Evening star., 1951-08-21
Political Document

Political Document
The statement filed by eight of the Re-
publican Senators who sat on the joint COM
mittee which investigated the dismissal of
Gen. Macarthur is essentially partisan political
document.
This is not surprising. In our political
system it is to be expected that the minority
party will make what capital it can from the
mistakes of the party in power, and that is what
the Republicans have done in their indictment
of the administrations Far Eastern policy-a
policy which they describe as "a catastrophe
failure" To take this line, to dwell upon the
bad and to ignore the good, is a traditional
political tactic, employed at one time or another
by both parties. As long as such tactic Is
recognized for what 1t is and evaluated accord
ingly, no serious harm will be done to our
national interests.
The Republican statement gains in effective
ness because there is undeniably much In the
administrators Far Eastern record that is
vulnerable to attack. Most of the COP fire
was directed at Secretary Of State Acheson,
presumably because he is considered to be a
good political target. Some Of the criticism of
him was manifestly unfair. For instance, the
COP Senators said that Mr.. Acheson is "associ-
ated with long series of vacillations and
equivocationS, the net result of which has been
to encourage Communist aggression A gen.
eralization Of that sort can cover many sins
But, in fairness, it should not be accepted as
meaning that Mr.. Acheson Is properly respon-
Sible for all of the State Department policies
which have encouraged Communist aggression
1t may be fair to charge him with responsibility
for the decision to pull out of Korea But the
primary policies which encouraged Communist
aggression were formulated when James F.
ByrneS and Gen. Marshall were at the head of
the State Department. or even prior to that
time. Mr.. Acheson, whatever his subsequent
errors was not then in position to fix policy
The statement was more effective, and more
realistic, in attacking portions of Mr.. Acheson's
testimony during the Macarthur hearings He
said on that occasion that truce somewhere
in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel would sat-
isfy the United Nations military objectives in
Korea of putting down aggression and restor-
ing peace, and that the uniflcation of Korea
was political objective to be worked out later
That is the kind of statement which, If taken
at face value gives rise to misgvings about State
Department policy. At Yalta, we made certain
agreements with the Russians There would have
been little wrong with those agreements If the
Russians had lived up to them. But they did
not live up to them and If we did not realize
then that the Kremlin would not deal in good
faith, we certainly should realize it now. Yet
Mr.. AcheSon, in 1851, speaks hopefully of salts
factory military settlement in the vicinity of
the Ssth Parallel, with the political objectives
to be worked out later. In the first place 1t is
hardly possible to make valid distinction be-
tween military and political objectives in Korea.
And If such distinction could be made, there is
nothing in the record of our dealings with the
Russians to lead one to believe that satisfactory
political adjustment could be made on the basis
of military settlement along the line of the
38th Parallel.
If Mr.. Acheson believes to the contrary, he
invites the suspicion that he is naive to say
the least And if he does not believe it, he is
vulnerable to the charge Of being something
less than wholly candid in his testimony.
What all of this really comes down to, how
ever, is the question Of how great military
effort we want to make and are capable of
making in Asia at this time. The Republican
Senators, if they mean what they say, should be
ready to accept full-scale war in the Far East,
although all of our top military men testified
in opposition to such venture. But the Repub-
licanS, unless by implication, did not-and prob
ably will not-openly advocate total war in Asia
now. They are merely demonstrating what all
political experience shows-that criticism and
denunciation come easily from those who do not
have to accept responsibility for the consequences
of the steps they advocate.