Evening star., 1946-01-21
Pearl Hurbor Perspective

History, with the perspective of
the long tomorrow" Admiral Kim
mel told the Pearl Harbor Investi-
eating Committee, will enter the
final directive in my case. I am
confident of the verdict" There can
be no doubt that, as the perspective
grows longer in the Pearl Harbor
case, many of the circumstances
surrounding the disaster tend to
stand out in sharper focus for all to
see. Admiral Kimmel's prepared
statement and subsequent testimony
to date have thrown additional light
on some events not hitherto clearly
revealed. Throughout his testimony
runs the well-known "too little"
theme-too little of everything from
planes to information. And with
respect to information, Admiral
Kimmel has provided first-hand
confirmation of what has been in
dicated in earlier hearings: That he
was commander charged with
grave responsibility but deprived by
higher authority of vital informa-
ton concerning latest moves OF his
potential enemy.
Affirmative Misrepresentation" is
what Admiral Kimmel called this
policy of withholding from him sew
eral of the more important inter-
ceptS of japanese messages which
passed between Pearl Harbor and
Tokyo shortly before December 7,
1941. That this policy misled him
can hardly be doubted. Washington
had been sending to the Pacific Fleet
commander over a long period the
decided messages intercepted by
our intelligence agents. 1t was not
illogical for Admiral Kimmel to as
sumo that he was being supplied
as he had requeSted-with every
bit OF information that could possibly
be of value to him in carrying out
his responsibilities. Instead, his su-
periors in Washington failed to send
him such significant messages as
the one disclosing that Tokyo had
divided Pearl Harbor into five areas
and was seeking a detailed listing
of warships in each area. Even if
the significance of such a message
was lost on those in Washington
who received them, they might have
been evaluated properly by COM
manders close to the scene of de-
veloping events.
1t has been testified by earlier
witnesses that some of the inter-
cepts were withheld for fear that
the japanese might learn through
leaks" or other sources that we had
broken their code. but it is difficult
to reconcile this explanation with
the undisputed fact that less i'm
portant messages were sent to Kim
mel almost up to the time of the Jap
attack on Pearl Harbor. Moreover,
If Washington feared tapped COM
munications, there was ample time
to fly courier to Hawaii with some
of the information, including the
disclosure that the Japs were chart
ing ship berthing areas at our Pa
cif1c base-certainly for no friendly
reason. One of these charts, with
"battleship row" plainly marked out
and ships identified by name, was
found after the attack in a crashed
japanese plane.
Under the balancing effect of the
lengthening perspective, with it's
tendency to bring all angles of the
picture into proper relationship, it
seems clear that, whatever the
personal responsibility of Admiral
Kimmel for Pearl Harbor. he was
gravely handicapped by the failure
of his superiors in Washington to
supply him with information vital
to the proper discharge of his
responsibilities.