Evening star., 1951-06-24
1t Was a Hard Decision

MacArthur's firing. Mr.. Acheson
made it plain his low opinion Of
the generalissino was not altered
by events in Korea.
A decision on Formosa wasI
postponed. The military advisers
described the meager state Of or
preparedness for the crisis that
had been precipitated In the Far
East.
AT the end Of this discussion, &
|it was decided we must help arm
the South Koreans and use our
own ships and planes to evacuate
American civilians from the war
zone. The President also ordered
the Pacific fleet to head out of
Pearl Harbor for the troubled
waters of China. The re-estab-
llishment of some airbases near
|Formosa was authorized. There
was talk of supporting the South
Korean war effort with air and
naval action, but no decision as
yet on this point.
That decision came the next
night at an almost identical din
ner at Blair House. Mr.. Acheson
was the man with the plan. With
IU. N. approval, he said, South
Korea should be supported by sea
and air action. Military aid to-
beleaguered Indo- China and to-
1.-THE Philippines should be stepped
up. Finally, Notwithstanding SUM-
days argument. there should be
1.-THE support for Formosa that the
military thought was necessary.
lChiang should be protected from
the mainland by our 7th Fleet
land the mainland equally should
be protected from him. Formosa,
in other words. should be neu-
traliZed.
As all the world knows, this
was precisely the decision which
was made that night. There was
no dissent. It was decided that
Gen. Macarthur should be placed
in command of our effort. There
was talk, that evening, Of the
i possible use of American ground
forces II the situation became so
serious as to warrant it. But this
subject was not given serious con-
sideration at that stage: 1t still
was hoped the South Koreans
could hold without our troops.
Macarthur Not Consulted
So far, Gen. Macarthur had not
been consulted in the decision
making. Nor, at the time that
the Monday night decision was
. announced, had the U. N. ac-
tually asked its members to help
: South Korea with arms. The
State Department had assurance.
however, that such request
would be forthcoming--and it
came along on Tuesday after
noon.
i The decision to commit Ameri-
can troops in the Korean war
) was made In the dark morning
hours of Friday. the 30th. The
Korean military situation had
gone from bad to worse. On
Thursday, the National Security
Council had met at the White
House with the President and
the State and Defense Depart
lment officials. The problem be-
.Ifore the group was posed by one
grim fact: Without American
] troops, the Korean war would be
lover In few days. The difficult
Il ties and risks Of our Intervening
!, on the ground had been thrashed
i out at some length-l1o actual
!, decision was reached.
{ But now, in the night, came q
message from Gen. Macarthur
just back from an inspection OF
, the battle zone. All our air and
j naval support would be futile, he
said. unless we sent in the troops
i This was it..
!. At 4 am. the telephone rang by
tiMr. Trumar's bed. It was Army
i Secretary Frank Pace, relaying
i the Macarthur message. The
I Presidents voice did not sound
81 sleepy the troops, he said
j And within o few hours. they
j were on the way.