Evening star., 1950-09-01


unity to resist aggression. If all
great-power delegates are present.
It was the self imposed absence
Of the Russian delegate which
made 1t possible to declare the
invasion of South Korea aggres-
sion and secure U. N. authority to
resist it.
If Russia stays in the Security
Council 1t will be impossible to
secure q. N. sanction to defend
Formosa, II that island is attacked.
Why the Soviets continued alb
sent when the North Korean in
vasion occurred is speculative. I
think it an error to believe that
they were convinced that the
Council would not act. Probably
they welcomed the political and
military test. They had nothing
to lose. Had the Council refused
to act. its prestige would have
evaporated. and another territory
fallen without resistance; il it
acted. either force might arrive
too late. or be engaged in a pro-
longed war to the dissipation of
strength elsewhere and. If resist
ance won. the victory would be in
decisive. $50
Rests on Tenuous Base.
The action rests, in any case,
on a tenuous base.
The United Nations never has
defined aggression, in relation to
violence. In Soviet argument.
Korea is engaged in civil war. On
the North Korean side no external
forces are engaged. On the South
Korean side external forces are.
These latter, being external, are
invaders and aggressors. and the
action is illegal, for u. N. cannot
act without great-power unanim-
| ity.
But all states that have passed
under Soviet control have fallen
through violence-Soviet-in inspired
civil wars, or internal putsches.
Yet. the United Nations. even
without Russia, has not formu-
lated a definition Of violence to fit
the aggressions Of this century.
Neither has it managed (even
without Russia) to create an in
ternational defense force. And
this raises, for the U. 8. A., con-
stitutional question.
Under the charter. member
states are expected, but not re-
quired, to furnish military force
to counteract declared aggressions.
Thus. even states that declare and
denounce an aggression may check
out of the consequences. In fact,
most states that declared the Ko-
rean invasion aggression have
checked out, leaving nothing more
than token forces or moral sup
port.
But checking in removes the
war-making powers from repre-
sentative bodies and puts them in
the hands of the executive. The
President, not the American Con-
gress, decided to fulfill American
obligations under the charter. It
must be emphasized that there Is
no such obligation. It is an OBJ
legation implicit but not COM
pulsory.
At no time has the American
Congress pledged itself to fur
nish armed forces to repel any
aggression that might be so de-
clared by the Security Council
or not to repel any others.
A bipartisan Congress ratified
the decision and. indeed, it was
practically impossible not to do
so. In foreign affairs, decisions
taken cannot be undone without
grave international consequences.
Fundamental Weakness.
But assuming that there were
a United Nations obligation to en-
force it's own DEGREES. how, logi-
cally, should they be enforced?
1 If they are to be enforced, as
presently provided, only by the
voluntary diversion of the armed
forces of the member states, these
forces will be granted or withheld
according to the situation of the
states involved. Laying aside Mr..
Nefru's views on the Asian situa-
tion, a government faced with the
possibility of war over Kashmir