Evening star., 1951-02-16


which must be considered, but
also that of conquest by default,
by pressure. by persuasion. by SUBJ
version, by "neutralism," by all
the paraphernalia of indirect ag-
gression which the Communist
movement has used.
If we approached this problem
as though our sole concern were
how we were going to act after
Europe had been attacked. re-
gardless of the human cost, what
ever the devastation. then we can
scarcely expect our European al
lies to show much enthusiasm for
the prospects of the future. This
kind of strategy drives our friends
in Europe into a mood of nom
resistance, a mood of neutral
ISM" which is. for them and for
all of us, a shortcut to suicide.
So our first purpose-and this
is something we need to make
absolutely clear to our friends
In Europe-is to deter the ag-
gressors from attacking Europe.
Our primary concern is not how
to win a war after it gets started,
but how to prevent it, and how
to help Europe stay free in the
meantime.
Three Deterrent Factors.
Now, what is it on which we
can rely to prevent an attack on
Europe?
There are three deterrent fac
tors to be considered. One is
the retaliatory power now in our
possession our capability of
striking with air power against
the centers of aggression. An
other is the reserve power which
helps tc convince the Russians
that they could not win in the
end. And finally, there ale the
integrated forces in being of the
North Atlantic treaty nations.
This third deterrent factor is
the one at issue. This is the de-
terrent which is now weak, and
which We are now striving to build
up as quickly and as effectively
as we can do 1t.
A number Of questions have
been raised about this effort to
build up the forces in being. in
Western Europe. Some have
asked why We need to do this
why we can't continue to rely on
the deterrent force Of our retalia-
tory air power. and our reserve
power elsewhere.
Some have argued that this
European defense force cannot
possibly be made large enough to
be effective, while others have
argued that this European de-
|fense force would be so great a /
threat to the Soviet Union that
lit would be provocative. These
concerns, although contradictory
|of each other, have led to a COM
mon line of reasoning-that we
should not move ahead with our
European Allies in building a de-
fense force in Western Europe.
Apart from the helpless and de-
fenseless predicament in which
this course of action-or more ac-
|curately, this course of inaction-I
would leave us. there are a num-
ber of powerful considerations
which point to the conclusion that
our own security, as well as the
security of our Allies in Europe,
requires vigorous efforts to build
an effective defense force in Eu-
rope at the earliest possible mo-
ment.
Time Will Cut Margin.
One reason why we cannot con-
tinue to rely on retaliatory air
power as a sufficient deterrent is
the effect of time. We have a
substantial lead in air power and
in atomic weapons. :. But with the
passage of time, even though we
continue our advances in this
field, the value of our lead
diminishes. 80.
Another reason why the avail
ability of defense forces in being
in Western Europe is necessary
| is that it enables the free nations
to deal more effectively with, and
thus to prevent. the various forms
of aggression that threaten them.
So far, we have been talking about
the possibility of bold, naked ag-
gression by the Soviet Union
itself. But we have seen recent
examples of another form of
Communist aggression-disguised
aggression through a satellite. :.
We have also become familiar
with the Communist use of in
direct aggression, in which the
Communists employ the weapons
Of fear and threats to undermine
confidence and paralyze the will
to resist. We saw this happen in
Czechoslovakia. The presence of
adequate defense forces in being
is also a bulwark against this kind
of aggression.
The argument is sometimes ad-
VanceQ tnat the western European
defense forces cannot be made
large enough to equal the forces
available to the potential aggres-
sor, man for man, and therefore
would be useless. The difficulty
with this argument is that it con-
siders the European defense forces
in isolation, as a sole weapon, in
stead of considering these forces
as a vital adjunct to the other
deterrent forces available.
It is not the case that ground
forces would or could be sufficient
by themselves, or that air or sea
power by themselves could or
would be sufficient, but that the
three elements of our deterrent
forces, taken together, are the best
means of preventing an attack
from taking place.
However overwhelming our avail
able air striking power is likely