Milford chronicle., 1948-05-14

Dividend Cheeks ana Tax Bills % EVefy
Individual National ana international
Problems Inseparabis from Lasal Welfare
Congressional enthusiasm for a
big air force is understandable for
two very different reasons. First,
it is highly desirable for political
purposes in an election year the
air force is on a strictly volunteer
basis, and apparently does not need
the draft to fill out its ranks Sec
ond, and far more important, is the
feeling that a powerful U. S. aerial
striking force would be one of the
best deterrents to possible ag-
gressor and that, If worst came to
worst, it would enable us to get in
a decisive blow at the outset
This view is not shared in all
military quarters. Secretary For
restal has protested against laying
what he believes to be too much
stress on one arm. The Army and
Navy top brass are naturally in
terested in getting as much as they
can for their services. General
Bradley and others have presented
the case for big-scale ground for
ces. However, Congress, which
shudders at the though of universal
military training now, is obviously
going all out for military aviation.
This has led to renewed interest
in an old argument. Prior to the
last war, there was a more or less
widely held theory that air power
might make land armies virtually
obsolete, by destroying an enemy's
Industrial and war potential and
thus effeeting an early decision
from the skies. The theory was
most persuasively presented by an
Italian general who wrote a book
about it which read with care and
respect in all the war ministries of
the world. It had a strong influence
on the thinking of Mllssolini and
Hitler AS bloody events proved,
the Italian general and his devotees
were fatally wrong. The bOmbers
of all the belligerents did terrific
damage, but ittwas never decisive.
Allied officers we're amazed at the
vars end when they found out the
extent to which German factories
had kept producing in the face OF
virtually unopposed saturation
bombing. And England was able e
keep on fighting in the early days
when the Luftwaffe blackened hel
skies and she had only a pitiful
handful of Raj planes to send
against them.
However, the fact that a theory
proved wrong once does not NEAR
that it will always be wrong. We
and the other powers-will have
infinitely superior planes, judged
by range and speed. And thos'
planes will have infinitely superior
weapons to carry to enemy centeri
If there is another war. The 4
bomb, of course, is the terrible
giant in this field. 1t may be with
Ia the realm of possibility that I
country with sufficient weapons o
that character, and with the Tigh
kind of air fleets to transport then
at the very outbreak of hostilities
could strike a blow within day o
two from which the enemy <cOult
not recover, and could finally de
eide the issue within 80 to 80 days
In these times, air-power is no
limited to humanly-piloted air
craft. Part of our preparedness pro
gram-like that of the defense pre-
grams of all major nations-wil
lie in the development of guide
missiles and related weapons. Cor
gress will undoubtedly vote larg
sums for this purpose. It is estims
ted that five to Is years will pas
before really accurate missile
can be produced, and before Ion
ranges will be possible. But the,
like meteorological and other type
Of chemical and scientific warfar
cannot be disregarded in the ca
culations we are making.
There has been much guessin
as to how many A bombs we no
have, after several years Of intens
production. Only few men in Il
country know that, and they aren
talking. But so-called "informe
estimates" say that we certainl
have not more than a few hundre
and that we may have only fe
dozen. That in itself could be a r
assuring sign. If every A bomb re-
resents such a tremendous expend
ture of money, manpower and M
terials as that indicates, it is pro
able that other nations are a lor
way from having them. In this CO.
nection comes Mr.. Forrestal
statement that Russia understan,
the process. but hasn't got the pr
duction facilities.
So little by little, our .armame
program is shaping up. There W
be a vast enlargement OF our a
strength, coupled with vast ste
up in research. There will be We
limited draft, and the hope here
that it will encourage enlistmen
to the point where relatively fe