The Wilmington morning star., 1946-11-04
MORE ABOUT
LIPPMANN
FROM PAGE ONE

namely in eastern Europe, it i.
silly to suppose that it would have
been any easier to reach stimuli
taneous and general agreement!
in a broader negotiation.
But 1 submit that there is moth
ing silly about this, and that if he
will study the history of any o.
the great peace conferences. hi
will find that successful statesmen
have always recognized that where
there were many difficult issues
none could be settled separately
that only in a general settlement
could any of them be settled.
There is a reason for this. Ir
any one region and Oh any one
issue, some powers are stronger
and have a greater stake thar
others. If the negotiation is con
fined to n region, the power
with the stronger position is able
to refuse an agreement except or
its own terms. But if the negotia.
ton is broadened to include severa
regions, then the situation be-
comes different. The powers which
were weak in the first region are
strong in the others.
In a general negotiation. there
fore, all have something to give
and all have something to ask, ane
this is what induces them to fine
a basis for agreement. The mort
the negotiator restricts the fiele
of the negotiation, the more likely
it is to become deadlocked. In any
negotiation, and particularly il
international negotiation, the way
to resolve a deadlock over one is
sue it to raise other issues.
Our recent experience in deal
ing with the Soviet Union is /;
There have been signs in the pas
good illustration of this poin
few weeks - notably Stains .wt
interviews - that there has beer
some slight change for the bette
in the behavior of Soviet officials
Now this change began almost i'm
mediately after an event, after tlt
United States government took the
decision to play a strong part il
the settlement of the Turkish ques
ton and to build up the fleet il
the Mediterranean.
Stain has, to be sure, p~rofessee
to be indifferent to this mo
mentous event. But l think we
are entitled to believe that this
was the event which, more thar
anything else that has happened
caused him to reconsider his tao.
tics and his position.
For Stain, as all who have dealt
with him seriously testify, is quick
to appreciate the significance o.
s~tfategical developments which at
fect his w country. The Language
he understands most readily is the
language of military power. Nov
as long as Mr.. Byrnes was trying
to negotiate the Red Army out O.
eastern Europe, Stain had only tt
compare the size of the Red Army
with the British and American
forces IN Europe, and he could be
confident that Mr.. Byrnes woule
get nowhere, though he argued al
summer.
But when in September Ameri
can sea and air power began t.
build up in the Mediterranean ane
behind Turkey, which is the from
door to the most vulnerable are;
OF the Soviet Union, then the bal
ance OF power in Europe and il
the world was altered. The Rec
Army, which dominates eastern
Europe, and could not be moved
by a diplomatic frontal assault
can be outflanked in the eastern
Mediterranean. The British ant
Americans can never match thu
masses of the Red infantry. Blu
sea and air power are a kind O
force which we do possess and cal
readily augment. The appearance
OF this force on the flank # thu
whole Russian position in Europe
and pointed in a direction wher'
Russia is most sensitive, was a.
event which Stain could not, ant
l believe did not, ignore in the Cal
culation of his policy.
This is a concrete example c
how, by broadening the field c
negotiation, the disposition to fin
agreements can be improved. MI
Byrnes's chances of a good agree
ment about Trieste and the Oar
ube, for example, will be create
in a negotiation which include
the Dardanelles and the Turks
question. For on the Danube h
has little or nothing with whic
to induce or compel agreement
At Trieste alone he has no mean
OF inducing or compelling tn
Russians to police Tito; yet ur
less the Russians will do that a
agreement about Trieste is worth
less. But at the Dardanelles MI
Byrnes has a good equivalent to
the Red Army, and therefore tn
materials and the conditions OF
genuine negotiation are presen'