Evening star., 1950-07-11
Decision Time for America


The trend OF events in Korea and elsewhere
throughout the world leaves no room for doubt
that this Nation is now at point where it must
make hard decisions, one way or the other, for
the sake of its own safety. Must we act at once
to mobilize our strength on a prepare for the
worst basis or should we merely hope for the
best and seek security in a program of half
measures?
This is not simple question. It involves two
risks at opposite extremes wholly apart from
how Russia might react to our heavy rearma-
ment. On the one hand, if the decision is for
al-out mobilization, and if the world-over
period of monthS-takes spectacular turn for
the better, our national economy and society
will have been subjected to highly costly up
heaval without such an upheaval really having
been necessary. On the other hand, however,
If we adhere to our current program of impro-
visation and keep on resorting to bits and pieces
of action from hour to hour, we may find
with overnight suddenness-that total war is
upon us and we are woefully unprepared. Stated
with some oversimpification, the choice this
presents is a choice between the danger of doing
too much and the danger of doing too little.
The United States needs to set a course
Tor itself right now. 1t must make up its mind
as to how much it wants to do-whether it wants
to go all the way or only part of the way-in
terms of things that deeply affect its national
existence. Regulation of the labor force; eco
noic controls like rationing, priorities and high
er taxation; conversion Of industry to mobilize
1t for sharply increased output Of tanks, guns,
planes, naval vessels, ETC.; the Communicating Of
shipping; the question of whether the present
limited draft is sufficient or whether we ought
not to call up our National Guardsmen and re-
serves-these are some of the matters that
must be decided upon. The chief decider, of
course, by virtue OF his office, must be Mr.. Tru-
man. Working in close consultation with key
Federal departments and with such men as w.
Stuart Symington, who has already begun to ex-
plore the situation as our mobilization director,
it is the President who must take the lead in
making up the country's mind.
Two weeks ago, just after the first shock
of the Kremlin-supported Red invasion of South
ern Korea, the American people-though aware
that this criminal act of aggression might lead to
another world war-had at least little reason
to be optimistic about the possibility of local
1zing 1t and ending 1t without too much trouble.
For at that time the President himself, describ-
ing our Intervention as police action, seemed
fairly confident that the job could be done with
a minimum of effort. But today the story is
quite different. Now we have ground troops
engaged in the struggle, and before we win-if
we are going to win-we may have to send in
as many as six divisions of them. Perhaps,
considered by itself, this situation, despite the
numerous grave risks and the serious supply
problem involved, does not require anything more
than our present bits and pieces program The
grim fact is, however, that it cannot be consid-
cred by itself. The grim fact is that what is
happening in Korea may be duplicated at any
moment in places like Iran, Yugoslavia and West
ern Europe.
For the pattern of Soviet-directed Commu-
mist aggression is world wide in scope, and the
kreml1n, either next week or next month or next
spring, may strike a blow-possibly against us
directly-that will lead Immediately to global
war. That is the thing we must keep in mind
now That Is the menace we must be wide
awake to- We may hope that nothing will come
of it. We may hope that the Russians will not
set off an explosion. We may hope that some
how, some day, we will be able to settle our diff
ferences with them without an armed conflict.
Meanwhile, though as they lurk and maneuver
furtively behind the Iron Curtain, we have every
reason to suspect the worst of them, and events
throughout the globe are like an alarm bell warn
ing us to be prepared.
In such circumstances, our choice is not
necessarily between doing too much and doing
too little. There must be middle course some
where between the two extremes. But we must
do more than we are doing now, and if we err
1t should be on the side of doing too much. For
1t is better to be ready for the worst even If
the worst never happens, than to hope for the
best and take the risk of finding ourselves losing
everything in catastrophe against which we
have armed ourselves chiefly with wishful
thoughts and desperate prayers.
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