Evening star., 1951-04-29

lSfactory samples thereof, and
can state confidently that they
all will be fully equipped first
line units in high state of readi-
ness for combat. All the units
listed will be fully at the disposal
of the supreme Allied commander,
Europe (Gen. Eisenhower. No
reserve units are included, nor
any which would be available only
on mobilization or after a con-
siderable lapse of time.
See Delaying Action.
The sober belief of general Of
f1cers who, at various levels of
command, will be responsible for
the defense of Western Europe Isl
that this force of o. divisions
might have a chance of delaying,
if not stopping, Soviet attack
in force. This is based on the
rough calculation that the maxi
mum initial Russian offensive ca
pability In Western Europe is of
the order of so Soviet divisions.
But this qualified optimism. as ex-
pressed to this reporter. was in
variably subject to one qualifica-
ton: Provided we can maintain
air superiority.
AS to our hope of doing this,
there is considerable doubt, for the
reasons presented in the preceding
article of this series.
However, it also must be pointed
out that % divisions is a pretty
small force to stop an attack by
so, even though Soviet divisions
ARE smaller than ours. What are
the prospects for increasing West
ern ground forces during 1852?
To Use New Weapons.
Under present plans, the num-
ber of United States and British
divisions in Western Europe will
not increase during 1852 unless
war appears imminent. Both
countries, however, will be build
ing up additional forces in their
home territory. The extent to
which the United States can do
this, of course, will be affected
by the course Of the Korean war.
The British will create one full
strength infantry division and one
brigade (regulars) at home, and
the flow of National Service men
into the Territorial Army will en-
able four territorial divisions to
be earmarked for quick mobiliza-
ton. The combat potential of the
United States and British troops
will be improved by training with
new weapons, additional service
and line of communications units,
and by the settling down" OF
division, corps and army COM
mands, as we'll as by inter-Allied
maneuvers.
The French expect to create
five additional f1rst-line divisions
during 1852, giving them a total
of IS divisions, of which 3 will
be armored. They probably can
speed this program UP somewhat
Iif they can be relieved, in whole
or in part, of the terrible drain of
the Indo- Chinese war on their
professional officers and nom
commissioned officers.
Five Belgian Divisions.
Also partly dependent on events
in Indo-China are French plans to
have two North African divisions
ready for immediate dispatch to
Europe during 1852.
Belgium is looking forward to
having a total force of five divi-
Sions Il of them armored) by
the end of 1852. BY that time
also, it is hoped that the eQuiva-
lent of 3 Dutch divisions will be
sufficiently trained and equipped
to enable them to be used within
u hours of mobilization. There
will also, by that time, be q
Canadian brigade group in Europe
l So by the end of 1852, the
prospects are that something likt
30-35 fully armed divisions will be
/ available for the immediate de.
fense of Western Europe, with
: perhaps half-a-dozen more or
, quick call in Britain and North
Africa, and just possibly some
French reserve divisions, too.
AS to the fianks of the line il
) Italy and in Scandinavia, the
: Danes are now and will still be il
: 1852, pretty dangerously exposed
The defense of Norway will de.
pend largely (a) on what Sweder
5 does. (b) on quick outside help
!. though Norway is hard place
olfor Russians to get at except ir
: the north.
Italy has about three divisions