Evening star., 1950-06-06

RAILWAY.
The question here is whether the
rules and practices of the Southern
Railway Company, which divide
each dining car so as to allot ten
tables exclusively to white passen-
gers and one table exclusively to
Negro passengers, and which call
for a curtain or partition between
that table and the others, violate
the Interstate Commerce Act.
That section makes it unlawful for
railroad in interstate commerce
ito subject any particular person,
to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever: :" We hold
that those rules and practices do
violate the Act. :.
The material language in the
Interstate Commerce Act has been
in that statute since its adoption
in 1887. From the beginning,
the Interstate Commerce Commits
sion has recognized the application
of that language to determinations
between white and Negro passen-
gers. That section recently was
so applied in Mitchell VS.. United
States.
The decision of this case is largely
controlled by that in the Mitchell
case. There a Negro passenger
holding a first-class ticket was
denied a Pullman seat, although
such a seat was unoccupied and
would have been available to him If
he had been white. -.
The similarity between that case
and this is inescapable. The ap-
pellant here was denied a seat in
the dining car although at least
one seat was vacant and would have
been available to him, under the ex-
isting rules, if he had been white.
The issue before us, as in the
Mitchell case, is whether the rail-
roads current rules and practices
cause passengers to be subjected to
undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in violation of Section
3 %. We find that they do.
Each Passenger Equal.
The right to be free from unrea-
sonable determinations belongs,
under Section %, to each particu-
lar person. Where dining car is
available to passengers holding tick
cts emitting them to use it, each
such passenger is equally entitled
to its facilities in accordance with
reasonable regulations. The denial
of dining service to any such pas
senger by the rules before us subjects
him to prohibited disadvantage. -.
We need not multiply instances
in which these rules sanction un-
reasonable determinations. The cur
tains, partitions and signs empha-
size the artificiality of difference
in treatment which serves only to
call attention to a racial classifica-
ton of passengers holding identical
tickets and using the same public
dining facility.
Our attention has been directed
to nothing which removes these ra-
cial ALLEGATIONS from the statutory
condemnation of undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or disadvantage.
:" 1t is argued that the limited
demand for dining-car facilities by
Negro passengers justif1es the regu-
lations. But it is no answer to the
particular passenger who is denied
service at an unoccupied place in
a dining car that, on the average
persons like him are served. :.
That the regulations may impose
on white passengers, in proportion
to their numbers, disadvantages
similar to those imposed on Negro
passengers is not an answer to the
requirements of Section 3 %. Dis
ordinations that operate to the
disadvantage of two groups are not
the less to be condemned because
their impact is broader than if only
one were affected.
Since Section 3 Cd of the Inter-
state Commerce Act invalidateS the
rules and practices before us, we
do not reach the constitutional or
other issues suggested.
The judgment of the District
Court is reversed and the cause is
remanded to that court with direc-
tions to set aside the order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission
which dismissed the original COM
plant and to remand the case to
that Commission for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with this
opinion.
HEMAN M. SWEATT VS.. THEOP-
lie S. PAINTER, EFT. AL.
This case and McLaurin v. Okla
homa State Regents, present
different aspects of this general
question To what extent does the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment limit the
power of state to distinguish be-
tween students of different races in
professional and graduate education
in a state university? Broader is
sues have been urged for our con-
sideration, but we adhere to the
principle of deciding constitutional
questions only in the context of the
particular case before the court.
We have frequently reiterated that