Evening star., 1951-06-02

fdentiGl 1949 State Department
document dealing Dith FormosG
and declaSSiffed yesterday By
the Joint Senate Committee in
Vestigating Far East policy.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA.
POLICY ADVISORY STAFF.
Y Special Guidance, No. %.
DECEMBER %, 1949.
Policy Information Paper
F0rm0Sa.
/. Problem:
To formulate information polio!
: which will minimize damage II
United States prestige and others
morale by the possible fall of For
mosa to the Chinese Communis
forces.
III. Background.
i A. Comment on Formosa is or
the increase as the Communist ad.
vances on the Chinese mainland
leave the island as the last sub.
stantial part Of China under Ma.
tionalist control. Attention is TO.
cused by three principal elements
i. Communists, world wide, who
charge the United States with
conspiring to build the island into
a fortress to be taken over by the
United States (if it does not al
ready control it,. thereby trying
to brand the United States with
the mark of aggressive imperial.
ism, and also hoping to get us in
volved in a risky and unpromising
venture;
/ 2. Pro-Nationalists principally
in the United States) who con-
slider Formosa redoubt in which
the government could survive ano
who tend to create an impression
the United States is delinquent il
it fails to save Formosa";
3. Groups in the United States
who are inclined to be critical OF
the United States for failure to
act to prevent loss of the island
to the Communists, largely be-
cause of mistaken popular con-
Dception of it's strategic Importance
to United States defense in the
Pacific.
Loss Anticipated.
B. Loss of the island is widely
anticipated. and the matter in
which civil and military condi-
tions there have deteriorateo
under the Nationalists adds
weight to the expectation. It's
fall would threaten:
/. Loss of United States pres
tige at home and abroad to the
extent we have become COM
Imitted in the public mind to hold
lit:
/ 2. Damage to the morale OF
other nations, particularly in the
Far East. which are disturbed by
the Communist gains and fear its
possible further advances.
! C. Formosa, politically, geo.
graphically. and strategically, is
part of China in no way especially
distinguished or important. Al
though ruled by the japanese tas
"Taiwan") for so years, his
torically it has been Chinese
Politically and militarily it is a
Istrictly Chinese responsibility.
1t is true that the technical
status Of the island remains to be
determined by the japanese peace
settlement. but the Cairo Agree
ment and Potsdam Declaration
and the surrender terms of Sep
tember 2. 1945, looked to it's re-
turn to China and the United
States facilitated its takeover by
Chinese troops shortly after VI
DAY.
Even the small United States
Military Advisory Group sent
there at Chinese government re-
quest was completely withdrawn a
year ago. Merely a handful of
military attache personnel with
diplomatic status remains. The
United States never has had mill
tary bases there. and never has
sought any special concessions
there.
Work Done by ECA.
ECA work done on the island,
particularly through the Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruc-
ton, has been of purely economic
and technical nature for assist
ance in improvement of condi-
tions. and no Quid Pro Quo has
been sought.
%. United States public opin-
ion has concerned itself primar-
lily with the question of the
Islands strategic Importance:
there has been insistent demand
from a few sources for military
action by the United States, but
it has not assumed significant
proportions. Rather, public opin-
ion obviously is divided and un-
certain, and there is no apparent
consensus for particular course
Of active Intervention.
iii. Treatment:
A. If rising public interest war
rants it, gradually increasing at
tention may be paid Formosa. to
establish publicly the facts indi-
Gated below. Overseas use should
be made of unofficial materials in