Evening star., 1946-01-24

identified as Second 1t. Kermit A.
Tyler, who received the information,
did not pass 1t on. The late Secre-
tary of the Navy Knox said in his
report the planes were thought to
be American craft coming into the
islands. At that time system had
not been devised for distinguishing
between enemy and friendly planes.
Gen. Short had told the commit
tee in his formal statement that
while the aircraft warning service
had been regarded as probably the
most important single defense prof.
ect, the priorities granted Hawaii
made 1t impossible to complete the
permanent radar stations prior to-
the attack" Delivery of equipment
from the mainland, he said, was
delayed six to eight weeks even
under the most favorable condi-
tions."
Mr.. Cooper asked Gen. Short If
he personally knew before the at
tack that the six mobile radar sets
which the Army had been able to set
up were in operation from 4 to 7
a m. the Sunday morning of the at
tack.
Assumes Orders Obeyed.
Gen. Short said they had been or
dered to operate during those hours
every morning and he assumed they
were, though perhaps certain ones
were out of commission at the time
he had not known.
Mr.. Cooper wanted to know
whether Gen. Short took any dis
ciplinary action against 1t. Tyler.
IT did not" said Gen. Short. II
didn't feel it was justified. He was
an inexperienced officer. There was
no way OF telling hostile from
friendly planes"
Under the information then avail
able and the situation as it existed,
the general explained, he did not
feel 1t. Tyler was culpable In as
suming the privates had picked up
American scouting planes.
+. Would Recall Miles.
Before the hearing resumed TO-
day, Senator Ferguson, Republican,
of Michigan, suggested that Maj
Gen. Sherman Miles, who headed |
Army intelligence in 1941, should
be recalled as a witness to throw
further light on two points raised
by Gen. Short.
Senator Ferguson said he would
like to question Gen. Miles regard
ing the message cited by Gen.
Short in which Gen. Miles was
advising Panama on December S.
1941, that he would notify that out
post when and If break in diplo-
matte relations with Japan was
imminent.
The Michigan Senator said
photostat of this message bore
markings indicating it was not sent
until December 7. Senator Fer
guson said the message indicated to
him "they didn't believe on the
5th or the 7th that war was immi-
nent."
Refers to Messages.
He said he would like to question
Gen. Miles about the heretofore
secret testimony from one of the
earlier Investigations indicating
that two of Gen. Miles subordi-
mates, whose duty it was to prepare
estimates of the probable moves of
Axis powers, were not getting the
intercepted Japanese messages.
These were available In the War
and Navy Departments as the re-
suit OF their having cracked ia
pans most secret codes.
Chairman Barley told Gen
Short yesterday afternoon that the
top men in Washington who saw
the intercepted Japanese messages
SAY they didn't expect the attack |
on Hawaii and were surprised when |
it occurred" He asked the general
If he and Rear Admiral Husband e.
Kimmel, Pacific Fleet commander In |
1941, feel they would have evaluated |
it differently. Both have stressed |
their failure to get this information. |
Gen. Short replied that in Hawaii |
they were closer to the situation |
and he believed they would have
viewed differently the messages that |
indicated japanese interest In
Pearl Harbor.
Denies Any Touchiness.
Senator Barkley asked Gen Short |
II there was ANY LONELINESS be-
tween you and Admiral Kimmel"
that might have prevented either
from inquiring too much about what |
the other was doing.
Il don't think there was at all"
Gen. Short replied. II don't think |
either of US would have wanted one
prying into details we felt did not
concern the other"
Senator Barley said he asked
/ nRn Am NRANIuAR