Evening star., 1953-04-26


smashed the enemy at Inchon
in September, 1850. that Secre-
tary of the Army Frank Pace,
jr., issued a cautious reminder
that the Army shouldn't go
overheard in making money
commitments.
And on September 27 Of that
year, the new Secretary of De-
fense. Gen. George c. Marshall,
issued a directive which Senator
Byrd has said was virtually a
showdown order" on military
preparations.
This directive ordered the
services in preparing money
needs to assume the war would
be ended on June 80, 1851. Under
this so-called "guideline." Army
witnesses have testified their
planning and procurement were
limited to a short-term effort.
They gave this directive as a
major reason why more was not
done sooner.
High Level Decision.
Gen. Marshall says he signed
the directive six days after he
took Office succeeding Louis
Johnson. He says he acted on
the recommendation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and this recon-
mendation was signed by Gen.
Omar N. Bradley, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs.
There have been hints in the
testimony that this "guideline"
originated with a higher level
than the Joint Chiefs, possibly
even the White House when it
was occupied by Mr.. Truman.
But it's actual source was not
disclosed in the open testimony.
The PSYCHOLOGY at the time,
witnesses agreed, called for no
urgent action on ammunition.
In fact. former Secretary Pace
told Senators that in October,
1850, there was a widespread be-
lief the war would be over by
Christmas of that year. He said
this impression came from Gen.
Macarthur during the generals
Wake Island meeting with Pres
ident Truman.
Gen. Macarthur replied only
two days ago that Mr.. PAGES
'labored effort" to connect him
with the ammunition shortage
was completely fantastic" Gen.
Macarthur said the real trouble
with the conduct of the Korean
war was not ammunition short
ages but lack of the will for
victory" He said that a threat
to destroy Red China's supply
lines from Russia would end the
Korean war, and might lead to
a settlement of all global issues.
u. S. Forced to Retreat.
Shortly after the Wake Island
conference, the Chinese entered
the war and forced the 9th Army
into retreat. Congress quickly
approved more than 81 billion
additional for ammunition. But
even the testimony reflected no
great alarm at the top levels over
the condition of the stockpile.
BY this time. more than six
months had elapsed since the
start of the war-and only a be-
ginning had been made toward
gearing up industry to produce
ammunition.
The hard facts of life are,
Army men insist, that even after
they get the money from Con-
gress it takes at least another 18
months before industry can be
fooled up to start production.
An testimony showed there
were other delaying factors, too.
Mountains of red tape in
processing contracts. Dif-
ferences with industry over con-
tract terms. 4. Trouble in shift
ing from brass to steel shell
cases. Bottlenecks in ma
chine-tool production. Lack
of overriding priorities for ma
chine tools and materials. .
The question of authorities dele
gated by the Secretary of De-
fenSe to those below him.
In the midst of of these prob
lens early in 1851, Presiden.
Truman removed Gen. MacAr-
thur from his Far Eastern COM
mands in a policy dispute. Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway was moved
from his 9th Army command to
succeed Gen. Macarthur in
Tokyo. Gen. Van Fleet went
to Korea to take over the 9th
Army.
Shooting is Stepped Up.
Gen. Van Fleet arrived on the
scene just in time to meet huge
Red spring offensive. He Or
dered his gunners to step up their
rate of fire to point far exceed
ing the shooting done in World
War II. His guns ate up ammu-
milton far faster than any
American Army ever had before.
Gen. Van Fleet believes in
shooting. He calls himself "big
firepoWer man." And when he
arrived on the scene. the old
war experience tables went out
the window. This called for more
and more ammunition from the