Evening star., 1946-07-26

Lne DemOCraClc voters respond UO
his appeal. Yet, though there were
hundreds Of columns written about
his "lost prestige certainly he sus-
tanned no political damage.
In 1910, breaking the third-tern
tradition, he was renominated al.
most unanimously and overwhelm-
ingly elected, carrying by large ma
jorities all the States in which he
had so vainly intervened. He just
was not hurt at all. And in a little
while everybody had forgotten al
about his "lost prestige"
So much for precedent. There Is
no more reason to believe Mr.. Tru-
man would be damaged by defeat
in his intervention than Mr.. Roose-
velt was in his far more extensive
one. And he may not be defeated
Actually, the Truman course in this
case seems the intelligent one. As
he sees it. Mr.. Slaughter not only
Is opposed to his policies but as a
member of the powerful House
Rules Committee is in position tc
block, choke and Illustrate the Tru-
man program. This he has most
effectually done and. If reelected
undoubtedly will continue to do it
Wide Apart.
He and the President are wide
apart. There is no chance of bring
ing Mr.. Slaughter into the admin
istration fold. Under these circum-
stances, Mr.. Truman would have
been politically cowardly not to have
q showdown with Mr. Slaughter in
his district.
And what Is the grave mistake?
Where is the risk? What is stupid
about 1t? Suppose Mr.. Slaughter
wins, as he easily may-for, here
tofore, the voters have tended to
rally to the local boy in instances
Of presidential Intervention. 1t
would be interpreted as rebuff
to the President and in a way it
would be. 1t would be said that he
had 'lost prestige" and been hurt.
But would that be true? Certainly,
it was not true with Mr.. Roosevelt.
Why then with Mr. Truman? Ac-
tually, Mr.. Truman would be exact
1y as he now Is with Mr.. Slaughter
That gentleman is the consistent
and bitter opponent of his policies
and not friendly. personally. A
reelected Slaughter would still be
all that-but nothing more.
The situation simply would not
have changed. Mr.. Truman would
be just where he is now with a de-
termined member of his own party
opposing him on the Rules Com
mittee where he can do real dam
age. He would have lost no per-
sonal strength and suffered no po-
litical injury. There is reason to
believe Mr.. Truman, who is any
thing but stupid politician. knows
all this and took the risk well aware
of the interpretations which would
follow Slaughter victory,
Risk Worth Taking.
Certainly. the risk is worth TAX
ing if only to make it clear that he
notes we'll MS Democratic oppo-
nents in Congress and cannot be
kicked around by them with COM
plete impunity. And, as said before,
Mr.. Slaughter may not win.
The grave mistake is not in let
ting it be known that he would like
to see this Missouri opponent of his
policies eliminated. A much better
argument can be made that the
grave mistake" Is in having these
policies. For the fact is that Mr.
Slaughter is a consistent, conserva-
tive Democrat and the Truman poll
cies he has opposed are really the
old Roosevelt - New Deal CIO -
policies which Mr. Truman felt he
had to adopt and make his own
That was a mistake-first. because
the policies are not now-and never
were-inherently sound or in the
national interests: second, because
his adoption and promotion of these
policies have not gained him the
friendship of either the Roosevelt
New Dealers or the CIO profes-
sionals.
Question of Policies.
It not only can be argued that ii
was a grave mistake" to adopt
these policies but it can be argued
that it was stupid politics" and
''unsound judgment" to have done
so.
Probably Mr.. Truman felt an obli-
cation tn "carrv o,It the Roosevelt
policies" Perhaps, too, he is con-
vinced of the political necessity OF
maintaining the White House tie
with the CIO. Maybe he feels COM
PEELED to travel forever along the
Roosevelt path because of the clat-
ter which the former Roosevelt job
holders and hangers - on make
about it. Those are his mistakes