Evening star., 1951-09-08
Politics in Iran

Trans Premier Mossadegh today is standing
at a political crossroads. The course which he
chooses, and the course which events take after
his choice, may well determine whether his gov
ernment is to remain in power. The future of
Iran and perhaps whether there Is to be war
or peace in Iran may likewise be forecast by
political developments in that country between
now and tomorrow night
Earlier this week the Iranian Premier re-
vealed his intention to deliver an ultimatum
to Britain that the British either reopen nego-
tiations on the oil naturalization crsis-on Mos
sadegh's own unchanged terms-or suffer the
expulsion of British personnel from the Abadan
refinery On Wednesday the upper branch of
the Iranian Parliament approved this intention
without dissent. On Thursday the lower branch
of the Assembly failed to muster quorum when
called upon to give similar Endorsement. The
clear implication of this development in the
lower house was that a sizable bloc of delegates
perhaps not large enough to vote down the pro-
posal, had decided to prevent vote of conf
dence by absenting themselves and thus making
a session legally impossible Government leaders
accordingly called new session for tomorrow
morning obviously hoping they would be able
to whip the reluctant legislators into line by
that time
On Thursday night the British Foreign Of
flee re-entered the picture by declaring that
MoSsadegh'S proposed ultimatum shows conclu-
sively that no further negotiations with the
present Persian Granian) government can pro-
duce any results" AS consequence, the For
eign Office concluded, the negotiations "are no
longer in suspense, but broken off"
1t seems apparent by the British action that
London now hopes that the MoSSadegh govern
ment will be repudiated and that a new one
will be named with which conversations on the
oil issue be resumed.
If Mossadeghs government should now re-
ceive the full vote of confidence requested, and
his ultimatum should then be forwarded off,
cially TO London, the British would be faced
with three very disturbing alternatives
One would be complete retraction of their
latest expression toward the Mossadegh admin
iStration. A second would be to suffer the in
dignity of allowing their personnel to be expelled
virtually by force-which they have already in
dicated they would not tolerate. The third would
be to attempt military protection of this per-
Sonnel, perhaps under cloak of the recent ruling
OF the International Court of Justice that exist
ing management Of the Iranian oil industry
should remain in being and without interference
from either side until valid decision is made
on its future.
None of these alternatives is happy one
Suffering the indignity of expulsion particularly
after the negotiating concessions already made,
might lower British prestige all over the world.
Resort by Britain to military strength might
or might not be comparably damaging on the
prestige side but it certainly would contain more
explosive potentialities
1t is almost anti-climactic at this point to
remember that no oil is being produced in this
period and that the Iranian economy is being
deprived of its greatest single source of support.