Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-05-27


here say there may have been
something more than coincidence
between that and the transfer of
the Sd Army.
That army was reported to have
been made up of about 10000
men at the time of the transfer.
Its removal to the Korean front
undoubtedly left some big gaps in
Communist China's garrison
strength and offensive power in
Southern China.
Other field armies except the
4th. which was already committed
in Korea, were called on to fill
the gaps in Southern China. AS a
result. some experts here believe,
the Communist forces may have
little strength for waging offensive
and effective aggression against
the countries of Southern Asia,
as poorly prepared as these may be.
Five Chinese Armies
Communist China is known to
have five field armies. In addi-
ton to the 4th and Sd. now en-
gagged in Korea. they are:
lst-In Northwest China. It
was believed some time ago to
have had a strength Of 100000
men.
2d-In Southwest China, with
perhaps as many as 100000 men.
5th-In Central China, with
100000 to 100000 men.
The fourth. which was based
in Manchuria, has been reported
as having 100000 men.
When the big Communist Of
fensive started in Korea May Is.
Gen. Matthew B. RidgWay. the
United Nations commander. esti-
mated there were $4,000 Red
troops in Korea organized into 20
separate armies. Since that time
the Chinese Nationalist on For
mosa. from their intelligence re-
ports, said that two more Red
armies were being alerted to move
from East China into Korea.
The situation, as it seems from
a great distance. points up some
of the testimony given in the
Macarthur inouiry-and empha-
sizes the basis of the hope ex-
pressed by Gen. Bradley, chair
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that serious and mounting cas-
ualties inflicted on the Communist
forces may make them willing to
negotiate for a settlement in
Korea.
AS vast as China is, with it's
millions of population, there is a
limit. as Secretary Marshall
pointed out, to the forces it can
equip and maintain in the field.
1T is this trained fabric of the
enemy forces that Gen. Ridgway
is seeking to cripple. if not de-
stroy. as it is committed to the
hOIcdU 11gllLlIlS.
The hope of winning peace by
that means may be dispelled. 1t
may not bring to an end the
give-and-take sort of fighting
that has been going on in Korea.
The war there. as in Greece. may
just peter out and the Com
munistS may turn elsewhere. But
the fact seems to remain that their
resources for aggression south
ward have been crippled for the
time being, to a serious extent.
Troops Still in South
Despite the shift Of the Sd
Army, and possibly other forces,
to the Korean front. the COM
munists still have stable forces,
including some provincial troops,
in Southern China. That was
brought out during Gen. Bradley S
testimony last week in the MAJ
Arthur investigation.
Senator Mcmahon, Democrat,
Of Connecticut said he had been
Uniformed there were about l mil
lion Chinese on the coast opposite
Formosa. rs that approximately
correct?" he asked.
You mean soldiers?" Gen.
Bradley asked.
eyes. troops" the Senator re-
piled.
II don't think you will find
that many on the coast" the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs said.
I"You will find that many in South
China, probably, but not neces-
|sarily all along the coast"
If the Chinese Nationalist on
Formosa can be armed and trained
into an effective force, that would
provide an additional threat to
the Communists. They could be
used for attacks on the main
land by inf1ltration. if not by any
large-scale assault. And they
might form some rallying point
for the guerrillas in Southern
China.
The effectiveness of Chiang's
ability to organize the guerrillas
on the mainland, however, is
open to serious question. The
point was touched on by Senator
Mcmahon in his examination Of
Gen. Bradley.
General, he asked, "are the
guerrilla forces now operating in
South China in harmony and SYM
pathy with Chiang?"
Upset Timetable
We'll. as I understand it," Gen.
Bradley responded, some of them
possibly are, but very large part
OF them are not. They are just
guerrillas. They are ANTS and
anti Communist and anti most
anything that is in power"
The overriding question, Of
course, is what effect the Korean
war will have on Soviet Russia
and the Kremlin's plans for ag-
erosion.
During Gen, Bradley's testi.