Evening star., 1951-05-04

government there, you might say
and as the man in charge of Japan?
Gen. MacArthur-No direct rela.
Itionship. They did dovetail into
each other.
No Disagreement on Treaty.
Senator Smith, am wondering
why you were removed from Japar
IF You had any disagreement on
the japanese peace treaty, or any
thing of that sort?
| Gen. MacArthur-None whatso.
ever. 4. I think that many of thl
concepts and bases for that treaty
are my own. There was nc
slightest friction whatsoever that
I know of.
Senator Russell-Senator George
not now being present. I will cal
on Senator Saltonstall.
Senator Saltonstall-.. On Apri
Is, the Assistant Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, in a teleyision and press
broadcast. stated, in part-and this
is the pertinent part of his speech
as I read it:
What we are trying to do is tt
maintain peace and security with.
out general war. We are saying
ito the aggressors you will not bt
allowed to get away with your crime
You must stop it,
"At the same time, we are trying
to prevent a general conf1agratior
which would consume the very
things we are now trying to de-
fend."
would appreciate it very much
with your knowledge of the Fal
East, if you will give me YOU
opinion of that statement, and i
that is a practical policy.
Sees Concept of Appeasement.
Gen. MacArthur-That policy, a.
you have read it, SCENE to me tt
introduce new concept into mill.
tary operations-the concept O.
appeasement, the concept that wher
you use force, you can limit thai
force.
The concept that I have is thai
when you go into war, you have
exhausted all other potentialities
Iof bringing the disagreements tc
an end.
AS I understand what you read
that we would apply to the mill
tary situation in Korea certain
military appeasements. to me
that would mean that you would
have a continued and indefinite
extension of bloodshed, which would
have limitless-a limitless end.
You would not have the poten.
tialities of destroying the enemy's
military power, and bringing the
conflict to a decisive close in the
minimum of time, and with a mini.
mum of loss. If that is the con.
cept of a continued and indefinite
campaign in Korea, with no definite
purpose of stopping it until the en-.
emy gets tired or you yield to his
terms. I think that introduces into
the military sphere a political con-
troll such as I have never known ir
my life or have ever studied.
Senator Saltonstall - In othe
words, you feel that the Korean
situation, having gone into al
armed conflict. it should be brough
to an end in the quickest possible
way through military victory.
Gen. MacArthur-I do, Senator
exactly; and believe if you do no
do that, if you hit soft, if you prac
tice appeasement in the use O
force, you are doomed to disaster
Senator Saltonstall-Then assum
ing that your four recommenda
tions, as made in your address t,
Congress, were all adopted, wha
do you visualize as the result?
Gen. MacArthur-I believe tha
if you carry that out, you stand tn
best chance that is possible of end
ing this war in the quickest tim
and with the least cost in blood.
Would Be Chance to Hit Foe.
! Senator Saltonstall - And yo
think that if your four recommen
dations were carried into effect,
would not necessarily spread tn
war into Manchuria and China, bu
by quick and effective action O
our power, it would be suficientl
limited to Korea as to be brough
to an end in that general vicinity
Gen. MacArthur-I don't thin
that if you apply the measures tha
I advocate, which were the meas
ures that the Joint Chiefs of Stat
recommended on January II, tha
you will necessarily confine the are;
of the conflict to Korea; but I be
lieve it will give you an opportu
nifty to hit the enemy where he i
assembling to hit you.
Senator Saltonstall-Now, may
ask this question. In this so.
called Wake Island conference
statement on Page s, on the printec
copy, the President is quoted a!
saying this:
Gen. Macarthur and I have
talked fully about Formosa. There
is no need to cover that subject
again. The general and are ir
complete agreement"
believe, that was also the sup