Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1949-05-28
What About Austria?

What About Austria?
The placing OF an Austrian peace treaty
on the agenda Of the Big -Four Foreign
Ministers Conference in Paris raises re-
newed hope that this contentious issue
may at last be settled.
That 1t should ever have become an
issue involves what is perhaps the most
glazing injustice Of Europe's postwar
period. For in both law and equity, Aus
tria was entitled to a peace treaty almost
automatically. Long before the close of
the war itself, America, Britain and the
Soviet Union had concluded q specific
agreement over Austria. Declaring the
"Anschluss" or union of Austria with Nazi
Germany to be legally null and void, the
big Three" declared Austria to be con-
sidered, not an enemy, but country to be
liberated" and they jointly pledged the
"re-establishment Of q free and independ-
ent Austria" The word "re-establishment"
implied the restoration of Austrias pre-
Anschluss frontiers, while its liberated"
status equally implied that no war repara-
lions or indemnity would be exacted. The
fourfold Allied military occupation of Aus
tria after the expulsion of the Nazis in the
spring Of 1945, though similar In form to
that OF Germany, was declared to be
merely temporary prelude to the restora-
ton of democratic government. Indeed,
free elections were soon held for a native
regime recognized by the occupying powers
as representative and valid.
However, in face Of all this, when the
Foreign Ministers Council took up the
actual negotiation of an Austrian peace
treaty, Soviet Russia disclosed an attitude
wholly at variance with its pledged obliga-
tons. Moscow demanded 4 huge sum as
disguised reparations together with special
privileges which would have made Austria
It's economic vassal In addition, Moscow
backed a Yugoslav claim to large slice
of Austrian territory. And Moscow stood
pat on these demands, despite the argu-
ments and indignant protests Of the West
ern Powers.
Thus began a diplomatic deadlock that
has lasted more than three years The
Foreign Ministers Council presently re-
ferred the issue to subcommittee Of
deputies who met time after time, only to
adjourn eventually in futility. Meanwhile,
tiny Austria, sliced into four occupation
zones, mercilessly exploited by the Rus
slams, and subjected to continuous Com
munist intrigues, lay economically pros
trate, saved from collapse chiefly by
American subsidies.
Moscow's willingness again to discuss the
issue at the highest diplomatic level nat
urally arouses interesting speculation as to
its reasons for so doing. So far as Austria
itself is concerned, Soviet hopes have been
disappointed even more erievously than in
Germany. Communism has virtually no
foothoid among the people, which is
staunchly democratic and devoted to West
ern ideals. Economically, the Soviet zone
has become liability rather than an asset.
Finally. Moscow has found it impossible
to sway the Yugoslayias OF Marshal Tito by
espouSing % territorial claims. Austria's
chief remaining value to Moscow Is that its
occupation provides = legal excuse for
retaining Russian troops in Hungary and
Romania rs chain of communications for
its occupation forces in Austria However,
1t may be that, by this time, the Commu-
mist regimes installed in those countries
have become strong enough to maintain
themselves without the physical presence
OF Russian soldiery. Furthermore, evacua-
ton OF all foreign troops from Austria
under a peace treaty could be used by
Moscow as an argument for similar action
in Germany.
Such reasoning is, of course purely spec
ulative and hypothetical. When Austria
comes up for actual discussion at Paris,
Soviet diplomacy may show itself as In
transigeant rs ever. Yet changed condi-
tons could make Moscow adopt an attitude
less unyielding than in the past.