Evening star., 1947-10-22
Man on Horseback :

VA0it VII ulVISVO0SN
Those who see in the sensational political
comeback of General Charles de Gaulle
nothing more than a gratifying rebuff to
the Communists would do well to take q
second look at the returns. For they raise
some questions which may become ex-
tremely serious for us.
This resurgence Of De Gaullist sentiment
in France is significant, Of course. But
from our point of view there well may be
greater significance in the fact that his
return to power was achieved, not at the
expense of the French Communists, but
rather at the expense of those Frenchmen
who have tried to hew to the political
center or bit to the left OF center
To put this another way, the middle-of-
the-roaders in French politics have been
squeezed, out as a controlling political
force. The Popular Republican Movement
(MPR), on the basis of latest returns, polled
only about 10 per cent Of the vote in Sun
days election, and the Socialists only about
Is per cent. The Communists, with some
80 per cent, have not lost any ground, and
the De Gaullists, with combined total of
about 38 per cent, enjoy substantial lead
The balance of the vote was split in
consequentially.
To undertake to explain this is a highly
speculative venture. Yet it needs to be
explained If possible. Certainly, the Com
munists were stupid in staging a political
strike on the eve of the election and in
denouncing the Socialists through the re-
vlved Comintern. But the probability is
that greater responsibility rests with the
middle-roaders directing the government
Afraid to come to grips with the Com
munists because Of the hold the latter have
over French trade unions, and equally
afraid to risk offending the reviving De
Gaulle sentiment, they tried to straddle,
and straddling is politically dangerous in
desperate country.
In any event, we are faced now with the
prospect that France, politically, is going
to be split between extremes of the Right
and the Left. That is going to pose a
difficult question for us-a question which
we must be prepared to resolve, not on
theological considerations, but on consid-
erat1ons OF where our real national inter-
ests lie. As the Marshall plan gets into
operation the French Communists, bar
ring change of heart in Moscow, can be
expected to exert every effort to nullify it..
They may attempt to use their control over
French labor to paralyzen French produc-
tion. And production is vital to the success
Of the Marshall plan. Should the Com
munists resort to this strategy, and if Gen.
eral de Gaulle is at the head of the govern
ment, we can look for the most severe
repressive measures.
In such situation, will Americans be
able to keep their eyes on the main con-
sideration-on the serving of our own ma
tional interests? There already has been
talk-with Communist encouragement-of
De Gaulie's triumph as signalling the re-
turn to France Of the Man on Horseback,
the modern Caesar. Before this thing
works itself out there may be great deal
more of it, and, in fact, De Gaulle may
yet emerge as dictator.
The point for us to grasp is that there
Is certain depressing sense of inevi-
liability about all OF this. France, chaI-
lenged by dictatorship of the Left, has
swung toward dictatorship of the Right,
thereby setting stage upon which any
thing can happen. And since we are
vitality concerned in what does happen, we
had better put our cliches and emotions
in moth balls and try to govern our future
decisions by the hard facts of a hard
case. If De Gaulle comes to power in
France, the basic question, for us, will be
this: Are we willing to back him up, and
to what extent, in event OF decisive. show
down with the French Communists?