Evening star., 1947-10-15

the policy of our Government had
changed"
Message to Truman.
On September 18, 1916, MIR. Byrnes
sent President Truman a message
In the following words:
IF 1t is not possible for you, for
any reason, to keep Mr.. Wallace, as
a member OF your cabinet, from
speaking on foreign affairs, it would
be grave mistake from every point
OF view for me to continue in Office,
even temporarily. Therefore, If 1t
is not completely clear in your own
mind that Mr.. Wallace should be
asked to refrain from criticizing the
foreign policy of the United States
while he is member of your cabi-
net, I must ask you to accept my
resignation Immediately"
The following day. Mr.. Byrnes dis
closes, he and President Truman en-
gagged in teletype conversation on
the Wallace matter. in the course of
which he told Mr.. Truman:
THE position of the delegation
in this particular conference is not
restored by Mr.. Wallace's agreement
not to speak during this conference
when he remains a member of your
official family and indicates in
effect that he will renew his criti-
cism of your present foreign policy
as soon as the conference is over
We are promised only a moratorium
from criticism of your policies by
your own Administration"
>Truman's Reply Not Given.
Mr.. Byrnes does not include the
Presidents statements, either in re-
ply to his threat to resign or in the
teletype conversation.
The former Secretary shows how
American Russian relations had
begun to deteriorate before Presi-
dent Roosevelt's death, and that
Mr.. Roosevelt and Prime Min
lister Stain engaged in sew
eral skirmishes by cable. One
Of these concerned the applica-
ton Of the Yalta Declaration of
Liberated Europe to Poland and
Romania. Another dealt with a pro-
posed allied meeting with high Ger
man staff officers In Bern, switzer-
land, to. negotiate the surrender OF
the German army in Northern italy
In regard to the Bern meeting,
the former secretary writes, Prime
Minister Stain charged that the
Germans were going to open up the
front to permit the American Army
to advance, while shifting the main
weight Of their divisions against
the Russians. In return for this
military concession. Mr.. Stain said
the United States and Britain had
agreed to easier peace terms for Ger
many.
Mr.. Roosevelt's reply, Mr.. Byrnes
says, was dignified until he reached
the last paragraph. There, Mr.
Byrnes adds. "He deeply resented
he said. the vile Misrepresentation
OF Stalin's informers which reflected
upon the President of the United
States and his trusted subordinates
and indicated a belief that Stains
informants wished to destroy the
friendly relations between the two
countries"
The former Secretary points out
that these messages dispose of the
legend that our relations with the
Soviet Union began to deteriorate
only after his ((President Roose-
yelt's) DEATH"
Roosevelt Urged Firmness.
The sequel to the Bern incident
was an apologetic message from
Prime Minister Stain and Mr.
Roosevelt's advice to Prime Minister
Churchill to minimize Soviet prob
lens" However. Mr. Roosevelt said
in his message to Mr.. Churchill an
hour before the Presidents death
I'VE must be firm"
Mr.. Byrnes devotes some discus
sion to the Morgenthau plan and his
refusal to become high commissions,
OF the United States in Germany
because of the adoption of that plan
at the Quebec Conference. He stood
with Secretary of State Hull ano
Secretary of War Stimson against
peace of vengeance.
1T is difficult to understand how
Mr.. Churchill approved the memo
randum of the Morgenthau plan,'
Mr.. Byrnes writes. Certainly, later
at Yalta, he deplored a peace that
smacked of vengeance. - It Is
equally difficult to understand Pres
ident Roosevelt's attitude"
Mr.. Roosevelt later admitted that
his agreement to the particula,
language of the Quebec agreement
must have been given without
much thought"
Conflict With Leahy.
Mr.. Byrnes' brushes with admin.
istration members were not limited
| tn Mr. Wallace fpr ho 1yae r1iraef1,