Evening star., 1949-08-29
What About Formoso?

Several aspects in the growth OF Com
munist power on the Chinese mainland
invest with increasing urgency considera-
ton of the problem OF Formosa. This
relatively large, extremely rich and stra-
logically important island lies only about
100 miles off the South China coast. Much
of that coast line has already fallen into
Communist hands, and the rest seems
about to follow suit This renders easy
night landings on the island by Communist
agents bent on intensifying the native
unrest that already exists against Nation
alist rule.
Formosa, to be sure, has long been ear
marked as the main bastion of Nationalist
defense in Eastern China and is said to
be heavily garriSoned. But the morale
of these forces is questionable In face OF
a large-scale Communist invasion. Such
an attack has hitherto been ruled out by
superior Nationalist naval and air strength.
However, recent reports indicate that a
Red Navy of some effectiveness is being
built UP, with a Red Air Force in process
of formation. The recent capture OF the
Changshan archipelago by Red expedi-
tionary forces Is disquieting portent.
These small islands, lying athwart the
sea-strait between Manchuria and the
province of Shantung were used by the
their blockade of the North China coast
The fact that they were unable to keep
them from capture by improvised Red
landing forces operating without air cover
is not good sign.
The question of Formosa Is not solely
Chinese affair. It involves both American
strategy in the Far East and certain inter-
national considerations. Formosa Is a
major link in the island-chain which
stretches from Japan to the Philippines.
A Japanese possession since its acquisition
from China in 1895, it played prominent
part in japanese strategy during the late
war, especially as the starting point for the
japanese invasion of the Philippines, from
which it is separated by less than 800 miles
of sea. In Communist hands, it would give
Red China frontage on the Pacific Ocean
combined with powerful military, naval
and air bases built originally by the
japanese and kept up by the Nationalists.
It is thus moot point whether we or the
other Western Powers could countenance
its capture by the Communists.
Sovereignty over Formosa remains un-
settled. To be sure, the Western Allies
promised to restore the island to China,
and esftsr Japan's capitulation 1t was
handed over to the Nationalists. But that
possession was and is what diplomats call
de facto until 1t is legally ratified by
Japanese peace treaty. And Of such
settlement there seems no immediate
likelihood, owing to disputes between the
victors. Technically, therefore, Formosa is
a former Japanese possession earmarked
for cession by treaty. 1t would therefore
be possible for the Western Powers to
maintain that status against occupation
by an uarecognized regime like the Chinese
Reds, Of whom they disapproved.
OF course, such action would presumably
be determined by larger questions of policy,
Formosa being only one factor in COM
plex situation involving other factors such
as Hong Kong and the whole matter of
Western relations toward the Chinese
Communists. But Red threat to Formosa
could impel a decision by the Western
Powers which might determine the entire
no1icv course