The Wilmington morning star., 1946-06-22
tStewing In His Juice
BY H KROCK

- T. dtSSy VI oGidhi6 u"
the President a temporary labor-curb mea-
sure as a substitute for the permanent regula-
tons of the Case bill is in a state of sinking
suspension in Congress.
The reason given by the Republicans who
first endorsed the strategy and now have cool
ed toward 1t is that the best politics is to let
Mr.. Truman "stew in his own juice" III their
opinion, a ~scalding liquid produced by his tenn
porary labor legislative proposals and his veto
of the Case bill.
But at the same time it can be reported
that, if the plan is ABANDONED, the President
and his political advisers will be pleased and
will feel increased confidence that Mr.. Tru-
man has repaired such political losses as he
may have sustained among members Of or
ganized labor in his recent skirmishes with
their leaders and with Congress. This is a
paradox, but that is nothing new in politics.
The Republicans who, after long and con-
tinuous efforts to ~legislate a number of fun
damental labor curbs, encouraged the strate-
gy described above and then argued against
attempting it, view the situation as follows:
Mr.. Truman acquired certain public assets by
his vigorous handling of the railroad strike
and by being the first President in thirteen
years to propose any balance lat all in the
p%ro-labor laws. But he lost these public assets
because of the workers draft proposal and
other features of the emergency legislation
he sought. And then he got himself further in
the political red by vetoing the Case bill
because that was disapproved by the public
and did not remove the grievances Of labor
against him for his emergency program. So,
runs the conclusion, Congress should let him
founder III the pit he dug.
The President and MS political counselors,
however, think this is the situation: Mr.. Tru-
man angered and a~lienated important sec
lions Of organized labor by strong-arming the
railroad strike and asking Congress to pass
his temporary plan. But he pretty well bal
anced the labor equation by vetoing the per-
manently imposed limitations of the Case bill
and by The pressure he simultaneously applied
to retain strong OPA.
Meanwhile, the public thinks Of him as the
man who put down the railroad strike and
asked for unusual peacetime powers to pre-
vent others that would paralyze the national
economy. And, since on labor curbs the pro-
ponents are badly divided, the Presidents
message on the Case bill produced a divided
reaction, much of which was favorable to the
message and to his position that no such meas
ure should become law before still another
study of the whole problem has been under
taken, as Mr.. Truman has also proposed.
Therefore, the President has divided his
critics and improved his political position with
the colrtry-at the expense of Congress.
The advocates of the strategy think this
second analysis is the more accurate. and
that is why they advanced their plan and still
it against the growing discourage
ment thar is coming from Senate Republicans
and Mr.. Martin, the House minority leader.
L it is adopted, they feel sure, the President
will be put definitely on the defensive and
remain there at heavy POLITICAL cost to him.
self and his party if he should veto the new
temporary measure. If he signs it, the reas-
nnlnp continues 4ho will ~ olyo L;oo ro.ra
among the people than he has been since he
first took office; but a much more important
consequence will be a balance in the labor
laws that will permit a return to full produc-
in the United States.
Their plan, evolved from their strategy, is
very definite. They would take what remained
OF the Presidents emergency legislation after
the bipartisan Senate group performed a ma
jor operation on it, and call this Title of q
temporary labor bill. They would make the
case bill conform more nearly to the Presi-
dents views as stated in his veto message
and add this as Title II
Under Title III they would put Mr.. Truman's
for a study of the whole problem by
joint Congressional committee, instructed to
report in about six months recommendations
for permanent labor legislation. The whole
measure would termina.e June 80. 1947. That
would allow Congress six months before il
w SOHoluCI Vile report Oh us SCuQy COM
mlttee ano pass a permanent law.
One detail of the plan is to eliminate from
Title II certain immediate legislation on the
necessity for which the President and the ma
lority Of Congress are egreed-the Hobbs bill.
Tor example-and pass this separately, prior
to the omnium temporary measure.
When, just after the veto of the Case bill
sustained in the House, this plan was
to a bipartisan conference there
general support for it. This support is
still strong among House members of the
group, bur it has steadily died away on the
Republican side of the Senate, the reasons
ascribed being those herein related. Unless
from that quarter is regained the
will be abandoned at this session,
and next session probably the iron that was
red-hot so recently can't be heated again.
The President and his political advisers. as
has been said, will be very we'll satisfied with
outcome. 1t will suit organized labor per-
fectly. The Republicans who blew hot and
then cold ON the plan are sure their political
interest will be served the best. Organized
labor's estimate is sound But the other two
groups can't both be right.-New York Times.