Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-07-26
Officials Here
Voice Cautious
Optimism
BY John M. Hiohtower
Associated Press Stoff Writer

Military and diplomatic officials
here consider that United Nations
negotiators got everything they
sought in the first round of the
Korean armiStice talks without
making any concessions on vital
/ issues.
In fact it was the Communists
who gave ground by backing down
twice from positions they had
taken.
Yet despite these initial sue
cesseS, responsible officials here
are only mildly optimistic about
the chances that the negotiations
will actually produce an armistice
Many difficult problems remain to
be solved in the round now start
ing.
Gen. Matthew 3. Ridgway's an
nouncement of the agreement on
an agenda noted there are nu-
merouS basic points on which
there is presently wide diversion
o. views" between the Reds and
the U. N. command. That eau
tionary note is fully Endorsed here
by officials familiar with all the
problems facing the negotiators.
May Take Another Month.
Some authorities believe it may
be as much as a month before the
negotiations are concluded, and
said it must still be determined
how high a price the Reds are
willing to pay in what Washington
considers real concession" in
order to end the fighting.
The two most serious problems
now foreseen here are those hav-
ing to do with the mapping out
of a buffer. zone between the
Communist and U, N. armies, and
with the arrangements for super
vision, or enforcement, of an
armistice once it is established.
The agreement on an agenda
was possible only because the
Reds abandoned yesterday their
previously insistent demand for
an agreement, prior to an armi-
stice. on removal of all foreign
troops from Korea. That broke
the week-long deadlock of the
Kaesong meetings.
| The price the United Nations
paid for this apparently is COW
cred in Point s of the agenda
The point provides that the nego-
tiators can later make recon-
mendations to the governments
on both sides.
In Line With Basic Policy.
It is understood that In &C.
cepting the modified Red proposal
on the troop withdrawal issue, the
United Nations agreed to discuss
arrangements for coming to
grips, after an armistice, with
the whole problem of withdrawal
of outside forces from the Korean
peninsula.
This was in line with the basic
American policy position that
troops would be pulleda out some
day but no time could be fixed
now.
Previously, the Communists had
given in on procedural point
when they agreed that the area
where the talks are held at Kae-
song should be treated as neutral
territory. They agree, too, that
Gen. Ridgway's right to send any
one he wished, including newsmen,
into this area, was beyond ques-
ton.
When Gen. Ridgway went into
the truce talks. according to in
Iformants here, he had instructions
to seek in the first instance sub
Istantialiy the agenda now adopted
This provides for discussion of
the demarcation line, armistice
arrangements and prisoner of war
arrangements without committing
either side to any particular line
Iof action. The real arguments
therefore are now to begin.
In connection with the location
of the buffer zone, the Reds have
made clear they will insist that
it be precisely on the 38th Parallel.
Gen. Ridgway's instructions are to
work it out along the present bat
tie line-most north of the paral-
lei. Argument on this could go
on for many days.
AS to enforcement of armistice
terms, Gen Ridgway has instruc-
tions to seek a firm system of in
spection all over Korea by inter-
national truce teams. The argu-
ment runs that this would make
preparation of a surprise attack
or other truce violations by either
side impossible.
On the third point of sub
stance, arranging for exchange of
prisoners of war, the difficulty will
come over the ratio of exchange.
However, many more Communists
are held prisoner by the U. N.
forces than the other way around.
A one-for-one exchange would
free all U. N. troops held captive
without freeing all Red soldiers.
So it is expected that the Com
munist negotiators will insistently