Evening star., 1952-09-30
Korea and the Assembly

AaSC WInCer, Wnen soviet FOrelgn Minister
vishinsky first proposed that the United Nations
Security Council intervene in the Korean truce
talks, the United States strong majority
backing-rejected> the idea for very good rea-
son: It did not want to give the Kremlin chance
to veto the Panmunjom negotiations into a state
OF paralysis at time when the outlook for an
agreement still seemed somewhat promising
In the weeks and months that have since
passed, however, the promise has all but vanished
completely. Undoubtedly taking their cue from
Moscow, the Chinese and North Korean Commu--
nistS have blocked every effort to break the dead
lock at Panmunjom, and their initial reaction to
the latest United Nations proposals on exchang-
ing war prisoners indicates that an agreement Is
as far away as ever. Accordingly, since such q
move could hardly make the impasse any worse
than 1t is, the United States now favors having
the u. N intervene to the extent of staging full
dress truce debate at the forthcoming session of
the General Assembly.
This change in our American position does
not constitute acceptance of the Vishinsky pro-
poSal for action by the Security Council. The
Soviet Union, echoed by its satellite bloc, can
raise great propaganda rumpus in the General
Assembly, but 1t cannot employ its veto power
there. AS far as the Korean war is concerned,
the aSsembly's members, after debating the ques-
tion, can arrive at majority decisions and recon-
mendations without let or hindrance from the
Kremln and although such decisions and recon-
mendations are not physically enforceable, they
have legal and moral strength of sort that could
conceivably press or embarrass the Reds into
yielding enough ground to make an armistice
possible. .-s.- s
Ostensiby, judging from what the Chinese
and North Korean negotiators have themselves
said, final agreement at Panmunjom is being
blocked by only one thing-the long and bitter
dispute over prisoners of war. The Communists
demand truce provision under which the United
Nations, using force If necessary would be obliged
to return all its POWs. The u NJ. for its part In
sSts upon the principle of voluntary repatriation
because almost $4,000 of its 10000 enemy cap
tiveS have declared-with something like des-
peration-that they do not want to be sent back
to their Red masters. These scores of thousands
have been marked down in the Communist black
book; to return them would be to condemn them
to savage punishment including death.
AS matter of prestige, of course, the Com
munists are UNDERSTANDABLE loath to accept any
arrangement showing how their troops have de-
serted them in large numbers, and the United
Nations Command-which in common decency
and humanitarianiSm cannot agree to forced re-
patriation-haS therefore offered number of
face-Saving proposals. But all such proposals
have thus far been rejected, and there is little
reason to hope that the latest ones will be better
received when the truce talks are resumed.
In these circumstances, even though the
Kremlin can use it for propaganda purposes a
Korean debate in the General Assembly has much
to be said for it, It is not likely to make the sit
uation at Panmunjom deteriorate further. On
the contrary, since the deterioration has gone
about as far as it can without forcing complete
breakdown In the negotiations, q thorough q. N.
airing Of all the issues involved may help to i'm
prove matters.