Evening star., 1946-01-13

war materials and secure adequate in
formation on the manpower, resources
and productive facilities of the Nation.
Commenting on our prewar unpre-
paredness, Eberstadt said:
"In the period before the war one OF
our most obvious failures lay in the field
OF intelligence. Various departments
and agencies had their own separate in
telligence service. Undoubtedly our ar
rangement and sources for obtaining So
called secret information were made
quate. Material collected by one agency
was not generally shared with the others.
There was no central organization whose
functions it was to coordinate these
various intelligence agencies and to
gather together for the use of those re-
sponsible for national policies all the
information which might be relevant
to an important decision.
Arnold for Central Agency.
mo one can say accurately whether
and to what extent our war effort suf-
fered at the beginning from the lack of
such co-ordinating agency. During
the war, this condition was substantially
remedied by the creation Of the Office
OF Strategic Services and the joint in
telligence agencies which operated under
the direction of the joint chiefs of staff.
"It is imperative that some account
be taken of this experience and that
provision be made in the future organ
lzation of our national security for
adequate handling of intelligence"
Gen. Arnold, commander of the Army
Air Forces, likewise demanded a per-
manent. centralized intelligence agency.
In his recent annual report to the
Secretary of War he wroteA
Our past conception of intelligence
was insuMcient to cover the require
ments of modern war.
Detailed and moment-by- moment
knowledge of all aspects Of civilian and
military activity within the territory
OF an enemy or potential enemy is
essential to sound planning in times
OF peace or war. Continuous knowledge
of potential enemies, covering their
entire political, social, industrial, scien-
tif1c and military life is also necessary
to provide warning of impending
danger.
Much of Plan Secret.
Strategic air warfare can neither
be Soundly planned nor efficiently exc
cuted without continuous flow of
detailed information of this kind. In
the future 1t will be suicidally danger
Gus to depend upon reports of military
attaches and routine or casual sources
OF information regarding foreign states.
There is a great need for a perma-
nent national organization which not
only deals with broad questions of policy
but also collects, evaluates and dissemi-
mates a continuous stream of intelli-
gence data. In addition we must have
a competent and active air intelligence
organization within the air force work.
ing with such national organ
ization in times of peace and war"
In Col. McCormack's cubbyhole Of
an office in the State Department
Building is large chart, the details
of which cannot be published, showing
how he plans to coordinate" the
work of dozen or more departments
and agencies. One-third of the chart
has been pasted over with blank paper,
concealing the plans for counter
intelligence and espionage.
For the so-called "open intelligence"
there are Is or 30 committees, the
chairman of which would come from
the department having the primary
interest. Some committees would have
their own stats. Thus the Sociological
Committee, composed of representatives
from the State, War, Navy, Commerce,
Labor and Agriculture Departments and
several agencies, such as the Federal
Security Administration, would compile
information about populations, birth
and death rates, racial characteristics
migration, education, health and living
standards.
Worked at Cross Purposes.
Nowhere in the present plans have
arrangements been made for a fun
neling of all information to a central
or focal spot so small group of per-
sons would have as complete picture
as possible of an individual country or
| an individual subject.
In his radio broadcast Mccormick
conceded that even now some infor-
nation is held back by departments.
Asked if the Army and Navy intelli-
gence reports came to the State De-
partment automatically or had to be
called for, he replied:
Most of them are channeled to us.
But we don't pretend to be clearing
house for all intelligence. We get only
| reports we can use on a regular basis.
Under the proposed intelligence au-
thority, the State Department will be
represented on most of the working
committees, since its interests are so
wide. So it will be In close touch with
everything that goes on in the intelli-
gence field"
Eberstadt pointed out in his report
that the British Secret Intelligence
served all government divisions and
drew on all military and civilian agen-
cies for personnel having special knowl-
edge and aptitudes.
Almost every one admits that our
prewar intelligence was woefu1ly made
quate, and that we paid price for our
unpreparedness in this highly specialized
| field. Today the problem is much more
widely spread and complex. If some
person or some group has the entire
picture of the changing world, the re-
sponsible officials can be given the in
formation for their decisions. One big
organization, such as Gen. Donovan