Evening star., 1951-06-02
Secretary Defends
State Department. S
Role in Korea War
Continued From Page A-4.)

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latter half Of '49. l.
During the IL months from june
'49 to June, 80 our exports were
some $50 million worth of goods
to Communist China, and our i'm
ports from the country were goods
valued at $110 million. The trade
during that period moving from
the United States consisted of such
items as raw cotton, chemicals
machinery. petroleum products
and metals. We received from
them bristles. silk. tung oil, tin
and tungsten. The greater part
of our exports were raw cotton. q.
In June. 1850. we recognized
after the Korean aggression. that
Communist China was likely to be
used as transshipment point. and
we Immediately put on an abso-
lutte ban of all petroleum ship
ments from the United States to
Communist China. We placed
a complete embargo on shipments
from the United States to Com
munist China of all items of
strategic value.
Embargo On All Shipments.
Then in December of 1850, after
the Chinese intervened in Ko-
rea,, we put complete embargo
on all shipments from the United
States, the halting of all American
ships to Chinese ports, and we
froze all funds. -.
Now, so far as our Allies are
concerned . in the fall of 194e
:. we undertook to discuss with
our Allies putting restrictions or
the export of arms and ammuni-
tions and implements of war
atomic energy materials, to the
Soviet bloc. -.
BY the end of 1949 the Euro
pean nations participating in the
efforts had embargoed shipments
to the Soviet bloc of about two
thirds of the industrial items
which our own experts then re-
garded as of primarily strategic
Importance. In early 1850 this
>. still was further expanded.
In early 81 agreement was
reached to increase the number
OF categories of goods subject to
embargo by about so per cent and
to increase by three times the
total number of items being re-
Stricted AS a result of these
last discussions, about 90 per cent
Of the items which we regard as
being of primary strategic sig
nificance have been put on these
lists for embargo. =.
Specialized petroleum products
such as aviation gasoline, specia,
lubricants, have been embargoeo
to Communist China and all other
Communist destinations since late
1949 by the United States, the
United Kingdom and other gov
ernmentS Major petroleum
companies shipping from offshore
sources have co-operated in this
embargo.
In addition, although it has not
been generally known, it is a fact
that ever since the Chinese Com
munists consolidated their hold
on the mainland. for many months
prior to the Korean hostilities,
the United Kingdom had cooper
ated with us and with the prin-
cipal American and British oil
companies in restricting ship
ments of petroleum products to
those types and quantities which
are clearly intended for civilian
Some Smuggling Possible.
It is possible that small amounts
of petroleum products may have
been smuggled into the mainland
1t can be stated fatty, however
that no significant shipments
of petroleum products of military
usefulness have been exported te
Communist China from or through
any place in the free world.
So far as U. N. action is con-
cerned, on May 18. the General
Assembly adopted by a vote OF
As to 4, eight abstentions, and
the Soviet bloc not participating
a resolution calling for an en-
barge on strategic exports tt
Communist China. Many coun-
tries were already doing this, as
I have pointed out; others were
not.
In regard to the situation which
existed in the past. and exists
now. in regard to rubber. in the
past we have had some difference
in respect to the classification OF
rubber, as to whether that was
strategic or not. We thought il
was; others thought it was not.
The difference in our appraisal
of the rubber problem and the ap-
praisal of certain other coun-
tries, including the British, was
largely a question of judgment
of its strategic value, and a ques-
ton of the effectiveness of the
controls if they were imposed
and not by the British-consid-
ering the volume of rubber in
the world which would not be un-
der effective control.
We regard rubber as strategic
commodity. We were concerned
with the size of the shipments be-
ing made, and we sought their
reduction.
We welcomed, therefore. the
British decision on May 10, tt
embargo rubber from British col
onies to China, even though they
like we, know that this may moi
completely cut off the supply Of
rubber to China or to the Soviet