The Wilmington morning star., 1947-05-10

treaty until all the Europena trea-
ties could be signed together. But
the mistake has been made, the
Italian treaty has been signed.
and e original mistake cannot
be corrected now by reopening the
agreements which Mr.. Byrnes
agreed to on behalf of the United
States.
That would be an even greater
mistake. For that would make it
much more difficult for Mr.. Mar
shall to negotiate effectively.
What answer could he make if
Mr.. Molotov asked him. if Mr..
Bevin and Nj. Bidault asked him.
how likely it was that he could
obtain prompt ratification OF an
Austrian or a German treaty?
What would Mr.. MARSHALL reply
if we r asked, as we would be.
whether the Senate would delay
the Austrian and German treaties
in order to influence the Japa
nese, as it delayed the Italian to
influence the Austrian and Ger
man? There could be no answer.
Mr.. Marshall would be a lame
duck in the Council Of Foreign
Ministers.
The chief pressure for. delay
comes, of course. from the friends
of Italy in the United States. Yet
1 think it be demonstrated
that it is not in the best interests
Of Italy to delay the ratification
Of this treaty. For until the
treaty is ratified, Italy is legally
at war with the United States.
with France, with the British
Commonwealth and Empire, with
Yugoslavia, with the Soviet Union,
and indeed with nearly all the
United Nations.
Mr.. Berle says that IAN execu-
tive arrangement can end 1.-The
purely technical state of war"
This is not true. The United States
cannot by a unilateral executive
arrangement of it's own end the
state of war between Italy and the
other countries. Y as long as
Italy is legally at war, she cannot
be admitted to the United Ma
tons, she cannot make CONNER
cial treaties, she cannot get the
payments due to her by Great
Britain and other countries, she
cannot recover her assets in Ger
many, she cannot collect the pre-
war commercial debts owed to
Italian nationals, she cannot en- :
joy the property rights abroad re-
| sulting from the trade which has
been carried on since the fall Of
| Mussolini in 1913.
Moreover, delay, WI h may
mean eventual rejection OF the
treaty, will permit Tito to reopen
the agitation for Trieste and the
rest Of Istria, and enable him to
say that the United States takes
the view that there has been no
definitive settlement Of the Italo-
Yugoslav frontier. If, in the sup
posed interest OF Italy, the Trieste
settlement is to be reopened now.
then obviously it can also be re-
opened in the interest of Yugo .
sIavia.
Inside Italy, delay with the i'm
plication that somehow the "Tru-
man Doctrine" is being applied ,
can only strengthen the hands OF
the extremists at the expense OF
the moderates. 1t will incite the
neo-Fascists and the cryptic
lFascists to dream of the Ameri-
lean support which u uncon-
sidered words appear to promise.
1t will incite the Communists to
tactics designed to create con-
fusion which the United States,
under the sophomoric view OF the
Truman Doctrine, will be obi
gated to cure but in fact unable
to cure. The great middle moder-
ate mass Of the Italian people =,
whom we really wish to befriend,
will be w~hipsaWed in the struggle
between the two extremes.
Copyright, 1947, New York TIL
bune Inc.