Evening star., 1950-12-17

'uJuSIIueuC De1Ore QeQ0lCe military
offer of $4,000 Chinese Nationalists
for fighting in Korea. Some be-
lieve that the Generalissilno's S
+. troops. who are getting intensive
= training on Formosa, would be
more valuable in Southern China
than in Southern Korea.
If no defense line could be es-
tablished and we were forced to
evacuate. serious attention would
have to be given to possible op-
erations outside Korea. On these,
as far as can be learned, there
) were no definite agreements be-
tween Truman and Attlee: in
fact. there appears to have been
definite disagreements.
Steps of Limited War
i On this problem, the most Sc
rious questions are whether We
could retain the support of our
Allies and whether limited war"
could be limited. Several of our
Allies, including the United King
dom and India. have recognized
the Communist Peiping govern
ment and think it should repre-
sent China in the United Nations.
Many were opposed to our single
handed naturalization Of Formosa
and it Is highly doubtful whether
they would officially and publicly
go along with us if we took the
logical steps of limited war.
i These steps would be: Imposi-
ton of economic sanctions against
all the mainland of China, sup
ported by sea and air blockade;
more aid to Chang and the lifting
of the naturalization ban: lend
lease or outright gifts of ships and
planes to Chang for fighting on
!; the mainland; help to guerrillas
on the mainland, and the arrning
of the japanese. The last named
would require amendment of the
japanese constitution, which re-
nounced war as an instrument of
national policy and would require
agreement among our Allies prob
ably in a peace treaty. on what
military and naval forces Japan.
formerly an aggressor nation,
should be permitted to have.
American officials concede that
great risks would be incurred If
we took these steps alone or with
Allies. There would also be great
advantages if they did not involve
us and some of our Allies in an
all-out war in China or did not
sound the signal for World War
III.
Strong Arguments
The obvious advantages would
be: Russian and Chinese Com
munists would be thrown off bal
ance in Asia and their attention
would be diverted from other ag-
gressions elsewhere on the per-
iphery of China and the Soviet
Union; every man and every piece
Of equipment moving into Asia
from European Russia would
mean that such men and such
equipment could not be imme-
diately available for a European
conflict: more economic aid could
be given to our friends in Asia,
and time would be bought to
build up American and European
armaments.
| Some prominent Americans, in
cluding Gen. Macarthur, Harold
Stassen and Republican Senator
Knowland of California, believe
that the Kremlin will not attack
in Europe until Asia has been con-
!, quered by the Communists for
, communism. Their arguments are
!, similar to those of the United
States and the United Nations at
; the time of the original invasion
Of Korea-if Comuunistic aggres-
sion is not stopped in Asia at it's
start, it will expand to the entire
mainland and most of the islands,
including the Philippines, Japan
and Indonesia. If we do not keep
, the Communists off balance, they
> say, the peripheral countries will
be easv prey of the aggressors.
Their arguments appear ir-
REPUTABLE. except on the bare pos
sibility that Mao Tse-tung will
become a nationalist Communist,
like Tito of Yugoslavia, a pos
sibility they reject on the grounds
that he has obediently followed
orders from the Kremlin since
1923.
.. The disadvantages of limited
war. even if it could be limited to
Asia, appear insurmountable.
They are:
A limited war against China
might be countered by limited
war by Russia against the United
States. If we gave or lend-leased
airplanes and ships to Chang,
Russia could more easily give or
): lend bomber planes and sub
marines to Mao. There is known
military pact between Peiping and
, Moscow providing that if China
is attacked, Russia is obligated to
:. come to it's defense. There Is
l evidence that this treaty contains
secret clauses.
Even if Russia did not come
:. openly to Mao's support, limited
war would bind the Russian and
1 Chinese Communists closer to-
: gether and make Mao more de-
pendent militarily and econom-
ically on the Kremlin. This might
!. permanently prevent Mao from
becoming another Tito.
!. It is impossible to forecast at
l this time what allies in the United
Nations we could take with us in
l a limited war and how much
actual support those who joined
with US could give. A limited war
might create the very thing the