Evening star., 1949-12-06
Technique of Strategic Bombing
Here to Stay, Arnold Declares
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planes spread in depth almost
across the entire Pacific.
With such q set-up, it would
have been very difficult for them
to employ strategic bombing with
the tremendous power required to
secure a terrific destructive wallop,
power that called for large num-
bers of planes to be used In mass
formations.
The difference in concept be-
tween the Army Air Force tech
nique and the Navy technique ex-
plains some of the criticism and
remarks Of last fall.
There have been many criticisms
Of our strategic bombing in Ger
many and Japan. It has been said
that no real destruction Of indus
try resulted: that we unnecessari-
ly caused the death of many wom-
en- and children in metropolitan
areas; that it did not really help
to bring the war to a close any
sooner: that our strategic bombing
actually caused a resentment-a
hatred-behind the lines which, in
effect. made the war last longer.
So the critics opined.
will not Bay that we did not
make mistakes. OF course we did.
Sometimes we selected the wrong
type of industries as our priority
targets, and the wrong plant or
factory of that industry. But who
knew what the mistakes were at
that time? Take German aircraft
production, for example. We de-.
strpyed factory after factory: but,
byfingenuity and initiative in fac
tory dispersion. and by under
ground construction, the German
Air Force had more planes when
the war ended than when 1t
started. Was it a mistake to bomb
German aircraft factories? Who
knows? Had we not done so. the
Germans might have been able to
put more planes In the air than
we did as we grew In strength.
AS far as we knew. we were
using the best available informa-
ton for target selection. We were
using as advisers men who had
been in Germany and Japan; who
had helped to build their indus
tries, loaned them money, studied
their industrial problems. sold
them their factory equipment, and
visited the factories. What bet
ter source Of advice could We have
obtained? War Departme m t?
Navy? ONI? State Department?
Department Of Commerce? We
tried them and they could not
even give us sufficient informa-
ton to make up a target folder.
on any one industry.
Bombing Survey Cited
Certainly we made mistakes:
but it does not take a smart man
to sit down now and. after look
ing over results, say what we
should or should not have done.
Now, as to what we did do. I
will take the report and recon-
mendations of the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, headed
by Franklin d'Olier, for my source
of information. That board was
absolutely unbiased and had no
axe of any kind to grind. Hence.
1t could give a far better picture
than those critics who went to the
bombed areas after all the f1ght-
ing had stopped and after the
cities had been partially cleaned
UP or who go abroad now and
shout about the ineffectiveness
Of strategic bombing. DOlier and
his group Of hundreds Of men
spent months during the war do
ing nothing else but evaluating
the results Of strategic bombing.
first hand. They really knew
what the score was. a.
Here are some Of the facts:
We did destroy the German Air
Force in our constant. day-after-
day hammering. They could not
replace their combat crew losses.
They did not have. the gasoline
for training. The morale Of the
German Air Force finally broke.
Hence. when the war ended. they
had planes, but no combat crews
with which to fly them or to
make a stand against our air in
vasion.
Our P-51's and PATS and heavy
bombers invited attack, looked
for 1t. Then the German losses
mounted sharply. until, by March
1914. they were losing about 1900
planes month in combat alone.
Their organization could not stand
it. BY the late spring of 1914 the
German Air Force really felt the
effect. Germany had saved her
aircraft production, but had lost
her air force. What better proof
does anyone need than the fact
that on D-Day they could assem-
BILE but 80 operational planes with
which to oppose the Normandy
Beach landings?
Our missions against ground
E