Evening star., 1951-05-07
Continued From First Page,

to speak fully and freely and II
rely upon the methods that W,
haFe devised for the protection O
this record to delete from thu
transcript any information tina
might aid our enemies. can as.
sure you that no other statement
that you make will be taken from
this transcript.
The evidence which you arr
about to present to this committee
upon the matters now under in.
quify shall be the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth
80 help you God.
Gen. Marshall-I do.
Chairman-General, do you
have prepared statement?
Marshall's Statement.
Secretary Marshall-I have a
brief statement to make, but first
would like to observe that it is
a very distressing necessity, a
very distressing occasion, that
compelS me to appear here this
morning and in effect in almost
direct opposition to great many
of the views and actions of Gen
Macarthur. 4" :
He is a brother Army officer. q
man for whom I have tremendous
respect as to his military capabili-
ties and military performances
and from all I can learn, as to
his administration of Japan.
l am here primarily to answer
whatever questions you and the
members of the committees may
care to ask me.
However. I think it may be
helpful if. at the outset, I make
a brief preliminary statement
which I think will clarity some of
the issues raised in the course OF
your hearings last week.
From the very beginning of the
Korean conflict, down to the pres
ent moment. there has been no
disagreement between the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
am aware Of.
There have been, however, and
continue to be basic differences OF
judgment between Gen. Mac
Arthur, on the. one hand, and
the President, the Secretary OF
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs OF
Staff, on the other hand.
In his testinoy last week, Gen
Macarthur indicated that, in his
understanding, there had been al
least two instances in which the
joint Chiefs of Staff had beer
overruled by the Secretary Of De.
fense or by higher authority.
Cites One Instance.
One of these instances related
to the views expressed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with respect Il
the disposition of Formosa and tht
seating of the Communist Chinese
government in the United Nations
In his testimony Of May 4. Gen
Macarthur suggested that I, al
Secretary of Defense. had over
ruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff il
their opposition to turning For
mosa over to Communist Chins
and to seating Communist China
in the United Nations.
AT the time I became Secretar,
Of Defense last September, thu
established policy of the United
States was to deny Formosa t.
Communist China and to oppost
the seating of the Communis
Chinese in the United Nations.
There has been no deviation
from that policy whatsoever. A
no time have I entertained tn
opinion that there should be an,
deviation. These two issues wer
to be excluded from any armistic
terms.
When the time comes for tn
negotiation of a settlement of tn
conflict in Korea, the questions o
Formosa and the seating of tn
Chinese Communists in the Unit
ed Nations will undoubtedly b
raised by other parties to the dis
cuSSion.
The position which the Unite
States has taken in the Unite
Nations in connection with sue
negotiations is that this Govern
ment will not oppose discussion {
these questions. In such discus
sionS, however, I am confider
that the United States will cor
tinue to adhere to its present pc
sition, namely, that it will oppos
any settlement of the Korean con
flict which would reward the ag
gresSor in any manner whateve
and it will oppose the attempt {
any nation or regime to shoot il
way into the United Nations.
Cites Second Instance.
The second instance referred
by Gen. Macarthur. of a suppose
overruling or veto of the views {
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relate
to the courses of action propose
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
memorandum addressed by thel
to the Secretary of Defense undo
date of January IL, 1851. Of
courses of action enumerated
the memorandum, the followir
four we're quoted by Gen. MAJ
Arthur in his testimony of May 3
Continue and intensity now a
economic blockade trade wit
China.
Prepare now to impose nav
blockade of China and place
into effect as soon as our positic
in Korea is stabilized. or when v
have evacuated Korea, and d.
pending upon circumstances the
obtaining.
Remove now restrictions on a
reconnaissance of China coast
areas and of Manchuria.
Remove now the restriction
on operations of the Chinese NJ
tionalist forces and give such i
CYSTIC support to those forces