The Wilmington morning star., 1947-03-01
Marshall Makes Change
BY ARTHUR KROCk

VI lHC hHS'
. the organization of the State Department ina
Secretary Marshall made was to unity III
intelligence unit, known as Research ahc
Analysis.' This step, the effect of which was
to take control of departmental
away from minor officials with a personal
stake in what to do with it, restores the
plan advocated unsuccessfully by Col. Alfred
Mccormack of New York City during the
regime of Secretary Byrnes.
MI. Byrnes assigned decision on admins
trative and organization details such as this
to his law partner whom he made an Assistant
Secretary, Donald Russell. After reviewing
Colonel McCormack's plan, Mr.. Russell de-
cided to distribute supervision of the intelli-
gence group among the heads Of the geo.
graphical acknowledgment Affairs, Far
Eastern Affairs, etc. He apparently concluded
that, since these were the officers on whom
the Secretary would principally depend for aid
in making policy, the information obtained in
the field should filter through them.
Under-Secretary Acheson preferred Colonel
McCormack's plan, but he was overruled, and
Colonel Mccormack resigned in order to
dramatic the issue. But, despite the fact that
he did this effectively. reversal of the Russell
plan did not come until General Marshall took
over and made Mr.. AcheSon his chief Of stat
in fact. 1t appears that. just as the restora-
ton OF the Mccormack system was one of
the new Secretary's first orders, it was one
OF Mr.. Acheson's first recommendations.
Col. William A. Eddy, special assistant to
General Marshall and director of the intelli-
gence unit, now is free to collect information
for his chief without relay through the geo
graphical desks. This conforms to Colonel
McCormack's and Mr.. Acheson's original ar
gument that those who must make the basic
decisions require direct. and that
1t should not be strained through counselors.
however able and honorable. who may not
find it to their liking. In reaching the same
conclusion. and recognizing at once to that
end. General Marshall simply followed the
system he found most effective as wartime
Chief of Staff Of the Army, both as an un-
INSTRUCTED guide to himself and as the method
best calculated to make his Intelligence divi-
sion stand on its own feet.
The arrangement still has its critics. al
though the change has disposed of one of
their objections. The other is that diplomacy
and intelligence do not mix. even if the
latter is called research and analysis True
intelligence work, of the kind Colonel Eddy
did so brilliantly and daringly in North Africa
before the invasion, should not, these critics
contend, be under the same roof where foreign
pollcy is operated and the relations of the
United States with other nations are conduct
ca. Emoarrassments and complications with
friendly governments that could become verv
grave are Incidental risks in such 2 comhi-
nation. in this opinion, and should be avoided
oy MAKING intelligence a wholly separate, in
dependent unit.
mere already exists in Washington a., in
teLlgence, bureau which collates. ana1vzes and
briefs for the President secret information
gathered by various branches of the govern.
nent. "A composite O. all this. is placed on
Mr. Iruman's desk every morning soon after
o O'CLOCK. But the material from which this
composite is written-on one sheet, by presi-
oentlal 'order-ls collected in several denart.
inehls' including War, Navy and State, bv
units independent of the central co1lat;nu
agency. These report their own findings and
analyses directly to their chiefs.
Inc alternative proposal is that an indie.
Penoent agency, directly under the President
Should do all this gathering and c~ollating and
mat even in the absence of such an arranea.
nent' the State Department. should keen o1+
~ tne business unless its unit is strictly con-
1lned to research and analysis" which wo11a
be an office job on which Colonel F %du,e
experience and talent in a more active in
tellsence field would be wasted.
! BE that as it may, he is now to renor+
aiect 10 the Secretary with whatever ma
terlal it is that he actually gathers. And This
is a vast improvement on the Russell Man.
~ .e view OF many quallf1ed students of the
problem. sIt means" said one advocate of
the change, "that no longer will the state
Department shape policy by town meeting"
The chiefs Of the geographical divisions are
unhappy over the loss OF immediate power
and ultimate influence, and it is only fair
to state their argument for the prior arraaoe-
ment and its extension. Some of them feel
that not only Colonel Eddy's section, but also
those dealing with economics and other SUBJ
iects, should work upward to the Secretary
through the geographical desks. This plan,
thew hold. would establish a ''true secre-
tariat' for the top officials. always a valuable
and sometimes indispensable coordinating
group in large organizations.
But. aside from the objections detailed here
to the inclusion of the intelligence unit in
such an Arrangement. a counter-argument is
that this would ''compartmenta1ize'' the State
Department even more than it is alreadv and
would create autonomy bodies without coordi-
mating them. This obviously was the Secre-