Evening star., 1951-01-21

but still insuffciently equipped.
the armed forces of the free coun-
tries. The Arab population in that
area can become sympathetic to
our cause if properly handled. So
Wet agents have tried since 1945
to instill communism among
them. but by and large they have
failed. The present lukewarm
attitude of these people toward US
could be changed into real friend
ship if we and our Allies play our
cards more intelligently than here
tofore.
The Importance of the existing
and ready forces in the Mediter-
ranean cannot be overestimated.
If we were to assume that Moscow
has decided to strike across the
Rhine and from CZechoslovakia
into Southern Germany next sum-
mer, we would have to recognize
that present Allied forces-even
if we did send five more divisions
to Germany in the meantime
could possibly resist for a few
weeks.
ADVANTAGES Listed
Retreats are demoralizing, not
only to the fighting men but also
to the highly nervous civilian pop
ulation. The mess which would
follow a retreat might precipitate
full military defeat.
The immediate arming OF the
nations would
offer the following advantages:
Cd Spain, properly armed.
would become a fortress offering
the retreating armies a safe
refuge before offensive action
could be undertaken by the
combined Allied forces from that
(2) The Yugoslavs, Greeks and
Turks-properly supported by the
Air Force and with the
lanes kept open by
the Allied feet-could undertake
an early offensive against Russia's
soft underside, namely, Bulgaria.
Hungary and Czech
oslovakia.
The Russians already are con-
cerned over that possibility. The
recent arrival of Marshal Ivan
Konev in Czechoslovakia and the
reported sent from
the Ukraine into the various Gen.
trail European satellite countries
indicate that the Soviet general
staff is not likely to be caught
mapping.
The armies of these satellites
are not reliable, in spite OF
numerous purges in the ranks Of
the officers. These Europeans, who
enjoyed comparative freedom for
many years, are not like the
Chinese Communists, who for GEN.
turies have been accustomed to
impressment into the armies OF
the warloads, where they have
had to fight for a pittance.
Since Tito's custer from the
Soviet bloc in the Balkans there
is not a single Red puppet with
the strength Of Mao Tze-tung.
The Moscow-appointed leaders
are not strong. Moreover. the
accustomed to inde-
pendent national life. is resigned
at present to acceptance of a
power which it cannot overthrow.
but there are sure indications
that those people would fight only
half-heartedly for the Russians
and would welcome a chance to
shake off the Russian yoke.
The governments OF Western
Europe are more anxious to avoid
a Soviet aggression-Which is un-
derstandable and logical-than to
fight it. They know that while
Communism is receding. 1t is still
very strong in France, Italy and
the Benelux countries. So long
as economic revival was being
the people were behind
the governments in those eoun-
tries and communism. although
vociferous, was not dangerous.
Attitude Differs
The situation could change over
night in the event Of sudden Soviet
aggression. The prospects of an
other devastation, produced by
planes and land battles, make
Western Europeans shudder more
than the peoples of the Mediter-
ranean basin. 1t is no exaggera-
ton to say that these people would
prefer temporary servitude under
the Communists to a finish fight
in which their cities and industrial
plants might be destroyed.
The Western European nations
except Britain, which is outside
the continent of Europe-have
been accustomed for centuries to
lnvasions and domination by alien
powers. The people have learned
to get along the best they could
with the foreigners who came to
their land. France, the Low
and the Italian cities
which were united in one nation
only in the last half of the 18th
century - have been occupied
dozens of times by alien armies.
Another occupation will be un-
pleasant, but less hard to bear
than another war.
There is no argument among
our political and military leaders
on the issue that Europe must be
saved for the sake of our own
security. But the question be-
fore us now is where we can apply,
best our military and industrial
power. bearing in mind the stark
reality that Russia may strike
long before the present Atlantic
pact paper armies become actual
forces, that is to say
within the next two. three or four