Evening star., 1950-08-28
Loss of Fornoso Would Brinq
War; Generals Statement Saws
Views Included
In Message for
VFW Convention

FOLLOWING is the tert of Gen.
MdcArthur'S message Which t0dS
to hare been deliuered to the
contention OF the Veterans of
Foreign Wars today:
In view of misconceptions cur
rently being voiced concerning the
relationship of Formosa to our
strategic potential in the Pacific,
believe it in the public interest
to avail myself of this opportuni-
ty to state my views thereon to
you, all of whom having fought
overseas understand broad Strate-
gic concepts.
To begin with, any appraisal of
that strategic potential requires
an appreciation of the changes
wrought in the course of the past
war. Prior thereto the Western
strategic frontier of the United
States lay on the littoral line of
the Americas with an exposed is
land salient extending out through
Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the
Philippines. That salient was not
an outpost of strength but an
avenue of weakness along which
the enemy could and did attack
us. The Pacific was a potential
area of advancement for any
predatory force intent upon strik-
ing at the bordering land areas.
Pacific Victory Changed View.
All of this was changed by our
Pacific victory. Our strategic from
tier then shifted to embrace the
entire Pacific Ocean which has
become a vast moat to protect us
as long as We hold it. Indeed, it
acts as protective shield to all
of the Americas and all free lands
of the Pacific Ocean area we
control to the shores of Asia by
a chain of islands extending in an
arc from the Aleutians to the
Marianas held by us and our free
allies.
! From this island chain we can
dominate with air power every
Asiatic port from Vladivostock
to Singapore. and prevent any
hostile movement into the Pacific.
Any predatory attack from Asia
must be an amphibious effort. No
amphibious force can be success
full with our control of the sea
lanes and the air over these lanes
in its avenue of advance.
With naval and air supremacy
and modern ground elements to
defend bases, any major attack
from continental Asia toward us
or our friends of the Pacific would
come to failure. Under such con-
ditions the Pacific no longer rep
reSentS menacing avenues of ap-
proach for prospective invader
it assumes instead the friendly
aspect of peaceful lake.
Natural Line of Defense.
Our line of defense is a natural
one and can be maintained with
a minimum of military effort and
expense. Tt emissions no attack
against anyone nor does it pro-
vide the bastions essential for Of
fensive operations. but properly
maintained would be an invincible
defense against aggression. If we
hold this line we may have peace
lose it and war is inevitable.
/ The geographic location of For
mosa is such that in the hand of
a power unfriendly to the United
States it constitutes an enemy sa-
lient in the very center of this
defensive perimeter, 100 to $50
miles closer to the adjacent friend
| ly SegmentS-Okinawa and the
Philippines-than any point in
Continental Asia. At the present
time there is on Formosa a con-
centration of operational air and
naval bases which is potentially
greater than any similar concen-
tration of the Asiatic mainland
between the Yellow Sea and the
Strait of Malacca.
Additional bases can be de-
veloped in a relatively short time
by an aggressive exploitation of all
World War II japanese facilities.
An enemy force utilizing those in
Stallations currently available
could increase by 100 per cent the
\ (See MacARTHITR TExT A-s>