Evening star., 1947-09-17

course, Korea SNOulO DeCOIHe Tree
and Independent. This multilateral
pledge was reaff1rmed in the Potsdam
Declaration of July, 1945, and SUBJ
scribed to by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics when it entered
the war against Japan. In Moscow
in December of 1945, the Foreign
Ministers of the USSR, the United
Kingdom and the United States con.
cluded an agreement designed tc
bring about the independence OF
Korea. This agreement was later
adhered to by the government OF
China. 1t provided for the establish
ment of joint United States-USSR
Commission to meet in Korea and
through consultations with Korean
democratic parties and social organ
iZations, to decide on methods for
establishing a provisional Korean
government. The joint commission
was then to consult with that pro-
visional government on methods OF
giving aid and assistance to Korea
any agreement reached being sub
mitted for approval to the four
powers adhering to the Moscow
Agreement.
For about two years the United
States Government has been trying
to reach agreement with the Soviet
government, through the joint COM
mission and otherwise, on methods
of implementing the Moscow agree
ment and thus bringing about the
independence Of Korea. The United
States representatives have insisted
that any settlement of the Korean
problem must in no way infringe
the fundamental democratic right
of freedom of opinion. That is still
the position of my Government
Today the independence of Korea
is no further advanced than it was
two years ago. Korea remains di-
vided at the 38th parallel with
Soviet forces in the industrial north
and United States forces in the agri-
cultural south. There is little or no
exchange of goods or services be-
tween the two zones. Korea's econ
omy is thus crippled.
The Korean people, not former
enemies, but people liberated
from 40 years of japanese oppres-
sion, are still not free This situa-
ton must not be allowed to continue
indefinitely. In an effort to make
progress the United States Govern
ment recently made certain proposals
designed to achieve the purposes of
the Moscow Agreement and re-
quested the powers adhering to that
agreement to join in discussion of
these proposals. China and the
United Kingdom agreed to this pro-
cedure. The Soviet government did
not. Furthermore, the United States
and Soviet delegations to the joint
commission have not been able to
agree on a joint report on the status
of their deliberations. 1t appears
evident that further attempts to
solve the Korean problem by means
Of bilateral negotiations will only
serve to delay the establishment of
an Independent, united Korea.
Problem to Be Presented.
It Is therefore the intention of the
United States Government to pre-
sent the problem of Korean indie
pendence to this session of the Gen.
eral Assembly. Although we shall
be prepared to submit suggestions
as to how the early attainment of
Korean independence might be ef-
fected, we believe that this is a
matter which now requires the i'm
partial Judgment of the other mem
bers. We do not wish to have the
inability of two powers to reach
agreement delay any further the
urgent and rightful claims of the
Korean people to independence.
; For the achievement of interna-
tional security, and the well-beine
OF the peoples of the world, it, is
necessary that the United Nations
press forward on many fronts
Among these the control of atomic
and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion has perhaps the highest prior
tty If we are to remove the specter
Of q war Of annthilation.
The preponderant majority of the
Atomic Energy Commission has
made real progress in spelling out in
detail the functions and powers of
an international control agency
which would provide a framework
for effective atomic energy control.
Two nations, however, have been
unwilling to join the ma ajority in the
conclusions reached. This is a dis
turbing and ominous fact. In deal
ing with the facts presented by the
advent of atomic energy, the ma ajor-
ity has devised a system of control,
which, while it is bold and daring,
is, in our view, essential for security
against atomic warfare. The minor
ity has evidently been unwilling to
face these same facts realistically
The mandate of the General As
sembly remains unfulfilled. Failure
to agree on a system of control
which can provide security against
atomic warfare will inevitably re-
tard the development of the peace
full uses of atomic energy for the
benefits of the peoples of the world
and will accelerate on atomic arma-
ments race.
The initial offer made by the
United States on jung IA, 1916, by
which this country would give up
its present advantage in exchange
for an effective system of control,
has found most gratifying accept
ance by the majority of the nations
on the commission
They have worked earnestly to-
gether to hammer out specific pro-
posals whereby such a system could
be put into effect. All have made
important contributions to the end
product. The majority is convinced
that its proposals provide the only
adequate basis for effective control.
Efforts to Be Continued.
Since the United States realizes
the consequences of failure to at
tain effective international control
we shall continue our efforts in the
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