Evening star., 1946-07-21
Pearl Hurbor FINDINGS


the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack failed to achieve
unanimity in its assignment of
blame for the magnitude of the
disaster, there was no lack of agree
ment on what has emerged as the
most important finding to be
cleaned from the voluminous testi-
mony: That the shortcomings of
men, methods and materiel which
gave the japanese their supreme
opportunity must never be permit
ted to develop in an age of atomic
weapons. Another surprise attack
according to the Pearl Harbor pat
tern of treachery might we'll prove
to be the last in American military
annals.
The majority and minority con-
clusions as to who was responsible
for the conditions which made our
Hawaiian base such easy prey for
the Japanese plotters are not SO
important as the lessons to be
learned from such a careful study
OF the tragedy as the committee has
given it. The committee has
brought the whole confusing picture
into proper perspective by it's sue
cinct observation that the ultimate
responsibility for the attack and its
results rests upon Japan" The
corollary question of what individ-
uals or acts or attitudes shared the
responsibility for falling to avert the
disaster appears to have interested
the investigators less than the need
for future safeguards.
The majority devoted only two
two printed pages to it's conclusions
generating high level Washington
officials of blame and holding the
Hawaiian commanders guilty of
"errors of judgment and not derelic-
tions Of duty" whereas nearly four
teen pages of recommendation for
future security were set forth. There
Is little doubt that an overwhelming
majority of citizens have come to
similarly philosophical attitude to-
ward the past and a similarly
earnest concern for what lies ahead.
For that reason 1t is not likely
that the general public will give
more than passing attention to the
minority's listing of the late Presi-
dent Roosevelt, former Secretaries
Stimson and Knox, Generals Mar
shall and Gerow and Admiral Stark
as officials who, with General Short
and Admiral Kimmel, were guilty of
failure to perform" their response
bilities.
The committees basic recon-
mendations growing out of the
December 7, 1941, object lesson are
vitally important. however self
evident some of them may seem to
be. Some of the reforms already
have been instituted and others are
in course of being made. Foremost
was placed unity of command"
but 1t should be noted that the
committee added the qualifying
phrase, "at all military and naval
outposts." 1t will be difficult for
advocates of Army-Navy merger
legislation to read into the language
anything more than the type of
unification which prevailed after
Pearl Harbor in the field and in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Equally i'm
portant-and already evolving-is
complete integration" of intelli-
gence activities, with intelligence
to be regarded as a career rather
than brief and casual tour of duty.
There are numerous other recon-
mendations that are we'll justified
by the mass of evidence included in
the report.
All in all, the committee handled
its difficult task iudicially and effec-
lively. It's inch-thick printed report
is not pleasant history, but it is a
valuable reference work on the perils
of complacency in a world not yet
freed from threats of war.