Evening star., 1951-04-17

balance and keeping the war con.
fined to Korea. we are minimizing
their chances for world domina-
tion.
We are going to be faced with
some difficult decisions In Korea
in the next few months. To solve
them, we must realize that Korea
is not o brief. acute attack OF q
new disease. 1t is q symptom Of o
chronic ailment which must be
cured.
In outlining my thoughts on
this matter. I have no intention Of
entering the foreign policy field or
even urging q particular policy In
the conduct Of foreign affairs.
Conduct Of foreign affairs is q
civilian responsibility. But a
soldier can often see strategic
perils that the layman might over
look. It Is fundamental that our
foreign policy must be based upon
our military capabilities to back
it up.
We cannot take the chance of
trying TO anticipate immediate
Communist intentions. We can
only determine their capabilities,
and prepare to meet them. Other
wise we would be In a guessing
game without o referee. We would
be playing Russian roulette with
. gun ut our heads.
Prepared to Meet Drive.
Fundamentally we Americans
are apt to become impatient with
. situation that has no foresee-
able conclusion. We all would
like TO know when the war In
Korea will be over.
I wish that ! might tell you:
My job would be less dificult II I
knew. -...,
II We examine the Communist
capabilities in Korea, We find in
dications that the Chinese Com.
munists are building up for an
other drive. We must prepare to
meet it. There is no assurance
that even when this attack is dis
PEELED that the war will be over.
In the case Of Korea, those who
despair OF an early solution are
apt to become frustrated and dis
couraged. There. have been re-
curing and louder whispers In
favor OF forcing q showdown and
delivering an ultimatum to those
who encourage such local wars
and who continue to obstruet sim
cere efforts for peaceful negotia.
ton.
Any such direct, unilateral solu-
ton to the problem would be
militarily infeasible.
! wonder II these responsible
citizens have pondered the condi.
tons OF such an act. Any ulti-
fnatum must state clearly the ir-
reducible minimum OF what we
would regard as satisfactory and
II ordinarily. If not always, inn
plies . threat to use force ii the
demands are not met. These dis.
SATISFIED and impatient stratesists
and they are not representing
the views Of responsible Air Force
omcials-sussest the threat OF
commandment rs part Of the ulti-
matum.
Best Chance for Survival
Our policy is to avoid war and
70 promote peace. Our best
chance for the survival Of our wav
of life and our freedom, is n
continue cooperation in mutraI
security efforts and to continue
negotiation in this world wi6e
conflict as long As possible. An
uItimatum would either commit
us to q so-called preventive war.
or gain for us only q temporary
respite from war. until the eneny
feels that conditions for his vic.
tory were more favorable.
Enlarging the battle to 4 full
scale war is never an economical
or morally acceptable solution tn
o limited conflict. If at all Dos
sible. Korea should be settled on
the present Battle-Ground.
The confinement or extension
OF the area Of combat is in the
realm Of diplomacy and interna.
tional politics. However, the milf
tary consideration is an intrinsic
part OF this problem. Our armed
forces will continue to carry out
the tasks assigned to them unti]
conditions permit q political de.
|cision to be reached.
I have mentioned the complex
ity Of the United Nations prob
lens only TO encourage us in q
steadfast course of patience and
preparedness.
u. s. Armed Forces Praised.
The United Nations forces In
Korea have done q magnificent
job and have exhibited q coop
erative spirit that IL more effec-
tive than any one could have
previously imagined.
The Air Force and the Navy