The Wilmington morning star., 1946-09-09

armies, by the feeblement of Eu-
rope, by the disunity of China, and
by the reorganization of the British
Empire.
Any policy designed to check
the expansion Of a mighty world
power entails grave risks, and the
direct policy certainly entails grave
risks. But if it is adopted openly,
and is explained clearly to the
Soviet government and to the
world, and is applied resolutely, it
can lead us back to direct negoti-
ations with the Kremlin on the
great questions of power which now
divide us. They are whether Ger
many is to be neutralized and paci-
fled or is to be sought as an ally;
whether the British Empire is to
be transformed peaceably Or dis
solved violently, whether the civil
war in China is to become an in
ternational war.
These are the questions we have
to discuss and settle with the ru1-
ers of the Kremlin if there is to
be any sense of security in the
world, and the beginnings of peace.
For twelve months, indeed since
shortly before the death of Presi-
dent Roosevelt, we have had what
amounts to a suspension of diplo-
matte relations on all the funda,
mental questions. But diplomatic
discussions of these questions must
be brought about or these ques-
tions will in the end lead to war.
To bring it about we must want
the discussion so much that we are
willing to take the risk of acting
to convince the Russians that their
power and our power are in bal
ance at a point, which is so vitality
important, that it is no longer pos
sible to evade negotiation.
7 The alternativeto a direct Ameri-
can-Soviet policy is the indirect
policy which, thus far at least, we
have been following. 1t is to wage
defensive diplomatic war by sup
porting wherever they appear gov
ernments, parties, factions and per-
sons who r threatened, or can
make out a claim to be recognized
as opponents of Communism and
the Soviet Union. We must ask
ourselves whether this policy, which
is certainly not succeeding very
well, a be expected to succeed.
To confront Russia directly with
a concentration of American power
under American command is one
thing. 1t is quite another thing to
confront Russia with dispersed
American power in the service of
a heterogeneous collection of I'M
stable governments and of con-
tending parties and factions which
happen to be opposed to the Soviet
Union. Direct action involves the
risk of how the Russians will react.
But indirect action, which means
reinforcing, substituting and sec
onding the undisciplined members
of a loose coalition, entails the
additional risk that we cannot de-
termine what our allies, partners
and proteges will do, as we lend
them our support, with the power
which we have put at their dis
posal.
A policy of l%end-leasing Ameri-
can power and influence to an anti
Soviet coalition means that we do
not deal directly with Moscow but
indirectly via London, Chungking.
Rome, Athens, Cairo and Tehran.
This policy, which entrusts to others
the keys to peace and war, is
bound to arouse the maximum re-
sistance of the Soviet Union. 1t will
see it as the organization of a coali-
ton war. And yet for us it offers
no prospect of a reasonably prompt
decision. For it will take a long
time to restore Europe, unity China
and reorganize the British Empire.
Our object in checking the ex-
pansion of the Soviet power is to
give Europe, China and the British
Empire the time, the freedom from
interference, and the opportunity.
to solve their enormously compli-
Gated problems. The coalition poll
cy puts the cart before the horse.
1t is an attempt to solve their prob
lens. in order to check the Soviet
expansion. The real need, however.
is to check the Soviet expansion in
order that their problems, which
invite the expansion, may be settl-
ed p%eaceably.
1t is most important, I submit,
that in conducting this great cam
paign we do not make the fatal
strategic mistake, which we avoid
led during the war, of mortgaging
our power and exhausting our
strength in minor theaters where
no decision of the main issues can
be had. The pressure for support
is persistent, strong and appealing.
We must not, however, confuse our
interest in cooperating with free
men to construct a free world with
the immediate and urgent problem
of world politics, which is to halt
the expansion of the Soviet empire
and to bring about a negotiated
settlement of the conflict of power.
Since this is a problem of power,
we cannot delegate it to u friends,
partners and allies. but must deal
with it ourselves, We alone ere