Evening star., 1951-02-02
General Eisenhower's Report

In his public report to the Congress, General
Eisenhower stuck to the high ground of uncon-
tested generalities. He bypassed the controver-
sial points and dealt as little as possible with
those details upon which the success or failure
Of Europe's rearmament must, in the long run,
depend
There were, of course, reasons for this In
the first place, he was appearing later in the
day before joint committees of the Congress
meeting in closed session. In that setting, he
could talk with degree of freedom that would
not be feasible in public appearance Another
reason is that many of General Eisenhowers
impressions of what the nations associated with
us in the North Atlantic Pact can do and will
do must necessarily be tentative No man can
visit 13 countries in 81 days and come back with
Judgments on delicate questions which he would
care to spread upon an open record.
When allowance is made for these and SIM
liar restraining influences, the report to Con-
gress can fairly be described as a fortnight and
heartening statement.
It must be remembered that this program
for the rebuilding of West Europe's defense is in
its infancy. In terms of military power the
North Atlantic nations are weak and for some
time will continue to be weak. The main ques-
ton, as General Eisenhower put it, has to do
with what is in the hearts of the people there
Have they lost the will to fight for their freedom
or is the weight of the evidence to the contrary?
On this score, General Eisenhower was cautiously
optimistic. In some areas he found sense of
pessimism bordering on defeatism but he also
discovered evidence "of rejuvenation, growth
OF determination, spirit to resist, spirit again
to try to live the lives of free men, to hold their
heads up in the world, to do their part, and to
take the risk"
General Eisenhower's principal recommended
tion is that we should do all that can be done
With the means that we can reasonably devote to
the task, to build on this small beginning And
he advocates this because, in his judgment, there
is no acceptable observation-disclosures our system
will "atrophy and wither away" if we permit
communism to dominate Western Europe and
the areas tied to it.
He did not say precisely what we should do
or how extensive our efforts should be- AS
good poker player he was not exposing all of his
cards. He did say, however, that Europe's great
and crying immediate need is for arms In the
matter Of sending more American troops to
Europe, he was exceedingly vague. All that he
said was this: II believe that it is essential to
have the transfer of certain of our units care
FULLY gauged in their ratio to what Europe is
doing" That even for an extemporaneous ad-
dress, is a remarkably unprecise statement.
The country naturally would like more in
formation on this key phase of the program.
But 1t has to be recognized that exact commit
ments cannot be made, certainly not at this stage
Too much depends upon events-upon the possible
reaction OF our enemies and upon what our
friends demonstrate, by actions rather than
words, that they are ready and willing to de- The
only real question now is whether we are going to
move forward with this enterprise whetherIwe
are going to set an example for others to follow
General EisenhoWer'S report, and It's reception,
leave little room for doubt on this score.