Evening star., 1951-06-26

TOKYO, June 26.-Tert OF a
general headquarters memo
randunl quoting unnamed State
Department officials on the So
uiet proposed for a cease-fre TN
Korea:
A number Of considerations
entered into the extreme caution
with which the State Department.
commented upon Soviet U. NJ
Delegate Jacob A. Malik's proposal
for negotiations Of cease-fire in
Korea.
informed officials reviewing the
|eleinents OF the Soviet proposal
which led to the cautious comment
OF the State Department pointed
out that the proposal itself seemed
too frontal and public, a device
which has not characterized pre-
vious Soviet actions.
Mr.. Malik,s statement that this
would require the readiness OF the
parties to enter on the path OF a
peaceful settlement of the Korean
question" led United States ex-
IpeEs to ask what he had in mind
by the path of peaceful settle
ment." This sentence appeared at
the tail end of Malik's speech and
lit must be considered in the con-
text of his full address.
Another phrase which led to
caution in the State Department
comment was as first step dis
Icussions should be started between
the belligerents for cease-fre. "
Mr.. Malik failed to say who the
belligerents were and it will be
recalled that Soviet Russia has
never submitted it's belligerency
lin the Korean conflict. The Chi
nese Communists have claimed
their armies are volunteers.
No Reference to Red China.
There was nothing in Malik's
address to indicate what sort OF
/ discussions Malik had in mind
.IIf those discussions involved other
governments, United States off,
,lc1als noted that Malik gave
,Ino indication Of who those
governments were. 1t was noted
ssIfor instance, that he made ne
. to the Peiping regime
5Iof Communist China.
4 A major element in the caution
Slthat characterized the State De
: apartments comment was the re
lationship of what appeared t.
Ibe a political move to the mill
Itary situation in Korea. II, TO
: instance, the Malik proposal wer
u accepted and U. N. forces with
,, drew from Parallel 38, it raise
elthe military question whethe
'sIsuch a move would be just shit
: in battle lines to place the enem
lin a better position militarils
: There is always the danger OF
: counterattack and the breakin
2 of an armiStice.
y, Another consideration enterin
Into the extreme caution OF tn
: State Departments comment wa
lc the direct concern of the other
], .,lnations with troops supporting th
uIU. N. campaign in Korea. It We
= pointed out that the State De
partment did not wish to CON
lment in stronger words within
:. - few hours after Malik's speec
- without consulting the other goN
lernments concerned in the Korea
y conflict with view to gainir
= their views and their assessmel
~ of the Korean situation in Il
light of Malik's proposal.
It was noted also by informs
s. officials that all u. N. memb
ne countries have diplomatic rel
r. tions with Moscow and that son
aniU. N. member nations have dipl
nj matte relations with the Chine
at Communist regime at Peiping.
Like Political Speech.
W Responsible officials in Was
toIigton were fearful that the ceas
its fire part of Malik's proposal mig
,ut have been a cover for military a
he vantage. A great many poir
having to do with the militia
mt situation in Korea were not TAX
sr- up by Mr.. Malik in his speech
he Finally, il Mr.. Malik's propol
he was a political move designed
lid awaken respect. it was emphasiz
on that the Russians do not usua
proceed. in the manner Of A