Evening star., 1951-03-14
General Ridqwoy's Optimism


ground forces in Korea, General Ridgway has
Just had some interesting and pertinent things
to say about the purely hypothetical question"
of how he would evaluate the situation if the
war came to an end at the 38th Parallel His
comment adds up to rather optimistic inter-
probation of General MacArthurs recent state
ment on the possibility of theoretical military
Stalemate."
That possibility, according to General Mac
Arthur. will become more than a probability II
the following three factors continue to affect the
situation: Cd If Red China keeps on pouring
troops and supplies into Korea (2) if there are
no major additions to the fighting strength of
the United Nations, and CD if there is no lifting
of the ban that restraints the U. N from attack
ing the enemy in Manchuria.
In making this statement, General Mac
Arthur spoke soberly but by no means gloomiy.
Nor did he offer any specific recommendations
of his own Instead, by implication he simply
suggested that the United Nations, since it faces
the possibility of a stalemate, must take vital
decisions to clear up the "obscuritieS" of the
situation-decisions that might involve either
sterner armed action or plans for diplomatic
negotiation in case military events reach point
where it would be plainly futile and Improbable
for the opposing sides to continue shooting at
each other.
Communists and their Moscow mentors hardly
encourages the hope that an honorable diplo-
matte settlement could be negotiated more than
a few voices have been raised in favor OF the
idea of smashing at Red China itself According
to this view, unless such a course is followed,
there can never be any kind of Korean peace
making decision worthy of the name and the
entire u NJ effort will bog down in complete
futility. But General Ridgway, without specfl-
cally referring to it, has taken a considerably
brighter view of General MacArthur's assessment
of the situation
Thus, in General Rdgways opinion, if the
hypothetical became the real, if the war ended
at the 38th Parallel with our allied forces in full
control up to that line, the politico-military
results would amount to nothing less than "a
tremendous victory" for the United Nations
Observing that such situation might be called
a draw because of failure to defeat the mass of
Chinese, he has reminded everybody that the
u N went into Korea not to conquer China but
to stop the Communist aggressorS and it has
not merely stopped them but hurled them back
with grevous losses-losses currently outnum
bering our own by more than so to /.
All this, in General Ridgway's words, has
demonstrated the superiority Of our men on the
battlefield" and the determination of free peo-
Piles to resist aggression and their ability to
Smash II. fuTtIleT, III I4dS IlOI IlcIeIy IOG
of air" out of the inflated balloon of Red Chinas
military prowess but has also made a mockery
of Peipngs once-loud boasts that its armies
would drive our American and allied forces into
the sea- The failure to make good on those
boasts is highly significant one, and it would
representa- the ended at the 38th Parallel
"a defeat of "ncalculabe proportions" in terms
of shattered Communist prestige throughout Asia
and the world.
Moreover, as General Ridgway has pointed
out, the U. MS military successes against the
Reds have greatly increased our allied bargain
ing power Presumably he has cited that fact to
suggest that the negotiation of good diplomatic
settlement-a settlement guaranteeing the exist
ence of a genuinely independent and unified
Korea-would be conceivable if a staemate were
really reached Perhaps he is bit too optimistic,
but his words deserve the careful attention Of
all who have taken a gloomy view of the Mac
Arthur statement.