Evening star., 1947-12-20

| LOnQOn conference.
The result Of the recent meeting
of the Council of Foreign Ministers
In London was disappointing. I
realize that the many lengthy state
nents and the frequent and funda-
mental disagreements were very
confusing to the general pub
lie. Also, the continuous accu-
sations against the good faith,
the integrity and the purposes of
| the governments of the western
powers, particularly the United
States, necessarily added greatly to
the confusion. This was, as mat
ter of fact. one of the purposes of
these attacks.
I anticipated great difficulty in
reaching comprehensive agree
ment but I did have hope that we
might make three or four funda-
mental decisions which would per-
NIT immediate action by the -Four
Powers to alleviate the situation in
Germany this winter and greatly
improve the prospects for all OF Eu-
rope. That we failed to reach any
such agreements is the greatest dis
appointment.
The United States delegation
went to London with an open mind,
as I had stated we would in Chi
cago, but we went with a strong
determination to bring to an end
the division of Germany which
has existed since the German capt.
ulation. We we're also determined
that any agreement reached at Lon
don should be a genuine workable
agreement, and not one which
would Immediately involve OBJ
struction and Illustration in the
Allied Control Council when it came
to be put into effect in Germany.
Immediate Discussions
I shall review only briefly the
linterminable discussions during the
weeks of debate at London. To us
lit was but a dreary repetition OF
what had been said and resaid at
the Moscow Conference. I shall
endeavor, however, to point out the
main issue on which the confer
ence deadlocked and give you my
estimate of the underlying reasons.
The basic issue, as we saw 1t be-
fore the opening of the London
Conference. was whether or not the
Allies could agree among them
selves to re-unite Germany.
The issue in regard to the Aus
trian treaty was even simpler and
had already emerged clearly at the
Moscow Conference.
| Because the two main issues which
have outlined would be the con-
trolling factors in our discussions,
three of the delegations had agreed
that the Austrian treaty should be
considered first and the economic
principles to govern the treatment
of Germany as an economic whole
should come second. We felt that
this order was logical and necessary
if we were to debate with any pros
pect of success the remaining items
on our agenda. The Soviet dele
CATION held a different view and in
sisted that questions on the prepara-
ton of a German peace treaty
should be given precedence over
the questions regarding immediate
economic unity for Germany.
In order to get the conference
started. it was finally agreed to ac-
cept the Soviet request that the
preparation of German peace
treaty should be item two on the
agenda. AS a result, with the ex-
ception of one day of discussion Of
Austria and the Austrian treaty,
it was not until after 10 days of
meetings that the conference really
reached the heart of the German
question. These first 10 meetings
were devoted to futile and some
what unreal discussion of the mech
anisms for the preparation of an
eventual German peace treaty be-
fore the question of whether or not
there was to be united Germany
had even been considered.
QueSLlOn OF FrOntlcfS.
There was one question, however,
of real substance during this phase
of the discussion which had a direct
application not only to German
peace treaty but also to the i'm
mediate situation in Germany. This
was the question of the present and
future frontiers of the German
state. No serious consideration of
peace treaty could be undertaken
without first considering what was
to be the area of the future German
state. Three delegations had al
ready expressed their agreement
that the area of the Saar should be
separated from Germany and in
tergrated into French economy. Mr..
Molotov refused to commit his gov
ernment on this point.
On this vital matter of frontiers,
three delegations agreed to the
establishment of a frontier COM
mission or commissions to make an
expert study of any proposed
changes from the pre-war from
tiers. MIR. Molotov refused to agree.
1t was impossible for me to recon-
cile his urgent insistence upon the
necessity of expediting the prepara-
ton for German peace treaty with
his categoric refusal to agree to the
appointment of boundary commits
sions which three delegations con-
sidered to be an absolutely essential
first step in any serious preparation
for future German peace settle