davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1951-05-13

your fundamental reasons for
assuming that an aggression will
not take place in Western Europe
until we are better prepared to
meet it. while seemingly you be-
Ilieve that Russia will enter the
Korean conflict if we bomb and
destroy military installations pos
seSsed by the Red Chinese?
Soviet May Act Any Time.
Gen. Marshall-In regard to
Western Europe, first I go on the
basis myself that Russia may step
into the aggression at any mo-
ment. Also that that is no argu-
ment that we do not do our best
to prepare for it even though it
may take two or three years.
In other words, we don't sit
Iimpotent any say Russia can act
at any time and therefore we do
nothing. That is the sense of the
European situation, and those
arguments came up in connec-
ton with the rearmament pro-
posals.
Now I will try to be brief again
in regard to the difference I think
i'm the situation in the Far East,
and it is this in the main: that
Russia possesses a very valuable
Ially in China. That you might
say is a Russian protectorate in
a sense, but one who is paying a
great bill of human lives and
iother things in order to fulfill that
role.
Now in view of their treaty with
the Chinese Communist regime OF
government. if it appears that
they have failed to support that
government in it's fight in Korea
we have a very special situation
because it affects every other
satellite of the Soviet govern
ment.
They get their example from
that. and to use the common ex-
preston in this country, that they
have been sold down the river
after a great sacrifice of life, SC
it has seemed to me and my asso-
ciates and advisors that we are
confronted by a Soviet govern
ment in a very difficult position
itself as to what it does in rela-
ton to the failure up to the pres
ent time of the Chinese Commu-
mist forces to drive us out OF
Korea.
Senator Cain. You do not
then put very much credence ir
the belief held by some that
Russia might be very strongly
inclined to let China and the
United States wage war against
each other to the further weak
ening of both powers, and by thai
means leaving Russia in a fal
stronger position even than she
is today.
Gen. Marshall-I would qualify
that as TO the weakening of China
but I would say that the Soviet
government would be perfectly
ruthless in its relationship tt
China in this matter if the Chi.
ness could continue to embroil u!
in general action out there
which would weaken our genera
lnOsifion
Evening star., 1951-05-13

cause you can't do any Of these
things openly.
We are weakened q great deal
by the concentration Of public at
tention c. the instrument from
which we expect all this secret
data, because II other countries
know what we are about, we don't
get anything along that particular
line. So I think it is Of great i'm
portance that it be made more
effective. but I think it has to be
given time and it has to be given
more secrecy, more remoteness
from public attention, or it can
never be very effective, in my own
opinion; because its most effective
sources you have just got to be
absolutely silent about and hardly
even think about.
That comes up in a great many
matters. In its inception, first
build-up, I was opposed to some
of the first contacts being pro-
posed, not by the agency, but by
Others, in connection with the
Government; and I thought those
contacts should not be because it
involved too many people, in
Ivolved almost essentially a break
down, and therefore it would be
an ineffective service; and there
fore it is not as dependable as it
should be. We have a good
many struggles with intelligence.
The Battle of the Bulge, landing
in Normandy was German strug-
gle for intelligence, our landing in
Africa was a struggle for intelli-
igence. All that is involved. Some
have been successful and some
have not. That is always the case,
but ho~e 1t will be improved. . I.
Evening star., 1951-05-13
General Strategy
Remains Same

Senator Cain. Gen. Mar
shall. I suppose we agree that the
allied forces have been confronted
by two different kinds of wars
since our forces were first COM
mitted in Korea.
AS I understand it, the first
war began in June against the
North Korean aggressor, and
ended in late November when the
Chinese Reds committed their
forces across the Yalu River. The
second war finds us at war with
the North Koreans and with the
Red Chinese.
Will you explain what we
are doing to win the second war
that we did not do and employ
in practically winning the first
war? = Is our general plan
today what it was when we were
confronted with an entirely diff
ferent situation last June?
Gen. Marshall. I would say it
is not. for the reason that at that
time we possessed forces of suf-
ficent strength and of competence
ito destroy the North Korean
army. and Gen. Macarthur did
destroy it, About $50 words de-
leted by censor.)
Senator Cain. 80 Gen. Mar.
shall, in your opinion. are there
today any considerable number oil
Communists in the officer corps
OF oul army. navy or air force
Gen. Marshall. I don't know O.
any. sir. -
Sees No Difference in Reds.
Senator Cain. What actor
would you take if you fount
Communists within our armed
forces, particularly in its Office
corps?
Gen. Marshall-I think there
a prescribed action in connection
with loyalty tests and matters O
Evening star., 1951-05-13
Soviet Could Stop
Chinese Attacks

oooA AOuse-OO you think
the Kremlin has enough influence
over the Chinese Communists TO
call off the Korean aggression if
they wanted to do so?
Gen. Marshall-My assump-
ton would be they could do 1t in
moment.
Senator Lodge-So, they are
really the real opponent, are they
not?
Gen. Marshall-That is our op-
ponent.
Senator Lodge-Do you think
the Russians are helping the
Communist Chinese much at the
present moment?
Gen. Marshall-They are Ger
talnly providing them with the
bulk of their war-making ma
teriel. They have provided ap-
parently large numbers of planes.
which have not been yet brought
into use, and so far as we can
ascertain. they have been pro-
Ividing the training of the per-
sonnel that would employ these
planes.
| To what extent they are in
volved in the rehabilitation and
oulld-up of North Korean units
1 don't know. They provide very
solid background in front of
which the Communist Chinese
forces operate.
think it might be put this
way: That the Chinese Commu-
mist forces would be utterly un-
able to maintain themselves
without very direct support by
the Soviet government.
During further questioning by
Senator Lodge, several hundred
words of testimony were deleted
by censor.)
Blockade Stand Explained.
Gen. Marshall-May I make a
comment?
Chairman Russell-Yes. sir.
Gen. Marshall-I recall In the
answers gave to Senator Cain
he coupled the naval blockade
with the economic blockade.
Senator Cain-Yes, sir.
Gen. Marshall-My reply would
indicate that was applying it to
both naval and economic. The
answer applied to the economic.
Senator Cain-Would you care
to respond to the question as to
whether or not you are in support
lof a naval blockade as we'll as an
.Ieconomic blockade. General?
Gen. MarShall-Nota at the pres
Evening star., 1951-05-13
Allies
Not Ready Now

| Senator CAIN Gen. Mar
shall. I should like very briefly to
refer to the relationship between
Western Europe and the Far East.
Is it not generally agreed that the
primary desire and aim Of Russia
is to secure control Of Western
Europe?
Gen. Marshall-I would assume
so.
Senator Cain-Is it not gener-
ally agreed that the defense estab-
Ilishment of our allies in the North
Atlantic Treaty is several years
away to be prepared to effectively
resist any large scale aggression
in Western Europe?
Gen. Marshall-I will not-I do
not wish to answer the question
as to several years away. Senator; ;;
but
Senator Cain-They are not i'm
mediately prepared?
Gen. Marshall-They are not
Immediately prepared. -.
Senator Cain-Is there any rea-
son to believe, on the basis of
your intelligence reports. that an
aggressor is presently threatening
to invade Western Europe?
| Gen. Marshall-The impression
from the reports that we gather
from many sources is there has
been a continuous build-up and
not necessarily in strength, though
it may be. but particularly in ar
rangements. specifically in the
satellite states, and in regard to
dispositions of Soviet troops in
Western Europe, and as to Soviet
increases in strength, as we under
stand them. in the Far East.
Russian Protests Recalled.
Senator Cain-I seem to recall
Gen. Marshall, that Russia pub
licly protested against our send
ing American divisions to joir
the North Atlantic Treaty In
ternational Army. Did the Rus
slams not state that this act by
F.. us increased the possibility of wal
in Europe?
Gen. Marshall-I do not recall.
the exact wording of the state
ment, but I think that was the
general effect,
Senator Cain My memory
seems to tell me that Russia pro-
tested the establishment of oul
airlift to Berlin.
Gen. Marshall-Very specific.
ally.
9 Senator Cain - Has Russia
= Gen. Marshall, to your knowl.
y edge ever protested against oul
considering the need for bomb.
ing military installations which
q are being employed by our presen
enemy. Red China, in Manchuris
|, or China?
+ Gen. Marshall-I do not re.
call that specific allegation o.
4 statement in regard to that, bu
v I think there has been a grea
t deal that has come out through
a Pravda and others as to Ameri
S can aggression, imperialistc eff
# fort.
v Senator Cain-But as the Sec
d retary of Defense you know o
IS no official protest that Russi
i has lodged either with our Gov
is ernment or with the United Ma
tionS?
" Gen. Marshall-I don't reca.
lie such.
sr Senator Cain What ar
Evening star., 1951-05-13
Combat Casualties
Very Low Now


Cat the conclusion of Senator
Gains examination, Senator Rus
sell questioned Gen. Marshall or
the movement of supplies from
Manchuria into North Korea
While pointing out that the bomb
ing of points inside North Korea
only, would have some effect or
the Communist supply source
Gen. Marshall referred the COM
mittee to the Joint Chiefs of staff
for more specific answer.)
Senator Lodge. In response
to Senator Cain, you stated that
the casualty rate had been falling
in Korea, and I wondered how
lit compared with the last siz
months, let's say. with the casualty
rate in World War II in Europe.
Do you have any idea what such
comparison would show?
Gen. Marshall Il don't know
how we would get at that unless
we took a certain phase of that
war when there was a general
troop advance or defense. Yor
could take a casualty rate in the
Battle Of the Bulge, for example
and get a very definite rate, anc
there I think the rate of casualtie.
was much heavier.
! At the present time the casualt,
rate is, considering combat, very
low. In the latter part of june
and in July and in August it wa.
high, particularly in terms O.
missing. I don't know how I coule
answer that, Senator. I will have
to look at the records and see /,
we can just take one piece thai
is comparable to the Korean
action.
Senator Lodge - Would yor
have any idea Of the ratio .o1
American casualties to enemy
casualties in this Korean war a.
compared with the war against
the Germans?
Gen. Marshall-I will have tt
Iget that information for you, sir
Could Have Stopped Eearlier.
] Senator Lodge - Using hind
sight. do you think it would hav
been better for all concerned i
our military effort had stopped a
the waist of Korea In the genera
neighborhood of the line Pyong
Evening star., 1951-05-13
FuIbright Sees
Compromise

Senator Fulbright-.. We had
unconditional victory In the last
war, did we not?
Gen. Marshall-Yes,s sir.
Senator Fulbright-We defeated
Germany and Japan uncondition-
ally.
Gen. Marshall-Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright-I would not
say that the result has been en-
tirely satisfactory, has it?
Gen. Marshall-It wouldn't seem
Iso. sir.
Senator Fullbright-So it looks
as if we are justified in examining
that idea Of unconditional sur
render, does it not?
Gen. Marshall-Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright Isn't that
what you really are approaching
in your policy in Korea, that you
are seeking a way that you can
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES Is bad
word. It has come to have a
meaning perhaps that is difficult
to explain, like the word "appease-
ment," which used to be a very
respectable word but now has be-
come word which you don't dare
to use in any connection, so we
will leave those two out, but aren't
we trying in Korea in a sense not
to go for all out victory in the
sense we did in the last war,
partly because we found that not
to be effective to achieve our pur-
poses. but to do something short
of that which in this instance is
to avoid war as long as we pos
sibly can, with the hope that we
may never have an all out war?
Isn't that what your real objective
lis?
Marshall Explains Purpose.
Gen. Marshall-That is the OBJ
jective to the extent that it first
appeared necessary to destroy the
aggreSsor considering the geogra-
phical situation and the continued
menace which would follow for
the South Korean government II
that aggressor from North Korea
remained in organized being.
Now. as I understood the ao-
plication Of the United Nations
action in the matter and our own
procedure in connection with it,
we were trying to bring to a
halt any idea of aggression, of
any people who attempt that sort
OF action. and particularly recog-
nizing that this was an aggres-
sion which was undoubtedly stim- .
| Continued on Page A-28, Col. ~
Evening star., 1951-05-13

into the matter OF his relief or
retention on duty.
Senator Cain. Gen. Mar
shall, were the views Of either the
civilian Secretary of the Navy or
the civilian Secretary of the Air
Force requested in connection with
the dismissal of Gen. Macarthur?
Gen. Marshall - Not to my
knowledge.
Senator Cain-Gen. Marshall, I
am advised that the Secretary Of
the Army is q member of the
Armed Forces Policy Council,
which advises the Secretary Of De-
fense on matters Of broad policy
relating to the armed forces.
Was the question Of Gen. Mac
Arthur's dismissal referred to that
Policy Board?
Gen. Marshall-It was not.
Senator Cain. ! have gath
cred then from your answers {.
that no civilian within the Depart
ment of Defense or the DEPART
ment of the Army was consulted
or had any influence in the dis
miSsal of Gen. Macarthur, is that
correct, sir?
Civilian Defense Secretary.
Gen. Marshall-I am supposed
to be the civilian Secretary Of
Defense. Out of my past I was a
soldier. MY answer would be that
I am the supposed civilian repre-
sentative of the Department Of
Defense. =.
Senator Cain Gen. Mar
shall, will you please relate any
conversations you had with Ad-
miral Sherman, with Gen. VAN
Idenberg, with Gen. Collins either
individually or collectively cover
ing. (a) the question of replacing
Gen. Macarthur in his several
commands, and (b) the method to
be followed in replacing the Cen
eral.
Gen. Marshall-I had no per-
sonal discussions with any one of
the three officials that you have
mentioned in the matter. Gen.
Bradley carried the questions to
the Chiefs of Staff and came back
with the information desired
which was largely one Of proce-
dure so far as military command
relationships were concerned, not
the political aspects, not the pub
lie aspects. ;.
Senator Cain-Gen. Marshall,
one last question about the Mac
Arthur question, please: Was.
either the chairman of the Sen
tate or the House Armed Services
Committees consulted regarding
the Macarthur removal?
Gen. Marshall-I cannot an
swer that. AS I said before, I got
the impression, if not the state
ment, of the President. that he
had seen several-I think he men
toned four. important leaders,
and discussed that with them on
Sunday, the ninth. Who they
were. I do not know, except one
case. and I would not state that.
Russell Denies Consultation.
Senator Cain-Well, may I ask
you this
Senator Russell I should
like to state in this connection
that I had no knowledge what
ever that this matter was even
under consideration. Since you
Involved me in that question, I
state further that I happened to
be out of the city at the time.
and I knew nothing about it un-
til the final order came to me
THAT action was taken.
Evening star., 1951-05-13
Marshall Explains
Changed Situation

Senator Cain Gen. Marshall,
does the United Nations COM
mander presently possess "all the
necessary military authority to re-
pei the aggressor army and restore
peace in Korea?
Gen. Marshall-Except as to al,
action. . (About 10 words de-
leted by censor.)
Senator Cain-Gen. Marshall, Il
Evening star., 1951-05-13
Stennis Questions
Choices in Korea

FOLLOWING is q partial tram
. script OF the afternoon teSti-
n,Ony..
Senator Stennis. Now,
there is some thought right along
that line. General, of what is 60
ing to involve Russia in the war
is a victory for us in Korea, and
that is the thought to the effect
that she is not going to let her
side, so to speak, lose. and if that
theory should be correct, why
quick victory over there-I mean
a bombing-or hope for a quick
victory through bombing-would
not be any worse than a slow So
luton through the present tactics,
would it?
Gen. Marshall. I wouldn't an
sWer-I couldn't answer that yes
or no. Because you have got
two factors in there. You have
got a very important factor in
there in that if you take one pres
entation there it would merely
mean that we don't do anything
for fear we win. Well, we
cannot accept that.
So. on the other hand, we are
fearful of this particular pro-
cedure's provoking it.
But our position before the
world is quite different if we have
been quite sincere and long -suf-
fering in endeavoring to avoid
such a development.
! Senator Stennis-Well, it boils
down, after all, in a very broad
way to the question of what will
Russia do? Or what is going to be
her position? That is the main
argument, and that is where the
real differences of opinion come
about, is it not, General?
Gen. Marshall-In general, yes
I think We feel that our great
opponent is the Soviet Union.
Intelligence Sources Asked.
Senator StenniS-. There has
been a great deal said about the
lack OF intelligence and the lack
OF cooperation among the diff
I1erent agencies of intelligence. As
say. it has a great bearing in my
thinking because 1t is quite disap-
pointing to me to see how far of
all OF them were at this Wake Is.
land Conference. Could you give
us any light on the operation o1
intelligence or should that come
better from the Chiefs of Staff:
leave that to you.
Gen. Marshall-I will saw this
Senator, and it is a rather touchy
subject.
Senator Stennis Well, I an
asking it just for light.
| Senator Connally Turn th,
light on.
! Gen. Marshall-It is q rathe,
touchy subject, particularly be.
cause it takes a long time to de.
velop an effective intelligence serv.
Ice such as we intend for the CIA
under Gen. Smith, and one of our
great difficulties as see it /.
the amount of public discussion
IN regard to it, because all of that
detractS against it.
think those special agencies
notably Great Britain and others
you never hear of them, I doubt
If you even know the designation
OF the unit. 1t is just kept entirely
out of discussion, comment, and
we have long way to go to reach
the point where we have more
authoritative sources. -.
Development Is Needed.
You could have a concentration
OF troops as threat and you could
have a concentration of troop.
with the definite intent to &c
ahead aggressively, but I believe
that we will be quite a while vel
before we have developed our Cen.
tral Intelligence Agency to the
point where it can give us more
accurate reports.
/ It is a problem not only of di.
Irection, but more particularly o1
opportunity for development, be.
Evening star., 1951-05-13

|ent time, sir, not in support at the
present time.
Cat this point the Committee
recessed for lunch.)
Evening star., 1951-06-10
By Burton Thompson

DENVER.-Residents of the
dry West-where there's COM
paratively little moisture but
lots of hope-are spending mil
lions to get rain.
Thousands of them have con-
tracted with commercial rain
makers to try to increase
rainfall or modify weather over
hundreds of millions of acres.
Scattered figures available on
financing add up to around $2.7
million and the target sections
total up to nearly 800 million
acres in an overall area cover
ing more than half the United
States.
Evening star., 1951-06-10
Dry West Fights Bottle of the Roinmokers

nature forms moisture on parti-
cles such as dust specks. The
rainmakers believe that there
frequently may be moisture for
rain in a cloud but not enough
particles. And they say that
artificially supplied matter. such
as silver iodide, forms raindrops
at higher temperatures than
natural particles.
They also explain that mois-
ture in some clouds remains
liquid despite below freezing
temperatures. In their idea,
dry ice seeded into clouds will
drop temperatures low enough
for droplets to freeze and form
their own particles. Or silver
iodide transfusions will give the
droplets something to form on
and freeze.
Either way, the theory is that
rain-or Snow-buildS up as a
comparatively small ice particle,
and when heavy enough falls
because of its own weight. II
it's warm below the ice meltS
Evening star., 1951-06-10
-AP Photo.

improvement. One major change
was to tip the mechanism on its
side so that the material could be
fed to the needle on a horizontal
plane. This made it possible to
run the machine continuously. He
was able to patent the improve
mentS.
Acceptance Of the machine was
slow. Singer, Snowman and pro-
moter. tirelessly demonstrated his
product at county fairs and exhi-
billions. He and his associates put
out the first home sewing machine
ins 1856-the turtle back" $125.
That was lot of money in those
days. So his canny partner, Law
yer Edward Clark, hit upon the
installment plan-so that a fam
lily with modest income could &C
|quire a sewing machine and have
the use of it during the long period
of paying for it. Later Singer fur
ther stimulated sales by paying
generous sums for used sewing
machines, applied on the price of
new ones.
Meanwhile, the Great Sewing
Machine War had broken out.
Various manufacturers and patent
Evening star., 1951-06-10
Roin Forms on Particles

Oversimplified. rainmaking is
seeding" of clouds with silver
iodide particles or other COM
binations. Some formulas are
closely guarded secrets of indi-
vidual business enterprises.
The idea-the theory-is that
Evening star., 1951-06-10

some doubt that what worked
in the laboratory and under
localized conditions will be
beneficial when attempted in
the wide open spaces.
Scientists and others, both
pro and con, agree that more
research is needed and that
evaluation of results will come
only in time.
There is total agreement that
you can't make rain. Only ma
ture can put moisture in a
cloud. The thing is to make her
give up some of it. That's why
those in the business prefer to
be called rain increasers."
Controversy Bitter
Claims on increases range,
from a little, up to 500 per cent.
Some display figures based on
official Weather Bureau meas
urements. Usually the figures
for a seeded period show greater
rainfall than in an unseeded
period. Some show figures for
a seeded area as compared to
an unseeded area which may be
adjoining. There are critics
who contend that rainmakers
use only figures and compari-
sons tending to put them in a
favorable light. Counter-critics
contend that a lot of the criti-
cism is sour grapes.
Not all weather modification
is aimed at moisture increase.
Fruit growers of the Northwest
want hail knocked out, rainfall
gentled. And pear growers in
Southern Oregon say that seed
ing from planes apparently does
the job. But, then, others in
the region don't like it.
fnirkr;h,An5 L. &h>