Evening star., 1951-05-07

/ DcmOcFdt, Oh virginia. ucSIS Hat
+ escort. Gen. Marshall to the b
Building. The two Senators also
at the airport last week to eScOr
Korea, where he had found that
the 9th Army was in good, shape
and was improving daily.
Thereafter, the situation of our
forces in Korea continued to i'm
prove and during the latter half
of January the enemy forces re-
manned on the defensive. Through
Iout February and March our
forces maintained the initia-
tive against the enemy.
AS the result of this change in
the military situation from that
which prevailed during the early
part of January, it became unnec-
esSary to put into effect all of the
courses of action outlined in the
Joint Chiefs memorandum of Jan
uary II.
None of these proposed courses
of action were vetoed or disap-
proved by me or by any higher
authority. Action with respect to
most of them was considered in
advisable in view of the radical
change in the situation which
originally had given rise to them.
Now, as to the basic differences
tof judgment which exist between
Gen. Macarthur on the one hand,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense and the Pres
ident, on the other hand:
| Our objective in Korea con-
tinues to be the defeat of the
aggression and the restoration of
peace. We have persistently sought
to confine the conflict to Korea
and to prevent its spreading into
a Third World War. In this effort,
we stand allied with the great
majority of our fellow-members
of the United Nations.
/ Our efforts have succeeded in
thwarting the aggressors in Korea
and in stemming the tide of ag-
gression in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere throughout the world.
Our efforts in Korea have given
JUS some sorely needed time and
impetus to accelerate the build
ing of our defenseS and those of
our Allies against the threatened
onslaught of Soviet imperialism
Gen. Macarthur, on the other
hand. would have us, on our own
initiative, carry the conflict be-
Iyond Korea against the mainland
of Communist China, both from
the sea and from the air. He
,, would have us accept the risk OF
involvement not only in an ex-
tension of the war with Red
China, but in an all-out war with
the Soviet Union. He would have
us do this even at the expense oi
losing our Allies and wrecking the
coalition of free peoples through
out the world. He would have III
do this even though the effect Of
=. such action might expose West.
ern Europe to attack by the mil
: lions of Soviet troops poised IL
Middle and Eastern Europe.
Question of Judgment.
. This fundamental divergence i
one of judgment as to the prope,
course of action to be followed b,
the United States. This divergenc,
t arises from the inherent differenc,
S between the position of a fielt
commander, whose mission is linn
tied to a Particular area and :
particular antagonist. and th'
: position of the Joint Chiefs o
{ Staff, the Secretary Of Defense
9 and the President, who are re-
! sponsible for the total security O
: the United States. and who, II
, achieve and maintain this securi
= ty, must weigh our interests ant
g objectives in one part of the glob,
), with those in other areas of tn
q world so as to attain the bes
overall balance.
1t is their responsibility t.
, determine where the main threa
h to our security lies, where W
must fight holding actions, an
:, where and how we must gain tim
- to grow stronger. On the othe
J. ~ hand, the responsibilities and tn
- courses of action assigned to
theater commander necessaril
;, apply to his own immediate are
- of responsibility.
i. 1t is completely UNDERSTANDABLE
II and, in fact. at times commendabl
that theater commander shoul
&c become so wholly wrapped up il
: his own aims and responsibilitie
= that some of the directives re
Is ceived by him from higher au
: thority are not those that h
would have written for himself
=, There is nothing new about thi
= :, sort of thing in our military his
20 20 tory. What is new, and what hs
% q brought about the necessity fc
"a Gen. MacArthur's removal, is tn
7 IIwholly unprecedented situation {
r. a local theater commander pub
IN licly expressing his displeasure 6
lis and his disagreement with tf
y. foreign and military policy of til
m United States.
Gil 1t became apparent that Gel
ut Macarthur had grown so far OIL
On of sympathy with the establishe
of policies of the United States tn;
there was grave doubt as /
n. whether he could any longer |
toI permitted to exercise the autho
he ity in making decisions that no
I'M NAL command functions wou
ng assign to theater commando