Evening star., 1950-06-18

1 by the middle Of next month.
: TO Secretary of State Acheson:
n. Bradley. chairman Of the Joint
will seek the answer.
Their conclusions on how much
and what kind of American de-
fense forces should be stationed
in Japan will depend largely on
their conclusions on the first
point.
The third question which they
are trying to answer is where these
defense forces viii be
stationed. This is a question OF
permanent bases on Japanese ter
ritory and one which now is being
threshed out not only on the
side but on the Japanese
side as we'll.
Maintenance of bases is sep
arated from armed occupation by
only a very fine line and the dis
tinction Is one which the mass OF
Japanese people Is not likely to
grasp. The presence Of American
troops on Q defeated enemy's soil,
even for the purpose Of common
defense. carries with 1t the implica-
ton Of occupation and the ques-
ton is whether 1t Is necessary to
provide for them in q peace treaty
or depend on the willingness Of
the Japanese government. subse-
quent to conclusion of q treaty, to
grant bases for our use.
The decision is likely TO bs
guided to some extent by expert
ence in the Philippines. where
strong pressure was exerted on the
Government to with
draw its forces and give up ali It's
bases after the war. We wound
up by retaining q handful Of
bases. the principal one being
Clark Field. northwest Of Manila.
None Of those bases is manned to
the fullest extent.
Case of Philippines
The Filipinos still generally
oppose the presence Of American
troops. but the suggestion is being
heard even in some higher Philip
pine quarters that the United
States strengthen its present bases.
The proposal also has been heard
In American circles that this coun-
try again occupy the Philippines
to defend 1t against the Reds ex-
panding from the mainland of
China. but American Government
officials reject this solution as one
which would only anger. not mol
lily, the Red-propagandized Phil.
ippine people.
The experience In Japan is
somewhat different. The Japanese.
being a defeated people. are more
resigned to accept what the oceu-
pying powers decide Is necessary
for the common defense. Premier
Shigeru Yoshida has indicated his
approval of bases for American
armed forces and more recently
some important segments of the
Japanese press have expressed
favor for the idea.
The Johnson-Bradley mission
adds up then to q search for the
answers to Japanese remilitariza-
tion, the maintenance Of American
armed forces on Japanese territory
whether or not @ treaty Is signed
and bases for those forces.
Mr.. Dulles mission, q separate
one. while intimately associated
with that Of the defense chiefs,
will be devoted more to the polit-
ical side Of the Japanese peace
treaty, that Is whether o treaty is
advisable at all now or whether
1t would be better from the Amer
ican standpoint to provide an
occupation statute similar to that
under which the Western Allies
are operating In Germany.
The conclusion Of q treaty now
depends on y number Of factors,
most important Of which. perhaps,
Is the readiness Of the japanese
people themselves for q resump-
ton OF their war-lost sovereignty.
Macarthur Favors Treaty
The desire for q treaty is not
limited to the Japanese people and
their leaders. Gen. Macarthur
himself has expressed the belief
that the time Is approaching when
a treaty should be signed. The
effects Of the occupation are wear
ing on. he contends.
The japanese government has
been reshaped largely In our own
image and the Japanese economy
has been restored TO some kind OF
prosperity. although much re-
mains to be done to revive indus
try to the point where it will sup
port the massive population of
the islands. The business COM
bines which supported the Japa-
nese war machine have been
broken UP and the economy, like
politics, has been democratized.
The question for Mr.. Dulles to
determines how firmly Japan
has been made over into q peace
full state which never again will
arise to threaten other peoples.
In other words, can the japanese
be counted on to continue along
the peaceful paths into which We
have led them.
The question Of the internal
Communist threat Is not regarded
by American officials as funda-
mental In determining whether O
treaty should be granted now. II
the japanese are devoted to true
democracy the Red danger is not
regarded as one which should
prevent conclusion Of q treaty.
Nor does q treaty depend on the
acquiescence and cooperation Of
the Soviet Union. The American