davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1946-07-21

sening of alertness there for the
reason that the Hawaiian COM
mands were at no time properly
alert.
!. Complacency and procrastina
tion are out of place where sud =
den and decisive actions are OF
the essence.
Beyond serious question Army
and Navy officials both in Hawaii
and in Washington were beset by a
lassitude born of 20 years of peace
Admiral Kimmel admitted he was
affected by the peace psychology
just like everybody else. AS ex-
pressed by Admiral McMorris. 1--WE
were a bit too complacent there
The manner in which capable off,
GERS were affected Is to a degree
understandable, but the Army anG
the Navy are the watchdogs of the
Evening star., 1946-07-21
favor Of supplying the informa-
finpV

Admiral Stark hesitated about
sending the 81 o'clock" intelligence
to the Pacific outposts for the rea-
son that he regarded them as ade-
quately alerted and he did not want
to confuse them. AS has been seen,
he was properly entitled to believe
the naval establishments were ade-
quately alert, but the fact is that
one-Hawaii-was not in state of
readiness. This one exception is
proof of the principle that any ques-
tion as to whether information
should be supplied the field should
always be resolved in favor of trans
mitting it.
4. The delegation of authority or
the issuance of orders entails
the duty Of inspection to de-
termine that the official man
date is properly exercised.
Perhaps the most signal short
coming Of administration, both at
Washington and in Hawaii, was the
failure to follow up orders and In
structions to insure that they were
carried out. The records of all
Pearl Harbor proceedings is replete
with evidence of this fundamental
deficiency in administration. A few
illustrations should clearly demon
strate this fact.
In the dispatch of November 27,
l94l, which was to be considered a
war warning" Admiral Kimmel
was instructed to execute an appro-
pirate defensive deployment pre-
paratory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL-46." Very little
was done pursuant to this order
with a view to defensive deploy-
ment; the Navy Department did
nothing to determine what had been
done in execution of the order. Yet
virtually every responsible Navy De-
partment offlcial has testified as to
what he assumed" Kimmel would
do upon receipt of this dispatch.
While 1t appears to have been the
policy to leave the implementation
of orders to the local commander,
as a matter of future practice it
would seem a safer policy to recog-
nize as implicit In the delegation of
authority or the issuance of orders
the responsibility Of inspecting and
supervising to determine that the
delegated authority is properly ad-
ministered and the orders carried
out.
The story of Admiral Kimmel's
administration of the Pacific Fleet
and supervision of the 14th Naval
District as well as Gen. Shorts ad-
ministration of the Hawaiian de-
partnent in the critical days before
December 7 Is the epitome of worthy
plans and purpose which were never
implemented. The job of an ad-
ministrator is only half completed
upon the issuance of an order; it is
discharged when he determines the
order has been executed.
5. The implementation of official
orders must be followed with
closest supervision.
In the November 27 warning sent
Gen. Short he was ordered ito un-
dertake such reconnaissance and
other measures as you deem neces-1
sary" and to report measures tax
en-" The commanding general re-
ported: Re your 472 Department
alerted to prevent sabotage Liaison
with Navy" This message from Gen.
Short was not clearly responsive to
the order. Yet during the nine days
Evening star., 1946-07-21
tion of responsibility in competent
s~l~

tion of responsibility in competent
officials.
On occasion witnesses have
echoed the sentiment that the Pearl
Harbor debacle was made possible,
not by the egregious errors or poor
judgment of any individual or in
dividuals, but rather by reason of
the imperfection and deficiencies
of the system whereby Army and
Navy Intelligence was co-ordinated
and evaluated. Only partial cred
ence, however, can be extended this
conclusion, inasmuch as no amount
of coordination and no system
could be effected to compensate for
lack of alertness and Imagination.
Nevertheless, there is substantial
basis, from a review of the Pearl
Harbor investigation in its entirety,
to conclude that the system of
handling intelligence was seriously
at fault and that the security of the
Nation can be insured only through
continuity of service and centraliza-
ton of responsibility in those
charged with handling intelligence.
And the assignment OF an officer
hauno an aptitude for such ,Dork
ouer an, extended period OF time
should not impede his progress nor
affect his promotions.
The professional character of in
telligence work does not appear to
have been properly appreciated in
either the War or Navy Depart
ments. 1t seems to have been regard
ed as just another tour of duty, as
reflected by limitations imposed on
the period of assignment to such
work. among other things. The COM
mittee has received the distinct i'm
preston that there was a tendency,
whether realized or not, to relegate
intelligence to role of secondary
importance.
AS an integrated picture, the Pearl
Harbor Investigations graphically
portray the imperative necessity. in
the War and Navy Departments, Cd
for selection of men for intelligence
work who possess the background,
capacity, and penchant for such
work; CD for maintaining them in
the work over an extended period of
time in order that they may become
stepped in the ramifcations and re-
f1nements Of their field and employ
this reservoir of knowledge in eval-
uating data received and go for
centralization of responsibility for
handling intelligence to avoid all of
the pitfalls of divided responsibility
which experience has made so
abundantly apparent.
8. The unapproachable or superior
attitude of officials is fatal; there
should never be any hesitancy in
asking for clarificat ti0n of instruc-
tions or in seeking advice on mat
ters that are in doubt.
Despite the fact that the record
of testimony in the Pearl Harbor
proceedings is filled with various in
terpretations as to what War and
Navy Department dispatches meant
In not one instance does it appear
that subordinate requested G
Qualification. Gen. Short was
ordered to undertake reconnais-
.sance, yet he apparently ignored the
order assuming that the man who
prepared it did not know of his spe-
cial agreement with the Navy in
Hawaii whereby the latter was te
Evening star., 1946-07-21

acterized by clarity, fortnight
ness, and appropriateness.
The evidence befort the commit
tee reflects an unusual number of
instances where military officers in
high positions OF responsibility in
terpreted orders, intelligence, and
other information and arrived at op-
posite conclusions at a time when
it was imperative for them to esti-
mate the situation and to arrive at
identical conclusions.
Admiral Kimmel was ordered to
execute an appropriate defensive de-
ploynlent. Every one in Washing
ton in testifying before the commit
tee seems reasonably certain as to
just what this meant; Admiral
Kimmel did not feel that it re-
quired his doing anything greatly
beyond that he had already done,
Evening star., 1946-07-21

out that he had failed to take the
necessary action to alert his COM
mand.
IL. Procedures must be sufficiently
flexible to meet the exigencies
of unusual situations.
Reviewing the Pearl Harbor evi-
dence there are, in both the War
and Navy establishments, several
illustrations of inf1exible procedures
that could not be or at least were
not subjected to sufficient alteration
to satisfy the exigencies of the stu
alton. Everything seems perforce to
have followed grooved pattern re-
gardless of the demands for dis
tinctive action. The idea Of pro-
ceeding through channels" was
carried to an extreme.
Among the best illustrations OF
this fact was the failure of Admiral
klmmel to advise Admiral Newton
that the war warning" had been
received. Admiral Newton was de-
parting from Pearl Harbor with
some of the most vital units of the
Pacific Fleet, yet because the table
of organization indicated Admiral
Brown to be Newton's superior, the
commander in chief did not take it
upon himself to insure that Newton
was fully informed as to the critical
situation between the United States
and Japan. and relied upon the
usual procedure whereby Brown
would keep Newton advised of de-
velopments.
IA. Restrictions Of highly confiden-
tial information to a minimum
number of officials, while often
necessary, should not be car
ried to the point of prejudicing
the work of the organization.
The Magic intelligence was pre-
eminently important and the neces-
sity for keeping it confidential can
not be overemphasized. However
so closely held and top secret was
this intelligence that 1t appears the
fact that Japanese codes had beer
broken was regarded as of more i'm
portapce than the information OBJ.
tanned from decoded trafflc. The
result of this rather specious prem.
Use was to leave large numbers Of
policy making and enforcement Of
ficials in Washington completely
oblivious of the most pertinent in.
formation concerning Japan.
The Federal Bureau of Investi.
cation, for example, was charged
with combating espionage, sabotage
and un-American activities withir
the United States. On February
Is, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Wash
! ington . detailed outline as to tn,
Evening star., 1946-07-21
Committee Majority rs Proposals Avoid Another Pearl abor

as sufficient. Dispatches must bs
unmistakably clear, fortnight ane
devoid Of any conceivable ambig'
uity.
The committee feels that the prac.
tice, INDUCED by the Navy, or send.
ing to several commanders an iden.
tical dispatch for action, ever
though the addresses may be 10.
Gated in decidedly different situa.
tions, is distinctly dangerous. In ths
preparation of messages to outpost.
the dispatch to particular Officer
should be applicable to his peculiar
situation. What may well be char.
acterized as the lazy" practice Of
preparing a single dispatch shoult
be replaced by a more industriou,
and effective system whereby a sep
arate 'individualized" dispatch i.
sent to each commander whose par.
ticular situation varies greatly from
that of another commander or there
may be reason for him because o1
distance or other factors to believe
so.
1t is believed that brevity of mes.
sages was carried to the point oi
being a fetish rather than virtue
Dispatches must be characterized by
sufficient amplitude to be meaning
full not only to the sender but, be-
yond reasonable doubt, to the ad.
dressee as well.
IL. There is great danger in careless
paraphase Of information received
and every effort should be made to
insure that the paraphrased ma
terial reflects the true meaning
and significance of the original.
To preserve the security of their
own codes the War and Navy De-
partments followed the natural and
proper practice of paraphasing mes
|sages received. From a review oi
several messages as paraphased tht
committee is of the opinion that the
utmost caution and care should be
employed in preserving the original
meaning of material One classic
example will serve to illustrate this
point.
In replying to the War Depart.
ments directive of November n
194l, Gen. Short said:
Re your 472. Department alerted
to prevent sabotage. Liaison with
Navy.
As paraphased upon receipt at ths
War Department, this message read
Department alerted to prevent
sabotage. Liaison with Navy re youl
472.
| 1t is to be recalled that the Army
and Navy had entered into a specia
agreement at Hawaii whereby tn,
Navy assumed responsibility fol
long range reconnaissance. There.
fore, having ordered Gen. Short tt
undertake reconnaissance, a reason
able construction of his message al
paraphrased would be that tn,
commanding general, through liza.
ison with the Navy, had made tn.
necessary arrangements for recon
naissance as instructed in the Wa
Departments warning OF Novembe,
I27. The message which Short actu
ally sent, however, cannot so easil,
be afforded this construction. Tn,
seriousness Of this matter lies in tn,
fact that failure to conduct long
range reconnaissance at Hawai-
was the prime factor responsible TO
the Army and Navy having beer
i caught flat-footed. Conceivably, hat
the message as pharaphrased no
been misleading, the War Depart
ment might well have followed W
on Gen. Shorts message, pointing
Evening star., 1946-07-21

majority The late President former Secretary OF
State ischarged their responsibilities oh distinction ability
and foresight"
The minority Mr. Roosevelt among those Washing
ton Uho failed to perform responsibilities essential the
defense OF Pearl Harbor Mr. Hull merited criticism there
being conclusions in his case" because had duties
the link of military responsibility and because the diplomatic
phase not completely explored
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12

ton district rs provided by the laws Of the
State of Washington, said proposed fire
district being described as follows: Ii
Commencing At the intersection Of the
east and west quarter section line Of
Section II, Township 2 North, Range
81 E.WM. and the west meander. line of
the Columbia River: thence north along
the west and south meander line along
tht Columbia and Yakima Rivers to the
intersection OF the north and south quar-
ter section line Of Section %. Township
8 North. Range % E.W.M.: thence south
to the intersection of the south right Of
way line Of the Columbia Irrigation Dis
trict Canal: thence southeasterly along
Il to the intersection of the east section
line of Section 80. Township 8 North.
Range 20 E.W.M.: thence south along
said section line to the southeast corner
Of Section 81. Township 8 North. Range
20 E.W.M.; thence east along the south
North. Range 20 E.W.M. to the north.
west corner Of Section s. Township 9
North, Range 20 E.W.M.; thence south
along the west section line of said Sec
ton to the intersection of the south
right Of way line of the Northern Paei-
right of way line of said railroad to the
intersection Of the west line Of Lot y
The Highlands Plat extended; thence
south TO- the intersection Of the south
right OF way line OF the hcuhS
wick Irrigation District Canal
thence southeasterly along the south
right of way line of said canal to the
intersection of the south section line Of
Section Is, Township 8 North. Range
20 E.W.M.: thence east along said sec.
ton line to the intersection Of the east
line of the Highlands Plat F; thence
north along the east line Of the High
lands Plat F to the intersection OF the
south right of way line of the Columbia
Irrigation District Canal; thence south
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12
SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION


In the Suprior Court OF the State Oh
Washington. in and for Benton County:
Elmer Schneider and Evelyn Schmelzef.
husband and wife. Frank L. Sherman
and Esther Margret Sherman, husband
and wife, and Harold G. Fyfe and Hazei
B. Fyfe. husband and wife. Plaintiffs.
III. ,nknown heirs of Peter Gilchrist and
Amy E. Gilchrist. husband and wife,
both deceased, ct al, Defendants:
The State of Washington: To the salo
unknown heirs of Peter Gilchrist and Amy
e. Gilchrist husband and wife. both de-
ceased. the unknown heirs of w. ]: Parkes,
deceased, the unknown heirs OF James
Burke, deceased. and all other persons an: aho
parties unknown claiming any right, title;
estate, lien or interest in and to the real
property described in the complaint herein'
You are hereby summoned to appear
within sixty days after the date OF the Iirs'
publication of this summons, to-wit: with.
in sixty DAYS after the 22nd day OF August
1896 and defend the above entitled tbe
COMPLAINT of the plaintiffs and serve
copy Of your answer upon the undersigned
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12

attorneys for plaintiffs. ut their office be
low stated, and in case Of your failure %
10 do JUDGMENT will be rendered against
Won According to the demand OF the com.
plant. which has been filed with the CLERK
The object Of this action il TO recover
judgment against each and al OF the Ge-
owners in Zee Of the following described
real property. to-wiS:
Parcel A: Beginning at point 1851
feet west and 1882 feet south OF the noftn'
east corner Of Section twenty (20). Town.
ship eight go North, Range thirty lS0l
East W. n: thence west SS9 feee %
point which Is the true point OF beginning
thence west 414 feet: thence south w
feet to right Of way Of Columbia 1rr1gasion
District canal: thence southeasterly along
said right Of way to . point that Il due
south Of point Of beginning: thence north
1920 feet to point Of beginning:
Parcel B: That part Of southwest quar-.
ter of northeast quarter lying south OF Col
umbia Irrigation District canal. Al m Sc.
ton twenty (20). Township eight I'D
North, Range 80 E.W.A., Benton county,
and ouietine title in plaintiffs ~ against
each and all defendants, and Al those
claiming by, through or under them, AND
adjudging any right. title. estate. lien OF
interest that defendants, or any OF them:
NAV have or claim to have in and TO said
real property to be inferior and subject 70
plantiffs' title and without force or effect
and granting to plaintiffs such further re-
lief as . court of equity can grant IN inc
NMOULToN & POWELL. THOMAS B;
CESS. Attorneys for Plaintiffs; Office and
washington. 1929 :26
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12

easterly along the south right Of way
line of said canal to the intersection OF
the south line Of the northeast quarter
of the northeast quarter OF Section q,
thence west 500 feet along said south
line; thence south 1887 feet; thence
east 1850 feet to the intersection OF the
west right of way line of the Columbia
Irrigation District Canal: thence south.
easterly along the south right OF way
line Of said canal to the intersection OF
the east and west quarter section line of
Section II, Township North, Range
81 E.W.M.: thence east along said quar-
ter section line to the point of Begin
porate limits of the City of Kennewick,
Benton County, Washington.
The purpose and object for the creation
of said district If for the elimination OF
fire hazards and for the Profession OF NE
hazard of fire and. generally. to nave an
powers and to do all acts granted to IRE
protection districts under the laws 0! ene
State of Washington, and the undersi9neo
petitioners silese that the d es.aDs tn the
public safety, welfare and convenience ana
win be benefit to the property included
therein.
matter will come on for neSs,as s'0 in
their office in the Courthouse in Prosser:
Washington, on Monday the 2Srd day OF
September, 1916. at the hour OF l! O'Clock
N at which time any interested par
ties may appear and be heard either ior
or against the establishment OF SAID IRE
district. ,o.e =.
Dated this 26th day of August. 1916, At
P PfosseT az ss cofJHTY COMMISSIONERS
OF BENTON COUNTY. WASHlNGION
By III. e. CHAPMAN, County AUDITOR
and ex-officio Clerk of the Board:
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12

their office below stated. and n case OF
YOUR failure 20 to do. JUDGMENT viii be
rendered against you according to the oe-
fiIed with the clerk Of said court.
The object of this action is to obtain 2
decree Of court quieting title OF the plain
TIFF. Leta Inez Moran in the following
described property situate in Benton coun'
~. washington. to-wit:
That part Of Lot IS, The Highlands;
Plat b. according to plat thereof recorded
Ia Volume 2 Of Plats, page 8. records OF
said County, lying south Of canal.
md 20 debar the defendants and each OF
them from asserting any right. title. or in.
terest therein. - L.
Plaintiffs.
Horriean and Leavy, Attorneys af Law
W. AVN August l6-Sept. Is
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12
sUMMONs FOR PUBLICATION

In the Superior Court OF the State OF
Washington, IN and for Benton County.
Leta Inez Moran, Plaintiff
Arthur II. Moran; Charles Grigg.
Grigg's; Joseph B. Bates and Cecile
Bates, his wife: and State of Washing
ton, Defendants.
The State of Washington to: Arthur ID.
Moran and Cecile Bates
You are hereby summoned to appear
within srxty days after the date of the
first pubscation Of this summons. to-wit.
within sixty days from the 18th day OF
August, 1876, and defend the above en-
titled action in the above entitled court
and answer the complaint Of the plaintiffs
and serve . copy of your answer upon
the undersigned attorneys for plaintiffs At
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12

favor OF the plaintiff and .u.,
PENDANT upon the grounds asainst as
ment OF plaintiff by defeua cnsl ~
have the Court grant 10 ana
care: custody and central plaintiff \
children Of the above parties The ~
being Torrance Eugene oshd ehDS
Margaret Ann Persinper. s'nse ~
KENNETH Z. sv,,
office and p. o. Address. iof Pin.
kennewick. Benton Count,
6.lLiN
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12
To Dorothy Persinger, Defendant:

You are hereby summoned 10 appear
within sixty days after the date OF the
first publication Of this Summons, to-wit :
within sixty days from the 18th day OF
August, 1896. and defend the above en-.
tiled action in the Superior Court OF the
State of washington aforesaid. and ans:
wer the Complaint Of the plaintiff and
serve a copy Of your answer or other
pleading on the undersigned attorney for
PLAINTIFF ut his office below stated. and in
the case of your failure SO TO do. judgment
viii be rendered against you according te
the demand OF the Complaint. which has
The object of this action is to obtain q
decree OF complete and absolute divorce in
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12
COMMISSIONERS
NOTICE OF HEARING

In the matter Of petition for formation Of
rural fire protection district.
For the purpose of the formation OF
fire protection district the undersigned
qualified, registered electors. now residents
within the boundaries of the proposed
District hereinafter described, do hereby
respectfully petition the Honorable Board
Of County Commissioners of Benton Coun-
ty, Washington, to establish . fire protec-
The Kennewick courier-reporter. [volume] (Kennewick, Wash.) 1939-1949, 1946-09-12
SIMMONS BY PUBLICATION
NJ alR1

In the Superior Court of the St1te o.
Washington - and for bs~to" eo*"'S
nOROTHY PERSINGER, Defendant.
STATE OF WASHINGTON:
The Wilmington morning star., 1946-10-29
Enriching Other Regions

In it's report of the South's economic
survey, made by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the Associated Press says the
bureau" -. found the South possesses
a younger labor force and potential
growth so great that it will continue to
enrich the industrialized northern and
western areas with educated and train
ed workers."
It is impossible to read this reference
to the South's enrichment of more high
ly industrialized regions without pro-
test. One of the strongest influences
at work in the past to retard the South's
development has been the emigration of
so many Of its "educated and tralned'
workers in industry and all highly
specialized technical fields of endeavor.
Southern men possessing rare skllls
have for generations been lured from
home because opportunities for advance
ment elsewhere have been greater than
in their native states.
Is this condition to continue, now that
the South has fully awakened to It's op-
portunities and has such an army of
educated and trained workers? With
the expansion of Southern industry, the
potentialities of which are well nigh
limitless, is it to be necessary, as in
the past, to import experts and see our
own young men, as capable as any from
anywhere, check their trunks at the
depot, intent upon filling positions up
North, down East, out West?
With it's acknowledged reservoir of
skilled workers of all degrees, it is
time, as Southern economists have re-
peatedly pointed out, to absorb it at
home, not let it drift away to "enrich"
other regions Of the country.