Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1947-09-13
America Must Be Convinced

Though vaguely put and strangely timed,
British Foreign Secretary Bevin's offhand
suggestion for peacetirne version of lend
lease makes better sense than his recent
proposal for redistribution of American
gold to promote European recovery. Much
the same suggestion has been made by
others, including former Governor Stassen,
and we are likely to hear a good deal more
about it when Congress debates the So
called Marshall plan.
At present the representatives of sixteen
nations, including Britain, are in session in
Paris to draw up final estimates of what
will be needed to put those nations back
on their feet. Up to now the estimates
which are to be made public soon-have
been the subject of only unofficial reports.
Roughly $4,000, 0000 900 is the figure that
has been most prominently mentioned as
the sum the United States will be asked to
advance over period of four years to en-
able the Western European countries to
buy food, fuel, machinery and industrial
raw materials. They must have these for
recovery, but they cannot get them unless
something is done to offset the critical
shortage of dollars. ~.
But the advance of such sum would
not necessarily have to be wholly in the
form of credits and loans. In part at least,
the Marshall program might be able to
operate as a kind of lend-lease, though
with conditions varying markedly from the
wartime version. What is urgently needed
is not the cash, but the things that the
cash will buy, the things that will help to
restore normal agricultural and industrial
production-the key to recovery. Accord
ingly, 1t is possible that percentage of
our aid might be extended directly in the
form of goods rather than dollars. Such
an arrangement would be different from
our loan to Britain, for example. The
British themselves have managed the
spending of that loan, but under modi-
fed lend lease we would exercise greater
measure of control over our help to the
recipient countries.
At this particular moment, however,
speculation over the virtues or lack of
virtues in the Bevin suggestion must re-
main largely academic, mere side issue
in terms of the over all problem of trans
lating the Marshall proposal into effective
action. Not the least important factor in
volved-indeed, the most important-iS
American public opinion. 1t needs to be
convinced that the European situation is
genuinely critical; it. needs to be con-
WINGED that the dollar-short countries are
doing their best, individually and collec-
lively, to help themselves and each other;
it needs to be convinced that the security
and economic well-being of the Nation
demand that Congress authorize the ex-
tension of extraordinary aid.
The evidence seems voluminous that such
aid is imperative, but the administration
has yet to present it publicly in an inte-
grated and persuasive way. The problem
itself is so complex that the task of ex-
planning will require an exceptional effort
on the part particularly of the White House
and the State Department. The sooner
the effort is made, the better. The Amer
lean people are waiting for it, and they can
be counted upon to respond favorably if
the case is convincing.