Evening star., 1946-07-21

tlOILo Ill PCdCCtlAIiCp dAAo " AS6AoAa
ton fully protecting the security OF
classified matter"
Reports Total $4,000 Words.
The majority report also recon-
mends that "the activities OF Col.
Theodore Wyman. jr., while district
engineer in the Hawaiian depart
ment, as developed by the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, be investigated
by an appropriate committee OF the
Senate or House of Representa-
tives." The committee explained
that it reviewed the Army Boards
findings but did not inquire fully
into the activities of Col. .Wyman
and his associates "inasmuch as
they did not appear to have con-
tributed in any material or proxi-
mate manner to the disaster for
reasons heretofore set forth"
The full text Of the majority report
runs to more than 100000 words,
including appendices, to which the
two dissenting Republicans added
another $4,000 words.
Although 1t may not prove to be
the last Pearl Harbor investigation,
it probably will stand in the Gov
ernment archives as the most COM
plete.
The majority document deyotes
many pages to arguments taking
issue with the defense put up by
Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short
during the long hearings last fall
In their conclusions, however, the
committee members are less severe
on the two Hawaiian commanders
than some of the earlier probers
have. been.
Honest Mistakes"
For example, this committee finds
that the mistakes made in Hawaii
were errors Of Judgment and not
derelictions of duty" The Roberts
Commission, which made the first
investigation in December, 1941,
spoke Of "dereliction of duty" at
Hawaii.
In this latest report the committee
says: More than any one else, it
cannot be doubted that Admiral
Kimmel and Gen. Short would have
desired to avoid the disaster of
December 7. But unfortunately, they
were blinded by the self-evident;
they felt that Japan would attack
to the south and Hawaii was safe
Their errors of Judgment were
honest mistakes-yet errors they
WERE"
Again, the report has this tenn
pering statement: "The estimate OF
the situation made by Admiral KIM
mel and Gen. Short Is not altogether
incredible in the light of the In
evitable lassitude born of over 20
years of peace. But the fact that
their inaction is to a degree under
standable does not mean that il
can be condoned."
Hawaiian Commands Liable.
In summing up the relative degree
of responsibility that rested on those
in command at Hawaii and in WASH
ington, the majority report declared
Aside from any responsibilities
that may appear to rest in Washing
ton, the ultimate and direct respon-
sibility for failure to engage the
japanese on the morning of Decem-
Der 7 with every weapon at their
disposal rests essentially and prop
erly with the Army and Navy COM
mands in Hawaii whose duty it was
to meet the enemy against which
they had been warned"
The committee points out that
Gen. Marshall and Admiral Stark
had the overall responsibility OF
!, supervising defense establishments
everywhere, including Hawaii, and
concluded:
! They discharged this duty to the
best of their ability"
/ Absolves Stark, Marshall.
ut was the duty of Gen. Mar
shall and Admiral Stark to alert
our military and naval garrisons
which they attempted to do and
felt assured they had DONE" the
report goes on. ITO superimpose
the administrative burden of super
vising details would be to enmesfl
them in such a confusing and be-
wildering network of detail as to
defeat the very purpose for which
the positions of chief of staff and
chief of naval operations were Gre
ated."
The minority report does not ab-
solve the Hawaiian commanders,
but declares ''the failure of the
Washington authorities to perform
their responsibilities provides ex-
tenuating circumstances for the
failures of these commanders in
the field"
In support of their action in plac.
ing part Of the blame on Mr. Roose.
welt for the surprise nature of the
attack, Senators Ferguson and Brew.
ster stated:
Before 10 o'clock on the evening
LOT December 6, 1941, President Roose.
welt had reached a great decision a.
to the immediate imminence of tn,
war which he had long expected. H,
had then finished reading the frs
13 parts of the intercepted memo
randum which was to be presented
to Secretary Hull by the Japanes,
Ambassador and special agent OF
the next day, and had said to hi
aide, Harry Hopkins, in substance
This means war In reply to a com
ment by Mr.. Hopkins, the Presiden
had also indicated that the United
States could not strike the first blov
for the purpose of preventing an,
sort OF surprise"
Between 10 o'clock on the eve
ming of December 6 and the Japanes,
attack on Pearl Harbor 16 hour
were to pass. The President had a
his disposal at least Is hours il
which to inform those outpost com
manders of impending danger, t,
add new and urgent warning to tn,
indefinite warnings that had beer
sent out during previous days ans
weeks"
i Cites Lack of Warning.
i They assert that no further warn
ing went to the Hawaiian com
; manders until 1917 Sunday after,
moon, when Gen. Marshall's message
sent by commercial wires, arrived
after the attack had started.
i Another complaint in the minor