Evening star., 1948-03-03

with the appropriate experts OF oul
Government and without any re-
gard for the policy we had been
trying to pursue in the past.
Shortly after the President re-
turned to Washington I went to
see him at the White House. I took
his memorandum of September Is
and the Morgenthau plan with me
(The September Is memorandum
set forth that the President and
Mr.. Churchill had agreed on the
substance Of the Morgenthau pro-
posal.-Ed. Note.)
90 Per Cent Could Live.
I said bluntly to the President
that Morgenthau's plan was out OF
all reason, and that no experts, no
appropriate officials of our Govern
ment or the President, and no other
governments had anything to do
with its preparation. Morgenthau's
plan, I added, would wipe out every
thing in Germany except land, and
the Germans would have to live on
the land. This meant that only
go per cent of the German popula-
ton could support themselves on
German land, and the other 40 per
cent would die.
I remarked that with regard to
the postwar treatment of Germany
would bear in mind two controlling
points. The first was that Ger
many should be kept under mill
tary control for rs or so years, as
necessity might require, until she
experienced an absolute change OF
heart away from all theories and
notions of Naziism and the absurd
idea that Germans were superior
race and had a right to govern
other races. The second was that
the standard Of living of the Ger
man population should be kept below
the average Of neighboring popu-
lations but should be raised gradu-
ally in proportion to the rate of
change on their part away from
Naziism, racial superiority and the
like, toward ideas Of human rights,
individual liberty, freedom and
peace. ..-..... .s..
7 concluded that I was satisfied
that the British at Quebec had
Joined in on this extreme starva-
ton plan in order to get Morgen-
thau's help In obtaining the $780,
000, 900 credit proposed by the Sec
retary Of the Treasury. I particu-
larly inveighed against this credit.
No Conditions on Credit. ''
For one reason, I said, negotia-
tions with Britain should be con-
Quoted primarily through the State
Department, the organ Of the ad-
ministration set up to negotiate
with foreign governments. For
another reason, ,Morgenthau's pro-
poSal had attached to it no condi-
tions whatever. There were numer-
GUS questions pending between us
and Great Britain on which we
should seek settlement. or action,
and the credits would be needed as
q part of our bargaining position
with Britain.
concluded that, apart from
all the other serious objections,
If Morgenthau's proposals became
known and the President were con-
nected with them, it would greatly
injure him politically. He was then
in the midst of the 1914 presidential
campaign.
The President said very little
during this conversation except to
indicate that he had not actually
committed himself to. Morgenthau's
proposals. In fact, he did not seem
to realize the devastating nature of
the memorandum of September is
to which he had put his "OK FDR."
I now asked my associates at the
State Department to assist me In
preparing q further memorandum
for the President. This, dated Sep
tember 20, I handed to him per-