Evening star., 1949-06-27
Evs. OF sna ar.lseE

The Federal Bureau Of Investigation has
had many Sethacks IN is LONG and sor-ae-
times sAnsulnAry warfare On public enemies.
but none o, mere tolting impact than the
disclosure OF It's confidential nles at the
Coplon trial
When Attorney General Clark decided 70
overrule Director J. Edgar Hoover O. tire
FBI and TO permit the Introduction N court
Of volum!nous investiga;lve records re was
assuming a tremendous responsibility. To
Mr. Clark /. was choice between two evils.
Either he must agree to the introduction O.
all the Governments evidence. as required
by Judge Reeves. or he must drop the prose
eution o! q case which has aroused vide
public Interest.
In choosing to continue the prosecution
the Attorney General evidently felt that
Mr.. Hoover was attaching too much i'm
portance TO the Sanctity O. FBI fles-oT at
least 70 the particular files involved In the
Coplon case
That Mr.. Hoover attaches great impor-
tance to this matter Of safeguarding the
integrity OF the agencys files there can be
no question. To him the very integrity Of
the FBI. to say nothing Of its future use
fulness to the Nation. depends on the in
tegrity OF its files
A Body Blow 70 Integrity.
And. TO the FBI. the release OF is con-
fidential memoranda. reports and other
documents-including information from I'm
reliable as wen as reliable informants-was
q body blow to its traditional integrity. II
was more than that. 1t was q potentially
devastating shock TO Its whole modus oper-
andi. For many Of the FBIs famous cases
have started With . tip by q confidential
informant" The bureau has learned by
experience that it cannot AFFORD TO overlook
or to reject as palpably preposterous-any
report or any ruuor or any spite gossip"
that may come to It, Even seemingly SIAN
derous spite gossip" at times has turned up
spies or dangerous criminals.
Director Hoover objected strenuously TO
the release Of his files because he was GER
tain it would have two disastrous effects:
First the fear Of publicity would deter cit-
zens from cooperating In the future with
the FBI in providing leads for investigation:
and. second. the ~elease Of confidential files
involved disclosures. or the threat OF dis
closures. that would shut of Immediately
certain sources Of information OF inestimable
value in protecting the Nations security.
The FBI will not comment. OF course. on
what sources Of Information have been closed
to it as q result Of the decision to let the
files become a public record. Revelations in
the New York trial Of II Communist leaders
show, however. that the FBI has had
undercoyer agents within the innermost CIR
cles of the Communist Party. Seven such
agents. by their own consent. have taken
the witness stand and given damaging testi-
mony against the obviously surprised and
outraged defendants. The fact that the FB1
was willing to sacrifice these seven sources
indicates that 1t felt 1t had sufficient addi-
tional sources to Offset the losses. But the
bureau did not anticipate that there would
occur in another court an action that would
pose the threat Of further serious losses.
through detection Of informants.
Important Contacts Lost.
It Is reported that such defections in con-
siderable numbers already have occurred.
It was hinted st the Coplon trial that the
FBI even had conndeutial informant In
side the Russian Embassy. The gravity OF
the loss OF such an important channel Is
apparent, In view Of the disclosure in the
Canadian inquiry into Russian espionage
that Soviet embassies and legations are
headquarters Of Moscow directed spy rings
In democratic countries
Most Of these contacts" have been
established only after years Of painstaking
effort. It takes . long time for an FBI
undercover agent to insinuate himself into
q position Of trust In an espionage ring or
q criminal gang. The lives Of such inform
ants are In constant peril. Any serious
threat Of exposure Is enough to end their
usefulness as far as the FBI-and the Ma
tion-is concerned. And the task OF build
ing up new sources OF information becomes