Evening star., 1948-02-03
The Memoirs of CordeII Hull
Simon Refusal to Accept Plan for Inspection
ScuttIed u. S. Disarmament Efforts in 1895

should have had. They ought to
have made large section Of the
American public more willing to
unite with right minded nations
abroad in bringing pressure to bear
on the nations obviously preparing
for war. Instead, they caused those
Americans, most of whom were
honest In their beliefs, to pull back
in alarm and to vow they would
have nothing to do with the rest
of the world. They blindly failed
to see that a major war anywhere
could not but touch us In many
vital points
Tried to Point Out LANCER.
I, myself, along with numerous
other officials cooperating with me,
never ceased trying to point out to
my countrymen, and to foreign gov
ernments as well, that the danger
to peace was great and becoming
greater.
A number of persons even to this
day, with apparent surprise and
astounding ignorance or forgetful-
ness, say loudly to those Of us in
immediate charge of our foreign
relations in those days: What were
you doing during the years follow
ing 1888? Why did you not discern
the foreign dangers steadily develop
ing? Why did you not give the
American public notice OF such
perils and the need for adequate
preparations against them? If the
isolationist viewpoint seriously in
terfered with the problem of dis
covering and making known to
America these perils and threats.
why did you not bring this
tremendously important matter to
the attention of the general
public?"
The answer to these apparently
innocent questions and exclama-
tions is fully set forth in the record.
AS the dangers of aggression In
creasingly revealed themselves, 7
made more than 20 addresses and
statements in my first two years In
office alone, containing as emphatic
warnings of coming danger as the
English language could convey.
I continued these warnings In the
years to follow. always paid great
attention to the preparation Of such
public addresses. I knew they
would be widely quoted at home and
also that foreign governments were
likely to read them in full. They
were to be an expression Of the
policies and views Of the American
Government, not merely Of myself.
Weeks Spent on Speeches.
Sometimes weeks were spent in
the writing Of one speech. I would
call to my Office group Of prin-
cipal advisers. Finally I picked
one of my associates to draft these
ideas into a text of the speech. The
head of an important department
required to make important state
ments of all kinds virtually from
day to day has literally no time
personally to prepare his own texts.
When the first draft Of speech
came to me, I revised and rewrote.
I then circulated this text to my
advisers, with the request that they
write in their suggestions or addi-
tons
Fifteen drafts of one important
address were written before ! gave
my final ok.
Before delivering major speech
committing the administration to. a
certain policy, I made 1t q point to
submit the text to the President In
advance of delivery. usually took
it to him myself. The President
silently read my speech but always
commented from time to time as he
found something that excited un-
usual interest. Only in rare In
stances, however, did he offer sug-
gestions or criticism, and they were
not Of a fundamental nature.
In addition to these addresses I
continued to speak privately in the
same tone to the ambassadors Of
the major nations.
I was listened to but not needed.
My congressional experience as .
Cassandra in the twenties was be-
ing transplanted to the foreign field
in the thirtieS.
Copyright. 194s by North American