The Waterbury Democrat., 1946-07-03
|Merry-G

WASHINGTON, July President Truman did not exaggerate when he told his radio listeners that he had given the veto most serious consideration According to his close advisers, he worried more and longer over this than over any other step he has ever taken.
 The Presidents decision to veto virtually made at Thursday night conference in the White House, attended by his Cabinet and economic ad- vsers Part of them opposed to the veto. Sec retary of the Treasury John Snyder, Civilian Produc tion Administrator John Small, anu Secretary of the Interior Cap Krug felt that President Truman should accept the compromise prce-contro bill de- spite its unavoidable features, ana try to make It work
 Attorney General Tom Clark at first agreed with them. He viewed the veto message from political angle and told the President he hated to see him break with his good friends Capitol Hill particu- larly Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Barkley. Later, when the decision was made in favor of the veto, however the Attorney General went to bat vigorously and helped White House advisers write the message.
 Advisers who carried the ball the inner White House debate Thursday night were OPA Adminis- trator Paul Porter, who practically camped at the White House during the week. Chester BoWles, who is retiring as economic sabilzer; John Steeman, the new war reconverter, who has become of the closest advisers to the President; and Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace.
 Backing them up were the Department of Agri- eulture-though it not vgorous--and Housing Administrator Wilson Wyatt who, though not pres ent at the meeting sent his representative and who vigorous.
 Later, when President Truman sat down with his four Congressional leaders Friday he almost changed his mind. He told friends afterWard that he knew how hard and loyally they had worked to pass price-control bill, and he simply hated to go against their advice However, his main argument to them was that the haf-breed price-control bill would not work. The Taft amendment, he especially argued, was absolutely impossible and he cited countancy experts of various big manufacturing firms all of them against OPA, who branded the Taft cost plus formula as likely to bring chaos to industry.
 T just have to put what I consider the coun- tryS welfare first" the President told his Congress sional leaders. Let's not fool the country and give them something that won't work
 When they told him that they would not be able to persuade their reluctant colleagues to pass any sort of price control bill, the President replied:
 "If it's this or nothing then we'll just have to take nothing
 Among other things the President figured that during the chaotic period to follow if the poly got price control bill passed, Congress would claim it was his fault for not making the bill work, when, in actual fact, the bill unavoidable. He felt also that if Congress did dare to go home with out price-control bill things would be hotter for them in their districts than ill Washington. He also warned that in this he would call special session of Congress.
 NOTE-In many respects, Truman hated to cept Chester BoWleS reSigna ton. However. BoWleS urged it upon him. partly because he wanted leave the government partly because he felt that the po-