Evening star., 1951-07-29
Arms Aid and the Power Balance

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State AcheSon
has made clear that the administration sees no
early end to the extension Of very large-Scale
American military and economic aid to our At
lantic Pact Allies and to other non-Soviet
nations throughout the world. Actually, far
from holding out promise of substantial relief
on that score, the official view now is that the
vital interests of the United States make manda-
tory a global security program under which
such aid will have to continue for the next three
years up to total of about $25 billion.
Considering all of the billions that have
already been poured out since the end OF the
Second World War, this prospect is hardly
cheering one and Congresses it most certainly
should undoubtedly will subject the whole bus-
ness to the closest kind of scrutiny and debate
to determine whether or not its magnitude is
fully justified Yet though the program may
be open to sharp question as regards details
and scope, the President, Mr.. Acheson and De-
tense Secretary Marshall have argued so per-
suaSively for it that its substance seems to be
pretty much beyond challenge as an under
taking we can scarcely avoid if we are to cope
adequately with the menace OF Red aggression.
For the fact is, as MIR. Truman warned in Detroit
yesterday, that that menace, regardless of what
happens in Korea is likely to remain real and
pressing for some years to come, and we and
our Allies must have armed strength-and
have it now-not in reserve. Not later. but now.
We must have men, ships planes tanks, bombs
on hand-ready for any emergency"
AS advocated by the administration the new
aid-oficially entitled the Mutual Security Pro-
gram-would require congressional appropria-
tions of $85 billion for the fiscal year ending
next June 80 OF this sum- almost 81 billion
would be earmarked for our European Allies,
with $5.3 billion representing military assistance
to them in the form of American-produced guns.
tanks, planes etc., and the balance covering
economic help designed primarily to enable them
to go forward with their own expanded rearma-
ment efforts without dangerously straining their
already y-strained civilian economies Beyond
that, SIS billion-the remainder of the total
requested-would be put to work in Asia Gn-
Guiding Formosa), the Middle East, North Africa
and Latin America.
All this adds up to 5000 million more than
the So 3 billion appropriated for the same pur-
poses in the fiscal year just ended. But the
difference now is that by far the greater part
of the projected aid is to be military in char
acter. AS far as the Western European countries
are concerned they have staged remarkable
economic recovery under the Marshall Plan, but
they need arms assistance at this stage while
gearing up their own defense output. without
such assistance, they cannot equip the forces
they have undertaken to place under General
Eisenhower's Atlantic Pact command-forces
that are to constitute about IS per cent of the
manpower committed to the defense of the West.
1t seems obvious, therefore, that the United
States should do everything within reason to
supply them with weapons as thoroughly and
as fast as possible.
The purpose of this aid, of course-and the
administration insists that we must reckon with
similar outlays for fiscal 1858 and 1954-iS to
make the free world so strong in the inter-
national balance of power that the Soviet Union
will be deferred from aggression. What the
projects advocates emphasize is that it must be
measured in terms of how many billions of dol
lars, how many dozens of great cities and how
many millions of lives would be lost in another
global war-an all-out atomic war. II the Mu-
tual Security Program can prevent such catas-
trophe, the money it takes will be money ex-
ceedingly we'll invested. And If it cannot prevent
1t, if the men of the Kremlin dare to strike, it
will be of inestimable value in insuring their
total defeat. That is the sum of the argument
favoring it. 1t is an argument not easily re-
butted. T. - rl:4,.sA5
E>ss. 1-
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