The Wilmington morning star., 1947-12-06
Balance Of Power
Bv WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLAIN

pv WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLAIN
| Molotov and Vishinsky have been trying
to make propaganda play with statement
which was widely attributed to Mr.. Iru-
man when he was senator from MISSOURI,
in the summer of 1941. The occasion was
after Hitler had invaded Russia, but be-
fore America had been lnvolveo III 'he wal
by the attack on Pearl Harbor:
What Mr.. Truman apparently SAID, ac-
cordinp to responsible newspaper reports
which were not denied at the time, Is that
America should support Russia While yer
many was stronger and Germany II Hus.
sia became stronger and that the WORD OF
both the Nazi and the Communist leaders
was worthless. From an American view
noint it is difficult to see anything obJec-
fionable in this statement. We might be in
much more comfortable international Po-
sition today if Mr.. Truman's canny per-
ception that it was not in our interest to
see either the Soviet or the Nazi form OF
totalitarianism completely vi Glorious had
dominated our foreign policy dur ing the
war.
Metternich, Talleyrand, Castlereagh or
any experienced European diplomat OF the
past would have recognized in MIR. Iru-
mans words honely expression OF the
balance of power idea which is as old as
the Peloponnesian War. Ever since nation
states began to exist it has been an in
stinct for those which felt threatened by
| the eIueTSeICe OIL d superior AoICe w pea1ASt
together in protective self-defense.
| The old saying about giving dog bad
name applies to this expression, balance OF
power. In American thinking about foreign
politics, which often confuses naivete with
idealism, phrases like balance of power
frightfully immoral But it has been well
said that power, after all, is what politics
is about
And before condemning the idea of main
| tanning balance OF power we should seri-
ously consider whether there is, at the
tanning peace and order in the world. Ger
tainly it is better to have reasonably ef-
fective balance of power than to create an
unbalance of power, in which a megalo-
maniac dictator may see a prospect of
dominating the whole world by mixture
of military force and subversive propagan-
da. The lessons of our immediate expert
ence speak strongly on this point.
After the end of the First World War
there were seven nations with some pre-
tension to be regarded as great powers.
There were the three main victors of the
war, the United States, Great Britain and
France. Germany, despite defeat and dis
armament, was still strong in trained man.
power and industrial capacity. The Soviet
Union was emerging from the chaos and
weakness of revolution and civil war, for
midable by reason of its militarized econo-
natural resources. Japan and Italy filled
out the list of seven.
For more than decade after Armistice
Day, 1913, fairly satisfactory balance of
power existed. German rearmament was
checked by the superior force of Britain
and France, plus the alliances which
France concluded with Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. The
Soviet Union was unable to pounce on its
weaker neighbors because of the likelihood
that any such move would provoke mill
tant European anti-Communist coalition.
Russia and Japan operated as kind of
mutual check and balance in the Orient,
with the United States, known to favor all
around respect for China's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, in the background.
This balance of power gradually crumbled
as the foreign policies of Japan, Germany
and Italy became more desperate and ad-
ventures and acts of aggression met no eff
fective resistance either from the League
OF Nations or from the independent action
OF countries which wished to oppose violent
changes.
The international picture was completely
changed after the Second World War. Ger
many, Japan and Italy were crushed be-
yond any prospect of speedy revival.
France revealed so much weakness in the
war and SO much internal division after
the war that it can scarcely be considered
major power. Britain was economically
bled white and gravely weakened. This
Leaves the United States face to face with
the Soviet Union over wide area of world
politics.
Between the part of the globe which is
definitely pro-American and the part which
seems firmly within the Soviet orbit there
is a very considerable No Mans Land in
which western and Soviet influences are
struggling for mastery. No new balance of
power has emerged, because the internal
situation IN some countries is fluid and un-
certain.
The hope that the United Nations would
eliminate the necessity for balance of
power has proved sorry delusion. For all
larger effective purposes the United Ma
tlons has been torpedoed by the indiscrimi-
nate use of the Soviet Veto
Confronted with unlimited ambition and
complete intransigence on the Soviet side,
the United States finds itself obliged to
seek national security in one of two
courses. 1t could retreat into hemisphere
isolationism. Or it could attempt to organ
lze friendly blocs of powers, resistant to
Communist pressure and infiltration, in
Europe and in Asia.
OF these courses is far more promising.
geographical isolation that might have
seemed invincible two generations, even
one generation ago, offers little real Sc
curlty IN the atomic age, when there has
also been an enormous development of fifth
column propaganda and techniques. We
should find ourselves caught in an intoler-
able wise, one that would snap many fea-
lures OF our democratic, free enterprise
way OF life like eggshells, if the decision
should go for the Soviet Union and against
US in all, or even a great part of the DO
litical No Mans Land which we see TODAY
In Germany, France and Italy, in China.
Japan and Korea.
That is why we have such stake, not
mere sentimental stake, but stake of
vital, essential national self-interest, in do
ing what is feasible without overstrainine
our own economy to promote recovery in