Evening star., 1952-11-19
Indies Korean PROPOSAL

In laudable effort to break the Korean
truce deadlock India has presented to the Cen
eral Assembly of the United Nations an interest
ing but inadequate proposal. It has done so,
according to some reports in spirit OF genuine
hope animated in part by assurances from its
ambassador to Peiping that the Chinese Com
munists, along with their North Korean CO.
conspirators, really want an armistice.
Despite this hope, however, the proposal does
not offer sound formula for ending the present
impasse. To begin with, it is based on the
assumption that only the prisoner-of-war issue
is blocking truce. Perhaps that is so but there
is some reason to believe that the Kremlin-
irrespective of what may be the true feelings Of
its Pyongyang -Peiping puppets-is quite satisfied
with things as they are and is using that issue
merely as pretext to prolong the deadlock.
In other words, there is ground for the suspicion
that the Soviet leaders, at this stage at least,
find it to their advantage to keep the hostiities
going
But in any case, whether or not such
suspicion is justified, India'S propoSal-which has
to do solely with the exchange of war prisoners
is much less than satisfactory as regards two
major points. The first of these calls for the
establishment of commission of four neutral"
powers to handle the problems of repatriation in
keeping with the principle that force must not
be used either to prevent or to effect the return
of captives to their homelands The second pro-
vides that if the Indian plan is accepted and put
into effect, and if 80 days thereafter there are
POWs who still refuse to 60 back to their native
countries the final "disposition" or fate of those
POWs will be decided by ost-armistice political
conference.
AS to the neutral repatriation commission,
India has suggested that 1t be made up of
representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Swe
den and Switzerland, with some fifth power to
act as deciding umpire" in case of deadlock
between the four. However wholly apart from
the organizational unwieldiness of such
arrangement it is difficult to see how the United
States and its U. N. allies in Korea can agree to
that kind of setup. For the Czechs and Poles
may rightly be regarded as mere agents or
puppets of the Kremlin, whereas the Swedes and
Swiss though linked in spirit with the West, are
definitely their own masters. Thus the neutral
ity" involved here would be weighted heavily in
favor of the Reds and the "umpiring" task
might prove to be well nigh impossible.
Even more unsatisfactory is the idea of
post-armstice political meeting to determine the
fate of POWs refusing to 60 home. Although
the Indian proposal places emphasis on the
principle of voluntary repatriation, it is self
contradictory in the way it leaves this question
open to future debate and probable deadlock.
Tens of thousands of Chinese and North Korean
prisoners, because they are desperately afraid of
being handed over to their Red masters have
declared that they will violently resist any move
to return them, and the u. N. command has made
clear that 1t will never force them back Why
then should their "disposition" be subject to the
decision Of later conference? If India's plan
is meant to uphold free-will choices, it argues
against itself when it calls for special negotia-
tions, after truce, to deal with these captives.
Despite this and other weaknesses, however,
the Indian proposal obviously constitutes an
earnest effort to promote peace, and there are
enough good points in it to warrant further
exploration with view to working out COM
promise acceptable to ALL But hope on that
score must be held very much in reserve. It
must be held in reserve because the central fact
of the present situation is that no Korean truce
plan, no matter how reasonable or just, will
succeed unless and until the Kremlin passes the
word on to Pyongyang and Peiping that it sees
nothing more to be gained from continuing the
war.