Evening star., 1946-01-10
By ]. A. O'LEARY and
CARTER BROOKE JONES.

After his defeat, he supported the
administrators policy of aid to
Britain, in the role of leader of the
loyal opposition" He had already
made a trip to England early in
1941 and, upon his return. was an
outstanding witness in support OF
the lease-lend bill.
The Roosevelt letter to Mr.. Will
kie is not the first indication, how
ever, that President Roosevelt was
aware of the imminence of war
like move by Japan. The diary of
former Secretary of War StimSon,
already disclosed in the Army Pearl
Harbor inquiry, told of meeting
of the Defense Council on Novem-
Der 25, 194l, at which the President
was quoted as having suggested the
likelihood this country would be at
tackled by Japan perhaps as soon
as-perhaps next Monday"
Mr.. Roosevelt's letter to Mr.. Will
kie concerning the proposed trip
said. in part:
1T would, of course be of real
value to cement our relations with
New Zealand and Australia and
would be useful not only now but
in the future.
There is always the japanese
matter to consider. The situation is
definitely serious and there might be
an armed clash at any moment if
the japanese continue their forward
move against the Philippines, Dutch
Indies, Malaga or Borneo. Perhaps
the next four or five days will de-
eide the matter"
The postscript in longhand read {:
This was dictated Friday morn
ing-long before this vile attack
started-F. D. R."
Meanwhile, the committee inter-
rupted its weeks recess yesterday
afternoon long enough to select
Samuel H. kaufman, a New York
attorney, as associate counsel to
serve with Seth w. Richardson, the
new chief counsel. Mr.. Kaufman is
head of the law firm of Kaufman
and Cronan, of 30 Broad street,
New York, and was recommended
by Mr.. Richardson. According to
Acting Chairman Cooper, Mr.. Kauf-
man is So years old and a Demo-
crat. He is also a World War vet
eran.
Hawaii Defense "All Right"
Committee members also received
copies OF transcript of additional
testimony before the Roberts Com
mission showing that Maj. Gen. Wal
ter c. Short, Army commander in
Hawaii when Pearl Harbor was
attacked, had been asked whether
the defense system in effect there
in 1941 was adequate and replied
I think the system is all right
l think that we made a very serious
mistake when we didn't go to an
alert against an all-out attack. ]
think that our system was perfectly
all right. Our estimate of the stu
alton was not"
The shortage of military equip
ment was brought up, it was dis
closed, and Gen. Short was asked
IF you had been furnished with
all the things that you felt neces-
sary, would that have made any
difference in this particular ac-
tion?"
Il do not believe it would" the
general answered.
Asked if unity of command, which
was not put into effect in Hawaii
until after the attack, might have
enabled the land and sea forces to
prepare better defense, Gen. Short
said he did not believe it would
have had any particular effect, un-
less the commander had decided
there was the danger of air attack.
Information Delayed.
Although officers on duty at the
War Department in 1941 have tes-
titled before the congressional com.
mittee that "of course" Gen. Short
knew the japanese consul in Homo
lulu had burned papers the day be-
fore the attack, since his intelli-
gence officer had reported it tc
Washington, Gen. Short said he
had not received the information
until after the attack.
"And you would consider that a
serious slip on the part of your in
telligence officer them" he was
asked. -..-..
well, that is a little question.
able" Gen. Short replied, because
we burn stuff every day. Any Sc.
cret stuff that we are destroying
we burn to be sure that there is nc
chance of it helping somebody break
the code, and I wouldn't have beer
surprised if the japanese consul's
office was burning every day."
But he knew nothing of the epi.
sode until several hours after the
attack, Gen. Short said, when the
FBI arrested the consul and ar
assistant as they were burning an.
other file.
Failed to Get Washington Data.
Gen. Short also said he had failee
to receive before the harbor wa.
bombed information from Wash.
ington that japanese diplomats hae
beeen ordered to destroy their cod.
machines. There was testimony
before the congressional commit.
tee that the Navy had so informed
its sea commands.
Gen. Short said this Japanese
order would have indicated an i'm.
pending attack on him. The in.
formation, he added, would hav,
been much more significant thar
just the ultimatum."
Gen. Short could give the Rob
erts Commission no additional ligh
on why an Army radar was oper,
ated from 4 to z am. on Decembe
Z, l941, the day of the attack, ant
no later. The japanese plane
Circulation, November, 1916
(Averape net nai6o