Evening star., 1947-06-29

cussions in France and Italy.
It is true that talking sternly to
Russia involves certain risk Of
an armed clash. According to most
of our military experts, this risk
to the security of the United States
is less now than 1t will be In the
future, when the Russians may de-
sire to provoke trouble with the
United States.
Bomb Still Our Ace
Our military preparedness Is la
mentable. But the Russians have
not yet reached the height of their
own war preparations, and they
know-just as our strategists know
that at the present time American
war potential can still be mobilized.
Flyers who fought in World War
II could be called quickly to active
duty, and it would not take them
long to resurrect their wartime skill
Moreover. we still possess exclusively
the knoW-how of the atomic bomb,
a secret which the Russians do not
expect to master for a few years
yet.
According to professional military
opinion the Russians are not pre-
pared for any kind of showdown
with the United States right now,
in spite of their great superiority in
trained manpower and their enor-
nous efforts to increase their heavy
war industry.
Those who favor blunt talk in our
relations with Moscow believe that
such a policy does not mean being
offensive to Russia, Or even causing
her loss of face. According to them,
it means merely telling the men in
the Kremlin that we have taken as
much as any country can take, and
that henceforth any move on their
part to infringe on the sovereignty
or territorial integrity of another
country will be resisted by the
United States.
Some Suggestions
There can be no question of. ask
ing Russia to give up the gains
she has made so far. 1t is hardly
conceivable, for instance, that this
Government could ask for restora-
ton or Poland's independence, or
that Marshal Tito be compelled to
hold another election in Yugo-I
slavia, this time in confolmance
with the Yaita agreements.
All that is water over the dam.
But we can ask that there be no
more coups, regardless Of what "neo-I
democratic" quarter they come
from.
We can tell Moscow what every
shepherd and peasant in the Bal
kans knows, that civil wars and
internal struggles are engineered
and ordered from the Kremlin,
We can tell the Russian leaders
that we will brook no further in
reference in the affairs of nations
outside the iron curtain.
We can tell Moscow that We are
eager and anxious to obtain Rus
sia's cooperation, and are also will
ing to go to great lengths to help
her heal her own battle scars, which
are many.
But we should also tell her that
she must desist henceforth from
creating incessant trouble all over
the world.
In the fall of 1885, the British
told Hitler: IF you really want
peace, we are honestly ready to
talk. We are ready to limit arma-
ments drastically, and talk about
your claims in Austria and Czecho-
slovakia and your lost colonies.
What contribution are you ready
to make toward the general security
and peace in Europe?"
There was nothing but vague
answers to this straightforward
approach of the British govern
ment.
In Germany's Position
Similarly We can address our
selves to Prime Minister Stain and
ask him what his actual demands
are and whether he is willing to
work with us and the rest of the
hungry world toward real
peace, not only in Europe but in