Evening star., 1948-11-08
Public Opinion Polls
Examined in Attempt
To Find Root OF Error
Predictions Seen Difficult
When Few Thousand Votes
Con Change Outcome
By David Laurence

By David Laurence
Merely to admit one made wrong
forecast on the election outcome
Is not to explain why all fore
casts went wrong. The phenom-
enon was not q matter of mere
Judgment in politics, for campaign
managers on both sides went wrong,
too. Not one but all public opinion
polls went wrong, though taken by
Q variety Of different organizations
and with different metho d s
throughout the country.
Re-examination of the data COL
lected by one of the larger polling
organizations indicates the follow
ing:
First, the true significance Of the
undecided" vote was not detected
1t was assumed to be a vote that
would stay away from the polls.
Although four and ive times as
large this time as the undecided ~
vote was four years ago and al
though the persons interviewed were
very largely Democrats, according
to answers they revealed concern.
ing their votes in previous years
they nevertheless told the inter-
rogators they were undecided" This
vote unquestionably turned to Mr.
Truman. and made the difference
in the result.
Second. the Nationwide polls were
completed about @ week or 10 days
before the election and therefore
could not take into account what
ever happened in the last week to
cause the undecided" voters to
make their decisions.
Reasons for Absentees.
Third, none Of the poll organi-
sations had any means Of measur-
ing the reasons which would cause
many people who said they would
vote to fail to turn up on election
day at the voting booths. Was 1t
genuine apathy or overconfidence
or the belief that the election was
o foregone conclusion anyway?
Fourth, there was no means of
knowing until the last minute what
Influenced the Wallace voters to re-
turn to the Democratic Party from
which most Of them had temporarily
strayed.
Again and again during the cam
paign there were evidences that the
Democratic Party in time Of pros
perity was the logical winner. The
fact that the popular vote would be
close and Gov. Dewey might be a
minority President If he won was
foreseen in these dispatches on
September II. But this was not re-
lated, as 1t should have been, to the
existence of O tide in favor Of the
incumbent administration because
Of what 1t had done in getting high
farm prices on the one hand and
high wages on the other.
The combination Of favorable vot-
ing for the Democrats in rural
areas, traditionally Republican, and
in the big cities, where the labor
union vote was modified, should
have been, on the surface, definite
indication that the administration
in power was more likely TO win,
and that 1t was up to the Repub-
licans to do the most intensive cam
paigning if they were to unseat the
incumbent administration.
Campaign Columns Recalled.
Looking back over dispatches
written during the campaign, this
writer referred to these trends, and
particularly to the likelihood that
the Wallace vote would evaporate.
1t was argued repeatedly that the
voters inside the Democratic Party
were getting from Mr.. Truman 5
campaign speeches the left-wine
doctrine which was 80 dear to the
groups that had been deserting to
Mr.. Wallace.
AS remarked on September 10,
this writer could not understand
why the Wallace vote was being
estimated ut such O large amount
by the polls when actually Mr..
Truman, by espousal Of the civil
rights program and by accepting
virtually every important point In
the Wallace program except its
apparent relationship to Russia,
was cutting the ground from under
the Wallace voters.
Basically, the Wallace appeal was
on the ground of left-wing and
New Deal doctrine on domestic
issues and peace with Russia in
the international field. Mr.. Tru-
man did support a firm and get
tough" policy with Russia, but at
the same time he showed that he
was interested in maintaining
peace. The ill-fated Vinson mis-
sion was basically sound approach
though the timing was wrong.
Nevertheless, there were millions Of
voters who did not perceive in 1t
any ineptitude when Mr.. Truman
later explained it.
All they saw was that the Presi-
dent was trying to maintain the
peace and that he would do every
thing in his power to prevent war
with Russia. Mr.. Truman himself
sensed the necessity Of avoiding
d crisis, and even when the Berlin
blockade was apparently in its most
exasperating stage. he was reassur-
ing the people that there was every
likelihood Of peace being MAIN
tained. This was wise strategy from
o. political standpoint, too.
House and Senate Races.
When some of my reporter
friends. returning from trips
throughout the country, reported
that the House and Senate races
were close, I asked them why, II
this were the case, Mr.. Truman
wouldn't carry some Of those same
States. They pointed always to the
public -ouinion polls, It seemed as