davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1953-04-19
The Far East

In the Far East vigorous
policy decisions were also taken
since the 80 days began. In
Korea we embarked upon a
program to change the COM
plexion Of that struggle. AS
President Eisenhower told you,
We still welcome an armistice,
not merely to end the fighting
but on the assumption that it
will lead to a peace which ac-
cords with the principles Of
the United Nations-and that
means free and united Korea.
OF course we want peace in
Korea. But we do not play the
role of suppliants.
We have vastly improved our
relations with the National
Government of China. We now
have and Ambassador at Tai
pei, Formosa, the provisional
capital. We are speeding the
delivery of military assistance
which was woefully in arrears.
Presid ent Eisenhower has
changed the instructions to the
Seventh Fleet so that, while
1t is still instructed to protect
FormoSa. it is no longer in
structed to protect the Chinese
Communists on the mainland.
In relation to Indo-C China,
the French Government and
the associated States have
been told that we would be
favorably disposed to giving
increased military and finan-
cial assistance to plans realis.
Evening star., 1953-04-19

he wanted to know whether DR.
Keith r. Ladder, as a consultant
for the Senate Small Business
Committee, had become over
enthusiastic in appraising Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology
tests on AD-X2.
DR.. Ladder recommended uni
versal use Of the additive, basing
this conclusion on the NIT re-
port of its tests. NIT, however,
yesterday telegraphed Senator
Ellender that, lit was unjustifi-
able to conclude that the battery
additive did or did not have COM
mercial value"
This did not satisfy Senator
Ellender. He planned to ask
NIT for a further statement on
the way its reports have been in
terpreted.
Senator Ellender said that
after he receives the other NIT
statement, he may ask Chairman
Bridges of the full appropriations
committee for permission to call
Bureau of Standards and Com
merce Department officials be-
fore the Commerce subcommit-
tee to discuss the AStin case.
Evening star., 1953-04-19

analyze and interpret foreign
conditions and to carry out
designated missions. usually
of delicacy. sometimes Of
danger. Just as the Nation de-
pendS. for defense purposes,
on the graduates Of our mill
tary and naval academies, so
the Nation, for foreign serv-
ices, depends on our career
diplomats.
Our people here at home,
our friends abroad and our
enemies abroad can know that
we have not only strong for
eign policies but that we are
rapidly molding an organiza-
ton which win be secure and
which will be efficient in
action.
I might add as of particular
interest to this distinguished
group Of American editors that
these foreign policies Of which
speak are no longer looked
upon as state secrets. We are
determined that the public
shall be as fully informed as
possible, and in the clearest
and simplest language pos
slble, about what we are doing
in the State Department and
what our foreign policy is.
I have long felt that, under
our form Of government, the
effectiveness of foreign policy
depends in large measure upon
public understanding and sup
port of it.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
Career Officers Serve
Country, Not Party
In Power, Dulles Says

Secretary of State Dulles said
last night the State Depart
ment's career officers are dedi-
Gated to the country, not to any
Democratic or Republican ad-
ministration.
While he did not say so di-
rectly, the Secretary apparently
had reference to a call by some
Republican Senators last Mon
day to rid the State. Department
of high level officers who served
during the Truman administra-
tion.
Mundt's Demand.
This demand came from Sena-
tor Mundt. Republican, of South
Dakoda, who said he had the
support of Republican Senators
Bridges of New Hampshire, Nc
Carthy of Wisconsin, Ferguson of
Michigan and other members of
the Senate Appropriations Com
mittee..
Senator Mundt said there was
no question of loyalty or security
involved. but added: 1--WE prom
iSed a change in the last cam
paign." He said an alarming
number of policy making officials
were held over from the Demo-
cratic regime.
In speech before the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors. Mr.. Dulles said there was
"a tendency in some quarters to
feel that confidence cannot be
placed" in career officers who
served under Democrats.
Cites Fine Tradition.
To the contrary, he said. such
officers can adapt themselves to
the new Republican leadership.
Like career soldiers, Foreign
Service officers respect and well
come high-level policy direction
such as they are getting under
President Eisenhower, Mr.. Dulles
said.
They are. with rare excep-
tions, a splendid and patriotic
group of men and women. with a
fine tradition"
Mr.. Dulles pledged that he
would do all possible to keep
Subversives out of the State De-
partment.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
The Soviet
Peace Defensive

Our conduct has been
calmly strong, never truculent
nor clustering. In the face of
it, Soviet leaders gave evidence
that they were changing their
policies. They initiated what
presents to you and to me one
OF the most ,perplexing prob
lens OF our time. 1t is prob
lem that think is largely due
to a misnomer. The Kremlin
launched what is commonly
called a peace offensive"
Whatever it is that the Krem-
lin has launched-and no one
can be sure just yet what it is
it is not a peace offensive.
1t is a peace defensive.
1t Is gratifying that Soviet
leaders appear now to have
shifted from an offensive to a
defensive mood. But we can
not yet tell whether this rep
resents a hasic change, or
merely a tactical shift. It is
prudent. for the present, to as
sumo that we are witnessing a
tactical move of the kind
which Soviet Communism has
often practiced.
Stain, in his classic treatise
on Strategy and Tactics"
taught that, from time to
time, concessions" may have
to be made in order to buy off
a powerful enemy and gain a
respite" He went on to ex-
plain the necessity of maneu-
vering with a view to effect
ing a proper retreat when the
enemy is strong. The OBJ
ject of this strategy is to gain
time and to accumulate forces
in order later to assume the
offensive. .fs
Is the Successor-or should
I say. are the SUCCESSORS
following this strategy of the
dead Stain?
Whatever the reason and
purpose of present Soviet
moves. the fact is that the
Communist leaders seem now
disposed to grant some things
which they formerly denied.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
Dulles Outlines Esenhowers Foreign Policy Talk Editors

cate its deep concern and
point out that failure to realize
the European Defense Com
munity could mean collapse of
the hopes and efforts that in
spifed the Marshall Plan. the
North Atlantic Treaty and the
Mutual Security Program.
Therefore. on January 30th,
just 10 days after the Presi-
dents inaugural, Mr.. StasSen
and I. at the Presidents re-
quest, visited the six European
Defense Community countries,
and also Great Britain. AS q
result Of our visit, and the re-
turn visits to Washington of
several European leaders, this
project has now been revived.
1t cannot yet be confidently
predicted that it will be real
lied. But it is today the Ivest
single topic before the six
parliaments of continental
Europe.
The Soviet Union now faces
the likelihood that Western
Europe will produce a uni
fled military force, including
French and Germans. Thus
would come to a final end one
of the hopes from which So
Wet imperialism has taken
comfort.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
European Defense
Community

One of the worries of the
free world, and one of the
hopes of the Soviet world, has
been disunity in Western Eu-
rope. For example, it would
be particularly disastrous for
the West if Franco-German
antagonism were revived. That
would indeed afford Soviet in
trigue a fertile field of opera
ton.
The continental European
Countries themselves, includ<
ing France and Germany, had
seen the danger and had de-
NAed a program to meet it..
They had proposed to create
y European Defense Commu-
nifty. the members of which
would merge their military
power into a single force. A
treaty to this effect was
signed nearly a year ago. It
was contemplated by the
treaty that it would be rati-
fed and come into force
within six months. But, fol-
lowing the signature of the
treaty. nothing happened. Last
January, it seemed that the
project was dying.
The President, out Of his
own intimate knowledge of
European conditions, felt that
our Government should indi-
Evening star., 1953-04-19
The New Era

Some weeks ago when I was
at the United Nations. said
that the Stain era had ended
and that the Eisenhower era
had begun. bringing with it
new hope for all mankind. AL
ready that prediction is in
process of confirmation. Pres
ident Eisenhower'S address is
a fact which will inevitably
influence the course of history.
Around the world peoples and
governments have universally
welcomed that address. In all
the capitals of the free world,
press and radio have demon
strated an unprecedented spon-
taneous support for the Pres
ident's call for a world-wid
peace offensive and his chal-
lenge to the new Soviet leader
ship to back up their words
with deeds. That response is
not merely because of the
words the President used. but
because what he said had its
setting in a 90-day framework.
I do not attempt to read the
future. That must always re-
main obscure so long as vast
power is possessed by men who
accept no guidance from the
moral law. But surely our duty
is clear. Those who represent
a nation with the tradition
and power of the United States
must act boldly and strongly
for what they believe to be
right. The future is for q
higher verdict,
Evening star., 1953-04-19
The Middle East and
Latin America

The Middle East and Latin
America, two areas far apart.
have both been the subject of
Communist attempts at infil-
tration. The ground was fer
tile because these areas have
somewhat lacked our attention,
and, in the case of the Middle
East, there has developed a
spirit of nationalism, which
has at times grown fanatical in
its opposition to the Western
powers.
AS was announced some
weeks ago, Mr.. StasSen and I
have been invited by the gov
ernments of more than a dozen
countries of the Middle East
and South Asia to visit them.
We have accepted and plan
to go next month. That is
significant, for no United
States Secretary of State has
ever visited any of these coun-
tries. It will afford us an OPP
portunity to meet at firsthand
many of the leaders and, I
hope, to dissipate the false
impressions which Communist
propaganda has fomented.
AS President Eisenhower an.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
Astiin
Continued From First Page.)

sources-that this conception is
not operative in the Commerce
Department or any where else
in the administration, the dam
age resulting from the Astin
affair will continue to spread" ."
Secretary Weeks. in delaying
DR.. Astin's custer for several
months, declared that he never
intended to reflect on the integ-
rity of the bureau or its direc-
tor. He also set up a special
committee to study the bureaus
tests of a controversial battery
additive, AD-X2.
Sees No Useful Purpose.
This prompted Chairman Thye
and a majority of his Senate
Small Business Committee to call
off hearings the committee had
scheduled to start Wednesday.
mo useful purpose will be
served by conducting the. hear
ings at this time" Senator Thye
told the Senate. "Any commit
tee hearings might we'll becloud
the issue at this time rather
than clarity it.
This committee is fully aware
of the Importance of the Bureau
of Standards. and especially DR..
Astin. I am confident the action
of Secretary Weeks and Assist
ant Secretary Sheaffer will ulti-
mately clear up the entire ques-
ton"
Ladders Stand Questioned.
Senator Ellender. however. still
had a suspicious eye cooked to-
ward the whole affair. He said
Evening star., 1953-04-19

tically designed to suppress
the Communist-inspired civil
war which for six years has
wracked the area and seriously
drained the metropolitan re-
sources of France.
We recently announced, in
conjunction with the French
Government, that should the
Chinese Communist regime
take advantage of a Korean
armistice to pursue aggressive
war elsewhere in the Far East,
such action would have the
most serious consequences and
would conflict directly with
the understanding on which
any armiStice in Korea was
reached. That decision was
taken prior to the recent re-
vival of prospects for a Korean
armistice. 1t was part of our
effort to anticipate what may
happen rather than to catch
up with what has happened.
We negotiated with the gov
ernments of Britain, France
and other maritime powers for
a tightening of the blockade
of Communist China. They
are taking important practical
measures to restrict the voy-
ages of their own ships to
China and to withhold fuel
from ships of other nations
which are carrying strategic
goods to China.
You can see, as others have
seen, that a new order of
priority and urgency has been
given to the Far East. Further,
it has been made clear that
we consider that our Eastern
friends, from Japan, Korea
and Formosa, to Indo- China
and Malaga. face single hos
tile front, to be met with a
common purpose and growing
cooperation as between the
component parts of freedom.
This means that the Com
munists in the Far East can no
longer count on winning by
shifting their strength and by
focusing attack on one or
another free world position
that is isolated from the
others. The Communist STRAIT
egy, based on a contiguous land
mass, is now confronted by a
growing free world unity based
upon the peninsular positions
and offshore island chain now
controlled by the free peoples
of Asia.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
NATO

1t was never expected that
the European Defense Com
munity, when created, would
alone carry the burdens of
making Western Europe Sc
cure, EDO, a community of six.
would stand within the frame
work of NATO, a partnership
of IA. This partnership, how
ever, also presented us with
urgent problems. For most of
the members had come to feel
that the program for NATO
represented a type of effort
which they could not continue
indefinitely to bear.
The United States and it's
NATO partners had been oper-
ating on the assumption that
the moment of greatest danger
was some early, practicable
date. Therefore. it had been
reasoned, emergency efforts
should be made to meet that
date, leaving subsequent years
for stab1lizat;on and recupera-
ton.
But the Soviet Union did not
conveniently relax it's threat
In order to meet the precon-
ceived timetable of the NATO
countries. Accordingly, it was
found necessary each year to
prolong the extraordinary ex-.
ertion and to defer the period
of Stabilization. This spas
modic approach was exhaus-
tive to all concerned. Several
of our Allies told us that they
could not hold to the present
pace without greatly increased
help from the United States.
The situa TO n obviously
called for fresh approach.
Because we did not believe
that any specific date of peak
danger could be reliably fore
cast; because Soviet commu-
niSm itself processes to operate
in terms of IAN entire his
torical era; because new
weapons inevitably change the
aspect of the military task;
because a vigorous and happy
society is itself an important
ingredient of freedom - for
these reasons we decided to
find programs which, on the
one hand, will provide Europe
with substantial insurance
against being overrun by Soviet
attack. and which, on the other
hand, can, if necessary, be
sustained for an indefinite
Evening star., 1953-04-19

In addition to the new Sec
retary OF State. there are two
new undersecretaries, one Of
whom specializes in admin
stration and security matters.
There are six new assistant
secretaries. There is a new
legal adviser, new counselor,
a new director Of International
Inf o rmation Administration,
who has responsibility for the
Voice Of America. The whole
Policy Planning staff is to 60
under new direction and be
co-ordinated closely with the
revitalized National Security
Council.
We are also bringing fresh
vision and new vigor into our
United Nations mission and
into our embassies abroad. The
chief Of the Permanent Mis-
sion to the United Nations,
former Senator Austin, re-
tired last January after many
years Of distinguished serv-
Ice He has been succeeded
by former Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, who now heads
the Permanent Mission. His
vigor and parliamentary skill
already demonstrate that the
Soviet leaders cannot look for
ward to using the United Ma
tlons as a sounding board for
propaganda but that they will
have to deal in the United Ma
tlons with a modified body of
world opinion which is deter
mined that the United Nations
shall, in fact, serve it's avoWed
purpose to maintain inter-
national peace and security in
conformity with the princi-
Piles of justice.
New Ambassadors are in
stalled or being installed in
Great Britain, Ireland, France.
Italy. Germany. Russia, Spain,
Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Free
China, India and Pakistan.
Other appointments are in
contemplation.
For the first time in State
Department history, all of our
major appointments are SUBJ
ject to FBI field checks so as
to eliminate security risks and
possibility of hostile inflltra-
ton into high places. So far
as is humanity practical, we are
seeing to it that Communist
agents shall not have access to
the State Department.
We are fortunate in having
a body Of foreign service ca
reer men and women who can
be the main reliance Of the
President and myself. They
are a permanent and non-po-
litical part of Government,
They became such under the
Rogers Act, enacted by a Re-
publican Congress during the
Administration of President
Coolidge and Secretary Hughes.
There is a tendency in some
quarters to feel that confidence
cannot be placed in these ca
reer officials because in the
past, as was their duty, they
served under Democrat Presi-
dents and Democrat Secre-
taries of State. 1t is, however,
easier than most think for our
career Foreign Service men
and women to adapt them
selves to new Republican lead
ership. Like career soldiers,
Foreign Service officers respect
and welcome high-level policy
direction such as they are
getting under President EiSen-
hover. They are, with rare
exceptions, a splendid and pa
triotic group of men, and
women, with a fine tradition.
They are experts. trained to
Evening star., 1953-04-19
The First 90 Days

President Eisenhower, speak
ing here last Thursday, opened
the door to the mansion of
peace. He invited the Soviet
Union to come in, That invi-
tation was not mere rhetoric.
Its timing was not chosen at
hazard. 1t marked a planned
stage in the evolution of Eisen-
hover foreign policy. The
speech really had its Begin
ming when President EiSen-
hover took Office, which was
80 days ago tomorrow.
The words which President
Eisenhower uttered might have
been uttered at any time dur
ing these past 80 days. But
these words gained immensely
in significance because they
came against a background
of cohesive, positive action.
When President Eisenhower
first took Office, a plea for
peace such as he made this
week might have been inter-
preted as a sign of weakness
or a mere gesture of sentiment
tality. In order that such a
plea should carry maximum
impact, it was first necessary
to demonstrate to the world,
and to Soviet leaders in par
ticular, President Eisenhower's
will and capacity to develop
foreign policies so firm, so fair,
SO just, that the Soviet leaders
might find 1t expedient to live
with these policies rather than
to live against them.
should like briefly to re-
view this 90-day period, which
had as its climax the PreSi-
dents historical address.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
Paul Junior High Meeting

Purchase of an intercommuni-
cation system for Paul Junior
High School will be discussed at
a meeting of the schools Home
and School Association at 8 pm.
Tuesday in the school audito-
rum, Eighth and Oglethorpe
streets NV. Members also will
view a one-act play given by
ninth grade students and a 100
exhibit science fair set up by
the students.
Evening star., 1953-04-19
Captive Peoples

The free peoples are sus-
ceptible to Soviet guile be-
cause they so passionately
want peace that they can
readily be attracted by illu-
sions of peace. One such
illusion is a settlement based
on the status quo. This present
status involves the captivity of
hundreds Of millions of per-
sons of distinctive nationality,
race. religion and culture. The
hardest task of the Soviet
rulers is to beat this disunity
into Communist conformity. If
that can be done, then the
menace of Soviet Communism
will be immeasurably in
creased.
1t was Of the utmost import
ance that we should make
clear to the captive peoples
that we do not accept their
captivity as a permanent fact
of history. If they thought
otherwise and became hope
less, we would unwittingly
have become partners to the
forging of a hostile power so
vast that it could encompass
our deStructtiOn
President Eisenhower, an
ticipating some of the events
that have since occurred.
acted immeditely after his in
auguration to propose that our
national position should be
made clear through a solemn
resolution concurred in by
Congress and the President.
The Congress has yet to act.
However. I am persuaded, and
trust that the captive peoples
are persuaded. that Congress
in fact fully shares the point
of view that President, Eisen-
hover expressed. In any event,
the Chief Executive has for
mulated his position on this
important matter and by doing
so has foreclosed another of
the hopes which Soviet rulers
had optimiStically entertained.
Evening star., 1953-04-19

period with growing reliance
on. Western Europe's own
strength.
Next week the Secretary of
the Treasury, Mr.. Humphrey,
the Secretary of Defense, Mr..
Wilson. the Director for Mutual
Security, Mr.. Stassen. and I
will go to Paris to meet with
the other members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation Council. There we shall
listen sympathetically to the
point of view of our partners
and together with them con-
cert military programs de-
signed to deter attack from
without. without undermining
inner strength.
All will know, and am con-
fident that the Soviet leaders
know best of all. that what
we plan is not greater weakness
but greater strength. The pro-
ductivity Of the free world is
so prodigious, its inventiveness
so phenomenal, that any mill
tary aggressor that attacked
our free world partnership
would be doomed to sure de-
feat.
What we plan is to dissi-
pate another Soviet hope, the
hope expressed by Stain when
he said that "the moment
for the decisive blow" would
come when the opponents of
Communism "have sufficiently
weakened themselves in a
struggle which is beyond their
strength have sufficiently
diSgraced themselves through
their practical bankruptcy so
that our victory is assured"
We do not intend that that
moment of bankruptcy shall
come.
Let me add that the policy
here expressed was determined
upon without regard to any
of the recent Soviet moves.
We are not dancing to any
Russian tune. Nothing that
has happened has induced in
us mood of relaxation or any
desire to weaken NATO. The
purpose and the result will be
a NATO more sure to live and
to perform its appointed tasks.