Evening star., 1950-08-17
By John M. Hiehtower
Associated Press Stoff Writer


Many of the best informed
American officials now believe
Russia will openly grab of North
Korea-above the 38th parallel
rather than let a victorious UN.
restore peace and unity to the
country.
1t is assumed here that the pre-
else steps to be taken have been
under negotiation between the
Soviet Union and Communist
China. 1t is also assumed they
will act jointly when the time
comes.
Administration officials, how
ever. give little credence to re-
ports which have come mainly
from Chinese Nationalist sources
that Russian Vice Premier V. M.
Molotov has been in Peiping, Red
Chinese Capital. negotiating with
Premier Mao Use Tung and other
officials on this and related prob
lens.
Whether Molotov has or has
not been there. the belief of re-
sponsible authorities here is that
the Soviets and Chinese must be
deeply involved in fateful talks
al this time, concerning not only
Korea but Formosa and other Far
Eastern political questions.
u. S. Determination Shown.
Increasing evidence of the
buildup of U. N. power in South
Korea, 1t is believed, must now
give the Russians and the Chinese
virtual proof of the determination
OF the United States and other
countries associated in the Kore-
an struggle to drive the invad-
ers out of the south. In other
words. the Red strategists must
now decide what means they will
use to deal with a victorious U. N.
coalition in Korea whereas up to
this time they may very we'll
have counted on a Communist
victory.
For the U. N. the prospect of
eventual success in South Korea
has already raised the question,
thus far unanswered, as to what
U. N. forces should do when they
reach the 38th parallel. Should
they then stop short on the theory
that the invader has been driven
out of South Korea? Or should
they drive on in the belief that
only by crushing the Communist
military power can real peace be
established in Korea?
There is a widespread belief
here that the latter course is the
only defensible one. This belief
however, is based on an assump-
ton that neither Russia nor Com
muniSt China will become directly
engaged in the Korean conflict.
If the Russians, perhaps in COL
laboration with the Chinese Reds,
reoccupy Northern Korea which
the Soviets left about two years
ago, the whole problem for the
U. N. powers will take on a new
color. They will then have to de-
eide whether to accept Russian
domination of northern Korea as
a fact to live with, or whether to
try to drive the Red occupation
forces out-which would mean
fighting with Russia directly and
which appears to be an unlikely
course.
FOrmosa Policy Is Puzzle.
Informed officials based their
speculation about Russia's prob
able action on the fact that Korea
has great strategic Importance in
relation to Manchuria and the
Soviet Pacific ports. They believe
that if Moscow cannot dominate
the country through Korean COM
munistS it is determined to rule
the northern half by occupation.
Speculation over Soviet Chinese
policy toward Formosa is much
less definite. Mainly official Wash
ington is trying to figure out why
the Chinese Reds have not at
tackled the island yet-with the
period Of favorable weather for an
amphibious operation about at an
end.
One line of reasoning is that
the Chinese Reds were not only
ill-prepared to launch an assault
but also did not desire to become
engaged in more fighting at this
time even though the Russians
may have been urging them to act
in order to involve American
forces on still a second front in
the Far East.
Another line of speculation is
that the Chinese Reds have been
straining at the bit but that the
| PuSSionS have nroUontad thon1