Evening star., 1950-08-28

sSNS~@
over the new Shotgun Of the Far
East who has welded Americas
vast power but has not himself
been in America for IA years.
President Truman. acted not
merely to save foreign policy as
the domain of civilian President
aided by a civilian Secretary Of
State but to relieve an interna-
tional crisis.
Gen. Macarthur does more than
direct United States forces. he is
the United Nations Commander
in the Far East. charged with
management of the Korean police
action. Except for Russia and her
satellites, u. n. nations are united
behind Korea. They have no part
in the Truman decision to i'm
mobilize Formosa and many of
them recognize the Chinese Com
munists instead of MacArthur's
friend. Chang Kai-shek.
Crisis Over-Same Dilemma.
Their curbstone reaction to ad-
vance word Of the Macarthur
statement on Formosa was that he
could no longer advantageously
serve U. N. interests in the Far
East.
The immediate crisis is over but
the Macarthur dilemma remains.
II cannot possibly be a secret
that the General had voiced views
on Formosa which contradict the
Presidents policy. That he did
not withdraw his statement will
ingly is obvious from his cable to
the VFW stating that 81 have
been directed to withdraw my
message"
That message had not been
cleared with the White House,
Pentagon or State Department.
Though the Generals unique sta
tus insured that his publicly ex-
pressed views on the delicate topic
of Formosa would have powerful
impact, he had chosen to pretend
that he was speaking personally.
First word of it here came from
newspapermen who saw an ad-
vance text and, realizing It's signi-
f1cance. sought official comment.
One look showed the experienced
publicists at Defense what was
involved, President Truman was
alerted and the cables to Tokyo
began to hum.
Second Official Torpedoing.
Tempers were already short
with respect to these matters. The
Macarthur message represented
the second official torpedoing
within three days of the Presi-
dents tenacious efforts to isolate
the Korean incident and prevent
a third and atomic world war.
In Boston Friday Secretary OF
the Navy Francis Matthews en-
dorsec the idea of the United
States initiating "war of aggres-
sion" on behalf of peace. De-
spite firm orders that all policy
speeches by Defense officials must
be cleared through Deputy Sec
retary Stephen T. Early, Mr.. Mat
thews had thought that one up
all b. himself and cleared 1t with
no one.
The President and Secretary
Acheson discussed the matter.
Secretary Matthews is known to
be uncomplicated and naive; the
Navy puts 1t that Admiral For
rest Sherman, Chief of Naval Op-
erations, is the Secretary of the
Navy.
It was decided that no malice
was involved. The State Depart
maot harshly repudiated the Sec
retary's views, the White House
said "Me, too." and the chastened
Secretary retreated into the sill
ences.
The job still remained of un-
doing the propaganda damage.
The Russians long have charged
the United States with being a
nation Of warmongers eager for
imperialistic war. Already public
debate on preventive war had
been gathering momentum and
furnishing Mr.. Malik with am
munition.
Then came word Of MacAr-
thurs explosive message.
It is not to be believed that a
military commander Of such vast
experience could make an inno-
cent mistake. Actually the grape