Evening star., 1948-02-28
By cordell Hull
assisted BY Andrew essdinS)
CHAPTER xxx.

BY Cordell Hull
(Assistsd BY Andrew Besdins)
CHAPTER xxx.
When the Russian Army began
to push into Romania in April
1914, the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the Balkans came
to the forefront OF our diplomacy.
A stir Of speculation arose In the
press Of many countries rs tc
whether Russias aims were those
Of liberation or Of acquisition. Sud-
denly British Ambassador Halifax
inquired of me on May 30, 1914, how
this Government would feel about
Ian arrangement between the Brit
ish and Russians whereby Russia
could have q controlling influence
in Romania and Britain . con-
trolling influence in Greece.
He handed me Q written COM
|munication from his government
asking whether We had any ob1ec-
tion to an agreement between Brit
ain and Russia whereby, In the
main, Rumanian affairs should be
the concern Of the Soviet govern
ment and Greek affairs the concern
Of the United Kingdom. This Brit
ish-R Russian understanding would
apply only to war conditions and
would not affect the rights and re-
sponsibilities which each Of the
three great powers would have to
exercise at the peace settlement.
The British Foreign Once said
that the United Kingdom govern
ment was fully alive to the impor-
tance of avoiding even the appear
ance of carving up the Balkans into
spheres Of influence.
Opposed Spheres Of Influence.
After telling Halifax that I would
give this serious consideration, I
said pointblank:
eat first blush, in view Of the
many charges and countercharges
now rising-and which will certain
ly rise In the future-about en-
croachments first by one govern
ment and then by another on the
economic, political. military Of
other European countries, 1t would
be doubtful course to abandon our
broad basic declaration Of policy,
principles and practice"
I was, in fact, flatly opposed to
any division Of Europe or sections
of Europe into spheres Of influence.
I had argued against this strongly
at the Moscow Conference. It
seemed to me that any creation OF
zones Of influence would inevitably
sow the seeds Of future conflict. I
felt that zones of influence could
not but derogate from the overall
authority of the international Sc
curity organization which I expected
would come into being.
I was not, and am not, q believer
in the idea Of balance Of power or
spheres of influence as . means Of
keeping the peace.
On the following day, May 81,
Prime Minister Churchill, to whom
Halifax's cable reporting my re-
marks was undoubtedly communi-
Gated, sent the President . telegram
direct in which he argued strongly
for our approval Of the proposed
agreement. He emphasized that
Britain did not wish to cut up the
Balkans into areas Of influence, that
the arrangement would apply only
to war conditions, and that there
would be no change In the present
collaboration between the American
and British governments in formu-
lating and executing the policy Of
the Allies toward Greece and Ro-
mania.
His telegram contained two addi-
tional items Of information. One
was that 1t was the British govern
ment which had suggested the
agreement to Russian Ambassador
Gousev In London. The second wal
that the Russians informed the Brit
ish on May 18 that they were IN
agreement with the suggestion, but
before they could give any final as
surances they would ike to know
whether the United States Govern
ment had been consulted and
whether we were In agreement with
the arrangement.
Mr.. Roosevelt sent this telegram
to me for consideration and to draft
reply.
My associates at the State De-
partment agreed with the original
attitude had taken with Lord Hall
fax, namely, that we could not lend
our support to any such agreement
and, in fact, should do what we
could to discourage 1t.
While this reply was being pre-
pared in the department, another
message arrived from the Prime
Minister on June 8. He again said
there was no question Of spheres Of
influence being involved. But he
added that, although we all had, tc
act together, some one must play
the hand.