Evening star., 1947-10-05

The Chinese envoy and his aide
pointed out that unless effective
support was received, the Marking
government might not survive
They also emphasized the potentia
consequences to the United State!
if the Communists became ths
dominant power in Manchuria ane
Northern China.
Instead of assistance the Chi.
nese received lectures on democracy
and the need for Gen. Chang tt
purge his government and estab.
lish something akin to the Ameri.
can Government. These sermons
were highlighted by the recent press
statement by 1t. Gen. Albert c
Wedemeyer, who was sent by Presi-
dent Truman to investigate condi.
tions in that war-ridden country.
The State Department has fol,
lowed for some time a policy Of
submerging this country's strategic
needs to the theological views o1
those who want to see China 8
democracy in the western sense ol
the word.
This policy appeared logical te
many observers at the time when II
was hoped that the U. S. S. R
would not become actively antago-
nistic to the United States, and
when it was expected that all inter-
national difficulties would be ironed
out by the United Nations.
Under those conditions 1t was
deemed essential that all countries
which relied on American support
should clean up their houses and
adopt as much as possible of west
ern democratic methods in their
political setups.
Gen. Marshall Failed
1t was this idea which prompted
Gen. Marshall, who was sent as
Special Ambassador to China in 1916
to insist on reconciliation between
Gen. Chiang's Kuomintang and the
Communists headed by Gen. Mao
Tst-tung. Those who were familiar
with the Chinese situation warned
our present Secretary of State that
such reconciliation was not possible
so long as the U. S. S. r. failed to
approve. He was told that Gen. Mao
and his lieutenant, Gen. Chou En-lai,
would never agree to a compromise
with Gen. Chang and cease their
military activities without Moscow's
consent.
Gen. Marshall tried the impossible
and failed. Belatedly he discov-
cred that there could be no settle
ment of the Chinese civil war. ex-
cept on such terms as the Com
munists-that Is to say, MOSCOW
desired.
Gen Chang looks at the situation
from the military point of view. He
told the Americans who visited him
that unless his armies could be
strongly supported with war material
from the United States, his chances
of defeating the Communists were
slim. He provided tangible proof
that while Russia was claiming to
maintain neutral attitude in the
civil war, she was sending large
quantities of arms and ammunition,
military instructors and troops
Russian or Japanese-to support her
puppet, Gen. Mao.
These arguments apparently did
not make an impression on the
American investigators" who were
shocked by the corruption and dis
honesty of Kuomintang officials.
Most of them were aware that this
system had prevailed in China for
at least 1000 years and that condi-
tions were as bad in the Communist
camp, except that there were many
more executions and killings than
in the Kuomintang- g-controlled area.
The account was placed on honest
government, rather than on the
strategic importance of Northern
China and Manchuria to the United
States in the event of conflict with
the U. S. S. R.
Gen. Chang has not yet despaired
Of obtaining assistance from Amer,
lea. But while we are fumbling, dis
cussing and analyzing economic and
social conditions in China, Gen.
Chang has told us indirectly that
he may follow Gen. Marshall's sug-
gestion and try to come to some kind
of agreement with the Communists.
Agreement Sought
However, this has not proved pos
sible by direct negotiations or by
American mediation, as 13 months
of effort have proved amply, and
Gen. Chang is considering making
his peace with Gen. Mao through
the medium of the U. S. S. r.
According to reports which are
still unverified officially, emissaries
from Gen. Chang have now con-
tacted Soviet authorities with the
view to bringing about a. cessation
of hostilities between Nanking and
the Communist regime. This would
open the field to further negotia-
tions, providing for the participa-
ton of Communists in the Chinese
government. In fact, this is the
very proposal that the American
Government made in 1945 and 1916.
If Moscow is satisfied that Gen.
Chang is willing to play its own
game, it can order Gen. Mao to ac-
cept whatever compromise the Po-
litbureau considers acceptable to its
interests.
How far these underground ne
gotiations have gone Is impossible
to say. Our Ambassador to China,
DR.. John Leighton Stuart, does not
enjoy the full confidence of the
Nanklng government and does not
y