Evening star., 1951-01-14


other wartime decision-to create
the United Nations organization
while the war was still in progress
had a happier outcome. How
and why that decision was reached
I shall also attempt to relate.
In Moscow in December, 1941,
British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden was met with an insistent
demand that Great Britain with
out further ado formally commit
herself to the recognition OF
Russia's 1941 frontiers as they had
been established by Stains deal
with Hitler in 1889. Stain also
proposed the restoration Of Austria
as an independent state, the de-
tachment of the Rhineland from
Prussia as an independent state
or protectorate, and possibly the
constitution of an independent
state of Bavaria. Other suggested
territorial changes included the
transfer of East Prussia to Poland
and of Sudetenland to Czecho-
slovakia.
Felt Need to Comply.
MIR. Eden limited himself to the
promise that the Russian claims
would at some future time be con-
sidered by the British Common
u,eoltb as well as by the United
states. But from Mr.. Eden's mes
sages it appeared that he felt the
need to comply unless the English
speaking powers were willing to
run the risk of an early break
with their Soviet ally and OF a
separate peace treaty between the
Soviet Union and Germany.
Even at the climax Of the furl-
ous German assault upon the
Soviet armies, Stain wished to be
sure that he would retain the
fruits of his earlier collusion with
Hitler.
Such an agreement was un-
thinkable. Our acquiescence IN
It would have been interpreted IN
every quarter of the globe as
meaning that the Atlantic Char-
ter in which the British and
American governments had SOL
emnly announced their intention
of securing future peace whicn
would assure "the right OF all
peoples to choose the form OF
government under which they VIII
live" was, in fact, no more than
a collection of high-soundlng
phrases.
We found that Mr.. Churchill
stood four-square with us.
For the time being, the Soviet
government acquiesced.
BY the spring of 1912 we had
already commenced within the
State Department our intensive
study of the kind of world Or
ganization and of the kind OF
political and territorial settle
ments that we wanted to see
made. The work was under my
Craftsmanship on the authority OF
President Roosevelt.
No Assurance on Results.
But in the light of our expe-
rience with the Soviet Union.
what possible assurance could we
have that when the peace con-
ference arrived, Moscow would be
willing to accept even a small
percentage of our recommended
tions?
Was it not the part of wisdom.
as soon as our own views had
been formulated. to try to set up
officially an international group
continuously to plan for future
peace?
I discussed, this with the ad-
visory committee. The sugges-
ton met with general approval.
Winning the war was and had
to remain the foremost objective
AS the months passed, 1t was
becoming more and more ap-
parent that the appetite of a vic
torious Soviet Union might we'll
become inordinate If no effort was
made to check it before the end
of the war. Recognition of this
resulted in several purely political
actions. Declarations covering the
restoration of Austrian independ-
ence and the future status of Italy
were issued when the foreign min
listers of the four major allies met
in Moscow in october 1913; and
a declaration covering Korean in
dependence and the restoration
to China of Manchuria, Formosa
and the Pescadores was made
when the President met with Chi
ang Kai-shek aud Churchill at
Cairo in December Of the same
year.
Stain Reverses Position.
At Teheran and at Yalta, new
and significant political agree
ments were reached. 1t was at
Teheran that the President first
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