Evening star., 1951-06-12
What the Marshall Mission Did

What the Marshall Mission Did
Last Wednesday, in his testimony before
the joint Senate committee investigating our
Far Eastern policy, Secretary Acheson read part
of message sent December Z, 1945, by General
Macarthur Lieutenant General Wedemeyer and
Admiral Spruance. The excerpt was as follows:
"It is suggested that the United States assistance
to China . be made available as basis for
negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring
together and effect compromise between the
major opposing groups to promote unified
democratic China"
On the next day, in telegram to General
Macarthur, Senator Knowland-an anti-admin
istration member of the investigating committee
declared that the quoted excerpt "implies that
you favored coalition government between
Chinese Communists and Republic of China"
Whereupon, on Saturday, the General replied
with wire that Q) denounced the Marshall
mediation mission of early 1885, (2) explained
that the intent Of the 1945 message was to sug-
gest that "a wise and judicious play upon the
potential of American assistance might materi-
ally strengthen Chiangs efforts to secure political
unification";; and 60 asserted that "Any in
ference that sponsored compromise which
would favor the forces of communism at the
CAPCASc VI t44C 1OACCo VI 1ICCuOM vi WOuA0 CA4CSo
political coalition of such diametricaly opposed
and irreconcilable forces is prevarication with
out color of factual support"
And now as the newest witness before the
Senate investigators, General Wedemeyer, besides
supporting General MacArthurs recommended
tions for bombing Manchura and blockadng the
Chinese mainland, has joined the deposed Far
Eastern commander in describing as absolutely
incorrect" any suggestion that the 1945 message
meant that he-General Wedemeyer-favored
the idea of promoting coalition Of the Commu-
mist regime of Mao TZe-tung and the Nationalist
government of Chang Kai-shek. Presumably the
thought he had in mind at the time was the
same as the one that General Macarthur has
somewhat vaguely explained to the implication
sensing Mr.. Knowland- that "a wise and
judcious play upon the potential of American
assistance might materially strengthen Chiang's
efforts to secure political unif1cation"
Actually, of course, whatever the exact
intent of the 1945 Macarthur W. edemeyer-S -Spru
ance message words do not always mean what
they seem to say), nothing in Mr.. Acheson's
printed testimony implies that either General
Macarthur or General Wedemeyer ever "spon-
sored a compromise which would favor the forces
of communism at the expense Of the forces Of
freedom" BY indirection, however, in attacking
Arthur's telegram to Senator Knowland strongly
suggests that the administration has favored
such a compromise. The suggestion is unwar
ranted. The record does not support It, What
the record shows is that the United States, in
the immediate postwar period, resorted to medi
alton aimed at ending China's civil war and
unifying the country under Chang and the
Nationalists
Thus, wholly apart from extending a vast
amount Of aid to the Generalissimo our country
prevailed upon the opposing sides, through Gen.
eral MarshalPs mission, to negotiate and sign
three agreements. Under the first of these, hos
tilitieS were to be ended permanently. Under
the second, pending the formation of a consti-
tutional and freely elected government for the
whole of China, state council of 40 members
was to rule Professionally. These members-20
from Chiangs Kuomintang party and 20 from
the Communist and other parties-were to be
appointed by Chang, who was to have veto
power over the councils actions, and who could
be overridden only If his own party deserted him
and made possible a three-ifths vote against
him. Ffnally-and most important of all
Chiang's and Mao's armed forces were to be
amalgamated into an army of so divisions so
OF them Nationalist and 10 Communist, and in
crucial Manchuria there were to be stationed IS
Of these divisions, IA Nationalist and / Com
muniSt.
Plainly enough, in both a military and po-
ltical sense, all this favored the forces of free
dom at the expense of the forces of communism.
Even General Macarthur, whose attack on
the Marshall mission is difficult to understand,
can hardly deny that these agreements, If they
had been honored, would have constituted "a
wise and judicious play" strengthening Chang
and promoting unified democratic China. Short
of sending American armies in to fight the Reds,
what else could have been done to fortify the
incompetently led Nationalists? Hindsight
critics have been free with lot of hindsight ad-
vice and recriminations, but the record, as un-
folded to date still lends fairly good support
to the administrations thesis that this tragedy
was not really made in Washington.