Evening star., 1946-09-08

neutrality of Sweden and Denmark, have
naval base in the Western Baltic and
military control of the Kiel Canal
Through the economic pressure which
she can now exert as a result of her
acquisition of the coal and Oil of Eastern
Europe, as wen as by direct military
threat from Finland, she is assured of
the neutrality of Sweden, at least. The
island of Rugen, which she now occupies.
affords naval base in the Western Bal
tic. When the question of the Kiel
Canal is raised, she will probably be
able to obtain favorable concessions from
England and the United States such as
joint military control of a canal zone.
This same urge for access to the
open sea is the key to Soviet strategy
in the Mediterranean. Fundamentally
strategic needs are simple. Reduced to
elementary terms, they are: Military
control of the exits from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean, a port on the
Adriatic, naturalization or destruction
OF British sea power, naturalization or
control OF the Suez Canal and the
Straits of Gibraltar.
The war has demonstrated that mere
physical possession of the Dardanelles
does not insure egress from the Black
Sea. For three years the Germans sue
cessfully blockaded the Black Sea by
occupation of the Aegean Islands. To
support this occupation, the Germans
were compelled to hold the ports of
Salonlka and Pireous and to control the
communications thereto So important
Gid the Germans consider this blockade
that they sacrificed an army in Yugo-
.slavia and Greece to maintain it to the
last. To the Soviet General Staff, there
fore, the question of bases on the Dar-
danelles must sink into insignificance
when compared with the importance of
military control of YugoSlavia, Greece
and Turkey, without which Russian ac-
cess to the Mediterranean can never be
assured.
Even with British sea power driven
from the Mediterranean, Russia will not
have access to the open sea until the
fortress of Gibraltar is taken or neutral
lied. Directly opposite Gibraltar on the
North African coast of Spanish Morocco.
is the fortified city OF Ceuta. The guns
OF Ceuta and the airf1elds of Spain al
ready dominate the straits To gain po-
Htical control Of Ceuta and, if possible,
to oust the British from the Rock is
therefore. one of the primary motives
behind the present Soviet attempt to
overthrow Franco and set up a Com
munist regime in Spain This same mill
tary motive was behind the demands
OF the U. S. S. R. for voice in the ad-
mlnistration Of Tangier the one Atlantic
port in Spanish Morocco from which
Ceuta can be successfully attacked
Aspirations In Far East.
In the Far East, Soviet strategic aims
combine continuation of Imperial Rus
sian policy with larger aspirations made
possible by the destruction of Japan. On
her southern and southeastern frontiers
In Asia, Russian penetration into China
has been in progress for the past 20
years. The obstruction of Japanese mill
tary power and the weakness of the Gen.
tral Chinese government have now made
possible an acceleration of this program.
Chinese recognition of Outer Mongolia
Republic, forced on Chungking by the
Big Three at Potsdam, will lead directly
to the inclusion of Tannutha and Inner
Mongolia into the Union of Soviet Re
publics and to the eventual ABSORPTION
of Sinkiang.
In addition to her occupation of
Southern Sakalin and the Kurile Is
lands. Russia by the acquisition of Port
Arthur, has once more obtained a warm
water naval base on the Pacific. In the
Japanese Russian War, Port Arthur fell
because of its isolation History has
shown, therefore, that Port Arthur is of
no military value unless Manchuria and
the Mancnurian railways can be held.
Hence to the Soviet General Staff, con-
troll of Manchuria and the Manchurian
railways must seem necessary to the re-
establishment of Russian sea power in
the Pacific. Conversely, it is to the in
terest of the Soviet General Staff to
place every obstacle in the path of the
acquisition by the United States of bases
in Japan, on the mainland of China and
in the Western Pacific area.
In the past, it has been the military
power of Japan that has stood in the
way of Russian expansion. In the past,
American foreign policy has not hesi-
tated to take advantage of this fact to
further American interests in the Far
East. To an already suspicious Soviet
General Staff, Gen. Macarthur must
appear, therefore. as the symbol of
Yankee Imperialism. bent upon the res
toration of Japan as a tool of American
diplomacy.
Army Presents Problem.
The U. S. S. r. has another military
problem which cannot fail to effect the
tempo of her foreign policy. Like the
other nations which have just con-
(see RUSSIA, Page C-s)