Evening star., 1949-08-23
Operation Visualized.

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tains and return.
Operation Visualized.
What the average man doesn't
know is that, in a practical sense,
this isn't what is meant by an
"intercontinental" bomber at all
It's q bomber that could fly 10000
miles nonstop all right, but in a
military sense the operation Is
visualized and planned really as
a fight from the big B-36 bases
at Fairbanks, Alaska, and from
Goose Bay, Labrador. It Is $500
miles from our Alaskan base to
the Urals and 3.700 miles from
Labrador to Moscow.
Nor does the average man real
ize that Russian long-range
bombers can fly from Russia to
Labrador or from the Siberian
bases-600 miles away from Fair
banks, Alaska-and put our fixed
bases out Of commission for sew
eral days or more while other
long-range bombers attack Amer
ican cities.
Both the Labrador and Alaskan
bases of the B-36 must be sup
piled by ships which are vulnerable
to the new type Russian sub
marines.
So the real fighting would prob
ably not be done on an inter-
continental scale at all. The best
bases for the B-36 are still in Eng
land. where the protection Of
British and American fighter and
bomber planes is available. Again
it must be remembered that these
bases must be supplied by sea, 80
the submarine menace has to come
into defense planning on o bigger
scale than ever before.
The prevailing assumption here
is that Russia would give no
warning but would suddenly at
tack with her long-range bombers
all fixed bases from which the
B-36 would fly. thus possibly
neutralizing the allied reprisals
for several days or more. Testi-
mony was given recently to the
House Armed Services Committee
by United States Air Force officers
that long-range bombers now can
be built to fly high enough to
avoid radar detection altogether.
The United States Naval Air
Forces have come up with an Of
fense and defense doctrine Of
their own to meet this contin-
gency. It Is that. even If the land
bases are put out Of commission.
the United States can have ready
for instant use big floating bases.
Before war breaks out. these big
carriers would be kept at sea out
of range Of enemy bombers but,
at wars outbreak, would move in
stantly to the Scandinavian coast
or to the Siberian coast and with
heavy bombers. requiring only q
1,500-mile range, launch an offen-
sive against Soviet air bases.
Why Navy Wants Carriers.
That is why the United States
Naval Air Forces want carriers
with strong enough decks from
which to launch the heavy bomb
ers which could serve q dual pur-
pose-maintain control Of the seas
everywhere necessary and help the
United States Air Force and allied
ground forces to control the air
and land close up to enemy opera
tions.
Such heavy bombers could de-
liver the atomic bomb and could
destroy coastal or inland bases Of
the enemy. While some carriers
might be put out Of commission
temporarily-as, of course, would
be true with fixed land bases-the
mobility of the carrier task forces
and the fact that they carry their
own fighter planes and defenses
against submarines makes them
difficult targets for enemy bombers
to locate or to put out Of action.
Safety lies in numbers. and sew
eral big carrier task forces would
make an effective instrument for
instant use.
The strategy now dominating
the department Of defense means
spending two-thirds or more of
the entire arms appropriation to
put all the eggs in one basket
billions Of dollars for fixed bases
and billions for one type Of long
range bomber. This isn't a bal
anced defense at all but "Magi-
not Line" which the long-range
bombers Of the Russian air forces
might readily penetrate the next
time as easily as the Germans
crumpled the first line Of the
French defense In 1910. Neither
the long-range bombers to be
built by the Russians nor the
Soviet submarine forces can be
safely disregarded in any Ameri-
can planning for the next war.
(Reproduction Rishts Reserved.)
Don't Cut corns