Evening star., 1951-07-22
Our Forces Must Stoy There

The Communists have put forward totally
unacceptable condition In demanding that the
agenda for negotiating cease-fire and armistice
include the question of withdrawing all foreign
forces from Korea. If they intend to adhere to
that position, then they have no real desire to
end the hostilities, and the United Nations has
virtually no other choice than to break of the
talks at Kaesong and return to full-scale battle
For the Kaesong talks have been strictly
limited in their objective. Their purpose has
been solely and simply to bring the U. N. and
the enemy into agreement on an agenda for
negotiations confined to the Immediate military
problem of working out mutually satisfactory
terms under which both sides would be solemnly
committed % to stop shooting at each other,
(2) 20 stay within the limits of certain precisely
defined lines in the general neighborhood of the
3Sth Parallel. and (3) to accept systematic and
thorough surveillance against possible violations
of the cease-fire and armistice.
In other words, If and when Kaesong paves
the way for armistice talks, the agenda for those
talks must be restricted to the soldiers business,
SO to speak, of reaching effectuating and main
tanning an agreement to end the fighting. Obvi-
ously, the question of the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Korea cannot be taken up
at such talks. 1t Is non-g -germane to the problem
of ceasing fire. 1t Is not matter that can be
dealt with in an immediate sense by military
commanders. 1t is long-range political issue
that "can only be settled" as Secretary Acheson
has said, "by the United Nations and the govern
ments concerned"-an issue that is part of the
larger r-all issue of working out a definitive
peace.
After all a cease-fire, such as exists between
India and Pakistan in Kashmir or an armistice,
such as prevails between Israel and the Arab
&c nouch different from a neace settle
ment AS far as Korea is concerned. the latter
probably will be long time coming even if the
Kaesong talks lead to an end to the shooting.
Accordingly in such circumstances, and espe-
cially in view of the enemys steady buildup OF
power behind the line he now holds 1t does
violence to reality to expect an early withdrawal
of our American and allied U. N. forces. Ger
tainly they will not withdraw under conditions
anything like those now obtaining The truth
is that it may be a matter OF years before they
can all safely pull out.
Thus, reminding everybody of how the Com
munists resorted to armed aggression only about
year after our troops had been withdrawn from
the South Korean Republic, Mr. Acheson has
summed up the present outlook in these words:
"If there is an effective armiStice, a United
Nations force must remain in Korea until gen.
uine peace has been firmly established and the
Korean people have assurance that tney can
work out their future free from the fear of
aggression" As for the size of the u N. force,
that will depend upon circumstances and. par
ticularly, upon the falthfulness with which an
armistice is carried out"
In short, although 1t would be happy thing
If the Korean people could assume full control
of their own country in the near future. the
fact we must face is that substantial American
and allied u N forces will have to remain on
guard over there for many long month to come
even if good armistice is put into effect. The
dictates of security and simple common sense
demand as much. In arguing otherwise. the
Communists at Kaesong can hardly have ex-
pected us to take them seriously.