Evening star., 1950-11-28
Russia and Japan

In its initial response to our American pro-
posals for japanese peace treaty, the Soviet
Union has left little room for doubt that 1t thinks
very little of them and that it is likely to oppose
them to the bitter end. Presented on a purely
suggestive and tentative" basis the proposals
are designed to bring Japan back into the society
of free nations. To that end, they contemplate"
the following major steps, among others:
Q) The drafting of Japanese treaty by
"any all' qualified nations willing to join in the
project-a suggestion implying that the job will
be done with or without Russia's participation
(2) The establishment of United Nations
trusteeship, with the United States as the admin
istering authority, over the Ryukyu and Bonin
Islands. 90 A joint decision by China, Britain,
the Soviet Union and our own country to deter
mine the status of Formosa the Pescadores,
South Sakhalin and the Kuriles; or if the four
powers cannot agree within a year after the
peace settlement takes effect, action by the U. n
General Assembly to decide the question. And
"a a continued sharing of responsibility between
America and Japan to maintain peace in the area
pending satisfactory alternative security ar
rangements."
To all of which, the Kremlin has replied with
questioning aide memoire. First, pointing out
the existence of 1912 United Nations declaration
against making separate peace with the enemy,
the Russians want to know whether the United
States would draft Japanese treaty without
them Second they ask what basis there is for
an American administered trusteeshp over the
Ryukyus and the Bonins. Third, observing that
the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam agreements decided
Cd that Formosa and the Pescadores should 60
to China and (2) that South Sakhaln and the
KurileS should be handed over to the Soviet
Union, they profess to be baff1ed by our proposal
that the status of these territories be subjected
IN 11yy fhnxy
the question whether our suggestion regarding
security arrangements with Japan means that
we have in mind rearming that country and
maintaining our own military bases there.
One does not have to read between the lines
OF the Russian aide memoire to discover the kind
of propaganda arguments that the Kremlin prob
ably will unleash to obstruct American efforts to
write Japanese peace treaty. In all frankness,
moreover, it must be admitted that some of those
arguments specifically those bearing upon the
territorial aspects of the Cairo, Yalta and Pots
dam agreements-are effective. OF course, it
is true that the agreements have since been
morally invalidated by the Soviet Unions
constant display of bad faith, but that does not
alter the fact that Moscow's propagandists can
use them to good advantage against anything
we may try to do to work out a peace settlement
that will re-establiSh Japan as an independent
land and serve to promote the security and WELL
being of Asia as whole
1t may be, however, that our proposals-since
they are only suggestive and tentative"-wil
help to pave the way for some common ground
on which we and the Russians can meet to work
out sound japanese treaty. Needless to say,
this depends primarily on whether or not the
men of the Kremlin have any real desire for
such treaty. If they have not, then the United
States and nations of like mind will have no
choice but to tackle the problem without Soviet
participation.