Evening star., 1951-06-07
Secretary Defends
Truman Decision
To Stop Invasion
CONTINUED From Page A-4.)

Contlnued From Page A-4)
Operations. ! to page "a. of that
report. That refers to meeting
on February Is, 1861. of the Joint
Chiefs Of Staff and representatives
of the Department of State. Now
it says:
During the course of the dis
cussion it became apparent to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
Department Of State would prefer
not to express political objectives
with respect to Korea until mill
tary capabilities there were estab-
lished. On the other hand. the
consensus of the opinions of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a
political decision was required be-
fore there could be suitable de-
termination of military courses of
action"
Then again, on page 80, para
graph 38, I quote this one sem
tence:
"It appeared to be generally
agreed that at some future meet
ing An agreement should be
reached on the objectiveS in
Korea. It was suggested that the
Secretary of State talk to the
Secretary of Defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of
Staff. IF this question was not
settled before the next meeting,
the question would be discussed at
the Joint Chiefs of Staff State
Department meeting on that
date"
Policy Understanding Debated.
In other words, on February 13
and again on Mrach Is. 1851
there did not seem to be any
determination of what our policy
in Korea was to be. What is your
answer to that?
Secretary Acheson - I think
there was understanding about the
policy: but there was a difficulty
in determining exactly what the
directive as to operations should
be. And in paragraph % you will
see that there was report there
that some of the nations aSso-
ciated with us did not think that
there should be military decisions
to advance beyond the 38th Paral-
lei until the political decision to
do so had been taken by the United
Nations, particularly by the ma
tions contributing forces.
Mr.. Bevin thought that major
penetration should be avoided. And
then it goes on to report what you
have read, and the discussion in
regard to what should be the mill
tary operation-how far north of
the parallel you should go, what
we should be trying to do north
of the parallel. involved both the
question of military capability-
could you go north, and how far
north could you go. and also the
question of what was the wise poll
tical objective in the light of the
military capability. We discussed
that for some time and later on it
has been resolved, I think the
operations which are now being
carried out indicate what the de-
ciSion was. 49,.
Senator SaltonStall-. So
from the point of view of the De-
partment of State the policy was
to prevent aggression and to re-
store peace in Korea. as you have
expressed 1t here number Of
times?
Secretary Acheson-Yes.
Senator SaltonStall-And that
policy was the policy Of the State
Department on those dates, but
at that time there was still doubt
as to the military capabilities of
how to accomplish 1t?
Secretary Acheson-That is cor
rect.
Senator Saltonstall-So at that
time there was a question as to
whether to go beyond the 38th
Parallel or to stop at the 38th
Parallel, or even to go as far as
the Yalu River; is that correct?
Secretary Acheson - Well, ]
don't think that any one was
considering going to the Yalu
River because that was a pretty
difficult thing to do, and has been.
But there was some question as
to how far it was wise fron a
military and political point OF