Evening star., 1951-11-27
The NATOOutIook

Like the September meeting in Ottawa, the
current Rome conference of the Council of
Ministers of the 12-nation North Atlantic Treaty
Organization probably will be bit too dull and
technical to stir up widespread public interest.
But even so, even though its decisions may be
less than sensational spectacular, 1t is an
event of high Importance in that it is designed to
promote a much needed further strengthening
of the NATO politically, economically
and militarily.
In the political sphere, the work at Rome
involves more than agreeing on arrangements
for enlarging the organizational structure to
include Greece and Turkey 1t also involves
dealing with the question Of West German
participation and working out Anglo American
differences regarding the choice of an admiral
to head the North Atlantic Sea Command.
Beyond that as General Eisenhower has declared,
one of the big objectives of the conference is to
encourage the member nations to subordinate
their separate interests and attempt the i'm
possible by bringing about greater and greater
pooling of their sovereignty to create real
common front, a genuine single defense COM
munity, powerful enough to cope effectively
with the threat of Red aggression.
Moreover economically and militarily, the
Rome conferees must deal with the extremely
difficult problem of cushoning the impact of
rearmament on civilian production and living
standards. The impact-notably in France and
Britain-haS been severe in terms of creating
manpoWer shortages, requiring increased auster-
ity, building up inf1ationary pressures, cutting
into gold and dollar reserves, and in general
straining aready-taut economies in way that
demands prompt corrective action if the Western
defensive effort is not to be seriously undermined
AS result, although there is still hope and
determination enough to attain it, the original
goal of equipping the NATO alliance with at
least so divisions of troops by 1854 has been
modified. What the modification calls for is
concentration on the more immediate objective
of bringing into being about 80 combat-ready
divisions within the coming year (at present
some 20 are available in under-strength form.
This is a less ambitious plan, but it is tailored
to meet the practical realities and if it is
ried out successfully, the groundwork will be
laid for continuous step-by-step progress toward
the much bigger force that General Eisenhower
would like to see in readiness by 1854.
In all of this the United States will have to
keep on playing the role of leader and chief
supporter If the project is to thrive, American
dollars and American arms will have to be fed
into it on large scale. BY the same token. of
course as is being emphasized at Rome, the other
members of the alliance must adjust their inter-
nal policies In whatever ways may be necessary
to speed up the pace of their own rearmament
and training programs But still, to insure the
success of this great and historic enterprise
which is vital to our safety-our country will
have to carry the main burden until an adequate
allied defensive force is in being and the econo
mics of our friends abroad have absorbed the
present shocks of preparedness and are no longer
extraordinarily strained.
When that time will come is anybody's guess
Theoretically. the overall NATO operation is
supposed to be at its peak-a stage in which
vast American aid would be unnecessary within
the next three or four years. Whether it will be
or not however, is purely conjeotural right now
"a thing that depends not only on what is
accomplished at meetings like the one in Rome
but also on what the Kremlin chooses to do in
the months ahead