Evening star., 1948-01-25

These men can reach no con-
elusive decision because they do not
know what our national policy Is.
Their liaison officers in the State
Department return empty-handed
when they try to learn the answers
to certain pertinent questions. The
State Department, on the other
hand, has not been able to formu-
late a real national policy, because
in recent years We have had none.
The Truman doctrine, for in
stance, could be as much national
policy as the Monroe Doctrine, but
after having formulated the new
policy concerning nations threat
ened by the U. S. S. R., State De-
partment policy trainers fear that
its implementation by the military
might lead us into trouble rather
than establish the lasting peace
they expected when they urged
President Truman to make his dec
laration 10 months ago.
Matter of Appropriations
The State Department, headed by
a distinguished soldier, is unwilling
to take the offensive. Secretary OF
State Marshall, who knows better
than any one else the state OF
Americas armed unpreparedness,
feels that unless Congress is in a
mood to provide much larger sums
than the armed forces already have
asked, in order to meet their pres
ent limited needs, 1t Is Of no use
to expect any strong measures.
Congress, which is anxious to
carry out some big economies as
election time approaches, knows only
superfcially the exact state OF
things between this country and
the nations behind the iron curtain
and Is unwilling to take any in
itiative to increase appropriations.
Thus, the stats of Army, Navy
and Air Force must mark time un-
til the State Department tells them
what our national policy is. The
State Department no longer receives
instructions from the White House
and is reluctant to undertake any
kind Of augmentation Of policy
which might necessitate the use OF
forces which weSdo not possess aiIi-.
less Congress appropriates The
money and passes some kind o1
conscription measure to expand ouI
forces. Congress is sitting tight be-
cause It Is not is business To; make
policy. & . '''S g = .. = e 4'
Marshall Plan Policy
This vicious circle Is little under
stood in this country, but 1t Is well
known abroad and particularly in
the U. s. s. r. For the time being
we are using the Marshall Plan as
! an instrument of national policy, al
though the Secretary Of State him
self, as well as other responsible
officials in the Government, fully
realize that the European Recovery
Program must be described as an
implementation of policy rather
than as policy itself.
Many members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee were
concerned during the war with the
haphazard manner in which the
administration was conducting for
eign relations. They called, indi-
vidually, on President Roosevelt,
had talks with his chief adviser
the late Harry Hopkins-and occa-
sionally summoned their principal
legal informant on foreign affairs.
Secretary OF State Hull.
They received kind treatment
in their talks with Mr.. Roosevelt
and Mr.. Hull. Many pertinent
matters, such as the real effect OF
the Teheran and Yalta agreements
were kept from them under the
excuse that we were then tied to
number of Allies and that revelation
of other agreements than those
publicly announced would cause
embarrassment and jeopardize the
administrators war effort.
The Senators had to be satisfied
with the frequently reiterated state
ment: Gentlemen, at this time our
foreign policy is to win the war. ;
When, some Senators like Robert
La Toilette, jr., pointed out in 1914
that war in itself was not a policy
but the implementation Of policy
the other stereotyped answer con-
cluded the argument: ITO say more
would be against public interest"
Situation Was Inherited
The present lamentable state OF
affairs must not be attributed ex-
clusively to those now in office.
They inherited a situation not OF
their own making.
The improvisations which we
called foreign policy during the last
two world wars are the result OF in
herent defects in our system and in
our psychology. It Is true that wars
are implementation of policy. The
Enropeans, to whose rescue we
went twice in a quarter century,
fought their wars not for ideologies,
but for certain definite purposes.
The Central Powers started World
War I for the purpose Of acquiring
more territory and greater pros
perity by imposing onerous peace
conditions on their opponents. The
Allies, who were then at the height
of their economic and social pros
perity, accepted the challenge In
self defense.
| They defeated the Central Powers
with the assistance of the United
/ States. But their leaders did not
think in global terms; they were
concerned primarily with repairing
the damage suffered at the hands OF
%hoir oneuies