Evening star., 1946-10-03

Memorandum No. 8, submitted to
the commission by the United States
representative on July IL and widely
published in the press. We said at
that time:
"The controls established. by the
treaty would be wholly Intellectual II,
In any such situations, to be defined
in the treaty, the enforcement OF
security provisions could be ! pre-
vented by the vote Of a state which
has signed the treaty. Any other
conception would render the, whole
principle Of veto ridiculous. 1t Is
intended to be an instrument for the
protection of nations. not a shield
behind which deception and criminal
acts can be performed with impunity
This In no way impairs the doctrine
of unanimity. No state need be an
unwilling party to the treaty. But
every state which freely and willing
|y becomes a. party to the treaty, by
this act, solemnly. and firmly binds
itself to abide by its undertakings.
Such undertakings would become
illusory, If the guarantee against
their breach resided solely in the
conscience of the one who commits
the breach.
Veto Relevant After Treaty.
voluntary REIMBURSEMENT Of the
veto ON questions relating to a spe-
cific weapon, previously outlawed by
unanimous agreement because OF
its uniquely. destructive character,
in nowise involves any compromise
of the principle Of unanimity OF
action as applied to general prob
lens or to particular situations not
foreseeable and therefore not
susceptible to advance unanimous
agreement"
There is, of course. no difference
OF opinion as to Secretary Wallace's
statement that until we arrive at
a treaty, not only the major powers,
but all nations will have an effec-
tive veto over any proposals. But
our plan has never taken issue
with this kind of veto. Once the
treaty has been ratified, the veto
becomes highly relevant. It should
not then be available as q possible
means Of protecting wrong -doers
from punishment called for by the
treaty itself. Nor could the atomic
development authority function ef-
fectively unless the veto were re-
moved as q possible hindrance to
its day-to-day administrative opera
tions.
In answer to Secretary Wallace's s
specific question, the action which
might be vetoed is a proposal to
punish a violation of the treaty.
Thus, the United States proposal
is designed to extend as far as
possible the domain Of effective In
ternational law In support Of peace
by defining the various classes Of
crimes, providing for judicial de-
termination Of guilt, and setting up
machinery for carrying out ap-
propriate punishments. This pro-
posal Is In sharp contrast with
the assumption that the only pos
sible sanction against international
crimes Is resort to the ultimate po-
litical measure Of war-an assump-
ton seemingly made by Mr.. Wal
lace. Even II resort to war should
prove necessary as punishment,
this action should not be q mere
series OF unilateral steps by the
nations who "are free to take what
action they feel Is necessary as
Mr.. Wallace says, but should rather
be united action pursuant to a recog-
nized international agreement.
4. Nature of the Soviet Proposal.
ta) Secretary Wallace's State
ments, I,.. ye~
Secretary Wallace's letter states:
THE Russian counterproposal it
self is an indication that they may
be willing to negotiate seriously II
we are. Inrsome respects their coun-
terproposal goes even further than
our plan and Is in agreement with
the basic principles Of our plan,
which is to make violations Of the
proposed treaty national and In