The Wilmington morning star., 1946-08-03
The Great Gamble
By ARTHUR kRoCK

Marshal Lord Wilson'S explanation why the
British were reluctant to approve the plan tor
the invasion of Southern France turn time
backward to the wartime differences OF
opinion on high strategy among the Allies.
These differences were generally settled on
current military considerations as they ap-
peared tc the United States authorities. But
those who took the other side, urging that post
war political factors should be balanced
against immediate military ones, %prophesied
that otherwise Soviet Russia would be by far
the largest beneficiary OF the terms of peace
in Europe.
These terms are observed to grant her the
largest territorial concessions, almost 81 bill
lion in reparations from the satellite nations,
and economic and military domination of Eu-
rope eastward from the Rhine. Had the Anglo
American disputes over the strategy of con-
tinental invasion been otherwise dispoed OF,
without promoting a sudden German : Soviet
peace, the rest Of the story including that
related in the treaty drafts - might have
been very different. This was the argument
that was lost by the British and some Ameri-
can conferees on political and military policy.
Their thesis-and it was maintained steadi-
ly by many British Officials and commanders,
and frequently by Prime Minister Churchill
was that military occupation is always the
source Of postwar power. Hence they first
stood out for an invasion of the Continent
northward through the Balkans instead OF
southwark through Normandy. Defeated in
that, when President Roosevelt and our COM
manders agreed with the Russian demand for
a second front on the west, they then support
ed the southern invasion from Northern Italy
through Hungary and Austria to which Lord
Wilson referred, instead Of the operations
northward from Marseille. This also was re-
jected.
The result was that the successful end Of
the war found the Americans, British and
IN occupation Of Western Europe, in
Guiding a part of Germany, but it discovered
the Soviet troops garrisoning the Balkans, the
Baltic, Austria, Poland, Finland and the agri-
cultural areas of Germany. Spread in armed
force Ear beyond any rormal zone in security,
the Russians were able to meet a theory with
a condition. Since they could not have been
without war, and since in all these
areas they had set up IRRATIONAL" governments
to speak IL the names of the occupied popula-
tons, the other Allies felt obliged to yield on
many major points and principles. The rec
ord is in the drafts Of the peace treaties just
published.
President Roosevelt cast the influence that
decided the Allied argument over strategy and
assured that, if Germany was defeated, the
Soviet troops would be ir occupancy of the
areas WIleIS liz OILY ALA CSOiloiiIlS
concessions were to be made because, though
France lad claims in the Rhineland, the Amer
leans and the British were pledged not to &C.
quire land or money from the peoples they
liberated.
Mr.. Roosevelt made his decision on two
principal grounds. One, which he himself sup
piled, was that Russia would follow Stain in
a postwar policy that would respect the At
lantic Charter and reflect gratitude for the
part the United States and Great Britain play
ed in saving Russia from Hitler. The Presi-
dent, terpoing this his great gamble" based
it on his personal appraisal Of Stain and Sta
Inns control of Soviet policy. The second
ground was his reasoning that this gamble"
would, as 1t did, remove any possibility that
might exist OF a wartime Improvement
between Berlin and Moscow.
Perhaps when the secret records Of these
and decisions are available, some fu-
ture generation may be able to determine
whether Mr.. Roosevelt's appraisal of Stain, or
his reasoning On ways to assure that Russia
would continue relentless war against Ger
many, or both, were sound, wise and neces-
sitous. But even il the records produce a
clear, comprehensive and undisputed set OF
facts on which judgmen: could persuasively
be reached, this vital and related question
will remain: If Mr.. Roosevelt had lived to
make the peace, would Soviet policy have fol-
lowed more nearly the course he apparently
expected and on which he founded his great
gambler Some Russian document may ul-
timately come to light that will furnish the
answer. But history suggests that very seldom
are it's great interrogatlons completely dis
posed Of in the secret files.
If Mr.. Roosevelt knew at Yalta that his
health was failing as rapidly as some who
were with him there believed, then his survi-
val into the postwar period as warranty Of
Stalin's cooperation could not have seemed to
him a matter Of paramount Importance to
the peace. But such intimate testimony as
has been offered is that he did not expect to
fall at his post before his great work was
done. Therefore the unanswered question be-
longs in the realm Of high speculation, and
may never be answered.
It is perilous craftsmanship, of course, to
base major decisions ON personal relations be-
tween the chiefs Of state, because these are
as transitory as life itself. "Memento mori''
should be written on everyone's mirror. But
Mr.. Roosevelt thought the risk had to be
taken. Ard there were many, including our
high commanders, who agreed with him.. -
New York Times.
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