Evening star., 1950-06-22

my contacts with Chinese Com
munists. Active cultivation of
these contacts was a basic and
vital part Of my full-time assign
ment during this period, which
was to learn all that / could. for
the benefit of the American. Gov
ernment. concerning the Chinese
Communists. Professionally. as
an intelligence officer, it is a mat
ter of pride rather than apology
that I was able through these
contacts with all of the important
Communist leaders from Mao Tse-
tung down. to obtain valuable
first information for which
I have been commended by both
the Department of State and the
United States Army.
During the war, the first OBJ
jective of American policy-in
China as elsewhere-was to win
the war as rapidly as possible and
with the greatest saving of Amer
lean lives. The non-co-operation
of the principal Chinese forces,
even in the face of the grave
Japanese threat in the summer
and autumn of 1914, was a serious
impediment to the war. Com
mencing in July, 1914, therefore,
the President of the United States
recommended that Gen. Stilwell
be placed in command of all Chi
neSe armies as a practical means
Of furthering a more effective
prosecution of the war and of
meeting the Japanese attack. This
proposal. which necessarily in
volved American command and
some supply of the Communist
forces was agreed to in principle
by Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek
in July, 1914.
Independent China Sought.
Beyond the winning of the war
American policy sought to pro-
mote the emergence of a strong
and independent China, friendly
to the United States and not sub
servient to any other power. The
developing contest for power with
in China not only caused a stag
nation of the war effort; it also
pointed toward a civil war which
would be disastrous for the eco
nomic recovery of the country
which would drive both factions
to extremes resulting in the elimi-
nation of moderate liberal groups
which we hoped would be the lead
ers OF the country, and which, in
view of the trend within China,
would probably end in a complete
Communist victory. In such a
civil war, our military support of
the Kuomintang Party would have
the effect of driving the Commu-
nists. who at that time showed
hopefully independent national
istic leanings. into the arms OF
Russia. 80.
+ 4 4
American efforts, therefore, were
directed toward persuading the
Kuomintang to strengthen its own
position by reform and, when this
persuasion proved of little effect,
to promoting a peaceful compro-
mise between the two parties
which might avert the calamity
of civil war, which in turn could
only contribute to Soviet domina-
ton.
It was to carry out this policy
of fostering military and political
unification that both Gen. Hurley
and Gen. Marshall went to China
and devoted great time and effort
I was not the originator of this
policy-which was determined b!
the President on the advice of his
principal political and military
advisers. However, I did and still
do believe that the policy was the
best one for American interest!
and the only practical choice
which we had under. the circum-
stances. AS an American intelli-
gence officer in the field, I OBJ
served the progress of our effort:
to implement that policy and il
was a part of my responsibility
to make recommendations from
time. to time. in the light OF
changing circumstances. as to the
best means of achieving thai
policy.
X X
Primarily Reporter.
But, it is important. I think
for me to emphasize that / was
primarily a reporter and never q
policy forming off1cer-although