Evening star., 1951-03-31
'Obscurities' in Korea

SHS@"IltCS !" NOfCN
There is nothing surprising about the fact
that the Chinese Communists-through the
Peiping radio-have Scoffed at General Mac
ArthurS proposal for cease-fire conference and
declared that they will fight relentlessy" until
the United Nations is "completely driven from
Korea. This tough attitude, whether or not it
involves lot of propagandstic bluff and bluster,
is altogether in keeping with the position they
have maintained ever since they crossed the Yalu
River from Manchuria to wage criminal warfare
against our allied anti-aggression forces. 1t need
hardly be added, of course, that as long as they
hold fast to that position, the outlook for ne
gotiating an honorable peace settlement will re-
main exceedingly dim.
In military sense, as General Macarthur
has pointed out, Red China has every reason to
be anxious for cease-fire It has suffered griev-
GUS casualties. It's supply lines have been so
severely hit by our massive sea and air lombard
ments that its troops in the forward battle area
have been extremely hard put to sustain opera
tions against our allied ground forces. Barring
all-out aid from the Soviet Union, it can hope
for nothing in Korea but continuing heavy losses
far heavier than any it can infict on the
United Nations. Indeed, if it keeps on fighting,
If it steadfastly rejects the idea of peaceful dip
lomatic negotiation it will be risking the pos
slb1ty OF u. N. decision to strike at it's coastal
areas and interior baSeS-a decision that could
result in complete Chinese Communist COL
lapse.
Yet, although it thus would be militarily
sensible for them to welcome cease-fre talks, the
Peiping Reds-and their mentors in the Krem-
in-apparently feel that it will be worth their
while to fight on even though they cannot win
decision. If that is their real intention, if
they are determined to maintain their war of
aggression, then the United Nations-a although
it cannot be driven from Korea unless the Rus
SLAMS intervene on an unlimited scale-muSt
reckon with General MacArthur's view that the
"battle lines cannot fail in time to reach point
of theoretical military stalemate" That is, they
cannot fail to do so If the following present cir
cumstances remain unchanged: ID The continu-
Ing How OF enemy troops and materiel to the
theater of action (2) the lack of major additions
to the strength of our allied forces, and 90 the
U. MS strict adherence to its self-imposed ban
against attacking the privileged sanctuary" of
Manchuria and other areas of China proper
Presumably, if one or another of these three
circumstances were remoyed-especially if the
United Nations command were relieved of the
handicap of not being allowed to strike at Red
China'S interior bases-General Macarthur
would be able to prevent theoretical military
stalemate" and lead his allied forces to deci-
oASC f1CIO1y Dut lS 1lOt WlIIllu his duGQOT1Cy
to act on his own in matters of this sort. That
is why he has been at pains to place himself on
record as declaring that vital politco- military
decisions must be reached at the highest inter-
national levels to clear up the 'obscurities" of
the present situation. In other words, it is up to
the U. N.-partcularly the United States and the
13 other members engaged in direct action
against the aggressor-to determine just what
course ought to be followed in an effort to bring
the Korean war to satisfactory end.
In this connection our Government is re-
ported to be advocating proposal under which
all the countries allied in the anti-aggresSion
action would join in statement formally de-
claring Q) that they are willing to negotiate an
honorable truce, (2) that they have no present
intention of attacking Red China itself, and
90 that they are nevertheless determined to
fight on if decent peace settlement is rejected.
But what if such a settlement is rejected? What
If the struggle develops into an indecisive stale
mate of indefinite duration? Will the U. N then
decide to strike at the enemys privileged sane
tuary"? And il it so decides will it not become
enmeshed in the very thing it seeks to avoid-a
full-scale war in Asia tragically shattering the
Vests historic ties of friendship with the Chi
nese people, an essentially democratic people
who may never bend themselves to the yoke of
Pepngs tyranny?
These and kindred questions speak pretty
much for themselves. Difficult as they are how
ever, they must be answered-and the sooner the
better. The free world has got to make up its
mind, firmly and decisvely, about what it wants
to achieve in Korea. The present "obscurities"
and hesitatons need to be brought to an end
Until they are, the enemy probably will pay
little attention to truce proposals.
The Peronisto Atom