Evening star., 1950-11-30
By HoI Boyle
ssoeioted Press War corresponde

NORTH KOREA, Nov. 30.-Be-
hind the crushing defeat of the
American 9Th Army in Northwest
Korea are two great questions.
Some high-ranking officers be-
lieve the answers-when they
come-will rattle a few skeletons
in the American military estab-
lishment and perhaps force a re-
vision in the American technique
of waging ground warfare.
The questions they raise-and
the fighting troops raise them,
too-are these:
l. Why. before launching its
disastrous "end-the-war" Of
fensive didn't the American high
command know the enemy had
massed such a force against it
that victory was impossible?
2. Why was the enemy able un-
erringly to pick the weak spots
in the United Nations line while
the Allied attackers were unable
even to locate with certainty the
general areas where the Reds had
concentrated their strength?
Intelligence Held Faulty.
A number Of officers give this
as general answer to both ques-
tions:
Our intelligence was faulty
and we again made the mistake
of undertaking what a. we'll
trained Oriental foot army can
do" The same classic error was
made early in July when Ameri-
can troops first ran up against
the invading North Korean Army
One officer said afterwards:
I'VE honestly believed that all
we had to do was stand up and
show our American uniform and
the Gool-s would turn and 60 back
across the 38th Parallel"
We underestimated the ability
of the North Koreans then to
compete successfully with a ma
chine-conscious American force.
We doubted their ability to
keep a war going long when
they had to pack their supplies on
human backs and move troop re-
inforcements up by foot at night.
But they did it.
Why then did we underesti-
mate the ability of the even more
veteran Chinese army to do the
same things and why didn't we
discover the real number of the
Chinese Reds in front of us in
time to call of our Inflated Of
fensive?
= Strength Set at 100000.
The evidence is that frontline
commanders were more uneasy
about the possible success of the
Allied drive to reach the Man
churian border than was the gen.
eral headquarters staff in Tokyo.
When the drive began last
Friday the headquarters esti-
mated the North Koreans and
Chinese Force at 100000. |
Four days later, 10000 men
in the nine United Nations di-
visions that had launched the at
tack were in full retreat after a
humiliating and surprising dis
aster.
Tokyo headquarters then re-
vised its estimate of the enemy
this side of the Yalu river to more
than 100000 Red Chinese and
$4,000 North Koreans.
Where were the other 100, 900
enemy during those four days.?
Military men feel sure q force
that large couldn't have been
brought across the Manchurian
border and thrown into action In
that time. i i
Why didn't the air spot them?
Air Explanation.
An Air Force officer said:
Frankly, both the Chinese and
the North Koreans are so we'll
;amouflaged by day they are ex-
5remely difficult to locate. They
move up at night. We send out
night planes to check on their I
but in the darkness
you can't judge accurately the
nature or the size of their troop
and supply movement"
Why couldn't secret agents op-
Grating behind the enemy line
have warned of the massing Red
force?
Obviously the United Nations
force must have such agents
either sent through the lines,
dropped by parachute both.
But their reports aren't made
public.
1t is significant. however, that
one Republic of Korea COM
estimated the enemy force
before him more accurately than
did the Army command.
The Americans thought his re-
port was exaggerated. They tend
to feel that ROK leaders always