Evening star., 1948-02-01

In Cuba the government of dicta.
torial Gen. Gerardo Machado was
slipping its cinch after II years ir
the saddle, and revolution was
plotting.
:. Facing me was the prospect of q
Pan American Conference scheduled
to meet at Monteyideo at the enc
Of the year. The conference
should have met in December, 1882
but so poor was the prospect of ef-
fective cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere that it had been post
poned for a year. Now there was
insistent talk OF further postpone
ment., ,t..s. ..#
The entire outlook, charged with
pentup bitterness, seemed thor.
oughly discouraging. I therefore
knew that implementing the good
neighbor policy proclaimed by
President Roosevelt would involve a
tremendous undertaking in the
Western Hemisphere. But this fact
was also challenge.
Long before March 4 had re-
solved that one of our principles in
dealing with Latin America would
be religious adherence to the prin-
ciple of nonintervention.
Cuba Had a Problem
Cuba was giving us good cause
for anxiety. Popular resentment
against the brutal dictatorship OF
Gen., Machado was growing acute
It was becoming evident that either
Machado would resign or a revolu-
ton would force him out. Bomb
explosions and shootings were oc-
curing in Havana, sugar mills and
cane fields were being burned
schools were closing and guerrilla
bands, left over from the unsuccess-
full revolution of 1881, were operating
in the hills. Political exiles Streamed
to the United States. Adding to
the political unrest was economic
distress, partly caused by high
United States tariffs. 1t was a
hair-trigger situation.
BY the so-called Platt amendment
to the treaty of 1903, the United
States had the legal right to inter-
vene in Cuba to preserve Cuban in
dependence or to maintain a gov
ernment adequate to protect life
property and individual liberty. But
the President and I were deter.
mined that we would not intervene
in Cuba. Despite the legal right
We possessed, such an act woulc
further embitter our relations with
all Latin America. 1t would undo
all our protestations of noninter.
vention and noninterference. II
would feed our traditional enemies
whom I hoped to starve.
President Roosevelt and I agreed
to send Sumner Welles to Cuba as
Ambassador and also as the Presi-
dents mediator among the various
factions in Cuba. if they appeared
willing. At the Presidents sug-
gestion, to which 1 agreed, Mr.
Welles had been made an Assistant
Secretary of State April 6, 1888. He
had good ability and experience
along with much ambition. In later
years we were to differ sharply on
questions OF judgment. In later
years we were to differ sharply on
questions Of judgment. In the
earlier years I found myself in
agreement with my other associates
more. often than with Mr.. Welles
on important questions of policy. I,
Of course, had the responsibility for
all decisions, and I endeavored in
every instance to meet it.
Welles Goes to Cuba
Mr.. Welles left for Cuba in May
1888, bearing with him instructions
from me, dated May l, which said
You will always bear in mind that
the relations between the Govern
ment Of the United States and the
Cuban government are those exist
ing between sovereign, independent
and equal powers; and that no steps
should be taken which would tend
to render more likely the need OF
the Government of the United
States to resort to that right OF
formal Intervention granted to the
United States by the existing treaty
between the two nations" I in
structed him to extend what as
sistance we could to better Cuba's
economic conditions, to negotiate
a trade agreement with Cuba, to
offer his friendly mediation, and tc
express to President Machado our
earnest hope that he would take
steps to end the state of terrorism
On August II Gen. Machado took
leave of absence and on the day
thereafter DR.. Carlos de Cespedes,
former Secretary of State, formed a
coalition government. Widespread
disorders and attacks on persons
and property followed Machado's
exit. President Roosevelt ordered
two destroyers to Cuban waters, but
said this involved no possible ques-
ton Of Intervention or of the slight
est interference with the internal
affairs of Cuba
We decided 1t was not necessary
to grant President de Cespedes
formal recognition, since the change
of government had been achieved
by constitutional process. AM
bassador Welles was working hard,
keeping in touch with all factions,
and on August IL the department
cabled him warm congratulations
and appreciation of what you have
done" from the President and my
self.
WelIes Suggests Force
/ held frequent conversations on