Evening star., 1947-05-04
Russia Watches Our
MiIitory Progress
Will Take Greater CANDLES If
American Strength Declines
n, Tsoo~ro rsoI,y;,,r r1.o4

By George Fielding Eliot
The attitude of the Soviet delegation
/ at the November meeting of the Big
Four in London win be very largely
determined by Americas military posi-
tion at that time. Soviet stalling at
Moscow was In part due to the fact that
/ the major aspects of American military
| policy are as vet undecided. The realistic.
| power prospecting Russians want to wait
and see what actual strength win sup-
port Americas new foreign policy; or
to put it In another way, what the size
Of the risk factor must be in their
calculations If they decide to oppose
that policy. BY next November they viii
know.
Uppermost In their calculations Of risk
is, of course, our strategic air force. This
is the long range striking arm, the arm
with which we could do serious damage
to Russian vital interests. They have
seen what strategic air power is capable
of in Germany and Japan. They are
aware that they are in no state to
defend themselves against a powerful
and sustained air attack today, whatever
may be the case five or 10 years from
now. But they are thinking less in terms
of actually running the risk of war now
than in terms of gauging American
determination to back up the President
and Secretary Marshall by what is done,
this year, about military appropriations
and IN the line of popular reaction to
such matters as recruiting.
xx*
II, in. this year Of apparent crisis,
Congress cuts our strategic air force,
for example, below the level of safety,
and the American people stand by and
shrug their shoulders, the Russians will
feel much more secure as to what will
happen next year. and the year after,
when perhaps crisis will not be so
apparent and when the long, hard pull
of carrying out an expensive and annoy
ing policy will be taking effect.
They will continue, therefore, to
obstruct and sow confusion. But IT, in
this year, Congress shows understanding
Of the need for military support Of
foreign commitments, and If the Amer
ican people stand firmly behind that--
representatiyes-then in November some
at least Of the compromises which
Generalissimo Stain speaks of may
develop into actuality. For the Russians
have a grudging respect for the words
of the strong.
The state of our long-range air force,
the No. l American military item on
the chart that hangs on the Kremlin
wall, may be used as some criterion Of
what Russians will be thinking next
November, and how they will be acting.
Right now our air force is in bad shape;
1T is just recovering from the effects of
the horribly disorderly demobilization
which followed VI day 1t has barely
20 operational groups of all types "a
group is unit corresponding roughly
to q ground force regiment; 1t includes
three~or four squadrons. with from u
to IL alrplanes in each). Gen. Spaatz
and his air staff, after careful study,
prepared a budget for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1948, which called
for rebuilt strength, at the end of that
year, of 10 groups of all types. OF these,
the long-range striking force would have
included 80 groups-20 of long-range
bombers (B-29 and B-36) and 10 Of
long-range fighters to escort the bomb
ers. This was considered the minimum
force necessary to provide prohibitive
risk factor in the calculations of any
possible aggressor.
The Bureau of the Budget carved a
healthy slice from this proposal. Hence
the budget submitted to Congress will
provide enough money for only IS op-
irrational groups altogether, including
striking force of Is bomber groups
and seven or eight fighter groups. This
Is lower than it should be, but 1t is
perhaps barely enough to command
some degree of respect. Economy
minded Congress will hardly restore the
70-group program; If they did they
would have to restore virtually the whole
air force budget to its original state,
which is too much to hope for But it
| is certainly not too much to expect that
| 1t will not be further reduced. There
| is talk of cut which would mean a
reduction to IS groups (meaning
| striking force of 10 bomber and five
| fighter groups. This is not enough for
sustained operation against any Sc
| rious opponent The result of such a
| cut would be Immediately reflected in
| the Russian attitude around the Coun-
Gil table. And so 1t will be with other
| American military decisions.
| *x
The opinion rests upon the lessons OF
experience. Generalissimo Stain was
commenting on a suggestion that the
capture of Rome would deliver the Vati-
can from German control. He asked
coldly: How many divisions has the
Pope?" Gen. John r. Deane in his
admirable book The Strange Alliance"
notes that Soviet reluctance to admit
China as signatory of the four power
| pact in October, 1943, was due to China's
fortunes being "at their lowest ebb, a
condition not calculated to induce Soviet
| respect" The Russians could scarcely
| conceal their contemptuous delight at
the swift dissolution of our armies at
the end Of the war. Their attitude
toward the British is gagged by Brit
ish weakness and exhaustion. The same
is true Of the French, And as to lesser
powers, it is the Soviet view, repeatedly
expressed, that they ought not to have
any voice at all in the settlement of
important world affairs.
In the months between now and
| November America rofrst daoida a..