Evening star., 1950-04-23

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dorsed-if somewhat reluctantly
the administrations policies ir
Europe. There was the usual
political oratory when the Truman
doctrine of aid to Greece and Tur-
key, the Marshall Plan, the Allan
tic pact and the military aid pro-
gram came before Congress. After
the Opposition" had gone on
record, all these measures were
approved with large Republican
votes.
This was not the work of any
one man in the group. The ma
jority of Republican legislators
realized that this country must
take a calculated risk in spend
ing many billions to prevent the
rest of the world from falling be-
hind the iron curtain.
The most stubborn Of the for
mer Republican isolationists is
fully aware today that since
Russia has become an aggressive
world power. strengthening those
who are willing to resist the So
viets means actually strengthen
ing the United States.
The risk involved is that if a
showdown occurs before the anti
Communist nations have been
really rearmed they will collapse
and most of the taxpayers bill
lions would be lost.
Paradox in Policy
But what the Republicans and a
number of Democrats in both
houses do not understand is why
the administration believes we
can stop the Red torrent in one
portion of the world while leav-
ing it completely unchecked in
another.
The bipartisan foreign policy
was wrecked when the admins
tration refused stubbornly to pay
any heed to warnings that our
abandonment of the Nationalists
would have more serious conse-
quences for the United States than
for China itself.
From the strictly strategic point
of view, China is as important as
Western Europe, if not more so.
The main Soviet military indus
trial establishments are believed
to be located now principally on
the Eastern slopes of the Urals.
Our problems of an offensive de
fensive campaign became much
more difficult when we lost the
possible use Of Chinese territory
for airbases and when we per-
mitted the Soviets to establish a
puppet regime in that country.
The Chinese problem, as prac-
tical men in Washington saw it,
was not whether the regime of
Chang Kai-shek was corrupt and
undemocratic. These are highly
important considerations in nor
NAL times, but are of only relative
Importance in the midst of a cold
war which may turn hot any day.
The realistic approach to the
Chinese problem should have been:
What is most necessary at this
time for the defense of the United
States? There could have been
but one answer: Maintain regime
friendly to the Western democra-
cies in that vitality important part
of Asia.
Republican legislators were not
the only ones who were convinced
of the wisdom of this realistic ap-
proach. President Truman him
self was one Of those who sup
ported such a policy.
Red Tape Slowed Aid
In spite of the State Depart
ment's opposition, the 80th Con-
gress voted $125, 100000 for mill
tary assistance to the Nationalist
army. President Truman signed
the measure early In the summer
Of 1943 but it came to naught be-
cause the military shipments were
tied up in State Department red
tape.
Mr.. Truman was busy with his
political campaign and had nc
time to bother about the aid-to-
China legislation. Toward the emo
of October he became aware that
nothing was being done. That
month John Steelman, his adviser
called 1t. Gen. Albert C. Wede-
meyer, chief of war plans in the
Pentagon, and asked for a com.
plete report on what was being
done about assistance to China
The President was on his cam.
paign tour and wanted the report
on his desk when he returned te
Washington.
War planning officers worked
night and day and finally pre-.
pared complete report on what
was going to be sent to Chang.
fighting forces, which still helc
the line north of the Yangtze
Mr.. Truman ordered top priority
for such shipments and in No.
vember, 1948. after he had beer
reelected, several Navy trans.
ports were loaded with military
supplies for the Nationalists.
While the ships were still al
sea they received news of fresh
defeats for the Nationalist armies
which had been starved of vita
military supplies. The shipment,
then were diverted to Formosa.
Some Material Useless
Spokesman for the State De
partment in the Senate, and par
ticularly Chairman Connally O
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. support the Depart
ment's contention that the Ma.
tionalistS sold their equipment t,
the Communists. If they had no
done so. they would not have los
Marking and the areas south O
the YangtZe River. IL is stated