Evening star., 1948-02-03
CHAPTER &.

In the first years Of the Roosevelt
administration, when Germany was
arming, Japan warning and Italy
preparing for conflict, it was most
unfortunate that many differences
plagued relations among the major
western democracies-the United
States, Britain and France.
Immediately upon entering the
State Department saw that only
a common attitude among these
three powers, preferably joined by
Russia, could recall the three jim
goist countries to their senses. Ac-
tually we presented a miserable
spectacle of disagreement and re-
elimination more often than Of
accord.
In our relations with Britain, For
eign Secretary Sir John Simon
proved a frequent source of annoy
ance. Beginning with the invasion
of Manchuria, Simon seemed to me
to lack a stable. basic course. I
believed, from all the information
available, that he showed too much
consideration for the japanese, and
I still think so. He surprised us
by conceding that Japan had some
special rights in Manchuria.
When the President decided i'm
mediately after his Inauguration to
rebuild our Navy up to treaty
strength, Simon requested that we
abandon the program lest it lead to
a race in naval armaments, but he
did not offer to abandon construc-
ton Of British warships then under
way. At the London Economic Con-
ference Simon had been unce-
operative. His personality was cold.
Simon Irritated President.
Simon's objection in March, 1885,
to the principle of international in
spection on the spot Of armaments
production sharply irritated the
President. Mr.. Roosevelt and were
in accord that we should agree to
this principle.
I&had sent him a telegram of
March 8 from Minister Hugh Wilson
in Geneva, giving three reasons for
Simon's opposition: Inspection
would reveal to continental nations
and precarious state OF Britain's
armaments: If they agreed to it
they would be giving away their
trump card" with reference to the
French, for whom there would then
be no incentive to go further and
make general treaty limiting arm
aments; and detailed publicity on
armaments orders would furnish a
basis for unfair competition that
would prejudice Britain's arma-
ments trade.
In note to me the following day,
March 8, the President commented
that this was "a very significant
dispatch which I think you should
lay aside for possible future need.
He went on: 1T shows two things:
first, the unwillingess of the British,
because of alleged armament weak
ness, to accept the principle of open
international armament inspection
thus making it impossible to go
along with what we have considered
essential in its application to Ger
many; in other words, the only
practical way of keeping German
armaments down to an agreed-on
level being to inspect German arma-
ment supplies, Britain dashes this
hope by declining to be inspected
herself. The last paragraph Is a
frank admission that the British de-
cline to accept detailed publicity as
to armanents orders on the ground
that it would prejudice their arma-
ment trade"
He then concluded: "At some
future time 1t may be advisable to
pull this rabbit out of our hat as
proof that the present British Gov
ernment is not sincere in seeking
limitation or reduction of present
world ornaments or present world
trade in warlike weapons.
II am much discouraged"
Lindsay Also Difficult.
In Washington, the British Am
bassador OF this period. Sir Ronald
Lindsay, was difficult to deal with.
He confined his contacts with
Americans to a restricted set of the
highest society, most of whom op-
pOSed the Roosevelt Administration