The Waterbury Democrat., 1946-03-21
Roosevelt
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 He said Short, despite some errors by his superiors in Wash ington, should have been on full alert against the possibility of hos- tile Japanese action even without 8 warning from Washington, which he got.
 Short has told the committee he alerted his command only against sabotage because that course was indicated in his advices from Washington.
 The decision of MT. Roosevelt and his war cabinet to fight Japan if she invaded Southeast Asia was based, Stinson said, on agreement that if Japanese task force then known to be headed down the China coast got into the Gulf of Siam 1t would endanger British, Dutch and American interests in the Pacific. . ..-
 "All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to land in the Gulf of Siam 1t would place a strong Japanese force in such a strategic position as to be @ severe blow at all three of the powers in South east Asia-the British at Singapore, the Netherlands in the Indies and ourselves in the Philippines" Stim- son said.
 we all agreed that 1t must not be allowed; that, if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra the British would fight; and, If the British fought we would have to fight"
 Hull At Farley
 The war cabinet meeting he de- scribed in his diary entry of No- vember 28 was attended by MT. Roosevelt; former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the late Secre- tary of Navy Frank Knox; former Army Chief of Staff General George 0. Marshall and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark.
 The 28 pages of diary excerpts and Stimson's 38-page introductory statement gave the Congressional Committee an intimate picture of what transpired in official circles during the critical period which preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
 The diary entries disclosed that:
 1.--Mr. Roosevelt boiled the full cabinet Nov. 2, 194l, and found 1t unanimously agreed that the Amer ican public would support war with Japan if Japan struck the British at Malaga or the Dutch East Indies
 2.-The war cabinet agreed Nov 25 that despite the risk of letting Japan have the advantage of the first shot, 1t was desirable" in order tc have full support of the Ameri- can public and so there would be no doubt as to who were the ag- gressors.
 3.-Mr. Roosevelt fairly blew up" when Stimson told him on Nov. % that Japanese task force of 30 to 50 ships was steaming toward 1ndo- China. MT. Roosevelt considered 1t evidence of bad faith by Japan in current negotiations.
 4. MT. Roosevelt personally or- dered the sending of final alert Nov. 27 to Pacific outpost defenders
 5.-The war cabinet agreed Nov 28 that south bound Japanese force should not be attacked without warning. As an alternative, 1t was agreed that MT. Roosevelt should address a secret message to the Jap- anese emperor and send a special message to congress reporting the danger and outlining what should be done if British, Dutch or the Philippines were attacked,
 (The message to Hirohito was dis patched Dec. 6, 194l, the night be. fore Pearl Harbor was attacked. The message to Congress never was de- livered prior to the attack)
 6.-Hull, Stimson and Knox all expected on the morning of Dec. [ that Japan was planning some dew iltry; and we all were wondering where the blow would strike" They had no thought Pearl Harbor would be struck.
 Tn recording the Nov. 25 agree ment that Japan should strike the tery with committal services con