The Wilmington morning star., 1947-02-22
TODAY

B Bill Baldwin,
Continued From Page One)

not the so-called Baruch principles
but whether the United States will
destroy its stock of atomic
weapons as the pre-condition of a
system o f international inspection
and control. The Soviet program,
as it has now been developed. is
a formidable me-. Though its es-
sential principle has not been
changed since Mr.. Gromyko's
statement of June 10, it is now
supplemented and amplified by the
acceptance of virtually the whole
set of general principles which
have been so heavily-and I think
confusedly advertised as the
American program.
We are, therefore, confronted
with a momentous responsibility.
For if we cannot now accept the
Soviet proposal - as I believe we
cannot-We have to make it very
clear to the whole world just why
we cannot.
1t Is that On the basis OF past
experience there is no reason for
thinking that atomic disarmament
will, if war breaks out, prevent
atomic warfare. There are, on the
contrary. compelling reasons for
thinking that atomic disarmament
in time of peace would lead most
surely in time of war to the use of
atomic weapons by the first power
able to manufacture them.
Fortunately, from the point of
view of the argument, MI. Gro
myko has already pointed to the
concrete example which most
clearly demonstrates this conclu-
sion. In his draft convention, SUBJ
last June, the preamble
states that just as poison gas has
been outlawed, so atomic weapons
should be outlawed. The Soviet
case, as presented to the world, is
that atomic weapons should be
prohibited as poison gas has been
prohibited.
But there is a fundamental diff
ference between the treaty on
gas (Which was signed Feb.
S, 1929 and the treaty on atomic
weapons which the Soviet govern
ment is proposing. The poison
gas treaty outlawed "the use in
war" of poison gas. 1t did not
outlaw h e manufacture and pos
session of poison gas in time of
peace. Mr.. Gromyko is proposing
to outlaw not only "the use in
of atomic weapons but their
existence at any time.
Now it is most significant that
the 1922 treaty was adopted by
the Allies after the Germans had
used poison gas with almost de-
success to break through
the British lines on the Western
The question is why did
the Germans use poison gas in
the first world war whereas
with all his savagery, did
not use it in the second world
war? The answer is that in the
first world war the Germans
had developed poison gas a year
before the British, who were, in
the field of chemical warfare, in
unarmed. But in the second
world war the British and the
Americans had poison gas from
he start. That s the reason it
Was never used.
The 1922 treaty was observed not
because it had prohibited the man
1facture and possession o poison
gas (Which it didn't but because
Doth sides had poison gas. The
certainty of reprisal enforced that
The rest of that same
which prohibited unre-
submarine warfare against
merchant vessels, was not OBJ
served. The military advantages
If the weapon were much greater
han the disadvantages of reprisal.
If we are guided by experience,
and the memorable logic of the
weapons of war, we shall separate
the proposal to outlaw the
Use of atomic weapons from the
proposal to outlaw the possession
f them. For US, and for all the
lations which may in the last
lnalysis depend upon us for their
ecurity, possession of atomic
Weapons is the one most depend
lble guaranty that atomic weapons
will not be used against us.
The whole system of interna-
ional control, which is SO desir-
bile for the development of the
'eaceable S of atomic energy. is
lot a system of security. 1t is a
ystem which has to be made Sc
ure, and from our point Of view
nd Of that of our friends, the
possession of atomic weapons is
he final element of security.
From the point of view of the
soviet Union there is no denying
hat until it too has atomic
Weapons, it does not have the
anne security. 1t depends on our
,ood faith in this particular field
# military power. That no doubt
S why the Soviet government is SO
lager to have immediate atomic
l do not blame them for trying
o get it. But l believe that we
an with a good conscience refuse
For while our possession of
tonic weapons is a great military
lsset, the Soviets are in no sense ]
i the terms-no matter how badly
hey may estimate our purposes
-defenseless and at our mercy.
Their inexhaustible reserves of
men, which can be marched {
gainst the vital centers of Europe
nd Asia, are a military asset of
ne first order. Tile atomic bomb. !
nough a powerful weapon. is not /
n the judgment Of any sober mill
ary ~strategist a decisive weapon {
gainst the Soviet Union. X