Evening star., 1948-03-03
The Memoirs OF CordeD Hull
Roosevelt Staggered When Drastic Character
OF Morqenthuu Plan Was Pointed Out to Him


its major points with him.
The following day received from
the President memorandum he
had written me on September 20;
that is, before my talk with him on
October 1. It clearly revealed that
he had not realized the extent to
which, at Morgenthau's urging, he
had committed himself at Quebec.
'The real nub Of the situation"
he wrote, ''is to keep Britain from
going into complete bankruptcy at
the end of the war" This last SEN
tence he emphasized by mixing Q
double line alongside it.
The press during the last week
had come out with O number Of
articles indicating the drastic nature
LOT the postwar treatment Of Ger
many discussed at Quebec. This
furnished NaA propoganda agen-
cies with wonderful ammunition to
spur the Germans on to fight to
the end.
Somebody" the President said
In his memorandum" has been talk
ing not only out Of turn to the
papers or tsic) on facts which are
not fundamentally true.
mo one wants to make Germany
q wholly agricultural nation again,
and yet somebody down the line has
handed this out to the press. I wish
we could catch and chastise him.
(Secretary Stimson later in
formed me that the President
thought the news leak had oc-
CURED in the State Department.
BY showing the President the
article Of q columnist who first
came out with the story and who
was in close contact with GER
tain ofhcials in the Treasury,
Stimson said he convinced the
President that the leak had not
occurred In the State or War
Departmental
Aim to Save Britain.
"You know" the President con.
tinued, that before the war Ger
many was not only building UP war
manufacture, but was also building
up enough Of a foreign trade to
finance rearming suficiently and
still maintain enough international
credit to keep out Of international
bankruptcy.
II just cannot 60 along with the
idea Of seeing the British Empire
collapse financially, and Germany at
the same time building up a poten-
tial rearmament machine to make
another war possible in 20 years.
Mere inspection Of plants will not
prevent that.
But no one wants complete erad-
ication Of German industrial pro-
ductive capacity in the Ruhr and
Saar'."
My conversation with the Presi-
dent on October / had obviated the
need to take any action on his mem
orandum. This latter showed me.
however, the line of thought he had
been pursuing.
The Presidents memorandum also
showed plainly that he had not un-
derstood the meaning ofSwhat he
had agreed to at Quebec. At about
this time Secretary Stimson had a
talk with the President, from which
Stimson drew the same conclusion.
He informed me that he had there.
upon read to the President several
sentences from the Presidents
memorandum of September is, con-
cluding with the phrase. looking
forward to converting Germany in
to country primarily agricultural
and pastoral in its character" ''
"' " Roosevelt Staggered.
Stimson informed me that the
President was frankly staggered at
hearing these sentences and said
that he had no idea how he could
have initiated the memorandum and
that he had evidently done 50 with
out much thought.
In any event, the President,
after my conversation with him.
ceased to embrace Morgenthau's
ideas on Germany.
The ideas my associates and I had
stated in the memorandum Of Sep
tember 4 and 20, to which the War
generally subscribed,
and to which Britain and Russia
later agreed, became to some de-
gree those that were carried out
when Germany was occupied.
Nevertheless, Morgenthau did not
cease to press his philosophy of
Germany to the dust. and
his ideas had an adverse effect on
the Allied program for that coun-
try, resulting in a more drastic
plan than what we had in mind
at the State Department prior to
my resignation.
My talk with the President on
/ was my last important
item of business in his office.
was now on the verge Of the col
lapse that necessitated my resigna-
ton.
Copyright. 1o48 by North American
Newspaper Alliance.)