Evening star., 1948-06-08
Germany, Russia and the West

germany, kuSSlo ono tne Vest
Soviet policy is primarily responsible for
the potentially explosive six-natlon plan
for the political and economic unif1cation
of Western Germany. Had the Kremlln
lived up to the Potsdam Agreement, this
far-reaching and fateful Development
accentuating the grim division that exists
in the world-would never have been
necessary. But it is necessary now because
Russian nay-saying and Russian expan-
sionism have made 1t an undertaking
essential to the success Of the European
Recovery Program and the security of the
West.
AS worked out by representatives Of the
United States, Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the
main features of the plan may be outlined
as follows: % Though remaining po-
ltically a part of Germany, the industrial
Ruhr is to be controlled by the six powers
and integrated with the ERP; (2) measures
are to be taken under which the Western
Germans will hold constituent assembly
to draft a democratic constitution for
federal government with adequate central
will be able eventually to achieve COM
plete self-rule through the whole of their
country; "a in the beginning, however,
they will be setting up a separate, trun-
Gated state under the thumb OF the
military governors in the Anglo-French-
American zones Of occupation, but the
hope is that Russia ultimately will permit
the Red Army zone to join the new
Germany; and (5) meanwhile, France,
Britain and the United States will CO.
ordinate their zonal economies as much
as possible, and they will commit them
selves to specific steps guarding against
the resurgence of German militarism.
Although the plan is at pains to empha-
size that 1t does not preclude, but rather
facilitates, eventual Russian participation
in an overall German settlement, it obvi-
ously creates an immediate prospect OF
partition. And that in turn creates a
number of serious but unavoidable risks.
In the first place, when and II the plan
is ratified by the six governments present.
ing it, the Germans themselves-who dread
the idea of seeing their country parti-
tioned-may lend less than popular support
to the projected new state, which would
embrace two thirds Of Germanys present
population and Industrial capacity. In
the second place, the proposal may cause
a political crisis in France, for the De
Gaullists are dissatisfied with It's guaran-
tees against a resurgent Germany and
they may therefore join the Communists
in opposing It, In the third place, the
Soviet Union may seize upon 1t as justif1-
cation for violent attempt to oust the
Anglo o-French-American authorities from
Berlin-a development that could have
the gravest physical and psychological
consequences. Finally, in an overall
sense, the undertaking Is bound to have
the initial effect of making the gulf be-
tween East and West seem deeper than
ever, thus dimming further what little
hope remains for building a decent and
enduring peace.
But these and similar risks are out
weighed by the larger risk of doing nothing
about Germany. Three years have passed
since We day. In all that time, repeatedly
violating the Potsdam Agreement, the
Soviet Union has persistently paralyzed
the effort to bring about the economic
unif1cation of Hitler's shattered Reich and
employ its great productive potential to
help put Europe back on its feet. This
policy, Of course, has been aimed at pro-
longing chaos and depression in order to
make 1t easier for the Kremlin to spread
its dominance over the entire continent.
To acquiesce in such policy, to take no
action to counter it, would be merely to
let the Red tide roll on wherever it willed.
With their new plan, however, the United
States and the Western Allies have made
clear that they do not propose to be
engulfed. In effect, recognizing the de-
cisive importance of Germany in divided
Europe's deadly power contest, they have
served notice of their determination to
smash the menacing stalemate caused by
Russia. Whatever the risks involved, this
course is far better than letting the
paralysis continue. The recovery and
safety of the West demand it. The Krem-
lin may react violently. but II 1t wants q
showdown, this probably is the right time
for one.