Evening star., 1953-06-10
HSouth Korea Fiqhts Alone


There is a tendency-a dangerous tend
ency-to underestimate the magnitude of the
problem with which we will be faced If the
South Koreans really are determined to reject
an armistice and fight alone.
The announcement that the Swiss will re-
fuse to serve on the neutral POW commission
unless the South Koreans agree to accept
an armistice is a first tangible hint of the
storm which may be in the of1ng. But it is
a hint, and nothing more. If the storm ac-
tually breaks, such things as the refusal of
the Swiss to serve will be among the least of
our worries.
In this situation we should be careful not
to delude ourselves with empty self-assurances.
It has been said, for instance, that we need
not worry too much; that South Korea must
look to us for supplies, and that the ROKS even
If they break away, cannot fight for long if we
refuse to supply them. This no doubt is true,
but it neglects to take account of possible con-
sequences which would be of the utmost con-
Germ to u.s. If the South Koreans should fight
alone until their supplies are exhausted, what
happens then? Are we to acquieSce in the
destruction of the ROK army which now holds
about so per cent of the front line? If this is to
be the case-if fighting resumes and the South
Koreans are defeated-what assurance is there
in the face of an advancing and victorious
Communist army? Even If the remaining U. N.
force would be secure, are we going to accept,
after all the fighting and bloodshed, Com
munist conquest of South Korea? If we say we
are not going to accept it, with what forces are
we going to prevent it, once the ROK army is
defeated?
Perhaps questions such as these raise ex-
treme possibilities. But if they are even pos
Sibilities they must be kept in mind In dealing
with this situation. Furthermore, we should
remember that South Korea can cause enormous
trouble without going to the extreme of fighting
alone. Suppose they merely refuse to accept an
armistice and decline to withdraw their troops
from their present positions. Would not that
raise the gravest threat to the hope of attaining
any armiStice?
At the very least in dealing with this
problem, we should not forget that if our
position is strong, so is that of South Korea.
We cannot snap our fingers and expect that
they will automatically Jump through the hoop.
We should remember that the South
Koreans have suffered more than any one else
in this war. We should remember that Asiatic
communism, a relatively remote threat to us,
is right at South Korea'S front door. And we
should also remember that the South Koreans,
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battle and are most Immediately concerned
with the settlement, were never really consulted
on the terms of this armistice. They were
shown the proposals only few hours before
they were submitted to the Communists. Pre-
sumaby this bypassing was intended to FORE
stall objections which we knew the South
Koreans would raise. But in the light of cur
rent conditions it was a strategy of question
able wisdom.
All of this is not to say that we can or
should permit South Korea to dictate the terms
of settlement or the alternative to settlement.
President Eisenhower has made clear our posi-
tion on the matter of fighting for military
decision, and there is not the slightest reason
to suppose that he is going to retreat in the
face of threats from our ally. At the same
time, however, we should clearly perceive that
there is no easy way out of this mess for us.
If we will not permit the South Koreans to
dictate to u.s. neither are we in any position
to dictate to them. What is required, instead,
are persuasion and reason-an unflagging effort
to make our South Korean allies realize that
it is to their interest, as we'll ours, to adhere
to the course that has been charted and to
refrain from threats which, If carried out, could
hardly fail to result in their own destruction
and incalculable damage to the common cause.