Evening star., 1951-10-31
Hard to Follow

Senator Taft's comments on the uselessness
OF the United Nations as means of preventing
aggression may have been nothing more than q
bit OF campaign oratory. If that is the case they
need not be taken seriously, although it would be
regrettable if man who may be the next Presi-
dent of the United States were to trifie with such
serious question.
The other-and more probable-assumption
is that Senator Taft was quite serious. And In
that event the logic, or the lack of logic in his
position becomes important
What the Senator actually said was that the
U. N. has proved an utter failure as means
OF preventing aggression, and that 1--WE can never
depend on 1t again."
That statement may be open to challenge
on two grounds. 1t is a questionable statement,
IN the first place, to the extent that it implies
that there is reason to be surprised that the
U. N did not prevent the Korean aggression No
sensible person ever supposed that the u ~, as
constituted, could prevent" aggression The
best that could reasonably have been expected
was that it would discourage aggression, and
that, If an attack should be made, it would
provide machinery for resisting aggression.
1t also seems little early In the game, on
the basis of the Korean experience, to say that
we can never depend on the U. N. again. In
Korea, granting that we are carrying the lions
share OF the burden, the U. N. at least is wagng
a war against an aggressor. And after some IS
months of fighting the aggressor has been fought
to standstill Nothing like this has happened
before in our time, and despite Senator Taft's
pesSimism it may well be that the experience
OF Korea will serve as very powerful deterrent
On future aggression.
Suppose, however, that the Ohio Senator is
correct. Suppose the U. N has been an utter
q cnfvr
that we cannot depend on it again. If these
assumptions arc made, then two questions arise:
Cd Why did the U. N fail to prevent aggression
In Korea, and (2) what alternative is there to
depending on U. N in the future?
1t seems fairly obvious that the u N failed
to prevent aggression in Korea because it had
no military forces to discourage the aggressor
There can be little doubt that if the U. N army
now fighting in Korea had been ready trained
and equipped in June OF 1850, that act of ag-
gresson would never have occurred Aggressors
strike when they think they can win They are
not apt to strike If powerful and determined
military force is arrayed against them.
If it be said that the U. N, In the future,
will not have such force, and in any event
would not be able to use it because of the
Security Counci veto power, then it follows that
the free nations must turn to something else
And that is precisely what is being done today
In Western Europe under General Eisenhower
There, and in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East. we and our associates are trying to build
military force that will be effective in prevent
ing aggression, and upon which we can depend
If aggression comes.
If Senator Taft has lost all faith in the
U. N, one would expect him to throw his full
support to such project as this. But he has
not done so. He voted against the Atlantic pact.
And although his subsequent position has been
unclear, ne certainly has not been by any means
wholehearted hacker of the Eisenhower project.
Perhaps there is logic in this position But.
II so, 1t is hard to follow.