Evening star., 1947-06-20

ssdg 9 y
would almost inevitably result In =
vote to reject the employers offer,
since such action amounts to q vote
of confidence by the workers In
their bargaining representatives.
The union would then be reinforced
by dramatic demonstration. under
Government auspices. of its strength
for further negotiations.
After this elaborate procedure the
INDUCTION would then have to be
the parties would be free
to fight out their dispute, and 1t
would be mandatory for the Presi-
dent to transfer the whole problem
to the Congress, even II 1t were not
In session. Thus, major economic
disputes between employers and
their workers over contract terms
might ultimately be thrown into the
political arena for disposition. One
could scarcely devise less effective
method for discouraging critical
strikes.
This entire procedure is based
upon the same erroneous assump-
tions as those which underlay the
strike-yote provision Of the War
Labor Disputes Act, namely, that
strikes are called in haste as the
result OF inf1amed passions. and that
union leaders do not represent the
wishes Of the workers. We have
learned by experience. however. that
strikes In the basic industries are
not called in haste, but only after
long periods of negotiation and seri-
GUS deliberation; and that In the
secret ballot election the workers
almost always vote TO support their
leaders.
Furthermore, a fundamental in
equity runs through these proyi-
sions. The bill provides for injunc-
tions to prohibit workers from strik-
ing, even against terms dictated by
employers after contracts have ex-
pired. There is no provision assur-
ing the protection of the rights OF
the employees during the period they
are deprived Of the right to protect
themselves by economic action,
In summary, I find that the So
called emergency procedure" would
be ineffective. 1t would provide for
clumsy and cumbersome Govern
ment intervention; 1t would au-
thorize inequitable injunctions; and
1t would probably culminate in
public confession Of failure. I can
not conceive that this procedure
would aid In the settlement Of dis
putes.
7. THE BILL WOULD DIscRIM-
MATE AGAINST employees.
%. It would impose discrimina-
tory penalties upon employers and
employees for the same offense, that
of violating the requirement that
existing agreements be maintained
for 60 days without strike or lock-
out while q new agreement is being
negotiated. Employers could only
be required to restore the previous
Of employment, but en-
ployes could be summarily dismissed
by the employer.
Board Would Have to Seek
Temporary Court Order.
"a. The bill would require the
board to seek temporary restrain
ing order when labor organizations
had been charged with boycotts or
certain kinds of jurisdictional
strikes. It would invite employers
to find any pretext for arguing that
"an object" of the unions action
was one OF these practices, even
Though the primary object was fully
legitimate. Moreover, since these
cases would be taken directly into
the courts, they necessarily would
be settled by the judiciary before
the National Labor Relations Board
had a chance to decide the issue.
This would thwart the entire pur-
pose Of the National Labor Relations
Act in establishing the board, which
purpose was to confer on the board,
rather than the courts, the power to
decide complex questions Of fact In
a special field requiring expert
This provision Of the
bill Is clearly a backward step to-
ward the old abuses OF the labor in
junction. No similar provision d.
rected against employers can be
found in the bill.
(3) The bill would also require
the board to give priority in investi-
eating charges of certain kinds Of
unfair labor practices against
unions, even though such unfair
labor practices might have been
provoked by those OF the employer
Thus the bill discriminates. In this
regard, in the relief available to en-
ployers and unions.
a. 1t would impose on labor or
ganizations, but not on employers,
burdensome reporting requirements
which must be met before any rights
would be available under the act.
80 In weakening the projections
afforded to the right to organize,
contrary to the basic purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act, the
bill would injure smaller unions far
more than larger ones. Those least
able to protect themselves would be
the principal victims of the bill.
8. THE BILL WOULD DIsRE-
GARD IN IMPORTANT RE
SPECTS THE UNANIMOUS CON-
vICTIONS OF EMPLOYER AND
LABOR REPRESENTATIVES AT
THE NATIONAL LABOR MAN
AGEMENT G ONFE r EN- c E IN
1945.
%. One of the strongest convic-
tions expressed during the confer.
ence was that the Government
should withdraw from the collective
bargaining process, now that the
war emergency is over, and leave
the determination of working condi-
tons to the free agreement Of the
parties. This bill proceeds In ex-
actly the opposite direction. In
numerous ways the bill would un-
necessarily intrude the Government
into the process of reaching free de-