Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1947-09-14
By the Associated Press

LONDON, Sept. 13.-The power OF
Winston ChurchillS words, the tides
of the English Channel, and the do
or-die British air fighters proved
insurmountable barriers to Hitler S
intended invasion of England.
These forces against aggression
which tipped the scales even in the
heyday of Nazi strength, received
credit today in a British Admiralty
report based on German naval docu-
ments captured by British and
American intelligence officers during
the war.
The documents, known as the
"Fuehrer Conferences, are minutes
OF staff meetings between Hitler and
the various commanders of the Ger
man forces and concern Operation
Sea Lion"-the invasion of Eng
land. which had been set for August
and September, 1940
On June 18 of that year.. after
the French request for an armis-
tice. Prime Minister Churchill had
dampened Hitlers hopes of speedy
British capitulation by these words
in the House of Commons:
Il expect that the battle of Britain
is about to begin. Upon this battle
depends the survival of Christian
civilization. Hitler knows he
will have to break us in this island
or lose the war.
Let us. therefore, brace ourselves
to our duty, and so bear ourselves
shat if the British commonwealth
-Ald empire lasts for a thousand
YEARS. f.aeif4will still~say, this was
their finest hour"
Raeder Raised Question.
The question of what to do about
England was brought up by the
former commander in chief of the
German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder, now under life sentence as
a war criminal. Hitler. jubilant over
mis- victory in France, paid little at
tention at first. He thought air at
tacks and possible naval blockade
would bring Britain to her knees
In the last days of June, 1910
Readers suggestion for invasion was
taken up by the German supreme
command Hitler agreed a land
ing in England would be possible,
provided air superiority could be
attained and certain other condi-
tons fulfilled.
There followed conference after
conference, with uncertainty leading
the way in numerous inter-service
arguments. AS early as July II,
Raeder himself, aware of British sea
power, saw the difficulties of execu-
ting Sea Lion
Raeder saw the air attacks on
Britain at that time as only pin
pricks' and said an early, concen-
trated attack was necessary to make
an impression on the British people.
The Fuehrer viewed invasion as
"a last resort" Yet he ordered
preparations to continue for an in
vasion any time after August Is.
Only July 16, Hitler issued his direc-
tive for the invasion, since England,
in spite of the hopelesSneSS of her
military position, has so far shown
herself unwilling to come to any
compromise.
Dissension broke out between the
Army, Navy and Air Force leaders
as to their allotted tasks. Raeder,
on July 10, in a memorandum to
the supreme command, said the
Nays part was ''out of all proper
ton to the Nays strength and
bears no relations to the tasks that
are set to the Army and Air Force. "
Army Fought With Navy.
Raeder said the transport routes
lie in a sea the channeD area in
which weather, fog, currents, tides
and the state of the sea present
the greatest difficulties"
Demands on the Army brought a
series of acrimonious disputes with
the Navy on the question of landing
on a broad or narrow 'front.'
On July 81 Raeder conferred with
est date for the operation was Sep
TENDER Is, month later than first
planned Then the date was fixed
for September 20-2l.
German intelligence continued to
give forbidding reports of anti-in-
vasion preparations in England. 1t
overestimated the size of the British
Army. and this worried the German
high command
1t was about this time, the report
continues, that Hitler began to show
his interest in the possibility of at
lacking Russia, and while ordering
preparations for Sea Lion" he
ordered reinforcement of the East
ern Front He began to doubt