Evening star., 1950-04-04
Text of baltimore Memo on Far East Policy

Text of Latino
The tert of the memorandum
on United States policy in the
Far East, prepared By OWen
baltimore and given out by him
yesterday. tollo10s:
In clearing the way for a fresh
approach to the problems of United
States policy in the Far East, sew
eral negative statements can use
fully be made.
l. The type of policy represented
by support for Chang Kai-shek
does more harm than good to the
interests of the United States, and
no modification of this policy seems
promising. Chang Kai-shek was a
unique figure in Asia. He is now
fading into a kind of eclipse that
is regrettably damaging to the pres
tige of the United States, because
the United States supported him.
His eclipse does not even leave
behind the moral prestige of good
but losing fight in defense of a
weak cause. On the contrary, he
put up the worst possible fight in
defense of a cause that was origin
ally strong and should have won.
The kind of policy that failed in
support of so great figure as
Chang Kai-shek cannot possibly
succeed if it is applied to a scatter
ing of Little Chang Kai-sheks" in
China or elsewhere in Asia.
Cannot be C0erced.
2. China cannot be economically
coerced by such measures as cut
ting off trade. Nothing could be
more dangerous for the American
interest than to underestimate the
ability of the Chinese Communists
to achieve the minimum level of
economic stability that will make
their regime politically secure.
Sound policy should allow for
cautious overestimate of the ability
of the Chinese Communists in this
respect, and avoid a rash under
estimate
3. 1t is not possible to make
Japan a satisfactory instrument Of
American policy. There are two
alternatives in Japan. The first al
ternative is to keep Japan alive by
means of American blood trans
fusions" of raw materials and
credits. Under this alternative,
Japan can be made to put on the
surface appearance OF strong
ally; but the reality will be an over
commitment of American resources
to a distant and vulnerable region.
Under the second alternative, ia
pan can keep itself alive by coming
to terms, economically and polite
ally, with its neighbors in Asia,
principally China. Under this al
tentative, Japan cannot serve as 4
trusted American ally. It's own in
terests will compel it to balance
and bargain between what it can
get out of Asia and what it can get
out of America.
South Korea is Liability.
4. South Korea is more OF liza =
bility than an asset to the interests
and policy OF the United States. 1t
is doubtful how long the present
regime in South Korea can be kept
alive, and the mere effort to keel
it alive is a bad advertisement
which continually draws attention
to a band of little-and-inferior-
Chang Kai-sheks who are the scorr
of Communists and have lost the
respect of democratic and would-be
democratic groups and movements
throughout Asia.
S. The colonial and quaSi-co
countries of Southeast Asia cannot
be forced to grant priorities to the
economic and military recovery o1
Europe, at the expense of their owr
economic and political interests. In
this region as whole, there is q
rapid development of combined po-
litical and military resistance tt
coercion, which can be indefinitely
sustained by local resources.
On the other hand, attempts al
reconquest by European countries
are so expensive that they defeat
their own ultimate purpose, which
is the strengthening OF the country
attempting the reconquest. The
situation can now be handled only
by convincing the nationalist leaders
in those countries that any sacri-
fees they are asked to make are
matched by sacrifices made by their
former or titular rulers and are moi
designed to give priority to the
interests of these rulers, but te
bring joint benefits both to the
ruling countries and to the colonial
country, on terms that satisfy the
colonial aspiration to equality.
Dangerous Assumption.
6. The United States cannot as
sumo that Russia will move in tc
take over direct control in China
and will thus be subjected to heavy
strategis and economic strains. II
is dangerous to assume that there
will be a diversion and commitment
OF Russian resources in Asia which
will limit Russia's ability to maneu-
yer in Europe.
Recent developments in the Far
East have been favorable to Russia
but not in a way that lessons the
resources that Russia can deploy
toward Europe. Policy toward Rus
sia and policy toward the Far East
meet at the point where such 8
move as the imposition of an eco
nomic Gordon sanitaire around
China is considered. Such a move
would increase Chinese dependence