Evening star., 1952-12-05


! development at the Pentoeon.
weapons provide the commander
with greater fire power at his i'm
mediate control than was ever
dreamed possible before these most
unique weapons became available.
Many were the times in World
War II when commanders in the
field would have been able to
achieve dramatic successes if they
had had available the essentially
instantaneous fire power of hum
dreds of battalions of artillery,
the equivalent of one atomic ex-
plosion. The artillerist thinks of
this fire power in terms of Time
on Target" and his constant effort
is directed toward reducing this
time to minimum in laying down
a barrage. No reasonable strength
in artillery can ever be expected to
provide the catastrophe impact of
an atomic explosion.
II one goes back to the days of
the phalanx as an example of one
of the earliest efforts to mass Of
fensive capability. we find that the
impact and fire power of cavalry,
as we'll as improvements to bows
and arrows, broke up this mass and
began to force dispersion on the
battlefield as a means of combat
ting such fire power" It is true
this dispersion was relatively
limited for many centuries. In fact,
the Communists assaults in Korea
today frequently abandon the prin-
ciple of dispersion for survival.
This does not change the fact that
the increased fire power of modern
weapons will force us to disperse
our forces whenever possible. This
trend toward greater dispersion
to decrease the effectiveness of
massed fire power will certainly
take a long stride forward with
the increased use of atomic
weapons on the battlefield, on the
sea, and in the air. Massed air
raids of the sort that pummeled
Britain in World War II will De
impossible with the application of
atomic weapons in air defense, and
dense grouping of fleet elements
or conveys at sea will make little
sense under atomic attack.
More Fox-hOle Warfare.
What are the implications of
these new capabilities? On the
battlefield it means more digging
in for our troops whenever the
military situation permits the time
necessary to gain this very con-
siderable protection. A man in
deep trench can survive an atomic
air burst of the size Of that used
against Nagasaki.
This is true because the three
pronged effects of an atomic weap-
on are not eually effective against
a we'll protected man. A man in a
fox-hole. unless he just happens to
be hit by falling debris, is reason
ably safe against the blast of an
air. burst atomic bomb at distances
much closer to that bomb than one
is inclined to suppose. OF course,
this is academic if he is close
enough to this burst to permit the
thermal or heat radiation from
the bomb to strike directly into his
fox-hole, but neither the heat nor
the blast effect is the governing
consideration in determining Just
how close a man can get to the
atomic burst if he is sheltered in
a typical fox-hole. The effect of
the bomb which digs deep into such
shelter and kills without immedi-
ate feeling or effect is the ionizing
radiation which is peculiar TO
atomic weapons. This is something
with which we have never had to
contend on the field of battle. Fire,
heat and blast are things we know
about. and from which we have
learned to shelter ourselves. but
ionizing radiation penetrates con-
crete and steel beyond that which
a man can possibly carry into the
field of battle without serious loss
of mobility.
This. then, is the immediate pic