Evening star., 1949-09-28
Continued From First Page)

one Of his daily sessions at the
White House at which he briefs
the President on international
developments during the previous
"a hours. His information is
based on evaluated reports from
the Central Intelligence and other
Government agencies.
He was able to make this par
ticular report because for the
past 20 months there has been
In existence a worldwide co-or-
dnated network Of intelligence
units set up In cooperation with
the Atomic Energy Commission.
The nature of this network is top
secret and it can be mentioned
now only because the Kremlin
must know that we could not have
detected an explosion in Russia
vices.
At the time Of the first Souers'
report, there was no conclusive
proof that the explosion was Of
atomic origin. It could have been
caused by an earthquake, the
blowing up of a chemical plant or
blasting for a hydro-electric prof.
ect. All governmental intelligence
units were alerted to verify the
blast and to find out the cause.
1t was essential to have positive
proof.
BY means which no official will
discuss, the approximate time and
place Of the explosion were def
nitely verified and fashionable ma
terial was established as the cause
early last week. 1t will be recalled
that Secretary Of State Acheson
told the United Nations that for
his own purposes he was assuming
that the Russians had made a
weapon which had exploded. He
gave no inkling whether the ex-
plosion had been accidental or
planned.
Problem of Timing.
After the atomic nature of the
blast had been definitely verified,
the White House was confronted
with the delicate problems of tim
ing the announcement to this
country and the rest of the world
and Of deciding what should be
said in the announcement.
For national security. economic
and legal reasons there was a
division among the Presidents
closest advisers.
One group thought the Nc
Mahon atomic energy law re-
quired that the information be
made public Immediately. This
law stipulates that the Atomic
Energy Commission shall keep
the Joint (CongressionaD Com
mittee (on Atomic Energy fully
and currently informed with
respect to the Commissions activ-
ities."
There also was the question of
informing the British and Cana
dian governments, including Brit
ish Foreign Minister Bevin, then
at the United Nations sessions.
Danger of Leak
Although the information was
known only to a handful of Gov.
ernment officials, there also was
danger Of an inadvertent leak"
by some scientist who might make
an assurate deduction from meag-
er material. Finally there were the
possibilities that Soviet Foreign
Minister Vishinsky might make
the disclosure in a spectacular
speech at the United Nations
meeting, or Prime Minister Stain
might announce it at a time favor
able to the Kremlin.
Another group pointed out that
It would be dangerous to make
the announcement on top of Brit
aims devaluation of the pound,
which was shaking all Europe. and
while this country was threatened
by steel and coal strikes. 1t was
feared that another d-shaking
announcement might cause chaos
In Europe and hysteria in this
country. To guard against this,
a few of the top national defense
officers were alerted.
Finally, there was the question
of the impending Senate vote on
the foreign military aid program.
If the announcement was made
before the final vote, many poll
ticians and others would have
charged that it was a political
maneuver to frighten the Senate
into approving the $1,314,000, 900
measure.
The President, as Commander in
Chief, had to make the ultimate
decision. Admiral Souers care
fully avoided voicing any personal
opinion. His duty was to give the
President the benefit Of all views.
MIR. Truman was adamant against
making the announcement before
the Senate had voted on the arms
program.
Ross Called Into Discussion.
Charles G. Ross, the White
House press secretary, was called
LOST.