Evening star., 1949-10-11
The National Security

There is reason to believe that Defense
to listen to the Navy's story has been
responsible for much of the discomfort
that is being spread upon the record now
before the House Armed Services Com
mittee. There is also excellent reason to
believe, however, that the Navys unbridled
attack on the B-36 and, by implication,
on the military competence of the high
command, is capable, as Mr. johnson says,
of doing "grave damage to our national
security"
No one questions the sincerity of motive
behind what these spokesmen for the Navy
have been saying. But there is a large
question as to the maturity of their judg-
ment, as to the propriety of the methods
being used and as to the wisdom of All
all-out public assault on the competence
OF another branch of the service No doubt
the Navy men earnestly believe that the
B-36 program has been a mistake and
that the true interests of national security
are served by their attempt at public
exposure. But it is very difficult to believe
that this is valid point of view
If one accepts the Navy's claims, GER
tain conclusions are inescapable. 1t is
necessary to believe that the B-36 is not a
useful weapon. Without fighter escort.
the Navy says, it cannot reach vital targets
in Russia. And there is no feasible way
of providing fighter escort. If some of
the big planes should get through to target
areas by flying at 10000 feet or higher,
they would not be able to hit their targets
from that altitude. Furthermore, accord
ing to one Navy expert" the atom bomb
is not an effective weapon unless it can
be dropped with high degree of accuracy.
What Is the conclusion to be drawn from
this? Obviously that the B-36 is useless
weapon. And If that is so, what would we
have as offensive weapons in event of war
with Russia? Presumably nothing, or, at
best, carrier-based planes.
No emphasis should be spared in point
ing out that this Navy view is not gen.
orally Shared. 1t is emphatically disputed
by the top-ranking officers of the Air
Force, and they have had by far the most
experience with the B-36 and long range
strategic bombing. It is not shared by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Army's
capable of an unbiased judgment If any
one is Nor is it supported by past expert
ence and common sense It should be
remembered that in the past many new
types OF planes, which proved worthy in
combat, were subjected to expert" crit
icism similar to that now being directed
at the B-36. 1t should also be remembered
that In event of war it is better to have
striking force in being, even though it's
success cannot be guaranteed, than to
have nothing at all to strike with.
When the Navy went into this hearing,
The Star. was among those who felt it
should be given an opportunity to present
its case. And if this had been confined
to a presentation of Navy grievances, to
an attempt to secure appropriate con-
sideration at the Pentagon of the Navys
views, useful purpose might have been
served. But the direction which the Navy
has taken is apt to be productive of
great deal more harm than good.
Secretary johnson now says that he
wants to be heard, and he also asks the
committee to hear several others. Pre-
sumably he feels that, from the standpoint
of public morale, the unrestrained attacks
on the B-36 and the judgment of the high
command, cannot be allowed to go un-
answered. Perhaps this is true But If
the parties to the dispute are genuinely
concerned with the national security, they
will not permit this public brawl to drag
out indefinitely. The proper agency to
pass upon the worth Of the B-36 is the
Weapons Evaluation Board. This is some
thing that cannot possibly be done by
public debate, and the sooner this phase
OF the committee hearings is closed the
better off we will be-