Evening star., 1949-10-20
Worst Fears Of Navy
Confirmed by Views
OF General Bradley
'Bosie Strategy Concept
Assumes Foe Will Folio,
Our Blueprint for War
Bv David La,yrence

D"St~ N~SSs WV
Gems. Bradley and vanden-
berg have been exceedingly frank
with the House Armed Services
Committee and with the Amer
lean people. They have confirmed
the worst fears of the United
States Navy-namely, that the
"basic strategic concept" of the
United States in possible war
is tied definitely to the thought
that strategic bombing is depend
ed upon primarily to win.
This concept. moreover, dis
misses naval air power in the
form of aircraft carriers as de-
sirable but not necessary. 1t holds
also that amphibious warfare
can be conducted by the Army
instead of the Marines hereafter
and that large-scale amphibious
landings in the future are not an
ticipated.
This is comparable to the views
tenaciously held in 1889 by the
French general staff-namely
that the Maginot Line would fur
nish all the protection necessary
against a possible German attack
View Held by Germans.
It Is comparable also to the
= view held in 1899 by the German
general staff-namely, that the
Siegfried Line was an adequate
defense, that no navy was re-
quired and no amphibious land
tngs were to be anticipated. and
that Goering's air force, which
dominated Germany's unif1cation
policy, would win the victory.
Gems. Bradley and Vanden-
berg are sincere men with honest
convictions and fortnight view
points. But just as Gen. Brad
ley, for example, complains that
Navy men do not understand
land warfare, so the Navy Of
ficers of top rank have felt for a
long time that Gen. Bradley,
with his land-army experience
does not understand naval war
fare.
Thus, Gen. Bradley repeats
what has been said by others
that, because Russia has no navy
there is no need to worry about
Americas naval strength. Yet
Gen. Bradley insists that the
Navy must keep the sea lanes
open. How can the Navy keep
control of the seas if Russian
aircraft flying over the North Sea
prey on Allied shipping to ano
from bases in the Scandinavian
area? Navies cannot protect
commerce unless they can defend
themselves against the enemy's
= land-based planes.
Can Gen. Bradley or any one
else assure the American people
that Russia will not attack Allied
shipping with land-based bomb
,ers? Can any one today assure the
American people that Russian sub
marines, which have the benefit
of all the latest German inven-
tions, can. be kept from interfer-
ing with the supplies of aviation
gasoline and other munitions
needed by our Allies In the North
Atlantic pact?
Records of Last War.
Gems, Bradley and Vanden-
berg concede that the Navy must
fight the submarines but the rec
ords Of the last war show that
Germany not only came near win
ming by undersea warfare but that
none Of the Allied planes was able
at any time in the war to bomb
effectively the submarine bases or
the European continent from
which the NaZi submarines
emerged so regularly without in
Perception. Submarine bases are
covered with heavy thicknesses OF
concrete which no atom bomb
can penetrate.
Gen. Bradley assumes that
the Mediterranean and the Per-
sian Gulf and the waters of the
Pacific are not primarily impor-
tant in the next war. He appar-
emily assumes also that Alaska,
which has to be supplied by sea,
can be defended against attacks
by enemy planes coming from ST.
berian bases and that the Navy's
help is not going to be paramount
there His reasoning must mean
that America can write off China
and Japan and the Far East as a
theater of war if the Navy isn't
going to have adequate aircraft
carrier task forces.
It would be comforting, indeed
If the enemy attacked exactly as
the defending powers expected
But Japan, with a fleet of air.
craft carriers, caught the United
: States Army mapping at Pearl
Harbor and found the Air Force
without the necessary planes to
defend that base. The American
Navy did not have enough car
.riers to protect Pearl Harbor O,
to engage the japanese success
fully If all of them had been sta.
toned in Hawaiian waters and
there had been an alert sounded
in time.
Something more was wrong al
Pearl Harbor. however, than mil.
ttary neglect Of all three services
It was the American military com.
placency which assumes the enem!
will do exactly as the blueprint
calls for. The answer to such un.
certainty is to build a balanced
defense capable of being expanded
in the next few years to protecI
America against a global attack
The answer also lies in a flexible
rather than an inflexible concep
Of strategy. For the next wa
will not be fought in Europe alon,
but everywhere on the seven sea-
and on the continents adjacent tt
the Atlantic. Pacific and Indial