Evening star., 1953-08-04
A Time for Allied Unity


emphasize that his current talks with President
serve as a kind of prelude to a broader inter-
allied discussion on how best to deal with the
Communists at the Far Eastern political con-
ference scheduled to begin in October.
This matter has been surrounded by
considerable confusion and misrepresentation
abroad. Although informed government leaders
in Britain, France and other countries allied
with us in Korea have had no such qualms op-
position spokesmen have spread the impression
that an exclusive "go-it-alone" American-ROK
policy has been in the making without any
reference to the views, needs or interests of
the rest of the United Nations coalition directly
involved-through the U. N. Command-in the
Panmunjom truce agreement. Now, however,
as a result of Mr.. Dulles statement that par
ticular miSconception should be pretty we'll
diSpelled.
Of course, as the Secretary has said, it is
clearly appropriate" that the United States
should engage in "a preliminary exchange of
views with the government of the Republic of
Korea, which was the victim of the Communist
aggression and which contributed so nightly
to stopping that aggression" Certainly, no one
but the Reds will argue against the objectives
of the Dules-Rhee meeting. For those objec-
ordinate policies in advance of the October
political conference and draft a mutual Sc
curity pact and it is obvious that our own
country and DR.. Rhee's, having contributed by
far the greatest effort to the pre-truce shooting
struggle, have an incontestable right to hold
special bilateral talks on these matters in an
effort to arrive at special bilateral understand
ings.
But this does not mean-not even re-
motely-that Britain and our other u N. allies
are to be excluded or left on the outside looking
in, with no opportunity to join in an attempt
to organize united front before meeting with
the Communists in october. Mr.. Dulles has
made that much very clear. He has done so by
emphaticaly declaring that "the United States
will not finally determine It's position in rela-
tion to the political conference and its proce-
dure until we have had the benefit Of wider
consultation" This wider consultation" it
may be assumed, will be directed toward recon-
Cling divergent views on such difficult and
highly contentious issues as Formosa, the future
status Of the Chinese Nationalists, pressure to
end the embargo against Red China and pro-
posals to accept the Peiping regime as men,
Der of the United Nations.
On these and related matters-including
the question of what should be done If the
Communists demonstrate nothing but bad faith
at the political conference-there are poten-
TALLY dangerous areas Of disagreement between
the United States and number Of its allies,
notably Britain. II no effort were made to
eliminate or greatly reduce those areas we
and our friends could come to parting of the
ways disuniting us first in Asia and later in
Europa disaster that would amount to a
gigantic victory for the Krenlin. That is why
there must be the wider consultation" referred
to by Mr.. Dulles. Common sense demands it;
1t is absolutely imperative.
In sum, what is needed above all at this
stage is concert of views not merely between
the United States and the ROK government
but between the United States and every other
key ally in Korea. Without that, without the
frmest possible common approach to the Com
munists, the free world will be flirting with
catastrophe at the coming political conference.