Evening star., 1946-03-21
|Stimson' S Story
|0f Pearl Harbor
Given Probers
Cabinet Felt Public
Would Support War;
Statement Suvs
By Corter Brooke Jones

By Corter Brooke Jones
Exactly a month before Pearl
darbor, President Roosevelt
,olled the cabinet and received
he unanimous opinion that the
country would support the Gov
,rnment if, without a declaration
If war, it met with military force
Japanese attack on the British
n Malaga or the Dutch in the
EAST Indies.
This was brought out for the first
lime today in evidence submitted
o the congressional committee
which investigated the naval dis
LSter.
1t came in a statement from
Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary
If War, in which he defended WASH
ngton officials for what they did
,oward preparing the Army and
he country for war and sharply
criticized Maj. Gen. Walter c. Short.
hen Hawaiian commander. for his
allure to be alerted against attack.
Feared for British Fleet.
Mr.. Stimson said he and Sec
-etary of State Hull and Secretary
of the Navy Knox thought, in the
lays before Pearl Harbor, that
America must fight Japan if the
British and Dutch fought her
I'VE realized" he told the COM
nittee, that if Britain were elimi-
lated it might well result in the
destruction or capture of the Brit
sh fleet. Such a result would give
% the Nazi allies overwhelming
,ower in the Atlantic Ocean and
would make the defense of the
American republics enormously diff
icult, if not impossible. All the
'easons why it would be necessary
or the United States to fight, in
;ase the Japanese attacked either
,rr British or Dutch neighbors in
he Pacific, were discussed at length,
md at my request Mr. Hull and Mr.
Knox dictated their views
Their statements were attached to
he document which Mr.. Stimson
ent to the committee.
Quotes From Diary.
The retired Secretary of War, In
Door health, was unable to appear
1t committee hearings, which were
adjourned about a month ago. He
submitted the statement
n response to correspondence with
Committee Counsel Seth w. Rich
ardson
Mr.. Stimson disclosed that he
favored beating Japan to the punch.
since it seemed obvious Japanese
aggression would menace our inter-
,sts in the Pacific.
On November %. 1871, nine days
,efore Pearl Harbor, he recalled, he
eceived from military intelligence
'of such a formidable
.haracter with regard to the move
nent of the japanese forces along
he Asiatic Coast" that he decided
o take it to the President before
le got up.
Il saw him while he was still In
'ed." said Mr. Stimson, land we dis
ussed the situation. He suggested
hat there were three alternatives,
IS my notes show: First, to do
lothing; second, to make something
n the nature of an ultimatum,
tating a point beyond which we
would fight; or, third, to fight at
nee.
Dangerous to Wait"
'I said that 1 felt that to do
lothing was out of the question, and
he President agreed with me. AS to
he other two alternatives, the de-
irable thing to do from the point Of
lew of our own tactics and safety
vas to take the initiative and attack
Without further warning. 1t is al
7ays dangerous to wait and let the
nemy make the first move.
Il was inclined to feel that the
warming given in August by the
President against further moves by
he Japanese toward Thailand JUS
ifed an attack without further
warming, particularly as their new
movement southwark indicated that
hey were about to violate that
Warming. On the other hand, real
zed that the situation could be
made more cleancut from the point
# view of public opinion if fur
her warning were given"
At noon the same day the matter
vas further discussed at a meeting
# the so-called war cabinet, con-
listing of the President himself, Mr..
Hull, Mr.. Knox, Admiral Harold r.
Stark, then chief of naval opera
ions, and Gen. George C. Marshall,
chief of Staff.
Pearl Harbor Not Considered.
The possibility of an attack on
Pearl Harbor was not discussed at
he meeting" Mr.. Stimson said,
since our thoughts were all TO-
used on this movement toward
Southeast Asia, which indicated
'risis in that direction. All agreed
hat if the expedition were per.
nitted to land in the Gulf of Siam
would place a strong Japanese
orce in such a strategic position as
o be a severe blow at all three of
he powers in Southeast Asia-the
British at Singapore, the Neither
ands in the Indies and ourselves in
he Philippines.
1--WE all agreed that it must not
e allowed; that if the Japanese
ot into the Isthmus of Kra, the
British would fight, and if the
British fought we would have to
lght. We realized that if this ex-
edition was allowed to round the
outhern point of Indo- China, this
,hole chain of disastrous events
yould be set on foot.
1--WE decided, therefore, that we
ould not just sit still and do moth
1g. On the other hand, we also
ecided that we could not attack
'ithout further warning to Japan,
nd we discussed what form that
7arning should take. The Presi-
ent suggested a special telegram
rom himself to the Emperor of
apan. After some discussion it
'as decided that he would send
lch a letter to the Emperor, which