Evening star., 1948-10-03

are optimistic enough to believe tn
of miracle.
1t is strongly felt in responsible
OF effective preparedness by the
end of the war have succumbed tc
the wishful thought that Russia had
become a peace-loving country-has
impelled the men in the Kremlin tc
force a showdown with the west
before the democracies can recover
the military strength they, pulverized
after VI day.
There is no question that II the
Soviets decide on war in the neal
future our position will not be q
pleasant one. The Red armies will
be able to move rapidly against the
token western forces on the Rhine
and in the rest of Western Europe
Our strategic position right now
is not good, principally because the
buffer states which represented some
military power in 1899 and 1910 are
exhausted and capable of only an
tnfinitesimal military effort.
Under these conditions it will be
necessary for our war planners tc
devise a strategic plan based on q
long conflict and the necessity Of
abandoning Continental Europe tenn
porarily as far as the Pyrenees. but
retaining the Iberian Peninsula.
It is no use to think wishfully in
this matter. Russia, which does not
depend on the sea lanes for her sup
plies, can carry on q war for . long
time, provided that internal condi-
tions in its own territory, and par
ticularly among the satellites, do not
deteriorate to the point of endanger-
ing the regime.
Concern for Alaska
The principal concern Of our war
planners is the prevention Of the
Soviet air force from reaching Amer
ican cities. The only spot from
which they could damage American
production is Alaska, and that would
be possible only if they succeeded in
establishing themselves there by a
blitz from their bases on the other
side OF Bering Strait.
Hence our efforts must be directed
at preventing another Pearl Harbor
L., A1oeLo and ~ kiro INN, odi I o}v
necessary preparations to frustrate
any attempt by Red airborne forces
to establish themselves there.
We have known for some time
that the Soviet government has
established important military CEN
ters in what used to be the waste
land of Northeastern Siberia, on
Wrangel Island and throughout the
Kamchatka Peninsula. Troops and
war material especially conditioned
for Arctic warfare have been as
sembled in those areas, which here
tofore have been but sparsely in
habited.
It is hoped that the Canadian and
United States authorities on whom
falls the responsibility for defending
the northern part of the American
continent will see to it that We are
not confronted with any surprises
and that If attacked we are pre-
pared to repulse any Russian at
tempt to establish permanent air
bases in localities which are within
easy flying range Of Chicago. Los
Angeles and other vital key cities in
this country.
Offensively there is little the
Russians can do from Western
Europe. Some high military men
believe that with our present ef-
fectives on the Rhine, reinforced by
two or three American divisions and
the proper artillery and air support,
We could hold the Russians on the
east bank Of the Rhine for several
months.
French Staff Pessimistic
This appears doubtful, however,
to some observers who have recently
returned from Germany. The
French. who have two divisions
more than the Americans and Brit
ish, are not quite sure what they
can do. They complain justly that
their men are not adequately pro-
vided with modern war equipment
and could not resist the Russian
attack for more than q few days.
Because of the heterogeneous nature
Of the Allied forces in Germany, we
have not been able to obtain even
unity Of command in that area.
According to realistic members of
the French general staff, the best
that France and the other Western
European nations could do in the
event Of Russian attack is fight a
Maquis-type warfare while the gov
ernments, together with whatever
military forces they can save, move
across the Mediterranean into North
Africa.
The African continent is consid-
cred by many military thinkers as
the only area where the western
powers can concentrate and prepare
to administer a fatal blow to the
Soviet totalitarians.
The crossing of the Mediterranean
with paratroops is an enormous task
which could hardly be undertaken
by the Soviets If any kind of deter
mined opposition is offered.
The Russians are in no position tc
tackle American and British naval
forces in the Mediterranean. With
out adequate naval protection nc
landing in Africa .is possible. And
airborne troops are doomed if they
attempt to land without first estab.
fishing ground forces in the objec.
tive area.
Thus, the Allies can safely start
their preparations for a long war
Africa, from Morocco to the Sue1
Canal and from the East African
bulge to the Gulf of Alden. is ar