The Wilmington morning star., 1947-03-26

an expanding power. We believe
it must be allowed to expand ne
farther. We believe, On the con.
trary, that there can be no peace
until it contracts.
Our immediate object is to con.
tain and then to reduce the ares
Of Soviet military power. Com.
munist parties and the Com.
munist fifth columns will continue
to exist in most countries. But as
a practical matter we should dis.
tinguish between Communism
supported by the presence Of the
Red Army and Communism
which, though it be inspired, di.
rected, nd even financed from
Moscow, is not under the aegis
Of the Red Army.
In Turkey the Soviet claims at
the Dardanelles and in the east
tern provinces would, if conceded,
bring Turkey under the domino
ton Of the Red Army. These
claims, we have decided to op-
pose. We are doing this by send
ing an American naval task force
to Turkish waters, a d we are
proposing lso to subsidize the
Turkish Army. Whether the mill
tary subsidy is necessary and
wise is debatable, so it seems to
me.
The question is whether the
show of American force would
not achieve u object, without
keeping the Turks over-mobilized
indefinitely, if we informed tn e
Soviet government frankly that
we mean to guaranty the teri
torial integrity and independence
Of Turkey, and that we intend to
continue this special guaranty
until a full settlement of Turkish.
Soviet differences had been nego-
tiated.
In Greece there is pressure
In Greece there is pressure
from the Soviet satellites in the
balkans which, if successful,
would mean the loss Of Macedonia
and the d i S m m b e r m e mt OF
Greece. We should serve notice III
Belgrade and Sofia and in Mos
cow that any attempt to take ad-
vantage of the weakness OF
Greece will be an unfriendly act.
and that the seizure OF power in
Greece by a Greek ito would be
followed by military measures,
such as blockade and the
severance Of the Peloponnesus
and the Greek Islands from the
control of such a Greek govern
ment.
Within CHE framework Of these
strong guarantees, we should then
have liberty Of action to insist
that the Greek civil strife be set
tied by political means and not
by civil war. Having taken a bold
stand internationally, we d
proceed with great caution before
we entangled ourselves as partl-
sans in the Greek Civil War.
In Central Europe our object is
to reduce the area Of Soviet mill
tary power. That means the evac-
uation Of Austria, Hungary, Ro-
mania by the Red Army. After
that III e position of the Commu-
mist parties will not be artificially
strong. They will still be strong,
but not nearly so strong as If the
Red Army garrisons we're there.
This will not produce "de'
in astern Europe:
That may take quite a while. But
it will greatly reduce the direct
:. .essure of Soviet imperialism.
That is not the whole loaf. But
it is a good big bite Of bread
II Germany our object is to
obtain a German political system
which will prevent Germany rom
becoming again the greatest
power on the Continent. If it does
become that, it will conspire Win
the West against tn e East. for
that reason we must oppose Mr.
Molotov's proposals for the re-
vival Of a centrally governed Ger
many. Only a genuinely de-
centralized Germany cannot be
d Dominated by Russia or by
United States, Or by any German
national party. That is why we
must insist upon decentralization.
Once this is admitted the eco
nomic arrangements can be neso-
tiated. For money matters are
not fighting matters.
These are definite detectives.
A guaranty to Turkey until a
treaty is ratified covering al
soviet Turkish disputes. A guar
antv to Greece against dismem-
in Macedonia. A direct
warning to the Balkans, to MOS
COW. and to the Greek Coi1illlu'
nists that the seizure of power in
Creece will evoke military
co,,nter-measures. The evacuation
the Eastern European countries
hv the Red Army. A German con-
stit,,tion which distributes Ger
sovereignty among the Ger
states.
Then a negotiation for the eco
nomic reconstruction Of Europe
As a whole and Of the devastated
regions Of Russia.
These are proximate and def
mite objectives, difficult to realize
but not unrealizable. They would
constitute a good working Aneri-