Evening star., 1951-04-26
Korea and Indo-chino

The news from the Tongking area Of Indo-
China strongly indicates that the Communist
guerrilla forces of Ho Chi Mini have at least tenn
porariy lost their ability either to engage in
offensive operations or to hold hxed defensive
line. They are reported to be dispensing and GO
ing into hiding In order to save themselves for
battle later on. Apparently they just do not
have sufficient power to get anywhere against
the French at this time.
This represents heartening change from
the situation that prevailed not very long ago.
AS recently as last October and November, Hos
forces were exerting such pressure on the French
that the latter had to abandon one frontier
stronghold after another. Indeed, there were
indications that the Communist guerrillas were
preparing for an all-out offensive effort to win
domination of the whole of Indo- China particu-
larly the vital food-producing areas Moreover,
there was good reason to suspect that Red China
was planning to support that effort not merely
by giving Ho large-scale aid in the form of mill
tary equipment but by sending masses of Chinese
troops across the border to help deliver knock
out blow
Since then, however the threat of such an
offensive has steadily diminished. One reason
for this is that the French, together with the
troops of the Associated States of Indo-C China
have been strengthened in command and have
AAC1SdScu tIlclT IfcQOWer WITH SCepp6Q-up ala
from the United States. second reason-un-
doubtedly the main one--haS been the course of
the war in Korea. When the Chinese Commu-
niStS entered the war in November, they prob
ably did not anticipate the kind of punishment
that has since been inflicted on them by our
American and allied United Nations forces Heavy
losses in materiel, grievous casualties and their
inability (up to now, at any rate) to score
decisive victory over the U. N have almost GER
tainly made the Kremlin-Serving Peping a1-
thoritieS change their minds about helping Ho
In short their Korean experience appears to
have left them in a position where they do not
have enough extra manpower and equipment for
aggression elsewhere
Thus, in effect, the U. N stand in Korea has
completely upset the Communist timetable for
the piece-by-piece conquest of Asia. It is a safe
assumption that that timetable, prior to Red
China's intervention across the Yalu River, had
Indo-China at the top of the list, and Formosa
presumably was not far behind Like Formosa
however, Indo-China still belongs to the free
world which is another way of saying that the
strategic gateway to the vast Southeast Asiatic
mainland remains shut against the Red totali-
tarians-a highly encouraging fact of prime i'm
portance to the security of our own and all
nke-minded nations, fact that must be credited
in large part to the heroic American and allied
operations in the Korean war.
Plainly enough, the significance of those
operations is not confined to Korea. If that
country can be held by us, If the current mas
sive offensive Of the Chinese Communists can be
smashed if the u. N. can once more inflict ter
rible punishment on the attackers and thus re-
emphasize the futility of their crime, then
Peiping and Moscow conceivably may be per-
suaded to abandon the fight and negotiate an
honorable settlement. The 'ffs" here are very
big, and they may be wishful but it is not wholly
beyond the realm of possibility that the free
worlds Korean stand may yet lead to peace pro-
viding enduring anti-aggression guarantees not
only for 1ndo-China but for all other lands as
well.