Evening star., 1951-06-12

Foundation that British foreign
policy has been built since. It is
not that we want that policy to
be exclusive. but that Soviet Rus
Sia's refusal to cooperate and her
maintenance of military forces.
far above anything that the joint
efforts of the free nations can now
command, compelled this collec-
tive grouping as an act of essential
defense. If. for whatever reason,
Ang1o-American friendship were
to be disrupted, the Atlantic pact
would collapse. and with it all our
lplans for the defense of Europe.
Collapse Would Be Calamity.
Since we, all agreed that nego-
tiations with Soviet Russia offer
their best chance of success if
they are conducted from strength,
the collapse of the Atlantic pact
would be a calamitious blow to
peace.
If we look beyond the immediate
confines of Europe, critical though
this continent is, we see equally
clearly how only cooperation be-
tween the British Commonwealth
and the United States can hope to
provide a rising standard of ma
terial well-being. We are frequent
ly told that we need more than
military weapons to combat COM
|munism. This is perfectly true. We
have to defend our own way of life
and to prove that it can maintain
and improve living conditions in
the free world.
The purpose Of our policies is
Ito unite the defense of the free
nations and buttress it with eff
Ifective military preparation. Only
thus can we insure true liberty;
only thus can we raise the stand
ard of life.
Always Ready for Discussion.
AS we work these policies
through. we shall be ready at all
times to meet and discuss with
the Soviet power and its satellites,
|or witfA any one else, the political
differences that divide us.
1t was not the West that rang
down the Iron Curtain. The Mar
shall Plan was always open to the
world. The Czechoslovak govern
ment accepted it. only to be sum-
Imoned to Moscow and ordered to
refuse. Here was fateful phase
in the forcible imposition of Com
Imunist rule on that unhappy
country. In contrast, once Yugo-
slavia freed herself from the die
tation of Moscow. she received
material help from the West to
enable her to sustain her inde-
|pendence. although her govern
|ment is still Communist.
1t must be disturbing to learn
Of divergenceS across the Atlantic.
We have to be careful not to
Iexaggerate their significance or
we shall merely be playing the
game Of those who want to see
differences become a chasm. AT
the same time. it is dangerous to
ignore them. for then they may
grow unperceived until they as
sumo alarming proportions.
Fears False Conceptions,
Misunderstanding frequently
arise from false conception OF
the burden each nation carries
In the early days in Korea the
British contingent, no doubt,
seemed very small to American
opinion. Now a Commonwealth
division has its place in the line,
and its units have won tributes
from our American friends. The
Royal Navy has played its part
throughout.
This sense of grievance, that
cne American share of the Korean
burden is proportionately unequal
would have been less widely felt
If there had been fuller knowledge
of the British military contribu-
ton and the casualties we have
been suffering in other parts of
the world, notably in Malaga.
This may have been our fault
for not telling the world loudly
enough; but Korea, Indo-China
and Malaga are part of a world
front. Our Malayan casualties do
not, OF course, compare with those
of the United States in Korea
But important fighting forces have
been engaged there three years
and more, and the strain is con-
lstant.
Can't Play KremIin's Game.
There would be no advantage to
the joint endeavor If the British
or the French were to weaken
themselves in the areas for which
we are directly responsible in order
10 increase the Allied forces in
Korea. That would be to play the
Kremlin's game. The British over
seas commitments extend from
Korea, through Malaga to the
Middle East, Trieste and Austria
10 Germany.
Then there is the champion
ship, which has been vocal in some
quarters In Great Britain of a
third force between the U. S. S. r
and the U. S. A. BY Americans
and not by Americans only, this is
regarded as theological neutrality
It is natural that it should cause
al the more impatience in the
United States, precisely because II
was once a familier attitude there
Having learned their lesson, Amer.
leans cannot understand why we
who have so often urged it upor
them in the past, should seem tc
have forgotten it.
The action of His Majesty's