Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1953-05-29
Not Going His Way

remaining silent he had lent the slightest
support to the Senator's thesis-the Western
Alliance would have been ready to close up
shop and go out Of business.
Senator Taft has always been an unpredict-
able man. But this speech, the relevant Sec
ton OF which is printed elsewhere on this page,
Is simply beyond comprehension In content
in timing and in impact 1t couldn't have been
worse If our btterest enemy had planned It,
1t would have added up to devastating days
work for an irresponsible minority Senator
That 1t should have come, as it did, from the
Presidents majority leader in the Senate is
almost beyond belief. Small wonder that Cen
eral Eisenhower felt impelled to serve notice
to the world that the Taft way Is not his way!
It is quite possible that Senator Taft did
not mean to rock the boat and did not fully
foresee the reaction his remarks would pro-
duce. At any rate he started of by saying
that he was not criticizing any one and that
his talk was intended merely to be in the nature
of comment and information" But when the
speech Is read carefully it is a masterpiece Of
internal confusion.
The Senator from Ohio thinks we should
do our best to negotiate truce in Korea. If
that fails, however, he thinks we should forget
the United Nations in Korea and notify eng
land and our other allies" that we are with
drawing from all further peace negotiations in
Korea" What would we do then? Senator
Taft doesn't say.
He says that even the best truce under
present conditions will be extremely unsatis-
factory; that it will leave Korea unnaturally
divided and fertile field for new war, and
that it will release million Chinese soldiers
who no doubt promptly will be moved down to
Southern China for use against Chang Kai-shek
or against the French in Indo-China." All of
these statements may we'll be true. But what
does the Senator suggest? He thinks that from
the beginning we should have insisted on gen.
eral peace negotiation with China, including
uniication of Korea under free Koreans, and
pledge against further expansion in Southeast
Asia. In the next sentence, he says that if we
make this present truce, no matter what we
put in the agreement about further negotiations
for a united Korea lit is no more likely to
occur than united Germany"
So what does the Senator want? If he is
saying that we should start all over again and
insist on general peace negotiation, including
a unified Korea, what does he propose to do
If the Communists refuse? Go to an about
war? Why does he indicate that he would trust
a Communist pledge to refrain from further
expansion in Southeast Asia when he has no
confidence in Communist agreement in the
truce to negotiate for united Korea? Does he
favor bigger war, II necessary, to gain his
detectives, at time when, in other statements,
he has urged severe cuts in our military budget?
Moving on, the Senator says we should not
send American troops to the Asian mainland
but he also says: II think we are bound to the
policy Of preventing Communist aggression
where it occurs and where it is within our
means to stop it," How would this apply, say
to a Chinese assault on Indo-China?
Senator Taft thinks that the u NJ, with
the veto in the Security Council, is not an
effective means to prevent aggression. NATO,
he says, Is military alliance designed, as far
as aggression is concerned, as a substitute for
an ineffective U. N. But he doubts that NATO
will be an effective instrument against agrees
sion. American ground forces, he contends,
cannot defend continental Europe. That should
be done by the Europeans Here again is a
curious inconsistency Senator Taft seems to
ignore the fact that the basic aim Of the NATO
project is to encourage and help the Europeans
to defend themselves. And If, in event of
aggression, the U. N. is no good and NATO is
no good, to what do we turn? Senator Taft
doesn't say
In summary, this is the speech OF man
who is filled with doubts and misgivings. He
hopeS-but he also doubtS-that an effective
alliance against communism can be maintained.
And for some unfathomable reason he chooses
at this critical time to give expression to all OF
his doubts and fears without offering anything
in the nature of an alternative.
Senator Taft is not the only one who enter
tains these apprehensions. They are shared,
possibly, by the President. But General Eisen-
hover, because, as President, he had to do it
and because it was the right thing to do, spoke
out against the hasty call to abandon ship.
His appeal was simply this: We cannot stand
alone in the world: therefore we must stand
with our friends. Compromise is the essence
of coalition, and we must continue to work and
hope and pray that this path will lead to peace.
It may be said that there is an element of
the Pollyanna in this view-that the Commu-
nists do not want peace, and that If the truce
forced to 60 it alone, either by striking for a
military victory or by getting out of Korea.
It would be an act Of folly, however, to try to
cross that bridge before we reach 1t. And 1t
is in his refusal to go along with Senator Taft
In this respect that the President has given
what is perhaps his finest display of real
leadership.
One of his old schoolteachers says Georgi
Malenkov was an excessively polite little boy
It's too bad he didn't grow up in America where
kids of that type seldom do anything worse
than rob few filling stations.