Evening star., 1951-05-11

FOLLOWING is a partial tert OF
Defense Secretary MGrShdll's
testimony today before a Joint
Senate committee Investigating
Far East policy:
Chairman Russell-When tn,
committee recessed yesterday
Senator Hickenlooper had MOI
concluded questions, so we will
now proceed with Senator Hick.
looper.
Senator Hickenlooper - Gen
Marshall. on yesterday a few
questions which / asked you al
that time were directed I believe
entirely at the theory Of why
we would accept a calculated risk
in Europe which was generally
agreed by every one to be Q
calculated risk of the possible
starting of a third world war
and now when we are in sit
uation of desperation, that Il
fighting and war and all those
things, why we refuse to accept a
similar calculated risk and not
carry out the military activities OF
bombing bases of supply back in
Manchuria where the Reds OF
China are actually fighting with
us.
For the sake of the record this
morning, would you care to am
plify that or discuss it any
further?
Secretary Marshall. First,
that it was felt we had no choice
in Western Europe but to proceed
as we did. unless we allowed that
region to go by default to Com
munist domination and that that
in our view was not similar to the
present situation where we are in
action and the question is whether
or not we can extend that action
without developing an enlarged
war on the Chinese side, or a full
war because of the reactions of
the Soviet Union.
The principal difference that I
see in the matter is that we have
an issue there that is very critical
to the Soviet Union in that they
now are in complete accord with
the Chinese Communist govern
ment so far as we know and they
have q treaty of accord.
That is being imperiled,
would assume, and my associates
have assumed. by what is happen
ing to the Communist forces in
Korea.
Therefore, the situation as to
the possible actions of the Soviet
government is a more acute one
by far than that in Western Eu-
rope because if they lose a close
community of interests and CO.
operative arrangement wit h
China at this time, that would be
a very great loss to them of
something they now possess.
Here is a situation where the
Chinese can be brought 10 feel, by
continued highly destructive
losses, that the Soviets have let
them down. Therefore, the situa-
ton is more dangerous. Now that
is the general view we have taken.
Senator HickenlooperI think
! follow your statement. General,
and still I want to say, without
any disrespect, that I can not
agree fully with it. Because it
seems to be that If the Soviet
interest is so much in accord with
that of the Communist Chinese
the Russians are going to
come in anyway to save them
from that defeat. -.
That is my view on that
philosophy. So that we are doing
nothing but losing. I mean we
might just as we'll take after them
back in Manchuria with our
bombers and destroy their build
up depots and SO on, because the
reasoning would seem to dictate
that Russia would come in just
as quickly one way as the other
Matter of Judgment.
Secretary Marshall-Well, Sen
ator, of course, that is bound to
be a matter of judgment. 80. On
my part, particularly the reactions
and the views on the Chiefs of
Staff, there are decided technical
involvements. :.
was questioning several men,
bers of the Chiefs of Staff this
morning to find out if my general
statements to you yesterday were
in accord with their views. F..
My reactions in this matter
come very largely from the Chiefs
of Staff. -.
These men analyze these vari-
Gus questions, all of them, and talk
out their various points of view,
and bring them to me and to the
President, I think it is a very for
midable general opinion on affairs
in the world: and, I didn't men
ton that they had been to Japan
quite frequently, and to Korea
frequently and recently; so, here Is
an opinion of quite a group.
I frankly doubt that this Gov
ernment will ever be so fortunate
as to have such a collection Of ex.
perience at one time in the Chiefs
of Staff. These men have Il
and they have world picture be.
fore them every day and therefore
when I refer to the views OF thu
Chiefs of Staff. I think am cor.
rect in saying that I am referring
to a very vital opinion as to wha'
is best to be done in connection
with these various matters we arr
discussing. -.
IIeo of Air p0Wnr