Evening star., 1949-10-24
Letters to The Star
Admiral Zacharias' Comment
On the Bradley Testimony

AOllNlS "
Admiral Zacharias' Comment
On the Bradley Testimony
To the Editor OF The Star:
General Bradley, in his testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, re-
membered one of the fundamentals of war;
offense. But his many friends and admirers
/ were chagrined that he was preSsured into
the ill-advised and vitriolc statement before
the committee. They feel that he has lost
much of the stature patiently constructed
through years of conscientious and effective
work.
Why did General Bradley have to defend
himself? 1t was necessary on two counts
First, because as Chief of Staff Of the Army,
he was at the center Of impact of the diverse
forces working for administrative control of
the Army by the General Staff, power
never intended when the General Staff was
established in 1903. These forces had, as
"quid pro quo," the elimination of the Ma
rine Corps to enhance the position Of the
Army. 1t sparked the agitation for the sepa-
rate Air Force and Department of the Air.
with an objective Of complete control or
emasculation Of Naval and Marine Corps
aviation. Are there not Congressman who
have seen the order which was placed upon
the desk of the Secretary Of Defense to COM
pletely absorb Naval and Marine Corps avia-
ton into the Air Force? And, secondly, as
chairman OF the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
eral Bradley, whose main function was to
act as arbiter in all disputes and to advise
the President, was urged into deviation
from his duties.
Underlying Reasons for Large Carrier.
How has General Bradley's stature suf-
fered? During recent weeks, he, with Gen.
eral Vandenberg, chief of the Air Force, and
others who reluctantly went aboard an air
craft carrier, witnessed for the first time and
at close range that vital component of sea-
power, naval aviation in action. What. there
fore, qualified General Bradley to make an
arbitrary decision that the new carrier
United States was not necessary for the job
Of controlling the seas? In returning to the
committee to correct his original statement,
he admitted that he had previously agreed
to such a carrier. but gave as the reason
that 1t had been approved by higher au-
thority. and accepted 1t as fait accom-
pill" Does this mean that under such con-
dttions he would never express himself sin
cerely and forcefully? Does General Brad
ley's concept of control of the seas really
extend only to anti-submarine work and
keeping the sea lanes open only against sur
face craft? Does he really not realize that
Navy to perform its functions at a greater
distance from the shore than previously be-
cause of Russian improvements In shore
based aircraft? Does he believe that inter-
continental bombers will keep Russian shore
based aircraft from the Atlantic? If not.
how would he propose to keep our sea lanes
open? He should remember the cold fact
that no modern large aircraft carrier has
eDer been sunk, and also that no carrier of
the U. S. has euer been sunk BY shore-based
aircraft. The Navys demand for a larger
carrier is to maintain that high standard of
performance. And. incidentally, if we do
have another war. our people will not care
Dho delivers the blows, or how many, even
though it involves the atom bomb or in
fringes upon that nebulous term and pre-
rogative now called strategic Bombing"
We must keep our defenses within the safe
limits OF domestic economy at least until war
Is imminent. But In so doing we cannot risk
unsound and unproven theories. General
Bradley said: II predict that large scale
amphibious operations such as those in
Sicily and Normandy will never occur again."
It was that type of thinking which built the
French Maginot line. That was the type of
thinking which persuaded Goering to send
masses OF bombers over to England unpro-
tected by fighters, and thereby lost the war
for the Germans. That was the type, of
thinking which gave England separate air
force and an emasculated Naval aviation,
thereby permitting the Scandinavian inva-
sion by Germany and without which the war
in Europe would have been brought to
much earlier conclusion.
Holds Bikini Was Not a Real Test.
General Bradley said: "Bikini and Eniwe-
tok revealed that the Navy afioat is one of
the most profitable targets for an enemy
with an atomic bomb" Does he really fail
to realize that those tests were on anchored
or immobile targets? Does he really feel
that the Navy, at least has not learned the
lessons Of Pearl Harbor? Does his knowledge
of atomic bomb production preclude realis-
tic concept that the world will never have
sufficient atomic bombs to drop them pro-
miscuously on ships at sea, with mobility
and the means Of preventing large slow
bomber from getting through to a profitable
target?
Even casual analysis of other statements
reveals that nothing constructive has been
added to the controversy. They do not re-
fute. IN any way, the expert testimony Of
specialists or add considerations which might
help our Congress to arrive at the right an
swer. The vindictive references to the Ma
rines participation in two amphibious
assaults and to the Fancy Dams" were not
based upon either moral values or the facts.
Everyone knows that it ,oas the Marines who
developed the techniques used, and taught
the Army all that they know Of amphibious
operations. At the time the Marines were
very busy in the Pacific.
AS for the opprobrium Fancy Dams" we
don't seem to have them in the Navy I hope
that he did not mean Dan" Callaghan and
Norman Scott, two admirals who gave their
lives slugging 1t out in the front lines"
against superior Japanese naval forces a
situation normal for Naval High Command
In time Of war. But General Bradley should
know that opportunity to get into the front
lines is not matter of choice.
As for his reference that onlv "a feu, ara