Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1949-10-15
Our Policy on East Germany

Secretary OF State Dean Acheson's state
ments on Germany at his news conference
last Wednesday do much to clarity the
departments attitude and policy toward
the latest Soviet moves. These state
ments confirm and amplify the pronounce
ment of Acting Secretary Webb, made
few days previously, denouncing Moscow's
entire postwar policy in Germany, cul-
minating in the setting up of an "oppres-
sive police state" in the Russian occupied
Eastern zone. And both Of those pro-
nouncements should be read in the light
of British diplomatic note to the Soviet
government, rejecting Soviet charges
against the legality of the Bonn govern
ment of Western Germany This indicates
an identity of views between Washington
and London and foreshadows concerted
policy on the issues involved.
Secretary Acheson did not mince words
respecting either the Soviet charges or the
character of the "so-called German Demo-
cratic Republic" just set up in the Russian
sector OF Berlin. He stigmatized this
regime as without legal validity or foun-
dation in the popular will = created
by Soviet and Communist fiat = Such
a government cannot claim by any demo-
cratic standard to speak for the German
people of the Soviet zone; much less can
it claim to speak in the name of Germany
as whole" He therefore pledged con-
tinued full support for the Bonn govern
ment, regardless of Soviet maneuvers
Equally fortnight was the secretary's
rejection of the Soviet charges echoed in
similar charges made by Moscow's satellite
regimes. He conceded that, abstractly, the
people of those East European nations had
"a legitimate interest in German affairs"
But he went on to point out that the
present regimes In those countries have
been "foisted upon their own peoples by
totalitarian methods" For that reason,
our Government rejects their attempts to
criticize "in the interests of foreign power
rather than of their own people" the
actions of nations trying to establish
democratic institutions in the greater part
of Germany.
From all this, it is obvious that the
United States and the other Western
powers do not intend either to alter their
policy in Western Germany or to recognize
the validity of the Soviet-backed East
German regime in any way. This naturally
intensif1es the split between West and
East Germany, with Numerically con-
hlcting claims of the two regimes in the
respective regions. The thorniest prob
lem arising out of this conflict is presum-
ably Berlin. The new East German regime
claims Jurisdiction over all Berlin; as in
deed, it does over the whole of Germany
That claim the Western Powers emphat-
ically reject. But this leaves the Western
occupied sectors of Berlin a political no
mans land, since 1t does not form part
of the West German state. The logical
answer might seem to be its prompt in
clusion, as its inhabitants ardently desire.
Yet there are certain practical difficulties
involved Not only does France object,
but IT is doubtful If the present Bonn gov
eminent would be pleased with the pros
pect, despite its formal advocacy of inclu-
sion. This Is because the conservative
Adenauer cabinet controls only 1879. seats
In the Bonn Parliament, while the Social
Democratic opposition has 49, 1t is gen.
orally anticipated that Berlin would give
Social Democratic majority large enough
to whittle down the present Conservative
lead or even overturn it, thereby ousting
the Adenauer cabinet and putting the
Social Democrats in its place.
That is merely one of several contin-
gencies which should be considered in
formulating the policy required by the
Soviet challenge. The augmentation Of
that policy will appear as the course Of
events unfolds