Evening star., 1950-10-06
lnchon Landings Put
Amphibious Warfare
Facts Before Public
Civilians Now Realize
Importance Of Using All
Three Armed Services
By David Laurence

Whatever lessons the Korean
war may have taught the military
folks, 1t is perhaps of even greater
Importance to them that in
America the civilian point of. view
on some fundamental matters of
military strategy has been enlight-
ened.
To any one. however, who fol-
lowed carefully what happened
during World War II in the
Pacific, it is matter of great
surprise that people generally have
regarded the landing at Inchon as
an exceptionally brilliant maneu-
yer.
Without detracting in the
slightest from the performance,
which was well executed, it is a
fact that similarly brilliant land
tngs during the Pacific war were
commonplace-only the American
people for the most part had their
eyes fixed on Europe and did not
take note of the amphibioIs opera
tions across the Pacific.
Thus, Gen. Macarthur moved
thousands of miles all the way
from New Guinea to the Philip
pines by a series of amphibious
landings climaxed by the great
operation at Leyte. He had there
a substantial naval force under
him, including aircraft carriers.
Every amphibious landing was
planned with care unified
operation without benefit of any
unif1cation law.
Naval Power Proved Itself.
Many of the landings made by
Gen. Macarthur were on deserted
shores, where. little or no opposi-
ton was encountered. The Ma
rines and the Army. however, in
their series of amphibious opera
tions, landed on beaches - at
Tarawa, Guam, Saipan, Okinawa,
Two Jima - heavily defended by
enemy forces. Perhaps the most
spectacular of these was at Oki-
nawa - the largest amphibious
landing and the longest battle that
the combined forces of the United
States ever fought anywhere in
the world. It lasted for 50 days.
There were more men killed on
the decks of the United States
Navy ships in that period than in
any other war in all the history of
the Navy. These losses were sus-
tained when the ships had to
stand offshore and furnish air
support for ground troops because
no land bases near enough were
available to the Army Air Forces.
But even today the facts about
amphibiouS warfare are not
thoroughly understood or well
known outside military circles.
Thus. again and again in the press
1t has been stated that the land
ing at Inchon might not have
been made If the North Koreans
had possessed air power or a navy
with submarines. What is over
looked is that the naval air power
of the United States at Okinawa
faced the air power of the Japa-
nese for as long as 50 days. Sui
eide planes came from Japanese
land bases on Kyushu and did
considerable damage to American
warships and personnel.
The anti-aircraft guns of the
Navy. some of which can fire auto
matically and for long periods at
a time, knocked down plenty of
enemy planes. AS for submarines,
the United States anti-submarine
patrols did a remarkable job of
protecting the task forces of air
craft carriers, cruisers and de-
stroyerS SO that not a single one
was sunk by a submarine at Oki-
nawa.
The truth is that United States
naval air power, which includes
anti-aircraft and adequate anti
submarine patrols, proved itself
against any air power or under
sea power that the Japanese navy
then one of the major navies of
the world-was able to mobilize.
Most Significant Fact.
The most significant and per-
haps the least appreciated fact.
however, is that United States
naval air forces, based on carriers,
held their own even against enemy
planes that came from land bases.
The American naval fleets roamed
up and down hostile coasts and
dared the land-based planes to
come out. Many of them did, but,
when adequate naval forces were
available, as they were in the Pa
cific, the land-based planes of
the enemy could not dominate the
air over the sea.
The major lesson of the Ko-
rean war, of course, is that Amer
lean air power, whether it be land
based or carrier-based, can sup
port an invasion army success
fully. Even if the Russians had
allowed some of their best planes
to fly in support of North Korean
troops, the United States airmen
flying from both land and car
rier bases-would have been de-
lighted to take them on. Jet
fighters were ready for them and,
in a few encounters, the enemy
would have lost control of the air.
To say, therefore, that the
American victory in Korea was
achieved because the enemy did
not choose to put submarines or
fighter planes into action against
us is to assume that our protective
measures against these very tao
tics would have been inadequate.
There might have been more cas-
ualties and it might have taken a
lite more time but the end re-
suit would have been a trium-
phant victory. just the same. For
the art of amphibious warfare
wasn't just discovered in the Ko-
rean war. The fact is it wasn't
given the publicity it deserved
during World War II, when most