Evening star., 1950-10-06
Why the Pause?

By plain and emphatic implication, the
United Nations through the Political and Secu-
rity Committee of the General Assembly-now
has voted overwhelmingly in favor of crossing
the 38th Parallel, erasing it, and taking whatever
other military steps may be necessary to insure
stability throughout the whole of Korea under
unified Independent and democratic govern
ment.'
simultaneously, the news has come from
Tokyo that General Macarthur, as supreme
commander of the U. Ms forces in Korea may
at any moment order an army of 175,000 troops
to march northward across the Parallel to destroy
the remnants of the political and military power
of the Communist aggressors. Thus far, only
about division of South Koreans-who have
advanced some go miles above the artificial line
has made the crossing, but now our full allied
strength principally American) apparently is
ready to do the same thing.
Occurring as they have at the same time,
these two developments-the U. N. vote and the
news from Tokyo-SuggeSt, rightly or wrongly,
that General Macarthur has had to hold every
thing in check south of the 38th Parallel while
the United Nations has been debating the
crossing issue at Lake Success. At any rate, the
fact that he seems suddenly to have actvated
his forces-forces that have been kept largely
immobile for several days past-lends some
plausibility to those who have been criticizing
the situation as an example of how the admin
istration has tied his hands by letting secondary
international political considerations endanger
the success of the all-important military opera
tions under his command.
Actually, of course, whether or not such
criticism is really justified, there can be no doubt
that the question of crossing the 38th Parallel,
ever since becoming an issue, has called primarily
for military decision-a decision based on such
factors as these: Cd It's necessity in terms of
completing the u N victory that has been won
up to now at great and grievous cost; (2) It's
effect on the Chinese Communists-whether it
might cause them to intervene directly and on
a large scale, thus creating grave and possibly
disastrous situation for forces; 80 the feasi-
bility of letting the South Koreans advance
while our American and other Allied troops were
rested for a few days, regrouped, replenished
with supplies, ETC., in preparation for an all-out
march northward, and a. whether it might not
be wise to wait for political action in the United
Nations If the wait itself would not be militarily
dsadvantageous.
With these and similar considerations in
mind, it may well be that General Macarthur
himself has been in favor of the pause south of
the 38th Parallel. Up to now, despite speculation
to the contrary by some critics of the admins
trations role in the matter there has been no
substantial evidence that he has had orders from
the White House to do nothing during the u Ms
political debate Under the Security Councils
June ~ decision, he seems clearly to have been
empowered to do whatever he regards as mill
tarily essential, and there has been no official
indication that that power has been circum-
scribed
However, If subsequent developments show
that General Macarthur, in spite of his own
best military judgment and advice, has been
obliged to hold back because of political maneu-
vering detrimental to the position of our armed
forces in Korea, then the administration here in
Washington will be held strictly accountable