Evening star., 1946-06-30
Eisenhower's Report:
A British AppruisoI
Tribute Paid to the Leadership Of

~NsSu sOiSOI
Tribute Paid to the Leadership Of
AEF's Supreme Commander
/ TN Editorial From the London Ttn,es.J
General Eisenhower was appointed
Supreme Commander, Allied Expedi-
ttonary Force in Northwest Europe. in
February, 1914. He then received a
directive from the Combined Chiefs OF
Stan. 1t was to them that he was
responsible for the conduct of opera
tions. and to them that his report on
his mission is addressed. General Mar
shall acted as their executive in con.
veying to him their orders and instruc-
tions, being besides the direct superior
OF General Eisenhower in the latters
capacity as commander of United
States Army forces. The report is
similar In type to the dispatches of
British ommanders-in-chief, but longer
than is common in British usage, and
goes into detail to an extent which
would not have been possible had not
the Suprems Commanders staff been
international In composition. It is a
sober and formal account of the great
victorious campaign In the west, but
Is nevertheless compiled not without
an eye for the dramatic It contains
some matter which would have lent
itself to sensational handling had that
been in accord either with the nature of
the author or the general character of
| the document
~
For example, General Eisenhower re-
veals that both Mr.. Churchill and Gen.
eral Koenig made strong representations
to him to forgo attacks with heavy
bombers, American by day and British
by night, on railway targets in France
on grounds of humanity and for fear
that the result might be to ALLEVIATE the
French from the British and Americans.
He could not agree. His feeling on this
matter was so strong and he regarded
the interruption of communications in
France in order to prevent a speedy
German concentration as so vital that
he demanded and obtained direct con-
troll OF the American Strategic Air
Forces and British Bomber Command
from the Combined Chiefs Of Staff, who
had not intended to hand them over to
him. Again, he confesses that, as 1914
drew to an end, he became more and
more perturbed because he knew moth
ing Of Russian intentions and found
difficulty in deciding upon the nature
OF his own operations while he remained
In this state OF ignorance of the plans
OF the eastern ally. 1t will be recalled
that the Russian offensive had been
confined to the south after the check
| on the Vistula in the summer OF 1914,
and General Eisenhower was naturally
| anxious to learn something of Russian
plans regarding the north German plain,
into which he himself designed to launch
his forces. The personal intervention
OF President Roosevelt induced Marshal
| stain to give an interview on the
| subject to General Eisenhower's repre-
sentative. In January, 1945, Air Chief
Marshal Tedder, General Eisenhowers
deputy, with two Army staff officers,
visited Moscow and were given highly
| reassurtng information about the tre-
| mendous new offensive which was actu-
ally launched in the middle of the
month and which excelled the hopes
| founded upon it.
x& -
Nothing can be easier than to seize
upon a series Of differences of opinion,
OF the accidents inevitable in warfare,
OF the occasional hasty words uttered
by men unaware that a recorder with
pencil and notebook. and possibly a gift
Tor embroidery. was so close at hand.
and to create out of them q picture of
wrangling and Illustration. Conflicts
OF view cannot be escaped while there
are commanders Of strong and inde-
pendent intellects, and armies do not
prosper under leaders afraid to say
what they think. Such conflicts ap-
pear in purely national armies, but
when they appear in international
armies they are heightened by a factor
which in no way dishonours those con-
/ cerned-the condition that every ma
| tional commander necessarily bears. in
! ADDITION to his responsibility to his
| chief, a responsibility to his own Gov
eminent for the national CONTINGENT
committed to his care That is the
major problem which the armies of a
| coalition campaigning under a united
command always have to face. It is one
which in formal logic can admit of no
absolute solution because no State.
unless it be merely a satellite or an
| instrument of that which rrov;See {b.
| supreme commander, can free itself
from its obligation to watch over the
| safety and welfare of its own forces.
In practice, with good will and COM
mon sense, the organization can be
made to succeed. In the campaign
fought under the supreme command of
General Eisenhower it did succeed; in
TACT 1t could scarcely have been more
triumphantly vindicated. Frivolous criti-
| cism, in search of what tickles the tired
appetite of the sensation hunter may bs
harmful in its effect upon the unthink-
ing but it cannot explain away the
efficiency and suitability of the organ
lzation set up by the Combined Chiefs
OF Staff and based upon the experience
which had already produced excellent
results in other theaters Of the war.
The Supreme Commander here pays
no empty compliments, but he does make
brief references to outstanding features
OF the British contribution to victory
which will be read with pleasure in this
country. He describes Field Marshal
Montgomery's tactical conduct of thu