Evening star., 1951-01-09
Withdrew From Koreo2

II MafSnal Tito OF YugoSlavla has made a
correct evaluation in declaring that the position
OF our American and allied United Nations forces
in Korea has now become "strategically futile D
then Senator Taft is on sound ground in ad-
vocating-as Tito also has advocated-that those
forces be withdrawn from the country and as
signed to tasks of more fruitful nature.
The case for such a withdrawal-again as
suming that the u N. position is in fact "stra-
logically futile-can be argued very persuasively.
Certainly, if nothing of value be accom-
pliShed by slow, fighting retreat to defensive
line designed to hold bridgehead for a pro-
tracted period the speedy evacuation of our
troops would seem to be called for as matter
OF common sense. They can be employed to
good effect elsewhere Our American divisions.
for example still essential to the security of
Japan, and elements of them can be used ef-
fectively in connection with the training of the
army we are now beginning to build up here
at home.
With that said, however, certain reservations
must be added. In the first place, there is at
least some reason to believe that it may not be
"strategically futile" for the United Nations to
try to hold on in Korea as long as possible. True
enough, short of an al-out war with Red China
which the free world does not want and which
probably would set off a global explosion-there
is virtually no hope that the U. ~ can roll back
the numerically superior Communists and unity
the Korean people under an independent and
democratic government of their own choosing
Even so, in both a political and military sense
strong argument can be made against the idea
that our allied forces should be withdrawn forth
with, regardless of whether or not they are
capable of lighting a long delaying action at
minimum cost to themselves.
In support of this argument as against the
Taft-Tito view, such considerations as the fol-
lowing may be cited: % If it can hold on by
a slow, fighting retreat involving relatively small
casualties the United Nations ought to do so
In order to win enough time to provide a safe
haven for the great numbers of free Koreans
who are in flight from the aggressors and whose
fate will be grim if they are abandoned IN a
swift and sudden allied withdrawal. ca There
Is possbty-though exceedingly remote
that long delaying action, infiicting heavy
losses on the enemy, might persuade Peiping to
reconsider its rejection of a cease-fre aimed at
promoting an honorable negotiated settlement.
t3) Before it quits Korea-if it must quit-the
U. N. should punish the aggression there to the
greatest extent possible. And (4) the longer the
Chinese Communists can be pinned down in that
theater, and the more their losses in men and
material, the better the chance of upsetting
their timetable of attack elsewhere in Asia,
hotdply IN 1ndo-Cnlna.
Needless to say, If these and similar politi-
cal-military considerations make sense, or If the
U. N. command under General Macarthur and
our own security agencies in this country regard
them as valid, then it is too early to dismiss as
"Strategically futile" the effort of our allied
forces to retreat slowly and hold ON as long as
they can in Korea Actually, of course the pres
sures being exerted by Red China's massive
armies may make this whole subject rather
academic by obliging us in the near future to
undertake haSty evacuation in order to avoid
a disastrous Dunkrk. In that case however, the
world Will have reason to recognize the with
draWal as fighting withdrawal made with
honor against odds too heavy, and in a theater
relatively not important enough, to justify
battle to the finish
Finally, If this withdrawal must be made
whether soon considerable time from now
the United States and the United Nations as a
whole should carry it out in way that will serve
notice on all peoples that it represents a lost
battle, not lost war, and that the struggle to
uphold freedom, decency and the rule of law
in the world will continue unabated regardless
OF the setback in Korea. To that end, one of
the first things that the U. NJ ought to do
and it can hardly delay much longer without
stultlfying itself-is to brand Red China as q
criminal aggressor. That at least will keen the
historical record straight.