Evening star., 1946-01-03


"yet am foreclosed from even ex.
amining 1t. It seems to me this
points very definitely to the author.
tty and responsibility of this com.
mittee. have certain very definite
information that this communica.
ton Is material to this investigation
Am. I, as q member Of this commit.
tee, to be bound by the opinion oil
an executive department of the Gov.
eminent as to the materiality oi
evidence?"
Mr.. Keefe read the committee q
letter from Undersecretary Acheson
who acted as head of the depart
ment while Secretary Byrnes was
In Russia. MIR. Acheson wrote that
he was unable to comply with the
committee members request for the
Salisbury memorandum because, un-
der the joint resolution setting up
the Pearl Harbor inquiry and the
Presidents order for departments to
cooperate, the investigation was
limited to matters concerned in the
Hawaiian attack. The State De-
partment, he added, has made avail
able all evidence material. Since
this paper was written after the
war began, it could not be material
to the inquiry, Mr.. Acheson held.
Stark Continues Testimony.
'If I interpret this letter correct
1y," said Mr.. Keefe, "the State De-
partment is declining to make avail
able information requested by a
member of this committee because
it does not consider the matter
material"
Mr.. Mitchell said he had not seen
the document and could not ex-
press an opinion on its materiality.
The flareup over State Depart
ment evidence interrupted for q
few minutes the testimony of Ad-
miral Stark, chief Of naval opera
tions at the beginning of the war.
Admiral Stark told the committee
today that the danger of an air
attack on Hawaii had been so thor
oughly understood and SO frequently
discussed by. the commander of the
Pacific Fleet and other responsible
naval officers that he had not felt
the necessity of emphasizing it in
1941.
Danger Fully Dicussed."
When Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, commander of the Pacific
Fleet. visited Washington early in
June, 1941, Admiral Stark recalled,
the danger of an air attack on
Hawaii was fully discussed"
Admiral Stark emphasized that on
this occasion he talked over the
Hawaiian hazard with Admiral
Kimmel, supplementing matters
which had been gone into in their
correspondence.
Because of the possibility of a sur
prise attack on the Island of Oahu
had been discussed SO often and
Joint plan of defense had been
drawn up and approved in Wash
ington, the admiral added, he did
not consider it necessary to empha-
size this in his letter to Admiral
Kimmel later in 1941.
Admiral Stark said he assumed
the Pacific Fleet commander con-
tinued to prepare for such an event.
uality. He added:
"I had no reason to believe that
his concern over an air attack had
diminished. am certain mine had
not" -
Kimmel Memoranda Cited.
Admiral Stark cited memoranda
drawn up by Admiral Kimmel and
letters referring to the menace of
a Japanese attack on Oahu either
by air or. submarine or both.
At the outset of his second day
on the stand, the witness, in volun-
tary statement, said he wanted to
correct some errors in the Nays
narrative of evidence" at its Pearl
Harbor inquiry.
II hope the committee will bear
IN mind" the admiral commented,
"that this narrative is only the idea
OF some representatives of the Navy
Department of what the evidence
ut the Navy court of inquiry was"
One summary of evidence, he
pointed out, quoted his warning"
to the Pacific commander on No
vember 27, 1941, and left out an
entire sentence. which referred to
the fact that the Army had warned
It's field commanders.
Surprise Attack Held Likely.
Admiral Stark quoted from docu-
ments in evidence showing that in
1910 he and other high officers Of
the Navy had recognized that "the
most likely and dangerous" form of
attack on Oahu (Pearl Harbor)
would be from carrier-borne planes.
This is what Japan used to surprise
the feet.
Early In 1s41, Admiral Stark
pointed out, Admiral Kimmel, in
the defense plan he worked out
with Claude C. Bloch, naval dis
trict commander for Hawaii, rec
ognized that the security of the
fleet based there must be predi-
Gated on the possibility that Japan
might strike without declaring war
and surprise attack could be con-
sidered likely and might be made
by air or submarine or a combina-
tion of both.
Senator Lucas, Democrat of Illi-
nois, brought out by questioning
Admiral Stark that in late Novem-
ber, 1941, Admiral (now Senator)
Thomas c. Hart, commander of the
Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel
formed different estimates of the
probable location of certain units of
the Jap feet.
Admiral Stark testified Admiral
Kimmel thought the Jap carriers
might be in the eastern Marshall
Islands, while Admiral Hart placed
them in home waters of Japan. The
Office OF Naval Intelligence here
then made its own estimate, also
placing them in home waters.
In other words, you accepted Ad-
miral Harris information" Senator
Lucas observed.
THAT was the best information
we had" Admiral Stark replied,
explaining that the estimate made
here was for his information and
was not sent out to the commanders,