Evening star., 1949-03-16
The B-36 Story

The Air Force is under fire from some
quarters because it is suspected of spread
ing the word that the B-36 intercon-
tinental bomber is capable OF attacking
Russia with atomic bombs in event of
another war.
It happens that the Air Force denies
giving out this story, which has been
carried by one of the press associations
But whether the Air Force leaked" the
story or not, it is a piece Of information
which, If true, ought to be published.
Heretofore there has been big question
mark dangling from the nose of the B-36
1t has been generally accepted that 1t had
the range to fly from American bases into
Russia and back, carrying an atomic bomb
on the ingoing trip. But the critics have
insisted 1t was so slow and numbering that
it would be Sitting duck" target for
Russia's Jet fighters.
This is the big point Of the story that
has now come out. The Air Force,
according to this report, has been con-
ducting experiments with our own Jet
fighters, and has learned that at 10000
feet the jets cannot successfully inter-
cept the big bomber. And they reason
that If our jets cannot do it, neither can
the Russian jets.
There is no way of knowing, of course,
whether this estimate is correct The risks
of error and surprise are always present
in military calculations But If the esti-
mate is correct, or If the Air Force, having
conducted honest tests, believes 1t to be
correct then the information is of kind
that ought to be made public to the fullest
extent that is compatible with security
requirements
There are several reasons for this One
concerns the sensitive matter of military
appropriations. When the Air Force stages
q nonstop round -the-world night, or when
a story appears that the B-36 can bomb
Russia, the suspicion arises that the
budget, and perhaps this is the case.
But what is wrong with that? II it
is true that seventy strategic targets
in Russia have been brought within
successful atomic bombing range by the
B-36, that Is highly significant
development. Why should the Con-
gress which makes the appropriations, or
the people who ultimately foot the enor-
nous bill for our military establishment,
be kept in ignorance of such an important
fact?
There is second, and, it seems to The
Star, more important reason.
The prime objective of our policy today,
both foreign and domestic, is to prevent
another war. Fear has been expressed
that publicity on the. performance of the
B-36 may serve to incite war. The more
reasonable view, however, is quite to the
contrary There Is small chance of war
unless 1t begins with Russian aggression
SO we have been trying by various devices
the Greco-Turkish program, ECA, and
the projected North Atlantic pact-to erect
structure Of strength which will dis
courage aggressive ambitions. The theory
Is that weakness invites aggression, while
strength has the opposite effect If this
Is sound, then why not tell the story of
the B-36? Is potential aggressor more
or less apt to strike If he knows that
retribution will be swift and terrible? We
know that Hitler struck because he mis-
takenly thought he could win a quick and
relatively cheap war. II we were to hush
up the capabilities of the B-36, might not
that help lead the Russians to the false
conclusion that they, too, could win a
quick and cheap war, at least in Europe?
We ought to put ourselves in Russian
shoes II we knew or believed that
Russia was capable of devastating seventy
American cities with atomic bombs, would
that encourage US to launch q war of
aggression which would invite such an
attack? Or would it make us think long
and hard before assuming that risk?
Finally, there is the question of our
potential allies. 1t is said that brandish-
ing big stick in the form of the B-36
will frighten them off, that fear of
Russian reaction will keep them out of
any alliance. But why is this so? In the
last analysis, they look to us for their
security. If we know, and If we let them
know, and If the Russians know, that we
have the means of carrying ruinous war
to Russia, what is apt to be their reaction?
Would our prospective allies rather lean
on strong reed, or a frail one?
These are some of the factors that
should be considered In weighing the
relative advantages of releasing and sup
pressing information. If the question is
considered dispassionately, it will be hard
to find any disadvantage that is not
greatly outweighed by the advantages of
full and honest disclosure of what we
are capable of doing, and what we will
do, II forced again into war.