Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1950-12-17

recrimination was much longer.
And that is what I was on my
guard against when we went into
this last war. I was under pres
sure time after time from very
distinguished officials who did not
think that I was increasing the
regular Army rapidly enough.
Opposed to Excessive Speed.
II was strongly opposed to ex-
cessive speed, because we were
not ready yet, we did not have
enough of a base to do it cor
rectly. I think the same applies
here. . Now if we get a ire
mendous expansion, it is very
hard to do it efficiently and al
most certainly it would be done
with an unfortunate amount of
waste. The important thing is to
do this thing in such a way that
it provides base for a very quick
further expansion if we are faced
with this world situation"
Mr.. Lovett spoke of an orderly"
mobilization. But he added that
eff we suffer reverses in Korea or
elsewhere" (the testimony was CIV
EN- December l as outnumbered
American forces beat a hasty re-
treat down the Korean PENINSULA
the estimate of 1,264,90 men for
the Army increases will be in
adequate"
The Army's troubles since 1945
have been very great. There is
warm admiration for its recent
handling of the most acute troubles
getting leaders. men, weapons
and supplies straight to the Ko-
rean battlefield.
Officers Speak Reluctantly.
But also at the Pentagon, among
a great many leading participants
in World War II, warm as is their
praise for American achievements
against great odds in Korea, there
is something like dismay over the
sloWness with which the Army
today is building up new and
'acutely needed strength at home
A larger call for Guard divisions
than the two President Truman
announced would come into Fed
eral service next month had been
expected but it did not materialize.
Army officers do not speak pub
licly of Guard and reserve matters
and they are reluctant to state
at what level of government the
extent of the calls is being de-
termined.
There is some talk of the diff
culties in the way of more rapid
manpower mobilization while ad-
hitting that a grand scale mobili-
cation yet may become impera-
tive.
Camp Facilities Limited.
Here are some of the difficulties
presented:
/. Training camp facilities are
few. Most of the World War II
camps were demolished. But a
high Army official said that there
are still installations that can be
expanded to take care of roughly
an additional $4,000 men within
matter of weeks. Some camps
could be expanded to take care of
divisions. Fort Mcclellan, Ala,
Pine Camp, N. Y, and Indiantown
Gap, Pa, would only need some
minor renovations to make them
ready.
The Army has just asked its
area commanders to look over in
stallations in their territories i'm
mediately to determine their
availability and state of readiness
on a priority basis.
An army of million men
would necessitate some construc-
ton on such reservations as
those at Shelby, Miss, Camp
Banding, Fla, and Camp Crow
der, Mo-, where roadways and
utilities still exist but where most
wartime buildings were torn down
to furnish lumber for civilian
housing. It Is estimated that it
would require six months to make
such facilities ready. There is
still space in some camps for
units of less than division size.
At Fort Meade, Md, with a Ca
pacity Of $4,000 to 10000 some
10000 to $4,000 are now housed
Fort Belvoir, Va. could be ex-
banded to q 1900 capacity. It
now has some 10000 to $4,000
engineer troops.
Camp Operations Spotty.
The Army's record of camp
operations has been spotty over
the years, generally moving like
a barometer as its planned
strength rose and fell. For in
stance, Camp Pickett. Va, and