Evening star., 1952-07-19
A Truce Nearing?

for an extended leave in Russia, Jacob A. Malik,
the Soviet representative on the United Nations
Security Council, has offered no explanations.
But at u. N. headquarters in New York his
unexpected action has led many delegates to
feel that he may have been ordered to stay on
the job because the Kremlin has reason to
believe that an agreement on a Korean truce
may soon be reached at Panmunjom.
This may be wishful interpretation Never
theeSS, though optimistic conclusion
jumping would be premature in the extreme,
the Malik move-coming almost on the eve of
his scheduled sailing for Russia-certainly tends
to suggest the possibility of an impending break
in the deadlocked armiStice talks. And the
possibility seems the more substantial because
the Communists at Panmunjom during the past
fortnight of secret negotiations and recesses
have been eschewing their usual propaganda
harangues and acting rather busnesslike.
Further Red China's qualified acceptance Of
the Geneva convention on prisoners of war has
left some observers with the impresson-right
or wrong-that the enemy may be preparing to
yield to the U.N.'s adamant demand for voluntary
repatriation. This issue appears to be the only
one now blocking truce agreement Accord
ingly, if the Communists have at last made up
their minds to stop insisting on the forcible
return of tens of thousands of North Korean
returned, then it ought not to be too difficult
to work out an effective armistice at an early
date. In short, although caution and skep-
ticism are still very much in ORDER Mr. Malik'S
cancelled trip may well mean that such an
armistice is nearing because the Pyongyang-
Peiping- Moscow co-conspirators have decided
that the time has come when they can gain
nothing from further stalling at Panmunjom.
At the moment there is strong tendency
in u N circles to take this optimistic view for
two reasons, among others. One reason is that
the men of the Kremlin may really be anxious
to end the Korean war. Propagandistically and
otherwise they have done pretty well in Asia,
but now they may wish to launch new peace"
offensive aimed at undermining the Atlantic
alliance and shattering the common defensive
front being built up in European offensive
that cannot be carried out effectively, even
among the ''neutralists," as long as there is
fighting in Korea to remind everybody that the
threat of Red aggression is very real. And the
second reason is this: That the Soviet Union,
seeing how much stronger the United States is
today than at the outbreak of hostilities two
years ago. and seeing also the progress being
made in our vast rearmament program, may
be eager for truce in the hope that it will
slow down our effort and lull all of us back into
a complacent, busineSs-as-us usual frame of mind.
These two points make sense, ana the SOVleL
leaders conceivably may find them persuasive
enough to warrant a Red retreat at Panmun-
jom-a retreat taking the form of acceptance
of the U. Ms prisoner exchange proposal. Per-
haps it is over-hopeful to expect such an
acceptance However, even though bitter expert
ence has shown that optimistic speculation is
always hazardous where Communists are
involved, the men of the Kremlin may well feel
that little yielding will be worth while if a
truce can be used to dissipate Western unity
and weaken our American defense program.
Certainly, if and when an armistice is agreed
upon, many people in the free world will be
inclined to relax and reduce the pace and scale
of rearmament Since nothing could be more
helpful to the long-range objectives of the
Kremlin, every effort must be made to insure
against backsliding of that kind. To allow it to
happen would be to hirt with disaster.