Evening star., 1951-12-02

been valuable during retreat
when the will to resist would need
stiffening-the statement lacked
purpose at a time when Americans
weren't surrendering in any con-
siderable numbers.
At this point, Col. Hanley con-
founded confusion by telling the
press:
ITO start talking about. war
crimes at this time would be dyna-
mite. We shall stay away from It,"
This, from the man who had
started it all, was battling, to under
state the case.
Troop Reaction
What did the troops at the front
think of the story? For the first
two days, nothing; they had not
been informed of 1t in that period.
On November 16, however, Stars
and Stripes-the Army newspaper
and the Armed Forces Radio
Service served the Hanley report
to the front in its original form.
Censorship? No, said an Army
spokesman. We just wanted to be
sure the story was right, a Radio
Service official added. Yet no one
in Tokyo or Washington will admit
to this day that the Hanley story
was right. Last week, an Army
source here explained that the
radioman must have meant he
wanted to check and see that Col.
Hanley had been quoted correctly.
The troops at the front took the
story in their stride. They had
known about atrocities all along;
they also had been in the Army
long enough not to believe every
thing they heard.
But the report had a bombshell
effect in the United States. Those
who had been waiting for chance,
like q youngster sweating out July
4, started clamor to drop the atom
bomb on the Reds in retaliation.
The Pentagon professed complete
surprise at the statement and said
1t would investigate. The President,
at Key West, said he was Mortified,
and called the atrocities the most
barbarous incident of the century
If true.
And all this time, in a dozen
files in the Pentagon, lay copy of
a month-old report to the United
Nations by Gen. Ridgway to the
effect that 5000 atrocity incidents
against Americans had been report
ed up to July 20. The Pentagon said
nothing about the report. nor did
Tokyo, until it was found, almost
by accident, by reporter in the
virtually deserted press room of the
United Nations Secretariat at New
York.
Condor Needed
A little candor on some ones part
could have cleared away the dust
in a few minutes time. Eve hope
Col. Hanley's estimate is too high,"
said a ranking Tokyo officer who
presumably knew that an even
higher estimate had gone to the
U. N. a month before II have not
had time to familiarize myself with
the content of the statement" said
Gen. Van Fleet in Korea. Top
Pentagon officials, who had had
copies of the U. N. statement for
more than a month, never men
toned 1t in the 10 days before it
was discovered. at New York. The
State Department had had 1t since
October IL, but had said nothing
about it to any one.
Later explanations at the Penta-
gon-that the report was not al
luded to by Defense officials be-
cause it was classified until released
by Ambassador Austin at the Unit
ed Nations sounded rather hollow
in view of the public clamor for en-
lightenment at the time.
At any rate, there was neither
candor nor Qualification. The Pen
tagon sent an "operationa immedi-
ate"-top priority-to Tokyo. But
it was not until three days later,
November II, that Gen. Ridgway
got around to issuing statement.
The 600-word handout seemed long
on adjectives and short on facts; it
included mention of the Deity but
excluded mention of the number of
atrocity victims involved; it ex-
pressed astonishment that the
American public should have been
surprised but said nothing about
the report to the U. N.
The statement also included
what sounded like an apology to