Evening star., 1951-06-02


The Chinese Red leaders hav
betrayed their long-standinl
pledge Of demobilization and tn
military demand for manpowe
has, instead been increase.
Peiping has also broken it
promises Of social and economi
improvement. In the great cities
dependent on imported materials
unemployment increases. Th'
regime has not lightened the bur
tdens Of the people. 1t has mad,
them heavier.
All of this is reflected in 1
sharp increase in repressive meas
Iures, and in propaganda to whil
lup the tagging zeal of their owl
people.
In the light of all these fac
tors, I believe that the aggression
can best be brought to an ens
with a minimum risk and a mini
mum loss, by continuing the pun
ishing defeat of the Chinese il
Korea. This Is being done.
No one can predict when tn
fighting will stop and when tn,
aggression will end. 1t is alst
true that no one could have fore
told exactly what would happer
when we undertook action to enc
the Berlin blockade, but we die
what we thought was right ant
the blockade was ended.
No one could have foretold how
the aggression in Greece would bt
Terminated, but again we tool
those measures which our best
Judgment and sense indicated
were the right ones and the ag.
gression ceased.
While the outcome of every
course of action in the foreign
policy field cannot be predicted
with certainty in advance, it /.
Jour responsibility in taking actor
to apply our best Judgment or
the basis of the best information
lat hand.
The Proposal to Enlarge the War
think it is fair to say that al
Iof the Presidents advisers believe
the course we are now following
gives us the best chance of stop.
ping hostilities and ending the ag.
gression in Korea.
I should like briefly to addres.
myself to the alternative cours,
which was placed before this com.
mittee. This course would seek t,
bring the conflict in Korea to al
end by enlarging the sphere O.
hostilitieS.
I will not try to review tn,
military considerations involved il
this proposed course. since thes,
have been thoroughly discussed
by the previous witnesses befor,
your committees.
| 1t is enough to say that it i
the judgment of the President
military advisers that the pro
posed enlargement of our militar,
action would not exercise a promp
and decisive effect in bringing tn
hostilities to an end. To thi
judgment there must be added ;
recognition Of the grave risks ant
other disadvantages Of this al
tentative course.
Against the dubious advantage
Of spreading the war in an ini
TALLY limited manner to the main
land OF China, there must b.
measured the risk of a genera
war with China, the risk of So
Wet intervention, and of Worlt
War III, as well as the probabl
effects upon the solidarity of tn,
free world coalition.
The advocates of this program
make two assumptions which re
quire careful examination. The,
assume that the Soviet Union viii
not necessarily respond to any &C
tion on our part. They also as
sumo that in the build-up O
strength relative to the Sovie
Union and the Communist sphere
time is not necessarily on our side
AS to Soviet reactions, no on
can be sure he is forecastin
accurately what they would be
but there are certain facts a
hand that bear on his question.
We know of Soviet influence il
North Korea. of Soviet assistanc
to the North Koreans and to Com
munist China, and we know tina
understandings must have accom-
panied this assistance. We ais
know that there is a treaty be
tween the Soviets and the Chimes
Communists.
Most Important Satellite.
| But, even if the treaty did no
exist. China is the Soviet Union
largest and most important satel
lite. Russian self-intereSt in tn
Far East and the necessity o
maintaining prestige in the Com
munist sphere make it difficult t.
see how the Soviet Union coul'
ignore a direct attack upon tn
Chinese mainland.
I cannot accept the assumption
that the Soviet Union will go it
way regardless of what we do. d,
not think that Russian policy i
formed that way any more thai
our own policy is formed that way
This view is certainly not vel
enough grounded to justify 9
gamble with the essential securit.
of our Nation.
In response to the proposed
course of action, there are 6
number of courses of counter
action open to the SovietS.
They could turn over to tn
Chinese large numbers of plane