Evening star., 1949-07-28

from those recovery efforts Would
be like building the walls of a house
while tearing out its foundation. In
order to enhance the ability of
Western Europe to provide for its
own defense, a not insignificant
part of the assistance planned for
it consists of items which will in
crease its own industrial military
production.
1t Is nevertheless scarcely likely
that the recipient nations will be
in a position to make their con-
ftribution to world security and the
defense of their area at the end
of this one-year period without fur
ther outside assistance. But
I cannot hope at this time to pre-
dict for how long contributions OF
this character will be required OF
us.
Some who oppose this program do
so because they fear that by send
ing arms to other nations we should
be increasing the chances of war
or, alternatively, that the arms we
give might some day be used
against us. On the contrary, I am
convinced that failure to reinforce
the determination of free nations to
defend themselves against subver-
sion from within and aggression
from without may invite combina-
ton of political and military aggres-
sion. If they should have to defend
themselves, 1t Is obvious that their
resistance would be more effective
with the arms we propose to supply
than without them. These are ma
tions with proud histories and great
traditions.
The existence of Communist
groups in some of these countries is
a reason for, and not against, sup
plying arms. The danger from
these Communist elements reached
its peak before the moderate gov
ernments of Western Europe proved
that they were too strong to be
overthrown by subversion. Since
these governments proved them
selves capable OF overcoming in
ternal threats to their security.
Communist strength and influence
in Western Europe have been
steadily reduced. Military assistance
from the United States would fur
ther strengthen the hand of the
democratic governments in dealing
with either internal disorders or
repelling aggression If it should
come.
Fears that the military assistance
program might set off an inter-
national armament race or provoke
the Soviet Union to war, in my
considered opinion, are groundless.
What Is proposed is not vast in
crease in the armies of Western
Europe, but the supplying of Ger
tain key items of arms and equip
ment for the very modest forces
which the Europeans have already
provided for in their budgets. The
Soviet Government is we'll aware
that those forces are for denfense
purposes only and cannot possibly
menace the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union knows that the DEM
ecratic nations have not the desire,
the intention, or the size of forces
Tor conducting aggression. The
people OF Western Europe seek only
the means Of defending their own
tioiiie''' :, 7.7
Moreover, the armed qforces4 of
Western Europe and their equip
ment, whether supplied from Eur
ope or from the United States, would
be subject to any international
agreement for the regulation and
reduction of conventional arm
aments under the United Nations
Charter The United Nations is de-
I.yslopinga plans ofor the regulation
and reduction Of conventional arm.
aments and armed forces. It is
clear. however, that agreement tc
put armaments regulation into effect
cannot be realized in the absence
Of international confidence and mu-
tual trust. -
Political and Military Threat.
Assertions have been made that
the threat to Western European Sc
curity is not primarily military but
political in nature. And that a
military assistance program is out
OF step with the realities. 1t is quite
true that the Western European
struggle for freedom has so far been
fought with political and economic
weapons. 1t is equally true, how
ever, that throughout this struggle
there has been in existence behind
the Iron Curtain the greatest peace
time combination of military forces
the world has ever known.
The fact that such forces exist
and can be set quickly in motion
constitutes a form of pressure which
has helped to maintain unpopular
minorities of Communist conspir-
ators IN power in the Soviet satel-
ties and In the case of the coup in
Czechoslovakia undoubtedly played
a large part in putting them in
power. The people of Europe are
frequently reminded of the nature
OF this weapon by carefully timed
and Sklllfully staged displays of
Soviet military power, such as the
recent exhibition at Moscow of the
latest model jet-powered military
planes.
The fact is that the appeal of in
ternational Communism is not, con-
trary to the self-serving assertions
OF the Soviets, an appeal to the
minds of men. International Com
munism has made its gains in Europe
not by any intellectual or spiritual
attractions but by the threat that
derives from the existence of large
forces, and the ruthless application
OF force wherever this has been
necessary to achieve It's objectives.
The mere presence of these large
armed forces has had psychologi-
cal effect that has been damaging
to recovery and stability, and has
been major influence in the loss
OF freedom and self-determination
In important areas of Europe. Nor
can the possibilities of direct mill
tary aggression be ignored. When
political aggression fails, as it has
failed so far An Western Europe,