Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1951-11-21
"A Foreign Policy for Americans
Toft Feors U. S. Is Wostins Monpower and Wealth
in FruitIess Effort to Halt Soviet Threat
By Senotor Robert A. Toft
CHAPTER 6.

problem of the best methods O
meeting it and protecting tn
safety Of the American people.
If possible, we wish to find tn
policies which will deter Russi;
from military aggression and a
the same time will not be so pro
vocative themselves as to Civ
Russia a sound reason for sucl
aggression. We must adopt ais
policies which, If war unfortu
nately comes. will best defen,
America and enable us to achiev
ultimate victory.
But we must be always alert t,
explore every possibility of per
manent peace and all changes il
public opinion in Russia or tn
satellite countries which look IL
that direction.
For the present our policy ma,
be said to be one of containment
but it certainly carries the hop
that we can develop an affirma
tive policy which will CONSTANT,
extend the doctrine and the powe
of liberty.
Vandenberg Influence Cited.
The administration seems t.
have accepted this strategy IL
theory, since the days of Secre
tary Byrnes. I believe that Ar
thur Vandenberg had most to d.
with reversing the policies of TIE
heran, Yalta snd Potsdam. H,
stiffened the attitude Of Secre
tary Stettinius at San Francisco
He counseled against concession
to Russia in Europe which nigh
have led to q Communist Ger.
many. He and Byrnes forcec
President Truman to eliminat.
the pro-Communist Henry Wal.
lace from his cabinet. Senator
Vandenberg was never consulted
about the Far East, and tn,
in policy there wa!
not made.
My basic criticism Of admins.
tration policy today is that no one
seems to have worked out a com.
prehensive plan for the applica
ton Of this strategy or any CO.
use of the many poll.
cies necessary to carry it out.
Have we any program, positive
or negative, ready for use in Yugo-
Slavia or Iran or Burma or Indo-
China?
Furthermore, no one seems tt
have recognized that there are
serious limits to our economic ano
capacity and that we
must be selective and restrained ir
determining the extent to which
we carry out our basic strategy
No one has given the people q
plan-for production
for spending and taxation, and
FOR controls-or explained to the
people in clear language the rea.
sons and justification for the
sacrifices which must be asked
for.
Our Limita tions.
We must realize that there are
definite economic and manpowel
on American strategy
The people Of the United States
only 6 per cent of the
population of the globe. Our raw
materials are certainly not more
than a third of the worlds re-
sources. Our huge production Is
still less than one-third of the
worlds production.
Our people cannot. and do not
iesire to, boss the internal affairs
II other countries. They cannot
'end armies to block a Commu-
1ist advance in every far corner
Of the world. Consequently, we
must consider the cost Of the pol
cies we adopt. both in men and
and we are forced to be
Selective in determining the rela-
i've value and cost OF each
project.
1t Is not solely military prob
EN-. For some years the admins
assured us that armed
forces OF approximately one and
half million men, costing about
sl3 billion. were sufficient to meet
any threat. On July /, 1851, al
though there seemed to be nc
agreed plan, it was suggested that
We need 3.5 million men in uni
form, at a cost which may run
rom $40 to $50 billion a year. or
more than four times the annual
amount suggested before the Ko-
rean war. Yet that war only &C
counts for about one-tenth OF
what Is requested. and the Rus
sian menace is about the same as
it was on January l. 1850.
$100 Billion Budget Seen.
On July %. 1851. however, the
President suggested in his eco
nomic report that 3.5 million mer
was only an interim goal, and
that plans were being made fol
substantially larger expenditure
Secretary Acheson sent word te
the Foreign Relations Committee
that $25 billion for three years
of foreign aid was a serious under
estimate. This indicated a Federal
budget Of at least $500 billion a
year for fiscal 1853 and fiscal 1854
No nation can be constantly
prepared to undertake a full-scale
var at any moment and still hope
70 maintain any of the other pur-
Doses in which people are inter-
,sted and for which nations are
,ounded.
In the first place, it requires a
complete surrender of liberty and
he turning over to the central
government of power to control
n detail the lives of the people
md all OF their activities.
1t would be impossible to con-
1uct any such about program
without imitation. In World War
i, in spite of complete controls.
We saw an increase in prices, ap-
'arently permanent. of about 70
per cent, a depreciation of the
dollar to so cents.
Finally, it would interfere with
he very production which is the
great basis of the strength of the
United Cfnfnr nn-l L. .