Evening star., 1948-03-01
The Memoirs Of Cordei Hull
Evidence Of Russian Drift Away From Policy
|Of Cooperation Began to Appear in Mid-1o44


be given Russia, any more than the
vote for our own country. My view
was that each major country pos
sessed such powerful prestige and
influence generally that it would
have little difficulty In securing q
full representation Of its rights and
interests at all times, without any
need to have more than one vote.
Roosevelt Never Voiced Fears.
On the occasions when the Presi.
dent came to see me at the hospital
after my resignation, including his
last visit only q few days before his
death, he said nothing to me about
any fears he might have that Russia
would abandon our cooperative
movement for peace or would block
or destroy it.
Since he and had labored to-
gether since 1888 to bring about Q
better understanding with Russia,
to say nothing Of our joint efforts
toward peace organization, I am
convinced he would have brought up
the subject with me II he had
reached the conclusion that Russia
was pursuing dangerous course.
It might be said that the Presi-
dent and I were taken In by Rus.
sia's promises and written pledges.
that we should have realized It was
impossible to do business with So
Wet Russia, that we should have
come to the conclusion that the
democratic United States could not
be friends with a government
founded on communism, and con-
that we should have
adopted the policy of the mailed
fist toward Russia right from the
beginning.
But as We went back over our re-
lations with Moscow felt, and
President Roosevelt did too, that
there was ample reason for the
policy Of friendship that we adopted.
Since 1917 Russia had been wrestling
with many nations that had refused
to recognize her more or less on ac-
count Of her policy Of conducting
subversive activities from Moscow.
BY constant effort, she had grad
uallly increased the number Of
recognitions, being obliged in con-
nection with virtually all acts Of
recognition to agree not to practice
subversive activities against the
countries establishing relations with
her.
Often ut Odds With Russia.
That she did not abandon these
activities completely is a matter Of
record, but 1t was our view that the
other governments. by steadily or
ganizing and building up and
strengthening world opinion against
such activities, would make as
nearly certain as possible Russia's
abandonment Of this policy Of in
reference in the affairs of other
countries.
1t Is Of record that the President
and 7 had been at hammer and
tongs with the Russian government
many times during the years from
the recognition in 1888 until we, ap-
preached the Moscow Conference in
1e43. I never lost an occasion to
point out to the Russians the ad-
vantage to themselves of abandon-
ing their thorny policy Of interven-
ton. .4- -....
The President and I were con-
vinced that 1t was efninently to the
self interest Of Russia to be full
fledged member of the United Ma
tions security organization and to
cooperate wholeheartedly with 1t,
and that the Russian leaders
would recognize this fact. We be-
lieved, as I believe today, that the
United Nations would ultimately
evolve into a unified. effective Or
ganization thoroughly adequate to
maintain the peace.
We recognized that there would
be difficulties, that some Of these
would come from Russia. and that
the United Nations would have to
pass through uncertain, delicate
periods; but we were certain by the
end of 1914 that we and the nations
working with us had laid the basis
for a projected organization within
which Russia and we could work
together.
In our relations with Russia,
the President and I also had con-
stantly before us the emphatic ad-
vice of our military leaders, given
on several occasions, that friend
ship with Russia after the war was
vitally essential from their mill
tary point Of view.
(copyright, 1e46. North American
ArisneaN