Evening star., 1948-03-02
The Memoirs of CordeV Hull
Hull Aneered by Roosevelt Churchill Approval
Of 'CotocIysmic' Morqenthuu Plan for Reich

1kstuA u3A0 Ia bl1C odeG WOulu bllSECs
fore be necessarily put out OF action
and closed down. It was felt that
the two districts should be put
under somebody under the World
Organization which would supervise
the dismantling Of these industries
and make sure that they were not
started up again by some subterfuge.
This program for eliminating the
war-making industries In the Ruhr
and in the Saar is looking forward
to converting Germany into q courl-
try primarily agricultural and pas.
toral in its character.
1.-THE Prime Minister and the
President were in agreement upon
this program"
In his note to me introducing this
memorandum, the President said
this seemed eminently satisfactory
to him and he thought I would ap.
prove the general idea Of not re-
habilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.
I could not, however. approve any
program looking forward to con-
verting Germany into a country
primarily agricultural and pastoral
in its character" Seventy million
Germans could not live on the land
within Germany. They would either
starve or become a charge upon
other nations. This was a scheme
that would arouse the eternal re-
sentiment of the Germans. It would
punish all of them and future gen.
erations, too, for the crimes Of q
portion of them. It would punish
not only Germany but also most Of
Europe.
British Credit Plan Offered.
The President also said in his
note to me that he thought he had
worked out the locations Of the oc-
cupying forces in Germany. He had
been hoping to get the Northwest
ern portion of Germany as the
American zone of occupation, but
finally agreed with Churchill that
Britain should have 1t, while the
United States would have most Of
Southern Germany, including Ba-
varia.
On the same day. September Is.
that the President sent me the
memorandum embracing the Nor
genthau plan and the decision on
the zones of occupation, he sent me
another memorandum which IN
formed me that Morgenthau had
presented at Quebec, in conjunction
with his plan for Germany, a pro-
posal of credits to Britain totaling
six and half billion dollars. This
might suggest to some the nature
of a quid pro quo with which the
Secretary of the Treasury was able
to get Mr.. Churchill's adherence to
his cataclysmic plan for Germany.
The President said in his memo
randum that he, had agreed that,
after the defeat of Germany and
while the war against Japan went
on, Britain should continue to re-
ceive munitions assistance from US
to the extent of $500, 10000 and
assistance Of $3,000,-
1000. He concurred in Churchills
statement that II the United King
dom was once more to pay her way
it was essential that her export
trade, which had shrunk to a very
small fraction, should be re-estab-
lished.
Shattered Negotiations.
Naturally no articles obtained on
lend-lease or identical thereto would
be exported or sold for profit, but
it was essential that the United
States should not attach any con-
ditions to supplies delivered to
Britain on lend-lease which would
jeopardize the recovery of her ex-
port trade.
This struck me amidships. It tend
ed to shatter negotiations we had
been conducting with the British
for three years. It derogated from
Article VII of our basic lend-lease
agreement with Britain, signed in
1912, which provided that Britain
would adopt a non-discriminatory
commercial policy after the war.
that she would give up i'm
perial tariff preferences.
This whole development at Que
bee, believe, angered me as much
as anything that had happened dur
ing my career as Secretary of State.
If the Morgenthau plan leaked out.
IS 1t inevitably woodland shortly
did-it might well mean a bitter
end German resistance that could
cause the loss OF thousands of Amer
can lives.
(copyright, 1e47. By MAMA, Ine)