Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-22

tranS-Pacinc raid. The alert
lasted for several weeks. War
Department files showed it had
been due to information tndicat-
ing the possibility of a Japanese
attack on Hawaii or on the Pana-
ma Canal)
Gen. Short pointed out that Gen.
Marshall had personally supervised
the 1910 alert.
1.-THE record Is clear" Gen. Short
added, that at the time Of the 1910
alert the chief OF staff had sum-
Gent time and sense Of personal
responsibility toward the Hawaiian
department to order and to super
wise the Hawaiian alert"
Cited Previous Action.
The witness went on to say:
TT was my expectation that II
the chief of staff once again had in
formation causing him to expect a
trans-Paciflc raid against Oahu,
he would follow the course he had
previously set as an example. I felt
that chief of staff who had per-
sonally- supervised the long-conti-
nued 1910 alert would certainly have
the time and interest not only to
read and to understand my succinct
report, 49, Department Hawai-
lam alerted to prevent sabotage
Liaison with the Navy but to send
further word in the event he dis
agreed in any way with the mea-
sures had taken in obedience to
his November 27 directive"
Gen. Short had reference to his
reply to the November 81, l94l,
message of Gen. Marshall which
stated: Negotiations with Japan
appear to be terminated to all prac-
teal purposes, with only the barest
possibilities that the Japanese gov
eminent may come back and offer
to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable, but hostile action
possible at any moment. If hos
tilities cannot be avoided, tn e
United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. This
policy should not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense.
Prior to hostile Japanese action you
are directed to undertake such re-
connaissance and other measures
as you deem necessary, but these
measures should be carried out so
as not alarm the civilian popula-
ton or disclose intent. Report
measures taken"
Message Sent to Short.
The next day. Army intelligence
in Washington sent Gen. Short
message, beginning, Critical situa-
ton demands that all precautions
be taken against subversive activ-
tiles -" This message stressed
the need to prevent sabotage and
espionage.
Gen. Short cited the two messages
that the Navy Department had sent
Admiral Kimmel November "a and
q, the latter labelled "a war warn
ing" The first message, he said,
indicated possible japanese move
ment in the direction of the Philip
pines or Guam and called for Sc
crecy. The second, while headed
war warning" did not place in eff
feet the Navy portion of the Pacific
war plan, he emphasized, indicat-
ing rather that later direction
would be received If it became nee
essary to carry out this plan"
Gen. Short reminded the COM
mittee that his own November 27
message from the War Department
had been labelled by the Army Pearl
Harbor Board a "Do-Don't" mes
sage, because of its conflicting di-
rections. - So
THE impression conveyed to me
by this message" he said, was that
the avoidance of war was para
mount and the greatest fear Of the
War Department was that some in
ternational incident might occur in
Hawaii and be regarded by Japan
as an overt act" .4 ar
a' Conferred With Navy. 60
Concerning his Haison with the
Navy during the critical period,
Gen. Short said:
From repeated conversations with
the Navy, knew that the Japa-
nese naval vessels were supposed to
be either in their home ports or
proceeding south. had no informa-
ton suggesting that some ships
might have been detached to pro-
coed eastward. Our information also
indicated that Japan had no land
based bombers capable of proceed
ing from their nearest island, some
2,100 miles away.
1T was known that the Omitted
States Navy usually had two OF
three tasks forces at sea. The car
riers with the task forces normally
secuted 300 miles to each side, q
total width of 900 miles. The tasks
forces would thus cover 1900 miles
of ocean in the vicinity of Oahu
The Navy also had reconnaissance
from Midway, Wake, Palmyra anc
Johnston Islands. I thus felt that
air attack was highly improbable
"On the morning of November
n I conferred with Admiral Kim
mel concerning the messages We
had each received from Washington
with reference to Wake and Midway
Admiral Kimmel and I discussed
reinforcement of the Wake and
Midway garrisons by Army planes
Such reinforcement would have
weakened the Oahu defense. The
admiral asked his war plans officer