Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-09-01

Under present circumstances we are
confronted with the implication OF
an impairment of sovereignty re-
sulting from the granting of military
rights, this implication making
other nations, even weak ones, re-
luctant to grant such rights.
This committee has repeatedly
emphasized that wise decisions car
be made only upon full knowledge
of all pertinent facts. Pearl Harbol
could not have been the disaster
that it was except for two circum-
stances: First, we did not have
sufficient knowledge of all the facts
and second, we failed to act intelli.
gently and promptly on even the
adequate knowledge that we die
have.
Future decisions as to our ma.
tional defense, if they are to be
wise and if they are to insure the
inviolability of our shores, must be
based on facts. This means thai
our intelligence agencies must bt
superior. A policy of economy which
fails to keep the eyes, ears anc
touch of the Nation continually al
their sharpest is a penny-wise anc
pound-foolish policy. ."
x X x +
Frequently in this report the com
mittee has emphasized the conduc
of diplomatic relations as being tn,
first line of national defense. It il
of equal and possibly even create,
Importance that decisions in thi.
field be based upon facts as they
are in the military field. It is also
obvious that diplomatic decision.
must be made in the light of cir.
cumstances in the military field ane
that military requirements may bt
governed by diplomatic commit.
ments. This, of course, makes i'm.
perative a close liaison between the
and diplomatic services. IS
Unless the United States ha:
larger and better intelligence agen.
cies in both the military and non.
military fields than we had before
World War II, our future nationa
defense will suffer.
Administrative Activities.
Now that the haste of war is over
attention should be given to the i'm.
provement of administrative proce.
dures and to the elimination Of
weaknesses in procurement and sup.
ply. Our Government should not
freeze the wartime errors and de-
ficiencies into its peacetime ma.
tional defense system. = -
The committee has never assumed
a pinchpenny attitude toward wal
Cost in terms of dol
lars is not necessarily proof of ex.
traVagance and waste - How
ever, the committee observed q
tendency on the part of many off.
Gals in the armed forces to throw
economy to the winds and even te
pride themselves on their disregard
OF considerations of cost and econ.
omy.
More businesslike administrative
in the opinion of the com.
not only would have reduced
the cost and future financial bur.
den OF World War II but actually
would have brought the war to 8
successful conclusion more quickly
with less loss of life and less de.
pletion of our important natural re.
sources. -
The committee expects mistake.
to be made, but the indifference t.
considerations of economy, as dis.
played in instances such as thu
Canol project, go far beyond the
limits OF error which should bt
tolerated.
Poor Business Judgment.
The committee found an example
OF very poor business Judgment or
the part of the War Department,
IN the setting up of what was known
as the strategic reserve plan" OF
the Army. Out of the ire.
mendous quantity of supplies anc
equipment which had been pro.
duced for fighting the war, the Wal
Department planned to retain huge
quantities of supplies for the pur.
pose of equipping and maintaining
the Army during the period of de.
mobilization, during the period OF
occupation, during peacetime years
and for the first year of the next
war
Under the reserve formula which
had been set up by the War De-
partment directive some items such
as tools and textiles would be kept
by the War Department for use as
late as 1869. .+*
On November S, 1945, after the
War Department became aware that
the committee had begun an inves.
tigation of the strategic reserve
plan" a special board was appointed
to review the plan. -
The boards report recommended
that the Army release supplies OF
civillan-type items for the civilian
economy except those quantities re-
CURED to meet military needs dur
Ing the rehabilitation and that
part OF the occupation period up to
June 80, 1949, and the quantities
necessary to fill certain foreign re.
qulrements.
Change Commended.
This was a tremendous change and
the War Department is to be com
mended for the vigor and prompt
ness with which this problem was
attacked and the courage with which
a far-reaching decision was made
This change in the strategic reserve
plan resulted in approximately $780,.
100000 worth of additional goods
being declared surplus by the Army
-
Much of the ineficiency ant
waste in the business operations oil
the armed forces during the wal
period can be attributed to made.
quately trained personnel and lack
of sound and tried administrative
procedures. IN all too many cases
Army and Navy officers, lacking ir
training and experience, were placed
in administrative positions with the
responsibility of handling hundred.
OF millions of dollars. " -
During peacetime members of the
armed forces, through the Regular
Army and Navy, as we'll as the Ma.
tlonal Guard, the Officers Reserve