Evening star., 1948-02-22
Tendency Seen to Limit
Presidential Authority

FreSidentiul authority
Congress Ponders Moves to Curtail
Powers of Executive Agencies
By Gerard D. Reilly
Contrary to popular impression, the situation
which prevails In the Federal Government To-
day, with Congress In control OF one party
and the executive branch In the hands Of
another, is not an infrequent occurrence In
American constitutional history. The midterm
defeat Of the Truman administration had Its
parallel in the Hoover administration, when
the Democrats gained control of the House.
Similar overturns occurred In the latter part
OF the Wilson administration in 1918 and the
Taft administration in 1910.
Shortly after the Republican victory in l94e,
President Truman, recognizing the sharp
change in the trend of public opinion an
nounced that 1t would be his policy to CO.
operate with the new Congress. Similar ex-
pressions of good will were made on behalf
of the Republican leadership. In practice,
however, this program has been honored chiefly
In the breach. With the exception Of foreign
policy, Congress and the President have BEEN
at loggerheads on all the major domestic Is.
sues-taxes, labor legislation and price controls.
An Illuminating analysis Of the relationship
Of the President with an opposition Congress
written by James H. Rowe. jr. member Of
the Commission to Reorganize the Executive
Branch of the Government, has just appeared
in the Georgetown Law Journal. 1t reveals
that the separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches which the
Constitution attempted was far from complete.
OF course, the exercise of the presidential veto
to frustrate the will of a bare congressional
ma ajority is well known, but Mr.. Rowe makes
the point that Congress constitutionally can,
and frequently does, deprive the President Of
any real control over the executive branch.
Writing from background Of experience as
a former administrative assistant to President
Roosevelt, and later as the assistant 10 the
Attorney General, Mr.. Rowe contends that
Congress Is incapable Of consistently voicing
q national interest because temporary SEC
tional coalitions tend to dominate its proceed.
ings. He feels that this 10 inevitable since
Congressman are not representatives Of all
the people but are answerable solely to their
own constituency. For this reason 1t Is almost
impossible to enforce party discipline - well
as to formulate any long orange program.
His thesis Is that by nature Of the evolution
of his Office the President is the sole spokesman
Of all the people. Yet in q period like this,
when the two parties are 20 closely divided
numerically in popular votes, there Is . fire.
quent temptation on the part Of the President
In his dual role as party leader to appeal to
minority interests which he may view as hold.
ing the balance Of power.
Instances of this sort have accentuated O
trend in Congress toward limiting the Presi-
dents responsibility over his own subordinates
An example cited by Mr.. Rowe was the National
Science Foundation bill, which virtually made
the director Of the foundation responsible to
no one. Under the complicated provisions oS
the bill "A part-time members were to be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and
consent Of the Senate These "A members In
turn would select an executive committee Of
nine This committee, required to meet only six
times year, was to appoint the director and
prescribe his powers and duties.
This proposal succumbed to q pocket veto
after Congress adjourned but similar legislation
In the field OF education introduced by Senator
Wayne Morse Of Oregon. Is pending at the
present session. Two other techniques, which
also represent q departure from the principle
Of centralized administration Of public mat
ters, are bills creating statutory advisory CONF
rnittees made up OF private citizens and statu.
tory interdepartmental committees
One of these advisory committee bills has
actually become law under the Hospital Con-
struction Act Of 1s46. BY the terms Of this
measure An advisory committee, made up Of
persons In the hospital business and IN the
medical profession, have the power to give
directions to the Surgeon General Of the Public
Health Service although the organic act ere.
ating his office makes him responsible only to
the President and the Federal security admin.
istrator.
Under the Hinshaw bill, which has received
considerable support from the aviation indus
try, there would be an air co-ordinating COM
mittee made up Of assistant secretaries OF
various departments The legislation creating
the World Bank and the World Fund already
has such body-the National Advisory Coun-
Gil on International Monetary and Financial
Problems.
In theory the President can exercise some
control over these committees through his
power to remove for cause Actually, however,
since they function outside the cabinet, their
affairs are rarely brought to his attention. The
result is that policies adopted ut the White
House seldom permeate to them. This Is
defect which is present in only O slightly less
degree in the independent agencies which have
a combination OF prosecuting and judicial flinc.
tions like the Interstate Commerce Comn1ts.
sion. the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Mari
time Commission.
**
Strangely enough. although these agencies
are rarely responsive TO the will OF Congress,
the history Of reorganization bills has shown
that Congress Is usually quite willing TO exempt
them from any plan which would contemplate
their consolidation with cabinet departments.
Yet it 10 obvious that as long as they continue
TO possess prosecuting and Legislative functions.
they are acting in the field Of policy.
The recent Administrative Procedures Act.
however, while directed ut curbing capricious
action by agency heads and giving litigants q
fair chance to be heard. has tended to exasser-
ate the independence" Of these bodies. A
wiser approach would be special legislation
| directed to the particular agency which would