Jackson advocate. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1939-current, 1952-04-26
TRAIGHT
AHEAD"

NEW YORK (GlobaD With
the Presidential campaigns shaping
up, attention naturally turns to
surveys, polls and analyses. 1t is
true that the polsters took an awful
shellacking after the 1913 election,
yet it is doubtful if their value can
be completely denied.
| Immediately after the election,
the Republicans looked back to APP
praise the situation in an effort to
ascertain where they made their
mistake. At the same time the
public opinion poll takers looked
over their shoulders to locate the
errors in the calculations which
brought them to the conclusion that
Governor Thomas E. Dewey would
win in a walk.
Now as we look back over the
1913 campaign, it is apparent that
both the Republican Party and the
poll-taking gentry committed iden-
tical errors. 1t was that they as
sumed a theory that was correct
In August, and mapped their STRAIT
egg accordingly. But in October
when the original theory was no
longer correct, they failed to bring
their strategy up to date to meet
the new situation.
This, was especially true IN the
case of Poll Taker Elmo Roper,
who took his poll in the late sum-
mer and didn't bother to recover
the territory. 1t was true in the
case of Gallup and the others be-
cause they failed to follow through
on their polling right down to the
last days of the campaign. 1t must
be admitted, however, that it is
not possible to poll the nation in
a few hours or days, and any Sc
we're or sharp shift in public opin-
ion will inevitably throw any poll
off considerably, perhaps fatally.
Back in August of 1913 when the
Henry A. Wallace Progressive
Party held its nominating Conven-
ton in Philadelphia, the prestige
of the former Vice President was
at it's height. 1t was believed then
by most observers that a conserva-
tive estimate of his vote, should he
remain in the campaign, was be-
tween 100000 and 100000. 1t
was on the basis of this finding
that Roper concluded that Dewey
would win because it was assumed,
and doubtless correctly so, that a
vast majority of these votes would
come from people who otherwise
would vote for President Truman.
This was, too, the assumption of
the Republican high command and
it was upon this basis that the
COP policy makers mapped their
campaign. strategy. 1t was Wise
at the time and, in all probability,
would have been successful if the
other factors had remained con-
slant.
But what happened! While the
prestige of Henry Wallace reached
its peak at the time of the Con-
vention, it should be noted that it
began receding almost from that
very moment. This was admitted
by the most casual observer. AS a
matter of fact, along toward the
end of the acmpaign, it was freely
and openly stated that the Wallace
campaign bad flopped completely,
and newspaper writer's began to re-
wise his probable total downward
until no one was willing to give him
a chance of getting more than 3
100000 votes.
1t was doubtless the collapse of =
the Wallace strength that changed
the course of the election. When
the poll takers failed to re-appraise
the situation in mid October. they
were putting their regulations on
the line; and the world knows now
how severely those regulations suf-
fered.
1t is hardly likely the same mis-
takes will be made twice. So, let's
watch out for the polls-carefully
and scientifically conducted, they
can tell a pretty accurate story.
---O-