Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1949-04-18
Irun-Soviet Tension

mounting tension between iran ana the
Soviet Union indicates the ominouS pos
sibility that 1t may soon reach the break
ing point The Iranian Embassy here has
reiterated its warning that Moscow con-
templates armed Intervention, invoking a
clause in the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of
1921 which envisaged, under certain cir
cumstances, the sending of Soviet troops
on Iranian soil.
The Iranian Government contends, in
the first place, that the circumstances
contemplated by the treaty clause could
not possibly arise. In 1921, the newly
established Soviet Union was beset by
foreign and domestic foes while Iran (then
known as Persia had just emerged from
a chaotic situation due to its involvement
in World War I. In return for Soviet
cancellation of special privileges obtained
in Czarist days, the Iranian Government
gave Russia contingent permission to take
security measures If Iran itself proved too
weak to prevent its territory from being
used as a base of operations by White
Russian emigres, perhaps supported by
Britain, then avowedly antagonistic to the
Soviet regime. For Moscow now to invoke
that outmoded clause would be pretext
as inequitable as it is logically absurd. The
Iranian Government is therefore report
eddy contemplating declaration that the
clause in question is legally null and void.
In addition, the Iranian Government
contends that this clause has been auto
matically superseded by various portions
of the United Nations Charter, under
which the signatories are pledged to re-
nounce aggressive or unilateral actions
among themselves.
Behind this diplomatic fencing lies the
stark fact that Moscow has been waging
virtual cold war" against Iran, de-
nouncing its government as the tool of
Western imperialism" and asserting that
Iran is being turned into base of opera
lions for Western aggression against the
Soviet Union. Moscows motivation for
this war of nerves may be twofold. In
the first place, Moscow dislikes the
strengthening of Trans internal situation,
which gives prospect of genuine national
regeneration and the transformation of
Iran from poor and backward country
into strong and prosperous one. Moscow
wants weak Iran as promising field for
aggressive cAPdliolOI IL lildy ~ ldl w
sabotage a national revival.
This motive may likewise coincide with
a policy designed to challenge the soli-
darity and resolution of the Western
Powers. Many informed students of world
affairs believe that Moscow will give some
highly provocative reply to the Atlantic
Pact and other Western measures de-
signed to contain Russian aggression. Iran
could be picked as soft spot" for such
Soviet test of Western policy.
Thus far, Iran has not shown softness
under Soviet pressure. Relying on West
ern assurances of support and its strong
legal status under the United Nations
Charter, the Iranian Government is taking
a resolute diplomatic position toward Mos
cow. while its armed forces seem qualified
to deal effectively with any internal dis
turbances fomented by Soviet agents.
Should Moscow 60 beyond its present
pressure tactics and resort to overt ag-
erosion, an international crisis of major
magnitude will almost certainly be pre-
cipitated