Evening star., 1946-12-22
Pearl Hurbor Altered
japanese War Plons
HUGE Success Led Strateeists
Into Fatal Overexpansion
BIZ Rer Collier

BIZ Rer Collier
Pearl Harbor was more costly to Japan
than to the United States, according TO
the report of the Naval Analysis DiW-
sion, United States Strategic Bombing
Survey (Pacific), released today.
Strangely enough, 1t was the over
whelming success of the surprise blow at
the American Fleet that hurt the Japa-
nese. The unexpectedly easy achieve
ment had tremendous repercussions In
Tokyo, the net effect of which was to
cause the Japanese high command 10
scrap its original war plan and embark
on an ambitious expansion program
eastward that was to hasten Japacs
defeat.
1t is interesting to learn that tnl
Doolittle raid was largely instruments
in expediting and shaping the revise
war plan, which called for extension o.
the defense perimeter" Of the Create.
East Asia" sphere to line extending
from the Aleutians through Midway to
Port Moresby, in Southern New Guinea.
Japanese military and naval author
tiles were unanimous in agreeing-in
retrospect-that this impulsive exten-
sion of operations beyond the first de-
fensive line was fatal error. 1t LED TO
e"unsolvable problems" of maintenance
and supply and spread both men and
materials so thinly that the task OF
holding the new line became impossible.
Moreover, the expansion drew the
japanese Navy into two major engage
ments which left the imperial fleet seri-
ously weakened. These were the Battles
of the Coral Sea and Midway-the latter
regarded as the turning point Of the war
| in the Pacific. The Japs never recovered
| from the loss of four carriers and other
| ships in their abortive effort to establish
a Central Pacific base on Midway
projected keystone of the outer defense
perimeter.
| And the decisive battle Of the whole
war, in the opinion Of the Japanese
strategists, was at Saipan, the loss OF
which meant the loss of the Marianas
After that, few responsible japanese
military experts had any hope Of avert
ing eventual defeat, according to their
own admission to American interro-
gators.
The Japanese basic plan for the
Greater East Asia war, as put into eftect
in December, 1941, was divided into three
major objectives.
The first was the invasion Of what was
termed the Southern Resources Area
Malaga, Burma, Java, Sumatra and the
other oil and mineral sources-coupled
with the attack on the American Fleet
in Hawaii and seizure of all strategic
islands within defense perimeter" ex-
tending from the Kuriles through the
Marshalls and Bismarcks to Timor, Java
and Singapore.
The second phase was to be the con-
solidation of the island bulwarks and
other areas ip which invading forces had
established themselves.
The third phase was to be the rela-
lively easy one-to the Japanese mind
of destroying the American will to con-
tinue the fight against Asiatic aggres-
sion. This simple task was to be accom-
plished by naval and air interception o.
any attacks on the perimeter Of base
guarding the Japanese conquests. Pre-
occupation of the United States with tI,o
war in Europe was to work in favor
the japanese plan.
The first phase was completed sue
cessfully-too successfully for the Jap;
own good. The Pearl Harbor raid,
was never intended to be more than
that-was so disastrous to the American
Fleet that TOTO and his. aides were moved
to reconsider the whole Japanese STRAIT
egy. They had never seriously consid-
cred an actual invasion of Hawaii, so
had no means of following up the knock
out blow with a landing attempt. Nor
had they any plans for anything more
i threatening to Americas West Coas.
than occasional submarine attacks OH
shipping in harbors and on installation,
ashore.
Out of the enthusiastic huddle Of the
Japanese top planners came the new
plan for expansion of Japanese control
beyond the original line. The revised
war plan called for four main objec-
tives: First, the capture OF Port Moresby
defense perimeter; second. the capture
of Midway for the twofold purpose of
defending the Central Pacific line and
trapping the United States Fleet into a
decisive engagement; third, invasion of
the Western Aleutians to secure the
northern anchor of the line; fourth,
seizure of New Caledonia, Fiji and
Samoa tn hlock the sunp1v lfne fror,
the United States to Australia.
' The time table called for all these
operations to be completed by March of
1943.
However, the Japanese ran into diff
culties in the very first stage of their
I program. The invasion fleet which sailed
from Truk on April 80, 1912, to take
Port Moresby succeeded in occupying
Tulagi, en- route, but encountered sur
prise opposition from the American car
=, riers Yorktown and Lexington in the
Coral Sea. After battle in which the
Jap carrier Shoho was sunk by planes
from the American ships and the Sho-
kaku was badly damaged, the Japanese
decided to postpone the Port Moresby
invasion until July.
Then, in June, came the loss at Mid
way of four more carriers and other
: units, plus many planes and pilots. The
Port Moresby seizure was indefinitely
postponed.
From Midway on the Japanese were
forced to go generally on the defensive
and, step by step, to give ground and