Evening star., 1952-11-23
Mr.. Trunon Helps the Chonqeover

General Eisenhowers prompt designation of
flve OF his nine cabinet members has brought
favorable and approving comment It is q
sound move to bridge the gap between admin
istrations. Members of the cabinet-designate
will have the advantage of continued briefings.
from those whom they succeed, in at least some
OF the responsibilities of their inheritance.
But President Trumans own personal con-
trtbution to this turnover deserves special note
He is doing everything he can to make it work
smoothly and well. His own conversations with
General Eisenhower last week displayed a genu-
Inc zeal that went beyond mere formality He
feels very deeply the enormous responsibilities
Of the Office Of President When he is relieved
Of those responsibilities, he is anxious that his
successor receive the advantages of everything
that good staff work can do to make their
assumption less difficult
In brief talk on Friday to employees in
training at the Central Intelligence Agency,
President Truman made some references to his
Job, and what he had done to make it less
burdensome to the incumbent He recalled his
own perplexities over the multiplicity of detail
that the sudden death of President Roosevelt
placed on his own shoulders. There was very
little co-ordination-or at least a very flimsy
machinery for o-ordnation-between the White
House and the various departments. There was
no systematic method of conveying to the Pres
ident the things he should know. Only two
people around the White House, he said, really
knew what was going on in the military depart
mentS. And it was from his conversations with
Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown over this
condition that the idea for Central Intelligence
Agency was developed-one of its functions being
the systematic preparation of intelligence for
distribution to the President and department
heads af 49,
President Roosevelt played by ear, so to
speak AS much as any President, he relied on
his own impressions of situations-and his own
impressions of the people who described them to
hin-as basis for personal decision. To some of
the military men directing the war effort the
almost total lack of sound staff organization at
the White House was something of nightmare.
General Marshalls own interest at one time,
la perfecting permanent secretariat, modelled
on the British system, possibly reflected his own
Illustrations in combating the lack of adequate
staff organization at the White House under
President Roosevelt.
One of the men who has been closest to
the President believes that one of Mr.. Truman's
greatest contributions has been his gradual
organization of staff machinery, through which
the President is given daily briefing on what
is going on. One of Mr.. Truman's gifts to
General Eisenhower has been a highly secret
document in three Volumes briefly summarizing
policies and estimates of conditions around the
world. And while the burden of decision rests
on the Presidents shoulders alone, in many
situations, Mr.. Truman has systematized the
routine under which the basis of decision is
outlined to him.
His anxiety now that everything be done to
facilitate the transition Of responsibility to his
successor is a reflection of his personal concept
of the appalling demands of the Office, and the
fateful nature of Presidents decisions.