Evening star., 1951-06-05
Fall of Tsinon
Started Collapse

However. when it came to the ap-
preparation process, Congress only
appropriated $275 million for
economic aid and $125 million for
military aid. So total was ac-
tually made available by the Con-
greSs of $400 million as against
s570 million requested. The
real collapse of the government in
a military way began in the lat
ter part of 1948. The first large
scale detection and collapse oc-
CURED in September, 1948, with
the fall OF TSinan. where govern
ment forces without any effort at
all went over to the other side and
surrendered with all their mate
In mid-November, 1948, Gen.
Barr. who was the head of the
military mission to China. re-
ported to the Department of the
Army:
y am convinced that the mill
tary situation has deteriorated to
the point where only the active
participation of United States
troops could effect a remedy. No
battle has been lost since my
arrival due to lack of ammunition
or equipment. Their military deb
scles, in my opinion, can all be
attributed to the worlds worst
leadership and many other
Notwithstanding factors that
led to complete loss of the will
to fight"
In another report early in 1949
he explained some of the causes
for the National government de-
feats. He says:
The government committed its
first politico-military blunder by
concentrating on the purely mill
tary reoccupation of former Japa-
neSe-held areas. 1t gave very lit
tie realization to the regional areas
or the creation of efficient local
administrations. Its strategy was
burdened by an unSound strategy
conceived by politically inf1u-
enced and militarily inept high
command.
Family Ties Hindered Regime.
Throughout the structure and
machinery of the National Gov
ernment there are interlocking ties
of interests, family. financial and
political. No Chinese, no matter
how efficient, can hope for a posi-
ton of authority because he is the
best qualified man. He must have
other backing. In too many cases.
such backing was the support and
loyalty of the GeneraIssimo and
his army comrades, which kept
them in posts of responsibility re-
gardless of their qualifications.
The direct result has been the
unsound strategy and faulty tao
tics of the Nationalists in their
fight against the Communists"
BY the end of 1948 the struggle
In North China had virtually
ended with the complete collapse
of the Nationalist armies. Eighty
per cent of all the materiel which
we had furnished, both during the
war and after, to the National
government, was lost; and IS per
cent of that is estimated to have
been captured by the Communists
One reason for this large cap
ture. Gen. Barr points out, when
he says. that the Chinese Ma
tionalist government never de-
stroyed any of the materiel, when
they were about to surrender OF
run"
He says, "The Chinese seemed
inherently unable to destroy any
thing of value"
Now. at the very end of my re-
marks here, briefly sum up some
Of the things, material and other
wise, which the United States did
in aid of It's policy in China.
Speaking, first, of things on
which it is impossible to put a
dollar value. First, is the aid rem
dered by the United States forces
in China in planning and in car
rying out the movement of the
Chinese government forces into
the areas occupied by the Jap
aneSe.
Marines Gave Vital Aid.
Second. is the evacuation of the
Japanese troops from those areas
Third, is the aid rendered by
the United States Marines ir
North China; in occupying key
areas and maintaining control fol
the government of essential rail-
way lines until the government
was able to take over.
Fourth. the aid provided by the
=