The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1946-04-11
Atomic Age Secrecy
BY HANSON w. BALDWIN


secrecy, and espionage regulations are con-
temporary problems that are part of the
broader problem of American military policy
and that must be solved by a niddle-of-the
road approach.
The protracted debate which has not yet
progressed beyond committee level and which
has revolved around the Mcmahon and May
Johnson bills must come to an emo; final
Congressional approval OF legislation for the
national control of atomic energy is overdue.
The reasonable compromise between those
who would bar the military from any share
of control over the development of atomic
energy for military purposes and those who
insist upon some military participation has
long been obvious.
Today, atomic fission represents military
power and little else; to exclude military in
fuence completely from an atomic energy
control commission is unthinkable. But it is
equally unthinkable that the military should
have dominant control; all the principles of
democratic government dictate t h e impera-
tive necessity for minority influence. The
saner minds of those who nave studied the
problem have long agreed on these principles.
Last weeks unanimous acceptance by the Sem
ate Atomic Energy committee OF a revised
Vandenberg amendment to the Mcmahon bill,
which embodies this ''middle-of-the road"
principle, comes, therefore, as a welcome re-
lief to weeks of petty quibbling and unfounded
and startling charges.
The problem of secrecy-not only about
atomic energy but also about all political
military matters-is even more important to
the future of the country than the exact COM
position of the Atomic Energy commission.
The atomic bomb and recent spy cases in
Canada and this country have been seized
upon as excuses for attempts to tighten great
ly-snd dangerously-the espionage laws. The
scientists rightly fear that too great an enpha
sis on secrecy not only would tend to increase
international friction but would also hamper
the development of science, for mutual
change of basic scientific information is the
keystone of much of our material progress.
The scientists hold, with some reason, that
additional basic information about atomic fis-
sion-particularly that relating to its medical
aspects-could be released, and their pressure
toward this end has probably been helpful IN
securing the ''declassifica alton" actual or
projected-of some of the papers that were
by-products of the atomic bomb.
But some of the scientists have gone to
extremes in their demands for mo secrecy"
A good many of them, and some Of the public,
have been disturbed by three specific in
stances-each one Of them involving a sci
entist-in which restrictive measures were
taken
DR.. Edward U. Condor, present head of the
at times in various capacities with the atomic
-omb project is one of three men whose
cases have now become a sort OF scientific
cause celebre. DR.. Condor was invited through
the Soviet Embassy, as were number of
other American scientists, to 60 to Russia last
June to attend the 220th anniversary Of the
Russian Academy of Science. He had accept
ed and was about to go when Maj. Gen.
Leslie R. Groves, commanding the Manhattan
District had DR.. Condons passport Cancelled.
This trip was scheduled during the war, be-
fore the bomb was used or its existence even
known and General Groves action, though
much condemned by some scientists, was I'M
loubtedly justified.
The second case was that of Bertram Gold
schmidt, a French scientist. connected with
a Canadian atomic-bomb project. After GER
tain period of association with the project,
Mr.. Goldschmidt was told he must either be-
come an American, British Canadian citi-
zen, or sever his connection with the project.
This, too seemed justifiable; governments
particularly when secret work is Involved
usually require their trusted employees to be
citizens.
But the third case-that Of Frederic Joliet
Curie, a French physicist, and alleged to be
Communists more dubious. The Westing
house company, which is to hold centennial
celebration in May, long after the wars
end, planned to issue an invitation to M. Joliet
Curie, as well as to other foreign scientists.
General Groves offered some behind-the
scenes objections, and the invitation was not
issued to the Frenchman.
The scientists rightly ask how long this lat
ter sort of thing must go on. If we are to
put up intellectual bars around the country,
intended to keep all foreign scientists out and
all our scientists in, we will create as much
of barrier % international understanding as
if we strengthen and build up tariff and cultur-
al BARRIERS Some secrecy in connection with
the atomic bomb and other military projects
is essential, but again we must follow the
middle ground.
Publicizing now every detail of the manu-
facture of the atomic bomb a nd of other
ornaments would serve no useful purpose
Indeed, as James Henle points out in letter
full dissemination Of all the data about the
atomic bomb to all the nations in the world
would not stop armament or atomic compe
tition; it might, indeed stimulate ii. For
atomic development has by no means ceased,
and dissemination of all the facts today would,
as MIR. Henle notes merely put competition
on different plane, and every government
will Immediately proceed to expend time and
money in perfecting more deadly bomb than
any other government possesses.
But L. N. Ridenour has written in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago:
1--WE can make an analogy Gin secret
policies) with the way other weapons are
handled. The design Of guns is kept conf
dental yet the metallurgy of steel is dealt
with in the usual way Military aircraft are
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