Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-09-01

~'aSSasssS
in both the Regular and Reserve
forces. This program should also
provide for the development of eff
Gent techniques in administrative
procedures which can be promptly
utilized in any future emergency.
X
Unfortunately, in World War II
the committee found that all toe
frequently the blunderers and in
competents were promoted, often
only because of seniority. and that
those who criticized superiors. even
when required to testify under oath
found it difficult to obtain even ordi-
nary promotion and recognition.
In some cases officers Of marked
ability achieved respect by hasten
ing to correct important errors OF
their own making. However, some
officers in important instances stub
bornly refused to admit mistakes ano
required the continuance OF prof.
ects and programs which resulted IN
enormous waste of manpower and
critically short materials. This was
waste OF type that if accomplished
by a saboteur would have resulted
in execution.
A glarlng example of this type Of
waste was the Canol project.
The committees investigation show.
ed that, based on a wholly made
quate study by part-time dollar-a'
year consultant and one-page re-
port containing no facts and only
recommendations, 1t. Gen. Brehor
B. Somervell had ordered the con-
struction of the Canol project II
the spring of 1912. It's purpose was
to provide petroleum products as ar
adjunct to the Alcan highway-lr
itself a dubious undertaking-and tc
provide for the transportation OF
supplies to service the chain OF air
fields through Canada and Alas
ka. ***
Secrecy Hides Reasons.
In an attempt to prevent the
committee from recommending that
the War Department be forced te
discontinue the Canol project, the
committees attention was called nJ
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a writ
ten recommendation signed by Ad'
miral Ernest King, chief OF stan OF
the Navy, despite the fact that the
NAVY Department, through the Sec.
rotary of the Navy, had officially IN
formed the committee that the Navy
Department did not consider the
project worth completing.
Admiral King, speaking for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended
that the project be completed anc
informed the committee that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached
that conclusion on the basis of Sc
cret information and on the basis
of future military operations sc
secret in character that it would bs
seriously detrimental to the war et'
fort for committee of the United
States Senate to possess such IN
formation.
Admiral King was asked to fur.
nish the reasons of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for recommending the con-
tinuance Of the project over the
objections Of the Secretary OF the
Navy, the petroleum administrator
and the chairman of the War Pro
duction Board, but he refused to dc
so on the ground of secrecy. The
committee decided not to subpoena
Admiral King because of the posi-
bility, however remote, that the wal
effort might suffer
The Foreign Liquidation Commits
sion has reported that Ncompeten'
military authorities of both the
United States and Canada consider
the refinery and oil pipeline system
of questionable value even in thu
event OF another emergency"
Information Recently Requested.
- The committee recent.
asked Admiral King, now retired
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fur
nish it with a statement OF thu
specific information, if any, which
was not made available to the com
mittee in December, 1943, the exac1
military operations intended ane
the relative Importance of the Cano
project to those operations.
The reply of Admiral King anc
the reply of the Joint Chiefs Of
Staff to the committee was in nowise
informative, consisting of nothing
beyond the reiterated opinion thai
the project was essential to military
plans never yet disclosed.
Admiral King was an. able officer
whose services we're OF great value
to the Nation, but after examination
of all the facts relating to the Canol
project, the committee has been
forced to the conclusion that he, as
member of the joint chiefs Of
staff, differed with the official posi-
ton of the Navy as expressed by
the Secretary of the Navy, and usec
the high Office of the joint chiefs Of
staff and the claim of military Sc
crecy for the purpose of preventing
the Congress and the people from
recurring the discontinuance of a
costly blunder by a fellow officer
who was unwilling to admit his mis-
take and who was stubbornly insist
ent upon completing project re-
gardless of the cost in manpower
and critical materials.
This action constitutes blot upon
the record of two otherwise capable
officers, which it is the duty of the
committee to report and comment
on to the end that there shall be in
the future no recurrence of similar
type of action.
Supported by Patterson.
In an effort to support Gen
Somervell's position, the then I'm
dersecretary of War, Robert P. Pat
terson. solicited permission from the
committee to make voluntary
statement before it, and compared
the Canol project to the winning Of
the beachheads at Salerno. With
out doubt Mr.. Patterson made that
comparison in reliance upon. state.
ments made to him by, or on behalf
of, Gen. Somervell and Admira
King. Nevertheless, the detriment
to the war effort from the resulting
waste in manpower and materials
uos creator than apv art of Sah0-