Evening star., 1952-09-29
Battle of Korean Words

The degree to which American policy is at
fault for setting stage for war in Korea, and
for the costly and indecisive continuance of
that war, can hardly be settled by the current
Eisenhower -Acheson battle of words.
Last Monday night in Cincinnati General
Eisenhower charged that the Secretary of State
in January, 1850, had defined defensive
perimeter" of American interests in the Pacific
which excluded Formosa and such ASiatic main
land areas as Korea. His implication was that
this definition and more particularly its exclu-
sions, constituted notice to the Soviet Union
that we would not defend South Korea in event
of aggression. He quoted the Secretary further
as saying that "No person can guarantee these
areas (those beyond the defensive perimeter)
against military attack"
Mr.. Acheson has replied to the general by
quoting further from his January, 1850, speech
in which he said that should an attack occur
upon the areas beyond the defensive perimeter
''the initial reliance must be on the people
attacked to resist it and then upon the COM
nitments of the entire civilized world under
the Charter of the United Nations" His con-
tention, in brief, is that he was serving warning
that areas beyond Americas immediate defen-
sive boundaries, as he had outlined them, would
be protected from aggression by collective action
of the United Nations.
cation of force to counter aggression is vested
in the Security Council, with a provision that
any permanent member of the Council can veto
such action. Soviet Russia is permanent
member, has exercised the veto power freely
and might have been safely counted upon to
veto action against an aggression which it
unquestionably inspired. As it happened, when
the attack on South Korea occurred in June
$780, Soviet Russia was boycotting proceedings
of the Security Council and the subsequent
commitments to collective action were voted
without Soviet participation.
Mr.. Acheson did not know this would be
the case when he spoke in January-and Soviet
Russia knew it could block Council action by its
veto. Why it chose to continue its boycott and
allow the Council to make its commitments is
question that can be answered only in Moscow.
Mr.. Acheson has since asserted, during this
current controversy, that the United States had
planned to take the issue before the General
Assembly If the Soviet Union had exercised a
veto in the Council-an alternative procedure
that might or might not have resulted in q
u. N. commitment to resist the North Korean
aggression by force.
In any case, the real question is whether
the public definition of our defensive perimeter
with Korea left outside-encouraged the North
Korean Communist invasion. The United States
had the only defensive strength of any substance
In the area. North Korea was prepared and
poised for attack-a fact, incidentally, that had
been generally known for months past. While
the American defense of South Korea was
undertaken in the name of the United Nations
it was in the beginning at least unilateral
action in fact. That we took this step was prob
ably a surprise to Moscow and the North
Koreans, in the light of Secretary Acheson's
earlier remarks.
There certainly is some reason to believe, Al
General Eisenhower seemingly believes, that II
the remarks had not been made the North Ko-
reans and their Moscow masters would not have
launched their aggression.