Evening star., 1952-12-06
No Ponoceos, No Tricks

1t is a happy thing, relief to the whole
Nation, that President-elect Eisenhower is
homeward bound from his unprecedented and
potentially hazardous trip to Korea. Made in
ful1llment of campaign pledge, the trip un-
doubtedly has served a number of useful pur
poses. But there is not the slightest reason why
the American people or any other people
including particularly the South Koreans
should expect magical results from it. For such
results, in view of the hard realities of the
situation, just do not seem to be possible.
General Eisenhower himself has been at
pains to suggest this point at his press confer
ence in Seoul. AS he has put it, he and his mixed
party of distinguished military men and civilians
have visited Korea merely to learn" and Ito
get grasp of the feeling in that part of the
world-"a look at the situation and better
understanding of many factors that will be
important" to everybody during the months to
come. The objective of his trip thus has been
strictly limited one In his own words now that
he has made it, 1--WE have no panaceas, no tricks
for settling any problems" That is to say, there
is no easy way out of the war over there, no
short or comfortable road to victory and peace
1t is good that the President-elect has given
voice to this word of caution. 1t is good because
here in our own country, as we'll as in South
Korea, there have been evidences OF rather
widespread feeling that simply by visiting the
theater of he might somehow be able to
bring about a quick end to the fighting and
dying. The feeling, indeed, seems to have infected
even American and allied U. N troops in the
front-line areas where his presence apparently
has had an electrifying effect on already-hlgh
morale and a genuinely remarkable esprit de
corps. In the circumstances, he has done well
to make clear that it would be mistake for
anybody to derive excessive hope from the mere
fact of his dramatic journey.
Nevertheless, although it has been limited
to only three days and can hardly lead to over
night miracles, General Eisenhower's on-the-
scene Korean survey may be regarded as having
been a worth while project for number OF good
reasons To begin with, wholly apart from DEM
onstrating to our troops and others that the
next Chief Executive of the United States has
an overriding interest in doing his best to bring
the war to successful conclusion, the trip has
been valuable in terms of our relations with the
Rhee government and the people OF South
Korea. Over and above that, it has enabled the
Decentralization as military man and as
our prospective national leader-to "feel out
the situation in a way that would have been i'm
possible if he had remained here at home con-
fnng himself to talks with State Department
experts and the Joint Chiefs OF Staff.
There is no substitute in great matters Of
this sort for first-hand personal observation BY
visiting Korea, General Eisenhower has equipped
himself with additional capacity to understand
what is going on over there and to make sound
decisions relating to it. Just what those decl-
sions will be remains to be seen, but he has
indicated that his survey has left him with the
feeling that there should be precipitate action
of a kind that might unnecessarily involve "a
grave risk of enlarging the war" At the same
time, however, he has suggested that he has
important new moves in mind. He has done so
with these words: Much can be done, in my
opinion, to improve our postion-much will
be done"
But no matter what he plans to do, and no
matter when he may do it, point worth en-
phatic repetition is that the President-elect has
firmly disavowed having any "panaceas' or
tricks" for ending the Korean war in hurry.
The dsavowal is timely. 1t should have the
wholesome effect of heading off further build
up of false hopes. What all of us must still
reckon with in short, is the fact that the krem-
lin and its Pyongyang Peiping puppets seem
clearly determined at this stage to keep on
fighting. General Esenhower's trip has not
changed that.