Evening star., 1950-12-27
Redep|oying ofForces
In Korea Shows u. ).
Not Accepting Defeat
Decision to Fight 1t Out
With Chinese Reds Seen
Upsettine Soviet Plans
By David LasCrence

Big decisions are in the making.
They concern international policy,
but they grow out of military de-
velopments.
Thus the decision to stay in Ko-
rea and fight it out with the Chi
nese Communists comes to the
public only this week with the
completion of the withdrawal by
sea from northeastern Korea. But
the orders to fight it out were is
sued many days ago. Such man.
moth operation could not have
been undertaken without planning
in minute detail for sea transpor-
tation to a definite destination
PuSan.
The decision to battle it out with
the Chinese Communists along a
defense line, which it is now be-
lieved can be safely stabilized in
Southern Korea, is one way to an
swer the defiant broadcasts from
Peiping. The reorganized U. N.
forces could in time influence the
Communists to reconsider their
arrogant attitude toward cease
fire arrangement.
Should Stand Off Enemy.
With an army of 250.O0O men,
the United Nations should be- able
to stand off a force of between
100000 and 100000 of the enemy.
This ratio Of one-to-two or one
to-three over an offensive army is
based on the theory that a we'll
equipped defense army has that
sort of advantage in holding
line, especially when possessing
superior air power and more
ground artillery.
The determination to stay in
Korea has many implications in
the overall sense. 1t means that
Soviet Russia now cannot transfer
her military strength to Europe
from the Far East but must keep
that area supplied with munitions
and manpower. The notion that
America was ready to permit Mos
cow to concentrate her strength
in Europe and be spared harass-
ment along potential second
front in Siberia vanisheS now with
the plans to carry on Indefinitely
sea and air war and a limited
ground war in the Far East.
incidentally, it is a matter of
much surprise here to read how
many comments there have been
In recent weeks from uninformed
quarters concerning the possibility
Of a ground war between America
and Communist China. The vo-
ciferous denunciation Of such a
possible course arouses curiosity
as to how the absurd suggestion
gained credence. For at no time
has 1t been part of American mill
tary planning. If a limited war
with Communist China became
necessary, it was always the
thought here that it should be car
ried on by sea and by air, with |
moral support to all non-Commu-
mist armies on the Asiatic main
land, irrespective of their nation |
ality. European apprehensions
that American manpower would
become begged down on the main I
land OF China are baseless.
So far as American commitments
in the Far East are concerned,
even 100000 is not too big num-
ber to use, though half that
amount seems to be what will be
needed for the limited war unless
Russia intervenes actively there.
Serves Notice on Europe.
The plan for Europe, on the
other hand. envisages an inter-
national force of many millions
Of men. The bulk of the man
power will have to come from
European countries themselves. In
this respect the Hoover and Dewey
speeches, plus the restrained COM
ments of Senator Lodge of Massa-
chusetts, will certainly serve notice
on Europe that American public
opinion is anXiously watching to
see how soon the other U. N. mem
bers will wake up to their respon-
sibility to furnish a substantial
share of the manpower.
The Far Eastern war and its
requirements need give Europeans
little worry as to the flow of
military aid to them. Lessons
are being learned in the Far East
which will be of inestimable value
everywhere to the armed services
OF the United States. Korea has
become training school for Of
flcerS in our ground armies and
also for our Air Force squadrons.
1t has limbered up our entire sea
transportation scheme and brought
out OF mothballs both planes and
ships that would otherwise have
not come into operation so soon.
The world should get some real
reinsurance about the redeploy-
ment of our forces in Korea. It
shows that the United States isn't
accepting defeat but is merely
digging in for further operations
in the same area and will not be
satisfied till the enemy calls for
cease fire" On terms that do not
compromise the American position.
The experience in 1941 is being
repeated. The build-up that
comes after a serious reverse is
even more powerful and more
rapid than might otherwise have
been the case. The end result
victory-Will come, though it
takes months of relatively slow
operations. Out of Pearl Harbor
and Bataan came Midway, Qua
dalcanal, Leyte, and Okinawa. The
victory timetable is sometimes slow
but time and American resources
do overcome earlier reyerses.