Evening star., 1946-02-03

Early in January one of the highest
ranking officers in Washington said
bluntly at small gathering, attended
by some of the country's most respon-
sible political men, that unless Americas
diplomacy changes radically from
policy of expediency and appeasement
to one of realism 1--WE may have an
other war within the next five years,
whether we like it or not"
Because this gathering was informal
and strictly -the-record the name Of
the officer can not be divulged. But he
is known to have both feet on the
ground and has never been a Red
batter" Quite the contrary. He has
been extremely understanding of Rus
sias actions, even when they appeared
to be contrary to the pledges and agree
ments Premier Stain had accepted at
the various tripartite conferences.
1t is too early to pass judgment on
what the UNO will accomplish in the
future. But one thing is obvious: Mos
COW does notebelieve in the rights of
the little nations and wants this as
sociation of powers to be dominated by
the Big Three. OF these, the United
States and Great Britain are soon to be
much weaker militarily than Russia.
The rehabilitation in this country has
already been so speeded up that today
we can no longer be described as a
strong military power. Britain has had
such losses and is in such bad shape
that she has only negligible force.
Russian Forces Strong.
Thus, when the American high-rank-
ing officer adopted gloomy attitude
about lasting peace, he took the point
Of view that if the United States, as
she did after the World War, sets the
pace of disarmament "by example" "
Britain will be compelled for economic
reasons to reduce further its weak mill
tary potential, and Russia will become
the worlds dominating military power.
Today Russia still has 100000 men
under arms; her aviation is intact and
she is planning to build powerful navy.
Compulsory military CONSUMPTION in
Russia and in satellite countries in Gen.
trail, Eastern and Southeastern Europe
will increase the standing armies of the
Soviet bloc.
But this in itself might not be dam
aging to the peace of the world if pow
ers which base their policies on military
strength rather than moral issues would
use their might unselfshly in the same
way we have used it during the first
and second World Wars.
We in the United States have had
two periods which were described in
their own particular fashion. There
we're, for instance, the Gay Nineties,
when life was gay and pleasant. Then
after the World War We had the hectic
era described as the Roaring Twenties.
Both had their counterpart across the
Atlantic in modified form. Now we live
in an era which eventually may be
described as the Lying Forties"
Promises Being Broken.
Promises are being made by govern
ments and are being broken within a
few months; solemn pledges are being
conveniently forgotten when selfish in
terests come into play and morality is
at a low ebb. Words have lost their
real meaning. The words democracy
and democratic" have one meaning in
the United States and another meaning
in Russia, Eastern Europe and China.
The same applies to the words liberal"
and liberalism Unlike after other
wars tripartite or individual agree
ments' are, in fact, replacing peace
treaties, although make-believe peace
conference will take place eventually be-
tween the visitors and the vanquished.
With this change of principles, it is
difficult to forecast how nation which
keeps its military power intact will act
in the future.
The French have saying, "rappetit
Went en- mangeant," which means 'the
more you drink the thirstier you get
Today it applies to politics more than
to eating or drinking.
The Soviet government indicated to
the Germans and to the French and
British governments in 1899 that the
price for It's assistance in the war would
be the incorporation into the Soviet of
a part of Eastern Poland and the Baltic
States.
Policy of Appeasement.
The territorial thirst" of the Kremlin
leaders increased, however, as time went
on and after Russia became member
of the United Nations There was a
time when the Russian thirst could have
been quenched by determined stand
by Washington. But the fear that the
Russians might change horses in the
middle of the stream and abandon the
Allies led our policy-framers to adopt a
yielding attitude. The increased Rus
sian demands for complete and exclusive
control of Europe from the Baltic to the
Mediterranean were accepted by the
American leaders, because, they said, it
was more important to defeat the Axis