Evening star., 1946-12-08
Brown
(Continued From Page CID

appoint a representative such as
Undersecretary Dean Acheson or
some other high official from the
foreign service.
The Forthcoming discussions for
q peace with Germany are going to
be protracted and highly contro-
versial. Mr.. Byrnes' weH-wishers
maintain that it would be advar1-
tageous to have a lesser person than
the Secretary of State himself to
participate in the negotiations. This
would give the American represen-
tatiye chance to gain time by re
ferring the matter" to Washington.
in the way Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov does so frequently. Mr..
Molotov can always postpone de-
cision of the Big Four by claiming
that the Kremlin has not been ex-
plicit in its instructions on Ger
tain imp0tant matter. MIR. Byrnes
cannot have the same excuse, since
1t is known that he is policy
framer. His substitute could truth
fully claim that his hands are tied
until he has had an opportunity to
consult his chief.
Greek, Iran Issues Explosive.
Because Mr.. Byrnes' attention has
been absorbed by the squabbles over
Trieste, the freedom Of navigation
on the Danube, free trade cppor-
tunities In the Balkans and other
such questions, he has paid only
perfunctory attention to the real
issues which are facing the world
today and are considered as highly
explosiye-the situation in Greece
and in Iran. s:4s.-- 4tlf
The situation in Greece has beer
engineered by Moscow through it
Yugcslaye stooge. Marshal Tito. A
athe foreign ministers meetings, Mr.
IMulotoy, Of course, disclainS an.
Iimmixture of Russia In this explo
sive business. But the American
British and other governments ds
mot hesitate to place the trouble.
LOT the Athens government at Rus
sia's doorstep. The q. s. S. r. de-
sires an effective control over the
Eastern Mediterranean and IN order
to reach this goal q Communist gov
erument must be established II,
Greece and the Greek people NUTS
be placed In the Slay orbit.
The policies adopted by the State
|Departmnt in consultation with the
White House and the War and Navy
Departments are always submitted
to Mr.. Byrnes for approval. Some
times, however, because his whole
attention is concentrated on the
problems under discussion at the
Foreign Ministers Council, his ap-
proval is qualified At other times,
the men who are handling inter-
national problems in his absence
from washington hesitate to take
too decisive steps. 1t is difficult Tor
them to get the Secretary's real
opinions by somewhat hasty tele-
phone talks or by communicating
with him by cable.
It Is dificult for Mr.. Byrnes to
catch the full implication Of the
problem when he cannot devote his
whole time to such matters. No
Secretary or Undersecretary OF
State can grasp the full details and
the meanings Of the dangerous in
ternational situation unless he
spends all the required time In con-
yersation with the chiefs Of the
various geographic sections who
have the details and necessary data
concerning the problem at their
finger tips. Moreover, these prob.
lens cannot be taken to be exclu-
siveyl Diplomatic. They are tied in
with military and naval strategy.
Byrnes Now Hampered.
If the Secretary Of State were in
washington dealing with major
problems as thsN are developing, ne
could give mt6h time in arguments
and fact-finding discussions with
his colleagues and experts in the
War and Navy Departments. But
as it Is, Mr.. Byrnes can allot only
half an hour to these specific mat
tiers. The rest Of his time is con-
sumed in conversations and negoti-
ations with his foreign colleagues
who may wish to avoid the discus
sion of aextraneous matters.
This country may be required, in
the near future, to take some mo-
mentous decisions to prevent q
major eruption in the Near and
Middle East. And 1t Is felt that
unless the Secretary Of state can
give more than perfunctory atten-
tion to such problems. we may muff
the hall again.