Evening star., 1946-04-28


aims of her own.
While the participants in these meet
ings stated In sonorous speeches that we
were on the road to the millennium and
the advocates of "one world" in this
country went ahead with their plans for
global organization, those who attended
some Of the meetings were skeptical
about Russia's future intentions. They
had been on the inside and knew what
kind of soup was being cooked for
that zone world" which would result
from the indestructible ,amity between
the Big Three. But because of the one
sided publicity given these meetings,
where reporters were spoon-fed with
propaganda and bromides, the public
was unable to realize what deals and
compromises had been reached at the
expense of democratic ideals sin order
to keep Russia in the war"
Threat to Korea's independence.
The present situation in China, for
instance, is the result of secret arrange
ments reached at Yalta, which led the
Soviet to believe that there would be no
opposition from the American and Brit
ish governments to its imperialistic aims
in Mancburia.
1t was at Yalta that the independence
of Korea was sacrificed, although nomi-
nally even today the Korean people are
encouraged to believe that their coun-
try will once more become independent.
There Is no question that the American
troops soon will withdraw from that
territory. But the Russians, who have
large force in the northern part of
Korea, have already organized strong
friendly" party which is expected to as
sumo control of the government with
the backing of Russian bayonets as soon
as the Americans retire.
1t was also at Yalta that Russia was
conceded the right to regain its pre-
| dominant position in Manchuria, which
she lost to Japan after the war of 1904.
This was contained in the recognition
of Russia's historical rights on the Chi
nese Eastern Railway and of her pre-
negatives in formerly Chinese Port Ar
thur, one of the most important naval
bases in the Yellow Sea.
| The Sino-Russian treaty signed few
months later reflected the decision Of
the Big Three at Yalta. It provided for
everything agreed on at Yalta and for
the joint use of the Chinese port of
Dairen, which for many years had been
occupied by Japanese.
Chinese Find Difficulties.
| That the Chinese were deceived by
| the treaty they signed in Moscow is
obvious now. When they insisted on
their rights to transport army units to
Manchuria through Jointly controlled"
Port Arthur their request was turned
down by Moscow, which had other ideas.
The Communist forces gathered at Foo
chow were moved to Dairen and thence
sent by rail to their fighting positions
at Changchun and Harbin, where the
Russians waited for them before evac-
uating these key cities in accordance
with their treaty with China. When
the Chungking government complained
to the Russians that they were allowing
Communist troops to occupy these cities
in contradiction to the August, 1945.
| agreement, the answer was that Russia
had agreed to surrender Manchuria to
Chinese troops without specifying
whether they be Nationalist or Commu-
mist. So far as Moscow was concerned
the troops which arrived first were Chi
nese and they did not bother to investi-
gate their "ideologies.''
1t is possible that if the Soviet gov
ernment had not received the impression
at Yalta that the American Government,
would not object to its gaining complet.
authority over Manchuria-either di-
rectly or through the organization o.
friendly governments situation
might have been different and Gen.
Marshall would be in less difficult
position. The Chinese admit now that
if it had not been for certain hints"
received during the Potsdam Conference,
the treaty with Russia would have been
different. They would have insisted on
physical control over Dairen and Port
Arthur before the Russian troops hao
a chance to reach those ports and Gen.
eralissimo Chang Kai-shek would have
been in better bargaining position.
The secrecy at Potsdam was equal to
that maintained at previous conferences
attended by President Roosevelt. At
that time there seems to have been no
agreements damaging further our nom
military war aims. 1t is known, how
ever, that Marshal Stain raised there
the question of a substantial cash .in-
demnity to be paid by Italy to Yugo-
slavia and Russia. This was sternlv
opposed by President Truman, who
explained to the Russian Prime Min
lister that while he did not object to the
Russians and Yugoslavs taking manu-
factured war materials from Italy, he
opposed any other kind of war indem-
nifty. He added that any payments in
cash or raw materials which the Italians
might be compelled to make would, in
the end, have to be paid by the United
States. Italy was down and out. T.
the U. S. S. r. and her satellites were
which she does not have-or the produc-
ton of her soil, the American people
would eventually have to make good he.
losses in order to prevent chaotic condi-
tions in that country from spreading.
And Mr.. Truman said clearly that he
was not prepared to burden the Amer
lean people with payment of war in
IDENTITIES to Russia, even if this were
in an indirect manner.
Chances of a meeting of the minds in
Paris appear slim to Secretary Byrnes
and his associates. They are going to
the French capital with the intention