Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-01-22
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could have been done without any
attempt to deceive the public by a
false pretense that my Judgment
had been the sole factor causing
the failure of the Army to fulfill
its mission of defending the Navy
at Pearl Harbor..
Il am sure that an honest con-
fession by the War Department
general staff Of their failure to an
ticipate the surprise raid would
have been understood by the pub
lie in the long run, and even at the
time. Instead they passed the
buck to me, and I have kept my
silence until the opportunity of this
public forum was presented to me-
Charges Note Was Held.
Gen. Short contended the evil
dence showed that the final Japa-
nese note breaking off negotiations
with the United States and point
ing to immediate war had remained
in the hands of Maj. Gen. Sherman
Miles, chief of Army intelligence
and his Far Eastern aide, Col. Ru-
fus Bratton, for two hours and Is
minutes on the morning of the at
tack, December 7, 1941-hours be-
fore it was dawn in Hawaii and the
time set for the Japanese attack
He said:
evidence before the commit
tee shows that Gen. George c.
Marshall, then chief of staff,
had sent the warning to Gen.
Short about 1l:25 that morn
ing, that the Army Signal Corps
had dispatched it by CONNER
cial telegraph and wireless via
San Francisco and that it was
not delivered to Gen. Short I'M
til several hours after the at
tack.)
Had the message in regard to
the japanese ultimatum and the
burning of their code machines,
Gen. Short went on, "been given
me by telephone as an urgent mes
sage in the clear, without loss OF
time for encoding, DECIDING, deliv-
cry, ETC., or I had been directed by
telephone to go on an about alert
for dawn trans-Pacific raid, with
out being told the reason, would
have had approximately four hours
in which to make detailed prepa-
rations to meet an immediate at
tack"
Explains Sabotage Alert.
Discussing his order placing the
Hawaiian department on an alert
only against sabotage, the officer
then temporary lieutenant gen.
eral, said:
MY decision to put the Hawaiian
department on an alert to prevent
sabotage was based upon a belief
that sabotage was our gravest dan
ger and that air attack was not
imminent. I realize that my deci-
sion was wrong. I had every rea-
son to believe, however, that my
estimate of the situation conceded
with that of the War Department
general staff, which had the signal
advantage Of superior sources of in
telligence as to enemy intentions.
Il know 1t is hindsight, but If ]
had been furnished the information
which the War Department had, ]
do not believe that I would have
made mistaken estimate of the
situation"
Gen. Short added:
Il have been more than astounded
to learn of the complacency of the
War Department general staff with
relation to so-called magic INTEL
'ligence. The War Department
could have devised a method to
paraphrase the information and
send it by courier to me, without
if'they chose, disclosing to fne that
1t resulted from an ability to de.
cipher Japanese messages"
Yamamoto Incident Cited.
The general made this reference
to the shooting down of the plane
bearing Admiral Yamamoto, COM
mander In chief of the japanese
feet, during the war, after the Navy
had. intercepted Japanese informa.
ton of its flight:
Gen. Marshall and Admira
Theodore s. Wilkinson (chief O.
naval intelligence in 194D have
pointed out that the security of oul
cryptanalytic ability was risked fol
the slight, temporary exultation O.
shooting down Yamamoto's plane
Surely. then, supplying the data tx
me and to Admiral Kimmel woule
not have been inconceivably risky!'
Aside from his lack of informa
ton pointing to the true interna.
tional situation and Japan's inten.
tons, Gen. Short told the commit.
tee:
II had been furnished adequat.
means to prevent sabotage. I usee
those means with complete success
as the testimony has shown. NJ
one can say to what extent sabotag,
would have occurred If the Arm,
had not taken such measures t.
prevent it.
Il had not been furnished adeouat,
means to defend against a surpris,
air raid. The War Department wa.
aware Of the madequacy of our air.
craft and antiaircraft defense estab.
lishment."
Equipment Shortage Recalled,
Citing shortage of planes and gun.
in various categories, Gen. Shor
added:
1.-The seriousness of this shortag,
OF equipment is best borne out b,
recalling that our equipment was in.
adequate to protect the Pacific Fleet
even had we been on an about aler
such as that which the chief of stat
had ordered in June, 1940."
evidence before the commit
tee showed that Gen. Marshall at
that time ordered 1t. Gen. c. D.
Heron, Gen. Shorts predecessor
in the Hawaiian command, to
alert the department against a
HAPPY RELIEF FROM cRuEI
NB3 3! {! K!
III Here's the clean, modern v.v f.