Evening star., 1951-02-09
A Big Four Conference?

n Dig FOuT NOHTeIenCe!
In its latest notes to France, Britain and the
United States, the Kremlin seems to have backed
away little bit-with important qualifications
from the position 1t took in its notes of November
8, when 1t first called for new Big -Four Con-
ference to deal with the problem of German
demilitarization. At that time 1t apparently
wanted to limit such a conference strictly to
Germany, with the so-called Prague declaration
serving as the basis for negotiation. But now
it has suggested that it may be willing to accept
some of the Anglo-French- American views.
These views, as set forth most recently in
the January % Anglo-French-American notes
(part of the replesto-replies series that started
November 81, may be summarized as follows:
% The Prague declaration-a set of Comm
form proposals aimed at converting Germany
into a Red satellite-cannot be accepted as
a basis for discussion. (2) Since the grave
tensions affecting the world today spring from
a number of basic issues, and not from the
German question alone, Big Four Conference
limited to that question would be waste of time.
90 However, France, Britain and the United
States will be responsive if the Kremlin agrees
that the subject matter of such meeting should
include equally the principal problems whose
solution would permit a real and lasting i'm
provement" in East-West relations. And "a
given Soviet agreement on this point the three
Western Powers will be willing to have their
representatives meet with Russian representatives
in Paris in an effort to work out an agenda
broad and promising enough to justify a full
dress session of Foreign Ministers.
In response to this, the Kremlin has now
declared Cd that the Prague declaration does
not necessarily have to be accepted as basis
for discussion; (2) that the Soviet government,
although insisting that the German problem is
Ia inns he
animation of other questions" during the pro-
posed conference; and (3) that it has mo OBJ
lection" to the idea of holding preliminary Paris
talks to work out an acceptable agenda. In
Secretary Achesons words these points add up
to a kind of grudging move toward agreement
with the Western Allies but there is. little ground
for optimism on that score. This is so because
the Russian notes strongly imply that Foreign
Ministers meeting, If it takes up Far Eastern
issues, must admit Red China's representative as
full participants condition that can hardly
be accepted. Further, the notes constitute in
large measure a propaganda harangue that
blames all present tensions "intolerable" steps
to rearm the West Germans "a project still only
In the talking stage) and on the enormous" and
"unheard of" rearmament being undertaken by
France Britain, the United States and other allied
countries.
In effect, like the charges that the United
States has committed aggression in Manchuria
and Formosa-charges that have just been over
whelmingly rejected by the United Nations
this propaganda is merely another example of
the threadbare technique with which the men
of the Kremlin accuse others of things that only
they themselves are doing. Actually, it is Soviet
policy that has created todays explosive tensions
Were 1t not for that policy, the free world would
not be rearming now. After the victory In 1945,
the West drastcally demobilized, but the Russians
kept-and are still keeping-huge armies in being.
In addition, as Mr.. Acheson has observed, they
have connived In an ominous, treaty violating
buildup Of the armed forces of satellites like Bull
garia, Romania and Hungary. They have created
militarized East German units They have stirred
up mounting fears and suspicious with their
Iron Curtain. They have supported the aggressor
in Korea. And they have Systematically blocked
all progress toward decent peace by refusing to
cooperate in such vital projects as atomic
control.
When read in the light of these and similar
facts, the latest Soviet notes-though they seem
to concede point or two-obviously do not war
rant much optimism. The best that can be said
Of them is that they continue to invite negotia-
tion, leaving open the diplomatic door which we
ourselves should strive to keep open if at all
possible. But we ought not to delude ourselves
new Big Four meeting will end in futility unless
the Russians are prepared, in good faith, to
effect basic change in their policy Until that
day comes, and until we can be sure of 1t, we
and our allies must spare no effort to become
strong beyond challenge.