Evening star., 1950-11-01
France Rocks the Boot

It is difficult at this stage, to appraise the
significance of the disagreement which has
broken up the meeting of the North At
lantic defense ministers. 1t may grow out of
one of those clashes that are inevitable when
allies try to work together, but which can be
satisfactorily adjusted. Or it may herald
the collapse of the ambitious project for con-
certed defense in western Europe-a collapse
due to the inability or the refusal of the French
to make a choice between the lesser of two evils.
If one may Judge from the tone of General
Marshalrs talk to the defense ministers last
Saturday, the situation is serious. General Mar
shall did not mention France by name But one
of the things uppermost in his mind must have
been the unwillingness of the French to accept
any realistic program for the use OF West German
armed forces in the defense of Western Europe.
Because of the tight censorship that has been
clamped on news from the meetings of the de-
fense ministers, the precise nature OF the dis
agreement remains unknown. Other things than
the German question may be involved But the
main stumbling block unquestionably Is the
unwillingness of the French to accept revival of
German armed strength on scale that would
permit the effective use of German manpower
in the common defense.
The reason for the French attitude is under
standable.. The soil of France has been invaded
turally, anything which smacks Of resurgent
militarism in Germany produces an acute case
OF jitters in France It may well be that as a
matter of internal politics the incumbent political
regime in France would be courting disaster by
agreeing to the American plan for the use of West
German troops in divisional units.
But these are considerations which must be
put aside. The threat to France, to Western
Europe, and to the world does not come today
from any prospective military revival in Germany.
It comes directly from the massive military power
and aggressive designs of the Soviet Union and its
satellites. All members of the North Atlantic
group have an interest that is hardly less than
that of France in preventing the rise OF Germany
as a military threat to its neighbors. The in
terest here Is common one, and the difficulties
Of erecting adequate safeguards are far from
inSurmountable.
1t would be quite another matter however,
to attempt, in difference to France, to set up an
adequate defense in Western Europe without
making effective use Of Germany If the West
Germans are left out, or If they are brought into
the arrangement on basis that would have the
appearance but lack the substance of real military
strength or If the Germans should refuse to
enter the partnership because of the inequity
of conditions imposed there would be little pros
pect of more than paper defense in Europe.
In our own interest, we should not go forward
with program Of mutual defense If the French
insist upon an arrangement which precludes the
possibility Of an effective defense. This may
have been what General Marshall had in mind
when he told the defense ministers that 1--WE
must develop plans in such way that they
not only are consistent with our principles and
traditions, but are realistic in the appreciation
OF the present critical situation. i" Each of us
must contribute to the common defense in &C
cordance with our respective capabilities"
The United States is doing its share, and
more, toward meeting that common RESPONSE
bilty. We should not enter into any agreement
which would enable any member of the North
Atlantic group to do less than its share.