Evening star., 1950-01-04
Formoso and Common Sense

fOfmOSQ 0nQ common SenSe
To state the case mildly, it Is extremely
difficult, in view OF the hard realities OF
the situation In Asia, to see what good can
be accomplished by the varying proposals
of Senator Knowland, Senator Taft and
former President Hoover to save Formosa
! from the Chinese Reds.
| Briefly summarized, the proposals.
which repeatedly are in line with the
views of General MacArthur-would have
the United States do these main things:
| Cd Absolutely refuse to recognize the
Peiping Communist regime as either the
de facto or de jure government of China |;
| (2) continue the recognition of General
issimo Chang Kai-shek and the National
| lists, now virtual refugees in Formosa; 90
give support to Chang in the form of
| economic aid and a full-Scale military
mission to help him with the remnants
| of his armed forces; a. if necessary,
employ our Navy to repel the Chinese Reds
in case they attempt an amphibious in
vasion of the island, and 90 withdraw
Marshall Plan funds (this is Mr. Know
lands idea) from any recipient country
recognizing Peiping
theoretically, especially if it is really
true that friendly Formosa is vital to
American security in the Far Pacific, all
this may seem to many people to be highly
desirable. Theory to one side, however,
what are the realities we must face?
Reality one is that the Chinese Com
munists now are in effective control of
the whole vast mainland of China Reality
two is that the discredited Generalissimo
and the Nationalists, forced to flee to their
| relatively small island refuge, simply are
in no position to govern the Chinese people
in de facto sense or to speak for them
authoritatively. And reality three Is that
India has already moved to recognize
Peiping and that other Asiatic countries,
together with the British Commonwealth
as whole and probably also France and
the Netherlands, are likely to do the same
thing within the next few days or weeks.
These are by no means all the realities
confronting us in Asia, but they are enough
to Indicate the kind of trouble we could
brew for ourselves If we attempted to fol-
low the advice of Messrs. Hoover, Taft and
Knowland. OF course, there are good
reasons why we should be slow about
recognizing Peiping, and it may be that
we ought to offer Chang (though he is
reported to have great deal of gold)
measure OF economic aid and military
counsel on strictly conditional basis.
That said, however, the other save-Formosa
proposals Just do not add up to common
sense. IT put into effect, for example,
Mr.. Knowland's idea on the Marshall Plan
could wreck the recovery of Europe, a
continent which right now is strategically
far more important than China. Moreover
such move would perfectly confirm the
Kremlin's propaganda charge that the
"imperialistic" United States is out to i'm
pose its will on every land.
Similarly, if China's near neighbors and
practically all the rest of the world were
to have diplomatic relations with Peiping
while we stood alone in recognizing Chang
and in employing force to keep Formosa
from the Chinese Reds, our "imperialism"
would become a hot issue in the United
Nations and we would find ourselves build
ing up in Asia great reservoir of political
Ill will against our country. Above every
thing, assuming that the Communists
undertook an amphibious assault on
Chang and that we used our Navy to
repel them, we might then very easily get
caught in labyrinth of troubles leading
directly to major war requiring the ex-
penditure of great quantities of American
blood as our armies stormed the mainland
of China
OF course, If non-C Communist Formosa
is essential to our national security, then
perhaps we ought not to lose moments
time in accepting all these grave risks. But
the truth OF the matter is that its essen
tiality-which only military experts are
qualified to determine-is very much open
to question. Indeed, although General
Macarthur is said to regard 1t as vital, our
Security Council and Joint Chiefs Of STAFF
are reported to believe that the island,
located 100 miles OF Southeast China, is
not nearly SO important as some people
say and that it can be written OF without
danger to our strategic position.
# this is true-and If 1t Is, then some
authoritative voice should come out pub
licly and say so-it would be sheer folly
for this Nation to adopt the Knowland-
Taft-Hoover proposals. To do so would
make about as much sense as II the British
after the Union forces had won the War
Between the States and held all of Con-
tinental America-had decided to fly In the
face of reality and turn back the tide Of
history by giving complete support to q
broken-down refugee Confederate regime
In Bermuda.
The analogy here is obviously very
loose one, but 1t is not altogether without
point. AS far as Formosa and Red China
are concerned, whatever our hearts or
emotions may say, we have got to be hard
headed. Otherwise we can get ourselves
into a terrible mess gaining us nothing but
bloody nose, soiled reputation, bitter
sense OF regret, and an internationally
foolish look on our faces.