Evening star., 1953-04-27

| AA11AIdAy c41OIt III Cl1G lace OF
drastic reductions in American
aid could be accomplished only
by further squeezing Of the civil
ian economy. In the light Of the
political realities here, it seems
doubtful that this could be done.
Would Doom European Army.
A third complication that al
most certainly would result from
leaving France to paddle her own
economic canoe would be the
Scuttling Of whatever immediate
possibility exists for a European
army.
| Again, it would be a question,
not Of what Frances present
leadership would want to do, but
Of what they could do II their
own position were weakened. The
chances for early ratification of
the EDO treaty are feeble enough
as it is. The inevitable public
reaction to withdrawal of Ameri-
can aid would provide more than
enough ammunition for the coup
de grace.
Many Americans fail to UNDER
stand the basis for French OBJ
jections to European integration
in the military and political field.
It is perhaps not entirely a ques-
ton Of pure cussedness and ma
tional pride. It is not even en-
tirely a question of playing
politics.
There is a serious reason for
Frances misgivings. This is
that. in themselves, neither EDO
nor NATO nor any other mech
anism Of international co-opera-
ton provides permanent guaran-
tees Of control over the force
that is being created.
The French fear that the
Western powers - particularly
the United ,States-may be, so
preoccupied with meeting the
threat of Russian military agrees
sion in Europe that they will
lose sight of the long-term i'm
plications of their defensive
strategy.
See Germany in Domination.
Germany, we say, must be re-
armed because we need IL Ger
man divisions right now. But
the French are inclined to look
beyond the immediate needs to
the ultimate possibilities. They
suggest that precipitouS rearma-
ment of Germany, combined with
pressure toward European uni
f1cation, will create a powerful
bloc of nations of most uncertain
political complexion.
The French are under no
illusion as to which nation finally
would dominate European fed
Grafton. They know they can
not match German military and
productive power in the long
run. They have little hope of
being able to redress the balance
with legaliStic counterweights.
They are realistic enough to rec
ognize that genuine political fed
GRAFTON of Europe, in which vot-
ing power will replace military
power. is still long way off.
The clear implication, to the
French, is that we are in dan
ger of building European power
complex which might have sim
lister similarities to the one which
Hitler failed to build by force of
conquest. If Germany could Sue
ceed ultimately in establishing
firm domination over Europe,
her position once again would be
hard to challenge. The French
do not like to think what might
happen if Germany were raised
to a position of leadership in the
EaSt-West conflict, backed by
the united strength of Europe.
Want U. S. Participation.
If there is one thing that has
given the French the reinsurance
they need to associate themselves
voluntarily in military fedora
ton with Germany. it is the
promise of permanent partici-
patton by the United States in
European affairs. It is this fact
which gives such tremendous
political Importance to the pres
ence of American troops in
Europe.
1t also gives the aid program a
significance far beyond its ac-
tual economic value. Withdrawal
of American aid would certainly
be interpreted as symptom of
reviving American isolationism.
And the effect could hardly be
calculated to speed the achieve
ment of NATO's goals in Europe.
These are some of the prac-
tical considerations thai sug-
geSt themselves when it comes
to considering the course of our
future policy toward this difficult
and temperamental ally. They
lead to an inescapable conclu-
sion:
If the consequences of scrap
ping our present policy turned
out to be as serious as they seem
now. the saving in dollars would
be of small comfort.
France happens to occupy a
piece Of European real estate
that is essential to the develop
ment OF European military and
economic strength. In the West
ern scheme of things, there are
no realistic alternatives to a
friendly and prosperous country
here. Without French co-opera-
ton, all talk of Western unity is
a pipedream. Without firm and
Well-organized line of supply
through France all hope of de-
tending Western Europe against
Soviet attack is fatuous.
With all her faults, France is
a country that must be accepted
and reckoned with in any sys-
tenn OF security that the free