Evening star., 1948-12-06
The Chinese Dilemma

Presumably, when she speaks with
President Truman, Madame Chang Kali
shek will appeal specifically for Affirmative
portedly submitted to him by Ambassador
Wellington Koo. But she cannot be con-
fdent of receiving favorable answer, the
reason being that the people and Govern
ment of the United States have grave and
legitimate doubts about the ability of her
husbands Nationalist regime to make
effective use of further American aid.
Ambassador Koo's program Is said to be
made up of four major proposals: Cd That
the United States Immediately reaff1rm its
support for Generalissimo Chang Kai-
shek in order to improve the morale OF
the Communist Chinese people; (N
that there be great speed-up in the
delivery of supplies envisioned in the $125,-
100000 program approved by the Eightieth
Congress to help the Natfonalists; 90
that an outstanding American general be
sent to China to assume direction of the
supply services, troop training and stra-
tegic planning of Chiang's government;
and "a that We bolster that government
with military and economic aid amounting
to $3,000,0O00 900 within a period of three
years.
If the situation in China inspired
reasonable measure of confidence, the
United States probably would be disposed
to look upon some such program as wise
undertaking to promote our own security
by helping the Nationalists prevent the
Communists from winning dominance. But
the confidence is lacking In the past
three years, since the defeat of Japan, the
Nanking government has received from us
direct and indirect aid valued at over
$2,000,00 900. Meanwhile, however, polit-
ically, economically and militarily, Nation
alist fortunes have steadily declined, not
merely because the Soviet Union has failed
to live up to its treaty with Chang, but
also because his administration-at levels
below his own-has been weakened by
corruption, stupidity and bad generalship,
the latter resulting In poor troop morale
and the surrender of vast quantities Of
American military equipment to the Chi
nese Reds
All this has raised serious questions In
the minds of the United States Govern
With many billions being invested in the
European Recovery Program-apparently
with good results-can we afford to invest
additional billions in project backing
Chinese regime'that has done poorly with
the substantial help we have already ex-
tended? Will additional aid accomplish
anything, or will it Just be wasted, with
the Communists continuing to advance
and take possession OF our equipment?
Moreover, how deeply involved would we
become If we followed Ambassador Koo's
proposal to delegate one of our generals
to run practically everything for Chang?
Would such step be likely to lead to our
direct participation in the civil war? Might
it not bring about dangerous clash with
Russia? And do our long-range strategic
interests in Asia justify our taking such
q risk?
The questions speak pretty much for
themselves. In view of the fact that our
own security will be imperiled If the Com
munists succeed in dominating China,
there is every reason-regardless of the
risks involved-why we should pay the
soberest and most sympathetic attention
to the appeal being made through Madame
Chang On the other hand, as events
themselves show, we must still ask our
selves whether such aid will not be money
and effort thrown away. The situation
adds up to dilemma for our policy
makers and there seems to be no simple
or easy way out Of it.