Evening star., 1946-06-16


happened to have been put in the serv-
ice of war. But there is reason to spec
ulate that in the future there will be
other developments in the field of SCI
ence which, while being applied at the
time to commercial uses, could be en-
ployed for destructive purposes in war
time. Factories which are producing au-
tomobileS may have equipment to
manufacture new types of destructive
engines. An ordinary agent or even a
military man may not be able to detect
anything out of the ordinary. But a
specialized engineer could see things
which would pass unnoticed to the
mechanically unframed eye.
Crops Are Vital Factor.
The same thing can be said about the
crops IN various countries. The enthu-
slaSm for war of a potential aggressor
Is dampened by bad crops. An army
cannot fight on an empty stomach. 1t
is known that Hitler had stored vast
quantities of food in Germany three
years before he decided to attack Po-
land. 1t is possible that had the Allies
known definitely about this concealed
boarding, they might have been less
inclined to describe Hitler's movements
and threats as bluff
Domestic internal conditions. such as
strikes, social diSorder-not fomented bv
paid agents-a bad and corrupt admin
lStration, loose morale. lack of ma
tional conscience, all provide additional
information whereby properly run in
telligence gauges the war potentials of
another country
These services no longer can be per-
formed by amateur sleuths who, though
they have good intentions, have proved
inadequate from the practical point of
view
In the past the intelligence services
OF the War and Navy Departments have
been greatly handicapped by the fact
That there has been no continuity of
service. The heads of these branches
were selected from among servicemen
who happened to enjoy a personal in
come and were mostly bent on having
good time in Washington. They were
anxious to see their "chore" finished
and desired to get back to their former
duties.
SHED From Intelligence Service.
Even those who took a real interest
in intelligence could never do ANYTHING
constructive because they did not stay
long enough to put their plans into ef-
fect There seems to be an unwritten
law In the armed services that 4 new
chief must change everything that his
predecessor has done. Thus, when the
time OF the director of intelligence was
up, his successor spent at least half of
MS tour of duty tearing up what his
predecessor had done and thinking of
new methods which the next man would
tear up again. The subordinate officers
considered duty in the military or naval
intelligence as an indication that they
were not considered tops in the branches
to which they belonged and were anx-
lous to get out as quickly as possible.
Very few, even among the top men.
were capable of estimating a situation
properly. This partially explains Pearl
Harbor, the failure of the military in
telllgence to appraise the situation at
klska, where an American fleet escort
ed transports carrying 10000 men to
occupy an island garrisoned, as it
turned out, by single japanese soldier,
This also explains the lamentable fall
ure OF the intelligence services to issue
the proper warnings before the Ger
man attack in the Ardennes bulge"
and the official report of high-rank-
Ing War Department intelligence Of
f1cer who, on August 4, 1945, asserted
that Japan would not surrender and
advised that we drop the atom bomb.
Insofar as the other kind of intelli-
gence-estimates of the social, economic
and political situation in various coun-
tries-is concerned, not only did our
intelligence services fail altogether but
they had few, if any, officers sufficiently
competent to draw the correct conclu-
sions even if they had received the
proper information.
Concrete Data Are Required.
The new intelligence organization is
expected to fill this gap. Besides draw
ing its information from the military
and naval attaches and from the observ-
ers in the field of the State, Agriculture
and Commerce Departments, it must
have its own highly trained personnel
to check on the mass of reports it
expects to receive from abroad.
In these days, "sleuthing" and spying
with the assistance of pretty dancers
or other charming ladies is of little
avail. What is needed is solid and
concrete information about the number
OF factories in foreign country, the
efficiency and morale of its workers, the
availability OF raw materials, the sources
from which they may be obtained, and
many other such things. No dancer or
actress, regardless of how attractive she
may be, can provide this highly tech
nical information. It requires men or
women with real knowledge in every
field of countrys national life. Army,
Navy and air forces officers are not
qualified for the job. 1t requires the
more elastic mind of an individual
trained in civilian life.
A large financial outlay is necessary
to accomplish this. Yet a budget of
even 500 100000 year is certainly not
too expensive, when we consider that
a proper intelligence organization capa-
BILE OF bringing together every piece of
information about what is going on all
over the world will guard the Nation
from another disaster in the event a
foreign power might wish to catch us
by surprise.
Gen Vandenherp adnnittedlu L. !.