Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-23


of relations with Japan.
Mr. Kaufman asked him why he
assumed that in the event of crisis
Gen. Marshall would supervise the
alert orders.
He had very definitely done that
in 1940," Gen. Short replied.
Gen. Short had reference to an
incident in June, 1910, when Gen
Marshall ordered 1t Gen. C. D
Heron, then commander in Hawaii
to Immediately alert complete de-
fensive organization to deal with
possible trans-Pacific raid. : y"
Seek Speedier Hearing.
AS the questioning of Gen. Short
got under way, the committee
planned an executive session this
afternoon in a further effort to
agree on plans for speeding up the
completion of the hearings. A two
hour closed session late yesterday
failed to bring an agreement.
After recalling the 1910 alert
which kept the Army poised for an
attack for several weeks before ii
was relaxed, Gen. Short continued
II expected him Gen. MarshalD
to do one of two things-either orde,
the general alert, or give me sufi-
Icient information"
Mr.. Kaufman asked him to con-
slider that conditions in the worlo
had changed materially between the
summer of 1910 and the fall of l941
increasing the problems and duties
of the top officials in Washington.
But I also recognized that things
which were dangerous in 1910 woulo
be dangerous in 194l." Gen. Short
responded.
Stressed Attack Danger.
Mr.. Kaufman began by citing the
I letters that passed between Gems
Marshall and Short early in 1941
as having stressed the possible
danger of air attack. Some of thes,
letters related to requests Gen
Short was submitting for additions
weapons and other defense equip
ment.
Gen. Short contended the,
stressed the danger of any kind O.
attack
Mr.. Kaufman asked If it was no
a fact that Hawaii was given {
priority in the allotment of aide,
facilities, including fighter plane
and radar installations during 1871
up to a certain point" Gen. .Shor
replied. Then they began to sem
all the Bits to the Philippines
They even took some away from
Hawaii to go to the Philippines
He agreed that the fighter plane
were increased and that provision
was made for six mobile radar sets
Three fixed radar stations also wer
being installed, but the general sal
these were not ready at the time o
the attack.
Equipment Not Ready.
GAS a matter of fact, if you ha
more equipment on December 7
wouldn't have made any difference
because what was there was no
alerted," counsel pressed.
1T would have made a great dea
of difference if I had had more ma
terial and the information the Wa
Department had," Gen Short. re
piled.
1t is understood that one of tn
main issues debated in yesterday
closed session was how far to go il
calling the staff officers of Ger
Short and Rear Admiral Husband T
Kimmel, who was Pacific Fleet com
mander in 1941 A decision on thi
question will have much to do wit
the length of the hearings.
Limit on Testimony Urged.
! The committee was reported t
be debating suggestions that tn
testimony of these staff officers Il
previous Investigations be accepted
or that some limit be placed on thei
examination as witnesses now. Tn
meeting is said to have develope
a wide range of individual opinion
without regard to party lines.
The controversial winds" mes
sage was not gone into, accordin
to reliable reports. This question
alone will involve calling a scor
Of witnesses, if the committee de
cides to settle the dispute owe
whether this Government ever in
tercepted before the Pearl Harbo
attack a winds code message Il
which Japan made known its in
tention to 60 to war against tn
United States.
i Chairman Barley declined to re
veal any of the expediting sugges
tons that were discussed, pendin
further consideration today.
Senator Barley told reporters h
still is hoping we are going t
finish February 15," but realization
of this hope hinges on today's ex
i ecutive session.
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