Milford chronicle., 1952-05-09

lAANdNS OL4lild, the DeSt solution
hinese out of Korea, to ask the
probably would not accept it and so
It would give US a certain practical
advantage with the United Nations
Support for chi0na
At the time Of writing. the mill.
tary commanders are negotiating
an armistice. Certainly it IS better
to maintain an uneasy peace on the
Thirty-eighth Parallel than a policy
Of perpetual war on the Thirty
eighth Parallel But an armistice IS
likely TO leave as in approximately
the same position we were in two
years ago, before we moved Ameri-
can troops out Of South Korea. ex-
cept that we would have TO put .up
billions Of dollars to repair the de-
struction in South Korea.
Regardless Of the matter Of an
armistice, if we really believe In a
policy Of containing communism
there is no logical reason Why we
should not give 100 per cent support
to the Chinese Nationalist Govern
ment on Formosa and reject anv
idea whatever Of a compromise on
this issue. There is no reason WHY
we should agree to the admission Of
the Chinese Communists To the
United Nations or to the negotia-
tions with Japan for a permanent
peace. 1t would be far better to
withdraw without condition from Ko-
rea Itself. without compromising
ourselves on these other issues. than
to follow the general proposals along
the line Of those made by the Unit
ed Nations in January 1851.
1t has been suggested that there
is a fundamental issue between
those who think that Europe is
more important and those who think
that Asia is more important. Ger
tainly my position is not an extreme
one on the subject Of Asia
We HumpeTed Chino
Broadly speaking. my quarrel is
with those who wish to 60 about
in Europe. even beyond our capac-
ity and who at the same time re-
fuse to apply our general program
and strategy to the Far East.
In Greece we moved in with over.
whelming support for the Greek
Government, even though it at first
had strong reactionary tendencies.
We gave it hundreds Of millions of
dollars to suppress Communists
within the country.
But in China we hampered the Ma.
tionalist Government. We tried to
force it to take Communists into
the Cabinet. The State Department
spoke Of Communists as agrarian
reformers and cut off arms from
the Nationalist Government at the
most crucial time. Contrary to the
whole theory of the containment Of
communism. where 1t could be done
without serious cost or danger, the
Administration proposed to surrend-
er Formosa to the Communists and
has constantly flirted with that idea.
Even though we were engaged IN
a bitter and dangerous war. the Ad-
ministration refused to fight that
war with all the means at its COM
mand, on the theory that we might
incite Russia to start third world
war. But in Europe we have not
hesitated to risk a third world war
over and over again.
Constunt Dunqer OF War
I think we have to recognize that
the policy we have adopted of the
containment Of communism involves
a constant danger that Russia may
begin third world war. But It IS
beyond our capacity to invade China
with American soldiers, and such q
program is not included In Mac
Arthur's suggestions or anyone
else 5. 1nere IS no possible threat to
Siberia. therefore. from anything we
may do in China.
On the other hand. in Europe the
building up Of great army sur
rounding Russia from Norway to
Turkey and Iran might produce q
fear Of the invasion Of Russia OF
some of the satellite countries re.
garded by Russia as essential to the
defense Of Moscow.
Certainly our program IN Europs
seems to me far more likely to pro.
ducs war with Russia than anything
we have done in the East. am only
asking for the same policy In the
Far East as in Europe.
NEXT WEEK: Methods TO de-
feat Comm unist tdeOIogy
throughout the world.
tFrom "a Foreign Policy for Amerf.
cans" Copyright 1851 by Robert a. Taft.
Published by Doubleday and Company,
Inc. Released BY The Register and Trth.