Evening star., 1951-05-15

Following is a condensed, cen
sored transcript OF Gen. Brad
ley's testimony today before
combined Senate Foreign Reid
tions and Armed Serpices Com
nrittees inquiring into the dis
ntisSal OF Gen. Macarthur:
Chairman Russell-Gentlemen,
we are glad to welcome here to-
day General of the Army Omar N
Bradley, who is the third of Amer
ica's greatest military leaders to
appear before this committee. i.
Gen. Bradley-Mr. Chairman
and members Of the committees
(from prepared statemenD
At the very outset, I want to
make it clear that I would not
say anything to discredit the long
land illustrious career of Gen
Douglas Macarthur. We may have
different views on certain aspects
of our Governments military pol
icy, but that Is not unusual.
Certainly there have been nc
personal considerations in our diff
IferenceS of opinion. In matters
Iof such great scope and of such
Importance many people have diff
ferent ideas and might con-
Isequently recommend different
courses of action.
AS chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Iof Staff. am one of the military
advisers to the President, the Sec
|retary of Defense, and the Ma
tional Security Council. I pass
on to them the collective advice
and recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs. When the Joint Chiefs
of Staff express their opinion on a
subject, it is from the military
point of view, and is given with a
full realization THAT conSidera-
tions other than military may be
overriding in making the final
decision. The relative Importance
Iof the military aspect varies. In
some cases it is greatly over
|shadowed by other considerations.
In other cases, the military as
poets may be the decisive ones.
When all Of these aspects are
considered the Governments pol
icy is determined. AS military
men we then abide by the deci-
sion.
Great Issue at Stake.
Before your interrogation on the
details of our Governments poll
cies in Korea and the Far East, I
would like tolask myself this ques-
ton: What is the great issue at
stake in this hearing?
Principally ! would say that
you are trying to determine the
course we should follow as the
best road to peace. There are
military factors which must be
Ievaluated before sound decision
can be made. At present the
issue is obscured in the public
mind by many details which do
mot relate to the task of keep
ing the peace and making Amer
Iica secure.
The fundamental military issue
that has arisen is whether to in
crease the risk of a global war by
taking additional measures that
are open to the United States and
its Allies. We now have a localized
conflict in Korea. Some of the
military measures under discus
sion might well place the United
States in the position of RESPONSE
bility for broadening the war and
at the same time losing most if
not all of our allies.
Gen. Macarthur has stated that
there are certain additional meas
ures which can and should be
taken. and that by SO doing no
Unacceptable increased risk of
war will result.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff be-
Ilieve that these same measures do
increase the risk of global war and
that such a risk should not be
taken unnecessarily. At the same
time, we recognize the military
advantages that might accrue to
the United Nations position in
Korea and to the United States
position in the Far East by these
measures. While a field COM
mander very properly estimates
his needs from the viewpoint OF
operations in his own theater or
sphere of action. those responsible
for higher direction must neces-
sarily base their actions on broader
aspects. and on the needs, actual
or prospective, of several theaters
Gl0bal Responsibilities.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view
OF their global responsibilities and
their perspective with respect to
the worldwide strategic situation
are in better position than is any
single theater commander to
assess the risk of general war
Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of staff
ARE best able to Judge our own
military resources with which to
meet that risk. B..
In order that all may under
stand the strategy which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff believe the United
States must pursue, would like
to discuss in broad terms this per-
spective in which we view our
security problems.
AS a background to our con-
slderation of global strategy. we
must realize that human beings
have invented a great variety of
techniqueS designed to influence
other nations. Right now, nations
are being subjected to persuasion
by propaganda, and coercion by
force OF arms. 1t is my conviction
that broad and comprehensive
knowledge of the strength, aims
and the policies of nations is basic
10 understanding the problem OF
security in a world of tension.
We must underStand-as wa