Evening star., 1946-07-21
Unity Of Command,
Stronger Intelligence
Urqed for Future
Conclusions OF majority and
minority members on Pages A-6
and All
By J. A. O'Leorv

solved from blame in the ma
jority report of the Congression-
al Pearl Harbor Committee last
night, while a minority placed
part of the responsibility on him
and other high Washington Off
cials for the Hawaiian disaster.
The majority report, signed by
eight members, found no evidence to
support charges that Mr.. Roosevelt
or his aides ''tricked, provoked, in
cited, cajoled or coerced" Japan into
attacking. On the contrary, they
held that high Washington officials
in 1941 discharged their RESPONSE
bilities with distinction, ability and
foresight"
The minority findings. filed by
Republican Senators Ferguson of
Michigan and Brewster of Maine,
listed Mr.. Roosevelt among six
Washington officials who, they as
serted, failed to perform RESPONSE
bilities essential to the defense of
Pearl Harbor."
Unity of Command Urged.
Unity of command at all outposts
and stronger. unified Army-Navy
intelligence are the chief recon-
mendations of the majority for pre-
venting such a surprise attack in the
future.
The majority report divided the
blame for the surprise attack be-
tween Army and Navy officers in
Hawaii and Washington but con-
fined the Washington criticism to
the Intelligence and War Plans Di-
visions of the War and Navy De-
partments. No criticism was direct
ed at Gen. George C. Marshall, for
mer Chief of Staff, or Admiral Har-
old R. Stark, former Chief of Naval
Operations.
The minority likewise divided the
blame between Hawaii and Wash
ington, but held that:
The failure to perform the re-
sponsibilities indispensably essen
tial to the defense of Pearl Harbor
rests upon the following civil and
military authorities:
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President |
of the United States and Com
mander in Chief of the Army and
Navy: Henry L. Stimson former) |
Secretary OF War; Frank Knox Qate) |
Secretary of the Navy; George c. |
Marshall, general former), Chief |
of Staff; Harold R. Stark, admiral
fformer), Chief of Naval Operations; |
Leonard T. Gerow, major general, /
Assistant Chief of Staff of War
Plans Division"
Avoids Criticism of Hull.
The minority found that the fall |
ure to perform responsibilities in
Hawaii rests upon Maj. Gen. Walter
c. Short and Admiral Husband E. |
Kimmel, who were the Army and
Navy commanders there on Decem- !
ber 7, 1941. and now retired.
The minority avoided any direct
criticism of Cordell Hull. of whom
they said: Secretary of State Cor
dell Hull, who was at the center of
japanese American negotiations,
bears grave responsibility for the
diplomatic conditions leading up to
the eventuality of Pearl Harbor, but
he had no duties as relevant link
in the military chain of responsible
ity stemming from the Commander
in Chief to the commanders at Ha-
waii for the defense at Pearl Harbor.
For this reason and because the dip
lomatic phase was not completely
explored. We offer no conclusions in
his case
The majority defended the han
ding of diplomatic policies in 1941
and called attention to Mr.. Hull's |
timely and forceful manner of
keeping the military authorities in
formed.
The eight signers of the ma ajority |
report were: Senator Barkley of |
Kentucky, chairman, and Senators
George Of Georgia and Lucas of
Illinois; Representatives Cooper of
Tennessee, Clark of North Carolina
and Murphy of Pennsylvania, all
Democrats. and Representatives
Geafhaft OF California and Keefe of I
Wisconsin, Republicans.
Keefe Writes Separate Opinion.
While Mr. Keefe signed the ma
1ority report, explaining he found
himself in agreement with "most'>
of the conclusions, he also wrote a
separate opinion, protesting that
the majority had dealt too lightly
with the Washington end in assess
Ing responsibility.
In this, the eighth investigation
into the Pearl Harbor attack, the
lawmakers did not confine them
selves to post-mortems, but looked
ahead to see what could be done to
prevent any other American OUTPOST
from being caught by surprise again.
To this end, the majority report
asks the War and Navy DEPART
ments to give serious consideration
to Is suggestions for improving the
procedure by which officers at vari-
Gus levels in the Army and NAVY
deal with each other.
These Is recommendations are
h2 2Snd r,NrfinrSc of |