The Wilmington morning star., 1947-04-03
Mass Move ment
Of Germ n
BY JOSEPH E. EVANS
In Wall Street journal

come insofar as it suggests somewhat more
reasonable, not 10 say more Christian, ap-
proach to Germany than up to now has been
apparent on the part of any of the four
powers.
1t is true that the motivations Of M. Bi-
dauit's proposal are admittedly to be found
not so much in reason Or Christianity as in
basic fear of resurgent German might; a
Germany with too many people in it, that
is, a potential threat to France. 1t is a pity
thai the proposal had to be made in this way;
that it could not have been made On the
basis of human rights and dignity; that mass
deportations of peoples could not have been
denounced as strongly when undertaken by
Allies as when undertaken by Nazis.
For there is little moral justification to be
found for the theory and operation OF the ex-
pulsion of four and one-half million Germans
from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
an expulsion agreed to By the Big Three at
Potsdam with the proviso that ANY transfers
that. take place should be effected in an Or
derby and humane manner"
The words sound now, as they should have
sounded to their trainers then, like a mon
strous joke. The very fact that four and one
hall million people have already been moved
in a year and one-half is sufficient indication
of how it was done. You cannot uproot that
many people in that length of time in an Or
derby and humane manner. For verification,
one needs only to meet the box car trains at
Anhalter Bahnof in Berlin bringing the
refugees from Pomerania, Silesia and East
Prussia, or to drive through the deserted viii
lagos of the Sudeten mountains in Czechoslo-
vakia.
The utter fatuousness, the stupidity ap-
preaching madness, of this part of the Pots
dam declaration is implied in M. Bidault's
proposal. Why were those people to be re-
moved in the first place? Because. in the
case of Czechoslovakia, they represented a
potentially dangerous minority which had in
fact to a certain large degree but by no
means unanimously demonstrated its dan
ger by supporting Hitler: a minority which
nonetheless had lived in the Sudetenland for
long periods, generations in some cases, cen
turtles in others. In the northeast, it was a
question of removing Germans from terri
tories temporarily placed under Polish ad-
ministration pending final establishment of
Germany's eastern frontiers - and for this
removal, because the boundaries were not
fixed. there was not the slightest excuse.
Aside from the moral stencil of these mass
deportations, anyone might have shown how
fantastically uneconomic they were. What
was to be expected from the dumping into
a foreshortened, industrially and agricul-
turally woefully un-self : sufficient Germany
with a tremendous housing shortage Of these
of homeless refugees? M. Bldault
has provided the answer: other millions of
~ DG SollSI u VI III
1t seems really not too much to expect
that the Big Three at Potsdam might have
had enough basic perception to foreSee this
inevitable result. 1t puts them back
just about where they were at Potsdam. ex-
cept that millions of people have suffered ter
rible hardship and the rich agricultural lands
of the East, "a per cent of pre-War Ger
many total land area and % per cent OF its
arabic land, is and for years will be all but
tn q food hungry world.
M. Bidault's proposal shows the tragic
short sightedneSS of the governments OF
Czechoslovakia and Poland (the Hungarian
German-minority question is by no means
greaD and the vicious inability
or refusal to understand of the governments
of America, Russia and Britain in still anoth-
er way. The proposal means that Europeans
and Germans are going to have to learn to
get along, for only on that basis is it possible
to think of Germans emigrating on a large
scale into other countries, particularly one
like France.
This being the case, it would seem that
it might have been understood from the be-
that, with regard to Czechoslovakla
especially. the German minority might have
been assimilated into that nation as M. BIZ
dault would now have German emigres as
simulated into Other nations. 1t is by no means
absurd to imagine that the time may come
when Czechoslovakia itself will agree to re-
accept. for economic reasons, part OF the very
she was so passionately eager to
evict. This would, of course, be the final
crown to the idocy of that section Of Pots
dam entitled 'Orderly Transfers of German
Good as M. Bidault's proposal thus was in
suggesting a dawning light Of reason on this
sad piece of Allied policy. it nonetheless i'm
plies something which is not at all good:
that the present temporary eastern boundaries
of Germany are to become permanent, for II
they were not, a large part of the refugees
from the ceded provinces could be allowed
to return there and mass emigrations else
where would not be necessary.
Mr.. Byrnes at Stuttgart made it clear that
the U. S. regards those boundaries as tempo
rary Gas Potsdam referred to them) and Cen
eral Marshall will certainly support that point
of view. But in allowing the German popu-
lations to be expelled from those regions,
the U. S. made a grave error which will be
difficult if at all possible to remedy. Mr..
was quick to point out that our agree
Ing to these removals was de facto evidence
of our agreement to make permanent the
boundaries as they now stand.
1t is a point on which the U. S. should
be prepared to exert all possible pressure.
permanent loss to Germany of the lands
east of the Oder-Neisse would be economically
catastrophe, ethnically' intolerable and
as politically dangerous as anything imagin-
able. Such a loss would mean that Germany
would never be able to rise from its condi-
ton as the slum' of Europe. These territories
again it must be stated, % per cent of
Germany's arabic land - comprised IA per
cent of pre-war Germany's population, IS per
cent of her employment, II per cent OF her
national income.
More Importantly, they gave employment
to one-fifth of all workers in agriculture and
forestry, produced rs per cent of Germany's
bread grains, including 80 percent Of her
rye, grew 80 per cent of her barley and
potatoes and accounted for more than 20 per
cent of her cattle, swine and sheep popula-
ton.
Politically such a loss could not fail to