Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1949-12-02
CONTINUED From First Page)

of the United States, composed OF
the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, Chief of Naval Oper-
ationS and the Chief of the United
States Air Forces. After Pearl
Harbor. when the British chiefs
and our chiefs met together, the
heads of the three branches were
present representing each coun-
try, and the combined Chiefs OF
Staff came into being.
Misgivings in Washington.
The three-pronged organization
for the United States was not &C
cepted by all agencies in Wash
ington without misgivings and
some hard feelings. Why not
have the chief of naval air, the
chief of our supply services, OF
the head of. the Marines repre-
sented? Why should the chief OF
the Army Air Forces be placed on
equal status with the Chief OF
Naval Operations and the Chief
of Staff of the United States
Army? AS member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, however, the
chief of our Army Air Forces was
accepted in that capacity, and has
continued so to act since that
time.
Prior to the creation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the agency
in existence for the employment
of our Armed Forces was the
Joint board. 1t was made up OF
senior Army and Navy officers,
Air officers being used only in an
advisory capacity, who had to rely
upon agreement" to get their
work done. Hence, such impossi-
BILE arrangements were accepted
as the plans for defense of Hawaii,
where everything hinged on
paramount interest" in japanese
planes coming in to destroy our
military and naval installations
and facilities. Under such cir
cumstances, just when does Navy
paramount interests stop and
Army paramount interest" start?
The joint board, and their plan
ners tried hard to show that the
shorellne was a good place to
switch commanders for defense of
Hawaii. However, as we all know
now, there was little time when
Jap planes were crossing the
shoreline to do much Of anything
about switching commanders.
Paramount interests" as a mill
tary method of deciding who
would be in command, went out
the window with Pearl Harbor.
War Speeded Unity.
During World War II, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, made up of Gen.
George c. Marshall, Admiral
Ernest King and myself, and
headed by Admiral William Leahy,
were able to make decisions and
reach accords that would have
been very difficult to attain in
time of peace. The stress of war,
the influence of our British OPP
posites, and a common objective,
namely, the defeat of Germany
and Japan, may have done the
trick. However, at that, there
were times when decisions were
mighty difficult to attain. For
instance, the question of unifica-
ton Of our Armed Services and
unity of command in the Pacific.
. 1lenns that were never
really solved in World War II.
The Navy had its ideas as to the
proper procedure for winning the
war; ideas that were Unborn in
their officers, who had been
schooled along certain lines for
many, many years. Had they not
adhered to such schooling, an
unnatural condition would have
existed. Similarly the Army off,
GERS and the Air officers had been
brought up to thing along certain
lines, to follow certain techniques.
They were just as sure they were
right and the Navy wrong.
What then could be expected
when these officers met for COM
pleting war plans or for coming
to an accord except dissension
and arguments? AS a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
almost five years, it soon became
apparent that it was easier to get
an accord of ideas among Leahy,
Marshall, King and myself than
it was among our planners, COM
mittee members and officers on
the working level. Yet some of
the best brains of the Army, Navy
and Air Force were used in ''pick
and shovel or spade" work on
these committees and boards.
Thinking on Broad Terms.
I have always held that Off
GERS of the f1ve-star rank should
think in terms of national prob
lens and interests, and use the ex-
kperience they have had for back
ground, to insure that the solution
of a problem is either practical
or impractical. I have always
thought that Leahy, Marshall and
King many, many times forgot the
color of their uniform and shoes,
and reached agreements, based,
not upon their effect upon the
Army. the Navy or the Air Force.
but based upon the winning of
the war in the quickest and most
effective manner; or upon what
was best for our country and our
Allies.
Now that peace, a synthetic
peace. prevails throughout the
world, the impetus of defeating q
common enemy is gone. We now
find the members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff ofttimes thinking
more of what is good for their
particular branches of the armed
services than for the security of
our country. Just look at the
mixup in the Joint Chiefs of staff
during tbe noe CT fou r,oopflc