Evening star., 1948-11-07


with the election battle and with
United Nations meetings in Paris.
Far more newspaper space was
devoted to the Palestinian question,
which has only minor importance
for the safety of this Nation, tkan
to the fall of Manchuria to Mos
cows stooges.
When we discuss China's recovery
potential and her future we must
bear in mind that Manchuria and
North China are by far the most
vital sections of that country.
Strategically both Manchuria and
North China are of great Importance.
They are a rampant of defense
against aggressors who may choose
Siberia as springboard for an
eventual attack against the United
States and Japan.
The economic and political i'm
portance of Manchuria and North
China is so great that since the days
of the Cars and the Tokyo war
lords those provinces have been
bones of contention between Rus
sian and Japanese imperialisms.
We recognized their Importance
in 1881 when, as the Tokyo war
lords opened their campaign against
China by way Of Manchuria, we
took up the cudgels for the Chinese
government, despite our military
unpreparedness, and spared no ef-
fort to dislodge the Japs from that
vital part of China.
Eventually the Mukden incident
brought forth our doctrine of non
recognition of territorial acquisitions
by force. That led to the Pearl
Harbor attack and our war with
Japan. which ended in the destruc-
ton of the military power of that
empire.
Pledges Made to Chang
Throughout World War II our
political leaders recognized that
whatever concessions we might
make to the Russians in Europe, it
was necessary for our security that
We keep Manchuria in the hands of
its rightful owner, the National
government of China.
At President Roosevelt's confer
ence with Generalissimo Chang
Kai-shek at Cairo in November,
1s43, the President promised that
as soon as Japan was defeated we
would see to it that the National
governments authority over Man
churia woud be fully recognized.
Mr.. Roosevelt undertook to win
Prime Minister Stain to that point
Of view, and, according to some re-
ports, temporarily succeeded in do
ing so.
At Yalta in February, 1945, we
weakened but did not surrender
Manchuria to the Russians. We
agreed that Russia should regain
the special privileges which the
Cars squeezed out of the weak" Chi
nese government. We also agreed
that Russia should regain control of
the Chinese Eastern and South
Mancnuria railways-which meant,
in fact, economic domination of
Manchuria-as we'll as an exclusive
lease on the Port Arthur naval
base, which the Czarist government
lost to the Japanese at the Ports
mouth Peace Conference in 1905.
We went further and obligated
ourselves to persuade the National
government of China to accept these
concessions, which were given to
Mr.. Stain without prior consulta-
ton with Gen. Chang and despite
the Cairo agreement for Man.
churia's return to China's SOW
ereignty at the end OF the war.
Mr.. Roosevelt is said to have
stated at that time that these con-
cessions to the U. S. S. Rim ex-
change for which the Soviet govern
ment promised to send more than 20
divisions to the Far Eastern front
within 80 days after the collapse of
the Reich-were of no great po-
litical importance,
More u. S. Backing Pledged
We promised the Chinese govern
ment that after the war was over
We would continue to supply its
newly created, American-trained
army divisions and air forces with
the necessary war equipment to
maintain them. Moreover, Mr..
Stain agreed to sign with Gen.
Chang . treaty of friendship and
amity and the Red dictator denied,
in the presence of Mr.. Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill, any in
terest in the Chinese Communists.
Everything looked lovely to- the
wishful-thinking policy-framers of
the United States. The Russians
would get an economic interest in
Manchuria, which eventually would
work to the benefit of the Chinese
themselves, while Gen. Chang
would have enough military
strength to defeat any attempt by
the Moscow-sponsored Communist
leader. Gen. Mao Tse-tung, to cap
ture Manchuria or any part Of
Northern China. q
Moreover, the ideological-minded
Far Eastern Division of the State
Department had assured the White
House and the Secretaries of State
who followed Cordell Hull that the
term Chinese Communist" was a
They were nothing more