Evening star., 1949-03-18
Last in a Series of Fipe Articles.
By WiIliom n. Horrison

NS9tVl0tlOIl VI II0O>
Last in a Series of .Five Articles.J
By WiIiiom n. Horrison
In any summing up of Scandi-
navia's effort to achieve full re-
covery by the time the Marshall
Plan reaches it's scheduled end
in 1928. several points of major
Importance call for special
emphasis.
The first of these is the fact
that the aid allotments made to
date by the Economic Co-opera-
ton Administration have un-
doubtedly-especially in the case
of Denmark and Norway-headed
of a paralyzing crisis.
The second is that in the en-
phatic opinion of our ECA mis-
sions in the three countries, the
Danes. the Norwegians and the
Swedes are now using that aid
effectively and are continuing to
make encouraging progress with it..
The third is this: That what
has been accomplished so far has
greatly discountenanced the Scan
dinavian Communists, who imme-
diately after the war constituted a
substantial minority, but who have
since been steadily losing ground,
even though their butter before
guns propaganda is not without
some effect-particularly in the
atmosphere of Norways drastic
austerity.
Finally, fourth-and again in
the emphatic opinion of our ECA
missions-continued aid between
now and 1923 is absolutely in
dispensable if Denmark, Norway
and Sweden are to attain, or come
reasonably close to attaining. the
long-term objectives they have
set for themselves in their effort
to get back to a sound economic
footing by the time the Marshall
Plan ends.
Main Factors Still Uncertain.
These four points are the out
standing ones among the dozen or
SO that could be made in connec-
ton with the short-term Scandi-
navian outlook. More important
still, however. are the points hav-
ing to do with the Ifs" and butts"
involved in the long-range pic
ture. when these are considered.
lit becomes obvious that the full
success of the Marshall Plan-not
merely its present success in
averting crisis. but its hoped-for
success in restoring Scandinavia
and all OF Western Europe to
lasting economic health-depends
on a number of factors about
which no sensible person would
presume to be dogmatic at this
time.
To begin with, some Scandi-
navian opinion is inclined to hold
that the long-term Danish, Nor
wegian and Swedish objectives
cannot be reached by 1923 and
that form of direct American
aid will be needed for a consider
able period thereafter. On the
other hand. all such suggestions
are deeply deplored by officials
like Commerce Minister Brofoss
of Norway. Their thought is that
II people get the idea that they
can count on more help than the
sums already projected, there may
be relaxation in effort at a mo-
ment when every ounce of energy
should be concentrated on attain
ing the fixed goals within the time
allotted by the Marshall Plan.
Nevertheless. even though men
like Mr.. Brofoss believe that the
difficult tasks ahead can be sub
stantially completed by 1923, the
long-term uncertainties still re-
main. Thus, wholly apart from
the fact that the three countries
have based their programs on
such yet-to-be-realized .assump-
tions as increased exports to
America and a renewed ability to
convert their British sterling earn
ings into dollars. they must rely
fundamentally on the hope that.
two key developments will take
place-namely, the revival of the
German economy and the restora-
ton of normal trade with Eastern
Europe.
Urge German Recovery.
Although anxious to guard
against resurgent German militar-
ism, the Danes, Norwegians and
Swedes regard it as a prime essen
tial to their own economic we'll
being that Germany recover suffi-
GENTLY to return to it's vital pre-
war status as one of their biggest
customers and suppliers. Recent
agreements with the occupation
authorities in Bizonia suggested
that real progress may be expected