Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-09-01

- ~ j ~ j ~
budget for national defense the ex
pense of maintaining them.
The committee includes, anon,
others, such Anticipated and useless
military posts as Governors Island
the fort which was obsolete in tn,
War of 1872. Aside from admin
:. stration buildings which properl,
;. should have been built elsewhere
the principal peacetime use of Gov
errors Island is as a polo field ant
l. country club for officers stationed
in New York City.
Il After the sad experience O
World War I with camp construc
ton, it was disgraceful that we en-
tered into World War II with al
!, Army that had no conception of tn,
proper location for its large camps
!, what kinds and types of building
they should contain and how tn,
materials and supplies necessar,
for construction could be assem-
|, bled, delivered, and installed.
i We must never again have t,
abandon large camp site simpl,
because no one has bothered to in
quire as to whether water could b,
obtained there. We must neve
again have general explain tina
he located a hospital in a swami
because he rode over the land OF
horseback in winter and didn't no
tice any mud. We must never agar
have a general explain that HI
never expected another war ano
therefore did not find it necessar,
to provide for the possibility Of
training large numbers of soldier;
in camps.
Superior Equipment Necessary.
Similarly, as to equipment, it is
more important that our industry
be technically superior to our op-
ponents' and that our Army ano
Navy Cooperate with our industries
in developing new and better tech
nlques and applying them to war
fare than it is to have a large
Army and Navy equipped with huge
quantities of obsolete or obsolescent
material.
At the beginning of World War
II we had no modern tanks, air.
planes, artillery, and small arms;
nor did we have plans or blueprints
for many of the most important
items of such equipment. $50
The designs of both Army and
Navy fighters and bombers before
the war were, in many respects, in
ferior to the best designs of other
leading nations. For example, our
Army and Navy had not developed
self-sealing rubber gas tanks or
armor protection for pilots. Even
during the war Germany was far
ahead of this country in the devel-
opment of jet-propelled aircraft and
guided missiles. We failed to prompt
ly grasp the Importance of these
two revolutionary developments in
the field of aeronautics. *''
The very fact that we were able
to make such immense strides in
devlslng new war materiel and i'm
proving existing forms of war ma
terrell in such short time empha-
sizes the extent to which our prewar
Army and Navy had failed in peace
time to plan for up-to-date equip
ment which was adequate in war
time.
Plans for Industrial Mobilization.
1t is desirable to have plans
Tor industrial mobilization which
can be pulled out of series of filing
cabinets on some future mobilization
day and placed into operation. How.
ever, such plans are relatively USE
less unless the Army and Navy know
exactly what they want produced.
In World War II we had such an
M-day plan. But the Army and the
Navy did not have modern, up-to-
date designs for their equipment
They did not know what they needed
the quantities they needed or when
they needed them. The plan was
never placed in effect, presumably
because the armed services knew
that 1T was so inadequate that they
believed 1t better to start completely
from scratch. AS for M-day, it was
never declared.
This disregard for the staff work
of two decades and the industrial
mobilization plan, which had been
put together laboriously and which
the public had been told was an i'm
portant safeguard to the Nation, in
dlcates that the work either was
done so poorly as to warrant the
severest condemnation or that the
plan should not have been shelved
in its entirety in favor of a new
start from scratch
The truth probably lies between
these alternatives, because much of
the planning in the industrial mobi-
lization plan was good and should
have been utilized. 49,
Research Funds Required.
These experiences of World War
II must not be forgotten, and sound
Mans should be instituted to make
~ertain that in the event of another
var they do not recur. This means
III turn that the Army and Navy
LIQUID be given sufficient funds to
-Jnduct adequate research and de-
.elopment and should be encouraged
- develop adequate personnel trained
IN research and development, so that
our Army and Navy Can have the
finest weapons that our industrial
and technical skill can produce. 80
/ Good planning, done we'll in ad.
vance of the emergency, and kept ur
to date, should render impossible q
recurrence of the scandalous waste
inherent in the hastily conceived
projects which were ordered in con.
struction without any sound analyst;
OF the problems which would be en-.
countered and the benefits which
might be obtained.
- The history of Government
controls during World War II was
one of improvisation, frequently
successful, but confusing, and very
often resulting in duplication anc
inefficiency. -
There Is an urgent need for 9
technical study to be made of the
methods of control which were mos
successful in each field and for this