Evening star., 1950-01-22
Spanish Reversal

Wncn experience IldS S1lo"l O So'SAAA
mental policy to be both a failure and
morally insupportable, it is time to change
the policy That is what Secretary Acneson
has done with respect to our Spanish policy,
and he has done it with degree OF forth-
rightness which merits commentator.
Pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
U. N. General Assembly in 1946, we have
not assigned an Ambassador to Madrid.
Our position has been that this country,
as firm supporter of the United Nations,
could not send an Ambassador to Madrld
in contravention of the Assemblys recon-
mendauion. That is contention, how
ever, which does not tell the whole story.
The prime movers in the u N campaign
against Spain have been the Communists.
They have been supported by non-Com-
munists, but the main drive came from the
delegates who were under the Kremlin's
thumb. Their motives in trying to over
throw the Franco regime have not been
even remotely related to the motives OF
the non-Communists who played the game
with them This became evident soon after
the 1916 resolution had been adopted, and
attempts were made to reverse the 1916
decision Although a majority favored
reversal last spring, the effort failed for
lack of the required thirds vote. :,
It was in this setting that our Govern
ment put forward its worst diplomatic foot.
Although it was clear that the policy was
wrong, and that it had failed, this Govern
ment could not bring itself to join the other
countries voting to rescind it. Instead of
taking position on matter of some i'm
portance, it sought refuge in the timid
device of not voting at all. That is not an
attitude which becomes the most powerful
Nation in the world, Nation which boasts
smaller countries are bound to look for
guidance.
The gist of Secretary Acheson's an
nouncement is that we will no longer seek
to dodge the Spanish issue. We will not
take the lead. But when the question of
resembling the 1946 resolution again comes
before the Assembly we will vote in favor
of lifting the ban and permitting the
member nations to do as they see fit in
the matter of exchanging Ambassadors or
Ministers with Spain.
There is still some foot-dragging in the
Acheson announcement. He frowns on
Spanish participation in the European
Recovery Program, for instance, because
the Franco government is unacceptable to
many Western European nations. Con-
sidering our role in ECA, that looks like
case of the tail wagging the dog. And
when one recalls the effort made to bring
into ECA some of the cutthroat regimes
behind the Iron Curtain, 1t Is bit hard
to swallow any implication that Franco
should be debarred on grounds of political
morality or immortality.
There may be practical reasons, however.
which justify this Government in It's unwil-
lingness to attempt to introduce Spain into
the Western European community. Franco
is dictator and he did come to power with
the aid of Hitler and Mussolini. If, because
OF these facts he continues to be persona
non grata with our allies in Western Eu-
rope, we should not attempt to force him
on them. No argument in behalf of Spain
could justify policy on our part which
would disrupt the Western European coali-
tion. The attainment of proper rela-
tonShlp between Spain and its neighbors
can be left to the processes of time. Mean
while, it is good to know that we have
abandoned policy which denoted moral
disapproval of Franco at the price of
implying moral approval of governments
whose conduct makes the Franco regime
seem like model of good democratic
practices.