The Northwest times. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1947-1955, 1947-11-21
KEEPING UP WITH
THE TIMES
by hideo hoshide
PROPAGANDA AND THE PACIFIC WAR
by hideo hoshide

alarm and obtained an immediate
audience with the Emperor.
The leaflets, he pointed out,
might cause an outbreak by the
1000 900 soldiers in the home Is
lands. They did not know that the
Emperor had sued for peace. They
had not even been told anything
to indicate that the war was being
lost.
Moreover, the terms of the Pots
dam Declaration, unconditional
surrender, would infuriate them,
and the Allied reply. that the EN-
peror, after surrender, must take
orders from the Supreme Command
er for the Allied Powers, would sound
like sacrilege.
A FRACTION
-. of army extremists was insist
ing on fighting to the last, and an
uprising by the rank and file
might give them an opportunity to
seize the government. Every mo-
ment the surrender was delayed
was dangerous, KIDD warned. Hi
rohito directed the Cabinet and the
Supreme Council to meet ''in the
imperial presence" within t w o
hours.
At 1920 the Cabinet and the
Supreme Council gathered before
the throne. The militarist would
agree to no surrender If the En-
peror's powers were to be in any
way abridged But Hirohito 10
longer listened to their wrangling.
"It was decided by the imperial
judgement" as KIDD expressed 1t,
that Japan would accept the Allies
terms.
THE EMPEROR
=. closed the session in e n
minutes and sent for KIDD. AS KIDD
reverentiy chronicled it, he had
an audience with the throne in
response to a summons from hts
majesty, and I really could not
lift my head as his majesty relat-
ed the circumstances with fearful
eyes"
They worked on the rescript all
day; 1t was $3.50 pm. when a draft
was ready. Hirohito made record
ing of it, and it was broadcast the
next morning at IL O'Clock. A
surrender message had been dis
patched, meanwhile to the Allied
governments. Proud Japan, for
twenty-five centuries a lsw unto
herself, lay PROSTATE.
HIROHITO "a
had seen it coming for at
least three months. In May, 1915
he had confided to KIDD that he
wished to end the war as soon es
possible. III mid-June KIDD and
Foreign Minister Togo had tried to
persuade the Supreme Council to
seek peace, a negotiated peace, for
at that time Hirohito still hoped
to avoid unconditional surrender.
On June % the Emperor sum-
moned the Council and directed 1t
to take steps Immediately to APP
proach Russia on the subject Of ar
ranging peace. Not until July 10,
after Hirohito had repeated his
command many times, did the
Council make plans to send an
emissary to Moscow. Even then
the militarists' only thought was
that by diplomatic maneuvers they
might possibly keep the Red Army
out of the war.
Prince Konoye on July IL was en-
trusted by the Emperor with the
Moscow peace mission. The same
day Ambassador Sato in Moscow
was instructed to ask permission
to send a special envoy to Russia.
The Russians gave Sato no reply,
however, and on July 26 the Pots
dam Declaration was issued.
The declaration was published in
Japanese newspapers. Enlightened
Japanese considered it an accept
able basis for surrender, but the
Army was. unwilling to give up. It
I contended it could defeat the Allies
on the Japanese beaches, or at
least inflict such heavy damages
that favorable peace could be ne
! gotiated.