Evening star., 1950-04-04

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Dutch and Indonesians, brought
about largely through benevolent
United States pressure, eventuate in
settlement which seems. in Indo-
nesia, to contain too much of hope
deferred, while the resistance in
Indo- China under Ho Chi-minh
achieves more and more of hope
fulfilled, the results throughout
Southeast Asia will be adverse to
the United States interest.
Repercussions Seen.
Heavy and primary United States
commitments in Western Europe
make it difficult to bear constantly
in mind that when the Dutch-1n-
donesian negotiations are consum-
mated, the satisfaction or diSsatis-
faction of popular opinion in Indo-
nesia will have wider repercussions
than the satisfaction or dissatistac-
ton of Dutch public opinion.
1t is a fact, nevertheless, that
Indonesian opinion is more difficult
to satisfy than Dutch opinion, and
it is also a fact that the repercus-
sions will be more serious If Indo-
nesian opinion is not satisfied than
if Dutch opinion is not satisfied.
These facts mark an important diff
ference between prewar and postwar
colonial Asia. They are facts that
American public opinion has by no
means fully accepted; but they are
also facts that are critical for the
formulation of an overall United
States policy in Asia.
f. The foregoing considerations
indicate that the major aim of
United States policy in the Far East
should be to convince the countries
of the Far East that they can get
along we'll with the United States
and with the countries of Western
Europe. They must be persuaded
that they can get along well because
of the mutual benefits to themselves,
to the United States, and to West
ern Europe.
They must not be made to suspect
that the real aim of the United
States is an ulterior aim of using
them against Russia.
Aim of United States Policy.
To put it in another way, the
aim of the United States policy
should be to enable the countries
of the Far East to do without
Russia to the maximum extent.
This much more modest aim than
insistence on and organization of
hostility to Russia: but it is an
attainable aim, and the other is
not.
A few suggestions for implement
tatlon are appended.
l. Conferences with the inde-
pendent governments of the Far
East, on the basis of helping them
to build their own economies, to
revive their trade with Europe, and
to expand their trade with us. EN-
phasis on positive steps that can be
taken. No negative conditions, such
as prohibitions of trade with Russia
or Communist China; no conditions
that could be interpreted as Ameri-
can regulation of their political
parties.
2 Working relations, and a re-
fusal to be bound by protocol, with
legitimate nationalist leaders in
countries whose full political aSpira- :
tions have not been met by their
European rulers.
Position Should Be Clear.
3. The United States should moi
allow any European country, in its
relations with any country in the
Far East, to state openly or to imply
by propaganda that its policy is
backed by the United States.
European representatives, in ne
gotiating with the representatives
OF countries in Asia, should be dis
couraged from stating or implying
that they are authoritative in
terpreters of United States policy
or Intermediates without whom the
United States cannot be approached
4. 1t should be made clear that
if there is delay or difficulty in es-
tablishing relations between the
United States and Communist con-
trolled countries, such as China, the
trouble comes from the Communist
side and not from the United States
side.
S. 1t should be made clear that
friendly and beneficial relations
with the United States depend es-
sentially on the inherent friendli-
ness or unfriendliness of the
nation concerned, and not on the
formalities of diplomatic recogni-
ton. In order to facilitate the con-
trast between countries which are
on friendly terms with the United
States and countries which are not
the number OF countries formally