Evening star., 1951-06-24
Yeor,s End in Korea

little more clearly and in better perspective,
the conseouences-good and bad-of the decision
to meet with armed force the challenge OF
aggression on that faraway peninsula.
Leading all else on the debit side, of course.
are the casualty figures. On June 20 the Penta-
gon announced that 10,833 Americans had been
killed In action, that 50,690 had beens wounded
and that 12,08l were missing. For these young
Americans and their families, the "police action"
has been very costly business-far more costly.
no doubt, than the President and his advisers
realized when they made the momentous deci-
sion The Pentagons figures take no account
of the losses Of our Allies, nor OF the slaughter
of the South Koreans and the frightful devasta-
tion Of their homeland. Yet these things must
be considered too and when the total is struck
there can be no denying that terrible price
has been paid for military stalemate
Another item on the debit side is the dissen-
sion which has grown up in this country as
byproduct of the war. When Mr.. Truman an
nounced the decision to go to the aid of the
South Koreans, the immediate response was one
of almost unanimous Endorsement The word
from the White House came like refreshing
breeze on sultry afternoon. In Congress and
throughout the country, the decision to stand
up and fight the Red aggressors was applauded
and approved But this mood was not to endure
Il.
the cruel disappointment when the Chinese
Communists entered the war after the triumph
at Inchon, the growing realization that we'could
not hope for a clear-cut military victory, the
firing of General MacArthur-all Of these things
combined to wipe out the first blush Of enthusi-
asm and to produce in this country deep and
ominous cleavage.
The economic cost is another debit factor
Taxes are being pushed up to the breaking point
An unwillingness at the outset to adopt necessary
control measures has contributed to mounting
and menacing imitation. Before we are through
with this venture we may find that our economy
has been irreparably damaged by. y.runaway prices
There is much to be said however, on the
other side of this argument. While the bad
consequences of our venture into Korea should
not be underestimated, neither is there any
reason to exaggerate them. For the time may
come when the verdict of history will be that
the price which has been paid, heavy though
it is was not excessive when measured against
what has been gained
Some of these gains are tangible, others
are not.
1t is helpful, in considering the former to
turn back to the days Immediately preceding
the Red assault in Korea. The threat to our
security was just as great then as 1T Is now,
and perhaps greater What were we doing about
it? Our military budget had been cut back to
meager $l3 billion. It was said that we could
afford NO more. although in year 1t has been
increased fivefold. During the week prior to
Korea, Senate House conferees voted to authorize
70-group Air Force. But this appeared to be
only paper increase since the President, having
impounded year earlier s615 million voted for
a 58-group Air Force, saw fit to reiterate his
opposition to anv air strength greater than the
economy Of the Nation "could afford" Congress-
was fumbling with a draft bill, and the House
wanted to forbid any inductions unless and until
expressly authorized by the legislators. The peo-
Pile were unconcerned, and one headline noted
that Booming Business browns Out Cries OF
Imitation"
In truth, we were living in fools paradise.
We were full of plans and talk for keeping the
Russians in their place, but, as Korea was soon
to show we were pathetically weak in terms OF
available and usable military power. We had
the atom bomb and little else.
But all that has been changed Today we
are well embarked on tremendous rearmament
program. At cost of many billions OF dollars
which year ago we thought we could not afford,
our military deficiencies are being remedied.
Given another year or so, we can hope to be SO
strong that the threat Of third world war
will subside. Does any one believe this would
have been possible but for the bitter lessons
learned in Korea?
There is little mention of another tangible
gain The fighting IN Korea has been hard and
bitter But 1t has had its value as training
ground Our men in all branches Of the service
have had to learn or relearn the techniques OF
war in actual fighting and this experience will
be of great value in readying the new units that
are being raised for the test of possible combat
The training that men get In peacetime, even
at It's best Is far inferior to the training OF
actual warfare This was amply demonstrated
by our experiences in the early phases of the
Korean war, and it may well be a critical factor
If another and bigger war has to be fought.
The intangible gains are blend OF actuality
and speculation 1t is not easy, therefore, to set
them out in neat and orderly fashion But with
respect to one thing, there can be little room
for doubt
We are fighting in Korea as the result of
decision made nominally at least through an
international organization to resist aggression
with force We are not fighting in any hope
of selfish gain Our sole aim is to establish in
this world condition in which peaceful states
will be secure against attacks by lawless
neighbors.
That may be vain hope. Perhaps the
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