Evening star., 1951-07-01
Gillette Backs Truman
On Macarthur Recall,
But Assails Confusion

in the recently ended inuestigd-
ton OF Gen. Douglas A. Mac
Arthur's recall and OF United
States Far Eastern Policy.
BY Senator Guy M. Gillette
In the eight weeks of painstak-
ing hearings conducted by the
joint committee known as the
Macarthur investigating group,
there was minimum of partisan
ship.
I doubt that hearing of COM
parable moment was ever con-
Quoted with less emphasis on party
and party advantage.
The inquiry seemed to fall nat
urally into four studies and goals
/. Was the recall of Gen Doug
las Macarthur justified by the
military exigencies and was it
properly carried out?
2. Was there substance to the
charge made by Gen. Macarthur
to the joint meeting of Congress
that he was left without clear
policy direction after the entrance
of the Chinese into the war indi-
Gated a need for revision OF
policy?
Did Joint Chiefs Agree?
3. Did the joint chiefs at first
agree with Gen. MacArthur'S pro-
gram of additional measures
against the Chinese Communists
to win the war in Korea, and later
repudiate their endorsement?
4. Under whose auspices and
under whose direction is the
Korean war being conducted, and
what are its goals and the pros
poets for its termination?
With reference to the recall of
Gen. Macarthur. it seems to me
there is general agreement Oh
these conclusions:
The President. as commander
in chief, had a perfect legal right
to recall Gen Macarthur from his
command. Military efficiency and
success depend on sincere CO.
operation in carrying out military
policies, regardless of the sub
ordinate officers approval views.
The President and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff agreed that the
recall was necessary because of the
Generals record of unsympathetic
attitude toward policies and direc-
tives from his superiorS, as well
as his ignoring of a clear direc-
tive against issuing public state
ments dealing with the war
emergency which had not been
cleared by higher authority for
publication.
Says Charge Unsupported.
AS for Gen. MacArthur's charge
that he had been left without
directiveS after the Chinese inva-
sion of Korea:
A close examination of all the
witnesses and a careful rereading
of their testimony convinces me
there is no support for the Cen
erals contention. 1t seems clear
that at no time was there an
absence of clear and concrete di-
rections as to policies.
With reference to the Mac
Arthur charge that the joint chiefs
at first agreed with his four-point
program and later repudiated it:
believe the evidence clearly
shows none of the joint chiefs en-
dorSed the proposals of Gen. Mac
Arthur, excepting as they were
embodied as part of a group
of possible projected actions to
be taken, should evacuation of
Korea become necessary.
In addition, the joint chiefs
and the Secretary of Defense
unanimously expressed their view
that to put his program into effect
would dangerously expand the war
and would probably bring the
Soviet empire and it's satellites
into a conflict that would rapidly
become the third world war.
Finally. in the discussion of the
progress of the Korean war, of the
facts surrounding it's inception,
of our goals there and of the
prospects of bringing it to a con-
clusion, there was such a con-
fusion of testimony as to leave me
utterly without clear idea of
the course the war is taking, and
of the ultimate conclusion that we
are seeking.
Lack of Agreement.
There also seems to me to be a
deplorable lack of agreement as
to the authority under which the
war is being conducted.
In my Interrogation of the Sec
retary of State, I sought a definite
answer as to whether the United
States is acting in Korea under
the traditional authority of the
President to send troops abroad
to protect American interests or,
on the other hand, as the agent
of the U. NJ, following out reso-
lutions of the Security Council in
conformity with our obligations
under the charter.
The Secretary of States reply
was to the effect that we entered
Korea both under presidential
authority and under what the
Secretary called the "aegis" of the
United Nations.
This was, to me, most unsat-
isfactory response, and I stated
that I deplored and repudiated
such an interpretation.
If we entered Korea under the
Presidents traditional authority
then the subsequent campaigns
the huge increases in our forces
there, our heavy casualties, and SC
on, have long transformed the
Korean action into a full-scale
war. Yet, we are in a conflict OF
this kind without declaration OF
war by Congress- an IInOrece-