Evening star., 1947-04-29

lment. thus leaving only technical
fdelimitation to gbe considered.
7 The United States Government
recognized the commitment made
| at Ya1ta to give fair compensation
Ito Poland in the west for the terri
tory east Of the Curzon Line in
corporated into the Soviet Union.
But the perpetuation OF the present
temporary line between Germany
and Poland would deprive Germany
of territory which before the war
provided more than a fifth of the
foodstuffs on which the German
population depended.
/ It is clear that in any event Ger
many will be obliged to support
within much restricted boundaries
not only her prewar population but
a considerable number Of Germans
from Eastern Europe. To q certain
extent this situation is unavoidable,
but we must not agree to Its aggra-
vation.
| We do not want Poland to be left
with less resources than she had
before the war. She is entitled to
more. but 1t win not help Poland to
give her frontiers which will prob
ably create difficulties for her in
the future.
| Wherever the frontiers are drawn,
they should not constitute barriers
to trade and commerce upon which
the well-being of Europe is de-
pendent. We must look toward a
future where democratic Poland
and a democratic Germany will be
good neighbors.
TREATY PROCEDURE
There is disagreement regarding
the manner in which the Allied
powers at war with Germany are
to participate In the drafting and
confirmation Of the German peace
treaty.
There are 81 states involved. OF
these, in addition to the four prin-
cipal Allied powers, 18 were directly
Eengaged in the fighting, some, of
course, to a much greater extent
than others.
| 1t is the position of the United
States that all Allied states of war
with Germany should be given an
opportunity to participate to some
degree in the drafting and In the
making of the peace treaty, but we
recognize that there would be very
practical difficulties, If not impos-
sibilities. in attempt to draft G
treaty with 81 nations participating
equally at all stages.
Therefore, the United States Gov
erament has endeavored to secure
agreement on method which in
wolves two different procedures, de-
pending on whether or not the
state concerned actually participate
in the fighting. But all would have
an opportunity to present their
views, and rebut other views, and
all would sit in the peace confer
ence to adopt treaty.
Following paragraph included in
prepared text, but not broadcast:)
1t is difficult TO get the agree
ment Of the countries that have suf-
fered the horrors of German occu-
patton and were involved In heavy
losses in hard fighting to accept
participation in the determination
of the treaty terms by countries who
suffered no losses in men or mate
rial and were remove from the fight-
| ing. The United States, however,
regards 1t as imperative that all the
states who were at war with Ger
many should have some voice in the
settlement imposed on Germany.
FoUR-POWER PACT. =,
The proposal for the four power
pact was advanced by the United
States Government a year ago. 1t
was our hope that the prompt ac-
Iceptance. Of this simple, pact ensur-
ing in advance of the detailed Ger
man peace settlement that the
United States would actively CO.
operate to prevent the rearmament
of Germany would eliminate fears
as to the future and would facilitate
the making of peace suitable to
Europe's present and future needs.
1t was our hope that such a COM
mitment by the United States would
relieve the fear of the other Eu-
ropean powers that the United
States would repeat its actions fol-
lowing the first World War, insist
ing on various terms for the peace
settlement and then Withdrawing
from a position of any responsibility
for their enforcement. It was
thought that the compact OF the
four powers to guarantee the con-
|tinued demilitarization of Germany
would reassure the world that we
we're in complete accord in our in
tention to secure the peace Of Eu-
rope.
However, the Soviet government
met our proposition with series
of amendments which would have
completely changed the character
of the pact, making it in effect a
complicated peace treaty, and in
cluding in the amendments most
of the points regarding the Ger
hAnkA PAobACAAA IOllSCllAIlS
there was, as I have pointed out,
serious disagreement.
I was forced to the conclusion
by this procedure that the Soviet
government either did not desire
such a pact or was following
course calculated to delay any i'm
mediate prospect of its adoption.
Whether or not an agreement can
finally be reached remains to be
seen, but the United States, think,
should adhere to its present posi-
ton and insist that the pact be
kept simple and confined to its one
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