Evening star., 1946-12-01
Arms and the Veto

AIIHS ono INe VGtO
The trouble with Foreign Minister
Molotov's Thanksgiving Day sur
prise-his espousal of international
inspection for the control of arms
and the atom--is that Mr.. Vishinsky,
his deputy, has followed 1t up with
a reaffirmation of Soviet opposition
to any modification Of the veto
power of the Big Five. We're it not
for that, Mr.. Molotpv's new view
could be interpreted with consider
able optimism as Russian conces-
sion calculated to promote progress
toward genuine disarmament and q
trustworthy peace.
HeretosDre, at any rate, although
never specifically ruling 1t out as an
eventual possibility, the Russians
have been hostile to the idea Of in
spection. Thus, ever since the first
meeting Of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, they
have strongly opposed the American
plan for world control of nuclear
f1ssion. They have called, instead,
for little more than a treaty out
lawing A-Weapons-a paper pledge
without teeth, entirely lacking in
such implementing measures as an
international supervisory authority
and systematic inspection to guard
against the hazards of violation
and evasion"
Accordingly, considered against
this background, there would seem
to be good reason to hail Mr.. Molo-
tov's Thanksgiving Day statement
as a belated but encouraging Rus
sian acknowledgment of the in
adequacy of a mere treaty. The
statement proposed the creation of
two new United Nations commits
sions within the framework of the
Security Council" to deal Cd with
supervising and policing the atom
and (2) with the regulation of all
other arms. Taken at face value,
this strongly suggests that the Soviet
government has at last advanced to
the view that any covenant outlaw
ing A-weapons or regulating general
armaments will have to be backed
by special international agencies of
control and inspection.
Unfortunately, however, in saying
within the framework of the Sc
curity Council" Mr. Molotoy ap-
parently meant that the Big Five
veto power will remain in force to
govern decisions regarding nuclear
energy. In any. case, Mr.. Vishinsky's
later remarks on the subject can
hardly be interpreted in any other
light-a fact which must largely
dissipate the optimism created by
Mr., Molotoy's unexpected espousal
of the inspection idea. For the Rus
slams, of course, have conceded very
little If they are still intent upon
adhering strictly to the unanimity
rule, under which effective atomic
control could be readily negated. On
the other hand, If the intent Is not
so strong as Mr.. Vishinsky has made
it seem, compromise may yet be
possible between the American and
Soviet plans.
Actually, the United States does
not object to keeping control Of the
atom within the framework of the
Security Council" On the contrary,
through Mr.. Baruch, it has long
since suggested compromise under
which the proposed world Atomic
Development Authority would be
subordinate to the Council in the
sense that the Council alone would
decide on grave atomic issues threat
ening the peace. In all such cases,
however, the veto power would be
suspended under our plan. The big
question now is whether Mr.. Vishin-
sky has spoken Russia's last word
on the subject. If he has not, there
is still chance to reconcile the
American and Soviet views.
1t remains for Mr.. Molotov to
clarity Russia's position on this,
point. His agreement to the idea
of strict international inspection
raises the hope that his country has
bowed, in at least one respect, to the
compelling logic of the unique and
perilous situation caused by the
atom. If that hope proves substan-
tial, then the logic may lead in time
to further concessions that will re-
solve the veto issue and avert what
might otherwise become the most
catastrophe ornaments race of all
time.
Wider Parole Scope
=; 11,,,1.. -.