Evening star., 1946-09-08
By Percy Black

teSo tSttttEt CuSY fCuCft VI UT UuSGS
OF influence, explaining anxiety.
from Turkey, have enormous strategic
value. 1t not only dominates the ap-
proaches to the trans-Caucasian oil
fields of Russia from Turkey but it is
the military gateway to Turkey, Syria
and Iraq.
Seek Kurd Autonomy.
Southeast of the Kar Plateau, the
Soyiets are also promoting an autonom-
GUS Kurdish republic to be carved out of
Turkey, Iraq and Iran. With Iran sub
servient to the Krenlin and Soviet con-
troll firmly established over this area,
the U. S. S. R. will be in military posi-
tion to dominate the Middle East, while
Soviet political penetration will advance
in rapid strides in the Moslem world
where might is right and the path OF
expediency leads to the strong.
To the Soviet general staff, the stakes
involved in this conquest of the Middle
East must appear far beyond the fond
est dreams of the Cars. The prize is
OIL With the Oil reserves of the West
ern Hemisphere fast diminishing, de-
nial of this oil to the western democ-
racies would seriously cripple the opera
ton of the British feet, prevent the
use of this oil to keep Western Europe
independent of Soviet economic domi-
nation and hinder the United States in
the accumulation of a strategic oil re-
serve.
The reasons behind the Soviet de-
mands that Trieste and the Italian
province of Venezia Guilia be given to
Yugoslavia are both economic and mill
tary. Inclusion of the port of Trieste
in the satellite state of Yugoslavia would
materially assist in the development of
the economic unity of Eastern Europe
within the sphere of Soviet economy.
The rail net which connects Trieste with
Budapest, Vienna and Prague provides a
continuous transportation link from
Stettin on the Baltic to the Adriatic and
direct connection via the Danube with
Romania and Russia. Internationaliza-
ton of the port of Trieste would be con-
trary to the policy of closed economy
which the U. S. S. R. is pursuing, and
fail to satisfy the defensive psychology
of the Soviet general staff.
Soviet demands that the province of
Venezia Guilia be incorporated in Yugo-
Slavia is another defensive measure based
on fear and distrust of the Western de-
mocracies. BY acquisition of this terri
tory. Yugoslavia would be in possession
OF the famous 1sonzo line along which
the inferior Austrian armies were able
to hold off greatly superior Italian
forces until the final collapse of Aus
tria in World War I. Possession of the
Isonzo line of Yugoslavia would insure
protection of the Ljubljana Gap, vital
link in the communicat atoms from Trieste
to Budapest.
The traditional Russian urge for ac-
cess to the open sea has been the key
stone of Russian foreign policy. This
is understandable 1t derives from
the same feeling of encirclement which
has driven the German people to their
struggle for lebensraum. The geograph-
ical position of Russia compels her to
continue the age-old struggle between
the land-locked and the sea borne ma
tions
One aspect of this problem was mem
toned by Mr.. Voznessensky in his report
when he spoke Of Southern Sakalin and
the Kurile Islands. Security of the
approaches to Russia's already existing
ports is one of the most pressing of
Soviet strategic problems. While the
ovifc cfol> ta ha
are now firmly in Soviet hands, security
of the entrance to the Barents Sea route
to the ice-free port of Murmansk must
seem equally important to the Soviet
general staff. During the war this life
line was nearly severed by the German
submarine and air blockade, operated
from Norway. To guarantee security of
the Barents Sea route to Murmansk
for the future, the u S. S. R. must have
air and naval bases either on the main
land of Norway or on the Spitzbergen
Archipelago which lies athwart the
entrance to the Barents Sea- In ad-
dition the Soviets should be reluctant to
see any other power occupy Iceland
This attitude undoubtedly accounts for
the apparently unrelated objection
voiced by the U. S. S. r., to the possi-
bility of United States bases on Iceland
and to her insistance on the immediate
withdrawal of United States troops.
Would Be Naval Power.
AS result of this urge for access to
the sea, Russia has always aspired to
become naval power. In the past, first
Sweden and then Germany in the Baltic
and Britain in the Mediterranean have
blocked her. With Russian military pow
er at its peak, this inspiration now seems
capable of fulfilment Stain has already
declared his intention to build fleet
Today Russia is mistress of the Baltic.
The great ports of Riga, Koenigsberg,
Danzig, Gdynia and Stettin are under
her control. Mastery of the Baltic, how
ever still does not given access to the
open sea. To dominate the exits from the
Baltic to the Atlantic, the U. s. S. r.
must be assured Of the cooperation or