Evening star., 1947-12-14
How Secrecy Can Hurt

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DR.. Karl Compton, the distinguished presi-
dent of Massachusetts, Institute of Tech
nology, made a point that has been made
many times before, but it Is one that
cannot be emphasized too often or too
strongly. 1t is simply this: That despite
widespread American opinion to the con-
trary, the United States has Jagged behind
Europe in producing basic new scientific
discoveries. We have been uniquely skill
full in applying the ideas of others to prac-
tical use, but we have been relatively
deficient in originating fundamental the
ories Of our own through abstract research
and experiment.
BY way Of Illustration, DR.. Compton has
reminded us that in the field of atomic
energy, "out of say a dozen of the funda-
mental ideas some nine or ten have come
from Europe, including the original dis
coveries of radioactivity, of artificial trans
formation of chemical elements and of
nuclear fssion." 1t is true enough, of
course, that our scientists, technicians and
industrial managers wrought a gigantic
and half-miraculous wonder in converting
pure theory into the worlds most awesome
reality, but the fact remains that they
could not have done it had they not had
access, first OF all, to the basic creative
work carried out by others overseas.
This is fact that speaks pretty much
for itself 1t means, as DR.. Compton has
warned, that the United States, far from
feeling complacent about its scientific
ability, must undertake special and con-
tinuing program to improve the scope and
character OF its work in every field Of re-
search and experiment in industrial, gov
ernmental and university laboratories. As
far as nuclear fission is concerned, the
warning is particularly important. More
than that it serves to underscore the
peculiar seriousness of the problem of
reconciling the need for secrecy with the
need for an all-out effort to achieve con-
stant progress in the world of the atom-a
vast new world, world still mostly un-
explored, in which man has only begun to
toddle.
No one is more aware of this problem
than Chairman Lilienthal of our Atomic
Energy Commission. On the one hand, as
he declared In his recent address to the
American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, 1t is absolutely imperative to keep
certain information under lock and key:
but on the other hand 1t is equally impera-
tive to have as many good minds as
possible working on all phases of the
project. AS Mr.. Lilienthal rightly sees it,
the situation demands that the line be-
tween the restricted and unrestricted be
drawn with wisdom and common sense
What we need to guard against is the
emotional and mistaken assumption that
secrecy and security are synonymous and
that the more we have OF the former the
better will be the latter.
Nothing could be less sensible. For the
fact Is, In Mr.. Lilienthal's words, that
secrecy, applied in a stupid and hysterical
and demagogic way, can actually impair
and weaken our security" 1t can do so
by drastically limiting the number of
scientists and technicians working on nu-
clear f1ssion. 1t can do so by choking off
the development of new ideas, ideas that
cannot be born in an iron-curtain atmos-
phere, ideas that we must have If we are
to maintain and increase our lead in the
field OF A-weapons. Thus, If we should
follow policy permitting only fifty good
men to know about project calling for
the brains of hundred, some other
country conceivably could outstrip us in
the atomic race.
Secrecy, in short, can hurt us very seri-
ously If we carry it to excess. It needs to
be applied most carefully. In relation to
other lands, our scientific position is not
so superior that we can afford to do any
thing likely to black out or impede new
ideas and discoveries. On the contrary, as
Dr. Compton, Mr.. Lilienthal and many
others have counseled, we are definitely in
need of policies designed to expand and
improve our fundamental research. Ger
tainly, not the least of these must be a
policy of atomic information free enough
to insure that we do not blind ourselves
in a way that could be our undoing.