Evening star., 1946-07-21

trative responsibilities in their COM
mands the fact that they had count
less and manifold duties in their re-
spective positions as commander in
chief Of the Pacific Fleet and COM
manding general of the Hawaiian
Department. additionally, Admiral
Kimmel has referred to the extra
ordinarily competent staff which he
had in Hawaii. The most funda-
mental responsibility that both
commanders had under the circum-
stances, however, was to make GER
tain beyond any reasonable doubt
that there was an integrated and
co-ordinated employment of defen-
sive facilities consistent with the
principle of command by mutual CO.
operation. No excuse or explanation
can justify or temper the failure to
discharge this responsibility which
superseded and surpassed all others
%. Superiors must at all times keep
their subordinates adequately in
formed and, conversely, subordi-
mates should keep their su.
periors informed.
In Washington, Admiral Wilkin-
son, director Of naval intelligence
anG Capt. McCollum. chief of the
Far Eastern section of that division
were not adequately and currently
informed as to the nature of the
dispatches being sent to our out
posts emanating from the War Plans
Division. Subordinate officials ir
both the War and Navy Depart
ments failed to appreciate the i'm.
portance and necessity of getting tt
both Gen. Marshall and Admira,
Stark the first 13 parts of the JAP
anese 14-part memorandum immed
ately on the evening of December
Ie. Col. French did not inform the
Chief of Staff that he had beer
unable to raise the Army radio ir
Hawaii on the morning of Decem-
Der 7.
In Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel failed
to insure that Admiral Bellinger
who was responsible for Navy patrol
planes, knew of the war warning
of November ~. Admiral Newton
as previously pointed out, was per-
mitted to leave Pearl Harbor with
task force completely oblivious oi
any OF the warning messages. Gen
Short, constituting the caution to dis.
seminate the information in the
warning Of November q to mini.
mum essential officers" in a too.
narrow manner, failed to inform thu
essential and necessary officers o1
his command of the acute situation
in order that the proper alert.
ness might pervade the Hawaiian
department.
"a. The administrative organization
Of any establishment must bt
designed to locate failures and
TO assess responsibility.
The committee has been very
much concerned about the fact that
there was no way m which it coulo
be determined definitely that any
individual saw particular message
among the Magic materials. II
does not appear that any record
system was established for initiating
the messages or otherwise fixing
responsibility. The system existing
left subordinate officers charged
with the duty Of disseminating the
Magic at the complete mercy OF
superior officers with respect to any
question as to whether a particula,
message had been delivered to OF
seen by them.
rs. In a well-balanced organization
- there Is close correlation of re.
sponsibility and authority.
Witnesses have testified rather
fully as to what their responsible
ties were, both in Washington ane
at Hawaii. However, it does moi
appear that any of them, except
the highest ranking officers, pos,
sessed any real authority to act
III order decisively to discharg,
their responsibilities 1t cannot b,
presumed that it will be possible tt
meet the exigencies of an emergenc!
if the officer charged with the dut.
of acting at the time the emer
gency arises does not possess th
necessary authority to follow
through on the situation. Their,
should be a close correlation be
tween responsibility and authority
to vest a man with responsibilit.
with no corresponding authority i
an unfair, ineffective, and unsatis
factory arrangement.
Pearl Hurbor