Evening star., 1951-11-25
CHAPTER 8.

fourth proposals to assist Europe
) (Shall We go to the European
countries defense if they are at
tackled by Russia or any one else?
And shall we commit American
troops in time of peace to an in
! ternational army to be stationed
in Europe0, however, we enter a
much more controversial field. be-
cause under both of these pro-
posals we frankly commit the
United States to war in case Rus
Sia attacks.
This we have not done any
where else in the world. except
as to the island nations of Japan,
the Philippine Republic. Australia
and New Zealand. The Atlantic
pact definitely commits us to go
to the defense of any one of the
II nations if Russia or any one
else attacks those nations.
There are various reasons why
this should be done. We became
involved in Europe by fighting
World War II, SO that we could
not remove ourselves from the
situation even if we wanted to.
We are one of the occupying pow
ers in Germany, and no one has
yet been able to devise a method
by which we can withdraw from
/ that obligation without prac-
tically inviting the communiza-
ton of Germany.
Must Limit Rearming.
We have an obligation to see
| that Germany itself does not re-
arm in such a manner as to be-
come again threat to the Secur-
Iity of Europe and of the world.
/ 1t seemed to me wise to notify
Russia definitely that if they un-
dertook war Gn Europe) they
would find themselves at war with
the United States. This feature
Iof the Atlantic pact was, in fact,
the extension of the Monroe Doc
trine to Europe. The Monroe
Doctrine brought peace to the
American continent for a hundred
years. A notification of this kind
to Russia seems to me a very
clear deterrent to its beginning a
war, because it must necessarily
fear the bombing by the United
States which would result if they
began aggression against mem
berS of the pact.
l do not like the obligation
written into the pact which binds
us for 20 years to come to the
defense of any country, no mat
ter by whom it is attacked and
even though the aggressor may
be another member of the pact;
and l do not like the obligation
OF the pact which requires us to
go to the assistance of a nation
attacked. without any consulta-
ton with other persons, without
a decision by majority of those
involved and without any exam.
inatlon Of the reasons for the ag-
gression which may have oc-
|curred. Nevertheless. I think the
advantage of the notice given to
Russia outWeighs. at least for the
present. these excessive obliga-
tlonS of the pact into which we
have entered.
Might Incite Russia.
In spite of the fact that I ap-
proved the warning given to Rus
Sia by the ratification of the At
lantic pact, I voted against it,
because 1 felt it was contrary to-
the whole theory of the United
Nations Charter, which had not
then been shown to be ineffective,
because I felt that it might de-
velop aggressive features more
likely to incite Russia to war than
to deter it from war, and because
l thought that. at least by impli-
cation, it committed the United
States to the policy of land war
IN Europe, when we might find
that third world war could bet
ter be fought by other means.
l wish to make it clear that
once the United States has en-
tered into an obligation I am inI
favor of meeting every such OBJ
legation.
While this is not an offensive
alliance, the line between defenseI
and offense today is indeed al
ShadoWy one. The Maginot Line
was the essense of pure defense.
Today it is the target of ridicule
Every good defense includes ele-
ments of offense. We cannot
have an adequate armament forI
defense which cannot be convertedI
overnight into a weapon of Of
fense. at least for limited objec-I
tlves. We talked of defense for
some years before entering World
War II, while our preparation was
also for offenSe.
Seen as Armament Race.
The result is that, no matter
how defensive an alliance may be.
If it carries the obligation to arm
ut means the building up of COM
.petitiVe offensive armament. This
treaty, therefore, means inevitably
an armament race, and armament
races in the past have led to war.
Nevertheless, after the Korean
and Chinese episodes we have to
Il give up the idea of the enforce
ment of peace by the United Ma
tlonS, and I see no choice now ex-
cept to rely on our armed forces
land alliances with those nations
willing to fight the advance of
communism. But don't let's fool
ourselves into regarding a mill
tary alliance as a world state
based on the ideals of collective
security.
have no means of guessing
whether the Russians intend to
start third world war or not,
but if they do intend to do SO I
believe they will begin that war,
regardless of anything we do,
when they feel that the time is
most propitious from their own
standpoint.
If they do not have the inten-