. If Mr..
Rhee became convinced that the
United States was deserving him
in some move he thought was
appeasement of the Communists,
American officials feel he might
be goaded into national suicide
by trying to resume the war on
his own. Such an action would
raise unthinkable problems for
this Government.
One of the things being Of
fered the South Korean leader
is a security pact under which
the United States would pledge
itself to consult with him on
what action could be taken if
South Korea again should be
the victim of aggression. Mr..
Rhee would like a guarantee
that this country would auto
matically go to war against an
aggressor against South Korea.
but it has been made clear to
him that he can't get that.
Strategy Proposals Sought.
Mr.. Dulles is inviting Mr..
Rhee's ideas about what STRAIT
egg the allies should pursue in
the political conference with the
Communists, due to begin be-
fore the end of October. But.
with one eye on Britain, France
and other U. N. allies. the Secre-
tary cannot make any definite
commitments. He has prom
ised wider consultation" with
the U. N. allies before this Gov
eminent finally determines its
position on the political con-
ference problems.
Assembly Meets Soon.
This consultation will come to
a head soon after Mr.. Dulles
returns from Korea next week.
The U. N. General Assembly
meets August II to lay down the
U. N. policy line for the talks
with the Communists.
= All this leads up to the actual
peace conference, for which no
definite time nor place has yet
been set. Under terms of the
armistice, the detectives Of this