The Wilmington morning star., 1946-01-01
PROBE REVEALS
SHORTS REPORT
Continued from Page One)

who were apprehended the day
following.
Before the attack was over en-
gineers began repairing the two
damaged airfields-Wheeler and
Hickam-and repairing planes.
Planes that were thus able to get
into the air before the Japs got
away downed 10 of the enemy
craft.
Shorts testimony before the
three commissions was exhaus-
tive, and in many cases, repeti-
tive. But it developed these major
points:
l. When he replied to the Army S
war warning of Dec. q, 1941, that
he was "alerted against sabotage
and maintaining liaison with the
Navy, Short was certain that this
answer satisfied the War Depart
ment. His belief was bolstered
by the fact that they made no
further inquiry of his defense plans
during the next 10 days.
2. Ten days before the Pearl
Harbor attack, Short thought
there was only a "slight chance"
of an air assault on Hawaii. He
believed the real danger was from
sabotage, disorders Or. possible
uprisings.
3. He did not see how it was
possible for him to have carried
out the desires of the War Depart
ment unless he was presumed to
have had more knowledge than
it possessed of the dangers of a
Jap attack, or knew more than
the Navy Department did about
the location of the Jap carriers
eastward bound for the attack.
4. Short did not believe he
should even be adjudged guilty Of
an error in judgment since he did
not foresee the Army's failure to
notify him on Dec. 7th Of the prob
able attack before it was made.
5. Short was convinced that the
"War Department did not fear an
attack on Honolulu from the air" ;"
6. 1t was the Navy's responsible
ty to carry out distant air recon-
naissance, and Short had an
'abiding confidence" that the Navy
would warn him of any impend-
ing enemy attack.
2. The United States law re-
quiring foreign agents to register
with the State Department had
''never been enforced" in Hawaii
8. Short never was shown the
Navy message sent from Washing
aon Dec. 3, advising Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, Navy Pacific
commander, that Jap diplomats
had been instructed to destroy
their codes.
9. While Short fully expected a
Jap attack, he thought it would
be made on the Philippines, where
the U. S. Naval forces were small
er than at Pearl Harbor.
10. Short was not told that the
State Department. had advised the
Army and Navy on Nov. 26, 1941
that it could go no further on
peace" negotiations with the
Japanese, and that the security of
the country therefore was in the
hands of the Army and Navy.
II. Even if the Army could have
mustered all of it's planes in Hawaii
to fight the Jap attack, its force
would have been "quite inferior"
to the enemy's. .---------
IL. Radar, for detecting ap-
preaching aircraft, was not used
very extensively in Pearl Harbor
because it was new and there were
few men trained to operate it.
13. The attack was complete"
surprise to Short, who wasn't in
formed until the day after that
a Jap submarine had been sunk
in the prohibited area just before
the air assault.
IA. Short knew of no drunkenness
involving the services on the night
of Dec. 6, as has been rumored.
Is. If the War Department had
telephoned him its Dec. warning,
he would have had two hours
notice. The message, sent by COM
mercial cable, reached Short seven
hours after the attack.
16. Short would have considered
his task of defense lessened had
the U. S. Fleet been at sea in
stead of bottled up in Pearl Har-
bor.