Evening star., 1951-06-01
The Case Against Macarthur

Admiral Sherman has concluded what might
be described as the administrators case In OPP
position to the Korean war program advocated oy
General Macarthur And from the testimony
of these top-hight presidential advisers General
Marshall General Bradley, General Collins, Cen
eral Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman-one
clear fact emerges: They are unanimous botn
in approving the present plan for the conduct
of the war and in opposing the Macarthur
recommendations.
There is, perhaps one exception to This
statement. Admiral Sherman joins General
Macarthur in advocating a naval blockade OF
Red China. But he would do SO only through the
United Nations, and in collaboration with our
associates there. General Macarthur would have
the United States Ego 1t alone" If necessary
Admiral Sherman is opposed to that.
This testimony from General Marshall and
the Joint Chiefs does not necessarily mean that
they are right and that General Macarthur Is
wrong. Perhaps the dismissed commander Is
correct when he says that the war in Korea
could be brought to speedy and successful
conclusion by bombing Manchurian bases, by
setting up naval and economic blockade, and
by making some use of Chang Kai-sheks troops,
and that, without these measures, we face an
endless, bloody stalemate. But the fact remains
that the Joint Chiefs oppose these measures,
fearing that their adoption would entail too
great a risk of war with Russia at this time And
in the face of this unanimity among his principal
military advisers the President cannot be crit-
cized for concurring in their views and rejecting
those of General Macarthur.
MIR. Truman may be vulnerable to criticism
because of the manner In which he relieved
General Macarthur of his commands. And in
the long run it may be shown that the action was
adverse to our best interests in Japan. But
the central question is whether, all things con-
Sdered it is in the national interest to continue
to fight limited" war in Korea, or to enlarge
that war and accept the risk Of still greater
war by adoption of the Macarthur recommenda-
tions. On this question the Joint Chiefs have
spoken in favor of the President. His strategy
views are their views, and in the light OF General
MacArthurs disagreement, the decision to remove
him, though not the manner in which 1t was
done, is defensible.
When all of this has been said, however,
there remains the question as to how the war is
to be ended on a satisfactory basis Admiral
Sherman strikes a hopeful note when he says
there is "a good prospect for defeating the
Chinese army in Korea and thereby achieving a
situation in which the war can be ended under
conditions which will in the long run be advan-
tageous to u.s."
If this prospect can be realized, if the
Chinese can be defeated in Korea and brought
to terms the position which the Joint Chiefs
have taken will be fully vindcated. But If this
does not materialize, II the war dragS on and
cannot be brought to conclusion, then it is
very likely to expand, whether we wish it or not
into that bigger war which the Joint Chiefs hope
to avoid. Then all of the measures which General
Macarthur recommended viii have to be adopted
and we will be in the position of having traded
thousands of casualties to gain time. Additional
time, if used to best advantage, can serve to
make us much stronger year from now than we
are today. But we have been fighting in Korea
for almost year now, and while that time has
not been frittered away, neither have we made
the most of It, We are still operating on guns
and-butter- basis, and there is every indica-
tion, casualties or no casualties that we will
continue on that basis