Evening star., 1952-11-29
To the Editor of The Stor:

Il, the campaigns No. issue, the Ko-
rean war, still remains the American
peoples No. concern. And in fulfill
ment of his campaign pledge. President
elect Eisenhower is about to make a
trip to Korea with view to ending
the Korean war .. . honorably."
Even Gen. Eisenhower, with all his
genius, will find that there is no magic
formula for ending the Korean war"
Under present circumstances, there are
three realistic courses-only three-for
the American Government to follow in
Korea:
/. Withdraw from Korea and let the
Reds have the country. Such a decision
would be what Secretary Acheson before
the U. N. Political Committee called
buying peace at the price of honor"
And it is unthinkable to Gen. Eisen-
hover.
2. Continue the present policy of in
decision and vacillation in Korea, with
a frustrating deadlock at the front and
humiliating negotiations at Panmunjom.
This course is "out" when we consider
that the general denounced this stale
mate policy with unmistakable clarity
in his Detroit speech on October "a
when he said: ITO vacillate, to hesitate
to appease even by merely betraying
unsteady purposes to feed dicta-
tors appetite for conquest :. :"
3. Knock the Communists out of Korea
once and for all, and settle the Korean
question on a permanent basis. This
will be most consistent with Gen. Eisen-
hower's campaign promises, and in the
long run the best solution of the Korean
problem. But the big question is, how?
The true trap" into which the WASH
ington policy makers were pushed a
year ago last June largely by European
appeaSers, worked to the enemyS ad-
vantage and gave him chance to build
up. It enabled him to dig in so deeply
and move up so many supplies, 1t would
be too costly for the Allies to break
through the enemy lines by frontal at
tacks. The only way to break the stale
mate of fixed positions Is by war of
maneuver at which the allies are best
adapted-to flush the Reds out into the
open where the United States Far East
Air Force can get at them
The first step in this war of maneuver
should be landing sizable force behind
the enemy line. The United States Ma
rines and South Korean GIs should
stage return engagement" at Hung
nam, port in the Japan Sea, from
which they were evacuated in December,
1850. From Hungnam to Sinanju, port
in the yellow Sea where the Navy can
operate with big guns and guided
missiles, is the narrowest waist of Korea.
distance of less than 100 miles. If
American and South Korean forces can
throw battle line across this waist, the
Chinese fnronS RI ho xY,i11 ha i1,
a nutcracker, as were the North Korean
armies in South Korea after MacArthur's
Inchon landing in September, 1850. The
Red armies facing their enemies front
and back will crack in no time.
In order to accomplish this feat and
win complete military victory in Korea.
Gen. Van Fleet Cor his successor) will
need more troops than he now has in
Korea. Where would he get them?
Wherever he can find them. Just re-
Gently two more divisions and six inde-
pendent regiments of the South Korean
army have been activated for front-line
duty. But that is not enough.
Secretary Of State-designate John
Foster Dulles advocates the training of
more South Koreans to replace American
G1s at the front. But that idea is
academic when we consider that it takes
long time to train raw recruits in the
effective use of highly technical equip
ment. 1t takes even longer to train staff
officers This idea was brought out by
Gen. Macarthur in his testimony before
the Senate committee last year, and by
Gen. Van Fleet in his recent statement.
Mr.. Dulles should have advocated this
idea seven years ago when the American
Army Of Occupation first went to Korea
in 1945.
Equally academic is Secretary Ache
sons plea for more troops from U. N.
members. Those U. N. members Of the
fence-sitting variety are long on lip
service and short on concrete aid. They
are all anxious to get more American
economic aid for themselves, but are
reluctant to help America for collective
security or the fight against Communist
aggression.
The only place where additional troops
Tor Korea can be found is Formosa.
where Chang Kai-shek has some 600, 900
men. about half of whom are fairly well
framed. Chang can and is willing to
send his men to Korea to fight the
Chinese Reds. With the control of the
air and the sea lanes on three sides of
Korea. the United States Navy can
transport with little difficulty 100000
Chinese Nationalist soldiers to North
Korea to cooperate with American and
South Korean forces.
Such move would raise cries of
complications" There are no complica-
tions except in the minds of defeatists.
The Reds on the Chinese mainland can
not invade Formosa so long as the 7th
Fleet guards Formosa Strait. The use
of Chinese nationalist troops will not in
volve the United States in a war in
China. Nationalist China is a perman-
ent member of the U. N. Security Coun-
Gil that sanctioned U. NJ intervention in
Korea. Many U. N. member nations