Evening star., 1947-09-14
Pottons Sd Army Hurried Up and Then Waited

steadily fell back, but there was no
mass collapse.
This resistance was merely crust.
1t had no depth. There we're no
effective reserves behind it. Nothing
out the Siegfried Line.
The Germans were able to main
tain their battered crust and avert
complete rout for one reason only
SHAEF.
It's insistence on forcing Sd
Army to fight literally with one arm
tied behind it made it possible for
the defeated enemy to hold the
German border.
Topside Refused
Had the full weight of Sd
Army, spread out paper-thin over a
475-mile embattled zone, been
thrown against the enemy crust, it
would have crumpled like an egg
shell, and the Siegfried Line and
the Rhine would have been preached
in 80 days.
The Germans admitted this later
And Bradley and Patton urged and
pleaded that it be done, but top
side refused.
1t was this SHAEF obduracy that
led directly to the tragic and costly
Battle of the Bulge and that en-
abled the Nazis to continue the
war until the following May.
September opened with Sd
Army short of practically every
thing.
1t lacked gas, rations. blankets,
winter clothing and troops.
Patton again was summoned to
Chartres, on September q There
he found Eisenhower, Bradley and
Hodges.
Eisenhower outlined the new Of
fensive. 1t was Montgomery's plan.
Eisenhower justified this on the
ground that Germany could be de-
feated by an all-out assault.
Patton challenged his view. He
declared this would not be neces-
sary if the attack were made in
the MetZ-Nancy area.
AS evidence of the enemy's weak
ness, Patton cited the fact that
the 18th Cavalry squadron had
entered Metz the previous day and
had spent an unmolested night on
the Cathedral square.
(The squadron was compelled to
withdraw when lack of gas pre-
vented supporting units from ad-
vancing to clear the city. Several
months later this great prize was
recaptllred by Sd Army, at a
cost of hundreds of casualties.
A Nebulous Victory
Eisenhower finally agreed to per-
NIT Sd Army to continue ad-
vancing to establish bridgeheads
across the Moselle.
1t was nebulous victory for
Patton. But it was better than
nothing. He had authority to ad-
vance, and that was the important
thing because he had an ace
secreted up his sleeve-a little secret
he carefully had not divulged to
Eisenhower. XII Corps had cap
tured 100000 gallons of German
aviation gas.
And in the line, the fighting units
punched on toward the Moselle.
But the shortage of gas and am
munition was making a big differ
ence. The decisive follow through
was missing. Penetrations were
scored, but there were no break
throughs. Lucky was hobbled and
unable to exploit promptly and
powerfully. 1t was heart-rending,
but tanks and guns can't roll with
out gas.
At this time. practically all ar
tillery units were immobilized be-
cause of lack of gas.
The enemy, fighting desperately to
stave off a major break through
took the utmost advantage of this
situation. He gave ground under
pressure but bounded back when 1t
was not followed up.
Patton repeatedly protested the
uselessness of the costly Brest siege.
Bradley Sympathetic
Bradley agreed but was power
less. SHAEF insisted on the opera
ton.
After it was captured, at heavy
cost In lives and money, Brest was
never used as supply port.
After repeated attacks, the in
domitable 80th finally clawed across
tho MoSe1le IN September T That