Evening star., 1950-12-17

must be made for a political 6
steps could be considered by thi.
country and the U. N. Though tht
prospects of a peaceful settlement
are not bright, it was felt that NJ
door should be closed against it
For that reason. only "alterna-
tives" for a Limited war" against
Communist China have been dis.
cussed among our high diplomatic
and military officials. Wher
these were merely mentioned tt
the British, they encountered
tentative but quick opposition.
Eventual use of these alterna-
tives will depend on the results
of diplomatic negotiations ano
actual military situations at the
time.
The framework into which all
political ano military efforts must
be fitted if possible can be ex-
pressed in two positives and two
negatives. They are:
l. Prevent World War III.
2. Retain and build up our
Allies. throughout the world.
3. Do not engage in an all
out land war in Asia.
4. Do not leave Western Eu-
rope undefended.
The crucial questions about a
'limited war" should political
efforts fail, are: What would
China, and, even more important
what would Soviet Russia do in
retaliation? Could limited
war" be limited? Would such a
war add to or subtract from our
ultimate victory in the greater
contest to stop Communist expan-
sion and aggression? Would our
present Allies support us?
Alternatives Considered
The objective of such a war is
clear. It would, in some opinion
keep the Communists engaged and
off balance in Asia and would de-
lay il not prevent them from at
tanning their ends in 1ndo-China
Tibet, the Philippines, Hong Kong
Afghanistan, India and Japan.
This same view is taken by some
of our top military leaders. OF
whom Gen. Macarthur is the most
persuasive, in the eyes of the pub
lie If not in the high Government
councils. It undoubtedly is the
view of a large number Of Amer
lean citizens who have not thought
through the almost inevitable con-
sequences. An opposing view is
taken by many Europeans OF high
authority, who have had more ex-
perience with global wars and who
naturally are worried about the
possible effects on their own home
lands.
Discussion with high American
and British diplomatic and mill
tary officials permits listing OF
alternatives that have been con-
sidered since the rout Of the U. N.
forces in North Korea. There was
no indication of what course might
be followed. AS one leader said:
Men have given their lives for
such information.
AS to Korea alone. the problem
can be divided geographically
into what alternates would be
available if Cd we are forced OH
the peninsula by an overwhelming
Chinese army and (2) If defense
line can be established somewhere
near the 39th Parallel.
Even if we were forced entirely
out of Korea, our Army and naval
commanders believe an orderly
evacuation could be carried out
with little loss Of men and ma
terrell. This assumes the Commu-
nists would not bomb or torpedo
our ships. Soviet submarines are
in the vicinity of Korea but the
orderly evacuation of Hungnam IN
Northeastern Korea begun last
week indicated the Chinese and
Russian Communists are not will
Ing or prepared to take this FISK
After a forced evacuation OF
Korea, American and U. N. forces
would be available for duty else
where. They would be larger
stronger and more battle expert
enced than our forces in the
Asiatic theeter before the North
Koreans attacked South Korea in
June.
Buffer Zone Idea
Theoretically they would be In
sufficient strength to try to retake
the peninsula. Whether they woulc
be SO used would probably be de-
termined by unforeseeable events
AS long as they remained in Japan
or on other nearby islands, they
would be a warning against fur
ther Communist aggression.
Unless there could be politica,
settlement after the total evacua-
ton, it appears likely that the
U. N. forces would continue tt
bomb the Communists in Korea
from Japan and the nearby islands
The sea and air blockade woule
be enlarged and the American
7th Fleet would continue tt
"neutralize" Formosa, at leas'
until other plans could be made
More aid probably could be giver
to Generalissimo Chang on For
mosa.
Competent thought is. however
that if a defense line could b'
established. the U. N. forces coule
remain in Southern Korea in
definitely. This belief is. O.
course, conditional. If the Chi.
nese Communists were willing ane
able to Withstand hundreds o.
thousands Of casualties. U. N
forces could be dislodged from
their positions.
With a fairly large footholt
in Southern Korea. U. N. forces
could bomb the Communists NOR
easily and effectively as Com
y,,,1oict finn lines ha