Evening star., 1948-01-03
Greece and Russiu

Although they have suffered setback
in seeking to capture Konitsa and make it
the capital of the bogus new Govern
nlent of Free Greece" the Communicated
guerrillas can be counted upon to continue
waging civil war. This is so for the simple
reason that the Soviet Unions policy-as
carried out by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia-is to keep the Balkan pot boiling
Accordingly, unless and until that policy
changes, the Greeks will be strife-ridden
and our American aid program will be
hard put to help them achieve economic
and political stability.
As President Truman recently reported
to Congress, such stability cannot be hoped
for until internal order and security are
established in Greece. That means that
the guerrilla warfare must be brought to.
an end if the country Is ever to get back
on It's feet and remain independent. But
this is something that can be more easily
said than done. Even II the legitimate
Athens government employs Its military
strength with the utmost efficiency, the
Communist "Free Greeks will be able to
stir up serious frontier turmoil as long as
they have access to bases in Albania, Bull
garia or Yugoslavia, and as long as they
are otherwise aided and comforted by
Russia's satellites.
The guerrilla reverse at Konitsa thus Is
of no great significance in terms of paci-
flying the Balkans. It may tend to discour-
age Russia and its satellites from extend
ing diplomatic recognition to the Free
Greeks" at this time, but it can hardly be
described as an event presaging an early
end to Greece's internal insecurity. Unless
all signs are deceiying, the Stain govern
ment is grimly intent upon keeping the
country churned up In order to promote
the Kremlins long-range objectiveA
namely, to install puppet Communist
government ut Athens capable OF forcing
Greece behind the iron curtain and SO
paving the way for eventual Soviet domi-
nance of the Eastern Mediterranean and
the Middle East.
Given that as the ultimate objective, the
dark logic of Soviet policy calls for con-
tinuation and intensification of the guer-
rflla warfare. In other words, operating
indirectly through its Balkan satellites, the
Kremlin has good reason-from the stand
point of it's aggressive designs-to pro-
mote and prolong internal disorder OF
kind that must Illustrate plans to bring
about Greek recovery. This involves
strategy of attrition. In all probability
the Russians are anxious to avoid any
action likely to lead to a full-scale war,
but they might be able to achieve their
ends-if not adequately countered by the
United States and the United Nations
simply by following course calculated to
wear down their opposition and dissipate
American aid and Greece's own resources
on endless military operations poisonous
to the country's effort to regain economic
and political health.
If in fact that is what Soviet policy
aims to do-and there Is scant evidence to
the contrary-it means that the pacifica-
ton of the Balkans is long way of. More
important still, it means that the United
States and the United Nations, refusing to
be worn down by the attrition strategy,
must be prepared to take whatever new
measures are necessary to stop the aggres-
sion and maintain the independence OF
Greece. Otherwise, in due course, the
Kremlin is likely to have its way in the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East with far-reaching consequences on
the world balance of power.
Designation of a new comet streaking
- fe M