Evening star., 1948-02-01

At the present time the Amer
anese civilian population to the tun
of 81 ,000, 900 a day. The cost of tn
army of occupation is estimated a
about $4,000, ,000, 900 since VI day
Under these circumstances it Ii
hardly probably American taxpayers
who will have to dig into theil
pockets for European relief and pos.
sibly for more than 11,O00, 900 ,00'
for defense, will be willing to spent
considerable amounts for Japan IL
the near future.
Yet, as Gen. Macarthur ha
pointed out, eventual inclosure o
Manchuria and Korea behind th'
iron curtain will make it difficul
for Japan to count on substantial
recovery after the peace treaty ii
signed. In the past the Japanes,
have imported from Manchuria larg,
quantities of wheat, soy beans, Goa
and other minerals. including gold
The imports amounted to abou
$50,000.000 a year.
While there are reasonable pros.
poets of economic and political un.
dertaking between China and Japar
after the peace is concluded, thu
considered opinion of all observer.
in the Far East is that Russia will
use the natural resources of Man.
churia and Korea to force Japar
itself behind the iron curtain in
Asia.
Marshall Gets Blame
Today. according to reports from
our military observers in China
Manchuria is practically lost tt
China. There are $4,000 we'll.
equipped Communist soldiers ir
that province against some 175,00(
soldiers of the regular Chinese
Army.
Congressional quarters, which
have been far more interested in
China's plight recently than the
administration. place the blame
for this situation squarely on the
doorsteps of the State Department
In general and on Secretary of State
Marshall in particular.
Although there are some indica-
tions, in conversations between
members of Congress and President
Truman, that the White House has
no fundamental opposition to sup
port of the Chang regime, which,
despite its many shortcomings, has
been loyal to its wartime Allies,
there are definite indications that
the State Department is placing
every kind of obstacle in the way
of support for the Kuomintang.
Gen. Marshall has never liked
Gen. Chang This antagonism
dates back to the days when Gen.
Joseph Stilwell, close and trusted
friend of the wartime chief of staff
was the American representative at
Chungking. 1t is we'll known that
Gen. Stilwell and the generahssimo
were allergic to each other.
Besides this personal antagonism
Gen. Stilwell became convinced that
the Chinese Communists were moth
ing but agrarians who wanted to
reform China and save it from the
corrupt practices of the venal Kuo-
mintang. Gen. Stilwell was able to
convince his chief in Washington
as to the correctness of his views,
which were shared by many Eek
perts" in the Far Eastern Division
of the State Department. One of
these was the former division chief
John Carter Vincent, now Minister
to Switzerland.
Chang Angry Over Request
At the instigation of Gen. Still
we'll, Gen. Marshall is said to have
cabled suggestion during the war
that the Chinese forces be placed
under direct American command.
Gen. Chang became angry when
this suggestion was reported to him
and told our Ambassador to China,
Patrick j. Hurley, that compliance
with this request would mean in
effect that he was surrendering his
command to the United States and
would become mere puppet.
President Roosevelt, who was ap-
prised of this situation by his Am
bassador, had some harsh words to
say and Gen. Stilwell was replaced
as Gen. Chiang's chief of staff by
the smoother and more effective 1t.
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
Soon after Gen. Marshall retired
as Army Chief of Staff he was urged
by President Truman to accept the
task of special presidential envoy
to China. Gen. Marshall accepted
the job reluctantly. Throughout the
war, he carefully avoided becoming
entangled in politics, domestic or in
ternational, and felt strongly that
he did not have the necessary prep
aration for any responsible diplo-
matte position. But when President
Truman offered to send him to
China ito settle the mess out there"
left by the spectacular resignation
of Mr.. Hurley, Gen. Marshall
treated it as an order from his
Commander in Chief.
Believed Truce Possible
Gen. Marshall's mind had already
been conditioned, however. He be-
lieved strongly that only Gen.
Chiang's stubbornness and the in
trigues of his corrupt advisers in
side and outside the cabinet pre-
vented an understanding with the
Communists led by Mao Tse-tung
and Chou En-lai.
The general was also convinced
that Chinese Communists were
nothing but agrarian reformers and,
unlike those in Europe, were not