Evening star., 1948-03-01
By CordeII Hull !
Assisted by Andrew Bsrdins)
CHAPTER XXI

AS autumn, 1914, approached, my
associates and I began to wonder
whether Marshal Stain and his
government were commencing to
veer away from the policy Of CO.
operation to which they had agreed
at the Moscow Conference, and
which, with a few exceptions. they
had followed since then.
We were beginning to get indica-
tions that the Russians were about
to drive hard bargains in their
armistice agreements with Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania, which would
give them something in the nature
of control over those countries. At
the same time we had just been
forced to take notice Of Russia's
strong attitude on the voting ques-
ton in the Security Council.
Accordingly I cabled Ambassador
Hartman. in Moscow on September
1s. Mentioning the voting question
that had risen at the Dumbarton
Oaks Conference, I said that this,
along with other recent develop
ments that Hartman had reported,
raised most serious doubts with re-
gard to future long-range Soviet
policy.
I added that I had begun to
wonder whether Stain and the
Kremlin had determined to reverse
their policy decided upon at Mos
COW and Tehran and to pursue a
contrary course. I therefore asked
Harriman's estimate of the present
trend Of Soviet policy so that we
might decide how to meet this
possible change in Russian attitude.
Causes Of Change Sought.
I stated to Hartman that would
find particularly helpful his views
as to the causes that had brought
about this, change in Soviet policy
toward the United States and
hardening of Russias attitude to-
ward Great Britain.
Hartman replied the following
day giving a number OF instances
of Russia's unilateral actions or ap-
parent unwillingness to collaborate
with Britain and the United States.
He said we had sufficient evidence
to foresee that, If world organiza-
tion were established requiring
agreement of all permanent men,
bers for the consideration of any
dispute, regardless Of whether or not
one Of them was involved, the So
Wet government would ruthlessly
block consideration by the Council
of any question that 1t considered
affected its interests. The Soviet
government would also insist that
the matter be settled by the Soviet
Union with the other country or
countries involved, particularly any
disputes with her neighbors.
Hartman stated his conviction
that Stain and his principal ad-
visers placed the highest import
ance on the association Of the Soviet
Union in a, major way with the
three great powers, but they expect
ed that their political and military
strength would enable them to die
tate the conditions. There was NO
doubt, he said, that the Russian
people craved peace and had been
led to believe that the intimate re-
lationship developed with Britain
and the United States during the
war would continue after the wal
and guarantee a lasting peace.
The Ambassador did not believe
that Stain could forego the ma
tertA as well as the psychological
value of this association without
causing grave concern among the
Russian people. Nevertheless, there
were powerful elements close to
Stain who were unwilling to give
up the right of Independent action
where Russia's interests were af-
fected and to see Russia depend for
her security solely on an untried
world organization with associates
whom these elements did not fully
trust. Stain, he thought, liked to
have two strings to his bow, and 1t
did not appear inconsistent to the
marshal to pursue simultaneously
these two methods to obtain security
for his country and to promote its
national interests as he envisaged
them.
Two Bases for Policy.
As left office, the policy advo-
Gated toward Russia rested on two
bases. The first was: Continue in
constant, friendly discussion with
the Russians. Consult them at every
point. Engage in no "cussin'
matches" with them. Explain to
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