Evening star., 1951-06-27
How MeoningfuI Is 1t?


indicated the Soviet proposal Korea still calls
for great deal of Qualification. It's true mean
ing Is not yet certain ITS sincerity remains open
to doubt The only thing we can be sure OF Is
that in advancing 1t through Jacob A. Malik, the
men of the Kremlin- describing 1t as "a hrst
step" toward peace settlement--have couched
1t in broad, non-specific language. They have
not been precise. They have avoided details
They have merely said that discussions should
be started between the belligerents for cease
fire and an armistice providing for the mutual
withdrawal Of forces from the S8th Parallel"
These words quite obviously leave lot Of
highly important questions unanswered. For
example, what does the Kremlin mean when 1t
says "bellgerents"? Does it mean only the North
Koreans on one side and the forces of the
United Nations on the other? The Russians
themselves although the instigators Of the ag
gression-have been elaborately pretending ever
since the start of the war that they have had
nothing whatever to do with 1t. Similarly the
Mao Tze-tung regime at Peiping has never adj
mitted that its armies are In the battle. Instead
those armies have been represented as being
made up of hundreds of thousands Of Chinese
volunteers" spontaneously inspired to take up
arms against the U. N. SO If cease-fre discus
sions are to be held will the negotiating "belliger-
ents" include, or exclude. Red China and the
Soviet Union?
Beyond that it is necessary to look twice at
the Kremlin's suggestion for "the mutual with
drawal of forces from the 38th Parallel" Right
now our American and allied U. N. troops are
20 or more miles north of that artificial dividing
line. How then can we withdraw southwark
from it without, in effect carrying out a retreat
that would greatly improve the enemy's geo.
graphical position? How can we do such thing
ri inc fIo xuox fho Communists
to move back into the so-called Iron Triangle"
the build-up area for their recent offensives?
Moreover assuming that agreement can be
reached on a demilitarized zone, what guaran-
tees can be established to insure that the Red
armies will not use the respite to prepare sur
reptitiously for a sudden new attack? will they
agree to strict aerial surveillance and other thor
ough checks designed to prevent any such vio-
lation of the armistice?
As for the political aspects of the situation,
Moscow and Peiping have in the past insisted
that peace negotiations must be conditioned on
steps to hand over Formosa to Red China and to
seat the Mao regime in the United Nations-steps
that would amount to offering rich reward to
the aggressor. Does the demand still stand? Or
has 1t been abandoned? And what about the
long-range future Of Korea? If and when
cease-fire and armistice are agreed upon, what
Chinese Communists cooperate with or obstruct
efforts to attain the U. Ms ultimate objective
Of ending Korea's partition holding free elec-
tions on countrywide scale. and establishing
united and genuinely independent nation ade-
quately safeguarded against the possibility Of
new acts of aggression?
Until we have clearer idea Of how these
and similar questions are likely to be answered,
the real significance of the Soviet proposal will
remain obscure. Optimism ought therefore to
be held in check at this stage. Certainly nothing
in the past record of the Communists justif1es
joyous, hat-waving attitude toward their offer.
Perhaps they sincerely want to end the Korean
war, but in sending up their dove of peace they
have also unleashed against US vicious new
propaganda barrage of hate-filled lies. That in
itself suggests that we had better be wary Of
their cease-ire bid until we have more evidence
Of the honesty Of their intentions.