Evening star., 1950-09-10

Despite apparent "reconciliatie
goa snd those in the State Depart
the practical views of the military
might happen in the next few
months. and the still unrealistic
and wishful thinking of the max
ers of our foreign policy.
The following instances are cit
ed as definite illustrations of the
differences between the two groups
Of officials:
The military men consider the
war in Korea not as a police action
bat as the curtain-raiser for World
War III. They had known about
Soviet plans for at least six
months before the North Korean
campaign. No adequate prepar-
ations could be made because our
diplomatic policy was mot to stir
up the hornets nest" by any
provocative action. Any practical
steps to bolster the Korean de-
fense would have fallen into that
category.
1t has been well established
from the testimony OF those who
appeared before the Armed Serv-
ices. Appropriations and Foreign
Relations Committees of both
houses that. in keeping with State
Department directives. the South
Korean Army was trained only as
an internal police force. Thus,
any suggestion that heavy arma-
ment be sent to the Seoul govern
ment would have been met with
formal opposition from the State
Department.
Moreover, Gen. Macarthur, who
was aware of the danger, could do
nothing about it. He has been ask
ing for additional forces In Japan
for at least the last IL months.
But he was told that none was
available. The administrators
policy of economy, as voiced by
Defense Secretary johnson, kept
the national defense to a mini
mum of combat forces in spite of
the $50 billion spent in the last
four years.
Gen. MacArthur's requests for
more troops and better war mate
rial than he had in Japan in 1945
were politely refused. We had 10
divisions (skeletonizedD all told,
and the four he had in Japan
could not be strengthened by a
single platoon.
Warnings Disregarded
The warnings that Gen. Mac
Arthur sent about North Korean
preparations were disregarded.
Russia was not in a mood for war
yet. he was told. Since this was
accepted automatically by the
State Department. there was nc
likelihood that the Korean pup
pets would move without the "go-
ahead" signal from Moscow
Moreover, number of experts or
the Far East convinced Secretary
Acheson that Korea was, so far al
we were concerned, a liability.
In his speech before the Ameri-
can Society Of Newspaper Editors
at the National Press Club last
February, Mr.. Acheson made q
frank expose Of our policies in the
Far East. In drawing the lines of
our specific interests he excluded
both Korea and Formosa, al
though he later stated that we
had some special interests" in
Korea. But the intention not to
get the United States involved in
the peninsula was clear.
Here begins the game of fact
and fiction.
Within 4S hours after the United
Nations made the Korean War it's
own, Generalissimo Chang Kai-
shek offered $4,000 well-trained
and fully equipped men to support
the 500 men Gen. Macarthur was
forced to throw into the battle as
the first echelon of the American
Army. The offer from Formosa
was in order. The Nationalist
government is still a member in
good standing of the United Ma
tions and one of the Security
Councils Big Five.
The offer was turned down at
the suggestion of the State De-
partment. The public was told
that such an action might weaken
the defenses of Formosa, which
was being threatened by the Chi
nese Communists. Later the pub
lie was told that permitting Ma
tionalist forces to support the
U. N. in Korea would be inviting
disaster. 1t would mean that
some 250,000 Chinese Communists,
already known to be on the Ko-
rean- -Manchurian borders, would
intervene in the fray and our
chances of stopping the North
Koreans thus would be seriously
impaired.