Evening star., 1951-05-04
Continued From Page A-6O

UOOPo Woo ACPOA UCO W washing"
ton. and approved by Washington.
There was no other way, when we
had to clear the Pyongyang-
WonSan line, to clear North Ko-
rea, but to go north.
Now, when the doubt arose as
to whether the enemy was con-
centrating great forces there, we
had three alternatives; one, was
to ascertain the truth of the
strength Of what he had; the
other was to sit where we were.
Had we done that he would have
built up his forces, and undoubt-
edly destroyed us.
The third was to 60 in pre-
clpitate retreat, which would not
have been countenanced, I am
quite sure.
Tested Enemy's Strength.
Now, what we actually did was
10 move forward to ascertain the
strength of the enemy'S forces.
When we moved forward, I had
already prepared, and the troops
had in their hands the order for
retreat if we found the enemy in
force. 1t was the only way we had
to find out what the enemy had ana
what his intentions were.
When we moved forward we
struck him in tremendous force
or he struck us, and we withdrew
The concept that our forces with
drew in disorder or were badly de-
feated is one of the most violent
preVarications of truth that ever
was made. Those forces withdrew
in magnificent order and shape. tt
was planned withdrawal from
the beginning. -.
If I had known the Chinese troops
were there I couldn't have4 done
any differently. If I had started
the withdrawal-it is exactly woat
I did, just as soon as we ascertained
the truth and the plans were ali
made.
Senator RuSsell-Well, now, going
back to the concentration on the
other side of the Yalu-of course,
you would not have advised that
they be bombed until they had dis
closed their hand, that they we're
coming into the war and thereby
precipitate a contest between Red
China and ourselves, would you,
General?
Gen. MacArthur-... When I re-
ceived the orders that I was to pre-
vent, with the 7th Fleet and my air,
any invasion of FormoSa, and re-
ciprocally prevent the Nationalist
Chinese troops from leaving For
mosa to attack the mainland, there
was a concentration of Red Chinese
troops on the mainland which
threatened Formosa seriously. Those
troops were the 4th and Bird Field
Armies which afterward showed up
in North Korea.
Threat to FormoSa.
Senator RuSsell-In other words,
you think the inhibition imposed
on the Nationalists by the Presi-
dent, of the Seventh Fleet, and the
order to prevent any movement
either way in between Formosa
and China was respol' sible for un-
leashing, or at least making avail
able these 3rd and 4th armies?
Gen. MacArthur-No, Senator
didn't say any such thing. If you
will let me finish
Senator Russell-Parden me, gen.
eral, I thought you had completed
Gen. MacArthur-I said that
these troops down there threatened
Formosa at that time At that
time, Formosa-it was necessary for
the generalissimo's troops to be
held in Formosa for its defense.
AS these troops were moved north
and the threat to Formosa disap-
peared, it became quite evident
there was no necessity to keep the
generalissimo's troops tied up on
Formosa. AS soon as it became
known these troops had moved up
north and were attacking me-the
Bird and 4th field armies-I recon-
mended to Washington that the
wraps be taken off the generals
simo. that he be furnished such
logistical support as would put
those troops in fighting trim, and
that he be permitted to use his own
judgment as to their use. The
slightest use that was made of
those troops would have taken the
pressure off my troops. 1t would
have saved me thousands of lives
up there-even a threat of that.
We were at that time with the
7th feet supporting my fighting
line and doing everything else in
Korea that was possible, lombard
ing and everything else; at the
same time with the other hand
they were holding back these troops
which, if they had been used, or
even threatened to be used, would
have taken the pressure off my
front.
1t was at that time that I made
the recommendation that the gen.
eralissimo's troops be brought into
play against the common enemy.
Senator Russell-Did you get any
reply to that request, or was it
vetoed?
Received No Reply.
Gen. MacArthur-I don't think
I received any reply, as far as
know. 1t was after that, or
about the same time, that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff made this similar,
made exactly the same recommen-
dation, on January IL.
Senator Russell-General, would
you mind advising the committee
and the Senate what you think is
the real strength of the General
issimo's forces on Formosa?
Gen. MacArthur-I went down
to Formosa. When I visited For
mosa, the week before that, I had
been receiving reports from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing
trepidation for the saftey of For
mosa, and I reported back that
under those conditions, hard press
ed as was in Korea at that time,
that would go down there and
make personal reconnaissance.
went down there, and within the
limit of time I spent there, I got
very definite impressions. The
Generalissimo has probably in the
neighborhood of a half million