Evening star., 1950-03-15
Lewis Traded Clause
Able and Willing 10
Control Welfare Fund
Existing Statute Affords
All Protection Needed
To Guard Workers Rights
By David Laurence

Just what did John L. Lewis
give up when he abandoned the
clause in the coal contract which
provided that the miners would
work only when liable and will
tng?" The impression here is that
the miners union chief traded
this for the all-important con-
cession from the operators per-
mitting the union to name two
of the three trustees of the in
dustry's welfare fund.
But actually a careful examina-
ton of the Taft-Hartley Act will
reveal that there is no advantage
in the liable and willing" clause
which is not already available in
the existing statute whenever the
miners choose to work intermit-
tently.
The law says:
Nothing in this act shall be
construed to require an individual
employe to render labor or service
without his consent, nor shall any
thing in this act be construed to
make the quitting Of his labor by
an. individual employe an illegal
act; nor shall any court issue any
process to compel the performance
by an individual employe of such
labor or service, without his con-
sent: nor shall the quitting of
labor by an employe or employees
In good faith because of abnor-
mally dangerous conditions for
work at the place of employment
Of such employe or employees be
deemed a strike under this act"
Never "SIave Labor Act"
The first part of the foregoing
provision makes it clear that the
Taft-Hartley law was never a
"slave labor" act, as so many union
chiefs deliberately misrepresented
1t to be. For the law amply pro-
tects any individual against Gin
voluntary servitude."
The law. however, does not pro-
tect concerted" action by indi-
viduals, and neither did the con-
tract which the miners union had.
The right to strike" has two sep
arate aspects. 1t is the right of
the individual to quit work which
is unqualified and absolute. 1t is
also the right of a union to per-
suade or order its members to
quit work. This is not only a
limited right but, under certain
circumstances, it can be an illegal
act to order strike.
For this reason Congress spelled
out in the Taft-Hartley law ex-
actly what is meant by the word
strike" 1t says:
The term strike includes any
strike or other concerted stoppage
OF work by employees (including a
stoppage by reason Of the expira-
ton. of a collective-bargaining
agreement) and any concerted
showdown or other concerted In
terruption of operations by en-
ployes."
Word Used Three Times.
The foregoing provision uses
the word concerted" three times. |
The reference to the expiration of
a collective-bargaining agreement
was intended to cover those cases
where the law itself specifies that
an extension of sixty days is re-
quired on an expiring contract be-
fore a strike can go into effect If
no notice of strike has already
been given. The main value of
the provision. however, is it's ex-
plicit. definition of strike as
concerted" action by individuals.
This means that the Taft-Hartley
Act Injunction recently ruled on
by Judge Keech did apply to any
concerted action by the miners,
but it also means that the prose-
cutors must prove that the action
was, indeed, concerted and not
the spontaneous act of individu-
ais.
The existing statute, therefore
affords all the protection that is
needed for the regulation of the
right to strike. and it is puzzling
therefore why in the coal industry
there was so much attention paid
to an liable and willing" clause
that has now been rightly aban-
doned because it was always sup
erf1uous.
Maybe Mr.. Lewis had it in the
back Of his mind only as a future
trading point, on which he has
now cashed in. He certainly got
q good deal in exchange for an
artificially- built advantage when
IN its place he obtained control of
the pension fund that may run to
$4,000, 900.
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