Evening star., 1948-02-22


which I agreed was true-in the
sense that the British cabinet con-
stituted the government, and Eden
had stronger claims under their
system than I would have under
ours to participate in war councils.
I learned from other sources than
the President what had occurred
at the Casablanca, Cairo and Te-
heran Conferences. I had no
special occasion to interrogate Mr..
Roosevelt on developments at these
conferences, but. II I asked him
questions relating to his discus
sions, he was prompt. with few
exceptions, to inform me frankly
on the most secret matters.
Did Not Discuss I'd Front
One question of military nature
I did discuss with the President and
his military assistants was the loca-
ton of the second front. agreed
that our major effort should be
made across the English Channel
into France. The question Of where
the armies would land and what
routes they would take across the
continent in the grand military
movement to conquer Hitler was q
subject never discussed with me by
the President or any Of his top mill
tary officials.
I was not told about the atomic
bomb. Occasionally some one gave
me q veiled hint, but I did not
press any questions. did not
really know about 1t until It was
dropped and the announcement
made. During the last months OF
its preparation, however, and when
1t was dropped, was no longer Sec
retary Of State, and consequently
not likely to have any knowledge OF
it. Mr.. Roosevelt deserves great
credit for making the tremendous
decision to 60 the length OF spend
ing $4,000, 100000 in developing the
atomic bomb.
The President continued not to
invite me to his military meetings.
He loved the military side Of events.
and liked to hold them in his own
hand. Following Pearl Harbor, he
preferred to be called Commander
in Chief rather than President. He
relished the title. He may have
felt that this all-important position
was nov more essential than that
Of President.
AT a cabinet dinner, probably IN
ls42, where I was to propose the
toast, the President asked me,
before I rose to speak:
please try to address me ss
Commander in Chief, not as Presi-
dent"
Brought Up Matter of Bases =,
Tt was impossible. of course, not
to take up some military subjects
in my conversations with Ambas-
sadors, particularly the represents
tives of our principal Allies. On
December 8, 1941, during my first
conversation with the new Soviet
Ambassador, former Foreign Com
missar Maxim Litvinov. with whom
I had conducted the initial negotia-
tions that resulted in the establish
ment of Soviet-American diplomatic
relations in 1888, I raised the ques-
ton of ,Russia's permitting us the
use of airbases on Russian territory
to facilitate the bombing Of Japa-
nese areas. We likewise discussed
the question of getting supplies to
Vladivostok in Russian ships,
Three days later, when Litvinov
called at my request, he said his
government had communicated to
him that it was not then in posi-
tion to cooperate with us against
Japan. Russia, he said, was fight
ing on q huge scale against Ger
many and could not risk an attack
by Japan.
I replied that I could appreciate
Russia's position. Recalling to him
the warnings we had given Russia
earlier in the year of an impending
German attack against her, I said
now had information that I
deemed equally reliable, to the
effect that Japan, Notwithstanding
the terms of the Russo-Japaness
neutrality agreement. was under
the strictest commitment to Ger
many to attack Russia and any
other country fighting against Ger
many, whenever Hitler demanded.
This arrangement, I added, had
contemplated that Japan would
first attack the United States. in
which assault Germany and Italy
would join, and that later, when
Germany demanded, Japan would
invade Russia.
Heard of Jap Plot
The labors of the State Depart
ment changed or intensified In
many ways following the outbreak
of war.
We we're likewise engaged in ne
gotiations, which consumed many
months, for the exchange OF our
diplomats and other civilians for
Axis representatives and civilians.
In the midst OF a State Depart
ment conference on this subject q
few days after Pearl Harbor, we
received word from a highly reliable
source that japanese Ambassador
Nomura and his Naval Attache had
received orders to commit hara-
kiri in the Embassy, whereupon ths
Japanese government would say
that we had murdered them.
Our apprehension over what
might happen to our officials in
Japan If such q plan materialized
was keen. We induced the Swiss
Minister to 60 Immediately to the
Japanese Embassy, inform Nomura
Of the report we had received. and
- l.