Chicago world. (Chicago, Ill.) 1918-????, 1949-02-12


FIGHTER: The Memoirs of
Claire Lee Chennault, Major
General, U. S. a. (ret) giving
on-the-spot info nation on the
seriousness of the present
situation in China.
Continued from last weekly
These, then, are the stakes Tor
which We are playing in China.
Ii China remains friendly to the
United States, the Russians will
dare not move deeper into Eur
ope leaving their vitals exposed
on the Asiatic flank. If the Asia
tic flank is secured and Ameri-
can airpower is pushed out be-
yond a critical range, then the
way will be open for new and
mere powerful ventures in Eur
ape.
1t is now obvious that the
United States played its prewar
hand in Asia badly. In::ics Jap
anese aggression in Manchuria
during 1881 and 1882 was the
tip-off to the potential agrees
sors that the world would not
be organized on a basis of col
lective security. 1t showed clear
ly that the western powers would
not stick together to keep the
peac. 1t is the answer to precise
ly this same question that the
Russians are probing Ior today.
On this answer Viii depend their
n ,ure plans. Oar record III China
| SO far has provided them with
The same answer as in 1881. If
our China policy continues along
its present course the Russians
will probably he justified in con
Guiding that our determination to
preserve the peace is no strong
e. now than that of the Western
nations in 1931-32 In that case,
Their decision will favor further
agr ession that can only lead to
war.
after Japanese attacks on
China i'll 1897 the United States
fsi-ed to enforce its E.Open Door
-FC ICY i'll China and allowed
Ja.uan to exclude us from the
iaLgtze and Ghina's costal ports
At The same time the United
States sold enormous quantities
o. sgrap iron, oil, and aviation
supplies to Japan. We were
! va ened from that fools dream
olc sunday morning by the sound
9 Japanese bombs blasting
t'e.,rl harbor
Our wartime policy in China
f&ied o retrieve our prewaI
lls5e Prlmariliy because of the
--adlr5llp Of Gneral Joseph w
st ~ we tailed to achieve
T. h military or the politi
al Ayactiyes desired in China
I 1,oJ lllil Stillwell was succeed
led 3y Lieutenant General Albert
G. Wodemeyer cid American pol
lev in China bear any resembl
ance to that of two allies fight
immediately after the wal
Wedemeyer continued to execute
a firm and constructive policy
Already he had regained much
of 5he ground lost by Stilwell and
had promising prospects of com
plete success. Collapse of Japan
found the Generalissimo's armies
4 still in South and West China
far from the vital ports and in
dustrial centers held by the Jap
anese. Chinese Communist arm
les, in contrast, lay along the
lower YargtZe valley and ear all
The major centers of North China,
; But III this race to relieve the
japanese, the United States pro-
vidd airlift and enabled the
lGeneralissmo's armies to leap
frog Communist forces in theil
path and occupy the key cities
!, Navy transports later moved
other Chinese divisions to Man
; Churian ports to begin occupa
!, tlon Of the vital area.
t To his everlasting credit, Wed
emeyer diagnosed the situation
: accurately and acted with thu
promptness and decision to aver
uhis initial Communist crisis an(
prevent the Chinese Communist:
from taking over control o
China's key areas from the Jap
anese. Later Wedemeyer made
a thorough study Of China's pos
war problms and blueprinted /;
detailed plan for the type anC
quantity Of American aid re
quired to help the Chinese effec
tivelyQ reorganize their shatter
ed country. The recommends
tons of his repor were no only
ignored but the report itself was
ruthlessly suppressed, and, the
American people and their Con,
5resS have been deprived Of the
testimony Of a man who is per.
hapS our best authority on most.