Evening star., 1946-05-26
Survey Shows Defense
Best in Separate Arms
Coordination in War Essential but Experience
Held to Indicate Each Branch Develops
Best When Kept Individual
By Myvon p. Gilmore,
Associate Professor Of History, Harvard University

JOrelgn WuLGTy organizations ana az
The Stars request has 1Dritten a con-
densed Uersion of his general conczu-
Sions in that feld.)
One of the most important problems
confronting this country in the postwar
period Is the organization of the armed
services. Our security for years to come
will in part depend on the kind of con-
stitution we now give to the military
establishment.
Shall we merge the Army and the
Navy in single department of national
defense?
What kind of organization will best
suit the needs of air power?
How can we secure the maximum f1ex-
ibility in assimilating the results of rapid
scientific development?
Is it good business to combine pro-
curement activities and other common
services?
Finally, and perhaps most important,
what measures can be taken to insure
better relationship than has prevailed
in the past between our national policy
as whole and our military policy?
There has been much discussion of
these and similar questions during the
last few months. Hearings have been
and are being held before congressional
committees and the whole issue has been
frequently discussed in the press. In all
this debate, however, there has been
surprisingly little reference to the ex-
perience of foreign countries who have
confronted analogous problems. 1t is
time to survey that experience and esti-
mate what we can learn from it.
Many Varied Factors.
At the outset it has to be said that
we cannot expect to get from such
survey a complete answer to the prob
lem. The military needs of every coun-
try are conditioned by historical, eco
nomic and geographic facts they are
also conditioned by the conscious aims
of national policy.
The kind of organization adopted for
the armed forces is only one factor
among many which may determine the
success or failure of that policy Further
more the relative Importance of the
organizational factor is difficult to de-
termine; brilliant leadership may sue
ceed in spite of bad organization and
the best Of organizations may fail if it is
weakly administered. But brilliant lead
ership is an unpredictable quality and
we would all admit the necessity of try
ing to set up the kind of organization
which will provide stability and conti-
nulty and at the same time give enough
scope to unusual ability. Insofar as we
can analyze those aspects of foreign
organizations which have been effective
or ineffective we may be brought nearer
to the determination of what we want in
our own military organization.
In considering the various experiments
of the major foreign powers it is useful
to distinguish three different aspects of
the general problem of the organiza-
ton of the armed services.
There is first the area of planning and
executing military operations at the
highest level below that of the political
head of the state. This is the function
of military command.
Secondly, there is the question of the
administrative and other services of the
military departments. This includes
medical, legal, procurement and other
organizations whose business is largely
civilian but whose character differs from
other civilian organizations in the fact
that they serve a military end.
National Policy Transcends.
Thirdly, there is the problem of the
way in which the national policy and the
military policy are kept in balance. This
is subject which transcends the i'm
mediate question of the organization of
the armed forces but, since it involves
the ultimate security of the state, our
conclusions would be worthless if they
failed to take account of it.
During the last 20 years the major
foreign powers have tried variety of
organizational forms in all these three
areas. Their experiments range from
extremes of combination to the main
tenance of separate departments with
loose coordination supplied by the high
est political authority.
Considering first the question of mill
tary command the most complete ex-
ample of combination is to be found
in Germany. From 1888 onward that
country had in the institution of the
high command single agency of direc-
uon Tor the army, navy and air force.
Three branches were functionally sep
arted but they were subject to the oper-
atlonal orders as we'll as to the admin
lStr3tiVp pIliHaneo of I,o T.
Germany is the only country which thus
attempted to center in one organiza-
ton both the military command and the
administration of the armed forces
Single Command in Russia.
Russia, without combining the serv-
ices, achieved what was in effect q
single supreme command during the war
through the plurality of Offices held by
the highest political authority, Marshal
Stain. Although there were separate
commissariats for the army and navy,
Stalin's position as commander in chief
of the army as we'll as Premier and head
OF the Defense Council meant that for
all practical purposes there was a single
. operational command for the armed
forces. Organizational changes in Rus
sia subsequent to the war appear to have
recognized this fact.
Both France and Italy at different
times experimental with less complete
and powerful forms of unified command.
These countries had in the period prior
: to 1899 general staff for national de-
= fense and supreme general staff, re-
spectively. At the head of both organ
izations was an army officer. The pow