The Wilmington morning star., 1946-03-11
Ben Hogan, Demaret
Take Miami Tourney
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LIPPMAN
FROM PAGE ONE

That much will be understood In
every foreign office. When a great
| power sends a battleship to a dis.
puted area. in the language Of
, diplomacy that means it intends
to participate in the settlement,
The ship is meant to symbolic the
fact that the diplomatic discussion
( IS not an academic debate, not a
mere expression of sentiment and
. opinion, but a truly serious nego..
, tiation.
For that reason it is most i'm.
l portant that we should ourselves
| interpret our own intentions. They
could easily be misinterpreted,.
especially at this moment, as COM
hitting this country to the role
OF seconder and supporter in an
. antl-Soviet coalition. If that inter-
probation is allowed to stand. we
, shall find that we have aggravated
the disorder of the world and
have sacrificed our influence and
initiative as a peace-maker among
the powers.
That surely is not what we
intend to accomplish by sending
the Missouri into the Mediterran-
can. Quite the contrary. Our real
reason, which is the best of all
reasons and should be made
known Enthusiastically, is to estab-
fish the fact that the United
States has great interests Of its
own in the Mediterranean, and
= that the settlement in the Medi-
terranean is not to be determined
! by Great Britain and hte Soviet
Union alone. The whole value Of
the demonstration would be de-
stroyed if Moscow, London and
Istanbul were allowed to think
that Mr.. Churchill has persuaded
us to come in order to reinforce
: Mr.. Bevin. This is not a lend.
lease operation. 1t is an insistence
t that we wish to be recognized as
: an independent power in the
f, Mediterranean and not to be COM
mitted, entangled, and discounted
: as an auxiliary power.
: An independent American par.
ticipation is indispensable if the
, conflict in the Mediterranean is
S not to become first deadlocked,
E and then dangerously explosive.
t The British Russian conflict is
e deteriorating towards violence. For
!. both in Moscow and in London
t the men who have responsibility
t seem to have run out Of ideas,
and of the energy to promote
i them, which offer any hope OF
. promise Of constructive settle
f ment. Moscow Is full Of dynamism,
t no doubt, but 1t is primitive,
S acquisitive, and morbidly self.
2 conferred: the Soviet leaders, who
profess to be the missionaries Of
a new civilization, are at the pres.
t ent time behaving as if no one in
! Russia had had a really new idea
since Peter the Great. And Lon.
: don. after all the fine rhetoric
: of the Labor party leaders, has a
r foreign policy which is not easily
i distinguishable from that of
: Palmerston at the time Of the
, Crimean War.
1t is as new power, without
, vested interests and long history
t in the Mediterranean, that we can
t best serve our own interests and
, those Of the general peace. To
! play this part well is not easy
t since We shall need to distinguish
/ clearly what so many have an
S interest in obscuring-the line be-
tween appeasement and retreat in
e the face of Soviet expansion on
t the one hand, of sterile resistance,
n inconclusive rear guard actions,
and ENHANCEMENT on the other.
. AS long as we are not physically
n present in this region as an indie.
J., pendent power. it almost impos-
: sible to draw that line. We are
n forever being caught between Rus.
d sian actions, which present us with
accomplished facts. and echoing
e the British protests, which do not
J, prevent the accomplished facts.
\ With the Missouri and an &C.
companying fleet, treated as the
/, symbol Of our power ard interest,
t we can make it Enthusiastically clear
S in Moscow just where we believe
l the outer limits of their expansion
4 are. They are at those critical
l points where the defense of the
r Russian homeland against inva-
: sions ends. They are for the Med.
iterranean quite evidently at Tri.
este, Salonika ard the Dodecanese.
) and tie other Greek Islands; they
are in the Red Sea and in the
Persian Gulf. That is clearly the
line which we must regard as
marking the outer limit Of legiti-
mate and acceptable Russian in.
terest.
On the Russian side Of that line
lies a belt Of territory which in
cludes the Balkans, Turkey and
Iran. Here there is legitimate
Russian interest. But if the Rus
slams wish to live peacesbly in the
same world with their allies, they
viii not attempt to magnify their