Evening star., 1949-08-04
What We Cannot Afford

There may be good reasons why the
foreign military aid program, calling 1or
an initial outlay of ST ,450, 100000, should be
modified in some respects.
The bill as drafted, especially Section 5,
would confer an extraordinary peacetlme
grant OF power upon the President. That
section would authorize him to extend
aid to any nation, or any group within
nation, if, in his judgment, this would
promote the security of the United States.
One can conceive of situations in which 1t
might we'll be desirable for the President
to have such authority. The day may come
when we will wish that he had it. But
there is also an immediate problem to be
approval of the essentials of the program
as quickly as possible. This problem, in
its most serious aspect, takes the form OF
Republican and some Democratic oppo-
sition to the broad powers which would
be granted to the President. Should the
administration insist on getting all OF
these powers, the chances are that no
bill will be passed at this session. That
would be the worst thing that could hap
II,
negotiations looking toward some reason
able compromise are to be welcomed, both
on the grounds of wisdom and necessity.
It most certainly does not follow from
this however, that the arms program
should be watered down to the point where
it will fail of its purpose. This is no time
for a resurrection of that abiding curse
of democratic societies-the too-little- and
too-late complex. Unless willing to risk
the needless failure of all of our past
efforts to insure peaceful and prosperous
world, Congress should not now, in the
name of false economy, whittle down the
amount of money sought for this program.
General Marshall, who has reached a
station in life where he cannot possibly
be suspected of any ulterior motive, has
given some interesting testimony on this
point.
He told the committee considering the
arms program that he has always felt that
if his 1899 requests for military appropria-
tions had been met speedily and even to
a modest degree the late war would have
been shortened by at least six months,
it would have cost some $4,000 ,00O, 900 less,
and nundredS OF CnOuSanuS oI cdSudlties
would have been prevented.
In peacetime, Congress always tends to
ignore the advice of men whose records
are such as to inspire confidence in their
Judgment But the illustration mentioned
by General Marshall is something for the
legislators to think about. There cannot
be the slightest doubt that false economy
in the prewar days cost us very, very
heavily when the fighting began. No SEN
sible person wants to repeat that expert
ence. It is true, of course, that we ought
not to permit spending abroad to seriously
weaken our own economy. But as General
N>rshau rather aptly expressed it, this
question is not merely one of how much
we can afford to spend. There Is also the
question of how much we can afford not
to spend If we are to avoid truly crushing
outlays later on.
It is the function Of Congress to strike
this balance But the decision should be
a realistic one, taking full account of the
factors in our own economic situation
which suggest that we can afford to make
the expenditures requested, and equally
full account of the factors in the lnterna-
tional situation which suggest that we
cannot afford not to make them.