Evening star., 1953-11-18
Bad Day for Mr.. Truman

international Monetary Fund. But the case
against Mr.. Truman has been convincingly
established in its other essential aspects.
The case breaks down into two parts, the
first covering the effort by the FBI to alert the
then President to Communist espionage in his
administration.
Attorney General Brownell disclosed yester-
day that the first warning went to the White
House on November 8, 1945. This was in the
form of short letter marked "Top Secret"
and listing IA persons suspected of being
espionage agents. The second name on the
list was that of Harry Dexter White, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury. This letter un-
doubtedly was delivered to General Vaughan
to whom the President had instructed ]. Edgar
Hoover to send such material. This was the
first time that General Vaughan had been
notified that an Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury suspected spy, and it is almost
impossible to believe that he would not have
taken such letter to the President Immediately
However, the FBI did not stop with that
letter. On December A. 1945 the major eSpio-
mage report was sent to General Vaughan. And
on February a. 1916, after the White nomina-
ton, the special report dealing specifically with
the evidence against Mr. White, was put in
General Vaughan's hands.
General Vaughan's testimony is that while
be remembers nothing of this he always re-
layed FBI reports to the President. Mr. Tru-
mans story is that he knew nothing about any
of these reports against White until February
5, or possibly February 6, when Secretary of
State Byrnes brought the matter to his
attention.
This may be true. But if it is, the former
President and his staff stand convicted of the
most shocking negligence in safeguarding the
security of the United States
Part two of the story begins with Mr..
Truman's belated discovery of what he had
done. The Senate. knowing nothing of the
FBI reports, confirmed the White nomination
on February 6, 1916, thereby posing rather
difficult problem.
Nobody believes that Mr.. Truman wanted
to give aid and comfort to a Communist espio-
mage ring. But there is considerable reason
to believe that Mr. Truman's course of action
after February 6 was motivated largely by a
desire to shield his administration, from the
embarrassment of disclosing that he had
negligently appointed aaCommunist spy.
The Truman version, in brief is that he
consulted with Secretary Vinson, that the latter
consulted Attorney General Clark, and that
"the conclusion was reached that the appoint
ment should be allowed to take its normal
course" The following are some significant
excerpts from Mr.. TrumanS speech Monday
night:
Any unusual action 1Dith respect to Mr..
Whites appointment might 10eu haze alerted
all the persons involUed to the fact that the
investigation aUas under 1Uay and thus en-
dangere6 the success of the investigation.
Tonight WGnt the American people to
understand that the course iUe took protected
the public interest and security and, at the
same time permitted the intensive inUestiga-
ton then in progress to 90 toraUard. No other
course could haze SerUed both of these purposes.
FBI Director Hoovers testimony was dam
aging to many phases of the Presidents story
But on these two points it was devastating.
With respect to the we-didn t-want-t alert
them version, Mr.. Hoover pointed out that five
individuals involved in the investigation were
dismissed from the Government between March
and September, 1946, when their subversive
activities were discovered. That destroys Mr..
Truman's first contention.
With respect to the second, Mr.. Hoover
said number of things. He said that he was
never consulted by the President and that he
did not favor continuing Mr. White in Gov
ernment service. He said that the appointment
of Mr. White to the Monetary Fund, instead of
assisting his investigation. actually hampered
the investigations He said that on February
26, 1946-the day the President signed Mr..
Whites commsSion-he was assured by the
Attorney General that Mr. White, as our repre-
sentative on the fund would be surrounded with
specially selected persons who were not security
risks.
In June, 1916, Virginius Frank Coe was
appointed secretary of the fund. The White
House was notified in February, 1946, that Coe
was suspected spy. Later, he was to refuse
to say, on grounds of possible Standardization,
whether he had engaged in espionage against
the United States. He remained secretary
of the fund until December, 1852, however, and
there is nothing to indicate that the Truman
administration made any effort to get him out
or even to alert the officials of the fund, until
shortly before he was forced to resign.
In the face of the combined testimony of
the FBI director and the Attorney General
Mr.. Trumans story simply does not hold water
And it might be added that his cries of "liar"
and politics" and "McCarthyism" seem hollow,
vulgar and disingenuous.
There is not much reason, perhaps, to
pursue further the matter of Mr.. Truman's
performance in the White case. The record
speaks for itself this point. There is one
other thing, however, which the record shows,
and which ought to be stressed
1t shows that the FBI, in the face of monu-
mental encouragement from the Truman
administration, did splendid job of tracking
the Communist agents who were infiltrating
our Government 1t is not the fault of the
FBI that these spies were so successful. The
fault lies at the door of the responsible public
officials who remained Indifferent to the re-
peated warnings and this is something that
should be remembered the next time some