Evening star., 1952-06-22

~ NJ ~. I5J y y& s. q zsSS
ping War
Of the unwritten "truce," it has be-
come harder to face the prospect
of all-out renewal of the war.
The Possibilities
Anything can happen in Korea,
Of course. But 1t seems likely that
one of five things will happen. Here
they are:
l. There still may be settlement
AN agreement, at least, on for
NAL truce. Even If there Is an agree
ment, 1t will not signal the end Of
our involvement in Korea. We
might eventually be able to bring
most of our troops back home. But
we could do this only If, at the
same time, We were able to make
it Enthusiastically plain that we were
both determined and prepared to
punish any renewed aggression at
the source. OF all the possible
Korean solutions" this probably
is the one that most appeals to our
top Strategists. Whether 1t ever
materializes depends on whether 1t
also appeals to the Kremlin.
2. The Panmunjom talks may
continue indefinitely, with fighting
confined to the relatively light
skirmishing that now is taking
place. This is sort of war Of nerves
to which Western man is ill-adapted.
AS we have seen, it poses difficult
problem of home-front morale, to
say nothing of that of troops in the
field. There is question hoT$eong
we could hold our resolve to stick it
out under these circumstances.
8. The truce talks may collapse,
yet the present "sitzkrieg" on the
S8th Parallel may continue indefi-
nitely. This situation would present
us with the same difficulties as
arise in connection with possibility
Number q The difficulties, indeed,
would be heightened in this case.
For there would be no apparent
purpose nor end to our passive in
volvement, once we had stopped
seeking a peaceful solution.
4. We may decide, If the talks
break down, to 60 all out in an ef-
fort to carry the war to the home
territory of our Korean enemy. TAX
ing leaf from MacArthurs book,
Gen. Clark indicated recently that
If the fighting were renewed and
the Reds hit us hard from the air,
we would retaliate by bombing their
airfields in the privileged sanctu-
aries Of Manchuria and China.
There is some question as to
whether Gen. Clark sees eye-to-eye
with his Pentagon superiors on this
point. In any event, there have
been reports that we are preparing
to carry out this threat with tao
tical atomic weapons. There are
two great questions about such q
course of action. One is whether
it would be effective. The other is
whether 1t would lead to an un-
leashing Of the world war we have
been trying all along to avoid.
Both are serious questions.
S. We may, If the talks break
down, be in for renewal of the
kind Of war we fought during the
first year in Korea-a bloody see
saw of maneuver and attrition, CIV
ing both sides a chance to test men
and equipment in a limited theater
of action and to kill each others
soldiers long way from home. The
trouble Is that the Reds can afford
to lose more young men than we
can-particularly when few, If any,
are Russians.
In threatening a new sort Of
Korean war if the Communists get
rough in the air, Gen.. Clark i'm
piled that this old sort of Korean
war was what could otherwise be
expected. The experts seem to
agree that the Red buildup of power
would prevent us from running
them out of Korea, as we did once
before. They are unanimously
hopeful, on the other hand, that
we have too much power in Korea
to be run out ourselves.
These, then, are the major pos
sibilities ahead, on this grim an
niversary. None of them is wholly
pleasant. Americans do not like to
think in these terms. The fact
Is, however, that there is nothing
pleasant about our situation these
days-in Korea, or anywhere else.
These are not pleasant times. They
are not going to be pleasant for a
long time to come
It boils down to this: There is no
reasonable prospect of our extricat-
ing ourselves from Korea In the
foreseeable future.