Evening star., 1949-10-11

l
greater respect for the B-36 and the atom
bomb, even naked and unescorted. A
frmer appreciation of the instructive Of
fensive spirit of this Nation in war. Less
confidence in the inviolability of their radar
screen and the instantaneous ubiquitousness
Of their defense squadrons In the vaStness
of the air. A more acute awareness, in
fact, of that essential air vastness-which Is,
in ratio to the surface of the ecrth both
land and sea, as the sea itself is to one fixed
island.
AS Admiral Radford has indicated, 1t is
better to prevent war than to win one. II
a billion dollars worth of B-36s can do that
trick by keeping a remembrance of the
wrath Of God in the minds Of potential
enemy. then they are cheap, even II only
cardboard. And they may not be that,
necessarily. JOEL TOWNSLEY ROGERS.
To the Editor of The Star:
Commenting on Admiral Radford's recent
testimony before Congress, you say "the ma
tional security will suffer infinitely more If
basic military decisions are to be made by
congressman who have no qualifications for
the task and If those decisions are then to
be imposed on the responsible military
leaders, This is sound as applies to the
command of the Armed Forces.
But the Constitution in terms confers upon
Congress the sole power to provide and
maintain Navy This makes it the duty
Of Congress to decide what the Navy shall
consist of-whether it shall have aircraft,
carriers and planes, and their sizes, numbers
and types. To this end the Congress may
hear and consider the opinions of military
men, but the Congressman themselves, how
ever. lacking in qualifications for the task"
must make the ultimate decision-which
decision must of necessity take into account
"a theory of warfare" which the admiral has
represented as unsound.
When Congress has made it's decision it
then becomes the duty of the President, as
ton, to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" GEORGE MELLING.
To the Editor OF The Star:
The principal thesis Of Admiral Radford
last Friday before the House Armed Services
Committee was that we must not in our de-
tense preparations think of the next war as
one in which we would shower atomic bombs
on enemy cities Such a course, he said,
would be morally reprehensble and it would
defeat its own purposes, for it's horrible
aftermath would be a kind of world in which
we would not want to live. Let us plan to
use tIle ATOMIC DOIQD, he SalQ, OuL only Tor
precision attacks on military targets.
The B-36. he contended, is unsuited for
precision bombing because its relatively low
speed and its vulnerability in the face OF
fighter attack compel it to operate at ex-
tremely high attitudes Even If it did man
age to &c through the enemy's defenses, the
B-36 would be suited only for the indiscrim-
mate bombing OF his metropolitan centers.
Precision bombing is possible only with
lower-fying, faster planes, which necessarily
have shorter range than the B-36. Since
we cannot depend on the availability Of suit
able land bases such planes can be brought
within range of target areas in Russia only
by means of aircraft carriers. That, think,
is the heart of Admiral Radford's, and pre-
sumably the Navy's, position.
In my opinion the fallacy in the argument
is that it overlooks the fact that Russia does
have the atomic bomb. Knowing that we
must be prepared for the possibility that the
next war will start with an unannounced
atomic blitz on our cities. We cannot af-
ford to assume less. And the only preven-
tive. failing a system Of international con-
trolls, is to have the machinery for instant
retaliation-to have in being the means by
which great numbers of atomic bombs may
be suddenly dropped upon the Russian cities
or upon the cities of any other nation that
may have the bomb.
The relative merits of the B-36 and of the
Nays proposed super-carriers should be
weighed with that primary objective In
mind. A. H.