Evening star., 1950-05-07
The London Conference

So many problems confront France, Britain,
the United States and the West in general that
it is too much to expect that any OF them Will
be solved by the Big Three Foreign Ministers
Conference opening in London this week. Yet
the conference-an international development of
major importance-Should at least have the
virtue of clearing the air in way that will make
possible greater coordination and unidcation
of the free worlds efforts to stand up with
formidable power against the global thHeat OF
expanding communism.
Because profound historical changes-eco-
nomic, political and military-have cast the
United States in the role of key leadership,
Secretary of State Achesons responsibilities will
be particularly heavy throughout the conference.
His French and British counterpartS-Foreign
Ministers Schuman and Bevin-will be looking to
him to define, or at least outline, long-range
American policy on a host of extremely complex
issues of vital interest to all three powers and
to the non-Sovet world as whole. For his
own part Mr.. Acheson will be seeking similar
Qualification as regards the positions of Britain
and France. What will complicate the confereeS'
task-since they each represent parliamentary
government that cannot be committed in advance
to any course they may recommends that they
will be unable to speak with full assurance about
what their countries may or may not do in the
future.
Yet it is imperative that the three powers
bring their common problems into better focus,
draft general overall policy for dealing jointly
with those problems, and establish some formula
for translating that policy into series of actions
calculated to increase the strength and unity
of the free world. Broadly stated, the main
issues to be taken up at the London meeting in
clude the following: % Questions bearing upon
the prospective end of the Marshall Plan, such as
what is to be done to promote trade with the
dollar areas and to speed up Western Europes
economic integration; (2) the problem OF making
non-S0viet Germany an integral part OF the
democratic European community; 90 how best
to cope with the Communist threat in Southeast
Asia; and "a what to do about sharing the
Atlantic Pact's defense COSTS which some OF the
signatories regard as too burdensome.
These issues-and they are not the only ones
likely to be discussed by the Foreign Minister'S
are self-evidenty extremely difficult. In the case
of Germany for instance, the three powers are
now following divergent policies, with France
largely on the basis of its long-range security
considerations-being UNDERSTANDABLE reluctant
to agree to any step that might revive the Ger
man potential for war of aggression. Similarly,
with the British recognizing Red China and with
the French and ourselves not recognizing 1t,
there is a real need for harmonizing views IN
order to work out JOINT program 10 cnecK tne
further advance of communism in Southeast
Asia AS for the Atlantic Pact'S defense costs,
Frances position, wholly apart from that of
other members, is that its share of the burden
in the West is inequitable in view of the heavy
load it is carrying in the East, in 1ndo-China.
Taken together with the problems inherent
in the approaching end of the Marshall Plan,
this sketchy outline of pending issues plainly
indicates that the Big Three Foreign Ministers
will face too big and complex job in London to
arrive at any definitive conclusions or firm de-
cisions Nevertheless, encouraged and prodded
by the record of the fine things already accom-
plished by Western cooperation, there is reason
to hope that they will be able to formulate
general policy whose step-bystep implementa-
ton can do much to strengthen the free worlds
political, economic and military unity. In any
event, in view of Soviet policy. nothing could be
more obvious than the need for such unity.