Evening star., 1946-06-24

with almost no reaction from tn,
enemy.
Observing the quality of his gen
erals, the supreme commander re-
marked of Gen. Bradley's tactica
operations during February an,
March which witnessed the com
plete destruction of the German
forces west of the Rhine that "the,
were the equal in brilliance of an
that American forces have ever con
Quoted"
In planning the 1945 campaign
Gen. Eisenhower had expected tha
the enemy would. as he had dom
in Normandy, stand without givin,
ground in a futile attempt to "figh
1t out" west of the Rhine.
by March," he asserted, "whel
our forces crossed the river at Rene
gen, and at various points to tn,
south, resistance on the eastern
bank was again reduced to resembl,
that in France following the break
through, particularly because tn,
enemy, mistaking our intentions
crowded a great part of his remain
ing forces into the Ruhr area"
Lost 325,0O0 Men.
The German decision to defene
the Ruhr resulted in the loss O
1926, 900 of Field Marshal Model
men.
In the concluding chapter of hi
report. Gen. Eisenhower appraised
the three decisive phases" of tn,
whole campaign which had starte,
across the Channel with "the larges
amphibious operation in history"
AS we struggled first to gain an,
then to hold our footing in Nor
mandy We learned the strength an.
also the weakness of these armies,
he said in alluding to the German
forces of the west which had no
been tried in full-scale battle sine
1910.
I'VE learned the German soldie
was still the same stubborn fighte
whom we had met in Africa and |,
Italy. but we saw, too, how slende
was the thread upon which his ex
istence in France depended. =.
We learned also how inadequat,
was the enemy's intelligence con
corning Allied intentions.
Thanks to his air weakness an,
consequent lack of reconnaissance
he was completely misled by ou
dlVerSionary operations, holdin,
back until too late the forces il
the Pas-de- Calais which, had the,
been rushed across the Seine whel
we first landed, might we'll hay,
turned the scales against U.S."
In the landings the Allied force
gained "a tactical surprise for which
we had hardly dared to hope" h,
said. A large part of the German
forces waited in vain for a secont
assault which never materialized.
Refused to Withdraw.
In the subsequent battle of tn,
Falaise pocket" the enemy agair
showed that fatal tendency t,
stand and fight when all the logi,
OF war demanded a strategic with
drawal. BY so doing, he allowed hi
7th Army to be encircled ant
ground to pieces. and the battl,
for France was decided among tn,
bloody orchards and hedgerows O
Normandy.
"As the broken pieces fled east
ward we strained every effort t,
complete their overthrow befor
they could reach the shelter of tn
Siegfried Line, but the logistics bur
den was too great, and we had t.
wait until the weary winter drey
to a close before we could strike tn
final blow"
Germanys fatal weakness
throughout the 1l-month struggle
Gen. Eisenhower emphasized, la
in logistical inability to maintain
the armies in the field.
Courage his forces had in ftl]
measure, but courage was no
enough" he explained. Reinforce
ments failed to arrive, weapon.
ammunition and fuel alike raj
short, and the dearth of fuel cause
their powers of tactical mobility t
dWindle to the vanishing point. L
the last stages of the campaign the
could do little more than wait TO
the Allied avalanche to sweep owe
them"
1t was for this condition that tn
supreme commander credited Il
large measure the work of the Al
lied Air Forces.
Long before we landed in France,
he said, THE heavy bombers ha
begun their task of destroying tn
centers of production upon whic
the enemy relied, and the fruits q
this effort were evident immediatel
the land campaign began. Follow
ing the invasion, these strategi
blows at the heart of the Germa
industry were continued, and tn
task was also undertaken Of cuttin
the supply lines which linked tn
factories to the fronts.
Resistance Broken.
Meanwhile the tactical aircraf
by their incessant bombing an
straf1ng of the enemy before u,
broke his powers of resistance an
prepared the way for the groun
advances which struck toward tn
center of Germany. Those thrusts
moreover, were made with a rapidit
which only the expedient of airborn
supply could support.
THE overwhelming Allied superi
ority in the air was indeed essentis
to our victory. 1t at once under
mined the basis of the enemy
strength and enabled us to prepar
and execute our own ground opera
tions in complete security"
In assessing the factors under
lying the Allied success, Gen. Eisen
hover said that even more import
ant than the always available weap
ons, was the indomitable fightin
spirit of the men of the Allied Ma
tions who welded them"
He added: "The courage and de
votion to duty which they exhibite,
throughout the campaign. in tn
grim days of the Ardennes counter
offensive as well as in the excite
ment of the dash across France an,
later advances into the midst O
Germany, were indispensable.