Evening star., 1946-10-13


and intercoastal commerce has focused
public attention anew upon the M
adequacy OF our present Federal labor
laws. This was not q strike over issues
which could be settled by private man
asement and labor organizations. It
was q strike to compel the adoption Of
q wage scale which the Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board had declared to be contrary
to the policy Of Title II Of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act.
Yet because the applicable statutes
had not made concerted activity for
such an objective clearly illegal and had
failAd TO vest the courts with power to
deal with such situation, the execu-
tive branch Of the Government was
powerless to bring about q resumption
of shipping except by yielding to the
demands Of the strikers.
While this affair was dramatic 1t was
merely one of a series of similar epi-
sodes. During the war, it was not un-
usual to find employers defyirg the War
Labor Board or to see unions on strike,
either in violation of its orders. or IN
violation OF the waiting period pre-
scribed by the War Labor Disputes Act.
Such incidents emphasize the futility OF
restricting the freedom of either indus
try or labor by governmental action,
unless such action is predicated upon
statute which contains provision for
judicial enforcement through the apph-
cation of sanctions sufficient to insure
compliance.
Labor Court Suggested.
This does not mean that a universal
system of compulsory arbitration is de-
sirable. Indeed, unless there can be
legislative formulation of the standards
by which an arbitrator should be guided,
there is grave doubt as to the wisdom
of having the law encourage arbitration
of issues which cannot be resolved by
reference to the terms Of a collective
agreement. 1t does suggest however.
the need of establishing a national
labor court, independent of the execu-
tive branch, vested with the power to
prevent the kind of activity on the part
Of officials Of either management or
trade unions which Congress defines as
contrary to the public interest.
Fortunately, we already have an
agency Of Government in the National
Labor Relations Board which, with
some changes in its internal structure,
is equipped for this role. Generally
speaking these amendments should be
in the direction of making the board
serve all economic groups as well as one.
It would thereby become a forum to
which management as well as labor
could resort.
The principal statute. which the board
administers today is the National Labor
Relations or Wagner Act, passed in 1885.
Despite the experimental character OF
this measure and the recurrent flurries
of congressional controversy with respect
to 1t, the substantive provisions of the
act have remained unchanged for II
years.
Partisan Charge Explained.
Enacted to prevent employers from
frustrating workers in their attempts to
achieve self organization and to encour-
age collective bargaining, the statute
has had q tremendous impact upon
American industry. Largely owing to the
provision enabling the board to obtain
judicial enforcement of its orders, one
nonunion stronghold after another has
been forced to yield to its provisions.
Since its passage, trade union member
ship has jumped from three million to
fifteen million. Wages and other working
conditions in mining, manufacturing
and transportation are largely deter
mined by collective agreement. There
can be no doubt that the civil rights
and economic status of the average
worker have been greatly strengthened
by the administration of the act.
This record of solid achievement has
been marred, however, by the widely
held impression that the board is parti-
san. The reflection Of this feeling in
Congress has brought about repeated
appropriation reductions even in the
face Of rising case load. AS a conse-
ouence the staff of the board has been
cut far below the level of efficiency of
operations, which in turn has tended
to discourage many capable young law
yers from feeling that the agency offers
an attractive field for Government
service.
Partisan Charge Explained.
My five years with the board have
convinced me that to the extent that
49, ~, ~ y>o ~ leo el,i,, ;c i,,ct;iad
1t is not due to any lack of judicial
qualities or integrity on the part of
the board members. 1t can be explained
as the inevitable outcome of a statute
which gives employers no affirmative
rights, imposes no duties upon employees
and places upon the board the duty
of acting as prosecutor as well as judge.
Under such circumstances the staff
members vested with the prosecuting
functions tend naturally to perform
their duties In cooperation with the
complaining unions and to deal with
the defending employers at arms
length. Hence employers and their
counsel frequently feel that ire
spectiye Of what facts are developed at
the hearing an adverse Judgment is
forestadowed, although in actual prac-
tice the board members who ultimately
decide the case in Washington rarely
know of its existence until the hearing
has been completed and the report Of
the trial examiner submitted.
This particular defect lin the boards
public relations could be cured without
any substantive changes in the Act.
AL that Is needed is an Executive Order
under the Reorganization Act transfer