Evening star., 1948-06-06

France. Sixteen Of these were dis
posed along the Channel coast.
Back Of them was . mobile reserve
of eight divisions which presumably
could be concentrated at any
threatened point in . few days.
The coast bristled everywhere
with defenses-underwater mines,
concrete pillboxes, ARTILLERY en-
placements. There were widerstand-
nests, stuetzpunkts, verteidigungs-
genicks-as the various types OF
fortifications were called In the
German reports In the hands 1
the planners. The thickness OF
concrete, the number Of guns in
each OF these was known with some
precision.
| Knowing the defense resources
available, the architects Of d day
had to put themselves In the place
of the Germans and determine the
number Of countermoves possible.
There were, 1t was decided, IL po-
tentialities. The German forces,
for example, could b built up very
rapidly If Hitler was willing to
weaken other fronts
Germans Had ADVANTAGE
Full account was taken Of the
danger to Allied shipping from .
secret weapon" described ~ 4
long-range, large -caliber rocket such
as soon was to be showered on Eng
land. Even In January, while the
plans for D day were being, formu-
lated, 1t was no secret that the
Germans possessed such . weapon.
The possibility Of use OF gas against
the assaulting troops was con-
sidered, but dismissed as quite
doubtful.
1T is believed" says the initial
plan, that the enemy's scheme OF
maneuver-a rigid defense Of q
beachline backed up by . mobile
defense Of the coastline with power
| full armored and motorized reserves
is clearly shown by his dispose
tions. The consequences to him OF
successful invasion establishing q
western front are sufficiently dire to
compel an all-out effort to smash an
assault on the Atlantic wall. Other
Atlantic Coast sectors will be
stripped OF reserves to the greatest
extent possible. His reinforcements
are independent Of weather, giving
him an enormous advantage, and
unless hampered and delayed by air
action or sabotage We cannot hope
to equal 1t over the beaches even
with fair weather. He has an esti-
mated two-month supply of gaso-
line and rations and one years
supply OF ammunition. Although
We are numerically superior in the
air, we suffer greatly from the dis
advantage Of approximately 125
miles between fighter airfields and
the assault area and the large num-
Der of airfields available to the
enemy
/ Losses Estimated
| A total of 1900 German air sorties
was expected in the first "a hours,
dropping to about 1000 in the first
five days. Here moonlight, so es-
sential for the invasion itself, be-
came a decided disadvantage to the
attacking forces.
Heavy losses had been anticipated
for Operation Neptune. The esti-
mate for the Americans before leav-
ing England, formed as basis for
calculating essential requirements,
had been for 40,482 killed and
wounded in the first 10 days. Actual
losses during this period were:
Killed, 4,771; wounded, 14,745; miss
ing, 3,0s7: captured. 81. This was
1854 less than had been expected.
The estimate was in error, however.
only for the first four days.
The airborne operations and the
beach landings were far less costly
than Gen. Bradley and his aides had
predicted on the basis of what their
intelligence agencies had told them
of German preparations and de-
fenses. After June 9, when the
enemy forces were fully modified,
losses for the next six days came
very close to those calculated. The
heaviest attrition naturally was
among enemy riflemen thrown into
the strange maze of hedged orchards
full of sharpshooters and machine
gun nests. Throughout June 420
men per 100000 were killed and
wounded each day. In July this
dropped to an average Of 800 day
Plans for the operation called for
an army of approximately 10000
ashore before dusk on D day. This
was to be built up during the next
IA days to a strength Of about half
million. This was the maximum
possible with the cross-Channel
transportation available and allow
ing for the requirements required.
This initial plan shows clearly
why D day was so long delayed.
Anything short of the effort finally
launched, the planners knew, would
have no chance whatsoever of sue
cess. 1t was necessary to wait until
there was no reasonable chance Of
failure In what must have seemed
at first an almost hopeless effort.
Although the invasion Of the con-
tinent long had been contemplated
much, of course, had depended on
the outcome Of the fighting In
Africa, Sicily and Italy-the actual
tactics and strategy involved was
not worked out until early in 1914.
1t was the work Of four men-Gen.
Eisenhower, Field Marshal Mont
gomery, Air Marshal Tedder and
Admiral Ramsey, the naval COM
mander in chief In British waters.
Cherbourg First Objective