Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-05-27
West Debates Mediterranean Defense
Fleet Commend Question Still Is to Be Answered
As Allies Study Eastward Extension of NATO Pact

little if any potential for the
defense of the Mediterranean
area. They have identified them
selves with the neutralist position
between East and West.
Iran, while lying next to Soviet
Russia. is devoted now to taking
over the British oil interests.
While still apprehensive of Russia,
Iran is more hostile to the West
today than. she has ever been.
Such is Me material with which
the Western powers have to work
It is extremely heterogeneous and
has little strength of its own to
meet the threats that face it.
What, specifically, is the threat
to the Mediterranean area as
whole-leaving aside the case OF
Iran?
Covers European Flank
The Mediterranean basin lies on
the right flank of Gen. Eisenhow-
er's front against Soviet agrees
sion on the continent of Europe
If the Mediterranean is securely
held by the Western, Allies. Gen.
Eisenhower can direct his full at
tention to a frontal assault OF
Soviet forces. If it is not securely
held, the position of his armies In
Western Europe can be endangered
| by a Russian sweep through the
Mediterranean. Defense in this
area is centered in naval and all
power.
Russia's centuries-old aspiration
has been to break out into the
Mediterranean. The only place
where this is really possible i!
the Dardanelles. now firmly hele
by Turkey under the Montreu1
convention. The other Theoretical
points of .entry-Albania ans
Greece-offer little advantage un'
less the Dardanelles also is taken
Seizure of the Dardanelles woult
require the conquest of majol
parts of Greece and Turkey. botl
of which have large standing
armies modernly equipped unde
the American-aid programs. Tn
Russians would have to fight hare
for victory there. But if tn
Dardanelles should be taken, tn
Soviet Union would be in position
to launch into the Mediterranean
its fleet OF submarines based j,
the Black Sea.
i Russia's submarines. particu
larly in connection with her avia
ton, are a real. tangible threat
Using Greek and Turkish port
as bases they could range lh
length and breadth of the Mediter
:. ranean.( -
Italy a Target ~
Italy might be the second Rus
sian objective. A submarine cam
paign around her coasts could b
co-ordinated with land campaign
through Yugoslavia into the Nortl
italian industrial areas. Even
the Soviet land campaign through
the Balkans could be checke,
short of Italy, submarine harass
ment of the sea lanes to tina
country could seriously hurt it
war effort. In Northern Italy
, heavy Communist population
might provide ready fifth col
, umn.
Lying in the middle of the Medi
, terranean, Italy is a base fror
which Russian air and submarin
5 power could radiate in all direc
: tions. The loss of Italy woul
mean. for most practical purpose.
the loss of the whole Mediter
ranean and the area around it.
What are the present and pro
spective measures to be taken 70
Mediterranean defense?
There are only three powers @
air those in that great basi
which can be counted on for an
substantial contribution to tn
naval and air aspects of defens
the United States, Great Britain
land France. Unless Italy is per
United to rebuild it's navy-a Ion
and tedious process-it will hav
little contribution to make. No
will Spain, whose naval forces ar
negligible.
The United States and Britain
maintain fleets in the Mediterra
mean, embracing all types Of nava
ARMS. France still has a measur
of seapower, most of which pre-
tsumably is in the Mediterranean
Greece and Turkey possess onl
the smaller auxiliary types of yes
sells.
Unified operations of the thre
major naval forces will be no gres
problem, for units of the thre
Inavies already have done exten
l5ive training together and will d
considerable more. STANDARDIZED
ltion Is well advanced between tn
United States and British Naviel
land the French are coming int
the program as to tactical doctrin
and operating methods.