Evening star., 1948-02-05
CHAPTER X.

President Roosevelt took lively
interest in the progress of the Lon
don Naval Conference, which con-
vened December 9, 1885, and went
on to the end Of March, 1886. Vir-
tually from infancy, he had had
wide experience with ships of all
kinds. Even as a boy, he had been
particularly attracted to naval yes
sells passing in the vicinity of the
New England shore.
When he came to Washington as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in
Wilson's administration. he reveled
In naval problems, tactics, facts and
administration. He left that office
as a deep student, of all important
naval affairs and with a fascina-
ton for the Navy.
When he became President. he
probably knew more about the Navy
than any Of his predecessors.
Throughout his administration, I
found him giving preferential atten-
ton to every question arising In re-
gard to the Navy. He himself made
most of the more important de-
cisions with respect to naval af-
fairs.
During the London Naval Confer
ence, the President exhibited a rare
knowledge of all the technical
phases. He was we'll equipped to
discuss the merits of the most tech
nical developments and to offer sug-
gestions.
Roosevelt Made Suggestion.
In the kilograms I sent the Pres
ident and in the verbal discussions
We had on the London Naval Con-
ference, the words "quantitative"
and qualitative" in connection with
limitation Of naval armaments were
used scores of times, the former
meaning limitation by total ton
mage and the latter meaning limita-
ton by the size Of specific types Of
ships and guns.
One day the President exploded.
"Quantitative, qualitative, quanti-
tative, qualitative!" he exclaimed.
IT get sick and tired of hearing
these words. Can't we find some
thing to take their places?" But
we never did.
The President made a suggestion
regarding the naval treaty on Feb
ruary % when he sent to the State
Department in a memorandum and
which We cabled to Norman Davis,
chairman of our delegation in Lon
don. This suggestion crystallized in
a section of the London treaty
which became one of the most I'M
portant developments of the con-
ference.
What would you think" said the
President, "of sending a telegram
to Davis asking him to try to get
even gentlemen's agreement from
Great Britain, France, Italy (and
through England from Germany
whereby each nation would agree
to notify the other of every decision
to lay down naval vessels of any
size over 100 tons? If such a gen.
tlemen's agreement could be OBJ
tanned, these four or five powers
could then jointly or severally in
vite Japan to do the same thing?"
Question of Germany Delicate.
The question Of whether Germany
should become a signatory to the
treaty was delicate one. On june;
l8, 1885, Great Britain and Ger
many had concluded an agreement
fixing the German navy at IS per
cent of the navy Of the British En-
pire. Since this was three times
the naval strength permitted Ger
many under the Treaty OF Ver-
sailles. France and italy protested
strongly. -"
+ We on our side remained nom
committal, because the Anglo-G Ger
man agreement was essentially
European one and because we were
not signatories to the Treaty of
Versailles. When Britain proposed
that Germany be brought into the
London Naval Conference, France
objected unless her entrance were
coupled with an accord with Ger
many on the Rhineland and with
Britain on mutual assistance.
Hitler summarily settled the dis
cussion concerning the Rhineland
by occupying the Rhineland with
German troops on March 7, 1886,
in violation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and the Locarno Pact. At
that moment the London Confer
ence was drafting the text of the
final agreement. The invasion of
the Rhineland was a European de-
velopment in which we were not in
YolYed and no action WAS called for