The Wilmington morning star., 1946-12-03
MORE O
LIPPMANN
FROM PAGE ONE
strength of the Red Army is in its

immense reserves of infantry. The
weapons of the Red Army are by
present standards primitive. They
are easy to manufacture. Almost
any n can quickly be taught tc
use them. The Red Army, more
over, is one that can march on its
own feet towards any theater
where it might wish to operate.
To reduce the Red Army is only
to send the troops home. The army
can be r~e~created in a few weeks
by calling the troops back. There
fore, because the essential strength
Of the Soviets is in their man
power, not in their technology,
disarmament is for the Russians
only a rehabilitation. An army
which has merely been demobilized
can soon be modified again, and
therefore a reduction Of the Red
Army is no real reduction In the
Soviet military potential.
Our own position is radically diff.
ferent. Our military power de-
ponds upon highly specified per.
sonnet operating extremely com
plicated weapons and machines.
The manufacture Of these weapons
and machines takes a long time.
The training of the men to make
them and use them takes a long
time. Installations are required to
exert our military power across
the wide expanse of the oceans;
they cannot be improvised quickly.
Therefore. if we stop making
our complicated weapons and ma
chimes, if we do not maintain the
installations to use them, If we dc
not train the specialists to operate
them, We are in fact disarmed. We
are not, like the Russians, merely
demobilized.
Thus Mr.. Molotov's proposal is
in its essence that the Soviet
Union should demobilize and that
we should disarm. If this proposal
were adopted, the Soviet Union
would indeed have every reason to
insist upon effective inspection.
For inspection cannot alter the
fact that Russian man power can
be modified by a decree calling
men to the colors. But inspection
to see to it that we did main
tain and develop our chronological
advantages would alter radically
the balance of power. The Soviet
Union would remain capable Of
exertiag its full strength at short
notice, and we should be incapable
of exerting ours except after years
of reconversion and preparation.
Thus in the fateful negotiations
which have to be undertaken to
achieve a general world settlement,
Mr.. Molotov's proposal would give
to the diplomacy of the Soviet
Union a decisive superiority Of
weight and force. The Red Army,
though demobilized, would be more
than ever the preponderant mill
tary factor in Europe, the Middle
East, and in the Far East. For the
countervailing force, which now
checks and balances it - namely
our naval and air power, including
the atomic bomb-would be re-
duced Or abolished.
Too much is at stake to justify
us in being mealy-mouthed for
fear Of seeming not to be on the
side of the angels, and therefore
opposed to immediate disarma-
ment. Our own security and the
stability of the world settlement
depend upon u maintaining a
true and effective balance of
power at all the disputed points OF
the globe.
If we are wise, we shall tell Mr..
Molotov that we wish to discuss
the reduction of all armaments
only in a discussion Of a world
settlement; that we do not wish to
conclude agreements before we ar
rive at a world settlement; that we
are prepared to negotiate about
ornaments only if, when, and as
we can negotiate about the recon-
struction of Europe around a re-
constructed Germany, about the
equilibrium of the Middle East,
and about the international posi-
ton of China and Japan in the
Far East.
I do not believe that we need
be embarrassed by taking this line,
or that we need fear that our own
people, or the other peoples of
the world, would misunderstood
us. For it would show that we
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