Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1947-12-26
Roosevelt 0verruIed
His Wish for Invasion
In '43, Stimson Says


Secretary of War Stimson, in
his wartime memoirs, ION Ac-
tive Service" writes that If he
or Gen. Marshall had been the
American commander in chief
the invasion of France would
have been launched in 1943," one
year earlier than it actually &C.
CURED.
Would the war have been ended
sooner?" he conjectured. This is
a problem in a dozen unknowns. No
certain answer is possible, and the
matter is here left open"
But Mr.. Stimson declared that
President Roosevelt's decision to
land an Allied force in North Africa
In the fall of 1912 was disapproved
at the time both by Mr.. Stimson and
the War Department general staff.
The first installment Of his biog-
raphy written in collaboration with
McGeorge Bundy Of Harvard Uni
versity, appears in the January is
sue of the Ladies Home Journal.
African Decision a Compromise.
Describing in detail the behind
the-scenes maneuvering that forced
postponement of Operation Bolero
the proposed Normandy landing, IN
favor of Operation Torch, the as
sault on North Africa. Mr.. Stlmson
said:
The Torch decision was the re-
suit of two absolutely definite and
final rulings. one by the British
and the other by the President
Roosevelt.
Mr.. Churchill and his advisers
caegorically refused to accept the
notion of cross-channel 1nva-
sion in 1912. Mr.. Roosevelt cate
gorically insisted that there must
be some operation in 1912. The
only operation that satisfied both
of these conditions was Torch"
But Mr.. Stimson indicated that
the compromise dlspleased both him
and Secretary of State Marshall
then the Army's Chief of Staff.
Considered Strategy Shift.
He became so eXasperated at one
time with British high level objec-
lions to the landing in France
Mr.. Stimson said, that he proposed
to Mr.. Roosevelt that I'VE turn
our backs on them and take up the
war with Japan"
But Mr.. Roosevelt was not real
ly persuaded, and the bluff was
never tried" Mr. Stimson continued
1T would not have worked in any
case, for there was no real tnten-
ton of carrying it out.
"At Casablanca in January, 1913
the British again refused to &C
ahead with any cross Channel op-
Grafton in the coming year, and II
was therefore agreed that the next
great move would be to Sicily"
Mr.. Stimson declared it was moi
until May of 1943 that Mr.. Roosevelt
took a decisive stand and forced
Mr. Churchill to agree to a Nor
mandy landing for 1914.
Churchill Wanted Marshall.
1.-THE Prime Minister finally &C.
cepted this position, although par
of his price was that Gen. Marshal
should be assigned to him for 6
tour Of North Africa-ruefully Mar.
shall remarked that he seemed to b
merely a piece of baggage useful a,
a trading point" :
Mr.. Stimson said he suspected
that his willy English friend" really
hoped thereby to convert Gen. Mar
shall to his view of making the
Mediterranean the scene Of the chiel
Allied effort, but that Gen. Marshall
remained unconvinced.
He added that when he himself
conferred later with Mr.. Churchill
the Prime Minister expressed feal
that even $4,000 Allied troops land.
ing in France might be swept into
the sea by the Germans and spoke
of the disastrous effect of having
the Channel full of corpses Of de.
feated Allies"
Final Cooperation Lauded.
But Mr.. Stimson said that Mr.
Churchill, once the die of eros.
channel invasion was cast, became
as magnanimous in reconciliation
as he had been stubborn and elo'
quent in opposition"
He described as wholly erroneous
the belief by some postwar writers
that the British preferred a Balkan
landing in order to block Soviet
Russia, and praised British cooper
alton.
THE real lesson of World War Il
was not to be found In any revela-
tons of disagreement" he contin.
ued. Franklin Roosevelt ane
Winston Churchill established anc
sustained a wartime collaboration
which grew ever stronger in the
settlement of successive differences
When all the arguments have beer
forgotten, this central fact will re-
main. The two nations fought q
single war, and their quarrels were
the quarrels of brothers"
Would Have Preferred T. r.
Mr.. Stimson said he was certain
the American Army never had 9
finer commander in chief" thar
Mr.. Roosevelt, but thought that
If the late President Theodore
Roosevelt had been in the White
House lin the crisis of l941 T. R
would have done a better and more
clean-cut job than was actually
done"
He deplored the fact Mr.. Roose-
welt did not establish a war cabinet
to advise him as had the British
Prime Minister and concluded:
Franklin Roosevelt as a war
time international leader proved
himself as good as one man could be
but one man was not enough
to keep track of so vast an under
taking
NAVY Chief Killed, ) Injured