Evening star., 1948-03-07

received his reply, dated April /, to
my recommendation Of March rs.
"I think this should be handled
differently" he said. TT would be
q mistake, in my judgment, to
abandon or make an exception In
the case of the words unconditional
surrender As matter Of fact
whom do we mean those words to
apply to? Evidently our enemies.
I'm August, 1s41. at the time OF
the Atlantic Charter, and in jan
uary, 1943, at the time Of Casa
blanca, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania
and Finland were the Axis satel-
lites. But they were not our en-
emies in the same sense that Ger
many and italy were. These four
little satellite states were enemies
under the duress of Germany and
Italy.
II think 1t is mistake to make
exceptions. Italy surrendered un-
conditionally, but was at the same
time given many privileges. This
should be so in the event of the sur
render of Bulgaria or Romania or
Hungary or Finland. Lee surren-
dered unconditionally to Grant, but
Immediately Grant told him that
his officers should take their horses
home for the spring plowing. That
is the spirit want to see abroad
but 1t does not apply to Germany.
Germany understands only one kind
of language. F. D. R"
Following the receipt of the Presi-
dents response, various Of my asso-
ciates strongly recommended in
memoranda to me that I take the
matter up with Mr.. Roosevelt again.
After some discussion sent the
President letter on April 4.
The President replied the follow
ing day. 1T understand the prob
len1s thoroughly" he said, "but I
want at all costs to prevent it from
being said that the unconditional
surrender principle has been aban-
doned. There is real danger if We
start making exceptions to the gen.
eral principle before specific case
arises.
1--WE all know that this would
happen If we were to make any ex-
ceptions to the principle which
would thereafter apply in all cases.
"I understand perfectly well that
from time to time there will have
to be exceptions, not to the surren-
der principle but to the application
Of 1t in specific cases. That is q very
different think (sic) from changing
the principle.
Question Raised Again
IF the Soviet and British gov
ernments will advise us of any case
of this kind. I am quite sure that
we will agree with them. This
should be made clear to both of
these governments. Then they can
not accuse us of having rendered
more difficult the Soviet military
task. F. D. r."
The question, however, would not
die. Only two days later it was
strongly raised from another quar-
ter, the military. On April 49, 1914,
received a cable from Undersec-
retary Stettinius, who was then in
London, conveying recommendations
made to him by Gen. Eisenhower
and Gen. Bedell Smith.
1 sent this cable on to the Presi-
dent, who was then resting from
his recent illness at the estate of
Bernard M. Baruch at Georgetown,
S. C.
On April Is, received a brief
message from the President which,
after referring to Stettinius' cable
of April 13, said: ANY reply thereto
should have my approval before
being sent"
On April II cabled William
Phillips. Gen. Eisenhower's political
adviser, asking him to inform all
concerned that the President wished
chat the subject be given no further
consideration without his approval.
The President having returned to
Washington on May 7, I sent him
a memorandum on the subject three
DAYS later. I said the State Depart
ment had been informed by the
British Embassy that the British
government considered it important
that Allied propaganda to the satel-
lite states should be reinforced.
With special reference to Hungary
and Bulgaria this propaganda should
henceforth omit reference to the
term unconditional surrender" in
order to attain the maximum mill
tary advantage in strengthening re-
sistance to Germany. Abandonment
of the general principle would be
avoided.
Surrender at Last
In making this proposal" I said,
"the British Embassy has pointed
out that the Soviet government had
not applied the principle to Finland,
and the same could be said for
Romania, If the Romanians should
come to terms along the lines pro-
posed for their surrender. 1t is
supposed that the propaganda agen-
cies will take these considerations
into account in preparing their di-
receives. AS for Hungary and Bull
garia, the department thinks that
advantages can, in fact, be gained
from energetic action at this time
in propaganda operations, and I
should therefore be grateful if you
would indicate whether you would
approve our taking parallel action
with the British and the Russians
in authorizing a degree of latitude
for propaganda purposes, having it
clearly understood that the excep-
tion is authorized to enable the
OroDaganCla services to omit refer