Evening star., 1947-04-27
Horse ! rode Suspected
On Economic Unity
Writer Relieves Western Europe
Deal Was Made at Moscow
BIZ GEORGE FIELDING Eliot.

DGdl WAS -dduG at MOSCOW
BY George Fielding Eliot.
Did the American and British delega.
tions at Moscow reach at least general
basis Of agreement with the French dele
CATION as to the economic unity of West
ern Europe?
There are good many signs which
suggest that this is the case Not the
least is the hardly concealed delight OF
John Foster Dulles, long an advocate
Of Western European economic plan,
In pointing to Secretary Marshall's state
nlent Of April 10. on the control OF the
Ruhr and other European industrial
areas by directly interested states as
"the most important development of the
Moscow conference. Along with this
went the prediction that during the next
two or three months these ideas will
attract wide attention and steadily de-
veloping support in Western Europe"
Now this is just lot of silly words
unless the French are going to partici-
pate in the program, and Mr. Dulles,
never given to the uttering of silly
words, is in position to know what the
French delegation is thinking.
OF course. it is not too much of
problem to know what French Foreign
Minister Bidault Is thinking on this
subject. It was an open secret in Paris
last summer that NJ Bidault would have
liked to join the French zone of Ger
many with the American and British
zones in the bi-zonal agreement then
under discussion. 1t was an even more
open secret at the meeting of the Coun-
Gil of Foreign Ministers in New York last
December that M. Couve de Murville,
M. Bidault's deputy minister, was in
close sympathy with the idea of unity
ing the three zones and trying to work
out formula for the Ruhr within the
framework of the federal system of Ger
man government proposed by America
and Britain. But the obstacle was a
great one-the French Communist Party,
which, it was felt, would regard any
such French moves as direct affront
to the Soviet Union, and would appeal to
the French people on the ground that
America was hell-bent on war with the
Soviets and was dragging France into It
"a war from which the French would
suffer worse than any one else In the
existing delicate balance of French poll
tics, this Communist attitude would
have made 1t impossible for M. Bidault
to carry through any proposal to go
along with America and Britain on Ger
man policy.
But there is now lot of evidence
which suggests very strongly that dur
ing the session of the Council of For
eign Ministers at Moscow the ground-
work at least of Anglo-American- French
agreement, or perhaps it would be bet
ter to say temporary working arrange
ment, as to Germany and Western Euro
pean economy In general may have been
laid
The French came to Moscow in no
very happy mood. They wanted more
reparations, especially more COAL from
Germany. They were anxious about
possible American plans for revival of
German industry, fearful that these
plans might go ahead without proper
attention TO security, which is the es-
sence OF French policy toward Germany.
But a beginning in reassuring the
French had already been made. On
March 4. the 50-year Anglo-French
treaty had been signed at Dunkerque.
On March 6. Secretary Marshall saw M.
Bidault in Paris. On March g. Secre-
tary Marshall in Berlin stated that he
favored the founding of four power Ger
man policy on four-power, 40-year
security pactLan American commit
nent far beyond anything this country
has ever undertaken before in regard to
Europe. On March IL, speculative Mos
cow dispatches were already suggesting
that Marshall was for a security treaty
with the three Western powers, even II
Russia would not come in--but with the
door always open for her to come in.
However, reparations came up first.
On March 16, NJ. Bidault, represented
himself as opposing the American idea
for raising the level of German pro-
ductaon, especially steel-on the ground
of security. But he also mentioned
Frances need for coal.
X X x
On March 20, M Bidault said that II
he could get coal agreement from
America and Britain (joint controllers
of the Ruhr under the bi-zonal deal
he might go along on raising the level
of production, etc. He blamed Britain
for failure to get more coal production
or permit the export of more coal, say
ing that too much was being held for
use in Germany. On March %. political
groups in the French-controlled Saar
region sent kilograms (inspiredO to
Bidault in Moscow asking for the eco
nomic union of the Saar region with
France. On April 5, it was announced
that both Ruhr coal and Saay coal were
being discussed by the three Western
powers in sideshow to the main Mos
COW conference. About that time the
French began voting with America and
Britain on almost every issue before the
main conference
On April 10 Bidault suddenly asked
the council of foreign ministers to ap-
prove the economic and financial union
of the Saar region with France. Mar
shall and Bevin Immediately agreed,
obviously by prearrangement. Molotov
baked; he said he had had only 10
minutes notice, would have to study the
proposal, etc. The next day he still
baked, and tried to tie the Saar pro-
posal in with four-power deal on
control of the Ruhr. which he knew
to be wholly unacceptable to the West