Evening star., 1951-05-11
Text of Marshall Testimony

served himself. that apparently
there were two points of view
within the State Department al
that, tiYne-one group believing
that this country should do every
thing it could to strengthen the
hands of the Generalissimo and
his Nationalist forces, and the
other group being of the opinion
that any support, further support
of the Generalissimo would be
support of a hopeless cause, ano
that therefore steps ought to be
taken by your Government to CO.
operate with the Communists ir
China.
My question Is this--Is it true
in accordance with your own
knowledge. that from AS to jan
uary, AT. when you were on the
China mission, you encountered
any such division of point OF view
within the official staff of the
0CdC6 OepdItIIlcI1t!
Secretary Marshall-No. sir, ]
did not. The views I generally
encountered were that there was
SO much dissatisfaction with the
operations of the then government
of the whole of China, the Kuo-
mintang Party. that they would
be unable to make their case,
and that they would lose by rea-
son of the lack of solid public
following; while on the Commu-
mist side, which was highly organ
lied, heavily indoctrinated and
under strong discipline, very seri-
GUS attack, political as well as
military, could be made against
the existing Kuomintang govern
ment.
Senator Morse-Gen. Marshall,
when you were the head of the
China Mission from 1945 to 1947
and subsequently when you were
Secretary of State, did you at
any time find within the State
Department any officials who were
pro-Communist and who wanted
the policy of this Government to
be one of supporting the Chinese
Communists?
Gen. Marshall--No, sir, I did
not; I am speaking in regard to
those people with whom I came
in contact.
Senator Hickenlooper-
Gen. Marshall, in your testimony
on yesterday, with respect to the
North Atlantic pact, and the mill
tary assistance to European coun-
tries under that pact. I believe
you said. in effect. that we had
no choice there: that is. our best
interests dictated that we had no
choice other than to participate
in the North Atlantic pact, and
it's implementation by arms and
troops.
Am I correct in that assump-
ton?
Gen. Marshall-You are cor
rect, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper-
Do you state. in your opinion. that
we had no choice in connection
with sending troops to Korea-by
the same yardstick?
Gen. Marshall-I was not in
that decision, but it would seem
SO.
Marshall Explains Risks.
Senator Hickenlooper-...Wh Why
did we accept most serious risks
in Europe, both in the question of
the Berlin Airlift and in the mat
ter of arming under the North
Atlantic Pact-why did we accept
those risks in Europe in the in
terests of either resisting or push
ing back Communism and refuse
to accept the risks which many
will admit exist, refuse to accept
the risks in this Korean war of
bombing the sources of supply
along the line of known and ac-
cepted military principles?
Gen. Marshall Il Western
Europe, as I said the other day,
We literally had no choice. Be-
ginning with our European Re-
covery program and later taking
up the rearmament of Western
Europe, it was a proposition of
whether we simply let that be
overrun by the Communist con-
quest, either political or military.
to our calamitous disadvantage,
but we had no choice In that
means.
Now, in Korea I have stated
that our command, in the opinion
of my military advisers, and in
my own concurrence, has not suf-
fered to any material extent from
the lack of bombing that you have
specifically referred to. (About
SO words deleted by censor.J Tie
concensus of opinion is that to
do as you have indicated in your
question involves a risk so great,
involves risk so great, that it
is not in the interest of the
country and not in the interest
of that Army to take that risk.
That is a matter of opinion.
That is a matter of judgment.
But the unanimous judgment on
this side of the water in connec-
ton with it, of the constituted
authorities in connection with it,
is that the risk is too great.