Evening star., 1947-04-29
basic purpose--to keep Germany
incapable Of waging war.
AUSTRIAN TREATY.

IncApAble OF WAS1ng war.
AUSTRIAN TREATY.
The negotiations regarding tn
Austrian treaty resulted In agree
sment on all but q few points, bu
these were basic and Of funda
mental Importance. The Sovie
Union favors and the other govern
ments oppose the payment Of rep
arations and the cession Of Ca
rinthia to Yugoslavia.
But the Soviet government at
tached much more Importance to it
demand that the German assets IL
Austria which are to be hers by tn,
terms OF the Potsdam Agreement
should include those assets which
the other three powers consider t,
have been taken from Austria ant
the citizens OF the United Nation
by force or duress by Hitler and hi.
Nazi government following the tax,
ing over Of Austria by military fore.
In March, 1888.
The Soviet government refused t<
consider the word duress, which, ir
the opinion OF the other three pow
ers, would be the critical basis fol
determining what property, that is
business, factories. land. forests, ct
cetera, was truly German property
and not the result Of seizures by
terroristic procedure, intimidation,
fake business acquisition, and so
forth.
The Soviet Union also refusd to
consider any process of mediation
to settle the disputes that are bound
to arise in such circumstances, nor
would they clearly agree to have
such property as they receive as
German assets subject to Austrian
law in the same manner as other
foreign investments are subject to
Austrian law.
The acceptance Of the Soviet po-
sition would mean that such q large
portion of Austrian economy would
be removed from her legal control
that Austrian chances Of surviving
as an independent self-supporting
state would be dubious. She would
in effect be but a puppet state.
All efforts to find a compromise
solution were unavailing. The Unit
ed States, In my opinion, could not
commit itself to a treaty which in
volved such manifest injustices and,
what is equally important, would
create an Austria so weak and help
less as to be the source of great
danger in the future.
In the final session OF the con-
ference, it was agreed to appoint
to meet in Vienna May
IL to reconsider our disagreements,
and to have a committee of ex-
perts examine into the question of
the German assets in Austria. Ger
tainly prompt action on the Aus
trian treaty is necessary to fulfill
our commitment to recognize Aus
tria as free and independent state
and to relieve her from the burdens
Of occupation.
SUMMARY.
Complicated as these issues are.
there runs through them a pattern
rs to the character and control of
Central Europe to be established.
The Foreign Ministers agreed that
their task was to lay the founda-
lions OF central government for
Germany, to bring about the eco
nomic unity of Germany essential
for its own existence as well as for
European recovery. to establish
workable boundaries, and to set up
a guaranteed control through a
four-power treaty. Austria was to
be promptly relieved of occupation
burdens and treated as a liberated
and Independent country.
Agreement was made impossible
at Moscow because, in our view, the
Soviet Union insisted >, upon, pro
posals which would have established
IN Germany a centralized govern
ment, adapted to the seizure of alb
solute control Of a country which
would be doomed economically
through inadequate area and ex-
cessive population, and would be
mortgaged to turn over a large part
Of its production as reparations,
to the Soviet Union. In
another form the same mortgage
upon Austria was claimed by the
Soviet delegation.
such plan, in the opinion of
the United States delegation, not
only involved indefinite American
subsidy, but could result only in a
aeterlorating economic life In Ger
many and Europe and the inevi-
table emergence of dictatorship and
strife.
Freedom Of Information for which
our Government stands inevitably
involves appeals to public opinion.
But at Moscow propaganda appeals