Evening star., 1950-11-26

A lot of GIs in Korea are wish.
ing for big umbrella" like the
one issued" the Marines when
they go out in a storm.
Even a little shelter right over
head, from the soldiers point Of
view, is better than any number
OF vapor trails streaking toward
targets beyond the line of his
sights.
The generals, of course, have the
big picture on tactical air support
Soon they will be called upon to
explain it before the House Mill
tary Affairs Committee in the light
OF criticism arising from expert
ence in Korea.
The Air Force. spokesman
i. said, welcomes the opportunity to
restate and perhaps clarity the
role of tactical support. Even the
U. S. A. F.'s critics will admit the
record is an impressive one
Whether it can be wholly justified
especially on the basis of prewal
planning at policy level. remains
to be seen. The hearing probably
will open in January.
It seems clear that the Air Force
men in the field did the best they
could with what they had, i'm
provising and taking heroic meas
ures as they went along TO- fight a
wholly unorthodox war against an
enemy whose guerrilla tactics ana
) sources of supply and reinforce
ment were unpredictable.
Jets Had Problems
Yet the Air Forces own tactical
demonstrations after the war ap-
peared to prove. even to the lay
man. that more World War II
fighters and fighter bombers
should have been modernized and
manned until the jets were more
nearly ready to take the field in
numbers, range and performance
1t would be unfair. however. to
appraise this lack apart from It's
background. The Defense De-
partment then was cutting its own
appropriations, strangely enough
while the Air Force strove, with
reduced funds, to build up a stra-
tesic arm capable of immediate
retaliation. Fighters and inter-
ceptors Of improved Jet types
could be ordered only in test
rather than production numbers.
The ground forces were disap-
pointed with the initial perform
ance Of the jets. The planes had
to fly from bases in Japan, could
spend little time over the front,
and often were too fast and un-
maneuverable to bring their
weapons to bear on targets i'm
mediately in front of the troops
or tucked into ravines.
Men on the ground hailed the
arrival of the old-time Mustangs,
which could carry greater loads OF
rockets and bombs and fly from
Korean bases. When the Marines
sarYived, they brought their con-
yentional Corsairs and twin-en-
Rined Tiger Cats. The Navy, too
was flying close support missions
with piston n-engined planes as well
rs jets.
Meanwhile, the range Of the
lets was heightened with an i'm
provised extension of external
wing tanks, and the young pilots
began to perfect tank and convoy
busting techniques.
The jets had another charac-
teristic which, fortunately, never
became too apparent to the Amer
lean soldier.
Want Close Support
Scores OF captured North Ko-
reans told the story of attacking
1eirplanes they never heard until
bombs, rockets. napalm and bull
lets rained death upon them.
III From many sources-tankerS
field gunners, convoy commanders
Tailroaders and bridge tenders-it
was learned that jet forays did
much to break the morale of the
enemy.
But the typical CT wants hi
close support more in the Marine
style-he wants it, that is. if hi
can be sure the pilot knows his
friends from his foes. The Ma.
rines working over the line put
down l00-pounders only 10(
yards in front Of fellow Marine.
below. The formula allows 500
FOUNDER some 500 yards off.
They concentrate on target.
from which Marines are being
fired upon. especially those diff
cult to eliminate from the ground
In theory a Marine division i.
supported by IL squadrons oi
fighters, although in Korea this
unfortunately. is only theory.
The Air Force would be happy
II IL could SlIprort a division with