Evening star., 1949-12-24

Western Military Chiefs
Held Firm in Intent
To Rebuild Reich Army
By Dorothy Thompson
The other day I found myself
with three distinguished colleagues
In = televised round-table discus
sion on developments during 1850.
All agreed that in the coming
year the German problem would
accelerate toward q crisis. revolv-
ing around German rearmament.
Now. there is no question that
American and British military
leaders intend to rebuild q Ger
man army, and that the military
influence over the President Is in
creasing, strengthened by the de-
parture from the State Depart
ment Of George Kennan who has
fought to keep diplomacy above
the military.
Although not much can be said
for the caliber Of some Of Mr..
Acheson's advisers. nothing what
ever cen be said for the political
gifts Of the military, who think
wholly in terms Of the strategy
of force. The problem of German
rearmament is pre- eminently
political and psychological, so
delicate that it can give the an
swer to peace or war, and to the
entire future of Europe.
Russians Take Initiative.
So far the Russians have taken
the initiative on every front and
Western moves have been merely
responsive. The Russians are re-
arming Eastern Germany Ergo,
the German republic should either
rearm or place a contingent Of
German troops at the disposal Of
q European army. However, .
European army is not on the
scene, for there Is no unified Eu-
rope. The Atlantic defense pact
is an merican-European coali-
ton only. If German contingent
is set up within it, 1t will be
German army no matter how
called or camouf1aged.
And it will mean that Ger
many will have two armies. each
in fact the mercenary of external
powers. Nothing could more rat
tfy the division Of Germany:
nothing could be a more cynical
confirmation of the total break
down of Allied postwar policy; far
from contributing to a solution Of
the German question it would in
dicate acceptance of its insolu-
bility, and far from leading to
Q detente in Europe with the Rus
SLAMS it would exacerbate the Sit
uation. Therefore. before we
take any such epochal step, we
must think hard whether no other
move is conceivably possible.
Are we, for instance, absolutely
convinced that 1t is impossible to
neutralize q Germany disarmed
both East and West, between our
selves and the Russians? Have
we ever tried, in a bold move.
to accomplish the unif1cation OF
the country? Have We ever pro-
posed to widen responsibility
through the q. N?
And even If we are convinced
that the Russians would not yield
to any proposal requiring recon-
sideration Of their own German
policies, would anything be lost
politically, morally, or psyche
logically. by making constructive
proposals, first automatically and
secretly. and later openly?
Firm Stand Urged.
It seems to me that the United
States should take the unequivocal
position that we will regard any
armed attack on Germany as an
act Of war involving Atlantic
security; that we regard the re-
armament of Eastern Germany as
4 provocation against Europe and
. breach Of treaty, but that we
dc not wish to answer provocation
by counterprovocation, but rather
entirely to remove provocation
from both sides. by mutual guar
antees that Germany shall not
be rearmed by West or East.
We should propose that q plebi-
scite be held In 1850. in the whole
of Germany under United Ma
tions supervision and control, with
every safeguard against falsifica-
ton Of returns, on the question
of whether the Germans wish to
Join the federal republic or the
East German government. the
police Of any state that might
emerge to be limited to normal
police weapons, with future con-
troll entirely limited to disarma-
ment and undertaken by the U. N.
This is certainly not Russian
policy. But it would not be easy,
psychologically. for Russia to re-
ject it. And If she did reject it,
there would be no valid argument
against the retention Of Allied oc-
cupation forces in Germany as
measure of security.
These provide, in the last an
alysis, more protection against
adventurism either Western. Rus
sian, or German, than any Ger
man forces are likely to do.
(Relsassd By the Bell Syndicate, lInc.)
j. 5. Refuses 10 Use Funds
Of ERP for Arms Program