Evening star., 1946-10-20
Atomic Inspection o.
Will Not Be Easy
But the Worlds Safety Demand.
Elaborate Arrangements
BIZ William H. Harrison


By William H. Harrison
In broad outline. as q proposal for an
all-powerful world authority buttressed
by a strict inspection system and swift
punishment for violators, the American
plan for international control of the
atom seems simple enough. In detail,
however, especially as regards the de-
tective work 1t emissions, it is anything
but simple.
Within the past few weeks this point
has been made abundantly clear to the
United Nations Atomic Energy Com
mission by the unanimous report of the
commissions Scientific Committee and
the follow-up statement filed last Tues
day by experts attached to the Ameri-
can delegation headed by Mr.. Baruch.
More clearly than anything of their
kind before, both documents show how
elaborate and complex the safeguards
will have to be if the world is to avoid
the cataclysmic danger of nuclear
armaments race
these: Cd That in time, five or ten
years hence, all nations of consequence,
with or without our help, will almost
certainly know the secrets" we alone
know now; 90 that atomic develop
ment for peaceful purposes-power,
heat, etc.-will involve the production
of highly dangerous fashionable material;
80 that an A-bomb of the Nagasaki
type requires more than four pounds
of such material but less than 220
pounds-probably much less, and "a
that given the material, the bomb itself
can be put together with relative ease.
Taking these facts into consideration
the two new reports submitted to the
Atomic Energy Commission are ad-
dressed largely to the problem of how
to cope with the possibility of bad faith
and clandestine violations after the
ratification of a world agreement on
control. The problem starts with the
mining of the nuclear raw materials
uranium and thorium). After that
come the extraction plants and the
numerous other installations and pro-
cesses that lead finally to the produc-
ton of the fashionable substance itself.
At each of these points, with increasing
gravity, secret diversion can be carried
out. At the mines, this danger is not
so great, but at subsequent stages it is
definitely serious-extremely so at the
final stage,
At every stage, according to the Scien-
tific Committees report. safeguards will
therefore have to be taken, all of them
calculated to detect Illicit activities as
soon as possible. In this connection, 1t
is important to keep in mind that the
later the stage at which secret diversion
occurs, the greater will be the danger
because the fewer will be the subsequent
steps needed to make A-weapons. 1t Is
noteworthy, too. that the detection sys-
mediocre The final product of plant
like Oak Ridge, for example, is so small
compared to the material processed
that conspiratorial group working in
such an establishment might readily be
able to 'embezzle" nuclear fuel, bit by
bit, until accumulating enough for mill
tary use. Only the most intelligent kind
of inspection system will be an ade-
quate safeguard against this.
Elaborating on this point, last weeks
American report strongly suggested
that very large detective" staff will
be needed for effective international
control. Thus, an installation like Oak
Ridge might require so inspectors in
permanent residence. Future atomic
power plants-if "denatured" fuel proves
to be an insufficient safeguard-might
each call for similar number, and a
great many more might be needed for
rowing assignments, including watch
on many non-nuclear projects that could
become nuclear, throughout the world.
Further than that, all such operatives
will have to be highly trained, equipped
to deal not merely with the technical
and scientific aspects Of their task but
also with the political and diplomatic
problem of doing their job without
offending the different nations with
excessive snooping.
After thus making clear that the safe
guards will be complex, the two re-
ports-which are oversimplified here
leave no room for doubt that even the
best Of inspection systems, with the most
learned and most alert of detectives"
cannot be an absolute guarantee against
clandestine diversion or other illegal
activities. For one thing it is altogeth-
er conceivable that new discoveries and
techniques may make atomic produce
ton much simpler in the future. It
may be found, for instance, that ma
terials far more common than uranium
and thorium can be converted into
nuclear energy, in which case the task
of detection and control would involve
great additional difficulties. Beyond
that, there will always be the possi-
bility of seizure even If every detail of
our American plan Is put into effect.
A world authority may own and oper-
ate the plants we have in the United
States or comparable installations and
processes that will in time dot such
countries as Russia, China, Britain and
France, but If international relations
break down, we, the Russians, the Chi
nese, the British and the French will
each have the power to take forcible
possession of all such facilities within
our borders and engage from then on
in desperate race to make A-weapons.
* X
But this risk is negligible in relation
to the incomparably greater risk of
having no control al ALL World own
ership and operation of all dangerous