Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-01
Pearl Hurbor
Continued From First Page. J

prepare against real attack. Tit
sabotage was a direct possibility.
"In the third place, if I ordered
Alert 2 or 3, interferred very seri.
ously with training. No. woult
have interferred seriously, particu.
larry with air and antiaircraf
training; 3 would interfere seriously
with all training"
With either of the alerts against
attack, all planes and antiaircrafi
batteries would have had to be
loaded and manned constantly. he
pointed out.
Gen. Marshall's message of No
vember ~ stated: Negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated to
all practicable purposes, with only
the barest possibilities that the jap
anese government may come back
and offer to continue. Japanese fu-
ture action unpredictable, but hos
tile action possible at any moment
If hostilities cannot be avoided, the
United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. This
policy should not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense
Prior to hostile Japanese action you
are directed to undertake such re-
connaisance and other measures as
you deem necessary, but these meas.
ures should not alarm the civilian
population or disclose intent. Re.
port measures taken"
Cites Three Messages.
Gen. Short replied to Gen. Mar.
shall: Department alerted against
sabotage. Liaison with Navy"
A further message from Army In
telligence in Washington warnee
Gen. Short and other field com
manders against sabotage.
Gen. Short explained to the Rob
erts commission that he receiver
three messages through November %
They emphasized right straigh
through" he said, 'that we must no
disclose our stand and that we mus
not alarm the population and tina
we must take measure to protec
against sabotage, against espionag
and against subversive action. No
where did they indicate in any wa.
the necessity for protecting agains
attack. They also did indicate def
nitely that we must avoid publicit.
and avoid alarming the public. If
ordered complete alert against at
tack, it would have alarmed at leas
the japanese population.
you will notice they made no OBJ
lection whatever to my wire where
stated I was alerted for sabotage
If they had any idea that that wa
not correct order, they had all tn
opportunity from November 81 t
December to come back and say
we do not consider the action takel
by you as sufficient, and that 70,
should instead take action to defen,
yourself against air attack
"In other words, I took it as
tacit agreement with the course
had taken and that there was no OBJ
lection raised, and I cannot see no,
I could draw any other conclusion.
No Sign From Kimmel.
Gen. Short made it clear that hi
close contacts with Admiral Kimme
had convinced him the Navy com
mander did not expect an attack O
Hawaii.
Gen. Short said, however, whe,
questioned by the Army Board, tina
he felt sure he had seen the IVA
warning" which the Navy Depart
ment sent to Admiral Kimnel O
the same day, November q.
IT feel sure I have seen tina
message" said Gen Short, "althoug
we could not find copy of it i
our headquarters when we locke
for It. That was during the perio
when was down there at Kimmel
headquarters every day for three {
four days, and in all probability b
either read 1t to me or read
right there, because it is familis
to me-"
Lit. Gen. George Grunert, pre-
ident of the board, asked: you ID