Evening star., 1946-07-07

priSed to learn that the u. S. S. r.
could use the veto that way Such a
thing had been recognized all along as
technically possible. The day was black
because it was the first time Russia had
demonstrated such stark, complacent
willingness to use the veto as a mere
parliamentary tactic, and because Coun-
Gil members came to their first full
realization of the hopelessness of their
task when such a tactic is employed.
Immediately there came spate Of
statements announcing the determina-
ton of this and that nation to bring
Che veto question "out into the open
when the General Assembly meets in
September. Cuba, through her Am
bassador here, said she was fed up and
would act to have the Security Council
veto abolished. China limited in the
same direction. Australia's f1re-eatlng
Foreign Minister, DR. Herbert v. Evatt,
made it clear he is still the Quixotic
champion of a strong U. N. and will
not pass up chance to slug it out with
ANYBODY on the veto issue, when the
time comes.
But experienced diplomatic observers,
taking it all In, regarded talk about
abolishing the veto as talk. Nothing
more.
Public Feeling Reused.
This is not to say that move to do
awav with the Security Council veto
would lack powerful popular support,
here and elsewhere. There can be no
question but that recent events have set
in motion, in the non n-Russian world, an
upheaval of public opinion against the
concept of the great powers right TO
veto Security Council decisions.
1t is more than a growing conviction
that no nation should be able to apply
its veto to decisions of proposed inter-
national atomic control authority.
There seems to be a general realization
that random use of the veto so seriously
threatens the Security Councils ability
to carry out its everyday functions as
in DR.. Evatt S words-to bring into queS-
ton the Councils right of existence"
If poll were taken in this country
today on whether the United States
should WELD its veto, assuming other
major powers were willing to do so,
there is good reason to believe the
man on the street would answer yes.
His thinking might even have progressed
so far since the U. N. was set up that
he would assume the only problem in
VOWED is selling Russia on the idea.
L. S. Wants Veto Right.
he ~ ted
ton For the fact is. of course that
the United States Government wanted
the veto in the first place, wants it
/ today and shows no disposition to con-
I slider abandoning it in the foreseeable
future.
1t is quite true. as our temporary
representative on the Security Council
was quick to point out after the June
| q debacle, that the United States does
not regard as Cricket the kind of veto
| which is now making a farce of Security
! Council procedure. The theory of the
veto, clearly set forth in memorandum
| addressed by the great powers to the
| San Francisco conference. is that it
shall be used only as a last resort
applied only on issues where the alterna-
tives to its use would be war or, at least,
the breaking up of the U. N.
On June d. it is obvious. no such issue
was at stake. Russia thought a pro-
posed resolution on Spain was too weak
She used the veto once to effect amend
ment of that resolution and once to
block passage of subsidiary resolution
with which the Councils majority tried
to repair" the original amended reso-
luton. Russia also used the veto when
the Council tried to vote that the mat
ter under discussion was "procedural'
and therefore not subject to the veto.
Although no one wants TO minimize
the Importance of the Spanish question,
it cannot be supposed that-without
the veto right-RusSia S regard for her
national integrity or honor would have
forced her to 60 to war or break up the
U. N. or anything of the sort rather
than accept the Councils ma iority de-
cision as to what to do about Mr.
Franco. Issues about which nations
must make that kind of decision
fortunately do not come along every
day-certainly not three times in day
What happened in the Spanish crisis
was simply that Russia, finding herself
outvoted, made use of the veto to force
her will on the Council. Furthermore
by using second veto on the question
of whether the original veto was allow
able. Russia made it clear she could use
the tactic on any issue, however insig-
niicant, on which she might find her
self at ODDS with the Council. Reduced
to an absurdity, it could work this way:
The Council might vote to adjourn
(an OBVIOUS procedural decision) and
Russia might dissent, claiming her dis
sent was veto If that happened, the
chairman logically would rule that the
question was procedural and that the
veto could not apply. Russia might
challenge this ruling which would ne
cessitate vote. The Council would vote
logically, in support of the chairman's
ruling, with Russia again dissenting
And that second dissent would definitely
be veto, for under the great powers
interpretive declaration at San Fran
cisco there must be Big Five unity in
determining that an issue is procedural
and nonvetoable.
The foregoing speculation is absurd
only in that it describes how the double
veto' might be applied to an obviously
could be powerful, high-speed, accu.
rate tool, cutting true and clean.
But tool of that kind must have
rouor ta ororoto ~, thic I,