Evening star., 1950-12-02
MocArthur's S ANALYSIS

sENsTSS
Conjectures that had the United
Nations modified its mission of
liberating and unifying Korea and
stopped it's campaign at some
incidental phase the entry of the
Chinese Communists into the war
could have been avoided find no
support in actualities. The mo-
mentous nature of the decisions
and actions which have been
taken clearly show them to be
basic in design rather than of
superficial impulse.
No Way to Avoid Risk.
@. 8. Could this risk have been
avoided by any manipulation of
your forces different from those
which transpired?
A. Not that I can see-the risk
of attack from China was one
which existed from the beginning
of war and which the United Ma
tions command itself had to ac-
cept from the start of operations.
1t was always inherent and al
ways present but impossible to
avoid by any field maneuver or
generalship.
| The risk was politically inherent
with the initial (June 25) resolu-
ton of the United Nations and
quite beyond any. military power
of modification. In carrying out
their mission against North Ko-
rean forces. our troops lad no
other option than To proceed with
their mission under the inherent
danger of the calculated risks
which the United Nations had ac-
cepted.
AS far as I can see no strategical
or tactical mistakes were made
Of any basic proportion or of
more than minor consequence.
The opportunity Of initial on
slaught in overwhelming force of
undeclared belligerency, which has
so frequently occurred in the past,
is inherent in war itself. It can
not be avoided under present con-.
ditions Of international relation
ship.
Q. 9. Has the military command
overexceeded It's authorities?
A. No, it has acted in complete
harmony and coordination with
higher authority. The military
does not make or attempt to make
policy. 1t merely executes and
administers those policies which
are prescribed for it. So far rs
I am aware, complete unity has
existed between the military COM
mand and its superior group
ments.
Won't Speculate on Future.
@. 10. Have you recommended
or asked for authority to bomb
north of the Yalu River?
A. No. any decision of this ra-
Jure belongs to higher authority
than my own.
thority to use the atomic bomb?
| A. No.
@. l2-What do you expect to
happen in Korea?
| A. should not care to make
any speculation as to the future.
! Q. 13-Are you entirely salts
| fed with the conduct of your
command?
A. Yes. I am sure 1t has done
everything that was humanity pos
sible under conditions which ex-
listed.
@. 14-Do you regard the pres
ent campaign as a continuation
of the North Korean aggression
or representing an entirely new
phase OF aggression?
A. This, in my opinion, is a new
war with a new opponent and a
new army. The North Korean
forces were destroyed and the
mission of the United Nations
command practically fulfilled
when this fresh aggression was
launched.
@. 15-How many prisoners do
you now hold?
A. Nearly 145,000.
@. 16-What proportion of
these are Chinese?
A. Less than 300 of them are
Chinese.
@. IT. The statement has been
made that had the 9th Army not
moved forward on November "a
uncovering the enemy's great
build-up then under way, that it
might well have resulted in being
overrun in a short time. What is
your opinion on this?
Probing Movement Essential.
A. This probing movement was
essential to develop the Chinese
purpose and strength. The only
other recourse would have been
to resign ourselves to the pos
sibility of devastating strike in
such power as to completely de-
stroy the 9Th Army. 1t was the
only chance we had to ascertain
the truth or falsity of the Chinese
contention that his intervention
was merely on volunteer and
individual basis.
The proximity of the main bor-
derline to the battlefront, only a
nights march separating them,
and the impossibility of recon-
noitering ground on the border
lines by our planes made it i'm
perative to develop the true state
of affairs. agree completely with
Gen. Walkers estimate that this
probing effort was made none too
soon.
Had our forces remained indefi-
nitely impassive it would not only
have foregone all chances of con-
cluding the North Korean cam
Ipaign which would have signaled
the withdrawal of main forces
fy.nyNa rNro, nxL &Loa