Evening star., 1946-10-13
Labor Law Change Urged
To Curtail Strike Threat
Industrial Court Suggested as One Method o1
Settling Disputes in Fairness to All
Parties Involved
Parties Involved
By Gerard D. r silly


al Labor Relations Board - -
anaiogies are more superficial than real.
These agencies have received broad
grants OF legislative power from Con-
gress to bring about certain economic
results ia their respective fields.
The Labor Relations Board, however.
has received no broad mandate to bring
about industrial peace. but rather to en-
join the commission Of certain precisely
defined misconduct. Moreover, these
other agencies rarely initiate q prosecu-
ton without an extended economic
analysis Of the problem and mature
consideration by the commissioners
themselves. The Labor Board has no
economies star and the Board members
are SO overwhelmed by the volume Of
cases which have already gone to trial
that they seldom have time to deter
mine whether complaint should issue
ct all.
Should the board be relieved Of such
functions, it would give 1t a truly judicial
character, for the Government lawyers
who have the task Of presenting the case.
to the board would then be as much
outside the framework OF the stah as
the private practitioner.
Employers Right More Complicated.
The problem OF giving employers
Affirmative rights Is more complicated.
Two changes in the boards own rules,
however, mark noteworthy advance IN
this direction. One would be to give
employers a wider right Of petition IN
representation disputes. 1t was not until
1910 that the regulations Of the board
gave an employer any right to request
an election. Then # was limited to cases
in which two or more competing organ
izations made conflicting claims Tor
recognition. In other words, If an en-
ployer is threatened with q strike be-
cause he withholds or withdraws recog-
milton from q union claiming to repre-
sent majority, there Is no way in which
he can have the dispute resolved by q
secret ballot unless the union inyokes
the processes Of the board. The absence
of an employer right Of petition under
such circumstances has been tradition
ally explained on the ground that en-
ployers might abuse the privilege by
calling for elections at the beginning OF
an organizing drive,
Union fears Of such tactics, however,
could be allayed by acting on such petit
tions only when the union has already
represented itself as the agent Of the
majority. The restricted character OF
the present rule not only places EN-
ployers in an awkward dilemma, but
fails to protect the individual employees
for whose protection the Act was passed.
for II an employer slirrenders to such
pressures. a minority may BE- able 70
impose its win upon the others. ''s7s i
The other change would be to make
an employers right 70 express himself
on labor questions co-extensive with the.
right of union organizers. Az the pres-s
ent time there are no restraints upon
what q union organizer seeking votes
may say. For many years, however. the
board took the view that the organiza-
tional choice OF his employees was OF no
concern to an employer; hence, he was
enjoined with the duty OF neutrality.
II he pointed out to his employees the
possible dangers arising from the par
ticular leadership of the union which
sought their confidence, he ran the risk
of being held guilty of an unfair labor
practice of coercion or interference.
Threat Of Reprisal Secuted.
In recent years, the Supreme Court
has held that in labor controversy the
right of employers to express their views
is protected by the first amendment.
Nevertheless, If an employer is guilty
of any other unfair labor practice-no
matter how remote or severable-or II
he addresses his employees during work.
ing time, the board has denied him the
right to speak his mind about the union
under such circumstances. 1t seems
to me that such a rule Of decision is
unsound, if an employers arguments
stop short of threats Of economic re-
prisal. This has been recognized by
many far-seeing union leaders. The
machinery of the secret ballot itself
protects the workers freedom Of choice,
and the notion that any argument by
an employer has an intimidating effect
is not justified by any realistic appraisal
of industrial relations today.
Such reforms as these would receive
the support of fair minded labor leaders
as well as the great body Of informed
opinion. But in formulating the sub
stantive changes in the act which would
be required to enable our highest labor
tribunal to utilize its processes to check
activity by any group or individuals
which is contrary to the public interest,
we enter q more controversial field.
While proposals have been advanced for
making the Labor Relations Act two
sided" as adding to the list 'of unfair
labor practices coercion from any
source" or refusal of bargaining rep
resentative to bargain, there has been a
great deal Of doubt as to their practica-
bility. The difficulty is to obtain any
general agreement on the kind of activ-
ity upon which the law should frown.
Transportation Field Worst.
Nevertheless, there are some practices
which are already in this category under
our present laws. A strike to compel an
employer to violate the ceilings fixed by
executive order under the Stabilization
Act is an example which comes readily
to mind. Then there is the kind Of ac-
tivity which is directed at forcing an
employer to disregard some provision
of the National Labor Relations Act.
The most aggravated instances seem to