Evening star., 1950-01-26
The Hydrogen Hell Bomb
Can 1t Be Produced? If So Then What About Its Military,
Economic, Political and Moral implications?
By Thomas r. Henry

ISO1lOll11\s l. O1lIlNdl al
BY Thomas X. Henry
| Four major questions must be answered
before President Truman can come to any
sound decision on whether this country
| should attempt to make hydrogen bomb
the so-called Hell bomb" whose potential
destructive power has been variously esti-
mated at from five to 1000 times that Of
| the plutonium bombs dropped on Japan
at the end Of the war.
| None of these questions has as yet been
answered-at least not to the knowledge of
| some of the most eminent of the scientists
who launched the Manhattan Project but
who are not now in Government service.
| The first question is this: Is a hydrogen
bomb scientifically attainable?
This must be answered by the Scientific
Advisory Board Of the Atomic Energy Com
| mission, which includes some of the worlds
most notable nuclear physicists.
That they have arrived at any conclusions,
which necessarily would be highly secret, is
doubted by some Of their closest friends who
are familiar with the general problem
although not with any specific details.
Competent scientists familiar with the
background of the problem believe, however,
that the present status of the hydrogen
| proposition is very similar to that of the
uranium bomb early in 1910, about year
| before President Roosevelt finally agreed to
the fateful decision to go ahead on what
seemed better than ffty-fifty chance. The
fission of the Uranium 235 atom had been
accomplished early in 1899. It suddenly
had thrown open the doors to the hitherto
highly discounted possibility of releasing
some of the enormous energy that binds
| together the atomic nucleus.
Scientifically Feasible.
Scientifically, as far as pure physics is
concerned the way may be clear for hydro
gen bomb of some sort. This can be known
definitely only to those on the inside. Sew
eral proposals have been advanced. Any
thing ever allowed to leak to the public
that is, to nuclear scientists not in the inner
folds extremely fuzzy.
It can be stated, however, that the prop
ositions most enthusiastically advanced to
date stem from group of nuclear physic-
lists OF the University of California, birth
place and home of the cyclotron, first and
greatest of atom smashers These men,
whose ability cannot be gainsaid, appear to
be very optimistic.
But little serious attention. SO far as any
body knows on the outside yet has been
given to the necessarily enormous engineer
ing, chemical and supply problems upon
which the success Of the bomb provided the
theories are right, must depend.
Even If there seemed fair promise that
the bomb project might succeed, the scienti-
flc advisers would have another difficult
problem-that of scientific, rather than
economic, COST Although there Is no Of
fetal sanction for the statement it is more
than probable that any possible hydrogen
bomb must have a plutonium bomb as
detonator. There seems little or no likeli-
hood OF devising means of fusing hydrogen
atoms to make helium from which enormous
release of binding energy would be obtained,
without temperatures which exist nowhere
else on earth except within plutonium
bomb at the instant OF its explosion.
Would BE Very Costly.
This means. it is believed. that much of
the present program of producing a stock
pile Of plutonium bombs would have to be
sacrificed to produce a hydrogen bomb. It
seems quite unthinkable that such project
could be started from scratch, with how
ever large an appropriation, to proceed en-
tirely on its own. 1t would have to use the
facilities Of the present atomic plants. It
would necessarily draw on their material and
skilled personnel. 1t would not be entirely
matter Of merely spending vast sums of
money out of the pockets of taxpayers. It
could involve the partial sacrifice of sure
thing for something which might well turn
out to be complete failure.
The scientific advisers Of the Atomic
Energy Commission are well qualified to
evaluate the chances Of success. but even
they cannot arrive at an absolutely sure con-
clusion, no more than could the man who
sold President Roosevelt on the Manhattan
District project. These could not guarantee
that an atomic bomb could certainly be
produced. They could only decide whether
there was a balance of factors for or against
success and whether the favorable factors
were great enough to justify taking chance.
The scientists finally advised President
Roosevelt that there was sufficient balance
in favor of the atomic project, and he took
their advice.
But it is not certain, or probable, that
any group Of experts representing more
than one specially is yet ready to make as
clear proposal to President Truman re-
garding the hydrogen bomb.
Military Value Weighed.
The second question Is this: Assuming
the hydrogen bomb can be produced, is it
worthwhile from the viewpoint of military
strategy?
The only group who could answer this
question and advise the President is the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Offhand, it is by no
means certain that they would approve the
project. They would understand clearly
that any advantage such bomb would give
the United States for national defense
might have to be bought at a very high
price. 1t probably would mean the deple-
ytion, or at least a great showdown in the
increase. of the precious stockpile of atomic
bombs. Accordingly, the jos would have to
decide whether the possible gain from a
successful hydrogen bomb would be worth
the possible sacrifice of sure thing.
One hydrogen bomb would be of greater
devastating power than multiple plutonium
bombs. But would one hydrogen bomb be
equal to ten plutonium bombs, and, pre-
sumably costing lot more, would it be
worth ten plutonium bombs? After all. It
could do damage only in one place. It
would be worthwhile only on highly special
lzed targets. Consider an enemy attack on
Washington. All the damage of real mill
tary value that could be done would lie
within about two-mile radius Of the White
House and could be accomplished nv an