Evening star., 1947-07-13

| ClnueQ 10 uRnC WIN WnaC uCCle lie
had. II he had accepted the jap
anese proposal, Allied victory might
have been postponed for many years
Some State Department ofncials
maintain privately that Gen. Chang
Is too shrewd 4 man not to have
realized that victory, would finally
be on the Allied side. II he is as
shrewd as that, he also would have
realized that his position would not
have been more desperate than 1t
is today If he had gone over to the
enemy.
The fact is that Gen. Chang be-
lieved China would recover only
with the help of the United States
and he had no reason to doubt our
sincerity of purpose. 1t was the
American Government which in
1881 started the ball rolling against
the Japanese aggression in Man.
churia, as it had eatlier offered its
services when the Russians in 1929
tried to take over a part Of Man
churia.
Fought Reds
The American government did its
utmost to supply China with equip
ment and war materials while 1t
was fighting the Japanese single
handed, and Mr.. Hull went on rec
ord-just as Mr.. Stimson did before
HMM opposition to any partition
of the young Chinese republic. 1t
was under the administration OF
President Hoover that We enunci-
ated the doctrine OF nonrecogni-
ton OF Japanese conquests in Man.
churia, and the japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor was precipitated by
our determination not to let Japan
expand on the Asiatic mainland.
All these facts were well-known
not only to Gen Chang but also to
his corrupt advisers, who saw no
profit in the tremendous bribes
offered them after Pearl Harbor by
the japanese. Yet since 1945 we
have done much to weaken the posi-
ton of the only Chinese govern
ment which still enjoys recognition
Of the world powers.
China has been fighting COM
munism for the last 20 years. After
flirting with Russia in the 20s, Gen.
Chang realized the pitfalls of So
Wet friendship. He expelled the
military mission headed by the
Communist leader, Mikhail Borodin,
whom Moscow had sent to help Gen.
Chiang's regime. Gen. Chang be-
gan fighting the Communists with
the smiling approval of Washing
ton. 1t Is true that he made peace
on one or two occasions with the
Communists who were cooperating
with his divisions. particularly in
the defense Of Shanghai in 1887.
But these were only incidental COM
promises, as occur in all Chinese
civil wars.
Pressure on Chang
After VI day Gen. Chang, who
was aware that the Communists
headed by the Moscow puppet, Mao
Tse- -tung. would prevent an early
recovery OF China, wanted to use his
American trained divisions to end
the Communist movement. He told
some OF our representatives, in
cluding Ambassador Patrick Hur-
ley, that unless he disposed of the
organized rebels while his military
power remained, China would be-
come the scene Of bitter civil war.
The United States opposed his
plans. The State Department and
part of the press and radio told
Gen. Chang that he must bring
the Communists into the govern
ment and try to work with them.
His argument that the only way to
work with Moscow's tools was to
surrender to them had little effect
on the State Departments officials
in China and in Washington.
When Gen. Chang demurred he
was told that American assistance
henceforth would be predicated on
his ability to unity China by taking
the Yenan government" into his
own. Under this pressure Gen.
Chang agreed.
After the spectacular resignation
Of Ambassador Hurley Gen. Mar
shall, who had just given np his
position of Chief of staff, was given
the thankless task Of mediator be-
tween the Chang government and
the irreconcilable Communists. Gen.
Marshall went to China and ex-
tended de fscto recognition to the
Yenan group by organizing tri-
partite teams to bring about truce
in China's civil war.
Strategy FAILED
Although the present Secretary OF
State was given wider powers by
President Truman than any other
special Ambassador ever had, he
took his inspiration from the spe-
cialists in the State Department.
This group of men was welded to
the idea that the Chinese Commu-
nists had nothing to do with Mos
cow. that they were agrarians and
reformers, and that by hook or by
crook Mr.. Truman's special Ambas-
sador had to ram cooperation with
Yenan down Gen. Chiang's throat.
This failed because Mao Tse-
tung's representative, Chou En-lai,
adopted the Moscow strategy of
making promises which he did not
intend to keep. Gen. Marshall re-
turned to Washington denouncing
both the National government and
the Communists for the failure to
create a united regime.
Russia stayed on the side lines
She had signed q treaty of arnity
with Cen. Chang in August. 1945