The Wilmington morning star., 1947-05-24
Postwar Mediterranean
a, ANNE o,HARE MCCORMICK

ev ANNE o'HARE MCCORMICK
The exciting tale General Mark Clark !!
telling about his submarine mission to Algier!
To nave the way for the invasion OF Nortl
Africa recalls the debate among the TOP Sus'
eeists in l941 and 1912 on where the ITS
Allied landing would be made. President Roos
evelt and the Americans favored a cross
Channel expedition to the Cherbourg PENN
sula. but Mr.. Churchill insisted that the sec
ond from. should be opened in the Mediterran
can. The "soft under-belly Of the enemy TN
Prime Minister talked of SO persuasively ole
not look so soft, General Clark says, 10 the
men who spent two grim years flgntlng tnel
wav across the African coast and up and
down the rocky ridges Of Italy, by common
consent the hardest terrain OF the war.
The British had a natural objection to using
the British Isles as a base until the continental
invasion had force enough behind 1t to make
success certain, and the arguments they ad'
vanced then are not irrelevant to their posi-
ton today and its relation to the American
position. Both are new and insure.
Durirs the war we heard a great deal
about the strategic importance Of the Med
iter-anean The same theme is stressed today,
but with a slightly different connotatlon' Tor
whereas in the past the defense Of the So
called empire route was regarded as the
paramount interest of Great Britain, now the
United States is being pushed into the fore
front of the Mediterranean defense line. Cen
eral Clark's story reads like an Oppenhelm
thriller, all the more so because the secret
L. j.~& ,;%h pnhNrf Mnrn6v and
General Charles Mast in 3 rundown French
villa in Algiers led straight to our present
involvement in Greece and Turkey and thus
opened a new chapter in American history.
1t brought the United States into the Med
iterranean and opened the way to the great
power shifts that tend to keep us there. The
war taught the British that they cannot de-
fend the Mediterranean alone. Nor is its de-
tense as important to them as it was before
the Withdrawal from India, which they are
striving to hasten, ever to the extent of ap-
Iproying separate constitutions for Hindustan
and Pakistan.
When they pulled up stakes in Greece, sub
mitted the Palestine issue to the United Ma
tons, started negotiations for the evacuation
OF Egypt-a more reluctant move because 1t
IL CI SACS vi LIS dAoI uNA sNS
cat was clear that they were definitely ana
deliberately easing out Of their old place as a
Mediterranean power.
Whether Mr.. Churchins war strategy was
designed to get us into the Mediterranean IS
debatable. but Britain's present policy is GER
tainIy calculated to draw the United States
into the vacuum. 1t is a policy OF adaptation
to new conditions, one of which is that SO
large a proportion of the worlds power and
I'll. 100000 I-- ~eecoI ~ fh1C
Consciously or unconsciously they are aban-
doring to us positions which front directly on
the Soviet zone. Their logic is inescapable and
American policy toward Greece and Turkey.
and no less toward the Palestine question,
has to be considered in the light Of this
SHIFT OF British weight and interest. 1t is true
that we cannot disinterest ourselves in the
fate Of the great tri-continental junction, but
we can guard it alone no more than Britain
can. We cannot contain Soviet expansion
alone, and it is imperative that we should
not be Unanswered into seeming to assume
a responsibility for long which in the end
must be international. This is why the United
States dare not falter in its effort to strength
en- the United Nations and make it the cor
n~erstone of foreign policy.
The British are obliged to cut their losses
and she]ve the less important for the more
important. In choosing The Mediterranean
rather than the, Channel for the first invasion
of Europe. Mr.. Churchill was acting to save
England from the consequences of the posi-
BILE failure Of an assault that could not at
that time be delivered in full force. His sue
~cessors today reduce their Mediterranean
commitments because again they must think
first of the survival of the home islands. The
front line of defense Of these islands is west
ern Europe, and it has been evident ever
since the fighting stopped that the British
Government has been preoccupied as never
before with its relations to its continental
neigibors. The Mediterranean Is no longer as
necessary as it was for the defense of India.
but the Middle East is still the source Of oil
and Oil is as essential to the life OF Britain
as bread. Yet to contain Russia in these
areas is not so crucial a problem to the
British as to prevent the death Or the dom
nation OF their immediate neighbors.
The United Kingdom is first and foremost
a part OF Europe, and anyone who has been
II. ENGLAND recently perceived that the sense
OF THIS mterdependence is fast superseding the
old imperial complex. France had a great
opportunity at the wars end OF assuming the
ieaoeTsnlp OF the liberated nations of the con-
'aieill. But the French were too obssSsed by
oo 1ears. too intent on recovering their place
a. d great power, to speak for Europe as
d "ho!e. England is more and more taking
I'VE ina: role, and rallying France to join
~ as 1of us, it is by support of a reorgan-
.zaeion SO vital to ourselves that we can most
, SaectlVe1E tie our aid to Crneca and Jurkev
nlto a program of reconstruction which will
|.o more than anything we can do by our.
ewes 10 save the West and redress ne lost
balance Of the world. 1