Evening star., 1951-05-10
The Heart of the Matter

General Marshall let several cats out of the
bag when he told Senator Russell's committee
that we would bomb Communist bases in Man
churia Immediately if there were no danger of
Soviet Intervention.
1t seems to The Star that this gets down to
the heart of the matter. 1t reveals that it is not
the fear of becoming involved in an endless war
with China that restraints us. 1t is not the risk
of driving the Chinese people into the arms of
their Communist masters. 1t is not the danger
of alternating Asiatic opinion. None of these
things, about which so much has been heard,
explains why we have permitted the Reds to
enjoy their "privileged sanctuary" in Manchuria,
according to General Marshall The real reason,
the controlling reason, is that an attack on those
bases might bring Russia openly into the war.
This is the real point of difference between
General Marshall and General Macarthur. The
latter doubts that an attack on Manchurian
baseS in itself, would bring Russia into the war.
If the Russians have not decided on war, he
told the committee, bombing of bases across the
Yalu probably would not bring them in. He con-
ceded, however, that II decision to fight has
been made by the SovietS, such an attack might
accelerate their timetable and bring them in
sooner But General Macarthur believes that
the prospective rewards in terms of winding up
the Korean war are sufficient to justify taking
the risk.
General Marshall dissents He doubts that
bombing of bases would have a decisive effect
on the fighting in Korea. He feels that the pro-
Spectve military advantages are not sufficient to
justify us in assuming the risk, and he regards
it as substantial risk that the Russians would
attack.
1t may be that censored testimony detailed
estimates as to Russian strength and dispositions
in the key areas-Would help determine which of
these views is the sounder. If this information
has been made available, the committee may be
able to form an intelligent judgment. But the
average citizen, on the basis of the testimony
which has been published, cannot do So He will
have to be governed by the weight of competent
testimony, and If the Joint Chiefs of Staff sup
port General Marshall, as evidently will be the
case the official view, and not the Macarthur
view, will prevail on this issue.
There is one thing, however which should be
kept in mind. Under the administrations policy,
we have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid
anything which might provoke Russian interven-
ton. The feeling is that in the military sense,
it is to our advantage to do this. We are willing
II necessary, to accept a Stalemate in Korea in
order to gain time for our rearmament program.
II this is sound, if in fact will be stronger, in
the relative sense, year or two years from now,
the policy makes sense. But this assumption may
not be valid one. At the moment there is every
reason to believe that our capacity to strike at
Russia is greater than the Russian capacity to
strike at u.s. We can hurt them more than they
can hurt us. But the Russians from all reports
are striving desperately to close this gap. They
are making great effort to perfect their radar
defenses, to strengthen their jet fighter force
and to develop guided missiles that could be used
against attacking bombers There is no assur-
ance that we will enjoy our present advantage
year or two from now Authorities as compe-
tent as DR.. Vannevar Bush have warned that the
Russians may be able to make bombing attacks
so costly that we will not be able to destroy
primary targets in the Soviet Union
Senator RusselPs committee should try to find
out how much substance there is to this For it
is at least possible that the time which we are
buying by pulling our punches in Korea is not
really working to our advantage.