Evening star., 1951-09-26
The Kuesonq Site

At the moment the effort to resume the
Korean truce talks is begged down in a morass
of argument and counter-argument over three
main issues. The first of these is the demand
by the Communists for a formal discussion OF
their mendacious charges that the forces OF the
United Nations are guilty of a series OF delib-
crate incidents" and "provocations" violating
the Kaesong neutral zone. The second is the
insistence of the U. N. command-which has
rejected this demand-that new conditions,
more conducive to progress toward an armistice,
should be arrived at prior to resumption OF
negotiations" And the third is General Ridg-
ways proposal that both sides, when and If
they agree to get together again, should meet
at another site, not at Kaesong.
The most important of these issues-the one
that can lead to a protracted stalemate over
resuming the talks-is the proposal for a new
site. The North Korean and the Chinese Reds
can be counted upon to oppose 1T with great
bitterness and tenacity. Kaesong is surrounded
by territory held by their forces. From the
propaganda standpoint and otherwise, they
derive a special advantage from that fact-an
advantage they capitalized on at the very start
of the negotiations in July, when they tried for
awhile until General Ridgway obliged them to
change their tactics, to make it appear that the
u NJ command was defeated and coming to
them abjectly with hat in hand, to sue for peace
In town they held.
It is clear now that the United Nations
which did so only because it wished to show its
readiness to negotiate promptly and In good
faith-ought never to have accepted Kaesong as
the site for the talks. Instead, it should have
insisted that the meeting place. as originally
proposed by General Ridgway, be at sea aboard
the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia, or in sur
roundings similarly removed from the battle
area Certainly, in the words of the U. N. COM
mand, experience has shown that the vast
majority of difficulties in connection with the
negotiations during the past summer would not,
in fact could not have occurred aboard the
Jutlandia" Hence, the present effort to per-
suade the Communists-who are not easily per-
suaded-to agree to the selection of a new
location.
Wholly apart from the propaganda angle,
this proposal as put forward by General Ridg-
way, is based on three important facts: ID
Irregular forces on both Sides partisans who
are responsible neither to the u N command
nor to the enemy command, are active in the
Kaesong area and might at any time start some
thing that would disrupt resumed negotiations;
(2) regular troopS-ourS and the enemy ys-are
constantly maneuvering in that region in way
that raises the daily possibility of an unintended
violation of the neutral zone; and 90 the site
is within only few minutes flying distance
from the main Communist supply line and is
therefore exposed to the danger of wholly acci-
dental attacks during our thousands Of legit-
innate aircraft sorties against that line.
These certainly are impressive arguments,
and although General Ridgway does not seem to
have presented them as an indispensable condi-
ton that must be accepted before negotiations
can be resumed, they ought to be driven home
to the enemy as emphatically as possible If
the Communists really want to work out cease
fire agreement and an armistice, they should be
willing to discuss the terms at place where
the atmosphere is better suited to such delicate
task than is the Iot-war atmosphere surrounding
Kaesong. At the very least. If they are adamant