Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-11-20
CHAPTER. S.

CHAPTER B.
I I pointed out in 1945 that the
defects of the United Nations
Charter make it completely USE
less against the aggression of one
of the five permanent members.
i This result has been made ap-
parent sooner than might have
been expected by two facts--first
the revelation that Russian conf
munism has spirit of aggression
which recognizes no laws or obi
cations (as~ we were told by all
those who knew anything about
it,. and. second, an administra-
ton policy which deliberately built
Russia up to a position of dan
gerous power.
The concessions made at Tehe-
ran, Yalta and Potsdam and oul
later policies in the Far East were
such as to build up Soviet Russia
to position of power which today
does indeed present 4 threat tt
the security of the United States
Yalta Agreement Cited.
Harry Hopkins and Averel
Hartman apparently accepted
completely the idea that Russia
was a peace-loving nation, for il
is so designated in the joint Dec
laration on Liberated Europe
agreed to at Yalta. At Teheran
Roosevelt signed a declaration
welcoming all nations into a
world family of democratic ma
tions." of which Russia was APP
parently one in the eyes of Roose-
welt, Hopkins and Hartman.
| Henry Wallace, former Vice
President and at the time of Yalta
Secretary of Commerce. had made
speeches about the new democ-
racy," to be built by the people of
the United States and of Russia
He said that any one suggesting
that the aims and purposes of the
two peoples were irreconcilable
was criminal, that in some ways
Russia was more democratic than
America. Joseph E. Davies, Amer
lean Ambassador to Russia before
Hartman, expressed the view that
the Soviet leaders were sincerely
devoted to peace" and that what
they most desired was to live as
good neighbors in world at
peace
My own view is that the Com
muniSts in our Government, in
the labor unions and among the
writing fraternity in both New
York and Hollywood were con-
cerned with influencing people
who were in a position to affect
public opinion or public policy or
others who could influence such
people. They planted exactly the
philosophy which was adopted
that communism was probably
not the form of government for
the United States but that it was,
in fact, a form Of government
more or less consistent with Amer
lean ideals.
Soviet Motives Suspected.
I could never understand how
any man who went through even
an American high school could
reach such a conclusion. Com
munism, from my point of view,
denies every principle of Ameri-
canism.
At the Potsdam Conference
July 17-August 2. l945} for the
first time. apparently. some sus-
picions about Soviet good faith
began to arise in The minds of
those who were running American
foreign policy, particularly Secre-
tary Byrnes, but, nevertheless, at
PotSdam, President Truman re-
affirmed all the agreements made
at Yalta and approved the Nor
genthau policy in Germany and
even went beyond the Yalta agree
ment in some Of the workings out
Of that agreement. His agree
ments finally sealed the fate of
the Baltic peoples. of Poland, of
Czechoslovakia and of the Balkan
states.
From that time on our policy Of
conceding everything in Europe
to Russia was gradually changed.
I believe very largely under the
influence of Senator Vandenberg.
who. at San Francisco, saw how
completely impossible it was to
deal with the Russians. Working
with Vandenberg, Secretary
Byrnes finally refused to 60 along
with any plan which would give
Russia a predominating position
throughout Germany. He threat
ened to resign unless Henry Wal
lace was dismissed from the cabi-
net, and President Truman
compiled with his advice.
Gradually. in Europe our whole
position changed, and we took a
definite position against the ex-
panSion of Russian influence in
any degree. We adopted the
Marshall Plan, which proposed to
give assistance to countries
threatened by Russian iniltration
and from communism from
within.
Atlantic Pact Ratified.
We adopted a policy of giving
military aid to Turkey and
Greece, which were under direct
threat of attack by the Commu-
nists. We finally ratified the At
lantic pact and agreed to go to
war with Russia If it attacked any
member Of that pact.
In short, we completely reversed
our policy in Europe and adopted
the general policy of checking the
advance of communism n every
way in which 1t could possibly he
checked.
On the other hand, in the Far
East we continued to encourage
the growth of the power of COM
InuniSm