Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-05-05
PRINCIPLES ond Power

Principles ond Power
In its Positive Program for Peace" the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in
America has set forth a number Of good
principles with which most Americans will
readily agree. But as practical matter,
In the bleak light of what has happened
since the end of the war, it Is difficult
TO see how the councils ideas offer any
greater promise than those already tried
In the effort to break down the Kremlin's
rocklike obstructionism.
To begin with, the ideas are certainly
not new. They reject the thesis that war
is inevitable. They urge action to combat
hysteria and blind hatred. They counsel
against relying primarily on military STRAIT
egg to meet Communist aggression. They
advocate greater concentration on eco
nomic, social, political and moral measures
to end conditions inviting the spread OF
Red totalitarianism. And they strongly
emphasize that we should keep open and
employ the avenues of diplomatic CONVEX
sation between ourselves and the Russians.
But this Positive Program for Peace"
does not differ substantially from the one
that the United States and like minded
nations have been following ever since the
collapse OF the Axis For the past three
years we have tried to get the Russians to
cooperate with the rest of the world on
the assumption that hysteria and hatred
are bad and that war Is not inevitable.
Far from relying on armed power, we have
demobilized much too fast. And with such
measures as the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration and the
newly launched European Recovery Pro-
gram, we have sought to eliminate the
kind Of misery that tempts people to
embrace communism. Finally, we have
certainly done our best to keep open the
avenues Of diplomatic conversation.
In its main outline this program is still
the program we must follow. But nothing
could be clearer now than that certain
elements Of it demand heavier emphasis.
This Is particularly true of its military
element. Our rehabilitation mistakes must
be corrected with preparedness measures
commensurate with the dangers of the
hour; In addition to arming ourselves ade-
quately, We have compelling reasons to
join In security pact with Western
Europe and to back up that pact with
revival Of lend-lease ornaments. In other
words, 1T Is no longer enough simply to say
that war Is not inevitable and that hatred
and hySteria are bad. Nor Is it enough to
engage In undertakings like the ERP and
continued diplomatic negotiations. What
we and the other free nations must have
behind 81
moral action is real power-collectively or
ganized armed power. If We are deficient
IN that then the Russians will have an
open invitavon to walk all over us in a
march for world domination
Instead of emphasizing this point, how
ever, the Federal Council of Churches has
tended to de-emphasize it, and that seems
less than realistic. For what does the
Soviet record show? It shows this. a.
That while we seek to keep diplomatic
negotiations alive, they make the iron
curtain more iron than ever, deliberately
violate past agreements, and Illustrate
every effort to work out understandings on
such problems as the atom; ca that thew
strive, through direct and indirect means
to promote chaos, misery and treason in
order to extend their totalitarian swav. as
In Czechoslovakia; 60 that they glorify
armed force; "a that their propaganda
machine churns out an incessant volume
of historical hatred against the West. and
90 that their fundamental Communist
doctrine assumes the inevitability of an
eventual war between their world and
ours.
War, of course, may not really be in
evitable, but it is entirely possible. and no
truly positive program for peace will ignore
that fact or minimize It, In the kind, of
world We have right now, principles, no
matter how good or noble, are weak reeds
to lean upon unless they are supported by
sufficient military power to enforce and
defend them without such power in the
West and without the Vests clear deter
mination to use 1t collectively If necessary,
the men of the Kremlin are not likely to
change for the better. To suppose other
wise is to be wishful and softheaded.