Evening star., 1946-07-21


information necessary to the success
Of its work. despite the fact that.
the closest liaison was supposed to.
exist among the FBI, naval INTEL
ligence and military intelligence.
Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, who was
in charge of the intelligence branch
Of ca, has testified that he at
no time was permitted to avail him.
self OF the Magic. And this despite
the fact that to effectively perform
his work he should have known Of
this intelligence and one Of hiE
subordinates, Col. Bratton, was.
loaned" to Gen. Miles to distribute
Magic materials to authorized re-
cipients. q
While, as previously indicated, it
is appreciated that promiscuous dis
tribution of highly confidential ma
terial Is dangerous, it nevertheless
should be made available to all
those whose responsibility cannot
adequately and intelligently be dis
charged without knowledge Of such
confidential data. 1t would seem
that through sufficient paraphrase
of the original material the source
of the information could have been
adequately protected. Certainly as
great confidence could be placed
in ranking officials of various de-
partments and bureaus Of the Gov
ernment as in the numerous tech
nicians, cryptographers, translators,
and clerks required for the inter-
ception and processing Of the Magic!f
Is. There is great danger of being,
blinded by the sef-evident.
Virtually every witness has testi-
fed he was surprised at the Jap
anese attack on Pearl Harbor. This
was essentially the result Of the
fact that just about everybody was
blinded or rendered myopic by what
seemed to be the self-evident pur-
pose of Japan to attack toward the
south-Thailand, Malaysia, the Kra;
peninsula, and perhaps the Philip
pines and Guam. Japan had massed
ships and amphibious forces, had
deployed them to the south, and
had conducted reconnaissance In
that direction. So completely did
everything point to the south that
it appears every one was blinded to
significant, albeit somewhat dis
guised, handwriting on the wall sug-
gesting an attack on us elsewhere.
The advice of the Army lieu
tenant to the radar operators tor
forget it, when they informed hims
OF the approach of a large number
Of planes appears to have been based
on the self-evident assumption that
the planes were Army or Navy craft
on patrol or the expected Bits
due to arrive from the West Coast.
Is. Officials should at all times give
subordinates the benefit Of signifi-
cant information.
Before the committee Admiral
Turner testified that he regarded,
an attack on Pearl Harbor as a
$3.50 possibility. Assuming this to
be correct, there can be little doubt,
considering the position he held as
director of war plans in the Navy
Department, that he could have
given the commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his
conclusion had he been disposed to
do so. AS a matter of fact Admiral
Turner had the principal hand in
preparing the November ~ war
warning"
AS has been seen, the orders con-
tained in the war warning neces-
sarily carried the implication of an
attack from without; however, the
dispatch did not reflect the likeh-
hood Of an attack upon the fleet
with the degree of likelihood mani.
tested by Admiral Turner in indi-
eating to the committee his estimate
of the situation Admiral Turner's
position would be indefensible were
his estimate based on any informa-
ton or intelligence he may have
possessed. 1t appears, on the other
hand. that his conclusion was predi-
Gated on rather long-standipg i'm
preston IN the Navy that an attack
on our Pacific Fleet by Japan could
be expected at one time or another.
1t Is regarded as unfortunate, how
ever, that Admiral Turner did not
see fit to give to the Pacific Fleet
the benefit of his conclusions out,
lined, with benefit of retrospection, 5
In such detail before the committee.
II. An official who nesIects to famil-,
iarize himself in detail with his
organization should forfeit his
responsibility.
1t would seem that War and
Navy Department officials both in,
Washington and Hawaii were so
obsessed by an executive complex
that they could not besmirch their
dignities by STOPPING" to determine
what was going on, or more espe-
cially what was not going on, in
their organizations. Examples should
Illustrate this observation.
Admirals Stark and Turner both
have testified they thought" the
commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet was receiving the Magic intel
ligence. Yet in period Of over six
months, with relations between the
United States and Japan mounting
in tenseness and approaching a.
crisis, neither of these ranking
officers determined for q fact,
whether the fleet was receiving this
information.
In the case of Hawaii, the evi-
dence indicates failures on the part
of the commanding general and the,
commander in chief to actually de-,
termine what was going on in their
organizations. Additionally, in g.
command by mutual cooperation it
was as important that Admiral
Kimmel know what Gen. Short was
doing, and pice versa, as that he
know what the feet itself was do
ing. But, as has been heretofore
pointed out, neither Of these officers
really verified whether his assump-
tions concerning what the other was
doing were correct.
IL. Failure can be avoided In the
long run only by preparation for
any eventuality.
The record tends to indicate that
anpraiSal of 1ikelv enenv Yoova .