Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1948-02-12
Hull
CHAPTER XVI.

CHATTER XVI
At 1880 o'clock on the night of
May 9. 1910. the telephone rang in
my apartment. and the excited voice
of Ambassador Cudahy in Brussels
informed me that heavy German
air forces were over Luxembourg
and flying into Belgium and were
reported over the Netherlands.
Cudahy informed us of large con-
centrations of German forces on the
frontiers Of Belgium, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, and of Bel
gums expectation that the Ger
mans would attack probably at
dawn.
I telephoned the President, in
formed him Of .Cudahy's message,
then telephoned some of my depart
ment associates, and went to my Of
fee, arriving there soon after II
o'clock, little in advance of the
others. I Immediately put in a
number Of telephone calls to key
European capitals.
When I reached Cudahy he in
formed me that Luxembourg had
been invaded, that German planes
were bombing the airport near
Brussels and that the Germans
seemed to be attacking Belgium,
Holland and Luxembourg sinful
taneously.
French Army Defeated.
But even more catastrophe than
the subsequent news of German
successes in the Low Countries were
the cables Ambassador Bullitt sent
the President and me on May S.
The Germans, advancing with over
whelming forces of tanks and dive
bombers, had broken through the
French Army at Sedan.
Premier Reynaud had telephoned
to Prime Minister Churchill, and
said that since the Germans had
broken through the war might be
lost in the course of a few days. In
Reynaud's opinion it would be lost
unless Britain sent her fighter plane
strength from the United Kingdom
at once.
Churchill promised to recommend
this to the war cabinet, insisting to
Reynaud, however, that there was
no chance of the war being lost.
Reynaud replied that Churchill
knew that as long as he, Reynaud,
.remainer Premier. France would
fight to the bitter end.
On the same day, May Is, Am
bassador Kennedy cabled to the
President and me a striking CONVEX
sation he had just had with Mr..
Churchill. The Prime Minister said
he was sending the President a
message on the next day that, If
Italy entered the war, he considered
slight the chances Of the Allies
winning.
Churchill said the French were
asking for more troops, but he was
unwilling to send men from England
at that time because he was con-
WINGED that within month England
would be vigorously attacked.
Churchill added he intended to ask
for loan Of 80 or 40 of our old
destroyers, and also whatever planes
we could spare.
Allied Victory Held Essential.
OF one point the President and I
had not the slightest doubt, namely,
that an Allied victory was essential
to the security of the United States.
Hastily surveying the field; the
President decided to scrape together
every available warplane to ship to
France. Bullitt cabled me on May
IA suggesting France be permitted
to send an aircraft carrier to pick
them up. After talking to the Pres
ident, replied the following day
that it would be impossible to load
the planes at New York because Of
the provisions of international law
and American statutes, but they
could be flown to a port on the east
coast Of Canada, possibly Halifax,
and loaded there This was done
but too late for them to get to
France.
1t was also evident to the Presi-
dent and me that the enormous su-
periority of the German Army re-
vealed by the lightning occupation
of Holland and the breakthrough at
Sedan required the revising of all
our estimates for the rearming of
the United States. The President
discussed with me the project of
sending special message to Con-
gress requesting a virtual doubling
of the military appropriations for
the year, in which I fully con-
CURED.
BulGtt had sent me a cable for
the President on May IS stressing
the Importance of increasing our
production Of planes, because of
the vital part planes were playing
in the German advance. I there
upon suggested to the President that
he tell Congress that the United
States should aim for a production
of $4,000 planes year.
I had already mentioned this fig