davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
, 1951-11-06
tar'y.

AS Commissioner of Industry
you organized a small hook rug
enterprise in St. Thomas which
was later placed in private hands
and abandoned because of .un-
favorable tariff conditions. In as
ISOLATION with the late Governor
Paul M. Pearson, you organized
and headed the Home and School
ASSOCIATION, which later became
the Virgin Islands Cooperatives
for the manufacture and market
ing of local handcraft. You con
Quoted, on behalf of the
Department of the Interior, nego-
tIatlons for the purchase of the
Bluebeard Castle property for the
purpose of tourist accommodation.
After bringing two groups of fl
nanclerS to the Virgin Islands for
the purpose of attempting a con
so1ldatlon of the sugar interests of
St. Croix, and receiving their I'M
favorable report. you drafted the
original plan and suggestions for
the late Governor Pearson for
setting up a government organi-
cation which became the Virgin
Islands Company, now the Virgin
| 81 an d S Corporation. Tooe+nor
with a representative of the US.
Department of Agriculture. Won
established a cannery in Saint
Thomas which exported soursop
Juice and canned mangoeS to the
United States. This small industry
was turned over to private capital,
but was later discontinued.
AS Homestead Administrator
you were responsible for the dis
tribution of homeSteadS at Man
dahl and Lindbergh Bav in Saint
Thomas, and for distribution of
approximately 5000 acres of
homestead land in st. Croix. unon
which were constructed APPROX
mately 100 loW-cost houses.
AS Administrator for ST. Croix
you have conducted the govern
ment's activities on that Island on
a high plane of efficiency and in
tegrity. 1t is a lasting tribute to
your courage and persistence that
substantially all monies borrowed
for meeting municipal deficits in
ST. Croix during the past years
have been repaid and the public
and trust funds are in sound fnan
cial shape. You served as Presi-
dent of the Virgin Islands Cor
poration. without cnn~nnra+;o~
during the last forty days Of your
Office.
, 1951-11-06
APPRECIATION

Until haue chance to thank
each one personally, I ask my
friends to accept this uncon-
centional toord Of thanks and
appreciation for their enqui-
site gift presented at dinner
last Wednesday. It OH azoays
recall those Friendships and
associations it so beautifulu
evidences.
Harry E.. Taylor
, 1951-11-06

October 81, 1851
Hon. Harry E. Taylor,
Administrator for st. Croix,
Christiansted,
st. Croix, Virgin Islands.
My dear Mr.. Taylor:
Today you retire from the SER
vice of the federal government in
the Virgin Islands by reason of
the mandatory provisions of the
Civil Service Retirement Act,
having reached the age of 70 with
over fifteen years service.
AS Governor, and as the only
official of the Virgin Islands Gov
eminent who has been closely as
ISOLATED with you since your
arrival here in March 1881, I wish
to embrace this opportunity to
express my lasting gratitude and
appreciation for all you did during
those momentous years to Tighten
the burden of the Executive. It is
with personal gratitude I salute
your accomplishments.
/ wish also to embrace this OPP
portunity to correlate the many
outstanding facets of your en-
blazoned service record with the
very definite progress which these
Islands have experienced, and
continue to accrue, over the past
two decades of your association
with the affairs of the Govern
ment of the Virgin Islands.
Arriving in st. Thomas on
March II, 1881 with the original
cabinet of Governor Paul M. Pear
son, you served as Commissioner
Of Industry of the Virgin Islands
until January l., 1886, when you
were appointed Homestead Admin
istrator. Within that period you
served as Project Manager for the
Subsistence Homesteads Projects
n the Virgin Islands from July %,
1884 and this in addition to your
other duties. On July 16, 1886 you
were appointed Administrator for
st. Croix without compensation,
again in addition to your duties
as Homestead Administrator.
On January /, 1897 you were
permanently appointed as Admin
istrator for st. Croix, with com
pensation, which position you
have held until today. On several
occasions, you have served as Act
ing Governor of the Virgin Islands
during the absences OF the Gov
ernor and the Government Secre-
, 1951-11-06

PENTHENY LINES, Inc.
CHRISTIANsTED, ST.cRoIx. VT
Or
lnter-isldnd Service
The Ships That Scrue
The Shipper"

your service in the Virgin Islands
mas peen marked by the highest
Standard OF pleasant and construc-
i've relationships. I know it must
be a satisfastion to you TODAY that
you are leaving this field If va,
endeaVor with the fullest a~pprecia-
1lon OF your colleagues. Please
accent our best wishes for good
health and happiness in the years
to como. o'
Sincerely yours,
Morris F. de Castro,
Governor.
, 1951-11-06

tributes to former Administrator for St. Croix
HARRY E. TAYLOR
tributes paid TO Mr.. Taylor by Governor de Castro, Administrator
Canegata and former Tax Assessor Ralph de chabert o n the oc-
casion OF his retirement after 81 years of service will be published
in sequence)
, 1951-11-06

October 81, 1851
Evening star., 1951-06-11

Japanese Treaty and Disunitv
British View on Far East Raises Question of Sincerity
While Fronce IS Center of New Controversy
Constantine Brown:

Allied unity, already subject to
many stresses and strains-not
the least of which is the dis
appearance Of two British dip
lomatS who could compromise
o-American diplomatic Sc
crets-is undergoing fresh dis
turbance with respect to the
Japanese peace treaty.
What was believed at one time
to be a pretty well settled mat
ter of concluding peace with
Japan by midsummer, now has
turned into fresh subject of
controversy and division, at a
time when the need is urgent for
tight lines OF cooperation, par
ticularly among the United
States, Britain ana France.
Both Paris ard London figure
in the new difficulties, which
John Foster Dulles, Republican
adviser to the State Department,
Is trying to clear up on his
present visit to Europe. That
there were differences with Brit
ain on the treaty is a matter Of
long-standing knowledge, al
though it was believed that Mr..
Dulles trip to London would
remove the last of those. What
Is new is the rift with France.
Frances position appears to
be that the Allies should post
pone signing peace treaty with
Japan now, in order to avoid
provoking Russia, and that in
dividual nations should make
direct diplomatic and economic
arrangements with that coun-
try similar to those which have
been made with Western Ger
many.
The British position is much
more complex, involving as it
does Britain's ideas that the
Japanese treaty should be in
the traditional victor-van-
quished relationship as opposed
to the American idea Of a treaty
OF reconciliation which would
Evening star., 1951-06-11

restore Japanese sovereignty in
all fields.
The principal British conten-
ton now, as it has been all
along, is that Communist China
should be taken into the treaty
negotiations in preference to the
Chinese Nationalists. The Amer
lean Government, it is reported,
was ready to leave the question
up to the Japanese themselves,
after a treaty is concluded, but
this the British cabinet is said
to have turned down.
The Formosa issue, too, re-
mains to plague this country's
effort to get a prompt settle
ment in the Far East, which
will permit us to rearm Japan
as an ally in a Pacific defense
system which will include Aus
tralia and New Zealand. The
British want Formosa disposed
OF in the treaty to China
whatever such a term is sup
posed to mean today-while the
United States wants nothing
done in the treaty which would
give FormoSa to the Chinese
Communists.
Adding to the conflict on
these two points is the British
insistence on getting reparations
out Of Japan's $200-million
gold reserve, and on limiting
japanese shipbuilding. Preser-
vation Of the gold reserve and
freedom for Japanese to build
ships-which might be badly
needed in any new conflict
are parts of the American argu-
ment that Japan should be given
every encouragement to restore
herself on a sound economic
basis.
1t will do Allied unity no good
II this country, in order to carry
through its plans for defense of
the Pacific, is forced to conclude
its own treaty with Japan in
Evening star., 1951-06-11
F7er1Ty NICLen1OTe
'Nicest Golfer of All Time
Once Looked Like Refuqee
Henry McLemore:

Three or four nights ago,
Jimmy Demaret was given a
testimonial dinner, and 1t set
me to thinking about testimo-
NAL dinners.
I have yet to go to testi-
monial dinner given to a man
Just starting out. That's the time
a man could use a testimonial
dinner. It would give him bus
fare, laundry money and a blue
plate lunch.
It cost $25 to go to Demaret's
testimonial dinner. For that you
got what Toots ordinarily gives
you for S.. The extra $40, I
guess, was to look at Jimmy.
AS I chewed my steak. and
had my pipe lighted by atten-
tive walters, I let my eyes roam
over the men who. on this day
in 1851, loved Jimmy.
why are Lney nere! ! asked
myself.
Running with a winner? That's
exactly what I decided.
My mind Travelled back to
Pinehurst. when Demaret was a
kid. No good sticks. Shoes didn't
match. Old clothes all over him.
Jim looked like a refugee from
a refugee camp.
It was a cold day at Pine
hurst. Play had ended, and !
was sitting in the bar. Walter
Hagen came in. He told me to
go out to the practice tee and
look at a kid who could hit the
ball.
Evening star., 1951-06-11
Doris FIeeson:
Doris Eeeson:
Mr.. Truman Off the Defensive
Two Men Are Responsible, One ShomefuIy Treated
By Democrats, And the Other Just Southerner

The big political news Of the
day is that long last the Tru-
man administration has got off
the defensive.
Ironically, of the two men
chiefly responsible, one has been
shamefully treated by the Dem
ocrats in Congress and the
other, being a Southerner, has
never had any real co-opera-
ton from the White House in
his efforts to end the party
SchiSm.
Timidity is the occupational
disease of politicians but the
Democrats built it to new
highs when with rare excep-
tions they failed to defend Mr..
Acheson and thus their own
Evening star., 1951-06-11

conjunction with as many others
OF the IA nations which fought
Japan as desire to go along with
us.
The French position is no.
where nearly as disturbing as
the British. But London's ada
mant refusal, even to meet con-
cession with concession, is going
to do much to stir up doubt in
this country as to Britain's sin
cerity in her participation on
the Western side of global poll
tics.
1t is recognized, Of course,
that Britain's interest in the
Far East, where she has had to
sacrifice a great deal in prestige
and position since World War
II. Is far less than her direct
interest in Europe. She feels
that she can temporize with
Communism in China in a way
that she would never dream of
doing in Europe.
Taken with the rebuff given to
Henry Grady. the American am
bassador to Iran, In his efforts
to mediate in the Iranian oil
dispute, Britain's refusal to 20
along with us in the Far East
threatens to add fresh strength
to suspicious in this country
about Britain's position. She
still appears to think that she
can work both sides OF the street
to the maximum benefit of her
own interests and without re-
gard for the needs of those on
whom she leans most heavily in
preparation for the real test.
One of the crying needs
at this moment in British
American relations is some fresh
evidence from the London gov
ernment that Britain stands
four-Square with us, as we have
stood with her through many
crises. 1t has been a long time
since we had such evidence.
Evening star., 1951-06-11
Thomas L. Stokes:

Antagonisms that develop be-
tween Presidents. and another
top-ranking figure in their party
are intriguing. More than that,
they are often significant be-
cause of the influence on the
course of events and-if you
please-history.
If they get bitter enough, we
political reporters come to call
them by that short and ex-
preSsive four-letter word
'feud." That has It's peculiar
meaning in a yet young nation
that still cherishes the legends
of its Western plains and it's
Southern mountain recesses
where the family Bible, with it's
f1y-leaf family history, the jug.
and the rifle were in close and
explosive proximity.
In this current Administra-
ton we have had what is politely
called a "break" between Presi-
dent Truman and his one time
Secretary of State, James F.
Byrnes, which might be in the
catalogue of a ''feud" since a
sometime ick-tempered Mis-
sourian and a more subtle South
Carolinian are involved. This
may become important politi-
cally later if Jimmy Byrnes, now
governor of South Carolina.
should decide to use that stra-
tegic position to organize like
minded fellow Southerners
against the President. or the
Fair Dealism which Mr.. Byrnes
deplores, in 1852.
Another Goodness that has
developed between President
Truman and an increasingly
influential Democratic leader
also may cast its shadow into
1852. The other party here
referred to is Senator Paul H.
Douglas of Illinois, quite a sub
stantial fellow who has achieved
unusual prominence in Con-
gress for a freshman member
and is beginning to attract no
tice nationally, of which, being
human, he is conscious.
All of this assumes political
Importance. If President Tru-
man does not run again, he
nevertheless expects to have
something to say about who
does. If he does not run again,
Senator Douglas is expected to
be among the contenders for
the nomination.
Unlike Jimmy Byrnes, Sen
ator Douglas is generally cata-
logued in the Fair Deal camp
politically and philosophically,
though with exceptions.
His offenSe, so far as the
President is concerned. was his
active part in the 194S move
ment sponsored by ex-New
Dealers and some labor groups
to sidetrack Harry Truman and,
instead, draft Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower for the nomination
Evening star., 1951-06-11
David LoWrence:

The American people have
not yet been told the true
story in actual sequence con-
corning the proposed evacua-
tion of Korea last January.
The reason for this is that
a key message-without which
everything that has been testi-
fed to in the last flve weeks is
not Observation-Disclosures been
withheld from the Senate in
vestigating committee. It is in
timated by some Senators that
this is attributal either to a
carelesSness in paraphrase or
a deliberate attempt to conceal.
The piecemeal and confus-
ing method of presenting to
the Senate committee the mes
sages which passed between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Gen. Macarthur is really due
partly to carelessness and part
ly to the failure of the Sena-
tors themselves to demand the
proper sequence and to COM
pare all the paraphrased mes
Sages with the originals.
The significance of the omis-
sions is that it turns out now
that Gen. Macarthur was vir-
tually ordered in January by
the Joint Chiefs to abandon
Korea and he was reminded
pointedly that the defense of
Japan was still a primary
mission" Being unable to han
die both the mission of re-
sisting in Korea and defending
Japan with the small forces he
had, Gen. Macarthur called
for reinforcements. He pointed
out that the Chinese National
lists could be used. that our
own Air Force and Navy were
being only partially utilized.
He asked for a decision at the
highest level and got it-Presi-
dent Truman who had ap-
proved all the previous mes
sageS wrote a special message
which, while not giving the
general directive, did encour-
age him to make the decision
in favor of staying in Korea.
But what's more important
and this isn't shown by the
messages - Gen. Macarthur
was given reinforcements from
the United States even though
the Joint Chiefs had previously
declined to send him any. Four
extra divisions. moreover, were
sent to Japan and this relieved
the strain on the mission to
protect Japan.
The story of what happened
as taken in chronological order
from the messages may be
summed up about as follows:
December 20, 1950-On this
day a key message was sent to
Gen. Macarthur by the Joint
Chiefs. It was improperly para
phrased early in the hearings
and most of the vital point omit
ted. It has finally been put into
the record but even now i'm
portant information has been
omitted though it has nothing
to do with security.
Gen. Macarthur was advised
in this message that his basic
directive which had been to fur
nish assistance to the Re-
public of Korea and repel at
tack and restore to the area Sc
curity and peace" was "modi-
fed" It was emphasized that
Evening star., 1951-06-11

his primary mission" was also
the defense Of Japan and that
the 9th Army was needed for
the protection of Japan, that
1t was not practicable to obtain
at this time additional forces
from the other United Nations
and that the Joint Chiefs didn't
believe commitment of addi-
tional ground forces Of the
United States should be made"
This message was the subject
Of conferences in Washington
over a period of three days be-
fore 1t was sent and President
Truman, Assistant Secretary of
State Rusk, Secretary Marshall
and Gen. Bradley all approved it.
December 80. 1950-Gen. Mac
Arthur sent a long message to
the Joint Chiefs pointing out
that United States Air Force
and Navy potential were not
being fully used, that a naval
blockade could be authorized
and that he be permitted to
bomb enemy concentrations in
Manchuria as well as Chinese
industrial targets but that if
no reinforcements of any kind
were coming he agreed with the
tactical estimate that it would
be better to evacuate. He point
ed out, however. that a forced
evacuation" without retaliatory
action against Red China would
have a most adverse effect on
the peoples Of Asia and particu-
larly Japan and in the end it
would call for greater rein-
forcementS Of troops than we
had then in the Far East.
January 8, 1951-The Joint
Chiefs sent a directive to Gen.
Macarthur telling him that his
various proposals were not prac-
ticable and that a naval block
ade by the United Nations was
not likely to be approved be-
cause of British trade with Com
munist China through Hong
Kong and that the effort to-
impose an economic blockade
was being intensified. 1t told
him fatty that Strengthening
of our effort in Korea does not
appear justified"
January 10, 1951-Gen. Mac
Arthur sent a message to the
Joint Chiefs stating that the
instructions given him about
using his troops in Korea for
the primary mission" in Japan
needed Qualification" He asked
the point-blank question wheth-
er he was to stay in Korea in
definitely, stay for a limited Pc
riod. or evacuate at once. He
said that, if policy considera-
tions required, his force could
hold out "for any length Of
time up to its complete de-
struction." He asked for a de-
cision at the highest level as
he felt that it was a matter
which should not be left to the
discretion of the theater COM
mander.
January IL, 1951-The Joint
Chiefs responded with a mill
tary directive saying 1--WE are
forced to the conclusion, based
upon all the factors known to
us, including particularly those
presented by you in your recent
message, that it is infeasible
under existing conditions, in
cluding sustained major effort
by Communist China, to hold
the position in Korea for a pro-
tracted period" because it was
Evening star., 1951-06-11
Dovid LonMence
How u. S. Was to Quit in Korea
The Senate Investigation Picked Up the Facts Piecemeo
And They Show Something Wrong in Top Commend

not desired ''to fight q major
war In Korea" It was further
pointed out to Gen. Macarthur
that 1t was important to United
Nations prestige "that Korea
not be evacuated unless forced
by military considerations" This
could have meant that Gen.
Macarthur had to sacrifice the
9Th Army and that he could not
make q voluntary withdrawal
even If conditions required it.
January 13, 1951-President
Truman sent q personal mes
sage directly to Gen. MacAr-
thur emphasizing policy factors
and stating that the message
was not q directive" The Pres
ident passed the buck on the
question Of evacuation but put
such emphasis on the impor-
tance Of successful resistance"
in Korea that it impressed Gen.
Macarthur that this was what
he really wanted despite the
confusing message Of the Joint
Chiefs OF staff on the preced-
ing day. In the message Mr..
Truman spoke of various ad-
vantages Of successful resist
ance" including the necessity Of
gaining "time to give direct as
sistance to the organization of
non-Communist resistance to
Asia, both outside and inside
China.
January Is to 16-Gen. Col
Inns and Gen. Vandenberg of
the Joint Chiefs were in Tokyo
comforting with Gen. MacAr-
thur. They had left Washing
ton before the Presidents per-
sonal message Of January 13
was sent so they discussed 1t in
a conference with Gen. Mac
Arthur and his senior officers.
Gen. Collins thought it meant
to stay in Korea for only a lin
tied period. Gen. Vandenberg
was inclined to accept Gen.
MacArthur's Interpretation that
it meant to stay and resist in
definitely. The issue turned on
the matter of reinforcements.
AS consequence of the visit Of
Gen. Collins. Gen. Macarthur
was subsequently given a prom
iSe OF enough troops to bring up
his divisions to full strength
very stable number of REIN
forcements. Likewise four extra
divisions were ordered to Japan
and thus the strain of the pro-
lection of the defense of Japan"
with the 9th Army was relieved.
The final words Of the Janu-
ary 13 personal message from
Mr.. Truman had said to Gen.
Macarthur that "the entire Ma
ton is grateful for your splen-
did leadership in the difficult
struggle in Korea" Gen. Mac
Arthur telegraphed back "I'u do
my best" He few to Korea to
tell Gen. Ridgway to take the
word evacuation" out Of the
9th Army's vocabulary.
That's the true story Of what
happened and any thought that
Gen. Macarthur just wanted to
expand the war for wars sake
Is rebutted by the facts-he
was denied reinforcements and
given an impossible directive to
fulfill. He got his reinforce
ments for both Korea and Japan
and then fought on. The whole
thing shows that there is some
thing vitally wrong at the top
command In Washington.
Evening star., 1951-06-11

So I walked out. A boy kept
hitting golf balls. He hit 'em
good.
said. MY names McLemore,
and Hagen told me to watch
you"
Jimmy said okay, and hit all
the shots Hagen said he would.
The boys who shagged his shots
didn't have to move very much.
I went back and wrote a story
about Jimmy. My story wasn't
wrong. He won.
He was a character.
Athletes who show of and
can't deliver don't last long.
Sports writer's. take care Of a
lot Of athletes. Most athletes
are-well, pretty dumb. Can't
talk. Just rub their red necks.
Quote them without saying
what they meant to say, and
you get ignorance. Real good
ignorance, too.
Demaret isn't that sort Of
guy. He can sing. He can play
a brassie. He can putt when the
chips are down.
Let me put Jimmy this way.
The best golfer Of all time:
Byron Nelson.
The second best golfer Of all
time: Ben Hogan.
The incest golfer of all time,
with no - repeat no excep-
tions: Jimmy Demaret. No golfer
and when I make a fiat state
ment like that I am including
Craig Wood-ever was quite as
nice as Jimmy.
distributed by McNausht Syndicate. Inc.
Evening star., 1951-06-11

erals nomination on both tick
cts with each party then to
select its own vice presidential
candidates.
Asked about this, the Presi-
dent, with a canny smile,
merely shot back another ques-
ton: With the Senator as vice
presidential candidate?
That was all-but it was
enough, certainly sufficient to
add zest to what will, indeed. be
a scramble in 1852 If the Presi-
dent does not seek renomina-
ton.
Evening star., 1951-06-11

policy from the reckless attacks
OF Senator Mccarthy. This fail
ure led to a long series of re-
treats. They eliminated drama
tically in the television cameras
centered upon the glamorous
figure of Gen. Macarthur as he
appealed to Congress to over
rule his civilian superiors.
Seniority put Senator Rus
sell Of Georgia at the head of
the joint committee chosen to
adjudicate the Macarthur case.
Senator Russell's brains and
parliamentary skill were recog-
nized by President Truman who
expressed willingness to have
him for majority leader. But
the President refused even to