Evening star., 1953-01-13
Mr.. Lovett's Proposals

In his just-released November 18 letter to
the President Defense Secretary Lovett has
set forth meaty list of suggestions designed
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
the countrys military establishment. Writing
IN a r1on-dogmatic spirit and acknowledging
that certain Of his views may be very much
open to debate, he has nonetheless emphat-
lcally warned that the present setup would
require drastic and dangerously disruptive
reorganization In the event Of major war
Accordingly, as a matter Of preparedness. he
mas urged that Congress lose no time in amend
ing the National Security Act-the basic law
governing the Pentagon's operations-to per4
NIT substantial improvement in existing
administrative and policy-making arrange
ments
Mr.. Lovett's suggestions of them
highly controversial-have been submitted at
the Presidents request in order to give help
1ul guidance to Charles E. Wilson, who will
take over as Defense Secretary in the incoming
EISENHOWER administration. Covering virtually
every major Pentagon problem the suggestions
range all the way from proposals to revamp
the Joint Chiefs Of Staff to an appeal for
action against "the apparent inadequacy of
existing legislation to protect this country
against traitors, spies and blabber- mouths"
The chances are of course, that Congress will
be slow to act on Mr.. Lovetts more debatable
recommendations but his presentation as a
whole Is so stimulating and persuasive that a
lot OF good reform is likely to come from 1t
If his successor-Mr. Wilson-argues in favor
OF its essentials, as he probably will.
To begin with, Mr. Lovett has proposed that
the National Security Act be amended to clarity
and strengthen the authority of the Secretary
Of Defense as the Presidents deputy COM
ms in foft t1oa
ton emphasizing civilian control. Further,
although the act forbids it now he has urged
revision to equip the Secretary with mill
tary staff of his own-a body wholly distinct
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He favors this
change primarily because the absence of such
special staff means that the jos must be
burdened with an inordinate amount of paper
work and administrative detail grievously in
terfering with strategical planning and similar
think" projects-projects that should be the
primary, full-time business of the Joint Chiefs,
who in their present situation, because Of the
law itself, find it impossible to function as
effectively as they can and should.
In Mr.. Lovett's opinion, the jos setup, as
it stands constitutes "one of the principal
weaknesses" of the National Security Act. He
therefore has submitted two alternative pro-
posals-one moderate and the other sweeping
10 TSOISdIllZe Tie JOlLL NIllclS dETduSemeut
In way calculated Cd to minimize the inter-
service rivalries and "back-scratching' inherent
in it, especially at lower staff levels, and (2) to
relieve 1t Of the present load Of paper work
and thus enable it to operate much more effec-
lively in the field Of planning and as q top
military advisory agency Two related agencies
the Munitions Board and the Research and
Development Board-have also been earmarked
by Mr.. Lovett for basic reorganization, chiefly
to end situation in which their Army Navy
and Air Force members "sit as judges on their
own requests"
1t is not possible, actually, to reduce Mr..
Lovetts trenchant letter to brief summary
Among other things, it calls for economizing
measures in the field Of headquarters personnel
in various regions; it advocates the adoption
of a system of universal military training;
and it strongly urges that an effort be made
to save money by undermining, improving and
doing away with duplication in the so-called
technical services" of the military establish
ment. AS he has wryly put 1t. reorganization Of
these services would be no more painful than
"a