Evening star., 1948-06-20

DllC.
and Republicans were Of the same
,est of our ability, Of the Nanking
pointed out that strategically ths
survival Of the Chinese National
government is even more important.
In the event of war with Russia
our position would be seriously I'M
paired If the Communists rule In
Nanking.
Fears Another Bataan
Japan is within easy reach Of
bombers flown from Chinese air.
fields and we might be faced with
another Bataan in the japanese
islands. From the standpoint OF
long-range policy, our position In
the Pacific would become seriously
jeopardized If. after we leave Japan.
the Soviet government is able, BY
economic means and subversive in.
filtration, to coerce that country
to place itself under Soviet domi-
nation.
Gen. MacArthur's summation
is said to have been that China
must be helped with every available
means from falling into the hands
Of the Communists. If Washington
were inclined to help the Chinese.
the expenditure would be relatively
small. There are important quaint.
ties Of war materials in Japan
today which are practically useless
to American armed forces but these
have not yet been declared surplus
and consequently cannot be sold or
given to the Chinese.
1t is logical to believe that secre-
tary Marshall, who was an able
Chief of Staff of the Army before
and during the war, would be able
to see the situation in the same
light as his colleague in Tokyo.
Strangely enough, this is not the
case.
After the war, when most other
five-star generals and admirals re-
tired or accepted less burdensome
jobs, Gen. Marshall accepted one OF
the most thankless tasks any ono
could have wished on man OF his
type. In response to President Tru-
mans pressing request he accepted
the position of special Ambassador
to China with the purpose Of recon-
Cling the Nationalists and the
Communists and persuading them to
work together in a unified govern
ment.
Gen. Marshall had acquired polit-
ical knowledge about China from
the personal reports Of his old
friend, Gen. Stilwell. whom Gen.
Chang personally had antagonized
and who was much courted by the
Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung
and Chou En-lai.
Marshall Blamed Chang
- The Marshall mission to China
ended in utter failure. the first
major setback he has had in his
long and distinguished career. 1t
is human to resent spectacular
failure, particularly when life has
been a series Of successes. Gen.
Marshall blamed the Marking gov
ernment rather than Chinese condi-
tions, of which he knew SO little.
He contended that q truce be-
tween the legitimate government
and the Communists was not pos
sible unless the Communists were
brought to power. He believed, with
the young men of the Far Eastern
Division Of the State Department,
that the "agrarians in Yenan" actu-<
ally were reformers, in no way con-
trolled by Moscow.
Thus, when Gen. Marshall became
Secretary of State in January. 1947.
he became determined to use all his
power to prevent any assistance to
the Nanking government. Already
In September, 1916, he had issued
instructions to suspend shipment to
China of certain war materials
which Gen. Chang had right to
receive under previous formal agree
ments with the United States Gov.
eminent.
Roosevelt Ideas Out
As Secretary of State Gen. Mar
shall considered obsolete formal
obligations made by President
Roosevelt to provide the Chinese
Nationalist Army with the means
Of maintaining itself against the
Communists. His animosity to-
ward the Marking regime finally
was challenged in December last
year when President Truman called
a special session Of Congress to vote
temporary aid to the Western Euro
pean powers, which had agreed to
accept the Marshall Plan. Over the
open opposition Of the State De-
partment a token sum was voted
for China. In spite of resistance
by the Secretary Of State Congress
authorized over $500 ,000,0 for
economic and military assistance
- $&hioa ,,pdor tho TRp
Gen. Marshall's confidential let.
ter to Congress last week, together
with the formal objections TO any
f,,rfhor nvpopdifIiro for China