Evening star., 1950-12-31
The Strategy of Counter-Attock

H9 Sf0tCS/ VI SOuHtCI.AtluIN
If. as seems to be the case, we are committed
to the policy of letting our enemy strike the
first blow, the address which John Foster Dulles
has made in New York is-up to a point-an
excellent statement of the only rational alter
native which remains open to u.s.
What Mr.. Dulles advocates is policy of prep
aration for counter attack. This is policy
which accepts grave risk. 1t grants the Krem-
lin all the time it may require for it's own prep
aratlonS, and 1t assumes, or hopes, that we will
not be destroyed in an all-out surprise attack
by the enemy. 1t is policy which rests on
willingness to pay fearful price in dead and
wounded in our own American cities. It is a
policy which leaves to the enemy the initiative
and the power of decision. 1t is policy which
means that we must resign ourselves for the
long future to an existence in an armed camp,
an existence in which we shall not know from
one day to the next when the blow may fall
And, to repeat it is policy which puts the very
life of this Nation in jeopardy as the alterna-
tive to taking the initiative and resolving that
we shall be the one to strike if the enemy will
not accept decent, dependable settlement
Despite these appalling risks, however, the
fact remains that this policy of preparation for
counter-attack is essentially the policy which
has been adopted by the administration, and it
is the policy which apparently has the support
of majority of the American people. There
fore, it is policy which needs to be understood
and which needs to be pursued with great vigor
On both of these counts, Mr.. Dulles, in his
address to the American Association for the
United Nations has made valuable contribu-
ton.
Mr.. Dulles appeared as a spokesman for that
wing OF the Republican party which does not
believe that security for the United States can
be found in a policy of retreat as long as there
remains any hope of organizing throughout the
free world strong and determined resistance
to the impending Communist assault. He said
that his speech was not reply to. the recent
proposals made by Herbert Hoover. Neverthe-
less, it was in some respects an effective answer
in both moral and a military sense, to the
notion that we can fall back and erect kind
of Gibraltar in the Western Hemisphere, which,
with some outlying bases would offer real hope
of security. Mr.. Dulles stated the matter we'll
when he said it has been proved a thousand
times that the defense which accepts encircle-
ment by the enemy will fall apart, and that the
mood which plans such defense carries within
itself the seeds of its own collapse .
Mr.. Dulles agrees with Mr.. Hoover however,
that we cannot and must not undertake to en-
gage in little Koreas wherever the Communists
may choose to stir up trouble. He says, and
rightly SO, that this leads only to weakness at
all points and strength nowhere.
But what other choices are there? Mr.. Dulles
suggests two, neither of which is new. He hopes
to build up enough strength around the rim of
the captive world to discourage little aggreS-
sions and to make them costly if they occur.
Second, he says that "if the Soviet Union itself
decides on open aggressive war" we must have
the capacity to counter ATTACK.
It is at this point, in The Stars judgment,
that the fallacies inherent in the policy of
notice that we will not strike unless and until
the Soviet Union decides on open aggressive war.
What is that but an invitation for the Russians
and their satellites to embark on Korean ven-
lures wherever it may seem profitable for them
to do so? The hope that we can build the
straining strength around the rim of the Com
munist land mass is at best slim hope. That
strength certainly does not exist now in many
of the vulnerable countries and If it does not
materalize-in Iran for instance-are going
to sit back and let the enemy pick off these
plums at will?
The main difficulty of those who think as
Mr.. Dulles thinks may well lie in the state of
mind revealed by one observation in his address.
So long as the die has not been irrevocably cast
for war, he said, 1--WE must assume that righteous
peace may yet be possible"
Why should we assume any such thing? Ger
tainly the available evidence points to con-
trary assumpton-to the assumption that, while
we may hope and work for peace, the odds favor
war. If we are going to assume, in the face of
the contrary evidence, that righteous peace is
possible, at what point going to conclude
that the die has been cast irrevocably for war?
Obviously in Mr.. Dulles view, that point was
not reached when the Chinese Communists
attacked the United Nations army in Korea.
Presumably, by the same standard of measure
ment it would not be reached if the Chinese
should strike, let say at India, or if satellite
armies should march into Yugoslavia, or if an
EAST German" army should invade Western
Germany.
In short, the theory that we must hold our
fire until the Soviet Union decides open
aggression is almost as dangerous and as self
defeating as Mr.. Hoover's policy of falling back
on the Western Hemisphere.
If we are going to surrender the initiative to
the enemy, then we must by every means and
at all costs create the greatest power of counter
attack of which we are capable But If we will
not use that power unless and until the Russians
themselves resort to open aggression, we shall
play directly into their hands Through their
satellites and the other means which they en-
ploy with so much skill, they can gobble up
country after country, and one essential natural
resource after another. If we let that happen
we will find ourselves lust as effectively isolated