Evening star., 1952-08-27
Hosty Preparedness Is Costly


ing the construction OF our air bases in North
Africa is beyond question. Whether the job could
have been done efficiently and economically un-
der the urgent conditions prevailing when the
gigantic undertaking was launched Is another
question. War is costly business Security
measures taken hurriedly when war threatens
cannot be geared to peacetime procedures. Red
tape must be slashed, shortcuts encouraged, rou-
tine checks on materials and manpower curtailed
or dispensed WITH costs disregarded. The single
minded, all-important objective must be the
strengthening Of national defense at the earliest
possible moment That objective has been ac-
complished in record time, whatever the final
cost. - s~a@
The Senate Preparedness Committee summed
up the situation in the very first page Of its
critical report when it said: "Once the site dor
a base) had been entered the difficulties multi
difficulties with the French authorities,
with procurement Of materials, with scarcities
of workmen, with the weather itself. Under these
conditions large scale lavish spending may have
been impossible to avoid. But even had the diff
culties been overcome, the so-called crash-pro-
gram directive-the decision to steam ahead
at full speed regardless of cost-made waste
inevitable"
The crash-program directive was not issued
by Lieutenant General Lewis Pick, chief of the
Corps of Engineers Of the Army, against whom
the committee has directed much of its criticism.
It was issued by the Air Force, which, declared
the security of America and of the Western world
depended on the preparation Of air bases in
French Morocco in the fastest possible time. The
task of providing those bases was given to the
Army Engineers. Entering into the spirit of the
post-Korea emergency, the Engineer Corps hired
contractors to do the tremendous job on rush
basis.
An insight into the complexity of the task
may be obtained from this statement to the
committee by a spokesman for the contractors:
Orderly, economical planning and operation,
which is the normal approach to construction
iob is not possible under conditions such as
those surrounding the initial phases Of the
Moroccan work, where plans and specifications
are nonexistent; when equipment must be pro-
cured wherever obtainable to meet unknown con-
ditionS; where quantities Of work are not known;
where wage rates are established by others
months after work Is started; where TRANSPORTS
ton of personnel and shipment Of all materials.
equipment and supplies are controlled by sep
arate agency of the Government; where ships
arrive in a foreign country and insufficient per-
sonnel is there to unload tally guard and protect
the shipments; where work is done in country
using two foreign languages; where housing is
extremely scarce . WucTc dIC
very poor"
It is not surprising that there was waste of
money, materials and labor during the early
stages of the enterprise The committee and the
Army disagree as to the extent and seriousness
of the waste While the senatorial report indi-
Gated that much of the work was defective and
will have to be done over or repaired, General
Picks report to Army Secretary Pace says that
relatively little rebuilding will be needed The
cost of repairs he said, viii be little more than
a million dollars-which is moderate, considering
the total cost Of the bases, $220 million. Both
General Pick and the committee agree that
the base program is proceeding on orderly,
busnesslike basis now that the emergency phase
is over. And it is evident that although the cost
has been high grave weak spot in our defenses
against Soviet aggression has been corrected with
a speed which must have confounded our poten-
tial enemies That accomplishment must not be
lost sight of in the dust storm of charges and
explanations swirling around the Moroccan bases