Evening star., 1949-12-16
Arnold Says Changes
In War Make Many
Facilities Obsolete
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Facilities Obsolete
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we needed a well-pIanned and
well-thought-out program for the
organization of the armed forces,
it Is now. We need such all-out
thinking for two reasons: First,
to provide for the security of our
Nation. Second, to cut out the
duplication Of effort and unneces-
sary spending due to obsolete
techniques, equipment or facili-
ties.
The balance in our armed forces
will not depend upon a Navy. an
Army or an Air Force of the size
or probably Of the type we had
in World War II, or of size de-
sired by their well-wishing
friends. It will come from studies
made by the Joint Chiefs Of Staff,
taking into consideration our for
eign policy, the probable enemy
and the strength and composition
of its armed forces. the possible
character of the next war. what
help we may expect from our AL
lies, and what we will need to in
sure the maximum fighting power
possible with the minimum ex-
penditure Of funds. ::
Just because we had facilities
here, there and everywhere. prac-
tically all over the world, and have
ben able to secure money from
Congress to maintain them Is no
reason why our armed forces
should continue to use them now.
Ideas Must Change.
It may be that the character
of the war. from the air point OF
view, will be entirely different
from that of World War II. Ger
tainly our ideas of interception Of
hostile aircraft must undergo a
complete change and revamping.
With the atomic bomb, the long
range bomber in q sneak attack
will cause destruction, confusion
and chaos that will completely
upset our military plans and our
industrial programs.
The entrance into the picture
Of the Atlantic pact changes the
mission Of the ground forces; the
location of the probable enemy
changes the mission of our Navy;
the large expanse Of open territory
available in Russia and Eastern
Siberia changes the technique OF
operation Of all three services.
Accordingly, if we are to get the
maximum efficiency and effective
ness from our armed forces with
the least expenditure Of money,
we must stop thinking in terms Of
what facilities we used in World
War II and how we employed our
equipment. and think instead in
terms of the difference between
island hopping" In the Pacific
from 1912 to 1945, and the Arctic
ice foes now confronting US; the
difference between landing in Nor
mandy against hostile opposition.
and landing behind the protection
of an Allied force fighting In West
ern Europe, and the difference be-
tween strategic bombing of we'll
located targets in Germany and
Japan, and bombing of targets in
a continental area where the To-
cation and identity Of our targets
may or may not be behind an
iron curtain. B. ~ r
There have been many large de-
velopments in Air Force equip
ment and its operation since
World War II. The B-29 was an
excellent World War II long g-rsnge
bomber and did a marvellous job.
but the long-range bomber Of to-
day is an entirely different breed
of cats; in fact, a different kind
Of animal! It enables the air war
to be conducted across areas here
tofore considered impossible.
Yesterday the Arctic was a seri-
Gus barrier. Since we have been
conducting our operations out Of
Alaska, we have proven that the
long-range bombers can fly over
the Arctic with the same facility
and reliability that they fly over
the Atlantic. There are no patrol
boats, submarines or hostile fleets
operating among the ice foes OF
the Arctic. There are no ground
forces or towns or cities to herald
the approach Of hostile aircraft.
We will not know of the approach
OF enemy airplanes until they
reach our air defense barrier.
In the same way, the long
range bomber can approach world
wide targets from other heretofore
impossible directions. These things
give an entirely different picture
of air warfare, of the method OF
approach of hostile planes, OF the
technique involved in providing
the necessary facilities for making
tnterception, and these facilities,
placed at points where they are OF
no real value in our military plans
of today cost money--lots OF
money-to maintain. So there is
another reason why we must econ
omize wherever possible. change
our ideas according to the teche-
nique of modern warfare and ac-
cept the necessity for balancing
our Armed Forces to conform to
these changes of ideas. :
There is really nothing new In
the conception of the Atlantic
pact except that we have now let
every one know that we are taking
advantage of our Allies fighting
In Western Europe, hoping that
those Allies will be able to hold
back the onrushing enemy until
we can land supplies, equipment
apd troops al, pOrts in ENGLAND OF