Evening star., 1946-07-21

War, or the Secretary Of Navy
tricked, provoked, melted, cajoled,
or coerced Japan into attacking this
Nation in order that a declaration
of war might be more easily obtained
from the Congress. On the contrary
all evidence conclusively points to
the fact that they discharged their
responsibilities with distinction, abil-
ity and foresight and in keeping
with the highest traditions of ou1
fundamental foreign policy.
IS. The President, the Secretary
of State, and high Government off,
cials made every possible effort
without sacrificing our national
honor and endangering our security
to avert war with Japan.
IS. The disaster of Pearl Harbo,
was the failure, with attendant in.
crease in personnel and materia,
losses, Of the Army and the Navy
to institute measures designed te
detect an approaching hostile force
to effect state Of readiness com.
|mensurate with the realization that
war was at hand, and to employ
every facility at their command
in repelling the japanese.
~. Virtually every one was sur.
prised that Japan struck the flee
at Pearl Harbor at the time that sh,
did. Yet officers, both in Washing
ton and Hawaii, were fully conscious
of the danger from air attack; the,
realized this form OF attack on Pear
Harbor by Japan was at least ,
possibility; and they were adequate
ly informed of the imminence O
war.
Specific Failures.
IS. Specifically, the Hawaiian com
mands failed
(a) To discharge their re-
sponsibilities in the light OF the
warnings received from WASH
ington, other information pos
sessed by them, and the princi-
pie of command by mutual CO.
operation.
/ CD To integrate and co-ordi-
nate their facilities for defense
and to alert properly the Army
and Navy establishments in Ha-
waii, particularly In the light of
the warnings and intelligence
available to them during the
period November n to Decem-
ber 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on basis
designed to acquaint each Of
them with the operations of the
/, other, which was necessary to
their joint security. and to ex-
> change fully all significant in
telligence.
Cd To maintain a more effec-
tive reconnaissance within the
limits OF their equipment.
(e) To effect state of readi-
ness throughout the Army and
Navy establishments designed
to meet all possible attacks.
% To employ the facilities,
materiel and personnel at their
command, which were adequate
at least to have greatly mini
mized the effects Of the attack, in
repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the signifi-
canoe of intelligence and other
information available to them.
Not DereIictions of Duty.
4 "9. The errors made by the Ha
waiian commands were errors {
judgment and not derelictions {
/. duty.
40. The War Plans Division of tn
!. War Department failed to dischare
its direct responsibility to advis
: the commanding general he had NJ
properly alerted the Hawaiian de
partment when the latter, pursuar
to instructions, had reported actio
taken in a message that was nj
satisfactorily responsive to the orig
nal directive.
al. The Intelligence and Wa
Plans Divisions Of the War an
Navy Departments failed:
ta) To give careful and
thoughtful consideration to the
intercepted messages from Tokyo
to Honolulu of September "a.
November Is, and November 20
! (the harbor berthing plan and
related dispatches) and to raise
a question as to their signifi-
! canoe. Since they indicated a
particular interest in the Pacific
Fleets base, this intelligence
1 should have been appreciated
and supplied the Hawaiian COM
/, manders for their assistance,
|, along with other information
/ available to them, in making
}, their estimate of the situation.
!. (b) To be properly on the qui
;, vive to receive the "one o'clock"
:. intercept and to recognize in the
:. message the fact that some Japa-
nese military action would very
!, possibly occur somewhere at
pm, December 7. II properly
appreciated, this intelligence
should have suggested dispatch
to all Pacific outpost commando
ers supplying this information,
as Gen. Marshall attempted to
do Immediately upon seeing it.
"12. Notwithstanding the ia,
; that there were officers on 24-hol
= watch, the committee believes ths
!. under all of the evidence the Ws
, and Navy Departments were n,
|, sufficiently alerted on December
|, and 7, 1941, in view of the imm
nence of war.
e RECOMMENDATIONS.
v BASED on the evidence in IL
E committees record, the followir
: recommendations are respectful
!. submitted:
v THAT immediate action be take
S to insure that unity of command
: imposed at all military and nav
outposts.
That there be complete int,
grafton of Army and Navy INTEL
gence agencies in order to avoid tt
pitfalls of divided responsible
which experience has made S
abundantly apparent; that upc
effecting unified intelligence, of
: GERS be selected for Intelligent
= work who possess the backgroun
penchant and capacity for sue
work, and that they be maintaine