Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-22
Army Made Him 'Scopeeoot' for PeorI Horbor,
Short Charges in First Public Defense Of Actions

'fenSe or ACTIONS
surprise attack at Honolulu. The
captain answered None Gen. Mar
tin (Maj. Gen. r. L. Martin. Gen
Shorts air force commander} and
Col. Mollison were present with me
at this conference.
Navy Oflicers Agreed.
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral
Bloch. who were present, expressed
no difference Of opinion with Capt.
McMorris."
Gen. Short pointed out that the
War Department had sent no mes
sage disagreeing with his action on
November 81 In alerting Hawaii only
against sabotage.
Gen. Short also pointed out that
the action Of the War Department
in sending flight Of unarmed Bit
bombers from Hamilton Field, Calf.
to Hawaii the night Of December
confirmed his belief that an air raid
was not probable.
He made it clear that he, like
Admiral Kimmel, still credited the
widely disputed report that the in
tercepted Japanese messages in
Guided a code announcement, dis
guised as a weather forecast, that
Japan was breaking of diplomatic
relations with the United States.
Il was not informed" said Gen.
Short, "of the so-called winds code
or Of the fact that the so-called i'm
plementing message had been re-
ceived, definitely confirming the
fact that diplomatic relations would
be severed between Japan and the
United States"
The committee is expected to call
special witnesses on the winds code
controversy after Gen. Short COM
pletes his testimony.
Items Summarized.
Summing up important items of
information that Washington had
and failed to send him, Gen. Short
said:
Il did not know that United
States Army officers at Singapore
had made tentative military COM
mitments, not approved by the
President, that the United States
would fight, along with the Neither
lands and the British, to defend the
Dutch East Indies and Singapore.
II did not know that the Japa-
nese suspected or had somehow
learned of this joint military pro-
gram"
Gen. Short explained that mes
sage intercepted December had
disclosed to the War and Navy
departments that the japanese did
realize such joint military action
would occur.
BY November IL, he added, Wash
ington had an intercept revealing
that Japan had been told semi
officially that IF Japan invades
again, the United States will fight
Japan
The general continued: IT had
not been told that the Secretary of
State regarded the November 90
1941, Japanese proposal as an ulti-
matum and that from then on it
was merely question of trying to
stall of the final break as long as
possible in the hope that some
where even then something might
develop suddenly and out Of the
sky"
Jap Orders Kept Secret.
Another thing I did not know"
Gen. Short said, was the fact that
the Japanese we're under orders to
destroy their codes and code ma
chimes. The War Department knew
of this code destruction as early as
December 1, 1941, and knew spe-
officially of the orders to- destroy
the codes in the United States on
December 8. I should certainly
have been told Of this intelligence. I"
Gen. Short also told the COM
mittee: >l-
LAS this Joint committees, In
lvestigation has already revealed,
there was a vast amount Of highly
significant information available In
the War Department which no re-
sponsible military man could ex-
clude from consideration in form
ing an estimate Of the situation
The War Department was aware Of
the fact that I did not have this
information. 1t was therefore theil
duty not only to make the estimate
of the situation, but to make the
decision as to what military actor
lit required, and to give me order.
to go on an about alert instead o.
permitting my sabotage alert t.
stand. This was in line with theil
I'D peacetime control sys.
.em.
at is my firm conviction that the,
did estimate the situation, that the.
expected only sabotage and subver
sive activities in Hawaii, and tina
on reading my report, Department
alerted to prevent sabotage; naisol
with the Navy they dismissed tn
, matter from their minds because
had done exactly what they desired.
Gen. Short made this comment OF
what he described as the failure o
Washington to keep him informed:
Il trust that the reorganizatio,
OF the War Department genera
staff will lead in the future Il
prompt evaluation and use of al
! items Of intelligence concerninf
possible aggressive movements b,
. foreign military powers"
The alpha particles emitted b,
, radioactive heavy elements are &C.
tually atoms of the light element
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