Evening star., 1952-12-05

lmmeQlaCely unQer the point OF
burst there will be an over-killing
of both men and materiel. Even
men in heavily armored tanks will
receive lethal doses of radiation
guaranteeing their death within a
week or two, and men caught in
the open or in fox-holes without
overhead cover are certain to be
immediate casualties. AS we pro-
gress out from the area immedi-
|ately under the burst. the chance
lof survival will increase rapidly
until. at a point about two miles
from the burst, under average
weather conditions, even man
caught wholly in the open has a
very high chance of survival with
out injury.
These considerations form the
basis for the general conviction
that dispersion is the best defense
against atomic weapons. On the
field Of battle in modern warfare
one would not expect generally to
find densities higher than a few
thousand men per suare mile. In
typical defensive situations, parti-
cularly on the front line. densities
are lower than this. If it is as
sumed that men in defensive posi-
tlons are we'll sheltered, it is ap-
parent that each atomic explosion
is unlikely to kill more than a few
hundred men. hardly a very re-
munerative target. The exact re-
verse will be true of typical often
Sive situations where men will be
caught in the open, giving an
obvious advantage to the defense
IN the use of atomic weapons.
Korean Situation Is Example.
A consideration of these factors
explains in part why there is no
great clamor today to use atomic
weapons in the Korean operation.
Both sides in this battle are very
well dug in. Atomic weapons dol
not show up to advantage in at
tacklng this type of position. III
a major offensive should be staged
by Communist troops in Korea this
picture might be changed.
1t has been said that the Naga-
sakl bomb is obsolete, that bombs
bigger and better than this can
be built. In fact. it is no secret
that the Acc is working on a
thermonuclear bomb which pre-
sumably can be made to give as
big an explosion as required if 1t
can be made at all. Even a weapon
such as this does not solve the
Korean situation, nor may it ever
be satisfactory weapon for en-
ployment with field armies.
The basic problem in the en-
ployment of very large yield weap-
onS is two-fold. While there is a
natural desire to increase the size
OF the explosion in order to attack
well protected targets, such pro-
lection is most likely to be found
IN too close proximity to our own
forces to employ such yields. The
tWo-fold problem becomes first to-
find targets large enough to Justify
their use, and second, to find them
at a sufficient distance from
friendly troops to assure reason
able safety for those troops.
1t is rare on the field of battle
that one finds targets in immedi-
ate sight of the front line COM
mander in anything like the largeI
numbers that appeared at certain
stages in the Korean operation
Massed targets in terms of thous-
ands of soldiers are unlikely to-
appear unless we can present suf-
flcient strength to force them to-
deploy this mass. The relatively
few divisions which the free coun-l
tries are able to place on the field
OF battle in defense against theI
Communist hordes will find it diff
f1cult to present a position suf-
ficiently strong that real mass will
be required to overcome it. Where
then. can remunerative targets be
found? We know that concentra.
tlons appear in major unit as
sembly areas in preparation for
attack, but proved camoufiage
capabilities make these targets diff
cult to locate.
Obviously, improved reconnais-
sance methods will become a fund.-
amental requirement in our PLAN
ned employment of atomic weap-
ons. We must find concentrations
OF the enemy, relay that informa-
ton to our command structure.
assess the target, and deliver the
atomic explosion all in a time suf-|
flciently short to assure the con-
tlnued existence of the target. This
total activity will always be easier
to accomplish when the target isl
comparatively close to friendly
forces. but here the fundamental
problem will always exist in the
fact that the heat effects of atomic
weapons extend to considerable
range in clear weather if troops
are caught in the open.
For safety of our own forces It'll
will be very difficult timing prob
lem to assure that every friendly
soldier is in his fox-hole at the
time of delivery of the weapon.
When one considers the employ