Evening star., 1948-01-14


InfIexibiIity Of Secretary
Held Typical Of MiIitory
In Political Dealings
By David Laurence
Secretary Of State Marshall is
greatly respected for his soldierly
attainments, but Congress is begin
ming to look on him as less and less
likely to develop q working arrange
ment with the legislative branch Of
the Government.
Mr.. Marshall is held in the high
est esteem as public off1cial Of
integrity and capacity, but un-
fortunately for him the post OF
Secretary Of State today requires an
ability to understand and work with
Congress. Any one in an executive
agency who isn't familiar with po-
litical government can do his own
cause considerable damage.
In q sense Mr.. Marshall Is proving
to many observers here how inept
Gen. Eisenhower or Gen. Mac
Arthur would be If either were
chosen President. This is because
a military officer Is accustomed to
giving orders and to carrying out
instructions with rigidity. There is
none Of the flexibility Of policy
which Is so necessary in accommo-
dating the various viewpoints that
arise in operating domestic policies.
Mr.. Marshall for q long time has
been regarded with q kind Of re-
spectful sympathy by various MEM
bers Of Congress who have hesitated
to criticize him because they ad-
mired him so much and also because
they respected his earnestneSs and
sincerity. But when the Secretary
Of State told a congressional COM
mittee recently that Congress had
better not do anything than do too
little by way Of international aid,
this was construed to mean that he
was serving an ultimatum of an
all-or-none variety This was. Of
course, farthest from his thoughts
and actually was just an inpromptu
remark to buttress his arguments
for the larger appropriation.
Criticism Is Impersonal.
The criticism heard is impersonal.
To be sure, the military mind has
always had difficulties with Con-
gress and in way has exhibited a
kind OF contempt for the political
mind. This is due to the firm be-
lief Of the military that what they
say about national safety Is final
and that foreign policy cannot be
administered so as to require any
less expenditures for national de-
tense.
Secretary Marshall isn't dealing
this time with national defense ex-
penses but with a $4,000, ,000, 900 rec
ommendation for the European Re-
covery Program. The impression
made by his argument is that Eu-
rope cannot possibly get along on
less and that the aid must be rem
dered no matter what damage is
done to the domestic economy.
It is the emphasis on aid to Eu-
rope no matter what happens to
America which has afforded critics
in Congress their opportunity to as
sail the Marshall Plan budget.
Everybody will appear to be in favor
Of the principle but the differences
arise over how to administer it and
how much to spend on it.
Secretary Marshall naturally has
tried to retain control of the opera
tion Of the plan by the State De-
partment. He comedies that an ad-
ministrator shall manage the agency
to be created but he wants the State
Department to be in control of for
eign policy. This is a vague de-
scription of vast power affecting
disbursement OF public funds and al
location of scarce commodities.
Out to Keep Control.
What is growing up in Congress
is determination to keep control
of the Marshall Plan in the hands
Of a commission or board or cor
poration which will give due weight
to the impact of the Marshall Plan
on the American economy. This
does not mean that America shall
not be required to make some sac
rif1ces but it does mean that Amer.
lea shall not be pinched to the point
Of genuine hardship just because
some one in the State Department
figures it out that he might win q
political battle in the parliament of
some foreign country by some extra
bushels of grain.
Mr.. Marshall is an independent
minded person and doesn't want
public Office. He would prefer to re-
tire. President Truman has insisted
that the general stay at the State
Department so that he himself
would be free from the responsible
1ty Of making the all-important de-
cisions in foreign policy that affect
domestic policy.
Actually few Presidents in our
history have so completely dele
gated to the State Department such
complete control over foreign-policy
decisions. After selecting Mr.
Marshall, Mr.. Truman virtually alb
dicated as the executive responsible
under the Constitution for the max
ing of foreign policy. BY eliminat-
ing James F. Byrnes, who was the
best qualified to deal with Congress,
and substituting military man
who is by experience unqualified to
deal with Congress, the problem of
getting funds for international aid
in the postwar period has not been
made easier to solve for the Con-
gress or the Executive.
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