Evening star., 1948-02-24
The Memoirs of CordeII Hull
WelIes' Forced Resignation Loid to Failure
To Cooperate Fully With Secretary Of State

intervention IN Cuba ana On our
evaluation Of the results Of the
Munich Conference. After war came.
we differed on the Western Helni.
sphere Neutrality Zone and on the
proposed ultimatum to Japan to
which Roosevelt and Churchill
agreed at the Atlantic Conference
and in the formulation Of which
Welles had been an adviser.
I felt this latter would have
brought on war with the japanese
at the time, when we were less pre-
pared than at the time Of Pearl
Harbor. After Pearl Harbor we DIFF.
fered on the handling Of Argentina
at the Rio Conference, on the ma
ture Of his speeches, and on the
structure of the postwar interna-
tional security organization.
Difference in Philosophy.
These divergences were due at
times to a difference Of philosophy
and at others to differences over
the more practical and effective
means of handling crucial ques-
tions and issues, to say nothing Of
Welles's frequent unwillingness to
do teamwork with me. This situa-
ton was particularly acute during
the later period of his service. and
was handicapping to those Of us
who were working together as 0
unit.
For some years I had looked to
Welles to supervise the admin
istration of the State Department
in the most efficient manner pos
sible. This was the normal func-
tion of an Undersecretary Of State,
thus permitting the Secretary Of
State to devote more time to the
formulation Of policy.
Welles, however, seemed to be-
come engrossed with other matters,
with the result that most Of us In
the department In position to judge
were keenly disappointed by the
result of his administrative serv-
ices After Stettinius became Un-
dersecretary I encharged him with
a complete administrative reorgan-
ization of the department.
The President himself had begun
to appreciate the extent Of Welles's
disloyalty to me. He complained
particularly and more than once
about Welles delivering the Ar
lington Cemetery speech without
consulting either of us. and he said
to me that he later demonstrated
with Welles about the speech.
I could have resolved the Welles
problem by going to the President
and insisting that he choose be-
tween Welles and me. But I had
been accustomed to work with peo-
pie, not against them. The work
of the State Department was now
colossal, Welles was a hard worker,
and it was preferable to utilize his
services, If they could be had on q
loyal basis, than to dispense with
them
Special Mission Suggested.
In early Summer, 1943, however,
the President himself realized that
the situation in the State Depart
ment could not continue. He de-
cided on his own that, in the light
of all existing circumstances, num-
bers of which need not be mem
toned, the efficiency Of the de-
partment would be better served by
Welles' retirement. He and I agreed
that Welles' resignation should be
rendered easier for him by the Pres
indent's offering to send him as
rowing Ambassador to South Amer
lea or to Russia on a special mission.
The President made this proposal
to Welles when he requested his res
ignation, pointing out to him that
he could thus leave the State De-
partment without undue sensation.
without giving the President q
definite reply to this proposal,
Welles came to my ONCE immedi-
ately after his talk with Mr.. Roose-
welt. He indicated his belief that
the President had acted at my
instance. I gave him the full facts.
I then urged upon him the Presi-
dents suggestion of a special mis-
sion, with particular reference to a
conference at Moscow. Welles. In
a tone of f1nality, promptly said
that nothing could be gotten out Of
that sort of trip. He soon got up.
come over to my desk, shook hands
and then departed. I have not
talked to him since.
I left shortly thereafter for the
Quebec Conference. Welles went up
to Maine. Instead Of accepting the
Presidents suggestion Of special
mission, he wrote out his resigna-
ton and mailed 1t to the White
House.
(Copyright, 194s, BY National American
Newspaper Alliance, 1nc.)