Evening star., 1951-10-02

world-wde in the closing weeks of 1945 Washing
tons attention largely focused upon their reflection
in the tangled problems of the Far China par
ticular, already presented diemmaD
20 November 1916
STATE -WAR-NAVY MEETING.
At the meeting with Byrnes and Patterson this morning
the question future policy in China and Manchura
commander of the United States forces Chna has
for instruction. his present directive being first keep
in China to accomplish the disarmament of the Japanese
and to provide for their repatriation to the point when
he considers the Chinese Nationalist troops
out this mission In his original cable of last
Friday he put the decision up the Washington
ment This mornings cable to him clear that
looking to him for recommendation the latter point
namely whether the Chinese Nationalist troops
had the capabty of carrying out the disarmament and
turn to Japan OF japanese in ManchuriG
There strong to bring Americans out of China
particularly the Marines. If we do we invite vacuum of
anarchy in Manchura and obvious that into that
ultimately either the japanese the Russians will flow At
the moment of it will be the Russians In this
necon referred to conversation with Admiral Mitscher
Sunday in which he pointed out that in any future
between combination of Russia and the Asatc powers the
manpower available to such combination would be
the indifference to the loss of life striking
that would serious problem to this country
Avoiding "Imperialist Meddlng"
(The problem was complicated by one factor that
again and again thereafter to vtate effective policy.
In the answering cable to Gen. Wedemeyer "a copy of
which Mr.. Forresta included in the diary it made
clear that while the State Department wanted to help the
Naonasts under Chang Kai-shek get the japanese
of China W does not wish to support the Nationalist
government directly against the Communists" The Chi
Communist armies under Mao Tsetung at that
time less well organized and far less we'll armed than they
were later to become.
(But the State Department impressed by the back
wardness corruption and unpopularty of the Naonasts
under Chang Kai-shek convinced that Mao's Commu-
nss represented an important popular movement and
that the United States could not openly combat the
charge of "imperast meddng" wished to stay clear of
the struggle between Chang and Mao This cable clearly
recognized the difficulty: Even to help Chang get the
Japanese out would result in collateral aid
tige in favor of the national government vsavis the
Communists, yet conversely withdrawal now Of Amer
lean troops may substantial Illustration of policy
we have long supported which contemplated unifying
China and Manchuria under Chinese national forces
They throughout the succeeding to find
to that
Can assistants more extensive notes of the meeting
show that it back at the end-aS many discus
sions of high policy inevitably did that winterto the
swift evsceraton of armed strength. Mr Patterson
said that on November he had written memorandum
~ to Mr. Byrnes pointing out that under present acce
Grated rehabilitation plans by next April will have
in Europe only some 100000 men. In China we are
faced with the reduction and the problem In
addition to the numerical decline in forces the loss
in their fighting prestige is greater He said that he
realized that these forces not sufficient to have
effective influence overall national policy. He
knew that the State Department. doubt considers it
highly important to maintain adequate military strength
bun unfortunately Congress the other side In con-
nection with War Department appropriations they are
saying if the Army will demobize fast enough,
present appropriations will last Mr.. Byrnes said that
the situation in China worried him considerably more
than elsewhere"
Wedemeyer Outlines the Dilemma
Gen. Wedemeyer had been asked for his advice; he
proceeded to give it in series Of long kilograms
exhaustive in their analysis of the situation but, when
it down to what could should be done about it,
little Illuminating than the State Department had
BEEN Under date of November 20 his final recommended
tions either to withdraw all troops at to
nounce continued military and economic support for
Chang. On the 23d he emphasized that it would be
impossible to support Chang and at the same time stay
clear of the atters with the Chinese Communists;
such United States support to the national government
will definitely involve American forces in fratricidal
fare. There be mistake about this. IT the
unifcation of China and Manchuria under Chinese
tonal forces to be United States policy involvement
in fratricdal warfare and possibly in with the
(See FORRESTAL, Page A-3)