Evening star., 1949-06-11
Normandy Landings in Retrospect
We Fooled the Enemy About Where We Would Strike
and He Never Quite Recovered From Surprise
By Tkemas n. Henry
fMr. Arnry. q esAs vAy cor


0Iid lC 4NNNSi >k0lAS IN
By Tkem.
xr Hear, q e.Ar eorrsseanesnI 10 sas @
PARIS. June CBy Mail Reasons for
| selection Of the Normandy beaches for the
| Allied landings i've years ago and the story
| OF the most far-reaching deception In his
| tory were revealed by the Arny's European
Command today 70 O group Of q. g. war
| correspondents here for the nfth anniversary
Of D day.
The deception plan was % successful that
more than two-thirds Of the German forces
| In France and the Low Countries was con-
| centrated elsewhere for nearly two months
while American and British armies were
| making good their foothold On the con-
tinent.
There were three likely assault points, the
report reveals These were as apparent TO
the Germans as to the Americans and
British. ANY invasion would have been f9-
tile without ports within O reasonable dis
tance Of the beachhead and q good road
network into the interior. The places con-
sidered were the Pas de Calais area. the
Brest peninsula in Brittany and the area
where the landings actually were made
Specifically considered. the Pas de Calais
region seemed by far the most favorable
There were excellent highways straight to
| Paris and into the interior Of France. 1t
was 80 close to England that there would
| be superabundant air cover for any opera
| tions and quick turnaround for all ship
| ping. The beaches were excellent for troop
| landings. Beyond lay level, open country.
| There were none OF the hedge rows and
| forests 50 common elsewhere. and which
| became the bane of the existence OF the
| troops in Normandy.
| The Germans Thought So Too.
All this was quite clear TO the German
| high command This was the weak spot
In the whole west wall. In consequence It
| was strongly defended. An assault there
might have succeeded but as the planners In
London realized. the cost in lives probably
| would have been incalculable. The Brest
| peninsula was quickly eliminated. 1t was
too far away from England for the air cover
| required.
In many ways the Normandy coast was
least desirable. It's port facilities were me-
| diocre. The road network inland was not
| good. The countryside was q maze OF wood
| lands and hedgerows, almost ideal for de-
| tense and extremely difficult for ofiense, Use
| Of armor was essentially impossible. It was
| close enough to the English airfields. how
ever. for effective cover although this neces-
| sarily would be considerably less than could
have been achieved In the Pas de Calais.
The beaches were bad for landings. The
German high command realized fully these
| great disadvantages for an assaulting force
| and left the region rather lightly defended.
Thus. the report reveals. they played into
| the hands Of the Allies. The Normandy coast
was selected primarily because there could
be an element Of surprise against relatively
weak defense. The wisdom Of this choice
| was entirely sustained by the results. The
five American and British beachheads were
established with the loss Of less than 1000
men-less than fourth OF what had been
calculated.
Pattern Of Elaborate Deception.
The German error was sustained for two
years preceding the invasion by extremely
elaborate deception. Obviously there were
plenty Of enemy agents In England. "Se-
crets" were whispered by high-ranking ofii-
GERS in extreme confidence with the hope
that they would eventually reach these
agents Many Of them did Secret" docu-
| ments. ostensibly guarded with the utmost
diligence were allowed to be stolen. Sc
| cret" radio codes were used which, 1t was
| known, the Germans had broken or could
break.
All these whispers. documents and code
messages indicated that the landing area
would be the Pas de Calais. Of which the
enemy already was fairly well convinced.
In addition. for at least six months before
the invasion this countryside was SUBJ
jected to o most terrific bombardment.
mostly by medium bombers. The Germans
naturally supposed that this was intended
to break down their defenses. The actual
purpose was to strengthen these defenses
at the expense of the Normandy area. The
latter was left comparatively untouched
from the air. Thus. 1t was hoped. an I'M
preston would be created that the Allies
had no interest in the region, or the prepa-
ration for its defense.
Presumably. according to the report the
enemy guessed fairly well the time Of the
assaults. The logic Of this timing was
as apparent to them as to the assaulters.
But the attack In Normandy was 80 con-
trary to their expectations that they could
not believe 1t was the real thing. Even
were established they still believed that the
move was feint and that the main assault
would come little later In the Pas de Calais.
Two Months Wait to he Sure.
II was almost two months before the
enemy was thoroughly convinced Of his
error and dared remove many troops from
the most strongly defended part OF the
Atlantic wall. BY that time all hope Of
successfully driving OF the invaders was
futile.
AS D day drew near. the reports made
public here reveal. the enemy strength in
France, Belgium and Holland consisted Of
so divisions. OF these 46 were disposed
In the general coastal area from Holland
to the Loire River. The greatest concen-
tration and the best-trained troops were
In the Pas de Calais area. All the rest
were in such positions that they could
quickly be concentrated there. Thus the
defenders of Normandy were denied strategic
reserves as they were overwhelmed by the
tide Of American and British troops pour
ing across the channel
The LIST Army's Break Through.
Another interesting revelation to corre-
spondents In that the great break-through
into the interior Of Normandy BY Gen.
Courtney b. Hodges First u. o. Army On
July 26. i've years ago, originally was
planned for the British ID Army more than
40 miles to the east
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