Evening star., 1951-06-04
PartioI Text Of Secretary Acheson'.
Settlement on Poee A-5.

Statement on Poee A-3.
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policy that at the time of Yalta-
January, 1945-''we did not know
whether we had an atomic bomb
or not" and it was considered
urgent to get Russia into the war
against Japan.
1t was not proved until some
months after the Yalta confer
ence that American scientists had
succeeded in developing the atomic
bomb, Mr.. Acheson said.
He stressed military opinion at
jthe time that Russia's help was
needed in what was feared would
be "a very bloody and terrible
battle" in finally defeating the
Japanese.
Little Doubt of Soviet Action.
There was very little doubt that
the Russians would come into the
war, Mr.. Acheson added, but "the
grave danger was that they would
really wait until the war was over"
and then come in and do what
they wished"
Looking to the prospect of a
bloody fight in the Japanese
home islands, he said it was Of
the utmost Importance" that
Russia be in a position to tie up
as many as possible of the TOO, 900
Japanese troops in Manchuria and
the 1926, 900 in China.
The price paid" for this, Mr..
Acheson said. was that Russia
should have the southern half of
Sakhalin, the Kuriles. that their
former rights in Port Arthur and
Dairen should be returned to them
and their former interest in the
two railways in Manchuria.
Chang Accepted Pact.
He stressed that the Russians
had it in their power" to take
by force what was conceded to
them at Yalta and much more
besides" The Yalta agreement,
he said, only gave them ''the basis
for a legal claim to something
considerably less than they might
have taken without a legal claim" +"
He added that the Chinese Ma
tionalist government at the time
regarded as very satisfactory
the August, 1945 treaty it made
with Russia on the basis of the
Yalta agreement.
Earlier. Mr.. Acheson said that
American aid cannot by itself in
sure the survival of a government
that this country is trying to help
against aggression.
What our aid must do and can
do is to supplement the efforts of
that recipient government and
that people itself. 1t cannot be a
substitute for those efforts"
Sketching the history of Amer
ican policy. Mr.. Acheson said the
main problem faced in China at
VI day in 1945 was in effect how
to create a nation"
He pointed out that for almost
an indefinite period in the past
there had not been any Chinese
nation 'in the sense Of a govern
ment in control throughout that
area"
Recalls Chang Weakness.
He recalled that the Chang
Kai-shek government was effec-
tive only in the extreme south
western part of China at the end
of the war. Manchuria was occu-
pied by Russian troops. The
north central and southeast parts
OF China were in control of the
Chinese Communists and the
Japanese, he recalled.
In addition. he said, the prob
lem was complicated by all of
China being in the grip of a
very profound social revolution. )"
He recalled that Gen. Macarthur
had told the committee earlier
about "the depth and strength of
this social revolution"
The 1945-46 period was the
first great moment of decision"
in this Governments China policy
Mr.. Acheson said. \
He traced the visits made to try
(See FOREIGN POLICY. A-4)