The Wilmington morning star., 1947-04-07
Foreign Policy
By VIM. HENRY CHAMBERLAIN

to Greece and Turkey as q means OF checking
totalitarian aggression is sometimes criticized
as inconsistent with a cherished landmark in
our diplomatic history, the Monroe Doctrine.
That the implications of the Truman policy
go far beyond anything contemplated by Mon
roe is obvious. Truman said:
"Totalitarian regimes imposed on free peo-
pies, by direct or indirect aggression, under
mine the foundations of international peace
and hence the security of the United States
1 believe that it must be the policy of
the United States to support free peoples who
are resisting attempted suOjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressure"
No geographical limitation is implied in this
Truman Doctrine" Monroe. on the other
hand, coupled a Hands Off warning to Eu-
ropean powers against attempting Ito extend
their systems to any portion of this hemi-
sphere" with a declaration of American non
intervention in Europe phrased as follows:
"In the wars of the European powers relat-
ing to themselves we have never taken any
part, nor does it compor with our policy to
do so 1t is only when our rights are invaded
or seriously menaced that we resent injuries
or make preparation for our defense Our
policy In regard to Europe is not to inter-
fere in the internal concerns of any of its
powers to consider the government de facto
as the legitimate government for u.s."
One aspect Of the Monroe Doctrine, the
establishment of defense ties with our Latin
American neighbors, has been broadened and
made more specific with the passing of the
lime. Under the Act of Chapultepec, con-
Guided in March, 1945, after a conference be-
tween the United States and all the Latin
American powers except Argentina, any at
tempt either by a non-American state or by an
American state against the integrity or in
volatility of the territory, the sovereignty or
the polical independence of an American
state" is stigmatized as an act OF aggression
against all American states. Any suggestion
of United States hegemony, offensive to the
national pride Of South American states, has
been eliminated in what is essentially a sys-
tenn of collective security for the two Amer
icas.
But the suggestion of complete disinterest
in European affairs, admirably suited to Mon
roe's own time and to the entire nineteenth
century, has not proved feasible under modern
conditions. We have been drawn into two
great wars, neither Of which originated In any
challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. One OF
these wars started in Serbia, the other in
Poland and North ~China-regions which were
far beyond the range Of the Monroe Doctrine.
The world of Monroe's time was one Of in
credibly slow communications by our stand
ards. Obstacles of space and dlstace were
infinitely greater than they are today. The
railway was in its infancy; the %airplane was
barely dreamed Of; an Atlantic crossing re-
uuired weeks and science had not got to work
on the atomic bomb
The Europe to which Monroe flung out his
challenge was a Europe OF five great powers,
Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia,
capable of exercising check and balance on
each other. Europe's wars up to the outbreak
of the First World War might be described as
wars Of limited detectives. we might have
felt emotional sympathy for one side or the
other. But it was Of no concern to American
security whether Austria or italy possessed
|Veni. e, whether Germany or France held title
Ito Ais
Circumstances now are so profoundly oil
ferent that it would be dangerous to assume
that a policy admirably suited to the char
acter of the nineteenth century Will assure
American security in the twentieth. Science
has enormously diminished the protective
| elem ents of space and distance. This worked
in our favor in the last war; but might very
easily operate to our disadvantage II some fu-
t,1re enemy. armed with the resources Of Eu-
|rope and Asia, should launch an offensive
against this hemisphere.
The balance OF power in Europe, something
that half baked moralists have been inclined
to denounce without understanding very clear
lly, is also irrevocably gone for our time. 1t
w w. this balance Of power, this inability of
anv European state to dominate the continent,
that contributed very much to our sense of
security in the nineteenth century. Today it
liz the thought Of what America might do that
is The chief restraining influence on a march
NJ the Red Army to the Mediterranean, Or to
the Atlantic.
A strict constructionist application Of the
Monroe Doctrine In this age would be a
s.heads T win. tails you lose" proposition for
Stain. If we should ostentatiously withdraw
from Europe ana Asia, while throwing the
theoretical fence of the Monroe Doctrine
around South America, the Soviet empire
could and most probably would expand at its
leisure to leviathan proportions. The Soviet
Union is already invading South America
through its local satellite Communist parties
every one a center of anti-United States agita-
ton and propaganda. There is no reason to
suppose that this political warfare would
cease if we should try to %confine our political
interests TO this hemisphere. 1t would rather
-oo~~-e i7'e~~;f'c1 with everv new Soviet sue
cess in forcibIy absorbing another European
or Asiatic country.
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