Evening star., 1951-05-13

with no definite. end in sight. .
You understand it was a CAL
culated risk from the day we en-
tered Korea on June 27; the cal
Iculated risk was whether China
or the Soviet would intervene.
believe it can be brought to
"a decisive end without the calam-
ity of third world war. I believe
if you let it go on indefinitely in
Korea. you invite a third world
war.
Gen. Marshall: I think it is a
very real possibility that the So
Wet will intervene, and like all
other matters pertaining to the
Soviet government. the decision
is of a few men and can be an in
slant decision whenever they
chose to make it.
They may make it without any
reference to specific event, and
again they may find themselves
imoeriled as they feel it, in their
future development of Commun-
ism in the world, and therefore
take action to reduce that peril.
I assumed. and we have as
sumed, that if we started that
procedure, particularly the bomb
ing and the naval action, in rela-
ton to Manchuria and China, we
would Immediately have whatever
retaliation they were able to ef-
feet.
POLICY IN KOREA.
Gen. Macarthur: The inertia
that exists! There is no policy
there is nothing, I tell you-no
plan. or anything. -.
When you say merely. I'VE are
going to continue to fight ag-
gression," that is not what the
enemy is fighting for.
The enemy is fighting for very
definite purpose-to destroy our
forces in Korea.
I don't see how it is possible
that Communist China could be
more at war with us than she
is today. and we are not at
war with her.
We are very limited in our re-
pulse of her efforts.
Gen. Marshall: Our objective
in Korea continues to be the de-
feat of aggression and the restora-
ton OF peace. We have persis-
tently sought to conflne the con-
f1ict to Korea and to prevent its
spreading into a third world war.
In this effort, we stand allied
with the great majority of our
fellow members of the United
Nations.
Our efforts have succeeded in
thwarting the aggresions in Korea
and in stemming the tide of ag-
gression in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere throughout the world,
RESTRICTIONS IN WARFARE.
Gen. MacArthur-I believe the
major thing is to take off the
inhibitions and let us use the max
imum of force we have
Most explicitly. was prohibited
from bombing any place beyond
the area of Korea.
+ Gen. Marshall-The restrictions
imposed on Gen. Macarthur in
the conduct of the campaign in
Korea were in general to confine
the operations to Korea, and un-
der no circumstances to carry out
operations beyond the border Of
Korea into Manchuria.
He was also cautioned against
having units within, think it was.
about IS miles of the border in
Northeast Korea where it touched
the perimeter Of Siberia. the So
Wet government.
ON BOMBING.
Gen, Macarthur: Our strength
is in the air and the Navy, as com
pared TO the. Chinese That is
where we should apply the pres
sure. they cannot. they have moth
ing to resist it with. They are
wide open.
In my own professional
opinion, Communist China, its
ability to wage modern war, has
been tremendously exaggerated: |
and believe when we place the
pressure on its distributive sys-
TENS that she would be forced to
yield within reasonable period
Of time.
Question to Gen. Marshall: If
you were assured that the Soviet
Russia forces would not be thrown
into that war, would you be dis
posed to favor the recommended
ion of Gen. Macarthur that we
follow planes into Manchuria and
oomb the military set-ups :? (
Gen. Marshall: Once, the Chi
lese Communist troops had ap-
oeared in force in Manchuria and
f, from a hypothetical point of
view, there was no danger what
ever of a Soviet intervention, Il
would say that certainly the
bombing you mention should start
almost Immediately
We might easily be forced into
action and are prepared to take
that action, but it is avoidable up
70 the present time. It. may not
be avoldable beginning tomor-
row, but it is avoidable at the
present time. and we have to re-
ate that to the opinion of many
other countries. many other peo-
pies that are involved in this same
struggle.