Evening star., 1949-03-06

than America and Britain.
During the two years that the
Communist Party was represented
in the French and Italian govern
ments it managed to place it's own
men in positions which could be
highly useful to Russian intelli-
gence.
Despite a number of purges in
the French and Italian armed
forces since the fall of 1947 there
are still today a substantial num-
ber of Communist spies, not nee
essarily members of the Com
munist Party, in French and Ital-
ian arsenals, among the ground
crews OF the air forces and in
other posts where they can OBJ
tain valuable information.
What is more important, and
now is alarming the Paris and
Rome governments, is that these
people, who are not easily identi-
fable as Communist agents, can
do much harm as SaboteurS in the
event OF a general mobilization.
France and Italy, as well as the
BeneluX nations, are in the front
line. Consequently Moscow is pay
ing particular attention at this
time to disruption of whatever
defense plans they may have.
The cleaning-up process in the
Western democracieS is not easy,
since the followers of Moscow are
screaming about their constitu-
tional rights-which, of course, do
not exist in the U. S. S. Rand
are hindering the job which the
Western governments must do in
their self defense.
Although only the most spec
tacular espionage cases appear in
print, for a public which takes
lightly this omen of war, it is
understood that the intelligence
services of all the Western nations
are seriously concerned over the
increasing activities of the serv-
ants of the Russian totalitarian-
ism, which has at its disposal far
better means for large-scale sabo-
tage and espionage than its pred
ecessor in world conquest-Ger-
man -Italian-Japanese fascism.
Reports Optimistic
The thousands of cases of espi-
onage known to Allied intelligence
services are ominous. But in their
weekly surveys about Russia's ag-
gressive plans, our intelligence
evaluators point out with a GER
tain degree of optimism that they
see no indication of concentra-
ton of Soviet ground and air
forces which they consider essen
tial before the cold war becomes
shooting war.
They mention the fact that for
several months before the attack
on Poland the NaZiS had concen-
trated a number of divisions and
air groups on the eastern border
and had strengthened and REIN
forced considerably their defen-
sive lines in the west. They
worked day and night to complete
the Siegfried Line and brought
some good troops to man it.
With the exception of the con-
struction of a new line of fortifca-
tions and the addition of about
10000 men to the forces which are
in Finland under the provisions
of the Russo Finnish peace treaty.
neither British nor American
agents have noticed any particu-
lar movements by the Soviet
Army to indicate an imminent
attack.
This optimism is not shared,
however, by a number of military
men in both countries. They point
out that the situation in Russia
in 1949 is entirely different from
that of the Nazis 10 years ago.
At that time the Poles had at
least Is good combat divisions and
France and Britain were supposed
to be real military powers. France
had, on paper at least, 10 COM
bat divisions and not even the
German general staff believed that
they would melt away as fast as
they did.
The German strategy was to
strike fast and with the utmost
violence at the Poles and destroy
their morale as we'll as their
troops.
Reds Position Changes
The arrival of large stocks Of
high-octane gas and bombs and
the enlargement of airdromes for
the LuftWaffe was inevitable.
None of these steps, which started
in the spring of 1889, could be
kept secret.
Russia's position is entirely diff
ferent today. No real forces today
confront her troops. The Soviet
army which exists between the
Vistula and the Oder Rivers is
conservatively estimated at 40
combat divisions, with an air
force of at least 5000 flrst-line
planes.
This force faces a combined
maximum of six American, Brit
ish and French divisions. The
fighting quality of these troops
probably is very good, but they
have no reserves supporting them
at this time. Neither do they
have the necessary supplies to re-
sist for any length of time against
a push by the Red Army.
There is, consequently, no need
for the Russians to concentrate
in the classical general stan
manner" and show their hand
before it is time.
It is what would come later
that should concern the Soviet
leaders and act as deterrent to
the general staff. But the fact
that no Soviet troop concentra-
tions are noticeable in the West
means very little. The intenslfi-
cation of their espionage activi-
t;oc ie moro significant. at least to