davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Ohio Waisenfreund. [volume] (Pomeroy, O. [Ohio]) 1874-1953, 1951-09-15

oerner Iu5riiitllng, einl6liebli6 BON
Slugltreltfr0ften.
rGine San-Srancisco-a fir
9entihlano"
San Sranci5co iii nur ser InInng
elmer gon5en Heibe Don 9erbItta9lln-
gen bon neltrmipannenoer 8eoeu-
tung. slllBer oen Sapon=&ertrog
muroen BORT S6ubz l1no Srutobfon,
men 5luildcn SEN Ser. Staoten, MI
ltrolien, Neueclono uno ser philip
piniihen 9tepublif geiflolien. g.
bon0elt iih oobei I'M Otoihen einca
umfoiicnoeu 9tebes, bo5 i6licBIih al
le Nonoeebicte oc2 8roben G5con3
gc9en @epalttotcn id)iibCn ion.
@oibngton Sttnlpo uno Non1
iinO Die ShnrpI6bc Ser nGdlten at
lontilNcn SoQlngcn. 9lllber ocnl
Oclttidcn ErobIem ltcben nod onoerc
midtiQc tSro0en ol1I 0en1 TrogromnL
Dor nucm Oie 3uIoiiung Don Brie-
hcnlonO lmo Ser Giirfci sum Noro-
9tlontIfEott, Damn oie GrIe0igl,nQ
Ser heiflcn Srieltcr 9lngelegenbcit,
0o2 itulicnild)c Grluhen unt NepiIon
ieine5 6ric0cn5Ocrtrogc5, Oie iponi-
ldcn 8cSicbun9cn 5u Sem Mclten,
sic NclfriIe in Sron lmo sic 8eorob-
ung GnOo-GbInu5 Our0 ocn &onlru-
niamll5.
9ci ser 9lu@iprohe in Son Iron=
cisco jo9 Ironfrcid)2 9IuBcnniniItcr
Nobcrt Sd)unlnu fiir europa ats Scr
@cbonOhng &opona Bic 9tutonmen-
0llng: 9tit onhcrcn MctboOen miilie
sort Ooa 9lcidc 3icl pcrfolgt mcr-
Sen mic in 9lIicn: Sic ShufIung ei-
ncr @cmcinihoit iricOlihcr &0lfcr,
bon Scr fcIn @ono nl>agcINloilen
mcr0cn Niirfc, e5 iei Oenn, onb cs
Iid iclblt olralhlicBc. Sic 9tuferlc-
glnQ rigorolcr &nntrouen unb @e-
'hrdntlln9eu bobe Itet5 pcriagt, uno
ouI9e5pun9cnc Gntlpofinmg bobc
lih ol5 cine gcIGhrlid)c ESuuiiou cr=
mielen in Greltben roh 1906 eten.
10 ipie in Geutlhlono nod 1918. "a
man fem ltarfeS &oIf in einen1 3u-
Itono Ser Snferioritat 5u bolten per
moge, gelte eS 81 perbinOerr Bob e5
li6 gegen 1lns belpaffne. 9as beoeu,
tet: @ir miiiien es 5u einem 8artncr
in Ser gemeiniamen slufgobe frieo=
liber @rneuerltnn MAIDEN.
8enn oieIer 8eiIt Ieinen 91ieocrz
I6lag bel BEN SluBenminiIter- Ser
banOlungen in @aibington finoet,
miro sic Solpiet= t=Sbitrl1ftion qegen
oie europaiIfe GerIt1n0igung ebenio
ideitern, Die ibr Glon, sic G0lfer
sIienS bon Ser l1nter5ei6nung oeS
SrieoenS nit Sopan ab5uI6refen.
Ohio Waisenfreund. [volume] (Pomeroy, O. [Ohio]) 1874-1953, 1951-09-15
Sine angebrad)tc @arnunq

Die iebt begonnenen @aIbingtpncr
ge1predungcn 1perben in einem 9cit-
artifel Ser Seem 9orfer ,Si1nes' ais
cine uoe,1tid)e San=S n=Sroncisco=&onie-
ren5" bc5eidnet. SRit ser ginI6rGns
flung freilid), ooB ser propiloriid)e
Gbarafter 0es Trie0en5ih1ulies nit
Ieutlhlano nod OieI lbGrfer her
nortritt, ol5 i'm 6nue Sopon5. Sd,on
oeabalb neil fcin freier 9euti6cr be-
reit tp0re, sic 9lbtrennung oe5 ocut-
iden Sltens ais enOgiiltig bin5unchs
men, lno audi neil fitr sic bon Rlb~
lono oergcrpoltigtc Nit5onc helltc ci=
ne poltttOe Hcgcllng nod ais aus
lidtalos erl6eint.
Gos Seem 9)orfer 9lutt betont sic
9coeutllng oc5 Shuman-Hlons unO
ser cltorpGild)en OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES.
Geutlhlun0 crideine I'M 2ihte oicler
Elone uno @offnungen oI5 veritcr
Staot elmer fiinTtigen europ0iihcn
sSooeratlon", nobel e5 Si6erheit uno
Iemofratie garnntiert erbolte llno
bafilr Ieine SouperdnitGt teilpeiic an
tnternationale 9lutoritlten iibcrtrogc
ais ben &orlaufcr elmer ipGtercn cu>
rop1ild)en alteration. Np6 bemcrz
fen5merter ais biele5 3ufltnTtSgem0l-
Be lit Sic @nrnung ser Zines nor
einem MiBbroud ser guropo=H<oce,
mobei Geuti6lano elmer 9lrt Grotefs
torat untcrmorien ipQre lno ihIedter
bebanoelt piiroe uI5 onoere friihere
Seinoe.
Gie Mnbnung uno @arnung iii
in mcbrfad1em Slime ongebrod)t. Tor
oIlem ioItc lid Ser Senot Sic fiinf
Dtinlrten 3cit nebmen, sic oo5u er-
forOerlth iino, ser gntldlieBun9 oes
Observation-Disclosures sur 9eenoi-
gunq oeS formellen &riees5uItanoes
nit Geltlhlano @eietesfroft su ner-
leiben. 8ei oieier @eleeenbeit Tei aufy
baran erinnert, oaB cine Nodpriifllng
Der Sanobabung Ser Sanoelsfriegs=
geltimm1lngen uno Ser Sertpertl1ng
uuslGnoiI6en Sripatbelites i'm 8eiIt
Ser pabren Sraoitionen 9lmerifas
erfoleen iollte. Die Gerpabrlolung
Ser Ge6tsbeeriffe bltrd) rationale
ltno internationale Sreibe,lter lit cine
&rieasfolee, sic nift MIR moterieIe.
@iiter bebrobt.
(ssortIesung auf Seite 81 !
Evening star., 1951-06-12
General Warns Nation to Quit

by political and economic meas
ures alone"-and those are the
only measures that were author
lied, the political and economic.
Further, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff at their meeting on Is
August reaffirmed their previous
views that overt United States
military action to deny Commu-
nst domination of Formosa would
be justified. However. I also note
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be-
lieve that the probabilities of the
Formosa situation make it more
than ever necessary that every
effort be made to forestall any
weakening of the overall United
States position with respect to the
Philippines. the Ryukyus and
Japan. In Department of the
Army consideration of this mat
ter. it appears to be- particularly
desirable that. should Formosa be
lost, this event should have a
minimum of i'll effects on the
governments and peoples of West
ern-oriented nations and partic-
ularly those of the Far East. Ac-
cordingly. it occurs to me that, If
not already instituted, you may
desire to consider information
measures designed to accomplish
this end.
"The above suggestion is sup
Elementary to those made from
time to time by the Army member
of the interdepartmental co-ordi-
mating staff established in accord
ance with NSC 4, who has been
furnished copy of this memo
randum. I trust you will consider
it appropriate for me to bring
to your attention such points
which may arise in connection
with our consideration of mat
ters of the above nature"
Signed. A. C. Wedemeyer. lieu
tenant general, General Staff
Corps.
Evening star., 1951-06-12

an enemy that is numerically.
possibly. stronger? Is it militarily
feasible to evacuate them, and If
1t is. how and by whose orders
could it be effected?
Gen. Wedemeyer - Well, Of
course. it can only be done by
agreeing with the United Nations
again. We are going back to the
authority. All authority ema-
mates. I presume. from that body.
It is militarily feasible. The
British evacuated a number Of
people at Dunkirk, under much
greater duress than the Chinese
Communists could inject into the
picture.
Senator Gillette-May I inter-
Irupt?
That is only 20 miles across
the British Channel. This is a
matter of evacuating 25o,o00
troops to the United States, or to
some intermediate point.
Gen. Wedemeyer-They would
be evacuated. I presume, to the
Japanese Archipelago, sir. 1t is
not very far.
Other Recommendations.
Senator Russell. What, II
any. recommendations other than
those contained in the so-called
Wedemeyer Report, applying to
China or Korea, had you made
which had not been approved?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Well, sir, I
(See TEXT, Page A-6.)
Evening star., 1951-06-12
General Compares
III. N. With Christian
Battle Against AttiIo
by the Associotsd Press

1t. Gen. Wedemeyer said yes
terday the free nations struggling
with communism need the same
faith and convictions which led
embattled Christian armies to VIC
tory against Attila the Hun. 1,500
years ago.
He was engaged in an exchange
with Senator Green. Democrat. OF
Rhode Island, who had suggested
the Korean war was the first time
in history that nations had band
ed in this fashion to resist aggres-
sion.
"You will find a similar setup
that ended up in the battle of
Challons," Gen. Wedemeyer said.
IT think that was 451 AID. when
Attila the Hun was defeated by
a similar group of people eth
nologically banded together to
fight against the Slavs to the east.
"The cohesive element that en-
abled them to win at that time
was Christianity, in my judgment,
and we have got to have faith and
we have got to have conviction in
what we are doing or we are
going to lose this struggle with
communism"
Evening star., 1951-06-12

which has been part Of this con-
troversy. while at the time he
issued the ultimatum he had been
notified not of the text Of the
Presidents proposals but of the
fact that the President was in
the midst of negotiating with our
Allied leaders concerning possible
terms of surrender and an armi-
stice-and it is alleged in this
regard that the statement by Mac
Arthur to the Chinese created an
embarrassing situation for the
President in his negotiations with
the Allies.
Backs Commander in Chief.
My question is, in your opin.
ion, under those facts and cir.
cumstances do you think a com.
mander should have communi-
Gated with his Commander ir
Chief in advance of offering terms
of surrender in the field and con-
tanning in his terms of surrender
a suggestion as to operations be-
yond his area in case they did
not accept his terms?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Yes, sir, do
I think the commander subordi-
nate in the field should carry out
the instructions or orders of his
superiors. sir. I think any mill
tary man throughout the military
hierarchy would give you an af-
flrmative answer along that
line.
I have so much confidence in
integrity. and I think
he has been a great public SER
want, and I can't imagine him
getting out of line, Senator Morse.
willfully. knowingly and mali
oiN,yc1x,
Evening star., 1951-06-12
Wedemeyer Reveals
Memo to Allen

Senator Sparkman-Gen. Wede-
meyer. first I want to ask you
with reference to this memoran-
dunn or whatever it was, that the
State Department put out on De-
cember %, 1949, ! believe it was.
;. Now, as you said in the begin
ming Of your statement this, morn
ling. Secretary Acheson, I believe
lit was, stated that that was put
out following a suggestion from
you.
believe. later, in answer to a
question put to him by the chair
man Of this Joint committee
he stated that that suggestion
from you was in writing, but do
not believe it has been produced
yet.
Do you have a copy Of it or, if
not, I will ask the chairman to
obtain one for us.
Gen. Wedemeyer-Now, sir, I
have a copy here
This is a memorandum for
George v. Allen, assistant secre-
tary of state for public affairs.
The date is August 26, 1949.
+ Subject: Current position of
the United States with respect to
FormoSa. rE...
I'm a memorandum for the ex-
ecutive secretary of the National
Security Council the Secretary of
State on 4 August, 1949, stated
that under present circumstances
the passage of Formosa under
Communist control by external
or internal action appears prob
able" You remember. gentle
men, earlier this morning that I
told you that many communica-
tionS that I had read in the de-
partment had that statement in
it, that the fall of Formosa ap-
pears probable.
Overt Action Held Unjustified.
This is just one reference to it.
a.. since there appears no Ger
tain assurance that Formosa can
be denied to Communist control
Evening star., 1951-06-12

that nature in my judgment
should be done under the aegis
Of the United Nations.
I say that I would get out of
Korea: I would break off diplo-
matte relations with Soviet Rus
STA and her satellites; and I
would establish economic block
ades around those areas con-
trolled by those categories of
countries.
7 think that if we continue to
fill these vacua created at times
and places and choosing of this
potential enemy. that we are going
to defeat ourselves economically
and psychologically. I don't be-
lieve we are getting at the real
enemy at all. I think we have
been unrealistic in our thinking,
and I think realism is what would
be understood in the Kremlin.
I am not a warmonger at all. I
think if we had used our political,
our economic and our psychosocial
forces intelligently and in con-
sonance with a real plan, we never
would have been in this predica-
ment today. =.
But today, sir, the Soviet makes
a move. we make a countermove
and generate American policy. I
say let's take the initiative in the
field of strategy in the interna-
tional field and begin to play the
tune to which these people will
dance. .r.
. The world looks to us for that
type of leadership, and we have
the potentialities.
Now our military experts say
and they are much more knowl-
edgeable than I am here, sir
that we are buying time. If that's
the consensus of opinion of our
military experts, I yield humbly
to their view--that we should buy
more time, to continue the Strug-
gle in Korea, sir. -.
/ would like to know don't
know, and maybe some gentleman
of the committee knoWs-exactly
what we are fighting in Korea for.
You say it is to stop the aggres-
sion that occurred, that started
June 25th, sir.
Well, of course, if that were the
purpose. we had no business then
going north of 38. Which we
did, apparently with official recog-
milton and cognizance and ap-
proval; so when they went north
of 38. my sons regiment, a cap
tain of the infantry. went clear
to the Yalu River.
Senator Gillette. You stat
ed that we should get out of
Korea. First, is it militarily
feasible to evacuate an army of
say 250,000 troops in the face of
Evening star., 1951-06-12
Calculated Risk
Must Be Taken

(Senator Green examined Gen.
wedemeyer on his concept OF the
United Nations purposes and aims
toward collective world security.
The Senator drew from him the
comment that any nations indi-
vidual action today is of concern
to other countries. Gen. Wede-
meyer said he did not think our
civilization would be destroyed by
unilateral action, but it might be
retarded0
Senator Green. And yet as
I understand you to say. that If
they were unwilling to go along
with us, we should go it alone?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Yes, sir, feel
that we should because I have the
conviction that we are doing the
right thing, sir. -.
Senator Green. And would
you Justify sacrificing the future
peace Of the world and this last
hope of uniting nations in order
to carry out principle which we
believe perhaps to be right but
they believe to be inexpedient?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Well, sir,
don't know to whom you refer
when you say "they."
Senator Green. Well, the
e.. nations of the United Nations.
Senator Green The mill
tary witnesses-all those who tes-
tified on this subject-have said
that a naval blockade and the
bombarding of the coastal cities
Is an act Of war. And if So
Russia was obliged under her
treaty to come to the aid of China
Gen. Wedemeyer-Yes, sir.
Calculated Risk"
Senator Greenland it is hard
to imagine our fighting Asia
mean China and Russia alone
and it would probably lead to a
third world war, would it not?
Gen. Wedemeyer-It might, sir:
that Is calculated risk. -.
Senator Green. How about
bringing about a democratic
China? Do you thing that is
possible?
Gen. Wedemeyer-In many
years to come. sir, Democracy,
as I understand it, is based upon
an informed electorate. You have
80 per cent of the people who are
illiterate, and the best thing that
could happen today would be a
strong man who was benevolent
and sincere to lead his people out
Of this morass and chaos.
Senator Green-Then you didn't
believe it possible for Gen. Mar
shall to accomplish that either?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Yes, sir;
did. sir, and tried to help him
all I could,
Evening star., 1951-06-12

earlier I said would not put any
ground forces in Korea, so you
can rightful1y say they would
overrun South Korea If we do not
have people to stop them, and ]
would answer that is tanta-
mount to defeat. in my judg-
ment, but you must take counter
steps in other fields. I would break
off diplomatic relations with them
I would go into full mobilization
And I would clearly lay it all
before the world would lay il
before the bar of the whole world
and would go further, I would
go to the real perpetrator Of all
this, because it is not the Koreans
the crux of this thing is In the
Kremlin. And If we continue to
permit them to call the tune to
which we shall dance, our form
OF government would be in jeop-
ardy.
Senator Fulbright-Would you
break off relations with the Krem-
lin? t..
Gen. Wedemeyer-Yes, sir-ano
their satellites. I would dc
it concurrently with the with
drawal. And I would in the psy.
Geological field do it now, in or
der to explain to the world my
future actions. II am going tc
take the initiative away from
these people"
Senator Fulbright-Well, would
that be tantamount to a declara-
ton of war?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Not neces-
sarily. You can break of
diplomatic relations-well, Sena-
tor. it is a calculated risk you
would inst take
Evening star., 1951-06-12
General AmpEfies
Withdrawal Idea

Senator Stennis-. I was
surprised when you said you
thought we ought to now with
draw from Korea.
Do you not think If we with
draw from Korea that would be
virtually knocking the legs out
from under the United Nations2
Gen. Wedemeyer-No. sir. Sen
ator. have never suggested any
thing here in my testimony today
nor will I in any subsequent testi-
mony. nor have in the past, sir
any action that I suggest of
Evening star., 1951-06-12

clearly stated that
some of the recommendations that
II made embarrassed the Govern
|ment-would embarrass the Gov
|ernment If publicized. I think
didn't agree with that, sir, but 1t
wasn't up to me to make that
determination.
A few days later I received a
communication to the effect that
that report would be top secret
land would not be divulged. :.
Evening star., 1951-06-12
Economics Dictated
Korea Withdrawal

Gen. Wedemeyer was ques-
TONED by Senator johnson on his
directive for the China mission
and reviewed his earlier state
n1ent.)
Senator johnson In that
directive. as 7 read it, you were
instructed when your mission u
Evening star., 1951-06-12
Foe Will Bleed u. 5.
To Death al Parallel,
Wedemeyer Says
Continued From Page A-4o

tConClnueo from rage A-4J
the best vehicle to accomplish
what we are striving to do. 49,.
You could ask me, and prop
erly: "Well, why did he fail i'm
mediately after the war? Why
did he have this series of de-
feats, and the Communists, who
were numerically inferior, took
over that vast land?"
The answer. in my judgment. is
more moral support than material
support. His soldiers were lack
ing in spirit and enthusiasm for
the job: and also, they began to
lose confidence in their leader,
Chang Kai-shek, and their lead
ers, the soldiers.
Why?
Immediately after the war,
propaganda from Yenan and
Moscow repudiating the Ameri-
can objectives in the Far East,
calling us imperialists, and indi-
eating that our purposes were
Interior, the American purposes
were ulterior-that propaganda
by pamphlets and by radio was
continuous and vociferous. I pro-
tested to the American Consul
General out there about it, and
asked him to protest to the Soviet
representatives: and it stopped for
q while and then it continued
vehemently and with increased
action.
Chang Lost Position.
Now, Chang Kai-shek lost his
position in this country and in
his own country.
The Chinese people, I am sure,
after so many years of war. ter
fic dislocationS. psychological,
economic-that country was just
tired of war. The people were
tired of war. All they wanted. /
have repeatedly stated to con-
gressional committees here, when
talking about that area, all the
people wanted was food, shelter
and peace.
And, the Communists exploited
those basic, fundamental desires
of the people; and they exploited
the corruption and the malad-
ministrations that were present.
to such a degree that Chang
Kai-shek, as I stated, was repu-
dated as a leader. the troops
were diSpirited and they didn't
flight. -.
Senator Saltonstall-.. Would
your point of view go as far as to
say that we should put ground
troops on the Island of Formosa
if the Nationalist troops are not
enough to-
Gen. Wedemeyer- :. Yes, sir;
once you decided upon the mis-
sion, sir, the means should be ap-
propriate to carry it out. And
ground forces as well as naval
forces and air forces would be
essential.
But in future warfare the es-
sential weapon is air. We must
have undisputed control Of the
air. It isn't on the ground that
the future wars are going to be
settled, sir, it is in the air. I
can't emphasize that too strongly
both tactical air and strategic
air. ...
Evening star., 1951-06-12
Refused to Sign
Extract of Report

/
meyer, I hold inrmy hand, sir, the
committee print of your report or
China and Korea; and / shoulc
like to ask you If you ever dis.
cussed this China-Korea report
with the President OF the Unitec
States, subsequent to your return
from your mission in the Fal
East?
Gen. Wedemeyer-No, sir.
Senator Cain. Did you ever
discuss your report with the Sec
retary Of State. or with represent
atives of the State Department
subsequent to your return from
the Far East?
Gen. Wedemeyer-Only briefly
with the then Secretary of State
Marshall.
Shortly after my return from
my mission in the Far East Sep.
tember, 1947, I did discuss the
report with Secretary Marshall
He complimented me and the
members of my mission for a lob
well done, as he Stated-Substan-
TALLY that-and then he admon.
ished me that I must not repeat
what was in that report until ]
received further instructions.
A few days later, a Mr.. Butter
worth. of the State Department
visited me in my temporary Office
in the Pentagon, and he had ar
extract OF my report and he tolc
me that there were some things
in my original report that rather
embarrassed the Government, and
asked me If I would sign this
extract.
Failed to Embody Ideas.
told him that I would look il
over and determine what had
been extracted; and, after doing
that. sir. I refused to sign it, to
sign the extract, because it didn',
embody the ideas that thought
my mission justified presenting to
my Government. Therefore, I re-
fused to sign it. 80.
This paper that had been
brought to me for signature had
been changed. Frankly. I don't
recall, anymore. the changes. ]
haven't got the paper. Mr.. Butter
worth took it back after I indi-
Gated clearly, politely but definite.
ly that I would not sign that ex-
tract, and there was nothing more
about that.
I was never asked, by the State
Department, and really felt
badly about it, to discuss the phil
|osophy behind the recommends
tions I made concerning China
and Korea, by members of the
State Department, nor was any
particular member Of my mission,
and I had some very valuable
men. fine Americans who worked
hard to help me evolve sound con-
clusions and recommendations
pertaining to that area.
Senator Cain. May I ask If Mr..
Butterworth represented himself
to you as being an agent of our
State Department and that in
that capacity he was asking you
to initial a particular exception
or extraction from your report?
Gen. Wedemeyer. He knew
that know that he was an
oficial in the State Department
when he brought that extract over
to my office in the Pentagon. :.
Senator Cain. May I ask
that after you had this converse
ton with Mr.. Butterworth, you
went to see the Secretary of State
to determine from him perhaps
what his wishes in this particular
connection might be.
Denies Any Pressure.
Gen. Wedemeyer-Well, it wor-
ried me, because I was given the
impression that Secretary Mar
shall was interested in my signing
this, but I contacted Secretary
Marshall and he assured me that
If didn't want to sign this extract
that certainly he didn't want to
influence me one way or the other
He was very nice about it.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-12-20

These prices effective until close Of business Mondoy December
"a 1851 in Washington D. c.; MARYLAND: Bethesda Silver
Spring. Tokomo Park Biodenbue Rockville Goitersbue Coral
Mono Wheoton Mount Ronier. College Pork Ber~yn sutond
Marlboro Loue. lndion Heed. copitoI Heights VIRGINIA.
Wenno, AnnondoIe NO sAEs 70 DgAIERs We RESERVE
THE RIGHT TO LIMIT QUANTITIES. Produce prices subject
to ehonee daily
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-12-20
Dairy Foods

Ddlry Foods
Lucerne Milk e sssS'1 z,---------* s", Ale
Lucerne Milk Vis etss. ? : *2n. 43c.
TobIe Cream los'''.:.- ~ J. loc
TobIe Cream lOs.rn.- -----~"pt Bic
Lucerne Half & Half "a f ssis %ut ~. 24c
Lucerne ButtermiIk a. lie
Lucerne Doiry-Drink eAese'e'' 'ss TIC
Whipping Cream l"s'"'-----*n :. 35c
Cottage Cheese ' 4i%. Ike pss. ice
Reddi-Whip TAo"0'e"''- 1 .ss Sc
Higher in Virginia stores.