Evening star., 1952-11-03
Text of Secret Korean Memo

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1947. 1948 and 194s with re-
spect to the withdrawal Of
United States troops from Ko-
rea has been made the subject
Of partisan political debate.
Many untrue accusations are
being made with reference to
the decision Of this Government
to withdraw our troops from
Korea. In order that the pub
lie may have access to the facts.
I have determined that a
memorandum from the Secre-
tary Of Defense to the Secretary
OF State, dated September 26,
1947. and its enclosure, which
have heretofore been classified
as top secret. should be de-
classified. Copies Of these docu-
ments accordingly are attached
to this statement.
The significance of this mem
orandum of September 26, 1947,
and its Importance to the subse-
quent developments of our poll
icy concerning Korea have been
made clear in my statement of
October q, 1852. Following the
military appraisal expressed in
this memorandum. this Gov
ernment proposed to the United
Nations in l947 that elections
be held in Korea looking toward
the establishment of united
Korea and the withdrawal of
all occupation forces. A resolu-
ton to this effect was adopted
at the General Assembly Of the
United Nations, November IA,
1947. This memorandum of
September 26, 1947, was relied
on in the formulation of United
States policy with respect to
Korea in the National Security
Council both in 1948 and in
1949, when the entire situation
was reviewed in the light of
then existing conditions, and
the decision to complete the
withdrawal of United States
troops was confirmed. At that
time, as I pointed out in my
statement of October 27, the
advice Of our military establish
ment was that, in spite of the
obvious risks, the withdrawal
of United States troops was
justified.
I would not have released this
document nor brought these
facts before the public if the Re-
publican candidate for PreSi-
dent, who was Chief of Staff of
the Army and a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, had
not in his campaign misrepre-
Sented the contents of this
memorandum and made intem-
perate and unjustified attacks
upon the civilian agencies par
ticipating in our decisions with
respect to Korea. Beginning in
his speech of September % in
Cincinnati and on various occa-
sions thereafter, eliminating in
his speech in Detroit on Octo-
ber "a, the Republican candi-
date sought to create the false
impression that our civilian Of
ficials were solely responsible
for our decisions with respect to
Korea and that they were guilty
Of blundering. if not of some
thing worse. AS I pointed out
in my remarks in Cincinnati on
october 81, our decisions with
respect to Korea, like many 9TH
er decisions in our struggle for
peace, involved both military
and diplomatic factors and were
reached through the honest CO.
operation Of both military and
civilian officials. False and ma
licious attacks on the loyalty
and judgment of either the mill
tary or civilian officials who
were involved in these crucial
decisions are inexcusable and
are extremely damaging to the
proper conduct of the Govern
ment. AS President, I feel it
my duty to protect the men who
are engaged in this crucial work
from such attacks.
In releasing these documents,
I wish it understood that there
is no intention to criticize the
opinion of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff or the work of the military
establishment in these critical
matters. Indeed, believe that
releasing these documents will
indicate the justification for
their views.
I hope that the release of
these documents will set this
controversy at rest, and will in
some measure protect those who
have not been able to protect
themselves in this debate be-,
cause of the secrecy classifica-
tion which must necessarily
cover great deal of their work..