Evening star., 1946-09-08

To many Americans, the dynamic
power politics which the Soviet Union
is apparently pursuing in the swift un-
folding of the panorama of international
affairs appears ineXplicable. Why do the
Soviets oppose participation of the West
ern Democracies in supervision of the
elections in Poland? Why did Gromyko
walk out of the Security Council of the
United Nations over the question of
Iran? What motive have the Soviets for
their attacks on Gen. Macarthur? There
is definite strategic plan behind each
move of the Kremlin. The pattern is
not haphazard nor is it new. 1t has
little or nothing to do with political
theology. 1t is the logical development
of Imperial Russia over the centuries.
To evaluate correctly where this devel-
opment will lead and how it will affect
us in America, we must carefully examine
from the Russian point of view the
strategic objectives which lie behind the
present Soviet military policy.
Distrust Major Factor.
| The Soviet military psychology is a
curious mixture of arrogance, ignorance
and fear. Above all, the Soviet General
Staff profoundly diStruSts England and
| the United States. II cannot forget the
| loss of its Polish and Besserabian ter
| ritories after World War !, nor that the
| British fought the BolShivik armies on
/ the shores of the Caspian and the Black
! Seas. 1t remembers the Allied occupation
! OF Vladivostok and Archangel in which
| American troops participated. 1t re-
members that it was American support
of Japan which brought about the Treaty
| of Portsmouth and the loss of Korea
and Manchuria
The present Soviet strategy is based
upon the lessons of the past. 1t is
primarily defensive. Twice invaded from
the west and once from the east in the
course of single generation, Russia is
attempting to build ring of buffer
states around her frontiers. She is seek
ing to secure her vital communications
with the outside world and to protect the
+ heart of the homeland from attack bv
| land, sea or air
In his report, delivered before the Su-
preme Soviet, March Is, 1916, Nikoli Voz-
nessensky, chairman of the State Plan
ming Commission, declared: "In the east
and west the historical boundaries of
| the Soviet Union have been restored
From now on, in the east, Southern
Sakalin and the Kurile Islands will no
longer serve as means of isolating the
Soviet Union from the ocean or as
base for japanese attack on our Far
East, but as a means of direct access of
the Soviet Union to the ocean and as
base for the defense of our country from
japanese aggression. From now on the
free and Independent Polish State is no
longer base for German attack on our
western frontier, but our ally in defense
against German aggression"
Buffer States Established.
Along her western frontiers in Europe,
the Soviet Union has already established
ring Of buffer states which she is de-
termined shall be tied to Russia politi-
cally, economically and militarily The
Soviet High Command is even now en-
gagged in the creation of satellite Soviet
armies in these border countries. Armies
Of from IL to Is divisions, trained by
Soviet officers, equipped with Soviet
weapons and, therefore, dependent upon
Soviet industry, are now in the process
OF formation in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Romania and Yugoslavia. Russian inter-
est in these countries is not new. To
the Russians, incorporation of Eastern
| Europe into the Russian sphere of in
fuence seems only the logical sequence
to victorious war.
This attitude accounts for the Soviet
opposition to participation of Great
Britain and the United States in super
vision of the elections in Poland, Ro-
mania and Bulgaria.
To the Soviet General Staff, South
western Russia must seem the Achilles
heel of Soviet security. Here, in the
Stalingrad-M d-Melitopole- -Khrakov triangle,
north of the Black Sea and in the great
Magnitogorsk- Ufa industrial complex, in
the Southern Urals. rs per cent of Soviet
heavy industry as well as most of the
Soviet oil, which lies south of the Cau-
casus Mountains and along the shores
| OF the Black Sea and the Caspian, are
within effective bomber range of British
and American controlled air bases in
Italy and the Middle East. To any gen.
| eral staff, the obvious answer to this
| potential menace would be the extension
OF military power to exclude potential
enemies from such bases, particularly if
this could be accomplished without re-
sort to war. The Soviet penetration of
the Middle East, which is now in prog
ress, can, therefore, be considered, at
least from this aspect, as the implimen-
tation OF defensive strategy.
Russian Interest Traditional.
Aside from the defensive aspect of
this strategy, however, there are other
| deep-rooted historical objectives in this
area. For over two centuries Russians.
Turks and Persians have been fighting
in the Caucasus and along the shores of
the Black Sea and the Caspian The
18th century is story of the struggle be-
tween Russian southwark expansion and
the rising influence of the British EN-
pire. The present controversy over Iran
merely marks resumption of Russian
policy interrupted by the weakness of
Bolshevik Russia after the revolution.
Soviet strategic aims in the Middle East
embrace political, economic and military
control of Asia Minor.
Once the autonomous state of Azer-
baijan has been firmly established, So
Wet control will inevitably spread
through the northern provinces of Iran