Evening star., 1947-03-30
The Dilemma Raised
By German Problem
People Must Feed Selves Without
Paving Way for New Hitler
Bg GEORGE Fielding Eliot.

faV1nG w ay Tor new Hitler
By George Fielding Eliot.
Are we in danger of rebuilding Ger
man military power and thus providing
opportunity for new Hitler?
Judging from some press comment
and individual remarks, there seems
to be some anxiety in the country on
this point. 1t may, therefore, be useful
to examine the basic objectives of our
German policy, which is now pretty
we'll defined.
These objectives are:
l. To enable the German people to
earn their living, and to contribute
within their capacity to the rebuilding
of the general economy of Europe.
2. To prevent their using their re-
covery to endanger their neighbors, or
the peace of the world.
3. To prevent Germany from becom-
ing the instrument and ally of Soviet
aggression.
4. To encourage and guide the Ger
man people in the acquisition, by ex-
perience, of that sense of individual
political responsibility which they have
never previously known, and upon
which alone can any future German
government be founded which will be
an acceptable. member of the COM
munity of nations.
It will be observed that the first and
fourth of these objectives are positive
hill NJ
third are negative and short range.
They are interdependent.
X
To discuss these objectives in greater
detail:
The first, or economic, objective Is
forced upon us by stern necessity. It
Is perfectly clear that the British tax
payer cannot, and the American tax
payer will not, continue much longer
to support the German population, or
the population of the Anglo American
zones, in idleness and misery. Nor is
it conceivable that we could maintain
an army of occupation and continue
to accept political responsibility in
country whose population we were per-
mitting to starve to death. Therefore.
We are faced with perfectly clear
alternative: Either to withdraw Alto
gether, in which case either the Rus
slams will move in or a new German
dictator will appear and take over, or
to take the necessary steps to revive
the German economy on the only practi-
cal basis which will enable the German
people to earn their bread-that is by
manufacturing for export. We have
chosen the second course as the first
would be destructive of the whole pur-
pose of the war, and of all hopes of q
secure peace.
But having chosen this course, we i'm
mediately find ourselves confronted with
the necessity Of preventing the German
people from using their recovery to
build up new German military threat.
This, in the American view, can be met
for the immediate future by keeping
effective Allied control over the revival
Of German economy-which means in
spection where needed, and a voice in
major decisions, supported by some
measure of military force. 1t is for this
purpose that we propose forty-year
treaty between the four occupying pow
ers, pledging all four to stay on the Job
in Germany for at least that period
Of time. With special reference to the
United States, such a treaty Is essential
because in the absence of such specific
pledge the whole policy would be at the
mercy Of future domestic political vacil-
lations born of mistaken ideas of econ
omy or sheer WEAKNESS with distant re-
sporlsibilities.
However, a forty-year treaty is not
enough unless we use that forty years
to build up and re-educate the German
people so that when the forty years are
ended, they will be safe neighbors. This
means not only some supervision of what
they do during the forty years. 1t also
has direct relation to their form of
Government. 1t is one of the major
reasons why the American policy favors
federal form of government, with only
absolutely essential powers delegated to
the central government by the states,
and with all such matters as police,
justice, education and public welfare
firmly reserved to State control. Under
such system 1t would be far more
difficult for any authoritarian movement
to gain control Of all Germany, whether
Of local or external origin, and it would
permit German education in political
responsibility to advance in easier stages.
1t would strike directly at the author1-
tartan concept Of government, which Is
the only concept that most Germans
have ever known. 1t would permit Ger
man children to grow up in a wholly
different political atmosphere to that
Of any previous generation of German
children. Similar considerations apply
to any nationwide association of trades
unions, to which we are likewise opposed
at least for the present.
Therefore the elements of our German
policy, serving our stated objectives may
be listed as follows:
l. Aided and controlled revival Of
German economy, looking to self-sup-
port in period Of three years.
2. No German armed forces at all,
with defense assured by sharply reduced
Allied contingents, supported by .
fortyyear four-power treaty.
3. A federal form of government, with
only absolutely essential powers dele
gated by the states to the central gov
eminent, which originally would consist
Of nothing more than the heads of the
several state governments sitting as q
federal council or h,IndeSrat