The Wilmington morning star., 1946-11-16
The Lewis Issue
BY KROCK

WASHINGTON An example of the powers
still resident in the executive department is
furnished by the latest demands on the govern
men by John L. Lewis. Mr.. Truman must
decide how these shall be disposed of, making
at the same time a choice. between great con-
sequences. And the fact that the Eightieth
Congress will have a Republican majority
by the vote OF the people has put no restraint
on this Presidential power.
Mr.. Truman must soon determine whether
to give in to Mr.. Lewis, as previous admins
traitors have done, and thus release a train
of other labor demands with devastating
strikes or more initiation as the result; or
whether to stand on the government contract
with his miners for the duration of government
operation of the mines. These were seized
under the Smith-C onnally Act, and hence it
is the United States and not the mine-owners
which must resolve the issue raised by Mr..
Lewis.
The release OF most commodities from fed
eral price controls opens the way, of course,
to the return of collective bargaining on min
ers' wage between the industry and its en-
ployes. But that must be preceded by the re-
turn to private operation OF the properties
themselves. Since the Southern operators have
declined to accept for themselves the govern.
ment's wage contract with the union, and the
miners will not work for half the industry at
one price and the other half at another, the
government is stuck with the mines FOR the
time being.
Its dilemma is equipped with the usual two
horns but these are unusually long and sharp.
If the government boWs once again to Mr..
Lewis even though concealing its surrender
as it did when Chester BoWles agreed to a
settlement that utterly broke the anti-inflation
'line'' on the 18 1-2-cent bulge the conse-
quences are foreshadoWed:
If the steel, motors, rubber and other heavy
industries then decline to adjust the pay of
their workers in conformity with the new pat
tern set in coal-mining, these unions will seek
government intervention in their favor. The
alternative will be devastating strikes repeating
the nations experience from January to May,
1916 when there were first strikes and loss Of
production and then official surrender.
MI. Lewis would then once more attain the
role OF leading a round of wage adjustments"
that would filter down to all workers and
raise all prices. This second round was actual
ly begun by the maritime unions, which had
their preliminary success last June, but the
grand procession would begin with Mr.. Lewis.
He would have also triumphed over Philip
Murray and the Congress of Industrial Organi-
cation because Mr.. Murray will not serve his
unions new demands until his policy committee
meets Dec. Is, and Mr.. Lewis will have won
his point by then if he wins it. Also he will
have demonstrated once more that he can
bend Presidents to his will, which, with the
exception of 1919, he has done regularly. Then
he accepted a Federal Court injunction with
the statement that eve will not fight the gov
eminent" But he has fought it often since.
If Mr.. Truman declines to NEE: Mr.. Lewis
new demands a coal strike will follow. The
Smith-Connally Act bans such a strike, and
not strike against the government. But last
Friday he threatened to give five days notice
to the same government that the present agree
ment win Secretary OF the Interior Krug, its
representative. will end. That would bring
about the walkout of 400, 900 miners, chanting
the chorus of mo contract, no work" And
the effect would be the same as a strike.
A virtually complete Walkout cannot, OF
course, be staged except by concerted plan
and grand strategy. But the governments
lawyers are divided over whether it would
technically breach the Smith-C onnally Act and
give ground for court action. And except for
a very few independents, Mr.. Lewis miners
are the only workers who can mine coal.
These are the alternatives faced by the
President. 1t may be that the government will
turn firm at last when dealing with Mr.. Lewis,
letting the walkout come and fighting it with
the law and public opinion until the shoe OF
compromise or defeat is fitted on the other
foot, or the Southern operators may accept
the Krug-Lewis contract as a basis for new
collective bargaining and take over the mo-
mentous decision whether there shall be a
surrender by private industry or a Walkout q.
But the history Of this protracted labor chap
ter is that Mr.. Lewis gets what he wants from
the government when he cannot get it from
the operators. And the necessity that coal
shall continue to be mined is as great as it
has ever been. This forced eX-Secretary 1ckes
to give him his contract in 1943 and MIR. Krug
to meet his terms in 1916 And in previous
disputes Mr.. Lewis got other official assistance
to attain his ends-notably from ex-secretary
Perkins and from John R. Steelman.
In 1943 the story is (Mr. Ickes can be witness
to its truth or falsity) that the then Secretary
of the Interior asked President Roosevelt, D
you want me to mine coal or smash Lewis"
and that the answer was. mine coal" If
this is still the position. the miners chief will
triumph again.-New York Times