Evening star., 1953-06-09
Guarantees for Free Korea

Although 1t Is easy to understand and
sympathize with the emotionally supercharged
anti-truce feelings of the South Koreans, the
position taken by the Rhee government-whi
still threatens to "go it alone" against the
Communists-can only be described as dan
gerously unrealistic and reckless response to the
guarantees offered by President Eisenhower.
For those guarantees, as eloquently set
forth in his personal letter to President Rhee,
add up to commitments of the first Importance
in situation where the United States and its
principal allies in the United Nations have
firmly decided that it is better to pin hopes on
an armistice than to undertake the risks of an
all-out effort to win peace through decisive
military victory. Future events may not vindi
cate that decision. They may, instead, prove it
to have been disastrously unwise and ignobe
Nevertheless whatever may be history's judg-
ment of it, the fact remains that it has been
made, that it is not going to be reversed now,
and that the South Koreans will therefore
be committing a bitterly fruitless and self
immolating act if they carry out their threat to
continue the shooting struggle on their own.
Certainly, given the situation as it stands
today, the forces of the free Republic of Korea
can hardly hope to wage protracted or effec-
tive "go-it-alone" war without American help
of sort that cannot be forthcoming during an
apart from this consideration, the Rhee govern
ment seems the more unrealistic and reckless
because of the way it has brushed aside Presi-
dent Eisenhowers proposed guarantees as If
they were things of little consequence. How
ever, far from being things of little consequence,
they are things of great consequence that hold
out to the ROK people very real and very solid
assurances projecting program of aid and
protection designed to promote their economic
rehabilitation, support their aspirations for
united country, and keep them secure against
the danger of renewed Red aggression.
Thus, as President Eisenhower has pointed
out to DR.. Rhee, the ROK government, under a
truce, can be sure of the following: % That it
will be left in undsputed possession of slightly
more territory than it controlled prior to the
Communist attack three years ago; (2) that it
can count upon the United States to employ
"all peaceful means" in the post -armistice
period to effect the unifcation of Korea-an
objective whose attainment, despite seeming
extremely remote at the moment is not entirely
inconceivable; 80 that adequate American aid
will be forthcoming to help rebuild the devas-
tated land; and "a that our country will be
ready to enter upon mutual defense pact with
the free Koreans solemnly pledging them our
support against future attack.
Of all these proffered guarantees, the most
important is the last, and there is virtually no
doubt that the Senate-aware that South Korea
has vital f1anking position in relation to the
defense of Japan-would be quick to ratify such
a pact More cannot be expected from our
country at this time. President Eisenhower has
made that much very clear, and the ROK
government and people-even though the i'm
pending truce falls far short of promising a
satisfactory peace-ought certainly to accept
what he has offered. To do otherwise, to fight
on alone, futilely, would be to put their great
valor to tragic misuse.