Evening star., 1948-02-14
The Memoirs of CordeH Hull
BuIIitt's Staying in Paris After Fall to Nozis
Deprived u. S. of Envoy With French Government

many. Subsequently, I arranged for
the military attache to confer with
the War Department on this sub
ject, and I requested our diplomatic
and consular officers in Germany
to keep us well informed on the
results OF British bombings in Ger
many.
I talked further with Lothian on
June "a about the disposition OF
the British feet. He again made
the suggestion that confidential
staff conferences be held between
the appropriate military and naval
officials of our two governments.
These would be highly important In
the event the British government
had to move to Canada, taking with
it what would be left of the British
feet. But this would result only
from British defeat-and neither
Lothian nor I contemplated this
at all.
Feared Conference Leak"
I remarked that it might prove
more desirable to have an exchange
of information through diplomatic
rather than through Army and
Navy officials, at least during this
stage What the President and
had in mind was the possibility
that the holding of military staff
conversations would leak out" and
opponents of the administration,
along with the isolationists, would
forthwith charge that the President
was planning to get the United
States into the war
A dramatic, though only partial,
settlement of the question Of the
French feet came on July 8. Then
the British took over the French
warships in British ports; they in
formed the French admiral in com.
mand of a squadron at Alexandria
that they would sink his ships If he
tried to take them to France where
they would fall under German con-
troll; and they delivered an ulti-
matum to the French admiral in
command of large portion of the
French Navy, at Mers-el-Kehir. near
Oran, North Africa.
The ultimatum required the French
warships at Mers-el-Kebir to join
the British or else proceed to British
or West Indian or United States
ports to be interned. When the
French admiral refused, the British
opened fire and put most of the
French ships out of commission,
killing more than 1000 Frenchmen.
I could not help but be inexpres-
sibly saddened by this latest mani
festation of the tragic break between
Britain and France.
A year and a half later, when Mr..
Churchill was visiting the President
toward the end of December, 1941. I
sat between the Prime Minister and
a British admiral at one Of the
luncheons the President gave for his
distinguished visitor. The admiral
asked me what had thought Of
the British attack on the French
feet at Oran. parried the ques-
ton because ! did not want to get
up souabble between him and Mr..
Churchill, for had heard that the
British Navy had been opposed to
the attack and that serious differ
ences over 1t had risen within the
British government. '"
Distrusted Vichy French.
A few minutes later, however, I
brought up the subject with Mr..
Churchill himself. He wound up
with a general statement that the
Vichy French were not to be trusted
and would have turned the fleet
over to the Germans if the attack
had not been made. He also said
that British prestige, being then at
its lowest ebb, he had wanted to
raise 1t throughout the world by
means of this action which showed
that Britain still meant to fight.
Bullitt, who had left Paris after
some days of German occupation,
saw Petain, Laval, Baudoin and
others at Vichy on July 4, the day
after the British attack. He cabled
me on the 5th that their reaction
was violent in the extreme.
Several cabinet members advo-
Gated immediate acts Of war against
Britain, but Petain resolutely OPP
posed anything more than a break
of diplomatic relations. Petain said
to Bullitt he recognized that only a
defeat Of Hitler by some other power
could restore independence toI
France, and he therefore sincerely
desired British victory He sought
to minimize the breach with Britain
by attributing it to what he called
Churchill's personal lack OF balance.
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