Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1949-08-07
The Tragedy of China

Although some Americans may disagree
with its reasoning, it's historical accuracy,
and the wisdom of publishing it at this
particular moment, the State Departments
white Paper" on China adds up, on the
whole, to a bleakly persuasive argument
in defense of the past policy of the United
States in dealing with the Nationalist.
If the document can be summarized at
all, it may be summarized as follows: ~
Through no fault of our own Government
a disaster of the first magnitude has taken
| place in China; (2) this disaster, which
| threatens to have a profoundly adverse
| effect on the strategic position OF the
| United States and the whole free world IN
relation to Asia, is attributable primarily
to incompetence, corruption and decay
within the Nationalist regime of General
issimo Chang Kai-shek. and 80 short OF
direct intervention by our armed forces
which could lead to war that would be
condemned by both the American and
Chinese peoples-there Is no practical,
concrete action we can launch at this stage
to help turn back the Communist tide; the
only thing we can do is to work out new
policy to meet the new situation.
In his letter transmitting the White
Paper" to the President Secretary Acheson
has been unqualifiedly emphatic in answer
ing those who have blamed the State De-
partment for what has happened. AS he
has put it, THE unfortunate but inescap-
able fact is that the ominous result of the
civil war in China was beyond the control
of the Government of the United States
Nothing that this country did or could
have done within the reasonable limits OF
it's capabilities could have changed that
result; nothing that was left undone by
this country has contributed to 1t. 1t was
the product Of internal Chinese forces,
forces which this country tried to influence
but could not" And he has made clear
that in his opinion the Nationalist are
now all but washed up, with the Comnu-
nists in a position to win control every
where in China.
In support of this thesis-which is backed
up by a vast amount of Recommendation,
including the hitherto secret Wedemeyer
| eport-Secretary Acheson begins with
| debatable but vigorous defense of the Yalta
Agreement and goes on from there to
| argue, In effect, that the postwar course OF
Chiang's Nationalist government led in
evitably to the present disaster. The Cen
eralissimo initiated the idea of political
reconciliation with the Communists, but
like the Red leaders, he resisted such a
reconciliation when the Hurley and Mar
shall missions sought to effect one. Then,
lean advice, he decided that he could settle
things by force of arms. But he found
that he could not. The war-weary Chinese
people drifted away from him. His armies
did not have to be defeated; they disin-
tegrated" After VI day he received about
81, 900 ,000, 900 in loans and grants from the
United States, plus military and civilian
surplus property originally costing 81 ,000,-
900, 900, but still he suffered defeat after
defeat Why? Not because of lack of arms
or ammunition, but because of decadence
in his regime, loss of confidence in his
leadership, incompetence among his gen.
erals, shattered morale among his troops,
and the fanatical zeal with which the
Communist forces fought against him.
Would the Wedemeyer proposals have
helped? Not without drastic reforms of
the sort Chang had steadfastly refused to
make.
Although there may be considerable room
for argument about the "ifs" and "buts"
involved in all this, Secretary Acheson and
the white Paper" have made clear that
there is one supremely tragic and danger
Gus fact that cannot be debated or wished
away The fact is simply this: That China,
after its long years of bitter struggle
against the war lords, the Japanese, and
the Communists, has lost-for the time
being at least-its opportunity to achieve
internal peace, unity, freedom and indie
pendence. What 1t faces now is the grim
probability of being converted into satel-
lite of the Kremlin. What the world at
large faces is the prospect of the Chinese
voting with Russia in the United Nations,
the prospect of Red aggression against
China's neighborS, and the prospect of a
gravely unsettling new balance of power in
the Far Pacific.
In the teeth of such situation, now that
we have virtually written off the National
lists, what should American policy be?
There Is no easy answer. OF course, as
Mr.. Acheson has said, we must continue
with such traditional things as our friend
ship for the Chinese people and our sup
port for the country's independence. In
addition, we must encourage all develop
ments likely to help throw off the foreign
yoke" of the Kremlin- Communists,
and we must do whatever we can to prevent
the Red contagion from spreading else
where in Asia. But it is far simpler to
speak vaguely of what we ought to do
than 1t is to hammer out a concrete pro-
gram of action that will yield good results
Accordingly, it goes without saying that
the special group organized by the State
Department to formulate a new Far East
ern policy has an extremely difficult job
on its hands. We ought not to delude our
selves about it: The tragedy of China has