Evening star., 1946-07-16

retary OF State ByrneS:
After every great war the vic
tors find the making of peace diff
cult and disappointing. 1t took
the 13 American States more than
five years after winning their in
dependence to agree upon a con-
stitution which promised anything
like a durable peace among them
selves.
To build world peace requires even
greater tolerance, patience and un-
derstanding 1t requires the will
and ability to seek the best, to ac-
cept the best obtainable, and then
to make the best obtainable work
AS war breeds war, so peace can
be made to breed peace.
That is why President Truman
and I were determined at Pots
dam last summer two months after
We day to set up the Council of
Foreign Ministers. We were eager
to have the Council start the max
ing of peace and to make peace as
quickly as possible wherever possible.
Started With Satellites.
It was obvious then that the
making of peace with Germany
would take time. There was no
German government to deal with,
and no agreement as to how soon
we should permit German govern
ment to function. 1t was equally
obvious that start could be made
toward making peace with Italy
and the states which were satel-
lltes of the Axis. They had gov
ernments. So we started there
The whole world knows how great
the struggle has been during the
last 10 months to harmonic the
views of the great powers so as to
make possible the presentation of
tentative drafts of treaties to a
peace conference. That struggle
has now been brought TO success
full conclusion and the peace con-
ference has been called to meet in
Paris on July %.
1t Is my hope that the Council OF
Foreign Ministers will consider the
the final text so that the treaties
may be signed by the delegates be-
fore the conference adjourns.
Satisfactory Approach.
The drafts of treaties agreed upon
are not the best which human viii
could devise. But they are the best
which human wit could get the four
principal Allies to agree upon. They
represent as satisfactory an ap-
preach to the return of peace as We
could hope for in this imperfect
and War-weary world
The attitude of the United States
In these matters represented not
only the judgment of the President
and the Secretary of State, but also
the judgment of Senator Connallv
and Senator Vandenberg whose long
experience in our foreign relations
and intimate knowledge of the spe-
cifc issues made their counsel in
valuable.
The greatest struggle was over
the Italian treaty, and the greatest
issue involved in that treaty was
the fate of Trieste and adjacent
territory along the western shore
of the Istrain Peninsula. The
American delegation, supported by
the French and British, urged that
Trieste and adjacent territory which
and predominantly Italian should
remain with Italy, and the predom-
inantly Slavic hinterland should go
TO Yugoslavia.
Opposed by Soviet.
The Soviet Union argued strongly
that Trieste and adjacent territory
should be cut off from its imme-
diate hinterland. While it admitted
that a few cities and towns along
the coast were predominantly Ital-
ian, it urged that the Istrain PENN
sula should be regarded as whole
and that so regarded it was predom
inantly Yugoslav. This view was
also urged by Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet Union further urged
that greater consideration should
be given to the Yugoslav claims
than to the Italian claims because,
while Italy as one of the Axis
partners was responsible for bring
ing on the war against the Allies
and for the loss of thousands of
Allied lives, Yugoslavia had fought
on the Allied side throughout the
war and suffered from the attacks
of Italy.
AS neither the Soviets nor our
selves were prepared to yield. we
then proposed that the issue be
left to the peace conference, but
the Soviets would not agree.
This left us in a more serious
dilemma than most people realize.
We could make separate peace
with Italy, leaving her Trieste, but
the Soviet and Yugoslav govern
ments and possibly others would
not accept that treaty.
International Status Proposed.
If We made separate peace, the
Soviet and Yugoslav governments
would undoubtedly demand that
Italy make a separate peace with
them, ceding Trieste to Yugoslavia.
If Italy refused, it is not difficult to
foresee the difficulties which would
arise.
Even If no one of us presented
treaty to Italy, a disarmed Italy
could hold Trieste against the
army of Yugoslavia only so long
as our troops held it for her.
In an effort to break this dead
lock the French informally sug-
gested that Trieste and adjacent
territory be separated from Italy
but not ceded to Yugoslavia, and
that its security and integrity be
internationally guaranteed
At first no one liked this pro-
posal. But the more 1T was studied
the more it seemed to offer a reason
able basis for agreement. 1t was
recalled that before Italy entered
World War l, she had proposed that
the Trieste area should become an
autonomous state
Our delegation insisted that the
area should be protected by the
United Nations and not by joint
agreement between Italy and Yugo-
slavia as the Soviets proposed, and
not by the four principal Allied
powers as suggested by the French