Evening star., 1950-12-10
Continued From First Page)

fire, machineguns and mortars-
the weapons that men can carry
into action themselves.
The United Nations have given
no indication that they will re-
cruit or send to Korea the hun
dredS Of thousands of infantrymen
who alone could really stem the
advancing tide of veteran Chinese
Reds.
Gen. j. Lawton Collins. chief of
staff Of the United States Army,
has said he can see no worthwhile
practical use in Korea for the
mightiest weapon in the arsenal
of democracy-the atom bomb.
When an army loses battle or
O war, it must surrender, retreat
or die fighting.
Obviously, the Americans, Brit
ish, Turks, FilipinoS and handful
of other foreign troops in Korea
have no intention of surrender
ing. It Is equally unlikely that
they will be ordered to stand and
die.
Each is too important to the
welfare of its own country. This
Is particularly true of the Ameri-
can force. which makes up the
greatest part of the army.
Nearly Half Of Our Troops.
The one Marine and six Army
divisions committed by the United
States in Korea make up nearly
half Of Americas trained pro-
fessional combat troops. They
must be saved to staff the citi-
zen army now slowly being built
up at home.
Gen. Collins said on his return
to Washington from Korea Fri
day that "our forces there will
be able to take care of them
selves without further serious
losses"
Gen. Bradley, chairman of the
United States Joint Chiefs OF
Staff, said last week that in talk
ing about evacuation possibilities
to Senators, he referred only to
the hard-pressed troops in ex-
treme Northeast Korea and not
to the Korean peninsula as a
whole.
Nevertheless, there is not evil
dent on this peninsula any sanctu-
ary which the Chinese horde could
not storm.
Only One First Class Port.
Logically, this would point to
ultimate withdrawal. But there is
only one first-class port in the
entire country. That is Pusan, at
the southeast tip of Korea, the
chief landing place for allied men
and supplies. Other ports might
be used, such as Inchon, but its
3o-foot tides limit its capacity
severely.
This probably means there can
be no major defense OF Seoul be-
cause any Allied force that tried
to hold 1t might be sacrificed in
the effort before 1t could escape by
sea
From this capital it appears un-
likely that there will be any more
major battles in the Korean cam
paign unless Allied forces with
draw 50 slowly that they are cut
off from behind.
The remaining big military
problem is to salvage as many
men and as much equipment as
possible. The only port that can
handle such volume traffic is
Pusan.
Will Lose Stores of Supplies.
There seems to be no choice but
to fall back, step by step, into
the old Pusan perimeter from
which the Allies broke success
fully last September.
Indications are that most OF
the men and most of their tanks
and artillery can be pulled out
safely. Great stores Of supplies
probably will have to be put to-
the torch.
The greater mechanization OF
the Allies is the safety factor
that should enable them to es-
cape. They can make a fighting
hit and run withdrawal. and there
does Isot appear to be anything
else left for them to do.
One question that only time can
resolve is what will happen to the
army of the Republic of South
Korea. Will 1t act as rearguard
for the 125,000 or more United
Nations troops? Will it collapse in
mass surrender to the Chinese
Reds? Or will 1t. too. be given
chance to escape to Japan and
become q refugee army such as
the Poles and the Free French
were In World War II.
To this observer it appears that
the entire United Nations police
action" in Korea will be over or
r0A N gRC