Evening star., 1950-03-26

CndJ STATUS, emma mas Deeu swept
left with defeated Japan as oul
course of that half of the world.
Not only do Japan and Japa
tegic toehold in the far Pacific.
Japan and our occupation con-
stitute America on trial before the
Orient. If the cold war is, as
many believe, resolvable only in
terms of theology. then Japan is
the moral battle-ground for the
East. For nearly a century Japan
dominated the course of the
Orient and finally in open war
inflamed Orientals with the Asia
for Asiatics' battle cry. Even ia
pans defeat has deprived Europe
of most of it's Asiatic empire.
If we succeed in leading Japan
to a peaceful rapprochement with
the West in the face of Soviet
Establishments from the mainland
of Asia, then we have a good
chance of leading the whole Far
East the same way. In terms OF
economics, which, as we have seen
in Europe, do much to determine
the progress of local communism
Japan is the key to all of the Far
East. For japanese industry is
the market for most Of the
Orient's exports and the source
of the cheap manufactured goods
which the Orient can obtain no.
where else. If, therefore. we can
somehow stimulate the japanese
economy out of the past four and
a half years of postwar lethargy
We not only give ourselves some
chance of converting that country
to democracy and westernism, but
automatically do the same for
Asia and the rest of the
Orient which is still outside the
iron curtain. If we cannot sue
ceed in Japan then we have, in
all probability, lost the whole OF
the Far East to the Soviet.
All Of this presents us with
difficult political issues. There is
much evidence that the military,
at least up to the recent past, had
written off Japan strategically
Should this concept ever gain
wide credence in Japan, the moral
effect would wipe out our politi-
cal and social gains there since
the end of the war.
Political Difficulties
It is politically hazardous also
to emphasize the necessity for
strengthening Japan, since we
tend to ALLEVIATE our most reliable
Allies in the Pacific, Austria and
New Zealand, to say nothing of the
effect on the Philippines. Our
recent action in stopping repara-
tions removals of industrial
equipment from Japan provoked
immediate protests. Finally the
restoration of Japan's faltering
economy can only come from
stepped up export trade which
completes with that of Britain
and in the United States market
with our own industry.
The whole political treatment
OF Japan is further complicated
by the fact that Britain and the
Soviet recognize Red China while
we continue to deal with Ma
tlonalist China, and that govern
ment still holds Formosa which
is the major trading area with
Japan. While policy toward
Japan is legally at least formed
by the Far Eastern Commission
in Washington, and while Gen
Macarthur is in theory at least
guided by an Allied Council
in Tokyo, the China embroglio
has meant virtual suspension of
any Allied course toward Japan.
There seems to be no prospect of
a full Allied peace treaty with
Japan.
For better or worse, therefore,
We must act unilaterally in Japan,
and regardless of the feeling of
our Allies we must make our
Pacific policy revolve around
Japan. The question becomes one
of how likely we are to succeed in
Japan a reliable center
Of that policy.
Our position in Japan has long
seemed impregnable. We entered
and occupied the country with
military aid only from the British
commonwealth. All of the ad-
miniStratlon has been in our
hands alone. And the japanese
astounded us by exhibiting an
enthusiastic acceptance of us and
all of our works. The early years
Of the occupation prob ably
to the sfnoothest and
most successful operation of its
kind in the political history of the
world.
Japan's Economy Precarious
It was. however, too easy, and
we are only now beginning to find
it so. Our policy makers compla-
Gently fed the japanese large
doses of reform and democratiza-
ton. while Congress appropriated
several hundred million dollars a
year to otherwise feed them. We
forgot completely the fact that
democracy and reform by them
selves do not guarantee material
prosperity, and the all-important
fact that without some degree of
economic well-being the Japanese
would be unlikely to cherish
either our reforms or the concept
Of democracy itself.
We now appear to have learned
that economic recovery is neces-
sary in Japan and have devoted
during the past year or more a
certain amount of intelligent
effort to bring it about-princi-
pally the removal of the bureauc-
racy with which we had entangled
business in the name of
"eform. BY virtue of such release