Evening star., 1946-01-28

matters, and for that reason, visited
the fleet intelligence Office. He
praised the work of Capt. E. T.
Layton, who was feet intelligence
officer in 1941.
There came a period when I
was concerned" Capt. zacharias
continued. That was what prompt
ed me to say to a group of officers,
I think it is time to stop having
surprise inspections and get ready
for surprise attack" He explained
he was referring to inspections of
the ships ordered without previous
notice.
The witness explained that his
cruiser was part of the Halsey task
force that took planes to Wake Is
land and did not get back to Pearl
Harbor until just after the attack
had occurred.
Delayed by Refueling.
Capt. Zacharias said the task force
originally was due back at Pearl
Harbor on December S, but had been
delayed by refueling and weather
conditions, "and now, I know, by
certain orders that did not speed up
our return"
DO you regard that as good luck
or bad luck?" asked Committee
Counsel Seth Richardson. n..~~~~.
Il regard that as good luck, be-
cause as commander of ship. 1
prefer to take my chances in the
open sea rather than in a closed
harbor."
Questioned about the orders he
had mentioned, he said that was
only hearsay, cleaned from the cur
rent hearings.
Capt. Zacharias said he was at sea
on December when he heard by
radio that the japanese Ambassador |
to Peru had arrived in Washing
ton, land that made me think
things were coming to head"
CThere were already two other
ENJOYS here. Nomura and Kurusu.)
No Access to Magic"
Chairman Barkley asked If Ad-
miral Kimmel, or his staff. had that
radio information Capt. Zacharias
pointed out that he had not told
those officers of his theory about the
arrival of third envoy.
He told Senator ,Barkley he did
not have access to Magic" the in
tercepted Jap messages in Washing
ton, but that if he had that in
formation it would have confirmed
his opinions.
Representative Cooper. Demo-
crat of Tennessee, asked the captain
why he attached so much impor-
tance to the arrival of the third
Jap emissary in Washington.
THAT came through experience
in intelligence work and observing
Japanese missions that came over
here ON inspections or purchasing
missions" he replied.
He said it was noticeable that |
these missions came in three differ
ent groups to look at the same thing. |
He said he decided the japanese
would not take the opinion of a
single individual, that the arrival
of the second was apt to lead to a |
difference of opinion and the third
would then be sent to determine the
issue.
Knew Nomura in Japan.
Capt. Zacharias said Admiral
Nomura, japanese Ambassador here
in 1941, told him during conversa-
ton at San Francisco that he hoped |
he could prevent war, because war
would mean the end of the Japa-
nese Empire and heavy losses to
the United States"
Il felt that he was quite anxious
to prevent war" the captain said.
adding that he had known Nomura
in Japan.
Capt. zacharias said he tried in
October, 1941, to discuss the critical
International situation with Admi-
raj Kimmel's war plans officer. Capt.
Charles H. McMorris but the latter
did not seem to be interested or to
want to talk about it.
you had warned Admiral Kim
mel in the spring." Senator Lucas.
Democrat, of Illinois pointed out.
Why didn't you warn him again in
lDIDjOIlIE