Evening star., 1948-02-01

the interested countries to the
South of us. We would no longer
make single-handed moves.
The situation hurried to a climax.
with widespread rioting and grow
ing mutiny in the Cuban Army.
The Cespedes government COLI
lapsed following a revolt within the
army led by the rank and file un-
der Sergt. Fulgencio Batista. At
that moment, September 2, re-
ceived a long telegram from AM
bassador Welles suggesting that
considerable American armed force
oe landed at Havana and smaller
forces in other Cuban cities.
What I propose" he tslegraphed,
would be a strictly limited inter-
vention of the following nature.
The Cespedes government should
be permitted to function freely in
exactly the same manner as 1t did
until the time of its overthrow,
having full control of every branch
of the government. 1t is obvious.
OF course, that with a great por-
ton of the army in mutiny. 1t could
not maintain itself in power in any
satisfactory manner unless the
United States Government were
willing, should it Cthe Cespedes
government) so requests. to lend its
assistance in the maintenance of
public order until the Cuban gov
ernment had been afforded the time
sufficient to form a new army
=. Such policy on our part
would presumably entail the land
ing of a considerable force at Ha-
vana and lesser forces in certain Of
the more important ports of the
republic"
Ambassador Welles said further.
The disadvantages of this policy
as I see them lie solely In the fact
that we will incur the violent ami
mostly of the extreme radical and
Communist groups in Cuba it
would further seem to me that since
the full facts of the situation here
have been fully explained to the
representatives of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, the landing of such
assistance would most decidedly be
construed as well within the limits
of the policy of the good neighbor'
which we have done our utmost to
demonstrate in our relations with
the Cuban people during the past
five months"
Confers With Roosevelt
The moment I finished digesting
the telegram I took it myself to the
President at the White House and
had him read it. then strongly ex-
pressed to him my opinion that We
could not and should not think OF
intervening in Cuba even to .
limited extent. 1t seemed to me
that Mr.. Welles was overinfluenced
by local conditions in Cuba and mis-
judged the disastrous reaction that
would follow throughout Latin
America If we agreed to his request.
From my previous conversations
with the President, / knew that he
was as resolved as myself to stay
out of Cuba. Mr.. Roosevelt readily
agreed with my viewpoint. He said
he would merely send a cruiser to
Cuban waters, where we already had
some light units. The naval vessels
were strictly forbiddea to send
forces ashore unless 1t we're neces-
sary to evacuate American citizens
caught between the contending
Cuban factions.
After my conference with the
President l went to my hotel-it was
already late in the day-to compose
the reply to Mr.. Welles. When it
was completed, returned to the
White House, where the President
and I quickly agreed on the draft.
then went to the State Depart
ment and at o'clock in the evening
sent the answer we had agreed upon
as follows:
I'VE fully appreciate the various
viewpoints set forth in your tele-
gram. However, after mature con-
sideration, the President has de-
cided to send you the following mes
sage: I'VE feel very strongly that
any promise, implied or otherwise.
relating to what the United States
will do under any circumstances is
impossible; that it would be re-
garded as a breach of neutrality, as
favoring one faction out Of many, as
attempting to set up a government
which would be regarded by the
whole world, and especially through
out Latin America, as creation
and creature of the American Gov
ernment." The Presidents conver-
sations with the Argentine, Brazil
ian Chilean and Mexican represent
atives have received widespread ap-
proval in the United States and
throughout Latin America and any
action contrary to the policy out
lined therein would have disastrous
results.
Neutrality Stressed
THE above does not mean, OF
course, that you should do anything
TO block or in the least affect any
movement by any section: in other
words, strict neutrality is Of this
essence"
The De Cespedes government hav-
ing fallen, DR.. Grau San Martin
became President. We delayed
recognition Of his government TO
see whether it could establish order.
Fighting among the factions con.
tinued. Such was the situation when
1 sailed for the Montevideo Confer
ence. Two weeks after my departure
the President issued statement
.,,,r.r.;n, the udllinopeSS of osir