Evening star., 1952-04-20

A comprehensive collation. of
the known relationships between
various friends of the Chang
government. as we'll as some
new material, have just been
published by the Reporter mag
azine. Two Senators, Morse of
Oregon and Mcmahon of Con-
necticut, now have renewed
their suggestion of last summer
that the China lobby be inveS-
tigated.
Turnobout
This is a clear case of turn
about. For it has been this
same China lobby which sup
piled most of the ammunition
for the past two years campaign
against alleged "pinko" ten
denotes in the State Depart
ment.
Enough is known about this
pressure group to guess that its
effectiveness in influencing our
policy has not been negligible.
The China lobby's principal
purpose has been the g1orifica-
ton of the Chang Kai-Shek
government in China. Before
the fall of China this meant
convincing the American gov
ernment, particularly the execu-
tive branch and legislators, that
Chang needed increasing
amounts of economic and mill
tary aid. Since China fell, the
lobby has sought all-Out Amer
ican support for the return of
Chang to the mainland of
China. This is a formidable
goal. If carried to its logical
conclusion it might well involve
the United States in all-out war
with Red China, and, presuma-
bly,, with Soviet Russia as well.
In order to get, American
backing for Chiang's return to
power, the China lobby has
worked toward several prelimi-
nary goals:
l. To prevent the recognition
Of Red China (thus protecting
Chinese Nationalist funds here
from seizure by Mao).
2. To prevent the seating Of
Red China in the United Ma
tions.
3. To oust men in the Amer
lean government who resist at
tempts to underwrite Chiang's
return to the China mainland
tnotably Secretary of State
Dean AcheSon).
-. To help Americans friend
II to Chang to be elected.
New DeoI Beginning
The lobby operates as close to
the sources of American power
as possible. Before the end of
the,war it had the backing of
President Roosevelt'S executive
branch, including such New
Deal stalWartS as Thomas Cor
coran.
In the postwar. period, how +.
ever, the lobby had to turn to
Congress, because of a stiffen-
ing attitude on the part of
President Truman and the State
Department. After Chiang's
Government was found to be
making less than a maximum
effort to use United States aid
wisely. but before China fell to
the Communists. congressional
appropriations were far below
what the lobby wanted.
After the Nationalist Govern
ment fled to Formosa. the lobby
was able to capitalize on the
bewilderment and fear among
Americans who were frustrated
and disillusioned by this sudden
advance of communism in Asia.
To exploit uncertainty in this
country, the lobby found willing
allies among Republicans eager
for political ammunition
against the Truman administra-
ton. 1t fed out much of the in
formation which led to broad
attacks on Secretary of State
Dean Acheson and his predeces-
sor, Gen. George c. Marshall.
Financial techniques of the
lobby are known only in broad
outline. The trail is covered SO
we'll that no one can get very
specific about it. Early Amer
ican aid to Chiang before Pearl
Harbor and during the war
primed the pump. The ruling
clique in the Kuomintang is
said to have enriched itself
either by speculation" on these
funds or by out-and-out mis-
appropriation (by American
standards). Part of this Ameri-
can aid money, thus funneled
into the hands of Chiang's lob
byists, was fed back into Amer.
lea to- finance campaigns fol
additidnal appropriations.
This Ilome-anG-nome arrange