Evening star., 1948-09-05


recommendations. However. a pre-.
llminary examination by this sub.
committee into the methods of pro.
cedure effected pursuant to Execu.
tive Order 1885 has disclosed certain
obvious defects in the present Fed.
eral employees loyalty program which
should and must be corrected with
out delay.
Failure to Give Special
Cases Special Treatment
1t would seem evident that a-full-
scale employees loyalty program
would have as its major objective
the securing of the Federal Gov
eminent from subversive efforts
within the governmental structure
The preamble of the executive Or
der, on which the program is based
states that 80 the presence
within the Government service of
any disployal or subversive person
constitutes a threat to our demo-
cratic processes"
There can be no argument with
the premise that those employees
in the Federal service, occupying
sensitive positions. that is, those
who have access to confidential in
formation affecting the security OF
the Nation, should be most carefully
Scrutinized for possible disloyalty
It was recognized during the PLAN
ming stages that the incumbent pro-
gram would take at least months
Nevertheless, the regulations imple-
menting Executive Order No. $685.,
issued by the Civil Service Commits
sion to the various departments and
agencies of the executive branch.
made no provision for priority in
the screening of the loyalty forms
OF employees in responsible. sensitive
positions, nor is there any procedure
for the special and expeditions han
ding Of cases involving charges of
a highly serious nature, regardless
of the position of the employe.
The Remington Case.
This serious defect in procedure
was recently vividly illustrated by
this subcommittee in the case of
William w. Remington, who held
several important Government posi-
tions. The subcommittee is advised
tnat Remington completed Forms "a
and 86 in December of 1947, while
employed as business economist by
the Council of Economic Advisers in
the executive Office of the President.
The subcommittee has been unable
to discover when Remington's loyal
ty forms were forwarded to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for
processing. On March 16, 1948, Rem
ington transferred to the Depart
ment of Commerce and on or about
May II, 1948, the Attorney General
notified the Secretary of Commerce
that a full field investigation had
been initiated on him. On June 9
1948, this subcommittee wrote to the
Department of Justice requesting
information on Remington. On June
II, 1948, three days after the sub
committees letter, the bureau trans
mitted its investigation report to
the Investigations Division of the
Civil Service Commission. This re-
port was received by the commission
on June Is and forwarded to the
Secretary of Commerce on June 18.
Remington was suspended, effective
June %, 1948, pending the prepara-
ton and service of interrogatories
and a loyalty hearing.
Here, then, is a case of an employe
in a clearly sensitive position con-
cerning whom the Federal Bureau
of Investigation obviously had loyal
ty information derogatory and
alarming in nature since, at least,
December, 1945, and no admins
trative action was taken until over
six months after his loyalty forms
were completed. The subcommittee
can only speculate as to the number
of similar situations that have been
or are being suffered, as it has been
denied access to any further infor-
nation by the executive branch Of
the Government.
The subcommittee believes that
the case of William W. Remington
Is not necessarily an isolated one.
With one exception, no case has
been called to the subcommittee S
attention in which any priority was
given to the clearance of a sensi-
tive employe 1t has been learned
that the Department of Labor did
include the members of its loyalty
board in the first group of incum-
bent forms sent to the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation for loyalty
screening However. this appears to
be the only case where any priority
was given to "Sensitivity' in the
more than 100000 incumbent cases
processed through the bureau files.
Miss Bentley's Testimony.
Nor is this situation limited to
eases arising since the institution of
the present loyalty program. Ac-
cording to testimony before the SUBJ
committee, Miss Elizabeth T Bent
ley, confessed Soviet spy, appeared
at the field office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation at New
Haven, Conn, in August, 1945. She
was closely examined by the bureau
agents and told her complete story
between August and December,
1945. Among the matters she dis
closed to the agents was Reming-
tons connection with her espionage
activities. This subcommittee is at
a loss to understand how Remington
could remain as a Government en-
ploye between December. 1945. and
his suspension, on June %. 1948
From December. 1945, to June. 1916
Remington was an ensign in the
Naval Reserve on assignment to the
Executive Office of the President
with the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion. After his dis
charge from the Navy he remained
as civilian employe of that agency
until March. 1947. From March
1947, to March, 1948, he was with the
Council of Economic Advisers, which
is also a White House staff agency
During the time that he was with
the Council of Economic Advisers
he was loaned to the Hartman COM
mittee, which formulated the Mar
I've 81, al