Evening star., 1948-02-14
CHAPTTR xVIn.

Premier Reynaud, just before leav-
ing Paris with his government few
hours after Mussolini declared war,
cabled a dramatic appeal to Presi-
dent Roosevelt to declare publicly
that the United States would sup
port the Allies by all means short
OF an expeditionary force.
I'VE shall fight" he said, 'in front
of Paris; we shall fight behind
Paris; we shall close ourselves in
enc of our provinces to fight and If
we should be driven out of it we
shall establish ourselves in North
Africa to continue the fight and If
necessary in our American posses
sions."
The President and ! knew the
French could neither fight in front
Of Paris or behind Paris nor close
themselves In one Of their provinces
(Reynaud had Brittany in mind :.
But it was still possible to retain
control Of the feet, withdraw to
North Africa and carry on the fight
from there.
The fight for France was effective
ly over; there was nothing we could
possibly do to keep Hitler from
conquering metropolitan France.
We therefore sought to send re-
ply that would encourage Reynaud
and his government to carry on
from North Africa and to preserve
the French fleet intact.
Bullitt Stayed in Paris.
The Germans occupied Paris on
June IA, the day before the Presi-
dents reply. Ambassador Bullitt
acted with the military governor in
turning the undefended city over
to the Germans without loss of life.
Bullitt, at his own wish, had re-
manned behind rather than accom-
pany the French government to
Tours and then to Bordeaux. He
had in mind the action Of Ameri-
can Ambassador Myron Herrick,
who remained in Paris rather than
accompany the French government
to Bordeaux during the First World
War.
This decision, in my opinion, was
unfortunate. It deprived Bullitt of
all contact with the French gov
ernment during the crucial week
between June 10, when 1t left Paris,
and June II, when it asked for an
armistice. Had Bullitt, with his un-
equaled contacts with the leaders
of the French government, been
able to represent us during those
historic days, it is possible, If not
probable, that that government
would have taken the fleet, gone to
North Africa, and continued the
fight from there. u
Bullitt's place was taken by Am
bassador Biddle, who had been in
Paris representing us to the Polish
government -in-exile. Biddle was
a fine diplomat, but his contacts
and influence with the French gov
ernment were not to be compared
with those of Bullitt.
AS the Germans approached Paris
Bullitt communicated to the Pres
ident direct that he knew the State
Department would oppose the pro-
posal he was about to make, hence
the was approaching him PERSONAL
[ly. He then proposed staying in
Paris, instead of going with the
French government.
Called President Direct.
Bullitt had communicated direct
| ly with the President on many oc-
casioas by telephone and cable. He
also employed a private code he had
worked out solely with the Presi-
dent. This routine reached q
climax in the tragic days OF Frances
defeat, The result was that at
times the State Department re-
manned In the dark as to what
Bullitt was thinking and doing, al
though the President informed me
of many of these communications
from Bullitt and always gave me
full information when I asked him
about any particular item. Liking
the dramatic side of foreign affairs,
Mr.. Roosevelt did not discourage
this practice.
When I became aware of Bullitt's
proposal I went to see the Presi-
dent. I said to him I opposed this
project and thought our Ambassa-
dor should go with the French gov
ernment. It seemed to me that
Bullitt's influence with the German
occupation authorities in Paris
would be very small. because his
strong anti-Nazi sentiments were
well known to the German govern
ment. On the other hand, his in
f1uence with the French govern
ment might be decisive.
The President himself then tele-
phoned Bullitt. He said to the Am
hassador that he, the President, and