Evening star., 1951-05-05
General MocArthur's Case

not going to end in clear-cut decision, one
way or the other, in the dispute over our Korean
policy.
The controversy has boiled down to a
difference of opinion And the conflict of
opinion revolves primarily around the question
of Soviet intentions. Since the parties to the
dispute do not know what the Russians intend
to do, the prospect is that the Senate hearings
will be inconcusive. When they are over the
people will not know great deal more than
they did before, and there is little likelihood
that many minds will have been changed by
the arguments. pro or con-
This is not to say, However, that the hear
ings have accomplished nothing. They have
served to clarity General MacArthur's real posi-
ton, and as they progress it is to be expected
that other points of view, notably that of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff will be brought into sharper
focus. This at least, will be some gain.
General Macarthur has effectively disposed
of the petty snipers who have been taking pot
shots at him. He is not the comic opera strategist
that they have tried to picture him as being
GENERAL MACARTHUR begins with one
~ central, undeniable fact: We are at war
in Korea. American boys, and boys of other
nationalities are being killed and wounded there
every day If the fighting is to drag on, incon-
lives. So General Macarthur wants to try to
end. the fighting. He wants to use all, not just
a fraction of the military power at our command
to this end.
The risks? He agrees that there are risks
He thinks that Red China is already fully
committed in Korea, and can do no more damage
there He comedies that to attack bases in
Manchuria, or to blockade Chinese ports, might
bring the Russians into the war. But that risk,
as he correctly points out, was inherent in our
decision to go into Korea. We assumed that
risk then and General Macarthur believes it
is both morally and militarily wrong to sacrifice
the lives of thousands Of young men in an effort
to avoid that risk, or to minimize it, now.
He thinks we are faced with one Of two
situations If the Russians have not decided
upon war with the West full-scale effort to
win the Korean war is not going to bring them
into the conflict. On the other hand, If the
Russians have decided upon war, an attack on
Chinese bases might speed up the Soviet time
table and bring them openly into the struggle
little sooner General Macarthur balances the
risks, and says he would take that gamble in an
effort-which he believes would be successful
to bring the Korean war to speedy conclusion.
In summary, he does not believe we should let
the fear of possible bigger war keep us from
fighting and winning the savage, bloody war
that we are already in. That is an attitude
which makes sense.
- ENERAL MACARTHUR also disposed Of some
~ of the ridiculous charges that his arm
chair critics have brought against him.
His objective in using all of the means
at our disposal to end the Korean war would
be to drive the aggresSor from Korea and dis
courage him from renewing his aggression. He
believes that we have the military power now to
do this-that by bombing, blockade, ETC., we can
so cripple the Chinese capacity to wage war in
Korea that the Communists will have to get out
of that country and stay out He emphaticaly
repudiates any thought of invading and conquer
ing China. That is the bugaboo that is raised
by his critics whenever attack on Manchuran
bases is proposed. But there is all the difference
in the world between ending the aggression in
Korea and conquering China. And General Mac
Arthur has made it clear that what he advocates
is the former; that he is wholly opposed to any
such scatter-brained undertaking as the latter.
And why is not that position sound? If we can
fight limited war to hold bloody line some
where in Korea, why can we not fight limited
war to make it impossible for the enemy to stay
anywhere in Korea? Because the Russians might
come in? Which is better-to take that risk,
or to accept the certainty OF scores of thou
sands of additional casualties in an indefinite
stalemate?
General Macarthur then amplified his views
with respect to the use of Chang Kai-sheks
troops on Formosa His use of this force
would be limited one. He thinks it
would serve as a threat to the enemy, and that
it might be used for diversionary purposes-to
take pressure off the U. N. troops in Korea.
He does not contend that it could, defeat the
Communists if put ashore on the mainland and
he thinks the Nationalist Chinese commanders
should decide in what ways their troops can be
most effectively employed But if General Mac
Arthur had his way, they would be used. In one
way or another, the troops on Formosa would
contribute what they can to the common fight
against the common enemy. And why not?
THE GENERAL, in his two days on the witness
stand. has not gone unchallenged. For the
g most part he successfully met the critical ques
tions. He has disavowed any intention of
sighting Europe to fight in Asia Instead, he
says that we must be prepared to meet and turn
back the threat of communism wherever it
appears.
= 1t was in this connection that Senator Nc
Mahon of Connecticut asked the $64 question
the only critical question that makes much
sense Senator McMahon'S view is that we are
not ready for war with Russia, but that by 1858
we will be ready. The Senator thinks that II
the Snssians should attack soon, our }esualties