Evening star., 1951-01-24

and importance of promoting a sat-
isfactory settlement in the Far East
and expressed our earnest hope that
the fresh approach, which then had
been made in the First Committee
of the Assembly, might lead to a
settlement of outstanding issues in
/ the Far East.
This fresh approach referred to
the principles for settlement, which
have been tabled by the Cease-Fire
Committee by an overwhelming
majority, though I regret that the
Soviet delegate and delegates OF
the satellite countries, despite all
their protestations about peace, saw
fit to vote against those principles.
Reply Did Not Close Door.
They were then referred to the
Central Peoples Government of
China. The Chinese reply was re-
ceived on January II. 1t seemed to
His Majesty's Government that the
reply, though most disappointing,
did not finally close the door to
negotiations.
It seemed, however, to us that,
before we could decide on the in
depreciation to place upon the Chi
nese reply, it would be necessary
to try to elucidate it, and the For
eign Secretary accordingly, on jan
uary 20, instructed the British
Charge d'Affaires in Peiping to put
to the Chinese government certain
points in their reply and to request
an explanation.
The most important issue was
reference to cease-fire, and on
this point the Charge d'Affaires,
who was received by the Chinese
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on
January 81, was informed that, as
the Chinese Government saw it,
there should be two steps in re-
gard to concluding the war in Korea
and reaching a peaceful settlement
of the Korean problem.
Limited Cease Fire.
The first step should be a cease
fire for limited period, which could
be agreed upon at the first meeting
of conference of powers and i'm
mediately put into effect so that
negotiations might proceed.
The second step in the Chinese
view was to discuss number of
problems, among them withdrawal
of foreign Gncluding Chinese)
troops from Korea, proposals for
the future of Korea itself, with
drawal OF United States armed
forces from Formosa and other
problems concerning the Far East.
At the same time, the vice min
lister made it plain to the charge
d'afaires that the Central Peo-
Piles Government of China must
be given their rightful place in the
United Nations organization.
This, then, is the point which we
have reached in regard to Korea.
We must decide whether the Chi
nese reply genuinely holds out any
prospect of a peaceful settlement OF
the Korean problem and of the
relations between China and the
rest of the world on a basis in
harmony with the great principles
of international conduct enshrined
IN the Charter of the United Ma
tions.
At the same time, it is necessary
to study the Chinese reply in con-
text of what they are in fact doing
and have done in Korea.
Do Actions Support View?
Do their actions iIl Korea sup
port the view that they are pre-
pared to accept normal principles
of international conduct?
This is not an easy decision to
take. The wording of the Chinese
reply, even with the help of further
explanations now given to us, is
not altogether clear, and we can
not be certain as to their real in
tentions.
In a situation of this sort 1t is
that we should continue to
take counsel with our friends. In
particular, we must give all weight /
in this Asian dispute to the views
of the Asian countries.
AS I read it, there is a general
feeling among the countries Of /
Asia that we must patiently pursue
every possibility of a peaceful set
tlement with China, so that the new .
China may be given an
should she so desire,
to play her part in a community Of .
on equal terms with other /
members. /
These are the considerations
BETHESDA AND SILVER SPRING.