Evening star., 1948-05-13
- The 7O-Group Air Force
How the Bill Now Awaiting Presidential Decision Differs
From What Administration Had Asked
By Robert K. Walsh

Main differences between the 70-group Air
Force. envisioned in a cash and contract au-
thority bill awaiting White House action, and
the 66-group program recommended earlier by
President Truman and Secretary of Defense
Forrestal are:
l. The cost and its possible effect on the
present drum tight" national economy.
The 70-group project could propel the an
nual cost Of the Army, Navy and Air Force to
$4,000 900 600 within the next two years That
is $1,000 0000 900 more than this years initial
military budget. 1t would boost the national
budget to $4,000, 100000.
The 66-group plan, for the next fiscal period,
would add $481 900 900 to the So 3O00, 600 pre-
viously asked by the administration to supple
ment this years sll 900 100000 outlay Thus,
the Army. Navy and 66-group Air Force would
cost $14,4s1 oOo,0 900 during the coming fiscal
year. Sic, 900 900 the second year and $16-
500, ,00oO 900 the third year, Secretary Forrestal
estimated.
Long Range W. Immediate Need.
2. The approach.
This differs on matters Of long-range and i'm
mediate needs, on quality and types of planes,
and on the definition Of balanced" military
establishment. 1t also differs on whether it
is wiser to build and replace planes immediate
ly in big way with an eye to 1852 or to make
the best use of what we've got now"
Those who urge or question 70-group Air
Force agree that the bill, Overwhelmingly
passed by House and Senate, is merely take
off toward an eventual actual 70-group combat
strength.
As sought by advocates in Congress and
the Pentagon, the 10 groups are still many
months away. They would exist In numbers of
planes and men before the end of the coming
fiscal year. But few Of the aircraft would rise
to "modernization" goals, and thousands of the
men would be only partly trained.
For the first 18 months the 10 groups would
resemble the suggested 66 groups, especially in
size and present striking power as well rs
quantity and make Of machines.
But with the Air Force set to place orders
for 2727 planes. including l,575 Jet fighters and
2s7 bombers, II the President signs the bill.
new planes might roll out before the end OF
the 1949 fiscal year.
They Get the Go Signal Now.
The pending bill simply gives the Air Force
and Navy approximately s3,19S 100000 tplus
another $4,000 900 for the Army engineers) in
money and contract authority to 90 ahead at
once on more aircraft and guided missiles
procurement. Most of this authority would not
ordinarily have become available until July l.
Congress included 1922 1000 900 in contract-
making authorization-which the administra-
ton had not asked for-so that the Air Force
could move without delay toward increasing It's
strength from 55 to 10 groups.
In its first stages the 70-group program would
have only 200 planes more than the 66-group.
It would contain two light bomber and two
troop carrier groups not included in the Co.
group Those four groups ordinarily would
support ground troops.
What this Air Force authorization bill really
does, in the opinion Of Chairman Bridges of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, Is to-:
Help determine what weapons the United
States will have in the period 1951-53 when
Russia may have erased our present advantage
OF exclusive possession Of the atomic bomb"
A 7o-group Air Force, its hackers declare, is
the minimum peacetime Air Force capable Of
providing adequate security for the United
States at this time.
Moreover, despite reports Of ''unifcation"
growing pains at the Pentagon, Secretary For
restal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff declare
there is no fight over the desirability of 10
group Air Force-from strictly military point
Of view.
But the principal argument for the 66-group
idea is summed up as follows by Secretary
Forrestal:
After taking into account all considerations
Of fiscal, economic and all others as well as