Evening star., 1946-05-07
Unificotion Weakness
Seen in War Secrets
Army Direction of Okinawa
Campaign Costly, Says Writer
By David Laurence

By David Laurence
Some significant secrets OF the war
are coming out at last. For reasons Of
security and for reasons that had to
do with harmony between high officers
in the Army and Navy at time while
all energies were concentrated on win
ming the war the public was not per-
nificance of those facts.
Now. however. as congressional COM
mittees are inquiring into the alleged
unification of our armed services during
the war, they are discovering that there
were some serious losses due to the in
ability OF high Army officers to UNDER
stand the nature of naval action or the
limitations Of naval forces
Reading between the lines of the
testimony of Admiral Chester w. Nim-
itz, one finds corroboration of the dis
patches written by this correspondent
after the Okinawa campaign. At that
time these dispatches occasioned criti-
cism at the Admirals headquarters in
Guam because it was desired not to have
anything published which might affront
the Army or give rise to belief that
the Navy was criticizing the Arnys
actions in the Okinawa campaign.
Tells What Did Happen.
But Admiral Nimitz now, with char
acteristic frankness and candor, tells
what did happen. In his official testi-
mony-the first he has ever given on
the Okinawa campaign-he says
Shortly after the visit of the Richard
son Committee to my headquarters
early in December, 1914, the Pacific
Fleet had the experience of the inva-
sion of Luzon and the requirements for
expensive naval cover and support of the
Lingayen landing in the face of suicide
attacks. During that operation, which
accentuated earlier experiences of the
feet of Leyte, naval commanders, my
self included, became more and more
impressed with the fact that officers of
the Army often lacked adequate appre.
citation of the capabilities and lin1ita-
tions OF the naval forces. Subsequently,
Two Jirna was captured by the Marines
with the. support Of the Pacific Fleet.
The Two Jima operation was carried on
expeditiously and although the casual
ties among the Marines were heavy, the
period OF exposure of ships to enemy
attack was brief, and the net result was
shortening of the period in which the
casualties and suffering of war were to
be incurred elsewhere
THE next and last major amphibi-
Gus operation of the war was the Oki-
naWa campaign The operations on
shore at Okinawa were carried on skill
fully and methodically. However, ap-
proximately three months were con-
sumed in overcoming japanese resist
ance. During that three months We en-
ployed the greatest naval force ever as
sembled for single operation. We in
Cured greater casualties and had more
ships put out of action than In any
other operation in history Subseoently,
by independent naval operation, We vir-
tually completed the destruction Of the
Japanese feet and bombarded Japan
itself"
Marine Corps Strategy.
Admiral NinnitZ does not reveal that
the Marine Corps had urged, before the
Oklnawa campaign was mapped out,
that Marine officer be given command
of the whole amphibious operation nor
does he tell of the Marine Corps strate-
gy, which is to land troops and keep up
a persistent attack without letting the
enemy dig in-as the japanese subse-
quently did on Okinawa while the Army
commanders slowly brought up artillery.
The admiral hints that the Leyte
operation in the Philippines revealed
weaknesses in the failure of the land
commanders to take into account what
naval forces were needed and for how
long. This is different story, which
will some day come out and will explain
the long delay in that operation which
involved particularly conflict III opin-
ion between air officers and naval COM
manders.
AS for Okinawa, the naval feet had
to use its carriers and their planes for
nearly three months to cover the action
OF ground troops. Naval forces were
never designed to be used as tactical
air cover for so long time.
What Episode Shows.
What the episode shows is that be-
cause the Army was given the RESPONSE
bility of doing an amphibious job for
which it never was primarily trained.
the United States was compelled to take
serious losses in it's fleet 1t will be re-
called that more American boys were
killed on the decks of the warships In
that campaign than in all American
history.
Admiral Nirnitz contrasts the three
months at Okinawa with the one month
at Two Jima, much smaller island and
a perhaps more difficult assault opera
ton. He says with respect to the opera
tion at Okinawa that I'VE incurred
greater casualties and had more ships
put out of action than in any other
operation in history"
This is a sensational statement. II
was not given out during the war; This
correspondent made that very statement
shortly after the Okinawa episode. It's
all past history now but what was the
lesson? 1t was that Army officers can't
and should not try to command ships
and naval officers can't and should not
try to command ground troops. It
teaches also that single commander
for all services is wrong but system Of
unified command directed by the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only
nracticable Uay IN co-ordjnate tho sne
cialized operations of all our armed