Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1947-07-20

as the desire OF frightened total1
wall around itself as q means OF {
the outside world.
This theory-which gives the
lack of theological bias-is now re-
yealed as nothing more than thu
naive prating of persons who refuse
to see the truth of Russia's aims il
those countries which We are con-
tent to pass over as satellite states.
Such an Interpretation provided
an outlet for those who, while de.
string to avoid any accusation O
pro- Communist or pro-Russian sym.
pathies, at the same time wished tt
associate themselves from wha,
they regarded as Communist-baitin
and Russian-baiting, in the BELLE
that by thus binding themselves tt
reality they were contributing tt
world peace.
Reasons Apparent
The theory of a frightened Russia
erecting defensive wall around it.
self, gained great currency in the
latter stages of World War II anc
the subsequent 10 months. 1t has
by now, been completely discredited
as Russia moves from one aggressive
action to another, revealing clearly
that her purpose in Central and
Eastern Europe is not defensive. but
preparatory to aggression wherever
in the world she can find the op-
portunity.
One need not look far to find the
reasons for Russia's tnsistence on
retaining the hold she had every
where when Germany surrendered
in 1915. Poland, with its coal, oil
and agricultural products; Romania
with oil and wheat; Czechoslovakia
with vital industrial products; Yu-
goslavia, with mineral resources and
agricultural production-all have
been drawn into a tight POLITICAL
economic coalition which Is de-
signed to strengthen the war po-
tential of the Soviet Union.
To a large extent these are the
same producing areas which Adolf
Hitler attempted, with some sue
cess, to harness to his war machine
when in 1899 he destroyed the peace
Of the world for the greater glory
Of the Nazi Reich-and world con-
quest.
Overreaches
Russia has gone beyond the rea-
sonable limits Of what could be
construed as her defensive sphere.
Such sphere could be regarded
as including Bulgaria, Romania.
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Even
Yugoslavia, which extends Russian
influence dangerously far to the
west. could, by generous construc-
zion of the idea of a defensive zone
be included in Russia's proper sphere
of inf1uence-if her aims were only
defensive.
But when we regard the Commu-
mist coup in Hungary, the Russian
effort to dominate completely the
Austrian government, and the Soviet
Indictment of Yugoslav, Albanian
and Bulgarian brigands-balked by
regular army forces of those three
detach Northern Greece
from the Athens government, we are
in the presence Of conscious and
determined effort to create q Stra-
tegic position from which even fur
Their aggressions could be perpe-
trated.
This strategic position is different
from, but related to, the economic
strength which Russia derives from
and association of
these areas with herself and with
other members of the Soviet bloc
which it Is now incorrect to call
Slavic, because 1t includes many
persons who are not Slavs except by
fractional parts Of their ancestry.
Double Purpose
BY her position in Austria and
by her assault upon the
Greek kingdom and by her domi-
nation of Finland, Russia obtains
or seeks to obtain-certain strategic
points which could, Of course, serve
her defensively, but would also serve,
more than anything else, for an
aggressive offensive into new
spheres.
Particularly is this true Of Finland
and Greece, at either extremity Of
Russias effort to engulf Europe on
the tanks while she makes frontal
on the continent itself.
In the north, subJugstion Of Fin
land not only gives Russia stronger
hold on the head Of the Baltic, but
also projects her somewhat closer
the North Atlantic, which is pos