The Wilmington morning star., 1946-03-21
Weighing The Veto
Nv SAYILLE r. DAVIS

II By SAV1LLE II. DAVIS
4 The Big Power veto is dlsconcertins al
fair. 1t IS not behaving quite ACCORDING 70
Specifications. There has been lot OF talk
i about II beine last resort, an ultimate Wea.
pom to be used only in the event OF drastic ma
(! tional necessity. The small powers and re-
formers generally made great russ mere
when Mr.. Vishinsky said he would veto the
Egyptian proposal during the Greek oenate.
i But what is the veto? Mr. Stettinius SAID IN
the early stages Of the Greek hearing - pe1ore
Mar. Vishinsky spoke-taat the United otateS
did not agree that danger to peace e%1s'ea
in that case Was that threat to veto? And
why not? The United States approval is neces'
sary to any action by the Council on TINS
subject. Either Mr.. Stettinius approves or ne
vetoes.
Likewise, Mr. Bevin in the Java case said
he would not agree to commission OF IN
curry. He never mentioned voting. He was
just stating his Governments position. But
suca is the nature Of voting-a dispute has
not been declared to exist and therefore MT.
Bevin was not disqualified from voting as a
disputant-that either he agrees to whatever
| action is taken, or there is no action.
| No one hit the ceiling when either Mr.. Stet-
| tinius Or Mr.. Bevin explained their positions.
But the more alert people in the room knew
what the effect of disapproval would be, and
more light began to dawn on this hitherto
| u
veto.
There Is another intriguing aspect to the
problem. The veto is popularity supposed to be
the diabolus ex nlachi1a of the Charter-a
kind of evil genie of old-fashioned national
ism which would hover about in the wings
until internationalism was about to win an
important victory, and then would descend in
to the drama to reverse its course. 1t may
be SO, but what would have been the course
of the Greek case without 1t?
Mr.. Bevin would have demaaded-and re-
ceived-a hundred per cent vindication on the
fact that British troops in Greece were not a
threat to international peace. That was the
technical issue at stake. Such a vote would
have uaquestionably reflected the majority
view accur ately on this point. But in very
real sense, such q vote would not have ex-
pressed the views Of the Council on a larger
issue which was also involved. This dispute
had metamorphosed into something quite diff
ferent from the Greek affair - hardhitting
conflict OF prestige and position between Bri-
tain and the Soviet Union Both sides, in the
view Of neutral members, had resorted to
n ore nationalistic excuses than the Council
could well Withstand, and few, if any, want
ed to support a vote which would imply a
complete vindication Of one side on this over
riding issue.
At this point the veto-1et US nnonentarily
indulge in a little propaganda for the sake Of
argument and call 1t unanimity rule-inter-
vened And was it entirely diabolic? The Char
ter voting rule says the Big Five must achieve
Iunanimty in such a case. Full vindication Of
Mr.. Vebn and full condemnation of Mr.. Wis
hinsky was out of the question, for the latter
would not approve. The result was a process
Of Cancellation, led by Mr.. Stetinius and sup
! 81 l>.,x nr~.vyA - 81
thos, often maligned diplomatic formulas,
whereby -eries of informal statements ex-
onerated Britain on a technical issue, and yet
iby the Council avoiding formal action there
was no completely one-sided verdict on the
larger issue. Everyone understood 1t that way.
Anything else would have misrepresented the
feelings Of the Council on what obviously
was matter and q precedent Of highest inn
portance.
And where does this leave us?
Nothing would seem justified except high
lily tentative conclusion that the veto is not
as simple as it once seemed to its critics
Jealous eyes. Obviously it is not democracy
md that is what we are aiming at Also, it
could become extremely embarrassing when
straightforward action Is needed. No such case
has arisen yet, so this aspect of the veto
has not been tested With Iran, Greece, and
Java, the Council for various reasons has
dropping the case.
Perhaps it is best to put It this way: AS Of
this moment, it would appear that where un-
! animity is desirable, through a general yield
ing all around. the "unanirnity rule COM
pels everyone to emphasize those virtues Of
cohesion and Cancellation which are too easily
forgotten once national passions are aroused.
! 1t even serves the cause Of conscience as
against those divisve forces which all too east
| ly tend to sp. men apart. 1t is even possible
within the flexible borders of unanimity to
achieve moderately one-sided verdict Bri.
tain clearly won in the unanimous formula
which closed the case Of Greece.
| But where a case crosses an invisible line
into an area where agreement becomes ap-
peasement, and clear-cut action is desirable,
tEen the veto still promises Its dangers.
AS to where the invisible line is drawn, we
bow out. Such a veto has not yet been used,
and possibly it is better to suspend fire until
seeing the whites Of its eyes. christian
Science Monitor
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