davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1951-06-24

wears stars today as an aide to
Gen. Eisenhower.
BY July 20. the situation had
become so critical that Gen
Walker ordered his troops tc
stand or die" Some stood. some
died. But the relentless Red push
continued and the danger to Pusar
Increased daily.
Immediate hope for negotiated
peace faded on August /. when
IRussia's Jakob Malik took over the
presidency of the U. N. Security
Council. The Soviet's July boy
colt of the Council had made some
small progress possible up to thai
time. But when the boycott
ended, the progress stopped. 4
Irecord-sized American televisior
audience was treated to a spec.
ltacle Of the new Soviet man" Al
work in the field of diplomacy.
| AS August aged, the situation
worsened. The Naktong River
last major barrier before Pusan
was crossed in force. BY Angus
27. the U. N. defense effort wa
Evening star., 1951-06-24
By George Fielding Eliot

not likely to happen unless the
Chinese use their air power
against United Nations troops
and bases first. If they do not
do that the present tacit "air
truce" seems likely to continue,
If only for the reason that most
Of our friends in the u. N. will
not go along with any direct
air attack on Chinese territory
which might bright into opera
ton the mutual : assistance
clauses Of the Russo Chinese
treaty.
Another possibility is the tao
tical use Of atomic weapons to
wipe out even larger numbers
Of Chinese troops in Korea
than are already being killed by
pre-atomic methods. This
would be an extension in scope
of the Operation Killer" idea.
It has two disadvantages. It
would give the Russians a pre-
view Of the effects Of such weap-
ons. which might be Of great
advantage to them later on.
And 1t would further devastate
poor. battered Korea.
There is always, Of course.
chance of another amphibious
operation such as the landing
at Inchon. Such a move, at q
well-selected moment. might
Evening star., 1951-06-24
At the Time, Nobody Kicked

tributed to the coming on Of the
Korean war. Senator Wiley of
Wisconsin was one of these, and
he also was one Of the first to
ask: Where do we go from
here?" But even he voiced no
immediate objection to the
Presidents action. There
seems to be nothing other than
force which the Russians un-
derstand." he said.
The most famous critic Of
them all finally-Gen. MacAr-
thur himself-had something to
say on the subject In his mes
sage last August to the Veterans
Of Foreign Wars convention in
Chicago-the message which
marked the official opening Of
his feud with the administra-
ton, and which the President
ordered him to withdraw.
1.-THE decision Of President
Truman on June a." he wrote.
lighted q flame Of hope
throughout Asia that was burn
ing dirnly toward extinction. -
Evening star., 1951-06-24

The offensive was in the form Of
an arnphibious landing at Inchon,
the port for Seoul.
Within two weeks the tide of
battle had changed completely.
The Red forces. North and South,
were riven. Gen. Macarthur had
called for the Communists sur
render. and talk already had
started about who was to go into
North Korea and when.
Eyes on Indo China
There had been indications in
the preceding months that the
Red conspiracy might be ready to
launch a second minor-league wal
in Indo- China, where the Com
munist rebel Ho Chih Mimi had
been raiding the French frontier
This prospect was the object OF
considerable Western concern
But no one paid much attention
when, on October Q, the Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister
Chou En-lai. warned that China
would not stand by If North Korea
were invaded.
Washington stfninimized" the
threat Of China,s entry into the
Korean fighting. Secretary o1
State Acheson said he believed
China would send no troops into
Korea.
On October II. China issued the
same warning again. President
Truman called conference a
Wake Island with Gen. Mac.
Arthur, to discuss the future con,
duct of the war. The Far Eastern
commander seemed to share Mr
IAcheSon's view that Chinese wa
talk was mostly bluff.
/ The United Nations advanc
continued. in most sectors at
runaway pace. And while casualt
reports kept mounting. they wer
mot so touchy q matter in the day
Of triumph as they were In days o
defeat. At the end Of Septembe
! casualties were tabulated at 20,75
!. dead, wounded and missing. an,
1.-TWO weeks later they stood q
ll26, ,701.
4 But by then Americans were il
lthe Red capital Of Pyongyang, an,
South Koreans were only Is mile
from Manchuria. Gen. Macarthur
tsaid the end of the war was near
Il AS October closed there were re
Evening star., 1951-06-24
Where Do We Go From Here?

The question viii not down:
How do we win in Korea? The
enemy cannot drive us out.
That has been demonstrated.
But how do we win? How can
we bring the war to salts
factory end?
To suppose that there are no
plans with this end in mind is
to suppose that Secretary Of
Defense Marshall Con the record
the ablest master of strategy of
our timeS) and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff tall officers of the high
est professional ability are q
pack Of nitwits. No harm can
be done by discussing a few Of
the possibilities.
The requirement is to bring
such pressure to bear on the
Communist government Of China
as to compel that government
to stop fighting in Korea and
withdraw from the country.
The pressure will have to be
severe. Such q loss Of face as
giving up in Korea would entail,
will not be easily accepted by
any Chinese government.
There are several courses Of
action which might be useful.
The one most frequently mem
toned during the Macarthur
hearings was, Of course, extern
sion Of the air war into Chinese
territory.
This may be done. But 1t is
Evening star., 1951-06-24

military mission at Seoul indi-
Gated at first that the invasion
might be contained by the South
Koreans. 1t soon became evident
that this analysis was wrong. The
North Koreans were on the march
l-Russian-directed conquest of a
peaceful neighbor became real
threat, not only to South Korea.
but to the free world.
At the United Nations, the So
Wet Union piously denied having
a finger in the pie. The war, said
Moscow. had been started by an
invasion of North Korea from the
South. instead Of vice versa.
But there could be no ignoring
the reality of what was happen
ing. The United States was clear
ly in q position Of leadership in
the free world. America must
take the lead, and the attack in
Korea must be met. Along this
line. President Truman acted.
Three days after war began,
with U. N. sanction assured, the
United States announced 1t would
defend Korea, but not with ground
troops.
Three days after that, the first
small detachment of American
ground powers was airlifted into
Korea and raced to the front. only
Ito be engulfed by the advancing
IReds-two rifle companies. one
mortar platoon, and four 105 mil
Ilimeter guns.
It had not been an easy decision,
but 1t was q popular one. The
facts as to how 1t was made,
and how 1t was received, are fully
set forth Id other articles on this
page. It Is enough to say here
that. when the step was taken,
public opinion seemed to solidify
behind the President as it had
not since World War II.
The news, however, lost no time
! in putting a damper on the initial
enthusiasm. Reds move IS more
tanks into big push - Suwon
taken-Red vanguard so miles
south of Seoul-Reds win Chonan
i Americans retreat In disorder
United States battalion trapped
behind Red lines"
4 And the news took more per-
|; sonal tone as the front-line eye.
witness dispatches came in. Tom
!, Lambert of AP told Of the deatf
Evening star., 1951-06-24

There may be q number Of
Americans, this June. 1851. who
find themselves wondering
whether we ever should have
become involved in the Korean
war. In June. 1850. however.
there seemed to be practically
no such doubt on anybcdy's
part.
Congress. almost TO q man,
applauded the decision to resist
the attack on South Korea-and
the sending in Of American
troops.
It Is not easy. today. to think
back to the mood Of brave opti-
mism which prevailed when we
first picked up the Red gaunt-
let. But /. it may be healthy to
do so.
Senator Taft. 1t Is true. con-
tended that President Truman
had by-passed Congress. New
ertheless, the general prin-
eiple was right, and he would
have voted for 1t II the question
had been presented to the
Senate, he said.
Senator Smith, Republican,
of New Jersey thanked God
that the administration has
changed its policy and reached
an aggressive policy regarding
the Far East
Overwhelming Support
Senator Knowland, Republic
can, of California urged "over-
whelming support" for the
Presidents move.
Senator Bridges, Republican,
of New Hampshire called the
Korean decision a damned
good move"
Some of the recorded reac-
tions Of those days make
strange reading in the light Of
the current great debate over
Gen. MacArthur's proposal to
try to win In Korea by going
after the Chinese Communists
in their own territory.
Reporting sentiment Of a
z Senate Republican conference
last June rs, Senator Milliken
of Colorado noted that most
members believed the Korean
situation should not be used as
provocation of an about war.
He pleaded for "cool heads"
About the most critical Re-
publican in those days was
Senator KEN. It was he who
made the statement that the
President had apparently ar
rogated to himself the authority
for declaring war;" But he did
not. at the time. actually say
Evening star., 1951-06-24

trap and destroy a considerable
part of the Chinese forces in
Korea. Whether its effect would
be decisive in ending the war
can hardly be predicted. It is
probably within the means now
available to the Far Eastern
command. should the tactical
situation seem to justify the
risk.
Navy Fovors Blockade
Another operation. also with
in available means and involv-
ing. no effort which would seri-
ously detract from our essential
military aid to Europe. would
be a naval blockade Of the
Chinese coast. American naval
officers strongly. favor this idea
indeed the Chief Of Naval OPP
erations, Admiral Forrest p.
Sherman, advocated it openly
during his testimony before the
Russell committee. AS Admiral
Sherman pointed out at that
time, any effective blockade
would have to be a United Ma
tions blockade. It could hardly
be a unilateral act by the United
States without incurring risks at
least as great as those Of bomb
ing Chinese territory. But once
adopted as q sanction against
an aggressor by the United Ma
tions General Assembly, a naval
blockade could cause the Chi
nese Reds q vast amount of
trouble. It would cut of all
sources Of outside supply ex-
cept by overland routes from
the Soviet Union.
The capacity Of existing
Asiatic rail lines is utterly in
sufficient to supply q nation Of
over 400 million people with oil,
machinery, steel rails, electrical
equipment and all the other
things China must import, to
say nothing Of weapons and mu-
nitions for the Korean war. The
total pressure thus exerted on
the Red government at Peking
would be enormous and could
be decisive.
Assuming that the Kremlin
is not ready for war, Russian
leaders would have an easy out
on this one, while they might
find 1t difficult to avoid taking
more serious view of air at
tacks on Chinese cities without
losing face among all their
satellites. It is becoming more
and more clear to all concerned
that something effective and
definite has got to be done, that
the Korean war cannot be al.
lowed just to drag on and on.
Copyright, 1851, General Features
Corp.l
Evening star., 1951-06-24
By Robert K. Welsh

he thought the President had
been mistaken in his decision.
Secretary Of State Acheson. OF
course, came In for a great deal
Of criticism. The Korean de-
cision was q reversal Of Mr..
Acheson's policies, and Mr..
Acheson should resign. So said
Senator Taft. So also said
Senator Mccarthy and Senate
Minority Leader Wherry. The
latter called the new policy"
a complete Reputation Of the
State Department" These state
ments are interesting today. in
view Of the testimony Of De-
tense Secretary johnson - no
Acheson fan-that the Secre-
tary Of State was almost single
handedly responsible for the
decision to fight for Korea.
Most Republicans. Of course.
remained critical Of the ad-
ministration decisions and poll
cies which. they said, had con-
Evening star., 1951-06-24

of defeat followed another. Gen.
Walkers name was one among
many in the casualty reports that
topped $4,000 by the last week in
January. He died in jeep ac-
cident. -
Talk of Allied withdrawal from
Korea became commonplace-the
question was not so much whether
we should pull our forces out as
whether we could get them out. 1t
seemed only miracle could stop
the avalanche. But the miracle
did happen.
'Operotion Killer
1t. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
took over Gen. Walkers place.
Slowly, almost imperceptibly. the
U. N. war effort regained agrees
lsiveness. Gen. Ridgway strapped
two hand grenades to his chest,
took the field and told his troops
that to him, real estate was sec
ondary-the primary object was
to kill Chinese.
As Operation Killer" began to
pay of. early in March. the enemy
Withdrew to the 38th Parallel in
sudden, swift retreat.
BY April /. the first American
dead had been returned to their
native soil, and the war had set
tied down into the deadlock"
doldrums. Press and public be.
gan to eye a new and more per-
Isonal war that was brewing at
home.
+ On April 5, Representative Mar
tin of Massachusetts, made public
. ia letter written a fortnight earlier
sstby Gen. Macarthur. Its contents,
by now, need no elucidation. They
: were damned in many quarters,
including British ones, as war
!; ;;Italk," and the hard core of anti
. Macarthur feeling gained new
,, converts.
: What would happen to Gen.
Macarthur? That became the big
Question, but the possibility that
he would be fired was ruled out.
The informed observers learned
better at am, April IL. Mac
Arthur Fired" the headlines read.
and the war in Korea was prac-
!, tically forgotten for the moment.
Forgotten or not. the war con-
! {see KOREAN STORY, Pig. C-5.)
Evening star., 1951-06-24

lcompacted into an area hardly
larger than the State of Delaware.
At home, support of the police
effort became less universal.
There were those at home who
feared rout-the name "Dun-
Ikerque" began to be heard. not as
"a symbol of heroic withdrawal, but
meaning plain. ignominious defeat
BY September, the Korean
nights were beginning to give a
hint of the cold that later would
punish our troops numerically
but just as the fortunes of wal
seemed to reach their nadir. Gen
Walker predicted the most fan
ltastic thing of ala big U. N
push. The prophecy was made or
September Is, the day that Louis
johnson resigned" as Defense
Secretary and Congress svartec
working on a bill to enable Gen
George c. Marshall to succeed
him.
At dawn the next day, the bis
push took place-but not on the
narrowing front before Pusan
Evening star., 1951-06-24

of the first American infantry
man: "The blond young dough-
boy raised his head. The
bullets caught him as he looked.
He coughed, cried out once, then
died."
On July 8. Gen. Macarthur
announced that the situation was
mot serious" But by the 10th
the Reds were within 20 miles of
Taejon, and after a counterattack
the bodies of seven GIs were
found in a position destined to
become familiar; their hands tied
behind them, their faces obliter-
ated by bullets.
Exaggerated Reports
The Air Force was "operationar'
by then. On the 18th, so B-29s
hit a North Korean target and
wiped it out. Gen. Macarthur s
private war with the press began,
as he termed the news reports
of casualties exaggerated" AT
Lake Success So countries were
asked for troop aid. A few re-
sponded.
And the Reds kept swarming
closer to Taejon. 1t. Gen. Walton
H. Walker hoisted the blue and
white United Nations flag over
his field headquarters, as the wal
officially became a U. N. action
New names kept cropping ur
in the headlines - Yongdok =
lYongdong-Kwangju Each name
showed UP on the map q little
farther South than the last one
The enemy's aim was clear:
To drive the q. N. forces into the
sea--to take over the whole
peninsula as another Communist
colony.
The North Koreans turned the
corner" as July drew to q close
Wiping out resistance along the
western shore Of Korea, they
wheeled and started driving al
Pusan, the on1y major port left
to us.
A young lieutenant colonel o1
infantry started appearing in ths
dispatches-one day on the south.
ern front, the next day hundred
miles to the north. Mike Michaelis
IWolfhound regiment became
known as the fire brigade.
IAdmiring GIs said Of him. "HeT
either be q live general or a deac
colonel" Still alive, Michaeli'
Evening star., 1951-06-24

ports Of Chinese Communists in
the fight-but only as so-called
volunteers" meaning conscripts
serving in Korean units. Gen.
Macarthur fixed the strength of
the volunteers at $4,000 and locat-
ed them in the Northwest part Of
the peninsula.
November % was Thanksgiving,
IA fairly bright day for the u. N.
troops, to whom the war seemed
almost over. Gen. Macarthur was
reported % have expressed the
hope that front-line soldiers might
he home by Christmas. Trium-
iphant Americans perched on the
border of Manchuria, waiting for
the word to go home. They had
seen no Chinese in their race to
the frontier.
Then Red China struck. Two
hundred thousand Chinese
swarmed down on the Allies. Our
lines broke and fell back. Gen
Macarthur called it an entirely
new war. President Truman said
we would use the atom bomb II
necessary to assure victory.
Christmas at home and in Ko-
Irea was far from merry, and New
Years was time of anguish. II
was q new war all right-and the
Chinese were fighting it in a new
way.
| Veteran GIs, who thought they
had seen everything in Europe ane
the Pacific in World War II
Learned about something yet NOR,
lhorrible-the human wave" tao
Itics Of the Chinese.
Bugles blew in the night. Torche
Iblazed. Screaming foot soldier
charged directly into machine-gul
fire and across mine fields, to di
in clouds Of flame and smoke
Others clambered over their dea
land charged on, to hang in dealt
, on aprons of barbed wire, whil
still later waves clambered owe
them.
4 It stopped being war as West
;Iern men knew it. and became sim
Iple carnage-nearly $4,000 KNOW
Chinese dead in a single day
If1ghting. And though Chinese lifl
seemed cheap, the price in deaf
!. and wounded that the Allies hat
Ito pay was no small one.
Despair increased as one repor
Evening star., 1951-06-24

Saturday. June a. 1850. was q
typical day. in the summer SOL
stice-sunny and hot. The Wash
ington ball team, at Cleveland.
was licking Fridays wounds and
getting ready to take another
beating at the Indians hands. The
silly season was just getting under
way. A pretty girl was photo
graphed frying an egg on sheet
of glass. Housewives were be-
moaning the terrific cost Of a
weekend's shopping. what with
sirloin steaks at SO cents q pound
and ground beef at 40.
A big military airplane touched
down at National Airport, dis
gorging the Secretary Of Defense,
Louis johnson, and his chief ad-
wiser, Gen. Omar Bradley. Just
back from the Pacific, they an
nounced they had -.all the facts
about our situation" in Asia.
Peace in the World
Afew minutes flying time away
President Truman ended brie1
address at Friendship Interna-
tionai, Airport, Baltimore, by say
ing, II dedicate this airport tc
the cause of peace in the world.
Nearly half way around the
world, little men faced other little
men across an imaginary line
drawn athwart q httle-known
peninsula. Sentries to the south
of the line watched uneasily the
movements of those to the north
But even as Saturday changed to
Sunday, there was little or moth
ing to alarm q South Korean sol-
dier on border duty.
Then, as dawn broke, q wave Of
Communicated troops swarmed
across the 38th Parallel to usher
in a new kind of war.
The Communist overlords In
Moscow had resorted to many
stratagems before. But this was
the first time they had ordered q
satellite to wage overt war against
o neighbor.
The news broke in Washington
late Saturday afternoon. There
had been virtually no hint Of I'm
pending conflict in Korea-what
few reports there had been from
that country dealt with election
and possible economic aid.
Word from the little America
Evening star., 1951-06-24


stances leading UP to the mo-
mentous decision to commit
United States arms in Korea will
be debated by historians for
years to come. But the broad OUT
line Of what transpired. in this
week a year ago. Is fairly clear by
now.
The Korean decision, which
was taken In progressive steps,
is essentially three-scene drama.
The first two scenes were played
at the Blair House dinner table.
where officials of the State and
Defense Departments were dinner
guests Of President Truman on
the nights Of Sunday. June Is.
and Tuesday, the 26th. The third
scene was President Truman's
Ibedroom-with Army Secretary
Frank Pace featured as an off
stage voice on the telephone.
The two principle actors in the
drama, without question, were
President Truman, who made the
actual decisions, and Secretary
of State Acheson, who actively
counseled the course Of action
on which the President decided
IGen. Macarthur does not appear
lin the cast at all, although his
Influence made itself strongly
felt in the third scene-the one
involving the decision to COM
Init American ground troops tc
the defense of South Korea. De-
tense Secretary johnson played
Ino important part. except in ad-
vocating that Formosa. too. be
defended.
Dinner at 7::45
Dinner was at 7::45 at Blair
House, that historic Sunday. Mr.
Truman, who had been spending
1.-The week end in independence. hae
flown back to Washington In the
Afternoon. AS the group gathered
lin the living room before dinner
lMr. Acheson filled the President
lin on q meeting Of the q. N
Security Council which had beer
called, at our request. at 3 pm
The Council had told NORTH
lKorean forces to get out Of South
korea. It had asked U. N. mem.
|bers to assist In the execution ol
this resolution and not to helr
1.-THE North Koreans.
Even before dinner. Secretary
johnson brought Formosa into the
picture. In December, the STATE
Department had circularized 1t!
lFar East missions to the effect
that the fall Of Formosa to Rec
China was to be expected-ane
didn't much matter. The Presi.
dent later had announced that oul
forces would not interfere in tn.
IFormosan situation. But Mr.
johnson argued now that. with
communism on the march in Asia
1.-THE island must not be allowed II
fall to the enemy. Gen. On1al
bradley, chairman Of the Join
Chiefs Of STAFF. backed Johnson vi
In this opinion. So far as oul
security was concerned, Bradle.
Isaid, Formosa was more irnportan
than Korea.
Everybody went In TO dinner
The crisis In Korea was the sub
Iject of q general conversation
Throughout the meal. After coffee
1.-THE group remained seated arount
1.-THE table. The talk got down I,
zIbrass tacks. Mr.. Acheson said, II
effect, that If the North Korean
Igot away with this. there woul,
be no stopping the rest Of tn
j Russian satellites.
4 Again Mr.. johnson switched tn,
4 subject to Formosa. The mos
important thing, he said, was TO
Illus to support the Chang Kai
shek regime there. Acheson de
INJURED. It apparently was q
this point that a really violen
discussion" took place betweel
Secretaries Acheson and johnson
Ito which the latter referred In hi
recent testimony before the Sen
ate committee investigating Ger