The Wilmington morning star., 1946-01-04

/ And yet our domestic postwar
problems are just as serious and
in many .ways-just as difficult as
our international problems. Unless
we can soon meet the need of OBJ
tanning. full production and employ
ment at home, we shall face seri-
Gus consequences. They will be seri-
Gus not only in what they mean to
the, American people as such, cut
also in what they can do to our
position as leader among the ma
tons of the world.
With the surrender of Japan last
August, we set certain domestic
goals to be attained. The tasks be-
fore us were clear then: they are
clear now.
We had to reconvert our economy
from war to peace-as rapidly as
possible.
We had to keep employment and
wages and purchasing power on a
high level during the change-over.
We had to keep the prices of
commodities from going up too
high. We had to get civilian goods
produced and put upon the marke..
promptly. ~ .
| In other words our primary aim
was to- bring about an expanded
production and steady, 'vell-paid
jobs and purchasing power for all.
The return of the United States
to a peacetime economy. in 1916
requires the same cooperation that
we had during the. war years. In
dustry, labor, agriculture, the Con-
gress, the President-each of these
- is called upon to do certain
things. None of them can do the
job alone. Together they can.
There is one vast difference, how.
ever, between 1871 and 1916. While
we were producing to meet the
needs of war, we. had. the great
stimulus OF. the war itself. That
stimulus is now gone. The COOP
GRAFTON and teamwork in some
quarters, am sorry to say. have
suffered proportionateiy.:
The reconversion period through
which we are now passing has as
many elements of danger to our
economy as the war period. Whe-
Their we fall into period of great
deflation because of unemployment
and reduced wages and purchas-
ing power, or whether we embark
upon a period of great initiation
with reduced production and spiral
ing prices. -
Immediately after the surrender
OF Japan, in the full flush of our
victory, representatives Of the
Congress, of industry, Of labor and
Of farm organizations called upon
me. From. them i received
promises of cooperation; and team
work during this reconversion per-
regret to- say that those prom
Uses have not all been kept. AS
result, many obstacles have been
thrown in our path as we have
tried to avert the dangers of in
flation and deflation.
First among those obstacles have
been labor-management disputes.
+ Immediately V-Day, the govern
ment announced a policy Of taking
off the wartime controls which 1t
had exercised over wages and over
industrial relations as whole. It
was thought, particularly by labor
and management that through col
lective bargaining, labor and man.
agement would be able to find
common ground, that they would
be able to agree. upon ways to
avoid stoppages Of work and to
continue the production that was
so necessary to our economic life.
f. Unfortunately industrial disputes
soon began, and many strikes were
called. Many Of these disputes and
strikes were settled or conciliat-
ed. But there were some strikes
of nationwide importance in which
collective bargaining and concilia-
ton: both failed.
In order to- enable management
and labor to. make a common ef-
fort to. find means for preventing
work; stoppages, and to consider
many other aspects of industrial
relations, the, government invited
their representatives to meet in a
conference Of their own, in Wash
ington. Ill.
/ Although it did reach agreement
on some matters and although it
did pave the way for future meet
Eings and discussions, the labor
management conference could not
agree, upon solution Of the most
immediate and pressing problem
what to do, about strikes when bar
gaining, Cancellation and arbitra-
ton, had AL broken down.
II As industrial strife has increas-
!! ed, with automobile workers out
on strike, and with the steel work
ers,., electrical workers, and pack
ing house workers scheduling
strikes, very soon, I have been
deeply concerned about the future.
! am sure that all Of us, including
/ these workers themselves, share
that concern.
When the labor management con-
ference ended, it became my re-
I sponsibility as the President of the
/ United States to recommend
course Of action. This I, did in
message. to the Congress on De-
cembers third, 1915.
Il recommended certain fact-find-
ing procedures which I believe can
II on . 1o,o NAV toward meeting