Evening star., 1950-09-15
Gen. Marshall Certain
To Dominate Cabinet
On Foreign Policy
Close Friend of Acheson,
Yet They Do Not See
Eye to Eye on Policies
Rp David Lawrence

of Gen. Marshall to be Secretary
of Defense will not be realized
for some time. His influence will
dominate the Truman cabinet not
only on military matters but on
foreign policy.
While it is true that Dean Ache
son was Undersecretary during
the time Gen. Marshall was Secre-
tary of State, this does not mean
that these two men see eye to eye
on world affairs. They are close
friends and have much respect
for each other. But 1t will be
necessary to examine anew the
influences that will be at work
when Messrs. Acheson and Mar
shall are given free rein to shape
both military and foreign policy
together. This is an important
area for collaboration. Messrs.
Acheson and johnson got into
difficulties there.
1t will soon be apparent that
Mr.. Marshall will accept such
proper limitations on his depart
ment's activities as the State De-
partment may impose. This will
Introduce some delicate questions
for the President to solve. Gen.
Marshall is the type of man who
knows how to keep out of any
body else's jurisdiction. He is
diplomatic and tactful to the ex-
treme. If matter is strictly that
of the State Department, he will
not interfere or volunteer his
opinions unless asked. Conversely.
where defense needs require
certain build-up of forces. it will
take a very persuasive argument
to deter him from getting the
necessary forces located where
they ought to be.
MarshalPS Reasoning.
1t is in the cabinet, where
overall policy will be discussed
and where global points of view
will have to be determined. that
Gen. Marshall will exert maximum
influence. Indeed. the general
was primarily responsible for the
initial steps that led to the grad
ual abandonment of Chang Kai-
shek. He had no illusions about
the Communists in China and,
while he differed with Chang, he
held no particular ill-feeling
against him. Yet when the time
came for a major decision. Gen.
Marshall held that America could
not become involved in China and
that, if Chang collapsed, it was
just too bad.
The generals reasoning was the
same as that he expressed re-
peatedly in wartime when he found
himself compelled to refuse the
requests of local commanders in
various theaters of war for more
and more troops and equipment
while Europe remained the first
consideration. Gen. Marshall had
to pacify Gen. Macarthur and
Admiral King as again and again
he insisted that it was necessary
to beat Hitler first and tackle
Japan on a total basis afterward.
Today the Communists are try
ing hard to involve America in
war with China. Gen. Marshall
has his eyes fixed on Europe as
our first concern. His viewpoint
is in accord, to be sure, with that
of the State Department that
everything should be done to avoid
further involvement in China. But
it is doubtful whether the general
would sanction any policy which
looks toward our withdrawal from
Korea and admission of the Chi
nese Communists to the Security
Council as a program of appease-
ment.
Weighty Questions Ahead.
Nor would the administration
venture to adopt such a program,
at least until after the North Ko-
reans have been driven back of
the 38th Parallel. Such weighty
questions as these, as we'll as mat
ters concerning the rearming of
Europe, will come up in the cab
met. When there are varying
views expressed, it is a safe bet
that the President will adopt the
suggestions on policy given by
Gen. Marshall. He will stiffen
the President against Russia if
any stiffening is ever needed.
Mr.. Truman's attitude toward
Gen. Marshall is one of awe, born
of tremendous admiration. 1t is
being said metaphorically in the
Capital that the President thinks
Gen. Marshall, in wisdom, is next
to God" This gives some idea
of the power that Gen. Marshall
may WELD on American policies
in the next few months.
There are some people in the
Capital, however, who do not think
Gen. Marsfall's mission to China
for example, was a success and
that. while he was conscientious
in his endeavors, he lacked the
imagination to formulate sound
policy for America in the Far
East. This will be debated for
many years to come.
One thing is clear - nobody
questions the Judgment Gen. Mar
shall exhibited as a war COM
mander or his remarkable faculty
Of selling Congress his ideas OF
what is needed for a military pro-
gram.