Evening star., 1951-09-24

|
With regard to the two-part
Kunming-New Delhi cable of June
%, it should be said that the mill
ltary recommendations contained
therein were the most important
contribution made while in China.
These recommendation were that
China be separated from the COM
mand of Gen. Stilwell, that Gen.
Wedemeyer should be considered
in the choice of a new military
commander in China, and that the
new commander should be given
the additional assignment of Per-
sonal representative" of the Presi-
dent at Chungking. The name and
record of Gen. Wedemeyer are
enough to indicate that the purport
of these recommendations was the
opposite of pro-Communist.
Some months later the change of
military command I proposed to the
President was carried out at the
most urgent plea of Chang Kai-
shek. History suggests that if my
Recommendations had been fol-
lowed when made, the generalisSi-
mo would have avoided the disasters
resulting from the Japanese offen-
sive in East China later that sum-
mer. And if ChiangS government
had thus been spared the terrible
enfeeblement resulting from these
disasters, the chances are good the
generaliSSimo would have been
ruling China today.
The political section of the Kun
ming-New Delhi cable of June %
should be read with the atmosphere
of that time in mind. Much en-
phasis had been placed from the
very beginning Of the war on the
primary Importance of beating the
Japs." and by the spring of 1914
even the most conservative Ameri-
can publications were urging that
the Chinese Communists could
contribute substantially to this end.
Roosevelt talked to me before
left, not about political coalition in
China, but about getting the two
groups together to fight the wal"
Chang Kai-Shek for internal polit-
Iical reasons had, on his own initia-
tive so I was informed, opened talks
between the Nationalists and the
Communists but, so he told me, with
no prospects for success. When I
cabled the President that "the at
Ititude of Chang Kai-shek towards
the problem is so imbued with
prejudice that I can see little pros
Ipect for satisfactory long term
settlement" I was referring not to
military problem" of getting the
two groups together to fight the
war" On the other hand, when
I said that the disintegration of the
Chungking regime will leave in
China political vacuum which will
be filled in ways which you will
understand" I was, of course,
warning against the possibility of a
Communist political triumph in
China.
Political Background.
The July 10 report does not rec
Iommend any political coalition be-
tween the government of Chang
Kai-shek and the Chinese Commu-
niSts. 1t was written, however,
against a Chinese political back
ground which is still quite unknown
to most Americans. In brief, one of
the worst of several ills from which
the Chungking government was suf-
fering at the time, was the absolute
control of all positions of political,
military and economic power by an
extreme pro-Asian, anti-American
group within the Kuomintang. This
was much emphasized by Ambassa-
dor Gauss who plainly stated that
this group in Chungking was doing
the Chinese Communists work for
them. The more Western minded,
more efficient and more pro-Ameri-
can Chinese'Nationalist leaders had
been so completely driven from pow
er that DR.. T. v. Soong's appear
ance as interpreter at my talks with
the generaliSsimo was authorita-
lively reported to be his first emer-
gence from a sort of informal house
arrest, while the most highly praised
Iof the Chinese generals, Gen.
Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in
Formosa, had been dismissed from
all command some months before.
These facts are hinted at in my
report to Roosevelt on July 10 in
which it is noted as Significant"
that 'T. v. Soong took no part in
the discussions with the generals
simo) except as interpreter" while
General Chen Cheng is mentioned
along with Gems. Chang Fa-kwei
and Psi Chung-hsi as the sort of
men who might rally the Chinese
armies to greater efforts.
In this concluding section of this
final report to President Roosevelt
on July 10, a coalition is in fact sug-
gested but not with the Communists.
Instead President Roosevelt is urged
to use American political influence
to support" the progressive bank
ing and commercial leaders," the
Large group of Western-trained
men," and the considerable groups
of generals and other officers who
are neither subservient to the land
lords nor afraid of the peasantry. -
In short I urged President Roose-
welt to help the generalissimo's gov
ernment to help itself, by bringing
back to power the better men in the
Chinese Nationalist ranks. These
better and more enlightened Ma
tionalists, being more able to stand
on their own feet, were somewhat
more independent of the generals
simo than the extereme pro-Asia
groups. Hence it was necessary to
point out to President Roosevelt
that if the desired changes were
made in the Chinese Nationalist
government, the generalissimo's flu
ture would depend on his political
Isensitivity," and his ability to make
himself the real ruler of the recons-
Itituted administration. Internal re-
form at Chungking was, in short,
my proposed means Of avoiding the
revolution" and insuring the ".evo-
luton that are referred to earlier
in this report of July 10. It is worth
noting that the generalissimo must
have been thinking along parallel
lines, since the extremists began to
llose their control and DIR. Soong and