Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1947-02-02

based upon decisions made from
questionable, incorrect or incom-
plete facts. Too many American
actions have been predicated upon
false or biased assumption. The
facts upon which analyses are made
must be objectively sound.
In order to evaluate the Korean
problem certain historical informa-
ton and recent events must be re-
membered.
Although there was notable de-
cline in the sovereign and cultural
position Of the Hermit Kingdom of
Korea during the latter days of the
18th century, Korea has always oc-
cupied a unique place in the Far
East, particularly following the
Golden Era under the vi dynasty.
which was inaugurated in 1892. For
centuries she served as the buffer
state between the empires of China,
Japan and Russia. However, begin
ming in 1905 with the tacit approval
of the United States, she was under
the economic domination of Japan
who placed her in complete subju-
cation in 1910 as an unwilling part
of the expanding japanese Empire.
Thus, her position as a political
entity was destroyed.
Planned for independence.
Yet, despite all efforts to subju-
gate, the active nature of her re-
sistance was great at home and
abroad. 1t was initiated abroad on
an active continuing basis by DIR.
Syngman Rhee, the able, incorrupti-
BILE Korean democrat. In 1922, to-
gether with other Korea patriots,
DR.. Rhee Che received his doctorate
under Woodrow Wilson at Princeton)
gave this activity permanent form
by the establishment in Washington
of the Korean Commission which is
still fighting for Korean independ-
ence. Later, a provisional govern
ment was organized in China where
Koreans have always been accepted
by Chinese leaders.
In fact, wherever Koreans were
to be found, there was active plan
ming, organization and agitation Of
a constructive type for independ-
Ience. AS many as million fled
to China and Siberia. Lesser num-
bers went to the Hawaiian Islands,
United States and other places
where they could find sanctuary.
Among the constructive decisions
of the Cairo Conference in 1913 was
a pledge that Korea would receive
her independence "in due course"
At the Yalta Conference, the follow
Ing year. the Soviets agreed in prin-
ciple with the United States and
Britain. That there may have been
something less than good faith in
such agreement is suggested by the
Second Moscow Conference deci-
sions in December, 1915. At least,
Soviet Interpretation thereof, in
Guiding the numerous delaying &C
tons and the failure of the Soviet
American meeting in Seoul in May,
1916. provides basis for the charge.
Other evidence includes refusal to
discuss the removal, except on Soviet
terms, of what has been well de-
Iscribed as an iron garrotte" across
Koreas center at the 38th parallel.
Analysis of Soviet action confirms
what Koreans feel strongly-that
the Moscow decisions were designed
to prevent, not bring about, either
Korean liberation or independence
Soviet policy has encouraged strife
within Korea. Possibly this is based
upon the Soviet intention that the
Koreans will lose patience and SO,
exhausted and embittered, begin
open fighting among themselves as
to how to get rid of the "liberators. :"
In the Soviet mind this would prove
to the United Nations that Koreans
are disunited, and in effect incom-
petent "hot heads" who are unable
to solve their own problems-and so
incapable of independence now.
Could Ignite World.
AS a result, liberation from the
japanese has proved to be hollow
victory to Korean patriots who ex-
pected independence, uncompro-
missed by foreign paternalistic atti-
tudes or the power politics of an
international tug-of-war.
If the Korean situation continues
| long as it is today it will explode
like an atomic bomb and ignite all
the world whether we will it or not.
On the other hand, if the Korean
situation is resolved justly aid ex-
peditiously Korea may be expected
to be balance wheel between
communism and free enterprise in
the Far East.
A Korea undivided by a 38th
parallel will be able to combine the
industries of her northern provinces
with the agriculture of her southern
section to form an integrated econ
omy. Korea's domestic political
future, granted noninterference in
a freely elected government, holds
great promise. Her people are
homogeneous. They have good
degree of literacy. The ideas of her
most widely supported leaders are
sound democratically and psyche
logically.
Therefore, whatever may be the
causes of Soviet stubborness and
American hesitancy, it is essential
that corrective action be taken at
high level-if necessary, within
the framework of the United Ma
lions. For example, it is essential
that there be joint evacuation OF
Korea by occupational forces of both