Evening star., 1950-07-22
Russian Strategy Held
Diversionaryi Korea;
Europe Ultimate Goal
From Soviet Viewpoint
War Move in Far East
: Is No GumbIe at All
By Dorothy Thompson

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was obviously long planned. That
the date was set or approved in
the Kremlin even was revealed II
the Russian press, which several
weeks before the attack boasted
that "unification of Korea" would
be accomplished by August is.
Unification could only be secured
by free elections or by military
force. Since the Russians had al
ready rejected the former, the pre-
diction was an open notice Of war.
Our Government should enter
tain very cautiously the notion
that the Korean attack was test
of whether the United States
would act.
No Gamble At All.
=, From the Russian viewpoint
the Korean adventure is no
gamble at all. Only one of four
alternatives could occur:
ID The United States would
not intervene, whereupon world
wide confidence in the security
system based on America would
collapse.
90 America would intervene too
late and be defeated, with even
worse results to American pres
tige.
80 America Gin order to local
ize the conf1icD might settle for
the prewar status quo in return
for seating the Chinese Commu-
nists in the Security Council.
90 America would have to fight
a prolonged war, diverting large
part of it's Immediately mobiliz-
able military potential to a dis
tant spot, thus weakening the de-
fenses of far more important po-
alitical and strategical centerS.
In short, whatever the outcome,
1t would be for Russia heads you
lose and tails we win"
Any speculation about Russian
aims is puerile unless it starts
with the correct thesis.
The correct thesis is that it is
the intention of the Soviet Union
to conquer the world, and by a
certain strategy.
That strategy is to involve the
rest of the world in war. while
weakening it's morale by peace
propaganda, and without directly
involving the Soviet Union, until
the last decisive moment.
Strategy With Hitler.
This was the strategy Stain
pursued with Hitler.
Stain wanted Hitler to make
war against the West. Fully
Knowing that the only restraint
on him was the refusal of the
German general staff to open
war on two fronts, he refused to
join a common front against Hit
lerian aggreSSion-after his hench-
men in all countries had called
for it at the top of their lungs.
Then, by the pact with Hitler, he
secured the German rear for the
attack on the low countries,
France, and Great Britain.
It is an error to think he was
: benefcent toward Hitler. His OBJ
ject was to take advantage of
temporary alliance to move for
ward with Hitler's consent into
valuable strategical positions-the
Baltic states, Poland, the Balkans,
and the Middle East-while Ger
many and the Western Allies
were exhausting themselves in
war, and then, having won time
to mobilize, strike the decisive
blow.
It was the ultimate recognition
of thiS-after the fateful Molotov-
Ribbentrop contretemps over Yu-
goslavia and the Dardanelles-
that led Hitler to order the attack
on Russia before Russia could
fully mobilize. For with Russia
unexhausted and German strength
expended, Germany. even in vic
tory, would have had to face a
final, formidable enemy. Hitler
then tried (through the Hess mis-
sion) to change allies and buy
off the British, who refused. The
greatest of all the lies that the
Soviets and Communists tell is
that the West tried to purchase
its own security at Soviet cost.
Like most Soviet lies, it accuses
the West of precisely the Soviet
Unions own Vaccinations.
Z In Soviet strategy Korea is di-
3verSionary. The Soviet goal is
Europe, beginning with Berlin
and Yugoslavia. O..
(Released by the Bell Syndicate, Inc)