Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1951-02-16
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Mistakes Not Rehashed
TT HAS BEEN the policy Of the
l brass hats that military mis-
takes, no matter how glazing are
not to be rehashed after they are
made. That perhaps is why even
the files on northern military blum
ders in the Civil War still are secret.
That is also why our intelligence
error in the Battle of the Bulge,
which cost the lives of thousands
of young men, still remains I'M
investigated; with the general then
in charge of us. intelligence being
promoted to be No. 2 man in the
central intelligence agency.
And that is also why the naval
commanders responsible for shoot
ing down and killing 400 us. and
British paratroopers in the invasion
Of Sicily never were investigated.
American newspapermen, includ-
ing this columnist, have written
about these tragic errors. But no
official investigation ever was made
public.
Likewise suppressed may be
the tragic Korean errors which
cost us the greatest proportion
ate casualties in history and the
greatest land-army defeat in
history, Certainly they will not
be published If Senator McCar-
thy has his way.
1t was to shed light on some of
these errors that this columnist
published paraphrased exec rpts
from General MacArthur's cabled
estimates of actual Chinese
strength. These showed that while
Macarthur was announcing more
than 100000 Chinese in Korea or
on the border, and that "a bottom
less well of Chinese manpower con-
tinues to flow into Korea" actually
only about $4,000 Chinese sent the
9th army on it's headlong l20-mile
retreat.
Errors Of Command
There was good reason why I
used paraphrased official cables
from Macarthur. If l had not, Sen
ator Mccarthy would have accused
me of lying, or manufacturing the
Chinese figures out of whole cloth.
Faced with the official texts, he
could not very well accuse me of
lying, SO he accused me of permit
ting the deciphering of coded mes
sages. This the Secretary of the
Army denied.
Mccarthy also implied that had
given secrets to the enemy. This
was absurd on the face of it. The
column in question dealt with Chi
nese military strength, and the
Chinese obviously knew their own
strength. Furthermore it was pub
lished on Dec. 30, one month after
the 9Th army's tragic retreat, and
facts published after battle don't
give much help to the enemy.
However, after a battle, the
people whose sons are lost and
whose country is injured are
entitled to know the reasons for
defeat. The reasons in this case
were errors in command. They
were not the fault of the troops
on the field of battle.
The reasons for this particular
defeat began at Wake Island, and
go back in part to two factors-a
brilliant, strong-minded general
who knew exactly what he wanted,
and president not versed in mill
tary strategy who, as a former
National Guard artillery captain.
was dazzled by braid and brass.
The Big Risk
At Wake Island, General Mac
Arthur proposed exactly what he
later executed-a lightning dash by
American troops up to the Man.
churian border, a pause on the
border only long enough to SYM
bolze victory, then a march home
by Christmas.
In talking to Truman, Macarthur
even used the words "home by
Christmas" He admitted that the
Chinese might be provoked into
attack. But he predicted they would
not cross the Yalu river in force
and confidently added that, if they
did, he could take care of them.
Macarthur also argued that the
North Korean guerrillas would be
destroyed by the severe Korean
winter, and that the South Korean
army would be strong enough to
protect it's homeland without
large U.N. army
President Truman was hesltant
He questioned the necessity of
marching all the way to the Chinese
border, also the wisdom of pulling
American troops out too quickly.
Macarthur replied that "Occu-
pations are failures" that the
execution of war prisoners is
foolish" and it would be best
to leave Korea in the hands of
Koreans.
Although Truman remained hes