Evening star., 1951-01-14

considered to be mere preliminaries
against the japanese islands. which
officers here and there, a jap
aneSe uprising could have sue
ceeded.
1 Yet there was not a single dis
turbance or act of hostility against
the Americans. Our disasters in
Korea could have encouraged
those who fish in troubled waters
to stage at least some demonstra-
tions against the power which de-
feated them and which now oc-
cupies the country.
Leans Toward u. S.
Nothing of the sort occurred.
Japan wants to become once more
a free and sovereign power and is
aware that the only hope it has is
by the side of the United States.
This feeling prevails not only
among the political and business
leaders, but also among the rank
and file of the population. This
explains why the small but active
nucleus of Communists in the pay
of the U. S. S. r. has been totally
unsuccessful in it's attempts to
create disturbances.
But this does not change the
very grave threat to Japan which
will arise if we suffer total defeat
in Korea. AS the cumbersome
wheels of our democratic diplo-
macy grind slowly, the essential
measures for the creation of a
japanese defense force are being
dangerously delayed.
Gen. Macarthur is said to be
pressing Washington for a de-
cision. but his counsel is not
needed these days, by either the
Pentagon or the State Depart
ment. The japanese have no
means of communication with
Washington except through Gen.
MacArthur's headquarters.
The seriousness of the Soviet
threat is so strongly felt, however.
by the Tokyo government and the
Japanese people that even the old
hostility toward Chang Kai-shek
is forgotten. In their fear of
Soviet aggression the japanese are
ready and willing to extend g
friendly hand to their former en-
emy. whose resistance between
1887 and 1945 brought the down.
fall of the old japanese empire.
Many Japanese leaders believe
today that if they had political
freedom they could join with
Chang in the common defense
against Russia. Under present
conditions it would be the blind
leading the blind, however. Both
countries have great military po-
tential. but lack completely the
industrial power to arm their
men. -.
Principal Objective
The men in the Kremlin are
fully aware that they must beat
the iron while it is hot. They
know that Japan cannot be al
lowed to organize ground forces.
lest the extension of Soviet domi-
nation to the former Japanese
empire be jeopardized.
This explains, partially at least.
the adamant attitude of Mao
Tze-tung toward the various offers
of conditional surrender put for
ward by the Asiatic-Arab bloc in
the United Nations-with the hid
den encouragement of the British
government.
America must be utterly de-
feated in Korea if Russian power
is to establish itself solidly in the
Far East by the domination of
our vital defense line, which ex-
tends from Japan through For
mosa to the Philippines.
Russia knows even better than
we do that she can take over West
ern Europe this year-or even this
month"; she wishes. The fact
that this might involve her in war
with the United States does not
carry much weight as things
stand now. But before she makes
that easy move she must be in
full possession of our Western de-
fenses, from Japan to the Philip
pines. And Japan is the principal
prize and objective.
Place in Strategy
While our political and military
men in Washington vaccilate over
how and when we can establish
our defense line in the Atlantic,
the men in the Kremlin are pro-
ceding unhampered with their
plans. The threat of their armies
between the Oder and the Vistula
almost panics American and
European statesmen. But few
people watch the Pacific, where
the Russians now are waging a
full-scale war and are said to be
ready to complete it by throwing
their own forces against Japan
after the Korean affair has been
liquidated.
! Reliable intelligence reports
place Soviet forces in the neigh
borhood of Vladivostok and near
the Korean border at about Is
divisions, including four which
are airborne.
J They cannot be of any use in
!; Korea, where the Chinese Com
munists have more than is neces-
sary to defeat our troops. In any
: event, paratroopers are not need
ed in Korea. The presence of this
:: strong Soviet force is not in
tended to intimidate us, as some
diplomats say. into getting out of
Korao ny i,,fo odyoiffipo tho