Evening star., 1952-11-30
Why We Must Not Yield

WY we WUSt jNOL ieIO
There are more than few Americans who
argue with considerable fire that our Govern
ment has been foolish in standing fast against
Communist demands for the forcible repatriation
of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war.
ALI of these prisoners, according to the
argument, have tried in the past-prior to their
capture or surrender-to shoot and kill young
men from the United States and other free lands
actively participating in the allied struggle
against Red aggression in Korea. Why then
have we insisted upon throwing a cloak of
protection around those of them (about $4,000
in total of 1210OO) who have declared that
they will violently resist being returned to their
Communist masters?
Americans who ask this question point to
the fact that the prisoner -of-War deadlock is
supposed to be the only thing blocking agree
ment on truce. In their view, therefore, it
seems soft-headed and unrealistic for the United
States and its allies to adhere to the position they
have taken After all, is the forced repatriation
of $4,000 resistant captives too high price to
pay for an end to the fighting and dying? Is it
not better to pay that price, is 1t not better to
bow to the Soviet demand, than to face con-
tinuation of hostilities in which our troops may
suffer casualties far exceeding the number of
disputed POWs? AS matter of common sense,
why do we not rise above so-called principle
and expediently give in to the Communists by
letting them have their pound of flesh?
This argument-which is somewhat over
Simplifled here-haS certain plausible ring to it.
But it is about as unsound and self-deluding as
anything could be- To begin with, it is based
on the mistaken assumption that the position
against forcible repatriation is in conflict with
international law and international practice.
Actually however, the Geneva Convention-in
lott OFT
history-fully supports and implicitly necessi-
tates that position. Further than that, iron
ically enough, the Kremlin has been party
in the past to no fewer than is treaties
specifically lauding and embracing the principle
of voluntary return of prisoners. The high COM
mand of the Red Army, moreover, is on record as
having embodied the very same principle in its
ultimatums calling upon Nazi troops to surrender
at Stalingrad and in the Budapest area during
the Second World War.
But much more than international law is
involved in this issue. The disputed POWs are
men who with good reason desperately fear
repatriation as passport to savage punishment,
including death. Accordingly, common decency,
simple misunderstanding demands that they be
protected from the kind of fate that befell the
large numbers of Russians (many of whom COM
mitted suicide) who were driven back to the
Secretary Acheson has said, the forcible return
of these Chinese and North Korean prisoners,
besides being highly immoral and Illegal would
require "a military operation of no inconSiderable
proportions, and any such dark and cold
blooded action would return to haunt the
conscience of all free nations agreeing to it.
Further, as hardheaded, practical matter, the
action would set precedent greatly handi-
Gaping our efforts-should there be some future
conf1ict-to persuade enemy troops to surrender
Persuasion of that kind would ring hollow in the
circumstances.
Above all, in the present juncture of affairs
there could be no more shocking act of appease-
ment than acceptance Of the Russian demand
abusively and threatfully expressed-for forcible
repatriation It might buy truce, but at the
political conference after the truce 1t would lead
the hungry Kremlin to keep on raising, higher
and higher, its price for peace, and there would
be no peace. Instead, there would be only the
bleak spectacle of the United States and its U. NJ
allies trying to deal with conSpiratorS deSpising
them for having shown weakness of will and
lack of staying power in a degrading surrender.
It would be a. surrender as dangerous, In its
own way, as Munich.
This certainly would be price much too
high to pay for a dubious armistice in Korea.
1t would be an abandonment of honor, humani-
taranism and the best and most vital interests
of the free world. Our Government has done
we'll, therefore, has done the imperative, in not
yielding on the issue.