Evening star., 1948-03-04
By CordeII Hull
lAssistsd by Andrew bsrdins)
CHAPTER XXXIV.

| i En- A<A<Axvs
An entirely new and startling
proposal was Unexpectedly inject
ed into the discussions by the
Soviet representative, Ambassador
Gromyko, as the second week of
the Dumbarton Oaks Conference
opened on August 20, 1914.
The discussion, In the Steering
Committee Of the conference, was
revolving around the question Of
what nations should be initial men,
bers Of the organization. Both the
Russians and ourselves said that
the members should be the United
Nations and the associated nations.
However, there emerged a basic
difference of Interpretation.
We meant that members should
be all the signatories to the United
Nations declaration, together with
eight other nations that had not
declared war against the Axis but
had been materially helping the
Allies in the prosecution Of the
war-helping more, in fact, than
some Of the Allies themselves.
These were six Latin American
Republics. Iceland and Egypt.
The Russians said the members
should be the rs original sigma
tories to the United Nations dec
laration, and they defined associ-
ate nations as being those which
had signed the declaration sub
sequently. They did not wish to
include the eight nations we
mentioned. Our discussion on this
latter point was proving incon-
elusive, and, In fact, the confer
ence ended with it still unsolved
16 Votes Asked for Russia.
At the same time, Ambassador
Gromyko, without previous notice,
said to the Steering Committee
that all 16 republics comprising the
Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics
should be made initial members Of
the United Nations organization.
Russia would therefore have 10
votes. He left Undersecretary
stettinius and Undersecretary Cado-
gan (head Of the British delegation
Ed. note) breathless, but they
lost no time In telling him that
his proposal would raise great dtm-
culties.
When stettinius reported this to
the President, Mr.. Roosevelt said
emphatically that the United States
could under no conditions accept
such a proposal. He instructed
Stettinius to explain to Gromyko
that it would present untold COM
plications, and that 1t was just
as logical for US to ask for the
admission of the 4S States Of the
Union as it was to agree to ad-
nit the 16 Soviet republics.
When Stettinius reported 1t to me,
I said I was amazed that such
proposal had been made. I added
that no such question had ever en-
tered the minds Of any Of Us In the
American group who had been
working on postwar planning. IL
concluded by saying I would oppose
1t with all my strength. i
On August 20 Stettinius reported
to Gromyko the substance Of his
conversations with the President
and me and stated that it was our
opinion that the suggestion was out
Of order and that to press it at this
time might jeopardize the success
Of the conference. Stettinirs ap-
pealed to Gromyko to withdraw his
suggestion and that, If the Soviet
had such thing In
mind it should more properly pre-
sent 1t to the Council OF the United
Nations organization after its crea-
ton. ~...
Gromyko Cooperative.
dromyko proved most cooper
ative. He said he had raised the i
point merely to advise u and the
British that his government has the h
natter in mind. He agreed that
here should be no further reference
% it during the conference. Never ,
heless, he indicated that on some c
,ther occasion his government r
would probably raise the question T
gain. g
The fact that the Soviet govern q
nentr had such a question of null t
iple membership in mind was dis t
urbing. I accordingly asked Am
Gromyko to come to see
ne on August 81, at which time I Il
tated to him as plainly as possible ,
he manifold objections I saw to the t
uggestion he had raised on behalf k
+ his government. o
I said to him. Ia effect. that this I b