Evening star., 1952-10-16
There Is No Easy Way Out

The proposal to train South Korean soldiers
to replace American and other U. N. troops on
the front line is assuming some of the aspects OF
party pledge. General Eisenhower, Senator
Taft, John Foster Dulles and Governor Dewey,
with strange unanimity, have each implied that
this is the thing to do to bring the boys back
home.
natural inference would be that we are
not now training South Koreans, or enough OF
them. Secretary of Defense Lovett has corrected
this impression by making available some OF the
statistics. South KOREAN soldiers trained and
equipped for combat number about 100000, ex-
ceeding United States troops by about so per
cent" They have suffered nearly so per cent
more casualties in action than American troops.
We have assigned a much greater part OF the
front line to South Koreans than we hold our
selves. We have done far more in training and
equippng South Koreans than the Russians ana
Chinese have done with North Koreans. The
training program is being stepped up, as the now
of equipment increases
What we have done and what we may be able
to do-now that the training of South Koreans
has become something of campaign issue
ought to become public knowledge and be decided
on the facts, some of these facts being no more
complicated than simple arithmetic. But MIR.
Lovett went about as far in this direction as ne
could go without violating security. He even
"uncassifed" some hitherto restricted informa-
ton. He has not told half the story And the
full facts on which people generally could reach
their own conclusions cannot be discussed In
detail without imparting helpful information to
the enemy.
That is part OF the risk of attempting to
make political capital out of the unpopularity OF
the Korean war. The real danger is to build up
false hope in the minds of the people by con-
Skinnin0 General Eisenhower
and other Republicans have DONE the conditions
that would have to be met before we could with
draw our own troops from Korea, or even the
front line, by substituting South Koreans. We
must take it for granted that General Eisen-
hover and his colleagues are not proposing that
we throw up the sponge, back down on every
thing we have fought for in Korea and write OF
as futile sacrifice our losses in men and
equipment.
General Bradley hoped, at the beginning OF
the campaign that some system OF briefng by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be established
that would inform both candidates of certain
situations to be avoided in political debate. The
plan fell through. The candidates are now kept
more or less informed of developments abroad by
periodic reports from the Central Intelligence
Agency. But no brieings from any source would
have anticipated General Eisenhower's sudden
fervor for training and arming South Koreans
because we do not want Asia to feel that the
white man Of the West is his enemy"-with all
the implications that may be read into that
declaration.
Some of General Eisenhower's campaign
tactics have been explained by his lack of ex-
perience in the rough and tumble of politics
But his experience as soldier should prevent
him from making statements about the Korean
war designed to implant wishful thinking among
the people as to an easy way out. There Is no
easy way out. And if as President he finds that
he cannot carry out what his campaign audiences
thought he was promising to do in Korea, he
cannot plead that his statements were based on
ignorance. AS soldier former Chief of Staff
and former Supreme Commander, he is sup
posed to know what he is talking about when he
talks about war.