Evening star., 1951-05-25
lncitinq Russia to War

At the conclusion of his testimony, General
Bradley had proved to be, on the whole, an effec-
tive witness against General Macarthur.
His disagreement with the Macarthur pro-
posals for bringing the Korean war to success
full conclusion was stated in clear and forceful
language. General Bradley is not persuaded
that the Macarthur proposals would be success
full, and he thinks they carry too great risk
of converting q small war into an all-out var.
He said that the Joint Chiefs of staff share his
views on these points, which means that the
weight of our top military opinion is overwhelm-
ingly against the Macarthur thesis.
In the course of his testimony however,
General Bradley made one statement that is open
to challenge.
Referring to earlier testimony that the ad-
ministration was opposed to carrying the war to
Red China because 1t was afraid this might bring
Russia into the conflict, Senator Cain said: "This,
to my mind advises Russia that the free nations
intend to resist aggression in Korea and any
where else. but only to point short of risking
war with Russia II the Russians believe what
you and others in authority have repeatedly said,
would you tell me why such statements will not
encourage Russia to initiate limited but very
destructive aggression in areas other than
Korea?"
w
supplement what General Marshall said when
he was here think 1t is very harmful to our
security and to our country and to our future
security to have to pass on to Russia all of our
intentions, all of our thoughts, all of our capa-
bilities. :. think that what you say is probably
very true, that we are unnecessarily inciting
Russia to war" General Bradley then qualified
his use of the word unnecessarily,
It is too bad that this exchange was left up
in the air, for it conveys erroneous and un-
fortunate Impressions
In the first place the basis for the question
was inaccurate. It Is erroneous to say that the
administration, by proclaiming its unwillingness
to risk war with Russia in Korea has informed
Russia that the free nations will resist aggression
in Korea "and anywhere else" only to point
short Of risking war with Russia. The best
refutation of this is found in the North Atlantic
Pact. by which we have obligated ourselves to
go to war with Russia If the Soviets attack any
of the nations adhering to that treaty.
Secondly, how can General Bradley justify
his answer? Certainly these hearings have not
made public and available to the Russians "all Of
our intentions, all of our thoughts, all of our
capabilities" Our intentions, so. far as the
Korean war is concerned. were stated by the
President before the hearings began. Defense
Mobilizer Wilson has stated on at least two
occasions, wholly outside the hearings, that we
would not be fully ready for a showdown with
Russia until 1853. The published testimony be-
fore the Russell committee has revealed some
thing of our capabilities with the limited forces
we have in Korea. But even If one assumes that
the Russians did not already know the extent
Of our capabilities there-a very doubtful as
sumpton-it by no means follows that the testi-
mony before the committee has revealed the
limit Of capabilities If all the forces at our
command were to be employed, or that the tes-
timony has served to incite the Russians to war.
The real deterrent to war with Russia is our
superiority in atomic weapons. And as long
as we maintain that superiority there is only
the remotest chance that the Russians will be
melted to war by the kind of testimony that has
been given before the Russell committee.