Evening star., 1948-02-29
Red Difficulties Seen
IN Duplicating Czech
Maneuyer in Finland
By John M. Hiehtower
Assoejotsd Press Stoff Writer

BY John M. Hiehtower
Assoeiatsd Press stoff Writer
Russia is expected to have a
much more difficult time forcing
Finland into the Eastern European
Communist bloc than 1t had with
Czechoslovakia.
American officials predict that the
resistance of the Firms will be
much greater than that of the
Czechs. They say 1t may, In fact,
succeed in preserving some elements
of liberty for Finland.
Authorities here were shocked
and distressed at the speed with
which the Czechs gave in to Com
munist demands. Reports now
reaching the State Department tend
to explain this speed. They are in
line with press dispatches from
Prague and relate that President
Eduard Benes had few powers Of
resistance left when Communist
Premier Klement Gottwald made
his bid for Communist-controlled
government.
Situation Reviewed.
These authoritative accounts on
which American policy toward the
new Czech government must be
largely based, summed UP the sit
uation this way:
The Communists threatened and
berated Mr.. Benes with words.
They pictured Czechoslovakia as
ripped with internal strife and
stained with blood of political war
fare. The Communists, moreover,
had the power to cause such trouble
II they wanted to, and Mr.. Benes'
own physical weakness plus his
knowledge that the situation was
extremely dangerous caused him to
give in. The Communists thus came
to power in legal manner.
They apparently came to power
through due constitutional process.
When opposition ministers resigned,
President Benes accepted their
designations and then agreed to
Communist proposals. for a new
ministry.
The use or threat of force in the
Czech situation is regarded by
American officials as q violation of
the traditional spirit of democratic
procedure. But the change in gov
ernment is difficult to challenge as
there is no direct evidence that it
was done In expressed opposition to
the wishes of Mr.. Benes.
Finland's Case Different.
The case of Finland is consider
ably different.
The Firms have been through two
wars with the Russians in the last
10 years, and such experiences are
toughening as well as enlightening.
Since the end of World War II,
when they managed to turn against
the Germans, the Firms have pur-
sued toward Russia a policy OF
friendly caution and complete cor
rectness. They came out of the war
owing the Soviet Union $500, ,000,-
600 in reparations, to be paid &C
tually in goods. The greatest. con-
Germ of the Finnish nation has been
to meet those payments on schedule.
They run until 1852 and give
Russia during that time virtually
tile power of life and death over
the Finnish economy-but not,
authorities insist-over the Finnish
spirit.
When this reporter was in Hell
sinki q year ago he was struck by
the generally rundown appearance
of the city. Finnish officials ex-
planned that they had no money
for repairs or new constipation up7
less absolutely vital. The Russian
reparations payments, they said,
were absorbing all their efforts.
But If they tried hard and had
little economic assistance from the
western powers they said that might
be able to emerge in 1852 as
country unthreatened by the claims
of any power. -
"Opening Wedge" Seen.
Technically, Prime Minister Sta
Inns demand on the Finnish gov
eminent for military alliance does
not seem to change this situation.
An alliance would not necessarily
make Finland subservient to MOS
COW more than it already is. What
authorities here fear is that the
demand for an alliance is a opening
wedge" the first Of series OF
moves designed to extend the belt
of controlled states along Russia's
borders from the Black Sea and
the boundaries of Greece all the
way to the Arctic Circle.
Whether the Russians can sue
eeed In any such Finnish adventure
will depend in the last analysis on
how ruthless they are willing to
be-
The Firms are well aware that
they are trapped by geography.
they are aware they have
centain legal and treaty rights.
Perhaps most important of all, their
Communist Party is small minor
ity of their voter strength even
though 81 of the 200 members of
parliament are Communists The
real power in the country has
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