Evening star., 1951-08-20
Text of G. OP Senator'S Conclusions in Macarthur Case

Conclusions
Republic should be restored. At
1.-THE time of President Roosevelt's
;ldeath on April IL, 1945, these COM
Imitments were presumably still in
force. The secret agreements at
Yalta were then unknown, not a.
'Isingle Russian soldier was engaged
lin the Far East, and the forces Of
1.-THE United States were within
striking distance Of the very heart
Iof Japan.
Reds Entered Vacuum.
I On August 8, l945, the Russians
lentered Manchuria. and, after a.
few days of skirmishing. the
Japanese resistance on the Asiatic
mainland was over. There followed
lthe movement of the Chinese
Communists into the vacuum
which the Russians conveniently
ilprovided. Later in the year (De-
Icember Is. 1945l, a formal demand
,lby President Truman was served
upon the Chinese calling for al
cessation Of hostilities between the
INationalists and the Communists
land insisting that a-"national
conference Of representatives Of
major political elements in the
country agree upon arrangements
which would give those elements
a fair and effective representation
in the Chinese National Govern
ment."
In this manner the fatal coali-
tion policy was imposed upon our
ally
President Truman has had four
Secretaries of States:
Edward Stettinius d945); James
F. Byrnes 1945-4D; George c.
Marshall u947-49) and Dean g.
Acheson t1949 to present writing) :.
The first of these four men held
Iofice for only a few months and
was little more than a temporary
place holder.
The second, though he was
present at Yalta, knew nothing of
the secret agreements made there.
He has said that he learned Of
them as a result of a Moscow press
statement, and that only diligent
search unearthed the relevant
documents in a White House safe.
The third. George C. Marshall,
undertook the imposition of the
coalition policy while acting as
the Presidents special representa-
tive in China. After his appoint
ment as Secretary Of State in
January 1947, he continued for
almost six months the embargo on
arms shipments to the Chinese
Nationalists. While declaring that
intervention by any foreign gov
ernment in these matters would
be inappropriate" the administra-
Ition in a most practical sense did
$50 interfere and indirectly aided
1.-THE ultimate Communist triumph
lin China.
The fourth, Dean G. Acheson.
lis associated with q long series
of vacillations and equivocations,
the net result of which has been
to encourage Communist aggres-
sion. His statement that the poll
icy was to wait until the dust
settles" is an example Of this.
His speech at the National Press
Club on January IL. 1850, is an-
other. In that speech. while draw
ing the Nations defensive peri
meter" from the Aleutians to the
philippines. he pointedly omitted
both South Korea and FormoSa,
thus implying that the United
States would make no effort to
Irepel q Communist invasion Of
either territory. Still another IL
Illustration of Secretary AcheSon'S
indirect encouragement of the
Communists was his statement on
May 81, 1850, to Members Of Con-
lgreSs in the Library auditorium
that the United States would not
use the veto to prevent the seat
ling of Communist China in the
United Nations.
/ Peace Through Appeasement.
One of the most singular as
lpects of the administrators far
eastern policy is illustrated by its
acknowledgment of the dynamic
character of revolution. AS Secre-
Itary Acheson has pointed out on
Iso many occasions, international
communism is a movement which
plans to overthrow existing gov
ernmentS by force and violence If
necessary.
While holding this point of view
our State Department has con-
tinually acted as though, if ap-
peaSement went far enough, the
Russians and their satellites would
consent to dwell peacefully side by
side with the free world"
It does not require prolonged
reflection upon the disastrous
results of the administrations far
eastern policy to draw some con-
illusions as to what the United
States must do Fear Of Russia is
mo basis for a foreign policy; what
we must have is a positive program
based upon confidence in our
/ liabilities and resources.
6. The foreign policy of the
: Urited States since the middle
1940s has been based on expedi-
ency rather than the principles Of
liberty and justice
It has been extremely difficult to
determine the full extent Of the
secret commitments which the ad-
niinistration has made. These
commitments are the basis for a
large part Of our present foreign
policy. The agreements made at
Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, Quebec.
Potsdam, and elsewhere were
largely international executive ar
|rangementS drawn without con-
sideration of the treaty-making