Evening star., 1948-11-07

tdCh Li4oI uldtlou Is WllQ W Tie
Are the big shots of the Kremlin as
hopeleSSly at sea about all aspects
Of western life as they are in the
small matter Of the warmongers?
And If so, is their ignorance of a
kind which might lead them to
underestimate the strength and de-
termination of the west and plunge
them prematurely into war?
Intelligence Appraisal
Obviously a straight answer is out
of the question. We can only glance
at probabilities. And first we must
divide Soviet intelligence into two
parts: The first part deals with ma
terial strength and resources; the
second with the imponderables-
popular morale, the readiness to
meet a challenge once that chal-
lenge is clearly seen for what it is,
the intentions of foreign govern
ments and the strength of local
Communists.
In wasteful and omnivoroEs
manner the Soviet secret service
Is ef1cient-as the Red Army III
wartime was efficient. From my
own experience in trying to work
with Red Army intelligence in Mos
cow during the war, I can say that
1t undoubtedly gets results. In
peacetime the output of useful in
telligence per man-hour is prob
ably the lowest in the world, but
the number of man-hours employed
on getting it is incomparably the
highest in the world. And, although
the central headquarters must be
by any but Russian standards ex-
cruciatingly unwieldly, it does piece
the Jigsaw together and produce an
adequate answer-when it comes to
facts and figures. And, in addition
to its Inultitudinous agents, whole
and part time, the Russians have
all the published matter of the
British and American press, the
indiscretions of soldiers, scientists
and politicians, and an immensely
valuable background of first-hand
information gathered during the
war, when whole armies of Soviet
military and civilian technicians
were free to look at almost any
factory or depot they chose. This
was part of the policy of teaching
the Russians to learn to trust us.
In other words, when 1t comes
to a straight appreciation of ma
terial forces the Politburo is likely
to be extremely well informed, with
slight temperamental bias in
favor OF an overestimate. springing
from the refusal of any Russian to
take anything at its face value.
Premises Often Wrong
When it comes to impondera bles
the story is different. We like
to think of the Russians as clever
In maneuyer; and so, in a highly
limited way, they are. They are
great chess players. They can see
more moves ahead than most other
people-given the correct premises
In chess they are given the
premises: The board, the chess
men, the rules. But in the game
OF international relations the
premises are not supplied. You
have to construct your own from
study of human nature, natural
laws and the psychology of differ
ent nations. 1t is here that the
Russians utterly fail. They get
their premises wrong, and on these
false premises they see an infinity
OF moves ahead. They did this
before they became Marxists. One
of the reasons why they became
Marxists, indeed, was their weak
ness for false premises. And the
Marxist dogma has played up to
that weakness. In the words of
the Short History of the Com
munist Party: THE power of the
Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the
fact that it enables the party to
find the right orientation in any
situation, to understand the inner
connection of events, to foresee thei'
course, and to perceive not only
how and in what direction they are
developing in the present, but also
how and In what direction they
are bound to develop in future"
This is not an abstraction, but an
article of faith. If any one doubts
the capacity of the human animal
to indoctrinate itself against the
truth let him examine q select
handful OF his own beliefs.
1t is also highly relevant to the
matter In hand. 1t is, for example,
where Mr.. Vishinskys warmongers
come in. According to the book,
warmongers must exist; therefore
they do. From my own observation
OF Mr.. Vishinsky at close quarters,
1 should say that he is sincere in
this conviction.
Suspicion, Hence Truth
1t was possible to contemplate the
workings Of his mind at famous
press conference during the Moscow
Conference, when q British corre-
spondent caught him out on the
charge that the British government
was selling Ruhr coal for its own
gain. 1t was perfectly clear that Mr..
Vishinsky believed absolutely in the
truth of his own accusation, so
much so that he had never troubled
to look into the facts-because, &C
cording to the book, Britain was
bound to steal Ruhr coal and sell 1t
for gain. n
| 1t is ir this spirit that the Russian
evaluates the intention and morale
of the west today. The workers of
the west must be on the edge of
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