The Wilmington morning star., 1946-11-06
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LIPPMANN
FROM PAGE ONE

a great war. The Allies have not
yet begun to talk about a peace
treaty with Japan. Yet in law
Okinawa and Two Jima, which we
occupy, and the Kuriles and
Northern Sakhalin, which the
Soviet Union occupies, are still
Japanese. The title to the man
dated islands. which we occupy. is
neither in the United Nations as
successor to the League, or per-
haps-no one seems to know
eXactly-in the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers of the last war.
No one has asked us to evacuate
the islands we occupy, and the
question as to how they are to be
governed de jure and permanently
cannot be separated, and should
never be separated, from the gen
eral settlement of the Far Eastern
war. Moreover, we cannot measure
correctly our own %strategical in
terest in these islands until we
know what the Allies can agree to
about Japan, about Korea, about
the Kuriles, and about China in
Guiding Manchuria. To single out
our w special claims and invite
a debate about them alone is most
Understandable: it causes us to
ask more than we may in the end
and as part of a general settle
ment feel we need, and it causes
the other powers to put the heavl-
est kind of discount upon whatever
we may wish to say about their
claims in regions which to them
a-e strategically important.
Unless the Far East is treated
as one strategical field, a settle
ment at a few points in the Pacific
makes no sense. The inundated
islands-the Marianas, the Caro-
lines, and the Marshalls-are not
only outposts for the defense Of
Hawaii and our West Coast: they
are stepping stones and staging
areas to the Philippines, to the
East Indies and Southeast Asia
to the coast of China, and te
Japan. The Kuriles r outposts
for the defense of Eastern Siberia
but they are also positions from
which the shortest passage tt
Japan and China can be inter:
fered with, and Alaska rendered
insecure.
Okinawa and Two Jima are
points from which Japan, Korea,
Siberia, Manchuria, and North
China can be dominated by air,
and the exits and entrances to the
vital East China Sea controlled by
sea power. But their s~trategical
importance and their permanent
place in the scheme of things de-
ponds upon what is settled about
Japan and Korea and China by
the Russians, the Chinese, the
British, and ourselves. Since we
have not begun to talk about any
of these pcoblems-having been SC
preoccupied with Trieste and Bull
garian elections and the like-the
time has not come to talk about
Okinawa and Two Jima. We &C.
cupy them, which is sufficient for
the time being, and until we make
up our minds to begin negotiating
a Far Eastern settlement, we need
not and should not talk about
them. The United Nations should
not be asked, nor allowed, to deal
with any territorial question arts
ing out of the war until, as the
Charter provides, there has been
a settlement of the wa.
The system under which our
foreign relations r being con-
Quoted does not permit us to have
a considered general policy, and
invites just what we r getting:
bits and pieces of policy decided
upon separately and by separate
parts of the government.
The Constitution vests in the
President the dual and insever-
able duties of Commande~-ln-
Chief and final authority in the
making of foreign policy. Mr..
Truman is unable to perform these