Evening star., 1946-07-21

Unified Intelligence
Lead LIST Of Points
Twenty-Five suggestions for i'm
proving administrative procedures in
the War and Navy Departments, to
prevent repetition of the Pearl
Harbor disaster, are attached to the
majority report of the Joint Con-
gressional Committee. The COM
mittee asks the military and naval
branches to give them serious con-
sideration." The text of this part
of the report follows:
Supervisory, administrative, and
organizational deficiencies in our
military and naval establish
ments revealed by the Pearl
Harbor investigation.
The committee mas been intrigued
throughout the Pearl Harbor pro-
ceedings by one enigmatical and
paramount question: Why, NTH
some of the finest intelligence
auaildble in our history, NTH the
almost certain knowledge that i1dr
1Oas at hand, With plans that con-
templated the precise type OF at
tack that 1Cas executed by Japan on
the morning OF December 7-1Dhy
7UaS 1t possible for a Pearl Harbor
to occur? The answer to this ques-
ton and the causative considera-
tions regarded as having any rea-
sonably proximate bearing on the
disaster have been set forth in the
body of this report. Fundamentally.
these considerations reflect super
visory, administrative, and organi-
rational deficiencies which existed
in our military and naval establish
ments in the days before Pearl Har-
Dor. In the course of the commit
tees investigation still other de-
fciencies, not regarded as haUing q
direct bearing on the disaster, haze
presented themselves. Otherwise
stated, all of these deficiencies re-
duce themselves to principles which
are set forth, not for their novelty or
profundity but for the reason that,
by their very self-evident simplicity,
it is difficult to believe they were
ignored.
It is recognized that many of the
deficiencies revealed by our investi-
CATION may very probably have al
ready been corrected as result
of the experiences Of the war. We
desire, however, to submit these
principles, which are grounded in
the evidence adduced by the COM
mittee, for the consideration of our
Army and Navy establishments in
the earnest hope that something
constructive may be accomplished
that will aid our national defense
and preclude repetition of the dis
aster of December 7, 1941. We do
this after careful and long con-
sideration of the evidence developed
through one of the most important
investigations in the history Of
Congress.
!. OperationaI and intelligence
work requires Capitalization OF
authority and cIear-cut alloca-
ton of responsibility.
Reviewing the testimony of the
Director of War Plans and the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence, the
conclusion is inescapable that the
proper demarcation of responsibility
between these two divisions of the
Navy Department did not exist.
War Plans appears to have insisted
that since it had the duty of issuing
operational orders it must arrogate
the prerogative of evaluating intelli-
gence; Naval Intelligence, on the
other hand, seems to have regarded
the matter of evaluation as properly
it's function. 1t is clear that this
intradepartmental misunderstand-
ing and near conflict was not re-
solved before December 7 and be-
yond question it prejudiced the ef-
fectiveness of Naval Intelligence.
In Hawaii, there was such q
marked failure to allocate RESPONSE
bility in the case of the 14th Naval
District that Admiral Bloch testi-
fed he did not know whom the
commander in chief would hold
responsible in the event of short
comings with respect to the condi-
tion and readiness of aircraft. The
position of Admiral Bellinger was
a wholly anomalous one. He ap-
pears to have been responsible to
every one and to no one. The pyra-
miding of superstructures of organi-
zation cannot be conducive to eff
cheney and endangers the very func-
tion of our military and naval serv-
ices.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely
take anything for granted in
the alerting of subordinates.
The testimony of many crucial
witnesses in the Pearl Harbor in
vestigation contains an Identical
note: Il thought he was alerted"
It took for granted he would un-
derstand";; Il thought he would be
doing that" 1t is the same story
each responsible official seeking to
Justify his position by reliance upon
the fallacious premise that he was
entitled to rely upon the assumption
that a certain task was being per-
formed or to take for granted that
subordinates would be properly vigi-
liant. This tragic theme was par
ticularly marked in Hawaii.
The foregoing was well illustrated
in Admiral Kimmels failure to ap-
preciate the significance of dis
patches between December 3 and 8,
advising him that japanese en-
bassies and consulates, including the
Embassy in Washington, were de-
stroying their codes. Navy Depart
ment officials have almost unani-
mously testified that instructions
to burn codes mean war in any
mans language" and that in sup
plying Admiral Kimmel this infor-
nation they were entitled to believe
he would attach the proper sig
nif1cance to this intelligence Yet
the commander in chief Of the Pa
cific Fleet testified that he did not
interpret these dispatches to mean
fhot Jopor coofenn Mated irnmediat te