Evening star., 1946-02-01

about $1,500.
that can be made from my recol-
lection and the circumstantial evil
dence now available, the winds
message was part of a Japanese
overseas news broadcast from
Station JAP, Tokyo ."
Recorded on Typewriter.
The broadcast, he added, prob
ably was in japanese Morse code
and was originally written in the
Kata-Kana form of written, plain
language japanese.
1t was recorded at Cheltenham,
he said, on a special typewriter de-
veloped by the Navy which types
the Roman letter equivalent of
Japanese characters.
Capt. Stafford pointed out that
Japanese diplomats in London and
the Far East already had been in
structed to destroy their regular
codes. This did not apply to WASH
in2ton. whose ENJOYS would know
what was going on.
THE only means by which Tokyo
could announce its decisions of peace
or war to its overseas diplomatic
representatives who had destroyed
their regular codes was by means ot
the emergency winds code"
The intercept advising Japan's
representatives in London, Hone
Kong, Singapore and Manila to de-
stroy their code machines had come
in by December /, the witness said
Significance Became Clear.
'The significance of the winds
message now became very clear to
me- he explained, land 1 began to
take the matter most seriously"
He added that higher authority
IN the War and Navy Departments
likewise took a greatly increased in
terest in the winds message and be-
gan heckling me as to the possibility
of having missed it. I instituted a
daily check of incoming teletype
messages to see that our intercept
stations were doing as much as could
be expected of them"
Capt. Stafford added: when I
first saw the winds message it had
been translated by 1t.
Comdr. (Alwyn D., now Capt.)
Kramer, in charge of the translation
section Of the Navy Department
communication intelligence unit.
Kramer had underscored all three
code phrases on the original incom-
ing teletype sheet. Below the printed
was written in pencil or
colored crayon in Kramer's hand
writing the following free transla-
ton:
War with England dncluding
NE1, etc.. (The Netherlands East
Indies.)
WAR with the U. S.
peace with Russia"
Feather in Our Cap"
Capt. Stafford continued:
"Tllis Is it, said Kramer as he
handed me the winds message. This
was the broadcast we had strained
every nerve to intercept. This was
the feather in our cap. This was
the tipoff which would prevent the
U. S. Pacific Fleet from being sur
prised at Pearl Harbor. This was
what the Navy communication intel
ligence had been preparing for since
Its establishment in 1924-war with
Japan"
Capt. Stafford said he sent an Off
Ger with the paper to Admiral Noyes,
lnstructing the messenger to deliver
it only in person. In few minutes,
the captain said, he received a re-
port that the message had been
delivered.
1T is my recollection" he went on,
that Kramer and l knew at the
time that Admiral Noyes had tele-
phoned the substance of the winds
to the War Department., to
the magic distribution list in the
Navy Department, and to the naval
aide to the President. For that
reason, no immediate distribution of
the smooth translation of the winds
message was made in the Navy De-
partment. The six or seven copies
for the Army were rushed over to
the War Department as rapidly as
possible; here the Nays response
bility ended.
Standard Procedure.
"The individual smooth transla-
tions for authorized Navy Depart
ment officials and the White House
were distributed at noon on Decem-
ber 4, l941, in accordance with stan
dard operating procedure. I have
no reason for believing that the
Army failed to make a prompt dis
tribution of its translation of the
winds message. I am thoroughly
satisfied in my own mind that Ad-
miral Noyes telephoned to every one
on his list without delay. 1 cannot
bring myself to imagine otherwise. :
Capt. Stafford expressed belief that
the winds message not only was in
formative, but a signal of execu-
tlcn" to certain japanese forces, pre-
cipitating probably the sneak attack
on Pearl Harbor and the invasion OF
tho Dl,i1inoiy,oc ord kEo1,uo