Evening star., 1951-06-12
'Wedemeyer Urges
Korea Evacuation

that the truce providing for a
cease fire at the 38th Parallel
would be a defeat for us.
Gen. Wedemeyer. 1 think II
would be tantamount to defeat
sir, psychologically. I will tell you
why. Do you want me to develop
that? >.
Senator Fulbright. -. I under
stood that is what you said. My
question is: What would you con-
slider the minimum that would not
be considered a defeat? -.
Gen. Wedemeyer-Well, Sena-
tor Fulbright, as I understand our
purpose in going in there, sir. It
was to establish conditions
throughout Korea to permit the
people to determine how and by
whom they would be governed
without intimidation, a unified
Korea, a democratic Korea.
If we end our military opera
tions on the 38th Parallel we are
right back where we started, sir.
Now, say it is tantamount to a
psychological defeat because the
third team of the Soviet has with
stood the first team Of the Allies.
the best we have got, right over
there fighting.
Both Sides Have Suffered.
They have suffered tremendous
losses in manpower; we have suf-
fered heavily, too; in numbers not
so many, but in quality of our
manpower, I think we have lost
very heavily. We have lost SO
many fine young men, our young
officers who have been trained at
great effort and expense to us.
Senator Fulbright-Gen.
Could you be more specific as to
what you would consider the least
we should accept?
AS interpret your answer 1t
would mean control Of all of Ko-
rea, and the exclusion Of all Com
munists from all Korea.
Gen. Wedemeyer-.. Well. that
conclusion, Senator Fulbright. was
based on the premise that we
really wanted to remove all Reds
from Korea and give the Koreans
the opportunity, as I indicated
earlier. the opportunity to estab-
lish a government Of free democ-
racy.
Senator Fulbright-Do you think
the Koreans are prepared for a
democratic system?
Gen. Wedemeyer-No, sir; no
more than the Chinese-probably
even less, Senator Fulbright. .
Senator Fulbright-. We do
not want to 60 on fighting in
definitely, I take it, so what should
be our goal, our minimum goal,
that we ought to set that we won't
take less than that in the pursuit
Of this war in Korea? just want
ed your own view.
Should Get Out of Korea.
Gen. Wedemeyer We'll, sir,
what an Army officer needs is
direction as to what you civilians
want to accomplish, sir. II you
tell me what you want to accom-
plish. could help you determine
what the military action should
be. and I would be happy to do it.
Now. I am going to step out of
the realm of an Army officer and
tell you this, sir. that in my
judgement we ought to get out Of
Korea. and I would do it because
I just don't think that we are
going to get anywhere.
We are losing our finest man
hood there. and they can continue
to pour people into the cauldron;
we can. and they can, but we have
a stalemate that worries me no
end. and what are we accomplish
ing there.
Senator Fulbright-What would
you propose? I mean. what steps
would you propose?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Well, it would
be. If necessary-I would fight
out; we can do just as we did
|at Hungnam, we evacuated that
way.
If we had to do it under duress,
I would be able to do it under a
temporary truce or something like
that.
But, Senator Fulbright, the
thing that concerns me is that
we might involve our boys in these
various places around the peri
phery, and we are letting this en-
emy, this Soviet enemy, more or
less determine our action.
I want to take the strategic
initiative away from that enemy.
and I want the Americans and
their Allies to take actions in the
political, the economic, in the
psychosocial and in the military
fields at times and places Of our
choosing, and the kind of actions
that we take will be co-ordinated
to accomplish our national aims.
Would Break Relations.
Senator Fulbright- =. Well,
general, If the truce provided for
restoration of the 38th Parallel to
them, as the dividing line. and
assuming that Korea would have