Evening star., 1946-07-07
BIZ F. Trubee DdUiSOn.


public. Whatever it may have to say
about individual responsibilities, there
Is one conclusion it must make, a con-
clusion that has been implicit in every
attempt to ferret out the truth about
the catastrophe.
That conclusion is, that tragedy was
inevitable at Hawaii because of the
disunity of command that permeated
every echelon of our defense organiza-
tion - from Washington down This
disunity merely produced it's grimmest
fruit in the breakdown of the Pearl
Harbor defenSes
The Investigations during the war, by
the Roberts commission and the de-
partments involved, could make public
only matters that would not endanger
the national security. The Joint con-
gressional committee has held its hear
lngs after the wars end An examina-
ton OF It's records gives us a lesson on
the dangers of divided command at a
time when Congress has before it legis-
lation to eliminate the dualism now
present in our defense structure.
l first became directly concerned with
these affairs as result of my service
during the war on the Joint Chiefs of
Stall Special Committee for Reorgan-
ization of National Defense. which rec
commended the establishment of a single
department of national defense. Since
then I have had occasion to STUDY the
reports of the Roberts commission and
the findings Of the Army and Navy
Board of Inquiry, as we'll as the pro-
ceedings Of the congressional commit
tee.
FROM the record of the Pearl Harbor
hearings 1t is apparent that there were
three major failures that can be directly
attributed to the fact that in le41 the
United States had two chains of COM
mana throughout its defense institu-
ton. These failures contributed directly
to the major defeat inflicted upon us bv
the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and the
resulting weakness of our position in the
Pacific.
These failures were.
the ground and naval commanders at
Pearl Harbor, which led to tactical un-
preparedness against the attack.
Z. lhe inability of the Navy and War
departments to establish Joint In
telllgence Committee which would have
kept the field commanders properly and
uniformly informed.
3. The inability of the two depart-
ments to reach any basis of agreement
Tor the establishment of unity of COM
mana IN peacetime for the obvious pros
pectlVe theaters of operations.
The first Of these failures is the simple
breakdown of coordination that was
apparent to every American immediately
following the sneak attack. In commit
tee testimony, it is expressed in page
alter page Of questioning of the two
commanders, Rear Admiral Husband F
klmmel and 1t. Gen Walter c. Short
Each OF them was in blackest ignorance
OF the others plans, dispositions and
capabilities. Every move by either was
based on presumption and complacencv
The second failure at Pearl Harbor
leadS directly back to Washington. This
hes IN the breakdown, not so much of
our intelligence, as of its dissemination
Vital information was sent tn one coro-
mander and not to another. The NAVY
had one view of japanese intentions,
the Army another. and the respective
commanders in Hawaii acted accord
ingly.
What was needed was a unified IN
telllgence agency. This was never
achieved; but before the war fun2bling
efforts were made to create the next best
thing, Joint Intelligence Committee
Had this existed, it is probable that there
would have been more complete aware
ness OF the prOba bility of war in De-
cember, l94l, and a corresponding alert
ness by the men to whom Hawaii was
intruSted.
Ihe prenatal career of the Joint In
telhgence Committee was described be-
fore the investigating committee by the
Army's Intelligence chief as "one of the
best examples that l know of the need
OF unltlcation Of the services. 1t actu-
q
Q94n. in those critical days, to inte-
CRATE and establish a committee for in
tellgence within the Joint Armv-Navv
Board, which was the high policy
making agency of the armed forces"
- The third major failure likewise Law
in the inability to- solve a problem that
had been recognized we'll before the out
break Of the war. The problem was to
set up efficient command where both
the Army and Navy maintained install
lations and had responsibilities in the
same area. Such areas were Alaska
and the Aleutians, Hawaii and the
Panama Canal Zone. The problem was
complicated by shore lines and the diff
cuitles in separating the various types
OF patrol and defense activities.
Admiral Harold R. Stark and Gen.
George c. Marshall, according to their
testimony, had been attempting to re-
solve these problems for over a wear
before the war. But resistance on the
part of Army and Navy stafTs had pre-
vented solution.
With the complete record Of Pearl
Harbor soon to be available, there should
be no further need to underscore the
major lesson that unity of command
from the top down must be achieved to
assure our national security. Whatever
the responsibility of the individuals in
volved, it is clear that any guilty per-
sons were inextricably caught up in a
web of ignorance and impotence woven
by years of dualism and interservice
diStruSt