Evening star., 1949-10-09

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ing.
Interceptor superiority is IA
vored by the factors of surprise,
initiative. and deception. and it
is assured by numbers. A Japa-
nese pilot, for instance. in a single
Banshee would undoubtedly be
destroyed, probably in collision
which would be a most economi-
cal way of dealing with very heavy
bombers and one which is re-
ported to have been of Russian
origin.
American pilots, however. are
entitled to sporting chance and
were they attacking an enemy
B-36. would consider that two
Banshees provide a fair fight
Three Banshees should positively
insure the destruction of the B-a6
In larger numbers the Banshees
will work progressively through a
bomber formation, concentrating
on parts of it with even more IA
vorable ratios. 1t is we'll to re-
member, too, that when a fighter
plane does get shot down in this
sort of action, the pilot is in
friendly territory and, in most
cases. merely makes a forced land
ing or parachutes to safety. The
bomber crew, of some 10 men, is
thousands of miles from home,
over enemy territory, and in most
distressing position.
You have already received testi-
mony that we may not expect, for
five years, yet, to encounter any
night fighter capable of intercept
ing the B-36. This evidence has
to be reconsidered in the light of
the following facts. The Corsair
night fighter now in service has
performance adequate to inter-
cept the B-36 at 10000 feet. It
has a radar which is effective with
ground control.
The Douglas Skynight. a two
seat jet night fighter, which will
soon 60 into service, has the per-
formance and has radar adequate
under all conditions to intercept
the B-36 at 10000 feet. 1t COM
rSted five successful night inter-
ceptions above 10000 feet on its
first radar test. 1t should be
noted particularly that the target
plane in this case was another
small jet fighter-a poor rada1
target. The night fighter version
Of the Banshee, with overwhelm-
ingly superior performance, will
also go into service very soon. It
must be concluded that the B-3e
is not even now safe from inter-
ception at night.
Night Fighters Called Threat.
To summarize these points-We
have convincing evidence that the
radar will detect and track the
B-36; that the fighters will find
and intercept the B-36: that the
unescorted B-36's will be attacked
and shot down in numbers which
will be prohibitive; and that the
night fighters are today. a threat
that cannot be ignored.
If We disregard completely the
question of economy. I concur with
the testimony that the B-36 has
some virtues as a night bomber be-
cause of the complications in
volved in interception and attack
during complete darkness. But
Our knowledge Of radar definitely
contradicts the qualified state
ments made before this commit
tee that any ground target can
be bombed at night just the same
as is might by daylight.
In addition to the very ques-
tionable accuracy of any kind of
bombing from 10000 feet, it is Ger
tain that large percentage of
strategic targets are nareas de-
void of the physical characteristics
which are essential if they are to
be located and identified by radar.
On this point alone, and without
regard to the vulnerability Of the
B-36, the chances of success of
any strategic night bombing mis-
sion are extremely uncertain.
The praat size If fho poc &c
particularly favorable to all as
poets Of the interception problem
under all conditions. It also sug-
gests that, for the future. other