Evening star., 1949-10-07
Partial Text of Rudford Statement

The unescorted B-36 is unaoceptably
vulnerable. The B-36 cannot hit
precision targets from very high
attitudes under battle conditions.
The facts on which I base my
conclusions cannot all be given to
you in open session.
(Admiral Radford interrupted his
testimony to introduce to the COM
mittee several naval officers and
aeronautical engineers who will
testify later on technical matters)
Role Of Bomber in War.
We do not quibble over minor
differences of opinion as to the
range, speed and altitude of the
B-36. '"' Has the plane a reason
able chance to attack successfully
without sustaining unacceptable
losses? If it has not, the B-36 is q
billion dollar ,blunder.
Before leaving the B-36 I shall
ask you to consider the broader
subject OF the role of the slow, long
range. very heavy bomber in future
war. ."
Are we as a Nation to have
bomber generals" fighting to pre-
serve the obsolete heavy bomber
the battleship of the air? Like its
surface counterpart, its day is largely
past.
A logical question is: What, then
should we have in its place?
I have stated that the B-36 is a
symbol of theory of warfare gen.
orally considered unsound by mill
tary men. If we do not accept that
theory of war, then a need for the
B-36 in quantity does not exist.
I feel that your committee must
have had these considerations in
mind when it sought to determine
whether the Air Force in concen-
trsting upon strategic bombing to
shch an extent as to be injurious
to tactical aviation and the develop
ment of adequate fighter aircraft
and fighter techniques.
Tactical Planes Retarded.
The British and the United States
Navy today have jet fighters with
excellent high altitude performance.
From the testimony given to you in
this investigation and from state
ments which have appeared in the
public press it must be inferred
that the United States Air Force
does not have such fighters. If
this be the case, then emphasis in
Air Force thought on the heavy
bomber as the overall answer to
our military problems has handi-
capped fighter development in that
service. The retarded development
|of fighters not only has distorted
evaluation of the vulnerability Of
the high-level bombers; it also may
have grave implications in the de-
tense of our own military bases and
in the defense Of our own home
land
Summarizing the problem of over
emphasis on the heavy bomber at
the expense TO other types, 1t is my
opinion that the Air Force is con-
centrating on slow, expensive, very
vulnerable, single-purpose. heavy
atomic bombers at the expense Of
small fast bombers and extremely
high performance fighters for which
we now have such an urgent need
in great numbers.
Air Force witnesses have given you
a detailed story of the ups-and-
downs and crosscurrents which have
characterized the B-36 program
within the Air Force. As . naval
aviator interestsd, in MI important
aeronautic developments, ! have
taken q professional interest in the
B-36 since,I FIRST learned Of 1t on
my return from the Pacific at the
close of the war. During all Of 194S
and the first part Of 1949, the period
during which the conflicts about the
.B-36 were being resolved within the