Evening star., 1950-04-16

Cold wars cannot be waged for
nothing: and even If we had no
knowledge of the internal state
of Russia. it would be obvious that
her aggressive policy of the past
three years must be costing her a
great deal. In making the 1947
decision to press this policy at all
costs. the Kremlin deliberately
threw away all hope of badly
needed material aid from the
West: and in forbidding the satel-
lites to take part in the Marshall
plan discussions. it gambled on
the failure of ERP.
The Soviet leaders were thus
faced with the task of pulling the
country. unaided. out of its war
time ruin. rebuilding q war ma
chine capable Of dealing with any
emergency. holding captive a new
empire cut off from much of its
traditional trade with the West,
conducting a harassing offensive
in Europe and Asia Minor to assist
the failure of ERP. and, for full
measure, exploiting in the name
of international communism all
rebellions and nationalist move
ments throughout Asia and Africa,
1t was large program and the
strain on the resources of the
Soviet Union has been heavy.
For example. we are accustomed
to think of the development of
the Soviet Far East as pure gain
But capital development has to be
paid for. and the cost of capital
development in the Soviet Far
East is the continued depression
Of living standards in European
Russia. Even before 1914 a Rus
sian economist could write of the
Russian Far East as "a pump
draining away enormous riches
from the heart of Russia"
Manpower Diverted
Again. the diversion of the most
able party leaders to posts ~oi
command throughout the new
Communist empire has meant a
very serious weakening of Com
munist leadership at home; and
this. coupled with the evident de-
terioration of the true party
spirit among regional and local
party officials, appears to be
changing the very shape of gov
eminent, with a mercenary police
under central direction assuming
more and more the duties once
performed by devoted party
fanatics. AS for the concentra-
ton of material resources and su-
perior brains in the services of
rearmament at the expense Of de-
cent living standards. the conse-
QuenceS of this are obvious.
How we'll is Russia succeeding in
this immense program for which
the government is sacrificing
everything. from proper housing
to the integrity of science? To
judge by the official figures for the
fourth year of the current plan.
very we'll. But these figures are
suspect for several reasons.
They are suspect in genearl be-
cause Soviet figures must always
be suspect, so long as the statis-
ticians permit themselves such
elementary receptions as COM
pairing 1910 production with 1949
production without mentioning
that in the interval the Soviet
Union has acquired considerable
new territories. together with
their inhabitants. They are
suspect in particular because even
while Central Statistical Bureau
was claiming that the 1949 plan
had been exceeded by 3 per cent
the party's Central Committee was
launching a widespread attack,
which still continues, on count
less individuals and concerns for
failing to fulfill their plans, for
falsifying their returns or for
reaching their total production
quotas only by turning out shoddy
products or goods that nobody
wanted.
Figures Found Misleading
The consolidated production
figures for 1949 have not been
corrected in the light of these rev.
elations, and are therefore mis-
leading. Thus, the rich agricul-
tural region of Kursk won special
honor for r-fulfillment Of its
grain production plan and was
later found to have made false
claims. Similarly a special COM
mission of inquiry sent out to in
quire into losses to the state by
the private barter of agricultural
produce found that the stocks
held in the grain elevators on the
lower Volga and elsewhere were
heavily deficient. In industry the
examples have been too many to
count: they range from coal to
textiles, from machine tools to
tractor spares.
For the past 18 months it has