The Wilmington morning star., 1946-05-10

neOuSly upon
status of western Germany. The
Potsdam agreement left the Rus
SLAMS masters of eastern Germany;
the management about the west
left the British the masters OF
most of western Germany. The
effect of this has been te
partition Prussia between the So
viets and Britain, excluding the
United States and France; from
direct participation in those Ger
man affairs which really count.
1t follows, so it seems to me, that
for us the right way back to In
fluence is to repair the Potsdam
error by Intervening for a settle
ment in western Germany. 1t Sec
rotary Byrnes and the State De-
partment could be induced to
invest in this vital region even q
fraction of the brain power
nervous energy, and moral passion
which they have expended on
Bulgarian elections, Iran. and
other secondary issues, they woulo
begin to get some sort of grip upon
the realities of war and peace
Twelve months after the great wal
which Germany started, they are
discussing, and quarreling about
everything on Gods green earth
except Germany.
This default in Washington-he
failure and refusal to take an &C
tive interest in a settlement OF
western Germany-has had a o
fusing effect upon the American
authorities in Germany.
In our own zone we are conduct.
ing a most promising experiment
with the political decentralization
of Germany. If the pattern, which
we have applied to Bavaria and to
two other south German states,
were generally adopted, it would
cause Germany to become a con-
federation of some ten or eleven
self-governing states. No one has
ever suggested any other constitu-
tional structure within which the
Germans could be free without
being a menace to their neighbors.
And only by developing such a con-
federation can the four separate
military governments be dissolved,
and replaced eventually by a united
Allied military supervision and
control.
This is the American conception
of how to deal with Germany. II
is a good conception, and no one
else has suggested a better one.
But, outside our own zone, we moi
only do not promote u own
demonstrated principle, but in fact
use influence against it. For,
harassed by the practical Difficult.
ties of f e e d g and supplying
Germany across the military zones,
we have become the insistent advo-
Gates of re-establishing a central
German administration-we do not
| admit that it would be a central
government" in Berlin.
Now it would be one thing to re-
establish such a central govern
ment Of limited powers-though i,
ought not to be in Berlin-if Prus-
STA, like south Germany, had al
ready been decentralized into a
number of separate states. But
Prussia has not been decentralized;
on the contrary, as l have already
reported, the British and the Rus.
slams are more and more commit.
ted to promising the Germans q
unified a d centralized Prussia,
dominating a unified and central.
lied Reich.
For us to promote a central gov.
eminent in Berlin under these CON
ditions is to defeat in Germany as
a whole our best contribution to
the solution Of the German prob.
lem.
The French have vetoed the cen
trail administration which General
Clay demands. They will not agree
even to the rudimentary beginnings
Of a central German government
in Berlin until the Ruhr and the
Rhineland have been politically
separated from Prussia, of which
they are now an integral part. This
is regarded as stubborn obstruction
But in truth the French have been
defending our own principle, and
protecting us against sacrificing to
immediate eXpediency our b e
contribution to a lasting solution Of
the German question.
The French demand that the
Ruhr be politically autonomous,
and not administered from Berlin,
is not opposed to the American con-
ception of Germany as a loose con-
federation. On the r a r y,
France and the United States have
the same basic principle. They
could with great advantage work
together toward a general German
settlement which would differ
radically from the kind of re-
united, centralized Reich which the
british and III. D,,cci,-. - 4basr