Evening star., 1951-02-11

Franco government and to agree
to taking Spain in as partner in
the common defense of the West.
Britain is still adamant. That Is
to say. the British government is
definitely hostile to the Spanish
dictator.
Unlike Frances Premier Rene
Pleven, Prime Minister Attlee still
resents the defeat of the Spanish
Loyalists by the forces of the
present regime. Mr.. Attlee's hos
tility is more emotional than ra-
tional. In 1887, as member of
Parliament. he visited in BARGE
Iona the British volunteer bat
talon which was fighting on the
side of the Loyalists.
Mr.. Attlee got rousing re-
ception from those supporters of
the Red regime and was moved by
their bravery to the point of giving
the Communist clenched fist salute
to the members of that unit. He
also wrote them a letter of con-
graduation, ending with the old
Marxist slogan: Workers Of the
world, unite"
Fourteen years ago he did not
expect to become Prime Minister.
He was also much younger and
consequently more enthusiastic.
Things have changed radically
since that spring in 1887. But Mr..
Attlee, as well as many members
of his cabinet and the party
which keeps him in power, find it
difficult to change their views. To
them inclusion of Spain in the
Western coalition seems the be-
trayal of an ideal.
Gen. Eisenhower is an idealist,
too. But he is also a soldier and
as such is compelled to lean to-
ward the hard facts of life rather
than theology. The hard fact Is
that Spain has an army in being
which amounts to nearly 100000
men and twice as many trained
reserves, ready to answer a call to
duty If they can be provided with
the means to fight.
1t has been said repeatedly in
Spain and in Europe that even If
Gen. Francois soldiers were given
all they need. the generalissimo
would not permit them to cross
the Pyrenees and fight on foreign
soil. Under these circumstances,
it is said, we would be denying
arms to the armies which are
under Soviet guns in order to
provide Spaniards with the means
to defend themselves.
Stand on Germany
This belief, based on some off,
cial assertions, is discounted by
Gen. Eisenhower and his two prin-
cipal field commanders, Field
Marshal Viscount Montgomery
and Gen. Alphonse JUN. They
both say Gen. Franco is an able
soldier and knows that defense
alone cannot save his country. If
circumstances warrant. the inter-
vention of Spanish armies in the
European theater of operations.
there is no doubt in the mind of
the supreme commander that Gen.
Franco would not hesitate to do
what is best from the overall
strategic and tactical point of
view.
Gen. Eisenhower believes that
his realistic approach to this vital
ly important question In the end
will persuade emotional civilians
to see his point. The Prime Min
listers of France and Britain could
be reminded, just as Mr.. Churchill
was during the last war, that mil
itary responsibilities must take
precedence over political consid-
erations. II the politicians show
themselves too unyielding before
the shooting starts in Europe,
Gen. Eisenhower feels that he
can always bow himself out of the
picture.
The supreme commanders posi-
ton with the peoples of Europe
was strengthened considerably
when he refused to be rushed into
accepting Germany as a full
f1edged military partner in the
present coalition. In this Gen.
Eisenhower was not prompted by
political considerations.
During the short time he spent
in Frankfurt, Gen. Eisenhower
(see SOLID FRONT, Page c-2o