Evening star., 1946-07-23
Pearl Horbor Report
Plainly Fixes Blame
Sectional Headings Tell Where
NEGLECT Was Flasrant
By DaUd Laurence

By Dapid Laurence
The American people are indebted to
the special Senate and House com
mittee which Investigated the Pearl
Harbor disaster. Despite the impres~
sions which the concluding part of the
report seeks to establish, the headings
OF the document hx responsibility ss
plainly as If names had been called.
The report is ingeniously developed.
1t states fsctually what occurred and
subdivides each important section with
heading. Future historians cannot
fail to read those tell-tale headings, for
each one states an impersonal eonclu-
sion out of which only one inference
Can be made-nsmely. that the persons
who had the responsibility for each
task and did not perform 1t efficiently
are being blamed
Thus there is language in the conclu-
sion of the report itself signed BY the
ma jority, which absolves certain in-
dividuals but there Is no such evssive-
ness in the headings.
Headings Not Evasive.
Here, for instance, are some Of the
committees own headings which sub
divide the conclusions and reeommen-
dations Of the report:
/. Opera tional and intelligence work
requires Capitalization OF authority and
clesr-cut ALLEGATION OF responsibility.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely
tal for MI - in Ho lArf
ing of subordinstes.
g. Any doubt as to whether outposta
should be given informs ton should
always be resolved in favor Of supply
ing the informa tion.
T. The deleeat ton of authority or the
issuance Of orders entails the duty of
inspection to determine that the oficisi
mandate is properly exercised.
s. The implementation OF oficisl
orders must be followed with closest
supervision.
Must Insure Alertness.
s. The maintenance OF alertness to
responsibility must be insured through
repetition.
7. Complacency and procrastina tion
are out OF place where sudden snd
decisive action are OF the essence.
g. The coordination and proper
evsluation of intelligence In times of
stress must be insured by continuity
of service and centralisa ton OF respon-
sibility in competent oficisls.
.. The unapproschable or superior
attitude of officials is fatal: There
should never be any hesitancv In ask
ing for clarification Of instructions o.
in seeking advice on matters that are
in doubt
10. There is no substitute for imag-
ination and resourcefulness on the part
of supervisory and intelligence oficials
II. Communicat ton. must be chsrac-
terized by clarity, forthrightness snd
appropriateness
Observations Significant.
There are in all Is OF these head
inss. Particularly significant are Nos
II, Is, "A and 76. Here rhsy are:
II. An oficial who nszlects 10 fs-
mlisrize himself in detail with his
organiza ton should forfeit his rsspon-
sibility
23 superiors must ut all times keep
their subordinatss Adequately informed
and. conversely. sabordinstes should
keep their superiofs informed.
a. The administrative orss nisation
of any establishment must be designes
TO locate failures and to assess responsl-
bility
Is. In 4 well-baianeed exBsn sntsa sion
there IL close correlation OF resporsi-
bility and authority
All that the historian Of tomorrow
needs to do is find out who, on De-
cember 7, 1s4l, was Chief OF stsfI Of
the Army. Chief Of Naval Operations
and in command of subordinate posi-
tions in the War and Navy Depart
ments and who was Conms nder In
Chief OF the Army and Navy and then
read the main headings OF the report
on Pearl Harbor He will And that
Republicans and Democrats were unan,
imous about the headings but polite
/. ness. courtesy and difference caused
the omission OF the names OF the per
sonalities involved, in the ease OF the
majority who signed the report whereas
the minority just named those responsi-
ble, It's really a unanimous report on
what happened
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