Evening star., 1946-01-05
The Korean Problem

first formal report on nonmilitary
affairs in that country and Japan
a report covering September and
October-lends considerable support
to the agreement worked out at the
recent Anglo Russian American For
eign Ministers Conference in Mos
COW. Despite Korean rioting over
failure of the conference to grant
immediate independence, the report
makes clear that the Moscow for
mula-envisioning possible five
year trusteeship and prompt
coordination of Soviet occupation
policies with our own-constitute a
sound approach to the problem.
Although the restoration of Ko-
rean independence and sovereignty
was. formally pledged by the Allies
as one of their war aims, genuine
postwar reconstruction has hitherto
been prevented by the armistice
terms which arbitrarily divided the
country into an American and a
Russian occupation zone that dras-
tically truncated its economy, the
American agricultural south being
sundered from the industrial north
in Russian hands. The dividing
line, as the Macarthur report en-
phasizes, has proved in practice to
be an impossible barrier.
This impossible situation is now
to be remedied. Within fortnight
the local commanders are directed
to confer "for the elaboration of
measures establishing permanent
coordination in administrative
economic matters" and in their
deliberations they are to be guided
by the overall directive looking to
"the establishment of Korea as
an independent state, the conditions
for developing the country on demo-
cratic principles and the earliest
possible liquidation of the disastrous
results of the protracted japanese
uOIlllIidIlOll III NOlCd.
This preliminary conference of the
American and Russian occupational
authorities is to be succeeded by
regular joint commission, while con-
currently a provisional democratic
government" of the Korean people
will be set up, broadly based on all
important parties and social organ
izations" Subsequently, the recon-
mendations of the Russo American
Joint commission and the Korean
provisional government will be
considered by the governments of
the United States, Soviet Union.
Britain and China "for the working
out of an agreement concerning a
four power trusteeShip of Korea for
a period up to five years."
While this deferment of Korean
independence is not to the liking of
Korean political leaders, it certainly
seems to fit In with General Mac
Arthur'S views. In fact, according
to his September October report,
his personal inclination is against
setting up even provisional gov
ernment because of the almost
complete lack of qualified Korean
administrators untainted by jap
anese collaboration and the absence
of any political party truly repre-
sentative of the people" The coun-
try has no fewer than fifty-four
political factions, he says, and al
though all have in common hatred
for the Japanese and desire for
self-rule, they differ widely in other
respects, with many having only the
vaguest idea of their aims.
This condition is understandable,
of course, and the Macarthur re-
port, which was drawn up before
the Moscow meeting, makes a point
of explaining it. For thirty-five years
Korea has been subjected to a ruth
less japanese regime, with the result
that present-day Koreans lack ex-
perience in self-government and are
suffering a natural confusion in
politics. A brief period of interna-
tional trusteeship, if honorable and
enlightened, should go far toward
fitting them for complete freedom
and autonomy. To this extent at
least, General Macarthur seems tc
be in full accord with the Moscow
agreement.