Evening star., 1951-06-09

| forces and Allied forces, too, from
| Korea?
Secretary Acheson-Well, the
possibility that we might be forced
out of Korea was one which was,
of course, very much present in
our mind at the time of the very
grave danger in December and
January of last year and this
year. I never favored the evacua-
ltion of the troops.
Senator Cain-May I ask, sir, if
you have ever known the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to favor or con-
slider seriously the possibility of
being required to evacuate our
troops from Korea after the Red
Chinese entered the war in
November?
Secretary Acheson-Yes, sir:
think that the papers which you
have before you show that ir
December and January there was
1.-THE full possibility that the tide
]of battle might force us out o1
Korea.
Senator Cain. It has al
ways been my individual view
THAT the question of evacuatine
Korea was initiated in the Unitec
lStates and that Gen. Macarthur
responded to an evacuation in
|quiry from the jos by stating
THAT II the jos estimate Of the
situation was correct and If mill
ltary restrictions prevailing las
November were not removed, Il
might become necessary to evac'
luate Korea.
l. Message Paraphrased.
| On 20 December, 1850. the jos
requested Gen. Macarthur for hi!
views as to conditions which
might determine a decision tt
evacuate Korea.
| A paraphrase of this message
Mr.. Secretary, appears on pag'
I8O of the jos report for the Join
COMMITTEES, which I think Mr.
Fisher has available for you.
and other Senators were neveI
satisfied with this paraphrase, be
Icause we had reason, or though
we had reason, to believe 1t lef
much unsaid.
The Senator from California
particularly. and the Senate
from Washington requested I
fuller and more def1nitive para
phrase of the message from tn
IJCS to the field commander las
December. This request was salts
fed in the last few days and al
Ianplification of the message ha
been inserted in the jos report
Mr.. Chairman, the origina
Iparaphrase and the amplifies
paraphrase bear little sinilarit,
to each other.
The title, Decision as to tn
Future Military Action in Ko
rea-"
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Oh
!. 20 December. 1850, pointed ou
: to CINCFE that effective resist
! ance at some position in Kore'
: and the deflation of the militar
: and political prestige Of the Chi
: nese Communists would be O
great Importance to our nationa
interests if this could be accom-
plished without incurring seriou
E losses. Further, the basic directiv
= of CINCFE was modified in tina
he was to defend, in successiv
positions, inf1icting maximum
damage to hostile forces. His op
Ierations, however. were alway
subject to the primary considera
ton of the safety of his troop.
E Further. maximum Korean con
D tribution to sustained resistanc
should be modified. Comment
Y by CINCFE were requested as t
! conditions which might determin
}, a decision to evacuate Korea.
e was stated that upon the receip
|, Iof his comments. CINCFE woul
v be provided a definite directive.
Additional Message.
t -. should like to read this re
j quested and additional paraphras
= of the message of December 2!
:, 1850. It's title. Personal for Mac
S Arthur from the Joint Chiefs G
Staff
= THE following paraphrase is i
y amplification of the summary {
n the message of 20 December 1876
u in paragraph 81. page 80 of tn
t compilation, as requested b
n Senator Knowland on page 45s
of the hearings:
Chinese Communists now az
e pear, from estimates availabl
n capable of forcing evacuation b
i: forces of U.N. BY committing SUI
o stantial United States fore.
n which would place other commit
ments. including safety of Japal
+. in serious jeopardy, or by inflict
ing serious losses on him, enem
y might be forced to abandon e,
? ercise Of his capability. # wit
j. present UN. strength successfV
n resistance at some position in Kc
!, rea without our incurring seriol
losses would be accomplished an
= apparent military and polite;
d prestige of Chinese Communist
: could be deflated, it would be {
e great Importance to our nations
= interests. In the face of increase
o threat of general war jos beliey
It commitment of additional Unite
n States ground forces in Kore
t. should not be made, since our vie
n is that major war should not (
! fought in Korea.
IS No Additional Forces.
! mot considered practicable
t obtain at this time significant ad
u ditional forces from other Unite
Nations. Therefore in light G
= xyo,,r 4