Evening star., 1946-07-21

tain the various arguments anQ
conclusions INDUCED in in the COM
mittee report"
What was done in Washington,
as we'll as what was done in Ha-
waii, was admittedly done in the
light of the universal military belief
that Hawaii was not in danger
from an initial attack by JAPAN"
said Mr.. Keefe.
If this belief was unjustified, as
I believe it was, then the mistake
lies on the Washington doorstep
just as much as it does upon that
Of Hawaii. feel that facts
have been marshaled, perhaps un-
Intentionally, with the idea of con-
ferring blame upon Hawaii and
minimizing the blame that should
properly be assessed at Washing
ton"
Sees Soft Light on Capital.
Again, he argued, 1.-THE committee
report, I feel. does not with exacti-
tude apply the same yardstick in
measuring responsibilities at Wash
ington as has been applied to the
Hawaiian commanders. I cannot
suppress the feeling that the COM
mittee report endeavors to throw
as soft a light as possible on the
Washington scene"
Mr.. Keefe contended basing the
Fleet at Hawaii was inherently
untenable and dangerous" in view
Of the Army Navy defense facilities
available there in 1941.
"On the evidence before us I con-
cur in the findings of the committee
with respect to responsibilities Of
our commanders in Hawaii" Mr..
Keefe went on. II believe that the
mistakes of judgment referred to
in the committee report are directly
related to the failures of the high
commands in Washington to have
their organizations fully alerted and
on a war footing and that those in
command at the Washington level
must bear their full share of the
responsibility for the tragedy Of
Pearl Harbor.
Secret Diplomacy Criticized.
II further conclude that secret
diplomacy was at the root of the
tragedy. The United States had
warned Japan that an advance to
Malaga or the Dutch East Indies
would mean war with this Nation.
The President gave Great Britain
assurances Of our armed support in
such event. What Japan and Brit
ain knew, our commanders in the
field and our own people did not
know. Washington feared that ma
tlonal unity could not be attained
unless Japan committed the first
overt act. Accordingly, the Army in
Hawaii was put on an antisabotaee
alert, defensive posture containing
the least possible risk of incident in
Hawaii which Japan might claim
was an overt act by the United
States.
The mobilization of American
PUBLIC opinion in support of an Of
fensive by the Pacific Fleet against
Japan was to be accomplished, if
at all, by a message to Congress at
tne last stage of our relations, re-
latlng to actual hostilities.' This
message was to be the prelude to
noStllltles by the United States If
Japan attacked the British and
Dutch at the outset of the war and
old not attack this Nation. A d.
rect attack by Japan against the
United States at the outset of hos
tlIltles would make such a message
unnecessary. Mr.. Stimson's diary
eiormer Secretary of War Henry 7,
Stlmson describes the plan suc-
cinctiy: The question was how we
should maneuver them into the no.
sltion OF firing the first shot with.
OUT allowing too much danger tn
ourselves In formulating this plan
undoubtedly Washington was inf1,,-
enced by public promises to keen nc
oue OF war unless attacked.
First Duty Not Performed
with full knowledge of Japan,s
intention prior to the attack. Wash.
ington mad one plain duty to thu
american people. That duty was te
INFORM them of the peril. This wa.
tot oone. Washington had a furthe,
outy to make sure that our arn,a a.
iorces were ready to meet the .t.
Jack by furnishing their commander.
aneio and af1oat with all available
information, or by. evaluatine thai
Information and giving them an.
pIoprlate clear and cateporic in
structions. LII
Those who find In various in
stances of poor co-ordination ha
tween the services the cause of Pearl
Haroor are satisfied with a suner-
Ilclai explanation. The state a,
readiness of our armed forces in the
neld was a reflection of over-aIl
policy adopted on the highest levs1
N washington. The President had
delivered to him the japanese inter.
cepteo messages and possessed much
more information about japanese
plans and intentions than anv field
commander. He gave most min,,ts
directions to commanders in ~
neid, even as to the scouting positions
OF individual ships, when he thought
such directions necessary. A merper
OF the armed forces and unity of
command in Hawaii in November and
December, 1s41, could not have elimi-
mated the dangers in the policy Of
maneuyering Japan into striking
the first blow. That policy wol,ld
have shaped the orders given. as
well as the information sent to a
single commander in the field"
Congress Defended.
Mr.. Keefe also challenged the
statement of President Truman in
August, 1945, that efforts of Presi-
dent Roosevelt to get preparedness
program through before the war
were "stif1ed" in Congress.
The Wisconsin Representative said
the record showed that: During the
fiscal years 1884 to 194l inclusive.
the Army and Navy jointly asked for
$26 $50, ,145,093; that in the same
period ths President recommended