Evening star., 1948-12-05
France Must Be Convinced

France Must Be Convinced
In voting Overwhelmingly against the
recent Anglo-American decision to name
German trustees to administer the indus
tries of the Ruhr, the French National
Assembly has made clear that Britain and
the United States have fallen far short
of persuading France that their approach
to this delicate and complex problem Is
either sound or necessary.
The issue involved is charged with deep
emotion in France. The people there,
acutely conscious of the fact that the
Ruhr has been the powerhouse behind
three German kavasions within the past
seventy-five years, are united against any
step that seems to them to revive the threat
of militaristic Germany. On the whole,
though they have not yet restored him to
national leadership, they are not inclined
to scoff at General de Gaulle's warning
that the Anglo American decision paves
the way for the rebirth of another aggres-
sive Reich capable of attacking them again
in some new double-crossing deal with
Russia.
Though recklessly exaggerated, General
de Gaulle's fear-in varying degrees
dominates Frances thinking and is sub
stantially shared by all political parties,
with one exception. The exception is the
French Communists. Ironically enough,
in the National Assembly vote condemning
Anglo-American Ruhr policy, they have
been the sole dissenters being faithful to
the Soviet line, which favors returning the
region to Germany for reasons quite diff
ferent from the ones animating Britain
and the United States What the Kremlin
would like to see, of course, would be a
puppet Red Reich with all the Ruhr's pro-
ductive power behind it.
Thus, considering their bitter historical
experience with Germany, and considering
also that powerful politicians like General
de Gaulle can argue plausibly about the
dangers of some new Ribbentrop Molotov
deal in the future, 1t is not surprising that
the French people-as they have just ex-
pressed themselves through the National
Assembly-have serious misgivings about
Britain's and our own attitude toward the
Ruhr. They need assurances, they must be
convinced, that that attitude Is not working
at cross-purposes with their own vital
security interests by unwittingly encourag-
ing the revival of German militarism.
To be sure, it may be clear enough
to Britons and Americans that the Ruhr
decision represents a wise and needed
move to accomplish two things: % To
ease the financial burden the United
States must carry as long as the region
operates on deficit basis, and (2) to in
crease its productivity and efficiency in
IN 11y,f ot
Of Germany but of all the Western Euro
pean countries-including France-par-
ticipating in the Marshall Plan. Moreover,
as Secretary of State Marshall has de-
clared, there are two additional points
OF prime significance: ID The Ruhr's
final disposition, despite the current Ger
man trusteeship plan, will not be deter
mined until definitive peace treaty IS
written, and (2) special guarantees in that
treaty, together with such separate un-
dertakings as the projected Atlantic
alliance, are likely to provide the French
with ample security against the danger
of a resurgent Reich in cahoots with
Russia. In this connection, in line with
Frances latest note on the subject, it is
not .inconceivable that an agreement can
be worked out to set up long term Allied
control of the Ruhr after the occupation
ends.
Nevertheless, though considerations of
this sort make criticism of the De Gaullist
type seem grossly distorted, the fact re-
mains-as demonstrated by the National
Assembly-that the French have yet to
be sold on Anglo-American policy toward
Germany. Since their full support is
essential to an effective security system in
the free Western world, it need hardly be
added that no effort should be spared to
remove their fears and suspicions-a task
which now ought to be vigorously pursued
by the British government and our own.