Evening star., 1950-12-23
Disaster Seen in Hemisphere Defense Idea

Europe, and in the United States
additional forces will be placed at
Gen. Eisenhower's disposal in
Europe.
Now the rest of the book, the ma
terial part of the book, the part
which is history has to do with what
we and our Allies have tried to &C
complish since the end of the war.
What we have tried to accomplish
has been in the light of a clear
conception which we have all had.
That is that the security of each
one of us is tied up with the security
of all Of us, and therefore strength
and security is a common problem
and common task. 1t is a task in
which we must all wish to work to-
gether and in which we are all part
ners in the truest sense of the word.
Now so far as the United States
is concerned, this is really national
policy. 1t isn't a matter which has
been decided by any small group OF
people in connection with any par
ticular event. 1t is the product of
the decisions of all the branches of
the executive branch of the Govern
ment, of the Congress, of the people
OF the United States over a long
priod of years.
Now all the way through these
chapters of the book and in con-
nection with all the steps that
have mentioned there have been
dissenting views expressed. There
have been views expressed that we
should not use our resources and
our power in conjunction with 9TH
ers to build up a common strength
and common defense but that
We should retire to our own conti-
nent, that we should try to isolate
ourselves from the problems and
difficulties of the world and that
here on our hemisphere we should
attempt to secure ourselves against
the dangers and difficulties. of the
world.
This attitude is one which is con-
tinually expressed and which is
continually examined. It is the
work of the National Security
Council. it is the task of the Ma
tional Security Council to examine
all alternatives at all times and
make recommendation regarding
them. And when the National Sc
curity Council performs its duty in
this respect it speaks for the whole
executive branch of the Govern
ment which is concerned with the
defense problems of the United
States and with the mobilization
of the economic power of the United
States which is necessary to back
up that defense.
They have examined this attitude
many times, the last time quite
recently, and every time they have
examined it they have recommended
unanimously that this is an I'M
possible attitude for the United
States to take because it spells de-
feat and Illustration, it has no pos
sibility Of success, and therefore it
is not an attitude which this Gov
ernment can usefully take.
Conclusions Drawn.
In our work on this particular
question we have brought out many
considerations. I shall mention a
few of them.
It Is our unanimous conclusion,
and has been throughout all these
years, and is now, that such policy
is policy of withdrawal into our
hemisphere and an attempt to deal
on a defensive basis with the dan
gers in the rest Of the world. Our
conclusion is that the first result of
that would enable the Soviet Union
to make quick conquest of the
entire Eurasian land mass.
To do that leads you to the second
conclusion. which is that it would
place at the disposal of the Soviet
Union a possession of military re-
sources and economic power vastly
superior to any that would be then
available for our home security.
And it would give the Soviet Union
possession Of a strategic position
which would be catastrophe to the
United States.
In that situation we come to the
third conclusion, and that is that in
such a position the Soviet Union
would be in a position to develop
power which could eliminate our
power and which would be used for
that purpose because, even isolated
as we would be, we would still have
some potential threat to the success
of the Soviet plans.
We then come to the fourth
conclusion, which is that such a
developing situation would make any
negotiation, any peaceful settlement
of the problems before us, quite i'm
possible. It would so unbalance the
power in the world, 1t would put us
at such a vast disadvantage that
negotiation would not be possible
at all.
That leads you to the fifth con-
clusion, which Is that negotiation
not being possible you are then
brought either to the position where
you must accept whatever terms are
imposed or where you must fight
without Allies and merely to main
tain if you can, in that precarious
position, your own physical exist
ence.
Case of Physical Existence.
I say physical existence because
that brings us to the sixth conclu-
sion, that a position of that sort,
accepted by us, would undermine the
entire constitutional structure, the
entire morale position, the entire
heritage of the American tradition.
Therefore the National Security
Council has rejected this policy
because 1t concludes that it is a
self-defeating policy and one which
could lead only to surrender or to
defeat. So we have not adopted