Evening star., 1946-02-24
The Power BuIunce
And Russiun Policy
Is Moscow Seeking Dominance
or National Security?
By William H. Harrison

or National Security
By William H. Harrison
Almost every day now some new de-
velopment takes place to deepen world
speculation over what Russia is up to.
Its long-range East European and
Balkan policies; its intentions I'M Iran;
its curious insistence upon being made
the sole trustee Of Tripolitania; its
war OF nerves" regarding the Darda-
nelleS and the cession of certain Turk
ish territory on the Black Sea- its
operations in Manchuria; its ugly
dispute with Canada over the leakage
of atomic information-all these and
similar matters have given rise to q
multitude of international worries which
boil down, in essential meaning, to
a single root question, namely, whether
the Soviet Union is seeking merely to
guarantee its national security or
whether it has embarked on q pro-
gram of imperialistic aggrandizement
looking forward to something little
short of the dominance of Europe and
Asia.
1t Is easy enough, in view of the
vast difference between the repressive
Soviet system and the free way of life
darkest Of implications into the cur
rent situation. At the same time, how
ever, although the pessimistic inter-
probation can be readily defended, there
Is more than q little to be said for the
point that 1t is bit early in the day
to jump to hysterical conclusions or
to assume, along with the drum beating
Russophobes. that it is hopeless to expect
anything reasonable from Moscow and
that perhaps the best course to follow
Is to have q Showdown" right now,
even II 1t means war. After all, the
issues involved are not simply matter
OF black and white. Historically, polit-
ically, economically, they are complex
in the extreme and constitute an un-
precedented challenge to the statesman
ship and common sense of an emotion
ally and physically fatigued world which
has just begun the enormously difficult
task Of trying to build just and en-
during peace.
For purposes of perspective, therefore,
three major points would seem to de-
serve more emphasis than they have
been getting in the present widespread
discussion Of Soviet policy, The first
of these is that that policy is in many
respects q throwback to the days of
the Cars, and not a Bolshevik in
novation. In its Mediterranean and
Middle Eastern aspects, for example, it
is like something lifted bodily from
the last century, reviving an old and
serious rivalry between Britain and
Russia, rivalry having little to do
with ideologies but stemming primarily
from a very real British worry over the
lifelines of empire and a not less real
desire Of the Russians to do something
about the fact that their vast country,
sprawling across two continents and
representing more than q seventh of
the land surface of the earth. has no
decent outlet to the sea.
To say this, Of course. is not to
justify the aggressive program now
being followed by the Soviet Union,
but it is an observation meriting con-
sideration nonetheless, if only because
it is historically opposite. The same
may be said of the second point
bearing on the present situation-the
point that a power vacuum exists in
both Western Europe and Eastern Asia
and that Russia, as the lively force
In between, will willy-nilly, if not by
design, naturally tend to fill 1t in,
especially If Britain and America do
nothing about it,. This is q condition
unique in modern history Germany
Is shattered. France is a long way
from regaining its past military pre-
eminence. The United Kingdom has
been seriously debilitated by the war.
The strength that was in the West
before, in other words, is no longer
there, and a similar change has taken
place In the East, with Japan cut
down and China merely a place of
potentialities. In short, the world bal
ance of power has been profoundly
upset and the Eurasian land mass
huSe hCCofuAlBly dCHleVe new
equilibrium.
In this situation the third point
meriting consideration perhaps the
most important point of all--is the ac-
tual and potential strength of the So
Wet Union. What did not exist in the
days Of the Czars exists now. Russia
Is years ago was at best nothing but
sleeping giant, q land where corruption
and incompetence in high places held
back potential progress. Today, how
ever, no matter how abhorrent the
harsh and relentless statism of the So
Wet system may be, the fact is that the
giant is fully awake and has far-reach-
Ing plans to grow ever more power
full. Thus, its economy having been
transformed from weak, agrarian basis
to strong industrial one between the
First and Second World Wars, it now
proposes to achieve, within the next 20
years or so, an annual output of pig
iron, steel, coal and oil not far below
the present American level. BY 1865. to
be sure, the productive capacity of the
United States can be much greater than
1t is now, but nevertheless, though like
ly to be considerably less than ours,
Russian strength will be thing of the
first magnitude-a power factor not