Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-08-15
Uranium to Russia?

SsS'bNh8t ~ tN0SStSs
Although the subject is worthy OF atten-
ton, there is no Justification for sensa-
tionalism in connection with Representa-
tive McDowell's statement on uranium
shipments to Russia in 1943. Some of the
more irresponsible reports probably have
left many Americans with the impression
that the shipments were tantamount to
| letting the Kremlin have the secret and
the wherewithal Of the atomic bomb
Nothing could be farther from truth, and
Mr.. Mcdowell himself. If he intends to
pursue the matter, ought to make that
| fact very clear.
| In this connection, two important points
need to be kept in mind. The first is that
in 1943, when the United States and the
Soviet Union were active wartime allies,
we had just begun to build our atomic
plant and were still very far from produc-
ing the first A-bomb. And the second is
that the shipments themselves, if accur-
ately reported, were altogether inconSe-
quential in terms of enabling anybody to
get anywhere in an attempt to harness
the atom. AS described by Mr. Mcdowell,
they added up to about 1900 pounds of
uranium compound" presumably an
oxide ore). They may also have included
though the Congressman apparently is
uncertain on this point-some heavy
water, which can be used to slow down
neutrons as part of the process of manu-
featuring pure nuclear fuel.
AS far as heavy water is concerned, 1t
did not figure in our wartime atomic
project, purified graphite being employed
in its place to control or moderate the
neutron bombardment in our nuclear
furnaces. AS for Mr.. McDowell's 1900
pounds of a uranium compound" they
could have been of virtually no help to
the Russians in any effort to produce
A-weapons. For the fact is that tons of
such ore must first go through an immense
complex of refinement and processing to
bring about the separation of relatively
minute quantity of U-235 or plutonium,
the pure fashionable material that makes
the A-bomb possible. The ore itself, in
short, is merely the starting point in an
enormously intricate series of operations
requiring gigantic plant facilities and
unique engineering and scientific know
how"
The famous Smyth report, the official
account of what we did with the atom
during the war, gives necessarily guarded
but nevertheless clear idea of just what
the production process involves. Thus,
wholly apart from the tremendously COM
plicated "know-how" and the vast plant
facilities, the report refers at one point
to the extraction and publication of some
grams day of plutonium from some tons
of uranium" from tons, a gram
being considerably less than an ounce.
Elsewhere the report states that one to
100 Kilograms of U-235 can be had only
by separation from at least 140 times as
much natural uranium In other words,
II 100 pounds of this fashionable material
are needed for bomb, then they must be
processed from not less than $4,000 pounds
OF the raw material.
Read against figures of this sort, the
reported shipment of 1900 pounds of
uranium ore to the SovietS in 1943 may
be likened to the shipment Of less than q
ton of coal to somebody interested in
manufacturing synthetic gasoline. Such
a quantity is much too little for output,
and practically nothing can be done with
1t If the producing know-how and facilities
remain secret and unavailable. In sum,
If, as and when the Russians make atomic
bombs, 1t will not be because of what we
sent to them five years ago. Mr.. McDowell's
statement seems hardly to warrant scare
headlines on the basis of the facts he has
cited so far. But it will be interesting to
know why, and on whose orders, the ore
went out.