Evening star., 1946-04-28
British Writers Urge
Help for Germany
Economist Group Dissents From
Potsdam Plan of Control
BIZ Raymond Moley.


The Paris meeting of Foreign Minis
ters will find, at the outset, that the
problem of Europe is still the problem
of Germany. 1t will use, as basic
guide to action, a voluminous plan
drawn up by the Allied Control Com
mission and recently made public and
commented on very critically in the
British press.
Five staff members of the influential
London Economist have analyzed the
plan in that publication. The sum of
their comment is that we shall have
to face some readjustment in our early
ideas of how to keep Germany helpless
in order to prevent her from becoming
an intolerable burden.
In this master plan for reparations
and the level of postwar German
economy" the Allied experts had to
keep within the three sharp limita-
tions of the Potsdam agreement:
/. That Germapy's war potential be
eliminated and her industries demilita.
rized;
2. That Germany pay reparations,
especially with industrial equipment, and
maintain a standard of living no higher
than that of her European neighbors;
3. That Germany retain, after pay
ment of reparations, sufhcient resources
to enable her to live without help from
the outside.
The third condition is a serious chal-
lenge. After the Potsdam conference.
it was predicted that Germany would
have to be given help from the outside
for seven to ten years, to the tune Of
$500 100000 to s4Oo,0oO,0Oo a year in
food and other raw materials. Up to
now, that prediction has been exceeded
by the facts. The British Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Sir Hugh Dalton. in
cluded in his budget $3.50 900 600 for
aid to and control of Germany for the
current year. That is the British bill
alone. And the Chancellor quantity
said that it represented Preparations
to Germany" The American bill for
Germany has been estimated at twice
that of Britain
The Allied experts cannot see any
relief from this burden until 1s49, when,
they hope, normal" year will come
Meanwhile. to reach stability in three
years, the Allied plan states three basic
conditions:
I. That postwar Germany will have its
1885 population of 65,oo0,0oo, but will
have only three-quarters of its food and
raw material producing territory;
2. That Germany be treated aS an
economic unit;
3. That exports from Germany be
acceptable in the international markets
Under these conditions, Germany
would be country with an industrial
production one-half as great as before
the war, with standard of Living at
the 1882 level, with two-thirds o! It's
former foreign trade and with 100000
or 100000 unemployed.
All this will be true. even if there Is
no hindrance from the division of Ger
many into zones of interest and occu-
| patton.
The Allied plan sets up three kinds OF
industries which will not be limited In
production: Agriculture, coal mining and
some smaller manufactures, such as
building material, furniture and bicycles.
The plan fatty prohibits all produc-
ton of arms, ammunition, aircraft and
sea-going ships. Production of synthetic
gasoline and oil. synthetic rubber and
ammonia Gncluding nitrate) will be
temporarily retained to meet domestic
requirements until such materials can
be imported and paid for. British
critics point out that the Germans will
not be able to pay for such imports
within generation.
Other German industries will be re
stricted" Generally, only about half of
prewar production will be allowed. Steel
production would be at about so per cent
of the 1886 level. Various consumer
goods would be produced at about three
quarters of the 1886 level, private cars.
at 16 per cent and machine tools at ii
per cent.
The most drastic provision in the Al
lied plan is the restriction on foreign
trade. German exports and imports are
to be only two-thirds of those in 1886.
British critics are convinced that the
plan cannot work efficiently. The Econ
omist says that it 'robs the future of
hope and that the despair it will induce
will bring crisis upon the occupying
British forces
The plan, it is said, grossly overesti-
mates the capacity of a Germany which
has lost quarter of its food producing
land to make up the difference iri brief
three years. The effect of a short food
supply upon Industrial producers is not
properly appraised For example, the
production of coal in the Ruhr was, in
January, one eighth of normal. It did
not increase, but fell off, in February
and March. because the miners were
short of food.
The Economist points out. further,
that the demands of France for slice
of the Ruhr or the Saar would, If
granted, throw even the mild prophecies
of the plan out of line.
1t is not pity for the Germans which
prompts these British views. Nor can it
be desire to build, once more, a Ger
man buffer against Russia. There
seems to be genuine concern that eco
nomic distress in Germany may ulti-
mately result in riots and civil war. For
such result, Britain, as we'll as the
United States, would pay heavy price.
North American Msvspaper Alllancsl
de Hirsch will long be tonored by
appreciative mankind"
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