Evening star., 1951-05-11
Partial Text Of Marshas Testimony Before Senate Committee


mind what seems to me to be tn,
fact that the failure to use tht
power we have, which is among
other things air. deep in thu
enemy's territory at his sources Of
. supply, must in the last analysis
be a political decision, that is i
must be in the field Of politics.
Secretary Marshall - Largel,
that, and nay read into, thu
record, If 1t is agreeable to you
Senator, the Presidents message
to Gen. Macarthur on the polit.
ical attitude of the Government
in this matter?
Senator Hickenlooper-Yes in.
deed.
i Secretary MARSHALL have had
1T paraphrased so that 1t can be
printed. It's been declassi-
fed with the approval of the
President, and in a manner that
we do not think discloses any
cryptographic information and
things of that sort.
This is from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the 18th of January,
addressed to Gen. Macarthur in
Tokyo. Japan. and it was sent on
this date in order to give the polit-
ical factors involved in a directive
from the Chiefs OF Staff that was
dispatched the day before. the
tentative proposals Of the Chiefs
of Staff to the Security Council Of
January IL.
'The following message from
the President to Gen. Macarthur
is transmitted:
"'I want you to know that the
situation in Korea is receiving the
utmost attention here and that
our efforts are concentrated upon
1finding the right decisions on this
matter of the greatest Importance
to the future Of America and to
the survival Of free peoples every
where.
"'I wish in this telegram to tell
you Of my views as to our basic
national and international pur-
poses in continuing the resistance
to aggression in Korea. We need
your judgment as to the maximum
effort which could reasonably be
expected from the United Nations
forces under your command to
support the resistance to aggres-
sion which we are trying rapidly
to organize on a worldwide basis.
This present telegram is not
to be taken in any sense as a
directive. It's purpose is to give
you something of what is in our
minds regarding the political
factors.
81. Successful resistance in
Korea would serve the following
purposes:
'(a). To demonstrate that
aggression will not be accepted by
us or by the United Nations, and
to provide rallying point around
which the spirits and energies of
the free world can be modified to
meet the worldwide threat which
the Soviet Union now poses.
"(b). To defiate the dangerously
Exaggerated political and military
prestige of Communist China
which now threatens to undermine
the resistance Of non-C Communist
Asia and to consolidate the hold
|of communism on China itself.
"'(c). To afford more time for,
and to give direct assistance to,
the organization Of non-Commu-
mist resistance in Asia, both out
side and inside China.
I'D. To carry out our commit
ments of honor to the South
Koreans and to demonstrate to
the world that the friendship OF
the United States is Of inestimable
value in time Of adversely.
Jap Peace Settlement.
"'E. To make possible q far
more satisfactory peace settlement
for Japan, and to contribute
greatly to the post-treaty security
position of Japan in relation to
the continent.
r. To lend resolution to many
countries not only in Asia but also
in Europe and the Middle East
who are now living within the
shadow Of Communist power, and
to let them know that they need
not now rush to come to terms
with communism on whatever
terms they can get. meaning COM
tplete submission.
&c. To inspire those who may
be called upon to fight against
great odds if subjected to a sud-
den onslaught by the Soviet
Union or by Communist China.
"'H. To lend point and urgency
to the rapid build up Of the de-
fense of the Western world.
"'I. To bring the United Nations
through its first great effort in
collective security and to produce
| a free-world coalition Of incal-
culable value to the national Sc
curity interests Of the United
States.
"'J. To alert the peoples behind
the iron curtain that their masters
Iare bent upon wars Of aggression
and that this crime will be re-
sisted by the free world.
"'2. Our courses Of action at
this time should be such as to
consolidate the great majority OF
the United Nations. This ma
Ijority is not merely part Of the
Organization, but is also the ma
tions whom we would desperately
'Ineed to count on as allies in the
event the Soviet Union moves
against us. Further, pending the
|buildup of our national strength
we must act with great prudence