Evening star., 1950-11-29
Gentlemen May Cry, Peace, Peace

~ rolled by since Patrick Henry made his
famous address to the Richmond Assembly
since he chided the gentlemen who were CRYING
peace when there was no peace since he warned
against the inclination of man to indulge in the
illusions of hope; since he asked whether we
shall gather strength by irresolution and in
action. Throughout those years millions of
men have given up their lives for the freedoms
and liberties which Patrick Henry so ably cham
pioned. And yet, despite all of the sacrifices,
despite all of mankind's, material advances since
1775, the remaining ctadelS of freedom and
liberty in the world are threatened as they
have never been threatened before
Patrick Henry was trying to arouse his
Fellow men, to prod them into throwing off the
shackleS of the mind so they would be able to
see and understand the real nature of the crisis
which had already begun to engulf them We
need something of the same thing today. We
need to take another look at the assumptions and
the hopes upon which our course of action
has been based. We need to ask ourselves
whether we have lapsed into a state of mind
where the longing for peace and the dread OF
war have combined to blind us to the fact that
In the larger sense there is no peace We need
to face up to the fact that we will drift into
certain disaster unless we are willing to make
decisions, perhaps painful decisions, and then act
intelligently upon them.
w HAT is one to think of the fantastic
w spectacle in the United Nations where
the Chinese Communists. with blood on their
hands, stand in the role of accuser and Russias
MIR. Malik puts the United States in the defend
ants box? Not until yesterday and then at the
last possible moment did our delegate, Mr..
Austin, revise his prepared speech to bring a
complaint of aggression against the Chinese
What is the rationale of this topsy-turvy bus-
ness? 1t was the United Nations which decreed
the use of armed force against the North Korean
aggressors. Does any one believe that the U. NJ
can serve the interests of peace, or of security
by seeking place to hide from this new and
uglier fact Of Chinese aggression?
In his earlier remarks to the General As
sembly's political committee Mr. Dulles repre-
senting this country, devoted most of his effort
to review of the occasions upon which the
United States has demonstrated its good will
toward China He spoke of the bond which this
record has forged between the people of China
and the people of the United States-a bond
"that the Soviet government is now trying, and
I am convinced fruitlessly to break" At the
moment that Mr.. Dulles was speaking a Chinese
Communist army of 100000 men was smashing
through the front of the U. NJ forces in Korea
an assault which General Macarthur describes
as an entirely new war" Is it possible to square
Mr.. Dulles hopeful words with the fact of what
the Chinese are doing? Can we have peace
with the Chinese people by closing our diplomatic
eyes when their leaders wage open war against
us?
IF THERE is one clear fact which emerges from
= all this business, it is the fact that we are at
war-now. It is not final, all-out war, but
1t is war nevertheless. And it is a war which
has taught certain lessons and which raises
still other questions.
We should be asking ourselves whether our
policy of containment has not been tried and
found wanting That policy was based on the
assumption that the Communists, and the Rus
sian Communists in particular, would continue
to expand unless checked by show of force,
but that they would not expand at the risk of
war. The thought was that the Russians could
be held in check, or contained, by nterposing
against them our own military forces or the
forces of allies that had become economically
and militarily strong. To say the least, that
assumption has become an exceedingly dubious
one, if for no other reason than that the con-
tanning military forces simply do not exist
ID UT IF THE policy of containment has failed,
~ what alternatives are left?
One possibility is a political settlement in
Asia which would enable us to break off the war.
This, no doubt, is being carefully explored. But
we should not build false hopes. 1t is unlikely
that settlement can be made which will not
leave the Communists as masters of Asia, and
If we voluntarily accept such settlement we
must expect to pay the price in loss of prestige
and potential allies throughout the world. If
we reject such settlement we might be forced to
get out of Asia as best we can. If that should
happen the minimum penalty would be the loss
of everything we have been fighting for there.
Another possibility is that we may accept
what comes in Korea, and go on from there.
But where will we go and how will we get there?
If the decision should be to fight and not to
retreat, we must face the question of whom we
are to fight and where and how.
Such a decision as this could be expected
to result only in total war; We would be at
war with Russia and with all of the satellites
that Russia could bring into the battle. Con-
sidering the enormous superiority in manpower
that the enemy would have-and nanpower of
excellent fighting qualities if may Judge from
our experience in Korea-could we hope to
fight on the ground anywhere in Asia or Europe?
Would war of land armies spell disaster for
US?
Could we fight and in any sense win such
war with air power? The atom bomb and the
long-range bomber are certainly the most effec-
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