Evening star., 1950-12-17

her own propaganda and is nearly
ready to show it up as a power
less institution when confronted
by well-armed, rapacious nations.
The chips are down in the Far
East. while we are straining our
selves to organize a purely de-
fensive force in Europe. Russia
is militarily and politically en-
gagged in an all-out offensive. We.
at best, are on the defensive. This
is not due to our lack of power,
but to a policy of refusing to
recognize that our defeat in Asia
will cause the crumbling of any
kind of resistance in Western
Europe.
Our defeats in Korea have had
a far more depressing effect on
the peoples of Western Europe
than on ourselves. Western Eu-
ropeans do not believe that the
American people have what it
takes to become a military power
and believe the propaganda of the
Soviet agents who have planted
the seeds of discofd among us by
saying, America will fight to the
last drop of European blood"
American troops in Korea. out
numbered, in many instances, 10
to /, have written one of the most
glorious pages in our military his
tory. But Europe sees only their
defeat at the hands of the Asiatics
and the American high COM
mand's lack of generalship."
First Defense Line
Our Western Allies-particu-
larly the French. who since 1870
have been imbued with the de-
fensive concept-cannot forgive
the offensive spirit of our strategy,
even when we know that the odds
are overwhelmingly against US.
They would want us to await the
enemy behind q defensive line
somewhere along the 38th Parallel.
If we were overwhelmed they
would rather see us retreat or sur
render than fight. That is what
happened in the fateful 40 days
in 1910 when q numerically in
ferior Nazi army caused some 1870
French, British and Belgian di-
visions to vanish into thin air.
Russia is expected to push re-
lentlessly into Asia, unless we
stand up and fight. And the sooner
we realize that the battle in Asia
is for our existence the better it
will be for this country.
Our Pacific frontier must have
as its first defense the line Japan
Okinawa Formosa Philippines.
Those bases are all closely inter-
locked. The abandonment of Ko-
rea to the mercy of the Com
will mean a grave impair
ment of our position in Japan.
Since vi day we have been able
TO control nearly 80 million. Japa-
nese with four skeleton divisions.
But these divisions are highly re-
spected. They were the victors of
Leyte, Okinawa and other battle
fields.
The Japanese. like all Orientals,
respect power. What will our posi-
ton be if, by some diplomatic de-
vices. we are forced to abandon
Korea, and defeated American
troops return to Japan? What will
the reaction of the Japanese and
Filipinos be if, under the same dip
lomatic formulas, we concede For
mosa to the Communists?
II the present diplomatic "com-
promise" is worked out success
fully by the IL Asiatic and Middle
Eastern nations at Lake Success
Communist China will become a
member of the United Nations, re-
placing the Nationalist representa-
tlves. AS such she will have
voice in the impending peace
treaty with Japan. The U. S. S. r.
will be on China's side.
Can we hope that the peace
treaty we are drafting now actual
ly will settle conditions in the
Far East? This is highly doubt
Iul. Russia, supported by its
Pelplng puppets, will see that
Japan eventually becomes part
and parcel of the Red new or
DER" which has been established
IN China and is by way of spread
ing to Indo-China, Burma and
other Asiatic countries.
The fact that Russia has its ewes
on Alaska has been seldom men
toned. But statements come from
the Understanding members of
the Politburo to the effect that
the sale OF Alaska to the United
States was reasonable act of
the Czarist regime. which cor~nt
be recognized by the Soviet gov
ernment.
Alaska May Be Issue
The time has not been ripe. so
far, to raise this question. But
there are strong indications that
as soon as we are liquidated in
the Far East Russia will bring
up the question of Alaska. This
is not a nightmare of "Red-bait-
ers." 1t is definite fact which
must be known by now even by
our optimistic State Department,
which CLOSED over these state
ments as the usual Russian bluff,
intended to intimidate us.
Our top officials should be suf-
f1ciently "intimidated" now to
take more serious notice of what
Moscow says. They did not be-
lieve that the Russians would at
tack through puppet Korea. which
has a strategic value insofar as
Japan is concerned. They did
not believe, after the attack, that
the Chinese Communists would
intervene in force to prevent the
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