Evening star., 1952-11-15
QuoIity VS.. Quantity of Aircroft

Ine DEFENSE Department has made an
effective answer to general charges by Senate
Preparedness subcommittee that the Pentagon
has bungled the rearmament program, especially
with respect to air power. Oversimpified, the
dispute between defense officials and Senator
Lyndon Johnsons group involves the basic ques-
tion whether to concentrate on quality or guam
tity in building up our air strength. The
Johnson committee has urged speedy increase
in air power. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer
to take calculated risk in opposing the COM
mittees demand for "freeze" on existing
aircraft designs. The freezing of models and
curtailment of research and redevelopment in
evitably would depreciate the quality of our
aviation forces-a dangerous thing to do when
our enemies give evidence of constant improve
ment of their aircraft.
One of the surprising comments of the
Johnson subcommittee was that our aircraft
production has been hampered by lack of
"topside" authority with power ito put an end
to the endless research and development and
order concentration on volume production" of
present aircraft designs. In the first place, as
Defense Secretary Lovett and his advisers
pointed out, topside authority with power to
curtail or expand research and development
already exists. 1t is the Research and Develop
ment Board. This board has no intention how
ever, of drastically restricting efforts by the
three armed services to improve present weapons
and equipment through continued research and
development.
The Air Force wisely is trying to maintain
proper balance between quality and quantity
in its aircraft procurement program. It told
the committee: "Our present objective-unlike
the all-out mobilization of World War lis
not to have built as many airplanes as we
possibly can. but rather-agan in keeping with
the national policy of limited mobilization-to
obtain specific number of planes by specific
time. The emphasis is on getting that certain
number of planes in the very highest quality.
II quantity were to be the sole objective, the
Air Force could have frozen on the designs of
the F-80 or the F-86A which existed at the
beginning of Korea and produced much greater
numbers OF these aircraft. The result today
would nave been larger but, in terms of
superiority over enemy aircraft, quite inferior
force. We believe it is clear from the
record that we have qualitative advantage over
the Communists which is paying off, and We
expect to retain that advantage"
If there is a flaw in this argument for
stressing quality in aircraft production, it lies
in the relatively few modern fighter planes that
have gone to Korea. The communiques seem to
indicate, however. that the policy has paid off.
During September, for example, our F-86 Sabre
jets shot down 81 RuSSian-built MIG-15S at q
cost to our side of only four planes downed by
the MICS. To sacrifice quality to quantity in
our aircraft production program would be to
put our pilots at grave Disadvantages. Our
flyers deserve to get the best planes that our
designers and manufacturers can produce-suh-
ject only to the reservation that the finest plane is
of no immediate value in war unless it is
available for combat.