Evening star., 1949-01-23
Atlantic Pact Uncertainties

Here in the United States it Is generally
assumed that our decision on the projected
North Atlantic Defense Pact will be
determining factor In its realization.
Basically, this is true; because without
definite commitment on our part to come
promptly to the aid of our partners In
case of armed aggression against any one
of the signatories, the whole idea would
come to naught.
However, it probably would be erroneous
to think that even such commitment
on our part would automatically implement
the pact m the fullness and scope which
our diplomacy has in mind. Various dim
culties have become manifest on the part
of other potential signatories which will
have to be ironed out before complete
implementation is assured
It should, of course, be understood that
we hope to enlarge the membership IN
the pact beyond its original nucleus which
consists of ourselves Britain, France, the
Benelux trio belgium, Netherlands, 8ux-
emburg) and Canada. 1t should likewise
be understood that the five European
countries above mentioned have already
made a defensive agreement under the
Brussels Pact of last year. However our
diplomatic aim is to enlarge this nucleus
by including the Scandinavian countries,
Iceland, Fire and Portugal, thus cementlng
all the nations bordering the North Atlantic
Ocean into a solid defensive front.
The outstanding difficulty regarding
Scandinavian adhesion centers in the atti-
tude of Sweden, which fears to antagonlZe
it's giant neighbor, Soviet Russia, by adher-
ing to the Atlantic Pact Sweden has been
trying to work out middle way" by engl-
neering a Scandinavian agreement that
would steer a neutral course between the
Atlantic and Soviet blocs. However, Nor
way and Denmark feel that this arrange
ment would give them no real protection
against Soviet aggression, and are thus
disposed to join the Atlantic Pact even
without Sweden The adhesion of Den
mark and Norway to the Pact is important
to its implementation because of Den
marks ownership of Greenland and Nor
ways ownership of Spitzbergen. Iceland
is an independent nation whose adhesion
is presumabe. SO is Portugal Fire tends
to balk over the status of Northern Ire
land, which hinderS its association with
Britain, though Fire is in general accord
with the aim of the Atlantic Pact.
Besides these essentially diplomatic diff
culties there are others, chiefly present
among the continental European nations,
which are political or psychological in
character. Although all the governments
participating In the Brussels Pact are
behind its extension to the Atlantic Pact,
they are seriously at odds over the question
of promoting the uniacaton of Western
Europe. through a parliament of limited
powers, their recent conference on the
subject ending in failure. Further, there
is widespread popular reluctance in France
to assume the attendant responsibilities of
a mutual defense treaty, owing to fear that
1t will not protect them against Soviet
aggression. This sentiment merges into
downright defeatism sedulously nurtured
by Communist propaganda. And uncer-
tainty as to the reliability of France en-
courages similar sentiments in Belgium
and the Netherlands. Much of this feeling
would be countered by our unequivocal
commitment under the Pact. Certainly,
NOTHING Ices wo,lld suffice