Evening star., 1946-07-21

authorities in Washington to use
the utmost care in putting the COM
manders at Pearl Harbor on full
alert for defensive actions before
the Japanese attack on December 7,
194l.
IL. Inasmuch as the knowledge
respecting Japanese designs and op-
erations which was in the possession
of high authorities in Washington
differed in nature and volume from
that in the possession Of the Pearl
Harbor commanders 1t was espe-
cially incumbent upon the former to
formulate instructions to the latter
in language not open to misinterpre-
tatie,n as to the obligations imposed
on the commanders by the inStruc-
tions.
Messages Not CIear-Cut.
13. The messages sent to Gen.
Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
authorities In Washington during
November were couched in such con-
ficting and imprecise language that
they failed to convey to the COM
manders definite information on the
state Of diplomatic relations with
Japan and on japanese war designs
and positive orders respecting the
particular actions to be taken-or-
ders that were beyond all reasonable
doubts as to the need for an all-out
alert. In this regard the said high
authorities failed to discharge their
full duty.
IA. High authorities in Washing
ton failed in giving proper weight to
the evidence before them respecting
japanese designs and operations
which indicated that an attack on
Pearl Harbor was highly probable
and they failed also to emphasize
this probability in messages to the
Hawaiian commanders.
Is. The failure of Washington
authorities to act promptly and
consistently in translating inter-
cepts, evaluating information, and
sending appropriate instructions to
the Hawaiian commanders was in
considerable measure due to delays
mismanagement, nonco-operation
unprepardness confusion, and neg
ligence on the part of officers in
Washington.
Responsibility Laid on President.
16. The President of the United
States was responsible for the
failure to enforce continuous, ef-
ficent, and appropriate cooperation
among the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief o1
Staff, and the Chief of Naval Opera.
tions, in evaluating information anc
dispatching clear and positive order.
to the Hawaiian commanders AZ
events indicated the growing i'm.
minence of war; for the Constitution
and laws of the United States vested
in the President full power, as Chie1
Executive and Commander in Chief
! to compel such cooperation anc
vested this power in him alone with
view to establishing his responsi.
bility to the people of the United
States.
II. High authorities in Washington
failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the
latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, ano
no requirements of defense or war ir
the Atlantic did or could excuse these
authorities for their failure in this
respect.
18. Whatever errors of judgement
the commanders at Hawaii com.
mitted and whatever mismanage.
ment they displayed in preparing fol
japanese attack, attention to chair
of responsibility in the civil ano
military administration require.
taking note of the fact that the,
were designated for their posts BY
high authorities in Washington-al
OF whom are under obligation tx
have care for competence in tn,
selection of subordinates for partic.
ular positions of responsibility il
the armed forces of the United
States.
l9. The defense of Hawaii restst
upon two sets of interdependent re.
sponsibilities: Cd The responsibilit,
in Washington in respect of its init.
mate knowledge of diplomatic nego.
tiations, widespread intelligence in.
formation, direction of affairs ane
constitutional duty to plan the de.
fense of the United States; t2) tn,
responsibility cast upon the com.
manders in the field in charge of {
major naval base and the fleet es.
sential to the defense of the terri.
tory Of the United States to do thost
things appropriate to the defense O.
the fleet and outpost. Washington
authorities failed in ID; and tn,
commanding officers at Hawai-
failed in ca.
20. In the final instance of crucia
significance for alerting American
outpost commanders, on Saturda,
night, December 6. and Sunda,
morning, December 7, the Presiden
Of the United States failed to tax,
that quick and instant executiv,
action which was required by tn,
occasion and by the responsibility
for watchfulness and guardianship
rightly associated in law and prac.
tice with his high Office from tn.
establishment of the Republic tt
our own times.
81. The contention coming from
so high an authority as President
Truman on August 3, 1945, that the
country is as much to blame as an,
individual in this final situation
that developed in Pearl Harbor,
cannot be sustained because the
American people had no intimatior
whatever Of the policies and opera.
tions that were being undertaken.
Terrorist Funds Seized
WARSAW, July 10 delayed (P
"A government spokesman said to-
day that secret police had seized
and handed over to the National
Bank of Poland nearly $500 1O0 sent