davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1951-10-04
Airline Names Muussner
Stution MANAGER Here

Frank MausSner has been named
station manager for United All
Lines in Washington. the air line
has announced.
Mr.. Maussner, who has been
station services manager in New
York, replaces r. J. Miesse who
has been given a special assign
ment with the air lines Denver
Office.
The new station manager has
been with the company since 1898
and has worked in Chicago and
Newark, N. j., as well as New
York. He will assume his duties
here on October IS.
Evening star., 1951-10-04
a Meteorite Specimens
Given to Smithsonian

Four specimens from meteorites
not represented in the Smith
sonian Institutions extensive col
lection have been received by the
institution from a Michigan col
lector, it was announced today.
The donor is Stuart H. Perry
editor and publisher Of the Adrian
(Mich) Daily Telegram and as
sociate mineralogist with the Ma
tional Museum. Mr.. Perry has
been sending meteorite samples to
the institution for many years.
Evening star., 1951-10-04
Norweqiuns Protest At Russians Lunquuqe

Northern Norway to an island of
NorWay's coast.
The newspaper said Norway's
condition for entering into a
settlement must be that the
Soviet government refrain from
employing a type of language
which may scarcely be termed
proper in communications with
a sovereign nation, and which ap-
parently aims at creating a split
rather than cooperation"
Evening star., 1951-10-04
Bishop Sheriff. to Speok

The Right Rev. Henry Knox
Sheriff., presiding bishop Of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in
the United States, will speak on
E"Our Shared Work and Witness
at a service at 8 o'clock tonight
in the Washington Cathedral.
Evening star., 1951-10-04
Indio Signs With Australia

NEW DELHI, India, Oct. 4 (P.
India and Australia yesterday
signed a trade pact extending to
Evening star., 1951-10-04

the end of June. 1852. Chief In
dian exports are listed as jute.
manufactures and cotton piece
goods. Australia will supply lead
and zinc.
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Directives Sent
ToCommonder

Chairman Russell-General, can
you supply for the record the di-
receives and orders and memo
randa sent to Gen. Macarthur by
the Department of Defense con-
tanning these restrictions, or any
restrictions that were imposed on
him in the conduct of the cam
paign?
Secretary Marshall - Yes, sir
that can be done. 1 suppose il
will be acceptable in paraphrase
form. -.
Chairman Russell Will you
please designate which can be
printed in the record and which
you think not? -.
Yesterday, general, I asked you
as to when t. e was a foreSeeablt
end to the Korcpn war under tht
present policic5 of the Defens'
Department. E.
Secretary Marshall-Mr. Chair
man, it is exceedingly hard to de
eide what may be said in answe
to your question because it reall
amounts to disclosing a war plar
May I project this little beyon
that factor?
In the matter of security we a,
easily recognize that matters mus
not be brought out here in wa
to break down our codes, for eX
ample, or to suggest other actio
by our opponents that would h
very harmful to our interests, an
I think everybody is in agree
ment that we must not discloE
planNof campaign.
we have to do always all
Evening star., 1951-05-08

tives in Communist China with
naval and air forces must await
attack outside Of Korea to U. N
forces by Chinese Communists
since only in that eventuality
could authorization be obtained
Id In view of probable greater
Iusefulnes elsewhere and unlikely
mess of effect on Korean outcome
which would be decisive, use in
Korea of Chinese Nationalists
from Formosa not favored.
(e) In event stabilization in
Korea not feasible, security OF
Japan must be served by portion
of the forces which may be evacu-
ated from Korea. If Stabilizatior
in Korea without commitment OF
additional forces can be accom-
plished, deployment of two Ma
tional Guard divisions partly
trained may be expected.
| f) Intensification of economic
blockade of Chinese trade being
pressed
Chairman Russell-Now, let.
turn to this January 18th docu.
ment to which you referred.
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Two Old Soldiers Clash Again,
Both With Sights on Peace

Europe first" was the decision
then. Gen. Macarthur still de.
mandS at least equal priority fol
Asia.
There's Pentagon scuttlebutt
that the MISUNDERSTANDING spill
lis more personal than this.
Gen. Marshall was promoted te
brigadier general in 1886 on the
recommendation of the Worle
War I leader. Gen. John J. Per.
lshing, years after Gen. Macarthur
had attained that rank. Gen
Macarthur. who was Chief o1
Staff from 1880 to 1885, was re.
ported at the time to have helo
up Gen. Marshalls promotion.
Some say and others deny that
"a GOODNESS developed between
them during that period.
At any rate, they're not men
who'd be likely to become bosom
friends.
Each keeps to himself, each
avoids public functions, and each
appears fully conscious of his
unique position in the Nation S
military history. Rivalry between
them wouldn't be surprising.
Gen. Macarthur has been
wounded in combat, decorated for
valor Gen. MarshalfS courage
has often been praised. but he
won his spurs as a staff officer
as a planner rather than as a
battlefield leader.
Ironically, the two old soldiers
are rivals in a job of salesman
ship now. Each seeks to persuade
investigating Senators and the
Nation that his own view is the
right one.
Even Gen. MacArthur's critics
conceded he did a magnificent
selling job last week. But Gen
Marshall is the man who sold
Congress the multi-billion- dollar
Marshall Plan, sold" the legis-
.lators on a So billion blank check
for developing the atom bomb.
Historians may well say: There
were giants in those days"
Evening star., 1951-05-08

our power not only to maintain
but to build up the fighting morale
of our forces, That is sometimes
very difficult.
During the last war it was diff
cult in certain areas. 1t is equal
ly difficult here. They have made
a magnificent response and I was
told only this morning the last
reports indicated a very high
morale but l am disturbed
and l should think you would be
disturbed at the effect that will
sweep through that force of stu
alton in which their commander
has stated his views which accen-
tuate the casualties that they are
suffering and in effect that it is
without justified purpose.
That is not only one time, but
number Of times; and the effect
tof the fact that their commander
has been in complete disagree
ment with the constituted author
tiles of this Government, that is
most serious matter, and we
should find some way of proceed
ing with this investigation that
does not destroy us in the field BY
serious reaction in the way o1
morale. =.
/ A soldier can be very easily
made to feel sorry for himself
particularly when he is in mos
disagreeable, unattractive anC
dangerous localities. and particu
larly when he has been callet
upon to make a tremendous effor
over a long period of time.
There were certain statement
made in the press during the las
war in relation to our forgotten
soldiers in Italy. The effec
of those statements was a ire
, mendous mail from wives. mother
and others to these soldiers, unit
1 was told by at least one corp
il, commander-and l think too
that the effect no morale had bee
!, so serious they didn't kno'
,, whether they could carry out sue
cessfully the next planned oper
ations.
I went to Italy from Yalt
: I was occupied three or fou
y days there doing nothing but talk
ing to groups of troops all throug
j, the mountains because the
- thought it was urgently necessar
!, that I do so because of the Seriou
they felt, almost calamitous-
Evening star., 1951-05-08

went with an endorsement from
him, approving the Joint Chiefs
request, or whether he made any
change in the number of recon-
mendations.
Chairman RUSSELL think that
is very pertinent question. Gen.
eral, did you approve this memo
randum of January II prepared by
the Joint Chiefs?.
Secretary Marshall-No, sir. I
neither approved nor disapproved.
I transmitted it to a meeting cS
the Security Council for general
consideration, in which I would be
! involved.
Chairman RuSSell-You mean
then that the final disposition of
this document prepared by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, these
recommendations, in the National
Security Council was based in the
last analysis on the recommended
ton of the Joint Chiefs?
II Secretary MarShall-YeS, sir.
Evening star., 1951-05-08
3Choices of Action
In Korean War

Now, that is a war plan that
this question leads to. I did state
it yesterday, but it Was-I said
we had three choices, Mr.. Chair
man, as I saw them. The one
was the extension Of the cam
paign along the lines suggested
by Gen. Macarthur. The one was
to withdraw from Korea and vio-
late our promise to those people
and sacrifice them to assassina-
ton and probably almost extinc-
ton, and the other was to fight
where we we're, to what advantage
we could gain by the method that
we followed.
That method was to inflict the
greatest number of casualties or
the Chinese Communist forces.
And also that we will retain oul
Allies
For the last five years our Su
Evening star., 1951-05-08

effect of this tremendous mail
from home resulting from these
statements.
Difficult Circumstances.
Now, translate this investiga-
ton to the soldiers in Korea, who
are doing a very wonderful job
but under very difficult circum-
stances, and hearing and reading
that no reinforcementS are COM
ing and that these casualties
probably. possibly, are not being
sacrificed to an advantageous re-
said yesterday that it was
tremendously important that we
give Gen. Ridgway what support
we could in his extraordinarily
difficult situation - coming into
command as he has.
That is all involved with this
That is the reason it is so diff
flcult to give the answers or re-
lease for publication to the public
the answers that you think would
he deSirahle
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Decision on Use
OF Chang Troops

Chairman RuSsell-NoW, gen.
eral. what was the course of pro-
Icedure which finally determined
as to whether or not the Chinese
Nationalist troops were to be used
in Korea?
Secretary Marshall Again
I think the actual detailed pro-
cedure can best be given you by
the Chiefs of Staff, because they
took the leading part in all of it
Iand made the anlySiS of the pros
and cons in the matter.
But there was an original con-
Isideration that took place l think
in August or Whereabouts, or
maybe July. In July 1850
IGeneralissimo Chang Kai-shek
Offered $4,000 Chinese Nationalist
troops for the battle in Korea.
Gen. Macarthur advised against
acceptance of the offer because
Continued on Page AS, Col, ~
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Partial Text From YESTERDAY

FOLLOWING is a partial tram
script OF yesterdays testimony:
Chairman Russell - Now, gen.
.eral, going back to the instruction
of January the 9th, when you
stated, I believe, that you advised
Gen. Macarthur that it would be
unWise to evacuate Korea.
I want to identify that memoran-
dun and document, whatever it
was.
Secretary Marshall-This is clas-
sified material.
| Reading) From the Chiefs of
Staff to Gen. Macarthur on jan
uary 8. :"
Substance of Message.
(The text of this message was
deleted by censor. but after the
session was over the substance of
the message was released as fol-
lows:
This replies to your recommend
ationS:
Careful consideration still be-
ing given to measures of retalia-
ton you suggested. Contribution
to general situation resulting from
drawing of Chinese Communists
into Korea is fully appreciated
/ The following points must be &C.
cepted on the basis of considera-
ton Of the overall situation.
(a) Strengthening of our effort
in Korea does not appear justified
on the basis of any change il
policy or other eventuality outside
of Korea.
(b) United Nations concurrence
would be necessary and, in par.
Iticular, negotiations with the
British would be required on the
Question of blockade. Hong Kong
position and extent of Chinese
Communist trade with British
would be involved. Evacuation
from Korea by our forces, OF
stabilization Of our position ir
Korea, would be required before
naval blockade of China coast
could be undertaken.
Co Decision of attack objec-
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Hazard of Soviet


Chairman Russell-You said the
hazard of Soviet intervention. Do
you think that that possibility is
remote or that it is very real
that the Soviet might intervene
Secretary Marshall-I think ii
is very real possibility, and like
all other matters pertaining to tht
Soviet government, the decision is
of few men and can be an in
IStant decision whenever they
choose to make it. :.
Chairman Russell-Now /. . yor
stated yesterday that you thought
there was great likelihood tha
the adoption of Gen. MacArthur''
policy would result in greater
losses in Korea than to follow thu
present policy. -.
/ Secretary Marshall-I assumed
and we have assumed, that if WI
started on that procedure, par
ticularly the bombing and thu
naval action. in relation to Man
Ichuria and China, we would i'm.
mediately have whatever retalia.
ton they were able to effect.
Chairman Russell. can yol
state for the record what Woulc
be likely to occur if the Soviet
intervened?
Secretary Marshall-Well, o1
course that would Immediately in.
volve the defense of Japan
Hokkaido in particular, attacks
on our air all over Japan, all ovel
Korea, at the bases, probably
IOkinaWa, and We couldn't accept
that without the maximum re-
taliation on our part which in
Ievitably means a world war. which
means unlimited losses for con-
siderable period of time.
| Chairman Russell-You do not
believe then that the war coulG
be limited to the Far East bul
would spread to Europe and al
IOther places OF the world?
| Secretary Marshall-That is oul
view Of the matter.
Chairman Russell-What woulc
be the effect on our world posture
of military strength to oppose
Communism if we withdraw from
the Korean peninsula Immediately
Mr.. Secretary?
Secretary Marshall-I feel that
that would have a tragic conse-
quence in relation to Communist
efforts in the Far East, the bulldog
of the Chinese Communist Party
the effect on Indo-China, Thai
land, Indonesia, the efforts in the
Philippines which are directed
against that government by Com.
munist st-inspired groups of peo-
+ pln
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Some Objectives
'On Conduct of War

Secretary Marshall-The Joint
Chiefs of Staff tentatively agreed
upon the following objectives rela-
tive to Communist China and Ko-
rea, together with the actions to
be taken to attain them, with
some indication as to the time.
I don't think it will be at all
wise for me to talk about the
objectives, because that is war
plans; but as to the actions to be
taken, in part, I will try to touch
on those. with the understanding
that they are classified.
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
tentatively agreed upon the fol-
lowing objectives-"
These are the actions to be
taken in connection with those OBJ
jectives:
"A. With the preservation of
Evening star., 1951-05-08
BY Ed Creoeh
Associated Press Stoff Writer

Two old soldiers. heavy with
honors:
George Catlett Marshall, Vir.
ginia Squire-70, gray-haired, re.
served.
' Douglas Macarthur, ousted rulel
Of a conquered empire-71, black.
haired, by turns aloof and warmly
genial.
They've much in common, these
generals, besides the closeness OF
their ages. Gen. Macarthur il
about II months older than Gen
MarshallD
Both served with distinction in
World War 1, rose to the peak OF
military eminence in World Wal
II. Each was more than a soldier
too Gen. Marshall became Sec
Iretary of State, later Secretary of
Defense. Gen. Macarthur ran
occupied Japan.
But look at the headlines:
Macarthur charges Marshall
favored Chinese Reds"
Marshall declares Macarthur
spoiled peace chance"
They're firing at each other now,
in the great foreign policy debate
the one which President Truman
said last night lis not a political
.issue-it is matter of life and
death"
Gen. Marshall is on the Presi-
dents side, Gen. Macarthur is
Iagainst both of them-on some key
questions of how to fight the
Chinese Reds. The three profess
"a common purpose: Preventing
World War III.
This isn't the first time Gen.
Macarthur and Gen. Marshall
have clashed.
In World War II, in the after
imath of Bataan, Gen. Macarthur
time and again raised a cry for
troops, ships, planes to fight Japan
Gen. Marshall, as Army Chief of
staff, often turned him down
until the war in Europe was won
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Opinion Is Sought
On War Extension

Chairman Russell - You have
stated, Mr.. Secretary, that there
were only three possible courses
of action open. I should like
to ask you to summarize the
advantages and the disadvantages
of the three possible avenues open
to us: First, as to the extension
of the war the adoption of
the Macarthur plan, in other
words.
Secretary Marshall I am
going to make statement, but ]
will qualify it before do. I am q
little fearful that you are thinking
was a Chief of Staff and maybe
am a kind of Chief of Staff now
1 am not. There are consider
Evening star., 1951-05-08

the combat effectiveness of our
forces as an overriding considera-
ton, stabilize the situation I'M
Korea, or evacuate to Japan, if
forced out of Korea.
(About ITO words censored)
Economic Blockade.
"E. Continue and intensity now
an economic blockade of trade with
China"
IF. Prepare now to impose a
naval blockade of China and place
lit into effect as soon as our posi-
ton in Korea is stabilized, or when
we have evacuated Korea, and de-
pending upon the circumstances
then obtaining.
&C. Remove now restrictions on
air reconnaissance Of China coastal
areas and of Manchuria.
H. Remove now the restrictions
on operations of the Chinese Ma
Itionalist forces and give such logis-
tic support to those forces as will
contribute to effective operations
against the Communists.
Il. Continue to bomb military
targets in Korea.
i j. Press now for United Ma
tions action branding Communist
China as an aggreSSor.
Send a military training mis-
sion and increase MDAP to Chi
nese Nationalists in Formosa.
Now. here is one cannot men,
ton. I will have to skip it.
Initiate damaging naval anC
air attacks on detectives in Com
munist China at such time as the
Chinese Communists attack any
of our forces outside of Korea.
(About so words censoredO
I omitted one.
Mentioned by Macarthur.
! Chairman Russell-All of those
items were embraced in the same
document that contained the foul
which Gen Macarthur presented
to the Congress and to this COM
mittee?
Secretary Marshall-That is COR
rect, sir.
Chairman Russell-Well, did the
memorandum show on its face that
this was a suggestion from the
Chiefs of Staff to the National
Security Council or that it ap-
peared to be a final finding by the
Joint Chiefs?
Secretary MarShall-It was, as J
read the statement, that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had tentatively
agreed upon the following objec-
tives relative to Communist China
and Korea, together with the ac-
tions to be taken to attain them
some indication as to timing. Tha
was sent to me and I had it sem
over to the Security Council fol
immediate attention. (About 10(
words censored)
Senator KnoWland-Might asl
you if you would inquire of hin
as to whether or not when thi
went to the Security Council on o,
about January II or II, Wheneve,
it finally went over, whether i
Evening star., 1951-05-08
GEN. MARSHALL.

preme policy has been to curt
Communist aggression and, il
possible. to avoid another world
war in doing so. The execution OF
this policy has required extraordi-
nary patience, firmness and de-
termination, in meeting and help
ing our allies to meet, and helping
them to meet challenges in Iran
Greece, Turkey. Trieste, Berlin
and Indo-C China, and finally
The struggle between the de-
mocracies, as we define the term
and the Communist powers is a
continuing one. And it may
last much longer.
There can be, / think. no quick
and decisive solution to this global
struggle short of resorting to an
other world war. The cost of such
a conflict is beyond calculation
1t is, therefore, our policy to con-
tain Communist aggression in diff
ferent fashions in different areas
without resorting to total war, il
that be possible to avoid.
AppeaSement Spurned.
This policy may seem costly, il
maintained over a period of years
but those costs would not be COM
parable at all to what happens il
we get involved in what you might
call an atomic war. =. Our policy
has been uniform in the following
respects:
He have spurned appeasement;
We have brought to bear what
ever has been necessary, in money
and manpoWer. to curb the ag-
gressor; and we have sought in
every possible way to avoid a
third world war.
The application of this policy
has not always been easy or popu-
lar. Korea is not the first time
there have been complaints of a
Stalemate. and it is not the first
time that there have been de-
mands for a quick and decisive
solution.
I think these periods are of
interest. Korea has lasted for
10 months but the Berlin crisis
lasted almost Is months and was
a very daring undertaking.
1t was carried out as you know
and ended up in relieving the
blockade without our getting into
an actual war, but it lasted IL
months.
There were times when the fight
for Berlin also looked like a stale
mate. but we kept our heads anc
persevered and in the end won q
notable victory.
There were those who wanted
to end this situation by smashing
through the Russian blockade
even though this might have
precipltated a war at that time
We refused to take that risk as
long as there were other means o1
accomplishing our ends and I al
that time was Secretary of State
While our foreign policy ha
placed considerable burden upol
the United States in recent years
| it is likewise true that it has i'm
posed great strains on the Sovie
orbit, which, in the end, may yielt
decisive advantages to this coun
try and our Allies. :.
| I repeat, that think the cours
we are following now is virtuall
the only course you could fol
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Partial Text Testimony Offered Senate Hearing by Defense Secretary Macarthur

hazard the development of very
much enlarged and probably a
World War, but would not lead
to a quick observation-disclosures of
a decisive nature which would not
only terminate the actual fighting
in Korea, but relieve us of very
heavy troop obligations in the
immediate future in that region.