Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-09-01

OF the Senate War Investigating
Committee, made public last
night by Committee Chairman
Mead
Conclusions and Recommendation.
l. Our national defense today re
quires highly trained armed force
equipped with the most modern
weapons, and capable of rapid ex
pansion in time of emergency. A
the beginning of World War
this Nation had no such force.
cannot be assumed that a numeri
cally superior armed force is il
itself an adequate defense. TIL
quality rather than the quantity O
our Army and Navy will be tn
best guaranty for an adequate de
Tense.
2. Since service in the arme,
forces during peacetime should b
such as to attract able, intelligen
men, an intensive study of person
mel matters in the Army and Nav
Should be made for the purpose O
setting up promotion system which
Will insure that the best qualified
men, regardless of age or seniority il
service, will obtain the most respon
sible positions.
Industrial Plan Needed.
3. For two decades prior to Worlt
War II, the Army and Navy worked
on an industrial mobilization plan
This plan was never placed in eff
feet. A workable plan for the inn
mediate mobilization of war indus
tries on any future M day is es.
sentlal to peacetime nationwide.
Tense program. This industrial mo,
bilization plan must be constantly
revised in the light Of chronological
developments in order that oul
armed forces can, at any time. bt
promptly and adequately supplied
with the most modern weapons anc
equipment.
4. Government production con-
trolls during World War II, although
frequently successful. were confus-
ing, and very often resulted in dupli-
cation and inefficiency. Many of the
faults of the original National De-
tense Advisory Committee, and its
successors, the Office of Production
Management and the Supply Priori-
ties and ALLEGATIONS Board, were in
some measure remedied by the War
Production Board. However. the
latter was hampered in its efforts
to mobilize and control industry
through interference by military
procurement officers. and by the
conflicts existing between the in
dependent administrators who were
put IN charge of oil, coal. transpor-
tation, and other aspects of the
war program. The weakness of the
Office of War Mobilization, created
to correct this situation, resulted
from its failure to act as a direct
ing and managing organization.
Experienced in Controls.
3. During the war we accumulated
wealth OF experience in the opera
ton of governmental controls in
war production. Our successes and
failures are valuable sources of
knowledge from which to furnish a
deflnitive guide for the future. We
should draw on our war experience
with Government controls to for
mulate plans now, subject to con-
tfnual revision, so that another
emergency will not find us with a
plan that Is obsolete and unwork-
able.
6. No nation, including our own,
is sufficient in the basic raw
materials needed to produce the
equipment and weapons necessary
to night a modern war. Although
the United States has been the most
energetic and vigorous nation in ex-
plotting and developing raw mate
rails, we are not necessarily the
richest In natural resources. It is
not possible to replace from within
our own borders the rich store of
materials that we provided for our
selves and our allies during the war.
1t is important that the recent
legislation providing for the stock
piling of strategic materials be sup
Dlemented with action. War settle
ments, including the sale of surplus
property in foreign areas, as well as
antitrust, patent, and other govern
mental policies, should be co-ordi-
mated for the purpose of adequately
protecting our sources of raw mate
rials here and abroad. Our Govern
ment, in considering future national
defense. must make certain that is
not confronted with the serious and
acute material shortages expert
enced in World War II.
Use for Bases.
7. The United States is abandon
ing overseas bases acquired during
the war at great cost in lives and
dollars. Many of these bases are
commercially useful during peace
time, and would have strategic mill
tary Importance in another emer-
gency. The War, Navy, and State
Departments should have had plans.
before the end of the war, to utilize
those overseas bases necessary to
our national defense, and they
should have used the full weight of
our bargaining power in executing
these plans. The appropriate Gov
eminent agencies must now work
out and set into operation a feasible
program for the acquisition or use
Of strategic overseas bases.
8. Under present world conditions
the national defense will suffer un-
less the United States has a more
efficient intelligence agency, in both
military and nonmilitary fields, thar
we had before World War II
knowledge of international eco
nomic, political and social condi-
lions is necessary if sound diplo-
matte decisions are to be made
Furthermore, data obtained by ar
intelligence service can assist ir
determining the size and character
OF the armed force to be maintained
Tor the defense of our Nation. The
establishment of a superior intelli.
gence organization is good economy
8. More busineSslike administra
tive methods in the armed force.
during the emergency would have
brought the war to a victorious con.
clusion at an earlier date, with les,
cost in life, dollars, and natural re.