The Wilmington morning star., 1947-02-01
German Negotiations
ANNE o,HARE MCCORMICK

By ANNE O'HARE MCCORMICK
The deputies gathered in London to prepare
the ground for the Foreign Ministers CONFER
ence in Moscow seem to be mostly slttlng.
Russian insistence that the procedure IN ne2o-
tiating the German and Austrian treaties must
follow the pattern adopted for the five treaties
already drafted evidently applies to pace as
well as formula. Fifteen months OF repetltlous
and dragging work in the first round OF peace
making might be expected to smooth the way
and save lost motion in the second round out
this is obviously not. the case.
The second act of peacemaklng, IN snort,
starts where it began. The present deputies
are beginning lust about where their prede-
cessors did in September, l945. Experience has
not changed attitudes or improved teamwork.
Reports of the preliminary meetings IN Lon
don only confirm the general view mat Inc
victorious powers are now entering on thelr
longest and hardest as well as their most oe-
cisive negotiations. The Big Four have worked
together in Germany and Austria. Ihrough the
Allied Control Council they have somehow
managed to keep going for nearly two years
an almost unworkable form of four-poWer ad-
ministration. In Berlin, seat OF this creaking
government, there are optimists who thought
this experiment in cooperation would make the
German settlement easier than diplomats be-
lieved.
High officers in military government pre-
OlcI6Q COlllQ0llLly Il1S W11ltS1 GAAob |E 5UDSS
of settlement were laid in the debates in Ber-
lin. This is the proving ground" they said.
Here we have learned how the minds OF the
four Governments work, where they stand firm
and where they are likely to give in"
Despite this experience, however, the Lon
don talks come up first thing against the old
impasse on procedure. When it comes to a
permanent settlement the conflict OF views not
only between Russia and the Western powers
L~+ -~1o-- A. INxDo orooiNr u will
be wearing and protracted. Former Secretary
Byrnes estimated that the German treaty
would take at least two years to negotiate, and
this estimate did not allow for trouble with
the Germans but only for differences among
the Allies.
This is not to say that we have learned
nothing in twenty months OF wrestling with
peace problems. Almost the first act OF the
new Secretary of State is to charge the Polish
regime with failure to carry out It's solemn
pledge to establish a permanent government
by free elections. This step is significant as a
prelude to the Secretary's visit to MOSCOW
and as an indication that American interests
as he interprets them do not stop at some
imaginary line drawn across Eastern Europe
The point is emphasized by the decision OF the
Government to maintain an American dlplo-
matte mission in Poland to keep itseE in
formed of developments" and manifest its con-
Germ in ''the welfare of the Polish people"
This method, whether effective or not, repre-
sents the fruit of experience.
The second phase OF peacemaklng involves
the future of Poland as well as the future OF
Germany: it determines, in fact, the fate OF
Euorpe and is therefore bound 20 DE longer
and more difficult than the first phase. This
gives point and urgency to General Eisenhow-
er's speech on Monday before the Woman's
National Press Club in favor of a proper oc
cupation'' of Germany. Like it or not, the
United States is il tor a prolonged involvement
in German problem. The form and character
of occupation will change as the internal Situa-
ton develops, one way or the other, and as
the peace terms dictate a gradual transition
from military government to long-term mill.
tary supervision. Any one who has observed
the experiment we are making il Germany
sees that the new tasks faced by our forces
require larSer reserves, better training and a
higher grade of personnel than we have at
present. This is what General Eisenhower
pleads for. Until absolute security is enjoyed
by every nation, he added, 1--WE must provide
for our own security" and until that time
comes training is the right of youth"
The tragic fact about our forces in Germany
is that they have deteriorated not only in
numbers but in morale. intelligence and ut
ness for the job just when those qualities are
needed most. What chance is there of "educat-
ing'' Germans unless the Army that repre-
SentS America ana lis lIlSLllutOHS Is All cuu-
Gated Army, and the men are old enough to
be responsible? AS it is. the percentage OF il
literacy in the troops is higher than in any
group of the same size in the United States.
Ignorant boys Of eighteen and nineteen, with
no real conception Of why they are there, and
no training in how they should behave in cir
cumstances entirely new in their experience,
are not even good policemen; still less are
they bright examples o. the American way
of life"
We are going to be a long time in Germany,
in a period of great competition and stress.
We are proving ourselves there as much as
We are influencing the Germans. Whatever
we do automatically. the American standard
and the American system will be judged by
the character of the rank and file personifying
us abroad, and their quality depends on the
seriousness with which the American people
resolve to carry out their responsibility as the
greatest democratic power on EARTH New
York Times.