Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1946-09-01

!, matically rushes in to fill needs.
The principal problem of govern
, mental control was to avoid the
assertion of needs which conf1icted
: with other more vital requirements.
!, The supplies of natural rubber
: in the United States were woefully
inadequate, partly because of the
failure to realize what vast guam
titles would be required and to
procure them in advance and partly
because of the attitude of the Brit
: ish and Dutch in restricting pro-
auction even as late as 1910 and
1941 for fear that huge SURPRISES
of rubber might overhang postwar
markets. We were also seriously
short of tin, copper, chromium,
nickel, tungsten, bauxite, manganese
and many other raw materials which
either were-not found in the United
States or could not be produced in
sufficient volume.
Many of these shortages could
have been alleviated. For example,
in November, 1910, one of the largest
producers of foreign copper at
tempted to sell in the United States
100000 tons of foreign produced
copper. The National Defense Ad-
visory Committee refused this offer
under the misguided assumption
that we did not need the copper
and that the importation might
damage our copper producers.
Germany had only meager sup
plies of these materials, but because
she planned aggression at a time
when we were not planning defense,
she had built up large supplies of
materials and had developed sub
stitute materials to a greater extent
than the United States.
Stockpiles Important.
1t is important that in the future
the United States maintain stock
piles of such materials as a reserve
and as an additional insurance
against possible foreign aggression.
The building up of such supplies
by purchase from abroad will assist
foreign countries to obtain dollar
credit necessary to enable them both
to pay for imports from us and to
meet the obligations of their citizens
to us. The committee feels that it
is and will be much better to buy
and stockpile materials that will
always have value and will con-
tribute to our national defense than
| it is or will be to loan or give
funds to foreign nations.
The raW-material picture cannot
be presented completely without
mentioning cartels. Monopolies in
this country by Alcoa in the field
of aluminium and by Dow in the
field Of magnesium were definitely
limiting factor on many important
war production programs. Similarly,
in international trade, control of
rubber, industrial diamonds, lead,
nickel, tin, mica, and other i'm
portant materials has seriously i'm
peded the production of many. i'm
portant weapons.
AS to these internationally con-
trolled materials of which we have
no important sources in this coun-
try, the effect was extremely seri-
GUS when many of our developed
sources were captured by the enemy
and no alternative sources were
available since they had not been
developed because of long standing
cartel control.
X X
Must Open New Fields.
Our antitrust, patent and other
governmental policies should be
shaped toward progress by the
United States in all new fields for
the benefit of business and for the
protection of the country from
national defense standpoint. These
antitrust and patent policies and
the purchase and development work
for our armed forces should be CO.
ordinated with the purpose of pro-
viding adequate protection to the
United States from a national de-
tense standpoint, as well as serving
all the other purposes for which
such policies are designed
The committee has urged that
steps be taken to acquire additional
sources of materials 1t was sug-
! gested that war settlements, in
Guiding the sale Of surplus property
in foreign areas. could be utilized
for this purpose. Unfortunately, to
date little progress has been made
in that direction. II, such sources
are now acquired, it will be much
more difficult to do so and probably
will entail the expenditure of vast
sums of money.
Overseas Bases Important.
With speed and time likely to be
even more critical in another war,
the United States can i'll afford to
rely upon a defense which begins at
our waters edge. Moreover, we are
and will necessarily be-in spite of
the most generous and farseeing
stock-piling plan conceivable-de-
pendent upon foreign sources of
strategic materials. Further
more, a major strategic objective
should be to deny the enemy access
to sources of critical raw materials.
Also some overseas bases are import
ant listening posts.
I 1t should not be overlooked that
many locations overseas, which in
another emergency would have stra-
tegic military Importance, are COM
mercially useful during peacetime.
Our foreign commercial policy can
go a long way toward aiding us de-
fensewise by encouraging the estab-
llshment of services and facilities.
for example, transportation, COM
munication, and public utility facili-
ties. which will be in friendly hands
in the event they are ever required
for military purposes. ."
Now the United States is aban-
doning many overseas bases won at
such cost. Some we are abandoning
because they are thought to have
little or no Importance to our future
security or to possess a relationship
SO tenuous as not to justify the
expense of their maintenance dur
ing peacetime years. Many others,
needed for peacetime security and