Evening star., 1953-12-06

It is all too easy to view the war
IN Indo-C China and come away with
Q false sense Of optimism. The
French radiate 1t. confidently and
brilliantly. The Wet Namese. for
their part, now are convinced that
the United States is on their side,
30 why worry?
It u, Of course, true that the gen.
eral tone Of optimism Is juStifiable.
The Wet Namese troop buildup is
at least under way, and American
equipment is arriving as fast as the
Franco-Viet Namese forces can use
1t. Native capabilities for increasing
their manpower are great, while the
Communist Wet Mimi are hard put
to replace their losses, say nothing
Of fielding many more troops. The
French goal Of final victory by the
spring Of 1856 looks reasonable.
But there are some soft spots" in
Indo- China that show things are
not as rosy as they seem. The
gloomy side of the war here involves
two main questions:
/. What are the Communists go
ing to do next?
2. Can the French really get the
show on the road?
The Reds, Of course, cannot be
expected to stand idly by while the
French and Wet Namese march to
victory in 1856. The general opin-
ion In Indo-C China. is that the Chi
nese Communists would prefer to
keep this area in Q state Of turmoil
for the foreseeable future. The half
hearted peace bid Of Ho Chi-Minh
last week hasn't changed this idea
much.
Red intentions
There are some who think Red
China. far from dallying. intends to
take Indo-China and the rest Of
gouthoAst AsiA In few years. This
could b done milttArily, or As q
political aftermath to . negotiated
poAOe such As Ho dangled before
the weary French people last week.
n the Reds should decide to come
into the war with full force, no mill
tAry expert In Indo- China thinks they
could be stopped. On the other
hand, most observers doubt II Red
China will try, because Of the risk
Of starting World War III. These
experts think Red China fears what
the United States would do-not
necessarily In Tonkin but in Man
churia and RuSsia-f Southeast
Asia were about to be taken over by
Communist armies.
The thing to watch for in Wet
Nam this year, then. is how Mao
Tse-tung reacts to the step-up in
United States aid for the Franco
Wet NameSe forces. If China in
creases its aid to the Wet Mini,
perhaps by providing air support.
the French target of victory by 1855
might be due for revision. If the
Ho peace bid proves genuine, that
could be signal the Wet Mini hope
to take over the country by peaceful
or subversive means.
The Wet Mini, by themselves,
also could disrupt the French time
table. This years French plan calls
for defensive Sortees by Franco-Viet
Namese regulars, keeping the Reds
off balance, while the Wet Namese
forces are being built up. Assuming
that the Wet Mini know this, they
undoubtedly are now printing them
selves for a large effort to throw
French plans out of gear.
The longer-range worry OF what
Communist China will do, and the
shorter range worry Of how the Wet
Mimi will do this 1953-54 dry sea-
son, then, are two of the main Com
munist-controlled factors inspiring
caution in appraisal Of prospects in
the Indo- Chinese war.
There are, as well, some observers
who think the Franco-Viet Namese
performance could be improved.
The principal Franco-Viet Namese
hope for winning the war, Of course.
Is to increase their mobile forces to
the point where they can chase the
Wet Mini, instead Of being haraSsed
themselves, and at the same time,
to educate the Wet Namese to a
high enough political level 50 that
they will not be such suckers for the
Communist propaganda line.
Vigor Held Locking
These have been the goals for
several years, but have not been
pursued with the vigor most free
world military and political experts
think could have been achieved. This
year the French, under Gen. Henri
Navarro, have shown q marked ten
dency to step up the pace. Whether
that pace Ia as fast as 1t could be
h still q matter Of controversy.
In the military field there are
three principal areas where many
think the French are moving too
slowly:
. Training Of Wet Namese forces.
o Techniques Of command.
. Vigor of French Union Forces
offensive operations.
The first two points are, Of course.
directly under the control Of the
French military command in Wet
Nam. The third problem. on the
other hand, involves heavy casual
ties, which French public opinion
has convinced its military leaders
it would not accept.
The troop training problem, every
one admits, is not one Of preparing
individual infantrymen for battle.
p-officers and non-coms
is the bottleneck. In Wet Nam it
has become a much bigger problem
than it was in Korea. Some 1000
officers and 10000 non-commissioned
officers are to be trained in Wet
Nam in 1858. In Korea, the United
States trained about two and one
half times that number in one year,
according to rough estimates based
on the number Of full divisions put
into the field.
Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat
of Wet Nam hopes to double the
outnllt of officers to 1000 and of