Evening star., 1952-11-21
Fleet Admiral King Ran a Tout Ship
By Rex Collier

Il a hard-boled salt of few words
and direct action. It was inevitable
that such a forceful personality should
have claShed occasionally with other
forceful personalities during the course
of World War II. With more wordage
than his reputation suggests, he reveals
in his third-perSon autobiography,
Fleet Admiral King-a Naval Record"
published today by w. w. Norton &
Co., New York. N. ", some of the
heated and fateful behind -the-scenes
debates that marked high-level plan
ming in the oig conflict.
Admiral King ran a taut ship as
"Cominch-CNO He was the Navys
severest critic and stanchest defender.
He also was severe critic of any one
who dared to try kicking the Navy
or its men around. The Navy may
consider itself fortunate to have had
such a stern and capable commander
when the COINS got tough. Admiral
King makes it plain in his book-the
joint work of himself and Comdr. Walter
Muir Whitchill. U. S. N. R.-that he had
to fight two walls after Pearl Harbor.
He had to fight not only the Axis en-
emies but, withal, an almost constant
effective warfare in the Pacific.
The Navy never had enough of any,
thing until the latter phases of the
war. when the impending collapse of
Germany made it feasible to concen-
trate attentions on the Pacific theater.
The Navy was long time recovering
from the blow at Pearl Harbor. Ad-
herring to Admiral Kings Injunction, it
did the best it could with what it had.
Admiral King, incidentally. has some
salty comments on the handling of the
Pearl Harbor inquiry. Writing in a de-
tached vein, he says: king has never
been able to understand why political
blame for Pearl Harbor should have
been attached to Stark (Chief of Naval
Operations) when no suggestion of blame
was ever attributed to Marshall, who
held the comparable post of Chief of
STAN OF the Army. -. However, in due
time, court of inquiry was held. and,
in the summer of 1945. Secretary For
reStal told King that Stark should be
relieved of his command in Europe, since
the report of the court had been ap-
proved. and it seemed to Forrestal that
Stark was at fault with Kimmel at the
time of Pearl Harbor. Although King
disagreed completely with the Secretary
in this matter, Mr.. Forrestal signed the
order relieving Stark of his post in Eu-
rope" King disagreed so completely
that he urged that Admiral Stark be
awarded Distinguished Service Medal
for his work in Europe after Pearl Har-
bor. It was not until John L. Sullivan
succeeded Mr.. Forrestal as Secretary of
the Navy that the award was granted.
Admiral King had his troubles with
President Roosevelt. despite the fact
that Mr.. Roosevelt picked him for the
top Navy job. And when the admiral
sent him reminder that he was near
ing retirement age the President Quip-
ped $50 what. old top! I may even
send you a birthday PRESENT."
The fleet admiral says that the late
President was largely responsible for the
weakness of the Navy's anti-Submarine
forces when the U-boat threat developed.
F. D. R.. he asserts. favored small boats
as submarine chaSers and prevented the
Navy from embarking on an effective
U-boat killer-ship program until the sub
marine menace became really grave in
1912. An interesting sidelight on the
Presidents desire to play leading role
in the war is the revelation that Mr..
Roosevelt developed a resentment
against Admiral Kings use of his title
Of Commander in Chief of the Fleet. Ad-
miral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Presi-
dent, suggested that Admiral King drop
the title-but the latter said he would
not do so unless the President ordered
him to do so. No such order ever came.
The Navy had troubles, too, with the
Army Air Force over use of Army air
craft in the battle against German sub
marines. The Air Force was willing to
take part in the battle, but in a role
independent of the Navy, which had
primary responsibility for meeting the
U-boat threat. The impasse was not
broken until our shipping losses became
so serious that Gen. Marshall took a
hand and gave the Navy the Army planes
requested.
OF current interest is the part which
Admiral King played in the selection
of Gen. Eisenhower, rather than Gen.
Marshall, to command the Normandy
invasion. Writes Admiral King: "The
President and Prime Minister Church
ilD had discussed the matter repeatedly,
and both seemingly favored Marshall
for the command King felt that Mar
shall, too, wanted it, although he never
said so. It was only natural, in Kings
view, that he should want it. as it was
the most enviable duty that could come
to any military man during the war.
Nevertheless King felt strongly that
Marshall was indispensable as men,
ber of the Joirt and Combined Chiefs
of Staff, and could not be spared how
ever desirable he might be as supreme
commander. In due time Secretary
Knox had come TO understand and SYM
pathize with Kings viewpoint. Mean
while, Leahy and Arnold (Air Force
Chief of Staff independently reached
the same conclusion. and they and King
had gone separately to the Citadel cat
Quebec and told the President their
views, which were essentially the same
that Marshall could not be spared
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff" Later.
Admiral King with Cen Marshall at