The Wilmington morning star., 1946-09-12
D and TOMORROW
Rv WALTER LIPPMANN

WIZ tllcT ~ WOQlu uOL De DSCCer 10
postpone the settlement of the
Italian frontiers as we have post
poned the settlement of the Italian
colonial empire. Postponement
would mean that we continued to
have the right to stand guard with
the British on the disputed from
tier; to agree to this treaty means
that we must evacuate our forces.
But unless the compromise which
we have agreed to is accepted with
some sincerity by Tito and guar
anteed expressly by the Soviet
Union, there is no point in evacu-
ating the British and American
forces. FoS now at least they en-
force a truce. If they had to come
back, which would be a perpetual
probability, they would be inter-
vening in a war.
So granting Trieste is a
very hot spot for us to stay in, it
may be better to stay in the frying
pan now than, if Tito breaks loose
and the Russians won't stop him,
to jump in the fire later on.
It is an awkward dilemma to
have to choose between having no
treaty and accepting this treaty.
Perhaps Mr.. Byrnes is no longer
altogether free to choose, though
of course, he is entitled to remind
M. Molotov that the Senate has
the last word under the American
Constitution, and that he is bound
to explain frankly and fully to the
Senate what the treaty means and
what it entails. The rules of the
peace conference cannot be SO
rigid and absolute but that he can
still with a good conscience and
in good faith exercise in some way
the right to review the whole
treaty before he finally signs it.
If Mr.. Byrnes did this, it would,
of course, reopen the whole
italian question. and would mean
that the long tedious process Of
making peace first with the satel-
lites had ended in a disagreement
and a postponement. But has it
not been demonstrated conclusively
that it was a cardinal mistake to
think that there could be a per-
manent settlement with the satel-
1ites before there was a settlement
of Germany and of the funda-
mental conflicts of power in the
Middle East and in Asia? For now
that we see the drafts of the satel-
lite treaties, we find that nobody,
literally nobody, thinks they are
good in themselves or that they
can be and will be enforced. There
fore, nothing substantial would be
lost, and much might be gained,
by laying them on the table, and
turning our full attention and ef-
fort to the fundamental issues
which must be settled first.
This would clearly be the right
move II we take the great de-
cision to restore the balance of
power in the eastern Mediterra-
mean. The tabling of these treaties,
if at the same time we began to
build up American sea and air
power, would be an emphatic
diplomatic move toward W h a t
should be our paramount objec-
tive: to end the exhaustive litiga-
ton of trifles and bring about a
negotiation with the Soviet Union
about the main issues. We would
be refused to consolidate the Rus
sian position within the Russian
orbit until we knew how the posi-
ton in Germany, the Middle East,
and China was to be stabilized.
Once again we must remind
ourselves that peace can be had
now only. by a policy of calculated
risk. We are living in an era
when the rule of reason is impos-
sible until there is again an equi-
librium Of force beneath it.
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