Evening star., 1946-05-21

uIlucT ATUlCle IL Oh IIle ClldIJeT u
make recommendations with respect
to the peace settlements. But
confidently expect Peace Confer
ence to be called this summer.
The situation which we will face
in the coming months will be a
test not only of others but of our
selves. There are now and there
will be in the future many occasions
which might impel us to say as we
did after the last war that, much as
we would like to cooperate in the
restoration of Europe, cooperation
as a practical matter is impossible
without the sacrifice of our princi-
pies and that we must be content
to cultivate and defend our own
hemisphere.
But we must not forget that if we
fail to cooperate in a peace which
is indivisible we may again find that
We will have to cooperate in war
which is world wide. Whether we
like it or not, we live in one world.
1 am unwilling to admit that we
cannot cooperate without sacrifice
of our principles. If we are going
to play our part we must take the
offensive for peace as we took the
offensive for war
But the victories of peace like
those of war, require sacrifice not
of principle but for principle. They
require faith in ourselves and in
our ideals. They require initiative,
resourcefulness and unrelenting
effort There is no iron curtain that
the aggregate sentiments of man
kind cannot penetrate.
Took Offensive for Peace.
The American delegation at Paris
did not hesitate to start the often
sive for peace.
Security is the concern of every
nation. But the effort of one nation
to increase its security may threaten
the security of other nations and
cause them in turn to try to in
crease their own security. The quest
for security may lead to less. rather
than more, security in the world.
It is in truth extremely difficult
to know to what extent the action
of any nation may be aScribed to
its quest for security or to its desire
to expand. But some so-called Sc
curity moves on the diplomatic
checkerboard have not contributed
to a general sense of security.
Many of these moves are said to
originate in the fear of the revival
of German military might.
On our way to Potsdam last sum-
mer, President Truman and I dis
cussed this situation and agreed
that it should be American policy to
disarm Germany and keep her dis
armed and to do what we can to
prevent a struggle between the pow
ers for the control of Germany
which might give Germany the
chance to divide and conquer.
Those principles were stated In
the Potsdam agreement. But Presi-
dent Truman and I thought at that
time that the policy of disarming
Germany and keeping Germany
disarmed for definite period OF
years should become a part of a
solemn treaty between the prin-
cipal Allied powers. Our policy
should be to prevent war and not to
wait until aggression gets out of
hand.
1t was not new thought. 1t had
been foreshadoWed in the Moscow
declaration of 1943. Others had
discussed it, but no one more force
fully than Senator Vandenberg in a
speech in the Senate in January,
l945.
Wins Stain support.
At the London meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers, when
the Soviet Foreign Secretary seemed
greatly concerned about the Soviet
security requirements in the Bal
kanS, I suggested 25-year, four
power treaty to keep Germany dis
armed as means of preventing any
real threat to Soviet security. I ex-
planned that we contemplated a
similar joint guaranty of the dis
armament of Japan.
I again proposed such a treaty in
a talk with Generalissimo Stain on
December "a while l was in Moscow.
The generalissimo said that if the
United States made such proposal
he would Fundamentally support it.
Later I also spoke to Mr.. Bevin,
who advised me that he personally