Evening star., 1947-09-29
Stars, Men and Atoms I
Nozis, Abreast Of U.S., =
Dropped Atom Research
Lack of Funds. Military Interference
Forced Reich Out of Race in ~

~ Ih0mGs X. Henry
Up to January. ls42. the Germans knew Al
much about atomic bomb development "A was
known In America.
Then. through lack OF funds and military In.
reference. came the turning point In history.
This IL the story Of DR.. W. Heisenberg, direc.
tor OF the Reich's atomic research and one of
the four or five foremost living physicists. He
has just told 1t publicly for the tirst time In
Nature. journal Of the British Association for
the Advancement OF Science
When the war started In 1880 he reveals, Ger.
man physicists knew the status Of atomic re-
search In America and the army already was
interested. From then on until early is42 re-
search in the two countries was on about an
equal status-until Germans made the fatal
mistake Of deciding that production OF an
atomic explosive was too expensive and decided
to devote the funds that were available to de-
velopmsnt Of atomic energy as . prime mover
for rockets.
German Expenditure Lsss.
I'm the United States" DR.. Heisenberg says,
the final decision was taken to 60 for the pro-
duction OF atomic bombs at an outlay which
must have amounted to q considerable fraction
Of the total American war expenditure. In Ger
many an attempt was made to solve the prob
lem Of the prime mover driven by nuclear en-
ergy with an expenditure OF perhaps . thou-
sandth part Of the American.
I'VE have often been asked why Germany
made no attempt to produce atomic bombs. The
simplest answer is that the project could not
have succeeded under German war conditions
1t could not have succeeded on technical
grounds alone; for even in America with Its
much greater resources of scientific men, re-
nd ind riel tial ND rvith
economy undisturbed by enemy action, the
bomb was not ready until after the conclusion Of
the war with Germany.
In particular, a German atomic bomb prof.
ect could not have succeeded because OF the
military situation. In 1912 German industry
was already stretched to the limit, the Ger
man army had suffered serious reverses in
Russia, and enemy air superiority was begin.
ming to make itself felt. The immediate pro-
duction of armaments could be robbed neither
Of personnel nor raw materials, nor could the
enormous plants required have been protected
against air attack.
Early End Of War Was Expected.
'Finally-and this Is q most important fact
the undertaking could not even be initiated
against the psychological background OF the
men responsible for the German war effort.
These men expected an early decision Of the
war; even in ls42, and any major project which
did not promise quick returns was specifically
forbidden. To obtain the necessary support.
the experts would have been obliged to promise
early results, knowing that these promises
could not be kept. Facing this situation. the
physicists did not attempt to advocate with
the supreme command q great industrial effort
for the production Of atomic bombs.
I'm the upshot, German physicists were
spared the decision a. to whether or not they
should aim at producing atomic bombs The
circumstances shaping policy IN the critical
year Of 1s42 guided their work automatically
to- the utilization of atomic energy in prime
movers. The mere possibility Of solving the
problem had been rendered possible By the
discoveries Of the German scientific workers
Hahn and strassmann, 80 We could feel satis-
fed with the hope that the important tech.
nical developments. with peacetine -applca-
ton which must eventually grow out Of their
discovery, could likewise find their beginning
in Germany and In due course bear fruit
there"