Evening star., 1951-06-03
A Propaganda Document

The Senate committees investigating General
MacArthur's dismissal have not endangered the
Nations military security in deciding, by vote
of Is to o. to make public-despite Secretary
Acheson's strong Objectionable State Depart
ment's hitherto classified policy information
paper" on FormoSa.s
To begin with the substance of the paper
issued on December 49, 1949-was published In q
news report from Tokyo less than two weeks
later. The now-released official text, which in
wolves no restricted military data, merely con-
firms that report. AS for the national interests,
the committees decision is open to question only
on the ground that it may have some unfortu-
nate effects in the field Of propaganda warfare.
The reason for this is that the document,
now that 1t has been spread on the record, gives
the men Of the Kremlin another club with which
to beat us over the head. For it shows when
read along with Mr.. Acheson's explanatory testi-
mony, that the United States was getting ready,
as far back as August 1949 to misrepresent to
the world at large its true feelings regarding
the significance of Formosa and the consequences
of its possible fall to the Moscow serving Chinese
Communists.
Thus, as Mr.. Acheson has told the Senate
committees, our FormoSan policy from october,
1948, to June 25, 1850 (the date the aggressor
struck in Korea) was based, among other things,
was of such strategic Importance that It's pos
session by hostile power would be harmful to
the interests Of the United States, and (2) that
nevertheless the then-existing condition of our
armed services ruled out the possibility of COM
mitting or promising to commit any forces to
the defense of FormoSa. These two views were
unanimously held by all the responsible depart
ments of the Government, including our military
establishment. Yet in August of 1949, when
there seemed good reason to anticipate FormoSa's
fall to Red China, steps were taken to start
laying the groundwork for a propaganda drive
designed to belittle such Ian eventuality as a
thing of little or no consequence.
These Steps-f1rst suggested by the Army
through General Wedemeyer-dnally led to the
State Departments policy information paper"
of December %, 1949. The paper was designed
primarily to make sure that the Voice of America
if and when Formosa fell, would undertake
systematic effort to give the impression to the
world that the United States-despite its real
feelings-was not particularly disturbed by the
event and regarded the island as place having
no special military significance.
Of course, as Secretary Acheson has testified
the main purpose of this propaganda line-a line
which events have made happily unnecessary
was to minimize damage to American prestige
and buck up the morale of free nations particu-
larly those in Asia, in case the Chinese Com
munistS captured Fornosa. In Mr.. Acheson's
words, the whole business was in keeping with
the principle that cheer-leading or inspirational
pep talks, no matter how Inaccurate can do
good in times of stress or danger.
Propaganda warfare being what it is such
things must be expected, In our day and age
facing as we do an unscrupulous enemy, we
can hardly fail to resort to some of his own tricks
in order to cope with him. Inevitable and
necessary as it may be, however it is regrettabe
that the United States must even plan to give
voice to something less than the whole truth
and nothing but the truth.
Needless to say Moscows propagandists can
be counted upon to make as much hay as they
can out of this admission. That is the one fact
that tends to support Mr.. Acheson's objections
to the release of the document on Formosa.