Evening star., 1949-03-13

This explains why the best
offer only guesses and conjectures
when the solemn. unsmiling Fya
as Foreign Minister by the mer-
curial Andrei Vishinsky.
There is, however, strong feel
ing in the highest quarters in
Washington, London and Paris
that the next few months will be
the most crucial in our history.
The only guide our policy
makers have in this whole matter
is Russia's definite overall policy
of winning world domination.
Methods of attaining that objec-
tive differ and are changeable: At
one time it appeared that the
Politburo would strive to achieve
its purpose through infiltration
and SubverSion.
Politburo Very Secretive
In recent weeks the United
States and other Western nations
have come to fear that Moscow
might have decided to use force
while it had at hand a military
Organization which, compared
with that which exists in the
West, appears vastly superior, at
least in numbers.
It is in this light that certain
|conjectures were made in regard
to the changes which occurred
March 4 in the top command OF
the Moscow Foreign Office.
The Politburo can easily main
tain the strictest secrecy in regard
to it's future intentions. This is
great advantage to it in the
present war of nerves. Only Il
men make the decisions for Russia
and their meetings are not like
the executive sessions of the Sen
ate Foreign Relations Committee
or top secret discussions between
President Truman and his cabinet
Top American policy decisions be-
come known sooner or later to
newspapermen and commentators
and through them to the rest OF
the world.
The IA Russian leaders make
descisions affecting the world as
we'll as themselves. The con-
spiratorial character of the
Communist regime makes them
secretive. The fact that their own
safety depends on the success OF
their enterprises makes them
doubly careful and is a further
compelling motive to prevent then
from talking to any one who doe:
not belong to the worlds moSt
exclusive club.
Conjectural Analysis
Consequently. our analysis O
the Soviet Unions future action
must be basically conjectural. W.
derive that analysis from ou1
knowledge of the main purpose
of the U S. S. R. as demon
strated since the end of the war
Some of our top analysts have
been led to the conclusion thai
the U. S. S. R. has decided to move
actively this year, because Rus
sia's plans for infiltration anc
economic and political disinte.
grafton, which it has decreed fol
Western Europe, are jeopardizec
by the prospective physical re-
armament of Europe. So long az
the United States-which is the
sole barrier to Russia's plan fol
world domination-WaS willing tc
pour goods into Europe under
UNRRA, ERP and other aid pro.
grams, Moscow was not undulJ
worried.
The Soviet's stooges, the Com.
munist Parties in France anc
Italy, were to nullify the effect o1
our efforts by well-calculated anc
we'll timed strikes and sabotage.
The peoples of Western Europe
are not enamored of communism
But the fact that only six Ameri.
can, British and French divisions
confronted 40 or more Red divi'
sions between the ViStula and the
Oder rivers has worried Western
Europeans so much that many o1
them decided to join the Com
munist Party before it was toe
late.
Those people we're so afraid OF
a possible Red invasion, and the
likelihood that nonparty member
would wind up in concentration