Evening star., 1947-07-13
Japan B|ames Failure
0f|nte|Iieence Chiefly
FOR Midway Defeat
/. By WiIIiom J. WheotIey

Poor Japanese intelligence con-
cerning United States forces in the
Pacific and an inadequately trained
second team" in the air were among
the Japs' excuses for their disastrous
defeat in their June Q942) attack
on Midway Island.
This was disclosed last night in
documents released by the Navy, in
Guiding play-by-play reports of the
japanese operations taken from cap
tured records, and detailed reports
of the American commanders con-
cerned.
A report on the battle-which the
Navy described as perhaps the deci-
sive battle" of the war in the Pacific
submitted to the Japanese govern
ment by Admiral Nagumo. COM
mander In chief of the Japanese
first air fleet, showed poor intel
ligence about American forces led
to three disastrous mistakes for the
Japs.
The japanese commander thought
American forces lacked the will to
fight" did not have any powerful
fleet units in the vicinity of Midway,
and was not aware of the Jap plans.
He found out differently.
Implications Explained.
A United States feet-including
the carriers Enterprise, Hornet and
Yorktown-was awaiting the su-
perior Jap force, which was built
around seven aircraft carriers.
Rear Admiral Roscoe F. Good,
who was assistant operations officer
at Admiral Chester w. Nimltz's
headquarters at Pearl Harbor at the
time, explained to reporters implica-
tions of the Japs' report.
He declined to say just when the
American Navy learned of the
japanese plans against Midway.
But it is generally known that the
American Navy had broken the
japanese code. 1t had a clear idea
both of the makeup of the Japanese
armada which came out Of the In
land Sea on May 27 and its objec-
tive.
On the other hand, the report
shows that japanese intelligence
was so bad-even on activities OF
their own forces-that Admiral
Good, with chuckle, said:
II almost felt sorry for that Jap
commander in chief" Either to
save face" or as a diversion tacticS
or because they didn't know it, they
sent orders to carriers already sunk.
Unenviable Job for Nagumo.
Admiral Nagumo had the un-
enviable Job of explaining to his
superiors the loss of four big car
riers and heavy cruiser, the re-
tirement of one of the most power
full armadas ever assembled and
abandonment Of the attack on Mid
way. He said:
1--WE had practically no intelli-
gence concerning the enemy. We
never knew to the end where or
how many carriers there were. In
other words, we participated in this
operation with meager training ana
without knowing the enemy"
The Japanese had lost heavily IN
experienced pilots in the battle OF
Coral Sea early in May. Admiral
Nagumo said that of those he had
at Midway practically no, one got
beyond basic training"
inexperienced flyers" the report
said, barely got to the point where
thev could make daytime carrier
landings. 1t was found Fthat even
some of the more seasoned flyers
had lost some of their skill. No op-
portunity was available to carry out
Joint training, which, OF course
made impossible any co-ordinated
action between contact Units, ilumi-
nation units and attack units. The
likelihood of obtaining any salts
factory results from night attacks,
therefore was practically nil"
Added to the inability to get the
men strained, number OF the Jap
carriers were laid up for repair and
maintenance work.
Japan's Ma jor Mistake.
Admiral Good said a major mis-
take was the Japs' belief that they
would be opposed by only local
craft around Midway and by the
land based air there.
Admiral William F. Halsey's Task
Force 16 had been sent to the Battle
of the Coral Sea, but 1t arrived too
late. However, in its race south 1t
got in too close to the Carolines and
was discovered by a Jap patrol
plane who reported it heading to the
Southwest Pacific. What the Japs
didn't know was that Admiral Hal
sey later was ordered to return to
Pearl Harbor together with the
remnants of Task Force II, which
was engaged at Coral Sea.
Task Force 16 arrived at Pearl
Harbor on May 6, and went out on
May %. this time commanded by
Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spru-
ance, who relieved Admiral Halsey
for disqualification. Task Force II
reached Pearl Harbor on May n
and went out on the 30th, under
command of Rear Admiral F. J.
Fletcher.
Both forces joined on June 2.
1912 and when the battle had end
ed on June 6, the Japs had lost the
carriers Akagi. Kaga. Soryu and
Hiryu, two and probably three bat
tleships damaged. two cruisers sunk
and three or more others damaged,
three destroyers sunk and one prob
ably sunk, and four transports hit
and one or more probably sunk
The estimated Jap personnel loss
was 4,800.
For this the United States paid
with the sinking of the carrier York
town and the destroyer Hamann,
$50 planes lost, and personnel losses
Of 90 officers and 215 men.
But the war tide was turned, the
Japs went limping home, never