Evening star., 1949-10-28
The First Head Falls

secretary Matthew's mas dCteu Ill az
cordance with military tradition older
than our Navy in ridding himself OF a
subordinate with whom, he felt, he could
no longer work. Under the circumstances
outlined in his letter to the President he
had no alternative, unless it was to remove
himself as Secretary of the Navy.
But the country is not going to accept
mere official incompatibility between the
civilian and the military heads OF the
Navy as the real reason for Admiral Den
fields removal The incident savors too
much of retaliation, of punishment to
Admiral Denfeld for speaking frankly at
the recent House hearings.
Mr. Matthews evidently had that in
mind when he phraSed his letter to the
President asking Admiral Denfeld'S trans
fer. He carefully notes October 4 as the
day on which he became convinced, and
so informed Admiral Denfeld, that his
usefulness as Chief of Naval Operations
seemed to be over. That was more than
q week in advance of Admiral Denfelds
testimony on, october 13.
What happened Immediately preceding
October 4? 1t was on October that
Captain Crommelin slipped to the press
services the sheaf of letters from the
admirals, including the final Endorsement
of Admiral Denfeld which bore his asser-
ton that "a Navy stripped of it's offensive
power means a Nation stripped of its
offensive power"
If Secretary Matthews mention Of
October 4 implies that Admiral Denfeld
was involved in any way in the release
of the correspondence, or in making 1t
available to Captain Crommelin, that
should be stated as fact. The same
thing is true if the Secretarys complaint
runs to any other specific thing that
Admiral Denfeld did or refused to do. For
as matters stand, the admiral is condemned
by innuendo, and the people of this coun-
try will not and should not accept that as
valid ground for his dismissal
Admiral Denfeld's personal fate is un-
important He might have put himself,
and the Navy, in stronger position had
he availed himself of another tradition
Of command and requested relief on the
ground that he could not conscientiously
carry out the orders of his superiors. Be
that as it may, the important question
now is the effect of the business on unidca-
ton in its relation to national defense.
The effect is apt to be bad. Admiral
Denfeld has not expressed mere personal
opinion. He has expressed, with other
distinguished Navy men who proved them
selves in action, considered and profess
sional protest against the procedure, under
unifcation, by which final decisions are
reached in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by
the Secretary of Defense. The source of
this protest wins respect for it. But Ad-
miral Denfeld's removal will be interpreted
as meaning that the Navy's protest is going
to be answered by Furnishing those who
express it, rather than by persuading them
that it is not sound or meeting them part
way by amending the parts of procedure
which cause their discontinue.
The resulting picture is not conducive
to public confidence. If unif1cations prog
ress depends on selection of Navy officers
who happen to agree with the Secretary
of Defense and his allies in the Air Force
and the Army, there is reason to doubt
that progress will be in the right direction.
Admiral Denfeld's successor is going to
have no easy row to hoe. And friends of
the Navy are not going to overlook the
seeming insult, added to injury, in the fact
that Admiral Denfeld was fired on the
abandoned anniversary of Navy Day-and
that he learned about it after the decision
had been announced to the press by the
Commander in Chief.