The Key West citizen. [volume] (Key West, Fla.) 1879-current, 1953-02-16
The World Today
BY JAMES NARROW

WHAT COLHCS VI TIcSluG0l ElSGu-
hower's decision on Formosa, at
least it has served him as a useful
trial balloon for testing opinion be-
fore he goes any further.
There has been not only world
wide reaction to his Formosa
policy but speculation, at home
and abroad and particularly in
Congress, on just what he should
or shouldn't do next.
What he said about Formosa.
taken at face value, didn't mean
much. He said he would tell the
Seventh Fleet to let Chang Kai-
Shek's Nationalist troops on For
mosa attack the Chinese mainland.
Actually, the Nationalist have
been doing just that for more than
a year, although only in small
raids from islands near the main
land. So the main purpose of the
fleet has been to keep the Com
munists from attacking Formosa.
And even with the fleet with
drawn, the Nationalists by them
selves can't do much more than
they've been doing, it seems.
Military experts say they won't be
capable of more than continued
small raids for a good while.
But Eisenhower left unanswered
the first question that came to
everyone's mind: What would the
fleet do now if the Communists
attacked Formosa by sea or air?
And that one unanswered ques-
ton gave rise to a host of others:
If the fleet stopped a Communist
attack on Formosa, would that put
this country into about war with
China, thus widening the Korean
War?
Is this decision about the fleet
the only move Eisenhower has in
mind? If not, what next? Should
he Navy blockade the Chinese
Communist coast to keep supplies
from the Reds? Should the u. S.
start bombing Red bases in Man
churia beyond the Yalu River,
which is what Gen. Macarthur had
wanted to do?
If Eisenhower wanted to push
the Communists off balance, psy-
chologically, by forcing them to
guess about what was coming next,
he undoubtedly succeeded. They
couldn't help wondering.
No one except Eisenhower's
inner circle knows whether he
intends any other moves to end
the Korean War or just announced
the new Formosa. policy - which
could mean nothing new or very
much, depending On what he has
in mind - to see the reaction
before trying anything else.
If getting reaction was all he
had in mind, he got ii. Neutral
Asians let it be known they don't
think much of Chang and are
concerned about any American
move that might widen the war
and make 1t world war.
Herbert Morrison, former for
eign secretary of the British Labor
government, told the U. S. it
shouldn't look for British support
on the Chinese mainland as
result of the mistaken Formosan
policy. There was worry elsewhere
in Europe.
And as speculation widened in
this country, one idea led to
another. giving Eisenhower
chance to see what American
opinion, or some Of it, was before
ne tried anything else.
Rep. Short. Missouri Republican
and chairman Of the House Armed
Services Committee, limited a naval
blockade of the Chinese mainland
was under consideration. He said
he got it from Adm. Arthur Rad
ford, commander of Pacific naval
forces.
Sen. Russell. Georgia Democrat
and leader of the Southern Demo-
Gratis, joined growing congress
sional demand for a blockade.
Sen. Taft. Republican Senate
leader, said he would back any
move Eisenhower might make in
the Far East. including a naval
blockade of China.
And Gen. Bradley, chairman Of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
reported Monday to have told
senator's he believes ships China
bound could be stopped and forced
to unload their cargoes without
precipitating war.
lean lille. from the White
House, silence. But the public is
being prepared for whatever comes
next.
WASHINGTON n NAT0 rnf<