Evening star., 1947-07-27

but dlSaSSOclated, spectators. FTa1
the complete destruction of German
finance and currency, and it was not
until 1925, more than six years after
the war had ended in Europe, that
creation of the Dawes Committee
and adoption of the Dawes Plan
brought a settlement and the END
of the French occupation.
Today's struggle for economic res
toration of Western Europe is vastly
broader and more intensive than
that which followed World War I
but like its predecessor it revolves
around the Ruhr, with its coal and
it's iron and steel industries.
Vital Sector
The Ruhr is the industrial heart
of Europe and little can be done
toward economic healing until the
question of this district, which COM
prises about $4,000 square kilometers
and four tc five million inhabitants
is settled. In just the same way as
coal and steel are fundamental in
the economic life of the United
States-their supply and price level
affecting every part of American
economy-these commodities in the
Ruhr inevitably determine Western
Europe's health or sickness.
The Ruhr lies in the British zone
of occupation, but the United States
has an interest in it because of the
economic merger of the American
and British zones. The French, al
though maintaining their own occu-
patton zone separate and apart from
the American-British zone-refus-
ing to accept repeated invitations to
make it a tripartite zone-are Wit
ally interested in the Ruhr, first
because they need supplies of its
coal, and second because they fear
and oppose a revitalized German
iron and steel industry which would
compete with French industry and
provide the possible basis for
resurgent, militaristic Germany.
Others Concerned
But these three, with their deep.
seated concern over the future Of
the Ruhr, are not all. Less directly
connected with the Ruhr, but in
f1uencing occupation policy there
are the Russians, who. want some
of its excess steel plant capacity fol
their own use on reparations ac'
count ana hAve been thwarted il
getting it by suspension last yeal
|of dismartlillg of German plants.
In their own small place, the Low
Countries also come into the pic.
ture of German industry-and par
ticularly Ruhr industry-because
they want to buy German industria.
products and resume the lucrative
transshipment business they did fol
Germany in peacetime.
The United States, bearing ter
rifle cost of feeding Germany, de.
sires to restore German productivity
as a means of making her self
supporting. This, 1t is hoped, car
be done by reviving German exports
of industrial products, but hamper
ing any such effort is the Potsdam
limitation of 100000 tons annually
on German steel production.
The United States and Britain
were on the point of signing an
agreement to raise this level of Ger
man steel production to probably
II 900, 900 or 100000 tons annually
but objections raised by the French
abruptly halted the conclusion OF
any such agreement and 1t ap-
parently has been put off for several
months while some means are found
to reassure the French.
Complicated Issue
Connected with the problem OF
steel production is the question OF
the Rdhr coal mines, and the Brit
ish failure to get adequate pro-
duction there. Present output OF
250,0OO tons a day is about half
what the mines produced before
the war.
This problem of coal production
resolves itself into several other
problems, namely food for the
miners. investment capital for more
efficient working of the mines and
political dissatisfaction among the
Ruhr population.
British inability, because of her
own financial straits, to provide
substantial improvements in the
food ration has led her to urge that