Evening star., 1950-03-16

VI OCII6luIy
/ by allowing the Commissions entry
into North Korea and by accepting
its report as the basis for a peaceful
settlement of that liberated coun-
try's problems. They could repatri-
ate japanese prisoners of war from
Siberian camps. They could refrain
from subverting the efforts of the
newly independent states of Asia
and their native leaders to solve
their problems in their own way.
Two. Use of Force.
With regard to the whole group
OF countries which we are accuS-
toned to think of as the Satellite
area, the Soviet leaders could with
draw their military and police force
and refrain from using the shadow
of that force to keep in power per-
sons or regimes which do not COM
mand the confidence of the respec-
tive peoples, freely expressed through
orderly representative processes. In
other words, they could elect to OBJ
serve, IN practice, the declaration to
which they set their signatures at
Yalta concerning liberated Eu-
rope. &
This is question of elementary
good faith, and it is vital to a spirit
of confidence that other treaties and
other agreements will be honored
Nothing would so alter the inter-
national climate as the holding OF
elections in the satellite states in
which the true will of the people
could be expressed.
Three. Obstruction in the United
Nations.
The Soviet leaders could drop
their policy of obstruction in the
United Nations and could instead
act is If they believe the United
Nations is, as Stain himself has
recently called it, a serious instru-
mentality for the maintenance OF
international peace and security
They are simply not acting that
way now.
Ther policy of walk-out and boy
colt is policy that undermines the
concept of majority decision. In
deed, they seem deliberately to en-
treach themselves in a minority
position in the United Nations. =
A respect for the expressed will
of the majority is as fundamental
to international organization as ii
is to democracy. We know that q
majority of the General Assembly
has generally not agreed with the
Soviet Union, whereas we ourselves
have generally been on the majority
side. There is nothing artificial
about this, situation. 1t has not
been the result of any sleight OF
hand or pressures on our part. We
do not have any satellites whose
votes we control. The significant
fact is that proposals which have
recommended themselves to a ma
jority of the members of the United
Nations have also commended them
selves to us.
Let the Soviet Union put forward
in the United Nations genuine pro-
poSals conducive to the work of
peace, respectful of the real inde-
pendence of other governments, and
appreciative of the role which the
United Nations could and should
play in the preservation of world
stability and the cooperation of ma
tions. They will then doubtless have
majority with them. We will re-
joice to see them in such a majority.
We will be pleased to be a member
! OF it ourselves.
Four. Effective Control of Atomic
Es Energy. 81 @ 5s
+ The Soviet leaders could join us
IN seeking realistic and effective ar
rangements for the control of atomic
kWeapons and the limitation of arma-
1ments in general. We know that it
is not easy for them under their
system to contemplate the function
| ing on their territory of an author
ity in which people would partici-
pate who are not Of their political
persuasion. --.-~- -,
If we have not hesitated to urge
that they as well as we accept this
requirement it Is because we Believe
that spirit of genuine RESPONSE
bility to mankind is widely present
in this world. Many able admins
traitors and scientists could be found
to operate such an authority who
would be only too happy, regardless
of political complexion, to take an
elevated and enlightened view of
the immense responsibility which
would rest upon them. There are
men who would scorn to use their
powers for the negative purpose Of
intrigue and destruction. We believe
that an authority could be estab-
lished which would not be controlled
or subject to control by either our
selves or the Soviet Union.
Five. Attempts ut Undermining
Established Governments.
The Kremlin could refrain from
using the Communist apparatus
controlled by 1t throughout the
world to attempt to overthrow, by
subversive means, established gov
ernments with which the Soviet
government stands in an outward
state of friendship and respect. In
general, it could desist from, and
could cooperate in efforts to pre-
vent, indirect aggression across ma
tional frontiers. - -
Six. Proper Treatment Of Diplo-
matte Representatives.
The Soviet leaders could cooper
ate with us to the end that the
official representatives of all coun-
tries are treated everywhere with
decency and respect and that an at
mosphere is created in which these
representatives could function in a
normal and helpful manner, con-