Evening star., 1951-10-14

- IL q " "
IS IS: IS: ! i; :; ;:;:: s: s: !: ~
war period,
the day to- James Forrestai'
day account running from mid
1914 to the spring Of 1949.
throws new light on the back
stage workings Of Government.
in the last months Of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and the sue
ceeding Truman years.
At times. it reflects non-too-
favorably on those guiding the
destiny Of the Nation in a criti-
cal era.
In brief:
In years of challenge. there
often was an absence Of coher-
ent leadership and teamwork IN
high places so vital to the future
Of the country.
There was almost total failure
to recognize the Soviet menace
for much too long. despite storm
warnings that appeared before
the war had ended.
Political Pressures.
Important decisions were
weighed in political scales.
Mr.. Forrestal recites the pres
sure that advisers brought on
President Truman to support
the Palestine partition plan be-
cause of it's vote-getting po-
tentialities.
The situation in the Far East
got progressively worse with
Government policies always IN
o state of f1ux.
1t is clear that right up to
the closing days of the war,
after the Nazis had been
crushed, the japanese were be-
ing oveTated here. while con-
versely. not enough consider
alton was being given to the
threat posed by the Soviet.
In early March, 1945. right
after the Yalta Conference. the
late Edward r. Stettinius, Sec
retary of State, was haiing that
meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stain, and reporting
"every evidence Of the Rus
sian desire to cooperate along
all lines with the United States"
Soviet Relations.
Three weeks later Mr.. Stet-
tinius had changed his mind,
and at a meeting of State, War
and Navy chiefs advised of a
serious deterioration of our re-
lations with Russia" which was
pointed up by President Roose-
velt's message to Marshal Stain
deprecating the Soviet demand
to have the Communist -domi-
mated Lublin Poles invited to
the upcoming San Francisco
Conference.
At almost the same time Am
bassador w. Averell Hartman
was warning from Moscow that
a tough policy was the one
way to maintain friendly re-
lations with Russia"
But the country continued to
try to play ball with Stain.
President Truman entered the
White House April II. 1945, on
the death of President Roose-
welt, and within a month was
able to announce the German
surrender.
In July, when he went to the
Potsdam conference with Stain.
and Churchill Qater Attlee), the
new President said prime OBJ
jective was to bring Russia into
the war.
Japan Already Beaten.
As Gen. Dwight D. Eisen-
however, Allied commander in
chief, later was to relate. he
begged the President mot to as
sumo that he had to give any,
thing away to do this; that the
Russians were desperately
anxious to get into the Eastern
war and that there was no ques-
ton but that Japan already was
thoroughly beaten"
President Truman announced
with satisfaction afterwards
that Russia was coming in.
Pulling and Hauling.
Much of the diary is consumed
with a discussion Of the pulling
and hauling that went on as
President Truman hammered
through his program for unity
ing the armed forces and Great
ing a single Department Of De-
fense, a plan which Mr.. Forres-
tai disliked, but which, paradox
ically, he was given the job OF
administering when the single
command idea went into effect
in the summer Of 1947. and
Secretary of War Robert P.
Patterson, the Presidents first
choice, instead went back to the
private practice Of law.
With the assignment went
the task of correcting the dam
age worked after the end Of
the war, when the "bring-the-
boys-home" philosophy domi-
mated the thinking of both ex-
ecutive and legislative branches
Of Government. and resulted in
the speedy wrecking Of the
worlds most powerful military
machine-despite recurrent evi-
dences Of Russian intransigence.
Here Forrestal encountered
not only a continuation of the
old inter service rivalries that
had stymied the uniflcation
move, but also an administra-
ton economy drive that pre-
cluded the balanced program at
~,