Evening star., 1950-04-04

- - sVb>sBB~ VII ~
on Russia; but it would probably
not make it necessary for Russia to
undertake a large-scale program in
China.
The Russians would get credit in
Asia, multiplied by propaganda, for
any grants they might make to
China, but would probably not have
to make grants large enough to
distort of strain their own resources
1t would be possible, therefore, il
the mistake is made of waiting for
the Chinese Communists to come
hat in hand" to ask for American
terms, for United States policy to
encounter another setback in Asia
without even the compensating ad-
vantage of hampering Russia S abil-
ity to apply pressure in Europe.
Positive Objectives.
The foregoing statements define
negative aspects of the situation IN
Asia, limiting the freedom of ma
neuver of United States policy
Within these limitations, it seems
advisable that number Of positive
objectives should be defined.
/. Policy in the Far East and
policy toward Russia have a bear
ing on each other. 1t certainly
cannot yet be said. however, that
armed warfare against communism
in the Far East. on scale lnvolv-
ing q major commitment of Ameri-
can resources, has become either
unavoidable or positively desirable
Nor can it be said with any assur-
ance that, in the event OF an armed
conflict undertaken for the purpose
of forcing Russia back from Eu-
rope, the Far East would be an
optimum field of operation.
There are still two alternatives
before us-a relatively long peace,
or a rapid approach toward war.
If there is to be war, it can only
be won by defeating Russia-not
Northern Korea, or Wet Nam, or
even China. Sound policy should
therefore avoid premature or ex-
cessive strategic deployment in the
Far East.
Primary Factor for Peace.
If there is to be long peace
the primary factor in making peace
possible will be a stabilization OF
relations between the United States
and Russia. Sound policy should
therefore maintain maximum
f1exibility. If and when negotiated
and mutually acceptable agreements
with Russia become possible, Ameri-
can policy in the Far East should
be in a position to contribute tc
Russo-American negotiations. II
should not be so mired down in
local situations that direct Ameri-
can-Russian negotiations are actu.
ally hampered.
States policy in the Far East mus
be able to fend off any accusation
of "appeasement" of local or Rus.
sian communism. In view of thl
effectiveness of the Russian ISSUE
as a weapon in in-fighting in Amer
lean party politics. it would seen
that the advice Of experts on do
mestic politics should be co-ordi
mated with the opinions of thos,
who are consulted on foreign policy
The dilemma is simple, but no
easy to solve; but unless it can b,
solved, no successful United State
policy in the Far East is possible
Any United States policy that il
interpreted in various countries il
the Far East as pressure applied TO
the purpose of creating a leagu'
against Russia will merely increas,
the ability of those countries t.
bargain with both the United State
and Russia. 1t will also increase tn,
Identification, in those countries
between local nationalism and loca
communism. On the other hand
any proposed United States polio,
in the Far East that is attacked il
America itself as a bid for bette
relations with Russia runs the
danger of being defeated.
Good Will Must Be Won.
8. The success of United State
Policy in the Far East will b,
measured largely by the contribu
tion that it makes to the recover!
of economic relations between tn,
Far East and Europe. This recover,
will be possible only If the assen
and good will of the Far Eastern
countries are won. Assent and rea
cooperation, in turn, can only b,
won if the representatives of th'
Far Eastern countries, including
those that are still technically tn,
subjects of European countries, ar,
convinced that they have as direc
access to the highest American au
thorities, as do the European repre-
sentatives; and If they are con
vinced that their economic need
and political standards are no
being given second priority, lowe
than that of the European coun
tries involved in the same nego
tiations.
The two test cases in Southeas
Asia, On which the leaders OF vari
Gus nationalist movements will rat
the difference between what can b,
attained through friendly associa
ton with representatives OF tn
United States and what can b'
attained through outright defianc,
of a European country which ha
strong economic support from th'
United States are Indonesia ant
the Wet Nam regime under H,
| lChi-minh.
II the negotiations between