The Wilmington morning star., 1947-03-05

cedure on the budget. and not,
like, for example, the abandon
ment of the gold standard in 1881
an uncomfortable event.
The immediate need, therefore,
is for a stop-gap arrangement
with the British government
which covers the immediate
emergency in Great Britain and
in Greece, and permits US to ex-
anime here, and with the British,
government, the great issues
which are at stake. 1t is not in
any ones interest hat they
should be dealt with in an at
1nosphere of panic.
For if, as is the case. the
British are overextended, 1t is of
absolute primary Importance that
the United States should not in its
turn become overextended. This
will require strategical judgment
of the highest order and at the
highest level as to where and how
the military and financial power
of this country must be, and can
be most effectively, applied. We
cannot be everywhere, and do
everything, all over the world at
once, and it is essential that we
pick and choose. If that is to be
done wisely, it will not be while
President Truman and Secretary
Marshall are away from Washing
ton where the picking and choos-
ing will have to be done.
The first thing we have to rec
ognize is that while the problems
of the threatened areas of Europe
and Asia cannot be solved without
large economic action on our
part, basic military and strategic
considerations are involved. To
intervene in Greece. for example,
is not a matter of money alone.
1t is a military commitment, even
though the troops stationed in
Greece continue to be British
troops. For the support of these
troops would be an American re-
sponsibility, and, if necessary.
their reinforcement. How the
Greek outpost is to be maintained
has to be judged in the light of
all our military commitments
around the world. For we are also
committed in Germany and in ia
pan and in Italy and in Korea and
iii the Philippines. all over the
two oceans, and the measure of
u ability to support these COM
'mitments is not the size OF Our
national income but the amount
Of our available military man
power.
In measuring how we can meet
our responsibilities we have,
therefore, to consider whether, as
seek to contain the Soviet ex-
pansion, we have to do it and can
do it at points like the Greek
mainland and like Korea and
China where the Russian military
man power, which is so much
greater than our own, can most
easily and cheaply be applied. We
are a sea and air power pri-
marily, and our natural military
habitat is in places where power
can be exerted without confront
ing directly the inexhaustible
masses of h e Russian infantry.
We should scrutinize very care
fully, therefore, any military
commitment on the mainland of
the Eurasian continent within
marching distance of the Soviet
Union.
We have one unavoidable COM
mitment on the Eurasian con-
tlnent-in the heart of Germany.
All the more reason. therefore.
why We should not weaken that
commitment by dissipating our
slender resources of military man
power at beachheads, which at
best can only be held defensively.
In accepting a growing respon-
slbility for the security of the
Middle East, it is necessary.
therefore, that we ask ourselves
where and how given the
characteristics Of our own mill
tary power we a most effec-
lively commit ourselves. There is
little doubt that the key position
both for the defense of the Middle
East and for the counter-offensive
is in Turkey. The strategical inn
p%ortance of Greece is in its re-
lation to Turkey, and it may well
be that the crucial question row,
as It was when the Germans over
ran the Greek mainland, is not
the Greek mainland itself but
Crete and the other Greek is
lands. 1t may follow that while
we must, of course, give
emergency economic assistance
to Greece, we should fix our at
tention on the islands, which are
rot only Of greater strategical i'm
portance but are far more
suitable to the kind of military
power which the United States
can muster.
The decisions which have now
to be made are remarkably sim
liar to h e high strategical de-
cisions of the war. 1t is impossible
to reinforce every theater, to fill
every vacuum of power and re-
store at one and the same time
the whole shattered economic life
of Europe and Asia. We have to
choose not only what to~hold but
what to let go Of, and where IN
fact to begin to rebuild.
The problem is globa1. The need
for help is worldwide. But unless
we are to dissipate our effort and
to fail, we must select the key
points and the key countries. 1t
is better to do all that is needed
to succeed, let us say IN the
United Kingdom, France and
Western Europe. than to do a lit
f1e eUarvwhare and mot epo,,oL