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are equipped for the most part
with standard, off -the-shelf items
plus some notifications of COM
mercially available devices.
A surprisingly small percentage
of our production plant cost is fo1
really unique equipment. Actually
if it were a large percentage, we
just could not have achieved the
current production capacity in
the relatively short space of time
it has taken. The strength Of our
atomic energy program does not
depend primarily on our ability
to manufacture unique or "secret"
equipment or materials; rather it
depends on the capabilities of
United States industry to produce
quickly and relatively cheaply.
great quantities of reliable preci-
sion equipment.
AS an example. the great gaseous
diffusion plants at Oak Ridge and
Paducah are filled with standard
or nearly standard items of equip
ment purchased from United
States industrial suppliers. Only
few items have required extern
sive special development work and
can properly be considered "se-
crets". The manufacture of the
diffusion barrier, a vital and
unique part of the plants. is a
closely guarded secret technology
Nevertheless, it is only because
there has been no general indus
trial interest in such a material
that it cannot be ordered as an
off -the-shelf item. If this material
were essential to the production OF,
say. commercial plastics. then it
could be expected that some seq
ment of United States industry
would by now have developed a
process for manufacturing the ma
terial, in which case this "secret"
might not be held.
Although the components of the
plants are for the most part not
secret. precisely how the plant it.
self is operated is secret. The
achievement of steady, day-after-
day efficient production requires
considerable technical skill. The
tricks of the trade" used to avoid
calamitous shut-downs and to pro-
duce a uniformly acceptable prod
uct-this is information worth
holding. 1t is information which
can only be gained through actual
operating experience. It is the de-
sire to conceal such operating
know-how which prevents our
making public more information
about certain production plants.
Acc Controls Secrecy.
Part of this same production
knoW-hoW is involved in the
power-plutonium reactor studies
currently being conducted by a
number of industrial groups. The
projected reactors are intended to
produce fashionable material, pluto
mum, and to generate electrical
power from the heat evolved IN
this production. Ultimately such
reactors might supplant the COM
missions present production units
where the heat is not used. If re-
actor technology is kept as part of
our production secret, then in
dustrial activities in this field may
be somewhat less than free.
Clearly. secret information is
controlled information and gov
ernment control of information is
not consistent with the usual con-
cept OF free enterprise. Industrial
engineers cannot design such
plants without having access TO
much information now considered
secret and the commission holds
the key to that access. The dilem-
ma facing the commission land
Congress, since legislative action
may be necessary to resolve the
question: is whether substantial
reactor technology should be made
public-and thus available to the
U. S. S. R.-so that really broad
industrial participation may be
realized or whether it should be
kept secret. and thus not available
to either the U. S. S. r. or to United
States industry as a whole,
and participation correspondingly
limited.
The dilemma is of course a basic