Evening star., 1946-06-30
Question of Timing Holds
Key to Atom Control Pact
U. S. Proposal of Gradual Release of Present
Advantage Fought by Russia, Which Insists
on Full Data Before Giving Up T. N. Veto
By Ne,vboId Noyes, L.

lawful use of atomic energy. AS Mr.,
Baruch sees 1t, the difference between
the American and Russian positions
here is not great. The only real differ
ence appears to be as to whether offend.
ing individuals, as distinct from nations,
can be subject to punishment by the
United Nations. The United States says
they can, under the "Nuernburg prin-
ciple." Russia says they cannot.
S. That the principles of atomic con-
troll eventually be applied to other mass
destruction weapons, such as germ bombs
and gas. No real difference here-a
matter of Interpretation. The United
States says yes. Russia says gas and
meteorological warfare already has been
outlawed among civilized peoples"
Thirteen proposals remain on Mr..
Baruch's list. These form the heart OF
the United States plan On all OF them.
Mr. Baruch's judgement, based on what
has so far transpired, is that "the door
is open for negotiation
AS he understands it. Russia s attitude
is that the answer to all 13 of these
points depends on the conclusions Of
the Drafting Committee
Mr.. Baruch, if one can read a mans
mind by studying chart, seems hopeful
that, eventually, this entire block Of
proposals will be acceptable to the Rus
slams Indeed, he has to be hopeful Of
that. The chart reveals, incidentally,
that his immediate hopes are highest
in this group for the proposal that the
world try to move toward international
control OF the atom by stages. which
is, in sense, the core of the whole
United States thesis. He feels that
through her acceptance of the General
Assembly's resolution establishing the
atomic energy commission, which con-
templates progress by stages" Russia
has given indirect assent to this
principle.
Twelve Remaining Points.
The other IL American points on
which the Russian door is regarded as
not closed are:
Establishment of the atomic develop
ment authority, international dominion
over fashionable raw materials, interna-
tional ownership and management Of
primary atomic energy production
plants, international research only on
atomic explosives. strategic distribution
Of dangerous atomic activities and ma
terials, interna tional definition of dam
gerous and nondangerous atomic activ-
tiles. international operation only Of
dangerous atomic activities, interna-
tional inspection, worldwide freedom
Of access, selection of the personnel of
the atomic authority on an interna-
tional basis, the yielding of national
control In stages, and the subordination
OF such national control bodies as may
be established to an international con-
troll body.
Mr.. Baruch's analysis of the situation
is itself summary, and attempting to
analyze and summarize it smacks of
presumption. But what it seems to say
Is this
The United States is willing to do the
things Russia wants to do to control
the atom, but first prefers doing what
1t wants to do. Russia may we'll be
willing to do what the United States
wants to do to control the atom. but
it is equally insistent on seeing its own
control projects pushed through first.
U. S. Has an Advantage.
The crux of this paradox, of course, Is
that the United States has the bomb.
Therefore the United States, wishing to
maintain that "advan:age," is unwilling
to destroy its bombs until it has set up
such international controls as will in
sure that no other nation will get the
bomb. Russia, on the other hand, not
having the bomb, is unwilling to give
up trying to get it until it has fixed
things 80 that the United States no
longer has it.
No doubt, in such, a situation. "ths
door is open for negotiation" Watch
ing these men of the atomic energy
commission at work-and make no mis-
take, they are at work in dead and
desperate earnest-one is driven to the
conclusion that it is on this delicate
matter Of timing that success or failure
depends, rather than, on their ability
to solve Immediately such spectacular
problems as the veto versus the atom
and the disclosure of atomic secrets.
For the secret and the veto can take
care of themselves. The secret" will
take care of itself in case the men try
ing to set up international control Of
the atom do not work faster than the
Russian atomic scientists do; the veto
will do likewise in case an otherwise
satisfactory system of atomic control is
achieved.
Russian Agreement Vital.
Americans are inclined to shudder at
the idea of world in which both Russia
and the United States have the atom
bomb. 1t is an interesting thought,
however. that Russian possession of the
bomb, viewed with detachment as an
academic proposition, assuming such a
thing exists, would seem to dispose Of
the timing problem which appears i'm
plicit in Mr.. Baruch's chart. If both
Russia and the United States had the
bomb and still wanted to establish in
ternational atomic controls, it would no
longer matter to either of them whose
plan went into effect first. 1t seems
not unlikely, in this case, that the
United States plan actually would be
favored by Russia, because it is the plan
designed to meet the needs of country
with the atom at its disposal.
The veto problem, it is true, looms
large at this stage. 1t appears prob
able, however. that if Russia or any
other country were to subscribe to and
abide hv all the nther ra ramifica finns Of