Evening star., 1951-05-10
Continued From Page A-1s0
quite certain there was not a
formal discussion of the matter.
Questioned on StiIweIl.

quite certain there was not
formal discussion of the matter.
Questioned on Stilwell.
Senator Smith-Now we are all
aware. Secretary Marshall, that
there were differences of opinion
with regard to our whole China
policy, and I want to ask you what
part Gen. Stilwell played in that
whole picture in determining
these policies. He was, as I un-
derstand, one of your advisers in
that matter at the time. :. What
am after is the difference be-
tween Gen. Stilwell's views and
Wedemeyer's views because that. I
think, has an important bearing
on the subject.
Gen. Marshall-I think the re-
ports will show :. . that Gen. Still
wells view .. was very much the
same as Gen. Wedemeyer'S. His
methods of procedure would
naturally have been quite diff
ferent from those of Gen. Wede-
meyer because Stilwell was very
positive, impatient individual, and
he had an extremely difficult role
to perform.
StilWell, as I recall this phase,
was intensely desirous of bringing
the Communist army forces and
the Nationalist army forces to-
gether in co-ordinated operations
against the japanese. And I
think the records will show that
he felt that the Nationalist forces
were inclined or too much involved
in fighting the Communists rather
than getting together in the op-
Grafton against the japanese.
Gen. Wedemeyer at that time,
November 20, 1945, stated that
'The Nationalist Government was
completely unprepared for the oc-
cupation of Manchuria in the face
of Communist opposition"
On November 20, 1945, Gen.
Wedemeyer reported. he being the
commander of our troops in China
and the Chief of Staff of the
GeneralisSimo, Chang Kai-Shek-l
reported, Chinese Communist
guerrillas and satateurs can and
probably will, if present activ-
tiles are reliable indication, re-
strict and haraSS the movements
of National government forces to
such an extent that the results
will be a costly and extended
campaign. Logistical support for
National government forces and
measures for their security in the
heart of Manchuria have not been
fully appreciated by the general
issimo of his Chinese staff. These
facts, plus the lack of appropriate
forces and transport, have caused
me to advise the generaliSsimo
that he should concentrate his ef-
forts on the recovery of North
China and the consolidation of
his military and political position
there prior to any attempt to ac-
cupy Manchuria. -
StillWell Wanted Action.
have no specific recollection of
Gen. Stilwell's attitude regardilN
those matters because he was re-
lieved of his command before we.
got to that particular phase.
What I do recognize was his de-
sire to bring concerted action
against the japanese, on the part
of the Nationalist forces, and the
Communist regime forces. -.
Senator Smith. Now, gen.
eral, I want to move from there
to why Gen. Wedemeyer was called
back to special mission in China
In 1947.
You say. in your previous testi-
mony. that you had suggested to
the President that he be asked to
go on a special mission.
Gen. Marshall-I decided, in an
effort to find out what best could
be done, that Gen. Wedemeyer was
the best available person for that
purpose, as he had been in China
for a considerable period, he had
commanded our forces in China
and he had been chief of staff
to the generalissimo and the
generalissimo had great confidence
in him. I took the matter
ther to the President, with the
draft of the directive for Gen.
Wedemeyer. The President thought
it a wise thing to send him and
1t was appropriate to have that
directive. Then. he authorized its
issue to Gen. Wedemeyer.