Evening star., 1951-10-17
lo. Bottle Of the BIockode

1948, Mr.. F0rreStal called q
weekend meeting of the Joint
Chiefs Of Staff at the Naval War
College in Newport. to settle the
interservice disputes which had
arisen over the definition Of
roles and missions laid down at
the similar conference at Key
West in the preceding March.
The result was to give opera
tional control over the atom
bomb to the Air Force, but OBJ
ligating it at the same time to
utilize any capabilities for
strategic bombing which the
Navy might develop.
Though the fact was not
then made public, the Joint
Chiefs also worked out two
complete plans for establishing
a unified, international COM
mand in Western Europe. One
was for immediate" use: the
other for use Sin the event Of
war" After clearance by Presi-
dent Truman and the State De-
partment the immediate" plan
would be urged upon our Euro
pean Allies: and it was in fact
followed by the appointment of
Field Marshal Montgomery as
commander In chief for West
ern Europe. The plan ''in the
event Of war" was "for United
States information only at the
present time" 1t provided for
"a supreme Allied commander in
chief (West) who should be an
American" and sketohedt out
other provisions. none of which
took effect until the, appoint
ment Of Gen. Eisenhower as su-
preme commander in December.
1850.
Reliance in Gen. Clay.
(Back in Washington Mr.. For
restal found himself involved
in the exhausting negotiations
over the Berlin blockade. They
were about to be transferred
from the ambassadors in Mos
cow to the military command
erS in Berlin.)
n august, 1913.
BERLIN SITUATION.
Lovett called me after lunch tc
express great concern about Clay's
ability to preserve his calm and
poise in these negotiations. He
said that he had the impression
that Clay was now drawn as tight
as a steel spring. I suggested that
Royal go over to help him, but
Lovett said this would be imprac.
t1cal because 1t would indicate q
lack Of confidence in Clay, through
sending over his superior, so Il
speak, to monitor and guide him
I later talked to Royal, who
agreed with Lovett's point of view
(Actually, there would seem
to have been little reason to
worry about Gen. Clay's calm.
"You cannot" as Gen. Clay
himself was to say in a telecon
conversation at the height of
the crisis, ''live surrounded by
force and bluff without showing
that you have no fear Of the
first and only contempt for the
latter" and Gen. Clay appeared
to fulfill his dictum. Indeed, one
of his kilograms at this time
provided what would almost
have been q note OF comic relief
had it not been so oninous.)
S September, 194S.
BERLIN SITUATION.
AT the close of Saturdays
meeting Sokolovsky announced
that Soviet air maneuvers would
be held In the Berlin area, begin
ming September g.. Gen. Clay re-
marked that such maneuvers
would hold grave dangers of un-
desirable accidents and incidents.
(Sokolovsky referred to these
maneuvers as normal maneuvers
Of this time Of year for the Soviet
forces and observed that they had
no other significance. Gen. Clay
remarked in his message to
Draper that in the four past sum.
merS no one had ever seen or
heard of these maneuvers.) The
British Gen. Robertson Gen. Sir
Brian Hubert Robertson, military
governor) thanked Sokolovsky for
providing the information and ex-
pressed the hope it would not In
terfere with the air corridors. To
this Sokolovsky replied. Certain
Ly." Gen. Clay remarked he
didn't know whether this meant
Certainly. yes" or Certainly,
no." He referred, in a subsequent
to Sokolovsky. to "our
agreed safety regulations" and
that there was sufficient air for
any type and kind of air rnaneu-
vers without utilizing the corri-
dors." To this Sokolovsky replied
that no such air regulations ex-
lsted and insisted that the Rus
slams would have to use the cor
ridorS.
Con Labor Day Mr.. Forrestal
talked over the situation at
length with Mr.. Lovett. The
Undersecretary of State had a
high regard for Ambassador
Smiths work at Moscow
s September, 194S.
'BeadIe" Smith Praised.
RECORD OF CONVERSATION.
Mr.. Lovett emphasized the
necessity OF unity in government
vt this time. "Beadle" Smith has
lone an excellent job in the Mos
,ow negotiations-better, than
SO out of 100 who might
nave been selected. While he
nay not have the negotiation
AGILITY of Lew Douglas, he has
he requisite toughness to deal
With the Soviets under current
conditions. There has been
tendency to criticize him for
allure to get this or that result,
,ut MIR. Lovett pointed out that
his criticism is not justified. He
stated that IT, is wary aocy ~