Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-02-06
The Memoirs Of CordeTHuT
|WeIIes Sold Roosevelt on World Peace PorIey
AT White House in 81 but Plan Fell Throug

vance. The conference should nos
be called an economic confer
ence" but q peace congress"
When I found that the President
was all for going ahead with the
Armistice Day drama In the White
House, I earnestly argued against
the project as being Illogical and
impossible. I outlined the situation
to Mr.. Roosevelt as I saw 1t.
At this late stage in 1887. Ger
many, Japan and italy had pushed
their rearmament so far that there
could be no doubt 1t was intended
for offense, not defense, for con.
quest, not for peace. It would DO
fatal to lull the democracies into .
feeling of tranquility through o
peace congress, at the very moment
when their utmost efforts should
actually be directed toward arming
themselves for self-defense. The
Axis powers would laugh ut any
such belated request of the peacs-
full nations for diarmament.
Even If an agreement could b
reached, of what value would 1t be2
All three members of the Axis had
demonstrated repeatedly their total
disregard for their pledged word
and their contempt for treaties.
The very word treaty" had be-
come a hiss and a byword with
Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese.
Mussolini Rejected Plan.
The President already had had
an idea of Axis reaction to his ap-
peals when Mussolini replied that.
having modified a million men
and spent 2,000, 900, 900 Ira, he sim
ply had to invade Ethiopia or his
prestige would be destroyed and he
would incur the disdain of other
countries. He truly echoed the
sentiment Of his Axis partners
They, too, had mobilized millions
of men and spent billions Of marks
and yen, and they meant to take
what they could. 4
Welles' somewhat pyrotechnical
plan was to be sprung" on Armis-
tice Day, without any advance con.
sultation or sounding out Of the
other nations. Not to ascertain in
advance the opinion of Britain and
France, at least, seemed unwise and
unfair. They were at that moment
engaged in delicate negotiations
with Germany and Italy; they were
trying to keep alive and functioning
the Nonintervention Committee for
Spain: and to spring" so ambitious
a project on them without warning
might seriously embarrass them.
In June, 1887, Norman Davis,
then in London. had sounded out
Prime Minister Chamberlain on the
prospect of visit to Washington to
see the President. Mr.. Roosevelt
was willing to extend the invitation
but thought it best for Chamberlain
to come after Congress adjourned In
September, and he also thought
that careful diplomatic preparations
should be made in advance Of the
visit.
Chamberlain Refused Bid.
Chamberlain wrote q letter to
Davis on July 8 and Davis forward
ed it to the President and me, stat
ing that he must turn down the
idea of a meeting with the Presi-
dent in the autumn. He said he did
not think the time was ripe; that
nothing would be more disastrous
than that a conference, which would
inevitably attract the utmost pubs
licity, should fail to produce com.
mensurate results; and he did not
see at the present moment that We
could expect to achieve the purposes
we had in view.
AS for the Orient, Japan had made
| It clear she did not want Occidental
mediation between her and China
and there was little likelihood she
would attend a peace congress with
any intention Of agreeing to any
thing substantial
In the various conversations had
with the President on this subject
he did not take issue with the views
presented. Eventually the project
was abandoned and we proceeded
with our constant efforts to rearra
and to arouse public opinion to the
serious danger Of world confiagra-,
ton.
Copyright 194s, BY North American
Newspaper Alliance, lno) ::