Evening star., 1951-06-06
Acheson on Past China Policy

Aeheson on Past China Policy
In all probability Secretary Acheson's latest
defense of the Governments postwar policy to-
ward China will not change the mind of any
one of the large number of Americans-in and
out of Congress-who have been bitterly and
outspokenly critical OF that policy ever since
the tragic mainland collapse of the Nationalsts
under Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek.
Yet, be that as it may, it can hardly be
denied that Mr. Acheson, in his testimony be-
fore the Senators investigating General Mac
Arthur'S dismissal, has restated the admins
tration's case with great skill and persuasive
ness. In effect, what he has had to say consti-
tutes synopsis of the 1.054-page white Paper"
Of August, 1949-a synopsis designed to defend
and reaffrm the following much disputed thesis
of that highly controversial document: 'The
unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the
ominous result of the civil war in China was be-
yond the control Of the Government of the
United States Nothing that this country did or
could have done within the reasonable limits of
its capabilities could have changed that result;
nothing that was left undone by this country
has contributed to it, It was the product Of
internal Chinese forces, forces which this coun-
try tried to influence but could not"
xO D6Slu Will, lulIu6U1dG6ly a1IGT C1e QGIGaG
of Japan. China was in the grip of profound
revolution, with Chiangs Nationalist govern
ment in the extreme southwestern part, with the
Communists controlling northern area con-
tanning il6 million people, and with more than
q million armed Japanese troops, backed by IT.
million Japanese administrative civilians, still
IN position to throw their weight to either side
and take over control Of the country. In these
circumstances according to Mr.. Acheson the
United States had three choices: Q) To wash its
hands Of the situation-a thing impossible to do;
CD 10 march IN with great military force in an
effort TO defeat the Reds, remove the japanese
and drive the Russians from Manchuria-an ex-
tremely difficult and risky enterprise not in
accord with American interests or 90 to help
the Nationalists in every way to preserve peace,
to re-establish themselves in Chinese regions
where they had been before, and to gain control,
for the first time, of territory which they had
never governed.
This third representing task Of
the greatest magnitude and complexity-was the
one our Government chose. To make 1t effec-
tive, the United States carried out, among other
things, tremendous airlift operations transport
ing fully equipped Nationalist armies to the
north. In addition, acting on Chiang's sugges-
ton, we sent the Hurley and Marshall missions
to bring about agreements for a political recon-
ciliation between him and the Communists and
for merger of their troops But these agree
ments were quickly broken by both sides, and
then the Generalissmo, against the strongest
American advice, decided he could settle matters
by force of arms. Thereafter events went from
bad to worse for him. Despite having received
about 50 billion in loans and grants after vi
day, plus military and civilian surplus property
originally costing 81 billion, he suffered one de-
feat after another until he finally found himself
in debacle.
Why did all this happen? Mr.. Acheson has
echoed the white Paper" in declaring that it
happened not because of lack of arms or ammu-
milton or adequate aid from us, but because of
such things as ID corruption among Chiang's
subordinates (2) loss of public confidence in his
leadership 81 his failure to effect vitally needed
economic, political and military reforms, a. in
competence among his generals who repeatedly
ignored expert American advice, and (5) shat
tered morale among his numerically superior and
well armed troops who surrendered in huge
masses without a fight and who handed over
vast quantities of weapons to the Communists.
In sum, according to the thesis restated by Mr..
Acheson, the Nationalists could have been saved
under these conditions only If the United States
Joined them in the civil war with its own armies
"a course which the overwhelming majority of
our people would certainly not have tolerated
at the time
This thesis, in terms of its reasoning and
historical accuracy, is being subjected to about
as much attack today-Senator Brewster, for
example, has just assailed it as "a bare-faced
distortion"-as when Mr.. Acheson first voiced
it in August, 1949. The fact remains, how
ever, that his critics-though they have made
challenging assertions-have yet to come for
ward with case as impressive, as specific or
as we'll documented as his. Beyond that, what
ever the merits of the opposing arguments, an
other fact is that the past cannot be recaptured
or changed and that there is therefore some
thing to be said for the idea that this contro-
versy, instead of being constantly rehashed in
our own day. might better be left to the judg-
ment of future historians.
After all, as far as China goes, the present
reality is that the NationaliSts are on Formosa,
that the Communists control the mainland, and
that the actual and potential consequences of
that situation must be met with united Ameri-
can policy that will be slow in coming If we
devote half our time and energy to an angry,
distracting and essentially futile debate over
milk split In the irrecoverable past.