Evening star., 1946-12-08
An Intelligence
Officer Tells
His Story
SECRET MISSIONS

By Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias,
u. S. n. Putnam; S3z5J
Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias is
pretty well known by now as
the American naval officer who,
in the last days of the war,
broadcast to the japanese in
their own language, warning
them of the danger of pro-
longing the conflict and expos
ing to the Japanese people the
deceit of their military leaders.
What the captain was doing in
the other 38 years of his Navy
career may not, however, be so
familiar. He writes it here. In
his telling it becomes the story
of a fight, generally uphill, to
develop a naval intelligence
service which would be eon-
sonant in efficiency with the rest
of our Navy organization.
The captain was sent to Japan in
1920 to learn the language. To that
assignment he added of his own
accord a study of japanese psy-
chology. He also went very seri-
ously into the whole art and mys-
terry Of intelligence service. From
that time on, with Interruptions in
the form of sea duty, he devoted
himself to making our naval intel
| ligence a real arm of the service. 1t
was ungrateful work, as he re-
ports it.
| He tells of an intelligence Office
which was meteorological, under
stated and nearly inactive. He
tells of opposition from high brass
who regarded intelligence as a
rather sissy interference with sea
| fighting. But he hammered away.
And through the years his efforts
| bore fruit. He broke the Jap spy
/ ring on the West Coast in 1910, he
| helped bring about the prompt
arrest of the Axis fifth columnists,
he was early aware of the fact that
| the German and japanese spies
were trading information, and he
warned Admiral Kimmel in March,
1941, that the japanese were likely
| to attack Pearl Harbor by air with
out warning at about o'clock on a
Sunday morning. He also told the
admiral what would be the signs of
| the imminence of such an attack
and what would be the proper de-
fence. Then, when Japan finally
! began to crumble the captain used
/ his long stored understanding of
the islanders psychology to drive in
his personal blows-he launched his
broadcasts in their own language.
That these talks nastened surrender
has been attested to by the Japanese
leaders themselves. 1t makes q
| handsome record.
Not the least part of it. either, Is
the captains active sea duty. For
that refutes the high brass conten-
ton that intelligence men are not
real sailors. Capt. ZachariaS was
in command of the heavy cruiser
Salt Lake City in some of the heav-
lest Pacific fighting in the where-is-
the-Navy period which Immediately
followed Pearl Harbor, and later OF
the battleship New Mexico. He was
decorated for his work in both in
4 stances. Ut was the Salt Lake
City, incidentally, which Bob Casey
immortalized as the Swayback Maru
in his book on the Pacific war called
Torpedo Junction.
But the captains rewards for his
intelligence work were somehow
curiously evasive. When, during the
war, he was suddenly called to
Washington to work in intelligence
headquarters, he was given to un-
derstand that he would be intelli-
gence chief. He was passed over.
however, for an officer who, until
that time, had had no intelligence
experience whatever. His plan for
a reorganized service was approved
| by Admiral King-and then pigeon
holed. He was not promoted. When
he retires next January it will be
with the rank of rear admiral but
the recognition was long in coming.
NC, r.