Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-02-02
CHAPTER !

The greatest threat to the trade
agreements program came not from
foreign countries, not from the Re-
publicans, not from certain manu-
facturers or growers, but from within
the Roosevelt administration itself,
in the person of George N. Peek,
former chief Of the .AAA.
In March, 1894, the President had
named him foreign trade adviser
If Mr.. Roosevelt had hit me between
the eyes with a sledgehammer he
could not have stunned me more
than by this appointment. Person.
ally Peek was most affable and
agreeable in his relations with
others. He was honest in his views
and supported them with persist
ency. But was convinced that his
economic ideas were unsound and
that it would be supreme tragedy
If they were to displace the sound
economic policies on which our
trade agreements rested.
His efforts, and those OF his
associates, aided at times by the
President, came perilously near sup
planting my whole set of inter-
national economic policies and my
program to extend their application
over the world and thereby to pro-
mote conditions Of economic we'll
being and peace.
Peek Wanted Trade Control.
Peek used to take basketfuls of
statistics to the White House, and
the President would sponsor his
statements to the press. He gave
the President q memorandum in
which he urged he be given control
over all foreign trade policy and
negotiations. He would have
stripped the State Department, as
well as the Departments OF Com
merce, Agriculture and the Treasury
of any real voice in foreign COM
merce. Fortunately, I was able to
block this development.
Then Peek turned to the negotia-
ton Of barter agreements with
foreign countries-precisely the type
of practice then going on IN Europe
which we hoped eventually to eliml-
nate through the trade agreements
based on the equality of treatment
principle. He started, no doubt,
from the honest viewpoint that there
were American SURPRISES that should
be disposed of abroad. But he
wholly failed to see that such barter
agreements and the trade agree
ments could not both exist at the
same time.
The Trade Agreements Act dealt
with broad policies and broad trade
methods rather than with individual
barter transactions. One basis OF
our trade agreements policy-equal-
ity of commercial treatment and
opposition to the numerous sorts
of discrimination and preference
would have been openly violated by
the Peek barter proposals.
Our program undertook in broad
way to provide export facilities
especially for the more burdensome
SURPRISES such as cotton, tobacco
lard, wheat, automobiles and the
like, by reducing determinations
and preferences abroad and increas-
ing equality in trade treatment. In
my view, the maintenance OF this
policy everywhere was all-important
German Pact Was Crisis.
Throughout the summer Of 1891
nv associates at the State Depart:
ment and I spent much time con.
testing Peek's theories. The con-
fiict reached a summit when Peel
negotiated a barter agreement witt
Germany in November and Decem'
Der of 1884. Germany was openl!
in default on her debts of $4,000
600, 900 due in the United States
but, while thus guilty of the worst
of bad faith toward American credi.
tors, she pretended to desire a fail
trade agreement with us: At the
same time she was keeping othel
countries placated for the moment
by paying her debts and trade bal.
ances due them.
Hitler's economic magicians sent
a mission to the United States ano
Peek negotiated an accord with
them. 1t had all the characteristics
of a typical German deal such as
Hitler and Schacht had forced