The Wilmington morning star., 1947-04-10
Centralizing Germany
BY JOSEPH e. EVANS

required DIV uQS IOtoQdlIA otAOH AN~J
seem difficult to reconcile with the year and
one-half record of Russia in blocking the ere
alton of such agencies.
The French are usually regarded as the
villains in this piece, but the Sovlets nave
used French intranSlgence as an excuse Tor
avoiding Or postponing, discussion Of the mat,
ter. If the Russians had really wanted central
agencies, they could have joined the Amer.
cans and British and by sheer weight forced
the French to an agreement, or simply ex-
Guided the French zone from consideration.
Economically interdependent as the zones
of erman are, the French zone is nonethe-
less the smallest az per cent Of Germanys
present land area and 10 per cent OF It's popu-
lation and, aside from the Saar basin, econom-
ically the least significant. The estapllsh-
ment Of central agencies for the rest OF Ger
many. leaving the French zone out, admitted
ly is not the most desirable arrangement,
but would be a tremendous step forward.
Establishment Of the agencies as soon as
possible after the Potsdam declaration would
have obviated many, though of course by no
means all, of the difficulties which have pla-
gued Germany since that time. Since this did
not happen, the conclusion is borne out by the
quadripartite discussions since Potsdam that
it was not merely the French, but the Rus
SLAMS who did not want central German agen-
cies.
Their reasons are not difficult to compre-
bend. The central agencies would have bad,
with respect to their particular fields of activi-
ty - finance, trade, industry, etc. - powers
which no zonal military commander
could veto or obstruct. The Russians, it is
now quite clear, had their own special in
tentions, with regard, for example, to finance
and industry, for their own zone. A general
effect of central agencies would have been to
open up the zonee, but the Russians, for rea-
sons both economic and political, needed the
kind of secrecy thew have been MAINTAINING
about their zone.
What, then, would account for Russia's shift
from tacit obstructionism to a fairly con-
crete proposal for the governmental %centrali-
zation of Germany?
For one thing, the game, economically
speaking, is now more or less up. The other
powers and the world know in general, if not
in detail that Russia has been inoUstrlally
stripping her zone far Beyond any reasonable
Interpretation of separations. More important
Iy, Russia has got to come to terms with the
involved questions of economic unity and CEN
trail German agencies, in order to have a
crack at reparations from the current produc-
ton OF tine Western zones and a say in the
control Of the Ruhr.
Another reason is political. The Russians
are anxious to appear to the German in the
best light possible; to come out now for gov
ernrnental Capitalization and German unity is
calculated at once to appeal to the German
people and to place at least a thin coating of
sugar on the bitter pill of Russia's $40 billion
reparations demand.
The Russian press in Berlin has for some
time been preparing for this sort OF develop
ment. The official organ of the Russian-spons-
ored Socialist Unity Party (SED), "Neues
Deutschland" has been most vociferous in
demanding a plebiscite on the structure of the
future German state - whether it should be
highly centralized or a more or less loose fed
GRAFTON of states. In this agitation, the SEQ
was certainly banking on the prevalence of
German Eationalism to make sure that, if
such a plebiscite were held, it would result
in favor of a strong central governmental
structure. Moreover, SEQ support OF this type
Of government meant, by implication, Rus
sian support and Mr.. Molotov's F-oscow posi-
ton would seem to justify the implication.
Through its own political organization and
those others which it influences, the SEQ
has appealed by other means to German ma
tionaliSm. In Leipzig during the fair, the
three parties permitted in the Russian zone
the SEQ, the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party
GDP) staged a huge rally in which they
jointly appealed to the Big Four to restore to
Germany her unity.
This joining of hands was under the aegis
of the Einheitsausschuss der antlfaschistische
Parteien Unity Committee of Anti Fascist
Z al LlC =, a pOllSlSol VIZ pCSoilol ~ llc
Russian zone, by virtue of which the SEQ is
able from time to time to secure the support
of the other parties for SEQ, or Russian,
aims.
Obviously the Russians are not appealing
to the nationalist %longings, which presumably
stir in every German breast, because they
like Germans, or because they like German
nationalism per Sc. They see in such appeals
a chance of lettering the not too favorable
impression they have SO far made on the
Germans, but far more Importantly they see
in the formation of a strong central German
government a greater chance for. communist
domination, or at least considerable influence,
than could possibly exist in the kind of feder-
alton the United States would like to see es-
tablished.
To have that chance, the SEQ must get
itself established in the western zones, and
moves toward that end are under way. Signs
Of the times are the recent formation of
working parties between the SEQ and the
Communist parties in the West, and the very
recent reconnaissance tour which SEQ lead
| ers Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm PECK made
into the western zones.
One would think at first glance that the
), chances of SEQ success, if the party were
established in the western zones, would not
be very great. Its counterpart there, the Com
munist Party RPD) is of negligible proper
tons, and even in the Russian zone the SEQ.
! with every conceivable advantage, polled onlv
5s per cent of the votes last fall. Further
more. in the West, the SEQ would not have
: those advantages on so large a scale, nor
n would it be able to embark on such a cam.
= paign of terror, violence, intimidation. coer-
= cion and bribery as has characterized it's NAL
odorous history in the Russian zone.
Nevertheless. the SED has the ADVANTAGE
of Moscow political training, perhaps best tvp-
flied in behind the-scenes leader Walter lib
RIGHT (whose implacably cold and ruthless
: countenance, staring out from the speakers
platform at Leipzig. was enough to give one
the jitters>. Even in the west, it can reason
ably hope to accomplish much by subterf,1ge
and indirection.
: This is especially true now that the SEQ,