Evening star., 1949-12-10
What About Formoso?

The rapidly deteriorating Chinese situa-
ton confronts our strategists and policy
makers with series of dilemmas, most OF
which are hard choices between greater
or lesser evils. The latest Of these Is
Formosa, the big island of the coast of
Central China, which has become the seat
of the peripatetic National government,
now that its mainland resistance to the
Communists has virtually collapsed.
If the Nationalists were able to maintain
themselves in this island stronghold, the
problem Of Formosa could be at least ad-
tourned. But the indications are that the
same process of Internal disintegration
which disrupted Nationalist resistance on
the mainland Is at work In Formosa as
well. The garrison troops are considered
unreliable, the hordes of refugees are
heavy liability, while the native population
Is hostile to government that has ex-
plotted and misgoverned them ever since
Formosa was turned over to the National
lists at the close of the war. Thus, despite
being in command of the sea and air
approaches, the Nationalists may soon lose
control Of Formosa, perhaps less from a
direct Communist attack than from q
chaotic breakdown from within.
This insistently raises the question what,
II anything, can be done to prevent
Formosa from falling into Communist
hands. A Communist Formosa would not
be pleasant prospect. It would give the
Chinese Reds frontage on the Pacific
Ocean and would breach the strategic
chain we now hold from Japan through
Okinawa to the Philippines. It would like
wise render easier Communist inflltration
Of the Philippines. The potential danger
would be intensified If the Reds should
extend facilities to the Russians for use
Of the excellent airf1elds and submarine
bases built on the island by the Japanese
All this is obvious. Yet the only practical
way to avert it would be military occu-
patton by American forces. And that
would entail grave complications, alike of
a strategical, political and diplomatic
nature. Such an occupation would have
to be of magnitude exceeding present
troop dispositions In the Far East. But
that would be the least of the difficulties.
A unilateral American occupation could
land us squarely In the Chinese imbroglio.
It codld hardly be done, without an agree
ment with the Nationalists, which we seek
to avoid for Obvious reasons. The passing
of mainland China wholly into Communist
hands renders much more likely their
diplomatic recognition by many If not most
Of our associates. We cannot afford to
tie our hands in this respect at so crucial
moment. Furthermore, an American
intervention might raise complications
with the United Nations.
theoretically, 1t might be possible for
joint action by the signatory powers under
the Japanese armistice. That instrument
adjourns final disposition of Formosa until
the signing Of peace settlement, even
though China has been promised the
return of the island, lost to Japan after
its victory over China in 1895. Technically,
Formosa remains Japanese territory in a
sort of escrow. But the turning over Of
the island to Chinese Nationalist posses
sion Is one Of those acts difficult to undo,
despite technical legalities. STU more
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