davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1951-11-25

In our historical experience, coali-
tionS always have been hort-lived
and ephenera1 structures. They are
knocked together for the purpose of
war against q common enemy. and
they regularly fall apart as soon as
the war and the common danger are
over. Or. If the expected war does not
materialize, they quietly disintegrate.
The great coalition which is EN-
bodied in the North Atlantic treaty
has from its inception been meant
to defy this historical law. Whatever
Russian propaganda may say, 1t
never was alliance for war. Its pur-
pose was and is to prevent war and
to enforce and maintain peace. This
is long g-term aim, and it means that
the coalition must hold together as
a working organism over long term
of years, and maintain joint policies
in spite of the many disruptiye fac
tors which are bound to arise between
sovereign allies in the course of time.
Lip Service to Union
It was doubtful all along whether
the North Atlantic Treaty organiza-
ton could succeed in this aim if 1t
remained a mere coalition of SOW
ereign States of very different power
stature and with different and some
times conflicting interests of their
own. It's founders expressed from the
beginning the hope that it might
ain time" grow organically into some
closer union, and much lip service
has constantly been paid to the idea
of an Atlantic community" and to
the underlying unity of political con-
cepts. traditions and ideals among
the North Atlantic treaty partners.
which make their relationship more
than mere alliance.
1t is now rapidly becoming clear
that this is not enough. Tbs, rhe-
torical term Atlantic community"
Evening star., 1951-11-25

Italians sand the 8 other NATo
states between them.
The fighting equipment of these
divisions, in any event, would be
supplied almost exclusively by us,
as would have been the case even
under the original schedule" Most
of the units (of the % divisions,
that Isl already are in various
stages of training. What they need
to make them effective is fighting
equipment. Whether they become an
actual military force-in-being next
year depends almost wholly on
whether the United States-plagued
as it Is with production snarls, and
faced with the necessity of sup
plying its armies in Korea and
building its strength at home-can
come across with the goods. Money
is not the primary problem here
funds already appropriated are
sufficient to equip the short-range
target force.
Meanwhile, the prospect is for a
return to greater proportion of
American economic aid, as opposed
to the military variety. In this
years appropriation, economic aid
for Europe was cut to 81 billion,
as opposed to $4.8 billion for mill
tary aid. The bill permits the
President to switch 10 per cent of
the military sum to the economic
field If he finds it Is necessary.
This probably will be done. An
other possibility is that we may
place military orders with Euro
pean firms, thus providing them
with dollars with which to pro-
cure the raw materials they need.
Down to Bross Tocks
What has happened, in short, is
that the United States, as leader
of the free world coalition, is COM
ing face to face at this stage with
some of the hard practicalities
which tend to get overlooked when
planning still Is on a theoretical
level. This Is never a pleasant
thing to have to do. It is process
Evening star., 1951-11-25

spread her wealth across the whole
structure Of the Atlantic alliance.
But If she does this. obviously she
will want to make sure that her sac
rifice serves a common policy. She
cannot want to strengthen a lot of
potential neutralists to the point
where they could desert her at the
crucial stage of the political world
struggle. The only way to make this
impossible Is to create an indissoluble
union between America and her
allies-a union whose foreign policy
is no longer worked out by diplo-
matte negotiation, but decided by
governmental action.
Pacific, Too? ...
1t may be that such a union would
have to be more broadly based than
even the present Atlantic coalition.
From British point of view, a per-
manent union that embraces Ger
many and Italy could hardly leave
out Australia and New Zealand.
From an American point of view.
there is something to be said for
uniting in it both the Atlantic and
the Pacific allies of the United
States.
The essential task is to create a
political structure which can COM
fortably sustain the economic, mill
tary and diplomatic effort of con-
tanning Russia for the requisite time
10 to 20 years-while at the same
time continuing to raise its own liv-
ing standards and developing the
underdeveloped countries Of the
world. Such a structure could ulti-
mately receive and accommodate
Russia herself, once she tires OF per-
manent Illustration and isolation, and
thus could become the first world
state. A tall order. But what else
Will see us through? 4
7tLcndon Observer FOREIGN News service)
Evening star., 1951-11-25
Can the Atlantic Community Survive as Group Sovereign Stotes

has so far not been translated into
any kind of hard concrete political
institutions, and common ideals are
no substitute for such institutions.
AS for the hope that a closer union
will grow organically in time" it is
now becoming rapidly clear that a
political union does not grow" like
a vegetable; that it must be de-
liberately willed. planned and made
by the governments of the states
concerned. and that the time in
which this has to be done If the
North Atlantic treaty powers are to
succeed in their purpose is not un-
limited.
Nothing much needed to be done
in this respect as long as it could be
hoped that the mere existence Of the
treaty, and the American guarantee
to Western Europe which it implied,
would discourage Russian expansive
designs and make Russia change her
policy. These hopes, never very
strongly based on facts. were finally
disappointed with the Korean ag-
gression Of 1850.
The rearmament policy has pro-
duced the first crisis of the Atlantic
alliance crisis with which it's
many councils and committees cur
rently are graphing with still un-
certain success. It is now clear that
the burden of rearmament falls with
very unequal weight on the various
allies; that the strength Of many of
them is insufficient to take the strain
at all without much greater support
from America. On the other hand.
it is also becoming clear that the
various allies act with very different
degrees of drive and conviction in
their rearmament policies, and that
the Americans are reluctant to invest
heavily in the halfAhearted efforts
Of uncertain allies.
Evening star., 1951-11-25

minded and psychologically ripe for
union. EE
The trouble Is that mere conti-
mental European union between these
states is not the answer tolthe prob
lem. Such continental European
union would never by itself be strong
enough to do the job Of the Atlantic
treaty powers as whole that is. to
create power which can in safety
and equanimity co-exist with hostile
Russia. 1t would always depend on
the continued support of America
and the continued alliance with
Britain and Canada. And the stresses
between these four coalition members
would be no less dangerous than
those between the present IL. A
mere European union within the
Atlantic coalition is no substitute for
an Atlantic union.
The best hope in the present cir
cumstances is that the rearmament
crisis is beginning to open British
and American eyes to the problem
and to create in Britain and America
a realistic interest in Atlantic union.
British policy during the summer
of 1851 has come up against the hard
realization that there is no future
for Britain outside permanent as
sociation at least with America. And
the present difficulties ought also
to have increased Americas interest
in Transforming her, present coalition
with her allies into an indissoluble
union. It is now clear that. America
cannot expect q lot Of much poorer
allies to make a proportionately equal
effort with her own. If she wants to
see the Atlantic rearmament pro-
gram succeed according to plan,
she win have to subsidize her allies
to far lager extent than hitherto.
In fact. shs will practically have to
Evening star., 1951-11-25

two years the Greek rebels were
whipped, and Russia had, backed
down on her Turkish demands.
Americans, in the meantime, had
turned their attention to the
broader problem in Europe. France
was in danger OF falling to Moscow
from within-Italy seemed on the
verge OF doing so. All Europe was
stagnant economic pool, breeding
the germs of communism. On June
S, 1947, Gen. Marshall, then Secre-
tary OF State, laid down the prin-
ciples of our European Recovery
Program. II these war-smashed
countries would work together for
their own economic salvation, the
United States would help them.
The program which grew out of
Gen. MarshalPs offer, administered
by ECA, was without parallel in
history. Within the framework of
its objectives and the situation in
which it was undertaken, it was
unquestionably successful. BY the
summer of 1850, thanks to their own
renewed efforts and $20-b billion jet
propulsion boost from this side of
the Atlantic, Europe was a going
concern. Some help still was
needed, but the end was clearly in
sight. For all countries except Ger
many, industrial output was higher
than it had been before the war;
Trade deficits had been cut to man.
ageable proportions. Prices and
wages were stable. The shrinkage
in the size and influence of the
Communist Party vote attested to-.
the fact that the average man was
getting his share Of the benefits.
The Feor Thot PoroIyzes
That, OF course, was before Korea
before the need for big-scale re-
armament entered the picture.
Europe's military security, however
its sense of military security, at
least-already was getting some
attention.
AS Russia's position in Western
Evening star., 1951-11-25

lot of thinking and hoping-even
promising-about what might be
done by this or that country under
such and such conditions. But this
is all there has been. And this,
therefore, is all that Is in for re-
adjustment, in the light of the
situation as it now appears.
This is the readjustment OF think
ing that is taking place:
The long-range NATO project of
providing Gen. Eisenhower with at
least so divisions by June, 1854,
with Europe paying substantial
portion of the ornaments bill,
moves into the category Of doubtful
propositions.
Still q Target, but ..
It is not abandoned as a target,
but there Is general recognition
that 1t may not turn out to be a
feasible one. It has been estimated
we would have to supply at least
rs per cent Of the hardware"
equipment for such a force. Now,
however, it seems questionable
whether the effort to supply the
remainder-plus maintenance costs
and such items as clothing, food
and soldiers pay-would not be
more than the European allies could
afford to take on by 1854.
In the face of this uncertainty
as to how big a force the NATO
countries can afford to maintain
by 1854, the disposition Is to con-
centrate on getting a force they
can afford into state OF combat
readiness next year. Two days ago,
in this connection, the NATO dep
uties and Military Committee were
reported talking in terms of force
OF 40 divisions by the end of 1852.
This goal seems surprisingly high;
according to earlier reports, tar
get force of % divisions by next
June was under discussion. The
French, 1t was thought, might sup
ply 10 divisions toward such force,
the Americans 6, the British 4, the
Evening star., 1951-11-25
By Sebostion Hoffner

ALI this may, with great patience
and good will. be overcome in the
many-sided and somewhat confused
negotiations now In progress. and the
Atlantic rearmament effort may.
with some loss of time. still be sue
cessfully carried out In the existing
framework.
But the rearmament crisis is only
the very first and mildest test Of
Atlantic cohesion. II it is success
fully overcome. the coalition, within
two or three years. will have to face
the far greater strain of evolving and
maintaining common policy in the
question OF settlement with Russia.
And If such settlement is achieved,
it will have to maintain for a long
time the strength to guard and sus-
tain it. To expect that it will stand
up to all this as mere coalition of
independent partners is straining
optimism. The sober truth is that
the North Atlantic treaty powers
have embarked on tasks which can in
the long run be mastered only by
one state. They either have to be-
come one state or fail in their tasks.
with calamitous consequences for
world peace and Western civilization.
The Downing Truth
This truth is still only just dawning
on most Of them. The will to sink
national sovereignty in a larger fed
eral union has for years existed in
one part of the Atlantic COM
munity,' but only in the, weakest.
most dependent and most exposed
part. The countries OF continental
Western Europe which suffered de-
feat and occupation in the Second
World War-Frkace, Germany, Bene-
lux, Italy-ares now all federal
Evening star., 1951-11-25
-Harris-Ewing Photo.

Europe began to weaken, she moved
swiftly to consolidate it In areas
where she still had, or thought she
had, the power to enforce her will.
The year 1948, among other things,
saw the imposition of the Berlin
blockade and seizure of power in
CZechoslovakia. The Czech coup
d'etat, in particular, created a pro-
found psychological effect among
non- Communist Europeans.
Fear has a paralyZing effect,
economically as well as physically.
BY practical standards, Europe then
was In no condition to defend
herself. Nor, of course, was the
United States in a position to de-
fend Europe. The feeling in this
country was that the Russians
probably were not ready, in the
face of the atom bomb, to try to
seize Western Europe by force of
arms. But unless Che effort toward
recovery was to be baked by help
less dread of the Red Army, some
thing must be done to give West
Europeans the feeling, at least, that
the United States was behind them,
militarily as well as economically,
and that there was some hope of
salvation If they applied themselves
to seeking it.
The Birth Of Treoty
It was against this background
that the North Atlantic treaty and
the effort to rearm Europe had
their beginnings.
The seed of the North Atlantic
treaty was planted March II, 1948,
in Brussels-one month after
Czechoslovakia fell. The occasion
was the signing of a treaty of
sweeping alliance between Great
Britain, France, Belgium, Holland
and Luxembourg.
These nations, alone, clearly did
not have the military power to allay
the fear that haunted Europe. But
they were not to stand alone. The
day the treaty was signed, President
Evening star., 1951-11-25
Tomorrow's Choice

This fact remains: There has
been, all around, a basic miscalcu-
lation OF the capability of our Eu-
ropean allies to bear, as of today.
the economic burden OF rearma-
ment. We thought they were strong
enough now to concentrate on the
drive for military security without
endangering their hard-won eco
nomic health. We thought wrong.
It is likely that the next few
weeks will be punctuated by q num-
ber Of remarks regarding the in
advisabiity Of sewing seeds on the
desert, casting good money after
bad" and so on. In his speech to
Congress last February, Gen. Eisen-
hover wisely concluded that the
great quality America will have to
develop, If its European undertake
ing Is to succeed, is patience.
One thing seems quite clear at
this juncture; namely, that Amer
leans are in no position simply to
throw up their hands at the un-
pleasant turn things have taken.
The United States cannot write of
Europe as chronic deadbeat and
pull back into its shell like some
great, disgruntled turtle. II a Sc
cure Western Europe was essential
to our security-if we could not
face the prospect of a friendless
future in terror-ridden, isolated
garrison state-if these things were
true two years ago, when we
launched the NAT0 effort, they are
truer than ever today. We still
cannot afford to see West Euro
pean manpower and industrial
power added to the Soviet war ma
chine. And we shall still need
European bases from which to op-
crate If war comes.
1t seems, therefore, that the de-
cision which probably will emerge
from the Rome Conference-to
push ahead with the program on
which we are embarked, as fast
as far and as bravely as we can
Is not only the right decision. but
also the only possible one.
Evening star., 1951-11-25

YN ROME, yesterday, the North
Atlantic Council went to work
l. in earnest. The job ahead was
a tough one: To push the build
ing plan for West European de-
fense through the grimmest crisis
yet.
The crisis grew out of the reali-
cation that Americas allies in
Western Europe could not rearm
themselves as fast as mad been
expected-without going broke In
the attempt.
What is taking place in the
Council sessions in the gymnasium
of the old Mussolini Forum ire
christened Italian FORUM Is TAX
ing place behind closed doors. It
will be some time before the full
story of the conference can be
told. A communique later this
week may contain the first formal
indications of success or failure.
Preparatory Spode Work
Much spade work, however, has
gone into the preparations for this
session of the Council, which is
composed of the foreign ministers,
defense ministers and finance
ministers of the IL member ma
tions of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. In Paris, as q sort
of side show to the main attrac-
tion OF the United Nations General
Assembly, the NATO situation has
been discussed in o variety of
committee meetings and informal
gatherings of officials concerned.
The most important Of these con-
versations have been those Of the
Three Wise Men" Of the NATO
economic bureaus executive group
the United States w. Averell
Hartman, Frances Jean Monnet
and Britain's Sir Edwin Plowden.
This committee has been trying
to square the necessities Of West
European defense, as envisaged by
Gen. Eisenhower and his staff, with
the actual possibilities of NATO re-
armament, as understood by the
economic experts Of the various
governments.
Evening star., 1951-11-25

which tends to evoke painful reac-
tions. The optimistic hopes we
have enjoyed must have been let
down, we are inclined to assume,
not so much by genuinely unfore-
seen developments as by the willfull
negligence of the people abroad
with whom we are trying to work.
This, then. seems a good time to
take quick look back over the
history of the postwar American
attempt to lead the non-Com-
munist world to peace through
strength.
Evening star., 1951-11-25
Todoy's Fears

The crisis which must be dealt
with by the delegates in Rome does
not stem primarily, as many seem
to assume, from O. sudden begging
down of the drive to build West
Europe's military strength. 1t Is
not a question of some unexpected
current failure to meet O theoret-
ical schedule for putting divi-
sions into the field. It Is true that
this process has been going slower
than it was supposed to 60. And,
Pentagonian double-talk to the
contrary Notwithstanding, part of
the reason for the delay is that
Americas industrial mobilization Is
going badly, and our arms ship
ments to Europe are tagging. But
all this is incidental to the real
NATO problem.
The crux of the problem is that
the armament efforts being made
by key European NATO states-in-
adequate as we may consider them
already are proving to be more
than their convalescent economies
can support.
In the Squeeze
The key European NATO coun-
tries, of course, are Britain and
France-and, to a lesser extent,
Italy. The impact of rearma-
ment on Britain's economic situa-
ton described in this space two:
weeks ago. has by now been re-
ported so extensively that it needs
no further elucidation here. How
the same sort of squeeze has
affected the French is spelled out In
another article on page C-5 Of to-
days Star. Italy's plight is similar.
In these countries, and to a certain
degree in all NATO countries, the
free worlds effort to build It's mill
tary strength has induced q Grip
pling imitation.
The result is progressive eco
nomic deterioration-of a kind
which eventually could leave West
ern Europe with little~to defend,
even if it had the means to de-
fend it.
Now there is, there can be, no
such thing as military security
gained at the expense of economic
security. Belts can be frightened, up
to a certain point, and butter can
be converted into guns. These things
are being done now all over the
free world, and will be done more
as time goes by. But to ruin
economies in order to build armies
is to let in by the back door the
very marauder you are trying to bar
from the front of the house. Europe
can never be safe, and we can never
be safe, until Europe's military
strength is backed by her economic
health.
Thinking Reodjustment
The situation, In short, calls for
readjustment of thinking con-
cerning NATO's rearmament effort.
That word thinking" should
perhaps be emphasized. The few
hints that have come out of the
Paris talks about plans to meet the
situation described above-specific-
ally, about discussions as to how the
cost of arming Europe should be
divided among the various NATO,
countries-have seemed, as some-
times reported, to carry the inn
plication that some firm division of
the ornaments burden already has
been agreed upon, which agreed
division must now be readjusted
This is not the case.
1T is true that there has been &
Evening star., 1951-11-25

Truman sent q message to Con-
gress. This development, he
said, deserves our full support"
Three months later, by q vote Of
"a to 4, the Senate expressed It's
agreement. In the Vandenberg
resolution, June IL, it recommended
that the United States associate
itself with collective security ar
rangements like the Brussels pact
"and make clear In advance that
any armed attack by an aggressor
nation upon a peace-loving nation
whereby the security Of the United
States is affected will be combated
by the United States In the exercise
Of our inherent right Of self
defense"
Diplomatic Londmork
Here, perhaps, was the most Cruz
cial policy declaration ever made by
this Nation in peacetime. For once,
the potential aggressor was put on
blunt notice-the kind of warning
the Kaiser, Hitler and Toto never
got-that he would have the United
States to contend with. The Brus-
sells pact nations did not miss the
point. On their initiative, CONVEX
sations Immediately were begun In
Washington - conversations which
resulted, on April 4, 1949, In the
signing Of the North Atlantic
treaty.
The primary purpose Of NATC,
as 1t then was conceived In this
country, was p safeguard progress
toward Europes economic recovery
by giving Europeans the psycholog-
ical basis for sense Of security.
That, too, was the purpose Of the
military aid program, which got
under way in the autumn Of 1949.
There was no doubt ut all on this
score. Economic recovery Il fun
damental and should continue to
have priority over rearmament,"
said the State Department.
Everything went fine-right up to
the moment when the Communists
struck In Korea.
The Big Switch
From that moment, the whole
emphasis of the program of Ameri-
can aid to Europe began to switch.
When Communist China entered
the war late in 1850, the change in
attitude became complete. There
were no more worries about how to
convince Europeans that they were
strong enough militarily to 60 all
out in the job Of building their eco
nomic strength. Instead, at every
point, we sought to convince them
that they were strong enough eco
nomically to 60 all-out in the job Of
building their military strength.
All this, of course, was only nat
ural. We were in the process of
appropriating some $10.3 billion of
our substance to the direct military
effort to discourage Russia from at
tacking in Europe. There seemed
to be every reason to demand q
similar maximum sacrifice Of our
allies. Nor was all the sense OF
urgency on this side of the Atlantic.
Just as there were words OF caution
on both sides, so were there over
optimistic estimates on both sides
of the European ability to sustain
the burden Of the arms program
which seemed required. Britain, for
instance, foregoing economic aid
ahead of schedule and launching.
unprodded, an ambitious rearma-
ment program, was making the
same miscalculation of her own
potentialities as was being made
here.