Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-01-29
The Memoirs Of Cordeu Hull
Roosevelt Checked HuIrs Reciprocal Trade Plan
AT London in '33 Because of Domestic Issues

|ciprocal agreements with individual
nations. All such agreements, both
general and bilateral, would be sub
mitted for approval as soon as Con-
gress reassembles."
This message was q terrific blow.
It swept from under me one of ths
prime reasons for going to London.
one Of the chief bases I had fer
hoping that real results could be
achieved at the conference to lift
the nations, albeit gradually, out
Of the world depression. The frlnda.
mental difference between my posi-
ton and what the President advo-
Gated in his telegram was this:
To me it was essential that Con-
gress grant the Executive authority
to negotiate reciprocal trade agree
ments embracing tariff reductions,
within certain limits, such agree
ments to enter into effect without
senatorial. approval. This was what
was done later, in June, 1884. But
what the President suggested was
the negotiation Of tariff treaties on
the old basis, which meant they had
to be submitted for Senate approval
by two-thirds majority. This
method offered me no aid or en-
couragement because no American
Senate had ever approved trade
treaty negotiated by the Executive
which materially reduced tariffs,
especially when negotiated without
prior congressional authority.
Others Aware of Handicap.
When 7 arrived in London, I
found that delegations of other
countries were well aware of the
severely handicapped situation in
which the American delegation was
thus left. The President announced
on June he was not going to send
tariff legislation to Congress. The
other delegations promptly SHE'D
away from any treaties that would
be left indefinitely in the lap of
Congress.
On June II, the day before the
conference opened, the President
cabled me: please do not worry
about the situation here In re-
gard to tariff reductions and re-
moval of trade obstacles. The
eleventh rows in Congress over
domestic problems made general
tariff debate dangerous to our whole
program.
"I am squarely behind you and
nothing said or done here will ham,
per your efforts. There is no all
teration of your policy or mine.
Remember, too, that If we can get
treaties signed we can call special
session of Senate alone in the au-
tumn to consider ratification"
But there was no hope here for
me. The President was behind me
in words, but I needed actions, too,
If was to have any success In Lon
don.
Delegation Divided.
The highly important fact, how
ever, should not be overlooked that
wide Emergencies existed among
almost all nations about an &C
ceptable method of trade barriers
reduction. Great Britain was NOV
ing toward a quota system. Some
OF the gold-standard countries, like
France, Belgium, Holland and Swift
zerland, were demanding, temporary
sterilization Of currencies before
they would consider tariff reduction.
Others demanded other prerequisites
such as war debt relief.
There was never so much milling
around and tugging and pulling as
characterized this conference. 1t
seemed to be moving and operat-
| ing most of the time in a dense
fog. Here the demagogue, the agi-
tator, the perverse person and the
chronic critic could keep thoroughly
busy.
These contradictory views and
attitudes characterizing the London
Conference extended into the Amer
lean delegation. There were high
tariff members such as Senator Key
Pittman; there were conflicting
approaches to the currency stabili-'
cation question and virtually all
other questions. Few mistakes can
be more unfortunate than for the
official head of a delegation to a
world conference not to have q
chance to consult with the Presi-
dent on the selection of the entire
personnel-or at least let the per-
sonnet have that distinct impression.
Otherwise there is little sense OF
loyalty or teamwork on the part Of
some, and open defiance from 9TH
ers. This has been my experience.
(copyrisht 194s, by North American
Newspaper Alliance)