Evening star., 1951-05-15

Star summer camp FUND.
over this point because there were
actually three documents prepared
on January IL and 13.
He indicated that the one Gen
Macarthur relied on in his speech
was not a directive. but merely 9
study which had been started late
in November, when it seemed
that an all-out war against China
might occur.
It was in November that the
Chinese intervened in North Ko-
rea.
According to Gen. Bradley this
study was changed several times
between November and January
IL. By that time the conditions
which caused it to be started had
changed, and Gen. Bradley said
it was boiled down to a set of
tentative agreements, but not a
directive to Gen. Macarthur.
Macarthur Message Cited.
Gen. Bradley said that on jan
uary 10, Gen. Macarthur sent
word that it might be difficult to
stay in Korea. In answer to this
message. a directive was sent to
Gen: Macarthur on January IL,
instructing him to try to stay in
Korea, but that was entirely sep
arate from the January IL study
of possible steps that might be
taken against Red China as ad-
vocated by Gen. Macarthur.
When the Joint Chiefs were
preparing the January IL directive
to Gen. Macarthur to stay in
Korea. Gen. Bradley testified, the
State Department wanted to in
clude in it some political factors,
Gen. Bradley said the Joint Chiefs
objected to that. The question
was taken to the White House,
and it was finally decided to send
the military instructions on jan
uary IL to stay in Korea and let
President Truman send the po-
litical and diplomatic reasons for
that course separately on January
13.
Gen. Marshall explained last
week that the other January IL
document. outlining the same
steps advocated by Gen. MacAr-
thur. was submitted to the Ma
tionel Security Council and that
a copy went to Gen. Macarthur
only for his information.
Situation Improved.
Gen. Bradley recalled today that
Army Chief of Staff Collins and
Air Chief of Staff Vandenberg
hurried to Korea on the evening
of January IL, after sending the
message to Gen. Macarthur to
try and stay there.
Fortunately" said Gen. Brad
ley, about that time the situa-
ton began to improve and from
then on the position was estab-
lished and we even started to
come back"
In other testimony Gen. Brad
ley said:
/. The Joint Chiefs of staff
were unanimous in their view that
Gen. Macarthur should be re-
moved from his Far Eastern COM
mand and decided also it was mot
feasible" to leave him in Japan
while relieving him of responsible
tiles for the Korean fighting.
2. The State Department has
not influenced the Joint Chiefs
on military policy in Korea.
Russian Threat Is Real.
8. The Nations top military
leaders believe there is "a real
danger" of Russian intervention,
II the Korean war should be ex-
panded along the Macarthur line,
because of the Soviet's strength in
the Far East and the fact the Rus
slams have been supporting Com
munist China and before that the
North Koreans. Gen. Bradley
added that the Soviets are capable
OF causing us a great deal of diff
Guilty"
4. The Joint Chiefs have opposed
the Macarthur proposal for using
Chinese Nationalist forces from
Formosa because they have "very
limited capabilities, particularly
for offensive action"
S. He favorS economic sanctions
against Communist China, but op-
poses at this time a naval blockade
since that is actually and can be
taken certainly as an act of war. I"
He added that in the opinion of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff naval
blockade would be effective only
II it were United Nations action
and not just a blockade by United
States forces.
Before any questions were put
Tn Gon Pro rlIay, Coxa%ax r3a1J