davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Commanders Plan Would Risk War With Soviet Unon Investigators Are Told

ton. That was a most serious
consideration.
I always felt that Gen. Mac
Arthur, because of his distance
from here, and because of his
preoccupation, naturally, with the
operations that were going on in
Korea, as we'll as his responsible
ties in Japan, did not fully realize
the state of mind of these asso-
.ciates of our, our allies, and the
extraordinary difficulty we had in
lining up, having them all line up
with us where we had to have them
before the United Nations Security
Council.
Loss of Allies.
The possibilities of the loss of
our Allies, the loss of continuation
and development of collective &C
ton, collective defense, and the
hazard of entering into a general
war appealed to us as being so
serious that the other possibilities
which would flow. in his opinion,
from carrying out his proposals,
were not considered advisable.
Chairman Russell-What effect
do you think it might have upon
the implementation of the North
Atlantic Treaty and the military
and political situation in Western
Europe?
Secretary Marshall-Well, it di-
rectly affected that AS you
know we were in a considerable
discussion, argument, with the
British government in relation tc
actions that ought to be taken. We
still have the basis there of argu-
ment and discussion relating to
Hong Kong and imports into
China. But we are intimately as.
sociated with them, with France
the other Western European coun-
tries, in the effort to build up a
defense in Western Europe that
will have some body to it, some
assurance of deterrent action
against possible Russian action
And all of those matters would be
jeopardized very, very seriously
And we never must forget that
aspect of the matter.
Chairman Russell-Mr. Secre-
tary. can you tell this committee
what progress is being made in
the imposition of an economic
blockade on Red China?
! Secretary Marshall-I can't tel
you the status Of that at the pres.
ent time because I have not hearc
Mr.. Acheson detail the results o1
his more recent pressure. He
has been endeavoring, I know, tt
bring about an accord in thai
matter, which means the termina.
! ton of the imports to China
! through Hong Kong.
Chairman Russell-Do you thinl
that if an economic blockade car
be imposed that it would have any
. material military consequences?
| Secretary Marshall-Oh, it vii
have certainly in my opinion, i
j.. will affect the military situation
: don't think it will affect then
seriously because their real suppl,
:, line as to war material, and 81
forth, is largely coming from thu
} Soviet government,
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Policy Relating
To 18th Parallel

Chairman Russell. Were
any instructions ever issued Gen.
Macarthur as to whether he
should stop at the 38th Parallel
or Pyongyong or any other point
short of the international bound
ary or boundaries?
Secretary MarShall-He received
instructions regarding the 38th
Parallel shortly after the landing
at Inchon, and then again the
question of the 38th Parallel came
into focus when the situation was
restored by Gen. RidgWay in a
successful operation of the troops
along about the latter part of jan
uary. and if we can find those,
can read them to you.
We regarded that there was no.
you might say, legal prohibition
against passing the 38th parallel.
but he was specifically informed
that the dominnat consideration
would be the security of his COM
mand, and if it was necessary to
go past the 38th parallel, for that
purpose, he would go ahead and
do it; but a major advance be-
yond the 38th Parallel at this
particular time when the situa-
ton had been restored was not
to be undertaken without the ap-
proval, specific approval of the
Government.
In the fall, when he started his
advance, following the landing at
1nchon, he was authorized to pass
the parallel in connection with his
own efforts to destroy the North
Korean troops. and finally given
authority by the United Nations.
Chairman Russell - Now, Mr..
Secretary, one of the issues here
is as to whether or not Gen. Mac
Arthur directly or indirectly vio-
lated any orders or directives is
sued to him by you, as a repre-
sentative of Defense, or by the
President?
Public Statements.
Secretary Marshall-In relation
to the conduct of the campaign,
no. he has not, not that I can
recall. In relation to public state
ments, he has.
Chairman Russell-Now, do you
know what instructions were
given him with respect to public
statements?
Secretary Marshall-A general
instruction was issued to all gov
eminent activities, and specific
ally to all military commanders,
that they would refrain from any
public statements regarding for
eign relations that were not
formally cleared.
Chairman Russell-Can you
give us about the date of that
order?
Secretary Marshall-It was di-
rective of December 6. This
directive had been preceded by 6
series of public statements and re.
leases by Gen. Macarthur con-
corning the failure of the often.
sive launched on November "a anc
on November 30.
Now the directive of December
9Th was put into general terms il
order to avoid making it Specifi.
cally personal to Gen. Macarthur
Chairman Russell-Well, was il
considered by you or any of Gen
MacArthur's superiors that those
statements were in violation Of
any order or regulation?
Secretary Marshall-YeS, sir.
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Aqreed on Need
To Gust General

Senator Knowland-Mr. Chair
man, right at that point, would
you be willing to clarity as to
whether the recommendations OF
both the civilian and military
people went into the matter OF
the summary removal of Gen. Mac
Arthur?
There was considerable discus
sion as to the procedure for his
relief, and for that-and in that,
the decision was reached that it
should be carried out by an official
of the Government, of some
stature: and Mr.. Pace, being in
Korea, he was designated to do
this, and he was specifically in
Structed to make the appointment
to see Gen. Macarthur at the
Embassy, his home, and not at
his office; and at a time before
he went to his Office for his daily
business.
The question of his opportunity
for the farewell to his command
was not discussed, as recall. The
necessity for his immediate relief
l think, was felt by all concerned
The issue was getting too compli-
Gated to go on, considering the tre
Imendous Importance of the events
then in progress.
The situation was going to be
exceedingly difficult for Gen. Ridg-
way. and our thoughts had to &C
to Gen. Ridgway and the tremen-
dous problem he was going to have
on his hands both in Korea and ir
Japan, particularly there in rela-
ton to the treaty discussions that
were then under way.
Just what would have developed
in connection with the procedure
of relief, which was named fol-
some date ahead, we will say spe-
cifically for Gen. Macarthur tc
take formal leave of his command
would also involve the reactions
that would be set up that might
be decidedly to the disadvantage
of Gen. Ridgway, whom we have
to look to carry out the campaign
in Korea and the responsibilities
in Japan? :.
My reaction was that it was
necessary to relieve Gen. MacAr-
thur Immediately.
Chairman RuSsell-Mr. Secre-
tary. did you or the Joint Chiefs
Of Staff through you ever inform
Gen. Macarthur that Intervention
by the Chinese would not occur
or was unlikely or that there was
a likelihood of the intervention by
Communist China?
Checked On Information.
Secretary Marshall-I did not
send him such information, and
think it will be better for you tc
question the Chiefs of Staff in
regard to that. have checked
up on the information sent tc
him by Gen. Smiths C. I. A. group
to find out, and I found that his
information was all sent out.
4 Chairman RUSSELL believe
Evening star., 1951-05-08

you have covered in your opening
statement your views on whether
or not Formosa should be given
to the Chinese Communists.
Secretary Marshall-Yes. sir. =.
I concurred with the views of the
Chiefs of Staff.
Chairman RuSsell-Does that
also apply as to the representation
by Red China in the United
Nations?
Secretary Marshall-Very spe-
cif1cally. yes, sir.
Chairman Russell-You are op-
posed to both?
Secretary Marshall-Yes, sir,
and 1 so stated in my statement.
I referred to the policy
which was in existence when !
became Secretary of Defense,
which was to deny FormoSa to
Communist China, and to oppose
the seating of Communist Chinese
in the United Nations.
At no time have I entertained
the opinion that there should be
any deviation from that policy
that these two issues were to be
excluded from the armistice
terms.
Chairman Russell-That cov-
ers the question.
Chairman Russell. ]
would like to get your views as tC
whether or not the Chinese Reds
can be driven out of Korea and
Korea pacified without the i'm
plementing Gen. Macarthur rec
ommends?
Fears Bigger Casualties.
Secretary Marshall. I should
say that if the Chinese Commu-
Inists continue in force in North
Korea with the potential of ad-
Iditional reinforcements that might
be made available, and with oul
situation where we visualize nc
considerable reinforcement of the
United Nations Army, that they
could not be driven out of NORTH
Korea, and I have my own doubts
as to whether the actions recon-
mended by Gen. Macarthur
would bring the conflict to a vic
ItoriouS end.
I am afraid in my own opinion
it might result in a great in
crease in casualties without {
decisive finish. but that is hi,
view to the contrary as the The.
ater Commander.
Chairman Russell. Did yol
say in your statement that 70,
doubted whether they could bt
driven out even If we adopted
these recommendations?
| Secretary Marshall. Yes. sip
Evening star., 1951-05-08

Hitherto censored remarks by
Gen. Macarthur on his desire to
bomb Red depot in North Ko-
rea were made public yesterday
The restored portion-a part OF
Thursdays testimony-follows:
Gen. MacArthW-Most explicitly
I was prohibited from bombing
any place beyond the areas OF
Korea.
I might say in that connection
that additional restrictions were
placed upon it. For instance, ]
was very anxious to bomb Rashin
That is in Northeast Korea. 1t is
the great central distributing
point from Manchuria down the
East Coast Of Korea. 1t is per-
haps 35 miles within North Korea
I was very anxious to destroy
that. Its usefulness to the enemy
was self f-evident. Great accumula-
tions. depot accumulations, were
lldOC IIlClC. ~ was q SICdU O10-
tributing center. They could run
the Soviets could run stuff from
Vladivostok right down there.
We asked to bomb that, and we
were forbidden.
The Chairman-You mean that
was within North Korea?
35 Miles Inside Border.
! Gen. MacArthur-That is In
North Korea, sir, 35 miles this side
Of the Soviet border. 1 made the
last request along that line-Gen
Stratemeyer. very magnificent
air commander, insisted that that
place should be taken out. 1t was
vital. 1t was forbidden in some
original directives. Other things
were forbidden. which were with
in Korea.
The Chairman-Will it disturb
you if, when I have something ]
want to ask, if interrupt?
That was forbidden specifically
III one OF your original dlrectlVeS?
Gen. MacArthur-One of the
original directives that I recall.
The Chairman-Was any rea-
son given as to why this town in
North Korea should not be
bombed?
Gen. MacArthur-I don't recall
Senator, but the reason seemed to
me to be self-evident. They wished
to avoid friction with the Soviets
Peremtorily Refused.
Now, to 60 back to Rashin, un-
der the insistence of the Air,
submitted that recently. shortly
before my recall, and it was
peremptorily refused and no rea-
sons given.
The Chairman-That is within
thirty-f1ve miles of the Soviet
frontier, rather than
Gen. MacArthur-That is up in
the Northeast, sir, opposite the
Soviet border there, and my guess
is about thirty-f1ye miles this side
OF the border.
Senator Lodge-Could we get
the name of that place for the
record?
The Chairman-How do you
! spell that town?
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Effect of Total
Naval Blockade

NlldII man fbuSS6lI-W nal 90 you
think would be the effect of a
complete naval blockade of the
China coast?
Secretary Marshall-I think it
would inconvenience them and in
time might have a very serious
effect on the stability of the
Chinese Communist government.
Chairman Russell-What effect
would it be likely to have if we
unilaterally imposed a complete
naval blockade?
Secretary Marshall-I am ad-
vised by the naval authorities that
you can not very successfully i'm
pose naval blockade under those
conditions, because we would be
involved with Russian ships, with
those of other nations, and it
would leak like a sieve" is the
expression they used to me.
Chairman Russell-General. will
you state briefly the directives of
our Government to Gen. MacAr-
thur with respect to use of bomb
ing as a weapon against the Chi
nese Communists. the limitations
that are involved?
Secretary Marshall-A number
of the messages involve that in
which he was cautioned time after
time against bombing beyond the
borders of Korea and he was given
one message, which I recited to
you, wherein he was notified that
If attacks were made against us
outside Of the boundaries of Ko-
rea, he could retaliate by bombing
under those conditions.
There were several messages
back and forth concerning the
bombing of the bridges over the
Yalu River and the communities
right on that river on the Korean
side when he was reporting large
movements of Communist Chinese
troops moving southeast through
Manchuria and crossing the Yalu
into Korea. :. And he was finally
given the authority to bomb those.
localities.
Chairman Russell-Gen. Mac
Arthur stated that there was
certain road juncture and supply
center, which. believe, was pro-
nounced "Rashin," and spelled
r. a-c-i-n." Can you give
any just or logical reason why
that town should not be bombed
within North Korea?
Question of Risk.
Secretary Marshall-It was
question of the risk involved in
an operation so close to the
Soviet frontier. and as to the
question of ships in the harbor.
and other mishaps that might
occur. -.
Chairman Russell We are
confronted. Mr. Secretary, here
with an issue as to whether or
not that specific testimony de-
livered by Gen. Macarthur should
be released.
Secretary Marshall-I would
want to look over the various
papers connected with that.
Chairman Russell-No papers
are involved. 1t was just a state
ment from Gen. Macarthur that
he was denied permission to bomb
the locality. -.
Secretary Marshall-I think
that can be released, and I will
find out and let the committee
know right away.
(Secretary Marshall later in
formed the committee that the
deleted portion of Gen.
MacArthur'S statement on this
subject could be released.)
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Continued From Page A-4.)

of their ineffectiveness and lack
of logiStic support.
Chairman RuSSell-If I under
stand Gen. MacArthur's testimony,
he stated that he did in the first
instance advise against the use of
Chinese Nationalist troops, but as
the operations in Korea proceeded
and particularly as our position
there worsened, that he very
strongly advised that Chinese Ma
tlonalist troops be employed.
Secretary Marshall - l find I
have the note here:
In late November Gen. Mac
Arthur recommended the 9th Army
be reinforced as rapidly as possible
with fifty to sixty thousand Chi
nese Nationalist forces from For
mosa. 1t was his view that this
number of Chinese Nationalist
troops were sufficiently well
trained and equipped to be COM
mitted to combat; that the Korean
war had sufficiently drained the
Chinese Communists potential to
negate the possibility of an early
invasion of FormoSa that since
the Chinese Communists already
had interviewed, no widening of
hostilities by the Chinese Com
munists would result, and that
the needs for reinforcements in
Korea and the inability to obtain
them from elsewhere justified the
use of Chinese Nationalist troops.
Forces Held Ineffective.
THE Joint Chiefs felt that
based on the past performance of
these same troops on the Chinese
mainland and the reports the sur
vey party which was sent by Gen.
Macarthur to Formosa as to the
adequacy of training and the
equipment of the Chinese Nation
alist forces there, the Joint Chiefs
were convinced that these forces
would not be effective in Korea.
(About Is words cenSored)
Furthermore, their departure
from Formosa would leave that is
land with inadequate defensive
forces to meet possible Com .
muniSt attack" 4
Chairman Russell. Later
then, in November, Gen MacAr- +.
thur did request the use of Chinese
Nationalist troops?
Secretary Marshall - That is
correct.
Chairman RuSsell-Now, return
ing to that memorandum of Janu-
ary II, 1851. was that prepared as
the result of recommendations
that were made in the first in
stance by Gen. Macarthur or was
that prepared by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on their own initiative?
Secretary Marshall-It was pre-
pared by them on their own initi-
ative, but it was, in part. related
to Gen. MacArthurS recommen-
dation. and his estimate of the
situation.
Chairman Russell-Was there,
as between the three members of
the Joint Chiefs. was there any
dissent as to that memorandum.
or do you know?
Secretary Marshall-I couldn't
answer that, sir. What l re- +
ceived was this memorandum
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
signed by Gen. Bradley. The pre-
sumption is, of course, that it is
unanimous.
Chairman Russell - Were you
consulted before it was prepared?
Secretary Marshall-I do not
recall that I was consulted Spe-
o;fooII,,
Evening star., 1951-05-08

Defense Secretary Marshall has
given, for the first time, the official
story of how Gen. Macarthur was
dismissed-and revealed, too, that
administration fears of a leak"
moved up the notification by
about 20 hours.
He related the story during his
testimony yesterday before the
Senate Armed Services and For
eign Relations Committees investi-
eating the Macarthur controversy.
Gen. Marshall also revealed that
it was originally planned for Army
Secretary Pace, then in the Far
East, to deliver the dismissal
orders to Gen. Macarthur at his
residence and not at his Office.
However. a power failure in
Pusan, in Southern Korea, kept
Mr.. Pace from receiving his in
IStructions.
Chairman Russell of the investi-
eating committee said it was
rather shocking" that a matter of
such Importance should have
Leaked out" before any official
announcement.
do you know whether or not
Iany official Investigation has been
had to know how it came about?"
the Georgia Senator asked.
IT don't know about that, sir
Gen. Marshall replied.
He added that this was rumol
which the Administration thought
had a pretty solid foundation. d
There were reports about the time
of the dismissal that a Washing
ton correspondent had made a
query as to whether Gen. Mac
Arthur was being relieved
Decision Followed Letter.
Secretary Marshall testified
that the decision to relieve Gen
Macarthur was reached after the
publication of the Far Eastern
commanders letter to Representa-
tive Martin of Massachusetts, the
House Republican leader, during
debate on the draft bill. In that
letter Gen. Macarthur urged a
much more vigorous policy in the
Far East.
Secretary Marshall made it
clear that President Truman and
his top advisers regarded the let
ter. as we'll as earlier public state
ments by Gen. Macarthur, as a
violation of general directives tc
clear policy statements in Wash
ington.
The letter, he added, was
brought to the Presidents atten-
; ton on April 5. Thereafter, the
Secretary continued. Mr.. Truman
called meeting of Averell Har.
riman, his special assistant; Sec.
retary of State .Acheson. Gen
Marshall and Gen. Omar Bradley
, the chairman of the Joint Chief.
i, of Staff.
! mo decision was taken at thi
meeting the Marshall accoun
said, but after a full discussion
the President requested that al
Irecords bearing on the subject b.
brought to his attention"
More Discussion April 7.
/ On Saturday, April 7, Gen
Marshall said the same grour
again met with the President fo
a further discussion of the matter
1T was suggested" he added
that the matter be considered in.
dividually over the'weekend.
Gen. Marshall said the Presi.
dent directed him, as Secretary o.
! Defense, to obtain the views oil
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from &
purely military point of view"
That was done. he testified, or
Sunday, the following day. when
the JOINT Chiefs met with Gen
Marshall and Gen. Bradley.
The recommendations of the
Joint Chiefs were reported to the
President at a third meeting on
Monday, April 9. of his principal
advisers in the matter-Mr. Harri-
Evening star., 1951-05-08

and they meet the same result
that came from their attack of
the last two weeks, we will have
almost destroyed again or ruined
the fighting power of some I
think it is "a new divisions. There
were that number concentrated
on what was the left of our line
on the 1st Corps, and I know
after the fourth day the report
was that we had disposed of 26 of
them up to that time.
Now on their part that cannot
continue without wrecking them
very seriously because they have
troubles in China themselves.
They had this threat they were
carrying out against Indo China.
That I am quite certain has been
decidedly delayed by the effect of
what is going on in Korea, and
the same thing applies to any
'IthreatS to Thailand or Siam.
When we turn to this country
I think we must keep in mind
] throughout that we had almost
nothing in the summer of 1850 in
the way of available troops in
!. this country other than one air.
borne division, the 82d, and a
part of a Marine division.
Everything else has been built
I iup since that time.
] You have the choice of employ
; ing all the means Gen. Mac
Arthur recommends, which would
certainly enlarge the fighting
and whether it would bring VIC
tory is a matter of opinion. The
Chiefs of Staff can give you their
own views in regard to it, and in
which I concur that it would
/ Part OFF the Record.
: Chairman Russell. Do I un.
derstand you to believe that that
: entire statement should be off the
!, record, Mr.. Secretary?
, Secretary Marshall. The first
: part of that should be off the
! record. The next part where
) I spoke of what we were now
: struggling for should not be or
= the record. The generalization
1 don't mind that being on the
record.
Chairman Russell. I under.
stand then that you recommend
"a continuation of the present
, policy in Korea rather thar
adopting Gen. MacArthur's pro.
posal?
Gen. Marshall. That is cor
-, rect, sir. l must add to that Of
=. course that If the Chinese Com.
j, munists with at least equipment
support from the Soviets anc
maybe more support carry the
.. war to us outside of Korea
then we have to retaliate.
We have no choice then. Tht
security of that command is oul
first consideration.
Chairman Russell - Now. MI
Secretary, what is your opinion
with respect to the probable mill
tary consequences if the program
so ably presented by Gen. Mac
Arthur, is adopted You hav'
5 already cleared it up with respec
to the operations against China
I ask you as to your opinion as tt
, whether or not it will likely pro
, mote intervention by the Sovie
power-or do you believe it would
) Secretary Marshall - My owl
view was-and I think 1t is SINH
lar to that of the Chiefs of Staff
that we were risking a hazard tina
had such terrible possible conse'
quences that what we would gair
was not comparable to what WI
were risking; and further thar
that. that certain of those action:
would almost inevitably lose us tht
cooperation of our Allies anc
, would precipitate situation where
: the troops on the ground woulc
> become involved as to whether Of
. not they could continue in the &C.
Evening star., 1951-05-08
Chromite in Pukiston

CHITTAGONG, Pakistan.-
Pakistan has the second largest
high-grade chromite deposits in
the world. 4