Evening star., 1946-01-06

tives" to Gen. Macarthur on urgent
matters" on which policies have not
already been established by the Far
Eastern Commission, the paragraph
continues:
provided that any directive dealing
with fundamental changes in the jap
anese constitutional structure or in the
regime of control, or dealing with a
change in the japanese government as a
whole will be issued only following con-
sultation and following the attainment
of agreement in the Far Eastern Com
mission"
Given Veto Power.
A following section provides that for
the commissions decisions to be effec-
tive, all the Big Four powers-the
United States, Great Britain, Russia
and China-must agree. Stated OBJ
versely, each has veto power over de-
cisions of the commission, which ap-
pears to be the body of ultimate decision
for major policies affecting Japan.
In addition, the Moscow agreements
set up an Allied Council for Japan to
sit in Tokyo and advise Gen. Macarthur.
Its role appears to be largely advisory,
but member Of the council may block
Gen. MacArthur's action on changes in
the regime of control, or in the Jap
anese government as whole, or on
changes in the japanese constitutional
structure, pending an appeal to the Far
. CT fGTy1 M 1rI1te ecjN f01s rS~
1t has been argued by those who ap-
prove the newly created Far Eastern
machinery that long-range policies for
Japan already have been determined
and that the United States. having a
veto power in the commission, may
block any Russian, British or Chinese
attempt to alter those policies. That,
undoubtedly, is true. But it is equally
obvious that they may stymie changes
in basic policies which the United
States considers necessary-an author
ity they did not have previously.
A good case can be made for the
thesis that the United States should
share control of Japan with its major
allies and that the Moscow agreement,
in this respect, is fair and workable.
But at the same time no one can deny
that it represents long retreat from
the original White House position that
''in the event of any difference of opin-
ion among them dhe Far Eastern pow
ers) the policies of the United States
will govern"
GuarantOr of Iran.
With respect to Iran, where Russia
now is attempting to carve out a place
of influence through a Moscow-inspired
autonomous movement" in Azerbaijan
Province, Mr.. Byrnes' course at the
conference had not been charted so
clearly by previous statements of policy
as in the case of the Balkan states and
the administration of Japan. However,
Iran appears to have strong claim on
American moral support in protecting
her sovereignty and territorial integrity
This country is party to the Te-
heran declaration of December l, 1943
by which the United States, Great Brit
ain and Soviet Russia jointly pledged
themselves to maintain the 'independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of Iran"
Iran charges-and these charges are
supported in general by neutral diplo-
matte reports-that the uprising in
Azerbaijan was inspired by Russian
agents who furnished the insurgents
with arms. The Soviet government
tacitly admitted in note to the United
States that it had stopped the advance
of Iranian troops which were dispatched
to put down the rebellion in the north.
Before he left here, Mr.. Byrnes had
appealed to the Russians to join the
United States in withdrawing all troops
from Iran by January l. That appeal
was rejected. The Iranian Ambassador
(See HARMONY, Page C-6)