Evening star., 1953-05-23
POWs and the Indian Plan


Although they have met in very cordial
atmosphere conducive to mutual understand
ing, Prime Minister Nehru and Secretary of
State Dulles have not succeeded, according to
reports from New Delhi in reconciling differing
Indian and American attitudes toward the
truce blocking prisoner -ofwar issue in Korea.
Mr.. Nehru apparently still holds to the
view he expressed in Parliament on May IS
namely. that the Communist repatriation pro-
posals are better than the counterproposals Of
the American directed United Nations Com
mand. The former, in his judgment, constitute
"a very close approximation" of the Indian
plan adopted last December by the General
Assembly, whereas the latter "diverge con-
siderably" from it.
What is the Indian plan? As approved by
54-to-5 vote (the Soviet bloc alone dissenting),
1t sets forth broad terms-some of them ex-
tremely vague-designed to serve as "a just
and reasonable basis" for negotiations. Ruling
against the involuntary return of any individ-
ual, it contains the following provisions among
others: Cd All POWs should be handed over to
neutral four-nation commission chair
manned by an umpiring fifth power; (2) both
sides to the conflict should be free to explain"
to balky captives why they should go home; 90
within 80 days after the signing of an armstice,
the commission should refer to the post-truce
political conference-with recommendations for
a solution including target date for the
termination Of their detention"-the problem
of those still baking; and a. "at the end
OF further 80 days." If there are men who
continue to reject repatriation "the RESPONSE
bility for their care and maintenance until the
end Of their detention shall be transferred to
the United Nations which in all matters relating
to them shall act strictly in accordance with
international law"
After having fiatly rejected this plan until
after Stalin's death, the Communists have pro-
posed QD that the neutral" commission be
made up of Switzerland Sweden, Czechoslovakia,
Poland and India; ca that each of these powers
bring to Korea an equal number of troops for
custodial work; 90 that there be an explain
ing" period of four months; and (4) that there
after the postarmistice conference decide the
fate of those still refusing to 60 home. In
response, the U. n Command has counter
proposed a procedure under which Q all North
Korean POWs rejecting repatriation-some 34,-
OO0-would be released to civilian life in South
Korea as soon as truce is signed; (2) the
remaining balky prisoners-about II, 500 Chinese
would be turned over to the five-nation COM
mission; 60 only India, which would chairman
the commissions proceedings, would furnish
the custodial troops needed; a. the explain
ing" period would be limited to go days; and
(5) the future of anti-repatriation captives
would be determined within that time, and not
at a political meeting where the issue could be
begged down in argument OF indefinite and
conceivably endless duration.
When all these points-the Communist pro-
posals and the U. N. Commands counterpro-
posals-are measured against the broad terms
Of the Indian plan, it may be that Mr.. Nehru
ran And some sl,nerhcia1 s,1nnnrt for view
1t may be, too, that our negotiators at Panmun-
jom, when they return to the talks there, may
find 1t advisable to present modified suggestions.
Even so, the fact remains, despite Mr.. Nehru's
judgment that what the enemy has proposed
is no good. It is no good because it leaves up
in the air the question Of whether the five
"neutrals" are to operate under a single top
command or independently of each other. It
is no good because four months obviously are
not needed to explain" things to balky prison.
erS. And it is no good because 1t fails to set a
time limit on how long the postarmistice meet
Ing might debate the future OF such men-an
arrangement that could result in the inhuman-
ity of indefinite captivity.
These are but few OF the objections that
can be raised against the Communist proposals.
If the u N. Command is going to modify its
own position, it should make very sure, besides
insisting on workable machinery, that the
notifications do not retreat in any degree from
the great moral principles or the considerations
of simple humanitarianism and common civil
lized decency inherent in the POW issue.
If Mr. Nehru looks carefully at the matter
in this sense, he may come to change his mind
about which side Is better living up to the spirit
of the Indian plan. It is the spirit that counts,
not the letter. Actually it is because the plans
letter is unsatisfactory in many respects that
our negotiators have been striving to work out
terms aimed at making its spirit effective.