Evening star., 1950-03-12
Controls Under Study
Make Those of Lost
War Seem Trivial
By Raymond P. Brandt

What would happen to thu
American civilian economy if We
suffered an atomic Pearl Harbol
attack? How far would civilian.
have to be regimented if, as De.
fenSe Secretary johnson suggests
we were blitzed at am. and hac
to retaliate by S am?
A dark picture of such con-
trolled economy was painted in 6
report to the National Security
Resources Board in May, 1948
before it was known that Soviet
Russia had broken our monopoly
Of the atomic bomb. 1t was writ
ten by G, Griffith Johnson, ar
economist, after consultation with
other Government agencies. He
foresaw reduction of Is per cent
in the average standard of living
in the event of a sudden war.
The study, confidential until a
few weeks ago, is obviously out
of date on some points but for
the past 18 months has been
used as a working paper" for out
lining the potential problems that
would face this country in the
event of a blitz requiring total
mobilization Of our resources.
Substantial Preview
How far the NSRB has gone in
solving these problems is a ma
tional security secret. 1t is known
that proposed legislation is being
constantly amended to meet
changing conditions and that
problem analyses based on vari-
Gus assumptions worked out by
the National Security Council, the
National Defense Establishment
and various Government agencies
are also under continuous revision
The johnson study is by nc
means Official Or a timetable OF
what will actually happen should
war suddenly come. The NSRE
has various studies to meet such
contingencies as the war starting
in Europe or the Orient. But
NSRB officials acknowledge that
the report is substantial pre-
view of what is likely to happen
to civilians should war come to
this country and Congress should
enact the already drafted Emer-
gency War Powers Act in one OF
its more drastic forms.
The M day program outlined by
Mr.. Johnson's 21-page report
gives some of the details of the
still confidential proposed legisla
tion that would freeze prices
wages and other incomes and
compensations, raise taxes, con-
troll employment and impose pri-
critics and ALLEGATIONS of goods.
The two documents partly an
swer Bernard M. Baruch's state
ment that I'VE dare not wait un-
til war has begun and bombs are
falling to debate what should be
done"
Possible Steps
The controls of World War II
were minor irritations compared
with the sacrifices necessary in a
total war. The basic problem, so
far as civilians are concerned
will be to prevent imitation and
to arrange an equitable distribu-
tion of a dwindling supply OF
consumer goods and services.
AS seen by Mr.. Johnson's study
this would require:
/. An immediate genera.
freeze" on prices and wages.
2. Moving of some workers tx
essential war-production loca.
tions.
3. Rationing of then available
goods through retailers ane
wholesalers; later stopping pro.
duction of many consumer good.
like automobiles and televisior
sets and creation of war models
for some essential items like
heaters and refrigerators.
4. Taxes greatly increased or
personal and corporation income,
and by high excises on non-essen.
tial goods.
5. Forced savings to limit thu
disposable money supply.
6. Sharp curtailment on mort.
gage and installment credit.
Z. Control of investments BY
banks and by priorities and allo
cations of materials.
AS foreseen by Mr.. johnson
the per capita level of living
standards would drop by about. 2!
per cent. During World War II
the level of living standards in
creased by Is per cent despite tn,
increasing demands of the Gov.
ernment for the war effort.
No real sacrifices were required
OF the home front during the las
war. The lack of adequate, timel,
controls cost this country billions
of dollars and this and succeeding
generations will pay for the mis-.
take in taxes to service the ma.
tional debt.
Recalling the mistakes of thu
past that almost ruined the wal
effort, Mr.. johnson osberves:
Contrast Made
THE required measures are
like most war measures, repug
nant in themselves. They can b,
advocated under conditions of wa
mobilization only because of tn,
nature of the alternative. Ant
the tendency to f1nesse stabiliza
tion problems and measures, be-
cause of their unpleasant impli
cations, should be resisted"
Mr.. Johnson's primary assump
ton, based on still secret stud,
by the Presidents Council oil
Economic Advisers, is that tn,
next war, if it comes, would fnt
most of the col1ntrv,S worker.