Evening star., 1952-07-10
The Mood Of Defeat

lie ViOOU VI HSJGOI
AS one rereads the addresses to the Repub-
lican convention by General Macarthur and
Herbert Hoover the conviction grows that these
men are the victims of peculiar kind OF
defeatist mood OF their own making.
It is not possible to sum up with literal
accuracy, in few paragraphs, the views which
they required some two hours to express In the
course of an hour-long address, one expressed
view tends to be cancelled out by another. Thus,
General Macarthur, If he takes defeatist view
OF the outlook In Europe, has been the leading
advocate of a more aggressive war in Korea. And
Mr.. Hoover, for all his fears and hesitations,
nevertheless advocates the building of an all
powerful air and naval force
In word, the disagreement of these men
with our foreign policy, reflected in the North
Atlantic pact comes down to a matter of degree.
Mr.. Hoover thinks that the policies to which
we are committed in Western Europe will impose
upon us an economic burden that we cannot
carry. He thinks we are paying price we cannot
afford for measure of security which is at best
of dubious value. He warns of phantom armies"
and pleads for his own concept of cheaper
security acquired at lower cost in the form of
air power.
There is no point here in debating this
military question. It is enough to say that not
one Of our responsible military men, so far as
The Star knows, is in agreement with Mr..
Hoover. It may be pointed out, however, that
Mr.. Hoover, over all the long years of recurring
crises, has tended to underestimate American
capacities. This is not said in any spirit of
mean criticism, for Mr.. Hoover is great Ameri-
can whose devotion to his country and whose
sincerity OF purpose command respect. The
record, however, should be kept straight.
When the British, after the fall of France,
were battling to save their own islands, Mr..
Hoover supported the principle of aiding them.
But he wanted to limit our aid in kind and
quantity for fear that we might try to do too
much. He opposed using the American Navy for
convoy purposes in the Atlantic. He was afraid
we might be drawn into war that we could not
win. In 1941, Mr.. Hoover was estimating, with
dismay, the cost of transporting an army across
the Atlantic. And, said he, mo military expert
believes we could land such. IAN army in Europe
even if we got it overseas"
Mr.. Hoover was mistaken. If he had had the
power of decision decade ago the chances are
that we would not have attempted the things
that we did-things that we had to attempt, and
had to do, If the aggressors of that period were
to be turned back
General Macarthur, one of our great soldiers,
also is filled with qualified doubts and misgivings
We must fully understand, he told the
Republicans, that once we commit ourselves to
the defense of others the issue of war or peace
is no longer In our exclusive hands And he
went on to say: ''We must remain faithful to
the commitments we have made to others, SO
long as they remain faithful to theirs made to
us, but failure of the principle Of collective
security in Korea, where we found ourselves
holding responsibility without corresponding
authority, plainly warns that too much must not
be expected from collective security elsewhere"
Whatever may have been in General Mac
Arthur's mind, this last phrase clearly suggests
that his faith in allies is waning Some Is years
ago, however, he wrote notable letter to William
Allen White.
1.-THE history of failure in war" he wrote on
that occasion, "can almost be summed up in
two words: Too late. Too late in comprehending
the deadly purpose of potential enemy; too
late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in
preparedness; too late in uniting all possible
forces for resistance; too late in standing with
ones friends"
Surely that counsel wise in 1889, is not less
wise today. The whole object of our efforts in
Western Europe and elsewhere is to unite all
possible forces of resistance, to stand with our
friends and to help equip them to stand with us,
before it is too late. The Kremlin is feverishly
building its forces and those of its satellites 1t
would be an act of folly if we should pull back
now from the task of building up our own forces
and those of our friends.
Collective security mas not worked as well as
we might wish in Korea. In Europe, it is true
that progress has been slow and disappointments
have been many. But let us remember two more
lines from General MacArthur's letter to Mr..
White: ITO face an adversary in detail has been
the prayer of every conqueror in history -.
The vulnerability of singleness will disappear
before unity of effort"
We should try to look at the whole picture.
The manifestations of failure are easy to see.
They Jump at us from headlines and from every
defeatist speech. But behind all this there
undoubtedly has been steady, rising growth In
the strength of our friends in Western Europe.
In the end, of course this venture of ours may
fail. But failure is certain unless despite the
dscouragements of the moment, we persevere in
the work that we have begun.
Another great man of our age, Winston
Churchill, spoke to the British people in their
darkest hour, and expressed to them what must
be our hope now in these quoted words
For 1o1tiIe the tired ,oaues, uainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding tn, the main.
There is still hope for Western Europe and
our free world. We must not abandon that
hope and our efforts just because a mood of
defeat settles on us from time to time.