Evening star., 1947-06-20

bers-who are, after all, members OF
free association.
5. THE BILL ABOUND6 IN PRO-
VISIONS WHICH WOULD BE
UNDULY BURDENSOME OR AC-I
TUALLY UNWCRKABLE.
"a. The bill would erect an un-
workable administrative structure
flor carrying out the National La
Dor Relations Act. The bill would
establish, In effect, an independent
general counsel and an independent
board. But 1t would place with the
board full responsibility for inves-
tigating and determining election
cases-over 10 per cent OF the pres
cnt case load-and at the same time
would remove from the. board the
authority to direct and control the
personnel engaged in carrying out
this responsibility.
(2). It would invite conflict be-
tween the National Labor Relations
Board and its general counsel, since
the general counsel would decide,
without any right Of appeal by en-
ployerS and employees, whether
charges were to be heard by, the
board, and whether orders of the
board were to be referred to the
court for enforcement. BY virtue OF
this unlimited authority, single
administrative official might usurp
the boards responsibility for estab-
fishing policy under the act.
Special Restrictions Found
Hampering NLRB Activities.
90. It would strait Jacket the
National Labor Relations Boards
operations by a series Of special re-
strictions unknown to any other
quasi judicial agency. After many
years Of study, the Congress adopted
the Administrative Procedures Act
of 1916 to govern the operation Of all
quasi judicial agencies, including
the National Labor Relations Board.
This present bill disregards the Pro-
cedures Act and, in many respects,
is directly contrary to the spirit and
letter Of that act. Simple and time
saving procedures. already estab-
lished and accepted as desirable by
employers and employees. would be
summarily scrapped. The board it
self, denied the power OF delega-
ton, would be required to hear all
jurisdictional disputes over work
tasks. This single duty might re-
quire a major portion Of the boards
time. The review function within
the board, largely OF judicial
character, would be split up and
assigned to separate stats attached
to each board member. This would
lead to extensive and costly dupli-
cation of work and records.
> -. The bill would require or In
vite Government supervised elec-.
tions in an endless variety Of cases.
Questions Of the bargaining unit, OF
representatives, Of union security.
Of bargaining offers, are subject to
election after election, most of them
completely unnecessary. The Ma
tional Labor Relations Board has
had difficulty conducting the num-
ber of elections required under pres
ent law. This bill would greatly
multiply this load. 1t would in ef-
feet impose upon the board a five
year backlog OF election cases, If 1t
handled them at Its present rate.
(5). The bill would introduce
unique handicap. unknown In ordi-
nary law, upon the use of statements
as evidence of unfair labor practices.
An antiunion statement by an en-
ployer. for example. could not be
considered as evidence OF motive,
unless 1t contained an explicit
threat of reprisal or force or prom
ise Of benefit. The bill would make
1t an unfair labor practice to induce
or encourage" certain types OF
strikes and boycotts-and then
would forbid the National Labor
Relations Board to consider as evi-
dence "views, argument or opinion"
by which such a charge could be
proved. <A
(s) The bill would require the
board to determine" jurisdictional
disputes over work tasks, instead Of
using arbitration, the accepted and
traditional method of settling such
disputes. In order to get its case
before the board q union must
indulge in 4 strike or boycott and
wait for some other party to allege
that 1t had violated the law. If the
boards decision should favor the
party thus forced to violate the law
In order that its case might be
heard the board would be without
power over other parties to the dis
pute to whom the award might be
unacceptable.
(D The bill would require the
board to determine which employees
on strike are entitled to reinstate-
ment" and hence would be eligible
to vote in an election held during
strike. This would be an i'm
possible task, since it would require
the board arbitrarily to decide
which, if any, of the employees had
been replaced and therefore should
not be allowed to vote.
6. THE BILL WOULD ESTAB-
LIsH AN INEFFECTIVE AND
DISCRIMINATORY EMERGENCY
PROCEDURE FOR DEALING
WITH MAJOR STRIKES AFFECT
ING THE PUBLIC HEALTH OR
SAFETY.
This procedure would be certain
to do more harm than good, and to
increase rather than diminish wide
spread industrial disturbances. am
convinced that the country would
be in for a bitter disappointment II
these provisions of the bill became
law.
The procedure laid down by the
bill Is elaborate. It's essential fea-
lures are a presidential board of
inquiry, waiting period Of approx
mately 80 days (enforced by in
junction and secret ballot vote
of the workers on the question Of
whether or not to accept their en-
ployer's last offer.
Board Of Inquiry Charged
With Investigating Cases.
At the outset board of inquiry
would be required to investigate the
situation thoroughly, but would be
specifically forbidden to offer its
informed judgment concerning q