Evening star., 1949-12-17
Atomic Partnership

wholly apart from the TACT that the
Russians apparently have learned how to
make A-weapons and presumably are now
producing and stockpiling them, there are
several good reasons for prompt revival
In at least a limited form-of the historic
wartime Anglo Canadian American atomic
partnership.
One of the reasons is that Britain and
Canada control large sources of uranium.
Another is that their nuclear scientists are
among the best in the world. They are
men who must be credited with having
played a vital role in helping us to design
and produce the A-bomb and there can
be no doubt that further cooperation
with them is highly desirable from the
standpoint of improving upon our present
program.
Moreover, it is a fact that Britain and
Canada, along with the United States, are
key members of the twelve-nation Atlantic
Pact-an alliance whose power rests in
no small part on our American ability to
manufacture and deliver A-weapons. II
1t Is to attain maximum efficiency and
force, however, that alliance must do
everything 1t can to coordinate its arms
programs and avoid wasteful, strength
sapping duplication. Hence, in terms of
economy, of increased effectiveness and
Of the safety to be found in locating
Installations in places as distant as pos
sible from conceivable enemy attacks,
there Is obviously great deal of common
sense in the idea that the British and
Canadians instead of carrying out ex-
tremely costly production programs of their
own, should agree not to make atomic
ment under which all such work would
be concentrated in this country.
But Britain and Canada cannot be ex-
pected to make such decision-which
would amount to surrendering measure
Of their sovereignty in the ornaments
held-without receiving something in re-
turn from the United States. That some
thing" has been the subject of the current
exploratory talks between them and u.s.
and although there has been no official
comment on 1t, there is reason to assume
that it involves steps "a to let them COL
laborate more closely with us in our atomic
work and (2) to give them firm guarantees
and assurances regarding how our A
weapon output could and would be en-
ployed to protect them in the terrible
event of another world war Under the
law enacted in 1916, an agreement on
matters of this sort apparently cannot be
made without special congressional ap-
proval. Assuming that adequate security
safeguards can be devised, however, the
assent of both houses ought not to be too
difficult to obtain.
On the face Of things, at any rate, the
reasons for some such restoration of our
wartime atomic partnership with Britain
and Canada would seem to be as compelling
rs they are numerous BY cooperation
with them-within reasonable limits, with
essential restrictions remaining in force
In certain felds-we could hope for ad-
vances that would be helpful not only to
them, not only to us, but to the entire
free world.
We cannot afford to be too aloof in this
matter. We have excellent nuclear scien-
lists, but we do not have all of them by
any means, nor is our knowledge of the
subject anywhere near complete. The
British and Canadians undoubtedly have
much to offer. Shutting them out might
well prove to be form of dangerous self
rohherv