Evening star., 1951-04-11
The Firing Of Macarthur

The Firing OF Macarthur
The dismissal of General Macarthur from
his commands effectively asserts the authority
of Mr.. Truman as President and Commander in
Chief. And when the matter is viewed only in
this narrow focus, 1t does not appear that the
President had any real alternative.
It Is clear that General Macarthur had
consistently and deliberately ignored or circum-
vented admonitions from his superior to hold his
tongue. There is strong indication that he told
Secretary Of the Army Pace that he would con-
tinue to speak out on issues pertaining to Far
Eastern policy in which he is in deep and funda-
mental disagreement with the President. In
those circumstances, one of three things had to
happen. General Macarthur could be relieved,
he could resign, or the President could adopt
General MacArthur's views as his own. The
President chose to relieve the general and 1t was
not to be expected that Mr. Truman would adopt
any other course.
But the firing of General Macarthur does
nothing absolutely nothing, to solve the main
problem which brought about his dismissal. That
problem remains on the Truman doorstep, and
the people of this country should be very deeply
concerned with what the President intends to do
about it.
In his statement accompanying the an
nouncement of the generals dismissal, Mr..
Truman said that "full and vigorous debate on
matters Of national policy is vital element in
the constitutional system of our free democracy"
That comment should be taken with grain Of
salt. For the documents released by the White
House make it clear that the administration
has tried to silence or censor, not only General
Macarthur, but all of our military and dplo-
matte representatives The intent was to prevent
them from saying anything inconsistent with
our national policy, and while there are obvious
reasons for this the effect is to stide "full and
vigorous debate" by gagging all those who dis
agree with official policy. This is something
that should be kept in mind during the furious
controversy that will follow General MacArthurs
dismissal for it means that no official in active
military or diplomatic service will be permitted
to express his views if he happens to disagree
with administration policy
The firing of General Macarthur presumably
disposes, for the time at least Of some Of his
differences with the President. Mr.. Truman will
continue his efforts to confine the war to Korea,
to avoid general engagement in Asia. and to
concentrate our strength on snoring up the
defenses of Western Europe. This is policy
that is advocated by most Of our top military
and diplomatic officials, and it is clamorously
advocated by our associates in the u. N. Once
again, looked at in narrow focus, the policy,
despite General MacArthur's contrary views,
seems sound. To say the least, our rearmament
program has not advanced to the point at which
we could safely undertake . general war In the
Far East.
But neither this aspect Of the problem, nor
the question of civilian VS.. diplomatic authority,
can be divorced from the grim fact that we are
at war in Korea. And the overriding question is
how that war can be brought to q satisfactory
conclusion.
It is with respect to this question that Cen
eral MacArthurs position is strong, and the
Presidents is weak. For General Macarthur at
least had a program which offered some hope
of winning the Korean war. He wanted to at
tack the Chinese with air power in their Man
churian sanctuary, to blockade their ports. and,
evidently, to make some use of Chang Kai-shek's
100000 troops on the island of Formosa. Such
policy might have failed and certainly would
have involved grave risks But 1t was also a
policy which might have brought victory in
Korea.
What is Mr. Truman's policy in this respect?
He Is opposed to the Macarthur measures but
there is no indication that he has any idea
as to what might be done to win the Korean
war. Neither have our associates in the United
Nations. They were willing to fight the North
Koreans, but they have been backing away ever
since the Chinese Communists entered the war.
oOIIlc VI tIlcul SIQW SlSllS Vi WILLINGNESS W
settle on any terms they can get-even on terms
that would stultify our motives in going to war
and that would sell out the South Koreans
These Allies will bear close watching in the
days to come.
It is not in MIR. Truman's character to en-
brace such settlement But events will force
him to some kind of decision, for the indica-
tions are that the war is entering upon phase
Of intolerable stalemate. Our Army cannot be
kept there forever. Neither is 1t conceivable
that it can be withdrawn on terms that would
amount to q betrayal Of the South Korean
people who have suffered so much in the name
of high moral purpose. Before the President
has resolved this thorny dilemma he may well
come to envy the commander whom he has
seen At to relieve Of all responsibility In the
matter.
Jusf Plain Foofishness