Evening star., 1948-02-28
The Memoirs Of CordeU Hull
Churchill Won Roosevelt Agreement to Plan
For Britain and Russia to Divide Balkans

When this telegram arrived was
resting for few days at Hershey,
Pa. The President, without con-
sulting me or the State Department.
replied the following day accepting
the Prime Minister'S three months
proposal, but adding that care
should be exercised to make it clear
that no postwar spheres Of influence
were being established.
The President did not inform the
State Department Of this action.
Arguments Outlined.
/ returned to Washington at this
juncture. On the day Of my return,
June II, not knowing Of the presi-
dents telegram to the Prime Min
lister, we sent the British Embassy
q memorandum which the President
had previously approved In which
we outlined our arguments against
the proposed Anglo Russian agree
ment.
Still not knowing of the Presi.
dents telegram Of June u to the
Prime Minister, sent him letter
on June II, In which I pointed out
that Mr.. Churchill openly applied
his proposition to the entire Balkan
region by mentioning Bulgaria and
Yueoslavia. In addition to RomAnia
and Greece, and that he advanced
our position In South America as
an analogy.
I also called attention TO what 7
termed an extremely disturbing as
pect Of this rnatter"-namely, that
the British had not discussed . pro-
posal Of this nature with Us until
after it had been put up to the
Russians and the latter inquired
whether we had been consulted.
On June 28 my attention was
called to O cable from our Ambas-
sador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeash,
whose Embassy was at Cairo, tell
ing us that his British colleague had
informed him that the American
Government had agreed to the pro-
posal, with the provision that 1t
should be subject to review after
three months. This was the first
intimation we had Of the Presidents
decision on June II.
Copy Sent to President.
I wrote the President . letter,
which went to him the following
day, inclosins . copy Of Abassador
MacVeagh's telegram and asking
him whether any changes hsd been
made in our position.
The President replied on June 30,
simply inclosing paraphrases or ex.
tracts Of the messages which had
been exchanged between himself and
MIR. Churchill.
These included the message to Mr..
Churchill which we had drafted In
the department and I had sent the
President on June IT. He had dis
patched this to the Prime Minister
on June 20. In it he said that he
was q bit worried and 30 was the
State Department concerning the
Balkans. He said that frankly We
were disturbed that the British took
the matter up with us only after
they had presented it to the Russians
and the latter had asked whether We
were agreeable to 1t. He said that
In future he hoped matters Of this
Importance could be prevented from
developing In this way.
The Prime Minister replied on the
following day, June 23, that he
could not admit that he had done
anything wrong. Three people in
different parts Of the world, he re-
marked, could not work together
effectively If each had to keep the
third informed Of any suggestion to
either of the others.
Need Of Accord Stressed.
Mr.. Roosevelt replied to this on
June 26 by saying that 1t would
seem to him that each Of them had
inadvertently taken independent
steps In q direction which they both
now agreed was for the time being
expedient. He emphasized that 1t
was essential that they should
always be in accord on questions
bearing on the Allied war effort.
Events fully justified the appre-
tensions we entertained over the
Anglo-R Russian arrangement which
duly entered into effect following
the Presidents acquiescence. When
Prime Minister Churchill and For
eign Secretary Eden went to Mos
COW in October, 1914, to see Stain
and Molotov, they extended the ar
rangement still further, even re-
ducing to percentages the relative
degree of influence which Britain
and Russia individually should have
in specified Balkan countries.
(copyrisht, 194s, By North American
Newspaper Alliance)
(Mr. Hulps memoirs sDdu Be
resumed Monday. An drticls