Evening star., 1950-08-08
By the Skin of Our Teeth

There now are increasing grounds for the
belief that we, will be able to stay in Korea.
The North Koreans, coming from the west,
hadpushed to wthinDasfew miles of Pusan. when
powerful American TEinforcements reached the
combat theater. First to arrive was the End IN
fantry Division, which went ashore in Korea just
three short weeks after leaving the United States
Following them came the 1st Marine Division, also
from the mainland; the Armys 5th Regimental
Combat Team from Hawaii and combat group
from Okinawa.
This quick build-up of strength has been a
remarkable achievement. It has given psyche
logical lift to the battered troops on the shrinking
defensive line. And it should mean that we now
have enough men in Korea, including those units
of the South Korean army that are still fighting
to hold an adequate beachhead. If this is cor
rect if the renforcements have arrived in time
to remove the prospect of an American Dunkirk
and to insure the holding of a beachhead from
which a successful counter offensive can be
launched that is an accomplishment in which
we may take great deal Of pride.
If we are over the hump, however, that should
not blind us to the fact that we have had very
close call. When the End Division arrived, the
strategy of planned retreat had about run its
course. We had traded space for time until reach
ing point where there was little more space to
give. And the Communist commanders, knowing
this, were throwing every ounce Of strength they
could muster into the offensive, hoping for
decisive breakthrough to Pusan before the weight
of reinforcements could balance the power scales.
1t is obvious that very little time, perhaps only
day or two, was of the most vital Importance
If the President had hesitated in making the
original decision, or if fumbling and irresoution
had characterized the action taken on the basis
of that decision, it is entirely probable that we
would have lost the fight for Korea.
This has a direct bearing on some of the
criticism of the Presidents decision to fight the
aggressors. Senator Taft, for instance, said that
while he agreed in general with the decision, he
thought the President should have obtained
congressional approval before acting Senator
Taft was not alone in holding this view and still
others would have preferred to wait until there
had been some more positive action by the
United Nations.
But events have shown that there was not
time to wait Had Mr.. Truman hesitated, the
chances are that any action which might have
been decided upon would have come too late
South Korea would have been gone, and, from our
point of yew an extremely difficult military oper
alton would have become virtual impossibity
This is an experience that should not be for
gotten. The normal democratic processes will
always be at disadvantage against an aggressor
who can select the time and place, and then
strike without warning. We must expect that the
assault on Korea may be duplicated anywhere, at
any time, and we should be extremely careful
about imposing restraints on the President which
would cripple his ability to react promptly as
circumstances may require Given the world in
which we live, world in which we cannot know
when or where the aggreSsor will strike next, II
is essential that the President have freedom to
act first and explain later If there are risks in
this, they are not as great as the risk that ac-
companies the policy of doing too little too late