Evening star., 1950-12-27
By WiIIiom Hines

u ing WIN alarm CQe depicted SCdJe Oh
our forces for ground warfare, is apt to
think in terms of simple, if drastic, So
luton. His reasoning may go something
like this: Let's not stall around. If what
we need is an army of something like 6
million men, let's tighten our belts and
call them up right now We have the
manpower-why delay about acquiring
the divisionS?"
The average civilian forgets that there
is no quick and easy way to acquire di-
visions There is no wand-Waving proc
ess by which we can take ourselves back
in a day, a month or year-to 1945,
and the strength we had then. The cold
fact, barring some miracle such as failed
to materialize in the most feverlsh days
of World War II, is that it will be two
possibly two and half-years before our
effective ground force strength is mate
rally increased as result of any de-
cision which might be made today.
Too quick build-up, indeed, might &C
complish the very thing its proponents
are trying to avoid: The ruination of
the economy and hence the security of
the United States.
In this country, there has always
been large discrepancy between our
dreams of building wartime armies and
our actual performance. World War II is
prime example. An army of more than
800 divisions was originally envisioned. In
subsequent months, the blueprint was
scaled down. to 200 divisions-then to
100-and finally to 80.
Actually, the Army fielded 80 divisions
at its peak strength, and virtually shot
its bolt with that effort. At We day, all
its divisions were overseas; 96 per cent of
its tactical strength was committed.
There was no significant reserve of Or
ganiZed combat units left anywhere, and
there were no divisions in the process
of formation.
The planning, activation and training
of a division is a slow, costly and i'm
mensely complex operation. Many months
of planning go into the steps before a
commander is selected. and after that
event at least three months are spent in
building up a staff before the division
Is activated, or formally brought into
existence. Then follows nearly year of
training and months of maneuvers be-
fore the division is adjudged ready for
combat.
Consider the case of the 65th Infantry
Division in World War II. This was the
last division activated in that war 1t
was organized at time when the Army
was well into a wartime routine, when
training and combat experiences were
fresh in the minds of military authori-
ties. At that time. too-the middle of
1943-the Nation was geared to a war
effort; it's factories were turning out
arms ammunition. equipment, clothing.
It's farms were routinely furnishing huge
quantities of food for the armed forces.
It's railroads were prepared for over
night calls for large amounts of rolling
stock. It's draft boards were going full
blast
Despite these advantages-which do
not exist today-the elapsed time from
the day the division commander was
appointed until the day the 65th entered
combat was just a week short of %
months. The division began organizing
only six months after the first North
African landings; it started doing the
job for which it was created just two
months before We day. Its preparatory
phase of life encompassed all but eight
months of our active ground war against
Hitler
The historical record shows that the
experience of the 65th Division was
extraordinary, rather than average. OF
81 infantry divisions-the least COM
plex kind-fielded in World War II,
three were already active before 1910.
and three others were created overseas
from smaller units already in being The
remaining 81 took an average of Is
months from activation to overseas
movement and probably close to three
years from the initial-planning phase
to actual combat.
While theoretically, it would take no
more than an act of. Congress to call 6
Or 7 or 10-million men into service
overnight here are some of the reasons
why this is only theory.
/. The Army does not have training
facilities for anything like million men
and never has had. At it's height,
the Army had only 63 camps capable of
accommodating perhaps 80 divisions
simultaneously.
2. The Army does not have the train
ing personnel. Many of the men hustled
into service under such a plan would be
unframed youths without prior service.
Others would be rusty veterans of the
last war. In either case they would
need training-and plenty-both as in
dividuals and in units And the instruc-
tors, in sufficient numbers, do not exist.
3. Neither uniforms nor equipment are
Immediately available in such quantities.
Nor is the supply service set up to handle
current procurement in the volume nee
essary Six million men, for example,
would consume close to a billion pounds
of food a month.
4. Most of the million would be
drawn from commerce and industry.
where they are doing jobs that would
nave to be done after their departure.
Where millions of industrial replace
ments might be found is matter Of
grave concern.
There are other considerations. In
flation-at least or hundred million
extra dollars month in circulation all
from Army payrolls. Dissatisfaction
within the armed forces-millions of
men all dressed up, so to speak, and no