The Wilmington morning star., 1946-09-18
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would have been an excellent
reason. For once these questions
are entangled with partisan poll
tics, not only is the truce broken
but the questions themselves can
no longer be considered on their
merits. For when Mr.. Wallace says
at a mass meeting that Governor
Dewey and the Republicans are
a British party, he has asked Tor
it if his political enemies retort
that he is the leader Of the Rus
sian party. That way madness lies.
If Mr.. Truman were to recog-
nize that his first mistake was to
let Mr.. Wallace make a partisan
speech on foreign affairs, he may
still be able to repair some of the
damage. He might do this by
issuing a public order as Chief
Executive and as leader Of his
party saying that the Republican
leaders have been cooperating
faithfully in the conduct of for
eign policy, that differences Of
opinion do not follow party lines,
and that for the remainder Of the
political campaign no Democrat
will with his sanction and ap-
proval make a partisan issue on
any question in foreign affairs.
That would repair much Of the
damage, and in its magnanimity
and decisiviness would do some
thing to give back to our public
life a little Of its dignity, its ma
turity land its good feeling.
There is another aspect Of this
incident which points up a prob
lem which needs to be examined.
though there is no obvious ready
made solution. Mr.. Truman has
made it perfectly plain that
though the President is charged
with the conduct Of foreign affairs,
this President is in fact not shap-
ing and guiding u policy.
This means that Mr.. Byrnes
has exceptional responsibility. In
deed, in this century at any rate
there has been no Secretary OF
State, not even Mr.. Hughes or Mr..
Stimson, who has had anything
like the initiative and ultimate
authority that Mr.. Byrnes pos
sesses.
That being the case, the ques'
ton must be asked whether 1t Is
advisable for Mr.. Byrnes to speno
so much of his time abroad acting
as the executor and negotiator O.
of his W policies. For in 1916 Mr.
Byrnes is the principal maker O.
American policy, as was Preslden'
Wilson in 1919; he is also the day
by-day, point-by-point negotia
teal truce. The meeting in Madi
son Square Garden "a a politlca
rally. That was the worst place
and the last place to discuss issue!
that have no relation to anc
should have none with the cleo
tor of the details Of the treaties
I think 1 am right in saying thai
in the judgement Of many of the
closest students Of the former
peace conference, Mr.. Wilson'S de-
cision to slug it out personally in
Paris was one Of his greatest mis-
takes.
Certainly it is a fact that ma
tons with the much longer expert
ence Of the hard realities Of major
league diplomacy do not let the
men who must make the final
and controlling decisions expend
themselves in the rough and tum-
BILE of a conference of this sort.
The principals negotiate through
their agents-only We among the
Big Five have as our agent the
man who must, in fact write his
own instructions.
Mr.. Byrnes is negotiating with
men who, though nominally of the
same rank and authority, do not
in reality have the same respon-
sibility. For Mr.. Bevin is a min.
lister acting for the Cabinet and
under its instructions. M. Molotov
is an agent of the Kremlir
where the Politburo must pass moi
only on major questions but ap.
parently even on the most minute
details Of procedure. M. Bidault
working right in Paris at the ma
tons capital. is in immediate
and continual contact with hi,
own government. But there is i,
lonely eminence about Mr.
Byrnes's position. For after h,
mas consulted his immediate ad
vlsors, there is no higher author
lty, detached from the tension
and pressures Of the conference
10 guide, comfort, and to coacl
him, and to be his backstop if h,
muffs the ball.