Evening star., 1950-10-07
Formoso's S Future

Although 1t has been scheduled for debate
in the present session of the General Assembly,
the question of Formosas future is likely to go
unanswered for many month to come. Bringing
1t within the precincts of the United Nations,
however, may help to pave the way for an
eventual satisfactory settlement
measure of the complexity of the issue is
that the Chinese Nationalist, who occupy the
island have found themselves in the unusual
position of voting with the Russians-their most
persistent foe in the U. Min a strenuous but
unsuccessful effort to prevent the ASSembly'S
Steering Committee from placing it onf the
agenda for a full-dress debate.
The Chinese NationalistS, of course, hold to
the view that the subject is not at all debataole
because Fornosa belongs to China and hence
must remain under their authority-an authority
which is still recognized by most of the world as
Chnas sole legitimate government Accordingly,
their delegation in the u N. can be counted upon
to offer bitter resistance to any effort to change
the islands present status.
AS for the Russians, they also insist that
FormoSa belongs to China. But their agreement
with the Nationalist view ends right there, for the
China they have in mind is the China whose vast
mainland is now dominated by the Communist
regime at Peiping. So their demand is that that
regime be recognized as the only government
entitled to speak for the Chinese people, that it
be admitted into U. N membership, and that
it be given control of the island.
What lends substance to the claim that
FormoSa Is Chinese territory regardless of
whether 1t should be Red Chinese or Nationalist
Chinese-is the fact that at the Cairo Conference
in 1943 the United States Joined Britain and
Russia in an agreement declaring that the island
should be restored to China after the defeat of
Japan. Since then, however, wholly apart from
the ofh he
feel about the matter, events have thrown doubt
on the Cairo decision.
The biggest of these events has been the
outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea, and
President Truman's subsequent order to the
Seventh Fleet to interpose itself between Formosa
and the Chinese manand-a move designed to
serve the twofod purpose of % supporting the
u. MS Korean operations and (2) neutralizing or
pacifying the area between the island and Red
China, particularly with a view to preventing
the latter from staging an amphibious assault
against the Nationalists
This action-which the Russians and the
Chinese Reds have phonily attacked as "aggres-
sion" against Formosa-has not yet been specih-
cally endorsed by the U. N. Indeed some of the
non-Soviet members in Asia have been wondering
whether the United States might not have in
mind the ultimate objective of permanently
incorporating the i-,and into the American
defensive systenl-an idea which General Mac
Arthur seems to favor, though our Joint Chiefs
of Staff apparently disagree with him.
AS for that part of the problem however, the
President has emphasized to the world that the
future disposition of Formosa is not something
that will be acted upon unilaterally by the United
States, but an issue that must await the
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace
settlement with Japan, or consideration by the
United Nations" That is one reason why our
delegation has proposed-with success-that the
General Assembly debate the question.
But the U. N.-which might we'll give thought
to a trusteeship-probably will be hard put to
find sound answer acceptable either to the
Chinese Reds or to the Nationalsts whose physi-
cal possession of the island naturally fills them
with determination to hold on. Here is but one
of the many factors (another is our own domestic
politics. that greatly complicate the problen1-so
much so that the possibility of good solution
looks very remote at this time.