Evening star., 1952-05-09
The Korean Prospect

since the Communists still act as II they
want to keep on talking at Panmunjom, there is
a possibility-though it looks very remote at
the moment-that they may yet agree to the
priSoner-exchange plan offered by the United
Nations on no-compromise basis Judging
from their past performance, however, the prob
ability is that they have nothing more con-
Structive in mind than to try to wear down
the U. N. negotiatorS with continued haggling
and propaganda of a sort that could easily
cause complete breakdown in the truce effort.
When and if such a breakdown occurs-and
it could occur within matter of days, or even
hourS-the big question will be, What next in
Korea? Will the situation remain pretty much
as it is, with each side satisfied to keep the
fighting as limited as it has been for many
months past? Or will full-scale hostilities be
resumed? Will the United States and its u. N.
Allies feel impelled to bring new force to bear
in an effort to end the stalemate and arrive at
a victorious decision? Or will the Communists,
who have built up impressive power since last
July, attempt another major offensive?
Although the situation is one in which any
thing can happen, there is some reason to be-
lieve that new enemy drive is unlikely This
is so because our Allied military position is
undoubtedly very strong-Strong enough, ac-
cording to the U. N. command, to insure that
any force attacking it would be grievously hurt.
If this is true-and there is little cause to doubt
1.-THE Communists must be we'll aware of it.
Accordingly, having in mind the terrible beat
ing they suffered in their spring offensives last
year, the chances seem better than even that
they prefer now just to sit tight, in the hope
that an indefinite prolongation of the present
impasse-in which kind of truce already
exists on the ground-will undermine our side
and eventually work to their great advantage.
The u. N. command, on the other hand
can hardly welcome the idea of letting the stale
mate continue week after week and month after
month, with no end in sight. OF course for a
number of political and military reasons, our
American and Allied forces have good cause
to hold back on launching an offensive of their
own. Still, the longer the war remains in an
indecisive state, the more intolerable the stua-
ton will grow and the greater will be the pres
sure for such an offensive-a prospect that has
already led to high-level consideration of new
courses of action against the enemy. This could
mean, among other things, naval blockade of
Red China and heavy air attacks on the Man.
churian sanctuary"
Although there have been no indications
that such action has been decided upon by our
own and Allied governments, the fact Is that 1t
must be reckoned with as near-future posi-
bility unless the Communists shift their stand
on the exchange of prisoners. The U. N. has
made clear that 1t will never consent to the
forcible return of those who do not want to go
back under Red control If the enemy really
wants truce, he will agree to the fair and
humane procedure that has been proposed.
otherwise, with each passing day, there will be
steadily increasing danger that the now-inde-
cisive Korean situation will suddenly explode
into greatly enlarged war.