Evening star., 1952-11-22
As Long as There's a Chance

Our American spokesmen in the United
Nations General Assembly have acted wisely in
: welcoming" British Foreign Secretary Eden's
address giving a qualified but warm and signifi-
cant Endorsement to India's Korean proposal
For the proposal, if properly modified, and if
accepted by the Communists can succeed in
breaking the truce deadlock and putting an end
to the present fighting and dying. Quite
obviously, therefore, as long as that possibility
exists the United States-as it is now doing
must maintain a receptive attitude and do
everything within reason to arrive at an honor
able settlement.
Mr. Eden's Endorsement is especially inter-
esting because it has come on the heels of
luncheon meeting between him and President
elect Eisenhower. Further it has come on the
heels of the latter's statement (made indirectly
through Senator Wiley) that he is emphatically
opposed to the forcibe repatriation of prisoners
of War-a statement that has greatly pleased
President Truman as evidence of Republican,
Democratic unity on this particular issue. Against
such background, it seems highly unlikely that
the British Foreign Secretary-particulary in
view of his prior talk with our next Chief EXecu-
tive-Would have taken the line he has without
first having had some fairly solid assurance of
a favorable American response.
Actually, it would be mistake for the United
States to offer any other kind of response at this
time. After all, in both principle and objective,
the Indian proposal is altogether commendabe.
Designed solely to promote peace in Korea it
seeks to make a truce possible by Offering
formula for a compromise on the prisoner -of-War
issue, which is supposed to be the only issue
blocking an agreement. But the formula is weak
and unsatisfactory in two major respects. In the
first place. it provides that the repatriation prob
lem be handled by neutral" commission made
I'm of Su,itznrland
Sweden and that some fifth power act as an
umpire" in case of a two-two deadlock. Sec
ondly, although 1t emphasizes that force must
not be used to effect tho aaSurn of captiveS, it
would have post -armistice political conference
determine the fate of the tens of thousands OF
Chinese and North Korean POWs who are afraid
of being sent back to their homelands and who
have declared that they will physically resist
any move to return them.
The weaknesses involved here are these: Cd
Aside from the vagueneSS and impracticability of
the suggestion for an ''umpring" fifth power, the
proposed commission would be much less "neu-
trail one side than on the other because the
Czechs and the Poles are bound tightly to the
Kremlin while the Swiss and SWedeS are domina-
tion-free And (2) Indias plan, while espousing
the principle of voluntary repatriation, tends to
contradict itself when it advocates that the
"dispoSition of returning POWs be decided
by the political conference to be held after
truce is agreed upon-an arrangement casting
serious doubt on the future of such POWs To
meet these shortcomings Mr.. Eden would Cd
establish five-power commission not subject to
deadlock, (2) drop the idea of having the
projected political conference deal with the cap
tive question, and 60 have the u N. itself insure
that no prisoner will face indefinite captivity, or
duress or penazation of any kind if he declines
for1 ia To on hock N his home
With such notifications, and assuming that
the truce itself will guard adequately against
Communist treachery the Indian proposal may
we'll warrant the support of the United States
and like-minded nations in the U. N. That is
why American receptivity at this stage, rather
than nay-saying attitude, seems very much in
order even though the chances are that the
Pyongyang- -Peiping Moscow axis will continue
to reject anything that may be satisfactory to us.