Evening star., 1948-02-20

Win the Unlteo STATES, Ru26l& or
Britain.
Then on November ao-Tranks-
giving Day-Nomura and Kurusu
handed me . new set Of proposals
from their government which ON
their faces were extreme. The in
tercepted message had appraised
Us Of the fact that this was Japan's
final proposition. It was an ulti-
matum.
Although Japan's proposal was Of
so preposterouS q character that
no responsible American oficial
could ever have dreamed Of accept
ing 1t, felt I should not be too
sharp In my reactions, 20 as TO
avoid giving the japanese any pre-
text to walk out Of the conversations.
Ambassador Ku-
rusu came alone to see me. I asked
Kurusu whether he or Nomura had
anything more to offer on the whole
subject OF a peaceful settlement. Hs
replied that he did not.
After this visit from Kurusu and
his statement that he had nothing
more to offer on the subject Of .
peaceful settlement, I redoubled, ir
conversations with individuals La
authority in Washington, among
them Admiral Stark, my warnings
that Japan might attack st any
time.
Situation Nearly Hopeless.
Diplomatically, the situation was
virtually hopeless. We on our part,
however. wanted to exhaust all
means to find q peaceful solution
and to avert or delay war. Secre-
tary Of War Stimson, Secretary o:
the Navy Knox, the Chief Of Staff,
Gen. Marshall, and the Chief Of
Naval Operations, Admiral Stark.
with whom I was In constant con-
tact, pleaded for more time In which
to prepare American resistance. On
the other hand, Japan was calling
for showdown. We stood firmly
for our principles; the Japanese
were unyielding and intimidating In
their demands.
As we sought to prepare our
counterproposals on November n
and az, we drafted q possible mod.
us vivendi, or temporary agreement.
to which would be attached the
outline Of q permanent agreement.
We worked on an outline Of q 10
point peace settlement to accom-
pany the modus vivendi. In gen
eral, my associates and I had
reached q stage of clutching at
straws to save the situation.
Secretary Morgenthau sent me q
further draft Of q proposed settle
ment, written in his department.
Although this was further exam
pie Of the Secretary Of the Treas
,Iry's persistent inclination to try to
function as a second Secretary Of
State, some Of its points were good
and were incorporated in our final
draft.
An intercepted message from
Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on
November az extended the deadlins
from November rs to 20. After
that, war.
Continued Effort Urged.
stick to our flxed policy and do
your very best" 1t said. Spare no
effort and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are rea-
sons beyond your ability to guess
why we wanted to settle Japanese
American relations by the 25th, bus
II within the next three or four
days you can finish your converse
tions with the Americans; II the
signing can be completed by tho
18th Get me write 1t out for you--
@th, II the pertinent notes can
be exchanged; II we can get an
understanding with Great Britain
and the Netherlands, and in short IL
everything can be finished. We have
decided to wait until that date.
This time we mean it, that the dead
line absolutely cannot be changed.
After that things are automatically
going to happen"
A few hours after my conversation
with the British, Chinese, Australian
and Dutch ENJOYS (on November az,
Nomura and Kurusu called at my
apartment. It was a strain to talk
to them in the same tone and on
the same level, knowing what did
of Japan's nefarious plans from the
intercepted messages and knowing
that Nomura and Kurusu had the
same information.
There they sat, bowing agreeably,
Nomura sometimes giggling, Kurusu
often showing his teeth in a grin,
while through their minds must
have raced again and again the
thought that, if we did not say
"Yes" to Japan's demands, their
government In q matter OF O few
days would launch new aggressions
that sooner or later would inevitably
bring war with the United States.
(Copyright, 194S, By MANA, Inc)