Evening star., 1951-07-15
The Japanese Treaty

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tials that the qualified free nations have every
reason to accept our American invitation to join
in signing it at special conference in San
Francisco during the first week of September
The Philippines and few other countries have
indicated dissatisfaction with some of its terms
(for example, its soft attitude toward repara-
tions), but that ought not to keep the democratic
world as a whole from uniting solidly behind It,
AS has been explained by John Foster Dulles,
its chief architect, the treaty has been drawn up
on the initiative of the United States as the
power primarily responsible for the defeat OF
Japan and for the maintenance of the free
worlds future safety in the Western Pacific
Nevertheless, although Amercan-inspired, the
draft document-which has been sponsored
jointly by the British and ourselves-is made
up of terms representing composite of the
views of all the major victors with the excep-
tion of course. of the Soviet Union, whose posi-
ton up to now has been that of an obstruc-
ZIONIST.
One of the most important features of the
draft treaty Is that it emissions peace OF recon-
ciliation. In Mr. Dulles words, 1t "does not put
Japan under any permanent restrictions or dis
abilities" Instead, breaking away from the Gus
tomary treatment accorded by yictors to the
conquered-the practice of imposing "discrimi-
nations and humiliations" that breed wars of
revenge-it provides that the japanese are to be
fully as sovereign as any other free people. AS
such they are to be eligible for membership in
the United Nations and for participation in col
lective security arrangements like the one be-
ginning to take shape in the Pacific on the basis
of the new pact that has just been initiated by
representatives of our own country and Australia
and New Zealand.
Accordingly in the spirit Of true reconcilia-
tion the treaty provides not only for the restora-
ton of Japan's political equality among nations
but also for its economic well-being Thus, while
drastically reducing their prewar territory, it
rules out the idea of imposing punitive repara-
tions on the japanese, leaves them with their
industry intact and recognizes their right to
negotiate as a sovereign power in sucn fields
as trade agreements. Beyond that, in the mill
tary sphere it permits them to rearm for their
own defense and for the common defense of the
free Pacific area. Moreover. in addition to clear
ing the way for an Observation-Disclosures U. NJ
trusteeship of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, it
allows for the conclusion of special agreement
under which the United States will continue
after the occupation ends to station armed forces
in and around their country to prevent power
vacuum that would invite aggression of the type
that has ravaged Korea.
If the men of the Kremlin were interested
in promoting the pacihcation of the Far East
as whole, they would join in signing this treaty,
as they have been invited to do. But all they
have done thus far is to inveigh threatfully
against the project as illegal" and invalid"
The Chinese Communists have done the same
thing. In the circumstances incidentally, the
China muddle has necessitated the dubious ex-
pedient of leaving it up to japan itself to decide
whether to arrive at peace terms with the Red
regime at Peiping or the Nationalist government
on Formosa), the free nations ought to make
special point of going ahead with the settlement
without exception. Such united action would be
the best possible answer to Soviet obstructionism
In any event. the greater the number Of
signers at San Francisco, the more auspicious
will be the beginning of Japans return to SOW
ereignty Further, by joining together in sign
ing the treaty the free nations will then be in
a better position to build up-with a proper
measure of japanese participation-a collective
security system against aggression in the Pa
cif1c. No matter what happens in Korea there
can be no doubt that the vital interests of our
own and like-minded countries demand the
formation of such a system with the least
possible delay.