Evening star., 1948-02-23
The Memoirs of CordeII Hull
Confused Relations With Vichy and De GoulIe
Nearly Caused Resiqnution of Hull in 1912

us If he could say "just few little
words" to the effect that, although
Britain had not desired to maintain
relations with Vichy, those main
tanned by the United States were
worthwhile in the common cause.
Otherwise, said, the existing gen.
eral impression that the United
States was "appeasing" Vichy, IN
direct violation Of British wishes,
would continue and spread.
The Prime Minister was not cor
dial to the suggestion.
I then asked the President to
bring his own personal influence
with Churchill to bear to produce q
Strengthening out of this anomalous
situation. Mr.. Roosevelt, however.
said he had done what he could
and he could not do anything fur
ther. These attitudes of the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister were
in striking contrast to their later
attitudes when they both became
bitterly hostile to De Gaulle and
renamed so.
now drafted a proposed agree
ment that I believed acceptable to
the United States, Britain and Cam
ada. and that would make with
drawal of the Free French forces
from the islands agreeable to De
Gaulle. This provided that the
United States, Britain and Canada
would exercise Joint supervision over
the islands. which would be neu.
tralized and demilitarized.
De Gaulle Rejects Proposal.
The President agreed to my pro-
posed solution. We thereupon sub
mitted it to Mr.. Churchill. He ac-
cepted 1t on condition that De
Gaulle agreed. Meantime the Pc
tain government agreed to 1t. But
De Gaulle rejected it.
De Gaulle never did consent to
our proposed agreement which
would have irened out the dispute.
Our relations with De Gaulle's
were not helped by the
incident. There was no doubt In
the minds of the President or my
self that De Gaulle personally was
responsible for violating his commit
ment to Britain and for going d.
rectly contrary to the wishes Of the
United States and Canada. We
regarded him as more ambitious for
himself and less reliable than We
had thought him before.
As for myself, the refusal Of the
President to bring more pressure
on Mr.. Churchill to clarity the rela-
tions between Great Britain and the
United States with regard to De
Gaulle and Vichy was one of several
factors that almost caused me to
resign as Secretary OF State in jan
uary, 1912. so seriously considered
resigning that I pencilled out note
to the President rendering my resig-
nation
A few comments may be in order
in summing up the effects of our
Vichy policy. 1t Is unfortunate
that that policy aroused so many
emotions in the United States that
even today some persons refuse to
see anything in it but the most
black.
The first point is that President
Roosevelt and saw as one toward
Vichy and toward De Gaulle.
The second point is that Prime
Minister Churchill, and sometimes
Eden, strongly supported, to the
and me. our maintenance
of relations with Vichy, even though
they themselves condemned Vichy
and made those relations dificult.
Ties Brought Advantages.
The third point is that our rela-
tions with Vichy brought us proven
advantages. They meant contacts
in Vichy France and In French
North Africa which would have
been cut of completely had We
broken with Vichy. They meant
They meant having
our own representatives on the spot
to convince Frenchmen that the
Allies would win, however long Ii
took, and that Vichy France should
not collaborate with Germany.
They helped keep alive in the
minds of the French people their
basic concepts of freedom and the
hope that Frances free institutions
would be restored. They were in
strumental in preventing the ces-
sion of bases and materials to Ger
many in May, 1941. These rela-
tions played a part in keeping ths
French fleet from passing into Ger
man hands.
The fourth point is that we had
no pre-eminent French leader to
turn to II we were to cut of Vichy
and perhaps push Petain's
government into Hitler's arms,
The fifth, and most important,
point, was that our relations with
Vichy, which permitted US to main
tain consuls In North Africa, paved
The way and prepared the back
ground for planning and sending
he Anglo-American military expe-
dition into the Western Mediter-
.anesn area and for assisting ths
supporting the British
operations farther East
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