The Waterbury Democrat., 1946-03-21

first blows Stimson noted in his diary that MT. Roosevelt reminded his advisers the Japanese were no- torious for attacking without warn- ing.
 "The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves" he wrote. 1t was a difficult sltuatloh.,
 The longest single excerpt was devoted to the events of Nov. 20 when the war cabinet decided that the United States should light Japan if British possessions were attacked. a
 F.D.R. Made Suggestions
 Stimson took the latest reports on the south-bound Japanese force to the White House while Mir. Roose- welt still was in bed. It led to a discussion in which Mir. Roosevelt suggested three possible courses of action.
 His alternatives were: First, to dU nothing; second, to make soine- thing in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once," Stimson recorded. '."
 T told him my only two were the last two because I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one (hght at once)." '.'
 The war cabinet met at noon and carlvassed the whole situation again, Stilnson wrote. All agreed that the latest Japanese move completely changed the situation when they last discussed, and decided against an ultimatun to Japan.
 MT. Roosevelt then began working oil the message to the emperor, which was dispatched on Dec. 6. The presidents message referred to the southward Japanese troop move inents and said "the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of is- lands of the East Indies, of Malaga, and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of u pan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these rsany directions. 1t is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable." iE
 By early November, 194l. Stimson said, he was convinced that:
 "1.-War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevit- able. .,.r..
 "2.-It was vitally important that none of the nations who were then desperately fighting Germany Eng land, Russia or China-should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we would be re- quired to go in. is
 "3.-While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, nev- ertheless we felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines, even if we had to enter the war ct that time, in view of the air power we were building up in the Philip. pines. tT
 4.-If war did come, 1t was iln- portant, both from the point of view of unified support of our own peo- pie as well as for the record of his- tory, that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggresSor."
 Attacks Speculation
 Regarding Short, Stimson said t is the duty of an outpost command ei to assume the enemy will strike his own post, rather than speculate on what might happen elsewhere, and take appropriate defensive acc ton. He said Hawaii had been more generously equipped than any other Pacific outpost.