The Wilmington morning star., 1947-01-22
Continued From Page One)

German settlement as such but
for a new European settlement.
The first question, of course, is
yahether Mr.. Dulles is in conflict
viii. the policy If the Administra-
ton. The truth here is, l think
that his German ard European
program is entirely consistent with
the best hopes ana intentions OF
he State Department and OF Gen
eral Clay's conduct of military
government. But for various rea-
sons, which we need not dwell
upon again, these hopes and inten-
tons have never yet been set forth
coherently and Systematically as
the American policy for Europe.
MIR. Dulles has now done that.
ie has made explicit what has
been implicit. He has stated posi-
lively and constructively what has
shus far been obscured and con-
fused b. an excessive ~preoccupa-
ton with details, with temporary
difficulties of the occupation. with
small expedients, and with the
quest for tactical advantages n
the general diplomatic conflict
with the Soviet Union. There ought
however, to be 40 serious obstacle
10 a fundamental agreement. For
The way Mr.. Dulles asks the Ad-
| ninistration to take is the way
every important person in it, who
las thought much about Germany,
:eally wishes to go.
The next question is how much
,upport such an American policy
a have among the bigger and
the smaller nations who must
make the settlement. Probably we
must assume that the Soviet gov
eminent will begin by not liking ii.
But it does not follow that in :ile
end the Soviet government may
not be induced TO accept it.
The Inducements are very great,
and they may even be compelling.
For this is not, as the Russians
themselves and many others may
at first think. a plan to organize
q western bloc" against the So
vet Union. The plan calls for a
sadically decentralized confedera-
ton of German states connected
by political and economic ties
with the surrounding countries Of
Europe. That would be a western
bloc only if the Russians them
selves made it one. 1t would be-
come a western bloc only if they
prevent the German states in their
zone from Joining the confadera-
ton. and if they compel Poland
ard Czechoslovakia to stay out o.
a European system.
The practical virture of this ap:
proach is that a great part OF Eu-
rope can be reconstructed even it
the Soviet Union does not at first
agree. The fact that SO much Of
Europe can be organized without
Soviet participation should act as
a most compelling inducement to
he Soviets to participate in this
organization of the whole OF
Europe.
This is not. then. a tough pol.
icy in the sense that it is designed
to organize a coalition to isolate
Russia. But it IS a tough-mindee
policy in that it denies to the Rus
SLAMS the right or the power to
veto the reconstruction of that
great part of Europe which they
DO not in fact control. The bene-
fits of participation will remain
open to the Russians and to the
Germans in their zone, and to the
countries in their orbit. But if they
do not choose to come in. the
western world could still do a
great deal for itself without them.
These inducements may take
some time to work. A great deal
of diplomatic effort will be neces-
sary to meet the inevitable sus-
picions of Moscow, and to over
come the hesitatlons and reluc-
lance and the nervous lethargy
which are an aftermath Of the
war.
Many European governments,
though they agree in principle,
may encounter the opposition Of
their own communist parties. But
this opposition is not necessarily
irreconciable. Much will depend,
of course, upon the position finally
taken by the Moscow government
itself. But there will be other fac
tors. The communist leaders in all
countries may take their direc-
tons from Moscow. But their con-
stituents are not all of them by any
means thick and thin followers.
This program of a European set
tlement. conforms to very power.
FIJI c,1rrents of thought and feeling