The Wilmington morning star., 1946-07-01
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LIPPMANN
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The Russians will be worrying
themselves needlessly if they worry
about that, much like a man who
could not sleep for fear he might
be robbed of the crown jewels if
he had the crown jewels.
For the real test of the bomb, so
far as it bears upon the military
position of the great powers, will
not be made at Bikini. 1t has al
ready been made at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. There it was used against
densely populated cities, and there
it was proved-what nothing that
may happen at Bikini can possibly
disprove-that the atomic bomb is
a weapon of mass destruction
against which there is no known,
and as yet no theoretically con-
ceivable, defense. For no nation
can hope to intercept every bomb
in a hail Of bombs launched with
out warning against its many vital
centers. Zen if intercepting devices
can be made, the installations
would have to be Intimately elabo-
rate to guard the whole sky over a
whole country.
So if the Bikini bomb is a dud, or
if it does not do much damage, that
will not disprove anything that the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs
have proved once and for all.
Therefore, so far as Soviet Amer
lean relations are concerned, the
Bikini test will be irrelevant as
long as the Russians have no navy
which we could bomb and no bomb
with which they could bomb our
navy.
We must be on guard, it seems
to me, not to mislead ourselves by
this test. There is considerable
danger that we may do just that,
particularly if the bomb does
spectacular damage to the vessels
anchored at Bikini. The danger is
that American public opinion and
Congressional opinion will, there
after. underestimate the continuing
Importance of the Navy and will
overestimate the military value OF
the atomic bomb.
At Bikini we have set up another
Pearl Harbor. We have concentrat-
ed a fleet of warships, and we are
going to drop a bomb in the midst
of them. What can this prove about
the value of a navy? 1t can prove
that an unprotected concentration
of ships can be sunk, and that,
therefore, in an age OF atomic Wea-
pons naval ships must not be con-
~centrated, and that the well-dis-
persed ships must be able to repair
to many dispersed bases where the
installations are underground and
there are specially constructed
shelters.
That sort of thing is immensely
important to us as a naval power.
But the one conclusion we must not
lump to - even if every ship at
Bikini goes up in smoke 1T that
this proves that naval vessels are
not vitality important to the United
States. =.
For even if the atomic. bomb
makes it impossible for naval ves-
sells ever again to operate as cor
centrated fleets, the military value
of dispersed ships will remaln very
high in a great war, and in all other
times of immense value as police
and as a diplomatic instrument.
The presence, for example. Of wi
small naval vessels at Trieste is
one important way of discouraging
any kind of unauthorized adventure
in that region. The fact that these
vessels could be destroyed by an
atomic bomb, or even by an old
fashioned bomb, or even by an old
fashioned mine Or gun, does not
make them any the less useful.
We must be equally careful not to
overestimate the military value of
the atomic bomb. It would, for ex-
ample, be %unusable, even a. a
threat, at Trieste and in Venezia
Giulia. Almost certainly it would
be worse than useless. For the
bomb would be useless against
Tito's infantry since it would kill
own troops as well as his, and
if he overran Trieste, could we kill
all the Italians whom we are trying