The Wilmington morning star., 1947-03-10
TODAY
and

Continued From Page One)

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would not agree. The American
position has been that it would
|disarm its atomic weapons whef
Its system Of international contro
was set up. If Mr.. Gromyko hac
expected to negotiate seriously, he
might have argued that American
disarmament should begin soon ir
return for firm promises to nego'
tate on the main elements Of the
american plan. But Mr.. Gromyko's
position now is that the United
States should disarm, and that il
should also surrender all hope o.
getting any of the important
features of its own plan.
We have to conclude that as a
matter of fact the Soviet govern.
ment expects us to continue to
have the monopoly of the atomic
bomb, that it does not believe we
can use 1t effectively, and will
therefore, make no concessions to
us. For the net result Of Mr.. Gro
myko's argument is that we con-
tinue to have the bomb.
That this would be the net re-
suit must have been evident to
Mr.. Gromyko and to the Kremlin
The question then is why does the
Soviet government take a position
which, stripped of all its d~ialectic,
leaves us in physical possession OF
a monopoly of this enormous wea
pom of war? Why does the Soviet
government take the very line
most certain to produce the very
result which her fiercest enemies
here and in Britain have wanted:
namely, no international control
and the continuing American mo.
nopoly of the bomb? Why does Mr..
Cromyko reject in the name of the
Soviet Union what Senator Nickel
Ter prayed not so long ago that the
Senate would reject in the name OF
the United States?
It must be because the Soviet
government has come to the con.
clusion that at the present time it
can discount the atomic bomb.
In the calculation which has led
to the conclusion the weakness OF
the British Empire has undoubt-
eddy been a determining factor.
The liquidation of the British EN-
lpire in Asia and North Africa is
going to mean that the United
Kingdom is to become primarily
a western European state. No
doubt it will long maintain its
connection with the English-speak-
ing nations of the British Common
wealth. No doubt it will also main
tain it's colonies in Africa and else
where. But the main imperial posi-
jtion. which extends from the east
ern Mediterranean and Egypt
through India to Malaga, is being
Iliquidated. The main interest OF
the British people in the British
Isles is, as a consequence, more
than ever bound up with the destiny
of France, Belgium, the Neither
LANDS, the Scandinavian countries,
and the Continent as a
whole. As Britain ceases to be an
Imperial world power, she becomes
necessarily a European state.
AS such, she can no longer re-
gard the continent of Europe as
the theater in which the giant non
European powers contend. She
must take the European view,
(which is essentially different not
only from the Russian, but also
from the American and the i'm
perial British view. She must pre-
serve Europe, because she is be,
coming part of it. from being used
as the battlefield of a world war.
and from being the arena in which
the theological conflict is fought
out to the bitter end.
Under these conditions the stra'
tegical importance Of the atomic
bomb is due to be revalued. 1t is
a reasonable inference from Mr..
Gromyko's argument that the So
Wet valuation of the bomb IS a
great deal lower than that placed
upon it by many Americans, and
by Englishmen like Mr.. Churchill
when he made his Fulton speech.
The Russians, no doubt, assume
that the atom bomb will never be
used against them unless there is
a total war. They must assume fur
ther that a total war can break out
only if Britain and the leading
countries of Europe are engaged.
A direct and isolated war between
Russia and America is for all prac-
teal purposes impossible. But If,
as is now increasingly probable,
Britain must throw in her lot with
Europe, and must prevent such
a war, then the atomic bomb can
be discounted as decisive IN the
world balance of power.
The naturalization OF Britain as
a world power has, therefore, alter
ed radically - much more radlcal-
" than we can as yet appreciate,
more radically than small meas
ures on our part can possibly OIL
ses the situation in the world to
which u postwar diplomacy has
been adapted.
Copyright. 1947, New York
Tribune, Inc.
NTKTC nTE