Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1950-08-13

It would be significant, hoWeve
military move made by the United
States in struggle which up to
the present has been treated as
primarily diplomatic. Korea was a
diplomatic bluff which, being call
ed, had to be turned over to the
unalerted military. Whether it was
a iustifiable risk on the diplomatic
level, time alone will tell.
Heretofore we have masked SEN
timental and economic considera-
lions behind military considera-
tons in our aid to Europe. That
is, we wanted to help certain ma
lions because we like them. We
also wanted to assure the sale"
of our surplus goods. thereby hedg-
ing against recession. We hoped
that the aided nations would be
inspired and inspirited to vote
down communism. In due time,
according to the diplomatic theory,
this example of richer life
through right thinking and voting
would triumph over the concepts
of communism.
Sources of Opposition
Likewise it was believed that
these revived nations would soon
rearm themselves in their own and
our interests, thus serving as our
first line of defense in Europe
In this way a military argument
was adduced from basically
theological development.
The chief difficulty with this
theory was the lin due time
element. 1t soon became apparent
that Russia, and not the United
States, was to be the timekeeper
We will probably never know
whether the complete European
aid plan would have worked fully
or not, for it now seems certain
that it will have to be merged
with plan which will be primar'
: lily military and only secondaril!
: propaganda and economic. Thu
granting of the Spanish loar
would mark the beginning of thu
changeover from the old plan tt
the new.
When we recall other leader!
whose aid we have welcomed ir
the last two wars, our choosineS'
regarding Franco is puzzling.
Opposition to Spain outside the
administration actually springs
, from two totally different sources
namely, Communist agents seek
ing to deprive America of an ex'
cellent military base, and thor
oughly loyal Protestants who hon
estly fear Franco as a tool O.
catholicism. That communism i
the stronger factor in this turmoil
} is indicated by the fact that les
fuss has been made over the ques
ton of the reappointment of
l representative of the President a
. the Vatican than over the recogni
ton of Franco as possible tool o
the papacy.
Spain Gusts Reds
The fact that aid to Spain viii
have to override all these obstacles
will emphasize the urgency of the
military considerations prompting
such a decision, if it is made
Obviously this small loan to Spain
would be only first step. 1t
would mean besides:
l. That we would build strong
base in Spain and increase and
strengthen Spanish armies, al
ready of considerable strength and
in high morale.
2. That we would indirectly
serve notice on our long subsidized
and at present surprisingly tran
quill Allies in Europe, especially
Britain and France, that unless
they can speed up their pre-
paredness we must fall back on a
stronger bastion, Spain, as a
bridgehead for both Europe and
Africa.
3. That we would inform Russia
by deeds that we do not intend to
let her select her own battlefields
and her own timetables around
the world, but are going to create
bases and raise mercenaries in all
major areas.
4. That with Spain and Spanish
Morocco as a background we
would be able to make Britain's
great contribution of Gibraltar
play a much larger role than in
the last war, when it was danger
ously hemmed in. With the most
recent weapons used against it
and with Spain again neutral,
Gibraltar would probably fall OF
be deprived of its worth.
Fighting Nation
Oddly enough the chief factor
which has blocked aid to Spain
will make her attractive as mill
tary ally-She has rooted out Com
munists. Few things have been
more alarming to our strategists
than the fact that neither Britain
nor France has been vigorously
against local Communists. The
situation has been similar in the
smaller Western nations, France
is today about Is per cent Com
munist, according to general re-
port.
Spain, by contrast, is ruthlessly
nti-RuSSian, to a degree found
nowhere else in Europe. In an
theological war friendly popula-
ton is of immense value to an
army, and hostile one is source
of perpetual danger. That is one
of the reasons that Spain rates
high as a possible base in the
calculations of our strategiStS.
Furthermore, the Spaniard him
self is great fighter. Prof. Soro-
kin calculated that over a period
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