Evening star., 1949-10-20

for a super aircraft carrier I have
been governed by the prescribed
functions of the Navy. If the ex-
isting carriers are adequate for these
primary tasks then the construction
of super carrier cannot be justified.
The fundamental purpose for which
the super aircraft carrier is designed
Is included within primary function
of the Air Force, which already
has adequate means and capabilities
to perform this function.
The U. S. S. r., except possibly in
the field of submarine warfare, is
not naval power of consequence.
Further, the U. S. S. r. Is not de-
pendent on maritime shipping to
reach sources of raw materials
Thus. the vast preponderance of
Allied naval power-which in addi-
ton to the United States Fleet,
overwhelmingly the largest in the
world, includes the second naval
power, the British Empire, and the
additional naval forces of other po-
tential allies-will have but little
opportunity to operate against Rus
sian surface vessels and should be
more than adequate to cope with
the major naval threat, the hostile
submarine. \" ",
The budget implications are such
as to interfere seriously with the
efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
create the minimum balanced mill
tary forces, land sea and air, to
provide for the security of the
United States, within the present
budget limitations. The construction
OF this super aircraft carrier will in
volve large expenditures Of funds,
and manpower, and will
require extensive accessories for it's
operations and protection, such as
planes, anti-aircraft ships, cruisers,
destroyers, and other auxiliary YES
sells. Increasing political commit
ments, recently proved long range
of land based bombers,
and the calculated risks we are &C
cepting in other important fields in
all three services are additional
factors that I have carefully con-
sidered.
Therefore. I conclude that it is
militarily unsound to authorize at
this time the construction of ad-
ditional aircraft carriers or to con-
tinue expenditures on the U. S. S.
United States"
Lack of Loyalty"
In the lengthy presentation that
has developed this second charge
which I am discussing, there has
been a continuing undercurrent and
an occasional specific outburst of
the insinuation that those RESPONSE
bic for war planning-the Joint
Chiefs of Staff-are ignorant as to
how a war should be carried on.
Even If I were not personally in
volved, I would harbor a distaste for
such lack of loyalty and for the
unfounded insinuations about men
who have earned their way on rec
ord and accomplishment to po-
sitions of grave national RESPONSE
bility. 80
Frankly, for the benefit of tn.
whole world, both our friends and
our enemies, I would like to see some
retraction of the record of the
allegations made; and some state
ment Of confidence to these respon-
sible men that might serve as a
renewed impetus to- their continued
cooperation and unity in approach
ing the responsibilities that have
been thrust upon them. -.
Closely related to the charges
that the Navy's capabilities are not
understood by the Joint Chiefs Of
Staff, Is the corollary charge that
the Fleet Marine forces are being
reduced toward their ultimate de-
struction. This Is occurring, accord
ing to Marine witnesses, because
the Marine Corps is not adequately
represented on the Joint Chiefs Of
Staff level, or the little Chiefs"
level, or in the Planning Staff.
As We all know, the Marine Corps
is under the Department OF the
Navy, and they are represented by
their superior headquarters, by the
Secretary Of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations. And any
improper representation is a prob
lem to be resolved within that De-
partment.
AS long as ] am chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with
the responsibility of preparing the
agenda and guiding the meetings of
the Joint Chiefs OF Staff, the door
will always be open-both to my
own office and in the joint chiefs
conferences-for the proper presen-
tation Of Marine problems. =
Nays Low Morale.
There is another consideration
that first prompted the reopening
Of this investigation, and since has
been given close examination, espe-
cially as expressed by some of the
keen questions on the part of the
committee members. I speak of the
&NoSy ~" illOI dlC.
The United States Navy, with a
long record of courage and daring
and accomplishment, should have no
lack OF morale. 1t would seem, how
ever, that Navy leaders have lost
sight of the fact that men, not
machines, win wars and protect
the peace. Senior. officers decrying
the low morale of their forces evi-
IDENTIFY do not realize that the spirit
of the men is but a mirror of their
confidence in their leadership. =
There Is another discouraging
factor of unrest that merits COM
ment. In an objective campaign
for public attention. overzealous
enthusiasts stepped to the FORE
front as self-appointed martyrs,
impugning the integrity of senior
officers in other branches of the
service. With no malice, I would
like to offer some impartial advice
to all aspiring martyrs: To be sue
cessful in a sacrifice, he must be 100
per cent right; to be respected, a
martyr must be completely unselfsh
in thought and motivation; his
sacrifice must be for the good of
the entire Nation. Under such re-