Evening star., 1949-01-31

| China in recent weeks have given rise to the
| most serious concern on the part of every re-
| nective person interested, as nearly all Ameri-
| cans are interested, In the possible adverse
| effects of these Developments not only upon
the immediate policies of the United States in
the Far East, but also upon the ultimate basic
safety of our country In many quarters we
hear only defeatiSt strain of comment The
cartoonists have resurrected the grim harpies
of World War II that appropriately were desig-
mated TOO Little" and TOO Late" There also
is great deal of wishful thinking to the effect
that China and the Chinese people will absorb
the Communist invasion without radical social
or theological changes, and that therefore our
national policy should be kept on the wait
and see level Distinguished authorities assure
us that China Is too big" for the Russian
Communist government to remake after its
own image The dominant opinion seems to
be that the situation in China is altogether
beyond the control of the United States,
whether for good or ILL
am going to venture the assertions that
these tendencies in contemporary thought in
the United States comprise many fallacies;
and that their net effect is to induce Americans
on insufficient grounds to support policy of
inaction with respect to China at critical and
formative time. For example, let us reconsider
the proposition above stated that the Reds
will not be able to remake China. While it is
true that the Chinese population is enormous
and hard for any one revolutionary clique to
handle, still this population is exhausted for
the time being, both economically and spirit
ually. and very likely may prove to an ex-
ceptiopal degree responsive to the demands OF
the triumphant Communists. China histori-
caly has been an authoritarian state, ard the
theory Of autocratic government has been ac-
cepted there for centuries. The Communist
dictatorship is much more in accord with au-
thentic Chinese traditions in governmental
organization than democratic government ever
can be. AS to the economic system, almost
anything will seem an improvement over the
present chaotic conditions, and the Commu-
nists, If once established in governmental pow
er, may we'll appear as the creators of an in
trinscally modest but relatively important
degree of economic prosperity.
Furthermore, the great weight Of Chinese
resources AMI manpower effectively can be
placed in opposition to the United States,
without remakng Chinese life in any radi-
cal sense. The Communists will find it easy
enough if they are left alone, to dominate
all the main channels of public information
in China With press and radio giving forth
ganda and corrective information excluded,
China we'll may become possessed of public
opinion thoroughly hostile to the United
States, even though economic life in China
remains on more individualistic basis than
life in the Soviet Union proper Further
more, the Communist dominated government
will be able to take up and maintain a hos
tile attitude toward the United States in
all diplomatic situations and in the Security
Council OF the United Nations. quite ire
spective of whether. the supposedly recalcitrant
peasants of China have been thoroughly
collectivized or not.
American Power to Do Something.
Now, it is not true that the United States
is without power to take any effective action
with regard to the Chinese situation. Our
policy should be to encourage resistance to
the Communist advance and delay the con-
solidation of Communist power in China.
For this purpose we might we'll make a
diplomatic offer to Chang Kai-shek to give
lasting support to any resistance government
that he might head, irrespective of the pos
sible surrender of Chiangs successors at
Nanking. A. any rate, we should declare
ourselves to be on the anti-Communist side
in China and take an unequivocal stand in
government. These positions should be main:
tanned throughout all the vicissitudes Of
fortune in the future. We then incidentally,
would retain realistic ground for protect
ing the present Chinese delegatse to the Sc
curity Council and the Assembly Of the
United Nations, as the authentic representa-
tives of the great power, China.
There are three principal objections to
such a course. First, that we would then
be backing the wrong horse Second, that
such policy might lead shortly to shoot
ing war with Communist China and perhaps
with Soviet Russia. Third, that any such
effort would prolong the civil war in China
and the consequent suffering of the Chinese
people
The first of these arguments appeals to the
natural instinct to be on the winning side, to
climb on the band wagon. But in the present
context the analogy is misleading We cannot
climb on the Communist band wagon, even if
we wanted to. The Communists in China, as
elsewhere, regard us as enemies. as the recent
statements of Gen. Mao, the Communist chief
tain. indicated. We cannot "appease" the
Communists by standing aloof from the present
contest, but by that policy we can lose all, or
nearly all, of our friends in China, actual or
potential
The validity of the second objection depends
entirely on the form our interventionist ac-
tion takes. The physical basis of American
power in the Far East is our sea power We
at present can limit the advance of Communist
aggression at the edge of the salt water The
project, apparently entertained by Generals
simo Chang Kai-shek of seeking a refuge in
Formosa is one that we could support effec-
lively. AS pointed out by Lothrop Stoddard in
his Illuminating article in The Star recently,
the success of this Formosa project depends
largely on the support and cooperation OF
the Formosa population. But in this relation
ship, the demonstration of our overwhelming
naval power on the side of Chiang's govern
ment in exile well might prove decisive with
that population, which is fundamentally pro-
Chinese and anti Communist though presently
somewhat disaffected toward the Kuomintang