Evening star., 1951-06-03

ALI ono 40.
Far East policy that such an
armistice would accomplish the
United Nations military pur-
poses" of freeing South Korea of
the Red invaders.
However, he added that he
knew of no present peace negotia-
lions or Communist truce pro-
posalS.
The secretary also told the Sen
ators during their 25th day of
hearings following the removal of
Gen. Macarthur as Far East COM
mander:
/. The oil dispute between Iran
and Britain is too explosive for
him to discuss publicly this coun-
try's efforts to arrange settle
ment. 1t might easily deteriorate
into a situation out of which war
could grow" he declared. He
added that if need for committing
American troops in that area
should develop he was sure Presi-
dent Truman would consult Con-
gressional leaders.
FOrmOSan Invasion Possible.
2. He sees mo immediate posi-
bility" of a break between the
Chinese Reds and Moscow, but
believes the basic conflict be-
tween Chinese and Soviet interests
might lead to f1ssure eventually.
3. The State Department recon-
mended against using Chinese Ma
tionalist troops in Korea because
they are needed for the defense
of Formosa, whereit is altogether
possible" the Chinese Reds might
make landings despite efforts of
the United States 7th Fleet as
signed to neutralize the island.
4. Great Britain and France are
unwilling to go as far as the
United States in imposing sane
tions on the Chinese Communists.
5. Because this country has had
"some success, but not complete
success" in getting economic re-
strictions imposed, he sees as
rather academic" talk of impos-
ing a U. N. naval blockade of
China. The imposition of a naval
blockade of North Korea was not
step which involved an extern
sion of hostilities, whereas to
impose one on China would raise
much more difficult and danger
Gus questions"
Opposes Manchurian Bombing.
6. He opposes bombing Man
churian baseS-as advocated by
Gen. Macarthur - because it
would materially increase" the
risk of a general war.
7. No part of the State Depart
ment has ever favored the Com
munist regime in China against
the NationalistS and the depart
ment never advised the British
this Government would eventually
recognize Red China.
8. He is under direct instruc-
tions" from President Truman not
to reveal what was said in White
House conferences leading to the
Macarthur firing.
9. Immediate effect of Gen. Mac
Arthur's custer in Japan was a
''very considerable shock" but
the situation there is "very large
ly restored" as a result of as
surances that there would be no
policy changes. Some "uneasi-
ness" is being caused in Japan
by reports of the committees in
quiry.
Explains Basis for Accord.
Mr.. Acheson has explained re-
peatedly during his two days of
hearings before the joint COM
mittee that there is a distinc-
ton between the military and
long-range political purposes of
this country's effort in Korea.
Militarily, he said, expulsion of
the Red aggressorS from South
Korea is sought, while politically
the purpose is the formation of
free Korean republic composed
of both North Korea and South
Korea.
Explaining that this Govern
ment might agree to a "real set
tlement that would accomplish
the military purposes" he said:
THAT is, if the aggression would
end and you had reliable assur-
ances that it would not be re-
sumed, then you could return to
a peacetime status and we would
hope gradually to remove the
troops from Korea, both Chinese
troops and United Nations troops"
Smith Disputes Statement.
Senator Smith, Republican, of
New Jersey, disputed the Secre-
tary's statement and said that a
truce along the parallel would
simply be stopping where we be-
gan" and would be a waste of
thousands of American lives.
Senator, if you accomplish
what you started out to do" re-
tsee FOREIGN POLICY, Pg. A-so