Evening star., 1951-04-01
No Secret About 1t

In his latest remarks on the Gro0pS-f0r-
Europe issue Senator Taft said the only point
he was trying to stress was that assistance "can-
not be given except with the approval of
Congress-"
He was referring, of course to the constitu-
tonal question as to the extent Of the Presidents
powers as Commander in Chief. This is an inn
portant issue, as the inordinate amount Of
legalstic hairsplitting in the course OF the de-
bate will attest It may be that some people,
following the tortuous progress of the senatorial
discussion, will come away with the feeling that
the Senators are living in world that is
slightly unreal-that the winning Of a consti-
tutional argument is assuming greater impor-
tance in their minds than the safeguarding OF
our own security and the civilization of the
West. Still, If this difference can be resolved
without throwing away our best and perhaps
last chance to survive as free nation, there Is
undeniably much to be gained by settling the
question now. That result, at the least should
do away with the divisions which currently de-
tract so much from the force of our effort in
behalf of the North Atlantic project
Senator Taft did not confine himself, how
ever to the constitutional question He also
said this: Members of the administration are
unwilling to tell the people what their project
(under the North Atlantic Pact) is, and to ask
the approval of the people for that project
because they are afraid that the people will
not approve it,"
That statement reflects little credit on Sena-
tor Taft. There is no secret about what the
project is. General Eisenhower stated 1t as
clearly as anyone could state 1t. We are trying,
through this project, to prevent the conquest
Of Western Europe by the Russians. To that
end, we propose to send American arms and
American troops to Europe. There are two
main objectives.
The first, and one hears very little about
this in the debate, Is to build up, with American
aid in men and arms, enough military strength
in Western Europe to discourage and prevent q
Russian aggression. Second, should we fail to
achieve the first objective we hope to develop
in the West enough military strength to check
and stop Russian attack if and when it comes.
It is true, of course, that this statement of
the project neglectS some details. It does not
specify, and the administration-if it knows
has not said publicly how many troops 1t pro-
poses to send to Europe. But the reasons for
this omission are well known, certainly to Sena-
tor Taft. There most assuredly is no basis for
any inference that the number is so great that
the administration is afraid to ask for public
approval.
This whole question boils down to what is
really very simple proposition. If Russia
should attack any one of the Atlantic Pact
nations, we are obligated under the Pact to go
to the aid of that nation. That means war; and
Senator Taft does not dispute 1t. So the real
questions for our consideration are these: U)
Shall we do all that we can do to discourage
and prevent the attack that would involve us
in war with Russia? (2) If, nevertheless, war
should come, do we want to have in being in
Europe the maximum military strength to pre-
vent the overrunning of the continent by the
Russians and the subjugation Of our natural
allies?
The effect of the North Atlantic project, as
conceived by the administration, is to answer
both questions in the affirmative. And the
chances are that Senator Taft's answers would
be the same.