Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1950-03-26

out the participation of Western
This has been the "otf-the-1
American strategists but also OF
the British, and. to a lesser ex-
tent, French and Italian military
men.
Unfortunately, domestic pollti-
cal conditions in France and Bel
GUM make the fulfillment of
such a plan difficult, if not i'm
possible.
In his final speech before the
French National Assembly in the
debate on American military aid,
Foreign Minister Robert Schu-
man felt duty bound to say that
France is grateful for American
arms because only by rearmlng
can France feel secure against
German aggression.
Mr.. Schuman has a more real
istic approach to present world
problems than most of his col
leagues in the government. Un-
officially he has advocated strong
ly an alliance or even a union
between France and Germany
It was Mr.. Schuman who, in off,
the-record conversations last fall
stated: Since 1871 (after Ger
many defeated France French
governments have made the great
mistake of seeking security every
where except where it was really
to be found"
Schuman Restricted
He expanded on this view by
saying that after the bitterness
of defeat had passed France
should have made every effort to
ally herself to Germany, rather
than seeking security in alliances
with Britain and Russia. Those
alliances led to World War I, in
which France in fact was defeated
although the Allies finally won
the war.
After World War I, France
sought security in an alliance with
the newly created and enlarged
Central and Southern European
countries - Poland, Romanla,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia-
rather than extend a truly friend
ly hand to the Weimar republic
in Germany. If the French gov
eminent had approached the
European problem realistically
there might not have been any
World War I and, certainly, sin
cere Franco-German cooperation
on equal footing would have obvi-
ated Hitler and World War II.
Such are said to be the inner
most thoughts of the French For
eign Minister. But present po-
litical conditions in France ap-
parently demand that he play on
the same old theme-fear of Ger
many-instead of the new menace
to Europe and the rest of the
World-Soviet imperialism.
Under such conditions it seems
difficult to induce France, the
pivot of the Atlantic pact in
Europe, to agree even to limited
rearmament of Germany, despite
the views which Mr.. Churchill has
expressed openly in London and
those which are known to exist
among military men, and some
political men. in the adrninistra-
ton in Washington. This blind
ness to reality may cause us some
severe headaches in the near
future.
Germany is still PROSTATE. The
crushing defeat of her armed
forces in World War II has
weakened greatly the nation
which once was the strongest on
the European continent. But the
people of Germany are trying to
come back. Moreover, the spirit
OF nationalism in the Reich, which
many observers wrongly describe
as resurrection of Naziism, is as
strong as ever. Whoever is able
to exploit that nationalism-
either for good or bad-will win
the next war in Europe.
Policy Doesn't Help
While the Western powers pur-
sue a hesitating policy which is
neither fish nor fowl nor good red
herring the Russians follow a
positive policy. They want to rein
tegrate the Reich by uniting the
Eastern and Western zones under
the leadership of the U. S. S. r.
We have an undecided policy
toward the weak, nominal govern
ment in Bonn. That government
has neither strength nor prestige
with its own people. John j. Nc
Cloy, the American high commits
sioner, is competent adminstra-
tor, but he blows hot and cold, in
accordance with instructions he
receives from Washington. Wash
lngton's policy is tied in with that
OF Paris and London.
While we are helping the Ger
man people at the expense of the
American taxpayer we continue to
permit the British to dismantle
German plants, thus increasing
the number of unemployed. Re-
Gently also we have given our
blessing to what amounts to an
nexation of the rich Saar coal
basin to France. The agreement"
to lease the coal mines of that
area to the French republic for
so years is tantamount to annexa-
ton.
The State Department, acceded
reluctantly to this arrangement
because it felt that it had to
strengthen the government in
Paris. The Bidault government
had become shaky. It was meet
ing severe opposition in the Ma
tional Assembly at a time when
the State Department was keenly
interested in having the French