Evening star., 1946-06-24

junction with elements of the Rus
sian 58th Guards Division and the
object of the central thrust had
been achieved without mishaps.
Gen. Eisenhower report-his Off
cial summation of Allied and Nazi
operational strategy during the
greatest military campaign in his
tory-is historically important for
that reason. In it the supreme COM
mander reviews the principal actions
from the launching of the D day
assault across the channel on June
6, 1914, to We day of May 8, 1945
when the terms of Germanys un-
conditional surrender went into
effect.
The report breaths life into an
oft-repeated story and follows In
chronological order the decisive
ground and air strategy that wreck
ed the Nazi war machine. In it the
supreme commander pays deserving
tribute to the help of the French
resistance" forces in the liberation
I of France.
/ Gen. EiSenhoWer'S account of the
surprising German counteroffensive
in the ArdenneS that set back the
Allied campaign "at least six weeks
is a commanders frank willingness
to shoulder the blame.
Sector Weakly Held.
t "As result of the decision to de-
ploy our maximum effort in the
Aachen sector to sustain the sue
cessful progress of our Saar- Wis
senbourg operations with the bal
ance of available forces, other
stretches of the front were weakly
held" he noted.
I'm particular the Eifel sector OF
some rs miles between Trier and
Monschau was held by no more
than four divisions. In this dispo-
sition of our forces / took a CAL
culated risk, based on the absence
of our strategic objectives or large
depots in the area and also on the
relatively difficult terrain"
MY headquarters and the 18th
Army Group had felt for some time
that a counterattack through the
Ardennes was a possibility" Gen
Eisenhower said, "since American
forces were stretched very thinly
there in order to provide troops for
attack elsewhere and because Field
Marshal Won Rundstedt had grad
ually placed in this quiet sector six
infantry divisions, a larger num-
ber than he required for reason
able security.
However, we did not consider it
highly probable that Won Rund-
stedt would, in winter, try to use
that region in which to stage a
counteroffensive on a large scale,
feeling certain that we could deal
with any such effort and that the
result would ultimately be disas-
trous to Germany. Nevertheless
this is exactly what the enemy did,
employing for a second time the
plan of campaign and strategy
which had made his first break
through in 1910 a complete success.
and taking advantage of period of
bad weather which prevented our
air power from operating"
Commanded by Montgomery.
Gen. Eisenhower had placed the
American forces north of the Ar
dennes salient under the command
of British Gen. Montgomery, ex-
planning that it would have been
"impracticaple" for Gen. Omar N
Bradley to handle forces both north
and south of the bulge at the time
The German commemorative hit
the Allied lines on December 16
but had been brought under contro
by the 26th. by the time the drive
WAS halted" the supreme commander
explained, "the enemy had preached
a 45-mile gap in our lines from
Echternach to Monschau and hac
penetrated over so miles westward
to within 4 miles of the Meuse neal
Celles."
This an-out surprise drive de
layed our offensive operation by al
least six weeks" Gen. Eisenhower
admitted, but the cost to Germany
in men and lost supplies proved q
setback from which the enemy could
not recover.
In the drive and the ensuing
Allied counterattack, Germany lost
100000 men, including 10000 pris.
oners OF war. The enemy also lost
500 tanks and assault guns and
about 1920 planes-"a severe blow
Gen. Eisenhower commented. Fuel
stocks were reduced to a bare
minimum" and over 5000 motor
vehicles were destroyed and 7,0OC
estimated damaged.
| But more important In the final
analysis was the widespread dis
lllusionment within the Germany
Army and Germany ITSELF he
added.
Yielded Alsace- Lorraine.
There were other controversial
matters involved in the Ardennes
campaign-dealings with the French
upon which the supreme COM
mander shed official light.
Because of the unsatisfactory DO
sition," he had ordered Gen. Jacob
l.. Devers, commanding the 9Th
Army Group, to Withdraw to the
Vosges, retaining in the area north
OF Strasbourg only light reconnais-
sance forces, yielding most of AL.
sace-Lorraine.
While the move would have ex.
posed Strasbourg to German occu-
patton, it would. however, give Gen
Deyers the strongest possible de-
1enslve line along his eastern flank
1t would have. permitted the EN-.
\ ployment of two American divisions
as a reserve farther to the north
leaving Gen. Bradley free to devote
his entire power to the offensive.
The French protested that this
would bring unfortunate political
repercussions in their country
bringing about, perhaps, the down
fall OF the De Gaulle government u
Gen. Eisenhower reported. The
French. he said, were ready to de-
fend Strasbourg in spite of their ILL
preparedness.
Gen. Eisenhower explained he felt
compelled to oyerrule the French
but later altered his decision when
ne became convinced that execu-
| ton of plans for the withdrouo,