Evening star., 1951-06-12

lClICuIllSId1lCCo. AL tltC CfCl1b bi1uO
Formosa's fall became a fact, I
recommended the employment Of
the Voice of America and any
other international means which
might minimize the effect upon
Far Eastern peoples, and I should
like to repeat, minimize.
I had no intention, gentlemen,
that there should be Justification
| of the military Importance of For
mosa or of the policy pertaining
to that strategic area.
I want to say to you, gentlemen.
I would not have been so much
concerned about this point. that
is about the association of my
name with the Formosa memo
random on the part of the Secre-
tary Of State, Acheson. had he not
resisted the efforts of the men,
bers Of this committee to obtain
the names of the individual or
individuals of the State Depart
ment who prepared the final
policy memorandum which, by
the way, was never referred to
me.
Not CO. ordinated With Successor.
I believe 1t was never CO.
ordinated with the Department Of
Defense prior to its dissemination.
I made the effort to determine
this point and was unsuccessful.
I was at that time-this was in
1949. gentlemen. in Augustine
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
and Operations in the Depart
ment Of the Army. It is possible
that this Formosa memorandum
may have been prepared subse-
quent to my departure for my
new assignment in the West Coast
which occurred in September 40.
The date on the memorandum
that was actually disseminated
was 20 December 1949.
I have inquired in the Depart
ment of the Army and have been
informed that the memorandum
was never co-ordinated even in
my former Office, that is with my
successor there.
To summarize, I have never
accepted the State Departments s
pessimistic view with reference
to the future of Formosa. I have
consistently and repeatedly rec
commended American supervised
aid to the Chinese Nationalist
government, presentely located
in FormoSa, in order to stop the
advance of Communism in the
Far East.
A third and final point that
should like to present to you gen.
tlemen:
On 6 June 1851, Secretary of
State Acheson testified that
MacArthur-Spruance- Wedemeyer
were all in agreement in the win
ter Of 1945 with reference to fu-
ture United States policy in
China. His testimony indicates
that he derived that information
from an ofhcial radiogram dated
7 December 1945, dispatched from
MacArthur's headquarters in
Tokyo after Macarthur -Spruance-
Wedemeyer had conferred con-
cerning projected United States
assistance to the Nationalist gov
ernment in China.
Acheson Testimony Recalled.
j The secretary quoted a para
graph of that radiogram as fol-
lows-this is the last paragraph
of that particular radiogram. gen.
tlemen, and I quote:
"It is suggested that the United
States assistance to China. as
outlined above, be made available
as a basis for negotiation by the
American Ambassador to bring
together and to effect compro-
mise between the major opposing
groups in order to promote a uni
/ fled democratic China"
/ The Secretary of State. Ache
son, laid great stress upon the
fact that this above recommended
action was the policy which Gen
Marshall was sent to China to try
to effectuate.
i The foregoing unqueStionably
would lead to the Interpretation
that I concurred in, and in fact
recommended, the formulation OF
a coalition government in China
! Involving the Nationalists and
Communists.
This Interpretation is absolutely
incorrect. never believed such
.|government possible. The para
graph quoted by Secretary Ache
son was taken out Of context from
la message which recommended
Icourses of action to be taken tc
consolidate and strengthen the
position of the Nationalist gov.
-Iernment in China.
These recommended courses OF
faction, which are included in the
message quoted by Mr.. Acheson,
lowered essentially the plans and
necessary arrangements for the
Repatriation of approximately 3
elmillion Japanese who were ir
elChina at the end Of the war. o.
slthese 8 million Japanese, about
Il million were military, many oi
flwhom were occupying and con-
tItrolling focal points of communi'
eIcations, lines Of communication
land production areas-particular'
lily in North China.
81 With the evacuation of so many
ylJapanese soldiers. vacua would b.
i lloperated and / proposed to I'll
-ltk----e vacua as rapidly as possible