The Wilmington morning star., 1947-07-31
How Strong Is Russia?
BY HARRY

--0
BY HARRY SCHWARTZ
Continuing on his own initiative the war
time work in which he was engaged IN WASH
ir gton, Mr.. Schwartz reads and compares
nume1 GUS publications printed in Russia as
well as those bearing on Russia. The infor-
nation in his article is derived from those
scurces.-The Ehitor.)
With a rapidity possible only in dlctatorlal
states, the Soviet counterattack against the
Marshall Plan has begun all over Europe.
Since it is Am erican influence and prestige
in Europe which are the chief targets, it IS
well to take stock of Russian strength and
Weakness.
Miscalculation of Soviet power could be
most expensive for the United States, politi-
cally end economically.
Too little appreciated in this country is the
strength Russia built up in the Urals, Central
Asia. and Siberia from 1941 to 1915. Using
LIE nd-Lease machine tools. machinery evacu-
ated from the Ukraine and other occupied
areas, and new equipment of Soviet manu-
facture, the Russians expanded their indus
trial capacity in the east tremendously. In
1915 total indux rial production was almost
up to that of 1871. although the rich western
territory formerly occupied by the Germans
pIOQCCSo oiiS q SAAoil 1oSNo
once had.
Heavy industry capable o: producing the
materials and machines for war received the
greatest impetus during World War III, as It
had too in the military preparedness pro-
grams Of the Five Year Plans. BY l945, there
fore. heavy industry was already producing
at a rate 10 to % per cent above the pre-War
level. and that production has increased SINCE
We Day. This year Soviet output OF steel,
oo,1 forp, ~ rbipary and m0nV important
types o: capital equipment will equal or ex-
coed the best pre-war levels.
Russia's strength in heavy industry sug-
sests the possibility that the Soviet leaders
may make token export OF tractors and olnef
machinery to their satellites. thus bolsterlng
Communist propaganda that it is economical
lv advantageous for these countries to do as
Russia wishes. ,..-+' a.
Hidden behind the Iron Curtain. however.
are great weaknesses. Deficiencies which can
be overcome only partially by totalltsr1an po-
lice methods. Both in the. areas devastated
by war and those never reached by the Ger
mans. food. clothing and shelter are extreme
ly scarce for tens Of millions.
Much Of Russis's present poverty arises
from the deliberate action of the Moscow
regime. Whole families have to live in a
room or part of a room because the gov
eminent subordhates housing construction to
the building of new factories. dams. and rail-
road lines. People have little in the way OF
clothing. shoes. and other consumer goods be-
cause the Krenl1n planners put most OF their
industrial labor and machinery to the task OF
further expanding heavy industry.
Food conditions during this past year have
been worse for many than they were even
during the war The poor 1916 crop resulted
in lower rations for millions. and large agrl-
cultural areas were reduced to subsisting
upon governmemt-provided famine relief. Yet
the Soviet government had no hesitation in
sending grain to Rumania recently IN order
10 offset heightened American prestige result
ing from this country's food shipments to that
country.
Late last yeatr. Moscow suddenly reversed
itself and announced plans for expanding con-
sumer goods production far more rapidly than
origin lily scheduled. Even the despised profit
motive was called on to stimulate production
by artisans cooperatlves.
To get more production from industrial
workers and farmers, inequalities o. pay
among individuals are being increased, and
piece rate compensation is being introduced
wherever possible. Remove from the collec-
tive farm structure is the old system Of shar-
ing all income equally on the basis OF work
done. Henceforth each collective farmers re-
turn is based primarily l1pon what is yielded
bv the ground he personally tends. the same
factor which determines the income OF the
individual farmer in ''backward' capitalist
countries.
These and other major changes in the Sow
ct regulations testify to a crisis in the Soviet
stete a crisis of individual morale and spirit
when manifests itself despite all the dicta-
torsh;p's power. Soviet concessions have been
relatively small so far, but that they have
been made at all is indicative of the force
behind the peoples yearnings for an easier
life with less sacrifice.
Russia's food outlook appears brighter now
than it hiss for some time. Although reports
of bumper crops should probably be heavily
d scounted, therta can be little doubt this
years harvests will be substantially better
han any O: recent years, most likely the best
since 1941.
After taking care of the vital domestic re-.
q~'iiren,ents, the Soviet regime will probably
have available one or two million tons of
grain it can ship abroad. This may be in
OF Eastern Europe give better harvests this
year than they have SO far under Russ an
onmlhatlon. Countries like Rumania and Hun
gary had to Feed Soviet occupation troops
even when their own people went hungry. If
;nese countries have anything resembling a
1000 surplus from the 1947 crop. this surplus
Will 60 where Moscow wishes it sem.
Adclng in all Russian sources, however. it
IS GEAR MOSCOW will have available for export
from the U.S.S.R. and satellite netions onlv
a small fraction of the IS million tons which
secretary Of Ayr iculture Anderson has esti-
mated as the probable American grain ex-
iForts curing this new crAp year. This amount