Evening star., 1948-08-08

e dt Oil GHIllCI udVts ~, lAOWCSC1s
Furthermore, there had been no
real penetration of subversives into
our national life. A few crackpots
were trying to prove to themselves
rather than to the country that our
social and economic system was OUT
moded. On the whole. however, We
were far stronger in the years pre-
ceding the Hitler aggression than
we are today. These things are
better know by Moscow than by
ourselves.
Hitler thought he was taking q
calculated risk when he plunged
the world into war to establish the
supremacy of the Aryans. Mr..
Stain and his Politburo, which is
far more of a real policy maker than
any group that Hitler had around
him, believe the situation Is entirely
different today. There is actually
no military force capable OF resist
ing him for more than a few weeks
in Europe.
Moreover he has what the German
dictator lacked-a much more
powerful contingent Of supporters.
counted by the millions, in France
and italy, the most important West
ern European states. We are far
away and the only possible fear the
Russians have is of our atomic
bomb, which could give the Soviet
government a lot of trouble.
Reich Future Involved
However, according to some Of the
reports which government agencies
consider reliable, the still under
sized American Air Force. which
lacks adequate bases In Europe.
Africa and the Far East, might be
unable to put to good use the only
weapon which the Russians have not
yet been able to develop in mass
production.
Thus, while some experts in the
State Department appear pleased
at the turn of events and at the
prospects of another session at the
table with Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov, and expect some tangible
results from such conference.
many others fear the consequences
of such a meeting, just as some In
Britain and France 10 years ago
feared the results of the direct con-
yersations between Prime Ministers
Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler.
The Russians already have indi-
Gated that they will insist on direct
participation in exploitation OF the
rich coal basin in the Ruhr Valley.
This participation is possible only
if the western Allies accept the
Russian thesis for the solution OF
the German problem. This Is the
reunification of the Reich into
single country.
Mr.. Stain is also reported to have
informed the ambassadors of the
western powers that the solution
Of the German problem by creation
of a single Germany must be &C
companied by an agreement Tor
Allied withdrawal from Germany
within a specified time after peace
treaty with Germany is signed.
Russians Are Closer
This would mean that American
forces of occupation-token forces
which, however, represent the United
States and all 1t stands for-would
have to be withdrawn 1000 miles
while the Russian troops would be
pulled back less than so miles from
Berlin
It is not difficult to imagine how
such an action would influence the
German people, particularly If the
Soviet Union succeeds-and 1t would
not be dificult-in imposing a free
democratic" government on Ger
many as 1t did on Poland in 1s46.
These are mere suspicious, 1t is
trus. but the history Of the last
three years shows that the fears OF
the politburo's actions during that
time, which some OF our policy
trainers ignored, unfortunately
proved to be well founded.
The Soviets have given us work.
ing over in Berlin in the hope that
this would soften us up and put us
into such q state of mind that we
would regard anything which oper-
ated to prevent war as acceptable to
the American and Western Euro
pean peoples.
This might have succeeded If 1t
had provided us with some face
saving device which would permit lis
to contend that we had not been
pushed out of. Berlin. But the ques-
| LiOu IIluSb UC dohCu WAACtAANA, o@sSA
we had saved our face, the real
prospects for peace would be In
creased.
We have Inundated ourselves
again and again to draw the Krem-
lin into a program Of world eco
nomic reconstruction to avoid an
other devastating war. In this work
we sold down the river nations for
which we fought the war.
The Drive Goes On
We have invited Moscow TO join
in this effort at economic recon-
struction, offering the Soviet gov
ernment billions in reconstruction
loans in the hope that this would
divert its attention from its pres
ent objective OF conquest by force
or by intimidation.
Until very recently we hesitated
to put the finger on the tens Of
thousands of subversive agents in
side and outside the Government, in
order to facilitate the continuation