Evening star., 1951-05-05
Partial and Censored Transcript Of Gen. MacArthus Hearinq

course, with the general limitation
lof the contingencies of campaign.
Urges Limited Pressure.
believe 1t would be a master
folly to contemplate the use of
United States ground troops in
China. ] do not believe it would
be necessary.
I believe, as explained several
times yesterday, that the applica-
ton of the, if you want to call it,
limited pressures would be quite
sufficient to bring Red China to a
reasonable attitude to gather
around a peace conference table
to end this savage slaughter.
Senator Northumberland, of
course we have had undisputed
command of the air in Korea. and
those Northern Chinese troops
keep pouring down into North
Korea.
Gen. MacArthur-The reason,
Senator. that the air has not been
more successful in stopping that
pouring down is because they don't
have the latitude of operation to
hit deeper than the Yalu.
You understand the Yalu is only
two or three days march from
the front line, and it gives the
air a very limited opportunity,
Especially when you would have
a couple of days of obscure wealth
er where the air couldn't hit, you
could get troops down from the
Yalu to the front line without
being subjected to any air at
tack, but if the air could go where
they are assembling, could go to
1.-The foundation roots where these
armies are being assembled to be
thrown at us, they could destroy
them.
At least they could so decimate
them that their efficacy when they
reached the front lines would be
most materially decreased.
The air has done a magnificent
ljob in Korea. Under the limita-
tions placed upon it, it has been
far in excess of any anticipation
that I had.
Senator Northumberland,
haven't had an opportunity to re-.
view the testimony of yesterday
except very hastily, but I saw one
of the newspapers had a headline
that you said yesterday that we
would go it alone if necessary. I
am sure, general, that you do not
underrate the Importance of hav-
ing our allies with us.
! Gen. MacArthur-Se Senator, AM
not responsible for what the
papers say, but in answer to your
question I would say individually
it is advantageous for us to have
all of the allies that we can get
and procure.
The great difficulty in the con-
tributions that are being made.
they're not in commensurate
strength with what we put in. The
forces we have in Korea are only
token forces from everybody ex-
cept the South Koreans and our
selves.
We have plenty Of Allies, but
! the numbers of them do not con-
tribute in the same generous and
noble way in which we do.
Senator McMahon-Thank you,
general. And they should put up
more. These Allies do have many
assets which we must think about
in any global struggle
Gen. MacArthur-Unquestion-
ably. Senator, and no one is more
fixed in the hope that we can pro-
tect them.
Quotes 1892 Statement.
Senator Northumberland, /
would like now-and this is my
closing observation-I would like
now to read into the record a
statement that was made by you
when you were Chief of StaH in
1882, and I quote:
"The national strategy of any
war, that is, the selection of ma
tional objectives and the determi-
nation of the general means and
methods to be applied in obtain
ing them, as well as the develop
ment Of the broad policies applica-
BILE to the prosecution of war, are
decisions that must be made by
the head of State, acting in con-
formity with the expressed will of
the Government. No single de-
partmental head, no matter what
his particular function or title.
could or should be responsible for
the formulation of such decisions.
"F'or example, in every war the
United States has waged, the ma
tional objective to be obtained has
involved the Army in land attacks
against areas held by the enemy
In every instance missions have
been prescribed for the Navy that
had in view the assisting and ia
cilitating of the Army efforts. Yet
in no case could these missions
and objectives have been properly
prescribed by the Secretaries of
War and Navy acting in unison,
or by single super-secretary act
ing for both. The issues involved
are so far-reaching in their effect
and so vital in the life of the Ma
tion that this phase OF co-ordi-
mating Army and Navy efforts
should not be delegated by the
Commander in Chief to any SUBJ
ordinate authority. Any such at
tempt would not constitute dele
cation but rather abdication."
Thank you, Mr.. Chairman.
Amazed at Wisdom.