Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-02
Pearl Hurbor
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Kai-shek's note protesting against
and modus vivendi, or temporary
agreement, with Japan.
Mr.. Hull indicated about that
time (Novemper Is or go that future
action was up to the Army and Navy.
1t was the first time he said he felt
there was no chance of settlement
through diplomatic intercourse, :"
Admiral Stark said.
Admiral Stark, replying to further
questions, said his only information
in the days before Pearl Harbor of
the movements of the carriers Lex
ington and Enterprise were in dis
patches from Admiral Kimmel
telling of plans for sending Marine
fighter planes to Wake and Midway
and certain Army air units to both
islands.
Kimmel Had Wide Authority.
Asked if he knew battleships and
heavy cruisers were tied up in Pearl
Harbor at the time the japanese
struck, Admiral Stark said he did
not recall whether he did or not.
That, he explained, was a matter
for Admiral Kimmel to decide.
Didn't you have a map in your
Offices showing exactly where every
unit of the feet was located every
dsy?" asked Mr.. Mitchell.
mo, we did not" said Admiral
Stark.
He added that Admiral Kimmel
had authority to move the fleet
around Hawaiian waters as he
thought best. If he had wanted to
take components back to the West
Coast he would have had to get
authority from Washington, Ad-
miral Stark explained, but if it was
a matter of moving units 100 miles
one way or another for target prac-
tice or any other purpose, no author
ization would have been necessary.
Admiral Stark also told the COM
mittee he had no recollection of
having been shown the japanese spy
message, decided in Washington on
october 9, 1941, in which Tokyo was
asking an agent in Honolulu to di-
vide Pearl Harbor into five areas
and to report thu exact location of
warships in eachsarea.
He testified that if the officers in
naval intelligence had thought it
was important they had full au-
thority to send it out to the field
to Admiral Kimmel.'
Can't Recall Seeing Message.
If they had regarded it as vital
he added, they also could have
brought it to the attention of the
front office"-to himself, or his
aides.
Tn the light of hindsight it stands
out very clearly as indicating the
possibility. or laying the groundwork,
for an air raid on Pearl Harbor,"
said Admiral Stark. THAT signifi-
canoe we now have by hindsight
was not pointed out to me by any
one at the time"
II have no recollection of having
seen the spy message" the admiral
testified. IT may. have seen it and
it slipped my mind. but I believe
I did not, because I have no recol-
lection of it."
ut went through our people and
It went through the Army, which
also was vitality interested in the
defense of Pearl Harbor," the ad-
miral admitted.
Admiral Stark explained there
was a general class of messages
coming in, in which the japanese
were asking for the location of
ships. He admitted, however, that
this one was distinct in that it
asked for locations of vessels at
particular berths. He said he could
not recall any similar messages,
except once or twice when the
location of vessels at docks in Puget
? Sound was mentioned
Unsuitable Desire for Detail.
There was mass of material be-
ing received, the admiral said, add
ing that I'VE all knew of the almost
Unsuitable desire of the japanese
for detail"
If had seen it (the message OF
OCTOBER % don't know what I
would have done" the admiral went
on. He said he might have COM
mentNa on 1t as q desire for detail
or he might have been prompted to
wonder why they wanted such in
formation.
Mr.. Mitchell asked him what else
1t could have meant If it did not
mean a possible air raid.
The admiral said 1t could have
meant either an air raid, move
looking to sabotage or informa-