Evening star., 1948-06-06
By Thomos R. Henry

BY Thomos R. Henry
For four months, while the rest
of the world speculated and won-
dered, at least 800 men knew his
tory's best-kept secret-the date Of
D day.
A distribution of 384 copies of the
initial joint plan for Operation Nep-
tune, the long awaited assault on
the Normandy beaches, was author
lied on February /. 1874, and 1t
differed only in minor details from
the course actually followed. Each
copy was numbered. The LIST Ameri-
can and the I'd British Armies which
were to establish the beachhesds
received three copies each. The Sd
United States Army, not due to
come into action for nearly two
months after the landings, got one
copy. Gen Eisenhower kept No. ]
for himself.
Plan Studied Whole Year
Since New Year Day it had been
no secret anywhere that the inva-
sion Of the continent was immi-
nent. This must have been Is OBJ
vious to the Germans as to every
body else. The piling up OF division
on division of American troops In
England admitted no other inter-
probation. The plan distributed In
February. result of more than 4 year
Of intensive study of the situation,
covered almost every detail of the
planned operation down to the ra-
tons OF individuals and the radio
bands to be used in communications.
But the small group Of men who
had access to 1t kept their mouths
shut and refrained from suggestive
speculation in a manner exceptional
even in high military circles. Only
now. three years after the landings
ut Omaha and Utah beaches, Is it
possible to reveal all the details of
the preparation for the invasion of
Normandy as they are cleaned from
the journals of the lst. United States
Army.
First the date-June 6, 1914. It
was rather strictly determined by
astronomy. Consideration of many
factors forced the decision that the
fateful landings by picked American
and British divisions must be made
on day when the first light came
three hours before high tide, with at
least partial moonlight after the
preceding midnight. For both 1t.
Gen. Omar N. Bradley and Field
Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
the respective American and British
ground force commanders, this de-
cision was a bitter dose to swallow.
They agreed to a daylight assault,
thus largely foregoing the invalu-
able advantage of surprise. only
after the naval commanders Of both
countries had insisted that in dark
ness they could not be reasonably
certain that troops would be landed
in the proper places. Field Marshal
Tedder, the Allied air commander,
also told them that at least one hour
of daylight would be essential for
his bombers to reduce the coast
defenses, an absolute essential to
success.
All Tides Considered
The landings could not be made
at high tide. Then the German un-
derwater obstacles would be hidden
and could not be avoided by the
troop-laden ships. They could not
be made on the ebb tide. Transports
would be left high and dry on the
beaches. at the mercy of enemy fire,
after discharging the assault forces.
They could not be made at low tide.
Then the soldiers would have to
move over wide strips of exposed
sand in the face of murderous ma
chine-gun and mortar fire. They
must be made at just the right time
when the tide was coming in to give
the men the maximum advantage
and at the same time save the ships.
A dim moonlight was held essential
for the paratroop landings to insure
reasonable accuracy for the drops
The first date for D day was
May 2. This fulfilled all the astro-
nomical requirements, but 1t had
been changed early in January
when the decision was made to
launch two American assaults in
stead Of the one in the general
neighborhood Of the little fishing
village Of Vierville-Omaha Beach
originally contemplated. This
made more time for preparation
essential. The first succeeding date
on which moon and tide were both
favorable was June S. The morn
ing of May Is was given due con-
sideration. On this day there was
q "neap" tide, due to the attraction
Of the moon alone on the Channel
waters. There would not, however,
be the necessary nearly full moon
after midnight. Thus 1t was neces-
sary to wait for three more weeks.
In the end 1t was necessary to delay
the assaults for "a hours because Of
an unanticipated storm, but the
planners had given themselves
leeway of two days and drawn up
the essential alternative time sched-
ules to fit the different tide times.
Little Left to Chance
Had the bad weather continued
delay Of 2S days would have been
necessary-or else radical change
in the proposed tactics. The hour
fixed for the assaults differed by
some 80 minutes between Utah
and Omaha beaches. This was due
to the fact that the direction Of
flow of the incoming tide was up
the English Channel and therefore
high water-less three hoilrs-oc-