Evening star., 1946-10-03

viduals can be punished"
lb) The Facts.
The Soviet proposal. as presented
to the commission by Ambassador
Gromyko on June 10, calls for a
mere agreement to prohibit the
production and use OF atomic
weapons and to destroy any stocks
of atomic weapons within three
months from ratification. The
agreement would include 4 declara-
ton that any violation is q
serious international crime against
humanity" It would also require
the signatory nations to enact ma
tional legislation providing severe
penalties for violators.
The Soviet proposal as thus far
presented does not 60 further than
the United States plan. Nor does
the Soviet proposal in fact make
violation of the proposed treaty."a
national and international crime
for which individuals can, be
punished"
The United States delegation has
hoped that upon exploration Of the
Soviet plan it would be found to
contemplate creation Of machinery
for holding violators particularly
officials Of wrongdoing government
or, If possible, such a government
itself) accountable before an inter-
national tribunal and for Furnishing
them.
Repeated efforts to elicit from the
Soviet representative reassurances
on this point have thus far proved
fruitlesS. So far as we have been
able to determine from the state
ments of the Soviet representative,
the Soviet proposal to declare viola
ton "a serious international crime"
Is not accompanied by any machin-
cry for enforcement other than an
appeal to the Security Council, with
the veto intact to serve as possible
shield to the yiolator. The proposal
for national legislation might pre-,
vent misuse of atomic energy by
private individuals within a country,
but 1t would, Of course, have no
effect on the national governments
themselves. Moreover. the Soviet
proposal contains no suggestions for
international preventive control
measures as contrasted with punish
ment after an onense. Obviously,
prevention Is the essence OF control.
S. Refusal by United States to Mod
ify the Principles Of Its Plan.
Secretary Wallace states at several
points that he believes the Russians
would negotiate workable agree
ment If the United States were will
ing to modify its plan so as to make
1t more acceptable. Thus he says:
"We may feel very self-righteous
II we refuse to bulge on our plan
and the Russians refuse to accept 1t,
but that means only one thing
the atomic armament race is on in
deadly earnest"
And again:
1--WE must be prepared to reach an
agreement which will commit us to
disclosing information and destroy
ing our bombs at q specified time
or in terms of specified actions by
other countries, rather than at our
unfettered discretion. II we are will
ing to negotiate on this basis, I be-
ueve the Russians will also negotiate
seriously with q view to reaching an
agreement"
And finally:
THE Russian counterproposal it
self is an indication that they may
be willing to negotiate seriously If
We are
The United States delegation can
not consider notifications in those
fundamental principles OF its plan
which, in our judgment. must be
maintained to meet the mandate
given the commission by the United
Nations General Assembly, last jan
uary. We have repeatedly encour-
aged the presentation Of any other
proposals which would meet this
mandate. In particular, we have
indicated that we would welcome
any suggestions to strengthen the
proposed controls. And we have
always displayed readiness to nego-
tiate details in collaboration with
all the other delegates as long as the
details fit within the proper frame
work Of principle. We have insisted
only that the commission abide by