Evening star., 1946-09-07
Mr.. Byrnes at Stuttqort

SJ'"Ss VI Stutt9OIt
Secretary Byrnes' highly signifi.
cant speech at Stuttgart does not
represent an American departure
from the principles-open and i'm
plied-of the Potsdam Agreement
1t is rather a Qualification of the
course we propose to follow in an
effort to put that agreement into the
kind of operation we deem to be
essential if Germany is ever to win
its way back to an honorable and
useful place among nations, a de-
~velopment vital to the peace of
Europe.
Mr.. Byrnes' thesis is simply this:
First, that the most important
clause of the Potsdam Agreement,
the clause providing that Germany
be administered as an economic unit,
has yet to be put into effect, princi-
pally because of French and Russian
objections; second, that unless and
until it is put into effect, upward
changes in the Potsdam -decreed
levels OF German industrial produc-
tion will be necessary if the people
of the country are to have a chance
to attain average European living
standards; and third. that otherwise
the barriers existing between the
four Allied occupation zones-bar-
riers restricting the free exchange
of goods, persons and ideas and now
proving "far more difficult to sur
mount than those between normal
independent States"-can serve only
to convert the defeated Reich into
a poorhouse retarding the recovery
of all Europe.
Accordingly, with a view to oblit-
Grating those barriers, Mr.. Byrnes
has re-emphasized Americas firm
intention to unity the German econ
omy in our zone with the economy of
any or all the other occupying Allies.
Up to now. only Britain has agreed
to do this with us-a fact which
means that France and Russia will
have to share the responsibility for
violating central Potsdam prin-
ciple unless they change their pres
ent course. Whether they will come
around TO our view remains to be
seen, but at the moment there seems
little chance that they will, particu-
larly because some of the points
made by Mr.. Byrnes at Stuttgart
run directly counter to the policies
they espouse.
Thus, Mr.. Byrnes has come out in
fiat opposition to Frances deep
seated desire to detach the Ruhr and
Rhineland from Germany. Thus, too
and in this he seems to have taken
a stand against a fait accompli
which he helped bring about and
which will be extremely difficult to
undo-he has strongly suggested
that the United States, at the final
peace settlement. will not approve
the present line marking Poland's
western boundary, a view bound to
be fought tooth and nail not merely
by the Poles but by the Russians as
well. AS for Mr.. Byrnes' remarks on
such matters as reparations and
occupying troops and his proposal
for United States of Germany, the
Soviet Union holds to opposite ideas
and is not likely to abandon them
soon.
The Stuttgart speech, in other
words, far from settling anything,
has merely pointed up and defined
the area of inter-Allied disagree
ment over Germany's future, par
ticularly the basic disagreement be-
tween us and Russia. Beyond that.
OF course, while making clear that
they must pay for the sins of their
nation, it was an obvious appeal to
the German people to understand
that the United States has their
long-term interests at heart and
is anxious to speed up the day when
they will be able to govern them
selves on a truly democratic and
non-militaristic basis-an appeal
calculated to Offset Soviet prop
aganda seeking to draw them away
from the west as whole.
An unnamed French official has
interpreted this as an open bid for
popularity with the Germans that
can lead only to dangerous competi-
ton with Russia. Unquestionably,
this risk is real. Yet, given the inter-
Allied failure to live up to the Pots
dam Agreement and given evidences
OF Soviet intent to play a lone-wolf
game, it is difficult to see what else
Mr.. Byrnes could have said. Sooner
or later it had to be said, and now
is a good time for it.