Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-10-18

SUUOT Alan hUE ana HWSSfQn
Foreign Minister Vishinsky
made public last night:
Statement by Ambassador Kirk.
have been instructed before
leaving Moscow for an extended
period to take advantage of the
opportunity to discuss certain
matters now causing international
tension and standing the way of
improved relations between our
two countries.
At the present time the most
explosive outstanding issue is
Korea and the armistice talks are
the most immediate aspect of that
problem. The cessation of fight
ing in Korea on a mutually &C
ceptable basis would serve to re-
duce tensions and contribute to
an atmosphere in which further
constructive steps might be taken
toward the solution of other press
ing international problems.
The developments between the
United Nations Command and
the North Korean and Chinese
Communist negotiators are in
comprehensive to the United
States Government. The North
Korean and Chinese Communist
proposals in regard to an armistice
line are inconsistent with the
current military situation and
with statements which Acting
Foreign Minister Gromyko made
to me upon the occasion of my
call on him on June ~ of this
year to clarity the earlier public
statement by Mr.. Malik in New
York on June Is. In that inter-
view Mr.. Gromyko explained that
the Soviet government enviSaged
a meeting of the opposing COM
mands to conclude a military
armistice which would include a
cease-fire and which would be
limited strictly to military ques-
lions and would not involve any
political or territorial matters.
Political Issues Later.
The United Nations Command
was surprised and disappointed to
discover that the opposing negotia-
tors kept insisting upon an armis-1
tice line not strictly military in
character which introduced COM
plicated political and territorial
issues contrary to the understand
ing on which the United Nations
Command had entered the
negotiations and which does not
conform to the military require
ments for a satisfactory armis-
tice line. To take important
political steps in military CONVEX
sations between the United Ma
tions commander on the one side
and commanders on the other,
who profess to represent Chinese
volunteers and North Korean
regime which enjoys no inter-
national status, cannot be &C
cepted. The United Nations COM
mander was authorized to partic-
ipate in such military talks with
the thought that this would pro-
vide the Soviet government with
an opportunity to assist in bring
ing about an armistice. This does
not mean that the United States
Government is prepared to dis
pose of important political matters
in talks with such irregular Com
munist military personnel. Political
issues Of Korean settlement must
be dealt with subsequent to an
armiStice by the United Nations
and by the governments concerned
on responsible basis.
In the opinion of the United
States Government the attitude
Of the Communist bloc toward the I
restoration of peace will be tested |
by whether the North Korean
and Chinese Communist negoti-
ators are prepared to reach an
armistice settlement based on
purely military factors; upon a
reasonable line affording safety (
to the armed forces of both sides
and upon adequate arrangements
for the inspection of compliance 4
with the armistice terms and for
the satisfactory disposition Of
prisoners of war. The Soviet
Government must surely recog-
nize that, as a simple statement
of fact, the breakdown of armi-
stice talks in Korea would add /
greatly to the explosive character
of the situation and might stimu-
late a course of events which
would be undesirable from the l
point of view of both our govern
ments. The United States Gov
eminent for its part has clearly
shown by its declarations and by
its actions that it desires an end
to the conflict in Korea and to
prevent its spreading to other
areas, purposes which the Soviet
Government has publicly stated it
shares.
Armigtice Desired.
With regard to the current
status of the armistice talks. l |
wish to affirm that the United
Nations Command is sincerely de-
sirous of concluding an armistice. |
However, past experience with the
Kaesong site fully illustrates the
fact that this place does not afford
adequate protection guaranteeing
the security of the negotiations.
The insistence of the United Ma
lions Command upon another site |
which will not be under the con-
troll of either side and to which
both sides will have free access
should eliminate the possibility Of
incidents and ensure that the talks
can be resumed with good pros
pect of success. In proposing to
discuss the change of site from
Kaesong, the sole purpose Of the
United Nations Command has been
to obtain a resumption of the talks
in truly neutral area with equal
ity of rights and access and to
obviate the possibility of charges