Evening star., 1948-11-21
Eisenhower's
Own Account
OfOurVictory
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
BY Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Dou
bleday; So
Reviewed by
CRESTON B. MULLINS.

bleday;: So
Reviewed by
CRESTON B. MULLINS.
The American people have
awaited the one monumental
and defnitive history of their
victory over the Axis in Europe.
This is it, written by the man
who more than any other bore
the burden of bringing victory to the
Allies-Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander, Allied Expe-
dictionary Forces.
Gen. Eisenhower attended at the
birth of the idea that the Allies
would have to invade Northwest
Europe. using England as a base,
In order to defeat the Axis. He lived
in the perfection of the concept and
in it's execution. He defended the
cross Channel invasion plan-known
as Operation Overload - against
doubters from the very inception OF
the idea until the invasion actually
was launched.
The war in Europe was finally
won," he says, because through
every trial and every temptation
- the President, Gen. Marshall,
and many others never wavered
from their purpose of launching a
full-out invasion of Europe across
the English Channel at the earliest
practicable moment"
Gen. Eisenhower puts in clear per-
spective all the parts of the Euro
pean crusade-North Africa INVASION
Sicily, Italy and Overload. 1t was
decided early in 1912. We are told,
to invade across the English Chan
mel. but it was apparent at the time
that the effort could not be made
before early 1914.
North Africa.
The North African invasion was
undertaken, Gen. Eisenhower says,
as a diversionary effort to provide
some victories against the Axis dur
ing the long period of preparation
which lay ahead before D-day, and
to re-estabish Allied control of the
Mediterranean. From North Africa
the route naturally lay into Sicily
and Italy itself, but there the Allies
had to decide whether to go ahead
with Overload or to shift to an in
vasion OF the Balkans.
Prime Minister Churchill raised at
this point one of the great issues
which arose between him and Gen.
Eisenhower as supreme commander.
The old Tory, weighing political
considerations heavily, was aiming
to set a limit to Russian expansion.
Gen. Eisenhower, supported strongly
in Washington, beat down the Prime
Minister'S opposition to overload.
The difference of opinion over
Overload was not the only one which
occurred between the two men. Mr..
Churchill felt it necessary to back
up Field Marshall lthen GeneraD
Montgomery's insistence on being
named overall ground commander
for Gen. Eisenhower in the Euro
pean campaign.
Points of Contention.
Marshal Montgomery relations
with Gen. Eisenhower provided some
of the most spirited controversy
which marred Allied relations in
Europe. His effort to gain overall
ground command-summarily beat
en- down each time it was made
was only one of several points of
dissatisfaction between the British
commander and the supreme Allied
commander.
On the whole. however, Gen.
Eisenhower's working relationship
with the British was good, but was
somewhat more difficult with the
French.
There are many phases Of the
crusade in Europe about which Gen.
Eisenhower cannot write, because
he is not given to self-gloriflcation,
and these await the study of the OBJ
jective historian. But there are a
great many things which he and he
alone can say.
The Ardennes Breakthrough.
The classic example of this is his
1ull acceptance VI ACokOl1ol1AliOy ioA
the Ardennes breakthrough by the
Germans in December, 1914 During
the autumn, Gen. Eisenhower,
writes, it had been impossible to
place more than four divisions on
the Ardennes line without relaxing
offensives by Montgomery on the
north and Bradley on the south.
The risk was calculated and was
accepted as part Of the strategy of
preparing for the Rhine crossing.
Gen. Eisenhower has little to say
about President Roosevelt. OF Pres
ident Truman, he speaks even more
seldom, although he quotes Mr.. Tru-
man as telling him in Germany dur
ing the Potsdam Conference: Gen
eral, there is nothing you may want
that I won't try to help you get.
That definitely and specifically in
cludes the presidency in 1948."
The general disavowed any such
ambitions at that moment as he
did in the preconvention months
of 1948.
Gen. Eisenhower was thoroughly
aware of the tasks of an Allied su-
preme commander in welding to-
gether the efforts of the coalition
members.
Thus, when he evaluates the
lessons of the Crusade in Europe"
he says:
The first and most enduring les
son of the Mediterranean and Eu-
ropen campaigns was the proof that
war can be waged effectively by a
coalition of nations"
This is a lesson which we may
we'll have to put into renewed prac-
tice in the future.